

**FOREIGN
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OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1977–1980

VOLUME IX

**ARAB-ISRAELI
DISPUTE
AUGUST 1978–
DECEMBER 1980**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

Volume IX

Arab-Israeli Dispute August 1978– December 1980

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<i>General Editor</i>	Adam M. Howard

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate

with Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected with bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto), is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and eluci-

date the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used where appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in 2013, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 5 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 21 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
The Historian

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of President Jimmy Carter. The volume documents U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute from August 1978 until January 1981, focusing on the Camp David Summit among President Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat; the negotiation and conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty; the Carter administration's ongoing efforts to broaden support for the Middle East peace process in the Arab World; U.S. involvement in the post-Treaty talks on Palestinian autonomy; bilateral security arrangements between the United States and Egypt, Israel, and Jordan; as well as U.S. efforts to deal with the ongoing hostilities in Lebanon and diplomatic initiatives taken in the United Nations vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute. This volume continues the narrative of the Carter administration's efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute begun in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978*, which covers the period from Carter's inauguration to Begin and Sadat's acceptance of the President's invitation to meet with him at Camp David on August 8, 1978. Readers interested in the relationship between President Sadat, the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and the new Islamic government in Iran, culminating in Sadat's decision to provide asylum to the Shah in March 1980, should consult *Foreign Relations, volume XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981*. The Carter administration's broader policy toward the Middle East region, separate from the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli dispute, including its efforts to construct a regional security framework beginning in 1979, and bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Yemens, and the Gulf States, is documented in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula*. For further regional context, including U.S. policy toward the revolution in Iran and the implications of the 1979 oil crisis, readers should consult *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979*, and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980*.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume IX

This volume continues the *Foreign Relations* series' documentation of the Carter administration's diplomatic efforts to achieve a compre-

hensive negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute begun in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978. This volume begins with the August 8, 1978, acceptance by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat of President Carter’s invitation to meet with him for talks at Camp David and continues until the end of the Carter administration on January 20, 1981. The volume is organized into five chronological compilations. Greater emphasis has been given to the first seven months of the period covered by the volume; three compilations are devoted to the period from August 8, 1978, until the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. This emphasis reflects the most intense period of U.S. diplomatic effort in pursuit of what the Carter administration hoped would be the first stage of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Indeed, during this seven month period, the Arab-Israeli dispute reached its apex on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities, reflected in President Carter’s direct involvement in the peace process at a level he had not reached previously and would not reach again throughout his presidency.

The Camp David invitation in August 1978 was an important juncture in U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process begun by Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, a process which was languishing by the summer of 1978. Following the inconclusive tripartite talks at Leeds Castle in July of that year, Carter’s invitation represented an ambitious new step for U.S. diplomacy, one which sought, through intensive, direct negotiations at the highest level, to do more than merely continue an Egyptian-Israeli dialogue. For Carter, the goal of Camp David was the establishment of concrete foundations for an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement, ultimately embodied in the two “Framework” documents signed in Washington upon the conclusion of the summit on September 17, 1978, in the hope of using this agreement as the springboard for a more comprehensive peace. In doing so, Carter placed the Arab-Israeli dispute at the center of the U.S. foreign policy agenda in a way no U.S. President had previously attempted and cast himself in the role of direct, personal mediator between Egypt and Israel. The compilation on the Camp David Summit documents U.S. planning for Camp David and the course of the summit itself. The reader will note the relative dearth of official documentation, especially memoranda of conversation, in the volume’s coverage of the summit. According to members of the U.S. delegation at Camp David, no written memoranda of conversation were kept of President Carter’s discussions with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. Carter kept his own notes of these meetings and afterward held debriefings with his staff. Much of this material is now in the Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, and has been incorporated into this volume as much as possible. The volume also draws upon the portions of Presi-

dent Carter's personal diary relating to the summit that were published in 2010. The complete, un-edited version of this diary is held privately by the Jimmy Carter Center and, as of the publication date of this volume, is unavailable to the public. Requests by Department of State historians to secure access to this version of the diary for use in compiling the *Foreign Relations* series were denied by the Carter Center. Similarly, Department of State historians sought access to the personal papers of other U.S. officials in order to supplement the official record of the summit. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski granted Department of State historians access to significant portions of their respective personal papers collections at the Library of Congress, both of which remain closed to the public as of this volume's publication, though Brzezinski denied access to his personal journals.

Although the Camp David Accords represented an important breakthrough in the peace process, the task of facilitating the translation of the Framework documents into a formal peace agreement between Egypt and Israel proved a slow, often laborious, task for the Carter administration. The compilation on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty documents the administration's efforts, beginning with the Blair House talks in October 1978, to work with the Egyptians and Israelis to reach an agreed treaty text, a process which reached a deadlock that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's frequent meetings with the Egyptian and Israeli leadership proved unable to break. The compilation on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty negotiations after Vance made a December 1978 trip to the region, therefore covers the administration's final push to work with Begin and Sadat to break the negotiating deadlock, marked by Carter's personal re-intervention in the negotiations, first in Washington, meeting with Sadat and Begin separately during the first week of March 1979, and then in Israel and Egypt a week later.

Following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the next round of negotiations, designed to address the question of Palestinian autonomy, largely took place at a lower working level. The final two compilations of this volume cover this period. In April 1979, Carter passed primary responsibility for the peace negotiations to a special representative, former Special Trade Representative Robert S. Strauss, who was in turn succeeded by Sol M. Linowitz eight months later. With the U.S. failure to broaden Arab support for its diplomatic efforts, highlighted by the negative reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in the Arab world as well as the pressures brought by the growing number of foreign policy crises elsewhere, the Carter administration's engagement with the Arab-Israeli dispute entered a far less intensive phase. During the last eighteen months of the administration, U.S. diplomatic efforts on this issue centered largely upon keeping the (ulti-

mately inconclusive) autonomy talks on track, securing the continued goodwill and stability of Egypt by negotiating resupply of the military with U.S. arms, mediating in Sadat's mounting public rivalry with Saudi Arabia, dealing with the ongoing upheaval in Lebanon, and addressing the series of resolutions related to the Arab-Israeli dispute brought before the United Nations Security Council.

In keeping with the other *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Carter administration subseries, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation, rather than the implementation of policy or day-to-day diplomacy. As in other volumes in this subseries, the National Security Council and the Department of State were the primary agents of U.S. policymaking. Given the intense personal interest of the President in the peace process through much of the period covered by this volume as well as the President's April 1979 decision to turn over the negotiations to a special representative answerable directly to him, the former occupied a more sustained place in determining policy. Following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, these two agencies were joined more directly in the policy making process by the Department of Defense, especially in assessing and meeting the perceived strategic needs of Egypt and Israel.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum in Atlanta, Georgia, particularly Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, David Stanhope, and James Yancey for their patient and tireless assistance. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency were helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. Thanks are due to the staff of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for expediting access to the papers of Harold Brown and Sol M. Linowitz. The editor thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance.

Alexander R. Wieland collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Adam Howard, then Chief of the Middle East and Africa Division, and Susan C. Weetman/Adam Howard, General Editor of the series. Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Stephanie Eckroth and Craig Daigle did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc. prepared the index.

Alexander R. Wieland, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume IX

For this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records held by the Carter Library. These records proved the best source of documentation on the roles of President Carter and the National Security Council in formulating, developing, and implementing United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Middle East peace process from August 1978 until January 1981. The National Security Affairs files are divided into two sub-series: Brzezinski Material and Staff Material. Within the Brzezinski Material sub-series, the Country File (especially those files on Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, and the files on the general Middle East region, which incorporate material on both bilateral relations as well as peace negotiations and the Palestinian autonomy talks which followed the March 1979 signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty), the Country Chron series of the Brzezinski Office File, the President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, and the Subject File provided the richest sources of documentation. The Cables File helped complete the documentation of the post-Camp David negotiations through its collection of Department of State Nodis telegrams. The Trip File provided important documentation on President Carter's March 1979 visit to Egypt and Israel. The Staff Material sub-series is a similarly valuable resource for nearly all aspects of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute, especially the Middle East and Office Files. The Middle East File—particularly, the Subject File, Meetings File, Trips/Visits File, and staff member Chron File contained within—is essential both for the breadth of the topics it covers and for its ability to display the way in which U.S. policy was developed at the working level within the National Security Council. The Presidential Advisory and Outside the System Files of the Office File contain some of the most sensitive documentation generated by the National Security Council for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski and President Carter. Separate from the National Security Affairs collection is the National Security Council Institutional Files, which focus primarily on the records of meetings of the National Security Council and its sub-groups, the Presidential Review Committee and the Special Coordinating Committee, (including supporting documentation generated by the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and others for the meetings), as well as documentation related to Presidential Review

Memoranda and Presidential Determinations. Documentation from all of these files is further supplemented by that contained within the collection of papers donated to the Carter Library by Zbigniew Brzezinski ("Brzezinski Donated Material") and the collection of material assembled by President Carter in order to write his memoirs ("Plains File"). Both contain a significant amount of material on the Middle East peace process, including meetings between President Carter and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and King Hussein of Jordan. Moreover, the Plains File includes Carter's handwritten notes of numerous meetings and telephone conversations with Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. officials, including exchanges in which no formal memoranda of conversation or other official records were produced. Similarly, for keeping track of the President's daily work schedule, the President's Daily Diary is a particularly invaluable resource.

To document the Department of State's role in the Middle East peace process, the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and the U.S. role in the negotiations which addressed Palestinian autonomy after March 1979, as well as key bilateral contacts between the United States and the Egyptians, Israelis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Saudis, and Syrians on these issues, the Central Foreign Policy File is a core resource. In 1973, the Department phased out the old subject-numeric Central Files, replacing them with an electronic system, the State Archiving System (SAS), which has been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration and is part of the online Access to Archival Databases (AAD). For this volume, the Central Foreign Policy File provided cabled accounts of key meetings between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the President's two Special Representatives to the peace negotiations, Robert S. Strauss and Sol M. Linowitz, with their Egyptian and Israeli counterparts, accounts for which no formal memoranda of conversation were produced. Similarly, the system contains important cabled messages from President Carter and Secretary Vance to Middle Eastern leaders, many of which were not followed up by signed original copies. Some of the most tightly held telegrams are not in the electronic system, but appear only on microfilm reels; the same is true of all non-telegram documents, such as memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, and memoranda to principals. For the sake of consistency and traceability for researchers, all citations to documents from the Central Foreign Policy File include the original microfilm reel numbers and frame locations. A number of Department of State lot files are also of particular value: the records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Lot 84D241); the files of Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. (Lot 80D166); the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Front Office Subject Files, 1978–1984 (Lot 85D251);

and the Department of State Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Handling Restrictions Memoranda File, 1979–1983 (Lot 96D262).

On the Department of Defense's involvement in the negotiation of military aid packages for Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, particularly after March 1979, a number of files are worthy of note, especially FRC 330–82–0217B, the Official Records of the Secretary of Defense for 1980; and FRC 330–81–0446 and FRC 330–81–0711, both covering the policy files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during 1979. Some additional material on Department of Defense involvement in bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries is in the papers of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, an unprocessed collection in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and to which Department of State historians were given access. This material, however, is largely duplicated in the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland.

A final collection worthy of note is the papers of Sol M. Linowitz, President Carter's Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Negotiations from December 1979 until January 1981, which are in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. While it is one of the smaller collections represented in this volume, the Linowitz papers yielded significant records of conversations between Carter and Linowitz on the latter's role in the Palestinian autonomy talks as well as reports produced by Linowitz for the President on his regular trips to the region, some of which were produced by Linowitz himself and were not found in the official files.

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Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall D. Shulman—Jan 21, 74–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109

Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

RG 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files

Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Donated Material

Geographic File

Subject File

National Security Affairs Files

Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Brzezinski Office File

Country Chron File

Cables File

Country File

President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File

Subject File

Trip File

VIP Visit File

Staff Material

Office

Outside the System File

Presidential Advisory Board

Middle East

Subject File

Meetings File

Trips/Visits File

Chron File

National Security Council Institutional Files

Papers of Walter F. Mondale

Plains File

President's Personal Foreign Affairs File

Subject File

Presidential Materials

President's Daily Diary

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Abbreviations and Terms

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ADF, Arab Deterrent Force

AF, Air Force

AID, Agency for International Development

Ammo, ammunition

AMOCO, American Oil Company (Standard Oil Company)

AMVIP, American Very Important Person

AO, area of operations

APC, armored personnel carrier

Art., article

Backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State

BEQ, bachelor enlisted quarters

BOQ, bachelor officers’ quarters

Bpd., barrels per day

C, Jimmy Carter; Confidential

CD, Camp David; Christine Dodson

CDA, Camp David Accords

Cherokee, a telegraphic distribution channel for the Eyes Only messages between the Secretary of State and an Ambassador

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CIP, Commodity Import Program

CJCS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Codel, Congressional delegation

Col., Colonel

ConGen, Consul General; Consulate General

CONUS, Contiguous United States

CV, Cyrus Vance

Cy, Cyrus Vance

D, Deputy Secretary of State; Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

DA, David Aaron

DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DefMin, Defense Minister

DEM, David E. McGiffert

DOD, Department of Defense

dols, dollars

DPO, deputy principal officer

DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency

EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

XX Abbreviations and Terms

EB/ORF/FSE, Division of Fuels and Energy, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

EC, European Community

ER, evening report

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPE, Office of OECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPE/EEC, European Economic Community Affairs, Office of OECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, exclusive distribution

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FMS, Foreign Military Sales

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FY, fiscal year

FYDP, Five-Year Defense Program

FYI, for your information

Gen, General

GNP, gross national product

GOE, Government of Egypt

GOI, Government of Israel

GOJ, Government of Jordan

GOL, Government of Lebanon

HASC, House Armed Services Committee

HB, Harold Brown

Helos, helicopters

HHS, Harold H. Saunders

HO, Henry Owen

HRH, His Royal Highness

ICA, International Communication Agency

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IDF, Israel Defense Forces

IG (also I-G), inter-agency group; Interdepartmental Group

IMF, International Monetary Fund

INOC, Israeli National Oil Company

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/DDC, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/RNA, Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/RNA/NE, Near East Division, Office of Research and Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Intsum, intelligence summary

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; Indian Ocean

IO/UNP, Office of UN Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

J, Jimmy Carter

JC, Jimmy Carter

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

LAF, Lebanese Armed Forces
LD, Leslie Denend
L/NEA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LOA, letter of agreement
LOC, lines of communication

m., million
MAP, Military Assistance Program
Memcon, memorandum of conversation
Memrec, memorandum for the record
MFA, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Milcon, military construction
MOA, Memorandum of Agreement

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/EGY, Office of Egypt Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/IAL, Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Niact, telegram indicator requiring immediate action
NIO/NESA, National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
Nm, nautical mile
Nodis, no distribution
Noform, not releasable to foreign nationals
Total, not received by all addressees
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRP, National Religious Party (Israel)
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council

OASD/ISA (NESA), Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Ofc, office
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OMC, Office of Military Cooperation
Opns, operations
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; President.
P&D, planning and design
PAO, public affairs officer
para, paragraph
PDRY, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
PG, Persian Gulf

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime Minister

PNC, Palestinian National Council

POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants

Pr., President

PRC, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee; Presidential Review Committee

PriMin, Prime Minister

RDF, rapid deployment force

Reftel, reference telegram

RG, record group; Robert Gates

RH, Robert Hunter

RO/RO, roll on/roll off

Rpt, repeat

S, Secretary of State; Office of the Secretary of State

SA, Saudi Arabia

S/AA, Ambassador at Large, Department of State

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government

SAM, surface-to-air missile

SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government

SASC, Senate Armed Services Committee

SC, Security Council; Susan Clough

SCC, Special Coordination Committee

SecDef, Secretary of Defense

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State

Septel, separate telegram

SFM, Sinai Field Mission

SGA, Self-governing authority

SISN, Personal Representative of the President

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

Spt., support

Sqd, squadron

S/S, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State

SSM, Sinai Support Mission

S/S-O, Operations Center, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State

Stadis, Department of State distribution only

Tac, tactical

Telcon, telephone conversation

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State

UAE, United Arab Emirates

UAR, United Arab Republic

UN, United Nations

UNDP, United Nations Development Programme

UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR, (Office of) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund

UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

U.S., United States
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDEL, United States delegation
USEC, United States Mission to the European Community
USG, United States Government
USINT, United States Interests Section
USLO, United States Liaison Office
USMTM, U.S. Military Training Mission
USN, United States Navy
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VBB, Vance-Brown-Brzezinski
VP, Vice President

WQ, William Quandt

YAR, Yemen Arab Republic

Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)
ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski
ZBB, zero-based budgeting
Zbig., Zbigniew Brzezinski

Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Abdullah bin-Aziz al Saud, Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister

Abu Odeh, Adnan, Jordanian Minister of Information until December 1979 and from September 1980; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ali, Kamal Hassan, Egyptian Minister of Defense from September 1978 until May 1980; Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1980; Deputy Prime Minister from May 1980

al-Araby, Nabil, Director, Legal Department, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Arafat, Yassir, Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization

al-Asad (Assad), Hafez, President of Syria

Atherton, Alfred L. (Roy), Jr., Ambassador at Large until May 22, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979

Avner, Yehuda, Israeli diplomat; personal adviser to Prime Minister Begin

Badawi, Ahmad, Egyptian Minister of Defense from May 1980

Badran, Muhdar, Jordanian Prime Minister until December 1979 and from September 1980; Jordanian Minister of Defense until December 1979 and from September 1980; Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs until December 1979

Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi emissary to the United States

Barak, Aharon, Justice, Israeli Supreme Court from September 22, 1978; Israeli Prime Minister's Legal Adviser

Bar-On, Hanan, Minister, Israeli Embassy in the United States

Bartholomew, Reginald, National Security Council Staff until April 1979

el-Baz, Osama, Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Begin, Menachem, Prime Minister of Israel; also Minister of Defense from May 28, 1980; also Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 23, 1979, until March 10, 1980

Ben-Elissar, Eliahu, Chef de Cabinet, Israeli Prime Minister's Office; Israeli Ambassador to Egypt from February 26, 1980

Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs until August 2, 1979; Administrator for the Agency for International Development from August 3, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Benson, Lucy W.P., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology until January 5, 1980

Bergland, Robert, Secretary of Agriculture

Bishara, Abdullah, Kuwaiti Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Blackwill, Robert D., Political Counselor, Embassy in Tel Aviv, until September 1979

Blum, Yehuda, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations

Blumenthal, W. Michael, Secretary of the Treasury until August 4, 1979

Boutros, Fu'ad, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 17, 1978, until February 1979

Bovis, Eugene, Foreign Service Officer in the Middle East

Bowdler, William G., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Bowie, Robert R., Director, National Foreign Affairs Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Bridges, Peter S., Director, Office of United Nations Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1980

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Burg, Yosef, Israeli Minister of Internal Affairs

Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader

Callaghan, James, British Prime Minister until May 1979

Carlucci, Frank C., III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Carter, James Earl (Chip) III, son of President Carter

Carter, James Earl, (Jimmy), President of the United States

Cathey, Charles H., Major General, USA; Head of U.S. Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia, from July 1977 until July 1979

Chamoun (Shamun), Camille, Leader, National Liberal Party (Lebanon); former President of Lebanon from 1952 until 1958

Chamoun (Shamun), Dany, Leader, Lebanese Forces

Charney, Leon, U.S. attorney for Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman

al-Choufi, Hammoud, Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State; Acting Secretary of State from April 28 until May 2 and May 4 until May 8, 1980

Church, Frank F., Senator (D-Idaho); Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Ciechanover, Joseph, Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 24, 1979, until January 16, 1981

Clift, A. Denis, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Clough, Susan S., Private Secretary to the President

Cohen, Geula, Member of the Israeli Knesset

Constable, Peter D., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1979; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Cooper, Richard N., Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs; Acting Secretary of State on May 3, 1980

Covey, James P., Political Officer, Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Cuq, Jean, General, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Southern Lebanon

Cutler, Lloyd N., White House Counsel

Dabboul, Mohammed, Private Secretary to Syrian President Hafez al-Asad

Daniels, M. Gordon, staff, U.S. Embassy in Jidda

Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs until October 21, 1979

Dean, John Gunther, Ambassador to Lebanon from October 10, 1978

Denend, Leslie G., member, National Security Council Staff; Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January 1981

Dinitz, Simcha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States until January 11, 1979

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dodson, Christine, Staff Secretary, National Security Council

Donovan, Hedley W., White House Senior Adviser

Draper, Morris, Director, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Duncan, Charles W., Jr., Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Dutton, Frederick G., U.S. consultant to the Saudi Arabian Government; Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Relations from 1961 until 1964

el-Ehrian, Abdallah, Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry

- Ehrlich, Simcha**, Israeli Minister of Finance
Eilts, Hermann F., U.S. Ambassador to Egypt until May 20, 1979
Eizenstat, Stuart L., White House Counsel; President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy
Ermarth, Fritz, member, National Security Council Staff until November 1980
Evron, Ephraim (Eppie, Eppy), Israeli Ambassador to the United States from January 11, 1979
- Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud**, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia
Flaten, Robert, staff, Legislative Management Office for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from September 1979
Freij, Elias, Mayor of Bethlehem
- Gaffney, Henry H.**, Director, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Gamasy (Jamasi), Mohammed Abdel Ghani, Lieutenant General, Egyptian Minister of Defense until September 1978
Gates, Robert, Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Gemayel, Pierre, Leader, Kataeb (Phalange) Party (Lebanon)
el-Gheite, Abou, staff, Office of the Foreign Minister (Egypt)
Ghorbal, Ashraf, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, President of France
Glaspie, April, staff, U.S. Embassy in London
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guingaud, Louis de, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until November 29, 1978
- Habib, Philip C.**, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State
Haddad, Saad, Major, Lebanese Christian militia leader
Hammadi, Saddoun, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs
Hansell, Herbert J., Legal Adviser, Department of State, until September 20, 1979
Hart, Donald F., Head of Economic/Commercial Section at Embassy in Tel Aviv
Henze, Paul, member, National Security Council Staff
Hinton, Deane R., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from January 4, 1980, until May 14, 1981
Hosni, Wafiq, Director, Economic Department, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Houghton, Arthur A., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Hunter, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff
Hurvitz, Yigael, Israeli Minister for Finance from November 1979 until January 1981
Hussein I (Husayn), King of Jordan
Hussein, Saddam, President of Iraq
- Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick)**, Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until April 1979
Iyad, Abu, Deputy leader, Palestine Liberation Organization
- Javits, Jacob**, Senator (R-New York)
Jones, David C., General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jordan, Hamilton, White House Chief of Staff from 1979 until 1980
- Kamel (Kamil), Muhammad Ibrahim**, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs until September 17, 1978

- Keene, Douglas**, Deputy Director, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from March 1979 until August 1980
- Khaddam, Abdel Khalim**, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Khalid bin Abdul Aziz**, King of Saudi Arabia
- Khalidi, Walid**, Palestinian historian; co-founder of the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut
- Khalil, Mustafa**, Prime Minister of Egypt from October 2, 1978, until May 15, 1980; Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 1979 until May 1980
- Kirby, William A.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 until 1975; Secretary of State from 1973 until 1977
- Kollek, Theodor (Teddy)**, Mayor of Jerusalem
- Kontos, C. William**, staff, Sinai Support Mission
- Korn, David A.**, Director, Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Kornienko, Georgi M.**, Soviet First Deputy to the Foreign Minister
- Kreisky, Bruno**, Austrian Chancellor
- Lawrence, Richard D.**, Major General, USA, Military representative, U.S. delegation, Egyptian-Israeli peace talks
- Leonard, James**, Deputy to the Special Representative of the President to the Middle East peace negotiations from May 12, 1979
- Lewis, Samuel W.**, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
- Linowitz, Sol M.**, Special Representative of the President to the Middle East peace negotiations from December 4, 1979
- Lipshutz, Robert J.**, White House legal counsel
- McGiffert, David E.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- McHenry, Donald F.**, Representative to the United Nations from September 23, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- McIntyre, James T.**, Director, Office of Management and Budget
- McMahon, John N.**, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
- el-Magdoub, Taha**, General, Egyptian delegate to the Blair House talks
- Maher, Ahmed**, Director of the Cabinet of the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- March, William H.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
- Marthinsen, Charles E.**, Director, Office of Egypt Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until June 1980
- al-Masri, Hikmat**, Former Speaker of the Jordanian Parliament
- Matthews, H. Freeman, Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Cairo, until August 1980; Chargé d'Affaires from May 20 until July 20, 1979
- Maynes, Charles W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until April 9, 1980
- Meir, Golda**, Israeli Prime Minister from 1969 until 1974
- Modai, Yitzhak**, Israeli Minister of Petroleum and Infrastructure
- Mondale, Walter**, Vice President of the United States
- Moore, Frank**, President's Assistant for Congressional Liaison
- Mortada, Saad**, Egyptian Ambassador to Israel from February 26, 1980
- Moses, Alfred**, Special Adviser to President Carter from March 1980
- Mubarak (Mobarak), Hosni**, Vice President of Egypt
- Murphy, Nicholas**, staff, U.S. Embassy in Paris
- Murray, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs
- Muskie, Edmund S.**, Secretary of State from May 8, 1980

Nasser, Gamel Abdel, President of Egypt from 1956 until 1970

Navon, Yitzhak, President of Israel

Nehushtan, Jacob, Minister, Israeli Embassy in Washington

Newlin, Michael H., Principal Officer, Jerusalem until January 1980

Newsom, David D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Acting Secretary of State from May 2 until May 4, 1980

Nimeiri (Nimeiry), Jaafar, President of Sudan

Nimetz, Matthew, Counselor, Department of State, until March 19, 1980; Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs from February 19, 1980, until December 5, 1980

Nunn, Sam, Senator (D-Georgia)

Orly, Abraham, General, Israeli Coordinator of the administration of Sinai, Gaza, and the West Bank

Owen, Henry D., Special Representative to the President for Economic Summits

Parker, Richard B., U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon until October 1, 1978

Pattir, Dan, Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister for Public Affairs

Pelletreau, Robert H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Peres, Shimon, Leader of the Alignment Party; previously Prime Minister of Israel from April 22, 1977, until June 21, 1977

Poran, Ephraim, Brigadier General, Military Secretary to Prime Minister Begin

Powell, Jody, White House Press Secretary

Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Quandt, William B., member, National Security Council Staff until August 1979

Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Prime Minister from 1974 until 1977

Rafshoon, Gerald, White House Communications Director from 1978 until 1979

Raphel, Arnold L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

el-Reedy, Abdul Rauf, Director of Policy Planning, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Rosenne, Meir, Legal Adviser to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs

Rubinstein, Elyakim (Elie), Assistant Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sabbagh, Isa K., Political Counselor, Embassy in Jidda

al-Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt

Salah (Salih), Ali Abdullah, Lieutenant Colonel, President of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

Sanders, Edward, Senior Adviser to the President and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs until March 1980

Sarkis, Elias, President of Lebanon

Saud bin Faisal al Saud, Prince, Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs

Saunders, Harold H. (Hal), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

al-Sayeh, Hamid Abd al-Latif, Egyptian Minister of Economy, Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade until May 1980

Schmidt, Helmut, West German Chancellor

Seelye, Talcott W., U.S. Ambassador to Syria from September 17, 1978

Seignious, George M., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Shaka, Bassam, Mayor of Nablus

Shamir, Yitzhak, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 10, 1980

Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, Chief of the Royal Court (Jordan) until December 1979; Jordanian Prime Minister from December 1979 until July 1980; Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 1979 until July 1980; Jordanian Minister of Defense from December 1979 until July 1980

Sharon, Ariel, Israeli Minister of Agriculture

al-Shawa, Rashad, Palestinian mayor of Gaza from 1971 until 1982

Sherman, George F., Jr., Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

Shulman, Marshall D., Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs to the Secretary of State

Sick, Gary, member, National Security Council Staff

Small, David H., Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Smith, Carl R., Brigadier General, USAF; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Sterner, Michael E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Strauss, Robert S., Special Representative of the President to the Middle East peace negotiations from April 24, 1979, until November 6, 1979

Suddarth, Roscoe S., Deputy Chief of Mission, Amman, until May 1979; Deputy Executive Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from May 1979

Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation

Tamir, Avraham, Major General, Director, Israeli Army Planning Branch

Tarnoff, Peter R., Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Terzi, Zehdi, Palestine Liberation Organization Representative to the United Nations

Toon, Malcolm, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until October 16, 1979

Tueni, Ghassan, Lebanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Tuhami, Hassan, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister

Turki bin Faisal al-Saud, Saudi Director of Intelligence

Turner, Stansfield, Admiral, USN, Director of Central Intelligence

Twinam, Joseph W., Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until July 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from July 1979

Tzipori (Zippori), Mordechai, Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State until April 28, 1980

Vanden Heuvel, William J., Deputy Representative to the United Nations from 1979 until 1981.

Vardi, Joseph, Director General, Israeli Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure

Veliotis, Nicholas A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until September 17, 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from September 17, 1978

Vest, George S., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Viets, Richard N., Deputy Chief of Mission, Tel Aviv, until October 1979

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Walker, Edward S. (Ned), staff, Office of the Special Representative of the President in the Office of the Secretary of State

Warnke, Paul C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Watson, Jack H., Jr., Secretary to the Cabinet and Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs; White House Chief of Staff from 1980 until 1981.

Weizman, Ezer, Israeli Minister of Defense until May 1980

West, John C., U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Wisner, Frank G., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1979

Yadin, Yigael, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister

Young, Andrew J., U.S. Representative to the United Nations until September 23, 1979

Zablocki, Clement J., Representative (D-Wisconsin); Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations

Zamir, Yitzhak, Israeli Attorney General

Zwiefel, David E., Deputy Director, Office of Egypt Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until June 1979; Deputy Chief of Mission, Amman, from June 1979

Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978– December 1980

Constructing Frameworks for Peace: The Camp David Summit, August 8–September 17, 1978

1. **Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador to Israel (Lewis)**¹

Washington, August 8, 1978, 1552Z

WH81110. Please deliver immediately upon receipt.

August 8, 1978

To: Ambassador Samuel Lewis American Embassy Tel Aviv Israel

From: Zbigniew Brzezinski

Subject: Camp David Mid-East Meeting Announcement

Below follows text of announcement Jody Powell will make at 11:30 a.m. edt today.² Please note minor changes in text:

"The President is pleased to announce that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have accepted an invitation to come to Camp David on September 5 for a meeting with the President to seek a framework for peace in the Mideast.

All of these leaders agree that there is no task more important than the search for peace. Secretary Vance has informed the President that both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have welcomed the meeting, and the President is gratified by their response.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 8, Backchannel Messages: Middle East: 2/78–11/80. Confidential; Sensitive; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Powell made the announcement to assembled reporters in the Briefing Room at the White House on August 8. The text as read by Powell is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, p. 1393.

Each of the three leaders will be accompanied by a small number of their principal advisors. No specific time has been set for the duration of the meeting.”

2. Special National Intelligence Estimate Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SNIE 36.4–1–78

Washington, August 8, 1978

LEBANON: PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The intense Syrian-Christian fighting that broke out in Beirut on 1 July 1978 and that has continued intermittently since has set the stage for a major confrontation between Syria and the principal Lebanese Christian militias. Israel's aim in the current situation is to prevent Lebanon from becoming a confrontation state responsive to Syria—support of the Christian militias is part of Israel's preventative measures. We believe that the Israelis would intervene if the fighting intensified and they perceived that the Christian militias were being defeated by the Syrians.² We do not believe that it would matter to the Israelis who initiated the fighting. A new and more serious round of fighting could occur at any time.

Syria's overall objective in Lebanon is to maintain a unified Lebanese state, relatively stable and responsive to Damascus' influence.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, SNIE 36.4–1–78 Lebanon: Prospects for Expanded Conflict. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note on the first page reads: “The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the NSA, along with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI submitted this estimate with the concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board except where noted in the text.”

² On August 7, Vance wrote in a letter to Boutros that the “Israeli government feels it has an obligation to the inhabitants” of South Lebanon “and to Major Haddad in particular to see to it that their sense of security is maintained.” However, Vance pointed out, following his discussions with the Israelis during his recent visit, the Begin government “has no objection” to the deployment of Lebanese army forces to South Lebanon, hitherto opposed by Christian militias, an “immediate task” that “should be seriously considered.” (Secto 9023 to Beirut, August 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332–0106)

President Assad's current aim is to neutralize the political and military power of the Christians sufficiently to force them to acquiesce to Syria's directions. Assad probably will attempt to avoid an all-out assault on the Christian heartland. Concern over possible Israeli intervention has been the principal constraint on the Syrians in dealing with the challenge posed by the Christian militias. Thus far, Assad has moved cautiously, seeking to avoid confrontation with Israel while reinforcing the Syrian military presence around the principal Christian areas and attempting to isolate the militia leaders politically. Assad has demonstrated to date an intuitive sense of how far he can go in provoking Israel, but there is always the risk of miscalculation on his part.

The aim of most militia leaders is to force the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, and to reinforce further the dominance of the principal Christian militias throughout Lebanon. We believe that the Christian militias will continue attempts at provoking the Syrians into renewed large-scale fighting that would draw the Israelis directly into the Lebanese conflict on the side of the Christians.³ If necessary, Christians leaders are quite prepared to see the collapse of the government of Lebanese President Sarkis and the establishment of a truncated Christian state in Lebanon, which they believe would be backed by Israel.⁴

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

³ The Department of State disagrees with the thrust of this sentence because it implies that the Christian leadership has determined to escalate the fighting in order to draw in the Israelis. [*text not declassified*] most Christian leaders suspect that the Israelis may not intercede even if the level of fighting increases. However, action by the militias ensures continued high level Israeli support and interest. Moreover, there are clearly provocations on both sides. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ In an August 9 memorandum to Brzezinski, Sick reported Ambassador Samuel Lewis's assessment of the "very ominous" mood among the Israeli leadership over Lebanon: "Israeli TV is showing emotional pictures of Lebanese refugees talking about the killing and destruction, and Begin keeps saying 'Christians are being killed and no one is doing anything.' It is very clear that Israel is considering 'doing something.'" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 57, Lebanon: 8/78)

3. **Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹**

Jidda, August 10, 1978, 0800Z

5841. For the Secretary from Atherton. Subj: Meeting With Prince Saud.

1. Ambassador West and I had a very good two hour meeting with Prince Saud in Taif evening August 9 in which Saud expressed full support for the President's invitation to Sadat and Begin and said he was considering recommending that SAG issue a public statement of support. In this cable I want to give you the highlights of the meeting. A full account² will follow shortly.

2. I began the meeting with a broad review of the situation as we see it and went through in detail with Saud the talking points that you approved. I stressed that the President felt the moment was critical and that a U.S. initiative and all-out effort to break the impasse was necessary. I explained in some detail why direct negotiations between the parties are necessary. In this regard Saud said flatly that he felt Saudi Arabia's position on negotiations had been misrepresented. Saudis had not sought to put an end to negotiations, and Fahd's trip to Cairo had not had that purpose; Fahd had in fact arrived in Egypt after Sadat had made his decision not to go to follow-on talks to Leeds.³

3. I stressed President's seriousness of purpose in inviting Sadat and Begin to Camp David, and I pointed out that in doing so the President had engaged his prestige. It is an act of courage which deserves the broadest possible support and we are confident it will find support from Saudi Arabia. Saud replied with considerable feeling that "we want Camp David to succeed" because its success would be the success of "our closest friends, Egypt and the U.S." He said "we will do everything we can to help" and added that Saudi Arabia will make its support known.

4. In response to a question by Saud as to the likely outcome of the Camp David meeting, I said that while I could make no specific forecast I could assure Saud that we do not regard the meeting as a pro-forma exercise; we envisage a serious discussion at highest level about how to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0033. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and Cairo. Printed from a corrected copy.

² Telegram 5848 from Jidda, August 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0044)

³ Reference is to the Leeds Castle Conference held near London July 17–20. For documentation on the conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 266–273.

overcome present differences on key issues. Saud spoke at length of his concern that Sadat, having already made concessions on peace and security, would be asked for further compromises. He stressed that whatever comes out of Camp David must be broadly acceptable in the Arab world. Saud repeatedly returned to this concern, that at Camp David we would press Sadat to agree to compromises on withdrawal and Palestinian issue that would be unacceptable to the Arabs. I repeated that I could obviously not say what would emerge from Camp David, but said Saudis can be assured that ideas we put forward on all of the major issues—peace, withdrawal, security, and the Palestinians—will be consistent with our positions on Resolution 242⁴ which Secretary and President have explained to Saudi leaders over past year. I explained also that at Camp David we would be seeking agreement on the broad principles that must guide a comprehensive settlement rather than the details. I could not predict whether there would be agreement or if so what the details would look like and could not discuss specific formulations which would have to emerge from the negotiations, but I did think that at least at the end our ideas would be clear. All this seemed to reassure Saud. He reiterated his support for the Camp David meeting, but added that Saudi Arabia feels toward it like the mother of the bride; it waits with both hope and apprehension.

5. After we had gone through this at length, I raised question of Soviet involvement in the peace process, pointing out that we have always felt the Soviets will have to be involved at some point but think their involvement at the outset would complicate the task immensely. In this regard I said the Secretary had asked me to mention that he had been surprised to hear the Soviets quoting the Saudis as saying they (the Saudis) want the Soviets brought in. Saud reacted very quickly to this, saying Saudi Arabia saw a Soviet role only because of Soviet influence with the Palestinians and to a lesser degree with the Syrians, and because the U.S. had not taken a position that would attract broad Arab support. He remarked quite pointedly that if there were a change in the American position toward the Palestinians, and the U.S. were to “build bridges” to the Palestinians, there would be no need for a Soviet role. In the absence of that, the Soviets would probably be needed to bring the Palestinians along. Having made this point, Saud went on to say, with considerable emphasis on his words, that as a general principle Saudi Arabia would like there to be no Soviet involvement either in the peace process or in any other way in the Middle East: “we don’t want them here, and we don’t think they have a role to play”.

⁴ For the full text of United Nations Security Resolution 242, adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967, see *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 18–19.

6. Final point Saud had to make regarding the Camp David meeting was that he hoped what emerges therefrom will include the Palestinians and the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians. He stressed that this would be very important on gaining support in the Arab world. I said I could understand this concern but cautioned that what we want is a workable set of principles not a ringing declaration that will not advance the cause of peace in practical ways. On the Palestinian question, we believed the Aswan formulation⁵ was a practical one.

7. We then turned to discussion of Lebanon. I stressed our concern over the situation there and told Saud of the time and effort you had put in on the Lebanese problem during your trip. Saud said he had read our press briefing⁶ on Lebanon and considered it very good. He recounted the talks Fahd and he had had recently in Damascus, saying that the Syrians are very suspicious of the U.S. Syrians misunderstood the U.S. effort to call a security council meeting on Lebanon, saw the hand of Israel—and therefore the U.S.—behind the aggressiveness of the Christian militias, and were suspicious of the contacts of the American Ambassador in Beirut with the Christian leaders. I said none of this is true. As regards the last point, I explained that Ambassador Parker's contacts were undertaken on instructions from Washington and in the cause of restraining the Christian extremists and strengthening President Sarkis. Saud said he and Fahd had told the Syrians that their suspicions of the U.S. are unfounded. Saud said he considered most important thing U.S. could do now would be to give as much attention as possible to its contacts with the Syrians. I told Saud we had been and still were active in Damascus, and especially in Israel, in seeking to keep the lid on in Lebanon.

⁵ In his remarks to the press after meeting with Sadat in Aswan on January 3, Carter said: "We believe that there are certain principles, fundamentally, which must be observed before a just and a comprehensive peace can be achieved. First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency. Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. And third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 19–20) For documentation on Carter's meetings with Sadat at Aswan, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 185–186.

⁶ For a summary of the August 8 Department of State press briefing on the situation in Lebanon see telegram 200652 to Alexandria, August 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780325–0103)

8. In accordance with State 200866⁷ I did not use talking points on Lebanon in State 200854.⁸ I told Saud we do not have anything to suggest at the moment but will want to stay in close touch with the SAG on Lebanon.

9. At end of group meeting, I asked for private talk with Saud and made the points you had asked me to convey, adding a few of my own about the way the “non-paper” (i.e. my talking points) which I left with him July 23⁹ had been distorted and misused. Main point I made was that we felt Saudis had encouraged Egyptians to have no further direct contacts with Israelis and had generally appeared to be working at cross purposes with us during critical period following Leeds talks. I said you were quite unhappy about all this and that we hoped Saudis would consult with us in first instance when they disagreed with us, rather than going to others. Saud protested that we had misunderstood their actions and motives, but he seemed to me evasive about specifics and sequence of events. Without arguing details, I expressed concern about perceptions all this had created in U.S. with respect to U.S.-Saudi relations. At the end, Saud said he would recommend Prince Fahd issue statement of support for President Carter’s proposal for Camp David meeting. I told him this would be important for Presidents Carter and Sadat and also for U.S.-Saudi relations. We will have to wait and see whether such a statement is in fact forthcoming and what it says but in any event I believe this exchange was essential to clear the air and will hopefully have some salutary effect on Saud. At end of meeting, Saud said he would arrange meeting with Crown Prince Fahd,¹⁰ about which up to then he and other Saudis had been vague

⁷ Sent August 9. (Telegram Tosec 90068/200866 to Beirut, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2231)

⁸ Sent August 9. (Telegram Tosec 90067/200854 to multiple posts, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2217)

⁹ Atherton’s summary of his July 23 conversation with Saud is in telegram 6146 from Amman, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850093–2523)

¹⁰ Atherton and West met with Fahd and Saud for one and one-quarter hour on August 10. During the meeting, Fahd expressed “total support” for Carter’s Camp David initiative and gave a “vigorous denial of the ‘amazing rumor’ that the Saudis had ever sought to persuade Sadat to abandon his initiative.” Following a review of the substance of Atherton’s meeting with Saud the day before, Fahd stated “he hoped whatever comes out of Camp David will mention the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.” (Telegram 5846 from Jidda, August 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0039) Atherton conveyed a longer summary version of this meeting in telegram 6497 from Amman, August 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850093–2607) Following Atherton’s visit, Khalid sent Carter a letter on August 15, in which the king expressed his “deep appreciation and true esteem” for the “gigantic, courageous step” taken by Carter in convening the Camp David meeting. (Telegram 5961 from Jidda, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0057)

and unwilling to be pinned down. We left Saud well after midnight, and within an hour had confirmation that meeting with Fahd will be Thursday at 2000 local in Jidda.

West

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 11, 1978, 2121Z

203927. For the Ambassador. Subject: Message to Gromyko.

1. Please deliver the following message to the Foreign Minister.²

2. Quote.

Dear Mr. Minister:

Having just completed my trip to Israel and Egypt, I wanted to say a few words to you about the reasons for President Carter's invitation to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to meet with him at Camp David.

As you know, we believe it is essential to continue efforts to build on the breakthrough that resulted from President Sadat's visit to Israel last year.³ Serious work has been done in the discussions since then.

While progress has been made, it has become clear that discussions must now take place at the highest political level. Agreements must be reached on the key issues of withdrawal, security, and the determination of the Palestinians' future before negotiations can succeed at the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2243. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Tarnoff; approved by Vance.

² Toon delivered the message to Soviet Acting Foreign Minister Korniyenko on August 14. Toon reported to Vance that after reading the letter and undertaking to transmit it to Gromyko, Korniyenko "commented that your hope that the Soviet Union would support the Camp David Summit meeting was unfounded. The Soviet side considers the path of Egypt-Israeli talks to be a blind alley which can cause 'dangerous complications' in the Middle East. Noting that in my view the Soviet position was wrong, I told Korniyenko that as a careful reader of the Soviet press I was not surprised at his response." (Telegram 19273 from Moscow, August 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1888)

³ Sadat visited Jerusalem November 19–21, 1977, becoming the first Arab head of state to publicly travel to Israel since its founding in 1948. During his visit, Sadat gave a speech in Arabic at the Knesset, calling for Israel's withdrawal from territory acquired during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as well as a permanent home for the Palestinians. A full translation of Sadat's speech is in "Transcripts of Sadat and Begin Addresses," *The New York Times*, November 21, 1977, p. 17.

ministerial and technical levels. Our hope is to make progress at the summit on these basic issues.

We hope the Soviets will lend support to this endeavor, realizing its importance as a step toward achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

On another subject, we are working on the response that Paul Warnke will be delivering to you, and I hope that it will be ready soon.

Sincerely, Cyrus Vance

End quote.

Vance

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, August 12, 1978, 2203Z

6532. For the Secretary from Atherton. Subj: Meeting With King Hussein August 12.

1. Summary: In my talks in Amman with King Hussein late afternoon August 12 and earlier in the day with Abdul Hamid Sharaf and Acting Foreign Minister Abu Odeh, I did my best to dispel concern over their perception that there has been erosion in the U.S. position on a Middle East peace settlement. All three voiced this concern, and Hussein spoke more frankly than I have ever heard him of his apprehension that the U.S. appeared to be pulling back from its position on meaning of Resolution 242 conveyed to him over the years since 1967. He said at one point that these past months have been “the most distressing of my life.” I assured them that our positions have not changed and that the positions we will take at Camp David in September will be consistent with those the President and the Secretary have conveyed to Hussein. His demeanor implied that he will believe it when he sees it. What he said, however, was that he welcomes the Camp David meeting, adding that even if it brings no progress it will be useful as long as it produces a U.S. position compatible with Resolution 242. I emphasized the importance of our friends in the Arab world expres-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850093–2458. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

sing publicly their support for the President's initiative. I said we were very pleased over Fahd's statement, which had been helpful as well in making the Saudi position clear in the U.S., and I hoped Hussein would give consideration to finding a way for Jordan, too, to show its support. (I had earlier said to Sharaf that Jordan's reaction will be closely watched in the U.S.) Hussein reiterated that he hoped for the success of the Camp David meeting and, turning to Sharaf said "we will see what we can do". Hussein, hence, did not tip his hand on question of Jordanian public support. He may wish to consult his cabinet on issue, and we will just have to wait and see how this matter develops. In all these meetings I was accompanied by Suddarth and Korn. End summary.

2. Question of Jordanian perception of an erosion of U.S. position came up and was discussed at length in my morning meeting with Sharaf, who expressed concern that U.S. position on the West Bank and Gaza was very [garble] to the Begin plan.² I told Sharaf I thought there had been misunderstanding in both Jordan and Saudi Arabia of what I had said in my previous visit in July. My purpose had been to set out our thoughts coming out of the Leeds talks³ on the Egyptian and Israeli West Bank/Gaza proposals; in doing this it was in no way my intention to imply that West Bank/Gaza arrangements should be made without prior agreement on a broad framework of principles covering all the major issues, withdrawal, peace, security and the Palestinian problem. I assured both Sharaf and Abu Odeh that this is our goal and that our positions remain as the President and the Secretary had earlier stated them in talks with King Hussein. With both Abu Odeh and Sharaf I made a strong pitch for some public expression of support from Jordan for the President's Camp David initiative. I said this was not only important for President Carter and Sadat, but for U.S.-Jordanian relations.

3. In the meeting with Hussein, which lasted about 40 minutes, I covered all the points in the talking points you approved for my stops in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. I emphasized in particular that the President felt we are at a critical juncture in the Middle East (Hussein agreed), that an effort was needed to break the impasse and the U.S. was the only one that could do so. I explained at length why direct negotiations are necessary. I said that our objective at Camp David will be

² During meetings with Carter in December 1977, Begin presented a plan for Palestinian "home rule" in the West Bank and Gaza. The plan called for the establishment of a Palestinian administrative council through free elections, while leaving security of these areas to Israeli authorities. The plan also called on Israel to hold in abeyance for five years its sovereignty claim to the West Bank; at the end of that period Israel would review the arrangements to see how well it had worked. For documentation on the Begin plan, see the attachment to Document 177 and footnote 6, Document 180, in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.

³ See footnote 3, Document 3.

to get agreement on a broad framework of principles. We cannot promise success but at least by the time the Camp David meeting ends U.S. position will be clear. I explained that the President intends to make an all-out effort and is ready to continue the talks at Camp David as long as necessary. I also assured Hussein that the Camp David meeting was our own idea and that we had not discussed it with anyone else. Begin and Sadat first learned of it when the Secretary arrived in Jerusalem and Alexandria⁴ (Suddarth had told me the King might be sensitive about the absence of any advance consultation.)

4. I said I realized that the impression existed in the Arab world that there had been an erosion in our position. The Secretary wanted me to assure His Majesty that is not the case. We continue to believe that a framework of broad principles has to be the starting point, and the ideas and suggestions that we will put forward at Camp David will be consistent with those the Secretary and the President have discussed with Hussein. I pointed out that the Camp David initiative was an act of great courage on the part of the President, just as was Sadat's acceptance of the invitation, and the President deserves the broadest possible support. I said I hoped Jordan would consider ways it could show its support.

5. Hussein thanked me for coming and said that, speaking as a friend of the U.S. and in spirit of our relations, he had to say that the recent period had been a very confusing one. Hussein said what he had heard not only after the Leeds conference but before that time had caused him to have doubts about the steadfastness of the U.S. In 1967 the U.S. spoke of Israeli withdrawal with minor border modifications. Now we hear of a 5 year period "that would lead to we don't know what" and the possibility of Israeli forces staying on the West Bank with Jordan providing a "cover" for their activities. Hussein said U.S. ideas did not appear to bring in the Palestinians sufficiently, and he stressed the importance of involving the Palestinians fully in the settlement effort. Hussein said in the post 1967 period the U.S. and Jordan had differences on only two issues, Jerusalem and the need for minor border modifications to be on a reciprocal basis. In recent years, however, differences seemed to have multiplied.

6. In sum, Hussein said, he felt there had been a "very serious erosion in the U.S. position" and that it had damaged the U.S. image in the Middle East. At one point he said the past few months had been "the most distressing of my life." (Comment: Hussein never alluded to his

⁴ Vance met with Begin August 5–7 in Jerusalem, and Sadat August 7–9 in Alexandria where he presented both leaders with invitations to meet with President Carter at Camp David. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 285–288.

desire to visit the U.S., but I suspect this also was implied in this remark.) However, Hussein said he was glad to have our assurances that U.S. positions remain unchanged and welcomed the President's Camp David initiative. Even if Camp David does not bring progress, Hussein said, it will be important and helpful if it produces a U.S. position compatible with Resolution 242. "We look forward to hearing the best possible news from Camp David" Hussein added. I said I had had a good talk with Prince Fahd⁵ and we had been very much heartened and pleased by Fahd's statement⁶ of support for the President's Camp David initiative. I noted that Fahd's statement had also helped a great deal in the U.S. in dispelling doubts about Saudi Arabia's position. Turning to Sharaf, Hussein said "we will see what we can do."

7. At end of this part of conversation, I reminded Hussein that during my previous visit I had said it would be helpful to know more precisely what Jordan needs in a statement of principles to be able to join negotiations. It would be particularly helpful to have his thoughts on this before September 5. I subsequently underlined this point with Sharaf. Both were non-committal.

8. With this the conversation on Middle East peace efforts ended. There followed a brief discussion of Lebanon, which is being reported separately.⁷

9. As regards the question of a Jordanian statement of support for the President's Camp David initiative, Hussein did not tip his hand in any way. Later in the evening Abu Odeh remarked that he did not think we should expect anything "yet". Suddarth's guess is that Hussein will wait to consult his cabinet before formally deciding anything, at least for appearances sake.⁸

Suddarth

⁵ See footnote 10, Document 3.

⁶ The Embassy transmitted the text of Fahd's statement as well as a proposed response by Atherton on August 11. (Telegram 5849 from Jidda, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328–0836)

⁷ For Atherton's August 12 summary of his discussion of the situation in Lebanon with Hussein, see telegram 6533 from Amman, August 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0444)

⁸ An official Jordanian statement expressing Hussein's support for the Camp David talks was broadcast on August 12. The Embassy transmitted the text of the statement in telegram 6534 from Amman, August 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0274)

6. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

PLANNING FOR CAMP DAVID

General Considerations

Our problem in the area is confidence; it is acute in Jordan but serious also in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt. Hussein quite frankly tells us he sees an erosion in our position, not only since Leeds² but since 1967. The Saudis and the Egyptians are a little less openly skeptical, but they too think that we have moved off of our position or fear that we will once the Israelis and their friends in Congress begin to put on the heat.

To a large extent, the erosion of Arab confidence has been brought about by our search for ways to get around Israel's refusal to commit itself to turn the West Bank and Gaza back to full Arab control at the end of five years. There are two problems here:

a) —The various schemes that we have thought up, while admittedly imaginative, have been too complex. At times we have not been clear even in our own minds about exactly what we meant. No wonder the Arabs were confused.

b) —The above notwithstanding, it is true that the moderate Arabs will buy, albeit reluctantly, things like a five year transition period and Israeli security arrangements on the West Bank and Gaza. But not without the assurance, in advance, that the West Bank and Gaza will be turned back to Arab sovereignty. Some ambiguity on this point might be allowable, but Sadat would at least have to be able to claim that he had gotten a commitment from the Israelis to withdrawal. If he accepts anything less (he probably won't) he will be repudiated.

In short the Arabs want us to stop trying to find schemes for getting around Israel's refusal to make the commitment to withdraw—schemes that in their minds leave too much uncertainty—and start trying to find ways to get the Israelis to change their position. We are now at the point where we are going to have to do that if we want to keep Sadat and the Saudis with us, and if we are to have any chance of ever getting Hussein to join the negotiations. Further devising formulas

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn on August 14. The paper was included as part of a briefing book prepared during Camp David preparatory strategy meetings attended by Vance, Saunders, Quandt, and Atherton at Ambassador Averell Harriman's estate near Middleburg, Virginia, beginning on August 11. The complete briefing book is *ibid.* For Vance's account of the Middleburg talks, see *Hard Choices*, p. 218.

² See footnote 3, Document 3.

for circumventing the Israelis now will lose us what little confidence we still enjoy. (And furthermore won't work with the Israelis. Begin understands quite well what we are aiming at. He won't go along and is probably encouraged in his resistance by the knowledge that we are looking for expedients rather than taking him on directly.)

Kamel and Saud, and many other Arabs who regard themselves as our friends and feel they have a stake in Sadat's future, fear that at Camp David we will strike a middle ground between the Egyptian and Israeli position and will try to persuade Sadat to agree to "compromise". They obviously think we might succeed in doing so. What they in fact mean is that they fear we will try to persuade Sadat to accept something that is less than a firm Israeli commitment to withdraw after five years.

The Camp David Meetings

Broadly speaking, there are two things that we have to decide:

- a) —what we want to end up with; and
- b) —how we can best go about getting where we want.

What do we want to end up with?

Ideally we would like to close the Camp David meeting with agreement between Sadat and Begin on a broad framework of principles for a settlement, covering all the main elements—peace, withdrawal, security and the Palestinians—which serve as a basis for a series of continuing negotiations to hammer out the details in each of these areas.

We know in advance, however, that it is not going to be possible to get such agreement. We also know several other things; they might be called the ground rules of the game:

—We cannot allow Camp David to be seen as a failure. The blow to the President's prestige and authority and the consequences for stability in the area would be too serious.

—Since it cannot succeed in achieving its ideal goal, we must have an acceptable fallback.

—Somebody is going to go home disappointed, probably mad, from Camp David. There will be no way to please both sides at this point (but the temptation to try will be strong and should be guarded against). Any effort to do so is likely to please the Israelis but alienate the Arabs.

—The Arabs do not really expect that at Camp David Begin will make the concessions that will be needed to achieve a Declaration on terms minimally acceptable to Sadat. They will, however, be satisfied and consider the meeting a success if it ends with the US taking a position on the issues minimally acceptable to Sadat.

If we do this, the Israelis will be unhappy and the Administration will be attacked by Israel's supporters in Congress and various Jewish

organizations. A certain level of displeasure on the part of the Israelis and their supporters is inevitable; it will be the price of keeping Sadat and the moderate Arabs with us. What we will need to do is find ways to minimize the repercussions.

The first step we need to take in our preparations for Camp David is to arm ourselves with texts that the President could use with Sadat. We should have a series of texts, running from the most acceptable to Sadat to one or two that we judge to be on the borderline of what Sadat can accept. Responsibility for the preparation of these texts should be put in Atherton's hands since he has much more direct experience in negotiating the principles than any other member of the group. Arrangement should also be made for Atherton to have a serious session with the President before Camp David to brief the President on the fine points of the positions and the sensitivities of the two sides as regards the language of the Declaration.

Our other main project will be to figure out how to get with the least possible damage from here to the statement of our position acceptable to Sadat at the end of the conference.

Getting To Where We Want

We start from the given that we cannot simply lay our proposal on the table at the outset. As much as possible, our ideas must seem to emerge from a genuine process of negotiation. We should recognize however that this is an ideal which is probably attainable only in part at best.

—We can expect Sadat and Begin to meet and talk with one another, but it would be unrealistic to think that they will negotiate in the technical sense of the word.

—If we try to force them into a negotiating situation we risk heading the talks into an impasse and a breakdown. Hearing the Israeli position in all its starkness could cause Sadat to react as he did after Leeds.

—Begin knows our tactic and will be armed to meet it. No matter how long we get Sadat to sit down and talk with him he will always say that not enough time was allowed for negotiation. Begin's fuse will be long and slow. Sadat's short.

In brief, very early in the Camp David talks we risk coming up against a contradiction between our need to have our positions emerge from the course of the talks and the need to get them out in such a way that they will have the desired impact on the Arab side. We will be faced then with the choice between:

- dropping the fig leaf of negotiations; and
- stringing out presentation of our proposals or so watering them down that we are seen by Sadat as failing to fulfill our commitments.

Planning a strategy to avoid being caught on the horns of this dilemma, or if unavoidable to minimize the dangers therefrom, is another (with the drafting of texts) urgent task. This will involve the development of a detailed scenario for the Camp David meetings and for the presentation of our proposals. Saunders should be given responsibility for this.

A third task will be to draft a speech for the President to give at the close of the Camp David meeting. Responsibility for this could be given to Quandt.

There would thus be three task forces, headed by Atherton, Saunders and Quandt respectively, who would be assisted by various other members of the Middle East working group to do the following:

- prepare our position on the Declaration
- prepare a detailed scenario for the Camp David talks
- prepare a draft of a speech by the President.

After Camp David

Assuming that Camp David ends with a US statement of positions minimally acceptable to Sadat, we can expect to find ourselves at odds with Israel and the negotiations therefore deadlocked because the Israelis refuse to continue them on the basis of our position. We will need to pursue the study (already begun) of ways to bring the Israelis to reconsider their positions.

7. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State and the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

THE PIVOTAL ISSUE: THE SINAI/WEST BANK RELATIONSHIP

The Issue

The pivotal issue at Camp David will be the relationship that exists in the minds of both Begin and Sadat between the resumption of Sinai

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: Negotiations: 8–11/78. Secret; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner, Brown wrote: “9/1. HB.” According to Quandt’s account of the Camp David negotiations, Quandt, Vance, Atherton, and Saunders drafted this paper during their strategy meetings at Middleburg, Virginia, beginning on August 11. (Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 212–213)

negotiations and progress on the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian complex of questions including the fundamental territorial issue. This relationship will underlie all of the discussions, although you may find only Begin and the Israeli team interested in getting it out in the open and pinned down.

Stated very briefly, the two fronts are linked in each man's mind in the following manner: Israel has placed top priority since last November on reaching a separate agreement with Egypt on the Sinai. Having now realized that that is not in the cards, Begin will be trying to acquire Sadat's commitment to conclude a final Sinai agreement, or failing that a "partial" Sinai agreement, in return for the minimum change in the present Israeli position on the West Bank/Gaza. Sadat also seeks a Sinai agreement that will bring about Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, but cannot politically afford to pursue such an agreement in the absence of a clear change in the Israeli position regarding military withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, the settlement of Israeli citizens there, and Palestinian involvement in the ultimate disposition of the territory.

Background

The two committees established after the Ismailia Summit²—military and political—rather quickly established a division of labor different from what their names might imply. The Military Committee, meeting in Egypt under Gamasy and Weizman, became the venue for discussing a Sinai agreement. The Political Committee, which met formally for only two days in Jerusalem at the Foreign Minister level but whose work continued through U.S. mediation, addressed the task of developing the framework for a comprehensive settlement and came to focus increasingly on the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian complex of problems.

The Military Committee made substantial progress in defining the essentials of a Sinai agreement, including an Israeli offer to return all of pre-1967 Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. The Defense Ministers were able to agree in principle on the outline of a timetable for Israeli withdrawal and on at least the rudiments of such arrangements as the establishment of buffer zones and limited armaments areas. Such potentially contentious issues as the status of Sharm el-Sheikh, which controls the Straits of Tiran, together with the land bridge to it from Israel—both of which Israeli Labor governments had insisted on retaining under Israeli authority—were agreed upon in principle.

² For documentation on the December 1977 summit meeting between Begin and Sadat at Ismailia, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.

Substantive discussions on the Sinai became stuck on two issues. One was the disposition of two airfields which Israel has constructed in the eastern Sinai—one in the north not far from the Gaza Strip and one in the south near Eilat. The other was the status of Israeli settlements which have been established in the northeastern Sinai between the Gaza Strip and el-Arish. The former is essentially a military question; the latter, while given a security coloration by some Israeli leaders, is primarily an issue with domestic political ramifications in Israel.

Israel has privately suggested to Egypt that these two issues be resolved through an exchange of territory. Sadat has resolutely maintained that there will be no tampering with the pre-existing international boundary. It seems clear that, were Sadat politically able to conclude a separate Sinai agreement, a deal could be struck by relying on time-phasing and other compromise solutions for resolving both the airfield and settlement issues. It is virtually certain, however, that Sadat will refuse to entertain further negotiations over outstanding Sinai issues in the absence of significant movement by Israel on the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian question.

Efforts to pursue the goal of the Political Committee—achieving a Declaration of Principles which would provide the framework for a comprehensive agreement—have made less progress. The major barriers to agreement continue to be (a) whether and if so how the principle of Palestinian self-determination shall be applied and (b) the related issues of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and who shall exercise sovereignty over these two areas. The U.S. has remained actively involved in these efforts, and with our assistance, the parties have been discussing for the first time questions which lie at the very heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict—namely, the ultimate partition of Palestine between Jewish and Arab political entities. Neither side describes the issue in these terms today, but this is what is basically at stake for both and accounts, on the one hand, for Israel's desire to keep the territorial boundary question open and, on the other, for the Arab desire to foreclose (except for minor modifications) what they perceive as further Israeli expansion through settlements and territorial acquisition beyond the 1949–67 Armistice Lines. In the Arab perception, acceptance of those lines as Israel's boundaries already involves conceding two-thirds of pre-1947 Palestinian territory.

On the question of Palestinian self-determination, Egypt publicly espouses the maximum in free choice for all Palestinians wherever they reside (although privately hoping to stave off the creation of an independent state under radical leadership) while Israel would prefer that only residents of the West Bank and Gaza participate at all in the process and then only in negotiations in which Israel could exercise a

veto. The formulation³ you used at Aswan last January holds the potential for a compromise on this issue. Language clearly derived from your statement, elaborated to provide that Palestinian representatives be a party to the negotiations, should ultimately be acceptable to both parties.

The more difficult stand-off exists on the questions of Israeli withdrawal and sovereignty. The Egyptian position on withdrawal is grounded in the legal principle (embodied in the preamble of Resolution 242) of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” although Sadat has accepted (including publicly) the need for “minor rectifications” in the pre-1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. He also recognizes that withdrawal poses security problems for Israel, and has been increasingly forthcoming in his support for time-phased withdrawal and special arrangements to solve those problems. On sovereignty, Egypt holds that it resides in and should be exercised by the Palestinians themselves. (It is useful to recall that neither Egypt nor any other Arab state ever recognized Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank prior to 1967.

The present Israeli position on these questions is a function of the longstanding conviction of Begin and his Herut Party that the West Bank is an integral part of the land of Israel, and that its separation from Israel prior to 1967 was a temporary aberration rectified by the war in that year. This finally came out in the open in February when the Israeli Cabinet refused to concede that Resolution 242 required Israeli withdrawal from any of the West Bank. On this, the Israeli position at the present time is at variance with our own and with that of all other parties involved in the discussions leading to the adoption of 242. Some members of the present Israeli Government, while not endorsing Herut ideology, nevertheless reject West Bank withdrawal purely on security grounds. Begin believes that Israel has a valid claim to sovereignty over the West Bank, although it is willing to admit that other competing claims exist. Even those Israeli political parties which reject Herut ideology are not prepared to accept minor modifications and insist on the need for “territorial compromise” (meaning more than what the Arabs would consider minor changes in the 1967 lines) for security purposes.

In April we asked Israel a set of questions designed to get it to come to grips officially with the matter of how to resolve the status of the West Bank after an interim period. Israel replied in June with answers that did not move things at all. Three weeks later the Cabinet somewhat modified its position and agreed either “to consider” any

³ See footnote 5, Document 3.

plan for territorial compromise presented by the Arabs or “to discuss” after an interim period the issue of sovereignty, to which it said that “a solution is possible.” As an indication of the problem before us, this was considered a major advance by many Israelis but has made little impression in Egypt, since it falls far short of what Sadat feels he needs. It appears that there is little room for further softening of the Israeli position except, perhaps, in return for a commitment by Sadat to pursue a Sinai agreement.

Both parties have accepted the need for an interim period between the beginning of the implementation of any West Bank agreement and the ultimate disposition of territory and sovereignty. This provides us with the ability to argue that irrevocable changes need not, indeed cannot, occur immediately. It does not, however, diminish Sadat’s desire to receive a commitment that those changes will indeed take place nor Begin’s difficulty in giving such a commitment.

What Each Man Wants

Conceptually, the needs of the two leaders can be expressed as follows:

—Begin, in order to justify the political and personal crises he would face in agreeing in principle to withdraw from the West Bank, will want from Sadat a commitment to see the Sinai negotiations through to a final solution which includes the removal of the Egyptian military threat and normalization of relations. It remains to be seen, in fact, whether even then he could agree to an ultimate relinquishment of Israeli control (except for security strongpoints) to an Arab authority which would come to exercise many if not all the attributes of sovereignty.

—Sadat, in order to justify the political crisis within the Arab world which would follow his agreement to pursue a Sinai agreement before West Bank details have been worked out, will want from Begin a commitment to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza subject to negotiation of the security and other details of a settlement, to freeze Israeli settlements, and to allow the Palestinians a meaningful voice in the eventual disposition of that territory.

Begin, in addition, wants to be assured that if he makes the necessary commitments on the West Bank there will be someone on the Arab side with whom Israel can negotiate. He understands that Sadat’s goal is to draw Hussein into the negotiations, but will want some assurance that, if that proves impossible, Sadat himself will undertake to negotiate at least the general guidelines of a settlement for the West Bank and Gaza and will negotiate a Sinai settlement even if there is no actual change in the status quo on the West Bank/Gaza.

In more concrete terms, *Begin wants as regards the Sinai:*

—A credible and public commitment to continue Sinai negotiations with a view toward reaching agreement. This could be given visibility by the reconvening of the Weizman/Gamasy talks soon after the Camp David talks end.

—Assurance that such an agreement will not entail the immediate dismantling of either the airfields or the Israeli settlements in the Sinai. (Because of Sadat's own needs, this may have to be given in the form of a verbal side understanding to which you are witness, with the recognition that Sadat may have to deny its existence if it were to leak.)

Begin has the following additional desires as regards the West Bank, assuming he is willing to commit Israel to withdrawal at all:

—Assurance that there will be no resolution of the sovereignty issue until after the interim period, presumably of five years.

—Assurance that Israel will retain sufficient latitude in future negotiations to avoid having to confront a final solution which is prejudiced to permit only "minor modifications."

—Assurance that Israel will be allowed some agreed form of security presence on the West Bank beyond the interim period.

—Assurance that, should King Hussein fail to enter the negotiations even if guidelines for negotiating West Bank and Gaza issues are agreed between Egypt and Israel, Sadat will either himself negotiate a West Bank/Gaza settlement or not insist on such a settlement as a precondition for concluding a Sinai agreement. (Sadat has on occasion told us he will negotiate a West Bank/Gaza final settlement if Hussein and the Palestinians won't. Ambassador Eilts feels strongly that it would be impossible politically for Sadat to do this.)

Sadat, for his part, wants as regards the West Bank and Gaza:

—A clear and public Israeli commitment to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, couched in terms that he can say preclude other than "minor modifications." (Ironically, language on withdrawal that is clear on the principle but vague on the extent may now be more easily acceptable to Sadat and other Arabs precisely because of the position thus far adopted by the Begin Government.)

—A freeze on further Israeli settlements.

—A clear and public commitment to resolve the issue of sovereignty after the interim period in the context of Israeli withdrawal—i.e., a commitment which he can interpret as meaning the area will devolve to Arab political authority. A reiteration of the Israeli willingness to "discuss" the sovereignty question at that time will *not* be sufficient.

—Language in any agreed document that assures active Palestinian participation in the process of determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza, including their consent to the terms of a final peace

treaty. Sadat wants language which includes the code-phrases “legitimate rights” and “a solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”

Sadat has the following additional desiderata as regards the Sinai, assuming he is willing to continue negotiations at all:

—Assurance that Israel agrees that such negotiations, and any agreement that may ensue, will be part of a comprehensive agreement. He may insist on a verbal understanding that final implementation of a Sinai agreement must await the successful conclusion of the steps agreed upon during an interim period on the West Bank.

—Assurance that when the implementation of a Sinai agreement has been completed, the Israeli airfields and settlements will be removed.

Handling the Dilemma at the Summit

General Considerations

Both men are coming to Camp David with the need to deal with the West Bank/Gaza and Palestinian issues very much in their minds. For Begin and his team, however, the goal is a Sinai agreement, and West Bank negotiations constitute a means to that end. Sadat, on the other hand, will want to avoid talking about the Sinai. To him this is a subject that must await basic Israeli decisions on the West Bank and Gaza. He believes he has already shown sufficient flexibility to warrant give from the Israeli side and is in no mood to make further concessions, least of all on his own territory. Moreover, Foreign Minister Kamel and other members of Sadat’s party will be ready to encourage Sadat to hold firm should he show signs of weakening.

While the relationship between the Sinai and the West Bank will inevitably surface directly at some point, the result when it does will not depend solely on the obvious issues themselves. It will also be greatly affected by our success prior to that time in (a) helping each to understand the political requirements of the other and (b) building a sense of shared strategic interest. Success in these areas early on would hopefully pave the way for a greater willingness by each to acknowledge the substantive needs of the other outlined above.

Bilateral with Begin

The task with Begin in this respect will be twofold:

—To convince him of our sympathy with Israel’s desire to conclude an agreement on the Sinai, thus normalizing its relations with its largest and potentially most dangerous Arab neighbor and going far toward removing the threat of another disastrous war, and

—To convey to him our understanding of Sadat’s reluctance to do so in the absence of something he can use in the wider Arab context.

You might express your esteem for the vision which both Begin and Sadat have thus far shown in confronting very difficult and complex issues. In the process, it would be important that Begin be left with no doubt that in your mind Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem was a watershed event in Middle Eastern history, undertaken in defiance of an Arab consensus to the contrary and at great personal and political risk. Begin should understand that you, without taking sides on the specific issues at hand, can understand why Sadat, from his perspective, believes that his act has not yet been reciprocated. It is also clear, however, that Sadat has not sufficiently recognized the importance of Begin's proposals on the Sinai.

You might also wish to stress the conviction that Sadat is serious in his offer to support security arrangements that will relieve Israeli concerns on this score. Begin would hopefully be left with the feeling that, in your mind, the existence of the time buffer provided by an interim period, the resulting ability to think in terms of time-phasing, and the fact that all arrangements will be freely negotiated and actual withdrawal will depend on prior agreement on security, make Israel's security concerns manageable. Most importantly, the U.S. remains committed to Israeli security, including in the context of negotiated changes in the status quo.

Bilateral with Sadat

The task with Sadat will also be twofold:

- To convince him of the negotiating assets available to him in seeking Israeli concessions on the West Bank because of Israel's desire for a Sinai agreement, and,

- To help him understand what is realistically achievable at this time on the West Bank without destroying his faith in the constancy of U.S. positions on key issues.

Sadat will want to focus almost entirely on West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian questions. We will have to try to lay out Begin's background, his ideological mindset and the basic support he has within his government—all without conveying the impression that we are sympathetic to the Israeli position on withdrawal from the West Bank. If Sadat asks whether our interpretation of Resolution 242, including our commitment to "minor modifications," has changed, you can say that we continue to believe that should be the end result but a precise commitment to it is not achievable at this point.

It is important to underscore the historic importance of his Jerusalem initiative.⁴ In this respect, you might wish to refer to the fact that

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 4.

no previous Israeli Government has been prepared to return all of Sinai or has been as willing as this one to discuss as thoroughly the core issues of the conflict—those surrounding the Palestinian dilemma.

It would be helpful to express sympathy with Sadat's belief that he should not be asked to discuss the Sinai further when Israel still has not made basic decisions on the West Bank. However, it is a Sinai agreement that the Israelis want most badly, and that desire provides Sadat leverage with regard to the West Bank. Although we do not expect negotiations on the details of a Sinai settlement during the Summit, it is our view that a commitment on Sadat's part to resume Sinai negotiations would be the most effective instrument available in bringing Israel to confront the need to reconsider its West Bank position.

We could also explain to Sadat the value we see in agreements that can be implemented over a period of several years, both on the West Bank and in the Sinai, describing how we see the initialing-signing-ratification-implementation stages of a Sinai agreement being phased in relation to specific stages of agreements on the other fronts in such a way that Egypt could retain a degree of leverage over the overall process throughout.

Finally, it may be necessary at some point to note that Israel's resistance to explicit withdrawal language in the context of general principles relates not only to the West Bank/Gaza, but to the Golan Heights where Israel will only be brought to contemplate withdrawal if Syria makes a much more convincing offer of peace than it has so far.

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, August 14, 1978, 1355Z

204867. For Ambassadors Lewis and Eilts from Saunders. Subject: Message to Begin on Israeli Settlements. Ref: Cairo 18867.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2296. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo.

² In telegram 18867 from Cairo, August 14, the Embassy reported on a conversation between Eilts and Egyptian Ministry of Information Under Secretary Mursi Saad El-Din in which the latter responded to Eilts' request to "lower" the public media rhetoric vis-à-vis the Israeli Government in advance of the Camp David Summit. Saad El-Din pointed out that an Israeli Cabinet announcement of August 13—which stated that Israel intended to establish five new West Bank settlements—caused "embarrassment for

1. For Lewis. Secretary has asked me to send you the following text of a message from him to Prime Minister Begin.³ Begin text:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We have just heard of the rumored plan to establish five new settlements on the West Bank. As you will remember after the historic steps of last fall, a principal reason the peace negotiations very soon ran into trouble was the action taken with respect to settlements. I am deeply concerned, and urge you not to take any step which would undermine the Camp David meetings or subsequent peace negotiations.

Please inform me directly what your plans are so that I can help to ease the concern being expressed here and in Egypt. End text.

2. In passing this on, you may relate it to the Secretary's conversations with Begin and Sadat⁴ on cooling the rhetoric before the Camp David meetings. The text of the message gives you a peg on which to hand [*hang?*] this point.

3. For Eilts. We are providing you with the text of the Secretary's message to Begin only for your background so you will have the flavor of it. However, the Secretary has asked that you get word to Kamel that, as we understand it, no Israeli Cabinet action has been taken on new settlements, but we have been in touch urgently with the Israeli Government and are awaiting their response. We will say this publicly and will also state that our position on settlements remains unchanged. Secretary, as of this moment, plans to make this statement himself when he faces the microphones following his closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning (Monday).

Vance

Sadat." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2078) Details of the decision to establish five nahal settlements in the Jordan River valley, made in secret by the Israeli Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs in June, are in telegram 10343 from Tel Aviv, August 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0595)

³ In telegram 10411 from Tel Aviv, August 15, Lewis stated that Vance's message was delivered to Evron on August 14 for delivery to Begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1595)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 5.

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, August 15, 1978, 1104Z

10418. For the Secretary, Atherton and Saunders from Ambassador. Subject: Some Thoughts on Camp David Strategy.

1. The big problem at Camp David will be to get Begin to agree to certain phrases in a declaration of principles which will be like castor oil for him. Dayan and many others are skeptical that he will bring himself to swallow the medicine, since he would have to walk away from a lifetime conviction about Israel's right to rule over the West Bank. But there is a chance he will rise to the historic moment, which he knows may be his last and best chance to become the Prime Minister who brought peace to Israel.

2. To have any hope of bringing Begin around will require far more than just another vague indication that with "satisfactory" language about the West Bank and Gaza in hand, Sadat would then go to Hussein to seek his participation, and if refused, might then shoulder the Palestinian problem himself. Begin will need much more than that to show for abandoning his ideological position, especially with his associates in Herut.

3. Put another way, the GOI will be asking what Israel will get from Sadat for acquiescing publicly on the principle of withdrawal. (Explicitly promising eventual Arab sovereignty is, I think, out of the question for Begin.) To get from Begin what Sadat needs will require him to make concrete certain understandings at which he has only hinted to the Israelis thus far. The goal should be a mutually agreed, specific framework coming out of the summit for a final, if phased, settlement in Sinai. Less from Sadat will bring less from Begin. Sadat's seriousness about peace will be judged here by his seriousness about a concrete agreement over Sinai, whatever is said about the West Bank and Gaza.

4. Nobody knows how far Begin is willing to go to reach an agreement with Sadat, probably not even Begin himself. What I am sure of is that the Prime Minister's final fallback will not emerge unless Sadat shows flexibility that has been notably absent from recent Egyptian statements, both public and private. In order to leave his past behind, Begin will have to be sure that Sadat will make a deal—not just talk

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House.

about one, but eventually make one. Thus, we will no doubt be faced in the September meeting with Begin and Sadat each waiting for the other to blink. That of course is where our own ideas come in. But in my view, we must take great care not [garble] through our own intervention the stark clarity of Begin's own choice.

5. His first interest will be to blame stalemate, if it occurs, on Sadat's inflexibility. In that case, it will not be enough for us to argue that Sadat was prepared *rpt* prepared to be flexible in private *rpt* private. The Israelis have heard that song before, and most do not now believe it. If Camp David were to fail, then it would be critically important for the subsequent political debate here and in the U.S. that Begin be seen as rejecting Sadat's clear, forthcoming and public offer, or Sadat's acceptance of U.S. compromise proposals. If Begin adheres to his previous position, if Sadat does pretty much the same, and if the U.S. puts forward ideas to bridge the gap which neither side accepts, Begin will return to Israel generally applauding the President's effort and specifically blaming the failure on Anwar Sadat. Most Israelis will believe him.

6. As far as is possible, we must seek in the Camp David talks to avoid giving Begin this way out. The choice for Begin, and for Israel should be as clear as we can make it. And that will require at Camp David a still flexible Anwar Sadat, ready to further moderate his positions, and recognizable as such by the majority of people in Israel.

7. Since moments of such clarity are as rare in international politics as anywhere else, we may not be able to pull this off. But we should try, and in the first instance that means the President should talk to Sadat along these lines at the outset. I recognize such a course will surely cause Sadat serious problems with his Arab brothers. In compensation, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship would be reinforced for the foreseeable future, a not inconsiderable achievement for him as well as for us. But if Sadat holds back at Camp David, his Jerusalem initiative will be dead and buried as far as Israelis are concerned, and that includes those most critical of the Begin government's present policy.²

Lewis

² Lewis sent a second telegram on August 17, in which he observed that Sadat's "flexibility" in the negotiations would mean agreement to a deferred resolution of the sovereignty issue until after a five year interim period, a "border rectification" on the West Bank "measured in kilometers and not in meters," an Israeli security presence on the West Bank beyond the interim period, and agreement to negotiate an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza if Hussein refused to participate. (Telegram 10589 from Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978)

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, August 16, 1978, 0116Z

207141. Subject: Message to Begin on Settlements. Ref: State 204867.²

Following for your information is Prime Minister Begin's reply to the Secretary's message of August 14, as delivered by Israeli Embassy August 15. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I thank you for your kind message of August 14th which reached me first thing this morning upon my return from a brief but fine vacation.

I understand your message was written before our cabinet resolved³ to suspend all decisions with regard to the five proposed nahal settlements until after the Camp David meeting.

I wish to use this opportunity, Mr. Secretary, to inform you of two basic facts:

—A) Nahal is a formation within the framework of the Israel Defense Forces.

—B) The most recent decision to establish five new nahal outposts in the Jordan Valley was originally taken on June 18, seven weeks before the idea of the forthcoming tripartite meeting was conceived.

I am informed that certain commentators in the U.S. media have expressed the opinion that Israel, by its alleged acts, was actually seeking to torpedo the Camp David meeting. You will perceive from the facts, Mr. Secretary, that nothing could be further from the truth. And truth, as always, will prevail.

May I repeat to you my profound conviction that whilst I believe all of the three countries concerned are interested in the success of the Camp David meeting, none is more so than the State of Israel.

In conclusion, Mr. Secretary, I wish to respectfully remark on one particular sentence in your recent message. It reads: 'as you will remember after the historic steps of last fall, a principal reason the peace

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2308. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by James P. Covey (NEA/IAI); cleared by Korn, Houghton, Ann K. Korky (NEA), and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Korn. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo.

² See Document 8.

³ August 14.

negotiations very soon ran into trouble was the action taken with respect to settlements.'

I am compelled to differ. In certain quarters this was given as an excuse. It was never the cause. I have heard many excuses why the January talks in Jerusalem were so abruptly suspended to your surprise and mine, the latest being the speech made by Foreign Minister Dayan at the very inception of the meeting.

All this however, belongs to the past. I am looking ahead to our important consultations in which we have all agreed to embark for the sake of peace.

I shall be grateful, Mr. Secretary, if you would bring this letter to the knowledge of the President.

With best wishes, Sincerely, Menachem Begin.

End text.

2. We do not plan to respond.

Vance

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

Washington, August 16, 1978, 0148Z

205958. Subject: Presidential Letter on Camp David Summit.

1. Please pass the following letter from President Carter to President Assad ASAP.² There will be no rpt no signed original to follow.

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: I wish to share with you some of my thoughts on the forthcoming Middle East meeting at Camp David.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332–1115. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by the White House; cleared by W. Nathaniel Howell (NEA/ARN) and Thomas C. Martin (S/S–O); approved by Veliotis. On August 11, Vance sent a draft copy of the letter, along with a list of suggested recipients, to Carter. This draft copy, with Carter's handwritten amendments, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 52, Middle East: Camp David Cables and Memos, 8/1–15/78. In telegrams 205956 to Amman and 205956 to Jidda, both August 16, the Department transmitted individualized versions of this letter to Hussein and Khalid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332–1118 and D780332–1113 respectively)

² Seelye reported that he delivered Carter's letter to Dabboul on August 16 for immediate transmittal to Assad. (Telegram 4717 from Damascus, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335–0306)

I know from our talks in Geneva³ of your own deep desire for a just and lasting peace. My understanding is that Syria continues to adhere to the relevant Security Council resolutions constituting the basis for a negotiated settlement and has left the door open to rejoining the negotiations if conditions acceptable to Syria are met. We are gratified that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have both responded positively to the invitation to meet with me next month in a major new effort to establish a framework for a Middle East peace settlement.

We have purposely not set a fixed duration for the talks, scheduled to begin on September 6, so as to be able to allow as much time as is needed for our efforts to succeed. This is an encouraging indication of the seriousness with which these parties are approaching this meeting.

I extended this invitation because I believe we have reached a crucial point in the search for peace in the Middle East. Nine months have passed since President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin opened significant new possibilities for negotiations with the historic meetings in Jerusalem and in Ismailia. The sides have made progress toward resolving some of the issues that divide them at this time, but recently, as you are aware, an impasse was threatened. I am convinced that we cannot afford an impasse, since the positions would then harden and the atmosphere deteriorate to the point where the present opportunity for peace could well become another of the lost opportunities that have marked the history of this tragic conflict.

The objective of the Camp David meeting will remain as it has been defined by the two sides themselves in negotiations this year: to make progress toward an agreement on a framework, based on Security Council Resolution 242, that would allow steady progress toward agreement on specific issues, within the context of the agreed goal of a stable, just and comprehensive peace. An agreed framework such as the United States is seeking might ultimately make it possible for other parties to the conflict, including Syria, to rejoin the peace negotiations.

Our experience in attempting to facilitate and promote negotiations this past year has demonstrated that it is impossible to carry negotiations beyond a certain point on the crucial issues unless the heads of government themselves can be engaged in a direct exchange. This was one of the considerations that led me to the decision to extend invitations to the two leaders to meet with me at Camp David. Our objective will be to achieve agreements at the political level which can provide guidance for the negotiators on the key issues. I plan to do everything

³ Carter met Assad in Geneva on May 9, 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 32.

within my power to help President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin achieve the progress for which we are all searching.

As we move into this crucial new phase of the Middle East negotiations, I wanted to share with you my reasons for taking this step and thoughts about what we hope to accomplish. I am aware of your concerns but I also hope that you will keep an open mind about the contribution such talks might make. I would welcome your own thoughts.

With my best wishes, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

Christopher

12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Camp David

The State Department will give you a comprehensive book² regarding substance, procedure, and schedule. At this point I would only like to make the following points:

1. The three leaders will *not* be truly in the same boat. Sadat cannot afford a failure and he *knows it*; both Sadat and Begin think you cannot

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 7–9/78. Secret; Sensitive. Outside System. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

² Vance sent the briefing book, designed to be a “first round of reading in preparation for the Camp David meetings,” to Carter under an undated covering memorandum. (Carter Library, Vertical File, Camp David Study Papers) In a second attached undated memorandum to Carter, Vance outlined the eight parts of the briefing book, covering objectives, meeting scenarios, model documents, the conduct of meetings and the personalities involved, building public support, the international environment in which the talks will take place, possible outcomes, and the “Nine Points” paper presented to Begin and Sadat in February 1978. Carter added the handwritten notation: “To Begin & Sadat: Analysis of consequences of failure. More ambitious goals. Communications w/Hussein. Inform Soviets at all?” (Ibid.) Quandt wrote in his account of the talks that Vance, Saunders, Atherton, and himself worked out the basis of this briefing at the Middleburg strategy meeting. (Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 212–213) Quandt submitted an August 17 memorandum to Brzezinski analyzing the briefing book and outlining his “reservations” with it. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 7–9/78)

afford a failure; but Begin probably feels that a Camp David failure is Sadat's and Carter's failure but not his own. Begin might well calculate that Sadat will be undermined and your policy will be discredited. Thus things will eventually return to what they were before you initiated the active search for peace.

2. It follows from the foregoing that you will have to make it very clear to both of them, but especially to Begin, that failure at Camp David will have directly adverse consequences for relations with the United States. In addition, failure is likely to reintroduce the Soviet Union into the region.

3. Sadat will define success in terms of substance, particularly in regards to withdrawal. Begin will define success largely in terms of procedure, since he prefers procedural arrangements to substantive concessions.

4. The above, in turn, means that you will have to extract substantive concessions from Begin, while persuading Sadat to settle for less than an explicit commitment to full withdrawal and return to 1967 lines with minor modifications.

5. You should avoid being overly absorbed in details or specific formulations, particularly during the first few days. Both Sadat and Begin will be trying to manipulate you to side with them, and Begin in particular will try to draw you into the details and verbal formulations that he enjoys discussing as a way of avoiding decisions. The State briefing papers include specific language on a number of substantive issues, but this should be thought of as illustrative, not as something you will want to introduce in the initial talks. As a point of reference, the attached table gives some idea of possible formulations on the central issues of withdrawal, borders, security, and sovereignty that we might try to get Sadat and Begin to accept.

Attachment

Table³

undated

<i>Illustrative Language on Central Issues</i>		
	<u>Minimum Objective</u>	<u>Maximum Objective</u>
I. <i>Withdrawal</i>	"Withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 in conformity with Resolution 242, including the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."	"Withdrawal <i>on all fronts</i> from territories occupied in 1967. . . ."
II. <i>Borders</i>	"Borders should be established on the West Bank/Gaza that satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and the security needs of Israel."	"Borders should be established in conditions of security and peace that <i>approximate the lines existing between 1949 and 1967</i> , with modifications as agreed among the parties."
III. <i>Security</i>	"Special security arrangements, including demilitarization, etc."	"Special security arrangements, <i>including a continuing Israeli presence</i> at strategic locations as agreed among the parties."
IV. <i>Sovereignty</i>	"The question of sovereignty will be resolved by negotiations by the end of the five-year period."	"The question of sovereignty will be resolved by negotiations <i>in conformity with all the principles of Resolution 242</i> by the end of the five-year period."

³ Secret; Sensitive.

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, August 18, 1978, 1606Z

19298. For Secretary, Atherton and Saunders only from Ambassador. Subject: Thoughts on Camp David Strategy. Ref: (A) State 207516² (B) Tel Aviv 10589.³

1. To my mind, our objective at Camp David should be obtaining arrangements, whether they be in a declaration of principles or in some other form, that do more than get us through this round of talks. They should be rooted in the realities of the area situation if they are not to be blown away with the first political gusts, which Camp David will inevitably generate. Both Sadat and Begin should be urged to be as flexible as possible, but form as well as substance should be carefully considered.

2. This said, and with all respect to Sam,⁴ I think some of the ideas suggested ref B would, if accepted, court grief and impermanence. The Secretary may know more from his private talk with Sadat⁵ than I do about how far he is willing to go, but Sadat's credibility at home and in the Arab world would be seriously impugned if he came home with the type of arrangements Sam suggests. Sadat would be accused of having bought a pig in a poke. He would in effect have agreed to a significant territorial compromise in the West Bank and to go ahead with concrete Sinai arrangements in return for some vague Israeli commitment that the sovereignty issue will be decided after five years—no one knows how—and acceptance of Begin's home rule plan.⁶ If Begin even refuses to bite the bullet on sovereignty, after Sadat has accepted other points, it will be cold comfort for Sadat to know that the Israeli Prime Minister may thereafter be criticized at home. Sadat's concessions, like those he made earlier on normalization, will from that time on be pocketed by whatever Israeli Government is in office and negotiations will in effect have to start from there. Sadat will look foolish to his people and the Arabs and, worse still, the US-sponsored peace process will be discredited.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 207516 to Tel Aviv, August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2311)

³ See footnote 2, Document 9.

⁴ Samuel Lewis.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 5.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 5.

3. In my judgment, if there is to be any chance of Sadat's being able to sell to Hussein, the Palestinians and the Saudis (as well as to his own military and public) whatever arrangements emerge from Camp David, careful packaging will be required. Any West Bank territorial compromise that may emerge should be strictly cast in the context of "minor", a term which has never been carefully defined and should therefore lend itself to some reasonable elasticity in interpretation, provided this is not too blatant. If the Israelis openly call such a concept territorial compromise, Sadat will have trouble selling what he has accepted. It seems to me that within the context of "minor" rectifications, the Peres proposed (but subsequently dropped) language at Vienna could be considered, namely "there will be changes in the borders between the West Bank and Israel which satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and satisfy the security of Israel".⁷ Sadat has accepted this. And all of this should be wrapped in a resounding reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. I know that this will be hard for Begin to swallow, but we may be asking Sadat to swallow even more bitter medicine.

4. As far as the Israeli security presence on the West Bank is concerned, demilitarization ought to be the objective, but it is a word that may be difficult to sell. The concept, on the other hand, should be saleable to Sadat, depending upon how it is put. At this stage, we may be well advised to limit any public declaration to something general, i.e., "adequate security arrangements will be worked out".

5. I frankly am at a total loss as to how Sadat can conclude a full peace treaty or something less on the West Bank by himself. It would be nice if he could, as he sometimes says he will, but he cannot do so and hope to make it stick. Nothing that he negotiates in the West Bank gives any form of legitimacy to the interim regime. As I have previously stated, it will be building on quicksand and will not endure.

6. There is much in the Begin plan⁸ that makes good sense were its authorship not so suspect in Arab eyes. But ending the Israeli occupation and setting up self-government, if it is to be acceptable in the Arab world at large, should be with the consent of all of the parties, including the Palestinians. It is not enough to have self-rule delegated by the Israeli Military Government. That's an important point.

7. Israeli settlement activities, though now temporarily stopped, will have to be addressed. Knowing our position, the Israelis have regularly sought to pull the wool over our eyes until caught flagrante delicto, so that admission was inescapable. The Israelis, for reasons which

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 264.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 177.

from their point may be understandable, want to change the demographic picture in the West Bank. Despite Dayan's talk about only individuals being allowed to purchase land, I suspect that the Israelis will continue to try to create facts on the ground that will affect what happens in five years. Given this situation, the illegality of large scale Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank should be reaffirmed if Sadat is to sell some unpalatable territorial concessions to confreres.

8. Since the Camp David meeting may bring us to the crunch, I have one other general observation to make with which Sam may or may not agree. Despite his sense of U.S. pressure, Mr. Begin strikes me as being in an advantageous position. If Sadat does not agree to his territorial demands, the Egyptian President can be depicted as being at fault; if Sadat agrees to those territorial demands, that's all the better; if Sadat subsequently goes under because of such agreement, well—that's just too bad because Mr. Begin knew all along the unreliability of the Arabs and, anyway, it removes the one Arab leader who successfully challenged Israel's longtime sole claim on the affections of the American people; and if it fails because of Begin's own unwillingness to go the extra mile, this can be explained away at home and any opposition criticism will be manageable for as adroit a political leader as Mr. Begin. Sadat has no such advantage. He must come out with something saleable or he is in trouble, his already faltering peace initiative will be irrevocably damaged, and the validity of his reliance on the United States will be perceived by his own people and the Arabs as having been misplaced.

9. The above are general thoughts based on reftels. It is difficult to be specific in the absence of some more precise indication of what our objectives will be at Camp David. As requested elsewhere, I am preparing a series of messages⁹ on the political/economic dynamics of Egypt which I hope to submit next week and which will spell out in greater length the constraints under which even the normally venture-some Sadat will have to work.

Eilts

⁹ On August 21–22, Eilts sent three telegrams to the Department on the political and economic dynamics of Egypt as they affected the peace process. Telegram 19438 from Cairo, August 21, discussed the basic political, economic, and social institutions in Egypt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2107) Telegram 19415 from Cairo, August 21, discussed Sadat's personal compulsions and constraints as he approached the Camp David talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2098) Telegram 19474 from Cairo, August 22, provided an analysis of Sadat himself. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2125) A separate paper, sent in telegram 19377 from Cairo, August 21, overviewed the current state of the Egyptian economy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780341–0199)

14. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Perceptions of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978

1. Attached for your information is a report [*1 line not declassified*] concerning Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's observations of the Camp David Summit in which he has expressed hope for the attainment of two separate but related achievements.

2. This information, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], is a raw report, not finally evaluated intelligence. The report is also being made available to the Secretary of State.

Stansfield Turner

Attachment

Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency²

undated

SUBJECT

Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Perceptions of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978

1. [*less than 1 line not declassified*], Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that despite anticipated difficulties, he has hopes for the success of the Camp David Summit. He stated that the participation of President Jimmy Carter in the peace process makes possible, if not probable, the attainment of two separate but related achievements. The first achievement would be a two-part publicly announced agreement to include the acceptance of principles, based on UN Resolution 242, coupled with an agreement on the Pales-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 9, Camp David Talks: [State Department Briefing Book]: 9/78. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the document reads: "Outside the System. Bill Quandt."

² Secret; Sensitive.

tinian question based on the Aswan Formula announced by President Carter at Aswan, Egypt in January 1978.³

2. The second achievement, to be won through hard bargaining, would be a precisely written secret agreement on the framework for a Middle East peace settlement. This secret agreement would be signed by both President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin with a witnessing signature by President Carter. The reason President Sadat would insist on a written document witnessed by President Carter is to prevent subsequent statements by the two parties—either inadvertently or deliberately—misinterpreting the understanding reached between the leaders of Egypt and Israel.

3. In defining what he meant by a precise agreement on the framework for a Middle East peace, President Sadat stated that both he and Prime Minister Begin had to agree on a clear definition of all the major aspects of a Middle East settlement. Following the acceptance of this major, overall framework of agreement, details would then be worked out by committees, hopefully to include the participation of other Arab nations also.

4. President Sadat's own basic tenet for a framework of an agreement allows for considerable flexibility on details, but no compromise on sovereignty or territory—except for minor adjustments on the West Bank.

5. President Sadat proposed the Palestinian question as one example of the need for both a public and a secret agreement. Whereas the public statement could announce an agreement on the Aswan Formula as a basis for the Palestinian issue, secret negotiations would need to address Israeli concerns regarding which Palestinians would be the future leaders of a Palestinian West Bank.

6. President Sadat stated that President Carter's participation is essential because he (President Sadat) has lost the trust and confidence which he had in Prime Minister Begin, and now he must fall back on his trust in President Carter's sincerity and fairness. President Sadat felt that if he and Prime Minister Begin reached a precise written understanding and if President Carter witnessed that written understanding, then the peace process could indeed take a major step forward.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, footnote 4, Document 187.

15. Report Prepared in the Vice Directorate for Production, Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DIAIAPPR 202–78

Washington, August 22, 1978

SYRIA-ISRAEL: COLLISION OVER LEBANON (U)

Summary

(C/NOFORN) *Syrian and Israeli policies in Lebanon appear to be evolving in a direction that will lead to a major confrontation. This possibility has little to do with the tactical situation in Beirut or in southern Lebanon, but is a consequence of fundamentally contradictory policies. Syria must remain involved in Lebanon if it is to achieve a solution favorable to its own regional interests. Israel, meanwhile, appears to seek an end of Syrian presence there. For Israel, the coming clash with Syria in Lebanon represents the awakening of a conflict that has lain largely dormant since the spring of 1976.*

Background

(C/NOFORN) After more than two years of overt involvement in Lebanon, Syria's goal of developing a unified, stable, and responsive state on its western border seems more remote than ever. No visible progress has been made on the basic problems complicating the Lebanese situation; no strong central authority has emerged, no national consensus favoring unity has developed, and powerful armed groups opposed to Syrian aims have not been neutralized. The latter problem is the most immediate.

(C/NOFORN) Syria's current difficulties are with its erstwhile allies-of-convenience, the Christian militias of the Phalange and the National Liberal Party. When Syria first intervened overtly in Lebanon in 1976, the Christians were being worsted by the combined forces of the Muslim Leftists and the Palestinians. Syria feared that if that coalition should triumph, the emergent Lebanon would risk coming under radical Arab influence—particularly that of Syria's arch enemy, Iraq. Out of fear for Syria's strategic interests, Damascus moved against the Muslim coalition, effectively siding with the Christians. That threat was eventually suppressed, but the Christians soon turned on their "rescuers", realizing that Syria intended neither to dismantle the Palestinian forces nor permit the Christians to reassert their ante bellum hegemony in Lebanon.

(C/NOFORN) The Christians utilized the respite afforded by Syrian intervention to improve substantially their military posture and

¹ Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Historical Collection, Box MEA-1 (5 of 12), 1977–1979. Secret; NoFORN.

have emerged as the most powerful non-Syrian force in Lebanon. At a minimum, they are capable of defending the areas under their control against the Muslim Leftists and Palestinians. It is clear that if the Christians cannot dominate a new Lebanon, they will try to fragment the country along confessional lines to achieve unencumbered political dominance in the areas—the richest in Lebanon—under their control. This objective has brought them into direct conflict with the Syrians. The first clash occurred at Fayadiyah in February 1978, and since then the tempo of fighting has increased. The results have not been disappointing to the Christians, and they seem more determined than ever to thwart Syrian designs.

(C/NOFORN) For its part, Israel's policy toward the Syrian presence in Lebanon has until recently reflected some ambivalence. In late 1975 and early 1976, Tel Aviv expressed strong opposition to Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil conflict because of the threats such a development would pose to Israel's security. Of particular concern was the threat to Lebanon's status as a Christian-dominated non-confrontation state, and that posed by a Syrian military presence along Israel's northern border. The careful manner in which Syria handled its escalating intervention in Lebanon, its tacit acknowledgement of Israeli security concerns, US pressure on Israel not to over-react to Syrian moves, and the transitory security benefits that the Syrian involvement provided Israel allowed Israeli officials to come to accept a carefully controlled Syrian presence in Lebanon. Israel at times was called upon to control Syria's actions, but at no time did Israel appear to be moving to end Syrian involvement. Tel Aviv, however, never accepted that the Syrian presence should become either permanent or dominant and, to a very real degree, Syria is in Lebanon at Israel's sufferance. It now appears that the Israeli Government has decided to end the Syrian adventure in Lebanon.

Discussion

Syria's Position and Options

(S/NOFORN) In the face of its difficult position in Lebanon, Damascus has three basic options: withdraw from Lebanon; confront the militias and prepare for a prolonged occupation; or temporize and hope for favorable developments. Syria has so far pursued the third option, partly out of natural caution and partly out of fear of the repercussions from exercising options one or two. The third option, however, is beginning to prove counterproductive. No favorable developments are on the horizon, and a series of escalating clashes, separated by tense cease-fires of more and more limited duration, has been occurring. Christian hardliners appear intent on provoking a Syrian military attack in the belief that Israel will come to their assistance. So far, how-

ever, there is no indication that President Assad, who would personally make the decision to implement one of the other options, has decided to do so. Nevertheless, Christian provocations and the unproductiveness of the present policy probably will eventually force him to reconsider. A withdrawal from Lebanon—partial or complete—would be an open admission of a massive policy failure and would entail serious risks to the stability of the Assad regime. Before taking such an irreversible and dangerous step, Assad will most likely essay a military solution. Although Damascus is thoroughly aware of the Israeli factor in such a decision, Tel Aviv's low profile during the fighting in Beirut in the latter half of July may have led Syria to believe that Israeli support of the Christians has its limits. Certainly, there is some support in the Syrian military—especially in Lebanon—and government for a more militant policy. At some point, it will probably seem preferable to probe Israel's commitment to the Christians, rather than move directly to the withdrawal option. However, if Damascus feels it can count on Israeli forbearance, it is probably miscalculating. In the final analysis, Tel Aviv will not permit the Christians to be crushed.

Israeli Perceptions and Responses

(S/NOFORN) The developments that prompted Israel to shift its policy are not known, but Israeli policymakers may have concluded after early July that Syria had no intention of ever leaving Lebanon; there was no chance to restore Lebanon to a unified state; and that Syria would inevitably attempt to crush the Christians. They probably reasoned that, if these conclusions proved correct, Israel's ultimate nightmare of a Syrian puppet state on its northern border would become an accomplished fact.

(S/NOFORN) Israel has consistently opposed such a development and has worked to avoid it. Additionally, termination of Syria's presence would remove a direct threat to Israel's northern border and leave the Christians in a dominant military-political position. Ultimately of course, such a policy would lead to the Balkanization of Lebanon. This, however, has already occurred to a degree, and Israel might find such a situation quite comfortable.

(S/NOFORN) Israeli actions since early July suggest that it has made and is implementing a decision to force a Syrian withdrawal. Tel Aviv provided an unprecedented level of support to the Christians following Syrian shelling of east Beirut in early July, and allegedly encouraged the Christians to harass Syrian forces. The Israelis have made increasing references to the need for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and have alleged Syrian intentions to massacre the Christians.

(S/NOFORN) Pursuit of such a policy is not without risks, for dealing with the mercurial Christian leadership is at best a delicate pro-

cedure. Israel is quite experienced in this and is certainly aware of the problems involved. Nevertheless, the Christian militias are an available tool with which to bring pressure to bear on the Syrians, and Israel may believe that if this leads to a showdown with Damascus, the Syrians will back down in the face of Israeli threats.

Outlook

(S/NOFORN) There is a real possibility of a miscalculation by one side or the other in this situation. While not seeking a confrontation with Syria, Israel's actions risk it. The future status of Lebanon is, however, a strategic problem for Israel and not merely a sideshow in the security and foreign affairs arena. Hence, Israel is probably willing to run even major risks. For its part, Syria appears more likely than ever before to probe Israel's will in Lebanon. The implication of these respective policies is that both powers are seemingly embarked on courses of action that risk a major confrontation in the Middle East, perhaps not in the immediate, but almost certainly within the foreseeable future.

16. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Ismailia, August 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Meeting with President Sadat re Camp David

PARTICIPANTS

President Anwar al-Sadat
Vice President Mohamed Husni Mubarak
Ambassador Hermann Fr. Eilts

I met with Sadat for one and a half hours in Ismailia. Vice President Mubarak was also present.

I first briefed Sadat on our current thinking on the scenario for the Camp David talks. I told him the thought is to devote part of the first day to bilaterals between President Carter and each of the two visiting leaders. Thereafter, the scenario might develop depending upon how

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an August 28 covering memorandum from Eilts to Vance, sent through Atherton, in which Eilts summarized Sadat's main points. (Ibid.)

the talks progress. Sadat said that this arrangement is agreeable to him. He is anxious to have the opportunity to have an in-depth talk with President Carter prior to the first trilateral meeting. I then told the President that I was returning to Washington the following day and asked if he had any thoughts he wished me to convey. President Sadat asked that I convey his warm greetings to President Carter and the Secretary and to outline to them his preliminary thinking as follows:

He first said that we should leave the Israelis to what he called their own misimpressions. The Israelis believe that he will be seeking a declaration of principles. This, Sadat stressed, is not his immediate objective. We should seek what President Carter has already stated, namely, a framework for a comprehensive settlement. Sadat noted that Begin has spoken of wanting President Carter to act as a “broker”, not as a full partner. Sadat was happy that President Carter has reaffirmed his willingness to be a full partner. He will want to discuss with President Carter their common strategy.

As he had stated, he will not be asking for an immediate declaration of principles. This is still desirable, but should be handled at another level. At the Head of Government level, the focus should be on what President Carter has said, namely, a framework for a comprehensive settlement. This is the very least that should come out of the Camp David meeting. The framework should be a written document signed by Egypt and Israel. Such a written document should be the Camp David achievement.

Sadat continued that he has not yet formulated his strategy in detail. He is still working on it and will in the next week or so concentrate on fleshing out his ideas. He already had some broad ideas in mind, however.

First, Sadat noted, President Carter should be prepared for a “confrontation” between Sadat and Begin. But, as he had told the Secretary, President Carter should be assured that he, Sadat, will not let him down. It will, nevertheless, require a confrontation with Begin. He reiterated that he will want to discuss his strategy with President Carter when they meet on September 6.

Sadat said that he considers the Camp David meeting to be a turning point. It will be a crucial meeting, especially if—as he hopes will be the case—the meeting creates some movement in the stalled peace process.

Sadat wants President Carter and the Secretary to be sure that he has taken into account all considerations that they have previously discussed in formulating his strategy. Apart from land and sovereignty, be it Sinai or Golan, everything is negotiable. Here Sadat noted that he will not be speaking for Syria, but any plans that are developed at Camp David will presumably also apply to the Golan. He will, however, be

speaking for the West Bank and Gaza. On the West Bank, Sadat stated he will prepare himself for “flexibility”. (He did not elaborate on what he had in mind.) He went on to say that in anything he negotiates, it will not only be Egyptians, but the Saudis as well who should support it. The Saudi position is terribly important. The U.S. has great interests in Saudi Arabia and has had a historical relationship with that country. If a satisfactory framework can be achieved, the Saudis will support it. He had the previous day received a message from Prince Fahd in reply to the President’s letter to King Khalid.² Fahd’s message had stated that, apart from relinquishment of Arab land and sovereignty, the Saudis will support him in whatever he agrees upon.

I said I was glad to hear that there will be flexibility in his West Bank ideas but noted that some of his closest colleagues contend that Egypt has no mandate to discuss West Bank matters. How did he see this aspect of the problem? Sadat agreed that the lack of a clear-cut mandate from either the Arabs, Hussein or the Palestinians poses a problem for Egypt in negotiating West Bank matters. But, Sadat observed, if he neglects to negotiate the West Bank, which means the Palestinian case, he will in effect be pressed into appearing to negotiate for a separate Sinai settlement with Begin. This, as he put it, will subject him to criticism by the Soviets and the rejectionist Arabs. A separate agreement for the Sinai will strengthen the Soviets in the area. This should, at all costs, be avoided. The second reason why he is prepared to negotiate for the West Bank is the position of Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. He noted that Egypt has half the population of the Arab world. Real power lies in Egypt. Israel recognized this in the October ’73 war. The Syrians were finished in 48 hours, but it took 19 days before the Israelis bested the Egyptians. Even then, they would not have been able to do so if the U.S. satellite photography had not been furnished to the Israelis. This satellite photography had revealed his 25th Division preparing to cross the Canal. Egyptian leadership in the Arab world will be totally damaged if he were to discuss only Sinai. An agreement on a framework of peace signed with Egypt will give the Israelis the endorsement of the largest Arab power. No one can do anything to change this. There may be some terrorism, but there is no real threat to Israel if Egypt is out of the conflict.

He recalled that his Jerusalem trip³ had given Israel legitimacy so far as the Arabs are concerned. On the West Bank, he reiterated that he will show flexibility. The West Bankers, he professed to know from his Jerusalem trip, are with us. This will provide ample legitimacy to any West Bank arrangements he might negotiate. He is ready to proceed

² See footnote 1, Document 11.

³ See footnote 3, Document 4.

with or without Hussein. If there are no Jordanians on Al Aqsa, he is ready to put up an Egyptian flag and deploy Egyptian forces on the West Bank.

Sadat went on to say that there can be no concessions on the Sinai borders. He hoped that whatever proposals the U.S. may make, the idea of Sinai border concessions will not be included. If it is, he will refuse it. This also applies to the sometimes mooted concept of Israeli settlements remaining in Sinai, perhaps under Egyptian Government protection. This is also not acceptable to him. Retention of the Sinai settlements is as a matter of principle refused. He could under no circumstances agree to this. He noted that this is a point of disagreement between him and the U.S. President Carter had at one point or another suggested something along those lines, but he wanted to emphasize that he cannot do this. (He did not spell out why not, but negative Egyptian military reaction has sometimes been cited as the reason why he cannot.) "Let us have no illusions on this matter," Sadat said.

Having said this, Sadat wanted President Carter to know that he will cooperate in making everything go smoothly. On the West Bank, he recognizes there is a security problem for Israel. He is ready to meet that security problem. If Hussein comes in, he is sure Hussein will do the same. If Hussein does not come in, he, Sadat, will take the responsibility. In negotiating the security problem, Sadat suggested that this should include the termination of the Israeli military government immediately after signature of an agreement, and also the withdrawal of Israeli forces. If this can be achieved, it will enable him to get Arab support for the agreement. The rejectionists will disavow it, but no matter. Over 90 percent of the Arabs can be persuaded to support Sadat if such agreement is reached.

When the stage of concrete proposals is reached, Sadat indicated we may want to tell the press about this. He plans to discuss this with President Carter at their first bilateral meeting.

There will be a role for the United States to play in the implementation of the agreement. Begin, Sadat was sure, will oppose it, but Sadat said he wants Begin to come out in the open and to be exposed on his opposition. Sadat stated emphatically that he has no confidence in Begin. It would be better to be negotiating with Peres, Weizman or even Golda Meir. But Begin is the Prime Minister and he will have to be exposed. Begin's idea of partial separate agreements is also "completely excluded". So is the concept of a third disengagement agreement. Sadat said emphatically that he will not sign anything of this sort with Begin.

Apart from this, however, he was sure President Carter will be satisfied with his strategy. As he had said at the outset, he has broad outlines but must still fill in the details. He will probably give President

Carter a written paper on the Egyptian strategy and positions. He plans to meet with Foreign Minister Kamel this week to develop details.

Sadat said he is thinking of “saving President Carter for a major coup.” Begin will be working on a theory that President Carter plans to come out with some proposals. This is what Begin is trying to abort. Perhaps, Sadat said, President Carter will not have to make any proposals or suggestions. He, Sadat, is thinking of doing something along the lines of his Jerusalem visit that might vitiate the need for an American proposal at this time. He did not at this time wish to elaborate.

President Sadat said that he will need President Carter in what he called a Dullesian⁴ exercise in brinksmanship. “This man Begin,” he said, “is totally against any agreement except on his terms.” Sadat’s strategy is that President Carter and he come out “victorious,” whatever the results of the Camp David talks might be. Begin is trying to “hit” at President Carter, but Begin will find that this turns into a trap for him.

As I was leaving, I asked whether Sadat has had any further thoughts on bringing Gamasy. Sadat said he does not plan to bring him. To do so will only give Begin the opportunity to divert the discussions by suggesting that the Defense Ministers might be tasked with discussing difficult matters. If agreement is reached and a need arises for Gamasy to come in order to work out details, Sadat noted that Mubarak can send the general to Washington within twenty-four hours.

⁴ Reference is to John Foster Dulles who was Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, August 28, 1978, 1528Z

6941. Subject: Message to President Carter From King Hussein.

1. Royal Court Chief Sharaf presented Charge August 28 the following message to President Carter from King Hussein.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, Middle East–1978. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President, Thank you for your letter² of August 15, 1978 in which you kindly acquainted me with your views and thoughts regarding the future meeting at Camp David. Your initiative in arranging this meeting reflected your personal courage and profound sense of commitment to peace in our region and in the world. I am particularly grateful and satisfied at your assurance that your efforts at Camp David will be guided by your views on a just and lasting peace which have been the subject of our talks and contacts since the beginning.

—Allow me, in return, to put before you our views of the present situation and the prospects of future progress.

—Before President Sadat's unprecedented initiative, Jordan was seeking to build a consensus among the Arab States [garble] people. These efforts I was conducting while in close consultation with you and within our agreed framework. The idea would have assisted in overcoming the serious procedural obstacles, the problem of coordination among the Arab parties and the issue of Palestinian representation in the peace talks. President Sadat's surprising and unprecedented initiative, although brave, led to a deep eruption within the Arab world upsetting the atmosphere of cooperation necessary for achieving a comprehensive settlement. Israel's negative attitude towards all the essential substantive questions in a future settlement, demonstrated in the talks following President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, caused a serious setback in the peace process and the atmosphere in general. It has increased the belief in the Arab countries that the Israeli Government is opposed to a total withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by force in June, 1967 under any circumstances, and it does not intend to allow any reasonable solution of the Palestinian question based on recognition of the right of the Palestinian people, recognized in many United Nations Resolutions, or the right to participate under conditions of freedom in solving the Palestinian problem and in exercising their legitimate human right of self determination. More than at any time previously, Mr. President, I am now sadly persuaded of this. The revelations resulting from President Sadat's initiative have brought us in the Arab world to this unavoidable conclusion. This is not to say that we in Jordan are any less convinced of the necessity and urgency of achieving a peaceful settlement and more precisely a lasting peace in the area. But we have now a more realistic assessment of the prospects of such a settlement. For us in Jordan, the situation has always been particularly unique and delicate in view of our special relationship

² See footnote 1, Document 11.

with the Palestinian question. The Israeli Government has also added to the obstacles by denying any Jordanian right in the West Bank and refusing to admit that it is occupied Jordanian territory. It is more necessary for us now to have a clear and unambiguous indication that as a result of the process of negotiation Israel would end its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the other territories occupied in June, 1967 and allow a process of self-determination leading to the resolution of the Palestinian problem along lines outlined and with reciprocal guarantees for future mutual security to Arabs and Israelis alike. I am convinced that under such circumstances it would be within our ability not only to participate actively and positively in constructing peace on a solid and lasting basis but also to influence our Arab brethren to participate in the peace process on the basis of the formula you suggested earlier for Geneva or a similar collective framework.

—I do hope and pray that your brave initiative in arranging the forthcoming talks in Camp David would result in the necessary breakthrough. I am sure that you are determined to achieve substantive progress. Permit me, however, to point out that it is feared here in Jordan that the inability to achieve such genuine progress in the talks, as a result of Israel's proven intransigence, might prompt the participants to issue a vague and uncommitting document of principles aimed at de-emphasizing the differences and inviting other participants. It would be unhelpful to move along such a course and, consequently, expose potential participants such as Jordan to unjustified international and local conflicting pressures. It would be unfair and unrealistic to expect Jordan and other Arab parties to shift their stands on principles on such grounds in the absence of genuine indications of an Israeli positive attitude on the substantive questions.

—I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that Jordan remains ready and willing to participate in all peace efforts that have a credible chance of progress and a productive conclusion. We are committed to the ideal of peace in our region and the hope of a just settlement. After the talks in Camp David I hope that we would reopen close consultations regarding the situation. I shall conduct consultations with my Arab partners in this spirit and for the reactivation of the atmosphere of collective search for peace and positive action. I have already conveyed my country's views to President Sadat and I am sure that he understands and appreciates them.

—I wish to thank you again for your confidence and friendship. I hope I can reciprocate and that my country would remain the strong friend and partner to your great country as it has always been and a factor for stability and a force for the preservation of the identity of the area and for honorable peace here and in the world.

—With my best wishes and deep respect. Your sincere friend, Hussein I. End quote.

3. Original letter being pouched to Department (S/S).³

4. Report of Sharaf's background comments on letter being cabled septel.⁴

Suddarth

³ A copy of the original typewritten and signed letter from Hussein to Carter, dated August 27, as forwarded to Brzezinski under a September 11 covering memorandum from Tarnoff, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Jordan: King Hussein, 2/77–2/79. Carter sent a brief response to Hussein's letter on September 2. In the letter, Carter stated appreciation for Hussein's "clear and candid expression of your position regarding the possible participation of Jordan in the negotiations in the future." Carter added, "Both of us are aware of the difficulties involved, but I want you to know that I am determined to spare no effort to achieve genuine progress at Camp David. I am convinced that both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat also want very much to see this meeting succeed. We will be concentrating at the highest political level on the core issues of the just and lasting peace we all seek. I intend to participate actively as a full partner in those efforts." (Telegram 224191 to Amman, September 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780360–0240) Carter's message was delivered to Hussein by Suddarth in London on September 4. (Telegram 7030 from Amman, September 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780360–0732)

⁴ In telegram 6942 from Amman, August 28, Suddarth summarized his August 28 conversation with Sharaf regarding Hussein's letter. After Sharaf reiterated the points contained in Hussein's letter, Suddarth "strongly urged" Jordan to "keep an open mind until after Camp David. Sharaf said it would do so but emphasized that Jordan wants U.S. to know its position clearly before talks start. King [Hussein] had sent a similar letter to Sadat." Suddarth concluded that Hussein's letter "appears to leave little room for Camp David talks to produce enough positive results for Jordan to associate itself with ongoing negotiations, unless a major breakthrough occurs on Israeli willingness to make major change in its position on West Bank withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination—a change which Jordan thinks will not occur." (Telegram 6942 from Amman, August 28; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, Preparations for Camp David Summit—August 1978)

18. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 30, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Aid to the Middle East

As you prepare for the Camp David meeting with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, I believe you should bear in mind a growing predicament in our aid to the Middle East. On the one hand, you should continue to assure both Israel and Egypt that the levels of U.S. economic and military assistance will not be decreased or withheld as leverage in the peace negotiations. On the other hand, there is an increasing disparity between the customary levels of U.S. aid to the Middle East confrontation states and *their actual needs* for assistance.

Below are some of the facts that point up the increasing difficulty in justifying continued high levels of U.S. aid to the Middle East. I am *not* in this memorandum suggesting a reduction in those aid levels in 1980. But I do suggest that you should consider the need to *begin* creating a climate where appropriate reductions will be acceptable diplomatically to Israel and Egypt.

—*Total*: U.S. aid to the four Middle East confrontation states totals \$3.1 billion (see attached table), or 39% of all U.S. bilateral assistance in 1978.

—*Israel*: At \$1.8 billion per year, U.S. aid to Israel amounts to nearly \$500 per capita. Israel's balance-of-payments surplus is expected to be in the range of \$800 million for both 1978 and 1979. This surplus allows Israel to increase its foreign exchange reserves (up 20% since 1976), retire short-term debt, and prepay medium- and long-term commercial debt. GNP growth, low since the 1973 war, is now expected to be in the 5–6% range in 1978 and to increase to 8% in 1979 and beyond. In addition, DOD and intelligence analyses indicate that the current level of Israeli military capabilities insures Israel's security against any likely attack by Arab forces. Preliminary analysis as part of the fall budget process indicates that U.S. aid of \$1 billion would be sufficient to meet Israeli needs.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 52, Middle East: Camp David Cables and Memos, 8/16–31/78. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Brzezinski.

—Although *Egypt* continues to have serious economic problems, its prospects have improved measurably since 1976, largely because of massive aid infusions from the U.S. and the Arab oil states. World Bank, IMF, and USG analyses all project a steady decrease in aid requirements in the future. While total new U.S. aid commitments have been running at about \$1 billion annually, disbursements will reach \$800 million in 1978 after two low years as the program gathered momentum. The “pipeline” of undisbursed AID prior commitments will thus be nearly \$1 billion by the end of this fiscal year. It now appears that new AID supporting assistance of \$600 million rather than the current level of \$750 million, when combined with outlays from the pipeline and food aid (\$200 million annually), will be sufficient to maintain flows of at least \$1 billion through 1981 or 1982. This would more than meet your commitment to President Sadat to maintain aid levels (in disbursement terms) over the next few years. A continuation of new U.S. commitments at the 1979 level would likely permit the wealthy Arab oil producers to reduce their aid.

—Aid levels for *Jordan* and *Syria* are primarily determined by levels for Egypt and Israel. Nevertheless, both of these smaller confrontation states are sufficiently strong economically that they could withstand a reduction in U.S. aid in the context of an overall cut-back of aid to the Middle East.

The disparity between recipient needs and U.S. support levels in the Middle East could be particularly important in making 1980 budget decisions as we consider heavy demands for funds to meet U.S. security interests elsewhere in the world. To meet new demands for assistance to Africa (especially southern Africa), Portugal, Turkey, and Latin America, we expect State to recommend a 1980 security assistance program well in excess of the planning ceiling. This in turn will force difficult tradeoffs with other areas if overall budget objectives are to be met.

Attachment

Table²

undated

*U.S. Aid to Middle East
Confrontation States, 1977–1979*
(in millions of dollars)

	1977	1978	1979 <i>est.</i>
<i>Israel</i>			
Security Supporting Assistance	785	785	785
FMS Credits	1,000 ³	1,000 ⁴	1,000 ⁵
PL 480	11	7	5
Housing Guarantees	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>—</u>
Israel Total	1,821	1,817	1,790
<i>Egypt</i>			
Security Supporting Assistance	699	750	750
PL 480	209	189	185
Military Training	<u>—</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Egypt Total	908	939	935
<i>Jordan</i>			
Security Supporting Assistance	70	93	143 ⁶
FMS Credits	75	75	85
Military Assistance Program	55	55	45
Military Training	1	2	2
PL 480	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>
Jordan Total	210	231	280
<i>Syria</i>			
Security Supporting Assistance	80	80	90
PL 480	<u>20</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>
Syria Total	100	94	102
<i>Grand Total</i>	3,039	3,081	3,107

² Secret.³ 50% of repayments forgiven. [Footnote is in the original.]⁴ 50% of repayments forgiven. [Footnote is in the original.]⁵ 50% of repayments forgiven. [Footnote is in the original.]⁶ Includes Maqarin Dam project presented as a separate regional project. [Footnote is in the original.]

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the White House¹

Tel Aviv, August 30, 1978, 1427Z

11400. NEA for Asst Sec Saunders and Ambassador Lewis. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister Begin on Lebanon. Refs: A) State 220265;² B) Tel Aviv 11335;³ C) State 220266⁴.

1. Summary: the Wednesday morning (Aug. 30) meeting with Prime Minister Begin, Dayan and Weizman centered on Lebanon. All three described the GOI's grave concern over developments there and their convictions that Syria intends to wipe out the Maronite forces and turn Lebanon into a part of Greater Syria. They believe that the Syrians are using the pre-Camp David period as a cover for their military actions in the belief that Israel will be hesitant to respond. In fact, Israel cannot accept Syrian domination of Lebanon and will have to consider greater military involvement there should the Syrians blockade or capture the northern ports, try to occupy Christian areas of Beirut, or continue to interfere with Israeli reconnaissance flights. They emphasized that Israel cannot allow the situation in Lebanon to continue to deteriorate during the Camp David period. If Israel feels it must act, it will act in enough force to convince the Syrians of Israeli seriousness. Prime

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0419. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and USUN.

² In telegram 220265 to Tel Aviv, August 30, the Department provided talking points for the meeting with Begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780353-0611)

³ In telegram 11335 from Tel Aviv, August 29, the Embassy reported: "GOI suspicions that the Syrians intend to crush the right-wing Christian forces have been heightened by the erosion of the ceasefire in Beirut and, over the weekend, by Syrian military action against the Christian villages in North Lebanon.

"The immediate consequences of these developments is that pressure is building very fast here for the GOI to do something in Lebanon to deter the Syrians from their present course." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780352-0820)

⁴ In telegram 220266 to Damascus, August 30, the Department requested that Seelye, in the absence of Khaddam, who was on an official visit to the Soviet Union, "get in touch as quickly as possible" with Deputy Foreign Minister Kaddour, Presidential Adviser Daoudi, "or any other senior Syrian official available" to share U.S. concern about the Lebanon situation and the "extremely troubling" worries about "panic" detected in the Lebanese Christian community, and to inform the Syrians that the United States continued to "deplore" the "shrill rhetoric coming from various quarters, including Israel." At the same time, Seelye was instructed to note "that Syria has not been as successful as it might have been in convincing all concerned that its objectives are strictly limited and that Syria will withdraw from Lebanon when the Sarkis government is able to maintain security on its own," as well as to "urge" Syria to "find a more credible way of allaying suspicions and restoring international confidence in Syrian intentions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780353-0601)

Minister Begin expressed appreciation for US efforts to reason with the parties involved, but he proposes that President Carter also send a letter to Assad immediately proposing a cease-fire and stand-fast in the weeks ahead. He asked that we get an urgent response to his proposal so that the participants at Camp David would not all be distracted by worries over Lebanon. End summary

2. I met for an hour Wednesday morning with PM Begin, FonMin Dayan and DefMin Weizman. Col. Tehila⁵ and Elie Rubenstein were also present. As anticipated, the subject on their minds was Lebanon. The atmosphere was serious but the participants did not seem particularly tense.

3. PM Begin led off the discussion. His remarks were brief and to the point. The Lebanese situation is nearing a grave crisis, he said. The Syrian Army has turned its tanks and guns against the civilian population. Israel wants a successful Camp David, he said, but it needs US help over the next few weeks to contain the situation in Lebanon. The Syrians are now trying to crush the Maronites and to take over control of the country. They are attempting to take advantage of the period before Camp David to do this because they believe Israel will be reluctant to act strongly in Lebanon at this time.

4. The GOI cannot permit this course of development to continue, the PM said. It has a moral commitment to prevent the massacre of a national religious minority. No one else is helping the Christians and it is an intolerable thought that they be wiped out.

5. The Prime Minister said that, in view of the above, he wanted to make a request of the US Government. He proposed that there be another American representation in Damascus as soon as possible demanding an immediate cease-fire in Beirut and elsewhere. If this can be arranged, the participants can go to Camp David "with a clear head" and not have to worry every day about what is going on in Lebanon.

6. Defense Minister Weizman said that he would like to emphasize the security part of the Lebanese equation. Until ten years ago, when the PLO arrived, Lebanon was quiet. Today there is not only an attempt to destroy the Maronites and impose the Syrian will on Lebanon, but Syrian occupation of Lebanon threatens the northern frontier of Israel. If Iraq's appreciable force, which can be moved to the area on short notice is added, Israel can find itself encircled on the northern front. Israel cannot tolerate the occupation of Lebanon by Syria.

7. Until recently, Weizman continued, IDF aircraft had flown over Lebanon on reconnaissance missions uncontested by the Syrians. In the last two weeks, however, there have been two attempts by Syrian MiGs

⁵ Ilan Tehilla, military aide to Weizman.

to intercept the Israeli planes. In Weizman's opinion it is only a question of time before there will be aerial clashes and then the whole matter will escalate further. Israel must be able to continue its air reconnaissance unchallenged.

8. Dayan picked up on both the moral and security themes. He asked what the USG position would be if Syria has decided to take over Lebanon. This would be a major change in the situation, he said. It appears that Syria has decided to go ahead and ignore other countries on the assumption that no one will stop it. He asked rhetorically "is Israel to sit idle?" Israel has a dilemma, Dayan continued. The US is asking the IDF to stay out of Lebanon and yet the Syrians are taking advantage of the situation. Dayan asked "what would be your reaction to our reaction if Israel intervened one way or another?" "How does the US feel about Lebanon becoming a part of Greater Syria?" Dayan predicted that this will mean shortly the introduction of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and other sophisticated equipment into Lebanon and Israel will be facing an enemy on its northern border.

9. "How has this come to be?" Dayan asked. Israeli planes have only been taking pictures and, from these, supplying information to the Christians on the locations of Syrian artillery. The Security Council talks about the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, not Syrian. He speculated that maybe it is only a coincidence that all this is happening during the preparations for Camp David (although he clearly did not accept this as a serious thought). In any case, Israel is being accused by the Lebanese Christians of having reduced their assistance because of the Camp David preparations. "Does the US want to maintain a status quo, a cease-fire, and no interference with IDF planes or does the US want Lebanon to become a part of Greater Syria?" Dayan mused that regardless of whether the US thinks this development would be good or bad, the US may have concluded that it cannot affect the outcome.

10. Israel does not want to be in the position three months from now of regretting that it did not take the action it could to deter the Syrians now, Dayan continued. Syria knows Israel can stop it militarily. "If we shoot down half a dozen of their planes they will know we are serious."

11. At this point Begin interrupted and said that after rethinking his proposal (para 2 above) he believes that President Carter should send a personal letter to Assad immediately so that the US Embassy in Damascus will have prompt access to the Syrian President. Begin was concerned that otherwise we might spend days trying to get through to the real decisionmaker. Representation at a lower level. Begin said, is not productive. Begin reiterated that President Carter must ask for a cease-fire. There must be "no more shooting." If Assad should use

Camp David as a screen to continue action from Lebanon, “this is a misuse and would be intolerable to us.”

12. Dayan added that Israel wants to put everything on the table and be 100 per cent honest. Israel is facing three military crises: a) Syria is threatening to take over or blockade the northern Christian ports. If they should try this, the GOI will be faced with the problem of what to do about it by use of its land, sea or air forces; b) in Beirut, if Syria goes into the Christian quarters the GOI will be asked by the Christians to do something militarily; c) Syria has tried to convert the Lebanese sky into a Syrian sky by challenging Israeli reconnaissance flights since last week. This is a change. “Is Israel to accept it?”

13. At this point Weizman interjected that the situation is highly volatile. If forced to act on the question of reconnaissance flights, the GOI will not go in with two or three aircraft to shoot down a few Syrian planes. The IDF will “bring in the elephant” (meaning that overwhelming force will be used).

14. I assured the Prime Minister that I would convey the full details of this conversation to Washington and be back to him as soon as I have a response. I then went over the points contained in ref A concerning our plans to calm the Lebanese situation. The Prime Minister said he very much appreciated our efforts and hoped that the President would also be able to accept his suggestion about a direct approach to Assad. He emphasized the need to deal with Lebanon before his departure for Camp David and said I should call him as soon as Washington responds.⁶

15. There followed some brief discussion of UNIFIL and South Lebanon which is being reported septel.⁷

16. Comment: The Israeli message was very clear: if the Syrians try to close the northern ports, move in force against the Christian areas of Beirut, or challenge Israeli reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, the Israelis may feel compelled to react militarily—Camp David notwithstanding. Begin seems convinced that anything less than a high-level US approach directly to Assad might fail to get across the message

⁶ In telegram 221462 to Tel Aviv, August 31, the Department instructed Hart, Chargé d’Affaires for the Embassy in Lewis’s absence, to inform Begin that Israeli concerns had been communicated to Vance and Carter, that Vance would be sending a message to Assad conveying the “seriousness of Israeli concerns and the possibility that, if confrontations continue, the Israelis may become more involved than they are now,” and that Seelye had made a strong démarche to the Syrian foreign ministry, while the Department had approached the Syrian Embassy in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2460) Hart conveyed this message to Begin in an August 31 meeting between the two. (Telegram 11474 from Tel Aviv, August 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0429)

⁷ Telegram 11406 from Tel Aviv, August 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780354–0357)

strongly enough. (Ref C had not been received when I departed for the morning meeting.)

17. As this was being drafted, Israeli radio began carrying stories of this morning's meeting. The thrust of the reports is that the GOI has pointed out the gravity of the situation in Lebanon to the US and asked the USG to convey a warning to Syria.

Hart

20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Syria and Israel¹

Washington, August 31, 1978, 0154Z

221463. For Ambassador. Subject: Lebanon Problem. Ref: Tel Aviv 11400.²

1. You should get in touch soonest with most senior and appropriate Syrian official available³ to request that the following points from the Secretary (in effect an oral message) be conveyed to President Assad:

—We are deeply disturbed by the recent trend of hostilities in Lebanon. The humanitarian aspect of our concern is that members of the Christian community in large numbers are fleeing Lebanon or are being driven into arms of militants. There is also a sharp increase in concern here and elsewhere that possible destruction of a key element in delicate Lebanese political balance would make it all but impossible to rebuild unity of Lebanese state—a goal which we believe the U.S. and Syria share. Our strategic concern is that continuation of current course could lead to wider hostilities with incalculable consequences.

—It has been and remains our practice not to convey Israeli messages or warnings to Syria, despite what the press may report. How-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2453. Secret; Niac Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Draper; cleared by James Thyden (S/S–O) and in substance by Newsom; approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Jerusalem, USUN, Amman, Cairo, and Jidda. Printed from a corrected copy.

² See Document 19.

³ Seelye called on Dabboul on August 31 to give Vance's oral message to Assad who was then out of Damascus. (Telegram 5122 from Damascus, August 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2076)

ever, I believe it is important for me to be sure you are aware of my own appreciation of the present mood there.

—I know from my own talks with Israeli leaders during my visit to Israel early this month⁴ that they remain deeply suspicious of Syria and of Syria's role in Lebanon. We recognize that the Syrian forces in Lebanon, along with contingents from Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are there at the request of the Sarkis government and with the approval of the Arab League for the expressed purpose of preserving the unity of Lebanon and restoring the authority of the central government. The Israelis at times have tacitly accepted this role but in light of recent Syrian moves against Christian areas, they again see Syrian moves as steps in a strategy of assuming a dominant role in Lebanon and preparing a second front against Israel. That perception arouses deep concern in Israel and heavy pressure on the government to take action. I believe these pressures to take action have reached a new intensity in recent days. As long as confrontations in Lebanon occur, misunderstandings and miscalculations about Syrian intentions in Israel could all too easily lead to greater Israeli involvement in Lebanon. It is vitally important that this be forestalled.

—These impressions gained during my own recent talks in Israel are underscored by more recent discussions our representatives have had with Israeli leaders.

—While the USG and I personally have made sustained and strong efforts in urging restraint upon the Israelis, there is a limit to what we will be able to do if the situation in Lebanon continues to deteriorate. An accidental clash between Israeli and Syrian aircraft flying over Lebanon could all too easily occur, and this could precipitate dangerous new tensions. We are urging the Israelis to exercise the most rigid discipline and prudence to prevent inadvertent clashes or a contest for control of the airspace over Lebanon. We urge Syria to do likewise.

—Our purpose in sharing this assessment is not to discuss responsibility for recent events. Syria too is deeply suspicious of Israeli involvement in Lebanon's affairs. Israel certainly is not without blame for some of the tensions and troubles which have engulfed Lebanon. Our purpose is to be sure Syria fully understands the situation in which its actions are being taken and to urge the utmost caution.

—In addition to sharing this assessment with you, I must also express the deep concern of many Americans, some with relatives in Lebanon, about where the situation in Lebanon is heading. The prospect of further changes in the delicate political composition in Lebanon raises questions about how Lebanese unity can be restored. As long as the

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 5.

civil war continues, there will be little possibility in moving toward that goal which is of concern to all of us. It seems to me crucial that a major effort now be made to halt the fighting once and for all so that attention can turn to that basic objective.

—What I believe must now be done—urgently—is to help bring about a real and lasting ceasefire and a breathing spell during which the underlying causes of the various confrontations in Lebanon could be dealt with. We know that during past ceasefires, provocations against Syrian forces have occurred, yet, since Syria's publicly stated policy, in addition to attempting to preserve law and order on behalf of the Sarkis government, is to respond only to major provocations, it might be possible to go one step further and reduce the chances of new provocations from elements hostile to Syria. This might take place if Syrian forces would stand fast where they are now and end or cut down the movement of Syrian forces through areas where provocations are likely to occur.

—If the Syrian forces made a determined effort to remain only in well protected and heavily fortified positions, reasonably safe from provocations—for at least a while—the repeated series of provocations and counteractions could perhaps be interrupted. If, on the other hand, Syrians continue to advance in force into areas where Syrian forces have not been involved previously, and particularly in the Mount Lebanon heartland, I fear that the situation will continue to deteriorate and the risk of escalation will grow rapidly. In our view, it might be preferable for the time being for Syrian forces to remain aloof from fighting that erupts between Lebanese groups and factions.

—I appreciate the renewed assurances about Syria's objectives that have been conveyed in recent days to us by Foreign Minister Khaddam and Deputy Foreign Minister Kaddour, but I believe the gravity of the situation demands a major determined effort by Syria to bring about an immediate ceasefire. I hope that our two governments can work together to bring about the strong and stable Lebanon which we have both wanted and which is important to Syria's well-being and security.

2. Make clear to the Syrians that we will, if asked, flatly deny that we have conveyed an Israeli warning to the Syrians. We will say merely that we have continued to be in touch with the Syrian authorities on the situation in Lebanon. However, please be certain that SARG understands from this message that the atmosphere in Jerusalem is increasingly tense about the Lebanese situation and that we are convinced a dangerous train of events could quickly develop.

Christopher

21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 31, 1978

SUBJECT

Strategy for Camp David

For the talks at Camp David to succeed, *you will have to control the proceedings from the outset* and thereafter pursue a *deliberate political strategy* designed to bring about significant changes in both the Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions.² I strongly suggest that you bear the following points in mind:

1. *Sadat cannot afford a failure* and he knows it; both Sadat and Begin think that you cannot afford failure; but *Begin probably believes that a failure at Camp David will hurt you and Sadat, but not him*. He may even want to see Sadat discredited and you weakened, thus leaving him with the tolerable status quo instead of pressures to change his life-long beliefs concerning "Judea and Samaria."

2. You will have to convince both leaders, but especially Begin, that failure³ at Camp David will have directly adverse consequences for our bilateral relations and in terms of Soviet influence in the region.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 52, Middle East: Camp David Cables and Memos, 8/16–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside System. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The date is handwritten at the top of the first page of the memorandum.

² The Department of State produced its own Camp David briefing book for Carter. The book, sent from Vance to Carter under an undated covering memorandum, presented a series of papers designed to supplement those produced by the Department for Carter on August 18. (See footnote 2, Document 12) In addition to an overview of the upcoming summit, the book includes strategy papers for the meetings with Begin, the meetings with Sadat, and the initial trilateral meeting among Begin, Sadat, and Carter as well as a copy of the Department of State paper on the Sinai/West Bank relationship (see Document 7), a paper on possible outcomes and options for the summit, and biographical sketches of the Israeli and Egyptian delegations. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 11, The Secretary Camp David [Briefing Book])

³ As part of its briefing book for the summit, sent to Carter under an August 31 covering memorandum from Turner, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a paper analyzing the possible consequences if Camp David failed. According to the paper, the summit will have failed if the United States was "unable to persuade both Sadat and Begin to continue the present negotiating process after the Camp David sessions have ended" or a "breakdown at Camp David does not at least set in motion forces in Israel that could either cause Begin to moderate his position or lead to the collapse of his government and thus present the prospect of different negotiations." The briefing book also contained papers analyzing the positions of both Begin and Sadat on the eve of the summit, the military backdrop to the negotiations, Arab and Soviet reactions to a possible U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and the economic benefits of Egyptian-Israeli

3. *Sadat will define success in terms of substance, and in particular an Israeli commitment to the principle of withdrawal on all fronts. Begin will define success largely in terms of procedural arrangements and will be very resistant to pressures for substantive concessions.*

4. You will have to persuade Begin to make some substantive concessions, while convincing Sadat to settle for less than an explicit Israeli commitment to full withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination.

5. *Your most important meetings will be with each leader individually, not with both together.* You cannot expect Sadat and Begin to reveal their fall-back positions in front of each other, but in private you may be able to move them toward greater flexibility.

6. During the first round of meetings, you will want to reestablish a personal relationship with each leader, expressing your understanding of their concerns and appealing to their statesmanship. During the second and third days, you will want to be frank and direct in discussing substantive points. Begin in particular will need time to reflect on what you say. There will be a natural break in the talks on Saturday,⁴ and Begin should understand that you will be pressing for decisions on Sunday.

7. *Both Sadat and Begin must starkly see the consequences of success and failure if they are to make hard choices.*

—Failure brought on by Sadat's intransigence would bring to an end the special US-Egyptian relationship. Even if Sadat is not held responsible for the collapse of negotiations, we would find it increasingly difficult to maintain the close ties of the past few years and the Soviet Union would find opportunities to strengthen its position in the area at Sadat's expense as well as our own. Sadat must be told that we cannot afford more surprise moves by him if we are to work together effectively for a peace agreement. We expect to be consulted before Sadat takes new initiatives.

—Begin must see that US-Israeli relations are based on reciprocity. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being must be met by an Israeli understanding of our national interests. *If Israel is responsible for blocking progress toward peace in the Middle East, Begin should be told clearly*

peace, as well as biographical sketches of Begin and Sadat. In the covering memorandum, Turner stated that the briefing book was produced in response to a request Carter made during his "recent visit" to the CIA. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 54, Middle East: Camp David Summit, 8/78) According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia between 2:03 p.m. and 3:15 p.m. on August 16, where he addressed CIA employees and attended a briefing on CIA operations and intelligence procedures. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

⁴ September 9.

that you will have to take the following steps, which could affect the US-Israeli relationship:

—Go to the American public with a *full explanation of US national interests in the Middle East* (strategic relations with Soviets, economic interests, oil, cooperation with moderate regimes).

—Explain the scale of US aid to Israel (\$10 billion since 1973, or nearly \$4000 for each Israeli citizen). Despite this, Israel is unwilling to reciprocate by showing flexibility in negotiations.

—*We will be prepared to spell out publicly our views on a fair settlement.*

—We will be unable to defend Israel's position if the negotiations shift to the UN or Geneva.

—Both Sadat and Begin can be assured that progress toward peace will mean a strong relationship with the United States, including in the economic and security areas, and enhanced ability to control developments in the region in ways that will serve our mutual interests.

8. The *absolute minimum* you want from each leader is the following:

—*From Sadat:*

—*Acceptance of a long-term Israeli security presence in the West Bank/Gaza.*

—*A five-year interim regime for the West Bank/Gaza; no independent Palestinian state; deferral of negotiations on borders and sovereignty until end of five-year period.*

—*Acceptance of less than an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination as guidelines for negotiations.*

—Willingness to negotiate guidelines for West Bank/Gaza even if Hussein does not come in.

—Repetition of “no more war” pledge; willingness to renew UNEF in October; honoring terms of Sinai II, including commitment to peaceful resolution of differences.

—A willingness to negotiate seriously if an agreement on principles is reached.

—*From Begin:*

—Acceptance of all the principles of 242, including withdrawal and the “inadmissability of acquisition of territory by war,” as applicable on all fronts.

—*Modifications in “self-rule” proposal* in order to make it sufficiently attractive to moderate Palestinians to bring them in as participants and to increase prospects of their accepting its main features (open borders, some Israeli security presence, some Israeli rights to live in West Bank, self-government) beyond five years. *These modifications require an Israeli acceptance of the principle of withdrawal; a moratorium on organized settlement activity, in contrast to the rights of individuals to acquire land on a reciprocal basis; a visible termination of the military occupation at the outset of the five-year period; devolution of authority for the new regime from an agreement among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan; and genuine self-government for the Palestinians.*

—Flexibility on the remaining issues of settlements and air bases in Sinai.

9. *Begin and Sadat are likely to try to shift the discussions to new proposals of their own.* Begin may concentrate on details as a diversion from the larger issues. Sadat may try to enlist your support for a bold move on his part which will put Begin in the corner. The risk is that you could lose control of the talks and be diverted from the central issues either by Begin's legalisms or Sadat's imprecision. You should keep the focus on the large picture, and strategic choices, and refer new proposals or suggestions for textual language to the Foreign Ministers and Secretary Vance. With Sadat, you will have to hear him out on his new strategy without appearing to collude with him against Begin.

10. *Both leaders will constantly be trying to get you to side with them on specific points.* They will not hesitate to remind you of what we have said to them in the past. Begin will remember that we called his "self-rule" plan a "fair basis for negotiations," and Sadat will have very much in mind the promises made at Camp David. Your best defense against these efforts to manipulate you will be to *concentrate on the future choices, on the strategic consequences of success or failure, and on the need for each side to transcend past positions.*

11. *Sadat is very likely to want to explore the possibility of reaching secret understandings with you and Begin on some elements of a settlement.* This is apparently more important to him than a declaration of principles. There are clearly risks in relying on secret agreements, but Sadat's willingness to be forthcoming on some issues may well depend upon our ability, as well as Begin's, to assure him that he will not be embarrassed by leaks.

12. If Sadat shows more flexibility than Begin, we may be perceived by the Israelis and their supporters as colluding with the Egyptians. This could be politically awkward, and you may want to suggest discreetly to Sadat that he not rush to accept any suggestions we put forward publicly. It will help our credibility if we are seen to be pressing both sides for concessions. *While we do want Sadat to accept our ideas, the timing and circumstances in which he does so should be very carefully coordinated.*

13. (The number may be symbolic.) If the meetings end in disagreement, we should not attempt to paper over the differences. The reasons and consequences of a failure will be publicly explained by you, and Sadat and Begin should understand from the outset that this will be the case, including the specifics in #7 above.

Finally, I summarize below what I consider to be the acceptable minimum that we must aim for on the central issues:

1. *Withdrawal/Security on the West Bank/Gaza*

Sadat should agree to an Israeli security presence during the five-year interim period and for an indefinite time beyond; he should agree to defer decisions on the precise location of borders and on sovereignty until the end of the transitional period. In return, he should be able to claim credit for ending the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and for establishing that the principle of withdrawal will be applied in the final peace settlement dealing with these areas.

Begin should agree that the principle of withdrawal does apply on all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza, provided that its application takes into account Israel's long-term security needs in the area; sovereignty will remain in abeyance until a final peace agreement is reached at the end of the five-year period. This will allow Begin to take credit for protecting Israel's fundamental security interests, while not requiring that he explicitly abandon Israel's claim to sovereignty over these areas.

2. *Settlements*

There should be a moratorium on organized settlement activities, but both parties should agree that provisions should be made for individual Israelis and Palestinians to do business and to live in Israel and the West Bank/Gaza in the spirit of open borders, free movement of peoples, and normal peaceful relations.

3. *Negotiations*

Both parties should commit themselves to *continuing negotiations* on both the Sinai and the West Bank/Gaza issues.

4. *Resolution 242*

Both parties should reiterate their commitment to all of the principles of Resolution 242 as the basis for peace treaties on all fronts. In addition, they should agree on the Aswan language⁵ on Palestinian rights, and should commit themselves to the concept of full peace and normal relations. Sadat should repeat his commitment to "no more war" and agree to the renewal of UNEF⁶ in October.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum⁷ of Ambassador Eilts' last conversation with President Sadat. It is well worth reading. Sadat seems to be preparing more surprises.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 3.

⁶ Reference is likely to the United Nations Emergency Force, known as UNEF II, deployed in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Its mandate was due for renewal in October 1978.

⁷ Not found attached. Reference is to Eilts's August 26 meeting with Sadat. The memorandum of conversation for the meeting is printed as Document 16.

22. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, September 1, 1978, 1715Z

2427. Subject: Camp David—The Missing Palestinians. For the Secretary, Atherton and Saunders.

1. It is indeed ironic that a summit meeting which will have as its focus the future of the Palestinians, especially those in the West Bank and Gaza, will not have any bona fide Palestinian representatives present. The PLO, which a majority of Palestinians say represents them, is absent because of Israel's refusal to deal with the organization. Hussein, who could be a surrogate under certain circumstances, has excluded himself. Sadat is not regarded as an authorized spokesman and West Bankers fear that Israeli intransigence may compel him to modify his heretofore acceptable position on the Palestinian problem in order to achieve a deal on Sinai.

2. As seen from here, Israel at Camp David will have a unique opportunity not only to cement its relationship with Egypt but to make peace with Jordan and a majority of Palestinians if it is able to rise to the occasion and make genuine concessions on settlements, withdrawal, refugee return and a Palestinian entity without endangering its security.

3. What West Bankers want. We believe that a majority of West Bankers emotionally support the views of Bassam Shaka, the Mayor of Nablus, the West Bank's largest city: total Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines, Palestinian self-determination and recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. After the achievement of nominal independence, many West Bankers recognize that a close association with Jordan as well as open borders with Israel would be a necessity. At the same time, all West Bankers, moderates and PLO supporters alike oppose the Begin plan lock, stock and barrel for, among other reasons, it is the plan of the occupier. Its objective is perceived as continued occupation with Palestinian participation.

4. Although nationalistic West Bankers espouse their allegiance to the PLO and proclaim their pessimism that Camp David will result in Israeli flexibility, we have detected tantalizing indications that under certain circumstances authentic West Bank leaders might be willing to take part in an interim government and participate in negotiations with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Camp David Summit—September 1978 and working papers. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.

Israel. The challenge at Camp David is to find a formula part way between the PLO's position and the Begin plan that Hussein and reputable West Bankers can be brought to swallow.

5. What West Bankers would settle for. Given the bitterness and frustration engendered by 11 years of occupation, they would be powerfully attracted by the prospect of an end to the occupation. Bona fide moderate West Bank leaders cannot and will not act alone: the key to their participation isn't Hussein's participation, something that Dayan reportedly realizes. Thus, the best way for Sadat to make headway on the Palestinian problem is to insist he cannot make a separate peace in Sinai and to maintain he must have enough to persuade Hussein to take the plunge thereby also engaging moderate Palestinians in the occupied territories.

6. West Bankers would assume that Hussein would not be willing to join negotiations unless he was certain of obtaining Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and restoring an official Arab presence in Jerusalem. This would give them confidence and enable them to counter radical criticism.

7. The most sensitive burning issue is settlements. A halt to further settlements would have a great positive impact for it would demonstrate concretely the peace process can work in Palestinians' interest. Withdrawal is also a *sine qua non*. Although West Bankers could reluctantly be brought to accept adjustments in the 1967 lines, this fundamental point would have to be presented in terms consistent with Resolution 242. Stress should be put on mutually acceptable modifications (perhaps lines could be extended somewhat in the north and south in order to permit adjustments elsewhere). Refugee return or family reunions with *de facto* Israeli controls would also be a powerful endorsement to participate, because it would allow local Palestinians to demonstrate they were acting for the benefit of expatriates as well. On sovereignty, we believe moderate West Bankers would reluctantly accept a limited form of self-determination whereby at the end of an interim period they would vote to ratify a link with Jordan. They (and we assume Hussein) would not accept Israel's position that the question of sovereignty can be discussed at the end of the interim period thereby permitting an Israeli veto over any change in the interim regime. They remember Begin's categorical statements about no foreign sovereignty in the West Bank and, in the absence of flexibility, the whole exercise could come to grief on this issue.

8. On security arrangements, West Bankers are pragmatic. After 11 years of living with Israelis they recognize Israel has legitimate concerns and are willing to accept an IDF presence for the interim period and perhaps beyond as long as their minimal requirements outlined above are met.

9. Connected to the settlements issue is the potentially explosive question of land ownership. Under Ottoman law, which was unchanged by the Jordanians, all land not built upon or cultivated is considered to be public land. Perhaps a formula could be found whereby Israelis would have the right to acquire land in the West Bank and Gaza, subject to agreement by the interim administration.

10. Presentation is all important. Any interim administration to have any hope of success must not appear to be warmed-over Begin plan² but a transition to a “better day.” Similarly, Hussein and supporters on the West Bank should be seen to enter the negotiating process reluctantly in order to safeguard Arab interests and not primarily on behalf of the Hashemite regime. PLO reaction would obviously be important here. If Israel is willing to make concessions outlined in para 7, PLO opposition in our judgment would not be decisive concerning moderate West Banker participation.

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² See footnote 2, Document 5.

23. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

OPTIMAL OUTCOME FOR CAMP DAVID

Overall

Far-reaching understandings on the following five elements of a peace settlement: (1) arrangements for a transitional West Bank/Gaza

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 13, Middle East—Negotiations: (7/29/78–9/6/78). Secret; Nodis. The paper was found attached to an undated covering memorandum from Vance to Carter stating that this was a “refined version” of the paper “that we discussed at lunch today.” (Ibid.) Reference is presumably to Carter’s September 1 luncheon meeting with Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jordan, Brzezinski, Eilts, and Lewis to discuss the Camp David talks. The luncheon took place from noon to 1:11 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. Carter noted in his personal diary on August 31: “All the briefing books from the State Department, NSC, and CIA had set our expectations too low. I want to insist to the Middle East leaders that we resolve as many problems as possible at Camp David, not just come out with a declaration of principles leading to further negotiations.” (*White House Diary*, p. 215)

regime; (2) main elements of a permanent solution for the West Bank/Gaza (what happens after the 5 years); (3) the principles by which the remaining Sinai issues might be resolved; (4) the relationship between a West Bank/Gaza agreement and progress toward an Egypt-Israel peace treaty; (5) the undertakings of peace that would be in a peace treaty.

1. Transitional West Bank/Gaza Regime

Agreement on the following arrangements for a transitional regime: (a) Israeli military government would be replaced by self-government by the inhabitants—i.e., an end of military occupation; (b) authority for the new regime would derive from agreement among the parties; (c) question of sovereignty would be resolved within 5 years; (d) Israeli forces would be withdrawn to designated areas; (e) Palestinian displaced persons and refugees would be allowed to return at an agreed annual rate and under agreed procedures; (f) during the 5 years negotiations would be conducted and agreement reached on a final treaty on the basis of Res. 242 including withdrawal, security measures and commitments to peace; (g) the inhabitants of the areas would participate in the negotiations through elected representatives and would express their consent to the terms of the final settlement; (h) Jordan and Palestinian representatives would be invited to join negotiations to conclude a detailed agreement on the transitional regime and to participate in negotiations for a final settlement.

2. Elements of a Permanent Settlement for the West Bank/Gaza (post 5 years)

Agreement that: (a) the area would be demilitarized; (b) Israel would retain its own security forces in specified numbers at specified locations, the arrangement to be subject to review after 10 years; (c) Israel would retain early warning installations (the U.S. could man these if necessary); (d) the locally-elected governing authority would undertake commitments to maintain peace and security and to prevent terrorist acts; (e) relationship with Jordan and/or Israel would be defined; (f) there would be open borders with Israel in terms of movement of personnel and economic arrangements; (g) Israeli participation in inspection of Jordan River crossing points would be defined; (h) certain Israeli settlements would be allowed to remain and rights of Israelis to purchase land defined; (i) principles governing immigration of Palestinian refugees would be defined; (j) the consent of inhabitants to the terms of the settlement would be expressed by plebiscite or parliamentary ratification.

3. Resolution of Sinai Issues

Agreement that an Egypt-Israel peace agreement would be implemented in two main phases over a five-year period.

(a) *First phase*. Peace treaty initialed. Line to which Israeli forces withdraw in first phase defined; Israel settlements allowed to remain under Israeli protection during this period; Israel would also retain use of airfields in Sinai; some concrete measures of normalization of relations would be instituted.

(b) *Second phase*. Peace treaty signed and ratified. Israeli withdrawal to international frontier; Israeli settlers allowed to remain under Egyptian jurisdiction; airfields dismantled or made into civilian airports; full normalization of relations completed; demilitarized and limited armament zones and third party presence in buffer zone defined.

4. *Relationship Between Egypt-Israel Treaty and West Bank/Gaza*

Agreement that: (a) Egypt would resume and continue to completion negotiations on Sinai issues; (b) when negotiations were completed Egypt and Israel would proceed with initialing of the peace treaty and implementation of the first phase, reserving the signing and ratification of the treaty, and implementation of the second phase to coincide with conclusion of a West Bank/Gaza treaty; (c) that if, however, Jordan and Palestinian representatives refused to join in negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza on the basis of the principles concluded at Camp David, Egypt and Israel would, after an agreed period, proceed with conclusion and full implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

5. *Peace Undertakings*

Agreement on the main elements of peace undertakings that would be part of the peace treaties between Egypt and Israel and on the West Bank/Gaza, including: (a) end of economic boycott; (b) end of Arab efforts to isolate Israel in international fora; (c) free passage in international waterways; (d) Israeli rights of passage in Suez Canal; (e) cultural and people-to-people exchanges; (f) commercial and diplomatic relations.

Agreement to set up working groups to begin negotiations on the detailed terms of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

24. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 1, 1978, 1:10–2:40 p.m.

Subject

Middle East—Camp David Summit

Participants

President Jimmy Carter	CIA
Vice President Walter Mondale	Adm. Stansfield Turner
<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Cyrus Vance	Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hermann Eilts U.S. Ambassador to Egypt	Hamilton Jordan
Samuel Lewis U.S. Ambassador to Israel	Jody Powell
<i>Defense</i>	NSC
Harold Brown	William Quandt
<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff²</i>	

The *President* began the meeting by asking Ambassador Eilts and Ambassador Lewis to discuss briefly the personalities who would be with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at Camp David. Ambassador *Eilts* noted that Hassan Tuhamy would be there, but that he would not have much influence over Sadat. Foreign Minister Kamil is the next most important person, and he strongly believes in protecting Sadat from going too far. Ambassador Eilts concluded that none of the ministerial-level advisers would have much influence over Sadat. Under Secretary al-Baz is very able and will be the principal drafting officer, but he also has little direct influence over Sadat.

Ambassador *Lewis* then reviewed the Israeli personalities who would accompany Begin. He ascribed greatest influence to Foreign Minister Dayan, and noted that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister now work closely together. Ambassador *Lewis* suggested that Dayan should be included in small meetings with Begin. Both Dayan and Weizman see Camp David as more of a watershed than does Begin. Weizman has a better relationship now with Begin than he did some months ago, but his relationship is not as good as that of Dayan. Begin is more ideologically attached to the land, the West Bank and Gaza,

¹ Source: Carter Library, Vertical File, Middle East. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. A summary of conclusions from the meeting is *ibid*.

² According to the summary of conclusions, General Jones represented the JCS at the meeting.

than is Dayan. Dayan is more concerned with security. Dayan is also less concerned with words than is Begin. Dayan is the element of continuity with previous negotiations. He is also personally pessimistic about getting any agreement with Jordan. Weizman is more instinctual and less intellectual, but he is basically pragmatic and is very determined not to miss the chance for peace. He is more convinced of Sadat's sincerity than the others. The former Attorney General, Barak, is a very creative lawyer who will try to help solve problems. Begin has confidence in him. Barak should be included in any talks when four Israelis are present. The *Vice President* noted that Sadat does not seem to trust Dayan and that he prefers Weizman. Ambassador *Eilts* confirmed that this is the case.

Admiral Turner was then asked to brief on the regional consequences of a possible failure at Camp David. If the United States remains involved in working for a peace settlement, a failure at Camp David would not necessarily lead to dramatic consequences. The Saudis see themselves in a "no lose situation". If there is a success, they can live with it. If there is a failure, Saudi Arabia will work to bring Sadat back into the Arab fold. Saudi Arabia does not attribute the highest priority now to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They care more about cohesion of moderate Arab states, and they are concerned with the situation in South Yemen.³ They do not believe peace is possible with Israel under Begin's leadership. They also believe that the long-term trends in the area favor the Arab side. They assume that eventually the United States will use leverage over Israel. They already tend to discount Camp David however it comes out. They will try to consolidate the moderate forces in the Arab world. If Saudi Arabia concludes that we will never use our leverage with Israel, however, the Saudis may move toward a more anti-American posture. But the Saudis are not inclined to play a major geopolitical role. They are more interested in self-preservation than in peace.

Secretary *Vance* asked how the Saudis want us to apply leverage. Do they mean that we should cut military and economic aid to Israel? Admiral *Turner* replied that the Saudis may not have a clear definition in mind but they do believe we have leverage. They think of the 1968 experience in Sinai. The other moderate Arab states will go along with Saudi Arabia. If the summit fails, this will confirm Hussein in his beliefs. The rejectionists will make noise, and will wait and see. The PLO will see a failure as a success. Sadat's own reaction will be to shift tactics, but he will not give up. He will be pressed to reconcile himself

³ Documentation on the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

with President Assad, and may try to do something dramatic such as ask for the removal of the UNEF forces.

Admiral *Turner* noted that Begin would be content with an unclear result. He does not want to take the blame for a failure with his own people who are generally ahead of him in their willingness to make a trade of territory for peace. The Soviets will try to blame a failure on U.S. policy and will try to get back into the peace process and to isolate Sadat. Concerning Lebanon, Admiral *Turner* did not think that Syria would want to fight Israel, but Syria does want to reduce the power of the Christian militias. The Soviets are not urging the Syrians to do too much there, and they do want to back the Syrians against Israel in a military conflict. The real question is whether the militant Christians will hold back. It is impossible to forecast what may happen between now and September 6. This will be a dangerous period. It depends most on the right-wing Christians and how hard they will push.

The *President* asked about Jordan and whether it looked to Saudi Arabia for guidance. He noted that there was a possibility that Hussein would be too timid to join the talks. He asked if Jordan could be persuaded by the Saudis to join the talks or whether the Syrians would also have to be brought in. Admiral *Turner* said Hussein would need Saudi support and an Israeli indication of a willingness to give up sovereignty in the West Bank. This will be more important than Syrian influence.

Dr. *Brzezinski* noted that he felt that the consequences of failure at Camp David could be more serious. The Arabs might conclude that the United States cannot lead the process for peace. They will draw conclusions of a far-reaching nature about the American role, which will cumulatively give them less of a sense of co-responsibility with us on matters of international economy and oil. Radical forces could be strengthened. Dr. *Brzezinski* also thought that Sadat might be less predictable than Admiral *Turner* had indicated. Sadat might be prepared to gamble on another war. He would not have to expect to win, just as in 1973 he went to war in order to force the United States to take action. The *President* said that he felt the Saudi attitude would depend heavily on what President Sadat says. Secretary *Vance* noted that Sadat had already said that if Camp David came to nothing, a strong statement by the United States would still help in the Arab world, and would have the effect of mobilizing world opinion to keep things moving. Dr. *Brzezinski* said that Sadat then defines success in terms of our taking a clear position. Secretary *Vance* agreed that if the United States did not take a position, then Sadat would feel that Camp David was a failure. Admiral *Turner* said that he thought it would be difficult for us to take a position which would satisfy Sadat without provoking a confrontation

with Begin. The *President* remarked that he felt Sadat was considering a rather drastic move about a month ago.

Ambassador *Eilts* noted that there will be two critical dates coming up. In October there will be the renewal of UNEF, and then in November there will be the anniversary of his trip to Jerusalem.⁴ Sadat is turning over in his mind what he should do if there is no movement. He will find it difficult to acknowledge that his peace initiative has failed. He may grasp at anything to keep it alive. He has confidence in the President and he looks to him for guidance. He has said that he would not let him down. That will give us scope to work with to prevent a failure. If the results of Camp David are inadequate, then pressures will begin to build at home and from within the Arab world. The Saudis might want him to acknowledge the failure of his initiative, and then there would be pressures for reconciliation and an Arab summit. Sadat knows that the United States is the only country that can help achieve peace. The Saudis basically share the same goal of reaching peace. They have some influence in Egypt because of the aid they provide. If Sadat decides to go the route of Arab reconciliation, there could be a summit within a couple of months. He could keep the peace process alive by going to the United Nations and calling for a resumption of the Geneva Conference,⁵ but if that were to fail, Sadat would increasingly look to the option of war. Egypt is not now ready for this and it will take time. Israel is stronger than in October 1973. The step that would be taken prior to preparing for war would be reconciliation with the Arab world. Neither Sadat nor Gamasy wants war. The losses would be high. They might have to take the risks, but they do not want it.

Secretary *Vance* stated that if no agreement is reached on the deeply substantive problems, but if Sadat feels that the American position is fair, he might agree to a renewal of the no war pledge in return for a freeze on settlements. Ambassador *Eilts* agreed that a fair statement of the U.S. position might lead Sadat to reiterate his no war position. Ambassador *Lewis* felt that Begin would not agree to a freeze on settlements in return for a no war pledge, since Egypt was already committed to a peaceful resolution of differences in the 1975 Sinai II agree-

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁵ The Geneva Conference was first established in December 1973 to find a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. President Carter attempted to reconvene the Geneva Conference in 1977, but came to view bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel as the avenue to an eventual settlement following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.

ment.⁶ Israel will not pay twice for that pledge. Admiral *Turner* remarked that the CIA assessment is that the balance of forces is more favorable to Israel now than it was in 1973.

Secretary Brown was then asked to review the number of security issues. He dealt first with the problem of conventional threats to Israeli security, noting that these were easier to deal with than the problem of terrorism. To deal with conventional threats, demilitarization is probably the most important concept. This provides time for Israel to react to any threat. For example, there might be arrangements which would prohibit Egyptian armor from going beyond the passes. A second means of providing Israel with security would be military enclaves in key areas. Three Israeli battalions in blocking positions along the roads from the Jordan Valley into the West Bank would provide good security for Israel. Access rights to these blocking positions would have to be worked out. In Sinai, Israel is particularly anxious to keep the airbase at Etzion. There is not enough airspace in Israel for training. Early warning sites might also be useful to detect any build-up on the Arab side. The United States can help improve the capabilities to detect movement of the forces. Third-party patrols offer another possibility. The United States could also assure Israel of stable levels of military assistance, and we could respond to a number of the outstanding requests under MATMON-C.⁷ For example, Israel might get more aircraft and access to advanced technology.

Secretary *Brown* went on to review ways of defending against terrorism. While these threats are more difficult to deal with, they do not affect the security of the state as much as the conventional threats. Therefore, it might be reasonable to ask Israel to accept somewhat less assurance in dealing with these threats, even though politically they are just as difficult to deal with than the larger threats. The key to dealing with terrorism is to have an Arab political authority which is a party to the agreement which is committed to maintain order. If Israel does give up the West Bank, this would pose new problems, but if an Arab authority were present it would have an incentive to prevent terrorism. There would have to be some sharing of intelligence and some cooperation at the local level. There are some technological arrangements

⁶ Reference is to the Egypt-Israel Interim Peace Agreement, also known as Sinai II, signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975. For documentation on the Sinai II Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976.

⁷ MATMON C refers to an IDF military force development plan created to cover Israel's projected military needs for the 1978–1986 period and which included a list of military equipment requests presented to the United States on October 3, 1977. MATMON B preceded MATMON C and was presented by Israel after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and granted by the United States during the Ford administration. "Matmon" is the Hebrew word for "treasure."

which could be developed to protect infiltration. Secretary *Vance* stated that Dayan had agreed that most internal security problems could be dealt with by a local Palestinian Arab government, and that Israel would not have to be involved in any significant way. Ambassador *Lewis* added that Dayan had sometimes thought of mobile patrols in the Jordan Valley in order to deal with the problem of terrorism.

Secretary *Brown* then turned to a possible American role in connection with security arrangements. He noted that military assistance would be one means of assuring the security of the parties. The United States could provide Israel with early warning technology, and accelerated delivery of equipment, as well as access to high technology. Consideration might be given to adding Israel to the list of countries exempt from the arms ceiling limitations. Dr. *Brzezinski* thought that this was not a good idea and Secretary *Brown* agreed that this would open the door to many other requests for exemptions. Discussion then turned to the possibility of a mutual security treaty between the United States and Israel, and it was generally felt that anything less than a NATO-type treaty would not be worth much to the Israelis. Secretary *Vance* and Ambassador *Lewis* agreed that a NATO-type treaty would be important to Israel. Ambassador *Lewis* also felt that some physical American presence would be welcome in the area, such as Haifa or in the Sinai but not in the West Bank.

Secretary *Brown* stated that an American presence in the Sinai would pose fewer risks than a presence in the West Bank or in Golan or at Haifa or Alexandria. A naval presence in the area is probably more of a problem than it is worth. In times of tension, we would want the ships to get out of the area. The base in Sinai would cause fewer problems. One might think of additional port visits and use of repair facilities in Haifa and Alexandria, although this would be less reassuring to the parties. The JCS has also developed the idea of an air training facility at Eitam air field. If this were useful, it should be raised with the Egyptians, not with the Israelis initially, since the base would be on Egyptian territory. Such an arrangement should only be considered as a cap to an agreement, otherwise it will look as if they are doing a favor to us. In fact there are problems in doing this and Americans could be held hostage and pressures would build on us to offer other quid pro quos. Therefore, Secretary *Brown* concluded, such arrangements should only be seen as a capstone to the peace agreements if it offers additional reassurances.

The *President* asked if any consideration had been given to a U.S.-Egyptian neutral⁸ defense pact. Secretary *Brown* said that this was

⁸ An unknown hand circled the word "neutral" and wrote "mutual?" in the margin adjacent it.

a possibility but no specific thought had been given to it. The *President* added that Sadat had not been opposed to a US-Israeli treaty, and he had the impression that Egypt would also participate if it were essential to peace. Secretary Brown thought that a multi-lateral treaty might be of some benefit. Dr. *Brzezinski* added that the Saudis might want to be part of such an arrangement. Admiral *Turner* added that the Arabs are a bit squeamish about joining any pact to which Israel would be a part. They also view foreign bases as anathema. The Soviets might also react very negatively. Secretary *Brown* agreed that the Soviets might try to get bases in Iraq and Libya.

Ambassador *Eilts* pointed out that the Saudis had not been enthusiastic about an American base in their territory and they were very sensitive about this issue, as much as they might like a strong American position in the area generally. The Egyptians are also sensitive about a highly visible American presence in Egypt.

The *President* concluded this part of the discussion by saying that no one favored an American military presence in the area unless Egypt and Israel both wanted it and feel that it is essential. It will not be an advantage to us. Dr. *Brzezinski* agreed, adding that it could be counter-productive. Secretary *Brown* agreed that the risks seem to outweigh the benefits. General *Jones* added that Israel will want some military presence in the West Bank and at the airfields in Sinai. While not advocating an American presence, the reason for suggesting the joint training facility was to deal with the problem of the bases in Sinai. While home-porting at Haifa does not seem desirable, more frequent visits in the area and use of repair facilities does make some sense. Secretary *Brown* felt that Alexandria was even a better facility than Haifa, but there were problems connected with use of either of these facilities.

The *President* concluded the meeting by discussing his plans for the first few days of Camp David. He thought that he would meet first with Begin alone and then with Sadat. They would then all get together. He would make an effort to reassure both leaders of our own good intentions, and would encourage them to deal with one another. He would offer our good offices and he would only put forward proposals after consultations. He would try to point out to both of them the benefits of a comprehensive agreement, and the dangers of failure. Begin should understand the risks of radicalization in the Arab world, and a return of negotiations to a U.N. or Geneva form. The *President* said that he would not try to rush the talks, but he did not want them to drag out too long either. He would try to get all of the concepts on the table before the end of Friday, then take a break on Saturday for a reflection. The Vice President would represent him in the White House during his absence, although he would also want the Vice President to come up for some of the discussions. He concluded by stating it was

important to keep the number of people at Camp David as small as possible and to avoid contacts with the press during the talks.

25. Memorandum From the President's Senior Adviser (Sanders) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Camp David Summit

The following is a summary of the points we discussed this morning:²

(1) The most significant questions³ that I hear raised frequently are:

—if agreement in principle regarding the West Bank is achieved and Jordan still refuses to join the negotiations, will Egypt be under an obligation to proceed bilaterally with Israel?

—will Israel be expected to agree at Camp David to withdraw from the West Bank? If so, what does this mean? Partial withdrawal? Partition?

—will Israel be allowed to maintain a security presence on the West Bank after five years?

—how can a Palestinian Administrative Council or other body be prevented from turning the West Bank into a threatening independent Palestinian state if Israel has no security presence there?

—what are the security measures Israel will accept in terms of territory, rights, and guarantees from the United States?

(2) The following are thoughts that I mentioned during the meeting:

—Israelis will respond most positively to statements which indicate that we clearly understand and agree with their security concerns.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 52, Middle East: Camp David Cables and Memos, 9/78. No classification marking.

² Carter met with Sanders on September 4 from 10:30 a.m. until 10:54 a.m. in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

³ In his memoirs, Carter indicated that Sanders is referring here to the views of American Jewish community leaders, liaison with whom Sanders was primarily responsible. Carter wrote that these views were "more restrained than we had expected, and this encouraged me greatly in my later arguments with Begin." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 322)

—neither Egypt nor Israel should be surprised by the other two parties.

—inducements to either Israel or Egypt should not make it more difficult for the other side to make concessions.

As we discussed, I am enclosing with this memo a copy of the memo⁴ which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 2.

⁴ Attached but not printed. In his September 2 memorandum to Vance, Sanders discussed Israeli security concerns about territorial concessions and moves the United States could take to assuage those concerns. The United States, Sanders suggested, should make “clear” that any peace settlement should provide for “demilitarization of the contested areas,” “Israeli (or joint) presence on key terrain to provide early warning and, at least initially, to control access to populated areas in Israel and perhaps in the West Bank,” “Israeli overflight rights in some areas to provide early warning,” “border adjustments to eliminate particularly dangerous areas,” “reduction of Arab forces contiguous to demilitarized areas,” and strict limitations on “foreign forces in Jordan.” Moreover, to win Israeli confidence, Sanders added, the United States should also consider a number of bilateral arrangements including “exempting Israel from restrictions on exceptional technology transfer,” increasing FMS credits to Israel, “guaranteeing a U.S. resupply of Israel if a war breaks out because of a failure of the agreement,” including Israel among nations “completely excluded” in annual arms transfer ceiling, offering Israel a Mutual Defense Pact, and “incorporating Israeli legitimate security concerns into our own proposals.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 52, Middle East: Camp David Cables and Memos, 9/78)

26. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter travelled to the Presidential retreat at Camp David shortly after noon on September 4, 1978, to complete his preparations for the summit meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin scheduled to begin the following day. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) Describing the day in his personal diary, Carter wrote: “This was a hurried morning, with everybody wanting to give me last-minute advice or information about the summit.” Upon arriving at Camp David, Carter spent the rest of the day “studying the voluminous notes, maps, past history of negotiations, [and] psychological assessments of Begin and Sadat.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 216) As part of his preparations, he drafted a list of the themes and issues which the summit would have to confront. For the text of this note, see Document 27. Recalling the final pre-summit preparations years later, both Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski reflected on the importance of the forthcoming negotiations for Carter’s admin-

istration and the summit's prospects for success. Writing in his memoirs, Vance noted: "Not since Theodore Roosevelt mediated the treaty negotiated in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, that ended the Russo-Japanese War had an American president even approached what Jimmy Carter was about to attempt." (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 218) Brzezinski recorded that "on the eve of the summit, Carter confided to me for the first time his sense of uneasiness about the prospects for success." (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, page 254) Of his own impressions of the summit on the eve of Begin's and Sadat's arrival at Camp David, Carter wrote: "Despite my efforts to the contrary, expectations had built up to a fever pitch. My only hope was that, in the quiet and peaceful atmosphere of our temporary home, both Begin and Sadat would come to know and understand each other better, and that they would trust me to be honest and fair in my role as mediator and active negotiator. It was soon to be obvious that Sadat seemed to trust me too much, and Begin not enough." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, page 322)

Over the course of the entire thirteen days of the Camp David Summit, the United States delegation was organized into two "mutually reinforcing" teams: one, "political" and the other, a "group of experts." (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 219) The political team consisted of Carter, Brzezinski, Vance, White House Press Spokesman Jody Powell, Presidential Adviser Hamilton Jordan, and, occasionally, Vice President Walter Mondale and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The team of experts, who met under Vance's direction, was composed of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Saunders, Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Ambassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts, Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis, and William B. Quandt, the member of the National Security Council Staff responsible for Arab-Israeli issues. On this arrangement, Vance wrote: "These two groups worked in the closest harmony. The political group negotiated with the Egyptian and Israeli senior political figures, while the professional group maintained contact with the Egyptian and Israeli teams and provided expert advice, analyses of the sides' positions as they evolved, and draft formulations to bridge the differences." (Ibid.) The President's Daily Diary recorded numerous internal meetings of the U.S. delegation during the summit in which President Carter participated. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memoranda of conversation or official records of the substance of these conversations, or indeed any of the internal discussions of the U.S. delegation, have been found.

This dearth of official documentation also extends to the negotiations themselves and reflects the idiosyncratic recordkeeping of the U.S. delegation at Camp David. Examining the documentation relating to the Camp David Summit printed in this volume, the reader will

quickly note significant gaps in the official record, especially the absence of memoranda of conversation from the numerous, often lengthy meetings that Carter held with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. The President's Daily Diary records the specific dates and times of each of the meetings that Carter held between the opening of the summit on September 5 and its conclusion on September 17. In addition, each Daily Diary entry contains a list of that meeting's participants. The most complete official record of the meetings held between the U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli delegations at Camp David is in a draft summary document produced by the National Security Council Staff. This summary provides the dates, times, and locations of each meeting held by the United States with Egyptian and Israeli officials, along with lists of participants and brief synopses of the meetings' substance. For the text of this summary, see Document 28. The reader should note that this volume includes all memoranda of conversation that have been found in U.S. Government archives.

In his subsequent writings on the Camp David Summit, Carter has highlighted his own personal note-taking and its importance not only for the historical record, but also for the work of the U.S. delegation during the negotiations. As part of his introduction to the summit in the published version of his personal diary, the President wrote that he "kept detailed written notes during all the discussions at Camp David (September 5 to 17), and from them I dictated entries in my diary a couple of times a day. Many of the scratched notes are available to scholars in the Carter Presidential Library." (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 216) These notes, along with multiple annotated drafts of the two "framework" documents, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel," which in part formed the basis for the summit negotiations, were collected into a "working papers" file in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated, and Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, 9/10–27/78. Also in the working paper folder is an undated, unsigned note accompanying the paper collection which states: "These papers need to be classified (or destroyed). Susan Clough says the President wants them 'sealed' for a very long time." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated) Carter added in his memoirs that following each negotiating session he "immediately dictated a complete record of the discussion from my written notes, which my secretary transcribed. Cy [Vance], Zbig [Brzezinski], Fritz [Mondale], Ham [Jordan], or Jody [Powell] read the one original copy that was made; then it was returned to me." (Carter,

Keeping Faith, page 327) These copies of Carter's notes, as presumably presented to other members of the U.S. delegation, have not been found.

Given the limitations of the official documentary record, this volume's account of the U.S. policy making process during the Camp David Summit must be read in conjunction with available memoirs and published diaries, which have been based largely upon the personal notes of the respective authors. President Carter presents a day-by-day reconstruction of the summit on pages 216–245 of his published personal diary, titled *White House Diary*, and in his memoirs, *Keeping Faith*, on pages 327–403. Brzezinski presents the summit in a similar day-by-day style in his memoirs, *Power and Principle*, on pages 255–270. Vance's account of the negotiations is in *Hard Choices*, pages 218–229. Quandt's viewpoint is represented in his account, which is part memoir and part scholarly study of the events, entitled *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. For the Egyptian perspective of the summit, see Foreign Minister Muhammed Ibrahim Kamel's memoir of the summit, titled *The Camp David Accords*, and Minister of State Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem*, pages 132–152. On the Israeli side, see Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's *Breakthrough*, pages 149–190, and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman's *The Battle for Peace*, pages 340–377.

27. Personal Note Prepared by President Carter¹

Camp David, undated

Notes made at C. David before Begin & Sadat arrived—

Demilitarize West Bank²

Israeli military enclave—5 years +³

No new settlements

Terminate military rule

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated. No classification marking. Carter discussed the drafting of this note in *Keeping Faith*, pp. 325–327.

² Carter drew an arrow and a caret in the left-hand margin pointing to this phrase. Carter made a checkmark in the right-hand margin adjacent to this phrase.

³ Carter drew an arrow and a caret in the left-hand margin adjacent to this and the next four phrases.

No independent Palestinian state
 No hazy security guarantees⁴
 242 basis of negotiations on all fronts
 Leave W Bank sovereignty ? open—5 years⁵
 Give credit to Begin homerule plan (5 years)⁶
 Jerusalem a united (Israeli?) city—borough type⁷
 Sinai—settlements—airstrips—no military threat—normalization⁸
 W B[an]k—withdrawal—security—borders—sovereignty—Palestinians—settlements
 Phased implementation—some postponements
 Local W B[an]k gov't control terrorism
 Israel monitor open borders
 End economic boycott—attempts to isolate Israel
 Open waterways, incl Suez
 Trade, cultural, student exchange + diplomatic recog[nition]
 Agreed number of returning refugees
 Long term Israeli security presence on W B[an]k
 Who will negotiate w/Israel absent Jordan?
 No more war
 Renew UN agreement in Oct.
 Inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war
 End military gov't in W B[an]k
 Genuine participation of W B[an]k Arabs in own gov't
 Multiple devolution of authority
 Some agreements may be secret
 We 3 can make any settlement stick
 W B[an]k Summary
 Palestine auth[ority] in all areas
 End Israeli occupation gov't
 Leave [Israeli] security presence
 Sovereignty/borders negotiated in 5 years
 No new settlements
 P 6,7 “Aswan” on Palestinians (voice; all aspects,

⁴ Carter drew an arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to this and the next phrase.

⁵ Carter drew an arrow and a caret in the left-hand margin pointing to this phrase.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 5. Carter drew an arrow and a caret in the left-hand margin pointing to this phrase.

⁷ Carter drew an arrow and a caret in the left-hand margin pointing to this phrase.

⁸ Carter drew an arrow in the left-hand margin pointing to this phrase.

Demilitarization of contested areas
Failure may mean US/Is[rael] lose control in M East
Unilateral statements permissible in final statement
Sadat is leader, not follower—His threat is from Africa
Historic opportunity—need strong leadership/statesmanship
US/Is[rael]/Eg[ypt] new econ/pol/mil coop[eration] & benefits
Success would bring in S[audi]A[rabia] & Jordan
We will back Sadat against moderate Arabs
We have already decided:

Common definition of peace
Israel must have security, incl[uding] presence on W B[an]k
5 year arrangement
Jordan & Palestinians should have negotiating role
No independent Palestinian state
Full Egyptian sovereignty on Sinai w/Int. borders
Staged implementation of agreement
We 3 are strong enough to have public support
W B[an]k withdrawal is a continuum, partial
Sinai [withdrawal] is time related, total
Israel's acceptance of "withdrawal" leaves bargaining position
Early warning with, perhaps, Israeli overflights

First Eg[ypt]/Jewish peace since time of Joseph⁹
Inducements to Israel (*per Sanders*)

US technology transfers
Increased FMS credits
Military sales policy equal to NATO
Mutual defense pact
Support for Is[raeli] military action if treaty broken

⁹ Carter struck through "Joseph" and replaced it with "Jeremiah."

28. Draft Summary of Meetings¹

undated

CHRONOLOGY

September 5, 1978—Tuesday

1430–1457²

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject: Welcomes Sadat at helipad. No substantive conversation.

1640–1716³

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Welcomes Begin at helipad. No substantive conversation.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page, reads: "Subject: Camp David Memcons 9/5–16, 1980." Unless noted otherwise, no memoranda of conversation for the meetings listed in the summary have been found. No other version of this draft summary has been found. The summary was found at front of folder; unless noted, individual memoranda of conversation referenced by tab were not found.

² In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "Sadat, on arrival at Aspen [Lodge], emphasized that he was eager to reach agreements, total if possible, not just to establish procedures for future negotiations. He stated that Begin did not want an agreement and would try to delay as much as possible. Sadat said he would back me in all things and has a comprehensive proposal 'here in my pocket' that would include establishment of diplomatic relations and end the boycott against Israel." Carter responded: "I told him I would delay any U.S. proposals until after he and Begin explored all the differences. He said he would try to protect me by putting forward good proposals and make it unnecessary for U.S. proposals. I told him he needed to understand Begin's problems and attitudes. He seemed to be somewhat impatient of Begin, distrustful of him, determined to succeed, perhaps overly bold and inclined to acquire my partnership against Begin." (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 216–217) For Carter's memoir account of this meeting, see *Keeping Faith*, pp. 327–329.

³ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "The next conversation was with Begin after his arrival—quite a different attitude. Begin was immediately interested in the techniques of Camp David discussion: times, places, how many aides at the meetings, and so forth. He pointed out that this meeting was historically unprecedented, that there had not been an agreement between a Jewish nation and Egypt for more than two thousand years." Carter responded: "I told him we three principals could not expect others to settle major issues if we couldn't, that all issues should be discussed at Camp David, and that Sadat had a concern about Begin's preoccupation with details instead of the major issues. Begin said, 'I can handle both.'" (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 217) Carter also discussed this meeting, in which he described both Begin and himself as "somewhat ill at ease," in *Keeping Faith*, pp. 329–330. Following this meeting, Carter met with Brzezinski and Vance at the Presidential lodge. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 255) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

2030–2253⁴

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: General discussion of proposed Camp David scenario. President emphasized importance of the conference to all the parties. At Begin's request, the President agreed to send a personal message to Assad about the Lebanese situation.⁵

Memcon-Tab

2200–2300⁶

Secretary Vance

Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: General conversation over drinks—tour d'horizon of settlement issues and differences of view within Israeli Delegation.

Memcon-Tab

September 6, 1978—Wednesday

1003–1151⁷

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject: Preliminary exchange of views on Egyptian position and how President Carter proposed to proceed during Camp David talks. Sadat told President Carter he would present a proposal for a peace framework.⁸

Memcon-Tab

⁴ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 217–219, and his more fulsome account in *Keeping Faith*, pp. 332–338.

⁵ See Document 29.

⁶ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁷ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 219–220, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 338–342. Following the meeting, Carter met with Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski to discuss this meeting: "We were all concerned about Sadat's harsh opening proposal and Begin's inflexibility on all the issues. However, we were not overly discouraged, because Cy and Zbig reported a much more forthcoming attitude among the other Israelis, and I was counting on Sadat's promised concessions. (*Keeping Faith*, p. 342)

⁸ Sadat presented his proposed "Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem" to Carter at the meeting and the text is printed in Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 356–360. Carter's annotated copy of this proposal is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated. According to Quandt, Sadat also presented three typewritten pages outlining a series of concessions he would be prepared to make in the negotiations. (Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 222–223) A copy of this document is in the Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 28, Mid-East: Camp David Summit, President's Working Papers, undated.

1000–1100⁹

Secretary Vance
Dr. Brzezinski
U.S. Delegation

Foreign Minister Kamel
Minister of State
Boutros Ghali
Egyptian Delegation

Subject: Preliminary exchange of views with Egyptian Delegation on Egyptian position with respect to the peace negotiations, Somalia, Libya, Chad, etc.

Memcon-Tab 3

1455–1637¹⁰

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: President Carter informed Mr. Begin that President Sadat would be submitting a new Egyptian paper.

Memcon-Tab

1500–1630¹¹

President Carter

President Sadat

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: First trilateral meeting. General exchange of views; Sadat presented to Begin a new Egyptian paper.

Memcon-Tab

⁹ See Document 30. For Brzezinski's account of the meeting, see *Power and Principle*, p. 255. Brzezinski noted that following this meeting, "we [Brzezinski, Vance, Mondale] then had a rather useful discussion with the Israelis. I was struck by how relatively open-minded Dayan and Weizman were." Brzezinski continued: "Dayan discussed in some detail his conversations with moderate Palestinians, and both he and Weizman indicated a willingness to discuss seriously the question of terminating additional settlements and of finding some formula that would give the Palestinians genuine self-government." (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 255–256) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

¹⁰ Reference is presumably to a brief private exchange between Carter and Begin before Sadat arrived for the afternoon meeting. (See footnote 11 below) In his personal diary, Carter wrote: "I met earlier with Begin to tell him two things: I had sent Assad a personal message calling for peace in Lebanon; and for Begin to expect a very tough proposal from Sadat and not to overreact to it. (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 220–221) Carter added that "Sadat was not yet ready for a three-three-three meeting, but that we would try to schedule one for the next morning." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 342)

¹¹ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Sadat and Begin on the patio of Aspen Lodge from 2:55 p.m. to 4:37 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 220–222, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 343–345. According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Mrs. Carter, Vance, Atherton, Saunders, Eilts, Lewis, Brzezinski, and Quandt, at Holly Cabin from 10:14 p.m. to 11:59 p.m. on September 6. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Of the meeting, Carter wrote: "I brought the entire American group together in my cottage to discuss the apparent damage Sadat's proposal had done. Begin was treating it as an insurmountable obstacle, and the other members of the Israeli delegation were also deeply troubled. We knew that Sadat was ready to make immediate modifications, but it seemed advisable for me to meet with all the Israelis before Begin and Sadat met again with each other, so that I could ease their concern. I asked Cy to arrange such a session." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 346)

September 7, 1978—Thursday

0830–0930¹²

President Carter
 Secretary Vance
 Dr. Brzezinski
 Subject:
 Memcon-Tab

Prime Minister Begin
 Foreign Minister Dayan
 Defense Minister Weizman

1030–1345¹³

President Carter President Sadat Prime Minister Begin
 Subject: Second trilateral meeting.
 Memcon-Tab

1115–1220¹⁴

Vice President Mondale
 Secretary Vance
 Dr. Brzezinski
 U.S. Delegation

Foreign Minister Dayan
 Defense Min. Weizman
 Professor Barak
 Israeli Delegation

¹² According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Holly Cabin from 8:30 a.m. to 10:25 a.m. on September 7. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I made the following points: Sadat's proposal is more rigid than I anticipated; the U.S. has not been active in the preparation of either [the] Israeli or Egyptian proposal." Continuing the account, Carter quoted Begin as saying: "The document smacks of a victorious state dictating peace to the defeated. Sadat was ill-advised to submit the document—not the basis for negotiations." Carter responded: "Sadat was reiterating established Arab position." Summarizing further in an annotation to the diary, Carter wrote: "Begin then insisted on going through Sadat's paper in detail, refuting dozens of points. I tried to convince the Israelis that the Egyptian proposal included its maximum demands and to trust me and let me know what they actually needed for security and to comply with international agreements they had already been accepted. Sadat had proposed minor adjustments in the pre-1967 borders. What did Israel propose? Expansion of settlements was the crucial issue." Carter quoted Begin as stating, "I will ask Sadat to withdraw the paper," to which Carter responded: "Everyone should be free to submit anything they want. You can be equally effective by saying it is unacceptable." Begin replied, "Okay. We will not ask for withdrawal. We'll simply say it is unacceptable." (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 222–223) On this meeting, see also Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 346–350.

¹³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin on September 7 from 10:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., with Sadat joining the meeting at 10:45 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter's accounts of the "very, very bitter" discussions, which covered the Egyptian proposal, questions over the return of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, Israeli settlements, Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza, the situation in Lebanon, and the status of Jerusalem, see *White House Diary*, pp. 223–225, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 350–357.

¹⁴ See Document 33.

Subject: Lebanese situation; Israelis put forward a suggestion that Sinai issues remain unresolved; withdrawal problems on West Bank, etc.

Memcon-Tab 8

1515–1600;

1700–1800¹⁵

Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Brzezinski
Secretary Brown

Foreign Minister Dayan
Defense Min. Weizman
Professor Barak
General Tamir

Subject: Resume discussion of Israeli ideas for West Bank/Gaza settlement. Explore Israeli positions on refugee return, security/withdrawal on West Bank, settlements, Sinai air bases and authority for interim regime.

Memcon-Tab 9

1600–1700¹⁶

Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Ambassador Eilts

Foreign Minister Kamel
Ahmed Maher

Subject: Probing for purposes of Egyptian paper

Memcon-Tab 10

1702–1855¹⁷

President Carter President Sadat Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Resumption of earlier trilateral meeting.

Memcon-Tab

¹⁵ See Document 34.

¹⁶ See Document 35.

¹⁷ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, which again covered Sinai, including the future of the Israeli settlements and airfields there, as well as the Straits of Tiran, see *White House Diary*, pp. 225–226, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 357–359. Carter noted that the meeting “began very stilted” and later “deteriorated,” prompting Sadat to state that a “stalemate had been reached, and he saw no further reason for discussions to continue.” In his personal diary, Carter wrote that he then “made an analysis of all areas of agreement and pointed out that the United States had a strong security interest in Mideast peace that could, if violated, cause a worldwide conflict . . . If they were willing to reject the entire peace agreement because of some minor difference, I don't believe their people would accept it.” Carter concluded by encouraging Begin and Sadat “not to break off their talks, to give me a chance to use my influence, to have confidence in me. Sadat reluctantly agreed; Begin agreed easily. We adjourned.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 226)

1700–1830¹⁸

Vice President Mondale	Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Vance	Defense Min. Weizman
Secretary Brown	Professor Barak
U.S. Delegation	General Tamir

Subject: Resumption of earlier meeting. Exploration of Israeli positions on refugee return, security/withdrawal on the West Bank, settlements, Sinai airbase, etc.

Memcon-Tab

1900

Marine Tattoo.

2230–2455¹⁹

President Carter	President Sadat
Vice President Mondale	Dep. Prime Min. Touhamy
Secretary Vance	Hassan Kamel
Dr. Brzezinski	
Subject:	
Memcon-Tab	

September 8, 1978—Friday

0930–1130²⁰

Secretary Vance	Foreign Minister Dayan
Secretary Brown	Defense Min. Weizman
Dr. Brzezinski	Professor Barak
Amb. Atherton	General Tamir
Asst. Sec. Saunders	Mr. Rubinstein

Subject: Continuation of previous meeting. Sovereignty/withdrawal on West Bank, settlements, devolution of authority for self-governed and related issues.

Memcon-Tab 14

¹⁸ See Document 34.

¹⁹ For Carter's personal diary account of this meeting, in which he quotes at length the two leaders' discussion of the course of the day's trilateral meetings as well as Sadat's desire to seek a resolution of sovereignty issues in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to those in Sinai, see *White House Diary*, pp. 226–227. According to Carter's account in his memoirs, Mondale, Brown, Vance, and Brzezinski on the U.S. side and Tuhamy, Kamel, and Boutros-Ghali on the Egyptian side also attended the meeting. (See Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 360–363) For Brzezinski's account of the meeting, see *Power and Principle*, pp. 257–258.

²⁰ See Document 36.

1433–1602²¹

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Subject:

Memcon-Tab

1500–1730²²

Secretary Vance

Foreign Minister Kamel

U.S. Delegation

Egyptian Delegation

Subject: Lengthy discussion of Egyptian concern over West Bank sovereignty issue, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem.

Memcon-Tab 15

1607–1653²³

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon-Tab

1900

President Carter attends Prime Minister Begin's Seder.

September 9, 1978—Saturday

1026–1126²⁴

Sadat/Weizman meeting.

²¹ According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in Aspen Lodge from 2:30 p.m. to 4:04 p.m. on September 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) On the origins of the meeting, Carter wrote the previous day in his personal diary: "Later [after the evening meeting with the Egyptians] I met Zbig on the path, and he pointed out that both Israelis and Egyptians were frustrated about whether any progress could possibly be made. The Egyptians are contemplating leaving because of the intransigence of the Israelis, primarily on the settlements issue. I asked them both [Begin and Sadat] if I could come to their cabin. Begin, because of protocol, said he must come to call on me. Sadat said OK." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 227) For Carter's accounts of the meeting with Begin, which covered the subject of the Israeli settlements, see *White House Diary*, pp. 227–228, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 365–367. At the meeting, Carter informed Begin that the U.S. delegation would present a comprehensive proposal for agreement to both the Israeli and Egyptian delegations.

²² See Document 37.

²³ According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in Dogwood Cabin from 4:08 p.m. to 4:52 p.m. on September 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) At the meeting, Carter informed Sadat that the U.S. delegation intended to work out the text of a proposed draft agreement the following day. For Carter's accounts of the meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 228–229, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 368–369.

²⁴ See Document 39.

1830–1915²⁵

Secretary Vance

Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: Primarily topics were Weizman's worries about Begin's rigidity, concerns about tripartite meeting among leaders having exacerbated the situation, Secretary Vance's providing some hints of the nature of the U.S. paper then in its final stages of preparation.

Memcon-Tab

2045–2200²⁶

Secretary Vance

Foreign Minister Dayan

Ambassador Lewis

Israeli Delegation

Subject: General discussion topics which had been addressed in earlier meeting with Weizman.

Memcon-Tab

September 10, 1978—Sunday

1000–1330

Trip to Gettysburg.

1600–1705²⁷

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Vice President Mondale

Foreign Minister Dayan

Secretary Vance

Defense Min. Weizman

Dr. Brzezinski

Professor Barak

Subject: New U.S. draft Framework proposal²⁸ given to Israelis and discussed on a preliminary basis.

Memcon-Tab

1755–1805²⁹

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon Tab

²⁵ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, which included a "heated discussion" between the two leaders about the language in United Nations Resolution 242, see *White House Diary*, p. 230, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 372–374.

²⁸ See Document 38.

²⁹ This meeting was scheduled, but not held. Following his meeting with Begin, Carter reported its substance to Sadat and the two decided to reschedule their meeting to discuss the U.S. Framework draft for the following morning. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 374) See footnote 32 below.

2130–0300 (Sept. 11)³⁰

President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Brzezinski

Foreign Minister Dayan
Defense Min. Weizman
Professor Barak

Subject: Detailed discussion of new U.S. Framework paper. Israelis present their objections and some redrafting based on Israeli views.

Memcon-Tab

September 11, 1978—Monday

0300–0345³¹

President Carter

Foreign Minister Dayan

Subject: The President asked Dayan to walk from Holly to Aspen with him.

1030–1230³²

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject: The President went over orally with Sadat the revised U.S. Framework paper.³³

Memcon-Tab

³⁰ For Carter's account of this meeting, which covered the applicability of United Nations Resolution 242, navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the definition of "Palestinian," political and military control over the West Bank, Palestinian self-government, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem, see *Keeping Faith*, pp. 375–378, and *White House Diary*, p. 230. For Brzezinski's version of the "heated and prolonged discussion," see *Power and Principle*, pp. 260–261. At the meeting a new version of the U.S. Framework paper was presented to the Israelis for their comments. A copy of this September 10 version, bearing comments presented by the Israeli delegation at 8 a.m. the following morning, is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979. Vance also kept a "master" copy of this version, upon which decisions to accept or reject Israeli decisions on the draft were recorded. A copy of this version is *ibid*.

³¹ On this meeting, Carter wrote in his personal diary: "At 3:00 in the morning, I asked Dayan to walk with me. I described the problem: that Begin was unreasonable and the obstacle to peace; that I had doubts about his commitment to an agreement. I asked Dayan to help me with these phrases when the Israelis meet again. Dayan told me that the question of Sinai settlements was the most serious. I told him I would bring this up with Sadat, but I didn't think there was any chance for success." Carter further commented: "Dayan is a levelheaded, competent person, and if he or Weizman were prime minister, we could long ago have reached a resolution. It's becoming clearer that the rationality of Begin is in doubt." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 231) See also Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 378–379, and Dayan *Breakthrough*, p. 156.

³² For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, p. 231, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 379–380.

³³ A revised version of the Framework document, dated September 11 and produced based on the Israeli proposals of September 10, was presented to Sadat at this meeting. A copy of this revised version is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979.

1200–1230³⁴

Secretary Vance
Asst. Sec. Saunders
Amb. Lewis

Foreign Minister Dayan

Subject: Luncheon conversation. Israeli suggestion that Sinai agreement be made more precise. Israeli suggestion that Sinai talks be pursued in parallel with broad Framework talks.

Memcon-Tab

1430–1530³⁵

Secretary Vance
Amb. Lewis

Foreign Minister Dayan
Defense Min. Weizman
General Tamir
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Possible joint Jordanian-Israeli and/or Egyptian-Israeli border patrols, nature of Israeli security requirements in West Bank, Gaza and Sinai (with briefings from Tamir's maps), potential cost of refugee resettlement in Gaza. Secretary went over quickly latest version of U.S. Framework proposal, indicating which Israeli suggestions had been accepted and which rejected.

Memcon-Tab 24

1830–1945³⁶

President Carter

Defense Minister Weizman
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Sinai and Israeli security requirements.

Memcon-Tab

2130–2300³⁷

Secretary Vance
Amb. Eilts

Foreign Minister Kamel
Amb. Ghorbal
Ahmed Maher

Subject: Preliminary Egyptian comments on revised U.S. Framework paper. Egyptian concerns with it. They view it as retreat from previous U.S. positions. It makes no clear reference to withdrawal from Sinai and Palestinians and refugee problems inadequately treated.

Memcon—Tab 26.

³⁴ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

³⁵ See Document 41.

³⁶ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, p. 232, and *Keeping Faith*, p. 381. In his personal diary, Carter noted that during the meeting Vance telephoned "to say that the Egyptians requested a twelve-hour delay so Sadat could spend more time with his advisors. This is a bad sign." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 232)

³⁷ See Document 42.

2040–2240³⁸

President Carter

Foreign Minister Dayan
Professor Barak

Subject: Sinai and handling settlements problem.

Memcon—Tab _____

September 12, 1978—Tuesday

0815³⁹

President Carter

Foreign Minister Kamel
Ahmed Maher

Subject: The President met Kamel and his associates while bicycling. Brief general discussion in which President Carter said he did not want Sadat to have to bear burden of West Bank. King Hussein should be absorbed into peace talks. President Carter thought Israelis will be willing to look at Egyptian suggestions.

1040–1205⁴⁰

President Carter

President Sadat

³⁸ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I found Dayan to be a little more optimistic but willing to accept failure rather than yield completely on the Sinai settlements because of political considerations in Israel. This also would set a precedent for full withdrawal on the Golan Heights. This is what we've long suspected, but the Israelis have never admitted any of these things. I guess it is a sign that they now are more trustful of us.

"I outlined to them the consequences of failure. They informed me that Begin was not going to reject the paper out of hand but would have several levels of action: acquiescence in an issue; approve it, but get cabinet and Knesset confirmation; disapprove it, but let the Knesset make the ultimate decision. Dayan suggested I proceed with a proposal Sadat might accept. At least it would clarify the issue." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 232) See also, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 382–383.

³⁹ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met members of the Egyptian delegation enroute while bicycling. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No specific time for these encounters is given.

⁴⁰ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, which covered regional security, as well as the draft Framework document, see *White House Diary*, pp. 232–234, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 383–385. During their exchange, Carter informed Sadat that the United States would formally propose that Israeli settlements in the West Bank "should not be expanded or the number increased." Moreover, he informed him, "we had to delay some questions: permanent borders in the West Bank; permanent status of the Palestinian Arabs; permanent status of Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs might after five years—if there was a genuine self-government and genuine autonomy—prefer, with Israeli and Jordanian withdrawal, to keep the interim government intact. He [Sadat] said he would keep an open mind about it and accept that possibility in the language to be drafted." (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 233–234) Following this meeting, Carter reported on these discussions in a meeting with members of the U.S. delegation. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 263) Carter then returned to his cabin and "looked again at the detailed maps of the Middle East I had been studying for the last few months. All of a sudden, I felt fairly confident that I could get both leaders to agree to a general proposal that could resolve all the long-term differences concerning the Sinai, and also provide the basis for a future treaty between the two nations. The only exception was the Israeli settlements, which remained a crucial problem. Within about a half hour, I had jotted down my thoughts on a yellow pad." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 234)

Subject:
Memcon—Tab_____.

1030–1115⁴¹

Dr. Brzezinski	Prime Minister Begin
Subject: Settlements.	
Memcon—Tab_____.	

1300–1345⁴²

Secretary Vance	Foreign Minister Dayan
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Subject: Luncheon conversation. Dayan urged that as a fall-back position to avoid a breakdown, the West Bank/Gaza agreement should be separated from Sinai since the latter seemed at that point insoluble. Secretary said this would not work.

Memcon—Tab_____.

1400–1615⁴³

Secretary Vance	Foreign Minister Kamel
U.S. Delegation	Egyptian Delegation

Subject: Lengthy discussion of revised U.S. Framework paper and Egyptian concerns about it. Egyptians presented written comments and suggestions on U.S. Framework paper.

Memcon—Tab 31.

1640–1700⁴⁴

President Carter	President Sadat
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Subject: Discussion of new Sinai principles based on President Carter's handwritten memo.⁴⁵

Memcon—Tab_____.

⁴¹ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. For Brzezinski's account of this meeting, during which Begin stated that his "right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement," see *Power and Principle*, p. 263.

⁴² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

⁴³ See Document 44.

⁴⁴ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I went over and met with Sadat. I only had a rough scratch copy of my concept. [See footnote 40 above] He read it over carefully and made only two suggestions for changes, involving the width of the demilitarized zone and the delay in implementation of the agreement after it was concluded. I agreed to have it typed up, make one copy, and let him look it over before it was submitted to the Israelis. The meeting lasted fifteen minutes." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 234)

⁴⁵ See Document 45.

1755–1758⁴⁶

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject:

Memcon—Tab_____.

1815⁴⁷

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Impromptu meeting at dinner. Brief exchange about Begin's insistence that he meet alone with President Carter later in the evening.

1956–2132⁴⁸

President Carter

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Begin discussed at length his objection to the "inadmissibility" language and to removing the Israeli settlements from the West Bank and Sinai.

Memcon—Tab_____.

2130–2335⁴⁹

Secretary Vance
U.S. Delegation

Prime Minister Begin
Israeli Delegation

Subject: Resumed discussion of U.S. Framework paper and separate Sinai Framework concept.⁵⁰

Memcon—Tab_____.

September 13, 1978—Wednesday

0810–1653⁵¹

President Carter

Prof. Barak

Osama el-Baz

Subject: Lengthy drafting session on revising the overall Framework paper.⁵²

⁴⁶ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.

⁴⁷ In his personal diary, Carter noted Begin's suggestion to meet that evening: "I tried to induce him to wait until tomorrow after the drafting session, but he insisted." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 234)

⁴⁸ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 234–235, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 385–387.

⁴⁹ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

⁵⁰ See Document 45.

⁵¹ For Carter's accounts of the lengthy Framework re-drafting sessions, September 13, see *White House Diary*, pp. 235–236, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 387–388.

⁵² A annotated copy of the September 11 version of the Framework, prepared for the September 13 re-drafting sessions is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working

2005–2215

President Carter Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Continuation of redrafting session on a new overall Framework paper.

2215–2220⁵³

President Carter Prime Minister Begin

Subject: President Carter called on the Prime Minister in order to express appreciation for the constructive Israeli approach during the protracted drafting session earlier in the day.

2220–2315 (Sept. 14)⁵⁴

Secretary Vance Prime Minister Begin
U.S. Delegation Israeli Delegation

Subject: Focus on U.S. paper on Sinai.

Memcon—Tab 36.

September 14, 1978—Thursday

0800–0905⁵⁵

President Carter President Sadat

Subject: Obtain Sadat's reaction to the work of the joint drafting committee done on the previous day.

0845⁵⁶

Ambassador Eilts Foreign Minister Kamel

Subject: Deliver U.S. draft Sinai Framework document.

Papers, undated. A September 12 "early master draft" version, annotated to indicate Israeli and Egyptian redrafting is *ibid*.

⁵³ For Carter's accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, p. 236 and *Keeping Faith*, p. 388.

⁵⁴ See Document 46. Multiple undated, annotated versions of the Sinai Framework document are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated.

⁵⁵ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I walked for an hour with Sadat. I complained about the adamant attitude the Egyptians had taken yesterday, and asked Sadat to be more flexible on the West Bank and Gaza. We discussed the questions of Jerusalem and self-determination. I reminded him that we had worked this out together at Aswan, and he said it could be in the implementing section of the agreement. He was interested in having an international highway connect the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat and was willing to have the Etzion air base used for the supply of Eilat so long as it was operated by the Egyptians and not the Israelis." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 236) On this meeting, see also, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 389–390.

⁵⁶ No other record of this meeting has been found.

0930⁵⁷

President Carter
Subject:

Professor Barak

1110–1205⁵⁸

President Carter
Subject:

Foreign Minister Dayan
Israeli Delegation

1336–1431⁵⁹

President Carter
Subject: Discussion of new Sinai Framework paper.

President Sadat

1400–1800⁶⁰

Secretary Vance

Prof. Barak

Osama el-Baz

Subject: Further revision of overall Framework paper developed during the previous day's drafting session.

1515

Secretary Vance

Foreign Minister Kamel

⁵⁷ In his memoirs, Carter wrote of this meeting: "When I returned from the walk [with Sadat], Barak was waiting for me. He was still encouraged about the positive attitude prevailing among Begin and the other Israelis. He suggested that I discuss the Sinai questions with Dayan, who was more knowledgeable than he about the subject." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 390)

⁵⁸ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "Later, Dayan and Weizman came by. We discussed the entire Sinai question. It ultimately resolved into the same subject—the settlements near Gaza. I told them I would draft language letting this be a matter open for negotiation, to be resolved during the three-month period." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 236)

⁵⁹ During this meeting, Carter presented Sadat with a new draft of the Sinai Framework document. Sadat "immediately responded that there were preconditions: the airfields not being used for military purposes, and the settlements. He would negotiate when—not if—the settlements should be withdrawn." Carter "discussed with him the procedure to be followed if the Israelis won't agree on the settlements issue in the Sinai, and he said he would like to sign the document anyway, because it described his proposal. (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 236) Also see Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 390. For the text of this revised version of the Sinai Framework, see footnote 54 above.

⁶⁰ No other record of this tripartite drafting session has been found. The same afternoon, according to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Dayan from 2:46 p.m. to 3:01 p.m. in Aspen Lodge. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Of this meeting, Carter wrote: "I went to ask Dayan how we could best end the deadlocked talks, and he said he preferred a paper that would list each paragraph, with the differences delineated side by side." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 390)

Subject: Secretary stopped by to explain the revised Framework paper to Kamel.

2000–2230

Secretary Vance Prof. Barak Osama el-Baz

Subject: Continuation of tripartite drafting session; indepth discussion of revised Framework paper.

September 15, 1978—Friday

1030–1121⁶¹

President Carter Foreign Minister Dayan
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Subject:

1130–1150⁶²

Secretary Vance President Sadat
Secretary Brown (later) Foreign Minister Kamel
Ambassador Ghorbal

Subject: Sadat explains difficulty of signing an agreement with President Carter if Begin does not also sign. Such an agreement would become the basis for further compromises in any future negotiations.

⁶¹ According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Aspen Lodge from 10:30 a.m. to 11:21 a.m. on September 15. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other record of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs, Carter wrote that Dayan reported "that he and Sadat had just concluded an unsatisfactory meeting. It had been arranged by Weizman in hopes that the two men might find some basis for continuing the talks." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 391)

⁶² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In his memoirs, Vance wrote of this meeting: "Friday, September 15, was a fateful day. That morning I received word from Sadat that he wanted me to come and see him in his lodge. When I saw him, his face was clouded and his mood somber. He was clearly deeply troubled, and not his warm and empathetic self. He asked me to sit down and then told me he had decided he must go home, as there was no hope that we could achieve an agreement. I struggled to persuade him to stay, stressing the importance of our task and our responsibility to our peoples and to world peace. I asked him to remember that it was his courageous initiative that in large part had made it possible for us to be here at all, and that history would treat us harshly if we failed. I urged Sadat to think about what I had said while I went at once to inform President Carter." (Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 224) Following the meeting, Vance walked to Aspen Lodge, where he informed Carter of the discussion. Carter noted in an annotation to his personal diary, "This was one of the worst moments of my life." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 237)

1207–1237⁶³

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject: Sadat agrees to President Carter's request that the Egyptian delegation not leave that day and wait until Sunday. This will allow another effort to be made with the Israelis to obtain their agreement to the revised overall and Sinai Framework texts.

1400–1600⁶⁴

Vice President Mondale (part)

Foreign Minister Dayan

Secretary Vance

Defense Minister Weizman

Secretary Brown

Professor Barak

Dr. Brzezinski

Subject: Settlements, airfields and withdrawal from Sinai. Reiterated commitment to Israeli security and readiness to provide needed equipment.

Memcon—Tab _____

1520–1545⁶⁵

Vice President Mondale

President Sadat

Subject: Conveyed copy of handwritten letter⁶⁶ of President Carter.

1555–1625⁶⁷

Vice President Mondale

Prime Minister Begin

Subject: Conveyed copy of handwritten letter⁶⁸ of President Carter.

General discussion of status of summit and Sinai settlements issue.

⁶³ According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place in Dogwood Cabin from 12:07 p.m. to 12:36 p.m. on September 15. For Carter's accounts of this meeting, in which the President persuaded Sadat to remain at Camp David and continue the negotiations, see *White House Diary*, pp. 237–238, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 392–393. Despite Sadat's agreement, Carter noted that the U.S. delegation continued to prepare "failure plans" should the talks fail to produce an agreement by Sunday. He added: "But I did not want to give up. That afternoon and evening I went over the proposals—the Framework and the Sinai document—with Vance and Mondale. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 393) Quandt wrote that Carter had tasked him with preparing a speech announcing the failure of the talks. (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 240) Brzezinski's handwritten note to Quandt, outlining the points to include in the speech, including the U.S. role and interest in securing Middle East peace and areas of agreement achieved is in the Papers of William B. Quandt, Private Collection.

⁶⁴ See Document 48.

⁶⁵ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁶⁶ See Document 49.

⁶⁷ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁶⁸ See Document 49.

1975⁶⁹

Secretary Vance

Nabil el-Araby

Subject: Egyptian paper⁷⁰ on proposed textual changes presented.

2000–2200⁷¹

Secretary Vance

Professor Barak

Ambassador Lewis

Ambassador Dinitz

Eli Rubinstein

Defense Minister Weizman (later)

General Tamir (later)

Subject: Discussion of Israeli proposed textual changes for overall Framework paper.

2045–2115⁷²

Sadat/Weizman meeting.

2130–2400⁷³

President Carter

President Sadat

Vice President Mondale

Secretary Vance

Subject: Watched Muhammed Ali/Spinks fight.

⁶⁹ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

⁷⁰ Reference is possibly to an undated Egyptian paper titled “Amendments on the U.S. Proposal for A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,” in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979.

⁷¹ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁷² For Weizman’s account of this meeting, in which he “made one more effort to soften” Sadat with regard to the Israeli settlements in Sinai, see *The Battle for Peace*, pp. 369–370.

⁷³ Carter discussed this meeting in *White House Diary*, p. 238, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 393–394. Before the start of the boxing match, Carter and Mondale discussed the negotiations with Sadat: “I [Carter] recapitulated the situation in Fritz’s [Mondale’s] presence, to make sure that all of us had the same understanding of the terms under which we would work for the last few crucial hours.

“I said, ‘Sadat has been the linchpin in the negotiations. Provided the rights of the Palestinians are protected, I have maximum flexibility on the West Bank and Gaza. In Sinai, we must preserve the integrity of sovereignty and land. We are determined to put together a document that we can both sign, and we’re still hopeful that Prime Minister Begin will be willing to sign it too. If not, then my hope is that the only remaining issue will be the Israeli settlements on Egyptian territory.’” “Sadat agreed, which reconfirmed his promise to me earlier that day.” (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 393)

September 16, 1978—Saturday

0800–0900⁷⁴

President Carter

President Sadat

Subject: During early morning walk, the two Presidents discussed

1130–1330⁷⁵

Vice President Mondale

Foreign Minister Dayan

Secretary Vance

Professor Barak

Harold Saunders

Ambassador Dinitz

Amb. Sam Lewis

William Quandt

Subject: Discussion of Israeli proposed textual changes to overall Framework document.

1200–1250⁷⁶

President Carter

Foreign Minister Dayan

Subject: Sinai Framework (?)

⁷⁴ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I got up early and listed all the things that the Israelis could possibly use as arguments on the Sinai document, and then went for a walk with Sadat. I told him that I needed him to give me some flexibility on the Sinai settlements. He said he would be willing to accept UN forces in the settlements area, agree not to dismantle the settlements, be flexible on the time of withdrawal of Israeli settlers—but he could not be flexible on the principle of their withdrawal." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 238) See also *Keeping Faith*, p. 394.

⁷⁵ In his memoirs, Dayan described the meeting as focused on the "contentious Article which dealt with the Palestinian issue." "After comparing our proposed formula with theirs," he wrote, "I explained that in our view there should be a clear distinction between the principles which should serve as a negotiating basis for autonomy for the Arabs of the territories, and the basis for any future negotiations with Jordan which should have as its objective a peace treaty with that country." Dayan continued, "Vance said the Americans held a different position, but it seemed to have been arrived at for practical considerations rather than for reasons of principle. It was impossible, he said, to reach agreement with the Egyptians over autonomy if it applied only to people and not to boundaries." He noted: "Each side kept explaining its position, and then we pulled a rabbit out of the hat—the working paper which had been produced and agreed to by the Americans and ourselves in talks that had preceded Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. In that memorandum, there was a clear distinction between the peace treaties, which were to be concluded between us and the Arab States, and the issues that were to be discussed with the Arabs in the administered territories. Vance admitted that was indeed true, but that was in the context of the proposed Geneva Conference, and since then things had changed." (Dayan, *Breakthrough*, p. 175)

⁷⁶ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "I decided to discuss the settlements issue with Dayan, and other matters concerning the general framework. The negotiations are primarily about whether UN 242 applies to all aspects of the discussions in the West Bank. On the West Bank settlements, he thought we could handle it with no new settlements, but that's something I would have to work out with Begin. He said that Begin felt somewhat excluded, and this evening I should meet with just Begin and Barak, since Weizman had met with Sadat this morning." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 238) See also, *Keeping Faith*, p. 394.

1300–1330 (?)⁷⁷

President Carter

Defense Minister Weizman

Subject: Sinai Framework (?)

1500⁷⁸1630–⁷⁹

President Carter

President Sadat

Vice President Mondale

Osama el-Baz

Secretary Vance

Subject:

⁷⁷ According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place on September 16 from 1:07 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. in Aspen Lodge, though it adds question marks next to the recorded times. (Carter Library, Presidential Material) In his memoirs, Carter wrote of this meeting, which followed his meeting with Dayan: "I then went to see Weizman, to find out about his meeting with Sadat. As he walked to Aspen with me, he reported that Sadat would be willing to say in the Sinai document that future negotiations would settle the issue of the Israeli settlements. I was startled, because this was not at all what Sadat had just told me. I knew that in general Ezer was an optimist, and that at Camp David, unfortunately, this attitude had rarely been justified. Weizman said he had also predicted to Sadat that the Knesset would vote to remove the settlements; Dayan had also told me the opposite." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 394–395)

⁷⁸ This entry appears to have been added in error. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale at Aspen Lodge between 3:20 p.m. and 4 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No record of the substance of that conversation has been found.

⁷⁹ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter and Vance met with Sadat and el-Baz at Aspen Lodge on September 16 from 4:40 p.m. to 7 p.m. In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: "The meeting was constructive. I went over my draft on Sinai with him, and also the general framework. I outlined all the advantages he would derive from a success at Camp David; everything that he would lose if we failed." "On the Sinai," Carter continued, "we are substantially in agreement. Sadat was willing to say 'international waterway' relating to the Strait of Tiran. He insisted that full diplomatic relations and open borders would apply only when the interim withdrawal was complete. He accepted the question of settlers by expressing the Egyptian and Israeli positions and then to let the Israelis decide—to go ahead or to fail. Sadat was in a sober and constructive mood." (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 239–240) Carter held a further meeting with Begin and the Israeli delegation on the evening of September 16. For this meeting, see Document 50. For the course of the final day of the Camp David Summit and the signing ceremony at the White House, see Document 51.

29. Message From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in Syria¹

Camp David, September 6, 1978, 1431Z

Subject: Presidential Message for President Assad.

1. Please deliver² the following message from President Carter to President Assad as soon as possible.

2. Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

Over recent weeks, I have been following closely with Secretary Vance the situation in Lebanon and would like to share my concerns with you.

I understand the interest in stability on Syria's borders and in the Middle East which led to your initial decision to introduce Syrian forces into Lebanon. I believe the United States and Syria have shared this interest in a unified Lebanon which could once again make a constructive contribution to peace and progress in the area. Syria along with its Arab partners has assumed responsibilities which have been difficult to carry out but important in bringing peace to the Middle East.

What concerns me now is the possibility of the fragmentation of Lebanon if the authority of the Lebanese Government cannot soon be restored. To allow time for this, I would strongly urge that you give urgent consideration to the idea of a ceasefire and standfast which Secretary Vance mentioned in his recent letter.³

I am writing to ask whether you feel there is any other step that might be taken that could bring an end to the fighting once and for all and provide a context within which the important factions in Lebanon could turn their attention to the work of rebuilding Lebanon as a nation under the authority of the legitimate government. Secretary Vance has earlier shared some of his thoughts with you, but I would be most appreciative to have your views.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 88, Syria: 4/78–5/79. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. The telegram is not numbered. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. The Department repeated the text of Carter's message to Assad in telegram 227283 to Beirut, September 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780007–0483)

² On September 8, Seelye delivered Carter's message to Dabboul, who said he would "have it delivered promptly" to Assad. (Telegram 5285 from Damascus, September 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2095)

³ See Document 20.

I am concerned because of the longer term strategic implications for the Middle East, and I am disturbed that further fighting in Lebanon could become the trigger for a wider war in the Middle East. I am also deeply moved by what continued fighting in Lebanon will do to the people there. As you know, many Americans are in touch with relatives there, and we receive constant reporting on the human dimensions of the tragedy there.

I understand, Mr. President, that this will reach you at the end of the holy holidays. May the blessings of this season sustain you.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

30. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 6, 1978, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council Advisor to the President

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large

Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

William Quandt, National Security Council

Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt

EGYPTIAN SIDE

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

Ahmed Maher, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry

SUBJECT

Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamel's Meeting with Secretary Vance

Schedule

The Secretary first outlined the proposed schedule for today, including the possibility of an enlarged meeting this evening after dinner.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, Middle East—1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.

Kamel wondered if we are not moving too fast. Ghorbal asked if we have heard anything from the Israelis which might warrant an accelerated schedule. The Secretary said the Israelis have not presented anything new. At Kamel's request, the Secretary undertook to inform President Carter of the Egyptian Foreign Minister's view that it might be wise to proceed more leisurely. The Secretary noted, however, the two Presidents may already have decided on the schedule.²

Camp David Talks

The Secretary invited Kamel to present any points that the Egyptians might wish to make. Kamel said that Sadat is coming to Camp David with an "open heart" and a willingness to listen to "the other party" and to any ideas that President Carter might have. The only point that should be borne in mind is that no concessions should be asked in terms of territory and sovereignty. If there is a positive outcome, Kamel noted, it should bring in the other parties. Hussein should be able to participate and the peace process would have Saudi blessing. Kamel noted that Sadat sees the Camp David meeting as "crucial and very important." Unless some positive outcome is reached, it will be difficult to continue. It will undermine Sadat's position in the Arab world.

Sadat, Kamel noted, has stated several times that whatever the outcome of the Camp David meeting, he will get together with the Arabs and report. Sadat is thinking of a mini-summit. The Secretary asked what Sadat has in mind in terms of limitation of numbers. Kamel observed that most of the Arabs are opposed to the peace process because they believe that the Israelis are not changing their attitudes. The Saudis believe that it is imperative that Sadat be supported by other Arab elements. Any Arab Summit or mini-summit does not mean a shift from the peace effort. This will continue on the basis of the decision made at Rabat to search for peace. Asked who might attend such a mini-summit, Kamel thought the Jordanians, Saudis and, hopefully, the Syrians. Asked about the likelihood of Syrian participation, Kamel noted that this will depend upon what comes out of Camp David. The Saudis will tackle the Syrians on this matter.

The Secretary asked about the present state of Egyptian-Syrian relations. Kamel noted these are very negative. There are no permanent channels of regular contact. Sometimes the Syrian UN Representative Shoufi meets with Egyptian Permanent Representative Abdul Meguid. Nevertheless, what the Egyptians are hearing about Assad's positions is encouraging. Kamel noted, however, that Assad's positions tend not to be constant. The Saudis believe that things can be worked out with

² See footnote 7, Document 28.

Assad in a manner which would allow the Syrians to come in—not necessarily at the beginning, but later. Brzezinski asked if the outcome of Camp David is a compromise, will the Syrians attend? Kamel answered affirmatively.

Quandt asked (a) is there likely to be another meeting after Camp David if the latter has reasonable success and (b) will the Jordanians attend such a meeting? Kamel responded affirmatively, noting that all Egyptian ideas are based on the concept of Jordanian participation. Quandt asked whether, in the event the Saudis support a Jordanian role and the Syrians do not, the Jordanians will still attend? Kamel thought they will, provided “Palestinian rights” are adequately safeguarded.

Boutros Ghali opined that two other countries might be interested in participating—Morocco and the Sudan. Saunders observed that during his post-Leeds Castle visit to Morocco,³ King Hassan had emphasized the need to obtain Arab support for Sadat’s initiative. Kamel observed that the Egyptians have had similar signals from Hassan. Egyptian priorities are to obtain Saudi support and Hussein’s participation. Hussein, Kamel noted, needs a clear and unambiguous commitment on withdrawal from the West Bank.

Quandt inquired where an Arab Summit might be held. Kamel responded that this is an open question, but identified his preference for somewhere in Saudi Arabia. Saunders asked who besides Morocco and the Sudanese might attend? Kamel spoke of the confrontation states,⁴ the Saudis, Morocco (if she wishes) and perhaps the Gulf States. Kamel observed, however, that the Moroccans are thinking of a full meeting. The Secretary wondered whether there might be more problems than benefits emerging from a full summit. Kamel agreed, noting that the Libyans would create problems. The smaller the summit, the better. Saunders asked about the Tunisians and the Algerians, and what weight they carry? Kamel responded that they all carry some weight, but did not think the two states would wish to participate. Boutros Ghali commented that the Tunisians tend to be neutralists: neutralists between Morocco and Algeria and neutralists between the moderates

³ Saunders met with King Hassan in Rabat, July 21, for a three-hour discussion of the Arab-Israeli negotiations and bilateral U.S.-Moroccan relations. Saunders sent a record of the discussion to Vance in Washington, as well as to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jidda in telegram 4437 from Rabat, July 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2392)

⁴ The “confrontation states,” also known as the Pan-Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, were comprised of Algeria, Libya, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The group, designed “to face the Zionist enemy and confront the imperialist conspiracy,” was formed at the conclusion of a summit held in Tripoli, December 1–5, 1977, to protest Sadat’s visit to Israel the month before. (Joe Alex Morris, Jr., “Arabs at Summit Agree on Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1977, p. A9)

and the rejectionists such as Libya. Kamel also reiterated his view that any success at Camp David will attract other Arabs at a later stage.

The Secretary stressed that President Carter is hopeful that something can be achieved. President Carter will outline to President Sadat in the course of their morning meeting what his ideas are. The President has set his sights high. Kamel emphasized that Egypt is concerned that the close U.S.-Egyptian relationship continue even if nothing is achieved at Camp David. Egypt will keep trying for peace and will need U.S. assistance. The Secretary recalled that we have often spoken of presenting our suggestions when the time comes. He thought President Carter will do so at this meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion of the political situations in Somalia, Eritrea, Libya, and Chad.]

Lebanon

The Secretary noted our concern about the periodic flare-ups in Lebanon. We have been in touch on a daily basis with Lebanese Foreign Minister Boutros, with other Lebanese, with the Syrians and with the Israelis. He had sent cables last Wednesday to Assad⁵ and to the Saudis,⁶ at a time when the fighting was heavy, urging (a) the Syrians to agree to a ceasefire and a standfast and (b) the Saudis to try to influence the Syrians along these lines. As yet, there has been no reply. Hence, President Carter had earlier today sent another message⁷ to Assad again urging restraint.

The U.S. has also urged restraint on the Israelis. The Israelis have been deploying reconnaissance aircraft over Lebanon. The Syrians have recently deployed anti-aircraft artillery to Lebanon, but thus far no missiles. If the Lebanese situation should explode, the Secretary noted, it could blow everything up. The Egyptians agreed.

Kamel thought that the Syrians would be only too happy to have a ceasefire. In his view, the Israelis need to be influenced and pressed. He opined that the Israelis are keeping the situation in Lebanon heated, perhaps even in connection with the Camp David talks. The Israelis withdrew their forces, but left behind Haddad and the Christian forces.

The Secretary said we have been in touch on a daily basis with the Israelis. Vice President Mondale had also talked to the Pope⁸ urging the Vatican to get in touch with the Christians in order to urge restraint. Kamel agreed that the Vatican is trying, and commented that the

⁵ See Document 20.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See Document 29.

⁸ Mondale attended the Papal Inaugural ceremony for Pope John Paul II on behalf of the United States September 2–4.

French are also involved. He asked what answer the Israelis have given to U.S. representations. The Secretary said they have replied that if there were a ceasefire, there would be no reason for Israelis to be involved. Boutros Ghali recalled that, while recently in Rome for the Pope's funeral, he had talked with Lebanese Christian leader Helou and Moslem leader Sulh. Both had asked for an Egyptian role in resolving the Lebanese problem. Boutros Ghali noted that as long as Egypt is engaged in the peace process, it is difficult for Egypt to play a positive role in Lebanon because of Syrian opposition. They had discussed this with Sadat on the aircraft on the way over. Sadat had said that as soon as something can be achieved at Camp David, this will open the way for a more active Egyptian role in Lebanon.

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 6, 1978

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt

EGYPTIAN SIDE

Mohamed Hassan El-Touhamy, Deputy Prime Minister

SUBJECT

Talk with Hassan El-Touhamy re West Bank/Gaza

While walking back to his cabin with Hassan El-Touhamy this afternoon, he noted that President Sadat will be informing Prime Minister Begin today² of his ideas on the West Bank/Gaza. Touhamy made a point of emphasizing to me that Egypt is prepared to assume responsibility for negotiation of the West Bank/Gaza even if Hussein and/or the Palestinians are unwilling to do so. When asked how this squares with the constant comments of members of the Egyptian Delegation that Egypt has no mandate to negotiate the West Bank/Gaza, Touhamy said Egypt needs no mandate to do so. As the strongest Arab power, it

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, unlabeled folder. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.

² See footnote 11, Document 28.

has a responsibility to undertake this mission if the other Arabs are too timid to do so.

Touhamy said that he had told Sadat that he, Touhamy, is prepared to act as “marshal” of the West Bank/Gaza for as long as it takes. This would even apply to Jerusalem. He claimed to know Teddy Kollek well and was sure that he could work with him.

Touhamy stressed that Sadat’s purpose in making such a proposal to Begin is to assure the Israeli Prime Minister that Egypt is willing and able to negotiate the West Bank/Gaza, provided the other aspects of the Arab/Israeli problem are satisfactorily resolved. He did not spell out exactly what he had in mind by “the other aspects,” but seemed intent upon emphasizing Egypt’s ability to do whatever is needed with respect to the West Bank/Gaza.

COMMENT: Touhamy’s comments run squarely counter to the views of Mohamed Kamel and Boutros Ghali on this matter.

32. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts)¹

Camp David, September 7, 1978

SUBJECT

State of Mind of Egyptian Delegation on Morning of September 7, 1978

I escorted President Sadat this morning from Dogwood² to Aspen³ and also had opportunity to speak to various members of the Egyptian Delegation. What follows is my assessment of state of mind of the Egyptian Delegation as of noon today.

In my brief chat with Sadat, he said he was very pleased with the way things were going. His meetings of the previous day with President Carter⁴ and jointly with President Carter/Prime Minister Begin⁵ had been very helpful. He expressed confidence that something posi-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 11, The Secretary Camp David [Briefing Book]. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.

² Dogwood Lodge, on the grounds of Camp David, was Sadat’s residence throughout the summit.

³ Aspen Lodge, the President’s residence on the grounds of Camp David.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 28.

⁵ See footnote 11, Document 28.

tive will come out of the Camp David talks. Subsequently, Presidency Director Hassan Kamel confirmed to me that Sadat had told the Egyptian Delegation about his pleasure and satisfaction with yesterday's talks. Ahmed Maher later told me that, in his briefing to the Egyptian Delegation, Sadat had indicated that he had told President Carter and Prime Minister Begin that he would be willing to negotiate the West Bank in the event King Hussein still refuses to participate.

In contrast to Sadat, Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel is worried and tense (Boutros Ghali is only slightly less so). Kamel is concerned (a) about Sadat's having told Begin of his readiness to negotiate the West Bank if Hussein will not play ball and (b) that in today's trilateral meeting, Sadat may make more concessions than he can implement. Kamel retains his worry that Sadat will be pressed by President Carter into accepting compromise positions that will discredit Sadat and Egypt in the eyes of the Saudis, the Palestinians and other Arabs. I suggested to Kamel that he ought to have a little more confidence that Sadat will know his own political limits, but stressed the importance of Sadat showing maximum flexibility at this delicate stage. Kamel remains decidedly uneasy.

After I had taken Sadat to Aspen, Ahmed Maher said he wished to speak to me. Maher commented that the Egyptian paper⁶ is regarded by Sadat as a comprehensive and balanced approach to achieving peace. He expressed the hope that both we and the Israelis will recognize this. He argued that the paper is as far as Egypt can go. I told him that I thought Prime Minister Begin will be commenting on the Egyptian paper at today's trilateral meeting. At some point I was sure that President Carter would also comment on it.

Maher then asked if the Israelis are putting forward a plan of their own. I said that I was not aware of any such Israeli intention and noted that Prime Minister Begin still stands by his self-rule and Sinai plans. I understood that Prime Minister Begin had indicated to President Sadat that everything in these Israeli plans is negotiable.

Maher then wanted to know if we consider it essential that "something" come out of the Camp David meeting? Would it not suffice, he wondered, simply to have a statement that the U.S. will continue its active efforts to work with the parties to achieve peace. He acknowledged that this would be pretty thin gruel for a Trilateral Summit, but expressed concern that Sadat might be pressed to agree to concessions in the West Bank that will be rejected by Hussein, the Palestinians and the Saudis. I suggested that Sadat was surely equally mindful of the need to satisfy the Saudis, Palestinians and Hussein in anything he might

⁶ The text of the Egyptian paper, "Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem," is printed in Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 356–360.

agree to at Camp David. Our common objective, I reminded Maher, remains to try to bring Hussein to the negotiating process.

Maher echoed Kamel's concern that Sadat had told Begin he was ready to negotiate the West Bank if Hussein refuses to do so. Maher said Foreign Minister Kamel had cautioned Sadat that the Israelis might at some point leak this bit of information and create embarrassment for Sadat and Egypt. Sadat's reply had been that if the Israelis do so, he will leak some of the things that Begin has told him. Maher commented that the Egyptian Delegation sees little purpose in such mutual public recriminations. It might come to that, however, if the Israelis leak Sadat's statement.

All in all, Maher noted, the Egyptian Delegation (except Touhamy, who is a bit of an outcast) is less sanguine than Sadat is about what might emerge from Camp David. Their gnawing worry is that Sadat will make more concessions than he should or that he can fulfill.

Atherton and Saunders got the same impression in talking to Egyptian Delegation members an hour later.

33. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 7, 1978, 11:15 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Vice President Mondale

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council Advisor to the President

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large

Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel

William Quandt, NSC

David Aaron, NSC

ISRAELI SIDE

Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan

Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann

Prof. Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court and Prime Minister's Legal Advisor

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis. The meeting took place in Holly Cabin.

Major General Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Dr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

Meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister and Defense Minister

Secretary Vance introduced this first meeting of the two delegations by outlining the schedule of meetings for the rest of the day.

Lebanon

He then turned to Lebanon, saying that the President had sent a message² to President Assad of Syria this morning as Prime Minister Begin had asked last night. Although there were no answers as yet to his earlier letter or, of course, to the President's message, we hoped for some response soon. We were also waiting for a response to our approach to the Saudis.

Secretary Vance then said that Prime Minister Begin had mentioned to the President an attack by Syrian aircraft on Israeli aircraft. He asked whether such an attack had occurred. Weizmann said that there had been no exchange of fire. However, three times in recent days Syrian fighters had scrambled and attempted to go into an attack mode in a menacing fashion. They were unable, however, to join combat as the Israelis broke away. He said that over twenty Syrian aircraft had been scrambled over Lebanon in these incidents.

Secretary Vance said we have no late intelligence suggesting that the Syrians have yet deployed any missiles into Lebanon, only anti-aircraft guns. Weizman said their intelligence agreed, so far, although missiles were deployed right on the border.

Peace Negotiations

Turning to major subjects for the Camp David meetings, Dayan said that Weizmann wanted to clarify something after his informal talk³ the previous evening with Secretary Vance concerning Sinai. Weizmann said it was important to emphasize there are still serious unresolved problems over Sinai, although great progress has been made in the various earlier meetings. If the Egyptians have the idea that everything is settled, this should be clarified. He agreed with Secretary Vance that in essence the remaining issues are the future of the settlements and the air fields. Weizmann said that although there are many records of the meetings at which the Sinai has been discussed, there is nothing in the way of a written agreement at this stage. Dayan asked

² See Document 29.

³ No record of this meeting has been found.

whether it would be possible to pick up the Sinai subject at these meetings and try to reduce understandings to writing. Secretary Vance said that the Egyptians are indeed prepared to discuss it here, and that despite Gamacy's absence, Sadat is of course present. He went on to say that as for President Carter's views, he wants to see as much accomplished here on both the West Bank and Gaza as well as Sinai as can be possible.

Barak then said he wanted to comment on President Carter's discussion last night with Prime Minister Begin concerning Sadat's desire for a statement on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Barak said it seemed to the Israelis that it would not be fruitful to go into this subject. The language is admittedly in 242 and they are not denying or challenging that fact. But, he assumes that what Sadat is really talking about is withdrawal and that this is what the phrase signifies. He suggests, therefore, concentrating on breaking down the principle of withdrawal into its component parts and discussing how to implement it on the West Bank and so forth. To get into a debate over this phrase of inadmissibility will only require the Israelis to distinguish between wars of aggression and wars of defense and to argue their position about the origins of the 1967 conflict.

Dayan then underscored this point by saying they wished to go into the question of what withdrawal would actually look like in all its specifics rather than argue over abstract formulations. Secretary Vance said he understood the Egyptians have done more work since the Leeds talks⁴ on details of West Bank arrangements and will be prepared to do so. Brzezinski said he understood then that the Israelis wanted to talk first about the substance of the arrangements on the ground and then try to extract general principles from concrete agreements. Dayan agreed and said that they were now at the stage in negotiations where it is essential to get down to cases. (Rosenne tried to introduce an argument to the effect that the language about inadmissibility is only preambular language rather than "operative" language in 242 but Weizmann diverted his effort.) Weizmann again asked Secretary Vance whether he could understand that the Egyptians were now ready to discuss the West Bank in detail from a practical point of view. How far in this direction can they go without a mandate? Secretary Vance said he did not yet know. He would meet later in the day with Foreign Minister Kamel⁵ and hoped to tell Weizmann afterward.

Dayan said he was somewhat confused from Begin's briefing after his meeting last night with President Carter on one or two points. He

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 3.

⁵ See Document 35.

had understood from Begin that according to President Carter, Egypt would be ready to permit Israeli forces to remain in the West Bank after five years, while insisting on a statement of “full withdrawal”, perhaps leaving Israeli forces there in some special status. (Secretary Vance nodded agreement.) But, Dayan said he was not clear on the future of the West Bank settlements. Did the Egyptians mean withdrawal to include dismantling all settlements? Secretary Vance said this was unclear at this point and has to be further defined. The basic principle is that there should be no settlements in the West Bank or Sinai in the Egyptian frame of reference. However, what in practical terms they will accept is unclear.

Weizmann summarized a number of points from his various meetings with Sadat and Gamacy which he characterized as “very interesting and tangible”. The question however is whether Sadat still endorses that. (He mentioned such examples as joint policing, retention of Israeli forces, leaving West Bank settlements intact, permitting private land sales to Israel, open borders, full commerce, and so forth.) Weizmann said that when he met Sadat he would remind him of their discussion of these points and that “we don’t start from zero in these meetings”. Secretary Vance agreed and said that one important purpose here is to get down in writing agreement on some of these points thus far discussed but not recorded.

Dayan then recalled that in the U.S./Israeli “working paper” of last autumn,⁶ the United States and Israel had agreed on the parties to be included in the negotiations, and one of the parties was the Palestinian Arabs. He then asked whether we can, in the near future, see a way to bring in representatives of the Palestine/Arabs to these negotiations, either formally or as advisers. Dayan said he had recently met privately with some Palestine/Arab leaders and that he was encouraged by their point of view, though he recognized that they would not necessarily say the same things if other Arabs were present. Was there some way to get them now into the negotiations? Secretary Vance said he had discussed this point with Kamel this morning who said that if Camp David ends with a sufficient and satisfactory agreement, that then he believed Palestine/Arabs would be prepared to join the negotiations.

Weizmann inquired whether Sadat still wanted to start with a broad statement covering the West Bank problem and then with that in hand to go ahead on Sinai. Vance replied that to the best of his knowledge he is still in that mood, but “you will have to hear it from him.” Weizmann said he hoped everyone understands that there is a major difference between the Sinai and the West Bank.

⁶ Not further identified.

Barak then interjected that he sees a clear analytical distinction between withdrawal and the settlements, and that withdrawal itself has two elements within it: withdrawal of the military government and withdrawal or non-withdrawal of the security presence. And, moreover, soldiers serving in the West Bank may have joint military government and security functions. Brzezinski said that he thought this was a manageable problem in differentiating elements to be withdrawn. Barak said this was the reason he thought it more useful to work initially on concrete details, a position to which Brzezinski said he was sympathetic.

Vice President Mondale then asked what approach by the Egyptians would be most helpful here at Camp David in order for the Israeli Government to be as forthcoming as possible. Dayan responded that they needed to know concretely more about the Egyptian proposals and to get into discussing their details, as was begun at Leeds. He said he thought they should pick up and continue the Leeds conversations about gaps between the Israeli and Egyptian positions to see what could be done to bridge them.

Vice President Mondale then asked whether it was fair to say that how much the Israelis could agree to on the West Bank depends at least in part on whether Sadat is ready to move ahead definitively on Sinai. Both Dayan and Weizmann said they were not sure. (Note: It was obvious that neither felt comfortable in responding to this question in Begin's absence, but the context of their subsequent remarks suggested the answer would be "yes".)

Weizmann then spoke at some length about the problem of getting Sadat to understand that his visit to Jerusalem, important as it had been, could not wipe out all previous history of conflict and remove overnight the reasons why the Israeli people still feel terribly insecure about their borders. Weizmann said he had tried to get this across himself to Sadat but without success. He stressed that the origins of the 1967 war, both in Sinai and in the West Bank (where the Israelis had urged Hussein not to intervene in the fighting) could not be ignored.

Vice President Mondale then asked whether, hypothetically, if the Sinai problem could be settled, and an agreement reached between Israel and Egypt in some form over the West Bank and Gaza, would that not be a great breakthrough whether Hussein joined or not? Dayan responded that he was convinced that if an agreement over the West Bank could be reached with Sadat that representative Palestine/Arabs would join in. In that case, Israel would certainly accept it and would not question Sadat's "lack of a formal mandate for the West Bank".

Brzezinski asked Dayan to review in more detail the outcome of his recent talks with the Palestine/Arab leaders, which Dayan did at some length. He said he had met with about six in individual meetings,

and that they included the Mayors of Hebron and Bethlehem, Hikmat Al Masri from Nablus, Anwar Katib from Jerusalem, a leading lawyer from Ramallah, and two members of the Shawa family of Gaza. Although there were individual differences, they all expressed a great desire somehow themselves to have a role in determining their own future. They are afraid that they will be left with nothing if Camp David fails, and they want very much to see the military government abolished and their own administrative council established. They want to be able to meet to discuss general political issues, which they cannot now do. They want reunification of families displaced in 1967, with perhaps as many as one hundred thousand returning. They feel that there are all the elements necessary for genuine self rule in the West Bank and Gaza; for example, there are plenty of Arab doctors now in the hospitals and Arab agricultural experts. With respect to the Israeli Defense forces, the Arab leaders distinguish between what they would like (total withdrawal) and what is realistic. Dayan insisted that their major concern is to make sure the IDF will not interfere in their daily lives; that they would, of course, agree they had to give assurances that their Arab police would prevent terrorist attacks against Israelis from West Bank locations, and that at present they would need substantial help from Jordan or Egypt to do so. They could accept an IDF presence limited to the function of defending Israel in a strategic fashion, though they of course do not like it. With respect to sovereignty, they agree, said Dayan, that this issue would be decided at the end of or indeed during the five year interim period. Therefore, he said it is vital to them that new settlement activity be frozen for five years so that "all the land won't be bought up by the Israelis". One Palestine leader wanted all Israeli settlements removed. But the consensus position is to freeze settlements, at least insofar as new settlements are concerned. (He said that they might agree to permit some additional families to pre-existing settlements.) Dayan said they know full well there are more West Bank Arabs staying overnight legally or illegally in Tel Aviv, etc., than all the Israelis living in the West Bank, and that their priority is to keep free access to the Israeli Arabs. With regard to self-determination, the Palestine leaders want that right. If they had it, however, they would want to keep some relationship with Jordan. Dayan said he had pressed whether they would give up their Jordanian citizenship for an "Arafat citizenship", and they did not wish to do so. They agree that the area is perhaps too small and too fragmented for a fully independent state but they want equal rights with other peoples to make that decision themselves. Dayan said he was also pleased to find that they put a high priority on keeping free contact with Israel; they do not want ever to return to closed borders with the Israelis or, of course, with Jordan. Dayan concluded this review by saying he was impressed that the leaders genuinely want to be involved in deciding their future, yet at

the same time have fear of PLO retaliation. They cannot “volunteer”. He said that they made clear they would be talking to Arafat as well as with the Jordanians and presumably the Egyptians; he said they used such defiant phrases as “we will tell Arafat what we intend to do.” Dayan said he assumed that getting “clearance” from all three parties for their participation would be more complex, yet he felt confident that if agreement were reachable with Sadat that one way or another the Palestine leaders would manage to nominate their own representatives to participate either formally or informally as advisers perhaps to an Egyptian if not Jordanian delegation. Quandt asked whether there was any Israeli impediment to these leaders seeing Arafat in Beirut. Could they then return? Weizmann replied that there were now no restrictions on their travel. He cited several cases of PLO sympathizers who have travelled abroad and returned without difficulty. Weizmann also underscored Dayan’s recital by saying that the West Bankers “have really started talking a bit differently in the last few weeks.” Weizmann then recounted his conversations with Sadat about his concept of peace with Egypt as a “first peace” rather than a “separate peace”. He said he understood that Sadat’s problem was whether Israel could give him enough on the West Bank and Gaza to protect him from charges of treachery by the Arabs. But for the Israelis it is of course very difficult politically, since practically no one will agree to return to ‘67 borders, even with minor modifications.

Brzezinski said that conceivably one could agree about the interim solution which might then well become permanent. But an interim solution needed to be attractive enough to permit Sadat to agree to it. Weizmann agreed. Weizmann then asked whether the United States was prepared to see an Egyptian/Israeli agreement over the West Bank if Hussein remained apart. Secretary Vance answered that such an agreement should go forward even if Hussein will not join, although obviously it would be better if he did. But, Secretary Vance emphasized, the real problem is to find an agreement over the West Bank and Gaza which is politically sufficiently attractive for Sadat to sell to the moderate Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia. Dayan again said that he really believed that the Palestine/Arab leaders would find a way to participate with Egypt and Israel, for they can almost “taste” what they sense to be in their grasp.

Weizmann said he wanted to ask how much influence the Saudis would have on whether or not an interim solution for the West Bank would be attractive enough politically, and how much influence they would have over Palestine/Arab attitudes toward it. Would they support it? Brzezinski replied he thought it depended on just how attractive the interim solution were. He said the Saudis are increasingly worried about other threats in the region and would like to support a

solution if it is attractive enough. Secretary Vance said in his view the answer depended on how strongly Sadat supported the solution. If Sadat is very positive about it, then he believed the Saudis would also support it.

The meeting concluded in order for Secretary Vance to meet with President Carter.⁷

⁷ According to the President's Daily Diary, Vance did not meet alone with Carter on September 7. Vance spoke by telephone with the President from 1:43 p.m. to 1:45 p.m., following Carter's trilateral meeting with Begin and Sadat. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

34. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 7, 1978, 3:15–4 p.m., 5–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Walter Mondale, Vice President of the United States

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council Advisor to the the President

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large

ISRAELI SIDE

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense

Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court and Prime Minister's Legal Advisor

Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch

Elyakim Rubenstein (notetaker), Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

Exploration of Israeli Positions on Refugee Return, Security/Withdrawal on West Bank, Settlements, Sinai Air Bases and Authority for Interim Regime

The following is a summary of the follow-on discussions with members of the Israeli Delegation to explore further some questions raised during the President's bilateral meeting with Prime Minister

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton on September 8.

Begin and his principal advisors the morning of September 7.² The principal subjects discussed were: (a) refugee return to the West Bank, (b) security/withdrawal on the West Bank, (c) Israeli settlements, (d) Sinai air bases, and (e) the source of authority for an interim regime. It was agreed that a further subject to discuss was the question of sovereignty and final status of the West Bank and Gaza, but time did not permit getting into this issue.

Of particular note, Dayan made the point twice during the meeting—once in connection with West Bank security/withdrawal issues and once in connection with the settlements problem—that Egypt could not make proposals going beyond its present positions; it was therefore important to know what the U.S. would agree to support and then for the U.S. to make proposals on these issues.

Refugee Return

Secretary Vance asked what Israel had in mind, in its West Bank/Gaza home rule plan, about the number of Palestinian refugees who would be permitted to return during the interim period and how this in-migration program would be carried out. The Israelis explained that they had in mind providing for the return of West Bank and Gaza residents who had been displaced in the 1967 War. About 40,000 had already returned and they estimated that perhaps another 100,000 would have a claim to return under this program. Dayan stressed that this was an important issue for the West Bank Palestinian representatives he had been meeting with. The Israelis did not see this as a major problem; the principal criteria were that they could be absorbed economically (i.e., that no refugee camps would be created) and that individuals who would be a security problem be screened out. The details could be worked out with the Administrative Council envisaged under the self-rule plan. Israel would have a veto but as a general principle these 1967 displaced persons would be permitted to return.

Dayan emphasized that Israel made a distinction between the West Bank/Gaza residents displaced in 1967 and refugees or their descendants from the 1948 War. The “right of return” which the latter claimed meant returning to Israel proper or to Gaza. In Gaza there were already 150,000 1948 refugees and no more could be absorbed. Israel, itself, could not take back any significant numbers. Therefore, the need is to have an international body which would resolve the problem of the 1948 refugees through resettlement, largely in countries where they reside. All governments where these refugees live would participate in this body, which would also deal with the problem of Jewish refugees

² See footnote 12, Document 28.

from Arab countries and their claims. The most difficult category would be the 1948 refugees in Lebanon.

Security/Withdrawal

Secretary Vance pressed Weizman and Dayan for their specific ideas on what their security requirements in the West Bank would be during the interim period. Initially, Weizman took the position that Israel would need to retain approximately its present military forces and positions in the West Bank. He enumerated the categories of Israeli security requirements as encompassing (a) a military presence in the Jordan Valley and control of entry to both the West Bank and Gaza; (b) early warning stations on the West Bank; (c) strong points on the West Bank heights overlooking the Jordan Valley; (d) control of key points on East/West access roads in the West Bank plus the building of some new roads; and (e) prepositioned depots and defense positions on the West Bank for additional forces that might have to be sent in. Weizman stressed that, even if there were peace with Egypt, Israel still had to be prepared against threats from Syria, Iraq and Jordan to the East.

Secretary Vance made the point that all of this would not take into account the essential political problem that there needed to be some reductions and redeployment (which could be characterized by the Arabs as withdrawal) of Israeli forces and a decrease in their visibility in order to give evidence of the end of the occupation. Secretaries Vance and Brown and Dr. Brzezinski pressed this point during an extended discussion. In the end, both Weizman and Dayan acknowledged the importance of agreeing on concepts which would meet the categories of Israeli security requirements listed above but would at the same time reduce the Israeli military visibility. Secretary Vance stressed Israel should have what it needs for security; at the same time, there could be withdrawal into encampments. Dayan said he hoped we could say withdrawal "out of," rather than "into."

The Israelis were reluctant to present to us a detailed military plan, arguing that this could be dealt with in negotiations. They did, however, suggest a number of ways in which their military visibility could be reduced: (a) the most important would be the abolition of the offices of the military government which Weizman said would remove Israeli military government officials (about 500 personnel) from about 15 municipal centers; (b) some service schools now located on the West Bank could perhaps be relocated in Israel proper; (c) if any troop concentrations were in populated areas, they could perhaps be redeployed to other points on the West Bank; (d) battalions could be converted into companies.

Dayan stressed that Israel's objective was to take itself out of the daily lives of the local population, even including security functions

provided the local authorities were able to prevent terrorist acts against Israel. If they could not, however, he clearly implied that Israel would have to reserve the right to intervene.

Weizman raised the additional problem that the West Bank (as well as Sinai) now provided the principal training areas for Israeli military forces. Given the present size of the Israeli defense forces, and the small area available in Israel, he did not see how their training needs could be met within the borders of Israel itself.

The Vice President asked whether, as an additional means of demonstrating the change from a military government regime, it would be possible to convert some Israeli settlements in the West Bank to military cantonments. Both Weizman and Dayan reacted negatively to this idea. Otherwise, however, by the end of the meeting they were clearly focusing on ways in which their security presence could be modified, without a significant reduction in its totality, to meet the political need to demonstrate that a new situation existed.

Settlements

Secretary Vance said that in his view the settlements in the Sinai and on the West Bank presented two different problems. On the West Bank, he believed there should be a freeze on further settlements with disposition of existing settlements to be dealt with in negotiations among the parties. As for the Sinai settlements, he did not believe Sadat would give in on his insistence that they be disbanded. Weizman said it was not possible to ignore the feeling of the Israeli people about the settlements in the Rafah area, given their memories of three Egyptian invasions. Admittedly these settlements were not a major military deterrent. They were psychologically important, however, and Israel's experience was that it could better control areas where its own people lived. Why, he asked, could these settlements not serve to help Israelis and Arabs learn to live together?

Weizman also recalled a suggestion he had once made to Sadat that the borders of the Gaza Strip be extended to include the Yamit settlement in the Rafah area; then whatever solution was found for Gaza could apply there. This constituted a minute part of the Sinai. Weizman asked if this was a matter of principle for Sadat. Secretary Vance said it was; to Sadat, the return of Egyptian sovereignty to the international border was something on which he would not concede. Dr. Brzezinski asked if there were any possibility in the idea of a new demarcation of the international border, with Egypt getting some land in the Negev in return for redrawing the Gaza border. Weizman said this had been discussed with Sadat and was an idea to consider although it had not been approved by the Israeli Cabinet. Professor Barak noted that General Gamasy had said this idea was a non-starter for Egypt.

With respect to West Bank settlements, Dayan asked whether we had in mind freezing only the establishment of new settlements or also the number of people in existing settlements. Secretary Vance replied that President Carter had come to no final conclusion on this but our present thinking was that the freeze should apply to both new settlements and enlargement of existing settlements. Our concept was that there should be a freeze until a negotiated agreement was reached.

Dayan said there was a link between Israel's right to settle in the West Bank and its willingness to agree to the return of 1967 displaced persons. Israel had proposed the latter in its self-rule plan on the assumption that Israel would also be able to settle the West Bank during the interim period. Dayan suggested that there were three points that needed to be covered in dealing with the settlements problem: (a) the relationship between freezing settlements and the return of displaced persons; (b) the settlement of refugees in Gaza through building new housing for them; and (c) to establish a plan for a fixed number of Israeli settlements in the West Bank so that the Arabs would be reassured that Israel's settlement plans were not unlimited and would not threaten to colonize the entire West Bank. Dr. Brzezinski thought this might be resolved by providing that the principle of unanimous approval by Israel and the local Administrative Council for the return of displaced persons should also be applied to the establishment of new settlements. The Vice President asked whether it was conceivable that this problem could be resolved by Israel's accepting the principle of a freeze on settlements, so that Sadat could claim a victory, but with some flexibility in practice for Israel, with the details to be negotiated between Israel and the local Administrative Council. Dr. Brzezinski thought a solution might be possible by agreeing that there would be a freeze on unilateral settlement activity and by making all three points raised by Dayan the subject of an agreement by the parties—i.e., a fixed five-year settlement plan (Dayan indicated Israel had in mind 15–20 new settlements in the Jordan Valley comprising 100 families each); the return of about 100,000 displaced persons; and permanent housing for refugees in Gaza.

Secretary Vance concluded this part of the discussion by saying that we would take note of what the Israelis had said and would reflect on it.

Sinai Air Bases

Picking up on the earlier discussion of Sinai settlements, Dayan said he wanted to try a "wild shot." If the U.S. took over the air base near Yamit, could the latter be included in a zone under U.S. auspices; the U.S. base commander could have an Arab deputy for the Arab population in the zone, and an Israeli deputy for the Israelis. Weizman followed up by asking how serious was the possibility that the U.S. would

take over this Sinai air base. Secretary Brown said we were not eager to do so. Secretary Vance said it would be politically difficult, and we would not consider this unless urged to do so by both Egypt and Israel, and unless it would advance a peace settlement. The Vice President said he understood Israel needed air space for training purposes (Weizman had earlier pointed out that the air space of Israel proper was inadequate for Israel's present air force). The Vice President asked whether it might not help Israel's training problem and Egypt's political problem if such a base in Sinai were characterized as a training facility on Egyptian territory for use by Israel, Egypt and the United States. Weizman said this was a possibility.

Authority for West Bank/Gaza Interim Regime

In a brief discussion on this subject, Secretary Vance explained our view that an interim regime would have greater validity if it derived its authority from the governments involved—i.e., Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Professor Barak asked what would happen if Jordan did not join the negotiations. The Secretary said if Jordan were invited and did not join, the authority could derive from an Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Barak said this presented no problems for Israel.

35. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 7, 1978, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Walter Mondale, Vice President of the United States

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt

EGYPTIAN SIDE

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ahmed Maher, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

Talk with Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamel

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts on September 8. The meeting took place in Laurel Hall.

Meeting:

The Secretary first told Kamel about President Carter's desire to have a meeting² this evening with President Sadat and three members of the Egyptian side. Kamel said he would inform President Sadat. Kamel noted that after this morning's tripartite meeting,³ Sadat was very relaxed.

Egyptian Paper:

The Secretary said that Sadat and Begin had begun to discuss the Egyptian paper.⁴ They had spent three hours on the subject and will discuss the paper further at their 5:00PM meeting.⁵ President Carter, the Secretary noted, has a number of questions on the paper. Some he has already raised, others he will want to raise. The Secretary was uncertain whether a discussion of the paper can be concluded today.

Kamel said he was not sure how things will move forward. The approaches of Begin and Sadat are totally different. Sadat is searching for essentials; Begin is concentrating on details. This difference of approach makes it more difficult for President Carter.

Kamel noted that the Egyptians had worked hard on the paper. They believe it is the minimum that can be presented to the Arabs. The Saudis and others will support the concepts set forth in the paper. Anything less will place Sadat and Egypt in a bad situation. Sadat is willing to agree to "everything on normalizing relations and security," but on territory and sovereignty he cannot do so.

On the West Bank, Sadat had mentioned the possibility of insubstantial modifications. Kamel insisted that Sadat cannot go beyond this. There is no reason to give on this point. Egypt, he emphasized, wants real peace. Egypt is sincere. It wants to deepen the human relationship with the Israelis. If Palestinian rights are ignored or Arab territory is not returned, Kamel insisted that there will never be a permanent peace. He asked the Secretary's views on the Egyptian paper.

The Secretary described the paper as an obviously serious effort and one which had been carefully put together. As President Carter had indicated, there is much in it with which we agree. On some matters, we do have questions. President Carter will want to talk about this and will want to make suggestions to overcome the difficulties.

Kamel later asked the Secretary how he saw the paper. The Secretary reiterated his view that it is a serious effort. We will have to go

² See footnote 19, Document 28.

³ See footnote 13, Document 28.

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 28.

⁵ See footnote 17, Document 28.

through it and try to find ways around points of disagreement. Kamel noted that some points included in the paper, specifically ending the boycott, will give Egypt problems with the Arabs. Egypt is nevertheless willing to go ahead if agreement can be obtained on essentials; he was certain that Egypt can carry the day.

The Secretary noted that the Israelis have said the Egyptian paper is unacceptable. Maher asked if the Israelis plan to present a counter-proposal. The Secretary said the Israelis are still pondering this possibility. He noted that we are prepared to offer our suggestions.

Kamel noted that Sadat has reported to the Egyptian Delegation that President Carter had asked about a “partial” success. He, Sadat, had responded that the same degree of effort will be necessary for a comprehensive success. Kamel also noted that the Egyptians have used many American formulations in their paper.

West Bank Settlements:

The Secretary noted that Sadat had made it clear that sovereignty and territory are non-negotiable. He wished to know, however, what the Egyptian position is on West Bank settlements. In the case of the settlements in Sinai, he understood that these should all be removed. But is this also true of West Bank settlements?

Kamel responded that in principle the West Bank settlements should all be dismantled. The parties with whom to discuss this, however, are the Palestinians and/or the Jordanians. Egypt cannot make any commitment on retaining the settlements. The Israelis could visit the West Bank as any foreigner can. The Secretary noted that the Israelis make the argument that the security problem is different in the West Bank than it is in Sinai. Kamel responded that the Israelis seem to believe that they have a right to retain the settlements. It is not really security that is the issue. Security is something that the Egyptians are prepared to work out. He doubted that the settlements, if retained, will provide real security. They will simply be a provocation. Kamel reiterated Egypt’s readiness to provide all feasible security measures.

The Secretary asked if it might not be feasible to retain existing settlements, but freeze all further settlement activities. Kamel thought that even this arrangement will result in friction. If security is covered by other means, the matter of the future of the settlements is one for the Palestinians and Jordanians to decide.

Vice President Mondale noted that, for purposes of negotiations, it might be stated that the Sinai settlements will be removed but that the West Bank settlements will be frozen for five years while negotiations are underway. The parties could then negotiate the details of resolving the settlement issue, land purchase, etc. Kamel acknowledged that freezing new settlements might help. He noted that Egypt is not in-

sisting that the settlements be removed overnight. It is a matter that can be discussed.

The Vice President noted that it is difficult for Begin to waive the principle of Israeli settlements. Many Israelis do not like the settlements, but it is necessary to find some way to handle the matter. A five-year freeze in the West Bank should enable the subject to be handled through more permanent negotiations. Begin cannot abandon his life-long commitment to settlement activities.

The Vice President and Secretary pointed out that another problem is that some of the settlements in the West Bank were built by Labor in unsettled areas; Begin, however, has built settlements in populated areas. Kamel agreed that this is a problem. Egypt, he said, cannot say now that some settlements might remain. The Palestinians and Jordanians must decide this.

The Vice President noted that Egypt could say that it is opposed to all such settlements and believes they should be frozen. Kamel said that this sounded alright to him but Egypt cannot go beyond this. He would convey this idea to Sadat.

West Bank: End of Transition Period:

The Secretary then asked what Kamel foresees will happen at the end of five years as this concept is set forth in the Egyptian paper. Kamel responded that the Palestinians should at that time exercise their right of self-determination. Egypt can work with the Jordanians so that any Palestinian entity which emerges is linked with Jordan.

The Secretary noted that previously three options had been cited for the end of the five-year period: (a) linkage with Jordan, (b) continuation of existing status, and (c) affiliation with Israel. Are these three still feasible? Kamel said that the last of the three will be troublesome to Egypt. He was convinced, however, that Egypt can work out the linkage-with-Jordan concept.

King Hussein's Role:

Vice President Mondale noted that King Hussein is gunshy when it comes to the peace negotiations. Kamel responded that Hussein has for the past eleven years built for himself a secure state east of the Jordan. He is anxious to keep this. Prince Hassan is even more so when it comes to the West Bank. Vice President Mondale agreed that Hassan thinks the West Bank is trouble. Kamel observed that King Hussein does not think so. He would like to have the West Bank back. Hussein is admittedly cautious, but if the right framework is developed, he can be influenced. He was sure that the Saudis and the U.S. can help to influence Hussein. Kamel opined that when Sadat talked about negotiating

the West Bank, the President had done so in the belief that others will come in.

Jerusalem:

The Secretary noted that we have some problem with the Jerusalem section of the Egyptian paper. Nothing is said in it about an undivided city. Maher argued that the pertinent Egyptian language is intended to mean this. Kamel affirmed that Egypt does not want to divide Jerusalem again. There should be a municipality council with an Arab, preferably a Jordanian flag. The Secretary asked whether a Jordanian or an Arab flag is contemplated? Kamel responded that the Egyptian paper starts with an Arab flag. He noted that the Israelis are talking about the West Bank as a melting pot between the Egyptians and the Israelis. This, he argued, can also be the case in Jerusalem. An Arab-Islamic Jerusalem would be of global-wide interest. No Arab or Muslim, Kamel insisted, can accept a Jerusalem under the Israeli flag. The Egyptian paper, Kamel stressed, does not envisage a wall within Jerusalem.

The Secretary said he assumed that Egypt does not want border guards, checkpoints, or restrictions on freedom of movement. The Vice President thought that if we can make progress on the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai, this will already be a success. Additional problems should not be sought. Maher commented that he did not think the Saudis will support anything that does not mention Jerusalem. The Secretary observed that there are ways to handle this matter; Kamel agreed and had Maher read Article 6 of the Egyptian paper. The Secretary said he had tried to draft something on this matter. Kamel said the U.S. should always keep in mind worldwide Muslim sentiment when it comes to Jerusalem. The Secretary said he was mindful of the Saudi problem.

Kamel also spoke of Egyptian support for freedom of access to Jerusalem. The Secretary agreed. He noted that a joint municipality council has some appeal. There are also precedents in support of such a concept.

Egyptian Proposed U.S. Action:

The Secretary noted that with respect to items in the Egyptian paper calling for U.S. actions, he had to point out that Congressional approval is a factor that must be borne in mind. With respect to Article 9 of the Egyptian paper, he thought this could be eliminated since the ideas are already contained in Articles 7 and 8. Kamel agreed.

Compensation:

The Secretary then asked how important Egypt considers Article 8 on compensation. Kamel observed that the Israelis have taken Egyptian

petroleum. The Secretary agreed, but noted such an article will only give rise to endless claims and counterclaims. Kamel pointed out that the Egyptian paper does not talk about damage to military installations. What is being talked about is compensation for damage to civilian installations. He suggested that the matter be taken up with President Sadat who has strong views on the matter.

The Secretary observed that during the morning tripartite session, Begin had responded to this article by citing a possible \$120 billion-Israeli-damage claim against Egypt.

Security Arrangements:

Vice President Mondale recalled that Sadat has often said he is open-minded on security arrangements. He asked about the possibility of existing security arrangements in the West Bank beyond the five-year transitional period. Kamel responded that the Egyptian idea is that after five years, Jordan and Egypt will assume security responsibility. The Palestinians and Israelis, he was convinced, should be able to coexist. They have many affinities during five years of trying to live in peace. Both sides will learn to live together. The Vice President and the Secretary agreed.

Sinai Airfields:

The Secretary then asked how the Sinai airfields issue might be resolved? Kamel responded that the Israelis should build airfields of their own in Israel. The Secretary said that the airfield near Eilat (Etzion) could be built elsewhere, but he wondered about the one near Arish. Kamel observed that Sadat is strongly opposed to having any Israeli airfields in Sinai. He suggested the matter be raised with Sadat.

Compulsory ICJ Jurisdiction:

The Secretary then asked about Article 4 of the Egyptian paper, having to do with compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. He asked if the Egyptians have any precedents for such compulsory ICJ jurisdiction? Maher thought there are some precedents and undertook to have the Egyptian lawyers look into the matter.

Peace Treaties:

The Secretary then asked about Article 6 having to do with peace treaties to be concluded three months after a framework was signed. He asked why “treaties” was in the plural? What did the Egyptians have in mind? Maher responded that the reference is to all of the parties concerned. Kamel elaborated by saying that the Egyptian paper envisages that the Jordanians and the Egyptians will sign peace treaties.

The Secretary thought that something like “promptly” would be better than specifying a three-month time period. Kamel observed that

the three-month time period is Sadat's idea. He said he personally does not like such a specific timeframe.

Appreciation:

After some further desultory conversation, Kamel said he wished to express the Egyptian Delegation's deep appreciation for what the U.S.—and specifically President Carter and the Secretary—are trying to do. He knew that Begin is difficult. A success, he noted, will be good for all parties. The Secretary agreed.

36. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 8, 1978, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council Advisor to the President

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large

Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

ISRAELI SIDE

Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

Prof. Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court and Prime Minister's Legal Advisor

Major General Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch

Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

Meeting with Israeli Delegation

This meeting was a continuation of a meeting with the same group Thursday afternoon.² It concentrated on the issues of sovereignty / withdrawal in the West Bank and the question of settlements there. In the course of the conversation, there was a brief review of understandings

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting took place in Holly Cabin.

² See Document 34.

on issues which had been discussed yesterday which produced some new qualifications.

Just to deal with the review of the two issues from yesterday first:

1. *Devolution of Authority.* Secretary Vance stated his understanding that it was generally agreed that authority for the Palestinian self-governing authority would devolve from agreement among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Barak and Dayan indicated that they had not yet discussed this with the Prime Minister and would have to do so. Barak recalled that, in a Begin-Lewis conversation³ before Begin's departure from Israel, the Prime Minister had suggested that authority would devolve from the Military Governor during the first two years of the transitional agreement and then, after that, from a Jordan-Israel-Egypt agreement. Both Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski said they felt that the devolution from the three party agreement should come immediately and to introduce a phase of devolution from the Israeli military government would undercut the political advantage of enhancing an appearance of authority moving promptly to the West Bankers. Dayan said they would take this up with the Prime Minister.

2. *Security/Withdrawal.* Secretary Vance summarized his understanding that what is needed is Israeli withdrawal out of certain areas and stressed the political importance of reducing the Israeli presence. He felt there had been general agreement the previous afternoon on the principle subject to discussing details of the Israeli security presence that would remain. The main new point introduced on this subject was Barak's question on whether the U.S. shares the Israeli view that this withdrawal would represent the full implementation of the principle of withdrawal in Resolution 242. In the exchange that followed, Secretary Vance responded that these moves would be an adequate fulfillment of the withdrawal principle during the transitional period but, since there will not be full implementation until the end of the transitional period, withdrawal in the interim period cannot be considered final implementation of the principles of 242.

The bulk of the meeting was spent on the issues of sovereignty and the Israeli settlements.

Sovereignty. Secretary Vance began by stating the U.S. view that, at the end of five years, there should be a decision on the future status and relationship of the West Bank/Gaza with its neighbors; that the Palestinians should participate in this decision; that the mechanism for decision on the final status and relationship should be negotiations among Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the West Bank/Gaza authority.

³ The Embassy transmitted a summary of the August 26 meeting in telegram 11013 from Tel Aviv, August 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0410)

The Israelis replied with a new formula which they had produced since the last meeting. It takes the form of a draft article which would have two parts:

1. "The Palestinian Arabs have the right to participate in the determination of their future through talks involving representatives of Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

2. "The future status of the West Bank and Gaza, including the issue of sovereignty, will be discussed and decided after five years."

Barak explained that this decision would be made with the participation of the inhabitants in a way consistent with Israel's autonomy plan. He explained that Israel would envision an exchange of letters between the U.S. and Israel which would state that the above formulation would in no way undermine Israel's claim to sovereignty.

For clarification, Secretary Vance asked whether the Israelis were saying that Israel would automatically assert its claim to sovereignty if, after five years, the West Bankers said they wished to federate with Jordan. The summary answer, stated by Dayan at the end of this portion of the conversation, was that Prime Minister Begin wants on the record now his position that Israel is reserving its right to assert its claim—not that Israel is today saying what it will do five years hence.

In the more detailed discussion, the Israeli position in summary embraced these two points:

—If a solution like federation is proposed which spreads Arab authority over the West Bank, Israel is likely to assert its claim to sovereignty.

—If, on the other hand, there is a solution which breaks sovereignty up into its various functional components and leaves unstated the question of who is sovereign, Israel is less likely to assert its claim to sovereignty.

Coming at the problem from a different direction, Barak said he preferred to avoid the use of such "19th Century terms" as confederation, federation, and sovereignty. The problem with "federation" is that it would ascertain Jordanian sovereignty to the West Bank and Gaza. The problem with "confederation" is that it suggests a Palestinian sovereignty. Neither is acceptable to Israel. But if there is a functional breakdown of the elements of sovereignty and no explicit decision on who is sovereign, then the issue does not need to arise.

Returning to the new formula Barak had presented, Dayan said he wished to make three points.

1. This formula now brings the question of Palestinian participation in determining their future into discussion of the sovereignty issue.

2. Israel does distinguish between the future of the Palestinian Arabs themselves and the future of the territory in the West Bank and

Gaza. He stressed that acknowledging the right of the Palestinian Arabs to participate in the determination of their future does not mean that they would “take their territory with them.” He argued that allowing the Palestinian Arabs to make the decision on the future of the West Bank and Gaza put them in a position of deciding an important element of the Jewish future as well. Israel could not accept that.

3. He felt that deferring a decision on the status of the territories until after five years would allow for a decision on arrangements which would not be black and white. Here he was echoing Barak’s point on leaving sovereignty undefined.

Settlements. Secretary Vance began this portion of the discussion by stating our tentative view that there might be a freeze on both the number of settlements and the number of people in the settlements. The future of the settlements would be decided in negotiations among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian authority. He acknowledged that Israel does not agree with this position and believes there should be some additions in both categories. The Secretary acknowledged that the Sinai is different because there is a recognized international boundary and there is no question of sovereignty in the Sinai. There, we believe settlements should be removed.

In response to questions from Weizman and Dayan, the Secretary reported that the idea of extending Gaza to include the Yamit settlements had been rejected and that individual Israeli buying of property in the West Bank is acceptable.

Dayan then explained with some feeling why freezing the number of settlers is “absolutely impossible.” He said that no one counts people who go in and go out of a community except in prisons. He also said that the freezing of the number of new settlements would be unacceptable to the Israeli government and that pressing this issue would have repercussions on other issues. Specifically, he said he did not see how Israel could agree to large numbers of displaced persons returning to the West Bank if Israel’s right to allow new settlers to go to the West Bank had been frozen. If the settlements are frozen, Israel would have to impose its own freeze on other issues.

Dayan then put forward Israel’s strategy for dealing with this issue. Israel would put forward a plan describing the number of settlements it proposed to install during the five-year transitional period, where they would be, and how they would acquire the land without confiscating it. By putting forward such a plan, Israel would impose on itself limitations on the settlements for five years and then would agree to the return of displaced persons and plans for settling the refugees permanently in Gaza.

Secretary Vance suggested the following formulation: there will be no new settlements or expansion of existing settlements without the ap-

proval of the four party council (Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Authority). Dayan did not respond but instead reiterated the point that Israel wants to change the practice of the last eleven years of not allowing displaced persons to return and felt that such a change would be an inducement to the Arabs to accept Israel's strategy.

Secretary Vance then asked what the purpose of the new settlements would be. Dayan responded that it would be to fill the gaps between existing settlements. He said there should be some linkage among the settlements. It is difficult for a settlement to exist without two or three nearby. He acknowledged that, in theory, one could take a position that there should be no settlements at all and they should be replaced by military forces. But if settlements are going to be left on the West Bank, they must exist in clusters and cannot be isolated.

Dr. Brzezinski pressed the point that the settlements and the return of displaced persons are unequal issues. In establishing the settlements, Israel wants to perpetuate in the West Bank an Israeli presence with its own guards, schools, laws, and other systems. He felt there is an inconsistency in the Israeli position. On the one hand, the self-rule proposal is supposedly designed to arrange something that the Palestinian Arabs can call their own. On the other hand, Israel insists on maintaining armed enclaves in this Arab area. No one in the world understands Israel's purpose. No one in the world supports Israel in this policy. He asked why Israel should complicate the process of moving toward peace by insisting on continuing its settlement policy.

Weizman interjected that he had never understood why settlements on the West Bank were called illegal. If eventually there is a confederation, there would be a sharing of this area involving Israel as well as Jordan. Moreover there had been settlements such as those around Hebron which had existed before the 1948 War. At least those first settlements must be legal.

Dr. Brzezinski stressed that there may not be a confederation if Israel creates the impression that it will use its presence to try to colonize the West Bank. He went on to argue that if Israel wants to work out an arrangement with the Arabs on the West Bank, they have to have the feeling that they control the area in some significant degree. If they feel that Israel is perpetuating and extending its control, then they do not feel that they have a place they can call their own. Dayan argued that if the approach he thought Dr. Brzezinski was implying were taken, it would be necessary to take a decision on sovereignty in the West Bank now. Dr. Brzezinski replied that this might be the ideal approach, but since we cannot do that we are trying to find a way to defer the decision until the end of five years so that we can allow the settlements to stay during that period.

Dayan on two occasions in this part of the discussion expressed his concern that the imposition of a freeze on settlements would very quickly be extended by the Arabs to apply to east Jerusalem, and Israel could not make itself vulnerable to that.

Weizman emphasized the importance of the settlements in Israeli psychology. He said the whole of Israel had been made and defended on the basis of settlements. Secretary Brown noted that if Israel did not have the Israeli Defense Forces—as had been the case earlier in its history—Weizman would have a stronger argument. Weizman then asked Secretary Vance to confirm his understanding that the United States is saying all settlements should disappear. Secretary Vance replied, “In the Sinai, yes.”

Secretary Vance then turned to Weizman and told him that President Sadat believes there is agreement between Weizman and Gamasy on the Sinai airfields. Weizman said that is not the case. Weizman then got out a map to explain how difficult it is for Israel to substitute for the Sinai airfields, particularly the one at Etzion near Eilat. Dayan thoughtfully suggested that maybe it would be possible to reach agreement at Camp David on the airfields so that only the issue of the settlements would stand between us and agreement. However, Dayan was not sure this issue could be negotiated with Sadat. Secretary Vance said tentatively he thought it would be desirable to try to resolve the airfield problem with Sadat at Camp David, but he said he would want to think about it and talk with the President.

Weizman said he did not want to sound as if he were suggesting a tradeoff between the Sinai and the West Bank, but he thought that if Israel knew how the West Bank problem were to be solved, it would be much easier to deal with issues in the Sinai when the negotiations focus there again. Dayan thought Israel should try to reach agreement at Camp David between Sadat and Weizman on the military problems in the Sinai and then return to the issue of the settlements. He wondered if the Secretary would arrange another meeting between Weizman and Sadat.

The Secretary replied by saying that he would want to give this more thought and then suggested that the conversation return to the West Bank. He said he understood what Dayan and Weizman had said about the settlements there, told them he did not find their arguments compelling but promised to report them to the President. Dayan reminded him for the third time that any freeze on settlements would ultimately come back to apply to Israeli population of annexed portions of east Jerusalem. Alluding again to his idea of a plan for the settlements, he said that we could perhaps deal with the Arab concern by applying a freeze at such points where the Arabs feel Israel will use the settlements to limit Arab activity on the West Bank.

Barak referred to Article 21 of the Begin Self-rule Plan⁴ and suggested that there be agreement in advance on the flow of immigration of displaced persons and on the number of settlements. (Note: Article 21 establishes a committee to determine the “numbers of immigration.”) Secretary Vance said he did not understand equating Israeli settlements and returning displaced persons.

Dr. Brzezinski, in concluding, enumerated the significant points on which the Egyptians had made concessions—a transitional period, Israeli security presence in the West Bank, no independent Palestinian state. He felt that asking them to allow for a continued program of expanded Israeli settlement is “overloading the circuit.” Secretary Vance said that to have everything founder on this issue would be tragic.

⁴ On the Palestinian self-rule plan proposed by Begin in December 1977, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978. An undated paper outlining the differences between this plan and the proposed Framework for Peace in the Middle East is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 8, Camp David [Summary]: 9/6–9/78.

37. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Egyptian Delegation's Views on US Suggestions

PARTICIPANTS

*American Side*²

The Secretary

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large

Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

William Quandt, National Security Council

Hermann Fr. Eilts, US Ambassador to Egypt

Denis Clift, Vice President's Staff

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts on September 16. The meeting took place in Holly Lodge. According to Document 28, the meeting took place from 3 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., September 8.

² Brzezinski is not listed among the participants on the U.S. side, but he participated in the discussion.

Egyptian Side:

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Ahmed Maher el-Sayed, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Ambassador Nabil el-Araby, Director of Legal Department, Foreign Ministry

Dr. Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador of Egypt to the US

Mr. Ahmed Abou el-Gheite, Office of the Foreign Minister

Minister Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry

Summary: Lengthy discussion of preference for compulsory ICJ jurisdiction and concern over (a) sovereignty issue in West Bank/Gaza, (b) Israeli settlements, (c) the return of Palestinian displaced persons and refugees, and (d) the future of Jerusalem.

The Secretary said that Presidents Carter and Sadat would meet at 1600.³ They will discuss generally the nature of the US suggestions. We had not yet begun to write our suggestions, but will begin doing so tomorrow. We hope to get a draft⁴ to the Egyptian side tomorrow afternoon or Sunday. Vice President Mondale will be returning tomorrow, and his input will also be needed. The Secretary thought that our ideas will be acceptable to both President Sadat and President Carter. They will outline a general framework and will draw heavily on the Egyptian document.

Kamel opined that the Egyptian proposal is in many parts consistent with United States positions. The Egyptians believe that their proposal should be accepted. He had told Sadat that the American and Egyptian Delegations would meet today. Sadat had approved such a meeting with all the Egyptian Delegation present. He then asked if we wanted any clarification on the Egyptian paper.

Compulsory ICJ Jurisdiction: He asked where the concept of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction had come from. Are there any precedents for this? El-Baz responded that the concept had been taken from the ICJ yearbook for 1975–76. In that volume, he noted, there are recorded at least 100 agreements on compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. The Secretary asked if any peace treaties are included. El-Baz said no, but referred to a Chilean/Argentinian copyright convention, a UK/Ghanian loan agreement, and a number of other agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. El-Baz also noted that the Israelis had on October 3, 1956, accepted the concept of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, admittedly with some reservations. Their declaration was not as exclusive as the Connally Amend-

³ See footnote 23, Document 28.

⁴ In his account of the summit, Quandt noted that Saunders began work on the first of twenty-three drafts of the U.S. proposal late in the evening of September 8. (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 226) This first draft is printed as Document 38.

ment,⁵ however. It simply excludes certain aspects of Arab/Israeli and domestic affairs. El-Baz thought that the area of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction could be enlarged. It has the advantage, he pointed out, of de-politicizing the dispute and bringing it into a legal rather than a political framework. In this context, the resolution of disputes should be easier. It should lessen tensions and help to eliminate controversy. The Secretary asked whether this means that disputes flowing from a peace treaty for contractual arrangements between the parties should be covered. El-Baz responded that any agreement could be referred to the ICJ for decision.

El-Araby pointed out that the USG has pressed Egypt to go to the ICJ on the petroleum issue. Hence, the Egyptians had believed that this concept could be beneficial to the conflict in general. The Secretary said he will have the Department's Legal Counselor look into the matter. Boutros Ghali observed that this would be our contribution to the ICJ, which at the moment has little to do.

The Secretary said that on other matters, he understood what had been said in the Egyptian paper. He noted the omission of Article 9. Also the general form of the Preamble and then the operational part are good approaches. He asked if the Egyptians have any question about our views.

West Bank/Gaza-Sovereignty-Round-and-Round the Mulberry Bush: Kamel noted that the United States has taken certain public positions that are on record. The Egyptians hope that these public positions will be reflected in whatever language President Carter introduces. Specifically, he mentioned (a) withdrawal, (b) the illegality of settlements, and (c) the Palestinian problem. The previous day, he noted, the Egyptians has gained the impression that we are backing away from some of these previously enunciated positions.

The Secretary said that this impression is wrong. President Carter has said that there is a good deal of merit in the self-government proposal of Prime Minister Begin.⁶ The Egyptians had assumed that the entire Begin proposal will be taken over. This is not the case. There is nothing inconsistent in this with our belief that there is a need to talk about self-government in the interim period. It is important to have a self-government in the transition period.

⁵ Named after Senator Thomas Connally (D-Texas), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Connally Amendment refers to language included in the United States' 1946 declaration of acceptance of the International Court of Justice's compulsory jurisdiction. The amendment stated that the Court's jurisdiction shall not apply to disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America "as determined by the United States of America." (C.P. Trussel, "Senate Vote Near on World Court," *The New York Times*, August 2, 1946, p. 5)

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 36.

Kamel agreed, and acknowledged that his impression was that President Carter favors the Begin plan with respect to self-government. He recalled that at the Leeds Castle conference,⁷ Egypt had also put forward ideas on the subject. The Secretary said that we take exception to the Egyptian idea that Jordanian and Egyptian authority should prevail in the West Bank and Gaza during the interim period. We believe authority for the self-governing authority should flow from Jordan, Egypt and Israel. There should be an election for representatives of the Palestinians who will govern.

Kamel thought that Jordanian/Palestinian and Egyptian/Palestinian relationships are enough for the interim period. Why should Israel participate in self-rule? Saunders noted that the Secretary had been speaking of an agreement which would provide authority to the government. He had not been talking about Israeli involvement. The Secretary observed that the Israelis would withdraw. Saunders pointed to the difference between our concept and that of the Begin Plan, which speaks of authority deriving from the military government. This, the Secretary noted, is not acceptable to us. Saunders stressed that under our idea, authority would devolve from the three governments—Egypt, Jordan and Israel. They would set up the mechanism for local elections.

El-Reedy asked about our interpretation of this difference in terms of the consequences for self-government? The Secretary said he had read the Egyptian proposal as suggesting a continuing supervisory role by Jordan and Egypt. This is not good. Authority should be gotten to the people as quickly as possible. Saunders noted that the Egyptian plan at Leeds Castle turned over authority to Jordan and Egypt jointly. This is not realistic. The Israelis are in the West Bank and Gaza. Hence, agreement by the three is better than any unilateral Israeli authority. El-Reedy asked if this suggests a role for Israel. Saunders said only insofar as the defined agreement on security is concerned. There would be no role in government. Security, possibly immigration and some other matters might be handled through a committee. The Secretary said we would have to find areas where such committee supervision is needed. Quandt noted that, under the Israeli plan, authority derives from the military authority. It can be revoked at any time. This is not acceptable. El-Baz recalled that El-Araby had alluded to United States thinking in terms of beginning the self-government role. What about termination of that role? Would this transpire in the same manner? The Secretary thought there would have to be a provision indicating what happens at the end of five years and how to proceed. This should depend in a major way on the will of the people. Saunders observed that

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 3.

we took our cue from the three points that the Egyptians had given us at Leeds. Only when the Palestinians are involved can one get a treaty for termination. One must have a peace treaty before anyone can sign. Hence, we had gone back to the El-Araby paper.

El-Araby asked whether the five-year transitional period will not simply be renewed. The Secretary commented that this depends upon the Palestinians. The decision on sovereignty at the end of the five-year period will be one for the Palestinians to decide. The Egyptians immediately demurred.

El-Baz argued that what is being discussed is different from sovereignty. Israel will be allowed to maintain its claims to sovereignty under our arrangement. If agreement is reached, sovereignty should rest with the Palestinian people. This is their inherent right. If we defer the issue, it is left unresolved. To say decide nor or self-determination is different from deciding sovereignty. The Secretary commented that the Aswan⁸ language speaks of Palestinian participation in the future. It says nothing about sovereignty.

El-Baz said the Egyptians need our thoughts on sovereignty. The Secretary responded that we cannot decide this matter now. There is no single claim to sovereignty. Both Jordan and Israel have claims. El-Araby argued that the Aswan language implicitly says sovereignty rests with the Palestinians. El-Reedy continued this point by noting that the Aswan language has three component elements: (a) resolving the Palestine problem—in all its aspects (the Secretary agreed, but noted that it does not say when); (b) recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people (the Secretary noted this means the right to a homeland). Self-determination, El-Reedy contended, is one of their rights and a universally recognized one; and (c) the Palestinians should participate in determining their future status. The Egyptians had inferred from this that the Palestinians are a party to the peace process.

The Secretary said there are different ways of exercising self-determination. It may be unfettered or it may be a choice among alternatives. The Egyptian paper suggests affiliation with Jordan; hence, self-determination is not an unqualified matter. El-Reedy observed that the Egyptian paper had indicated the GOE will recommend such a link. Ghorbal asked whether the American idea is that there should be an independent Palestinian state or a confederation. Secretary Vance said we are against an independent Palestinian state. We prefer confederation, federation or something of this sort. El-Araby thought that the principal people to decide this issue will be the Palestinians themselves. Only the Palestinians will be asked and be a party to the exer-

⁸ See footnote 5, Document 3.

cise. The Secretary reiterated that the alternative “will have to be limited.” El-Araby observed that only the Palestinians can decide this. The Secretary noted that we cannot say this. El-Baz asked who else might come into the process. The Secretary said that King Hussein could come in. Hussein has not foregone the Jordanian claim to the West Bank. Nor has Israel foregone its claim.

El-Baz said Sadat had told President Carter that Israel has no right to claim sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza. The Secretary recalled that in recent years it has been the practice that the people on the land where conflicting claims exist have the right to determine their own future. El-Baz argued that if the issue is left vague, Israel has a privileged claim on sovereignty until the last minute. This is an unbalanced arrangement. It will reopen the whole issue at the end of the transitional period. There is no mechanism to ensure Israeli departure.

The Secretary said we assume that in the transition period talks will take place between the Palestinians and Jordan on what happens afterwards. El-Baz argued that the Israeli objective is to keep the West Bank. Jordan, he insisted, does not claim it. Egypt could go to King Hussein to obtain his renunciation of the Jordanian claim, should this be required. Association between Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza should be left to the Palestinians. The Government of Egypt says it favors such a link in advance. Egypt will also push for this. But in the final analysis, the Palestinians should decide. If the issue is left floating, it will appear that the entire Palestinian problem is unresolved. We should agree that the question of sovereignty not be left to negotiation.

Quandt said that sovereignty is the word that upsets everyone. The final status, he noted, should be decided at the end of five years. Why should we now try to get into the sovereignty question and create problems for ourselves. El-Baz responded that the reason is that the Israelis are mentioning the issue.

El-Reedy said that the Israelis are introducing sovereignty in order to confuse their obligation to withdraw under UN Resolution 242. The introduction of the sovereignty issue was done to make the West Bank/Gaza appear as disputed territory. Egypt never claimed sovereign rights in Gaza. It simply administered the area under an armistice agreement. Jordan was in the West Bank in the same manner. The late King Abdullah moved into the West Bank in 1950. His takeover was challenged by the Arab League and was not recognized. In 1967, after UN Resolution 242, everyone talked of the return of the West Bank to Jordan. At the same time a Palestinian national movement emerged. At the Rabat Summit⁹ a decision was reached that the party to which au-

⁹ Reference is to the October 1974 Arab Summit conference held at Rabat, Morocco. For documentation on this conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976.

thority over the West Bank should be returned was the Palestinian people rather than Egypt or Jordan. He also noted that the Palestinians were recognized as early as 1947 as having a right to their own state. Kamel argued that Egypt was sure King Hussein is ready to renounce any claim to sovereignty to the West Bank. The Secretary noted that Israel is only willing to put aside for the next five years any claim to sovereignty to the West Bank.

El-Baz asked how the problem should be solved in the end. The Secretary said it should be solved by sitting down with the Palestinians. El-Baz asked what happens if the Israelis refuse. The Secretary noted that the Israelis reserve their claim to the West Bank. El-Araby noted that if the Israelis do not like what is happening, they can go back in under our ideas. El-Baz observed that the Israelis have not put forward any claim to sovereignty prior to Begin's advent. When they did so, their purpose was simply to annex territory. If they wish to present a claim to sovereignty in the future, they can also do so in Sinai and elsewhere. Sovereignty, he reiterated, should reside with the people. Self-determination is necessary.

El-Reedy said that legitimate security concerns can be discussed, such as termination of belligerency, good neighborly relations, etc. El-Baz insisted that the sovereignty question should be dropped. Quandt noted that some day it will have to be resolved. Atherton said it is not simply one of how it will be resolved, but also when. In the peace treaty, Egypt, Israel, Jordan are all parties and can define their relationship.

El-Baz noted that deciding a relationship is different from sovereignty. Quandt pointed out that we are talking about a political relationship. El-Baz thought that a link could be obtained. But to introduce Israel as a party to sovereignty over the West Bank produces a problem. Quandt pointed out that we are trying to get a framework to see where we are going. El-Baz noted that after five years the Palestinians may opt for their own entity. They may prefer an independent state, although Egypt will do what it can to influence a linkage with Jordan. If Israeli sovereignty is introduced into the equation, it negates self-determination.

El-Araby commented that the Israelis occupy and the Palestinians live in the West Bank. Egypt says that the Palestinians are the proper sources of sovereignty. He asked what the Israeli claim to sovereignty to the West Bank is based upon. The Secretary said that Begin bases it on biblical rights, others say by annexation. El-Baz noted that by the same token, the Palestinians could claim a right to determine the sovereignty of Israel. If the issue of sovereignty in the West Bank/Gaza is left open to Israel, the same should also be done in reverse.

El-Reedy referred to Atherton's statement that sovereignty will be decided in the peace treaties. He asked whether this means that we cannot now know what a peace treaty will look like. Atherton commented that the peace treaty will be based on the principles of UN Resolution 242, including withdrawal. El-Reedy commented that eleven years after the passage of 242, why is it not possible to say that the Israeli claim to sovereignty is not acceptable. This should by now be clear. El-Araby asked whether that if the assumption is made that the Palestinians will wish to join Jordan at the end of five years, will Israel be able to veto this and continue proposed arrangements for five years to fifty years. Egypt is not against a limited choice. El-Baz said that when Egypt accepted the right to a limitation on self-determination, it never thought that the sovereignty issue would be involved. Egypt cannot accept anything that keeps the sovereignty question open for five years.

Quandt observed that there is no such thing as absolute sovereignty. Two elements must be worked out: (a) borders, which may require adjustments, and (b) security, which may dilute some aspects of sovereignty. El-Baz said that Egypt considers that sovereignty rests with the Palestinians. Ghorbal noted that we are coping with two diametrically opposed viewpoints—that of the Israelis and that of the Egyptians. The United States is trying to put off the issue. It cannot be put that way. Egypt agreed to a limited exercise of sovereignty in order to satisfy the security needs of Israel. Egypt said it would direct the Palestinian entity into a link with Jordan. But Egypt cannot accept dissolution of the Palestinians into a greater Israeli state. The Israelis want the West Bank and Gaza to satisfy their expansionist ambitions. We cannot paper over the differences. He likened the issue to the UAR/Syrian union,¹⁰ which was "an act of sovereignty." Egypt cannot accept a link of the West Bank and Israel. It cannot accept what it has put forward for Israel's security, namely Israeli expansion in five years. The Secretary asked how the question of sovereignty should be resolved. Ghorbal responded that the United States had worked on Sadat to make peace and to normalize relations. Now there must be a political decision also to press the Israelis.

El-Baz observed that the Israeli claim to sovereignty does not mean anything. Sovereignty rests with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, he reiterated. The type of entity and self-determination can be resolved. But on sovereignty in the West Bank there can be no legitimate problem. If Israel agrees to withdraw, it is a renunciation of the Israeli

¹⁰ Reference is to the 1958–1961 political union of Egypt and Syria, known as the United Arab Republic.

claim to sovereignty. Begin talks about sovereignty to justify the extension of the Israeli occupation.

El-Araby noted that an agreement between Jordan, Israel, and Egypt should not have a provision giving Israel the right to continue the occupation in five-years time or to veto a change in regime. Quandt asked what happened if agreement cannot be reached on the matter of security. Does the occupation continue? El-Baz responded that the Palestinians should be brought in on everything. It should then be possible to work everything out, even at the beginning. If too many loose issues are left undecided, problems are bound to develop. Ghorbal recalled that the phrase was included in the Aswan language, "legitimate rights." He asked where this is being taken into account. If in five years the Israelis do not leave or the Palestinians have the right to self-determination, where does this leave us?

The Egyptian three-stage procedure is vitiated if the Israelis retain the right to veto. The Palestinians should be given self-determination. They should have the right to determine their own future. The issue should not be cast in terms of a security threat to Israel.

Brzezinski pointed out that we do not believe that the sovereignty question needs be resolved at this time. We concede that sovereignty rests with the people. But we must also recognize that there is a problem of security. We believe that the security problem must be resolved at an early stage. The solution of the Palestinian question should not be deferred until the end of the five-year period. If one attempts to do so, it amounts to an interim, partial agreement.

Quandt asked why the Egyptians had agreed to a five-year period if they wish everything to be settled at the outset. Time is required to settle some of the difficult problems. El-Baz responded that the Egyptians accepted the five-year period at the United States' urging. The Egyptian concept is two-fold: (a) a transitional period in which the Palestinians are conceded the right to self-determination, even though Egypt recognizes it is difficult to bring this about; (b) agreement to the phasing out of "certain things." While the Israelis are withdrawing, Egypt will propose introducing security, the determination of belligerency and peace. The transfer of authority in the West Bank/Gaza can take place in steps. Egypt does not accept the transitional period as a way of deferring fundamental issues. Egypt is willing to do all it can to press the Palestinians to link with Jordan and to discuss borders, security, etc., with a view to deciding these matters. Ghorbal noted that any solution must assume that sovereignty rests with the people. The Israelis admit self-rule should be the right of the people, hence this concept fits in. The Israelis ought to be satisfied that the Arabs, with the help of the United States, will during the transition period work to have the Palestinians agree to a link with Jordan. They will also agree to nor-

malizing relations. It should be left to the future to see how this works out, but the Israelis should not be able to use their armed forces to achieve their aims in the West Bank and Gaza.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how this would come about. Ghorbal responded that the United States had seen how, despite its statements, the Israelis have gone ahead to do what they wish. Brzezinski thought that we should talk about some of the details of the five-year arrangements, e.g., a freeze on settlements. Let us suppose, he stated, that as a result of our efforts the Israelis get out of Sinai, in the West Bank the military occupation is limited, there is a reduction of Israeli forces, a self-governing authority is set up, and there is a freeze on settlements. There might also be a return of some divided families. This process will require five years in itself. It will transform the political realities of the West Bank. This is what the United States is aiming at. We have to talk about tangibles and we have to work with Egypt to achieve this. Ghorbal commented that this must also be present in the Israeli minds. Brzezinski reiterated that we must create conditions to manage this type of situation. Five years is not a great deal of time. We need to nail down specifics: e.g., the end of the occupation, the nature of the strong points, etc. We should not seek now to solve hypothetical problems. Israel, he noted, would even be willing to solve the Golan problem if Syria is ready. In Sinai, the Israelis are willing to do so. In the West Bank, the Israeli presence will be significantly reduced. These are all tangible benefits.

Kamel said he was astounded that the United States should accept the Israeli claim to sovereignty in the West Bank. Egypt will not accept this. It is out of the question. The Secretary pointed out that one cannot stop the Israelis from asserting their claim. Kamel responded that sovereignty is inherent in the Palestinians. The Israelis have to return everything. Brzezinski noted that we are seeking a process that will go ahead. The Secretary noted that sovereignty is not mentioned in the agreement, but that this is an underlying reality. The Secretary said there must be some kind of a misunderstanding. Kamel appeared to believe that we support the Israeli claim to sovereignty. This is not so. All the Secretary had said is that Israel may be expected to make its claim to sovereignty. The United States does not support that claim. Brzezinski added that we will not force the Israelis. We will, however, create conditions that will change the situation in the Arab favor. El-Baz said that Egypt can endorse this concept if any reference to sovereignty is omitted. The Secretary said we will not say anything on sovereignty.

(This concluded a long, turgid talk on the sovereignty issues.)

Settlements: The Secretary then turned to the matter of the Israeli settlements. He pointed out that we consider them illegal. In Sinai, we believe they should be eliminated over a period of time. In the West

Bank, the settlements should be frozen until such time as the Palestinians and the Jordanians can negotiate their future.

Kamel said Egypt had understood the American position to be that all Israeli settlements in occupied territories are illegal. Freezing is a practical solution and this should be begun. It is up to the Palestinians and the Jordanians to negotiate the future of the settlements. But some way should be found to dismantle some of the new settlements and have others transferred to “encampments.” The Secretary asked if this is not something for the Palestinians to work out. Boutros Ghali agreed that freezing is a good idea, but suggested some way should be found to begin a dismantling process. El-Reedy echoed this view, contending that the Egyptian idea is to dismantle the settlements. The Secretary said that in Egypt this can be done, but not in the West Bank.

Boutros Ghali observed that if the United States accepts withdrawal, then this should also apply to the settlements. Cannot a “certain number” of settlements be dismantled in the withdrawal process? El-Baz asked if we consider the settlements in the West Bank to be different from those in Sinai and Golan. Dr. Brzezinski responded in the affirmative. Sinai, he noted, is on the other side of a recognized frontier. El-Baz asked about the armistice lines as they pertain to settlements. El-Reedy said that all settlements on the West Bank have the same “quality.” One of the arguments that the Israelis have sometimes used is that the settlements are necessary for security reasons. At least some settlements should be abolished in the context of a general principle of withdrawal. El-Araby asked whether by freezing, we are thinking of the number of settlements or the number of people. The Egyptian Delegation chorused that both should be limited. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the problem of the West Bank settlements is more difficult to solve than that of Sinai.

Refugees: El-Reedy asked about the United States’ view on refugees. Saunders said we agree with Egypt that an agreement must deal with displaced persons and with refugees. The latter will involve a larger group to help work it out. El-Reedy recalled that in the Rogers Plan,¹¹ the United States had been clear on this issue. The refugees should go back or there should be compensation. Why should not some of the refugees go back under the United States proposal? Atherton observed that the solution of the refugee problem must be an international effort. El-Reedy reiterated the need to restate the right of return. Atherton recalled that we have regularly voted for this. It is a principle.

¹¹ Reference is to a series of formulas for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute first articulated by Secretary of State William P. Rogers in an address he gave on December 9, 1969. For the text of Rogers’s speech, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, pp. 7–11.

To implement it, however, one must look at alternatives. Detailed plans have never been developed.

Boutros Ghali said that one of the American viewpoints seems to be to postpone all basic problems regarding the Palestinians for five years. The Egyptian view is to have some general principles so that the program can be sold to the Palestinians and the other Arabs. If it is different in Sinai and the West Bank, it makes it difficult for Egypt. Egypt would like the maximum of general principles which can give security and guarantee to the Palestinians. He suggested that a freeze and abolition be applied to Sinai settlements as well.

El-Baz said Egypt accepts the concept of freezing. The starting point should be that settlements are illegal and ways should be sought to liquidate the settlements everywhere. In the West Bank one must look for a special formula to liquidate the settlements over a period of time.

Dr. Brzezinski said we are not entirely seeking to postpone these issues. We recognize there is a difference in the West Bank/Gaza, and the problem that this poses for Egypt. The Egyptian judgment will have to prevail. The resolution of the Sinai and West Bank problems cannot be identical. The emotional context of the West Bank problem is difficult. The United States is seeking to reverse fundamental trends. We would like to solve the Sinai effort right away, depending on the Egyptian judgment. In the West Bank, we want to begin a process that is a fundamental reversal. In five-years time, the situation should be greatly changed.

Kamel observed that any proposal on settlements should include a freeze and a statement that they are illegal. Quandt asked if the Egyptians want the Sinai settlements dealt with separately. Kamel responded in the negative.

El-Reedy asked about the reaction to Palestinians outside the West Bank. Should there be a role for them? Saunders said that the people must begin to think of alternatives. The present situation is unsatisfactory. The process we are talking about begins something called Palestinian. El-Araby referred to the displaced persons and to the refugees. Saunders said we are talking about more than a million people. How can all of them be moved? The displaced persons number about 100,000; the West Bank cannot absorb all of these. Time will be needed to settle the matter. Quandt observed that Dayan agrees with the Egyptians on this matter. There will be terrible human difficulties. But all agree that the Palestinians have rights. El-Araby said these rights and principles should be reaffirmed and then a mechanism should be set up to implement them. El-Baz talked of restating the principle and working out modalities for implementation. Atherton commented that if one gets a framework and a reversal of present trends, some Pales-

tinians outside of the West Bank will request going back. Hopefully, many practical-minded people will support this. They should be able to see that they have a stake in the matter. El-Reedy recalled that in the '69 Rogers Plan there had been a reference to the return of refugees.

Jerusalem: El-Baz asked about our thinking on Jerusalem. Saunders said we have no refined ideas on the subject. Quandt observed that the Egyptians know some of our ideas. There should be no division of Jerusalem and there should be free access. El-Baz asked if Jerusalem is included in the withdrawal concept. Saunders thought it was. El-Baz said he was aware of the sensitivity on this point. The Saudis, the Christians and others are keenly interested. El-Reedy asked how the self-government concept applies to East Jerusalem. Atherton, expressing his personal feeling, commented that the less specific one is at this time on Jerusalem, the better. Details should be left to be worked out later on. El-Araby asked what we already have on record with respect to Jerusalem. Saunders observed that we must hold this until we have high-level guidance.

Kamel said that Egypt is concerned that the American proposal be agreeable to the Saudis. It should include some language on Jerusalem in order to get the Jordanians to join. The United States must help Egypt consolidate its position. Egypt counts on a continued relationship with the United States, and Egyptians want a comprehensive settlement. The Secretary observed that he has always spoken of a comprehensive settlement.

FOOTNOTE: Subsequently the Egyptians told Eilts and Quandt that they do believe that the Sinai settlements should in our paper be treated differently from those in the West Bank.

38. Draft Text Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders)¹

undated

**A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID**

Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to _____, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—After four wars over thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat and Israel's warm reception of his mission have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if the peoples of the Middle East are to spare this generation and the generations to come the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—The only agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 supplemented by Resolution 338.² Resolution 242 in its preamble empha-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 11, The Secretary Camp David [Briefing Book]. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on September 9. For Vance's discussion of the drafting process for this document, see *Hard Choices*, p. 220.

² For the full text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted unanimously on October 22, 1973, see *The Quest for Peace*, p. 40.

sizes the obligation of Member States in the United Nations to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter. Article 2, among other points, calls for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for Members to refrain from the threat or use of force. Egypt and Israel in their agreement signed September 4, 1975,³ agreed: “The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.” They have both also stated that there shall be no more war between them. In a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2, negotiations between Israel and any nation prepared to negotiate peace and security with it should be based on all the principles of Resolution 242, including the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security. Negotiations are necessary to determine how best to apply and implement the principles of Resolution 242 and fulfill all of its objectives in the circumstances which exist today.

—Peace is more than the juridical end of the state of belligerency. It should lead to normal relations between nations. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. Under the terms of peace treaties, the sovereign parties can agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, special security forces, liaison, agreed programs for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Agreement

Taking these factors into account, Egypt and Israel have agreed:

1. They are determined to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties on the basis of the full implementation of all the principles of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all the nations who have been principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it must provide security; and it must give those people who have been most deeply affected by the conflict a sense that they have been dealt with fairly in the peace agreement.

2. They undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United

³ See footnote 6, Document 24.

Nations. They also undertake to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to all disputes emanating from the application or the interpretation of their contractual arrangements.

3. In order to achieve peace between them, they have agreed to negotiate within three months from the signing of this “Framework” a peace treaty between them.⁴ In response to Egypt’s offer of full peace and normal relations, Israel has proposed the restoration of the exercise of full Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and Israel. Security arrangements, the timing of withdrawal of all Israeli forces and settlements,⁵ and the elements of a normal, peaceful relationship have been discussed and will be defined in the peace treaty.

4. They will participate in negotiations on resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. To this end, they agree that agreements relating to the West Bank and Gaza should be reached in three stages:⁶

(a) Egypt and Israel hereby agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, there should be a transitional period not exceeding five years. They further agree that the Israeli military government will be abolished and withdrawn as soon as a government shall be freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. This transitional arrangement should derive its authority from an agreement concluded among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this agreement.⁷ Palestinian advisers selected by Jordan and Egypt may be members of their delegations. The establishment of the new regime should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of all the parties.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan should meet to negotiate an agreement to end Israel’s military government in the West Bank and Gaza and to establish the elected interim government there.⁸ This agreement would define the authorities of the interim government. It would in-

⁴ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Vance wrote “promptly.”

⁵ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this clause, Vance wrote “from Sinai.”

⁶ A blank half-page follows this phrase. At the bottom of the page, a typewritten notation reads “. . . more.”

⁷ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Vance wrote “full autonomy.”

⁸ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Vance wrote “X.”

clude arrangements for assuring external security and public order; it will also include arrangements for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from designated areas and will define their duties. Egypt and Israel propose that, to assist in ensuring security during this period, Jordan and Egypt would assign officials to share responsibility with the security forces of the local authority in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, and to maintain continuing liaison with the designated Israeli authority on internal security matters to ensure that no hostile threats or acts against Israel or its citizens originate from the West Bank or Gaza. The numbers, equipment and responsibilities of such Egyptian and Jordanian officials would be defined by mutual agreement among the negotiating parties. In addition, by mutual agreement, United Nations forces might also be introduced during the transitional period.⁹

(c) When the Palestinian Arab authority in the West Bank and Gaza is inaugurated, the transitional period would begin. Within two years after the beginning of the transitional period, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the interim authority in the West Bank and Gaza would undertake negotiations for a peace treaty which would settle the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors on the basis of all of the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242, including the mutual obligations of peace, the necessity for security arrangements for all parties concerned following the transitional period, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. The boundaries and security arrangements must satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinians and meet Israel's security needs. They may incorporate agreed modifications in the temporary armistice lines which existed between 1949 and 1967. The peace treaty will define the rights of the citizens of each of the parties to do business, to work, to live, and to carry on other transactions in each other's territory. The peace treaty shall provide for an expression of consent to its terms by the people concerned.

5. During the transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza, the negotiating parties would constitute a continuing committee to reach agreements applicable during that period on the following:

(a) issues involving interpretation of the agreement or issues unforeseen during the negotiation of the agreement, if not resolvable by the governing council;

(b) the return of agreed numbers of persons displaced from the West Bank in 1967 and of Palestinian refugees;

⁹ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Vance highlighted the sentence and wrote “?”

6. During these negotiations¹⁰ no new Israeli settlements will be established, and there will be no expansion of facilities in existing settlements.

7. Jerusalem, the city of peace, must not again be divided by the instruments of war. It is a city holy to Christian, Jew, and Muslim, and all must have free access to it. For peace to endure, each community in Jerusalem must be able to express freely its cultural and religious values in an acceptable political framework. An agreement on relationships in Jerusalem should be reached in the negotiations dealing with the West Bank and Gaza.

8. They agree to consult with each other and with other interested parties on a just solution of the refugee problem.

9. Synchronized with the implementation of the provisions related to withdrawal, they shall proceed to establish among them relationships normal to States at peace with one another. To this end, they undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps taken in this respect include:

- (a) Full recognition.
- (b) Abolishing economic boycott.
- (c) Ensuring the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.
- (d) Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other Parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
- (e) Encouraging the free movement of people and goods.

10. In all of the negotiations described above, they will arrange to guarantee the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and the political independence of each State negotiating peace through measures such as the following:

- (a) The establishment of demilitarized zones.
- (b) The establishment of limited armament zones.
- (c) The stationing of United Nations forces or observer groups as agreed.
- (d) The stationing of early warning systems on the basis of reciprocity.
- (e) Regulating the acquisition of arms by the Parties and the type of their armament and weapons systems.

(f) The adherence by all the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Parties undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

¹⁰ Vance put brackets around the phrase “During these negotiations,” underlined “these negotiations,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin adjacent to the sentence.

(g) Applying the principle of free passage to transit through the Straits of Tiran.

(h) The establishment of relations of peace and good-neighborly cooperation among the Parties.

11. In all of the negotiations described above, they will explore possibilities for regional economic development in the context of both transitional arrangements and final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

12. A Claims Commission will be established to adjudicate claims made by either side against the other.

13. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the time-table for the carrying out of the obligations of the Parties.

14. The Security Council shall be requested to endorse the Peace Treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated.

15. The Permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the Peace Treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

39. Memorandum for the Record¹

Camp David, September 9, 1978

At his request, Weizman saw Sadat this morning.² He asked the following questions:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 8, Camp David [Summary]: 9/6–9/78. Secret. Carter wrote that Begin had asked him at the end of their meeting on September 8 (see footnote 21, Document 28), “if it was possible for Weizman to meet with Sadat regarding the four items concerning the Sinai. I told him that all *five* items, *including* the settlements, should be discussed between them, that I was on my way to Sadat’s cabin and would arrange for the meeting he had suggested.” (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 367) Quoting from his personal notes made at the time of the summit, Brzezinski wrote of the meeting in his memoirs: “In the meantime just had word that Weizman went to see Sadat to discuss the outstanding issues between the Egyptians and Israelis and also he proposed to them that they cut a deal leaving us out of it. Apparently, Sadat refused all of these requests.” (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 259)

² For Weizman’s account of this meeting, see Weizman, *Battle for Peace*, pp. 359–362.

1. Can Egypt and Israel reach any kind of agreement just between the two of them (by implication, without the US as a party)? Sadat said no.

2. Will Sadat agree to an Israeli military presence in the West Bank/Gaza after five years? Sadat said no.

3. Will Sadat agree that the Yamit/Rafah area could be joined to Gaza district? Sadat said no.

4. Will Sadat agree to open borders and diplomatic relations? Sadat said he would recognize Israel, but that the other matters pertained to sovereignty and he would not agree to them.

5. Weizman asked if Israel could keep the Etzion airfield near Eilat if they gave up Eitan in the north? Sadat said no, but he would help them build a new airport in Israel and they could keep Etzion for the two years until withdrawal was completed.

Al-Baz told this to Quandt on September 9, 1978, at 2:45 p.m. He asked that it be conveyed to the President. Weizman will see Sadat again this afternoon.

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, September 11, 1978, 1530Z

5335. Subject: President Assad's Letter to President Carter. Ref: Damascus 5318.²

Summary: President Assad's response to President Carter's September 7 letter,³ received September 11, was forthcoming. He said inter alia that Syria would continue to seek a political solution; that fundamentally—despite provocations—Syria's policy in Lebanon is one of self-defense and standfast; and that the objectives of Syrian policy in Lebanon remain the unity of the land and people of Lebanon, the sovereignty of the central government and the stopping of fighting. He stressed that all acts of the peacekeeping force, which is responsible for maintaining security and public order, are motivated by concern for the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–1998. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

³ Reference is presumably to Document 29.

unity of Lebanon and the continued existence of the Lebanese state. He pledged that Syrian forces would practice a maximum degree of self-control while efforts are being exerted to help the Lebanese reach a solution. The remainder of the letter is a catalogue of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis, highlighting the activities of the Chamounists and Phalangists in blocking reconciliation or rebuilding the national army. Assad called attention to the Israeli role in encouraging these two groups, and urged the US to exert pressure on Israel to stop interfering in Lebanon. In delivering the text the presidency highlighted Assad's public statements on Syria's Lebanon policy in German interview (septel),⁴ including Syria's intention to withdraw the minute they are requested to by the Lebanese Government. End summary.

1. President's Private Secretary, Mohammed Dabboul, delivered to me September 11 President Assad's response to President Carter's September 7 letter on Lebanon. The response is forthcoming. Text of letter follows.

[Begin] text.

His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter

President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President

I have received your letter dated September 7, and while I share your concern over the sad events that are taking place in the sister country of Lebanon, I would point out the following:

1. Since the very start of civil fighting in Lebanon in April 1975 and until the beginning of June 1976, we exerted great political efforts to stop acts of violence and to restore calm and stability to the sister country of Lebanon. However, those political efforts in which other parties—Arab and foreign—sometimes participated failed and the civil war continued: hundreds of people were killed daily, villages and city quarters were destroyed, the state of Lebanon collapsed, the army and the security forces disintegrated and partition became a factual thing and the talk of all parties. Indeed, some of these parties made practical arrangements for the setting up of petty sectarian states and Syria received one million Lebanese refugees.

2. Together these events produced grave results which threatened the unity and independence of Lebanon and the integrity of its territory. The sovereignty of the State was shattered into fragments that fell into the hands of various parties. In those difficult circumstances and while the fighting was favoring one party, we realized that the continuation of the fighting, the imbalance of forces and a victory by one party

⁴ See telegram 5334 from Damascus, September 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780369–1067)

over the other—all this would mean a defeat for the unity and independence of Lebanon as well as more violence, bloodshed and destruction. Thereupon, Syria assumed its national and brotherly responsibility towards Lebanon and sent units of its armed forces to stop fighting, restore peace, foil acts aiming at partition and maintain the unity and national safety of Lebanon. In this effort, Syria clashed with parties with whom we have political and emotional ties, including the Palestinians. The Syrian units made use of some of the means available to them to stop the fighting and to maintain the national balance in Lebanon, notwithstanding the psychological effects produced on us by this use. But we regarded the interests of Lebanon and the restoration of peace to its territories more important than the suffering, burdens and losses we endured. Thus, fighting was stopped and peace was restored to all parts of Lebanon.

3. During the period of calm which followed, we tried to make the Lebanese Government play a more effective role in achieving national reconciliation and building up a national army which enjoys the confidence of all parties, because it is nationally constituted and because it owes allegiance only to the state and not to armed factions or to leaderships produced by the civil war. We did this in the belief that a country's army should symbolize the national aspirations of its citizens as well as their desire for peace and stability. Unfortunately, however, no part of all this could be effected because the Falangists and the Chamounites placed obstacles in the way of the endeavors of the Lebanese Government to produce national reconciliation, commence a national dialogue, form a Council of Ministers embracing all parties, restore the institutions of the State and impose its authority in all Lebanese territories. In addition to rejecting the reconstruction of the Lebanese Army whose unity had been shattered by the civil war, they tied up the majority of its officers and military personnel with the "Military Council of the Lebanese Front" and thereby prevented the President of the Republic of Lebanon and his government from taking any effective measures related to the armed forces. They furthermore resorted to all means to achieve their aim—including threats of murder and terror—and did all this so that officers of the Army would serve them and would not serve the State of Lebanon.

4. During that period we displayed a measure of tolerance and flexibility beyond belief. We did this in the hope that time would persuade the deviating parties to go back to the right path and to restore to the central Government of Lebanon and authorities usurped by them. In fact they have been exerting authority to levy taxes, control education and public services and commit incredible acts of brutality against citizens in the areas over which they have imposed their authority. The Falangists and the Chamounites who performed these acts adopted

partition slogans such as “self-ensured security” in the areas in which they have overthrown the authority of the State of Lebanon.

5. The two parties of the Falangists and the Chamounites were encouraged by Israeli intervention in Lebanon and particularly in southern Lebanon. You recall in this regard, I am sure, the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon and the part played by Israel in preventing the effective restoration of the authority of the State of Lebanon therein and in barring the entry of a Lebanese Army unit into this area, thereby violating Security Council Resolutions nos. 425 and 426. In fact you know best the details of the Israeli intervention.

6. Since the beginning of this year, Israeli intervention has become more evident: arms and military aid are being sent to the Falangists and Chamounites, who are urged to proceed with their partition policies and practices and instigated to commit provocative acts against the peacekeeping forces, including the Syrian forces. The great provocation, however, was launched on February 8 of this year, when some military elements made an unexpected attack on a patrol of the peacekeeping forces, killing a number of its members. Successive provocations against the peacekeeping forces followed, and the forces which are the instrument of the lawful authority in Lebanon had to resort to self-defense and to sticking to their positions without moving over any territory in the hope that those who challenge the unity, safety and stability of Lebanon would ultimately return to the right path.

In fact provoking the peacekeeping forces was not the limit for them. For they went so far as to commit crimes of murder in order to rid themselves of the policies of Christian leaders opposed to their own policies and practices. Such was the case of the murder of the late Toni Franjieh, a former Lebanese Deputy and Minister and the son of President Suleiman Franjieh, a former President of Lebanon.

7. Launching attacks against the peacekeeping forces aims to put an end to all manifestations of lawful authority in Lebanon inasmuch as those forces, in addition to being the only force of the lawful authority in Lebanon acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people, constitute the only force capable of imposing law and order. This explains why the Israelis persist in instigating armed groups to clash with the peacekeeping forces.

8. By virtue of the nature of their mission, the peacekeeping forces are responsible for maintaining security and public order in Lebanon. All acts which they have carried out in Lebanon and those which they will carry out are motivated by concern for the unity of Lebanon and the continued existence of the Lebanese State. I am sure, Mr. President, you agree with me that if a armed group were to violate public order and threaten the safety and security of citizens in an American city, it would be the primary duty of the American security forces to hasten to

defend law and public order without awaiting a specific order, the act being of the very essence of their tasks and duties.

9. In this connection, reference should be made to the campaign currently being launched by the Israeli information media on the subject of an alleged liquidation of Christians in Lebanon. I very much wish that in relation to this campaign you would recall the acts and practices of Israel against the Palestinians—Christians and Muslims alike.

When the Christians were hard pressed in the civil war in Lebanon, Syria alone assumed the responsibility for relieving pressure and restoring balance to the Lebanese arena.

I hope you are not unaware of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Christians are opposed to the policies and practices of the Phalangists and Chamounites, as has been declared by a large number of their leaders. Moreover, the Christians living in the areas controlled by the peacekeeping forces enjoy excellent conditions of life. If the whole question were sectarian in nature, why is it, it may be asked, that fighting breaks out only in a limited section of Beirut?

The fact is that the Christians in Lebanon, like the Muslims, are opposed to the acts of violence practiced by the Phalangists and Chamounites with Israeli instigation. They are all in favour of the unity of the country and of restoring the authority of the State to all parts of Lebanon.

10. It should also be noted here that the talk now being carried on by the Israelis and Zionists concerning alleged persecution of Christians—who constitute part of our nation and cannot be subjected to persecution by anyone—is reminiscent of the European practice in the 19th century—which is now part of history—of using the pretext of the protection of minorities in order to cover intervention in some areas and to impose European colonialism.

A more important consideration is that this talk will lead the Islamic world to talk about the fate of the Muslims of Lebanon, considering that Lebanon, by its very social structure, consists of several sects and communities. Such trends, Mr. President, will surely lead to the destruction of the national unity of Lebanon, which is a matter of the utmost significance to all the citizens of Lebanon.

11. While thanking you for the letter in which you expressed concern over the present situation in Lebanon—a concern which I share with you, I believe that the United States can greatly help the sister state of Lebanon by exerting pressure to make the Israeli Government stop its intervention in Lebanon and discontinue the military, material and political support which it gives to some armed groups—a support that encourages acts which contradict what both our governments have declared concerning the security, peace, sovereignty and unity of Leb-

anon. Moreover, a declared American stand in this direction, would constitute a positive and constructive contribution.

Undoubtedly, a continuation of the Israeli attitude constitutes a factor threatening the security of the region.

12. In conclusion, would reaffirm the objectives of our policy in Lebanon, namely the unity of the land and people of Lebanon, the sovereignty of the central government and the stopping of fighting. Acting on these principles, the Syrian forces in Lebanon practice a maximum degree of self-control, while efforts are being exerted to help the Lebanese Government by attempting to reach a political solution acceptable to the various parties and by taking measures conducive to maintaining security, upholding the authority of the law and safeguarding the country's unity and integrity.

Syria is as desirous to protect the safety of the citizens of Lebanon, regardless of their social or political adherence, as that of its own citizens. They are all our brothers for whose sake we have endured a great deal of suffering, burdens and sacrifices.

With best regards and wishes,

Hafez al-Assad

President of the Syrian Arab Republic

Damascus, September 10, 1978

End text.

2. Comment: Dabboul seemed very pleased with the contents of President al-Assad's letter, obviously believing that they were responsive to the points made by our President in his letter. After reading the letter, I said I was glad to see that President al-Assad had alluded to "efforts being exerted by the Lebanese Government . . . to reach a political solution." As he knew, we felt very strongly about this, believing that further military actions would only complicate the situation in Lebanon and risk escalation. The situation is very tense and unless Syria exercises caution, there is the ever present danger of Israeli intervention. Dabboul echoed the standard SARG position that the Syrian Army is merely reactive to provocations.

3. I then reminded Dabboul of our proposal that the Syrian Government reiterate publicly its ultimate intentions in Lebanon, including an eventual troop withdrawal. Dabboul enthusiastically showed me a copy of the daily newspaper *Al-Ba'ath* in which Assad was quoted in a German interview as not only reiterating Syria's "honorable" intentions in Lebanon but also as saying that Syrian forces would withdraw from Lebanon the minute they were requested to do so by the Lebanese Government.

4. Assad's two public interviews September 9 and 11 (septel)⁵ constitute further clear statements of Syrian intention to withdraw. Statements specifically counter charges that Syria seeking by its actions in Lebanon to undercut Camp David, ignore the popular will in Lebanon, or implement dream of "Greater Syria."

5. Believe, as Dabboul implied, that these statements are a direct response to our request for public statement on intention to withdraw.

6. Suggest Department pass⁶ to Beirut and Tel Aviv.

Seelye

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The Department relayed Assad's letter in telegram 231943 to multiple posts, September 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780007–0528)

41. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 11, 1978, 2:30–3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Samuel Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

ISRAELI SIDE

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense

Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch

Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court

Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister

Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States

Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

Israeli Views on Their Security Requirements

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Lewis met initially alone for a few minutes with Foreign Minister Dayan at Secretary Vance's request. He wanted to explore some of the Israeli views of their security require-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David: 9/9–17/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis on September 15.

ments, primarily with regard to Sinai but also with respect to some aspects of the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan said he would like to invite Defense Minister Weizman to join since this was the subject of the discussion, and the remainder of the participants came in ten minutes later.

Before their arrival, Secretary Vance asked whether the Israelis could accept joint patrolling with the Jordanian and Egyptian armed forces. Dayan replied that he would not rule it out for the Jordan River Valley with the Jordanians; in fact, he thought it was a good idea. However, he saw no appropriate way to do it in Gaza since the international frontier was only about three miles long between Gaza and Sinai. It was apparent, moreover, that Dayan saw no possibility of Egyptian forces being readmitted to Gaza; he admitted only the possibility of mixed border control points with some token Egyptian participation.

Vance then went over very quickly with Dayan the latest version of the U.S. draft “Framework” document,² pointing out to him where the Israeli suggestions on the previous draft³ had been rejected and where they had been accepted. (Review with Dayan was so rapid that he could not have obtained more than a very general idea as to which of the Israeli counterproposals had been accepted.)

Dayan then made his familiar argument in favor of the U.S. taking over Etam air base, both to solve the problem on the air base itself and also to make easier an ultimate solution of the Rafah settlements issue. Vance explained why Sadat had rejected this idea and why the whole concept of foreign bases on Arab soil is antithetical to the Arabs at this point. He said that Sadat had not completely ruled out the idea, but would consider it only with the greatest reluctance, and that he, himself, was not enthusiastic about it.

Dayan said that he was against the idea of “civilianizing” the three Israeli airports; under Egyptian-civilian control they could be transformed over night during a crisis into staging bases for Egyptian military aircraft almost adjacent to the Israeli frontier. If the UN had control over the airport at Sharm el-Sheikh, this would be a good way to protect it for use as a civilian facility; the same idea could apply to port facilities at Sharm el-Sheikh. Perhaps the same idea could apply to the other two airfields as well.

Dayan then said he wanted to raise another subject, that of the need to resettle permanently the large refugee population in Gaza. They all have employment, he said; what is needed is sufficient money to house them properly, and this would all be accomplished under the

² See footnote 33, Document 28.

³ See footnote 30, Document 28.

aegis of the Arab self-governing council. Would it be possible for the U.S. to finance this resettlement? The Secretary replied that he would not rule it out and asked whether Dayan could provide a rough estimate of the cost, which Dayan said he would do. (Later in the day, Rubenstein told Ambassador Lewis that a very rough estimate of the cost involved would be \$200 million.)

Dayan then said he was hard pressed to know how best to pursue the question of detailed negotiations over Sinai here at Camp David. Would it have to be done between Begin and Sadat, or rather between Sadat and Weizman?

(At this point in the conversation Weizman and Tamir along with the other participants joined the discussion.)

Secretary Vance asked Weizman if he would please review his understandings with Sadat and Gamasy with respect to security zones in the Sinai.

Weizman replied that Sadat insists that the air bases must be totally out within two years along with all Israeli settlements. He would agree to limiting his troops across the Canal to one infantry division with approximately 200 tanks between the Canal and the Mitla Pass. Various “frontier force” units would be spread out East of the Mitla. (Weizman said that this was all a bit confusing, however, since Sadat at one point in Salzburg⁴ had talked about needing only one brigade of troops throughout the Sinai.) There would be UN forces stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh and elsewhere along the eastern borders of Sinai, although Sadat really would prefer to have all UN forces out. Any electronic early warning systems retained would have to be based on the principle of reciprocity. (Here Weizman added that the Israelis would prefer to give up electronic warning sites of their own in Sinai if having them meant that there would have to be Egyptian sites within Israel proper. But perhaps U.S. monitoring sites of the type now at the Sinai Field Mission could substitute.) Weizman said that Sadat had spoken of a general thinning out of his overall forces, cutting back substantially from the present level of 750,000 men under arms.

Weizman then made clear that he saw no difficulty making firm decisions on the various security zones once Israel had made a clear decision to get totally out of Sinai. But he made clear there was no such decision at present because the Israelis cannot accept Sadat’s insistence that their settlements be dismantled. One other unresolved issue was whether or not Sadat would insist on having his own military aircraft east of the passes at bases like Bir Gifgafa.

⁴ Reference is to the July 13 meetings between Sadat and Weizman in Salzburg, Austria. For documentation on these meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.

Tamir, at Vance's request, then unveiled several detailed maps⁵ of the West Bank and Gaza showing exactly what force dispositions Israel would require during the five-year transition period, and in most cases beyond. He also explained in detail the roles of the various Sinai air bases, force dispositions near Gaza (it would be unnecessary to retain forces within Gaza itself except for the military nahals), and the areas along the Jordan River required as permanent installations to defend against attacks from the east. Secretary Vance studied the maps carefully and listened to the briefing. He remarked that it would be very helpful if Weizman and Tamir would repeat this briefing for President Carter. (This occurred later in the evening.)⁶

⁵ Not found.

⁶ See footnote 36, Document 28.

42. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 11, 1978, 9:30–11 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

American Side

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt

Egyptian Side

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

Ahmed Maher, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

Meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Kamel

Kamel met with Secretary Vance this evening. He was accompanied by Ambassador Ghorbal and Ahmed Maher. Hermann Eilts was present for the American side.

Kamel first expressed his apologies for the Egyptian side's inability to be ready with its suggestions at 2000 this evening. He explained that the Egyptian side had not been able to begin work until

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts on September 12.

mid-afternoon, after Sadat had returned from his meeting with President Carter.² The Egyptians had thereafter had a brief meeting with Sadat, who had given them some instructions.

Kamel then said that the Egyptian side had found the American paper³ “perplexing.” It was not “coherent.” It had given them a great deal of trouble. Things are scattered throughout the paper, and the Egyptians were having trouble following exactly what has been meant. The Secretary asked about the nature of Kamel’s concerns. Kamel said the Egyptian side feels it is necessary to study our paper carefully. It is now in the process of doing so. The Secretary stressed that we want the Egyptian views on where they believe the paper is deficient and what should be done about it. Ghorbal stated that the Egyptians are doing exactly that. He indicated that the Egyptians agreed with what Eilts had suggested, namely, that the Egyptians present us with specific textual suggestions.

The Secretary then again asked Kamel for precise indications of where the Egyptians believe our paper is deficient. Reading from a handwritten memorandum, Kamel indicated the following:

A. First, the Egyptians believe our paper is a departure from previously expressed American positions. Specifically, in the withdrawal language on the West Bank, there is no mention of the ‘49 lines. The Egyptian side had expected that there would be a reference to a return to the ‘49 lines with minor recifications. The Secretary told Kamel that this subject had been discussed between Sadat and President Carter. The language included was that agreed upon by Sadat. Kamel was a bit nonplused, but responded that we should recognize that the Egyptian side must first study the document before agreeing on specific language. There must have been some misunderstanding if President Carter got the impression that Sadat is in total agreement. Sadat, Kamel pointed out, is “shy” and wants to be polite. As Kamel understood it, Sadat had only agreed with President Carter that the paper would be referred to the Egyptian Delegation in order to obtain the latter’s observations. These were the instructions that Sadat had given to the Egyptian Delegation. Sadat wants the Egyptian Delegation to scrutinize the paper. Kamel apologized profusely for any wrong impression that might have been given. Ghorbal added that Sadat had read what President Carter gave him, but that Sadat’s comments had been preliminary and off-the-cuff. They were neither complete nor were they intended to be a final judgment.

Kamel went on to say that Sadat had said he would agree to anything so long as land and sovereignty are excluded. “We are Eyp-

² See footnote 32, Document 28.

³ See footnote 33, Document 28.

tians,” Kamel said. “You must take us the way we are.” Sadat takes it for granted that President Carter will take into consideration Egyptian and Arab interests and concerns. Kamel also noted that Sadat had at the outset presented proposals, which the Egyptian side consider should be agreeable to all. These proposals were well balanced. They should be kept in mind as a background. All of Sadat’s ideas are incorporated in the Egyptian proposal. The Egyptians, Kamel stressed, do not want to be embarrassed before the other Arabs. The American language in the American paper will embarrass the Egyptians in the eyes of the other Arabs.

B. The second point on which the American paper is deficient, Kamel indicated, is that it makes no clear reference to withdrawal from Sinai. The only reference is to the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. The Secretary interjected that this is because Sadat had told President Carter that he wanted it put that way. Sadat had asked that the Sinai language be written in terms of sovereignty and the inviolability of territory. There is no question, the Secretary noted, about the need for total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

The American paper, the Secretary stated, had been given the Egyptians in order to obtain their reaction.

C. The third objection that Kamel indicated is that the rights of the Palestinians are inadequately treated. There is only one sentence on the subject. Moreover, that sentence is a change from the Aswan language.⁴ The Secretary noted that President Carter had told Sadat about the concept of a footnote at the beginning of the paper, expressing the meaning of the term Palestinians. He regretted that it had not been possible due to the rush in preparing the paper to include the footnote in the draft that had been given to the Egyptians, but stressed that this is still our idea. The footnote would state clearly that when “Palestinians” are referred to throughout the paper, the meaning is the Palestinian people. Kamel responded that the original Aswan language had included specific reference to the “Palestinian people.” This should be retained. The Secretary again explained the footnote idea. He stressed that we were not trying to nitpick, but that in our judgment the problem is eased by such a formulation. Kamel insisted that the Aswan formula is the minimum that Egypt can accept. He noted that even the Saudis oppose it. The Secretary responded that if we define (in a footnote) what we mean by Palestinians, surely this should be all right. Kamel said Sadat had referred to the Palestinian people in recent statements, including in his departure statement. He cannot now accept anything less. The Secretary again stressed that we will be defining the meaning of Palestinians.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 3.

Kamel insisted that the way the term is used elsewhere in the paper is also different. There were frequent references to the “inhabitants” rather than to the Palestinians. The Secretary thought that “Palestinians” is used throughout the paper. Kamel said this is not the case.

D. Kamel then turned to another objection, namely the reference to the refugees. This, he noted, departs from previous statements on the subject. There is no reference to UN Resolution 194⁵ or to other UNGA Resolutions having to do with the Palestinian refugees. Moreover, Palestinian and Jewish refugees had been mentioned in the same context. The Secretary commented that he was aware of the Egyptian views, but that he thought they might be wrong. The Jewish refugees also have rights. Ghorbal insisted that the equation distorts what had been agreed upon unilaterally with respect to the Palestinian refugees for many years. The Secretary noted that we have talked about the admission of displaced persons and refugees to the West Bank and also about the need for an overall settlement of the refugee problem. Ahmed Maher stated that the Jewish refugee matter is a totally different problem. The doctrine of Israel, he recalled, is that Jews anywhere in the world should go back to Israel. This is the essence of the “return law.” How in such circumstances, he asked, can the Israelis argue that people who are returning under this law can properly be considered as refugees. The Secretary urged that the Egyptians read the appropriate language again. He thought that if they consider it carefully, it should not give them too much problem. Kamel commented that the Egyptians have always taken it for granted that displaced persons should be allowed to return to the West Bank and Gaza. Under our language the Israelis have a veto on these people as well as the refugees. The requirement for unanimous agreement gives them this veto. The language of our paper, he stressed, deeply troubles the Egyptians. The Secretary responded that part of the language on this subject comes directly from Sadat. He would be happy to look at any other language that the Egyptians might propose, but he wanted to stress that Sadat’s very words were used in some of the language having to do with displaced persons and refugees. Again, Kamel was nonplused. He recalled that when the Secretary was in Alexandria, he had tried to explain to him that Sadat is looking as an objective to a real peace, but that the President’s phrasing is not always felicitous. The Secretary again noted that we will look at any language the Egyptians care to suggest. We cannot guarantee to accept it, but they could be sure that we will carefully study it.

⁵ Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, passed on December 11, 1948. Article 11 of the Resolution addressed the status of Palestinian refugees displaced by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

E. Kamel next observed that there is no reference in the paper to settlements. The Secretary pointed out that this had been deliberately omitted. He then explained our position on settlements, stressing that we have clear and strong views on the subject. In the case of the Sinai, the settlements should be withdrawn. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, as he had indicated to Kamel the other day, there should be a freeze on all settlement activity. Kamel asked why there had been no reference to our previously expressed position of the illegality of settlements. The Secretary said President Carter will make a speech which will include a reference to our longstanding view that settlements are illegal. The Secretary then explained why we had left out in our present draft any reference to the settlements. This had been done in the hope that, without such a reference, it might be possible to work out with the Israelis the other aspects of the problem. The Israelis have been made aware, however, that our position on settlements is a strong one and that it will be included in any final document. He could assure Kamel that when we leave Camp David, appropriate language on the settlements will be included in our paper and that this will be made public.

Kamel reverted to the overall paper, indicating that the Egyptian side is not at all happy with the paper. The Secretary responded that the Israelis are also unhappy with it. Kamel wanted to know what the Israelis could find in the paper that would make them unhappy. The Secretary went through his copy⁶ of the paper and noted the following points: (a) The inclusion of language on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through war. Ghorbal noted this is only in the preamble, which we and the Israelis have always claimed does not have the same weight as operative language. (b) The concept of restoring Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. The Israelis want to cast this solely in terms of the Begin Peace Plan.⁷ (c) The language on Suez and Tiran, which we had refused to include. (d) The Israelis do not like the inclusion of the Aswan language. (e) The Israelis do not like the transition arrangements as we have worked them out. They want to base these on the Begin self-rule plan. (f) The Israelis do not like the Vienna language.⁸ Here Kamel interjected that the Egyptians also do not like the Vienna language. (g) The Israelis also object to the Palestinian refugee language. (h) They dislike the Jerusalem language. They argue that in the case of Jerusalem there is nothing to be resolved. It has been declared to be the capital of Israel. We have not accepted this.

⁶ Not further identified.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 5.

⁸ Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties posits a "general rule that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the treaty's purpose." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1969, p. 736)

Kamel contended that a major problem with the paper is that all of the obligations are on the Egyptian side. He continued that the only Israeli obligation is to negotiate.

Ghorbal reiterated that in many instances there has been an erosion of previous American positions. The United States should not allow this to take place. The Secretary again asked that the Egyptian ideas be given to us.

Kamel said this will be done, but he pleaded that we take into consideration the overall effect that the document will have in the Middle East. The United States, he emphasized, needs a strong Sadat. Sadat is a proud man. What is at stake is implementation of Resolution 242 and the establishment of peace.

Eilts pointed out that great care has been given in developing the document to ensure that Sadat is not discredited in the area. The Secretary affirmed this. Ghorbal noted that this is essential.

Kamel observed that the Egyptians hope the present meeting will come out with something positive. But there are things in the American paper that Egypt can never accept. He reiterated that the sole Israeli obligation is to negotiate. The Secretary denied this, noting that the Israelis also have the obligation to withdraw and to negotiate their secure borders. Withdrawal, he noted, is fundamental, withdrawal in return for peace and security.

Kamel reiterated that the West Bank language in our paper is unacceptable. Ghorbal added that it is not consistent with previously expressed American principles. Negotiation of minor changes has always been the American concept. Egypt and the United States must be sure that the language is not simply the language that Israel wants. Unless this is done, it will defeat the purpose of the entire effort. Ghorbal expressed appreciation for the efforts of President Carter, Secretary Vance, and the United States Government.

Eilts asked how tomorrow's scenario will work out. Kamel noted that Sadat will meet with President Carter at 10:30 and with the Egyptian Delegation afterwards. Sadat had indicated that he wants to see the Egyptian paper at that time. The Secretary suggested that it is important that Sadat see the Egyptian paper or at least have the Egyptian Delegation's ideas before he meets with President Carter. The Egyptian Delegation was clearly embarrassed. Ghorbal said the Egyptians will try to arrange this. If there is no time for Sadat to read it before his meeting with President Carter, the Egyptian Delegation will alert us to their idea later. Kamel reiterated this, but expressed personal frustration that Sadat seemed to be unwilling to read the Egyptian paper before he meets with President Carter. He wants to do so afterwards. Eilts suggested that, if the Secretary and Kamel agreed, he would be willing to go over to Sadat's bungalow and suggest, in behalf of Secretary

Vance, that he read the Egyptian paper or at least be aware of the Egyptian Delegation's objections before he meets with President Carter. He could then indicate to President Carter the areas in which the Egyptians see problems and suggest that details could be discussed later in the day with the Egyptian Delegation. Kamel was skeptical about Eilts' going over there and finally suggested that this not be done. (Comment: Kamel was sensitive to the idea that he had not been able to get to Sadat and that we might be able to do so on our own.)

Kamel noted with some chagrin that President Carter had said that President Sadat is flexible, but that his aides are not. President Carter had indicated the reverse is so with the Israelis. He thought this was not fair. The Egyptian Delegation is seeking to find a fair and honorable settlement. He wished to emphasize this point. It was not seeking to block what Sadat wants to do. We are passing through a crucial phase, Kamel noted. Sadat has placed all of his faith in the United States. He again urged that the United States, and specifically President Carter, take into consideration Sadat's problems in the Arab world. This is terribly important. Secretary Vance pointed out that we do so. Kamel insisted that the paper in its present form will hurt Sadat in the Arab world. Sadat, unfortunately, does not like to go to President Carter and appear to be "bargaining." The Secretary pointed out that there is no desire to bargain. What we want is Sadat's statement as to what he feels is wrong with the paper. Details can be discussed with the Egyptian Delegation. Kamel did not respond directly, but noted that the present paper will frighten off Hussein, the Saudis, and others. Sadat will be totally isolated.

There were some more exchanges on the possibility of the Egyptian Delegation meeting with Sadat prior to the Sadat meeting with President Carter in order to persuade the President to point out to Carter what is wrong with the paper. That part of the discussion ended inconclusively with the Egyptians indicating they will try, but clearly not being sanguine about the possibility of such an advance meeting.

As Ahmed Maher and Eilts were going from Walnut⁹ to Laurel¹⁰ to get ice and glasses, Maher said to Eilts that the basic problem that the Egyptians have with our paper is that it is viewed (rightly or wrongly) as a U.S.-Israeli paper. He noted the Egyptian awareness of the fact that we had given the paper first to the Israelis and thereafter spent six hours with the Israelis hearing their suggestions. Eilts pointed out that we had rejected many of the Israeli suggestions and, as Secretary Vance had pointed out, the Israelis are not very happy about this. Maher said

⁹ Walnut Lodge, the Camp David residence of Vance and Mondale for the duration of the summit.

¹⁰ Laurel Lodge, the location of the main dining facilities at Camp David.

he understood this, but that it would have been much easier for the Egyptians to swallow had we given them a copy of our initial paper at the outset. It is now viewed in Egyptian eyes as a U.S.-Israeli paper no matter what we say about it. Kamel had not wanted to say this to the Secretary, but we should know that this is one of the principal Egyptian gripes about it.

43. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 12, 1978, 1:45–3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

American Ambassador Samuel Lewis
Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan

SUBJECT

Dayan's Unhappiness with Secretary's Response

As we were leaving the dining area, Foreign Minister Dayan took me aside in some agitation. He said he wanted me to remember today's date very carefully, since he thought history would show that a conversation² he had just had with Secretary Vance over lunch was the point at which the chance for a peace agreement had been lost and the seeds of the next Arab-Israeli war had been planted. He said he had made a proposal to the Secretary and that he was extremely sorry the Secretary had rejected it so quickly, "But since he has, I guess there is nothing more to be done and we will just have to live with the consequences."

I took Dayan aside for more elucidation. He went over, at some length, his conclusion that there were at least three insoluble issues which precluded any chance of Israeli agreement on an overall framework: "The inadmissibility of the acquisition language, the demand for removal of Sinai settlements, and insistence on a total freeze on West Bank settlements." He said there might be a number of other points, but he believed that, based on what he felt now, the other hurdles could have been surmounted if we had not been adamant on these.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David: 9/9–17/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis. The meeting took place in Laurel Lodge.

² See footnote 42, Document 28.

He said that in this situation he believed strongly that it was a tragedy not to conclude at least an agreement on how to organize the West Bank and Gaza for the transition period and “to get on with establishing the self-rule regime.” This, he said, was now well within reach; the other two major subjects under discussion, a broad set of principles applicable to everything and the Sinai problem, did not seem to be within reach, blocked by the inadmissibility language, settlements removal, and Sadat’s insistence on removal of all airfields within three years. He had, therefore, suggested to Vance that we find a way to separate out the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza so as at least to leave Camp David with that as an achievement. He was sorry that Vance had replied that this was, in his view, impossible.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion about all of these subjects in which Dayan revealed, among other things, that he had, with great difficulty, finally persuaded Begin to accept language on the Palestinian question and on 242, including “in all its aspects” and “in all of its parts,” which Begin had resisted for months. He said it was totally impossible to move him on settlements at this juncture, and Begin had now decided to take the whole issue back to the Knesset where he (and Dayan) were quite certain an overwhelming majority of members would refuse to sanction removal. He said that Begin and he were both now planning to leave Camp David no later than Wednesday night, September 13, as was Barak—who in any event had to be back in Israel Thursday night in order to be sworn-in as a justice of the Supreme Court. Dayan seemed convinced that there was little left now to do but close out the conference.

I urged Dayan not to jump to conclusions and, above all, not to plan to leave or to permit Barak to leave before Friday, at the earliest. I reviewed the anticipated schedule for the next 48 hours with him and said that they should wait to see the next draft of our paper, which would be based on their reactions, as well as the Egyptian reactions, to our first draft. I also urged him to think long and hard about some way that the “inadmissibility” language could be incorporated into the Preamble in a form which Begin might accept. I said that all of us understood the depth of feeling about the settlements question, and that we should both continue to seek formulas by which it could be handled in this framework, since it would be tragic to be able to agree on most other issues but find no way of dealing with this question.

After lengthy debate, in which Dayan’s mood gradually improved, he finally agreed to seek ways in which the “inadmissibility” language might be utilized, while asking me to do everything possible (a) to look for a way to deal with the Sinai settlements issue in this paper which put off to the period of detailed negotiation its eventual resolution, and (b) to persuade the Secretary to reconsider his response

to Dayan's idea of an ultimate fallback position for Camp David centered on agreement with regard to the West Bank and Gaza procedures and prospects. In this connection, he stressed that the difficult language of general applicability is intended to apply ultimately to peace treaties, and there are no peace treaties anticipated for the West Bank and Gaza until the five years have elapsed. He therefore believes it would be sad to hang up over general language for this area when agreement on the actual procedures may be within reach.

With regard to joint patrolling with Egyptians and Jordanians, Dayan said again that he would not rule out joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols on the narrow 3-mile international border between the Gaza Strip and Sinai. He very strongly rejected any possibility of involvement by Egyptian police or military with the Gaza police, but would accept Jordanian police advisers in Gaza, if needed. He was negative about joint coastal patrolling of the Gaza Strip, but did not absolutely rule it out. What came through most clearly was Israeli determination not to have Egyptian military involvement inside Gaza ever again. Jordanian involvement would be acceptable, and would be consistent with the Israeli desire to join the Gaza to the West Bank for future administrative purposes.

Dayan talked at some length during our conversation about Sadat's recently reported rejection of UN forces along the buffer zone between Israel and the Sinai. He said that, contrary to what they had understood about Sadat's views earlier, they now were told that Egyptian civilians would have to man the air bases at Sharm, Etzion, and Etam. He said he could not see any way in which this would be acceptable, while on the other hand a UN force could perhaps operate or administer all three airports for civilian use, if the US continued unable [or] unwilling to take over Etam. Etzion, for example, would be a very useful civilian airport for Eilat, assuming freedom of movement back and forth across the border between Eilat and Etzion; but this arrangement would only be feasible if it were under UN control and not available overnight for Egyptian military to re-occupy it, as would be the case if Egyptian civilians were administering it or the other airports. The same reasoning ran to the use of the port facilities at Sharm.

(Defense Minister Weizman had made some of the same points to Secretary Vance on September 11³ with regard to the airfields, although he had stressed the great desirability of retraining Etzion for a much longer period for Israeli military use. If it had to be given up for military purposes, he said it would be vital for Israel to obtain a promise in the agreement to use the air space over the buffer zone along the fron-

³ See Document 41.

tier for training purposes. Air space over the Negev was already in short supply, and if Etzion were relocated across the frontier it would be essential to retain use of some Sinai air space to make the new air base viable.)

44. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 12, 1978, 2–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the President
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
 Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
 William Quandt, National Security Council
 Hermann Fr. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
 Denis Clift, Vice President's Staff

EGYPTIAN SIDE

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
 Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
 Ahmed Maher, Director of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister
 Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
 Nabil el-Araby, Director of Legal Department, Foreign Ministry
 Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry
 Abou el Gheite, Office of the Foreign Minister

SUBJECT

Egyptian Comments on U.S. Paper

Kamel first expressed appreciation for the efforts of President Carter, the Secretary and the U.S. Delegation. He said that the Egyptian side understands the importance of positive results. He had earlier in the morning met President Carter by chance and in a brief chat explained to the President what the Egyptians have in mind.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.

² See footnote 39, Document 28.

Prior to discussing the U.S. paper³ in detail, he wished to outline a number of points on which the U.S. and Egypt are in agreement: (a) the desire to keep and to preserve the relationship between our two countries, (b) concern that a comprehensive and just peaceful settlement be reached. The results should be such that it will attract others to join, (c) whatever settlement is reached must “fortify” Egypt and strengthen the moderate states of the (Middle East) area in order to enable them to meet the “dangerous trends” that are now spreading in that area, (d) we must prevent chaos from developing in the area and be alive to the dangers of Soviet penetration. This means that conditions should not be created which have the effect of distorting the U.S. image in the area.

The Secretary said that we agree on all four points. He called the maintenance of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship vital. There must be a comprehensive settlement. We wish the result of the Camp David meetings to fortify Egypt, to protect Sadat, and to underscore Sadat’s paramount position in the Arab world. We have great respect for President Sadat as a true leader. We agree that world chaos should be avoided as should anything that jeopardizes the moderate forces in the area.

Kamel went on to say that the Egyptian side has carefully studied our paper. He was happy that we welcome any proposals that the Egyptians might wish to put forward. The Egyptian proposals, he said, aim at creating a balance between the obligations of the parties. As he saw it, the American proposal in its present form will in no way obtain Saudi approval. He thought that we are in agreement that Saudi support is needed. Hussein will also be reluctant to join. Hussein’s participation, Kamel stressed, is essential.

The Egyptian position, Kamel recalled, is explained in the paper which the Egyptian side had earlier presented to us. It is based on (a) a balance of obligations between the parties, (b) insuring Israeli withdrawal to the ‘67 lines except for minor rectifications, (c) insuring the security of all parties, (d) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, (e) the participation of all parties. Kamel then asked el-Baz to present the details of the Egyptian ideas.

El-Baz first explained what he called the “Egyptian approach” to the U.S. formula. The Egyptians had come, he stated, with the objective of reaching agreement. By this they meant agreement with the “other party.” A fortiori they wish to reach agreement with the U.S. in order to see if there is common ground between us. The Egyptians are positive

³ The specific version of the draft Framework paper is not further identified. See footnote 52, Document 28.

on the U.S. role. They have an interest in assuring the success of the American effort. They believe that the American side wishes to be even-handed and fair. The American paper has been studied in this light. Points of agreement between us have been sought. So has the answer to the question: what is the main purpose of the United States in presenting the proposal? It is intended to be a compromise between the Israeli and Egyptian positions or is it a formulation of U.S. views on controversial issues involved in the dispute.

The Secretary said that the purpose of the U.S. proposal is to set forth a fair and even-handed method and framework which will allow a comprehensive settlement to be achieved. It also takes into account practical and other related aspects of the problem.

El-Baz said the Egyptian side has some problem with the structuring of the American paper, but that this is not overly important. He wished to make some general comments about the American paper. First, the Egyptians do not get a clear definition from our paper of corresponding obligations that the parties should have to each other pursuant to UN Resolutions, which are the basis for settlement. He specifically mentioned UN Resolution 242. The recurrent theme in the American paper, as the Egyptians see it, is that the main obligation is to negotiate. The obligation to “act” has been subordinated by this emphasis. Negotiations, he contended, are a process; they are not a basic obligation. They must also be put in the framework of how the Arab-Israeli situation has evolved. Our approach only defers dealing squarely with the problems. The U.S. paper suggests that the parties negotiate on the basis of such and such resolutions. The history of the dispute, el-Baz argued, makes it clear that the Israelis conduct their litigation without a full recognition of the mutuality of obligations. Egypt believes it is essential that there be a clear definition of the obligation of both parties. The negotiations should focus on how to implement obligations.

Second, el-Baz noted, the American paper appears to de-emphasize mutuality and reciprocity, especially in its provisions concerning security. The Egyptians realize that security is for both parties. “For certain reasons” Egypt accepted the “notion” that the Israelis are more sensitive on this point. But this should not be a general rule. Security is a right and an obligation for all.

When Egypt presented its draft proposal, el-Baz continued, it believed that the proposal contained many ideas. The Egyptians were surprised to find that the American paper did not draw much on the Egyptian paper. There were some serious omissions in the American paper, e.g., (a) any reference to the declaration of human rights, (b) a declaration to the principles of international law, (c) any reference to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. The Egyptians had thought that this last

provision, in particular, should give no problem, since as early as October, 1956, Israel accepted the concept of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, (d) the concept of UN Security Council guarantee of borders. The latter, el-Baz argued, should be in the interest of every party to the dispute.

The Secretary explained that these omissions were prompted by our belief that if certain declarations are cited, the Israelis will wish to add their own list of citations. We want to achieve the objectives of the Egyptian proposal within specific reference to a series of documents. On compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, he noted that when the Israelis signed this agreement, they specifically excluded its applicability to Arab-Israeli matters. The Israelis do not believe that the ICJ is unbiased. If there were some method other than the ICJ, it might be more palatable. On borders, the Secretary pointed out that we have covered this in paragraph 7 of the American paper. Our language is simpler, but the Egyptian concept is included.

El-Baz commented that Israel appears to be seeking to force Egypt to accept only one method in resolving disputes. This method is uninterrupted negotiations, even if these lead to no progress. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which the American paper cites, speaks of other methods of resolving disputes. Israel regrettably thinks it can deal with the Arabs on the basis of the *de facto* situation.

The Secretary suggested that the Egyptians make their suggestion on this point. Nabil el-Araby observed that the methods of settling disputes are contained in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. The article leaves it to the parties to choose the method they wish to employ. Why should the method of direct negotiations be singled out? The Secretary responded that we have not singled out any method. The ICJ language has been taken out.

El-Baz then commented that in the Egyptian paper, there had been the proposal that all parties agree to the NPT. The Egyptians had assumed this would meet with enthusiastic American approval. The (nuclear) issue creates a special element of tension in the area. It gives psychological and physical concern to both sides. There is no need, el-Baz argued, to accommodate the Israelis on this point.

El-Baz then said he wished to make some specific comments:

A. The Palestinian problem: This, he noted, is the crux of the issue. The formulation and concept to resolve it must be clear. The sovereign rights of the (Palestinian) people must be clear. He understood that the Egyptian and American positions on this are similar. If one begins from this assumption, one must go on to say that in principle, Israel is obligated to withdraw in the West Bank/Gaza in accordance with the “inadmissibility” language.

El-Baz stated that, in recognition of the sensitivity of this problem, Egypt has accepted the concept of a transitional period. It did so in an

effort to be cooperative and to ease the resolution of the problem. It also did so to accommodate the United States. Israeli withdrawal will enable the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination. The Egyptians find basic defects in the way this problem is presented in the American paper. The interim arrangement envisaged in our paper carries with it the seeds of perpetuation. It can become a permanent arrangement. There is no clearcut Israeli commitment to withdraw or how to do so. Israel is also given a prominent role in deciding the final outcome. Granted, the American paper calls for the abolition of military government, but Israel remains a major participant in running the area. All authority is derived from Israel. This, el-Baz contended, negates the concept of abolishing the Israeli military government. Egypt and Jordan, he noted, can play a role to provide additional needed security in the West Bank/Gaza.

The Secretary said that it is not correct that the American proposal envisages the interim regime will become a permanent one. We have spoken of an interim settlement and the participation of the inhabitants in the determination of their own future. He drew attention to page 7, para 2 in support of this view. The people elect the self-governing authority. That authority derives its competence from Egypt, Israel and Jordan, at such time as the latter joins. We sought to place authority in the hands of the people through an election process. Egypt, Jordan and Israel should have a role so that they can in a practical way set up the authority.

Abdul Rauf el-Reedy contended that this simply creates confusion. It can be used by the Israelis to claim that Israel is a partner in the interim period. This prejudices the basic principle that authority should derive from the people. The Secretary noted that the Egyptians believe this and so do we, but the Israelis do not. Our belief is that the American formulation is a practical way to handle the problem. Nabil el-Araby stated that as long as there is a provision that Israel is one of the parties from whom authority is derived, Israel will claim a favored position. On page 8 of the American draft, Israeli residual rights are cited. The Egyptians' study of those rights suggest that the self-governing authority will be limited to maintaining internal security. Others will handle the territorial aspects.

The Secretary asked if it might be better to delete the sentence about the source of the authority for the self-governing group. The Egyptians readily agreed that this should be done. The Secretary said we will consider this.

El-Baz noted that if this concept is deleted, page 9 of the American proposal still gives the Israelis an important voice in determining the future of the West Bank/Gaza. This should be handled through self-determination of the Palestinian people. The Egyptians know the

American concept. But the parties must agree at the beginning on pertinent principles to be applied. This should not be left to the end, otherwise the self-governing arrangement will simply be perpetuated. The Israelis will have a veto. Leaving the issue vague, as the American paper does, poses a problem for the final settlement.

The Secretary observed that if one tries to eliminate Israel at this point, one is prematurely forcing a decision on the sovereignty question. The Israelis are reserving their claim to sovereignty in the West Bank, but are not now asserting it. The United States and Egypt believe that the people of the area should decide. El-Reedy contended that it will be difficult to proceed with two interpretations of this issue. If a way is left for Israel to assert sovereignty, it will cause trouble. The Secretary said we cannot stop the Israelis from doing so. El-Baz argued that this is a basic issue. The Secretary agreed, but said we had agreed not to face it now. El-Reedy said that if Israel is to determine the future of the West Bank/Gaza, Israel will always believe that is its objective. El-Araby argued that the sovereignty issue should be faced squarely.

El-Araby stated that when the right of self-determination is mentioned, this means the final step. It should be decided by the Palestinians living there, either through plebiscite, referendum, etc. No one but the Palestinians should participate. Egypt accepts negotiations with the Palestinians and Jordanians on security measures, but not on deciding the final status of the West Bank/Gaza. The American paper confuses this issue. El-Baz asked what happens if Israel does not reach agreement with the Arabs? The American proposal omits any clear and unequivocal obligation on the part of Israel to withdraw from the West Bank/Gaza with the possibility of minor rectifications that do not reflect the weight of conquest. This has been the constant United States position.

El-Baz also noted that the Aswan formula⁴ has not been reproduced in full in the American paper. The term “people” had been omitted. The Secretary said that he was willing to put this back.

El-Araby next indicated Egyptian unhappiness with the “amalgamation” of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. The Israelis, he noted, are given a veto in our paper on the return of displaced persons. In the case of the refugees, El-Araby acknowledged, Israel has a say in accordance with UN resolutions. However, UN Resolution 237 of 1967,⁵ which the United States had voted for, governs the status of

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 3.

⁵ U.N. Security Council Resolution 237, adopted on June 14, 1967, called on the Israeli Government to ensure the safety and facilitate the return of residents who had fled the fighting during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. For the complete text of the Resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1967, pp. 190–191.

the displaced persons. It is different from UN Resolution 194,⁶ which covers the Palestinian refugees. These two concepts, el-Araby asserted, should not be amalgamated.

El-Araby also was unhappy with the inclusion on page 12 of a reference to Egypt and Israel reaching agreement on “Arab and Jewish refugees.” On Arab refugees, it is the Palestinians who are involved. In the case of Jewish refugees, El-Araby noted that this can only apply to Egyptian citizens of Jewish faith who left Egypt after 1967 or before. Egypt is agreeable that such individuals may return to Egypt at any time they wish.

The Secretary noted that we are aware of the refugee program. It has not been adequately dealt with. Our paper is trying to show that the entire refugee problem needs to be handled. El-Baz stated that the Egyptians object to equating the Jewish refugee issue with the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian refugees, he reiterated, are separate from the displaced persons and should be so treated. They are also separate from Jewish refugees. He saw no real problem with Jewish refugees. If an individual has a claim, it is his or her right to seek redress through the courts or through international adjudication.

The Secretary asked if the Egyptians object to the use of “Arab” and to the inclusion of Jewish refugees also to the non-reference to the UN Resolutions. Saunders pointed out that there is a separate Jewish refugee problem. He did not think it sufficient to cite UN Resolution 194. Israel must somehow be brought into the action in order to solve the refugee problem. El-Araby suggested the matter be taken piece-by-piece: displaced persons should be cited, Palestinian refugees should be cited, but in a manner where their rights are not prejudiced during the interim period. (He made no reference to Jewish refugees.)

El-Baz referred to our reference to a continuing committee to handle by unanimous agreement unresolved issues. He asked what we have in mind with this provision. Saunders observed that the reference is a purely technical one. He recalled the mixed commission that was set up in the Sinai II Agreement. There are certain issues which such a group could discuss and, hopefully, resolve. El-Baz responded that putting problems into hands of the two parties might in effect result in a stalemate. He pointed out that mechanisms do exist to handle this sort of a situation and referred again to the ICJ.

El-Araby noted that day-to-day operations in the West Bank/Gaza should be within the competence of the local, self-governing authority.

⁶ The status of Palestinian refugees is specifically addressed in Article II of Resolution 194–(III), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 11, 1948. For the complete text of the Resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49*, pp. 174–176.

Saunders suggested that the Egyptians provide us with appropriate language.

The Secretary asked whether the use of the term “consensus” will solve the Egyptian problem. The Egyptians responded unanimously that it will not. Saunders pointed out that the Israelis are a party to the problem during the transitional period. El-Baz agreed to provide us with pertinent language.

El-Baz then referred to the paragraph in our paper on Jerusalem. He expressed understanding that the problem is difficult and sensitive. But, he pointed out, Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank. Neither the United States nor Egypt recognize the amalgamation of Arab Jerusalem into Israel. Jerusalem, he insisted, is included in the Israeli obligation to withdraw. Egypt agrees that the city should not be redivided. He drew a distinction between the issue of sovereignty in East Jerusalem and that of the life of the people. The Secretary pointed out that our paper says that Jerusalem should not again be divided. El-Baz noted that the United States also agrees that Jerusalem is not a part of Israel. The Secretary observed that trying to solve the Jerusalem problem now is a mistake. It will simply create problems. He suggested it be left to the Jordanians for the future. Kamel observed that we want Hussein to come in. El-Baz stated that if this is our common concern, the United States formula is harmful. The “future relationship” phrase used in the American paper, he contended is Israeli phraseology. The Secretary pointed out that it is not, it is our language. El-Baz insisted that two sovereignties in Jerusalem should not be allowed. The issue should be handled first by Israeli withdrawal, and thereafter by agreement not to redive the city. The starting point should be non-recognition of the Israeli occupation. Unfortunately, the phraseology in the American paper leads to the conclusion that the Israelis may remain. The Secretary pointed out that we are simply saying that the ultimate arrangements for Jerusalem must be worked out some time in the future. Atherton suggested that the final sentence in the paragraph on Jerusalem should take care of the Egyptian concern. The Egyptians insisted it will not. The Secretary asked whether the Wailing Wall should be under Jordan. El-Baz said it should be so far as jurisdiction is concerned. The Jews might have the right to visit, and claimed this is already taken care of by the reference to freedom of access to religious shrines. El-Reedy pointed out that internationalization of Jerusalem is another possibility. The Secretary wondered whether anyone would support this. El-Baz did not answer the question, but urged that nothing be included to prejudge the final outcome. Doing so would mean that the status quo will be perpetuated. The Secretary observed that the more one goes into detail with respect to Jerusalem, the greater

is the problem for Sadat. El-Araby again referred to UN Resolution 267 of October 1967,⁷ which the United States has approved.

El-Reedy asked if the Palestinians in East Jerusalem will or will not be included in the self-governing regime. The American paper seems to suggest that it will not be (page 8). Saunders opined that we should think of Jerusalem separately. El-Araby suggested that the reference be to the West Bank and Gaza, instead of to areas now under Israeli military government jurisdiction. Saunders suggested that our phraseology protects Sadat. It leaves the Jerusalem question separate. El-Araby responded that the West Bank/Gaza has specific geographic meaning. The Secretary suggested that the Egyptians provide us with their proposed language.

El-Baz then referred to the absence of any reference in our paper to settlements. The Secretary pointed out that this omission had already been explained to Sadat and Kamel. Before our paper is finalized, language on the settlements will be included. On the matter of the illegality of the settlements, President Carter will repeat our position in a speech to the Congress.

The Secretary then said he would like to raise a question or two.

On page 4, the fourth line from the bottom, he asked if the Egyptians would like to have the phrase “based on the principle of reciprocity” included. The Egyptians said this was agreeable to them and observed that President Carter had already agreed to the inclusion of such a phrase.

El-Araby asked what is meant by “special security forces” on page 4 of our paper. Saunders said the reference is to the collection of police forces that might be involved.

The Secretary alluded to the phrase on page 6 of the American draft “assist in the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty.” He suggested an addition, “based on phased withdrawal, Israeli forces, etc.” He said we have some language to this effect. The Egyptians suggested that “phased” be removed, withdrawal should not be qualified. A statement could be included suggesting withdrawal in accordance with some timetable.

El-Araby suggested that on page 6 a statement be included to the effect that “security arrangements will be reciprocal,” or some other similar phrase based on the principle of reciprocity.

El-Reedy returned to the issue of the basic structure of the paper. Some of the fundamental principles for Egypt, such as the inadmissibility language, is in the Preamble. The Secretary observed that this is

⁷ For the text of UN Security Council Resolution 267, adopted July 3, 1969, see *Quest for Peace*, pp. 23–24.

where it is in UN Resolution 242. El-Reedy stated that it is in 242 because it is also in the UN Charter. Egypt suggested that there might be a general part of the paper to cover fundamental principles. The issue, he pointed out, would not be important if the Israelis had not come up with the idea that the “inadmissibility” language is not binding because it is in the Preamble. The Secretary said he believes it should be in the Preamble. Perhaps the matter could be treated by citing the entire Preamble. El-Reedy noted that the American paper had also added to the pertinent preambular language the phrase, “within secure and recognized borders.” This is not in the UN Resolution 242 Preamble. El-Baz noted that because the Israelis insist that because the “inadmissibility” language is in the Preamble, it is not important. For that reason the Egyptians believe it should be in the operative language. The Secretary pointed out that the Israelis “climb up the wall” with any such suggestion. El-Baz suggested that this shows their intentions.

El-Baz then referred to para 7 on page 12 having to do with the possible inability of Jordan to join in the negotiations. This, he insisted, does not help and could be offensive to Jordan. The Secretary responded that the phrase is intended to show that the negotiations would go ahead even if Jordan does not participate. Kamel observed that the Egyptian side is proceeding on the assumption that Jordan will join. The Secretary said we hope so, but cannot be sure. El-Baz thought it is not necessary to provide for such a contingency. It goes without saying, he argued, that if Jordan does not participate, Egypt will go ahead. The Secretary noted that the language is for Egyptian protection. El-Baz argued that Egypt does not need it. Boutros Ghali thought that the matter might be handled by a side letter.

El-Baz then referred to para B–2 on page 12 having to do with diplomatic, economic and cultural relations. He contended that diplomatic recognition does not require immediate diplomatic or other relations. Sadat, he claimed, is clear that diplomatic relations should not be provided for at this stage.

On page 13, El-Baz referred to para 3–E on the deployment of armed forces. He noted that the Egyptians had proposed regulating the acquisition of arms in order to stop the arms spiral. This, he noted, had been taken from the original Israeli proposal of last year. The Secretary thought the entire paragraph might be eliminated. The police issue could be taken care of on page 4. The Egyptians seemed agreeable, but El-Baz insisted that what is also needed is a reference to a general reduction of armaments. He reiterated that the Egyptian language had been taken from the September 77 Israeli draft.⁸

⁸ For documentation on this draft, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978.

The Secretary agreed to study the Egyptian suggestions. The Egyptians then provided a draft paper, which in effect recasts the American paper. It was agreed that we will go over the paper and provide the Egyptians and the Israelis with a revised draft tomorrow evening. El-Baz contended that since our paper is being revised on the basis of the latest Egyptian-Israeli proposals, we should meet first tomorrow morning with the Egyptians and only afterwards with the Israelis.⁹

⁹ Instead of separate bilateral meetings with the Egyptians and Israelis, Carter met with Barak and El-Baz from 8:10 a.m. to 4:53 p.m. and again from 8:05 p.m. to 10:15 p.m., September 13, in order to revise the overall draft Framework. See footnote 51, Document 28.

45. Draft Framework for a Settlement in Sinai Prepared by President Carter¹

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Framework for a Settlement in Sinai

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

PEACE TREATY

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of this peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

In the peace treaty the issues of: a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine; b) the time of withdrawal of Israeli personnel from the Sinai; c) the use of airfields near El Arish,² Eitam,³ Etzion,⁴ and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, undated. No classification marking.

² In brackets above this word, Carter wrote "El Arish."

³ In brackets above this word, Carter wrote "Rafah."

⁴ In brackets above this word, Carter wrote "Ras en Naqb."

Ofir⁵ for civilian purposes only; d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel and other nations through the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal; e) the construction of an international highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat; and f) the stationing of military forces; steps listed below (will be resolved by negotiations between the parties.)

Stationing of forces

—Within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal, no more than one division of Egyptian mechanized or infantry armed forces will be stationed.

—Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed lying west of⁶ the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km, and east of the same border approximately 5 km in width.

—in the area not included above, border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as mutually agreed during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist as mutually agreed to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed in the Sharm el Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, and will be removed only if such agreement is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition; termination of economic boycotts; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

INTERIM WITHDRAWAL

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

⁵ In brackets above this word, Carter wrote “Sharm al Sheikh.”

⁶ The remainder of this phrase was inserted from an attached typed page.

46. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 13, 1978, 10:20–11:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
 Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
 William Quandt, National Security Council
 Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel

ISRAELI SIDE

Prime Minister Menachem Begin
 Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
 Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman
 Prof. Aharon Barak, Member Israeli Supreme Court and Prime Minister's Legal Advisor
 Dr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to Foreign Minister
 Major General Avraham Tamir, Director, Army Planning Branch
 Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
 Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
 Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Mr. Dan Pattir, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Public Affairs

SUBJECT

Israeli Discussion of U.S. Paper on Sinai

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Lewis went to Foreign Minister Dayan's cabin to deliver to the Israelis the draft framework agreement² on the Sinai which had been discussed briefly earlier in the evening³ by the President with Mr. Barak. Dayan looked it over quickly, asked Defense Minister Weizman to come over to the cabin to join him, and initiated a discussion about problems he immediately saw in the document concerning the use of airfields and the provisions for stationing of UN Forces at Sharm el Shaikh. He was also concerned about the language on withdrawal of all Israeli personnel and the immediate establishment of the exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. A confused discussion with Weizman then ensued about definitions of the various zones in the paper, interrupted by a telephone call from Begin to Dayan. Dayan said that the President was sitting with Begin and Barak at the present mo-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David Memcons, 9/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lewis on September 14.

² The specific draft of the Sinai Framework agreement is not further identified. See footnote 54, Document 28.

³ See footnote 51, Document 28.

ment and suggested that we all adjourn to Holly Cabin rather than continue the discussion in two places. The Secretary agreed.

While arrangements were being made to move to Holly, Dayan said that of the three zones mentioned in the paper, so long as Weizman agreed with the deployments described for the two westernmost zones, then he had no problem. All of the problems, as he pointed out, are in the zone from 20 to 40 kilometers west of the old international frontier between Sinai and Palestinian mandate. He did not see a way to reach agreement at Camp David on all of the complex problems in that zone, and suggested leaving negotiations on these issues for the next phase, retaining the status quo while those negotiations went on.

Secretary Vance asked Weizman whether the dispositions of forces described in paragraphs C1, C2, and C3 were generally consistent with his understandings with Sadat. Weizman said that they were, though some rewording and readjustment would be necessary.

The Dayan-Weizman-Vance meeting then adjourned to Holly, where it was joined by the remainder of the Israeli Delegation and by Saunders, Atherton, and Quandt. Begin began by asking Rosenne to read out slowly the text of the US Sinai proposal. Begin then initiated a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion, after some preliminary and rather prolonged discussion among the Israelis in Hebrew.

Begin said that according to his agreement this evening with President Carter, paragraph B would be dropped and would be replaced by language which stated in essence that the issue of the Israeli settlements "would be decided in the peace treaty." After further discussion in which Dayan restated his view of the difficulty in resolving the complex issues in the easternmost zone at this point, Dayan suggested revising paragraph B to read, "Except as otherwise agreed in the final peace treaty, Israeli armed forces will be withdrawn from Sinai." He said that this should be coupled with a statement that during the period of negotiations for a final peace treaty, the status quo should prevail, and that all the issues involving that zone will be discussed and decided in the negotiations for the final peace treaty.

Begin then went back to a paragraph-by-paragraph approach, saying that the first paragraph was fine, and that the second paragraph should read, "All the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in the resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt." (He stressed that the dispute was between the two countries, and did not just involve Sinai. Secretary Vance agreed.)

They then agreed that the word "full" in paragraph A would follow the first word "the", rather than precede the word "Egyptian". There was some objection by Begin to the use of the word "full" but he dropped it.

There then ensued a lengthy debate about language which should be used to describe the concept of withdrawal of both armed forces and settlements, much of which went on among the Israeli delegation. Dayan then asked Secretary Vance if he could accept Dayan's idea of making clear that the principle had been accepted in this document of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and establishment of the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. He said this would defuse the airfields issue and leave only the settlements question to be hammered out in subsequent negotiations. The Secretary said he understands the concept, but did not comment on it. Dayan said that Weizman should be able to work out here a timetable for the turnover of the airfields to civilian control, but that obviously the status quo would have to be maintained until final negotiations are complete for the treaty.

The Secretary then asked Weizman whether paragraphs C1, 2 and 3 of the draft and the subsequent paragraphs were satisfactory. There was a confusing discussion among the Israelis, and Weizman said that the concepts were generally satisfactory but the wording was unfamiliar and did not accord with previous concepts of buffer and demilitarized zones used in the previous agreements between Israel and Egypt. They would have to accept some alternate language.

After another long debate in Hebrew took place, Secretary Vance suggested that perhaps we leave the Israeli delegation to examine the document at a more leisurely pace and to give us their reactions the next morning. Begin agreed. The meeting then adjourned with an understanding that it would reconvene at 10 a.m. on September 14,⁴ at which time the Israeli reactions to this draft would be available.

⁴ Carter met with Barak alone from 10:11 a.m. to 10:40 a.m. and with Dayan and the rest of the Israeli delegation from 11:05 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., September 14. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) See footnote 58, Document 28.

47. Editorial Note

On September 14, 1978, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid I. Brezhnev wrote a letter to President Jimmy Carter on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. As part of his *tour d'horizon* of the "specific manifestations of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in our relations," Brezhnev offered an assessment of the "problem" of the Middle East and of the Carter administration's role in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Brezhnev wrote that the Soviet

Union “is prepared, acting together with the US, to play a positive role in the settlement in the Middle East and in securing at last a durable peace there. We both had a good ‘asset’ here—last year’s joint Soviet-American statement. And the line of action charted therein is something that we should go back to. Any other steps, including the ones being taken most recently, do nothing but make the Middle East conflict still more deeply seated without solving its main issues. The fact that the USSR and the US are now practically following different roads in Middle East affairs cannot but have a negative effect both on the situation in that area and on our relations.” An unofficial translation of the Brezhnev’s letter and a Russian-language original version are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78.

Rather than provide a specific reply to Brezhnev’s letter, Carter instead dispatched a general message to Brezhnev at the conclusion of the Camp David summit, informing him of the outcome of the summit and the substance of the two documents agreed by the participants, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” and “A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel.” The text of Carter’s letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 149.

48. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, September 15, 1978, 1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Vice President Mondale
 US Secretary of State Vance
 US National Security Adviser Brzezinski
 Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan
 Israeli Defense Minister Weizman
 Israeli Legal Adviser Barak

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Talks—Pre May 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vance. The meeting took place in Holly Lodge. According to an undated chronological summary of the Camp David meetings prepared for the NSC, this meeting took place from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., September 15. The summary also stated that Brown attended the meeting. See footnote 64, Document 28.

Today the Vice President, Dr. Brzezinski and I met with Messrs. Dayan, Weizman and Barak. I opened the meeting by saying there were a number² of items I wished to discuss. I suggested we first discuss the outstanding issues with respect to the proposed Framework for a Sinai settlement. We discussed these issues at length and concluded that we would³ resume the discussion⁴ either later today or tomorrow.

I next stated that I wished to reaffirm the US commitment to the security of Israel and stated, as we had said on numerous occasions in the past, that we would provide the assistance necessary to meet Israel's essential security requirements. I then asked how important Israel considered the possible negotiation of a mutual security treaty between the United States and Israel to be. I added, as the President and I had both said before, that if the negotiation of such a treaty would provide the necessary linchpin to bring about a settlement of the Middle East problem, that we⁵ would very seriously consider recommending such a treaty to the Congress. Dayan responded that it was his personal view that the negotiation of such a treaty was not desirable. He said that he believed the negative aspects of the negotiation of⁶ such a treaty outweighed the positive contributions it could make. He noted that if such⁷ a treaty existed, he felt that it might⁸ be used to try to get Israel to compromise on the delineation of borders and other questions on the basis that with a mutual defense treaty such concessions would be acceptable. I said that I was interested to hear that since Prime Minister Begin had indicated on previous occasions that he was interested in the possibility of such a treaty.

I then asked Messrs. Dayan and Weizman to give us their views as to what the next steps should be based upon two assumptions—(1) that we were able to reach an agreement at Camp David, and (2) that we were unable to reach an agreement at Camp David. We discussed at length the various possible scenarios. We both agreed that it was necessary to provide safety catches in the event that the negotiations at

² An unknown hand struck through "a number" and replaced it with "several" here.

³ An unknown hand struck through "concluded that we would" and replaced it with "and decided to."

⁴ Two further meetings to discuss on the Israeli proposed textual changes to the overall Framework paper took place at Ministerial level September 15–16. On September 15, from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m., Vance and Lewis met with Barak, Dinitz, Rubinstein, Weizman, and Tamir. On September 16, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., Mondale, Vance, Saunders, Lewis, and Quandt met with Dayan, Barak, and Dinitz. See footnotes 71 and 75, Document 28.

⁵ An unknown hand struck through "that."

⁶ An unknown hand struck through the phrase "of the negotiation."

⁷ An unknown hand struck through the word "if."

⁸ An unknown hand struck through the segment "existed, he felt that."

Camp David were not successful. In this connection, Messrs. Dayan and Weizman emphasized the importance of trying to get an extension of the presence of UN forces under the second disengagement agreement when the issue arises next month.

49. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Camp David, September 15, 1978

To Pres. Sadat & P.M. Begin:

We are approaching the final stage of our negotiations. With your approval, I propose that today we receive your most constructive recommendations, that tomorrow (Saturday) be devoted to drafting efforts, and that we conclude the meeting at Camp David at some time during the following day. We will, at that time, issue a common statement to the press, drafted together. Additionally, we should agree not to make any further public statements prior to noon on Monday. Please let me know if you object to any of these proposals.

J.C.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, 9/10–27/78. No classification marking. The handwritten letter was found attached to a September 15 note by Clough indicating that original copies of the letter were hand delivered to Sadat and Begin by Mondale. (Ibid.) In his personal diary, Carter wrote that the text of the letter was agreed at a meeting of the U.S. delegation in Aspen Lodge on the morning of September 15 and that both Sadat and Begin accepted the message. (*White House Diary*, p. 236) According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting, involving Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, Jordan, Brown, and Powell, took place from 7:51 a.m. to 9:55 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Mondale delivered the letter to Sadat and Begin on the afternoon of September 15. (See footnotes 65 and 67, Document 28)

50. Note Prepared by President Carter¹

undated

Settlements in West Bank and Gaza

Late in the evening, Saturday, September 16, 1978, Prime Minister Begin, Foreign Minister Dayan, Attorney General Barak, Secretary Vance and I were concluding discussions on the final wording of the section on the West Bank and Gaza.²

Section 6 referred to the Israeli settlements, and as drafted in the American proposal, stated:

“6. After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established and there will be no expansion of physical facilities in existing settlements unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”

Prime Minister Begin objected to this language, and began to make several alternate proposals. They included: (a) a fixed time (three months) during which no new settlements would be constructed; (b) prohibitions against civilian settlements only; (c) right to build a limited number of new settlements; etc. All of these proposals were rejected by me.

Finally, we agreed on the exact language concerning the settlements, and that the paragraph would be removed from the West Bank-Gaza section and included in a letter from Begin to me. I told him it could not be a secret letter and the Prime Minister replied that the text would be made public.

The agreed text was:

“After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President’s Working Papers, 9/10–27/78. No classification marking. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the document, “OK. J.” A draft version of the note, in Carter’s handwriting, is *ibid*. The note was found attached to an undated note by Clough, stating that Carter signed the note September 20 and that copies were sent to Begin, the Department of State, the NSC, and Powell.

² According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter, along with Vance and “other U.S. officials” met with Begin, Dayan, and Barak at Aspen Lodge from 8 p.m., September 16, to 12:20 a.m., September 17. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, p. 240, and *Keeping Faith*, pp. 395–397. For Vance’s account, see *Hard Choices*, pp. 224–225. For Dayan’s account, see *Breakthrough*, pp. 181–186. Quandt wrote that Vance briefed the U.S. negotiating team (including himself) “immediately after” the meeting had broken up. Quandt described this briefing in *Camp David*, pp. 249–250, although he concluded “exactly what took place in the meeting between Carter and Begin on Saturday night will never be known.”

future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties.”

It was clear and obvious that the “negotiations” applied to the West Bank and Gaza.

Early the next day I informed President Sadat of the agreement.³

On Sunday afternoon⁴ Mr. Barak brought to me from Prime Minister Begin a proposed text which differed substantially from that on which we had agreed. I informed him that it was unsatisfactory, and read to him the text on which we had agreed, which was still lying on my desk. He did not disagree with the agreed text.

Jimmy Carter

³ In his personal diary, Carter wrote of this meeting: “Sunday morning I went to discuss the final draft of the Sinai agreement with Sadat. He does not want to meet in El Arish as long as it is under Israeli control. He was pleased with the submission of the settlement question to the Knesset prior to negotiations. He said that he would make these concessions, as he calls them, only if the Palestinians can participate in negotiations on the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, and he would like to delete the entire paragraph on Jerusalem!” (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 241) Also see Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 397–398. Following this meeting, Carter wrote, he redrafted all language in the Framework documents “to incorporate what I thought would be acceptable to the two delegations, and then walked down to Holly [Cabin], where Vance and our team were meeting with Dayan and the other Israelis. I called Dayan out, went over my suggested compromise language, and asked him to help me during these final hours and with the Knesset when the time came for a vote. Dayan said that he was absolutely certain the parliament would never vote for a withdrawal of settlers prior to negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.” (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 398) Following this, a further dispute emerged in which Begin objected to the U.S. draft letter to Sadat, outlining the U.S. position on Jerusalem. In a “tense moment,” Carter met with Dayan, Weizman, Barak, Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski, and offered to revise the letter, striking out quotations from U.S. representatives made at the UN on the subject of Jerusalem. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 398–399) Carter added in an annotation to his personal diary that a subsequent meeting between himself and Begin, in which the President signed photographs of the Summit with personal dedications to Begin’s grandchildren, represented a “turning point” in Begin’s attitude toward reaching a peace agreement “from obdurate objections to an obvious desire to be successful.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 242)

⁴ According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Barak, and Weizman at Aspen Lodge from 2:45 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. on September 17. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) For Carter’s accounts of this meeting, see *White House Diary*, p. 242, and *Keeping Faith*, p. 400.

51. Editorial Note

Following President Jimmy Carter’s meeting with the Legal Adviser to the Israeli Camp David delegation, Aharon Barak, from 2:45 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. on September 17, 1978, at which Carter described Is-

raeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's draft of the West Bank and Sinai settlements language as "completely unsatisfactory," Begin telephoned Carter at his cabin. Begin informed the President that "he could not accept my language on the Knesset vote, because he interpreted it as a threat to the independence of the parliament." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, page 400) Following their conversation, Vice President Walter Mondale informed Carter that Begin was then meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat at the latter's cabin. In his personal diary, Carter described subsequent events:

"I ran out the front door, and Begin was just leaving Sadat's cabin in a golf cart with Barak. Begin was quite happy, saying they had had a love-fest, and that Sadat had agreed to Begin's language on the Knesset vote. I knew this was wrong, and every time I asked Barak to tell me exactly what Begin and Sadat had said, Begin would interrupt him and not let him reply. Finally, I asked Prime Minister Begin to please let Barak answer. What Begin had asked Sadat was: 'Do you think the Knesset should be under pressure when they vote?' Sadat said, 'No, I don't think the Knesset should be under pressure.' This was the total conversation. Begin therefore assumed that he could write any language he wanted concerning negotiations versus the Knesset vote.

"I asked Barak to come with me. Begin excused him, and we went to my cabin. I checked their language very carefully and finally thought of a way to say it that was in the final letters and satisfactory to both Begin and Sadat. Susan [Clough] typed it up. I wrote a note to all our people: 'This is the exact language to be used. Do not use any other language on or off the record.' We firmed the issue up, literally at the very last minute. Only then did I realize that we had finally succeeded." (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 243)

The note referenced by Carter, and to which he appended the handwritten message quoted above, reads: "There is one major issue on which agreement has not been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel states that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations. Within two weeks the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President's Working Papers, 9/10–27/78)

Following this, the three leaders and their staffs departed Camp David by helicopter for Washington. At the White House, a nationally-televised signing ceremony was held in the East Room from 10:31 p.m. to 11:04 p.m. on September 17. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) The three leaders signed the final versions of the two "framework" documents, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the Conclu-

sion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." For the texts of these two documents, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pages 1523–1528. Accompanying the two framework documents were nine letters: a) a September 17 letter from Begin to Carter informing the President of his intention to submit the question of Israeli settlements in the Sinai to the Knesset; b) a September 17 letter from Carter to Sadat transmitting to the latter Begin's letter; c) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter affirming the Egyptian position on Israel's Sinai settlements; d) a September 22 letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging letter (a) and attaching letter (c); e) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter affirming the Egyptian position on the status of Jerusalem; f) a September 17 letter from Begin to Carter affirming the Israeli position on the status of Jerusalem; g) a September 22 letter from Carter to Sadat acknowledging letter (e) and informing Sadat that he intended to transmit it to Begin; h) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter informing him that Egypt "will be prepared to assume the Arab role" with regard to the Framework for Peace's provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza; and i) a September 22 letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging Begin's understanding of "Palestinians" or "Palestinian people" in the Framework text to mean "Palestinian Arabs" and Begin's understanding of "West Bank" to mean "Judea and Samaria." The texts of these letters were published on September 22 and are printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pages 1566–1568. Following the signing ceremony, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel resigned from the Egyptian cabinet in protest of the Camp David Agreements and was replaced by Minister of State Boutros Boutros-Ghali on an interim basis. An additional side letter, from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman, in which the United States pledged to consult with the Israelis on assistance the former could give in connection with the relocation of Israel's Sinai airbases in Eitam and Etzion to new locations in the Negev desert area of Israel, was agreed on September 28. The Department transmitted the text of this letter in telegram 247570 to Tel Aviv, September 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780396–1338)

On September 18, President Carter addressed a Joint Session of Congress on the outcome of the Camp David Summit and the agreements reached. The text of this speech is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pages 1533–1537.

On September 28, the Israeli Knesset concluded its debate on the Camp David Agreements, approving them by a vote of 84–19. The Israeli Commerce and Industry Minister Yigael Hurvitz resigned from the Israeli cabinet in protest. For Begin's statement to the Knesset following the debate, see *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, pages 549–554.

Negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Part I: September 18–December 16, 1978

52. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 18, 1978, 12:37–12:47 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

The following conversation took place between President Carter and King Hussein of Jordan on September 18, 1978, at 12:37–12:47 p.m.

President. I think we have had a very successful Camp David conference. We have come out with a tremendous improvement in the status of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular. Let me just summarize briefly some of the provisions in the settlement which I think you would like. Then I would like to make a request of you.

—First of all, the Israelis accept the proposition that, in the West Bank, Resolution 242 applies in all its parts, all its principles and all its provisions.

—Secondly, the Israeli military occupation will be concluded immediately as soon as a self-government can be set up in the West Bank/Gaza and the provision calls for full autonomy for the Palestinians who live in the West Bank area. It also provides for a strong police force for the local inhabitants who can also be joined by Jordanian citizens of course, and with strong liaison directly with you or Egypt or Israel to control terrorism and to promote internal security.

—The Palestinians would have complete and full and equal involvement in negotiating the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and, if you have no objections, when the treaty is negotiated between you and Israel, the Palestinian Arabs will have full rights to participate in those negotiations. The Israelis have agreed. Of course, if you have objection, they cannot attend. But that will be up to you.

—After the negotiations take place between you and Israel and Egypt and the Palestinians, there will be a separate vote by the Palestinians themselves to either accept or reject the agreement that has been worked out. There would be an immediate withdrawal of Israeli security forces. I would say a substantial reduction. And the Israeli security forces could only remain in specified points that you, the Egyptians

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 56, Jordan: 8–10/78. Secret.

and the Palestinians would have to approve. There would be a Jordanian participation in joint patrols and monitoring of the borders if you agree. The Israelis have already agreed.

—The Israelis recognize that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians have to be honored and that there will be no new settlements in the West Bank or Gaza Strip during the time of the negotiations and any additional settlements would be as determined by the negotiations themselves.

—The Israelis have agreed also that there will be a final settlement of the status of the West Bank/Gaza Strip and also a treaty with you within the five-year period.

These are some of the provisions which are in the Camp David agreement that directly involve you and/or the Palestinians. Our hope is, Your Majesty, that you would agree to have a thorough briefing from us, and following that briefing, that you would agree to join the present negotiations. This is a first step, but it provides a framework through which all the hopes and dreams of the Palestinian people who live in the West Bank and Gaza can be realized. But it is very crucial that you be willing to participate.

If you have specific questions after you have a thorough briefing on the documents, or have objections, I would like to have an opportunity to work with the Israelis to remove those objections before you reject the possibility of your participation. I hope that you will not make a decision on this until we can have a thorough briefing for you.

I have already invited Crown Prince Fahd to come to Washington² as soon as it is convenient to talk to him about the provisions of the Camp David settlement. But I urge you in the strongest possible terms to participate fully in it along with ourselves, if you desire, and the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Egyptians.

King Hussein. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President. I appreciate very much indeed your kind call. Mr. President, the last few hours have caused us very many surprises and call for very deep thought. And with your kind permission, sir, it is something I will think about very carefully and I will be looking forward to receiving the briefing. On the other hand, we will see what we can do not only within Jordan but also within the area itself. Against the background of these many many years of tragedy and see what we can come up with. With your permission, Mr. President, I will be in touch with you.

President. Can I assume, Your Majesty, that you will try to participate in the negotiations, but that you will not make a decision until after you get a thorough briefing from us? Is that correct?

² See Document 59.

King Hussein. I would appreciate a thorough briefing, Mr. President, but on the subject of participation . . . If you don't mind, sir, I would like to be able to, with the Government, over a whole day to go over details of exactly where we stand. Then hopefully we should be able to be guided by God to take whatever decisions will serve the area in the best possible way.

President. So you will not make any statement against participation until after you get a briefing from us, is that correct?

King Hussein. We won't be making any statement whatsoever until after I have had a chance to really absorb all that has happened.

President. Can I tell Secretary Vance to send someone to meet with you and go over the questions that you might have?

King Hussein. I would appreciate that very much indeed, Mr. President.

President. We will do that. I know that you are coming to see me before too long, but I would like to give you this briefing very quickly.

King Hussein. Thank you very very much. As you know, I have not yet received it officially. I only arrived back in Jordan a few minutes ago. I hope that it will be possible very soon to respond to your kind invitation.

President. I'm going to see Secretary Vance in just a minute and I'll tell him to be in touch with you through diplomatic channels to give you a thorough briefing.

King Hussein. I hope Mrs. Carter is well. Give her our regards and respect.

President. I'll do that. Thank you very much, sir.

King Hussein. All the best.

President. Good bye.

53. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 19, 1978, 2:30–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
President Sadat

Substance of Discussion

1. The two presidents reviewed the purposes of the Vance mission to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. President Carter summarized the substance of the letters that the Secretary will take with him.² He also stressed the importance of discussing with the Saudis such issues as Lebanon and Yemen. President Sadat both endorsed the mission and agreed with the substantive points.

2. The President stressed the importance of restraint in public discussion of the Camp David accords. In this connection he strongly praised the very positive as well as restrained posture taken by President Sadat, especially in President Sadat's comments on some observations made in the last two days by Prime Minister Begin.

3. The two presidents discussed the forthcoming Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. In this connection, President Sadat stated that he very much hoped that the U.S. will take part in these talks through the presence of a representative of the President as well as the pertinent U.S. Ambassadors. The President indicated that he expected that Roy Atherton would be present, in addition to Ambassadors Eilts and Lewis.

Moreover, the two presidents agreed that talks should be held either in Ismailia, or in Ismailia/Beersheba, or in El Arish if the arrangements for an acceptable Egyptian enclave can be worked out. President Sadat mentioned that Minister Weizman showed him a map for such an enclave and the size of the enclave seemed acceptable.

President Carter stated that he would like Ambassador Lewis to work with Minister Weizman and Ambassador Eilts to work with Minister Gamasy regarding the details of the first phase of the withdrawals as well as regarding all other matters connected with the subsequent withdrawal and other arrangements. The two ambassadors are to use

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Brzezinski summarized the conclusions of this conversation in a September 21 memorandum to Vance. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David: 9/18–21/78)

² For the text of Carter's letters to Hussein and Assad, see Documents 55 and 56. The text of Carter's letter carried by Vance to the Saudis has not been found.

the same map in their respective discussions with Gamasy and Weizman in order to avoid any misunderstanding. The arrangements worked out by them are to be brought to President Carter's personal attention.

The President wishes to obtain a full summary³ of the tentative decisions reached in the Gamasy-Weizman talks. Such a report will be requested from the Israelis, and President Sadat promised also to provide an Egyptian summary of such agreed decisions.⁴

³ A summary document of the Gamasy-Weizman talks at Camp David, which primarily addressed the military dimensions of an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, has not been found. For Carter's commentary on the progress of these talks, see *Keeping Faith*, p. 381.

⁴ Brzezinski initialed at the end of this paragraph.

54. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 19 September 1978

1. I congratulated him on the success of the Summit. I asked what we could do to help from here. He indicated that we are trying to find ways to help Sadat survive. These are not to be symbolic actions but actions that would really be of support.

a. David Aaron has suggested that because there are reports of dissatisfaction within the military about their lot in life that we might help here. Specifically, we might build barracks or otherwise help to improve the material conditions of the soldiers. This goes to a report we promulgated that General Gamasy had found lower ranking officers willing to criticize his standard of living. I said I had my doubts as to whether we could really get at this because barracks wouldn't do for many of the people; they need better housing for their families, but that I would have a look at just what the dissatisfaction of the Egyptian mili-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 41: DCI/DDCI MEMRECs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, August–December 1978. Secret. According to the date stamped on the first page, this memorandum was drafted on September 20.

tary is. What are the specific bases of complaint? This might give Aaron and those working on the policy side some clue as to where they could make a suggested offer of help.

b. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

c. The two actions above should be done on an urgent basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

Stansfield Turner²

² Ratliff signed for Turner above this typed signature.

55. Letter From President Carter to King Hussein of Jordan¹

Washington, September 19, 1978

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

Your majesty:

Secretary Vance will explain to you the meaning and significance of the Camp David agreement and its far reaching benefits to those in the Middle East who look to you for leadership.

I consider future action on this agreement to be crucial for peace in your troubled area, vital for the maintenance of stability among the peoples and nations, and of profound importance to the relations of the United States with the governments involved.

Egypt and Israel have proven that they want peace. A failure of our effort because of lack of support from other responsible and moderate leaders of the Arab nations would certainly lead to the strengthening of irresponsible and radical elements and a further opportunity for intrusion of Soviet and other Communist influences throughout the Middle East.

I need your strong personal support.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 56, Jordan: 8–10/78. No classification marking. The letter is handwritten.

We look forward with great pleasure to your visit with us here, and especially to meeting your lovely bride.

You have my warm regards and best wishes.

Jimmy Carter

56. Letter From President Carter to Syrian President Assad¹

Washington, September 19, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I want to add a personal note to my message to you of September 17, 1978,² in which I informed you of the results of the talks at Camp David. Your country's concerns have been very much on my mind in the past two weeks. I would appreciate very much hearing from you directly in order to avoid any possible misunderstandings.

Let me emphasize a point that I made last night in my speech before a joint session of Congress³—the peace we seek in the Middle East is a comprehensive one. The general Framework document signed by Egypt and Israel specifically deals with principles applicable to all fronts of the conflict. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts remains the agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I also stated in my speech that there must be a just solution of the refugee problem which takes into account appropriate United Nations resolutions.

I know of your deep commitment not only to Syria and the Arab Nation, but also of your concern for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, which Israel has now, for the first time, recognized.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 88, Syria: 4/78–5/79. No classification marking. On the first page of the letter, Brzezinski wrote: "Quandt: FYI." An unknown hand also wrote: "Handed to Vance by ZB." Seelye delivered Carter's letter to Khaddam on September 19 in the latter's office at the Syrian Foreign Ministry. After discussing its contents with Seelye, Khaddam said he would pass the letter to Assad. (Telegram 5475 from Damascus, September 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780381–0549)

² On September 17, Carter sent a letter to numerous world leaders, including Assad, informing them of the outcome of the Camp David Summit. The Department transmitted this letter in telegram 236043 to multiple posts, September 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780379–0641) Telegram 236045 to Damascus, September 18, amended the text of the letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780379–0554)

³ See Document 51.

While the Camp David agreements do not answer all of the questions related to the Palestinians, they do provide a basis for solving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. Under the terms of the agreement signed by Israel, a solution would be possible in two stages. First, the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza would be ended, a substantial number of Israeli forces would be withdrawn, and those that remain would be redeployed into a few specified locations to provide Israel with security from external attack. Internal security would be handled by a strong Palestinian police force. With the end of the military occupation, a freely elected self-governing authority would be established. After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations to set up the governing authority, no new Israeli settlements will be established. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties.

The second stage would involve negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and on peace between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinians participating in those negotiations. Those negotiations should be based on the principles of Resolution 242, including withdrawal of Israeli armed forces. The results of these negotiations should allow the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they wish to govern themselves.

I know that there are many issues that we were not able to resolve at Camp David. But I do want to assure you of my deep personal commitment to remain involved in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I am hopeful that you will share your views with me and with Secretary Vance when he visits you in Damascus on September 23.

You have my very best wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

57. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States Observer Mission in the Sinai¹

Washington, September 20, 1978, 2203Z

239358. Subject: Intsum 653—September 19, 1978. London for Glaspie. Paris for Nicholas Murphy. Other addressees for Chiefs of Mission.

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1. Camp David Summit. The Jordanian Government issued an official statement on Camp David yesterday following a three-hour Cabinet session. The statement said Jordan:

(A) would not be bound by agreements it had not helped to negotiate;

(B) believes that the Arab-Israeli crisis requires a comprehensive solution; and

(C) criticized the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. "The dissociation of any of the Arab parties from the responsibilities of the collective action to reach a just and comprehensive solution . . . constitutes a weakening of the Arab stand and the chances of reaching a just and comprehensive solution."

2. Despite this negative statement, King Hussein's attitude toward the post-Camp David era is not yet clear. The King, however, seems aware that the outcome of the summit will oblige him to make a difficult decision on his entry into the peace process.

3. The Jordanian press has been universally critical, and the majority of Jordanians seem to oppose entry into direct peace negotiations. The East Bank Jordanians who dominate the government are very reluctant once again to be held responsible for the West Bank and the Palestinian problem. They also fear that if Jordan becomes saddled with negotiating for the Palestinians, the future of the Hashemite Kingdom would be jeopardized.

4. The large Palestinian community in Jordan is also unlikely to support a Jordanian role in the negotiations. They recognize the PLO as

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780385–0095. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Albert A. Vaccaro (INR/RNA/NE); approved by W.D. Wolle (INR/RNA); cleared by C. William Kontos (SSM). Sent for information Priority to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Baghdad, Brasilia, Cairo, Doha, Jerusalem, Kuwait, London, Madrid, Manama, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Muscat, Nicosia, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Sana, USUN, and the Department of the Treasury.

the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Hussein seems also to be under pressure from the other Arabs not to break ranks and join Sadat. Syrian President Assad called him late yesterday, and Hussein spoke with Saudi Prince Fahd as well.

5. Following a special meeting chaired by King Khalid, the Saudi Cabinet also issued an official statement on Camp David. We believe it is likely that the Saudi and Jordanian statements on Camp David may have been partially coordinated. The Saudi statement called the documents an “unacceptable formula for a definitive peace” because “it did not make absolutely clear Israel’s intention to withdraw from all Arab territories it occupied, including Jerusalem.” The statement also noted that the Agreements failed to record the Palestinian right to self-determination and ignored the role of the PLO as recognized by Arab summits.

6. The Saudi statement goes on to say that, in spite of its reservations, the Saudi Government “does not consider that it has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country or to oppose such a country’s right to regain its lost territories by way of armed struggle or peaceful means as long as these do not contradict the higher Arab interests.” The statement praised President Carter for his efforts but said Saudi Arabia’s decision was based on its deep commitment to its Islamic and Arab principles and to the decisions of Arab conferences. It called for a collective Arab stance which would lead to victory. We believe, however, that the Saudis are indicating that they do not object to Egypt’s negotiating the recovery of the Sinai but they oppose any agreement with Israel which fails to meet the fundamental demands of the other Arabs. (Confidential)

7. Israel. Embassy Tel Aviv reports² that several dozen Gush Em-unim members established an unauthorized settlement a short distance south of Nablus on September 18. Gush leaders claim this is the site of the biblical Elon Moreh and the action was termed the “proper answer by the land of Israel faithful to the Camp David Agreement.” The settlers have been joined by Knesset member Geula Cohen. Deputy Defense Minister Tzipori told the Embassy that he wanted to prevent the settlers from getting to the site but was overruled by a high authority, probably, the Embassy reports, Acting Prime Minister Yadin. The site was surrounded yesterday by the IDF. Yadin told the Embassy that the settlers would be removed forcibly if they did not leave voluntarily but he postponed resolution of the problem until conferring with Weizman

² Telegram 12710 from Tel Aviv, September 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780381–0538)

and Dayan. The Cabinet reportedly decided last night that the settlement will be removed.³

8. There is certain to be greatly heightened interest and focus—as well as controversy—over the settlements issue as a result of the Camp David Accord calling for a freeze on settlement development for at least 90 days. Israel has steadily expanded its settlements in the occupied territories since the 1967 war. There are five types of civilian settlements, in addition to para-military Nahals. The most successful civilian settlements are associated with large kibbutz federations. The kibbutz is a communal settlement, in which the land is leased from the State, and worked collectively. A moshav is a smallholders' community, in which each settler works a separate piece of land leased from the State. A dormitory settlement is a type of bedroom community, where most residents work elsewhere. A regional center is a larger community, surrounded by four to six small agricultural communities, for which is provided administration, support, and services. And finally, an urban center is a community planned and built by the government.

9. The 48 settlements on the West Bank, pose the greatest problem, as far as pressure for new settlements is concerned. Comparative photography of one such community on the West Bank, Shiloh, illustrates the rate at which one of the settlements can be expanded. A comparison of photos taken on November 13, 1977 and February 14, 1978 shows that the number of housing units at Shiloh had increased substantially. Tel Aviv has also continued to increase housing units at other existing settlements in the last several months, suggesting that Israel wanted to achieve as large a buildup as possible in the territory before negotiations with Egypt caused a halt to further development. Between late March and mid-July, 500 housing units were added at 17 settlements. These new units could accommodate up to 2,000 more settlers. They appear to be part of a broad-based plan, rather than efforts of one religious group or political party. (Secret/Noform)

10. Steadfastness front. According to Embassy Damascus⁴ all "steadfastness" states except Iraq are expected to be represented by their leaders at today's meeting in Syria.⁵ A Foreign Ministry official

³ The Israeli Cabinet issued an ultimatum on September 20 to the Gush Emunim settlers, warning that if they refused to leave by September 21, Israeli troops would break up their unauthorized encampment. (William Claiborne, "Israelis Order Settlers to Leave West Bank Hilltop," *The Washington Post*, September 21, 1978, p. A10)

⁴ Telegram 5502 from Damascus, September 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780381–0794)

⁵ The third summit of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, or "Steadfastness Front," convened in Damascus on September 20. The group, consisting of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and the PLO, formed at the end of 1977 in opposition to Sadat's dialogue with the Israelis. In addition to producing a formal charter for the Front, the summit participants drafted a proclama-

commented that his colleagues were studying the Camp David documents “phrase by phrase.” He said the Front members would compare their analyses and draw conclusions.

11. The Syrian Government has not yet reacted officially to the conference although the media have again begun calling Sadat a “traitor” and a “capitulationist.” A senior Baath Party official published a sharply negative commentary on the Camp David results. Not surprisingly, the reactions of many politically aware Syrians are more moderate than their leadership. They recognize that Egypt got a good deal in the Sinai but are concerned with the absence of any mention of the Golan. Despite Syria’s opposition to Sadat, these Syrians believe that Sadat had publicly committed himself to work on behalf of all Arabs.

12. A definitive Syrian reaction is not expected until after the Front meetings conclude but it will, undoubtedly, be very negative. Assad is known to believe that once Egypt is excluded from the Arab-Israeli equation, Israel will have little incentive to compromise further. (Confidential)

13. Lebanon. Reports are circulating in Beirut that Sarkis intends to call for the renewal of the ADF mandate which expires in October but hopes to blunt Lebanese rightist criticism by circumscribing the Syrian role. The Phalangist radio and other sources report that Sarkis is expected to try to reduce the number of Syrian troops operating in Lebanon and confine the Syrians to assembly areas from which they would be used as a ready reaction force in support of Lebanese forces. Even if Sarkis succeeds in restricting the Syrian role, this would not satisfy hardline rightists. Dany Shamun warned after leaving a meeting with Sarkis that it would be “a gross mistake” for Sarkis to renew the ADF mandate. (Confidential)

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tion calling for the Front’s member states to break political and economic relations with Egypt and for the transfer of Arab League headquarters from Cairo. A full summary of the summit’s resolutions is in telegram 5738 from Damascus, September 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780395–0045)

58. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Amman, September 20, 1978, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS*U.S. Side*

Secretary Vance
Ambassador to Jordan
Nicholas Veliotis
Ambassador Alfred Atherton
Ambassador Michael Sterner
Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs Hodding Carter
DCM Roscoe Suddarth (notetaker)

Jordanian Side

King Hussein
Crown Prince Hassan
Prime Minister Adnan Badran
Chief of Royal Court Abdu Sharaf
Minister of Court
Amer Khamaash
Minister of Education
Abdul Salem Majali
Minister of Information
Adnan Abu Odeh
Commander-in-Chief Lt. General
Zayd Bin Shaker

I

King Hussein: I would like to seize the opportunity to welcome you to Jordan. It is a personal pleasure to meet you at any time as a friend. I very much appreciate the fact that President Carter was kind enough to ask you to come to Jordan to speak about the current important issues. Needless to say, I have always held the highest regard for President Carter's sincerity and determination for a just and durable peace. He has spent many hours on this fundamental problem.

Recent developments have taken us by surprise, not only in terms of the results at Camp David but also because of the unexpected positions of Egypt. We have looked at President Carter's letter² describing Camp David and held a meeting with the Cabinet. At every level in Jordan and in the area people are preoccupied with these developments and also in terms of the meaning of the Camp David documents.

We are not able at this stage to adopt any final position before getting the details on what happened at Camp David and the meaning of the words of the documents. We hope you can cover some of the gaps. I

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Action/Future Stops. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Hashamiya Palace. The Jordanian Prime Minister was Muhdar Badran, not Adnan Badran as indicated in the list of participants. On September 21, Vance cabled a summary of this conversation to the Department of State for distribution to Carter and Brzezinski. (Telegram Secto 10015 from Amman, September 21; Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 60, Foreign Countries—Middle East [9/16–30/1978]) Vance arrived in Amman on September 20; he departed to Saudi Arabia on September 21.

² See Document 55.

interrupted my travels abroad and came back immediately after Camp David; I have been in constant consultation with my Government and in touch with Syria and Saudi Arabia. The implications of Camp David are very serious and will have an affect on the future in a very basic manner. We are reserving judgment until it is clearer where Camp David stands and where it is headed.

Thank you for the Presidential letter after Camp David. As a result we now have at least a glimpse of what happened at Camp David.

Thank you also for the President's letter³ conveying an invitation for me to visit the United States. I accept with great delight. We will be in touch to ask President Carter if he can spare time at another appropriate date for my visit.

Camp David has placed us in an untenable position. Nothing is more important to us than maintaining the closest relations with the United States. Furthermore, if we have an idea of the end result that we would be striving for in a peace settlement we would believe in doing our utmost to attain a just and durable peace. In reviewing the past, you should remember that we were the first "Palestinian refugees" and the Hashemite Family was involved since the beginning of the century in the struggle for Palestinian rights. Many of our citizens are from Palestine and a sizeable number of our citizens have been affected by this tragedy: some in 1967 moved to this part of the country, some of whom were uprooted from their homes in Palestine two or three times. My grandfather⁴ stood for Arab rights in Jerusalem and gave his own life in that cause. My own experience has been to make a durable peace and this has been a precious objective for me. This problem has affected us all personally and left many scars. Our objective is to live through this problem until a solution is found.

We have many questions. One element of surprise was in the change of events and attitudes since the initial adoption of Resolution 242 in 1967. The United States told us that Israel's acceptance of 242 would be implemented in a short time not exceeding a few months. This meant Israel would withdraw from all territory occupied in the 1967 War with only minor border rectifications. Our position on this was that minor but reciprocal rectifications would be acceptable. We also asserted that Arab Jerusalem was to be considered a part of the West Bank in the withdrawal issue. On Jerusalem, we understand the United States accepted neither the Israeli nor the Jordanian position but

³ See Document 55.

⁴ Abdullah I bin al-Hussein, Emir of Transjordan from 1921 until 1946 and King of Jordan from 1946 until 1951. King Abdullah was assassinated on July 20, 1951, while visiting the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

was more for internationalization. For us this meant internationalization of both the Israeli and the Arab sides of Jerusalem.

Jordan has been consistently in favor of Palestinian self-determination. Before Camp David we sent President Carter and President Sadat a letter outlining our position.⁵ We had assurances from Cairo that this was also the Egyptian position and we thought a total solution and a comprehensive settlement was also their goal. Throughout the many months of the past we talked about nothing other than a comprehensive solution, and we argued with others in the area when they said Egypt would go its own way (for a separate peace). Previous to that, we were all working for a unified Arab delegation to Geneva. With the Sadat initiative⁶ everything changed, but Egypt said they were pursuing a comprehensive settlement even just before they left for Camp David.

We very much appreciate U.S. efforts in pursuing a solution to the Middle East problem. And we have carefully read the two documents coming from the Camp David meeting. These documents suggest that they provide a framework for a settlement. We hope this is the case and have many questions.

One: Do these documents in fact provide a framework for a comprehensive and final settlement?

Two: There is a question of the five-year transition period. In our mind, are Israeli attitudes that prevail in the last eleven years going to continue to prevail during this five-year period?

Three: There is the question of the Israeli military presence and the withdrawal to specified locations for security purposes. What specified locations? What security purposes?

Four: What are the details of the transition arrangements including the Jordanian role for the maintenance of security. Whose security and in what way? Against what threats? We have already positioned troops along our border with Israel for many years to prevent hostile infiltrations from attacking Israel. How would this new situation differ?

Five: During the five-year transition period Palestinians are supposed to participate. In what and from where? What freedoms will they enjoy? What rights will they enjoy and to what degree?

Six: Is the West Bank/Gaza formulation supposed to be a total solution to the Palestinian problem? Who are the Palestinians who have the right to join in the negotiations?

Seven: There is discussion of a Jordanian/Israeli peace treaty. On what basis?

⁵ See Document 17.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 4.

Eight: There is mention of Resolution 242. Would it apply equally to Jordan, Egypt and Syria, as well as to the West Bank and Gaza? Which territories would be ceded to whom? This question is particularly important since the Israeli position on territorial withdrawal even in statements by its leaders after Camp David is contradictory to Resolution 242.

Nine: How can Palestinians determine their own future or organize the way to self-government under even a partial Israeli occupation?

Ten: Would Palestinian representatives be drawn only from the occupied territory or would electors have a wider choice?

Eleven: Regarding Israeli settlements: Would all actions on enlarging present settlements or building new settlements be stopped from the moment of the Camp David agreement or only stopped during the initial negotiations for a self-governing authority?

Twelve: The Jerusalem question is of very great significance for us and for others. The U.S. position is that the status quo is not acceptable as a final solution. However, what is the precise U.S. attitude towards Jerusalem?

Thirteen: All persons are now depending on Jordan regarding the implementation of Camp David. We are flattered and touched but on the other hand what are we able to do the way things presently stand? Is, in fact, Jordanian participation as crucial or essential as outlined?

Fourteen: What can the United States do in terms of support and in obtaining support of others for Jordan? We mention this only in a general context since we know there will be risks. We wish to see a sound final solution that will be acceptable to future generations. Anything short of that would cause further turbulence and reflect on those involved as well as the United States.

In responding to the points of the President's letter we have the following observations:

One: We frankly have reservations on the results of Camp David. Despite assurances about your interest in a comprehensive peace, in fact Camp David spells out a separate Egyptian/Israeli agreement which is unconnected or binding with the other aspects of the Arab/Israeli problem. This will lead to the isolation of Egypt and the paralyzing of the peace process. We feel this very strongly, particularly since a separate peace has been a primary Israeli objective throughout.

Two: On the invitation for us to participate in administering the West Bank and Gaza, we are asked to assume legal, military and political obligations before knowing what the end result of the transition period will be. If we knew the end result we would be prepared to consider such an involvement. However, since the nature of the transi-

tional period as described is so vague, it could result in an unacceptable end result in five years.

Three: Apart from some insubstantial changes in the Israeli position, the Camp David framework does not assure Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders, self-determination for the Palestinians, a resolution of the refugee problem or the future role of Jordan. It is, therefore, not possible to conclude from Camp David that these questions will be answered affirmatively at the end of five years of negotiations. This is precisely the situation that we have faced for the past eleven years with respect to resolution 242.

Four: The two documents are also extremely different. The Israeli/Egyptian document is extremely explicit as to terms and end result in contrast to the vague nature of the other document, particularly as concerns the end result.

Five: Jordan is asked to participate in West Bank security arrangements aimed against Palestinian subversion, yet without knowing if there will in fact really be an end of the Israel occupation (that the subversion is presumably aimed at terminating).

Six: President Carter seems to be departing from positions earlier in his Administration on the Palestinian question.

Seven: If Jordan is expected to participate, the basis for it must be clearer and more balanced. We are not tempted to participate in the implementation of the Begin Plan.⁷ If the Begin Plan will be implemented anyway, with U.S. assent, why then involve Jordan? It would appear this Plan could be unilaterally implemented.

Pardon us for our frankness. I feel bad personally after your long ordeal at Camp David to discuss things in this manner. However, it is my duty to ensure that there are no misunderstandings in our position regarding problems of such magnitude.

We studied the results of Camp David but because of their gravity we had no choice but to make our statement⁸ of yesterday in which we said that Camp David does not constitute a binding legal document for us until a lot is cleared up and that we were not involved in bringing this document about. To tell the truth, we feel less let down by the United States than by our sister Arab state (Egypt), since there is no linkage between the two documents of Camp David. But this is something between us and Egypt and not for us to discuss at this point. We have received many requests from you to keep quiet on Camp David. However, we have a public opinion including many persons who have suffered the most regarding the Palestinian problem. We have been

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 5.

⁸ See Document 57.

startled by the many local statements against the documents, vague as they are. Israel has a U.S. commitment to support its survival and other countries in the area have similar great power backing. We here however have nothing but ourselves and our links to the past and the future and a desire for peace and a more stable and progressive area. I hope there is no question that we will play a role toward achieving a peace we feel we can live with. For this we are ready to risk everything, but short of that, this risk is not justified and is not honest in terms of U.S. interests in this turbulent area. To you, once again thanks for being with us today.

II

Secretary Vance's Reply:

I want to express my deep gratitude for the gracious and warm welcome I have received on behalf of President Carter and my country to discuss the incredibly important questions involved here. I want to answer all the questions you have put to me, but first I want to mention some general considerations behind the reasons why the President considered it so important to send me here.

We have not pressed for Jordanian participation until we felt we had achieved a workable framework for further progress. We are pleased that we now have a framework which, in the language of Your Majesty's August 28 letter,⁹ has a "credible chance of progress and of a productive conclusion . . ."

Assuming a favorable vote by the Knesset on the Sinai settlements question, a concrete, substantive, and procedural framework has been established which will make it possible for serious Egyptian-Israeli negotiations to begin in the very near future. President Carter also attached great importance to an early beginning of the negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza. He believes very strongly it is of great importance that Jordan be in on the process at an early stage because if it goes ahead without Jordan's being a participant from the beginning, we are fearful that Jordan's ability to influence the process will become much more difficult as time passes.

We recognize that the Camp David agreements do not contain everything Your Majesty or we would have wished. We also recognize that this makes the decision Your Majesty faces all the more difficult. It is important, however, to look not only at what is not in the agreements, but also at the very substantial new elements which they contain from the Arab point of view. I might just summarize some of those points:

⁹ See Document 17.

—Israeli military occupation ends. In both the West Bank and Gaza, Prime Minister Begin has committed Israel in principle to withdraw in accordance with Resolution 242.

—For the first time ever, a self-governing Palestinian authority will be created during the transitional period. This will take place in the West Bank/Gaza as the Israeli military government is withdrawn. We believe that if responsibly conducted, this should set in motion an evolutionary process which will enable the Palestinians to govern themselves.

—Once started, we believe that this process will become irreversible so that at the end of the five year transitional period an outcome which meets basic Arab requirements will be almost inevitable. A major advantage of this approach is that it deals with the West Bank and Gaza in their totality, rather than talking about some form of partitioning of the West Bank—e.g. along the lines of the Allon Plan,¹⁰ or other forms of partition.

—Next, the Israelis have recognized the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians. The implications of the acceptance of this principle are very important. They should enable a political, economic, and social relationship to develop between the Palestinians and their neighbors which will, we hope, promote political stability and economic development in the area.

—The document states that the Palestinians are recognized as a party to negotiations with Egypt, Israel, and, we hope, Jordan. They will have a real voice in determining their own future.

—The settlements on the West Bank will be brought under agreed limitations. I might comment on what other documents say on issues not covered in the Camp David framework. In an exchange of letters we said that after the signing of the framework and during the negotiations there would be no new settlements in the area. The issue of future settlements would be decided by negotiations. There would be a freeze on new Israeli settlements. During these negotiations the future of the settlements would be agreed to among the four negotiating parties.

—There is an Israeli commitment to work out procedures promptly on persons displaced in 1967, which have been such a great burden on themselves and on Jordan’s resources.

¹⁰ The Allon Plan, initially presented in July 1967 by then Israeli Minister of Labor Yigal Allon, would have returned approximately two-thirds of the West Bank to a “Jordanian-Palestinian state” while Israel retained control of the Jordan Rift Valley and mountain ridges to the west from Nablus to Hebron with Israeli military outposts along the Jordan River and the remainder of the West Bank demilitarized. The Palestinians were to have self-administration in an autonomous or semi-autonomous region, and Israel would remain in full control of a united Jerusalem with a possible Jordanian status in the Muslim quarter of the old city.

—Finally, the framework does apply to all of the confrontation states and we believe provided the desired framework of the comprehensive settlement.

—In addition to the gains I have just mentioned from the Arab point of view, the Camp David agreements also offer important strategic advantages. They provide in our judgment a basis around which moderate forces in the area, with the support of the United States and our friends, can rally. They can help strengthen the moderates in the area and insulate them from radical pressures.

—Precisely for those reasons, it is inevitable that the Camp David agreements will be attacked by a number of countries and radical elements, and that they will create a certain amount of dissention (in the area) in the short run. Over the longer run, however, they hold out a better prospect for stability and moderation than any alternative we can envisage.

—We are very mindful of the pressures which will be brought to bear on Jordan, should it join the negotiating process. We have always believed, however, that Jordan has a leadership role to play in the search for peace. Your Majesty has played that role at key moments in the past; we believe we are again at one of those historic moments.

—We recognize these agreements do not bind Jordan but if there is a just solution, that Jordan must play a major role to bring that about.

—We can understand that Your Majesty will want to consult with your friends in the area, in particular the Saudis, as well as your internal advisors, before making a final decision. Before you make that decision, President Carter wants you to know that he remains fully committed to the role of a full partner. He does not intend to see the substantial achievements of Camp David, which have been recognized as such by most of the world, fail to lead ultimately to a comprehensive and just peace in this area. We will be involved in very practical ways in the on-going negotiations. The results of Camp David demonstrate what we have long maintained—that real movement can only emerge from the dynamics of on-going negotiations. We believe those dynamics can continue to produce movement in the direction that Your Majesty considers essential and important.

—Our own view of the ultimate outcome of the process remains unchanged. We continue to prefer and will support an outcome which links the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. We have made this clear to the Israelis, and President Sadat has also indicated that he supports such an outcome should that be the desire of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

—If Jordan decides to join the negotiations on the basis of the Camp David framework, we are convinced that there will be broad support in our Congress to provide the help that you may need under

those circumstances. We will review sympathetically what might be done to provide additional military and economic assistance to Jordan.

—It goes without saying that we would also give Jordan full political diplomatic support through our contacts with other area governments and through our public statements. In this connection I should note that among the side letters to be published in connection with the Camp David agreements is a letter from us reaffirming our historic position on Jerusalem. We tried to resolve Jerusalem in the document. It was impossible. Therefore we agreed with Egypt and ultimately with Israel to state our positions in documents to be made public. Our position on Jerusalem remains that outlined by Ambassadors Goldberg,¹¹ Yost¹² and Scranton¹³ in U.N. debates with which you are familiar. The most fulsome expression was that of Yost.

¹¹ In an address before the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg declared: "with regard to the specific measures taken by the Government of Israel on June 28 [1967], I wish to make it clear that the United States does not accept or recognize these measures as altering the status of Jerusalem. My Government does not recognize that the administrative measures taken by the Government of Israel on June 28 can be regarded as the last word on the matter, and we regret that they were taken. We insist that the measures taken cannot be considered other than interim and provisional, and not prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem." He continued: "We believe that the most fruitful approach to a discussion of the future of Jerusalem lies in dealing with the entire problem as one aspect of the broader arrangements that must be made to restore a just and durable peace in the area." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July–December 1967, pp. 148–151)

¹² Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969, Ambassador Charles Yost declared: "the United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June [1967] war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power." He continued: "Among the provisions of international law which bind Israel, as they would bind any occupier, are the provisions that the occupier has no right to make changes in laws or in administration other than those which are temporarily necessitated by his security interest and that an occupier may not confiscate or destroy private property. The pattern of behavior authorized under the Geneva convention and international law is clear: The occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem present a different picture, one which gives rise to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem may be prejudiced, and that the rights and activities of the population are already being affected and altered." He continued: "My Government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity, and it has so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967. We have consistently refused to recognize these measures as having anything but a provisional character and do not accept them as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 9, 1969, pp. 76–77)

¹³ On March 25, 1976, Ambassador William Scranton stated to the United Nations Security Council that "as far as the United States is concerned, such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land or other administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. The U.S. position could not be clearer." (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 19, 1976, pp. 529–530)

—I would welcome any suggestions Your Majesty may have with respect to my forthcoming talks with the Saudi leadership. I would also appreciate your thoughts about my forthcoming meeting with President Assad. We recognize that Jordan cannot totally ignore Syrian views and, while we do not expect to convince Syria at this stage to support the Camp David agreements, we will do all we can to maintain our dialogue with Syria and to persuade it to keep an open mind.

—Finally, I would be happy to explain any of the specific parts of the Camp David framework which Your Majesty may wish—in particular the paragraphs dealing with the West Bank/Gaza problem and the Palestinian role. In this connection, I would welcome Your Majesty's judgment about ways in which moderate Palestinians, in particular Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, might be brought to see the opportunities which the Camp David agreements offer to them.

III

Secretary Vance continued: Let me now go through the specific questions you asked. (NOTE: The sequence below, in which the Secretary repeated the King's questions and responded, does not correspond exactly with the sequence in which the King posed them.)

One. Jordan's role in maintaining security and whose security?

Security is not for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The document provides for the establishment of a strong local police force. There is an unwritten understanding that the local police will be responsible for internal security. They could discharge this function without assistance from others with the exception of certain situations when they might need some additional assistance. Therefore, there will need to be drawn up procedures covering the roles of the police and other security forces in the document setting up the self-governing authority.

Two. The question of Israeli withdrawal of armed forces to specified locations.

According to Israel, they have approximately 10,000 troops on the West Bank, comprising three brigades plus other forces. In a tentative and unfinalized figure, they would withdraw roughly 4,000 of their troops to Israel and the remaining forces would be deployed to locations away from population centers so as not to interfere with the daily activities of the inhabitants. We were shown maps on their locations. There would also be retained two or three installations including "black boxes" of technological instruments to give early warning. There would be a total of 12 to 15 military installations containing some with only 15 or 20 people. All would be laid out very promptly with their precise locations designated. It should be emphasized that this is

for the transition period only. At the end of this period, there would be further withdrawals to be worked out by the parties.

Three: What would be the Palestinian participation in the negotiations and what rights would they have?

There are the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. They would not include Palestinians from outside unless by mutual agreement. On the rights of the Palestinians: The document refers to “legitimate rights” and says that any solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and their just requirements. The Israelis fought this hard but have now been willing to put this concept in a formal document.

Four. How will the Palestinian problem be solved?

The document says it will be resolved in all its aspects, another concept that Israel has consistently fought against. The document also addresses the refugee problem not only for displaced persons but in a broader refugee context.

Five. To whom do the principles of 242 apply?

The document says that 242 and its principles apply to all the parties. The negotiations in Paragraph 1 are not only between Israel and Jordan, but also on the final status of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in relation to their neighbors. It states that 242 applies in all its parts. There was big debate on this question because Israel knows what “all its parts” means.

Six. How would the Palestinians determine their own future?

The answer to this is contained in Paragraph 1C providing for two committees which would commence their work within three years and complete it within five years. Israel wanted to start after four years with no commitment to end it. This was a major step forward in our negotiations at Camp David. It provides for negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relation to its neighbors. Paragraph 1C also provides “negotiations for the resolution of other outstanding issues by the end of five years.” Furthermore, the document must be submitted to elected West Bank representatives for approval.

Seven. What is an elected representative?

The West Bank inhabitants would be free to elect a number of representatives to govern the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period. Anyone can run for the election even a PLO inhabitant of the West Bank and Gaza. This is another step for providing the participation of Palestinians.

The document also provides (assuming this is acceptable to Jordan) for Palestinian participation in the work of the Jordanian/Israeli treaty. While Jordan may not agree to this concept, we found that the problem of the final status of the persons in Jordan and the West Bank,

plus the broader questions were so entwined that both sets would require participation of the Palestinians. Paragraph 1C3 provides that the elected representatives will decide how to govern themselves, consistent with the determination of the West Bank and Gaza issue and other outstanding issues.

Eight. What about the dissolution of the military government?

This would occur at the moment of the establishment of the self-governing authority, which we believe would take about three months to set up, including electoral and self-government provisions. (I do not know if three months is correct—but this was urged on us as a desirable figure—at that time 650 Israelis would be withdrawn. These are the military and civilian members of the military government.) That means that a disturbing presence would be withdrawn from the cities and towns in the short period of three months. But a number of regular armed forces personnel would remain in specified locations. I believe that Israel wants to turn over the governance and maintenance of security to the West Bank inhabitants.

Nine. Are the representatives only to be from the West Bank and Gaza?

Yes.

Ten. Settlements?

On Sinai, no agreement could be reached at Camp David on its settlements. Sadat said the commitment to withdrawal was a prerequisite to a Sinai agreement. Begin's position was that they should be worked out in a three month period before the peace treaty. Since they were not worked out, Begin said he would take the question to the Knesset casting aside partisan discussion and voting with members voting their conscience. No one knows how this will turn out although many think the vote will favor withdrawal. Begin first said he would stand aside, but Dayan urged him as Prime Minister to vote and take a leadership role. My guess is the Likud and Labor will split on this issue. My belief is that when many see that this is a vote for peace or no peace, they will vote in favor of withdrawal. On the related security issue, I do not believe it is a valid argument but it is, nevertheless, held by many people. We mentioned the possibility of having UN forces permanently stationed in the Rafa Junction so they would not need settlements because of the UN buffer. Dayan said he needed that in order to convince people to give up those settlements.

Eleven: Jerusalem.

We have indicated our position on this issue.

Twelve. Comprehensive peace.

For peace to endure we believe it must constitute a basis for not only Egypt and Israel but also for others. We have felt strongly that the

document had to have this element in it and we feel deeply that there must be a comprehensive peace in order for the framework to be durable.

Thirteen. Is it possible that an unacceptable result could come about at the end of the five year period?

The document provides that there must be a conclusion reached by the end of five years, regarding relations with the neighbors and the other issues. We have also stated that these negotiations are based on 242 and on all its parts. Obviously it requires negotiations and the outcome is not certain. But the document does state that the result must be accomplished by the end of five years.

Fourteen. Ambassador Atherton noted that King Hussein mentioned that the Israeli/Egyptian document is more specific than the West Bank one.

He pointed out that Secretary Vance said that in the former case you had two parties (Egypt and Israel) who were negotiating directly and could, therefore, reach a specific agreement. The other document was general because the other parties (Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria) were not there.

Fifteen. Ambassador Atherton mentioned the question regarding the refugee problem and said President Carter in his speech¹⁴ to Congress stated the refugee problem must be solved under the relevant Palestinian refugee UN resolutions.

Sixteen. There is a different tenor to President Carter's earlier call for Palestinian rights and a homeland in contrast to the new direction that Camp David is alleged to take.

We still support a Palestinian homeland and we promote this concept by (a) the transitional stage which provides for full autonomy and (b) allowing the Palestinians to choose their status and relations with their neighbors. We have made no change in our view on Israeli withdrawal nor on legitimate Palestinian rights. In fact, we added the concept of "just requirements" for the Palestinians. There has also been no change in our position of Jerusalem.

This conclude the Secretary's response to the King's questions and the session turned to general discussion.

IV

Sharaf made the following point:

If Jordan plays a role, it must be on a more solid basis. Self-government during a transitional period makes sense only if the transition leads to a final solution.

¹⁴ On September 18, President Carter addressed a Joint Session of Congress on the outcome of the Camp David Summit and the agreements reached. The text of this speech is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1533–1537.

VANCE. We can not give the assurance of a final solution now. One must be practical.

SHARAF: This is the whole problem. The current position is a radical change from the past and has put the cart before the horse. In the past, the whole discussion was on self-determination and withdrawal with considering being with the modalities of how to attain those goals by negotiation. Now we have the opposite “escapist” approach. We now have transitional modalities without any assurances that a final determination will be worked out. Jordan has been asked to participate in negotiations for three years in order to reach a result that is by no means guaranteed. The transition therefore becomes not a part of the implementation, but rather an exercise taking place in a vacuum. We give a commitment to get involved on the West Bank while Israel’s leaders are now saying they will continue their settlements in the West Bank. We, therefore, end up giving a Jordanian endorsement to the Begin Plan.

VANCE. We will not be able to resolve the question of the final status of the territories overnight. The document provides for a period of time for the negotiation of that issue. This is precisely why a transitional period is necessary.

SHARAF: Why does Jordan have to play a security role?

VANCE: Jordanian help was felt necessary because Egypt felt that if there are forces left in the West Bank there should also be an Arab presence there during the transitional period.

SHARAF: If everything rests on Israeli intentions at the end of five years, why not let them implement the Begin Plan now without Jordanian involvement?

VANCE: You have a real interest in promoting Palestinian rights during this period and also from Jordan’s standpoint in influencing those who will be on your border.

SHARAF: In consenting to the Begin Plan, Jordan does a disservice to the Palestinians by endorsing it, since the situation only changes from a military to a civilian administration.

VANCE: The U.S. would feel more confident if Jordan were keeping an eye on the West Bank than we would if you were not there.

SHARAF: The point is that we have no assurances regarding the future final disposition of the West Bank, which is a particularly important consideration in the context of repeated Israeli statements that they do not intend to give up the West Bank, the settlements there or Arab Jerusalem. To speak frankly, the U.S. seems too absorbed with the formulas of Camp David to look at the broader picture, which includes forces for peace arrayed against forces for destruction. Radical forces are increasing. Jordan is asked to underwrite an Israeli occupation

while covering a separate agreement being negotiated with Sadat which is unconnected with the West Bank document and is to be signed within three months. Jordan, therefore, absorbs the whole Palestinian question itself without being involved in any assured final outcome. We are, therefore, asked to erode our own credibility. One must take into account that the Israeli leadership is saying that Jerusalem is to be united under Israeli rule forever, that Samaria and Judea will not be given up. We are not being over cautious in our position. How can one ignore this blatant situation.

VANCE: Unfortunately, if there is no negotiation, then your objective of working for Israeli withdrawal is even less likely to come about. Begin only has two and a half years left. Once you start a process of self-government and negotiations there is a good chance—and even a near inevitability—that you can work out a solution. If there are no negotiations, the odds are very small that you will achieve any Israeli withdrawal.

KING HUSSEIN: President Carter said that if we have any points on which we are not clear we should bring them up. We will, therefore, have to consult among ourselves and go to others in the Arab world. Our people must involve themselves in this issue.

We must, however, be sure of the U.S. position on these positions in a very clear fashion. This may help to make up our own minds and to clarify the way that we approach our own people. I remember after Resolution 242 that Nasser said “I will not reopen the Suez Canal or discuss the Sinai until Jordan and the West Bank situations are dealt with.” Now we find the Suez Canal open and a peace treaty being signed over Sinai. We are talking now from a position of weakness with regard to Israel and this will be especially true if Egypt moves out of the conflict; in three or four years under such conditions Israel would not even be interested in what we are speaking about today. We need clear and, if possible, written assurances of what the U.S. position is regarding what lies at the end of the road.

VANCE: Would it be helpful for us to provide written answers to your questions.

KING HUSSEIN: Yes. It would help us to formulate our own options. But, in addition, we want a U.S. commitment and a description of your own position.

MINISTER MAJALI: Does the West Bank include Jerusalem?

VANCE: In the transition period, Jerusalem would not be included since there are conflicting claims in its regard. We believe it is occupied territory, however, and this is a conflict between us and Israel.

MAJALI: Would Israeli settlements be included in the self-governing territory? And are the West Bank and Gaza 1967 borders?

VANCE: The answer to the latter question is—Yes. The question of settlements was not discussed.

MAJALI: The biggest issue is whether the borders would include the Israeli settlements and whether the settlers would vote.

VANCE: I assume they would vote but I must get a clarification on this.

MAJALI: How would the government be financed and who would sponsor elections?

VANCE: Regarding elections—Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians would sponsor them. We assume there is no problem in bringing in the UN or others to supervise elections. The greatest problem is the question of the status of the West Bank. At any rate these are all questions that would be worked out during the three month period.

MAJALI: The central question is where the West Bank borders would be. These must be defined.

ABUODEN: Everyone admits that the psychological aspect is important, especially in the Arab world. We have asked our people to read the documents closely and taken pains to see they have been published. We have surveyed our people and found that they have no feeling of assurance about the outcome of the transitional period. If we could have a phrase saying that the transitional period is a stage on the road to reaching a treaty and thus achieving a durable peace and that it would be conducive to the attainment of Palestinian self-determination as provided for in Resolution 242, then we would have a different situation. If at the end of the five-year period there is no agreed solution or, alternatively, if the Palestinian voters rejected then what is the result? This is a very ambiguous situation.

VANCE: We have provided for three stages in the transitional framework. Your questions are good ones but we do not believe that amending the document is realistic. Perhaps you could get a clarification during the negotiations.

MAJALI: The document makes no mention of past UN resolutions.

VANCE: There is mention of Resolutions 242 and 338. Furthermore, President Carter said in his speech to Congress that all pertinent UN resolutions “had to be taken into account regarding the refugee problem.”

SHARAF: What does the U.S. envisage for the future of the other Palestinians outside the West Bank (who are armed)?

VANCE: We recognize that problem and it must be addressed, but in a broader spectrum—involving Lebanon and Syria. As to immigration into the West Bank, this is a problem not easily resolved, although the question of displaced persons has been resolved.

SHARAF: How much is this now a framework for other parties?

VANCE: The document provides a broad solution which would include even Golan Heights. On the Palestinian issue there is as much in this for Syrian interests in that respect as for others.

SHARAF: If agreement is not reached and Jordan does not take part in the negotiations, what is the situation regarding Israeli intentions on self-government on the West Bank?

VANCE: Israel would like to proceed with the Begin Plan's implementation, but Egypt does not accept this. The agreed procedure is that negotiations on this would start soon. Also, Egypt has an interest in the Palestinian issue in Gaza.

KING HUSSEIN: The people in Arab Jerusalem would fall under what category? Do the people there exercise independent rights or are they considered Israeli citizens?

VANCE: This was a problem we labored over for hours. How do you suggest we address it?

MAJALI: At the end of the agreement, it calls for open borders, diplomatic relations, etc. In such a case, Jerusalem is no longer a problem since the door is open for the full exercise of the rights of its Arab population. No one would put up barbed wire.

VANCE: This is a good point. Everyone agreed on free access to the Holy Places, that the Holy Places would be fully administered by each respective faith and that the city would no longer be divided. There was also agreement on free movement within Jerusalem. The hangup was on sovereignty. The U.S. position is that the status of Jerusalem must be negotiated by the parties. We have our own view but we can not compel the Israelis to accept it. We have stated that annexation was illegal but to enforce our view is a different story.

KING HUSSEIN: This is a crucial question for us.

VANCE: We recognize that.

CROWN PRINCE: Why was Jordan mentioned as participating in the local police force, particularly since this would set a precedent for Jordan with respect to other aspects of the West Bank governing authority.

VANCE: Jordan was included because of your expertise and the feeling that it would be necessary to have Jordan help operate the police force. This, however, is not mandatory and Jordan might not choose to take part.

CROWN PRINCE: During the transition period would inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem perhaps become gradually acceptable as voters?

VANCE: This was argued at Camp David and it could be possible after two years or so.

In conclusion King Hussein said it would be helpful to us with our local people and with others in the area if we could have formal written U.S. answers to the questions that we have raised here. Secretary Vance agreed to do so and asked that the Jordanians send us their questions in writing. King Hussein agreed to do so.¹⁵

King Hussein said that the Jordanians will be discussing these two documents and will be asking many questions concerning them and the precise meaning of their language. We will continue our discussions with Secretary Vance in their regard in order to clarify these issues.

¹⁵ On September 28, Badran formally presented Veliotis a list of 14 questions on the Camp David Agreements in the form of a letter from Badran to Vance. The same day, the Embassy transmitted the text of the letter in telegram 7605 from Amman. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Camp David Final)

59. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, September 21, 1978

PARTICIPANTS

Saudi Side

HRH Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz

HRH Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, Minister of Defense (and Acting Foreign Minister)

Counselor Rashid Pharaon

Abd al-Rahman Mansouri, Deputy Foreign Minister

Ismail al-Shura, Director of Western Affairs, Foreign Ministry

U.S. Side

The Secretary

Ambassador John C. West

Ambassador Roy Atherton

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Memcons, 2 of 2. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Twinam on September 23; approved by Wisner on October 3. The meeting, held in the Al-Ma'dher Palace, followed a brief meeting between Vance and Khalid. In this exchange, which largely focused on the King's health and the general history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, Khalid told Vance that "during the Camp David summit he had been preoccupied with his wish that President Carter would achieve success, that while he was also concerned for Sadat's success his thoughts were much more with President Carter." The record of this meeting is *ibid.* Vance visited Saudi Arabia September 21–24.

Hodding Carter, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Joseph Twinam, notetaker
Isa K. Sabbagh, interpreting

Prince Fahd opened the meeting by referring to the rigors of present day diplomacy conducted by air travel. The Secretary noted that it must have been easier in the days of ship travel at the time of the Versailles conference.² He said that except for Wilson's involvement in Versailles, no American president has been longer involved in a diplomatic conference than was President Carter at Camp David.

Fahd said that as difficult as Camp David must have been for those inside the camp, it was even harder on those outsiders like himself, since the insiders at least knew what was happening, while he could only guess. Fahd said that whatever the results, there was no denying that Camp David represents a good step forward which opens certain paths.

The Secretary emphatically agreed and referred to the Congressional reception of the President's report,³ which was unlike anything seen in the halls of Congress in decades. There was a spirit of joy and hope on both sides of the aisle, without regard to party affiliation.

Fahd said he appreciated that a stalemate of many years was broken. He wished that all of the participants would heed Carter's advice to refrain from making rash statements after the agreements had been reached. He continued that Saudi Arabia was greatly pleased by the Secretary's visit, since it regards the United States as its greatest friend and always finds it useful to exchange views.

The Secretary expressed appreciation at having been received on such short notice and asked if he could brief Fahd on the agreements.

The Secretary said the President considered the results of Camp David so important that the President wanted him to come immediately to the area to brief Fahd and others and answer any questions. He appreciated Fahd's suggestion that he go to Damascus.

Fahd said he considered the Damascus visit a wise thing to do. King Khalid had sent a message to Assad urging calm and restraint. In the message the King sought to emphasize that President Carter from the beginning of the Administration had seriously and with much effort focused on the Middle East problem. The Saudis had advised Assad to bear with us and to give us a chance to move toward a common goal.

² Reference is to the Paris Peace Conference, an international meeting convened in January 1919 at Versailles, just outside of Paris. The purpose of the meeting was to establish the terms of the peace after World War I.

³ See footnote 14, Document 58.

The Secretary said the President wanted him to convey the need to seize the opportunity provided by Camp David. We have seen the Saudi government statement. We realize that a number of our friends in the area have concerns about the agreements. The Secretary said he would like to try to resolve any questions Fahd might have. We recognize that the Camp David agreements do not contain everything we and others would have liked.

Fahd said the Saudi statement had been carefully worded. In his view it had forestalled a few things from happening. Time will point out the advantages of the Saudi statement.

The Secretary said it is important to look not only at what is not in the agreements, but at the very substantial new elements which they contain from the Arab point of view. Camp David achieved an Israeli commitment to resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza within five years. For years Israel refused to face up to the West Bank issue. Even this year the Israelis talked only about considering it at some point in the future. Now Israel is committed to considering it within five years. This may seem long but political vitality of the West Bank is like a new born child which takes time to gain strength and learn to walk. The agreement states that solutions must be in accordance with all the provisions and all parts of resolution 242. This means also that the principle of withdrawal in the West Bank and Gaza applies, as it does to the other fronts. The U.S. side had sought for hours and days to get Israel to sign a document saying that 242 applies in all its parts and provisions.

The Secretary continued that the framework agreement is designed to provide a comprehensive settlement. In its first operative paragraph it says

“They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.”

The Secretary continued that Israeli military occupation would end. The agreements provide that a commission of Egypt, Jordan, if it will, and Israel will sit down with a committee of West Bankers to proceed through free elections for an administrative council. Although it is not spelled out, the understanding of the parties was that inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, regardless of political affiliation, could be elected, including persons affiliated with the PLO. The Secretary said he wanted to make clear that he means residents of the West Bank or Gaza and not PLO members from outside that area.

Fahd said he understood this to mean that the governing authority would not include Palestinians from outside the West Bank and Gaza.

The Secretary said this is correct but that the agreement provides a mechanism for admitting displaced persons in an orderly way. This is to assure that they will have means of support rather than having to go to refugee camps.

Fahd asked if the number of persons permitted to return is to be limited.

The Secretary replied that the limit would be imposed by the commission which would determine how many could return each year. He read Fahd from the agreement:

“During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.”

Fahd asked if this provision applied only to the refugees of 1967.

The Secretary said there was another provision for earlier refugees. He quoted the relevant paragraph:

“Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.”

Fahd asked if all 1967 refugees have the right to opt to return.

The Secretary said yes, but the committee will determine the number to return each year. The Secretary continued that he should add that President Carter had made clear in his speech to the Congress that all this should be in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.

When the Palestinian authority takes over in the West Bank and Gaza the Israeli military government is to be withdrawn, lock, stock and barrel. The thousands of Israeli military personnel in the cities and towns will be withdrawn. In our view, if the Palestinian authority conducts itself responsibly this would set into motion an evolutionary process which will enable the Palestinians to govern themselves.

The Secretary continued that we fully believe that this process, once started, will be irreversible. At the end of five years an outcome which meets basic Arab requirements will be almost inevitable. The great advantage of the way this is structured is that it deals with the West Bank and Gaza in their totality rather than talking about partitioning the West Bank or Gaza.

The Secretary continued that in this document the Israelis have recognized the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians. The implications of the acceptance of this principle are great and obvious. For years Israelis have had trouble accepting this concept. Now they have signed a document saying, “The solutions from the negotiations must also rec-

ognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.”

Fahd said that is fine but he had heard that Begin refused to use the term “Palestinians” and continued to refer to them as the “Arabs of Israel.”

The Secretary said what Begin had said was that he would continue using the term “Palestinian Arabs.” He never said “Arabs of Israel.” We would reject that and so would Egypt.

The Secretary noted that on the West Bank settlement Begin had given us a letter which we had rejected.

Fahd deplored Begin’s “verbal acrobatics”, noting that he had heard the details as the Secretary described them on Israeli radio. The Secretary said he had a message from Dayan⁴ in which Dayan agreed with what the Secretary and the President had been saying on the settlements, and indicating that they would straighten things out when Begin returned to Israel and give the U.S. an acceptable letter. The Secretary said that he felt at Camp David that Begin’s advisors sincerely wanted an agreement which would bring lasting peace.

Fahd said on the basis of the recent poll, Israeli public opinion obviously wants to relinquish the Sinai settlements. He feared Begin wants to make trouble in his remaining years in office. What is important, however, is what the U.S. Government understands the agreement to mean.

The Secretary said that our own West Bank settlement language will be in a published letter. The Saudis should wait to see what it says.

The Secretary continued that the Palestinians are recognized as a party to negotiations with Egypt, Israel and Jordan in which the final status of the West Bank as well as its relation to its neighbors will be settled. The negotiations are to be completed within five years. Parallel with this negotiation, Israel and Jordan will negotiate a peace treaty. We insisted in a difficult fight that the agreement provide that Palestinians can participate in the Jordan/Israel treaty negotiations. Our position was that the treaty would affect the future of the people of the West Bank and Gaza and that they therefore had a right to participate

⁴ On September 20, Dayan asked Viets to inform Carter and Vance that he, along with Weizman and Barak, were “extremely upset over Begin’s public disagreement with the President over the issue of the duration of a settlements freeze.” Viets reported, “Dayan said he was certain that he, Weizman, and Barak ‘and others in the Cabinet’ can prevail on Begin to agree to a formulation covering cessation of settlement activity which will be acceptable to us. In retrospect, Dayan observed, it had been a serious error ‘to leave Begin on his own’ in Washington and New York. He (Dayan) should have stayed on, for if he had this unfortunate situation would never have arisen.” (Telegram 12849 from Tel Aviv, September 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2618)

in negotiating it. Finally, after long argument, Israel accepted this principle. The Secretary said that Israeli settlements on the West Bank would be handled in accordance with the letter to be published next week. In essence, Israel has agreed not to create any new settlements while negotiations are underway for a West Bank transitional regime. The question of future settlements will be subject to agreement among the negotiating parties setting up the regime.

Fahd said this was good work on President Carter's part. He read the Saudi government's Arabic language translation of the appropriate section of the agreement.

The Secretary continued there is an Israeli commitment to work out procedures promptly on the persons displaced in 1967. Dayan said that he thought most of the 1967 refugees will return and that a place could be found for them. Fahd said that the important thing is that the Palestinians outside the area be given the choice of returning.

The Secretary continued that in addition to the gains he had just mentioned from the Arab point of view, the Camp David agreements offer important strategic advantages. They provide a basis around which moderate forces in the area, with the support of the United States and our friends, can rally and expand the position and influence of moderate Arabs in the area. The Secretary said he thought this of strategic importance. A major motivation in the President's mind at Camp David was to strengthen moderate forces by means of establishing a peace framework that would break the stalemate which provided an opportunity for radicals to move in. This is a critical moment for the moderates as we look around the area. At this moment, we feel moderate forces in the Arab world are looking to Saudi Arabia and the United States for leadership. We believe and hope Saudi Arabia will play a key role in seizing the opportunity. We can understand that Saudi Arabia will want to consult with its friends in the Arab world. As the Saudis do so President Carter wants to make very clear he remains fully committed to the role of a full partner in seeing this through. Now, with Camp David achieved, we are not going to walk away and cease to pay attention. We are going to see it through.

Fahd said that at this time not just governments but individuals in a position to be influential must do what they can with the stalemate broken to achieve a satisfactory solution. While there are others in Israel besides Begin who will take tough positions which are not in Israel's interest, there are persons of reason and good will who recognize the logic of peace. But the paramount question of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and outside of it is what will happen after the transitional period. This is what the moderate Palestinians will ask the Saudis.

The Secretary said that in his view evolutionary progress will start in the transitional period, reminding Fahd that there will have to be discussions among the parties in order to work out the treaties.

Fahd said the agreements spoke of negotiations up to the end of the transitional period.

The Secretary said they provide a limit so that they cannot drag on indefinitely. The process will determine what evolves from it. It was his belief that in the West Bank and Gaza some sort of Palestinian entity will emerge. It is his guess that this entity will have some sort of link with Jordan but that is up to the Palestinian people.

Fahd said that is fine and logical. It represents the principle of non-imposition by outsiders.

The Secretary said that is precisely why the Palestinians must be given a role in the negotiations.

Fahd said that freedom of choice is the only sensible solution. Thanks to the American effort, by the end of the transitional period the Palestinians will be ready to make a responsible choice.

The Secretary said it is our deep hope that they will be ready to govern themselves responsibly.

Fahd said the problem, which is deep one, would be if Israel is permitted to insist on not permitting the existence of a Palestinian entity. What if Israel permits local government but keeps for itself the elements of sovereignty such as defense and foreign affairs? He had wanted to see language giving the Palestinians a free choice with regard to attachments or affiliation at the end of the transitional period.

The Secretary said we were not able to get "self determination" into the agreement. Instead we were able to get the Aswan wording⁵ about Palestinian participation in determining their future. We had felt this inadequate without spelling out the procedures to achieve it.

Fahd said there is a basic difference. After five years either Israel says there will be no Palestinian entity or Israel says the Palestinians will have to determine their own future. That is a big difference. What worries the Saudis is that the ink is hardly dry and Israel is already saying that there will never be a Palestinian entity. This is causing anxiety. This will tie the Saudis' hands. For instance, on the settlements, now they are saying three months. If they are saying this the Saudis will not be able to help President Carter as much as they would like. Even on the Egyptian agreement the Saudis fear Begin might obfuscate. These agreements are serious, and Israel must treat them as such.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 3.

Fahd continued another point is that the Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza think that the agreements are keeping them out of the process. This is disturbing because they are likely to be the primary makers of trouble. Also, self rule may not be fruitful if Palestinians in the area hesitate to come forward to participate in it in deference to those Palestinians outside the area.

The Secretary said that with respect to those Palestinians outside the area there is provision for the return of those displaced in 1967 and the sketching of guidelines to achieve prompt, just and permanent implementation of the refugee problem.

Fahd said once the Palestinians outside realize that they have the choice of returning and participating in the administration and determining the future of the area, all would be well. If that is not clear he felt that things would not go well. He asked whether President Carter has in mind that after five years Israel will withdraw totally leaving the Palestinians free to determine their own lives.

The Secretary said that the answer is yes, with the proviso that if necessary to protect Israel's security, Israel could have specified limited areas in which limited numbers of military forces could be placed for defense.

Fahd said he would like to pursue this. Israeli security points will not be effective but will only agitate the Palestinian population. Why should they be in Palestinian territory? Why not in Israeli territory? The Palestinians will not feel free if they are in Palestinian territory.

The Secretary replied that after five years Israel and Jordan and Israel and Egypt will have negotiated treaties. There is no security problem there. The Israelis, however, fear Iraq. Fahd asked where the Iraqis would come from, through Saudi Arabia, or across Syria? He assured the Secretary the Iraqis would not interfere with Israel's security. The Secretary replied that is the Israelis' concern.

Fahd said that it is his deep conviction that in its heart Israel is confident it is here to stay. The security concern is a fabrication. Real Israeli security lies in support by the United States and peace with the Arab states and in the willingness of the Palestinian people to live in peace.

The Secretary said he agreed with this. In five years as the situation develops, the Israelis may come to feel that the security points are not needed. He wanted to make clear that we are talking possibilities. The agreement does not specify arrangements after five years. It simply says there should be provision for security but does not specify. Fahd stressed the importance of the psychological element that the Palestinians realize that they will be free after five years and that those outside the area will be free to return. If they realize this all problems will cease. He urged the United States not to lose sight of this.

Fahd continued that Saudi Arabia wishes President Carter every success. What would seem to spoil that wish, however, is how the Palestinians outside the area will react because they feel neglected. It would not be as smooth as Saudi Arabia or the U.S. would wish. If the outside Palestinians felt after five years that they would have self determination, all would go smoothly. They are at loss to see what is intended for them. The PLO is organized; it is recognized in the UN. What will it do?

Fahd continued by asking what Saudi Arabia could tell the Palestinians in the absence of assurances. Without such assurances they would consider Saudi Arabia an enemy, not a friend, if it urged support for the agreement. Saudi Arabia hopes for a clear-cut reference projecting past the five-year period so that it can calm the Palestinians down. Fahd continued that he stressed this point because Saudi Arabia wants to cooperate with the United States. Thus Saudi Arabia is pleading for a significant indication or promise that the United States can give. He urged the Secretary to go back and discuss this with the President. He urged the Secretary to convey the strength of Saudi feeling. He asked that we come up with something tangible that the Saudis can use if they are to carry out their side of the bargain. This is urgent, so that Saudi Arabia can take an active role. It is extremely important for Saudi Arabia to support President Carter's magnificent effort.

Deputy Minister Mansouri asked if there is linkage between the two agreements.

The Secretary replied that there is no specific linkage in the documents but that Sadat had said he would not sign the Sinai agreement until Israel had signed the general agreement.

Fahd said Saudi Arabia wants to help Sadat. He asked the Secretary to convey to the President the tone, the spirit and the urgency of his remarks. He said that if the U.S. would give Saudi Arabia the wherewithal the Saudis will summon the PLO and others to soothe the situation. Saudi Arabia is fearful of an explosion. The Soviets and rejectionists are lighting a fire under the Palestinians. It is easy to do. If the U.S. will enable Saudi Arabia to hold the reins the Saudis can help with the Palestinians. The U.S. should also get Begin to "pipe down".

The Secretary said that he had called Begin personally⁶ to say that Begin is doing a disservice to his own country and to Sadat. Counselor Pharaon noted that the absence of reference to Palestinians outside the area will cause Israel to insist on security barriers as long as there are displaced Palestinians who might cause trouble. The Secretary noted

⁶ A record of this conversation was not found.

that the provision for displaced persons should help us to start dealing with that problem immediately.

Fahd said that is fine but what is needed is something tangible. The Secretary said he understood and said he would see if we could do something to help. He would be meeting with the President Monday⁷ and would convey his remarks. Fahd urged him to do so and reiterated that if he had this from the President he would invite the Palestinians to talk. The rejectionists are now meeting and Saudi Arabia needs something to counterbalance. Fahd said that three days ago he had talked with Palestinian representatives, urging them to be calm and work for peace. He felt that he had calmed them somewhat but he was missing something in his presentation to them because they lacked assurances. The Secretary asked as a hypothetical question whether, if the U.S. could resolve the problem it has in talking with the PLO, a dialogue with them would be helpful.

Fahd said the PLO would be delighted. Saudi Arabia would arrange the meeting. He asked that we think about it.

Fahd asked if the Secretary could confirm that Sadat had written Assad that the Golan solution would be the same as the Sinai solution. The Secretary said he didn't know whether or not there had been a letter but that Sadat had said that the Sinai agreement could be a model for the Golan agreement.

Fahd asked if Golan were discussed at Camp David.

The Secretary said there was no real discussion of the Syrian aspect, just reference to Syria and the fact that we had to have a framework applicable to all the countries.

Fahd expressed appreciation for the Secretary's patience with the Saudi concerns. He assured the Secretary that Saudi Arabia would like to support anything that the United States embarks upon. He expressed appreciation for the invitation to go to the U.S., saying that he was actually packed when he learned that the King had to go for medical treatment, thus he had to stay in Saudi Arabia. He said he was reserving the invitation as a rain check.

The Secretary said that Fahd had a standing rain check. (At this stage Fahd asked his advisors if they had questions and Mansouri asked about Jerusalem.)

Fahd said that Jerusalem is another large and urgent problem. There is no mention in the agreements of Jerusalem. This gives the impression that it is ignored and Israel is free to work its will. The Secre-

⁷ September 25. According to the President's Daily Diary, Vance met with Carter, Mondale, Brown, Brzezinski, Eilts, and Warnke from 7:31 to 8:46 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

tary explained that we had tried desperately at Camp David to have an operative paragraph on Jerusalem. The parties reached agreement on such issues as holy places and free access but hit a stone wall on the question of sovereignty. Therefore we were not able to include it in the framework.

Fahd urged that it not be neglected.

The Secretary said each of the parties has written a letter stating its position. These letters will be made public. They will supplement the framework without attempting to resolve the question.

Fahd noted the question of Jerusalem is important not just to the Arabs but to all Muslims. The Secretary said we understand this, we will state our position, which is the historical American position.

Fahd said the whole world expects the United States to be clear and fair on this position. There was a clear division of authority in Jerusalem before 1967. Saudi Arabia would welcome a clear U.S. position.

Fahd said he would ask the Secretary to reserve the discussion of the situation in South Arabia until he met with Prince Sultan the following day.⁸

The Secretary said he would like to make two final points. This is not a perfect agreement. It lacks points we would like to see in it. But if we don't seize this opportunity and it slips through our hands it may be a long time before an opportunity comes again. That is why all of us must work to make it work.

The Secretary said that secondly he would like to see Fahd's advice on the upcoming meeting with Assad. What subjects might interest him?

Fahd said Assad is wise, honest and discerning. For instance, despite pressure at the Tripoli conference⁹ he refused to renounce 242. The Secretary should take time to explain the agreement to him and show him what is the official outcome of Camp David as opposed to subsequent rumor. The Secretary should ask him to examine the situation calmly, noting that there is no overnight solution and that the United States position is based on deep conviction. The Secretary

⁸ Vance summarized his September 22 meeting with Sultan in telegram Secto 10038 from Riyadh, September 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780387–1166)

⁹ Arab leaders convened in Tripoli on December 2, 1977, in response to Sadat's trip to Jerusalem the previous month. The conference established the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to oppose Sadat's peace initiative toward Israel. The Front was joined by all of the attending heads of state, from Libya, Syria, Algeria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and by leaders of Palestine Liberation Organization factions. On December 5, Sadat broke diplomatic relations with all countries that attended the conference. (Marvine Howe, "Arabs Meet in Libya On Opposing Sadat; Accord Is Uncertain," *The New York Times*, December 3, 1977, p. 1)

should stress that President Carter would like to see a Golan solution in order to relieve the great burdens on Syria and to permit the development of a close US-Syrian relationship. The best way to cause Assad to ponder the situation calmly is to assure him of President Carter's deep interest in solving both the Palestinian problem and the problems of Syria. The Secretary said he could do that.

Fahd said it is extremely important to assure Assad that President Carter wants to solve the total Palestinian problem. The Secretary noted the President had said that publicly the other night.¹⁰ Fahd said that it bears repeating face to face by the Secretary. He said the Secretary should urge Assad to calm the Palestinians down and to give us a chance. He should appeal to Assad to urge the Palestinians to avoid violence and not to mar the Arab image while President Carter is trying so hard for the Arabs.

The Secretary thanked Fahd for his advice. In closing Fahd expressed his delight that the Secretary would be going to Syria.

¹⁰ Reference is to Carter's televised speech of September 18. See footnote 14, Document 58.

60. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Secretary's Aircraft, September 24, 1978, 1740Z

Secto 10071. Subject: Meeting With Assad September 24, 1978. Pass White House for the President and Dr. Brzezinski from the Secretary. Department for Christopher and Saunders.

1. We have just come from a marathon four and one-half hour meeting with President Assad. There was discussion of Lebanon² for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 88, Syria: 4/78–5/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance arrived in Syria from Saudi Arabia on September 24 and departed the same day. Seelye sent an assessment of this meeting in telegram 5677 from Damascus, September 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2033)

² During the portion of the meeting which addressed the situation in Lebanon, Assad charged that in contrast to his government's position of urging that Lebanon's "central, legal authority must effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the country," the United States had "unwittingly seemed to encourage outside assistance" in the country. Assad further stated that Ambassador Parker "seems to be coordinating resistance activ-

part of this, but bulk of time was spent on Camp David Agreements. At end of my presentation, Assad called for his copy of Agreements and began long list of penetrating questions about documents. He and Khaddam had obviously given close and careful scrutiny to the documents and in course of our discussion they asked questions designed both to zero in on certain aspects of the Accords which are particularly important to him. i.e., Jerusalem, the Palestinian question, etc., as well as many points on which he felt genuinely in the dark, or confused.

2. Assad raised so many points it is impossible to mention them all in this initial report, which I want to get off to you quickly. But I will touch on what appeared to be the main areas of his concern. He expressed keen interest at several points which were “not in the Agreements.” He asked whether there had been any discussion of where final borders would be on West Bank (I said this had been left to negotiations for final status of this area). He asked what discussions there had been on Jerusalem. I reported that there had been areas of agreement but that final agreement had foundered on issue of sovereignty. He asked me to restate US position on Jerusalem. I did and he seemed reassured.

3. I discussed at length the outcome on West Bank settlements issue in which Assad was keenly interested. I explained at length our agreement with Begin that new settlements would be frozen during negotiations for the transitional regime, and that those negotiations would also deal with question of future settlements. Again this was a point on which it appeared possible to reassure Assad. On another point, Assad seemed puzzled by provisions at end of general framework agreement in which we invited the Security Council to endorse the peace treaties, and the permanent members to underwrite the treaties and conform their policies thereto. I explained that the latter provision only requested the permanent members to act and that this provision was included with the Soviets in mind.

4. Assad asked some penetrating questions about our view of Jordan’s role in any West Bank settlement. Did we feel Jordan had same kind of role in West Bank situation as Syria was playing in Lebanon? I explained that Jordan had profound interest in peace settlement with Israel and that we did not think problem of determining final status of

ities,” citing his visits with Lebanese Christian leader Camille Chamoun. In response, Vance countered that the United States “fully” supported the “unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon,” adding that he believed that Parker’s meetings with Chamoun “have been aimed at persuading the Chamounists to terminate their resistance and to cooperate with the Central Government.” A summary of this exchange is in telegram 5655 from Damascus, September 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–1017) Assad reportedly replied to Vance’s explanation, “I did not know that.” (Telegram 5696 from Damascus, September 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780394–0430)

West Bank could be separated from negotiations for a Jordan-Israel peace treaty. This was why we saw them as linked and had proposed that elected Palestinian representatives participate in both sets of negotiations.

5. We had lengthy discussion of question of Israeli forces remaining on West Bank during and after 5 years. Assad pressed particularly hard as to whether there had been agreement behind the scenes for Israeli troops to remain after 5 years. I told him this question would be determined in negotiations for final status in which, I pointed out, elected Palestinian representatives would participate as well as the three parties. Assad said he noted Begin was saying otherwise, and I told him Begin was saying a number of things these days, presumably in anticipation of the vote in the Knesset.

6. Assad also pressed to know whether Golan had been discussed at Camp David. I said only in the general sense that all agreed that the negotiations for a Syria-Israel peace, when Syria decided to join the negotiations, would be governed by all the principles of Resolution 242. Assad said as far as he was concerned the Camp David Agreements were seriously “unbalanced.” They were specific on things the Israelis wanted—such as ending the boycott—but remained vague on things the Arabs wanted—such as withdrawal. I took issue with him and went through chapter and verse. This led to discussion of the withdrawal question with Assad asking whether the US position that withdrawal should be to 1967 lines with minor modifications had changed. I said it had not.

7. At end, Assad thanked me for these explanations but then summed up Syrian attitude which was standard Syrian hard line. He said he considered the Agreement to be completely in the interest of Israel. He did not see that it served Syria’s interest. He could not give it legitimacy except as an Egypt-Israel understanding. He said Sadat had regrettably slipped from the united Arab front and no single party could achieve peace on its own.

8. Assad said in spite of this Syria wants peace and will not be deflected from pursuing peace in accordance with Resolution 338. But there was a serious contradiction between 338 and the Camp David Agreements, because 338 calls for conference of all the parties whereas at Camp David only one on the Arab side had been there. There could be no compromise with Israel on territory or on Palestinian rights.

9. I rebutted Assad’s summation, asking him once again to focus on what the Agreements achieved and reflect carefully on the advantages, which I had detailed, of what they offered the Arabs. In particular, I pointed out they provided the Arabs with the prospect of changing the status quo which had not been in the Arab interest. I asked him, as I had earlier, to see Agreements not as an ending them-

selves but as beginning of a process which I was convinced would lead ultimately to a solution which would meet Arab objectives.

Vance

61. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, September 25, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have asked Ambassador Eilts to convey to you my warmest greetings.² Once again, let me express my deep admiration for the courage and statesmanship you showed at Camp David.

The task we now face is to translate the Framework documents into a negotiating process which can quickly resolve the remaining issues in Sinai, while also setting in motion the first stages of the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. Ambassador Eilts will discuss with you my views on how some of the contentious issues in Sinai might be best resolved. You can be assured that I remain ready to lend my full support to the successful conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

To this end, I would like to emphasize my strong belief that the talks on Sinai should begin without delay following the Knesset vote. Immediately after the Knesset has approved³ the Camp David agreements, it might be desirable for General Gamasy to meet with Minister Weizman in Washington to discuss with me the Sinai security arrange-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 9–12/78. No classification marking. At the end of the letter, Carter added the handwritten notation: "Best wishes. I would like to see a peace treaty in a few days of negotiations—not a few weeks. J."

² Eilts delivered the letter to Sadat on September 28. At Carter's request, Eilts raised three additional points with the Egyptian President during their meeting. First, Eilts suggested that Gamasy be sent to Washington for the upcoming Sinai negotiations. Second, he asked Sadat to appoint some Palestinian representatives to serve as "advisers" to the Egyptian delegation. Third, Eilts raised the possibility of granting Israel overflight rights in Sinai. (Telegram 21796 from Cairo, September 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2151)

³ The Knesset voted to approve the Camp David Accords and the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula on September 28, 1978. The vote was 84 in favor, 19 against and 17 abstentions. (Dial Torgerson, "Knesset Approves Begin's Mideast Peace Agreement," *Los Angeles Times*, September 29, 1978, p. B1)

ments and withdrawal. Could you please give Ambassador Eilts your thoughts on this matter?

We also share an interest in the rapid initiation of talks to let the Palestinians form their own government, and to implement the West Bank and Gaza commitments. As provided for in the Framework agreement, Palestinians can participate in the talks as advisers to the Egyptian and Jordanian delegations from the outset. I would appreciate hearing from you the names of Palestinians whom you would judge appropriate for inclusion in your delegation, and also regarding Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza with whom discussions on the arrangements for self-government should be initiated.

Finally, we want to move rapidly to work with you to help stabilize the situation in Lebanon. Ambassador Eilts will be prepared to convey your views to me personally on this vitally important issue.

With friendship and respect,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

62. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, September 26, 1978, 1828Z

13295. For the Secretary from the Ambassador. Amman for Ambassador Atherton. Subject: Dayan on "Settlements Freeze" Controversy. Ref: A) Tel Aviv 13095,² B) Tel Aviv 12849.³

1. I met with Dayan midday September 26 to discuss unresolved side letter⁴ concerning freeze on new settlements in West Bank and Gaza. Ciechanover, Rosenne, Rubinstein and Blackwill were also present.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2629. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House, Amman, Cairo, and Jerusalem.

² Telegram 13095 from Tel Aviv, September 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2623)

³ See footnote 4, Document 59.

⁴ See Documents 50 and 51.

2. Noting Prime Minister's unbending statement on this issue at yesterday's Knesset debate (septel),⁵ I asked Dayan to explain Israeli position. Dayan said he had spoken to Begin this morning, and letter to the President had been drafted but had not yet been signed. It would be sent today or tomorrow. After his return from the U.S., Begin had checked carefully with Barak and was now "absolutely determined" that he had agreed at Camp David only to a freeze on settlements during the three months of the negotiations for the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Barak's notes on the night meeting September 16, Begin had twice, once in the middle of the conversation and again at its conclusion, said that he wanted to think about the President's formulation overnight. Dayan said that the next day Begin had sent his letter to the President via Barak with the language which contained his position—a three-month freeze on settlements during the Sinai negotiation. The Prime Minister felt strongly that his memory was correct, Dayan continued, and Barak's notes confirmed it. Therefore, Begin would in his letter to the President commit himself at this time to nothing further than a three-month freeze on West Bank/Gaza settlements.

3. More than somewhat taken aback, I said I had the clear impression from earlier conversations that both he and Barak agreed that the negotiations referred to in Begin's talk with the President concerned the West Bank and Gaza and that the only difference between the Israeli record and our own was the reference to Begin's saying he would have to think about our language overnight. I said I had thought Dayan and Barak had agreed that the settlements freeze had not been mentioned in context of Sinai negotiations.

4. Not answering me directly, and obviously trying to put the best face on Begin's position, Dayan argued that in practical terms it made little difference whether the freeze was tied to the Sinai or the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. He said that the latter talks should last no more than three months. In any event, he stressed, Begin had certainly made no commitment to freeze settlements for the five-year interim period.

5. I then repeated to Dayan what I had told him several times since my return to Israel. It was the President's strong conviction that the

⁵ On September 25, Begin stated to the Knesset: "As regards Judea, Samaria and Gaza, I had no doubts whatsoever: I promised President Carter that during the period of the negotiations for the signing of a peace treaty; . . . during the estimated three-month period we [Israel] would not establish new civilian settlements." "This matter," Begin continued, "caused misunderstanding. Therefore, even though I had absolutely no doubts concerning the substance of this assurance (and this was the only one given), on Saturday night, we examined, with the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister and Prof. Barak, all the notes and documents, and they showed that this is how it was." The full text of this statement is in telegram 13271 from Tel Aviv, September 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780393-0491)

Prime Minister had agreed at Camp David to the American language on a settlements freeze. On that basis, the President had conveyed the GOI position to Sadat, who had in turn agreed to sign the Camp David Agreements. The President was thus left in an extremely awkward position, and I had no doubt that this Israeli interpretation would cause real problems in Washington.

6. Admitting he realized how badly this would go down in Washington, Dayan indicated he was extremely relieved that it was Barak who had made their record of the meeting. The President would certainly not doubt Barak's honesty, and his notes show clearly that Begin's memory of that evening was correct. Rosenne then read from Barak's notes a sentence in which Begin said, "I shall think about it and I will write to you tomorrow." According to Barak's memcon, Begin repeated at the end of the meeting that he would consider the President's proposal and convey his response in writing the next day. That response, in the form of a letter⁶ to the President, indicated the Prime Minister's agreement only to a freeze on settlements during the Sinai negotiations.

7. I reminded Dayan that the President, having received that letter, wrote his language back in and returned it to Begin via Barak. There was no question that the President thought he had Begin's agreement to the U.S. formulation and had acted with Sadat in good faith.

8. Dayan then speculated on the roots of the misunderstanding. He said that there had been whispering during the meeting in question and separate conversations between the principals from time to time. He did not doubt that the President believed his language had been accepted, but, Dayan repeated, that was simply not the case. The Israelis regretted the misunderstanding, but the Prime Minister's letter to the President would commit the GOI to a settlement freeze for only the three months of the Sinai negotiation. Again trying to find a silver lining, Dayan stressed that after the three-month period, the issue of an extension of the settlement freeze would come up and "then we shall see." But, the argument over whether the freeze was tied to Sinai or the West Bank was inconsequential since both negotiations should last no longer than three months. Rosenne said that Sadat has now publicly referred on three occasions since Camp David to Begin's commitment for a three-month freeze on settlements. Therefore, he argued, Sadat can be under no misapprehension.

9. I responded that, given the complications of getting the Palestinians and the Jordanians to participate in the talks, three months was an extremely short period to conclude negotiations concerning the mo-

⁶ See Document 64.

dalities for setting up the self-governing authority. Dayan disagreed, and said that if the others don't come in, Egypt will not wish to go into great detail relating to the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, Sadat would devote himself to principles which would govern West Bank/Gaza arrangements and then turn the negotiations over to the Palestinians and the Jordanians. This first phase of the negotiations might take no more than one month to conclude. In Dayan's judgment, Sadat would want to have launched the "modalities" concerning the West Bank and Gaza authority before he signed his peace treaty with Israel over Sinai, and that would propel the former talks forward at considerable speed.

10. I then stressed to Dayan that you and the President understood "negotiations" as used in our formulation to refer to the period of discussion leading to agreement on setting up the self-governing authority. The second U.S. sentence dealt with the subsequent period, and future new settlements would be the subject of negotiations and agreement among the four parties, and not the three. Rosenne confirmed that both U.S. sentences were indeed in Barak's notes, but he repeated yet again that Begin had only agreed to think about this formulation overnight.

11. In concluding, I said that I would report what Dayan had told me and would, of course, transmit the Prime Minister's letter when it was received. But this news would be very badly received in Washington. Dayan got in the last word by saying that despite this disagreement, he was optimistic that once the issue of settlement freeze was out of the headlines, it could be dealt with practically. But the issue had to be treated quietly. Could I imagine, Dayan queried, what Geula Cohen would do "if we had made a mistake at Camp David and now had to agree to the U.S. proposal. The summit agreements would be rejected by the Knesset." (sic)

12. Comment: As indicated in reftels, Dayan, since his return from Washington, has been optimistic that he and others in the Cabinet could prevail on Begin to modify his position on cessation of settlement activity in a way that would be acceptable to the U.S. I cannot be sure why Begin has stuck to his guns, but several possibilities come to mind. He may simply be sure that his recollection of the meeting with the President is the right one. If that is the case, Barak's notes are a handy, indeed indispensable, buttress for that position. Another explanation is that Begin, emotional and exhausted, did not understand what he was agreeing to at Camp David. Finally, Dayan's remark about Geula Cohen raises the possibility that Begin did understand the U.S. formulation and accepted it, but in the cold light of day, and especially now that he is in the midst of an agonizing domestic debate about the Sinai settlements, decided that he had gone several steps too far and proceeded to backtrack. Whatever the reason for Begin's rigidity on this

issue, I left Dayan in no doubt about how this conversation [garble—would?] be judged by the President and by you. Dayan did his best to minimize the disagreement, but I am sure he realizes what damage Begin's adamant position can cause to his relationship with the administration. On the other hand, Begin is feeling extremely beleaguered by Gush Emunim demonstrators and the desertion of his oldest personal allies. He is very unlikely to budge at this moment of political hypertension.

Lewis

63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 27, 1978, 1710Z

Tosec 110017/245637. Subject: Oral Message From the President on Settlements Issue.

1. Following is text of an oral message from the President to Begin for you to give to Begin in the course of your discussion² with him on Camp David Agreement on question of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. President's intention is that you have this message to use at the moment you consider most useful in your further talks with Begin on this issue.³ Unlike other message⁴ that is being sent you at same time this one is not necessarily to be delivered immediately but, as already stated, to be used at the time and in way you judge most appropriate

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 9/24–30/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee, Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the Secretary's Delegation. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Korn, cleared by Quandt and Tarnoff; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2110) Vance was in New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly.

² See Document 64

³ Lewis presented Carter's oral message to Begin during his meeting with the Prime Minister, September 29. (Telegram 13646 from Tel Aviv, September 29, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

⁴ Not further identified. Reference is possibly to telegram Tosec 110016/245587 to Tel Aviv, September 27, which contained a brief message of congratulations from Carter to Begin, to be delivered in the event of a Knesset vote in favor of Accords. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780394–1287)

and useful. You will understand that this oral message is not rpt not a part of formal exchange of letters on settlements issue.

2. Begin quote.

As I have previously indicated to you, my understanding of the agreement⁵ we reached at Camp David regarding the question of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is as follows.

Begin inner quote.

After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties. End inner quote.

The negotiations referred to were obviously those to establish the self-government in the West Bank and Gaza because the paragraph which we discussed late Saturday evening⁶ was in that section of the document. It was never related to the Sinai negotiations.

I did not interpret your agreement to imply a five-year moratorium.

I want to reiterate my government's view that the settlements could become a serious obstacle to peace. Construction of new settlements during the negotiations could have the most serious consequences for the successful fulfillment of the Agreements. End quote.

Christopher

⁵ See Document 50.

⁶ September 16.

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, the Mission to the United Nations, and the White House¹

Tel Aviv, September 27, 1978, 2120Z

13420. Subject: Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy. Refs: (A) Tel Aviv 13350 (notal),² (B) State 245187 (Tosec 1100170),³ (C) Tel Aviv 13295,⁴ (D) State 245637 (Tosec 110017) (notal).⁵

1. I had a long meeting with Begin afternoon September 27 at Knesset on side letter concerning freeze on new settlements in West Bank and Gaza. Begin's aide Yehuhda Avner and Pol Counselor Blackwill were also present and Weizman joined us near the end of the conversation.

2. Begin who had just stepped out from the Knesset debate began with lengthy and emotional description much like that in reftel of political flak he was taking over Camp David Agreements. Especially from his own party (reported septel).⁶ When he moved to the settlements letter question, he said that after his return to Israel he had consulted with Weizman, Dayan and Barak about the September 16 meeting and

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, Amman, and Jerusalem. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Quandt and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2116) At the top of the telegram Carter wrote: "Zbig. Compromise may be based on no new settlements during 'self-government' negotiations. Time cannot be tied to Sinai negotiations. Work on it. J." Under Carter's note, Brzezinski wrote in the margin of the document: "#s 10–12 indicate clearly why Begin so adamant; he wants the right to build, no matter what the 'autonomous' Arabs may think. ZB."

² Telegram 13350 from Tel Aviv, September 27, summarized a telephone conversation between Lewis and Begin the night before. Begin, "in a great state of emotion and personal anguish," related to Lewis the political problems he was facing as a result of the Camp David Accords. Begin stated that, in accordance with Carter's request that he "say as little as possible in public" about the details of the negotiations, he had delivered his September 25 speech before the Knesset on Camp David in "as low-key and non-controversial fashion as was possible," but that he had been confronted with demonstrations, accusations of treason, and threats from as much as half of his own Herut Party to vote against the Accords. Lewis assured Begin he would convey to Vance his feelings and recommended to the Secretary that Carter issue a "personal message of support and commendation" to Begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2838)

³ Telegram Tosec 110010 /245187 to Tel Aviv, September 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2108)

⁴ See Document 62.

⁵ See Document 63.

⁶ See footnote 2 above.

was absolutely convinced that he had not committed himself to U.S. formulation.

3. He then said he wanted to read to me a draft letter from him to the President on this dispute and subsequently ask my advice on whether he should send it. The draft letter he read was as follows: Begin text.

Dear Mr. President.

As I promised you, upon my return to Jerusalem I checked with my colleagues, the Foreign Minister and Professor Barak, their recollection as to the contents of our discussions on the matter of the settlements at our evening meeting of September 16, 1978, in which Secretary Vance also participated.

According to the minutes of this meeting, as recorded by Professor Barak, you suggested, in summing up, the following text as a commitment to be undertaken by the Government of Israel:

“after the signing of the Framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in the area, unless otherwise agreed. The issue of further Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed by the negotiating parties.”

As recorded in those same minutes by Professor Barak I responded to this proposed text by saying: “I shall think about it and I will write to you tomorrow.” By any standard, such a reaction cannot be construed as an acceptance.

You will perhaps recall, Mr. President, that throughout our lengthy discussions at Camp David I employed a consistent vocabulary, always brief, when acknowledging acceptance of a point of agreement between us. My language of assent was always expressed with the words: “agreed,” or “accepted,” or “all-right.” The lengthiest phrase I was wont to use was: “we accept your proposal.”

In the course of the meeting in question our Foreign Minister remarked that it would be preferable to formulate the issue in positive terms. He gave his opinion that during the negotiations on the establishment of the administrative council,⁷ and during the five-year transitional period, we would discuss with the Arabs our proposal for the admission of displaced persons within this period, as well as our plans for new settlements, also within this same period.

You will remember, Mr. President, that I discussed with you our plans to establish a number of nahal settlements⁸ in the course of the

⁷ Carter underlined “during the negotiations on the establishment of the administrative council.”

⁸ See Document 57 for a description of the different types of Israeli settlements.

next three months, on the Golan Heights, in the vicinity of Beier Sheva and perhaps in the Jordan Valley.

At the close of our meeting, while we were all standing preparatory to our leave-taking, I again reiterated to you my previous statement with regard to your proposed formulation, promising that I would think about it and convey my answer in writing the next day. This, too, is affirmed by Professor Barak's minutes.

And, indeed, on the following day, Sunday, September 17, 1978, I transmitted my written response through Professor Barak who brought it to your cabin. The text read:

"Dear Mr. President,

"I have the honour to inform you that during the agreed period for negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty,⁹ no new settlements will be established by the Government of Israel in Sinai, in the Gaza district and in the area of Judea and Samaria."

As shown by the record taken on the spot by Professor Barak, this was the only commitment I assumed at Camp David on behalf of the Government of Israel with reference to the settlement issue.

Respectfully and sincerely,
Menachem Begin

End text.

4. When he had finished, Begin emphatically stressed that he could never have agreed to the U.S. formulation for two reasons. It would have meant an indefinite moratorium on new Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza, and would give Arabs the right to veto Israeli settlement activities in those areas. He would never, never agree to such a thing.

5. Referring to the first phase of this controversy in the U.S. just after Camp David ended, Begin asserted that he had had a "horrible two days" with the media after the U.S. sentences had been given to the press. How did the journalists get those two sentences? Begin believed Doctor Brzezinski's denial that anyone in the White House was responsible, but someone in the administration had done it. Saying that he was deeply hurt by this, Begin called the leak of the U.S. language unfair and destructive. The ink had not yet dried on the Camp David Agreements before a conflict had arisen between Israel and the United States, a conflict that was unnecessary. The letter to the President which he had just read to me was the complete truth and he would not agree to any other interpretation of what he had said at the September 16 night meeting. Begin then asked for my reaction to his letter.

⁹ Carter underlined "during the agreed period for negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty" and wrote "which peace treaty" in the right-hand margin.

6. I responded that I had been pondering the problem and I wanted to describe to him the situation as I saw it. The public in both our countries had been promised the text of a letter on a settlements freeze which would be made public. It was obviously important that the Prime Minister's complete recollection of that evening's meeting be brought to the attention of the President. However, I had serious doubts whether the letter he had read to me should be made public. If it were, the press in both countries would dissect every word of the message and our differences would become more and not less serious. Further, if Begin sent the President such a letter, and it were made public, the President would surely be compelled to state publicly in a letter to the Prime Minister his conviction that Begin had agreed to the U.S. language. He would doubtless also restate the U.S. position on the settlements freeze, perhaps with much more specificity.

7. I continued that the President's notes, which the Prime Minister had seen, made no mention of Begin's desire to think the matter over until the next morning. The President did not recall that Begin had spoken those words.

8. Moreover, and on the basis of the President's conviction that the Prime Minister had committed himself to the U.S. formulation, Sadat has signed the Camp David Agreements. Thus, the President's own credibility with Sadat was at stake.

9. Begin then said that it was not necessary to publish the lengthy letter he had read to me earlier, although he stressed it was important that the President be personally aware of the way he remembered the September 16 conversation and of the "minutes" of the conversation kept by Barak. Instead, a shorter message to the President could be sent and published which simply stated the Israeli position on the settlements freeze. Pulling another piece of paper from a stack in front of him he read me the following draft language: Begin text

Dear Mr. President

I have the honor to inform you that during the agreed period of negotiations (three months) for the conclusion of the peace treaty no new settlements will be established in the area by the Government of Israel.

Sincerely yours,
Menachem Begin

End text.

10. I told Begin that language got nowhere near solving our mutual problem. Something had to be said about the period after the three month freeze. I told Begin I had written out some language in the car on the way up to Jerusalem which I wanted to try out on him although it had no status whatever in Washington. Could he agree to the following two sentences being added to the one sentence he had just read me. Begin text: It is my hope and expectation that, during this same period

of three months, agreement will be reached on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Thereafter, the course of future settlement activity in those areas will be the subject of negotiations among the parties, including the representatives of the elected self-governing authority. End text.¹⁰

11. With only a moment's hesitation, Begin indicated he could agree to my first sentence but that the second one was totally unacceptable. It meant that Arabs could veto Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria which were Israel's inalienable right. Jews had as much right to live in Hebron as in Tel Aviv. Under no circumstances would he commit himself to a freeze beyond three months. If the Sinai negotiations lasted six months, his commitment to no new settlements remained only for three months.

12. Was there no way, I asked, that the Prime Minister could state his readiness at least to discuss the future settlements issue with the parties after the three month period? Begin said no.¹¹ He believed with all his heart that Israel had a right to settle in Judea and Samaria and he would agree to no language which prejudiced that right.

13. Weizman, who had joined us a few moments earlier, then said that in his judgment it was a gross mistake for the US to press the Prime Minister on this issue at a moment when the party he had led for so many years was in open revolt against him. Vigorously picking up this point, Begin contended that if he were to do what Washington was asking, "there would be a revolution in my own party".

14. Winding up the conversation, I suggested to Begin that I transmit his long letter as a private oral message to the President. In that way, he could honestly say to the press if asked that he had not sent a letter to the President. I would also send the text of his short message although it had no status since it had not been signed. I urged him to do nothing more with either of his messages until I had an opportunity to report this conversation and to get Washington's reaction. Begin agreed and said he was willing to send the long letter and make it private or public, send the short letter and make it private or public, send both letters and make them private or public, or send no letters at all. He was sure his memory of the September 16 conversation was correct. He had not agreed to the US formulation, and Professor Barak's notes proved him right.

15. Comment: Throughout the conversation Begin was intense and emotional but always in control. He listened carefully to what I had to

¹⁰ Brzezinski wrote in the right-hand margin next to this text: "I suggested this to Lewis."

¹¹ Brzezinski underlined this sentence.

say and I think is genuinely desirous of avoiding a major row with the US over this issue. However, despite my best efforts, there was absolutely no give in his position as to what had happened that evening at Camp David, nor any sign of a willingness now to compromise. I am afraid that whatever chance we might have had to change his mind was blown away in the Knesset in the course of today and tonight when his friends of thirty years, his “blood and flesh” as Weizman put it, got on their feet and accused Begin of betraying his and their dream of Eretz Yisrael at the Camp David Summit.

16. Ref D with the President’s oral message for Begin arrived after I had returned to Tel Aviv. I will deliver it at the right moment; however, my view is that it needs some elaboration and modification in light of this conversation and Begin’s own “oral message” herein.¹²

Lewis

¹² See footnote 3, Document 63.

65. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, September 28, 1978, 10:26–10:36 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Prime Minister Menachem Begin

The President: I believe your actions in the last two days in defending the Camp David agreements before the Knesset were the most courageous I have ever seen during my political life. I know how difficult it was for you. Last night I was with a large Democratic fund

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 8–9/78. Secret. Carter wrote on the top of the document: “OK. J.”

raising group² when the news came of the Knesset vote. I announced it to them and I pointed out to them the courage that you had shown. They gave you a standing ovation for three minutes.

The Prime Minister: Mr. President, I appreciate your calling me. We spent seventeen hours debating in the Knesset without interruption. All 120 members took part. We got a big majority. I told them I would have resigned if I had not gotten a majority in my own party. It was a very serious debate. Some of my friends left me, and the opposition supported me. You will remember that I wanted to separate the issues in the vote, but when I got back to Israel, I read the press and it was strongly against that idea so I presented the agreements and the vote on the settlements to the parliament together. I decided there should be a single vote on the agreement and on the settlements. So we had it, and we won with 85 votes against 19. I told Ambassador Lewis how difficult it was for me.

The President: I know it must have been difficult to have many of your close friends oppose you. I want to refer to one other subject. There has been an unfortunate disagreement between us on the question of the West Bank and Gaza settlements. I want to resolve it quickly. We have a difference of opinion.

The Prime Minister: I sent you a letter³ through Ambassador Lewis. Have you received it?

The President: No, I haven't seen it yet. I also sent you a letter⁴ congratulating you on the Knesset vote.

The Prime Minister: Thank you for your letter. I did receive it. I have now sent you a letter⁵ through Ambassador Lewis. Ambassador Dinitz will also have the details and he will talk to Secretary Vance. You know that Mr. Barak took notes of our meeting. I spelled out everything in this letter.

The President: I am concerned about our misunderstanding. There was no thought of tying the West Bank and Gaza settlements to the Sinai negotiations. Nor was there any discussion of a five-year moratorium. I hope that we can get some language that is mutually acceptable.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, President and Mrs. Carter attended a Democratic National Committee fundraising dinner at the Washington Hilton Hotel from 9:42 to 11:34 p.m. on September 27, where he addressed the assembled guests. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) In the middle of Carter's speech, Hamilton Jordan informed him that the Israeli Knesset had voted 84–19 to remove Israeli settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Carter paused to announce this news to the audience. ("Carter Pauses in a Speech to Announce Vote," *Los Angeles Times*, September 28, 1978, p. 16)

³ See Document 66.

⁴ The text of the letter was released to the press on September 28, and is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II*, p. 1651.

⁵ See Document 64.

The Prime Minister: When you read my letter, you will understand what happened. We took the record compiled by Professor Barak who is a very precise man. You will see our views. I read your statement on this issue in the press today. I don't agree that there should be a freeze for more than three months. When you read my letter you will understand my position.

The President: I am determined to solve this question and we will try to minimize our differences.

The Prime Minister: I have already received an invitation from President Sadat to send a communications group to Egypt. They will go after Rosh Hashana.⁶ Mr. Atherton is coming here tomorrow.⁷

The President: I would like to see the Sinai agreement settled within days.

The Prime Minister: We can do it. We need only take an international peace treaty and copy its passages and write in what we agreed at Camp David.

The President: Do you think it would be a good idea for Weizman and Gamasy to meet privately?

The Prime Minister: Foreign Minister Dayan will be the head of our delegation. I will suggest this to Dayan, but he is the head. There are other ministers who will be included, such as Ezer, but we will consult on this. We need also to decide where to meet. I suggest that we meet first at a place where all three of us find mutually agreeable. This might be Washington. Maybe when we reach the peace treaty we should sign it in the White House. You should witness it. We will do this by mutual consultations. Our preference is to have the delegations meet under the sponsorship of the United States.

The President: We are ready to move. I will contact Sadat. The place of the meeting does not matter. Give my regards to Dayan, to Weizman, and especially to Barak. I am in love with him. He is the unsung hero of Camp David. He is a wonderful man.

⁶ Rosh Hashanah began at sunset on October 1.

⁷ On September 29, Atherton met with Begin to brief the Prime Minister on the meetings with Arab leaders that he and Vance had had since the conclusion of the Camp David talks. Atherton informed Begin that Carter had asked him to give the Israelis a "frank account" of those meetings and outlined three general concerns expressed by the Arab leaders. Atherton explained: "They felt Agreements not specific enough with respect to withdrawal from West Bank. With respect to Palestinian problem, they interpret Agreements as dealing primarily with inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza and as ignoring majority of Palestinians who live outside of this area. They interpret Agreements as basically an agenda for separate Egyptian-Israeli peace without sufficient assurance that a comprehensive peace will be achieved. Finally, they note that documents themselves do not mention Jerusalem." (Telegram 2703 from Jerusalem, September 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0160)

The Prime Minister: He is now a supreme court justice, but I have asked the president of the supreme court to let him have six months of leave so that he can participate in the peace treaty negotiations. I am very grateful to you, Mr. President, for your call.

The President: I am giving a press conference this afternoon. I intend to minimize our differences on the settlements question. I am sure you will be pleased with what I say.

66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 28, 1978, 1537Z

Tosec 110031/246945. Subject: Message From the President to Begin on Egypt—Israel Negotiations.

1. Deliver² following to Prime Minister as soon as Knesset votes approval of Camp David Agreements. Begin text.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 9/24–30/78. Secret; Sensitive; Niac Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, USDEL Secretary in New York, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Quandt and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2116) An earlier, draft version of the message to Begin, with Carter's amendments, as well as a September 27 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter bearing Carter's initialed approval, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 9, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 7–12/78.

² Carter's message was delivered to Begin by Lewis on September 29. At that meeting, also attended by Atherton, Begin proposed that the treaty negotiations begin in Washington on October 12 and confirmed that, in addition to Dayan, the Israeli delegation would consist of Weizman and Burg. Moreover, Begin and Dayan stressed to Lewis "that first agenda item should be nature of peace, not details of Sinai withdrawal, since withdrawal principles all basically agreed to at Camp David." (Telegram 13624 from Tel Aviv, September 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2083) On September 9, Lewis reported on a lunch with Dayan and Atherton following this meeting, and confirmed U.S. agreement on the October 12 date, pending Sadat's approval. At the lunch, Dayan and Atherton discussed further the timing of the negotiations concerning the West Bank. Dayan suggested that he would like to see the Israeli military government abolished and the self-governing body installed within three months, but that "frankly" he would like to see an Israeli-Egyptian agreement signed before West Bank self-government began. (Telegram 13716 from Tel Aviv, October 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2010)

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Once again, let me express my deep admiration for the courage and statesmanship you showed at Camp David. I am naturally gratified by the overwhelming approval given to the Camp David Agreements by the Government of Israel and by the Knesset.

2. The task we now face is to translate the framework documents into a negotiating process which can quickly resolve the remaining issues in Sinai, while also setting in motion the first stages of the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. I want to assure you, as I have President Sadat, that I remain ready to lend my full support to the successful conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. To this end, I believe every effort should be made to begin the talks on Sinai without delay following the Knesset vote. Now that the Knesset has acted, it would be desirable for Minister Weizman to meet with General Gamasy in Washington to explore the issues regarding Sinai security arrangements and withdrawal. Could you please give me your thoughts on this?

3. We will also want to move as rapidly as possible to initiate talks to implement the provisions of the West Bank and Gaza portion of the framework agreement. Ambassador Atherton will fill you in fully on Secretary Vance's talks with King Hussein, the Saudi leadership, [and] President Assad. King Hussein has not made up his mind about joining the negotiations but is giving the matter his most serious consideration. He has indicated he needs more time and would like to have further exchanges with us on the subject. I hope that he will decide to join once he fully understands the benefits that Jordan and the Palestinians stand to reap from their participation in the Agreements.

4. With friendship and respect, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter
End Quote.

Christopher

67. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1978, 1:50–1:57 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and
President Sadat

President Carter: Mr. President, I thank you for your support in the peace negotiations.

President Sadat: I value your contribution for peace. Without you nothing would have happened.

President Carter: How has the reception been in Egypt?

President Sadat: It is marvelous. It is as I expected.

President Carter: I was very grateful for the Knesset's vote.

President Sadat: It was very good news indeed. It was a good vote.

President Carter: We want to conclude the peace treaty as soon as possible? How soon can talks begin?

President Sadat: The discussions could begin on October 12th.² October 6th is a special day in Egypt.³

President Carter: When are you going to discuss the terms of the agreements with the Saudis and Jordanians?

President Sadat: I will consult with them tomorrow.

President Carter: After you have your consultations, let me know the results through diplomatic channels.⁴ We will help to get their support.

President Sadat: I will keep you informed.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 9–12/78. Secret. Carter wrote on the top of the transcript, "Zbig—He also said he agreed with my proposals on Sinai issues relayed to him by Eilts. J." The transcript was found attached to a September 28 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski bearing a handwritten notation that reads: "revised version hand carried to the President Sept 29."

² Carter underlined this sentence.

³ Reference is to Egypt's Armed Forces Day, an annual holiday commemorating the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces at the outset of the 1973 October War.

⁴ Eilts transmitted Sadat's September 28 letter to Fahd, in which he explained Egypt's actions at the Camp David Summit, in telegram 21918 from Cairo, September 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2161)

President Carter: We want to move as rapidly as possible after October 10th. If you have any messages send them directly to me. I hope we can resolve the place for the negotiations.

President Sadat: I have no preference at all. I will leave that to you.

68. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 29, 1978

SUBJECT

Consultations on Lebanon

At his press conference on September 28, the President referred to the possibility of "a conference of those who are involved" in Lebanon, "primarily the people who live in Lebanon, the different factions there." He also mentioned a "new charter" for Lebanon and some form of UN action, presumably in promoting a conference of interested parties. (See the attached portions of the press conference.)²

In response to questions, we have been saying that the President's statement does not constitute a formal proposal. We will be consulting with the Lebanese government and others on possible next steps to alleviate the crisis in Lebanon.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 135, Quandt: 9/78. Secret. Sent for information.

² Attached but not printed are the portions of Carter's press conference related to Lebanon, in which he responded to a question regarding the situation in Lebanon by suggesting the convening of a multinational conference to resolve the crisis. According to Quandt, Carter's response was an "offhand reference." (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 267) The complete transcript of the press conference is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1653–1663.

³ On the evening of September 27, heavy fighting, including artillery fire, erupted in East Beirut between Christian militia and Syrian forces, killing six and wounding 50. Militia officials blamed the Syrians for the skirmish, which they described as the worst since the July 1978 bombardment of East Beirut, stating the move was intended to disrupt the Camp David Accords. This charge was countered by a communiqué from the largely Syrian Arab League peacekeeping force faulting the militia for the violence, adding that it "cannot go too far in its toleration" and "will regretfully find itself forced to silence sources of fire effectively and quickly wherever they are found." ("Beirut Erupts; Syrians Accused of Attempting to Wreck Accords," *Los Angeles Times*, September 29, 1978, p. 11)

Secretary Vance will be discussing this issue at the UN⁴—he meets with the French Foreign Minister today⁵—and you will want to compare notes with him before you depart for Europe.

Without knowing how Secretary Vance is handling this in his talks, let me make a few points:

—An “all parties” conference on Lebanon is probably not in the cards, since the parties include Syria, the PLO, Israel, and the Christian militias, as well as the Sarkis government.⁶ I do not see these disparate groups all sitting down with one another.

—There may be some prospect for us to organize talks among “friends of Lebanon”—France, Saudi Arabia, the Vatican, Jordan. We should be a bit cautious in taking our cues on Lebanon from Egypt or Israel in present circumstances. Both have their own axes to grind.

—Lebanon’s problems will not be solved by a “new charter.” A fairly good political formula was worked out in late 1976 when Sarkis was elected President. (It provided for an equitable sharing of power among the various political communities in Lebanon.)

With those caveats in mind, we should recognize that there will be no solution to the Lebanese crisis until the following steps are taken:

—The Syrian army disengages from the areas of confrontation with the Christian militias in Beirut. This requires the introduction of a loyal Lebanese armed force.

—The creation of a Lebanese army/gendarmarie loyal to Sarkis and responsive to his orders. (This seems to be politically impossible, but the effort has to be made.)

⁴ Vance referenced Carter’s September 28 remarks in his statement at the opening of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 29, stating that Carter had “made clear” his “determination to spare no effort to assist in finding a solution to the Lebanese tragedy.” The current UN force, Vance argued, “has done much to stabilize the situation in that part of the country, and we call upon all to support this effort to reassert Lebanese sovereignty . . . As the President said yesterday, it is time for us to take joint action to call for a conference of those who are involved and try to reach some solution. It may involve a new charter for Lebanon.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1978, p. 49)

⁵ Vance discussed the situation in Lebanon, Carter’s September 28 statement, and his UNGA speech with French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud on September 29. In telegram 251591 to Paris, October 4, Christopher summarized the conversation, reporting that the French “expressed keen interest in possible USG initiative for a conference on Lebanon and urged full consultation with France and others before any such meeting be called.” Vance explained to Guiringaud “that USG was still examining all options to break Lebanon impasse,” emphasizing that “no decisions had yet been taken,” but promised the French “full and early consultations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780405–0833)

⁶ In a telephone conversation on the evening of September 29, Parker raised Carter’s press conference remarks with Boutros. Parker reported in telegram 5700 from Beirut, September 30, the Lebanese were “disturbed that idea of this importance would be floated without consulting them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780399–0724)

—Some reduction in arms and serious restraint on the part of the extremist Christian militias (who are aided and abetted by Israel).

—Some means of reducing the size of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, particularly that of the armed PLO elements.

Significant progress on any one of these steps would be worth more than a dozen conferences. The problem is to find channels of influence to move forward on any or all of these fronts. What we should be doing now instead of calling for conferences or discussing new charters is to identify correctly the problem, then try to figure out how to influence directly or indirectly the Syrians, the Christian militias, the Israelis, and the PLO, while simultaneously providing Sarkis with a bit of backbone. But we have to think of what we can realistically ask each of these parties to do. A plea for restraint and moderation is not going to get very far.

I suggest that we explore with Sarkis, the Syrians, the Israelis, the Saudis and the French the following steps:

—Disengagement of Syrian troops from Beirut and their replacement by Lebanese army units.

—Simultaneous steps to insure that the Christian militias do not take advantage of a Syrian withdrawal by seizing control of more territory by force. (The Israelis will have to help with the militias.)

—Active consultations with Sarkis and other Lebanese political leaders to mobilize support for a more assertive Lebanese governmental role in ending the fighting. (The arrival of our new Ambassador⁷ provides an opportunity for extensive political contacts.)

⁷ Parker departed Beirut on October 1. Carter nominated the new Ambassador, John Gunther Dean, on September 15. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book. II, p. 1513) Dean was formally appointed on October 2 and presented his credentials to the Lebanese Government on October 10.

69. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State and the Embassy in Israel¹

Jerusalem, September 30, 1978, 1127Z

2707. Subject: Atherton Meets West Bank/Gazan Palestinians.

Summary: Ambassador Atherton initiated high-level U.S. dialogue with West Bank/Gaza Palestinians evening September 29. Palestinians expressed their concerns over perceived shortcomings and ambiguities of Camp David Framework and received detailed US explanations and clarifications. Atherton made clear US recognizes centrality of Palestinian issue and quoted from Secretary's UNGA speech² to good effect. Palestinians stressed, among other things, necessity: settlement freeze throughout transitional period; either Hussein or PLO entering negotiations; Jerusalem must be discussed and Arab residents of East Jerusalem must be able to vote for transitional authority. Atherton indicated that while Palestinians might find their particular framework wanting in some respects, it did offer genuine opportunities and they should consider carefully their alternatives. At end, Nu-seibeh said West Bankers/Gazans would draw up document setting forth their views on Camp David Framework's shortcomings. Meeting was boycotted by pro-PLO mayors but we are certain they will receive

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780399–1152. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Niact Immediate to Tel Aviv. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Sent for information to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, and USUN. On September 22, the Consulate General in Jerusalem reported that while "we have not thought it appropriate" for Vance or Atherton to meet with West Bankers in previous visits, "[i]n the fundamentally changed circumstances after Camp David, we believe a quiet unpublicized meeting by Ambassador Atherton with leading West Bankers could help build support for the Camp David Agreements." (Telegram 2631 from Jerusalem, September 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780387–0095) After discussing the proposal with Lewis on September 27, Newlin confirmed the plan to hold a meeting between Atherton and West Bank/Gaza notables on September 29, in order to "allay some of their underlying fears and misgivings." (Telegram 2673 from Jerusalem, September 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780394–1196)

² In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 29, Vance devoted the bulk of his discussion of the Middle East to the subject of the Palestinians. He emphasized the Carter administration's commitment to seeking a negotiated solution to the "problem of the Palestinians in the broadest sense" and the importance of the Camp David Accords as the means whereby this solution would be found. "We believe that the Palestinian people must be assured that they and their descendents can live with dignity and freedom and have the opportunity for economic fulfillment and for political expression, Vance asserted. "The Camp David accords make a solid start toward achieving these goals," Vance stated, by making provision for the end of Israeli occupation, the negotiated institution of a self-governing authority, and the definition of the relationship of the institutions of self-government to Palestinians outside of the area, including "the question of admission of Palestinian refugees to the West Bank and Gaza." (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1978, p. 49)

full briefing. Palestinians expressed genuine appreciation for opportunity to meet high-level US official for first time. End summary.

1. Atherton met with six West Bankers (Bethlehem mayor Freij, Nablus notables Hikmat and Zafar al-Masri, Jerusalem notable Nuseibeh, Ramallah lawyer Shehadeh, and Bir Zeit professor Nazzal), and three Gazans (Mansour Shawwa, son of Gaza mayor, Gaza notable Abu Ghazzalleh and Gaza lawyer Abu Rahmi) at DPO³ residence in East Jerusalem evening September 29. Invited pro-PLO mayors of Nablus, Tulkarm, Ramallah, El Bireh, and Halhul had agreed to boycott meeting; three of the invited Gazans did not show up. In addition to Consul General and DPO, Twinam, Blackwell, and ICA Officer Smith were present.

2. Introducing his remarks by noting that Secretary Vance had personally wanted him to meet with West Bank/Gazans while in Jerusalem, Atherton expressed his own pleasure for this opportunity. He then gave an account of Camp David summit concluding by noting that meeting was "a cliff hanger" with agreement achieved on last day. One of the main new elements coming out of the meeting which should be recognized by all is the personal engagement of President Carter and fact that U.S. will continue to be fully involved as active partner in all negotiations flowing from Camp David. Atherton stressed centrality of Palestinian issue.

3. Leading off for Palestinians, Jerusalem notable Nuseibeh (brother of Jordanian UN Ambassador) stated frankly that he was not happy with Agreements and found there were many gaps. He thought that Sadat had put Palestinians in difficult position. For example, Sadat had insisted on Israeli recognition of Arab sovereignty in Sinai and subsequent dismantling of Israeli settlements there, but had not required same Israeli recognition for equally Arab sovereign land in West Bank, including East Jerusalem. According to Nuseibeh, there was an "uneven" quality in the two documents which encouraged Palestinians suspicions that basically Camp David was a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli deal at the expense of Palestinians.

4. Next up was Nablus notable Hikmat al-Masri who also struck note of difference in treatment of Sinai and West Bank. In the former, a total immediate withdrawal was sought and obtained, while for the West Bank, it was left as negotiable.

5. Atherton responded by recounting history of Carter administration's efforts at reaching comprehensive Middle East peace settlement and Sadat initiative.⁴ He reminded Palestinians that Sadat could have

³ Donald A. Kruse was DPO at the Consulate General in Jerusalem.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 4.

had a bilateral deal as early as last November, but wanted to negotiate a framework for all parties. Sadat, however, could only act for Egypt at Camp David; he could not negotiate further for Palestinians. In fact, Atherton noted, there was no other party who could negotiate for Palestinians at Camp David. Acknowledging that Camp David Agreements did not have everything Palestinians desired, he said that choice became either what was attainable or nothing at all. The U.S. is convinced that Accords do move the process forward and represent significant changes in Israeli positions. Clearly Accords go beyond SC Resolution 242 and Palestinian problem is now recognized by Israel for first time as having political and territorial dimensions; not just a refugee problem. Although all issues were not resolved at Camp David, Sadat gave up no Arab positions there, Atherton concluded.

6. Ramallah lawyer Shehadeh was concerned about use of term “West Bank” rather than “occupied territories” in Camp David Agreements as this might make it difficult to bring East Jerusalem into negotiations. Israelis will want to consider East Jerusalem as outside purview of negotiations while Shehadeh noted it is essential for Arabs that it be included. At this point, son of Gaza mayor Shawwa defended Sadat by asking if anyone could have gotten more. For him, the most important thing was ending the settlements. Hikmat al-Masri agreed that ending settlements was 70 percent of Palestinian position. Expressing apologies on behalf of mayors who did not attend, Nazzal said he had just seen several of them who wanted to relay two questions—(1) why was U.S. meeting with Palestinians now and not before? (did GOI approve?), and (2) why not deal with PLO who are the real representatives of Palestinians?

7. After dinner, group discussion resumed with Atherton responding to Nuseibeh’s request for briefing on what other Arabs were saying. After describing reactions he had gotten in other places, Atherton described his Amman stop where he found the King undecided. There was a debate going on in Jordan. He said that Jordanians took his explanations at face value. However, when he asked Jordanians what it would take to get them in process, Atherton reported that they were unable to answer. Jordanians have asked questions of U.S. and wish to continue dialogue with us, Atherton said.

8. Atherton then explained in detail Camp David Accords and urged that Palestinians should focus on positive rather than negative aspects. He counselled them to focus on wording of Agreements rather than subsequent statements by either Israelis or other parties.

9. During following wide-open discussion period with all Palestinians participating, following were themes and concerns raised:

(a) Israeli settlements—this was primary preoccupation. Freij, Hikmat al-Masri and others stressed need for Israeli commitment to

settlement freeze during interim period. Nazzal said “we don’t mind Jews buying land” but settlements are different. He thought it vital that self-governing authority be responsible for all public land from Jordanian times as this was land which Israelis had primarily taken for settlements. Atherton reiterated U.S. understanding of settlement freeze issue.

(b) Arabs in East Jerusalem—Shehadeh and Freij were concerned about 100,000 Arabs in East Jerusalem and especially their right to participate in West Bank elections. They thought Israelis would veto this. Atherton said that he was not sure this was the Israeli position and suggested that Dayan be queried. Freij said he would do so next time he saw Dayan.

(c) Return of 1967 displaces—several Palestinians asked when 1967 displaced persons would be allowed to return and Atherton said the Framework agreement provides for return during transition period.

(d) End of military government and administration—Shehadeh said that General Orly had told him recently that Israelis were committed by Camp David Agreements to end military government in West Bank/Gaza within three months and that this would be done come what may. Atherton noted comprehensive Framework provided for negotiations to set up modalities for elections to self-governing authority and that there was no time limit involved. Shehadeh said if Israelis were going to get out within three months, this would force West Bankers to adopt a position. Other Palestinians present considered Orly’s remarks to be a hollow threat since Israel would never permit the state of civil anarchy to develop on the West Bank similar to that in Lebanon.

(3) Restriction on individuals—in response to inquiries about who can participate in self-governing authority, Atherton said that there was no restrictions on inhabitants of West Bank/Gaza but that those from outside would have to be acceptable to all parties.

10. Throughout discussion, there were frequent references by West Bankers to their inability to represent all Palestinians and a call for U.S. to talk to PLO as the “national liberation movement” of Palestine. As Nazzal put it, “we are in a tough situation; we don’t want to dig our own graves.” Also there were statements suggesting that US guarantee outcome of negotiations. Atherton responded that US could not guarantee the results, but does guarantee the process and continued US involvement in the process. Reiterating deep American interest in Palestinian issue, Atherton quoted from Secretary’s UNGA speech earlier that day.⁵

⁵ See footnote 2 above.

11. In a final statement, highly respected Hikmat al-Masri said that all present appreciated this first opportunity to speak to high-level US official and asked that Atherton carry back to Washington all of the points raised. He reminded Atherton that despite willingness of those present to convey personal views, they could not speak on behalf of all Palestinians; “only Arafat or the King can now represent us.”

12. Nuseibeh said that West Bank/Gaza would attempt to prepare paper which would point out shortcoming in Camp David Agreements as seen by Palestinians.

13. Comment: This was a meeting “whose time had come.” Palestinians who attend wanted to hear high-level expression of US policy and were prepared to ask serious and thoughtful questions. Recriminations and polemics were noticeably minimal. Granted that group was composed of relatively moderate leaders. Nevertheless, all West Bank/Gaza participants were genuine Palestinian nationalists. It was unfortunate that mayors could not hear Atherton’s authoritative explanations and clarifications. Nevertheless, I am sure the word will soon spread and I think (via al-Masri, Freij, Shehadeh and Nazzal) our dialogue with West Bankers/Gazans has had a significant boost. End comment.

14. (Ambassador Atherton made no comment to the press either before or after this meeting.)

15. Foregoing was reconstructed from memory by ConGen and Embassy participants after Ambassador Atherton had departed.⁶ He may wish to comment.

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⁶ Atherton departed for Cairo where he briefed Sadat on September 30 on his meeting with the Palestinians. At the outset, Atherton explained that the meeting “had been at our own initiative” and that Vance had told him in Damascus that such a meeting would be “useful.” (Telegram 21929 from Cairo, September 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2176)

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:45 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Carter-Gromyko Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Warnke
Ambassador Toon
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. V.G. Makarov
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. A.A. Bessmertnykh
Mr. N.N. Detinov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

Middle East

The President believed that both our countries wanted to pursue peace in that region. Each of us had close relations with the countries involved in the Middle East dispute. We felt that the Camp David discussion had produced a viable mechanism for working out a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the main combatants in that area. He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union could help to move this process along, and that within the bounds of its own foreign policy it would support the Camp David agreements. We did not have any military forces in that area and, in fact, our observers in the Sinai might be removed once that peace treaty went into effect.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/20–25/78. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Drafted by Krimer. The memorandum, printed in its entirety, is also in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union.

Gromyko wanted to speak briefly on some specific aspects the President had touched upon.

Middle East

With regard to the Middle East situation he had to say that the Soviet Union took a different approach to the actual state of affairs in that area. He would note that both sides agreed that the situation there was complex and dangerous. As for methods to resolve Middle East problems and the specific political steps necessary to ensure a settlement of the Middle East problems, our respective standpoints were entirely different. Regarding the Camp David meetings, of course the President would know that the Soviet Union did not share his views concerning the results achieved and would not associate itself with the process and methods used. The Soviets were against separate “deals.” Gromyko would say that the United States had acted rudely toward the Soviet Union despite the common understanding achieved last year, to the effect that we would take concerted action with respect to the Middle East. He noted that the United States had gone a separate way, demonstratively disregarding the previous understanding with the Soviet Union.

As for Camp David, if anything was accomplished there, it was that Israel had obtained what it had been striving for from the very beginning, while Sadat had received nothing and had in fact lost everything he had. At the same time Syria and Jordan and the Palestinians had been completely circumvented, producing great disarray in the ranks of the Arabs. Was this really the path to peace and calm in the Middle East? The Soviets did not believe so, and no one could convert them to the views of the United States or Sadat or Begin on this score. They had their own assessment and views. That the Soviet Union wanted peace in the Middle East was well known throughout the world. It wanted to see the states in the Middle East live in peace as independent sovereign states, and this, of course, included Israel. The Soviet Union had stated this hundreds of times for all the world to hear, and its position was well known. It was equally well known that the Soviet Union wanted to do all in its power to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Now he could only say that they would have to wait and see how events developed in the future.

Gromyko asked the President not to consider him a pessimist. The Soviets were optimists and firmly believed that eventually all the problems would be resolved for the people of the Middle East. The Soviets had never had any idea of pushing Israel into the sea. On the contrary, they had upheld Israel many times in the international arena, certainly to a much greater extent than the Israelis themselves were doing by their ill-considered extremist statements. Gromyko concluded his

discussion of the Middle East by saying he supposed each of us would retain our own concepts with regard to the Middle East.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

71. Editorial Note

In the aftermath of the resumption of artillery clashes between Lebanese Christian militias and Syrian forces in the area around the Lebanese capital, Beirut, on September 27, 1978, a new, more intense round of fighting broke out on September 30. That morning, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut reported the shelling of the villages of Bikfayah and Beit Meri by Syrian artillery, the “first time villages in [the] Christian heartland have been subject to bombardment since [the] Syrians came.” (Telegram 5704 from Beirut, September 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780399–0898) For Embassy officials, this new round represented a “qualitative change for the worse” and was “the heaviest fighting since the 1975–76 civil war.” This “significant escalation,” they suspected, had been “intentionally provoked” by the Lebanese Christian militias in order to “dissuade” Lebanese President Elias Sarkis from asking for a renewal of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), the multi-national Arab peacekeeping force dispatched to Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1975–1976 conflict, which was due to expire. They also speculated that the Lebanese Christians may also have provoked the fighting “as a way of pressuring USG to follow through on [the] idea of [an] international conference on Lebanon.” Despite this, however, the Embassy believed that the Syrian forces were “very seriously over-reacting.” (Telegram 5710 from Beirut, September 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780399–1206) Hostilities escalated further early on October 2 as Syrian forces began shelling East Beirut. The Embassy in Beirut cabled regular situation reports to Washington on the continuing artillery duels between the Syrians and the Lebanese Christian militias between October 2 and October 5. The telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File.

President Jimmy Carter asked the Department of State to prepare policy recommendations for bringing an end to the crisis in Lebanon. In response, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance prepared for Carter a memorandum outlining twelve possible initiatives the U.S. Government could undertake. At the beginning of the undated memorandum, Vance wrote that any “serious effort, to resolve, rather than simply to

contain, the Lebanese crisis will require international support.” “Equally important,” Vance continued, “it will require pressure on Israel to reduce significantly and ultimately to end its military relationship with the Maronites” and “particularly to refrain from employing their presence in Lebanon to alter the political balance. Syria will also have to keep the Palestinians under control.” Vance’s suggested initiatives called for inviting greater United Nations participation, including UN military and police forces, the appointment of a special UN representative to Lebanon, and the expansion of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) to include the entire country (Options 1–4, 7, 11); organizing a high level international conference under UN auspices with Saudi assistance (Option 5) or a conference of Arab States exclusively (Option 6); imposing an arms embargo and blockade of Lebanon (Option 7); initiating direct U.S. interaction with the Lebanese Government through the establishment of a U.S. military training mission (Option 9) or the formulation of a U.S. proposal to resolve the “domestic political aspects of the crisis” (Option 10); and urging Lebanon to invite a “Wise Man’s Group” of international statesmen “acquainted with Lebanon’s problems” to visit the country (Option 12). In a series of handwritten annotations on the document, Carter indicated his views: United Nations involvement was a “possibility” and an arms embargo and blockade would bring a “probable confrontation w/Israel.” At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “There don’t seem to be any really good ideas. Saudis and UN best hope.” (Memorandum from Vance to Carter, undated; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 71, Brzezinski, Chron: 10/1–10/78)

On October 4, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing wrote to President Carter, suggesting a ceasefire solution. Giscard informed him that he had been in touch with Lebanese President Sarkis who had suggested redeploying ADF forces “in the most exposed sectors of the Beirut metropolitan area in such a way as to avoid contact between the military elements of one side or the other,” with the objective of eventually replacing these forces with Lebanese army units. The French President agreed to support this initiative and to take it to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad for the latter’s approval. Giscard stated to Carter that he had done this “in the most urgent terms.” Carter responded to Giscard on October 5, stating his strong support for the initiative and emphasizing the need for the continuation of U.S.-French cooperation over Lebanon. The texts of Giscard’s October 4 letter and Carter’s October 5 response are in telegram Tosec 110083/253369 to Secretary of State Vance and Damascus, Tel Aviv, Beirut, and USUN, October 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2201) Carter also sent a letter to Assad, who was then in Moscow for talks with the Soviets, urging him to accept the ceasefire terms. The text of

Carter's letter, sent in telegram 253368 to Moscow, October 5, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 88, Syria: 4/78–5/79. Chargé d'Affaires Jack F. Matlock delivered Carter's letter to Assad at the Kremlin at 9:30 a.m. on October 6. After going through the letter with an interpreter, Assad delivered a preliminary response to Matlock. Assad stated that Syrians also sought to avoid bloodshed, that the "main responsibility for the situation lies on the Israelis," and that he would study Carter's letter "carefully" in Damascus and confer with Sarkis. Matlock responded that Vance had made "strong representations to top Israeli officials regarding Israeli military support for the militia" and that the United States was prepared "to go to the Security Council today if the fighting does not stop." (Telegram 24032 from Moscow, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–1016) A more detailed record of this conversation is in telegram 24033 from Moscow, October 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–1141)

Vance contacted the Israelis on October 6 through a personal message to Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman. In the message, Vance stated he was "deeply concerned" about Israeli involvement in Lebanon, including the shelling of the Lebanese coast by Israeli gunboats, and the "threatening language" used by Israeli officials "to suggest that Israeli intervention in northern Lebanon may be desirable in order to provoke UN intervention." Vance cautioned that Israeli military intervention would be a "historic mistake," and undermine the "fragile" Camp David Accords. (Telegram Secto 11033 from USDEL Secretary in New York, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–0645) U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis conveyed the substance of the message to Weizman by telephone at 0710Z on October 6. (Telegram 14047 from Tel Aviv, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–1015) Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded to Vance's message on behalf of his government stating that Israel "cannot under any circumstances ignore the cry of men, women, and children being cruelly slaughtered by artillery and tanks." Begin urged the United States to push for an immediate ceasefire. (Telegram 255417 to Tel Aviv, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780410–0083)

Carter sought Soviet support for the ceasefire and dispatched another letter to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev via the hotline on October 5. The letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. Brezhnev responded on October 6, stating his agreement that "the immediate termination of hostilities by all sides participating in the conflict must be realized."

The text of Brezhnev's response is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/77–12/78.

The United Nations Security Council made a formal call for a ceasefire in Lebanon on October 6. Syrian armed forces declared a unilateral ceasefire in Lebanon on October 7. (Joe Alex Morris, Jr., "Syrian Forces Declare Beirut Cease-Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, October 8, 1978, page A1) Following this, the Department of State issued ceasefire implementation instructions to the Embassies in Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tel Aviv. (Telegram 256088 to multiple posts, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780411–0704)

72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

Subject

Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel

We have received agreement in principle from both Egypt and Israel to send Foreign and Defense Ministers to Washington in October for talks on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Begin has told Sam Lewis that Dayan, Weizman and a group of advisors could be in Washington on October 12 to begin talks;² Sadat has told Hermann Eilts and Roy Atherton he could send his delegation of nine to ten members for talks to begin on October 12.³ I suggest that we now move to extend formal invitations for talks to begin here on October 12. Attached are draft letters from you to Begin and Sadat.

We have looked at a number of possible locations for the conference. We do not believe that an out-of-town site would be desirable, for it would be inconvenient and would slow messages we might wish to send to Sadat and Begin. In Washington, we think that Dumbarton Oaks would be an ideal site not only because of its fine facilities, but also for the symbolism of holding the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotia-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850035–1878. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See footnote 2, Document 66.

³ See footnote 2, Document 61.

tions at the site of the 1944 negotiations for the UN Charter. If you agree, I would like to have the Department begin immediately to make the necessary arrangements with Harvard University, the owner of Dumbarton Oaks, for its possible use as site for the talks.⁴

I recommend that our negotiating team be headed by myself, with Roy Atherton as my Deputy. We have been considering whether to bring Ambassadors Eilts and Lewis back to Washington to participate in the talks. Sadat and Begin will remain in their respective capitals, and I believe it will be more important to have Eilts and Lewis stay at their posts to work with Sadat and Begin on problems that arise in the talks. Unless you have other views, I will instruct Eilts and Lewis accordingly.⁵

Recommendation:

1. That you approve the attached letters to Sadat and Begin.⁶
2. That you authorize the Department of State to explore the possibility of having Dumbarton Oaks as site for the Egyptian-Israeli talks.

⁴ In his memoirs, Vance wrote that “a number of possible sites for the talks” were considered, but ultimately, Blair House, the official guest residence of the President, located across the street from the White House, was chosen as the venue for the conference. “Although its physical facilities were not really suited to this use,” he noted, the “historic nature of the site added to the atmosphere of serious purpose, and it was assumed that the delegates would have other work space at the nearby Madison Hotel. Eventually, more and more of the working parties’ meetings shifted to the hotel, which became known among the delegates as ‘Camp Madison.’” (*Hard Choices*, pp. 232–233)

⁵ In telegram 250355 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, October 2, Saunders instructed Eilts and Lewis to remain at their posts during the talks since neither Sadat nor Begin would be attending. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2069)

⁶ Carter indicated his approval of both recommendations and initialed “J” below them.

Attachment**Draft Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat⁷**

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. President:

Now that the Israeli Knesset has approved the “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel,” as well as the withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty, I believe we should proceed to begin the talks to conclude peace between Egypt and Israel.

I would like therefore to⁸ extend to the Government of Egypt an invitation to send its Foreign and Defense Ministers⁹ to Washington for talks to begin on October 12 with their Israeli counterparts. I am today sending this same invitation to Prime Minister Begin.

I have asked Secretary Vance to represent the United States at these talks, which we are prepared to arrange to be held at an appropriate site in Washington.

With all best wishes,

Jimmy Carter¹⁰

⁷ No classification marking. The letter as amended by Carter was sent to Cairo on October 2. (Telegram 249940 to Cairo, October 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402–0561) Eilts reported in telegram 22019 from Cairo, October 2, that the letter was delivered to the office of Boutros-Ghali for couriating to Sadat at The Barrages. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402–0902) Boutros Ghali informed Eilts on October 3 that Sadat had instructed him to accept formally the invitation. The Egyptian foreign ministry previously informed the Egyptian media of Sadat’s acceptance the night of October 2. (Telegram 22050 from Cairo, October 3, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780403–1090)

⁸ Carter struck through “would like” and “to” in this phrase.

⁹ Carter crossed out the phrase “its Foreign and Defense Ministers” and replaced it with “your negotiating team.”

¹⁰ Carter wrote: “OK. J” next to this typewritten signature.

Attachment

Draft Letter From President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹¹

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Let me once again tell you of my admiration for the courage and skill with which you have approached the difficult but historically important decisions made in the Knesset September 28. As we agreed on the phone, with the conclusion of the Knesset's vote, I believe we should now proceed to begin the talks to conclude peace between Egypt and Israel.

I would like therefore to¹² extend to the Government of Israel an invitation to send its Foreign and Defense Ministers¹³ to Washington for talks to begin on October 12 with their Egyptian counterparts. I am today sending this same invitation to President Sadat.

I have asked Secretary Vance to represent the United States at this conference, which we are prepared to arrange to be held at an appropriate site in Washington.

With all best wishes,

Jimmy Carter¹⁴

¹¹ No classification marking. The letter, as amended by Carter, was sent to Tel Aviv on October 2. (Telegram 249939 to Tel Aviv, October 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402-0559) Lewis reported in telegram 13788 from Tel Aviv, October 3, that the letter was delivered to Begin's residence the morning of October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780403-1102)

¹² Carter struck through "would like" and "to" in this phrase.

¹³ Carter crossed out the phrase "its Foreign and Defense Ministers" and replaced it with "your negotiating team."

¹⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

73. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Comments of King Husayn on his Perception Of U.S. Pressure on Jordan to Join the Middle East Peace Negotiations and on his Recent Discussions with Saudi and Gulf Leaders

1. In King Husayn's contacts with the United States, and in particular in three letters² and one telephone call³ he has received from President Carter, Husayn has discerned the following theme: entering the negotiations is a difficult and risky course, but the King has taken risks in the past; furthermore, not getting involved holds far more risks. These and other messages—indicating that if Jordan “falls into line” its military and economic needs will be satisfied—add up in the King's mind to an implied threat. (Comment: In a separate conversation, Jordan Armed Forces Commander in Chief Lt. Gen. Bin Shakir stated that during his June 1978 visit to the U.S. he was told by a U.S. Presidential Advisor that Jordan had been too “passive” about getting into the peace process.) At one point, Husayn noted that he will never reach the level of importance that Israel has in U.S. eyes, and that he can never turn to the Soviets. He said, “I may go down.”

2. Very evident throughout the conversation was Husayn's frustration with the Saudis. He described Crown Prince Fahd as indecisive and ineffective while having all the power in the world at his disposal. He urged Fahd that they set up a committee of two to discuss “alternatives”, as time was running out. Fahd agreed in principle; when Husayn asked when they could meet for a follow-up, Fahd said he would have to check first with King Khalid. This apparently exasperated King Husayn, who figured that getting Khalid's clearance could take weeks. In Saudi Arabia, Husayn observed, nothing gets done right and nothing gets done on time. (Comment: Though Husayn did not mention Saudi aid to Jordan, we can probably safely assume that he got no definitive answer from Fahd on this score either.)

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1978), Box 7, Folder 3, J-3: Jordan. Secret; Sensitive. The report was forwarded under an October 7 covering memorandum from Turner to Vance, which indicated that the information in the report was also provided to Brzezinski and Veliotis. In the memorandum, Turner stated that [*text not declassified*] had not seen Hussein in “such an apocalyptic mood since the evening following the Rabat Summit Decision.” (Ibid.)

² See footnote 1, Document 11 and Document 55.

³ See Document 52.

3. Husayn's overall prediction is that the Saudi regime is going to go under. "I think people are underestimating the capacity for madness in this part of the world", he observed. Husayn observed that some of the younger princes of Saudi Arabia do not care for the traditional ways of the people at the top; and furthermore, it was one of these princes who killed the late King Faysal. Husayn then recalled how King Faysal with one masterful stroke (i.e., the oil embargo) completely restored Saudi Arabia's credibility. Husayn felt certain that if Faysal were alive today, the Saudi reaction to Camp David would have been decisive and different.

4. This led Husayn off on one of his conspiracy theory of history tangents, as he mused aloud why Faysal had been killed and whether this was part of a larger plan. He then went on to describe the pattern of events in which Jordan has been systematically squeezed for the past several years. He sees Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat as the leading figure behind this, but implicit in what Husayn said was that there was U.S. backing throughout as well. "Sometimes I think I was born in the wrong century", said Husayn, who added that it is no longer a question of principles but rather a situation in which computers take over and one's position and role are war-gamed by somebody from afar. (Comment: Read Washington).

5. Also during the conversation, Husayn touched on his visits to the individual Gulf countries, which he found to be completely under the influence of Saudi Arabia. He has a special feeling for the Bahrainis as wiser and more genuine than the rest. He found the Qataris worried about pressure from Iraq. In Kuwait, he was told by the leadership that the Iraqis are worried as to what would happen were the Shah of Iran to be overthrown. (Comment: Overall, Husayn reads the Iraqis as disposed to be more moderate.) In Oman, Husayn found the Sultan to have the tribes under much better control than previously, as Qabus has appointed new chiefs and received new pledges of loyalty. Everywhere Husayn went in the Gulf he found anger with Sadat, not so much for having placed Egypt first, but for his tactics and methods.

6. Husayn plans shortly to write a letter⁴ to President Carter in which he will explain fully his position on the peace process and the Camp David accords. He is still planning to visit the U.S. soon after the first of the year and feels more than ever that to visit now would be very bad timing.

⁴ Not found.

74. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Preliminary Views on the Conduct of the Egypt-Israel Negotiations in Washington

Major bilateral issues between Egypt and Israel have been resolved and, while the negotiations will take some time because of the care and detail involved, it should not be difficult for the two sides to move steadily to agreement on the precise terms of a peace treaty. In our role as participant and chairman of the talks we face no obstacles as serious as those at Camp David on this aspect, although there are a couple that have not been discussed and there will be snags where our own intervention will be important in moving issues to resolution.

The main issues we face in the talks opening October 12 are: (a) how to engage the two sides in discussion of West Bank/Gaza issues, if possible reaching further agreement on at least some issues, so as to improve the prospects for Jordanian and Palestinian participation in West Bank/Gaza negotiations; and (b) related to this, whether the Egyptians will at this stage try to reintroduce some link between implementation of their Treaty with the agreement on the West Bank/Gaza.

Organizing the Talks on Bilateral Issues

Our own approach to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, as you know, envisages a fairly short basic treaty text supplemented by two annexes that spell out (a) the withdrawal and security aspects, with an accompanying map, and (b) commitments to peace in specific terms. Even if the two sides decide to approach it differently from the point of view of a Treaty text, the basic division of work we have sketched out appears logical. This would suggest that the talks could, very soon after opening, break down into 3 working groups that would work on (a) the basic Treaty text; (b) a military annex; and (c) an annex detailing commitments to peace and normalization of relations. (The Israelis have signaled their wish to proceed first with the commitments and normalization of peace aspect; we assume they can be talked out of this since

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, unlabeled folder. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner on October 6. Sterner also initialed the memorandum. The initials “CV” are stamped at the bottom of the first page indicating that Vance saw the memorandum.

the talks will be in immediate trouble if either side insists on a one-sided approach.) Under this kind of format we would need to field a delegation (see below) that can keep a member present in each of these committees. We will also need, in addition to good general strength in Arab-Israel affairs, expertise in two special fields—military and legal.

We see all the real work being performed in these sub-groups, with the plenary convened for opening and closing sessions, or perhaps periodically to hear progress reports from the working committees. Our delegation members will presumably serve very informally as chairmen in the working committees but we envisage letting the two sides get on with the work in their own manner as much as possible without guidance from us so long as they are able to make progress in this manner. Our role in the negotiations on bilateral issues will be to be present so that we know what is going on, to be available for consultations, and to be alert to possible trouble spots which might require our intervention, either with the ministers here or through our ambassadors in the capitals.

Your Role

The President will open the proceedings on October 12 with a short public speech, after which the meeting will go into closed session and you will be in the chair. We suggest you use the remaining time before lunch that first day to outline our suggestions for a format for the talks and to settle on procedural matters. After a working lunch, which we suggest you host, we may wish to continue discussions in plenary for a further afternoon session before breaking up, for the following day, into working groups. The afternoon session might be the time for you to make it clear we intend to use the talks here to tackle West Bank/Gaza issues as well.

With the negotiations moving into its working group phase the next morning, there would no longer be a need for you to maintain a regular presence at the talks. Roy Atherton would take over as Chairman. We hope that you will keep time available in the first few days to engage the two ministers in discussions about West Bank/Gaza issues.

The U.S. Delegation

We recommend:

Cyrus Vance, Chairman

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.,

Deputy Chairman

Harold Saunders

William Quandt

Michael Sterner

William Kirby

James Covey

Alternates:

Morris Draper

David Korn

General Richard Lawrence, Military Member
Herbert Hansell, Legal Advisor
George Sherman, Spokesman

While part of the delegation, I would not plan to spend full time with the talks. With the Egyptian-Israeli talks launched, I would plan to devote my time—in addition to tending other NEA matters—to preparing for the West Bank/Gaza talks.

Engaging the Two Sides in West Bank/Gaza Issues

The Egyptians will be all for this, although we do not know how far Sadat is prepared to go in slowing down progress on an Egypt-Israel treaty to achieve a further stage of understanding on West Bank/Gaza issues. Boutros Ghali, in his latest conversation² with Hermann, continues to deny any formal linkage but says Egypt will be expecting a “gentleman’s agreement” with Israel that progress on West Bank/Gaza issues should be synchronized with movement toward agreement on an Egypt-Israel treaty. He warns that the pace of Egypt’s willingness to see normalization of relations put into effect will be affected if Israel is “stiff-necked” about moving further on West Bank/Gaza issues. The Israelis will be prepared to talk about the West Bank/Gaza but will be reluctant to make any further concessions prior to Jordan entering the talks.

In particular, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank looms as crucial, and may have to be isolated if we are to progress on other issues. The credibility of the Framework will be seriously vitiated in Arab eyes if Israel is allowed to continue to “create facts” on the ground, and this would also weaken Arab confidence in the U.S. role. On the other hand, it will be the hardest point for the Israelis to give ground on because to do so will strike at Begin’s ability to maintain, for his domestic political purposes, that the Camp David Framework leaves room for an essentially “Israeli solution” for the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, with the Israelis signalling us that they want to talk immediately about normalization of relations, and the Egyptians telling us this will be linked to progress on the West Bank and Gaza, West Bank/Gaza issues will probably emerge early as the crux and potential sticking point of the talks. It will be important to make our own early assessment of Egyptian intentions, because regardless of Boutros Ghali’s intentions, it will be Sadat that ultimately decides to bring into play the sanction of delaying progress on the bilateral treaty, and we will need to tailor our approach accordingly. We believe the best approach

² A record of this conversation is in telegram 22407 from Cairo, October 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1855)

would be for you to explore where we can go from here on the West Bank/Gaza with Dayan and Boutros Ghali separately to begin with. It would be a waste of time to try to set up a working group on West Bank/Gaza issues as part of Peace Treaty negotiations structure unless some progress can first be made at the ministerial level.

In effect we would use the presence of the delegations here to get the negotiations started informally on the West Bank/Gaza, our objective being to build, through successive increments of understanding between Egypt and Israel, on the basis of agreement achieved at Camp David. These talks would go in parallel with the Egypt-Israel talks on bilateral issues, would have no terminal date, and would be open at any stage for Jordan and West Bank/Gazans to join. Our strategy would be to combine as much progress as we can make on West Bank/Gaza issues with the growing reality of an Egypt-Israel peace treaty to increase the incentive for Jordan to join, or at least to encourage Palestinians to cooperate with allowing transitional arrangements to go forward.

A paper³ is attached suggesting a sequence of further stages of agreement on the West Bank/Gaza that we might seek.

³ Attached but not printed.

75. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Crawford) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sterner), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Draper), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders)¹

Washington, October 6, 1978

At 1:00 p.m. Friday² I accompanied Mr. Christopher to Brzezinski's meeting on the coming Egypt-Israel negotiation. The meeting

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Post Camp David Papers. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Korn and Staff Assistants.

² October 6.

lasted about 25 minutes. Only Bill Quandt and David Aaron were present.

Highlights: Brzezinski focused immediately on the essentiality of using the Israel-Egypt treaty negotiation to make progress on elements of the other framework, although he recognized this might carry us only so far on the latter if Egypt wanted to wrap up its peace and didn't really worry about more than a fig leaf for the other. In this context, Brzezinski said what is lacking is contact with Palestinians. If we are to be talking about questions of interest to them as an adjunct of the coming negotiation, we should/must be in touch with them, and quickly. I said this is very much in our minds and a paper³ is being developed for the White House which sets out alternative levels of relationship ranging from what we have now at one end of the spectrum, to direct discussion with the PLO at the other, but several in-betweens. Brzezinski said he would like to see this paper soonest. I ventured our thought about bringing Walid Khalidi to Washington and sketched out how this might be done. (HHS: See attached⁴ which Mike and Morrie already have). Brzezinski commented that he liked Khalidi and twice said, "Fine, that is a good approach." Comment: in the context of other remarks by Brzezinski, I think we now have a green light on the Khalidi idea which does not exclude other approaches as well as they will be outlined in the paper we send forward. End Comment.

Brzezinski asked who would handle the side negotiation on the West Bank framework with the Israelis (which he thought the President should open as soon as Dayan comes to Washington), the Egyptians and Palestinians. He emphasized twice that State should handle diplomatic relationships with the Palestinians as contacts by the White House had a difficult domestic dimension. Quandt and I said you had hoped to hold yourself available for the side of the coming negotiation dealing with that Framework and Brzezinski said that was fine. Quandt said that in discussions with Palestinians, such as Khalidi he would like to share the responsibility with you. Brzezinski didn't exactly demur but emphasized that White House officials should in general steer clear of Palestinian contacts; it "should be a diplomatic responsibility."

³ Not found.

⁴ Document not attached and not found.

After discussion, Brzezinski outlined a memo⁵ which he asked Quandt to prepare to be ready for the President by no later than Monday⁶ night. This is to contain our strategy for the negotiation with much fuller emphasis on how we bring in the West Bank/Gaza framework and engage the Palestinians, the latter in a way that “doesn’t blow the Israelis right out of the negotiation.” Quandt will do a first draft as directed by Brzezinski and bring it to the meeting⁷ scheduled with all of you for 11:00 Saturday.

Brzezinski noted that Sanders had announced at a breakfast with the press that the question of an exchange of letters with the Israelis on settlements is dead. He asked if this were true and answered his own question aloud by saying Begin seems to understand that if he sends us a letter, we will send ours and it will be much stronger than he wants. We may be alright if Dayan confirms to us that he will hold to the public statements he made following his return to Jerusalem after Camp David. If we can trust the Israelis, “those are good enough.”

Brzezinski thought we should not say anything about Blair House⁸ until we have the President’s approval. He is going to Camp David (2:00 p.m. Friday and will not be back until Monday night). The issue can wait until then. Pending the President’s decision, Blair House should not be mentioned in telegrams. The Egyptians and Israelis have no need to know just now; it is sufficient that we have invited them to a site in Washington.

There was agreement that Murray could best represent DOD on the U.S. delegation and that Lawrence would be available in a supportive, more technical role.

⁵ Quandt and Saunders drafted the memorandum, “Launching West Bank/Gaza Negotiations: A Proposed Course of Action,” on October 9. The paper set out four main objectives for U.S. policy: 1) “to continue developing the concept of the Palestinian self-governing authority;” 2) “to explore concrete proposals for engaging some moderate Palestinians and the Jordanians if possible” in negotiating an agreement that will “call elections and establish the self-governing authority; 3) “to persuade the Saudis and a cluster of moderate Arabs that we have created an opportunity for a Palestinian solution that they cannot afford to dismiss;” and 4) “to persuade the Israelis” to “move quickly and dramatically to demonstrate that they are prepared to live at peace with Palestinian neighbors who genuinely govern themselves” and that “we will work with them to assure enough controls through the transitional period so that there will be no threat to Israel’s security.” (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, unlabeled folder)

⁶ October 9.

⁷ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 72.

76. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 10, 1978, 4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

AMERICAN SIDE

Jimmy Carter, President

Walter Mondale, Vice President

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council Advisor to the President

Alfred L. Atherton, Ambassador at Large

ISRAELI SIDE

Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister

SUBJECT

Middle East Peace Negotiations

The President opened the meeting by confirming with Dayan that he was prepared to stay in Washington until a peace treaty was concluded. Sadat was eager to conclude a treaty without delay. The President said he would be available to help if the negotiations slow down. The President said we had prepared a draft treaty which we would make available Wednesday to both the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations. We had studied the maps carefully and had done our best in drawing the lines.

Dayan noted that the Camp David framework speaks of full normalization of relations after the interim withdrawal but does not say this would happen immediately. Is it Sadat's intention that normalization should be immediate?

The President said his position was that Sadat should move to full normalization immediately, including open borders and recognition, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, perhaps with the exchange of Ambassadors occurring a bit later. The President responded affirmatively to Dayan's question of whether this meant full normalization would occur in a matter of weeks after the interim withdrawal.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—President. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton on October 11. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 4:47 p.m. to 5:53 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter's handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79.

The President said he would also like to see an early Israeli withdrawal. Weizman responded that this would be easy so far as military units and equipments are concerned but was more complicated with respect to the Israeli listening posts in Sinai. Israel would like to arrange for some of these to remain, perhaps with U.S. help. Weizman estimated there were five such sites involving radar stations and telephone systems (he mentioned for example at Jebel Libni). Israel would do its best to pull back within three months to specific spots in the northern, central and southern sectors but it would not be a direct line. Withdrawal would definitely be concluded to the interim line, however, in nine months. Israel may ask for U.S. help with respect to its intelligence sites. Weizman said he could also foresee a need for assistance with respect to the total cost of withdrawal from Sinai and relocation in Israel over the three-year period, which might amount to \$2 billion.

The President said he would hesitate to ask Sadat to permit early warning stations to remain on Egyptian territory, though this might be possible if they were operated by the U.S. The Secretary added that if any Israeli sites remain on Egyptian territory, Sadat would want the same rights on the Israeli side. Weizman said Israel was prepared to discuss reciprocity and, in response to a specific question by the President, said this could include an Egyptian site in the Negev. Weizman said he would ask General Tamir to discuss these questions with General Magdoub early in the conference and would report the results to the President.

Dayan said Israel wanted to move as fast as possible and in some areas could withdraw within three months. He thought Egypt would cooperate with respect to intelligence sites until Israel constructed new ones even if this took more than three months, with U.S. personnel manning the sites in the meantime.

In response to Dr. Brzezinski's question about how many personnel would be involved, Weizman said it was not the number of people but the installations themselves—e.g., fuel and ammunition dumps—which were the problem.

The President said Sadat would not yield on the exchange of normalization for withdrawal. If even a few Israeli troops were to stay on the Egyptian side, Sadat would delay an agreement and this would risk having everything go down the drain. If Sadat agreed, the U.S. could man two watch stations with each side choosing its own location.

Weizman said Israel would be withdrawing faster than it had ever imagined. It had to be an orderly withdrawal but Israel wanted to move fast for the same reasons the U.S. did.

The President turned to the question of the UN zones envisaged in the framework agreement. He had talked² with Waldheim who thought the present UNEF of about 3,000 personnel could be used. If the number were increased, Security Council action would be needed and would risk a Soviet veto. In response to the President's question, both Weizman and Dayan thought that UNEF with its present strength could do the job. The President added that we are prepared to leave the Sinai Field Mission in place for a period of time if Israel and Egypt wished.

Reverting to the earlier discussion, Dayan said the key question was whether Israel could be assured that Sadat would agree to full normalization a few weeks after the interim withdrawal.

The President replied that Sadat says he (the President) had forced him to accept diplomatic relations and open borders. The President had told Sadat this was in his interest, in order to have a means to discuss routine problems as they arose. The President said he would pursue with enthusiasm the objective of immediate normalization following the interim withdrawal. Dayan said it was not a question of having an Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv *per se*; he was worried about what might happen after two or three years if relations had not been fully consolidated. The President said he intended to marshal all possible U.S. help to consolidate normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations—e.g., trade missions, capital investment, etc. Sadat was impulsive and could be brought to support this objective if handled correctly, but he could also be impulsive in negative ways.

The President then asked how soon Israel envisaged complete withdrawal from Sinai. Weizman said not before three years because of the airfield construction problem. Israel was squeezing itself back into a small area and needed the best possible new airfields.

The President said we would like to help expedite Israel's airfield construction. With respect to Israel's interest in using Sinai air space for training purposes, the President said he could not reveal Sadat's position but thought that Sadat sees this as an inducement to expedite the withdrawal process. If the talks go well on both sides and we can get Sadat in a good mood, the President believed he would agree to Israeli training in Sinai air space. If Sadat agreed, however, it would be as a good faith gesture; he is not required to do this. Weizman said Israel would seek Egypt's agreement to this, for unarmed training in specified corridors.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Waldheim in Orlando, Florida, from 7:07 p.m. to 7:25 p.m., October 1. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

The President asked how long it would take for the Israeli settlers to leave Sinai. Dayan said a few months one way or other made no difference. The airfield construction would be the controlling factor.

The President said it is important to keep Sadat in a good mood. He can be generous if he thinks he is being treated fairly, but he can be mean if he feels pushed. Sadat wanted the President and Mrs. Carter to visit Egypt and this would be an incentive to him to expedite matters. It is important, the President added, to keep the trust of the Egyptian Delegation. If El-Baz proves difficult, the President instructed Atherton to bring him to the White House for a talk.

Dayan again emphasized that Israel wants to move rapidly. Sadat has problem, but Israel also has domestic political problem which must be taken into account.

The President asked how much could be accomplished in Washington on West Bank/Gaza issues. Dayan said nothing could be accomplished; with whom would Israel negotiate? The President replied it was not a question of negotiating but of discussing how to get the West Bank/Gaza process started, and how to get Hussein and Palestinian Arabs involved. We have questions from Hussein to answer, and there will be difficulties when the answers become public.

The President then raised the problem of settlements on the West Bank, saying that his personal word of honor was at stake. If Israel could write a letter relating the settlement freeze to the West Bank/Gaza negotiations for establishing a transitional regime and could combine this with the statement Dayan made on his airport arrival in Israel September 19,³ this would be sufficient.

Dayan replied that he would not advise Begin to do anything more on the settlements issue, given his political difficulties at home. Begin had already pushed matters to the limit and there was the risk of losing his Knesset majority, which would require new elections; this would require time and delay negotiations undesirably. There would be no new settlements for three months beginning Thursday, October 12. Why would this matter need to be raised now?

The President said he was not pushing it but was not certain that Egypt would not insist.

The President said there was no decision at Camp David to postpone West Bank/Gaza negotiations.

Dayan replied that Israel did not want to postpone them, but the reality was that there had to be Palestinians who would cooperate so

³ The text of Dayan's September 19 press conference, held jointly with Weizman at Ben Gurion airport, is printed in *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, vol. 5, pp. 535–540.

that West Bank/Gaza elections could be held as a first step toward establishing a Palestinian administration and the withdrawal of the Israeli military government.

Secretary Vance said preliminary work could be done in Washington on how to organize elections and a local administration. The President asked how Palestinians could be brought into the process. Dayan responded that if the Palestinians see the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations progressing, they will join. In response to a question by the President, Dayan said he was referring to their joining a short time after the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was signed. This could not be done, however, in the next two or three weeks.

With respect to Hussein, Secretary Vance said he had three choices: to join the negotiations, to stay out but encourage Palestinians to join, or to reject negotiations entirely. The Secretary said he doubted Hussein would reject totally but was not certain precisely where Hussein would come out given the many pressures he is under.

Dayan thought it most likely Hussein would give a green light to the Palestinians while not committing himself. Hussein would watch carefully how the Washington talks would progress. If a treaty is signed in two to four weeks, the chances were that the Palestinians would join. Dayan said it would have a negative impact if in the Washington negotiations we seem to be patronizing the Palestinians by negotiating for them.

Secretary Vance said he saw another problem. While there is no linkage between the two frameworks, Sadat sees them as part of the same context. He needs to show that he has not forgotten the Palestinians. If there is no movement on West Bank/Gaza issues, Sadat will have problems. Dr. Brzezinski stressed that we needed to keep in mind Weizman's distinction between a "separate peace" and a "first peace."

Weizman responded that if West Bank/Gaza issues are rushed too much, nothing will result. Once an Egyptian-Israeli treaty is signed, Israel should seek to implement what it has promised by moving toward West Bank/Gaza self-government. If Israel demonstrates that it is prepared to go ahead—and Israel can do this—this will help Hussein.

The President then commented that he had honored his pledge to have no contact with the PLO. If he goes to Cairo, however, Sadat wants him (the President) to meet with some Palestinians. How far, the President asked, could he go in this respect? The President said he does not want to violate his promise to the Israelis but could not check the credentials of Palestinians Sadat might ask him to meet. Dayan said he did not know which Palestinians Sadat might bring to Cairo. The President commented that perhaps Hussein could choose them. Dayan said this would be better. If the issue to be discussed was the self-government proposal, they should be Palestinians who live in the West

Bank/Gaza, whatever their political sympathies. The President asked why it could not be any Palestinians who were qualified to participate even if they did not live in these areas. Dayan said this would create a problem. In response to the President's comment that Hussein could choose any Palestinians living in Jordan, Dayan thought this would be no problem; Hussein would not choose PLO Palestinians. He saw no problem with the President's meeting Palestinians from Jordan but was not so sure about Egypt. In response to the President's comment that he assumed there were thousands of PLO members in the West Bank and Gaza, Dayan said he was concerned primarily about a small group of leaders of the PLO. The best thing would be to let Israel look at the list of Palestinians involved.

The President said he would not want to show Israel the list. If he went to Cairo, he would ask Hussein to bring a group of Palestinians to meet with him.

Dayan said he saw no problem with this. Hussein might bring Palestinians Israel had expelled but Israel could live with this. Israel's concern is about those Palestinians it must work with; they must be elected representatives. Dayan concluded this discussion by saying it would be a wrong move to focus now on West Bank/Gaza issues instead of concentrating over the next few weeks on the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. It would only antagonize the Arabs. Let us work within the framework agreement, Dayan said. The Palestinians will join when they see that the train is moving.

Secretary Vance said we need to move fast but urged Dayan not to close his mind to discussing West Bank/Gaza issues; this may be necessary in order to expedite the treaty negotiations. (Dayan and Weizman did not respond to this point.)

The President then raised the question of claims. Sadat had said in his and Begin's presence that he would have a claim for the oil that Israel had extracted. The President said his own inclination was to try to get both sides not to make any claims against the other. Negotiations over claims could be a festering sore. If we could get Sadat to agree not to press claims, the President hoped Israel would also agree.

Dayan said Israel has questions to raise about the oil fields. Israel's interest was in being able to purchase Gulf of Suez and Sinai oil; this could be left to the oil companies, which were American on both sides, perhaps with Israeli and Egyptian representatives participating. Dayan said he agreed the best solution would be to have no claims.

In conclusion, the President said we would prefer the same arrangements for briefing the press as had been adopted at Camp David. Dayan and Weizman both agreed. Dayan noted, however, that this would be harder to enforce in Washington than at Camp David, but if there were any leaks, they would not come from him.

77. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 11, 1978, 5:35–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President's Meeting with Egyptian Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large

Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff

H.E. Kamal Hassan Ali, Minister of Defense

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Acting Foreign Minister

H.E. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

H.E. Usama al-Baz, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs

The *President* welcomed the Egyptian delegation and referred to the good feeling produced in Egypt and Israel by the Camp David agreements. He expressed his hope that the remaining differences might be identified quickly so that the talks could reach a conclusion within days not weeks. The Israelis have agreed to work quickly.

The *President* said that the United States had drafted a standard form² of a peace treaty to use as a model in the discussions. This will provide a starting point. Ambassador Eilts has also gone over the Sinai map with President Sadat. We want to work toward realization of the Camp David agreements within the shortest timeframe envisaged. The President has already talked to the Israelis about the need for rapid moves. He urged them to complete the first withdrawal within three months, not nine months. The Israelis in return raised the question of how rapidly Egypt could move toward recognition and the normalization of relations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 14, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/11–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was found attached to an October 24 memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski indicating that this is the official transcript of the conversation. Carter's handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

² A copy of the initial draft negotiating text of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume II [III]. An earlier version, dated October 9 and bearing Carter's handwritten comments and textual changes is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Blair House Talks—October–December 1978: Briefing books.

The *President* referred to the many pressures that exist within the Arab world. He fears that if the process of peacemaking goes on for a long time there will be more chances of problems arising. He expressed his hope that President Sadat would be willing at the time that the interim withdrawal had been completed to go ahead with open borders and normalization of relations without delay. The *President* said that he also asked the Israelis how soon they could carry out total withdrawal. They said that it would depend upon building alternate airfields. The United States will help in this process and will examine sites. If this can be done in two years, then we want total withdrawal, including settlers, to be completed by then.

The *President* said that he had talked to U.N. Secretary General Waldheim,³ as well as to Dayan and Weizman,⁴ about the U.N. forces in Sinai. There is general agreement that there is no need to increase the present force of about 3,000 men. If it were necessary to go back to the U.N., the Soviets might debate the question and could veto any increase. It will, therefore, be best to stay at the present level. This apparently suits Israel. We do not need larger forces. They should be a token force in any case, with a specific role, for example near the airfields in the Rafah area and near Sharm al-Shaykh. The U.N. forces there would just routinely inspect the airfields as agreed upon.

There is also the question of early warning stations. The *President* has told the Israelis that President Sadat required reciprocity if there were to be any early-warning stations on Egyptian territory. Based on this principle, there should be stations within Israel as well. The Israelis agreed to this principle. It will be worth discussing this further with them, but they agreed to reciprocity. This is a major step. The level of U.N. forces at places like Sharm can be negotiated. The *President* said that he had no preferences.

The *President* then stated that we had taken a map⁵ and drawn some lines for the interim withdrawal. This line is the most controversial. The President curved it eastward, but the Israelis may insist on a straight line, and it will be hard to dispute them. We have looked at a topographical map and have tried to find the most appropriate line, but we have no preference. We just want things to go quickly. The President has urged the Israelis to be forthcoming, and they are taking a constructive attitude.

Concerning the buffer zone envisaged for the Egyptian side of the border, the *President* said that the Israelis had spoken of a zone thirty to

³ See footnote 2, Document 76.

⁴ See Document 76.

⁵ Not found.

fifty kilometers wide, but the President knew that Sadat wanted it to be only twenty to forty kilometers and he has agreed to this. We have, therefore, suggested a line that is about twenty-five kilometers wide. Our lines are not final, however, and are meant to be the basis for negotiations. If Egypt and Israel cannot reach agreement easily, we will try to help.

There is also a question, the *President* noted, of demilitarized zones on either side of the interim withdrawal line. There should be some buffer in this area, and this needs to be decided. A ten to twenty-kilometer zone would be good. This is not written into the agreement. There might also be a U.N. force, simply to inspect this area. This has not been discussed yet with the Israelis. Finally, the *President* mentioned that he hoped that the press arrangements during the talks could be similar to those at Camp David. We want to keep the negotiations out of the news.

The *President* said that he also hoped to use the talks in Washington to lay out a plan for the West Bank and Gaza. He understood that President Sadat felt disgust with the attacks that had been leveled against Egypt, but he would not want to give up on Hussein or the Palestinian Arabs. We need to try to move to reach an understanding on the authority of the self-governing body, on who will represent the Palestinians, and on the timeframe for these talks. It will be best not to inject these issues into the formal Israeli negotiations, but Egypt should prepare a list of questions for the President. Then we could act as an intermediary with the Israelis. It is better for Israel and Egypt to meet together directly to deal with the Sinai issues, but on the West Bank and Gaza there is little that can be done now without Jordan and the Palestinians. Therefore, it is preferable for the Egyptians to deal with the President and for him to talk to the Israelis. The United States can be the intermediary. We don't want some dispute over Jerusalem to disrupt the Egypt-Israel treaty talks. As those move forward, then we can advance on the West Bank and Gaza.

President Sadat has asked the President to come to Egypt for the signing of the peace treaty. The *President* said he was inclined to accept, although he had not given a formal response. If he did go to the Middle East, he would want to talk to President Sadat about how to help bring the other parties into the negotiations. When they see the Egypt-Israel agreement being finalized, their opposition will dissipate.

Minister *Hassan Ali* said that President Sadat appreciates President Carter's efforts in the Middle East. He said that Egypt had some differences with the Palestinians and with King Hussein, but that Egypt hoped that by giving some impetus to the West Bank and Gaza talks this will help encourage moderate Palestinians. *President Carter* said that he had a list of questions from King Hussein that he had not yet

personally studied. Ambassador Atherton might go over these questions with the Egyptians and the President would do the same with the Israelis. Then he would respond to King Hussein. He wanted to encourage the King. He also said that the Saudis appeared to be taking a somewhat constructive role and were not an obstacle at present. If the Saudis see the United States working actively in the West Bank and Gaza, this should help. We do not intend to go over our answers with either Egypt or Israel, but we will discuss the questions that King Hussein has posed.

Minister *Boutros Ghali* then explained recent developments in Egyptian thinking. He had personally spent twelve hours explaining the Camp David agreements in Parliament. There were many questions reflecting a fear that Egypt might become isolated in the Arab world. There was criticism of the idea of a bilateral, separate peace with Israel. Many deputies pointed to the fact that the Egyptian constitution starts by referring to Egypt as part of the Arab world. He was asked about the correlation between the two Framework Agreements. After the first Agreement is achieved, what pressure would be left on Israel to carry out the West Bank and Gaza agreements? Why had the letters on the settlements not been received? Many felt that Jerusalem was important. The most difficult question of all was that of the correlation between the two peace agreements. There must be some synchronization of steps.

Boutros Ghali said that President Sadat had spoken of parallel movement in the two agreements when he was in Morocco. He spoke of a *de facto* link. If Egypt is to obtain some advantages in Sinai, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza should also gain some advantages. If the treaty is signed between Israel and Egypt, then the military government in the West Bank and Gaza should also end. Otherwise Egypt will be isolated. There was some concern expressed in Egypt about what would happen to the two billion dollars that Egypt receives from Saudi Arabia.

Egypt's prestige is also at stake. There were more than seventy questions raised in Parliament, some of which were minor, but many of which were serious. Opposition came from the government's own part, not just the left and the right. There is a fear of isolation. Even in Morocco, and with the close ties between Egypt and Morocco, there was criticism of the idea of a separate peace. This comes back to the need for some correlation between the Sinai talks and the West Bank and Gaza. There should be some clarification of the settlements question before a treaty is concluded. We need some gentlemen's agreement with Israel. If everyone agrees that Egypt should be helped to play a leadership role in the region on behalf of moderation, then practical advantages for the Palestinians are important.

Minister *Boutros Ghali* said that he had met with many Palestinians and with the Arab ambassadors, as well as with the French leaders just recently. They all asked the same question: Won't Egypt lose leverage over the West Bank/Gaza negotiations after the signing of a treaty with Israel? If the West Bank/Gaza negotiations are postponed, sooner or later there will be real problems in the Middle East. The *Minister* said that some correlation must be found, and some exchange of letters or some gentlemen's agreement must be reached. This is very important. This is more important than the points that the President had reviewed in his opening comments.

Minister *Boutros Ghali* said the President had also spoken of normal relations. This question had come up also in the Egyptian Parliament. Questions had been raised concerning how far Egypt could go toward normalization while foreign troops were on its territory. This can be answered, but it was harder to answer the question about the lack of any direct correlation between the two agreements. Boutros Ghali has spent his full time on this question. New members of the government are even asking these questions. Some have asked why President Carter has not yet received a letter on the settlements.

President *Carter* said that he considers the framework agreement on the West Bank and Gaza to be binding on Egypt, Israel, and the United States. His own reputation is at stake. He wants to know from the Egyptians how we can move forward, especially if Jordan stays out, and if the Palestinians refuse to participate. What could be done in those circumstances? The *President* said that he had also spoken to Dayan about the settlements. President Sadat's memory was that there would be a freeze on settlements for three months, and that then consultations would take place. The President and Prime Minister Begin disagree over whether the period referred to was the Sinai negotiations or the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. *President Carter* said it was not meant to refer to the Sinai negotiations, since it was being discussed in the context of the West Bank and Gaza. There should not be any new settlements set up during the negotiations for the self-government. Later there should be consultations among the parties. Dayan has re-emphasized that there will be no new settlements for a period of three months beginning tomorrow. The West Bank/Gaza talks should also be concluded in this three-month period. Dr. *Brzezinski* and others reminded the President that this had not been specified in the framework agreements.

The *President* stated that the best way then to avoid any problems of timing would be to get King Hussein into the talks as soon as possible. There would be nothing to prevent him from having his delegation made up of Palestinians. They could be from Jordan or from the West Bank, or by mutual agreement, from outside these areas. The *Pres-*

ident wants to move on the West Bank and Gaza. He sees the two sets of issues as interrelated. He urged the Egyptians through their contacts with Palestinians to start to encourage Palestinians to sit down and negotiate, even without Jordan. Perhaps there could be Egyptian, Israeli, and Palestinian talks at a minimum.

Mr. *al-Baz* stated that the Egyptians are already in contact with moderate Palestinians. Some have come to Cairo and seen Sadat. They have come from the West Bank and from Gaza. The Egyptian assessment is that the situation will improve for Palestinians participating in the negotiations as time goes by. It is hard now for them to participate openly, but they believe that it will become easier. The opposition to the Camp David agreements has just about reached its peak. Secondly, the attitude of King Hussein will probably improve in the next two to three months. The United States and Saudi Arabia can influence them to be more positive. Hussein will realize that he has no other good alternative. More Palestinians will want to accept the agreements on a de facto basis and will respond to the argument of trying to improve the agreements from within. Hussein wants to try to improve the frameworks to justify his participation. This is the purpose of his questions. He can then justify joining the talks. The people from the West Bank and Gaza who have talked to the Egyptians think that it will take another two or three months for the situation to ripen. The people in Gaza are more willing to participate than those in the West Bank. They feel closer to Egypt and their interests are tied more to Egypt. Jordan has little influence in Gaza, whereas it has great influence in the West Bank. Some moderates in the PLO leadership have even tried to discuss the positive aspects of the Camp David agreements, but the PLO leadership has overruled this approach and their attitude will remain negative for some time. Some in the West Bank and Gaza are intimidated by the extremists outside the area.

The *President* said that he would appreciate receiving suggestions on what might be done before the Palestinians and the Jordanians join the negotiations and what could be done if Jordan did not participate. Minister *Boutros Ghali* said that we should find some way to get practical advantages to the Palestinians quickly even before the conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel. Dr. *Brzezinski* noted that military rule could not be brought to an end before some Palestinian authority had been formed. This would require talks. Minister *Boutros Ghali* agreed, but said that some steps short of ending military rule should be found, such as some redeployment of Israeli forces. Dr. *Brzezinski* added that there might be a lifting of the ban on political meetings, but that Palestinian participation would be important to produce “*partenaire valable*” to whom authority could be bequeathed.

President Carter said that we are as interested in the West Bank and Gaza as in the peace treaty negotiations, but we do not want to see the

treaty negotiations complicated by disagreements over details on the West Bank and Gaza. The *President* said that he would be available day or night. If there were any problems that could not be resolved, Ambassador Atherton could call on him. He would be prepared to come over or to receive the delegations at the White House. The President hopes as much agreement as possible can be reached at the outset. The President would then help resolve areas of disagreement. He has already reviewed maps and believes that the lines suggested are fair, but these are just suggestions. The lines suggested are somewhat favorable to Egypt, and Israel may oppose them. The President has tried to meet President Sadat's needs, but the Israelis have not yet seen the map.

Mr. *al-Baz* said that the Egyptians are assuming that the negotiations will go forward in the new spirit of cooperation and they should not be particularly difficult. The *President* said that the Egyptians should feel free to turn to him whenever necessary. Ambassador Atherton understands this. He asked Minister Hassan Ali to convey his deep friendship to President Sadat and his appreciation for Sadat's constructive attitude. He reiterated that he is very eager for early success.

The meeting ended at 6:15 p.m.

78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Egypt and Israel¹

Washington, October 13, 1978, 0057Z

259062. For Ambassadors from Atherton and Saunders. Subject: First Day of Blair House Talks—Oct. 12, 1978.

1. We had a very productive first day of talks, marked by more substantive progress than we had anticipated and the early identification of some potential problem areas.

2. Following opening ceremonies at the White House, we had a plenary session that served to pin down general procedural questions. Both sides agreed to meet as full delegations rather than subdividing into working groups, although there have already been private

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Kirby; cleared by Richard Castrodale (S/S-O) and Atherton; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2252)

meetings between counterparts (Dayan-Boutros Ghali; Weizman-Hassan Ali).

3. The rest of the day was devoted largely to bilateral meetings, which focused on a draft treaty text that we had prepared and made available to both delegations, and which both agreed to use as common negotiating text. We met first with the Israelis who had done their homework on our text and suggested a number of changes. (We are aware that you do not have our draft text and so will not try to convey the specific Israeli comments at this preliminary stage.) Unfortunately, we do not have either side's agreement at this stage to make public that we are working from a US draft,² so please don't let cat out of bag.

4. We then met with the Egyptians, who were not yet prepared to offer comments on our text. The Secretary shared with them most of the Israeli suggestions, and when we resume in the morning the Egyptians will offer theirs.

5. During our meeting with the Israelis, Weizman brought up their concern about the speed with which they will be able to withdraw, pointing out the importance of U.S. assistance in this regard. He expressed particular concern about their leaving "live installations" such as Um Khasheib and wondered if a mobile American installation might not be loaned to Israel while they are establishing an alternate site.

6. Egyptians raised two general concerns. (Osama al-Baz did most of the talking for their side.) They obviously hope that a treaty will not erect impediments to their conduct of relations with and obligations to third parties—i.e., other Arabs. They are also hoping to achieve reciprocal gradualism in the implementation of the withdrawal and normalization aspects of a treaty. Obvious Egyptian desire to avoid neglecting West Bank and Palestinian issues was pre-empted by Secretary's suggesting that we must begin discussing West Bank/Gaza questions if only for clarification purposes, with which Egyptian delegation immediately agreed. Secretary will pursue this subject bilaterally with Dayan Friday.³

7. Day ended with brief trilateral meeting of Secretary, Ali and Dayan for purpose of summarizing day's highlights and agreeing on program for Friday.

8. You will appreciate impossibility of sending you daily detailed accounts. Once main issues have begun to crystallize, we will try to send you periodic summary of where matters stand and highlight issues that might be raised with you in capitals.

Vance

² See footnote 2, Document 77.

³ October 13.

79. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Yasir 'Arafat's Preference to Deal Directly with the United States Government rather than to Discuss a Middle East Peace with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

1. The following information was obtained [*less than 1 line not declassified*] October 1978. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat recently gave Major General Shawqat, the head of Military Intelligence, permission to probe Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chief Yasir 'Arafat's views on the Camp David Accords and on continuing Middle East negotiations. Yasir 'Arafat conveyed a message to General Shawqat via an emissary on 12 October to the effect that he, 'Arafat, does not trust President Sadat and would prefer to deal directly with the United States (U.S.) on the matter of peace in the Middle East and the role of the PLO.

2. Given the nature of the message, General Shawqat chose not to pass the message to President Sadat and instead sent his own emissary to contact 'Arafat for clarification of 'Arafat's precise views and desires. General Shawqat's emissary was expected to return with 'Arafat's more precise views on 19 October.

3. General Shawqat has been appointed by the Egyptian Government to maintain discreet contact with the PLO. General Shawqat expressed the view that Yasir 'Arafat believes the U.S. Government is sincere in its efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and desires to be fair to all parties. General Shawqat believes, therefore, that Yasir 'Arafat would indeed want his own direct contact with the U.S. Government.

4. (*U.S. Ambassador to Egypt's Comment*: In our talk earlier this week, Shawqat also mentioned to me 'Arafat's alleged desire to engage in a direct dialogue with the U.S. He did not cast it in terms of a new effort, but rather as a continuation of 'Arafat's longstanding desire to have direct association with us. 'Arafat's desire to do so, Shawqat claimed, is intensified by the recent Camp David Accords. I reminded Shawqat of our offer of last summer to engage in a dialogue with the

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R, Executive Registry Subject Files (1978), Box 7, Folder 13, M-1: Middle East. Secret; Sensitive. The report was found attached to a covering memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski, date stamped October 23, stating that a copy of the report had also been sent to Vance.

PLO if it publicly accepted U.N. Resolution 242 with appropriate reservations on the inadequacy of the refugee language and explicitly recognized the right of Israel to exist. I recalled that we, working with the Egyptians and the Saudis, had last year developed a fair formula for this purpose. Unfortunately, although the Egyptians had told us that 'Arafat favored the formula, he could not obtain the acquiescence of the PLO Executive Committee and the effort aborted. Shawqat should know that our offer still stands, but in the absence of such public acceptance by 'Arafat and the PLO of U.N. Resolution 242, it is not possible for the U.S. Government to engage in a direct dialogue with 'Arafat. I suggested that the best thing Shawqat could do was to urge the PLO leadership to reconsider their rejection of this earlier U.S. offer. Shawqat agreed that the PLO leadership, thanks largely to the Rejectionists and negative Syrian counsel, had been shortsighted, but seemed uncertain whether the PLO Executive Committee was likely to adopt a more positive stance in the present circumstances. The whole thrust of Shawqat's comment, reported in Cairo Embassy message number 22724,² was on the importance of PLO acquiescence if West Bank/Gazan leaders are to be willing to stick their necks out and participate in the negotiations.)

5. According to information [1 line not declassified] an American of Arab extraction has been instructed by the PLO to meet quietly with Secretary of State Vance to ask if the Secretary would be willing to meet secretly with Shafiq al-Hut, who is in the U.S. as a member of the PLO delegation attending the U.N. General Assembly. Al-Hut apparently has instructions from 'Arafat to attempt to meet secretly with Secretary Vance to convey Palestinian views on the Camp David Accords to the U.S. Government as well as what in their opinion, the proper role of the PLO should be in future negotiations or in a peace settlement. No other members of the PLO delegation know of 'Arafat's instructions that al-Hut attempt to meet with Secretary Vance.

² Telegram 22724 from Cairo, October 12, conveyed a conversation between Eilts and Shawqat regarding PLO participation in West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Eilts reported that Shawqat told him that he had sent a colonel with Egyptian military intelligence to meet with "second level" PLO leaders in Beirut in order to ascertain whether they would "be willing to cooperate" in negotiations. Shawqat "noted that GOE has little influence with influential West Bankers or with Gazans;" therefore, "Egyptians must be armed with strongest possible arguments," a task made "much more difficult" by "recent Begin and Dayan statements." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067-1850)

80. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Pretoria¹

Washington, October 16, 1978, 0105Z

Tosec 120023/261453. Subject Progress Report on Egypt-Israel Peace Talks October 13.

1. Drafting group met again today for four hours: it was a good session, resolving several minor points, and making definite progress in bridging the gap on important differences over language about commitments to prevent hostilities and acts of violence from each other's territory, it was again a very friendly session with both sides making a genuine effort to move matters forward, but both were obviously constrained by instructions on important issues. On several points the two sides reached compromises ad referendum to their Ministers in the first instance and Capitals in the second. Discussion of language in several articles had to be deferred because the Egyptians were still not ready to discuss Annex III dealing with normalization of relations, but as we know they received fresh instructions from Sadat on this today and they say they will be prepared to go on this tomorrow. At end of session today Egyptians, clearly on basis Sadat's instructions, proposed inserting "gradually" in several places with respect to normalization. This raised immediate red flag with Israelis, and Egyptians, who sensed it could cause psychological set-back, urged Israelis not to report this development while they consulted overnight. I reinforced concern about this development in private talk with Boutros Ghali.

2. Meanwhile Dayan and Boutros Ghali had exchange over question of how to handle correlation between Egypt-Israel treaty and West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian aspect. Dayan proposed, instead of trying to include language to take care of this in treaty itself, that this be handled through general reference in preamble plus exchange of letters between Sadat and Begin—possibly through President Carter—which could be made public sometime between reaching agreement on text and actual signing. Boutros agreed to try this on Sadat and has yet to receive reaction. Boutros agreed with Dayan that, even if exchange of letters idea did not work out, Egyptians would seek to insert language about correlation only in preamble but not in operative articles of treaty.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Thomas G. Martin (S/S–O); approved by Sterner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2041) Vance was in Pretoria for discussions on the Namibian question with South African officials.

3. Boutros remains concerned about this aspect, however, and claims instructions he is getting from Sadat put more and more emphasis on correlation between the two. When subject of what should go into contents of letter exchange came up with Dayan, Boutros Ghali also preferred language saying two sides would discuss freeze on West Bank settlements and Jerusalem. He told us Dayan balked sharply at this saying such letter could include only language in Camp David Framework, but nothing new.

4. Discussions also continued between military experts on map, and good progress has been made. Two sides feel they are close to agreement on final withdrawal aspects, including size of UN controlled areas. Interim line poses somewhat greater problem, with Israelis asking for westward adjustments in our line to take care of one of their settlements and certain communication facilities, as well as resisting idea of buffer zone on Israeli side of interim withdrawal line. Neither side, however, feels insuperable obstacles exist on military issues.

5. Despite Israeli religious holiday Monday,² we agreed drafting group will meet all day, consulting principals as necessary in effort to conclude treaty text or at least narrow differences to minimum. We have also urged military group to speed up pace of their talks and have reminded both delegations of need to move quickly to get technical talks started on transfer of oil fields.

Christopher

² October 16. In 1978, the date fell within the Jewish holiday of *Sukkot*.

81. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. to President Carter¹

Washington, October 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Status of Egypt-Israel Negotiations

We have reached the stage in the talks where the issues we will have to contend with are coming into clear focus. They can be grouped

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 10/78. Secret; Nodis. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

in three categories: (1) issues connected with the text of the treaty itself, (2) Israel's desire for U.S. assistance in connection with its withdrawal from Sinai, and (3) the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian aspect.

I. Unresolved Issues in Treaty Text

There are two main issues and several minor ones that remain to be resolved in the treaty text. The main ones are:

A. Major Issues

1. *How to correlate the Egypt-Israel process with language on a comprehensive peace framework.* The Egyptians started out by proposing a number of additions to our basic treaty text, both in the Preamble and in the operative articles, that stressed the continuing commitment of the two sides to solve the problems of a comprehensive peace and the Palestinian issues. The Israelis immediately put up a stiff resistance. Following a meeting with Ghali, Dayan in an effort to be helpful suggested that all of the language along these lines could be embodied in an exchange of letters, either direct between Sadat and Begin or through President Carter. Sadat has agreed to this in principle, and it is now being considered by Begin. The two sides have not yet discussed the contents of such an exchange of letters, but Dayan insists it must not go beyond Camp David language.

The Egyptians have now also agreed that, with respect to the treaty text itself, it will suffice for language on a comprehensive peace to be only in the Preamble, omitting anything along these lines in the operative articles—though they probably want more extensive language than Dayan has in mind.

2. *The question of how fast normalization of relations will be put into effect.* The Egyptians are not yet prepared to discuss this subject in specific terms as laid out in our draft Annex 3 (they are meeting today to try to develop a coordinated position). They have received instructions from Sadat to put emphasis on a phased schedule for normalizing relations. I met privately with Boutros Ghali today to stress the importance that we, as well as the Israelis, attach to rapid normalization, and that we regard this as implicit in the Camp David undertakings. The Israelis attach the most importance to an immediate establishment of diplomatic relations; they warned in a drafting group meeting this morning that if the Egyptians tried to stretch this out beyond the interim period, it would cause Israel to reconsider its commitment to conclude its interim withdrawal within a shortened time-frame. This is going to be a difficult issue, but we will not know the exact dimensions of it until we see what the Egyptians propose for the specific steps outlined in Annex 3.

B. Minor Issues

1. *Controlling third party acts of violence from either party's territory.* Israel wants more detailed and specific language than Egypt. The Eryp-

tians do not want language that seems to make the treaty specifically directed against the Palestinians. However, steady progress has been made in narrowing the difference on this paragraph, and we think that with a little bit more work, agreement can be reached.

2. *The UN Role.* The problem here is that the parties cannot, by mere agreement between themselves, commit a UN Force or observer presence which of course must also be authorized by the Security Council. Dayan feels that the treaty text which is based on the Camp David language is inadequate. In this morning's session he cast around, in a thinking-out-loud manner, for the possibility of some kind of U.S. assurances in the event that the UN Force were withdrawn against the two parties' consent. We are trying to come up with a range of options that might meet Dayan's concern on this point.

3. *Rights of Navigation.* We now have agreed language on Israeli use of the Suez Canal, but a difference remains on the question of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel wants, in accordance with the language at Camp David, to have the treaty state that the parties consider these waterways to be international waterways "open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation." The Egyptians are resisting this language because they do not want to frame their commitment in terms of a general principle which could weaken their position to bar Soviet or other vessels from unimpeded passage in these waterways. The Israelis exhibit no sign of give on this point however. They take the position that because it was in the Camp David Framework it cannot be weakened.

4. *Arms Limitation.* The Israelis originally proposed an article on arms limitation but now request that it be withdrawn. The Egyptians do not seem to feel strongly about it one way or the other; they are checking with Cairo about dropping this provision.

5. *Priority of Obligations.* The Israelis want sweeping, all-encompassing language to the effect that this treaty supersedes any other Egyptian obligation. This causes the Egyptians severe problems because of their numerous defense pacts with other Arab states. There has been much discussion about this item; both sides fully understand the other's problem; and they are beginning to try to formulate language that may in the end be mutually accommodating. The latest Israeli suggestion came from Dayan this morning: he wonders whether Egypt might not supplement the somewhat vaguer language it prefers in the treaty text with a letter to the U.S. stating that if Syria (for example) attacks Israel, Egypt would not honor its defense pact undertaking to come to its assistance.

6. *Oil.* The Israelis want to begin discussions about this as soon as possible; the Egyptians have not made up their minds about it. We see this as something the two sides will have to come to some under-

standing on before overall agreement is possible, and we have recommended to the Egyptians that they authorize their experts to begin discussions now.

7. *Review Clause.* The Egyptians want a provision in the treaty for review after five years, which in their mind would be linked to the five-year period for a transitional regime in the West Bank and Gaza. For the same reason that Egypt likes this idea, the Israelis don't. The Israelis have countered with language providing that the parties can open discussions about "amendments" to the treaty "at any time."

8. *Security Council Endorsement.* The Egyptians have signaled that they want to embody in this treaty the language in the General Framework on Security Council endorsement. We have signaled to them our concern that this might give the Soviets a handle on the treaty that none of us want. The Egyptians said they would give some further thought to the matter.

II. *U.S. Assistance to Israel*

Weizman has persistently brought up at our bilateral meetings the extra costs that are entailed for Israel in a speedy withdrawal from Sinai. He hopes the U.S. will assist Israel financially to compensate for these costs, and also possibly with certain equipment which the Israelis would have to leave behind. Weizman has informally put a \$2 billion figure on this and has made it clear he sees it as over and above the assistance on the two airfields that we are already committed to. He told me this morning once again that he is anxious to come to grips with this as soon as possible. He has experts standing by in Israel who could come here as soon as we signal that we are prepared to begin discussions on this aspect. Weizman said clearly to me this morning in private discussion that he does not see such assistance as a condition to the rapid conclusion of a peace treaty, but he has also said our response on this is likely to affect Israel's final interim withdrawal schedule. At minimum, he wants the discussions on U.S. assistance to be underway as the final terms of the treaty are worked on.

III. *Israeli Gestures on West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian Question*

We have discussed with Dayan practical steps or statements of intention Israel might make, in conjunction with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, to encourage Hussein and the Palestinians to begin negotiating, such as:

- Reduce military government presence and give more responsibility to the existing local authorities.
- Amnesty for Palestinian detainees.
- Withdrawal and redeployment of some Israeli troops.
- Permit political meetings in the West Bank and Gaza.

—Agree that Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem can vote in West Bank elections and hold office in the self-governing authority.

—Agree that the self-governing authority will take over administration of public lands.

—Relax procedures for Arabs crossing Jordan River bridge.

Dayan has listened with interest but has been non-committal on all but two points. He said he would discuss with Weizman drawing up a list of Palestinian political detainees to whom amnesty might be granted. He also is considering some unilateral reduction in the Israeli military government presence and responsibilities, though in a later timeframe than we believe desirable.

82. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 17, 1978, 2–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President's Meeting with the Israeli Delegation, October 17, 1978, 2:00–3:15 p.m., Oval Office

1. Dayan expressed his concern with three main obstacles in the peace treaty negotiations. First is the question of "priority of obligations." Israel wants to make clear that Egypt's obligations under the peace treaty will supersede any other obligations, such as mutual defense pacts.

2. Dayan's second problem was the linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the West Bank/Gaza issues. Israel wants the treaty to stand on its own without any linkage to other obligations. He will accept mention of the comprehensive framework in the preamble, and some of the Camp David understandings can be included in an exchange of letters. In addition, Israel might be prepared to consider

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 14, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/13–18/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The memorandum was found attached to an October 19 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski, upon which Brzezinski marked his approval, as well as a copy of the memorandum for the record of Carter's conversation with the Egyptian delegation later the same afternoon, printed as Document 83. The covering memorandum also stated that copies of the summaries would be sent to Eilts, Lewis, and Vance. (Ibid.)

some unilateral gestures to demonstrate its goodwill in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza issues.

3. The President suggested that Israel might want to let the Egyptians put in some phrases dealing with the broader peace framework so long as they did not affect the substance of the treaty. Dayan mentioned amnesty for political prisoners, and removal of military headquarters from some cities, such as in Gaza, as the type of unilateral gestures that might be possible. The President suggested that the Israelis might ease the ban on political activity in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan said that they would consider this, but that it might create problems for Sadat, since there might be demonstrations against him.

4. Dayan's third concern was the speed of normalization. He fears that the Egyptians are weakening their commitment to the establishment of diplomatic relations at the end of the interim withdrawal. They are speaking of gradual normalization. In the economic and cultural areas, Israel can accept this, but not in the diplomatic area. Israel has already agreed to speed up the pace of the withdrawal, so that al-Arish will be returned within two months, Rash Muhammad within four months, and all of the rest of the area up to the interim withdrawal line, by the end of six months. This was done on the assumption that the Egyptians want to move quickly on the normalization of relations. The President said that he agreed with the Israelis on this point.

5. Dayan also mentioned the problem of one Israeli settlement located to the west of the interim withdrawal line. Some arrangement should be made so that this settlement is not required to withdraw before the others.

6. Dayan also raised issues in our bilateral relationship. He spoke first of the need for some form of American guarantee that the agreement will be carried out in good faith. Dayan's second point concerned financial assistance to help carry out the withdrawal of forces. Weizman explained the difficulties that Israel would confront beyond those of building two new airfields. The President agreed that an American team could consult with the Israelis, but that they would not have authority to make any commitments.

7. Finally, Dayan turned to the question of the cost involved in relocating the settlers from Sinai. The President made clear that he would not be prepared to ask Congress for funds for this purpose in light of the well-known American position on the illegality of settlements.

83. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 17, 1978, 3:50–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with the Egyptian Delegation, October 17, 1978, 3:50–5:10 p.m., Oval Office

1. Minister Hassan Ali indicated that agreement had been reached on the main zones on Sinai. He noted that there was some disagreement over including surface-to-air missiles that are integral parts of the Egyptian division that will be in Sinai. He added that the Egyptians should be allowed to have four battalions of frontier forces in the buffer zone, and the President agreed that this had been decided at Camp David.

2. Boutros Ghali stressed the importance of establishing some correlation between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the progress in the West Bank-Gaza talks. In his discussions with Dayan, they had reached agreement that reference could be made to the comprehensive agreement in the preamble and that there could be an exchange of letters which would be published. This would demonstrate to the Arab world that Egypt is still involved in the Palestinian question. He had also discussed with the Israelis the question of establishing diplomatic relations in phases. Dayan had shown some flexibility at first, but had then taken a more negative position. The Israelis insist on including the word "immediate" after mentioning the establishment of diplomatic relations, and in response, the Egyptians have suggested the word "gradual."

3. Al-Baz said that Egypt is thinking of establishing diplomatic relations over a period of six months after the interim withdrawal. First there would be an announcement of diplomatic recognition, then the establishment of an embassy headed by a charge, and finally the accreditation of an ambassador. The President said that he had discussed this in detail with President Sadat at Camp David, and that he was disappointed to see that the Egyptians now want to delay the exchange of ambassadors. He had understood that this would take place at the time of the completion of the interim withdrawal. The President expressed some disappointment with the Egyptian attitude, stating they were less forthcoming than was expected in the Camp David agreements, whereas the Israelis had been more so.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(9/78–12/78). Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

4. Concerning the question of linkage, the President said that he thought our answers² to King Hussein would help to clarify our own views on this. He told Ambassador Atherton to give a copy of the answers to the Egyptian delegation.³ There was some discussion of the question of priority of obligations, the arrangements for a U.N. force, free passage in the Strait of Tiran, and other minor problems. Concerning the question of Gaza, the President expressed his view that it should be mentioned in the text that the final status of Gaza was not decided by the establishment of the border between Egypt and Israel.

5. Finally, the President indicated that he would like to be able to come to the Middle East in the near future, and that his own schedule would permit a visit in late October or early November.

² See footnote 4, Document 85.

³ Ibid.

84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Pretoria and the Embassies in Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, October 18, 1978, 0257Z

Tosec 120078/263638. Jidda for Saunders from Atherton. Subject: Blair House Talks—October 17.

1. We met first today with El-Baz and his colleagues bilaterally. They handed us a proposed annex² on oil and after some discussion indicated that they were now ready to begin negotiations with the Israelis on this subject. We conveyed our view that assurances about long-term supply of oil to Israel would be important in determining how soon the Israelis were willing to withdraw. El-Baz took the position that this could not be expressed in a contractual undertaking but “an understanding,” might be reached about it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2579. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Atherton. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Vance was in Pretoria for discussions on the Namibian question with South African officials.

² A copy of this proposal has not been found.

2. The Egyptians then gave us their proposed redraft of Annex III on normalization of relations.³ As we had expected, the Egyptian text details a more gradual establishment of the various enumerated elements of a normal relationship. In commenting on their text, El-Baz said there were two considerations that led the Egyptians to this approach: first, there had to be “parallelism, between the phased nature of Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of relations; and, second, it was pragmatically impossible for Egypt to “throw the door open” all at once to the Israelis. He emphasized again the problems this would cause Egypt with the other Arabs.

3. I told El-Baz frankly that if the text were handed to the Israelis in its present form it would come as a considerable shock and disappointment to the Israelis, in particular stretched-out Egyptian phasing for establishment of full diplomatic relations which envisage an early announcement, then after some delay opening offices in capitals at Charge level, with Ambassadors being exchanged after six months. I said I thought President Carter would also be disappointed in this approach. We felt that this issue had been resolved at Camp David, namely, that in the general sense normal relations would be established immediately following completion of Israel’s withdrawal to the interim line. Using “gradual” to qualify normalization process would inevitably convey a sense of Egyptian reluctance to take these steps. As for El-Baz’s concept about the need for parallelism, I said this ignored the essential imbalance between the tangible and physical nature of Israel’s withdrawal, which could not be reversed without going to war, and the intangible nature of implementing Egypt’s commitments to peace and normal relations. I told El-Baz that I thought it would be helpful if we could sit down again with them over this text before they presented it to the Israelis. El-Baz stressed Egypt’s commitment to everything agreed to at Camp David and to full and permanent peace. He said Egypt’s interpretation was that “immediately” relates to starting process of normalization by phases, not to completion of process.

4. We then had a bilateral meeting with the Israelis, both Dayan and Weizman present. Dayan reported on a lengthy dinner conversation he had had with Boutros Ghali the night before. He was clearly depressed by this meeting. Boutros Ghali had discussed with him Egypt’s desire for rather extensive language in the preamble of the treaty reflecting the two sides’ continuing commitment to a comprehensive peace and to resolution of the Palestinian problem. They talked about a possible Begin-Sadat exchange of letters to supplement this preamble language, but Dayan said the Egyptians wanted to choose selectively and extensively from the Camp David Framework in a manner that

³ No copy of the Egyptian redraft has been found.

would distort its balance. Dayan thought this might be overcome by having Sadat put whatever the Egyptians wanted in his letter, while Begin, without repudiating Sadat's letter, would stress the points that Israel wanted in his reply. They also talked about Egypt's desire for gradualism in the normalization of relations, which Dayan, even before seeing the text for Annex III, clearly found disappointing and not in keeping with Camp David understandings.

5. Dayan took a firmly negative position about putting comprehensive peace language in this treaty beyond the single agreed preambular paragraph. When I asked him whether he did not recognize that Sadat had a political problem about this and that it was in our joint interest to help strengthen him in Arab world, as well as to find language that might help bring Hussein and moderate Palestinians into negotiations, Dayan expressed impatience over Israel's constantly being asked to worry about Sadat's problems when in fact Israel had taken the extraordinary step of returning all of Sinai to Egypt and had difficult problems of its own.

6. President met separately in afternoon with senior members of Israeli⁴ and Egyptian⁵ delegations, which will be reported separately.⁶ Purpose was to review status of negotiations, identify problem areas and talk about ideas for dealing with them. We will be meeting bilaterally Wednesday⁷ morning with Egyptians and then with Israelis to follow up on these ideas, and are tentatively thinking of scheduling a trilateral drafting session for late morning or afternoon to see if we can resolve some of remaining differences in treaty text.

Christopher

⁴ Document 82.

⁵ Document 83.

⁶ The substance of Carter's October 17 meeting with the Israeli delegation was reported in telegram Tosec 120114/265618 to Cairo and Amman, October 19. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/17–22/78) Telegram Tosec 120113/265619 to Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Amman, October 19, provides a summary record of Carter's October 17 meeting with the Egyptian delegation. (Ibid.)

⁷ October 18.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, October 18, 1978, 0950Z

7435. From Assistant Secretary Saunders. Subject: Talk With King Hussein. Ref: (A) Amman 8074,² (B) Amman 8082.³

1. Assistant Secretary Saunders meet afternoon October 17 for two hours with King Hussein. Hussein had Royal Court Chief Sharaf with him; Ambassador Veliotis, Suddarth and Howell accompanied Saunders. Generally cordial discussion was marked by moments of frustration, some bitterness at Arab colleagues, and some moving deeply personal comments about dedication to peace.

2. At outset of meeting, Saunders presented original of US responses⁴ to Jordanian questions to Hussein, stressing that United States had been acutely aware that Jordan was not represented at Camp David and had accepted Jordanian queries with full respect for the considerations which led Jordan to pose them. Hussein expressed appreciation for response and for President Carter's personal interest in reviewing and signing them. He indicated that he would wish to study

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2755. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and the Secretary's delegation. Vance was in Pretoria for discussions on the Namibian question with South African officials.

² Telegram 8074 from Amman, October 17, summarized Saunders's initial three-hour October 16 meeting with Prime Minister Badran on the U.S. responses to Hussein's questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780424–0841)

³ Telegram 8082 from Amman, October 17, confirmed Hussein's agreement to U.S. release of the answers to his questions to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and "selected key congressional leaders" on a "confidential basis." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425–0229)

⁴ The text of the U.S. responses to Hussein's fourteen questions is printed in Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 388–396. The Department cabled answers to the Embassies in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jidda on October 17. (Telegram 262521 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jidda, October 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 10/78) In telegram 262527 to Jidda, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Amman, October 17, Christopher conveyed Carter's instructions to Eilts, Lewis, and West to present copies of the responses to their host governments once Saunders had presented them to Hussein. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780424–1059) The Department also provided copies of the responses to Hussein's questions to the Egyptian and Israeli delegations at the Blair House talks. (Telegram 263280 to Jidda, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425–0915) The final draft version of the responses, with Carter's handwritten amendments, is attached to an October 14 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter indicating textual changes proposed by Mondale and Vance. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 10/78)

them further and get into details during his meeting with Saunders on Oct 19.⁵ He welcomed, however, Saunders' offer to outline US thinking and philosophical approach which had resulted in Camp David Agreements. King made point of restating his familiar position on Jerusalem and questioned Saunders closely on status of US disagreement with Israel on West Bank settlements issue.

3. Following introductory remarks by Saunders, King who had clearly been briefed by Sharaf, replied that he considers that the US and Jordan are engaged in a very constructive dialogue which Jordan hopes to pursue. He observed that the US and Jordan have similar objectives but appear to be working at the problem from different directions. Half joking, he suggested that the US has attempted to avoid making the framework as tight as it might be. In a later remark, which is probably indicative of the strategy he will pursue at least until after the projected Baghdad summit, Hussein said he would continue for a period of time to pester us with questions which he jokingly said the US "will continue to try to evade."

4. Hussein said, in a more serious vein, that Jordan needs something in hand to assure it that there has been no erosion of the US position on the shape of a final settlement. Decrying the fact that Jordan has no external guarantor, he said he wished that he had a commitment from the US similar in fact, if not in depth of sentiment, to that enjoyed by Israel. Jordan, he emphasized, is being asked to enter into the framework negotiated at Camp David from a position of great weakness. The results of Camp David, he stated, had come as a complete surprise to Jordan. Nevertheless, he said he had been seriously considering what Jordan might do to bring about a starting point for further progress. Scattered throughout his discourse were references to his unhappiness at what he perceives as Egyptian strategy and, at one point, he stressed that Egypt must realize that it is not the "shepherd" with Jordan and other Arabs playing the roles of the "flock". Hussein also felt obvious discomfort with the Saudi role which he felt put Jordan on the line without quote anything in terms of meaningful support. End quote. King also repeatedly stressed with bitterness continuing Saudi support for the PLO.

⁵ Saunders again met with Hussein at Hashemiya Palace in Amman, following the former's return from Jidda, on October 19. Following the ninety minute meeting, during which Saunders's trip to Saudi Arabia, the upcoming summit of Arab leaders in Baghdad, and Hussein's continued study of the U.S. responses to his questions were discussed, Saunders concluded: "In short, King Hussein is not yet prepared to join Camp David framework negotiations on West Bank/Gaza himself—at least not before Arab summit—but he is prepared to encourage West Bankers to participate in Egyptian delegation and to discuss mechanics of Egyptian recruitment efforts with Egyptians. (Telegram 8137 from Amman, October 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–1868)

5. Reflecting his contacts with President Assad of Syria, Hussein expressed his conviction that Syria continues to desire a comprehensive peace, but that Assad will insist that the Soviets be involved with Syria to provide, Hussein suggested, a protector for Syrian interests. He added somewhat cryptically that he and Assad had agreed in principle to meet and discuss possible alternatives to the Camp David approach. In response to his rhetorical query about whether the US had made a policy decision to keep the Soviets out of the process, Saunders returned at a subsequent point in the conversation to a discussion of the Soviet role. Saunders reviewed Soviet involvement, including the US-Soviet joint statement⁶ of October, 1977 and the lack of subsequent results re progress towards Geneva. The US, Saunders observed, has not closed the door to a Geneva-style forum in the future if that should prove useful, but, he pointed out, that would only be helpful if the Soviets were able, as they have not done in past, to contribute positively to the process.

Neither Egypt nor the Israelis desired such a role at this time and, Saunders reminded Hussein, there are aspects of the Soviet position, [such] as advocacy of an independent Palestinian state, which are not necessarily in Jordanian interests. In any case, he continued, we have before us a framework which holds promise of ending Israeli military occupation in the West Bank/Gaza as soon as the Jordanians and Palestinians decide to take advantage of it. Those who shape what evolved in the occupied territories, Saunders concluded, will be those who negotiate in the next few months. Saunders said our assumption has been that Jordan wants a role in shaping future of West Bank and King affirmed that it does.

[garble] acknowledging the difficulties of the choice confronting Hussein, Saunders raised the issue of the forthcoming Arab summit⁷ and pointed out that, historically, such meetings have seldom had positive results in terms of peace. Hussein did not disagree but said he had felt such a summit was inevitable following Camp David. He urged the Saudis, he reported, to take the lead in convening the meeting in the hope that this would have assured moderate control over the venue, agenda, etc. The Saudis, however, had not acted, he said with bitterness, permitting Iraq to seize the initiative.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 120.

⁷ On October 10, it was announced that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry had invited the Foreign Ministers of all the Arab states, except Egypt, to a conference to be held in Baghdad beginning on October 20 in order to develop a “common approach to the Camp David accords.” (Edward Cody, “Saudis Insist Arab Summit Invite Egypt,” *The Washington Post*, October 11, 1978, p. A20) The conference was ultimately set to begin on November 2.

7. If Jordan were to decide ultimately that it could not take up the negotiations offered by the CDA, Saunders asked, what would be its attitude toward the inclusion of West Bankers in an Egyptian delegation? Hussein replied that Jordan had made it clear that it would not stand in the way of West Bank Palestinians and will support whatever action they decide to take. Jordan has already begun increasing its contacts with the West Bank, he said, but needs time to organize its campaign. Asked whether those West Bankers who might be inclined to participate in negotiations could be supported effectively against those with PLO connections and those who oppose the CDA, Hussein said this was possible but would require more resources than Jordan possesses. The Saudis, he said, are tipping the balance in the West Bank and elsewhere by their generous financial support of the PLO. Saunders asked what US could do to help. The King replied: (1) provide Jordan with materials (such as answers to questions) for a dialogue with West Bankers, (2) "Ask your friends (read Saudis) to make up their minds".

8. Saunders closed the discussion by saying that he looks forward to a more detailed discussion of US responses when he returned from talks in Saudi Arabia. Once again, he emphasized that the replies are straight-forward and honest reflection of precise US position. To have gone beyond them in terms of specific commitments about the results of negotiations would have been a disservice to the spirit of frankness that characterizes US-Jordanian relations. He added that Hussein has received statements of the US view on issues, such as Jerusalem, which are important to him and to all Arabs and that he had President Carter's commitment by word and deed to continue as a full partner in the negotiations until a successful conclusion is achieved. Saunders pointed out the strong congressional and public support the President enjoys for his efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the high priority that objective has for the President. He suggested that Hussein ponder these important considerations along with the other elements of his decision on Jordanian policy. In closing, King Hussein suggested he now had a better understanding of US strategy at Camp David and is sympathetic to giving fullest consideration to our views, in particular on ways to maintain pressure for Israeli withdrawal and West Bank self-determination.

9. Saunders comment: Jordanian policy toward West Bank/Gaza negotiations and Baghdad summit⁸ is still very much in flux. Today's reading had to be that Jordan is not likely to make a decision before Arab summit, but there is a serious interest and increasing activity with West Bankers which Sharaf promised to discuss with me in more detail Thursday. Jordanians keep stressing the risks in joining a process

⁸ Ibid.

without knowing where and increasing activity with West Bankers which Sharaf promised to discuss with me in more detail Thursday. Jordanians keep stressing the risks in joining a process without knowing where it will lead. I think, nevertheless, it may be possible to engage Jordanians in getting West Bankers into negotiations. Many elements in Camp David Framework seem not to have been understood.

West

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, October 18, 1978, 1537Z

7455. To INR McAfee only: please handcarry to NEA/Crawford for transmittal Eyes Only to Brzezinski for President from Saunders. Subject: Talk With King Hussein.

1. During discussion with me Oct 17, King Hussein made following intensely personal observations with deep emotion on King's previous personal involvement in peace process that I believe you would want to have reported to you. These comments shed light on background to his current reactions to Camp David Accords.

2. At end of our lengthy conversation, during which his initial considerable reserve gradually dissipated, King said he wished to share some sensitive and intimate details with me to help in our understanding of his reserve with regard to Camp David Agreements. King then alluded to his extensive secret contacts with Israeli leaders in recent years and mentioned that the former Israeli Prime Minister (Rabin) had told him (probably in 1977) that Israel's objective was separately to take Egypt out of the MidEast negotiating process by making a separate peace regarding the Sinai. Israel would then deal with the West Bank issue by making arrangements with the West Bank inhabitants, which King implied were much along lines of administrative autonomy suggested by Begin plan.² King said this strategy had been reaffirmed to him by Israeli Foreign Minister (Dayan) last year. King suggested that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 5. Secret; Roger Channel; Sandstone; Niact Immediate. In the right-hand margin of the telegram, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the document.

² See footnote 2, Document 5.

the coincidence of these Israeli statements with some of the at least superficial aspects of the Camp David Accords were an element contributing to reserve with which he has been treating Camp David.

3. King said he hopes we appreciate his efforts over past 11 years during which he undertook extensive clandestine contacts with Israelis, involving considerable risks, during which he tried his best to move towards peace. He said that in a sense his previous wife (Queen Alya) met her death (in night helicopter crash) as a result of this effort because it was necessary to do extensive night flying in royal helicopter to provide a cover for the use of helicopter for night meetings with Israelis. King added that he personally would be ready to meet his death “this minute” if that would help to bring a sound lasting peace to the area and that “nothing is too great” for him to undertake to advance that goal.

4. King said he deeply appreciates all you have done and are doing for peace in MidEast and wishes to convey his gratitude and respect to you, and his hopes to continue our dialogue. King mentioned your handwritten letter³ to him in which you referred to your awareness of risks to his position but to greater risk of not taking steps to continue momentum of peace process.

5. King said that he will need a little time to look closely at the evolving situation and to consult and discuss Jordan’s possible role within Jordan and with Arab moderates. He said that “before he takes the plunge he would like to know where the shore line is since Jordan is not a good swimmer”, unlike Egypt, which is more isolated from heartland of Arab world, any miscalculation could involve Jordan in fighting on several fronts. As a result Jordan must work on the Arabs for some support. In this respect, he noted particularly that Saudis with their fixation with PLO were not rpt. not giving him support he would need to enter negotiations. I will be following this up in Saudi Arabia.⁴

West

³ See Document 55.

⁴ Saunders met with Fahd on October 18. They discussed the U.S. answer to Hussein’s questions. The Embassy transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 7469 from Jidda, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2409) In addition, Saunders held a meeting with Kamel, Adham, and Turki on October 18 and a final meeting with Saud, Turki, Adham, and others on October 19. Saunders dispatched a report of all his meetings with Saudi officials in telegram 7470 from Jidda, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2413)

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, October 18, 1978, 2145Z

23172. Subject: Sadat Message to President Carter. Ref: (A) State 263406,² (B) Cairo 23136.³

1. VP Mubarak asked that I meet with him 2000 hours this evening at his residence. He had just returned from Ismailia, where he had met with Sadat. Sadat had asked him to contact me immediately in order to convey the following to President Carter.

2. Sadat had received a report on President Carter's meeting with Kamal Hassan Ali and Boutros Ghali (ref A). He had studied that report and wanted President Carter to have his thoughts. He had four specific points:

(A) What is going on now in Washington, namely negotiating a treaty only on Sinai, will isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Sadat believes that President Carter recognizes this situation. It had been discussed in Camp David.

(B) The Sinai treaty should refer to the need for a comprehensive solution.

(C) On the "main point," namely diplomatic relations, Sadat agrees with President Carter's views that the process should be completed as soon as possible, i.e. six months as President Carter has suggested. Sadat has received President Carter's message that he could come for signature in late October or early November and is pleased. Sadat agrees with President Carter that there should be formal recognition of Israel and a quick exchange of diplomats. This should be begun immediately after conclusion of the first phase of Israeli withdrawal and should be put into the draft treaty as at the Charge level. (Sadat, Mubarak said, had mentioned that the U.S./PRC precedent might be applicable.) Sadat wants President Carter to know, however, that when

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2689. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found. Likely a mistaken reference to telegram 263466 to Cairo, October 18, informing Eilts of the substance of Carter's October 17 meeting with the Egyptian Blair House delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2577) For a summary of the meeting, see Document 83.

³ In telegram 23136 from Cairo, October 18, Eilts reported that Mubarak, "at Sadat's behest . . . this morning again urged that we and Israelis agree to including Gaza in present negotiations. According [to] Mubarak, Sadat had made this suggestion to President Carter in order to get the West Bank/Gaza negotiations going in the face of Hussein's foot-dragging." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2681)

the treaty is signed in President Carter's presence, here or at Jabal Musa, he is prepared to accede to a request from President Carter that ambassadors be exchanged as soon as diplomatic relations are established. Mubarak made a point of saying that this concession is for President Carter and should not be mentioned to the Israelis, the Egyptian delegation or be included in the treaty. Moreover, Mubarak said, Sadat's willingness to do this is contingent on a specific inclusion of Gaza in the treaty.

(D) On Gaza, Mubarak said Sadat considers it essential to include a reference to moving ahead on Gaza in the Sinai treaty lest failure to do so isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Sadat wants the self-governing body to be set up in Gaza without delay. The Israelis should withdraw their military forces to security points that are agreed upon without delay. Sadat would like these points included in the Sinai treaty, but Mubarak indicated that the President has an open mind on this subject—so long as progress on Gaza is synchronized with the progress on implementing the Sinai treaty. Specifically, if as President Carter has suggested, the Israelis have completed their interim withdrawal in Sinai in six months time, a self-governing body should by that time have been negotiated and established (perhaps on the last day or the day before Sinai withdrawal) so that "self-rule" is in effect in Gaza at approximately the same time as Phase I of Sinai withdrawal is completed. Sadat wants President Carter to know that if new leaders cannot be found in Gaza, the present ones would be acceptable for this purpose. Sadat is prepared, in accordance with his letter to President Carter, to begin negotiations on a Gaza settlement immediately and without waiting for Hussein's or West Bank agreement, so that there can be synchronization between Sinai and Gaza. In making these points, Mubarak stressed that Sadat believes that he cannot go it alone in Sinai. There must be some parallelism between Sinai and a Gaza settlement. Sadat was confident that President Carter understands this from their talks at Camp David.

3. I told Mubarak that I would, of course, convey President Sadat's views. I reminded him, however, that Sadat had agreed that there be no formal linkage between the two framework documents. President Carter has spoken of the need for an inter-relationship between the two sets of negotiations, but I doubted that the Israelis would agree to including Gaza in the Sinai treaty. A Gaza settlement, I pointed out to Mubarak, would be based not upon the Egyptian/Israeli framework document, but upon the comprehensive framework. Hence, while we also appreciate the need for an inter-relationship between the two processes, they are not part and parcel of the document under which negotiations are now taking place. Mubarak insisted that Sadat needs a specific relationship between the Sinai agreement and the establishment of

a self-governing body in Gaza. He reiterated that Egypt is prepared to negotiate a Gaza settlement under the comprehensive framework, but that the establishment of the self-governing body in Gaza and related matters must be synchronized in point of time with the completion of the first phase of Sinai withdrawal.

4. Comment: Sadat and the Egyptians are feeling the heat at home and from other Arabs about the lack of any linkage between the two framework documents. Even Mubarak did not seem to know that Sadat had agreed that there need be no legal linkage between the two documents, which suggests to me that Sadat has done the predictable: he has suggested to his intimates that an understood relationship exists between the two. Since neither Hussein nor the PLO seems about to play on the West Bank, Sadat has concluded Gaza should be tackled separately if he is to proceed with Sinai without doing irreparable damage to GOE's position in Arab world. As Mubarak had said earlier in the day (ref B), a Gaza settlement would help to put pressure on Hussein and the West Bankers.

5. Mubarak said that he will be meeting Usama al Baz on Sunday, October 22, in London for a report. He will at that time give the above instructions to al Baz for use by the Egyptian delegation. (Note: He will not rpt not tell al Baz of Sadat's willingness to announce at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, in response to a request from President Carter, that diplomatic relations can be established at the Ambassadorial level.) Mubarak had no rpt no objection to our mentioning the above points (with the exception of the Ambassadorial level point) to the Egyptian delegation even before he meets with al Baz in London later this week. This would allow time to discuss Sadat's ideas in depth with Egyptian delegation so that Usama al Baz can go to London with our thinking for use in his talk with Mubarak there. The point at issue seems to be that Sadat wants the "parallelism" that he spoke about in Rabat (after leaving Washington) to be concurrent in the case of Sinai and Gaza rather than sequential.

Eilts

88. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Geneva, the White House, and the Embassies in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan¹

Washington, October 20, 1978, 0356Z

Tosec 120125/265774. Subject: Egypt-Israel Negotiations October 19.

1. The President joined senior members of delegations for lunch at Blair House today,² which provided the opportunity for a timely and helpful discussion covering not only the issues of the treaty text and military talks but also how the two sides might get things moving toward West Bank/Gaza negotiations.

2. Prior to lunch we held a short trilateral meeting³ with Ministers present to review the state of play on the text of the treaty. We had left it the evening before that each side would consider suggestions made (in some cases ours) for bridging the gap on a number of unresolved articles.⁴ Our review this morning revealed that positions had frozen on the various issues along the lines we have previously reported with no sign of further flexibility.

3. At lunch, the President urged the Egyptians to be more forthcoming on the pace of normalization, and the Israelis to be more understanding of Egyptian need for language on comprehensive settlement and Palestinian issues so long as it does not in any way make Egyptian-Israeli treaty conditional on progress with respect to those issues. The President also encouraged Egyptians and Israelis to begin discussions to work out timetable for getting West Bank/Gaza negotiations started.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/17–22/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Quandt and James E. Thyder (S/S–O); approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2072) Vance was in Geneva for discussions with the U.S. delegation on the upcoming SALT negotiations.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations at Blair House from 12:27 p.m. to 2:01 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Atherton's briefing memorandum for Carter, prepared for the meeting, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 14, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/19–20/78) Carter's handwritten notes from the luncheon are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 8–11/78. No other record of this meeting has been found.

³ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁴ The Department transmitted a summary of the treaty text negotiations held on October 18 in telegram Tosec 120099/264803 to Geneva, the White House, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Amman, October 19. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/17–22/78)

Other principal subjects discussed were (a) problem of ensuring establishment and maintenance of UN or other international force not under UN auspices, possibly including U.S. component among components from other friendly countries, and (b) those issues which are proving particularly difficult in the military talks (Israeli settlement near El-Arish and movement of Egyptian air defense missiles east of Canal). President said he would reflect on all these issues where differences exist and would convey to parties his views on what would constitute a fair way of resolving them with the hope that they would be receptive to his recommendations.

4. Following lunch at the President's instructions our delegation went over the treaty with a view to preparing a fresh U.S. draft with our recommendation for compromise language on the disputed articles. I reviewed this with him at the end of the day and we now have an approved text⁵ which I will put forward to the parties tonight or tomorrow morning.

5. We did not deal with the preamble or annexes, the Egyptians have now presented to us and Israelis revised preamble language and proposed exchange of notes on "correlation."⁶ We hope to move forward tomorrow with our recommendations on these two drafts as well as on Annex III (normalization and friendly relations), finally, President has asked us to convey to parties that we believe interim withdrawal line should be drawn closer to Al-Arish to include Israeli settlement on Israeli side of line, and that we could not support Egyptian SAM's east of canal since this would be departure from Camp David understanding.

6. We have clearly reached our first difficult point with both sides digging in until the bidding can be reviewed at the highest levels at home. In these circumstances the President's intervention today and the submission by us of new compromise proposals is timely.

7. In the military talks the Israeli and Egyptian cartographers encountered some differences in trying to plot on maps the limits-of-forces lines agreed to yesterday by Magdoub and Tamir.⁷ The differences were minor and should have been easily resolved, but neither Magdoub and Tamir will now give any ground, nor are they willing to discuss anything else until they settle the issues at hand. This means that the military discussions have ground to a halt, too.

⁵ See Document 89.

⁶ The Egyptian delegation's proposed drafts of the treaty preamble and a proposed exchange of notes on the framework agreement between the heads of the Egyptian and Israeli delegations, annotated with U.S.-suggested textual changes and dated October 19, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78.

⁷ No other record of this meeting has been found.

8. The breakdown is more a reflection of the present sour political mood, however, than any inherent difficulty over military issues. As soon as things get moving at the political level, we expect Tamir and Magdoub will very quickly dispose of what problems remain.

Newsom

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Jerusalem and the Embassies in Egypt and Israel¹

Washington, October 20, 1978, 1851Z

265927. Jerusalem for Saunders. Subject: U.S. Revision of Draft Treaty Text. Ref: State 265774.²

1. Our October 19 revision of draft treaty text (described in reftel para 4) follows:

Article I

Termination of State of War and Establishment of Peace

—1. The state of war between the parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty.

—2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I-A and I-B), and thereafter Egypt will exercise its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

—3. After completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I-A, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III.

Article II

Inviolability of Boundary

—The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Marthinsen; cleared in S/S; approved by Sterner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2063)

² See Document 88.

territory of Palestine. As shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the status of the Gaza Strip. The parties regard this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

Future Relations

—1. The parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

—A. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence:

—B. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries:

—C. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

—2. Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other party. Each party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of belligerency, hostility, international terrorism or violence against the other party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

—3. The parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this treaty is set out in the annexes protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

Security Arrangements

—1. In order to provide maximum security for both parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I–C, including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, United Nations forces and observers, and other security arrangements.

—2. The parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five permanent members, unless the parties otherwise agree.

—3. A joint commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

Article V

Freedom of Navigation

—1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

—2. The parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight and undertake to respect each other's right to such navigation and overflight.

Article VI

Priority of Obligations

—1. Each party ensures to and agrees with the other, in recognition of the parties' commitments to each other in this treaty, that there will be no conflict between its obligations under this treaty and any of its other obligations, including those under any other international agreement, whenever made. Each party also assures the other that it will respect its obligations under the United Nations Charter in its dealings with all states.

—2. The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under the present treaty.

—3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.

—4. This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

Dispute Settlement

—1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this treaty shall be resolved by diplomatic negotiations.

—2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be submitted to an arbitration commission at the request of either government. This commission shall be composed of five members: two of each party and the fifth to be selected by them.

Article VIII

Settlement of Financial Claims

—The parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX

Final Clauses

—1. This treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

—2. This treaty supersedes the agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

—3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

—4. The treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at (blank) this day (blank) of 1978, in duplicate in the Arabic, English and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. End text.

2. Texts of preamble, annexes, and possible exchange of letters are being negotiated and will be provided when ready.

Newsom

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1978, 7:30–10:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President's Meeting with the Israeli Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large

Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President

Mr. Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser to the Department of State

Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff

H.E. Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister

H.E. Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense

H.E. Aharon Barak, Justice of the Supreme Court

H.E. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States

The *President* reviewed his talk² earlier in the day with the Egyptian delegation. He confirmed that the Israelis would be able to use the Suez Canal for their ships immediately upon signing of the peace treaty. On the question of priority of obligations, the *President* suggested that Barak might meet with our legal advisers to see if some acceptable language could be found.

Barak said that this problem had caused them great concern. It was a political and a legal question. Barak and Rosenne had gone to Yale today to meet with Professors [Eugene] Rostow, [Leon] Lipson, and [Myres S.] McDougal. They had explained their problem with the question of priority of obligations. The professors suggested some language. They all felt that the American draft³ was inadequate, and might even be worth nothing at all. *Rosenne* proceeded to read suggested language on this issue. *Barak* said that it did not solve all of the problems,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum was found attached to an October 25 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Boutros-Ghali and El-Ehrian in the Oval Office from 4:10 p.m. to 4:55 p.m. on October 20. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

³ See Document 89. As part of a package of negotiating materials for this October 20 evening meeting, including copies of the preamble, the Egyptian draft letter, and draft language on UN forces, Brzezinski forwarded an annotated text of the treaty (numbered Draft 5A) upon which Carter added his own notations. This copy of this draft of the treaty is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: Non-Meeting: 2–12/78.

and that they had concluded that they could not settle such questions as what might happen if Israel were engaged in a military conflict with Syria and Egypt felt obliged to go to Syria's defense under the provision of the U.N. Charter which provides for collective measures of self-defense. *Rosenne* noted that some American treaties have contained language similar to that suggested by the Israelis. He quoted the NATO treaty⁴ and the 1953 treaties⁵ with Greece and Turkey. Israel's concern is that it is entering a treaty with Egypt in the full knowledge that Egypt has fifty mutual defense pacts with adversaries of Israel.

The *President* asked if the Israelis could accept language similar to that which we used in NATO and in our treaties with Turkey and Greece. *Rosenne* said they could, provided there were an additional statement on the priority of this treaty over all others. *Barak* said that there were two ways of dealing with the issue. You could say that the most recent treaty supercedes those that have preceded it; or you could declare that there is no conflict between this treaty and any other. But the latter solution can be misunderstood. *Rosenne* said that it is not enough simply to state that there is no conflict. The *President* said that it would be easier to convince Sadat if the language used was similar to that in the NATO treaty. *Barak* noted that the problem with the NATO formula is that it is not adequate because it simply states that there is no conflict between the Egypt-Israel treaty and other obligations, and this is not in fact true.

Dayan said that he would be returning to Israel, and that if he reported that Barak and Rosenne had met with the highest legal authorities in the United States and that they were not satisfied with the language, he could not expect the Cabinet to accept it. The *President* bluntly asked if Dayan would prefer for us to withdraw from the negotiations entirely. *Dayan* repeated that the legal experts had said that the U.S. draft was not adequate. *Barak* said that Israel could not ask the Egyptians to withdraw from their other treaties. The language Israel has suggested is the best that they can hope for. This is a technical problem of international law. *Rosenne* added that if the Egyptians cannot accept this language, it will raise doubts in Israel about their sincerity.

The *President* said that Sadat had insisted⁶ that the interim withdrawal line be east of the settlement near al-Arish. The President had

⁴ The text of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949, is in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, Western Europe, pp. 281–285.

⁵ Reference is presumably to the "United States use of Defense Facilities: Agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, October 12, 1953." (*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, pp. 2188–2189)

⁶ For Eilts's conversation with Sadat on September 28, see footnote 2, Document 61.

told Sadat that he could not agree with this.⁷ He would not be able to go on with the negotiations if Sadat were to insist. The *President* feels that the line should be around the settlement. If Sadat does agree to this, he will not allow the settlers to go into Egyptian territory from the settlement. The *President* said that he had also informed the Egyptians that they could only have SAM-7 missiles across the Canal. *Weizman* said that this would be no problem. The *President* said that all other missiles would have to be west of the Canal. The Egyptians have referred this to Cairo and they will provide an answer soon. They understand that they can move their other missiles up to the Canal.

The *President* said that he had also discussed the question of the timing of normalization. The Egyptians have talked of a seven-month period for normalization and the exchange of ambassadors. This was not specified at Camp David. The President's first suggestion had been full normalization at the time of signing the peace treaty. Sadat had objected. He said that normalization could take place at the time of the interim withdrawal. The President said that he understood the Israelis wanted the exchange of ambassadors to be within one month of the interim withdrawal. The President had recommended to the Egyptians that they accept this one-month provision, and that it would be to their advantage. Israel is withdrawing faster than required, and will be out of al-Arish within two months. Israel has also offered open transportation between al-Arish and Gaza. The President asked if that was correct. *Dayan* said yes, although there might be some check posts along the way.

The *President* said the Egyptian delegation would ask Sadat's views on the settlement issue and the exchange of ambassadors. On Gaza, the President said he thought the Israelis understood the problem and asked if they had found a solution. *Barak* replied that something along the lines of the "question of Gaza will be solved according to the framework agreement" might be adequate. The President [asked?] if Israel could accept the language in the text as it now stands. *Barak* said that he had called the Prime Minister who had said the language was unacceptable. This is not a legal problem, but it is one of public opinion. It could imply that Israel accepted the status of Gaza as it was previously and that Israel had given up its claims. *Barak* had suggested "the issue of the status of Gaza". *Begin* gave no answer to this. *Barak* had also suggested this language to al-Baz and had not gotten any reaction.

The *President* noted that Sadat does not want to acknowledge that Gaza is a part of Israel. *Dayan* said that we might refer to the Camp

⁷ No record of this exchange has been found.

David agreement. The final status of Gaza might be settled according to the Camp David agreement. *Barak* suggested language on “without prejudice to the status of Gaza, which will be settled in accordance with the framework agreement”. The *President* said he felt that Israel was trying to assert its own claim to sovereignty over Gaza. *Dayan* said that they just wanted to tie this to the Camp David agreement. He suggested the following language: “the issue of the final status of Gaza, which will be decided in accordance with the Camp David framework agreements.” The *President* said that Israel cannot lay a claim to Gaza on this basis. The *President* said he was wondering what Israel’s intentions were in not accepting the language as it presently was written. He suggested that we stick to the Camp David language and show a map with a line at the border and around Gaza.

The *President* turned to the letter⁸ that the Egyptians were planning to write referring to the general framework agreement. He said that he had urged them to cut down dramatically the specific references from the Camp David agreement. He asked the Israelis if there were anything they would like to have in that letter. *Dayan* said that they knew what they did not want in the letter. The *President* urged them to be in a constructive mood and to leave something in the letter for the Egyptians. *Barak* said that the main problem with the letter was that it could be seen as implying some legal link between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the broader framework agreement. The letter should not be binding on Israel. The *President* said that this would not be the case. The Egyptian and Israeli letters did not have to be identical. *Barak* said that if Israel can write whatever it wants in the letter, then Israel does not care what the Egyptians write in their letter. He had thought that a common letter was envisaged.

Messrs. Hansell and Rosenne returned to the room at this point after having worked on the priority of obligations language. They suggested some new language, which *Barak* said he could accept. The *President* suggested that we try this language with the Egyptians.

Turning to the exchange of letters, The *President* argued for a single joint letter on the beginning of negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza issue within one month, to which the text of the Camp David agreements would be appended. In addition, there would be mention in the preamble of the treaty of the Camp David framework agreement. *Barak* said that this raised the question of linkage. *Barak* said that the Israeli commitment to the framework agreement is a fact, but that it should not be mentioned in the treaty itself. If it were, it could be seen as the foundation stone for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and could call into

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 90.

question the viability of the treaty if the broader framework were not to be implemented. The *President* said that this was not a new concept. The Sinai framework itself was predicated on the acceptance of the general framework.

Barak said that Israel's problem was that any mention of the general framework as the basis for the Egyptian-Israeli treaty would seem to make the Egypt-Israel treaty conditional upon the implementation of the broader framework. If this is mentioned, somewhere in the treaty there must be a sentence that the treaty stands on its own. If that is included, then Israel does not care how much reference is made to the broader framework. *Rosenne* suggested language which would make the treaty completely separate from the broader framework agreement. *Barak* said that this would balance off any reference to the general framework. If this were included, the Egyptians could even add language in the preamble referring to the comprehensive peace. But if this sentence were not in the treaty, then no reference could be made to the broader framework. The *President* said that he did not believe that Sadat could agree to the Israeli language. He insists that there is some tie between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the comprehensive peace. The Sinai agreement was meant to be part of a general framework. This is why he was able to agree to it at Camp David. He needs to be able to make some specific reference to the broader framework. It seems to the *President* that the Israelis were moving backwards.

Barak said that whatever connection existed between the two frameworks still remained, but out of the framework agreement on Sinai there was not going to be a specific treaty, and it should stand on its own. It is a contract between two parties. *Rosenne* said that the United States had made reference to the treaty standing on its own. The Israelis do not want to point to a separate peace with Egypt, but in legal terms the Egypt-Israel treaty should not be dependent upon anything else. Israel will still adhere to the broader framework agreement, but Israel needs some guarantee that the language in the preamble will not pose any conditions.

The *President* said that if the Israelis could convince Sadat, it would be okay with him. But he would personally not try. He would not propose this language to Sadat. He would not say that there was no connection whatsoever. Two framework agreements were negotiated at Camp David. Everyone knew it at the time that they were linked. Sadat only signed the Egyptian-Israeli framework on the premise that the West Bank and Gaza framework was viable and agreed upon.

Rosenne said that there was a difference between a political link and a legal link. The *President* said that the Israelis were wasting time on this issue with him. He would not propose a completely separate agreement. *Rosenne* said that this caused a serious problem. The *Presi-*

dent replied that if that was the case he could not help matters. But he would not ask Sadat to say that the agreement with Israel was not related to the broader framework. Israel had already agreed to language in the preamble reaffirming her commitment to the broader framework. The President has tried to get the Egyptians to remove excess verbage from their letter and he has proposed simply to have the text of the framework agreement appended to the exchange of letters.

Rosenne said that the implementation of the broader framework agreement might depend on some third party and that would give them the possibility of preventing the implementation of the Egypt-Israel treaty as well. *Dayan* added that Israel had accepted the reference to the general Camp David framework in the preamble. In addition, there might be an exchange of letters, although they would not necessarily be identical. But there should be nothing in the preamble other than what the American draft contained. The *President* asked whether Israel would accept everything else in our proposal. The Israelis are trying selectively to accept our suggestions. The *President* said that he had tried to get the Israelis to say what they could accept. *Barak* said that the text of the framework agreement could be annexed to the exchange of letters. This could be done with the letter on setting up negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza within one month. *Barak* said that when Israel agreed to reaffirm its commitment to the framework, it did so in conjunction with a section in the treaty which stated that the Egypt-Israel treaty would stand on its own feet. This is not a new point.

The *President* asked the Israelis if they really wanted a peace treaty. *Dayan* said that he could not imagine anyone thinking they did not. The *President* said that he detected an attitude among the Israelis that they had gone too far at Camp David, and they now seemed to be trying to back off some of their undertakings there. *Dayan* denied this. The *President* asked why then they were not willing to reaffirm their commitment to those agreements.

Barak asked if the West Bank framework did not work out for some reason, would the Egyptian-Israeli treaty stand? The *President* said yes. *Barak* said that is what the Israelis were trying to say. The *President* asked what would happen in a situation where the interim withdrawal would be complete, ambassadors had been exchanged, and then Israel would refuse to withdraw her military government or to redeploy her forces, or would not negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza, what should Egypt do? *Barak* said that Israel would then be breaking her agreement under the framework document. The *President* asked whether the Egyptian-Israeli treaty should then stand. *Barak* said that it should stand on its own, but Israel would then be in breach of another agreement.

Hansell said that the preamble language did not constitute a binding obligation. It could not be grounds for the termination of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty if the general framework were not implemented. *Atherton* added that the Egyptians have not seen that as setting a condition on the Egypt-Israel treaty. *Barak* said that he was afraid it could provide a legal basis for breaking their obligations. The *President* added that Egypt merely wants Israel to say in the preamble that it will reaffirm its commitment to the framework agreement. If after doing so, you were to declare sovereignty over Gaza, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty won't be worth anything. *Barak* said that politically that was true, but not legally. Israel wants the legal structure to be correct.

The *President* said that Begin had shown courage in taking a strong position on the removal of settlements. Sadat has also shown courage in breaking with the other Arabs. He has said that he will negotiate in the place of Jordan. Now Israel is suggesting that the framework might not go forward, but Egypt has said that it will negotiate. *Barak* asked what would happen if the Palestinians were to boycott the elections. The *President* said that there was no possibility that Sadat would declare the Egyptian-Israeli treaty null and void in that event. *Barak* replied that Israel is trying to find a way of stating the legal principle that the treaty will stand intact in those situations. Israel remains bound by the framework. Israel is not backing out of its obligations. Israel does not want the legal structure laid for an argument about the validity of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

The *President* said that Barak was not trying to help solve the problem that exists. If Israel cannot accept the language in the preamble, then perhaps other language could be drafted which would say that if the general framework could not be implemented because of the actions of third parties, this would not be an obstacle to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. *Barak* said that this suggestion helped, but there could be a situation in which Egypt might say that Israel was to blame for the non-implementation of the West Bank/Gaza framework. In reply, the *President* said it was impossible to cover every eventuality. If the Egyptians want to attack Israel, they will find some pretext.

The *President* urged that we return to the kind of spirit that existed at Camp David when the agreements were signed. We want to remove obstacles. The Israelis know what Sadat needs in terms of his credibility in the Arab world. There has to be some reference to the Camp David agreements. The *President* said that he would be able to get Sadat to drop some references in the preamble, but not everything. Pretexts can always be found to break agreements. The Israelis might want to draft a paragraph dealing with the contingency in which the Palestinians and the Jordanians cause the problem for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. But generally he has the impression that the Israelis are trying to

back away from the minimal agreed linkage established at Camp David.

Barak said that Israel would reaffirm in a joint declaration or some other means the commitment to the Camp David agreement. But Sadat wants this in the preamble to the peace treaty. The *President* reminded Barak that Egypt had earlier wanted references made throughout the treaty and now they were prepared to accept a reference only in the preamble. If the Israelis can persuade Sadat otherwise, let them try. *Barak* insisted again that they do not want a legal link. A letter from them saying that there was no legal link would be all right.

The *President* asked whether the Israelis could accept the preamble as it now stands, with only minor deletions. Would Israel then refuse to sign the treaty? The President will try to get Israel the settlement in Sinai, as well as an exchange of ambassadors after one month. He cannot imagine that the Israelis would then reject the treaty because of a reaffirmation of the commitment to the Camp David framework. If that is a problem, we should simply stop the negotiations. Sadat will not renounce any linkage at all between the two frameworks. This was the whole basis for Sadat's willingness to sign the Camp David agreements. If it is so important to Israel that they cannot reaffirm their commitment to the Camp David frameworks, then Sadat and Begin should just meet again to try to work this out. The President would drop out of the negotiations. The Israelis seem to be going back into Camp David.

Rosenne said once again that if mention were made of the framework in the preamble some reference had to be made in the treaty that the treaty itself would stand on its own. There had to be some reference. Events outside the control of the parties might hinder the implementation of the broader framework. *Rosenne* suggested adding language to the article on the priority of obligations which would say that this treaty was binding and was independent of any other agreement that might exist. *Rosenne* suggested that reference be made to the second framework agreement between Egypt and Israel at the end of the preamble.

Dayan suggested that these suggestions be put in writing. He said that he felt bad about the discussion. Israel has tried to explain its position and its honest feelings. Israel wants a peace treaty and it is committed to the Camp David agreements. He would be prepared to ask the Prime Minister if he could accept the preamble as it now stands, but the political decisions would have to be made by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

The *President* said that what Egypt wants goes into the preamble or in an exchange of letters. What Israel wants always has to be in the text. He suggested including the reaffirmation of the commitment to the framework in the preamble. He does not see that this causes any

problem. If it does, the Israelis should suggest another paragraph to include in the preamble. If the President can understand the Israeli concern, he'll recommend to the Egyptians that they accept. But he has already gone to the Egyptians on the Israelis' problems, and he has tried to get favorable action. He has not seen any comparable effort by the Israelis. They wait for the Egyptian draft, we modify it, and they keep pushing for better advantage.

The *President* said that he found this very frustrating. He said that the Israelis were trying to undo the degree of linkage that had been established at Camp David. He knew that the Israelis had wanted none in the first place, but he could not understand why they now wanted to drop things, such as the U.N. Security Council endorsement of the treaty. Sadat also wants Israel to help out on international waterways, but Israel has not been forthcoming. On the points of importance to Israel, such as Suez passage, settlements, and others, the President has tried to help. If the Israelis now insist on the language they want in the text of the treaty, they are trying to undo any linkage at all. The Egyptian-Israeli treaty is based on the overall framework agreement. Sadat made sure that Israel would understand that at Camp David. He told this to the Israelis. Now the Israelis are trying to undo that minimum degree of linkage. Sadat has his integrity at stake. The President has told Hussein and Fahd and Assad that the two agreements are related. We have said that Sadat has not agreed to a separate peace treaty. For Israel now to create the impression of a separate peace would cause Sadat great problems. The President does not personally care about this issue, but he cannot accept the Israeli position in good conscience. Israel should be helping Sadat solve his problem. He cannot say that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty stands completely on its own. The Israelis know that there is an interconnection.

Dayan said the President had referred to a political linkage, but not a legal linkage. The *President* agreed, and *Dayan* said that this is the Israeli position. Israel does not want a legal linkage. The *President* said that if the Jordanians and the Palestinians do not want to negotiate, neither he nor Sadat would use that as a pretext for saying that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty should not be honored. The Israelis could write something to deal with this situation. *Dayan* said that if there could be some statement on political linkage without implying legal linkage, the Israelis might be able to accept it. *Barak* was afraid that this might provide a pretext for not honoring the treaty, but the *President* replied again that a pretext can always be found. The Egyptians recognize that Israel wants to have influence in the West Bank and Gaza and in East Jerusalem. They know that Israel wants to keep settlements in the Golan. They are not forcing Israel to take a stand on these issues. They are not predicating this treaty on assurances that the Egyptian position

will always prevail. *Dayan* said that they would have to check how legally binding a statement in the preamble would be on Israel.

The *President* suggested that at the end of the preamble language should be inserted saying that “in order to implement the framework [of] an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty the parties agree to the following provisions”. *Rosenne* said that this would help, but there should also be some mention that the validity of this treaty is not conditional upon any act or development under the control of the third party. *Dayan* said that the *President* might have to contact the Prime Minister directly on this point.

The *President* then suggested that we leave the preamble as it is, and that we add some language referring to the second framework agreement toward the end. Then later in the section on priorities, there should be some reference to the treaty not depending upon any action or inaction by third parties. *Barak* said that they would have to go to the Cabinet to get agreement on this, but that he could accept it wholeheartedly. *Dayan* confirmed that they would all recommend this formulation to the Cabinet.

The *President* said that he would try to sell it to Sadat. The Camp David agreement should also be appended to the treaty not the letter. *Barak* said that he felt bad about this whole discussion. The *President* said that he would then withdraw his suggestion that the Camp David agreement be appended to the treaty and that it could be attached to a letter in which the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the general framework. It might be appended to the letter on the talks beginning in one month. *Dayan* said that Boutros Ghali had agreed to a separate letter on the negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza beginning in one month. The *President* said that he wanted a joint text of that letter. It should say that the parties are prepared to carry out the provisions of the Camp David agreement, and that in order to do this Egypt and Israel would meet within one month to begin negotiations on establishing a self-governing authority. The Camp David agreements would be appended to that letter. Concerning the priority of obligations, language was suggested on page six, paragraph 2, which said that the treaty would stand “without regard to the action or inaction of any third party”. The *President* said he would try this with Sadat. *Dayan* said that this would be all right with the Israeli delegation.

The *President* then turned to the question of free navigation in the Strait of Tiran, and whether the Egyptians could find some way to close those waters to Soviet ships. *Barak* said that the right of ships from all nations had to be respected or ships carrying cargoes to Israel might be prevented from passing through the Strait. Mr. *Aaron* suggested that the phrase “for access to either country” be included as a way of indicating that the free passage was for ships going to or from Israel or

Egypt. This would preclude Soviets coming in and maneuvering in the Gulf of Aqaba. The *President* suggested that the parties accept this and the Israelis agreed.

The *President* then showed the Israelis language that we would be prepared to use in a letter dealing with the U.N. force or a multilateral force if the U.N. would not agree to station troops in Sinai. This would be a letter from the United States to Israel. It should be kept secret for now, otherwise the U.N. will not act at all. *Dayan* said that the Israelis were concerned about the situation in which the United States might do its best to keep the U.N. force intact, but that it would fail. The *President* said that he would have to talk to Congress about the extent of the American obligation. *Dayan* said that he would ask the Cabinet not to publish the text of this letter. The *President* said it would be very embarrassing to him if it were published. He does not want to consult with Congress until we are closer to agreement on the treaty. *Dayan* agreed to this idea.

The *President* asked what problems would remain if the Egyptians were to accept what had been decided on this evening. *Barak* pointed to three other problems. One was the linguistic problem on page 1. The Israelis would like to say “upon completion of the interim withdrawal”, rather than “after completion of the interim withdrawal”. This would mean that the Suez Canal would be open immediately. *Atherton* suggested that specific reference to the passage of Israeli ships in the Suez immediately should be put in Annex III, and *Barak* agreed.

The *President* said that Egypt wanted to delete the reference to terrorism on page 3. *Dayan* said that he would have to refer this to the Cabinet, but that he would suggest that no reference be made to terrorism. The *President* suggested that some other word might be included. *Weizman* said that he would also recommend the deletion of the word.

Barak then turned to Article VII on arbitration. The Prime Minister wants to reopen this issue, and now favors an arbitration commission of four members, two from each party. If each party agrees that a deadlock has been reached in the talks, by agreement they would name a fifth. But it should not be automatic that there would be a fifth member. The *President* said that the Israelis were going on their agreement to Article VII and that it would be hard for the Egyptians. *Dayan* said that they could leave it as it is now, and there might be a problem on other points. The Israelis then might want to reopen this one as well. The *President* asked whether they would agree that there would be a four-person commission and if both agree there is a deadlock, then they will choose a fifth member. *Barak* said that this would be okay. The *President* said that he could agree to language as follows: “If the parties agree

there is a deadlock, they will select a fifth member on the Arbitration Commission."

Turning to the question of diplomatic relations in the Annex, the *President* responded to Dayan's question by saying that he favored the exchange of ambassadors within a month or so of the interim withdrawal. This could be spelled out in an Annex or in an exchange of letters. He preferred the Annex. *Barak* said that this was vital to Israel and that it should be in the text, but that Israel could accept its being in the Annex, but it should not be in an exchange of letters.

Dayan said that he also raised the question of the American involvement as a guarantor, as a party to the agreement with a special responsibility for guaranteeing that the parties will honor the agreement. He said that the *President's* reaction had been generally positive. The *President* said that *Sadat* will want this also. He will want us as a full partner. *Dayan* said that he would like to discuss this again. After the agreement is reached, there should be some American responsibility for assuring its implementation. The *President* said that this should not relate to the costs of implementation of the agreement. If the Israelis could suggest some language, he would consider it. *Rosenne* suggested language, but the *President* felt that it was too sweeping and that he could not accept it. The *President* cannot force compliance with the treaty, but he can agree to use his good offices and to consult with the parties.

91. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State and the Embassy in Israel¹

Jerusalem, October 21, 1978, 1008Z

2886. From Saunders. Subj: October 20 Meeting With Prime Minister Begin.

1. I saw Prime Minister Begin for two hours afternoon October 20. Ambassador Lewis, DCM Viets, Pol Counselor Blackwill and Howell accompanied me. On Israeli side, MFA Director General Ciechanover and Begin's aide Avner were also present.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033-0186. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

2. After Begin welcomed my visit and asked if I were tired as a result of my travels, I recalled that the President had remarked in connection with the Camp David meetings that making peace is harder than making war. I added that I had experienced some of the truth of this during my visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia where some of the agonies of making crucial decisions related to peace were as evident as in Israel. Begin thanked me for recognizing the problems he faces, adding with evident feeling that some circles in the US always thought of ways to help out Sadat without realizing that others have problems as well in the aftermath of Camp David. "I have problems of my own," Begin said which are internal in distinction to the external pressures on Sadat. "For the first time in thirty-five years, since January, 1944, there is division among my closest long-term associates in the Irgun.² This has never happened before, but now, a group within the old Irgun, men with whom I have risked my life, have been writing a letter in which they denounce the CDA and the policies of the Begin government." All I ask, Begin noted is that it is recognized in justice that others besides Sadat have problems.

3. I responded to Begin's remarks by saying that, in some respects, I thought that the difficulties he faces are harder than those of others because he has to work them out within a democratic process. He agreed, stressing that half his old friends and comrades-in-arms in Herut³ either abstained or voted against the CDA in the Knesset. Sensing, I think, that his dilemmas were understood, Begin asked what I could tell him about King Hussein's readiness to participate in the peace negotiations as a result of my recent talks with him. I told Begin that Hussein is not yet prepared to enter the process, giving some of the flavor of Hussein's agony in facing what he had characterized as one of the most difficult choices in Jordan's history. I said he faces divisions within his country, feels he has no Arab support and believes he was let down by Sadat. Before Hussein reaches a final position, I commented, he must go through the Arab summit process which is already in train. I added, however, that Hussein has confirmed to us that he is prepared to encourage his friends and supporters on the West Bank to cooperate with the efforts leading to negotiations and will put his weight behind the West Bank aspect of the CDA. Begin inquired whether Hussein

² Irgun Zvai Leumi was a militant Jewish underground movement in Palestine, founded in 1937 by former Haganah (precursor to the Israeli Defense Forces) commanders. The Irgun is most remembered for its July 22, 1946, attack on the King David Hotel, the British headquarters in Palestine, killing 91 soldiers and civilians, and the April 9, 1948, raid on the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin. Menachem Begin headed the Irgun from 1943 until 1948.

³ Founded by Begin in 1948, Herut formed a constituent part of the Likud alliance of Israeli right-wing political parties from 1973 until 1988, when Likud transformed itself into a unitary party.

would go to the Baghdad summit and I said he would, if it takes place, but that he had emphasized that he will work for a positive outcome in terms of the peace process. I reported that he had stated that he will walk out of the summit if it takes a negative course, although there would obviously be tremendous Arab pressure on him not to follow through with this threat, if the time came.

4. Begin summarized his understanding of Hussein's position and observed that, until this time, both the pro-PLO and the pro-Hashemite figures in Judea, Samaria and Gaza have adopted attitudes negative toward the CDA. What did I learn of the Saudi view, he asked? I said I had brought two essential conclusions away from my talks in Saudi Arabia. First, they do not believe the CDA is clear and precise enough as regards the ultimate future of the West Bank and Gaza. I said I had explained that the US neither can nor wishes to provide the kind of guarantee of an independent Palestinian state which the Saudis sought. Second, I said I came away convinced that the Saudis had adopted a position that may be described as neutral. They had told Hussein the decision was up to him. I observed that the Saudis, like the Jordanians, were concerned about the forthcoming Baghdad summit and want to maneuver to bring about a moderate outcome, although it is difficult to perceive any reasoned program to accomplish this.

5. Begin asked who I had seen in Saudi Arabia and I told him I had held conversations with the Crown Prince, Prince Saud, Kamal Adham, and Turki Bin Faysal. I said that some of them seemed to understand the process that we were seeking to set in motion and are intrigued by it. Our Embassy in Jidda felt that in the post-summit environment we might expect more support, but I had found the task of selling the CDA difficult, partly because of differences in cultural conditioning. Patience is limited and they want to see what lies at the end of the process now. I said that I had tried, for example, to explain why the US would regard a determination in advance of the eventual status and relationships of the Palestinians living in the West Bank/Gaza contradictory to the concept of allowing these people to participate in determining their future. My success had been limited.

6. Begin turned at this point to the replies⁴ which the USG had given Hussein in response to the questions posed by Jordan. He said he would like to give his analysis of some individual points but would first like to make a more general statement. He asked first that I express to President Carter his "deep sadness" that these answers were sent without prior consultation, stating that the subject matter affects Israel's rights, security and its very survival. Israel had, he felt, a pre-

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 85.

vious commitment from the United States to consult on such matters. He said that he had received copies of the answers only two days earlier and had an opportunity only to begin his study and that he is finding new things in the document every time he reads it. He expressed an intention to write to President Carter, implying that he would deal with some of the points on which he disagrees.

7. The next hour of the meeting was given over to Begin's point-by-point discussion of his disagreement with specific aspects of the US replies. It was agreed that he would proceed through the document without my responses until the end. Begin's comments, keyed to question numbers, follows.

8. Question 2 rpt 2, para 2 rpt 2, sentence beginning "It is expected. . . .": Begin observed that the previous reference to groups or organizations could apply to the PLO and the language used in the answer could suggest that the US commitment⁵ of 1975 regarding contacts with the PLO had been weakened, since what had been expressed as conditions (acceptance of UNSC resolutions and Israel's right to exist) in 1975 had now become expectations. This was a violation of President Ford's commitment.

9. Question 3 rpt 3, para 2 rpt 2: noting the use of the phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," Begin argued that at CD this expression had been accepted only after the Israelis had won agreement to the inclusion of the word "also" to reserve Israeli "rights." The current formulation, without "also" is not rpt not what was agreed at CD. He would not have agreed to this wording at the summit. Begin said he had made it clear in his discussions at Camp David that at the end of the 5-year transitional period, Israel will claim sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. At CD, he asserted, it was agreed that the question of sovereignty would be set aside and left open to deal with the human problems of the territories. At the end of the transition, if there is agreement on Israeli sovereignty, fine. If there is no agreement, autonomy will continue and Israel will have security while the Palestinians will have autonomy, "and there will be no harm to anybody." He noted that all the Arabs, including Sadat, are interpreting the phrase "legitimate rights" as meaning an independent Palestinian state. He would never have agreed to this interpretation at CD, Begin asserted, and would never have incorporated the phrase into the CDA without the inclusion

⁵ In the September 1, 1975, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States, the United States agreed to "adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." (*Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227)

of the word “also,” which reserves Israel’s rights as an integral part of the CDA language. “We will never place this area under foreign control.” The deletion of “also” is a most worrying departure from the CDA which the President witnessed as a “full partner.”

10. Question 4(a) rpt 4(a) and subsequent on Jerusalem: Begin said he wanted to underline that the differences between Israel and the US on Jerusalem are most serious problem between the two governments. He asked that I tell the President and the Secretary that the Israeli people “will never give up part of Jerusalem to anybody. This people is ready to fight and to die for Jerusalem. It’s as simple as that.” Jerusalem, he continued with great passion, is an Israeli city, the capital of Israel and will remain so as long as the Jewish people live. It is not a problem for Israel alone but for all the Jewish people everywhere. For three thousand years, since King David established it as our capital, it has remained so. Sometimes, he said, he asked himself, what is happening to our American friends? 140 capitals are recognized in the world. Why not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel? He said he realized that the US has other interests, such as oil, but for 30 years, his American friends had not recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.” Two generations had been born in Israel. How long can this go on? What other country in the world does not have its capital recognized? Why is this being done to us? We can’t comprehend it. “And now you repeat it in writing in midst of our peace negotiations with Egypt.”

11. Begin continued that we had a para on Jerusalem at CD. I told the President, he said, that we could not live with this letter. Israel would not have signed on those terms. But then the language was changed. Begin said he had read the Yost speech,⁶ which differs from that of Goldberg.⁷ Yost said that East Jerusalem is occupied territory. “In 1948, Jordan tried to occupy all of Jerusalem. It destroyed the Jewish quarter completely, including the synagogues. It never allowed us to come to the Western Wall to pray and almost destroyed the Had-dassah hospital and the Hebrew University. On Monday, June 5, 1967, we asked Hussein through the American Embassy not to attack us. At one o’clock, he attacked seeking his share of the supposed spoil, but we fought and we liberated Jerusalem. Now we are called occupiers in the ancient city of David. The Jordanians were the occupiers without basis in international law.” Begin said he “is an old man and an old Jew doesn’t have much time left.” But he must say that “this is one of the greatest wrongs ever done in the history of the world to a nation.” Here in 1978, he said, the Israeli character of Jerusalem is being questioned by the US at a time when negotiations between Israel and Egypt are

⁶ See footnote 12, Document 58.

⁷ See footnote 11, Document 58.

under way in Washington. Begin said he was sorry but on this question he was speaking from the heart as well as the brain. Focusing on para 2 rpt 2 of reply 4(a), Begin drew attention to the phrase that “the final status of Jerusalem could be different . . .” from the rest of the West Bank. He said this could be interpreted as meaning that Jerusalem in toto is part of the West Bank.

12. Question 4(d) rpt 4(d): Begin said he did not know what the term “Israeli security personnel” means when at Camp David everyone had spoken of the IDF. Where, he asked, had it been agreed that, after 5 years, we will negotiate about the presence of the IDF in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Israeli security was unimagineable without the IDF in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. That is why the CDA spoke of a presence for five years and “beyond.” When Dayan returned from the meetings at Leeds Castle,⁸ Begin reported, Dayan had told him (Begin) that the US agreed that the IDF could stay in those areas. The President had told Begin that it was his impression these forces should be in the Jordan Valley. Begin had explained the need to have forces in the Samarian Highlands and the President had agreed. Now, Begin said, you promise Hussein we will have to negotiate continued IDF presence. This is a violation of the CDA.

13. Question 4(e) rpt 4(e): Begin objected to the use of the phrase “legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.” He said that the President had agreed to delete this language at Camp David at Israeli insistence and substitute “requirements.” Now suddenly “aspirations” reappeared. Why?

14. Question 5 rpt 5: Begin next questioned the concept of an international supervisory authority, “nothing in the Framework excludes, etc.” “The self-governing authority, of course, means administration council,” Begin asserted. He said that there was nothing in the CDA on this and no mention of the UN as there is in the US answer. The question of such an international authority was never even discussed at CD he said. Why was it inserted? “We would have rejected it of course.” It was absolutely not consistent with CDA. I interrupted to agree that this was not discussed at CD but was raised in Hussein’s question and our answer was an effort to respond to him honestly.

15. Question 6(b) rpt 6(b): Begin drew attention to the statement regarding the participation of the “Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem: in elections to constitute the self-governing authority. This, he said, was never mentioned at CD. Israel had not agreed. It was not in CDA.

16. Question 7(a) rpt 7(a): Begin expressed surprise at the suggestion that Egypt would be a participant in the negotiations to establish

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 3.

the status of Jerusalem, saying pointedly that he did not recall Egypt being mentioned at CD in this connection.

17. Question 7(b) rpt 7(b): He questioned what was meant by the holy places of each faith being under “the full authority of their representatives?” He said they already had these powers and mentioned a dispute between two Christian sects which the GOI had been asked to solve. Each religion already had full control over its holy places. He said he would like an explanation.

18. Question 8(b) rpt 8(b): Begin said that the question of settlements had been an issue of debate at CD and since. He said he had given a three-month commitment to the President but had said that Israel might establish three nahals which are part of Israel’s defense establishment. He had also told the President that there could be increases in the size of existing settlements by several hundred families on the West Bank during the three months. In this response, to Hussein he said he found a repetition of the US position on the Israeli commitment, Israel had not agreed.

19. Question 8(c) rpt 8(c): Begin took issue with the phrase “in each others territory” which had been deleted at CD at Israel’s insistence. This language is not in the Framework and Israel does not accept it.

20. Question 9(b) rpt 9(b): Begin drew attention to the phrase “whatever number (of Israeli settlements) that might remain” which was very “hurtful” because it would lead the Arabs to expect that not all of the settlements would remain after the transitional period. Some would be liquidated. He said he had never heard at Camp David that Israel might be asked to remove any of them. He added that he is being cursed literally for agreeing to remove settlements from Sinai and had the day before attended an angry demonstration of settlers from Yamit. And now the US promises Hussein that some settlements in Judea and Samaria will be removed.

21. Question 10(a) rpt 10(a): Begin said he could not understand how the term “ratify” could be applied in this context. Ratification is a concept in international law that applies to states. The word does not appear in the CDA and now it is used with Hussein. He also took exception to the description of “a strong local police force” which would assure the political process. He said he understood the function of the police to be the maintenance of law and order.

22. Question 11(a) rpt 11(a), para 3 rpt 3: Begin objected to the mention of “political institutions of self-government” maintaining that there was not one word at CD about institutions of self-government, which in his mind implied a political organization quite beyond the autonomy which he envisages. Israel means autonomy, he stressed, not a state.

23. Question 11(b) rpt 11(b): Focusing on the phrase “applicable UN Resolutions,” Begin stated that could imply resolutions, including those of the General Assembly which are not binding, that Israel does not accept, especially the one of 1948. He said that at CD it had been made clear that the refugee question would include not only Palestinians but Jewish refugees as well. In the ensuing discussion at Camp David the US had suggested deleting such a phrase. President Carter had inserted it again into his address to Congress⁹ without Israeli concurrence. “I found it difficult to applaud that portion of the President’s speech,” Begin said. Now this idea appears in reply to Hussein.

24. Question 12 rpt 12: Begin charged that the reply was misleading in stating, as regards an eventual peace settlement between Israel and Syria for example, “the principles of the Framework should apply to treating.” He argued that the CDA enumerated a limited number of principles which were agreed to be applicable between Israel and other confrontation states. It was not, he said, agreed at CD that all the principles embodied in the framework document would be applicable in these cases: “We will withdraw to the international border in Sinai. We will not do that in Judea Samaria and Gaza Strip.”

25. Thanking me for my patience, Begin summarized his general reaction to the US responses to Hussein’s queries by stating that he felt the document will harden Sadat’s attitude in the Blair House negotiations. He wanted to express his “deep sorrow” that such a document was given to King Hussein. I replied to Begin’s lengthy analysis by stating that, as the signature on the document attested, President Carter had personally gone over every word of the replies carefully and is completely familiar with their content. He will, therefore, be especially interested in the Prime Minister’s comments.

26. I said that I would like to make two general points on the replies and then, with Begin’s agreement, try to respond to his specific comments and criticisms when I meet with Ciechanover on Sunday. He agreed. I said I felt that it was important to stress the philosophy of US strategy in the peace effort. We realize that we cannot solve all problems at one time and for this reason we decided a year and a half ago on the idea of a transition period in the West Bank/Gaza. We pursued this tack mindful of the interest Israel has in seeing what it can live with in the territories as we go along. Because we are putting some problems off for later resolution, however, we felt strongly that we should save for ourselves some options to tackle them in imaginative ways and there is an element in our replies to Hussein of keeping the door open to human creativity. It is true, as Begin noted, that we had

⁹ See footnote 14, Document 58.

not confined ourselves to decisions taken and language agreed at CD because some of the questions asked of us looked beyond the CDA to what might happen in the process. It is inherent in everything contained in those replies, I assured Begin, that the ideas will be negotiated by the parties.

27. As to the matter of prior consultations with Israel, I drew Begin's attention to the fact that the second part of many of the questions asked for US positions. In the CDA is embodied what was agreed by the three participants. Just as Israel had made reservations on certain issues, so the United States reserves its position on a number of questions. In the communications between heads of state as we have not felt it proper to clear our views with a third state. It is fair to say, I continued, that Israel's views on a full range of questions are known to us and we realized that Israel would not like some answers on issues where we have an honest difference of opinion. The US replies, however, do not commit Israel. We will enter negotiations, when they arise, in good faith and will inevitably face some differences of viewpoint. As we have told the Arabs as well, we cannot guarantee the results of the negotiating process but we can advance our ideas and cope with new concepts that arise.

28. Begin said he understood my points and that we are all free men when it comes to expressing opinions. He knew that the US had been asked by Hussein about matters concerning the CDA but Begin had found in our responses novelties, ideas that are not in the CDA and concepts which were inconsistent with the CDA. This was Israel's serious complaint. Much in our response to Hussein had nothing to do with Camp David. He concluded without enumeration that some of the US replies were excellent and he had chosen not to dwell on them.

29. I told Begin that I wanted to take a moment to explain to him what I have been doing on this trip so that he would know first-hand. I said the CDA has posited a series of negotiations—first Sinai, then the Palestinian and Jordan aspects, Syria, and finally Lebanon. As he knew the Egyptians had been raising in the Washington negotiations the question of relationships within the series. While there is no formal linkage, we need to maintain, and discharge the commitments we all assumed at CD. I have been seeking to figure out how to carry out these obligations and had been seeking the ideas of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Palestinians about the way to crystalize the process and capitalize on the opportunity before us. I said I believe in what we did in CD and would like to find ways to generate moderate Arab support for Sadat and the peace process.

30. Begin replied that he was glad I understood that I should not use his comments on the US replies with the Palestinians with whom I would be meeting (he had earlier asked that I not do so and I assured

him I did not intend to do so). He said he had no objection to my meeting with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians as he understood I would be doing that evening. He added, however, that he felt our Consulate General in Jerusalem was too active and should not take over the Israeli job of dealing with Palestinians. No American, he asserted, should negotiate with the West Bankers and Gazans since that, under the CDA, is an Israeli task. He said he knows that officials of ConGen Jerusalem sometimes have contacts with these people and are exercising an Israeli right. Begin said he had just received an intelligence report of threats against those who had met with Atherton. He said he is watching out for them but faces significant security problems, including the availability of large quantities of explosives in the area. He said he would soon be writing President Carter and would outline the security problem. In closing, Begin wished me success in my mission.

32. Ambassador Lewis said he would like to make one point before the meeting broke up. Under the American distribution of responsibilities, it is Embassy Tel Aviv that has responsibility for contacts in Gaza and the ConGen which carried out the function in the West Bank. What both are doing, Lewis stated, is exactly what I had said I was doing. We are quietly explaining the CDA and taking soundings of views. We were not negotiating. We had no intent to supplant the Israeli role. We are all on the same team, trying to implement the CDA and bring peace to the Middle East. We recognize the security problems related to our contacts but also know that the local inhabitants incur risks by their contacts with Israeli officials too. Begin nodded assent. If Begin has any question about what we are doing, Lewis said, he could ask and we would tell him frankly. I added that I held a similar meeting with Palestinians on the East Bank and believed I was sensitized to the problems associated with such contacts.

33. Comment: Begin was quite tense when the meeting began (he barely looked at me while shaking my hand), but loosened up as our talk went along, after I expressed recognition of the personally difficult time he had been having and gave him a chance to talk about it. Although markedly distressed with our replies to Hussein, he periodically punctuated his comments with humorous asides. He was always courteous, and emotional only when discussing the Jerusalem issue.

34. At the same time, he had obviously pored over our responses in his lawyerly way. He seemed genuinely hurt and unable to understand why we had departed from the agreed CDA language in responding to the King. My explanation appeared to make no dent on him and I think we can expect soon a lengthy letter to the President from Begin enumerating the Prime Minister's grievances. The meeting served its purposes, however, in letting him put his initial reaction on the record and

in letting me say that the US believes it is important to proceed deliberately in organizing the West Bank/Gaza negotiations.¹⁰

Newlin

¹⁰ On October 24, Begin wrote a brief letter to Carter to which he attached the minutes of his October 20 meeting with Saunders, requesting that the President read them “personally.” “I feel compelled to add, Mr. President,” Begin wrote, “that it is difficult for me to find the proper words to express the depth of feeling of pain and sadness in which I spoke to Mr. Saunders.” The letter was found attached to a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, bearing a handwritten date of October 26, upon which Carter wrote “No answer. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 9, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 7–12/78) Begin’s minutes of the meeting were, however, not found attached. Brzezinski provided Carter with a summary record of the meeting in an October 25 memorandum in which he described Begin’s objections to the answers provided to Hussein as “legalistic, even obscure.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 7–10/78)

92. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 21, 1978, 6:50–8:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President’s Meeting with Egyptian Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
 Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
 Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
 Mr. Hebert Hansell, Legal Adviser, Department of State
 H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Acting Foreign Minister
 H.E. Abdallah el-Erian, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/21–25/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

The *President* began by reviewing his talks² with the Israelis. He said that they had shown flexibility and that they would be going back to their cabinet with a number of specific recommendations. He gave the Egyptians copies³ of the revised treaty text. In the preamble, the reference to reaffirming a commitment to the framework agreement would be left in, and in addition there would be a letter⁴ in which the Egyptians and the Israelis would commit themselves to begin negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza within one month of the signing of the treaty. The *President* urged that they both sign the same text. The Israelis have no objection to what the Egyptians put in a separate letter of their own concerning their views on the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis will have a different letter on that topic. It is up to Egypt to decide what to put into a separate letter.

The *President* said that he would suggest the deletion of a couple of the paragraphs in the preamble and suggested one addition referring to the Egyptian-Israeli framework agreement. The *President* asked if the Egyptians had received any new instructions on the timing of the exchange of ambassadors and *Boutros Ghali* said that they had not.

The *President* then turned to the reference to Gaza in the treaty. He said that Israelis were prepared to accept reference to the issue of the status of Gaza. He might also propose a new sentence saying that the status of Gaza and the West Bank will be decided in accordance with the framework agreement at Camp David. The *President* said that he understood that Egypt does not claim Gaza as a part of Egypt, but does not want to acknowledge that it is a part of Israel. The Israelis reserve their right to claim sovereignty over this area. A map should be appended which would show the border between Egypt and Israel, as well as the boundary around Gaza.

El-Erian said the idea which would be reflected is that Egypt has some responsibility under the general armistice agreements for Gaza. *Boutros Ghali* said that he would accept the language proposed by the *President*. Egypt will mention its special responsibility for Gaza in a letter.

² See Document 90. Carter had also met with the Israelis on the afternoon of October 20. The *President's* Daily Diary records that Carter met with Dayan and Weizman in the Oval Office from 2:50 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

³ Reference is possibly to a complete, revised text of the draft treaty—including the preamble, a draft letter on UN forces, and a suggested Egyptian draft letter on West Bank and Gaza—forwarded from Atherton to Carter under an October 20 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78)

⁴ See footnote 3 above.

The *President* again said that the Egyptians could put anything they wanted in a unilateral letter, but that the Israelis would not necessarily say the same thing in their letter. But it is important that both parties reaffirm clearly their commitment to the framework. *El-Erian* noted that it would not be appropriate to refer to the West Bank when dealing with the Egypt-Israel border, only Gaza was at stake. The *President* agreed.

The *President* then informed the Egyptians that the Israeli delegation had agreed to recommend the deletion of the term "terrorism". This is subject to Begin's approval. On page 5, the section on navigation had been modified to deal with the Egyptian concern that Soviet ships might try to maneuver in the Gulf of Aqaba. *El-Erian* said that there were two problems. Egypt could accept for itself the status of the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway, but Egypt could not speak for the other riparian states. Egypt's position should not appear to commit them or prejudice the question as it will be dealt with in the law of the sea conference. He said that the formulation in the revised draft was acceptable, however, the *President* said that the Israelis had agreed to this language.

Turning to page 6, the *President* discussed the question of arbitration. The Israelis want to resort to negotiations first. If there are routine difficulties, there is no need to have a fifth member for arbitration right away.

Boutros Ghali said that negotiations were already dealt with in the first paragraph of this article. Arbitration is the fallback position. It would be unusual to have an arbitration commission of only four members. *El-Erian* said that there is need for some umpire in arbitration. Usually someone appoints the additional member.

The *President* said that he would like to see disputes normally solved through negotiations. It should not be normal practice to refer to a referee. He would prefer that there be a commission of two members from each party first, then if they agree there is a deadlock they could invite a fifth member to join them. He would like to see three steps: normal diplomatic negotiations; the four-member commission; and then arbitration.

Boutros Ghali said that this was an interesting innovation, but there was no precedent for it. He would prefer not to spell out the details. *El-Erian* referred to Article 33 of the U.N. Charter⁵ and encouraged that conciliation be referred to as one step in settling disputes. The *President*

⁵ The full text of Article 33, requiring parties in a dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" to employ negotiations "or other peaceful means," is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1946–47, p. 835.

again said that a quick move to binding arbitration would cause him some problems. He would like to have some in-between step. *El-Erian* suggested a slight change in Article VII, paragraph 2. The four-member commission should be for conciliation, not arbitration. The *President* said that this sounded all right to him, but they should try to work out three stages. *El-Erian* suggested negotiations first, then conciliation, then arbitration.

The *President* then showed the Egyptians the letter that he had drafted earlier in the morning. He would like Begin and Sadat both to sign this letter committing themselves to begin negotiations within one month on the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, the Egyptians could have their own letter using Camp David language on the West Bank and Gaza. *Boutros Ghali* asked if the letter would be part of the treaty. The *President* said that it would be signed on the same day. Israel has not yet seen the exact text of the letter, however, but they will reconfirm their commitment to the Camp David agreements and they will allow the full text to be annexed to this letter. It will say that within one month negotiations will begin on the West Bank and Gaza. This will establish a strong link between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. *El-Erian* said that if this letter were part of the treaty it would be great. The *President* said that it would not be in the text, but the same procedure would be used as at Camp David, with the letters being released on the same day. *Boutros Ghali* asked if it would be legally binding and the *President* confirmed that it would be. On this basis, the Egyptians agreed to the idea of the exchange of the letter.

The *President* then turned to page 6 concerning the priority of obligations. He said that Israel wanted to be assured that if the Jordanians or Palestinians refused to participate in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, this would not impede the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. *Boutros Ghali* initially hesitated to react to the new language, but on reconsideration said that there would be no problem.

The *President* then turned to page 5a. This deals with the question precedence. Some of Egypt's mutual defense agreements are in conflict with the terms of this treaty. We have tried to find words in our treaties, such as the NATO treaty, which make it clear that the most recent treaty takes precedence. *El-Erian* said that this was a legitimate Israeli concern. According to the Egyptian constitution, a treaty requires that domestic law be in conformity with the treaty. The treaty is self-executing in that sense. Egypt has committed itself to end the boycott. Many Egyptian laws will have to be abrogated. Everything that has been based on the state of war will end. It is hard to say that in all circumstances this treaty will prevail. Therefore, Egypt preferred the first American draft, which simply said that "there will be no conflict." Only

the U.N. Charter, in Article 103,⁶ has such status of being superior to all other commitments. The most difficult problem for Egypt are the security pacts. Some have expired, but at least one from 1950 on joint defense and economic cooperation embodies the idea of collective self-defense against aggression. This would cause great difficulties for Egypt and the Arab world if this treaty had to be renounced.

The *President* referred to the Israeli consultation with American experts on international law. They had agreed the American draft language was not adequate. The *President* suggested that el-Erian and Barak might get together with some international lawyers to work out adequate language. *El-Erian* said that the problem was not entirely a legal one. Egypt does not want to appear to be washing its hands of the Arab league. Mr. *Aaron* said the reference to the U.N. Charter was met to protect Egypt's right to collective self-defense. *El-Erian* acknowledged that this was helpful. *Hansell* added that in the event of Israeli aggression, the reference to the U.N. Charter would allow Egypt to respect its commitment under the mutual defense pacts. *El-Erian* said that he recognized the validity of this point and this would make it easier for Egypt to accept. Egypt would like, however, to avoid any appearance of referring specifically to domestic law. This is covered by the Egyptian constitution. The *President* suggested that the reference to internal law be deleted. *El-Erian* said that in that case, Egypt could live with the language as drafted. *El-Erian* asked if the language "will prevail" could also be removed. Egypt agrees on the concept, but would like different words. The *President* said that he wanted to get this resolved now. He wants Barak to be able to say that these issues have been resolved. The Israeli delegation should recommend the entire text to the Cabinet. *El-Erian* said that this would be a major issue for them. *Hansell* confirmed that the United States had used similar wording in the NATO treaties, particularly that "there will be no conflict". *El-Erian* said that instead of "will prevail", language such as "shall be honored" might be used. The *President* urged him to try to work this out. We would agree that the reference to internal law should be deleted. The *President* also thought the words "shall be honored" could be used.

Boutros Ghali asked about the possibility of U.N. Security Council endorsement, and the *President* said that this was already in the Camp David agreements. He suggested that in the exchange of letters the Egyptians might refer to this paragraph. *Boutros Ghali* said that would be acceptable.

⁶ The full text of Article 103, stipulating the primacy of the UN Charter over obligations to any other international agreement for UN member states, is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1946–47, p. 842.

The *President* said the whole text of the Camp David agreement should be appended in any case to the exchange of letters. It would be better not to start selecting different parts of the agreement. The *President* said that he also suggested a letter on U.N. forces. There could be a problem if the Soviets or the Chinese refused to approve the stationing of U.N. forces in the demilitarized zones. The United States wants to insure that the treaty would not fail on this account. The *President* would be prepared to send the letter which he showed to the Egyptian delegation. *El-Erian* said that the letter was acceptable.

The *President* said that there could be troops from many different nations, provided they were mutually acceptable. If Begin accepts all of these suggestions, we will have resolved all of the difficulties. We will try to get the Israelis to drop any reference to Egyptian internal law. We also talked to them about the missiles, and have said that only SA-7 missiles should be allowed across the canal. The other missiles could move up the canal. This can be done as soon as the treaty is signed. This is acceptable to Israel. *Boutros Ghali* said this would be all right.

Atherton said that three annexes remained to be completed. The one⁷ dealing with diplomatic relations was most important. It needs to be worked out in detail. *Boutros Ghali* said that he hoped to get answers from Sadat. The question of the settlement is also unresolved. He did not want to put the reference to one month for the exchange of ambassadors in the treaty. He asked if this could be handled in a letter. Egypt agrees and will do it. He will send a letter to Dayan if necessary.

The *President* said that he would try to work this out. If Sadat agrees to do this within a month, perhaps he can refer to it in a letter along with the letter that says negotiations will begin within one month. The *President* said that he would try to get the Israelis to accept the idea of referring to this in a letter rather than in the annex to the treaty.

El-Erian said the Israelis are also asking for a guaranteed oil supply. They want an advantageous position. They will already have a de facto advantage because of their location. The *President* said that he agreed with Egypt on this point. *Atherton* said the oil experts have not yet begun meeting and the talks could be complicated. The *President* said that he would not support the idea that Israel has any right to preferential treatment on oil. Maybe they can negotiate a five-year supply contract, but Israel cannot demand this of Egypt. This should not hold up the signing of the treaty. Israel should not have to be given preferential treatment. *Boutros Ghali* said that he agreed this should not delay the treaty. The *President* said that Israel already had some advantage

⁷ See Annex III.

because of proximity, but they should not be given any other special advantage. *Boutros Ghali* said that the Israelis can bid for the oil and this would pose no problem.

In conclusion the *President* thanked the Egyptians for being very forthcoming. He said he would support their position on oil and deleting the reference to internal law. He said that the Israelis had also tried to be forthcoming last night, and that he thought it was a good step to have an agreed text of the letter on negotiations beginning on the West Bank and Gaza in one month. This should help with the Saudis.

93. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

Subject

Status of Israeli-Egyptian Peace Talks

The Egyptian and Israeli delegations met² with us today and by early afternoon agreement had been reached on a preamble and the entire treaty text, except for the annexes. The only language in dispute concerns the “priority of obligations” and there the difference is between Rosenne and Barak and not between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. The Egyptians will accept either alternative proposed by the Israelis.

One new suggestion was made by Dayan this morning concerning the Egyptian commitment to send an ambassador within one month. The Egyptians are reluctant to make a public commitment on this point. He suggested that President Carter send a letter to Prime Minister Begin assuring him that President Sadat would send an ambas-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/21–25/78. Secret; Eyes Only. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the memorandum. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² According to telegram Tosec 120171/268678 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Vance in Moscow, October 22, Quandt, Hansell, and Atherton met with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations for a drafting session on October 21. The Department further summarized the specifics of the agreed treaty text, noting that resolution was still needed on the lines of final withdrawal on the treaty map, Annex I, Annex III, and the Egyptian-Israeli oil talks which had not yet begun. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3)

sador within one month. The Egyptians said that they would be prepared to give US an oral commitment, and that then we could send such a letter to the Israelis.

The military delegations met³ during the day and have reached agreement on the interim withdrawal line, with the exception of the northern sector. We will meet⁴ with the Egyptians tomorrow to go over the annex on normalization of relations. Roy Atherton and I are preparing draft letters to Sadat⁵ and Begin,⁶ and these should be ready Sunday⁷ morning.

Bill Quandt⁸

³ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁴ See Document 95.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 96.

⁶ See Document 96.

⁷ October 22.

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

94. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, October 22, 1978, 1209Z

2892. From Saunders. Subj: Saunders Meeting With West Bank/Gaza Palestinians, October 20.

Summary: Nine West Bank/Gaza Palestinians, including the mayors of Bethlehem and Gaza, met with Saunders for four hours evening of October 20 to discuss possible Palestinian participation in peace negotiations based on Camp David Accords (CDA). Consensus was that Palestinians under occupation² could not participate without sup-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850033–0204. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

² Saunders's references to the status of Gaza and the West Bank provoked a "heavy and almost universally critical" reaction from the Israeli press. On October 24, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv* accused Saunders of "stressing U.S. positions that are close to Arab points of view on Jerusalem and the West Bank," with "blunt political declarations" that caused "considerable anger in Israel and increased suspicions of U.S. intentions." (Telegram 15477 from Tel Aviv, October 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780446–0987) The *Los Angeles Times*

port from Arab world (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria) and particularly PLO. Several sought US guarantees on questions of Jerusalem, sovereignty, self-determination and settlements. Saunders reiterated US positions but said he could not guarantee that USG could bring Israel to accept Arab or even US position on all these questions and certainly not now. He could guarantee the US would be a full partner in negotiations and expressed his belief that Palestinians' bargaining position would improve with the maturing of a self-governing authority (SGA). It was proposed that US issue statement recognizing that sovereignty lies with the people in West Bank and Gaza which could be used by moderates to convene a national assembly to draft a constructive counterproposal to CDA. Saunders did not reject idea, but urged that any counterproposal take account of political realities. ConGen urged that Palestinians rely upon themselves to act now or watch ever-increasing Israeli consolidation on their land. End summary.

1. Saunders met nine Palestinians October 20 at Consulate General in Jerusalem to discuss possible Palestinian participation in peace negotiations based on CDA.³ Present were: Rashad Shawwa, Mayor of Gaza; Mansur Shawwa, the Mayor's son; Hatim Abu Ghazellah, a Gazan attorney; Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem; Hikmat al-Masri of Nablus; lawyer Aziz Shehadeh of Ramallah; Jerusalem UNRWA Director Antranig Bakerjian; Jerusalem business man Fa'iz Abdinnur and Mahmoud Abu Zalaf, publisher of "Al Quds." Also present along with Consul General Newlin were DPO Kruse, PolOff Hull, PAO Smith, and Embassy PolOff Blackwill, and NEA Officer Howell.

2. About an equal number of invitees from the West Bank declined to come. Some of them specifically on grounds that the CDA "ignored the (Palestinian) national movement and the PLO as its recognized leadership."

3. Consensus of those who did attend was that, aside from deficiencies of CDA, Palestinians in West Bank/Gaza could not join negotiations because they lacked support from Arab states (Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria), and PLO.

4. "We in West Bank have no power to negotiate . . . my own experience from public meetings in the West Bank, sponsored by communists and blessed by Israelis, is that public opinion is dead. We can't

reported on October 27 that Saunders's comment prompted Begin to issue statements calling for the expansion of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and the transfer of the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem. (Dial Torgerson, "Begin Reasserts Right to Settle on West Bank," *Los Angeles Times*, October 27, p. B1)

³ Saunders also met privately with Mayor Mulhim of Halhul on October 21. The Embassy transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 2894 from Jerusalem, October 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780434-0992)

move an inch without the PLO, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia,” Freij said.

5. Mayor Shawwa noted that democratic principles insured rule of majority, and most people in occupied territories supported the PLO. “How could Israel force another representative on them?” he asked. He mentioned that during recent meeting with Arafat he had proposed a transition period followed by complete Israeli withdrawal and a link with Jordan. Arafat had proposed this suggestion to executive committee and gained approval, Shawwa said.

6. Saunders said he was hearing same thing but in reverse from Arab states. Saudis said they couldn’t move, but Jordan could. Jordan said it couldn’t move, but West Bankers/Gazans could. Question was who would take first step. As for PLO, a new situation had arisen. CDA clearly recognized political character of Palestinian problem. In new situation, should PLO decide it could accept 242, USG would talk with it, but, he wondered, given Israeli attitudes whether that would much advance peace.

7. Al-Masri concurred that PLO must be involved, but “with a new formula; we could be the PLO.” The important thing, al-Masri continued, was to change the CDA to stipulate an end to settlements and guarantee self-determination for Palestinians. With that, Palestinians could go to PLO and Arab countries for support.

8. Saunders said he could guarantee continued US participation as a full partner, but not the final outcome. USG would certainly consider any reasonable counterproposal from a representative group of Palestinians, but the CDA itself could not feasibly be changed. Any proposal would have to take into consideration political realities. From his experience at Camp David, Israel had gone about as far as it could for the moment. There was no way the Americans could simply dictate sweeping alterations. Palestinians, he suggested, should consider tackling their problems in a logical sequence, making progress where that was possible, e.g. on powers of SGA, and use success at one stage to open new possibilities at another. “I am amazed that you are telling me, and I shall have to report to President Carter that you prefer continued occupation to self-government,” Saunders said.

9. Abu Ghazallah protested that Saunders was thus asking an unfair question, but Bakerjian asked: “Do we all want to reject even this modest step forward?”

10. Bakerjian asked whether USG could declare that sovereignty lies with Palestinian people in West Bank/Gaza, but, for practical reasons, there would have to be a transition period and an SGA. “In situations like this where sovereignty is historically confused, the USG holds that sovereignty resides with the people on the land and that their will must be expressed through an agreed method of

self-determination,” Saunders replied. He explained that self-determination does not mean automatically giving the Palestinians an independent state. A review of acts of self-determination shows different methods have been used to suit the unique circumstances in each case.

11. Shehadeh suggested that a national conference be convened on the basis of such a public US declaration in order to formulate a constructive response to the CDA. Freij warned that such a conference would only put a seal of rejection on it.

12. Saunders reiterated that the USG would listen to reasonable proposal, but—he cautioned—it would have to be politically astute, something which could move the Israelis.

13. The group asked Saunders what he thought would happen if CDA were finally rejected by Palestinians. He said he believed Israelis would implement some form of self-rule and Western world would find it difficult to differentiate this from Camp David Accords and to understand why this was not in the Palestinians’ interest.

14. The Consul General suggested that, as a result, the West Bank and Gaza would be isolated and Israeli colonization would continue apace. “The PLO can’t help; Syria, the Saudis and the King have their own interest; you will have to help yourselves,” he urged.

15. Saunders comment: It becomes increasingly clear that advantages of CDA are not understood and that it is politically safer to reject CDA because it does not guarantee a clear-cut outcome. Palestinians are sure from experience that they are too weak to negotiate successfully with Israelis. More fundamentally, one senses that serious dialogue is going on among them, but they need a little more time to sort out their thoughts. Apart from the political difficulty of deciding who can make decisions and represent them, the West Bankers also have some tough technical problems to talk through on the powers of SGA when they reach that stage. I will have recommendations on how we might proceed when I return.

Newlin

95. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter¹

Washington, October 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Today's Talks with the Egyptian Delegation

We met with the Egyptian Delegation this afternoon for four hours to discuss Annex 3 which deals with normalization of relations. Boutros Ghali had received reports from his Ambassadors in the Arab world which caused him considerable concern over mounting Arab opposition to the prospective Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. He was also embarrassed by reports out of Israel that the treaty is virtually in final form.

Boutros made one suggestion that he thought might help Egypt in the Arab world. At the time of the signing of the treaty, Sadat would write a letter to both you and Prime Minister Begin spelling out his views on a comprehensive settlement and on the West Bank and Gaza issues. The language of the letter would be taken from the Camp David framework agreements. Boutros asked whether you could reply to Sadat in a letter which would reaffirm our willingness to be a full partner in future negotiations and to work for a comprehensive settlement. Roy and I told him that we would like to see his draft language of their letter, and that we would seek to get your general reaction to this procedure.

In the talks, we reached full agreement with the Egyptian delegation on a revised text² of Annex 3. We will show this to the Israelis on Wednesday when they return,³ and we anticipate that they will find the draft acceptable, perhaps with a few minor problems. We do not see any major difficulties, however.

Tomorrow⁴ the military delegations will seek to reach final agreement on the text of Annex 1. This will put us in a position by Wednesday when the Israelis return to accelerate the pace of the negotiations, with the objective of reaching full agreement by the end of the week.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads "DACOM'd to CD 10/23." According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spent October 23 at Camp David. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

² A copy of the revised text has not been found.

³ Dayan and Weizman returned to Israel for consultations on October 21. They were scheduled to return to Washington on October 25.

⁴ October 23.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, October 22, 1978, 1926Z

Tosec 120172/268679. Subject: Letter From President Carter to Prime Minister Begin.

1. Please deliver² following text of letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin on Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations:

2. Begin text.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

In the past few days, I have directed much of my time to the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. I am pleased to tell you that we have made very good progress. Your delegation has shown a constructive attitude throughout the talks and has succeeded in keeping the Camp David spirit alive.

On Saturday,³ the two delegations were able to reach agreement on the text⁴ of a draft treaty which they will recommend to their respective governments. In my judgment, it is a fair and balanced document that protects the interests of both parties. After you have had the opportunity to study it carefully, I hope that your government will be able to give it your full endorsement. I am making the same appeal⁵ to President Sadat.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/17–22/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the Secretary's delegation. Vance was in Moscow for SALT negotiations. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Quandt and Thomas R. Reynnders (S/S–O); approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2474)

² In telegram 15380 from Tel Aviv, October 23, Lewis reported that Carter's letter had been delivered to Begin's private secretary for delivery to the Prime Minister. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2358)

³ October 21.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 93. Along with a draft version of this letter to Begin, a copy of the October 21 treaty draft (Draft 7) is attached to an October 22 memorandum from Atherton and Quandt to Carter summarizing the U.S. delegation's talks with the Israelis and Egyptians. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: Non-Meeting: 2–12/78)

⁵ The text of Carter's letter to Sadat was sent to Cairo in telegram Tosec 120173/268680 to Cairo, October 22. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/17–22/78) In telegram 23464 from Cairo, October 23, Eilts reported that he had delivered Carter's letter to Sadat and read it to him. Sadat told Eilts that the Egyptian comments on the current draft of the peace treaty had been sent to Boutros Ghali in Washington and that he instructed Khalil to present the comments to Eilts for transmittal to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/23–31/78)

I have also suggested to your delegation that you and President Sadat exchange letters agreeing to begin negotiations within one month of signing the treaty to establish the self-governing authority. I consider it particularly important that this letter be signed and announced on the same day as the treaty is signed. As you will learn from your delegation, I am also prepared to send you a letter that I will be prepared to take the necessary steps to ensure that a UN or multinational force will remain in Sinai on a permanent basis.

On three other issues of deep concern to you, I have made a personal appeal to President Sadat. I have asked him to accept an interim withdrawal line which will leave Neot Sinai under Israeli control until the final withdrawal is carried out. I have also urged him to accept a limitation on his surface-to-air missiles whereby only SA-7s or their equivalents would be allowed to accompany the mechanized division in Sinai. Finally, I have strongly advised President Sadat to send an Ambassador to Israel within one month of the completion of the interim withdrawal. I have told him I would be prepared to record this agreement in a letter which I would send to you, as Foreign Minister Dayan suggested. President Sadat had not yet given me his answers, but I am hopeful that he will adopt a positive attitude.

Important work remains to be done by the technical experts on some of the issues dealt with in the annexes to the treaty, but it is my belief that we are very close to having an acceptable treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel. This is an historic moment and you can take well-deserved pride in having brought your people a long step toward the goal they cherish—to live in peace with all their neighbors.

Mr. Prime Minister, it would be a great honor for me to join you to witness the signing of the peace treaty.

You have my best personal wishes,

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

Christopher

97. **Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Inderfurth) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, October 24, 1978

SUBJECT

[text not declassified]

We received the attached CIA proposal² on Monday.³ It was staffed to Henze who has distributed it to SCC principals. Stan Turner may want to discuss this on Wednesday,⁴ hence I am providing it to you for your information.

[7½ lines not declassified]

I suggest, by the way, that if this assistance is to be provided, it should be done *quickly*. Months of delay, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* could prove harmful. *[2½ lines not declassified]* My hunch is that there isn't, but we should explore this.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-025, Egypt 3 Feb. 1977–16 Aug. 1979. Secret.

² Attached but not printed.

³ October 23.

⁴ October 25.

98. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Israeli Position on Oil Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

David Korn, Director, NEA/IAI

David E. Zweifel, NEA/EGY

John Craig, NEA/RA

Hanon Bar-On, Israeli Minister

Joseph Vardi, Director General, Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure

Elisha Ruih, V.P., Operations, Israeli National Oil Co., Ltd.

Ely Rubenstein, Secretary to Foreign Minister Dayan

Naftali Lavie, Press Spokesman, Israeli Foreign Ministry

Eitan Raff, Economic Counselor, Israeli Embassy

We called on members of the Israeli delegation at the Madison Hotel to learn about the Israeli position on the oil issue and what may have transpired during the course of October 23 Israeli-Egyptian discussions² on this item.

Bar-On recapitulated the Egyptian position as having been as follows. There should be early Israeli withdrawal from the area, a transfer of operating fields in good order, and cessation of exploration activity upon signature of the agreement. Any subsequent cooperation with the GOE (e.g. concessions in free areas) would be on the basis of international bidding practices.

The same would apply to Israeli purchase of Egyptian petroleum at competitive prices. The Egyptians did recognize that, by reason of proximity, Israel would have a competitive advantage as a logical market for Egyptian crude.

He then summed up the GOI position as follows. There is no question about Egyptian sovereignty in the area. The Israelis are prepared to lay aside previous legal argumentation during the current negotiations. During the Egyptian-Israeli meeting on October 23, claims were not discussed. Basic premises underlying the Israeli position are that any economic cooperation is positive and “peace building” should be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Memcons 1 of 2. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by David E. Zweifel (NEA/EGY) on October 25. Copies were sent to Atherton, Sterner, Draper, David Small (L/NEA), Donald F. Hart (EB), Korn, Lewis, Eilts, and Zweifel.

² No other record of these discussions has been found.

encouraged. Under GOI auspices, considerable pioneering work has taken place during the occupation. A shutting down of the fields would imply an economic loss to the GOE. On the question of transfer of the fields, there would be no problem if the present operator (Neptune) continues. Under these circumstances it would be a simple matter to arrange for a redirection of revenue flow and that portion of production accruing to the sovereign. Hence, the GOI believes it would be most advantageous to come to an agreement whereby Neptune³ would continue to operate the fields but would do so henceforth under Egyptian aegis. The GOI also would like to arrange for the continuation of Israeli commercial operators (sub-contractors) to work with any Egyptian concessionaire.

Vardi elaborated on Bar-On's presentation. He noted that petroleum exploration and exploitation is perhaps unique as an area wherein international involvement is a norm. The proposed Israeli arrangement would result not in a petroleum deal between the two governments, but between the GOE and a commercial group. In this regard, Vardi said Israel hopes that Egypt would agree to grant a concession to Neptune and the Israeli National Oil Company (INOC). Neptune and INOC would join together for this purpose, Vardi said.

Vardi acknowledged Egyptian sensitivity on sovereignty aspects, noting that, apparently, any restriction on concession granting authority (e.g. through a negotiated agreement specifying a role for Neptune and/or INOC) would be interpreted by the GOE to be an infringement on that sovereignty. While the Israeli team recognizes the GOE argument re responsibilities to AMOCO as a "very valid argument," they believe that the 1974 AMOCO concession⁴ was primarily a political instrument. AMOCO "did not come with clean hands" into the present negotiating matrix, since the company accepted with "eyes open" a concession wherein access was not possible.

Vardi went on to state that the GOI has moral commitment to Neptune. He opined that Neptune was entitled to USG help. He alluded to extensive geological data developed for broader areas in the Sinai which could be made available to the GOE in the context of an agree-

³ Israeli petroleum company.

⁴ In October 1974, Gulf Petroleum, a joint company formed by Amoco and the Egyptian General Petroleum Company, in line with Egypt's policy of selling petroleum concessions in territory unoccupied by Israeli forces, made a large strike in the Damadan off-shore oil field in the Gulf of Suez. ("Promising Oil Strike Reported in Egypt," *The Washington Post*, November 1, 1974, p. A19) On October 25, Egyptian petroleum negotiators "underlined" to Korn Egypt's commitment to Amoco, adding that "as sovereign, the GOE should have unfettered right to determine concessions in the area." The memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 6, Memcons 1 of 2.

ment. He reported that the GOI is “very eager” to buy Egyptian petroleum at current market prices; this would serve GOE interests as much as it does those of the GOI.

According to Vardi, the October 23 discussions touched on the Israeli suggestion that at some future time a gas pipeline might be laid from the Egyptian Delta and Northern Sinai into Israel. This was not discussed at length.

Again on the issue of Israeli future purchases, Vardi stated GOI willingness to accept the concept of international bidding (apart from production from the Alma field where the principle of payment-in-kind would apply). The latter would involve renegotiation of the sharing arrangements between the Israeli proposed Neptune-INOC consortium (as operators) and the GOE.

Mr. Korn asked how much oil the Israelis wanted to purchase from Egypt. After some consultation amongst themselves, Vardi spoke for the Israeli team, stating that they would hope for approximately 22,000 bpd during the second half of 1979; this amount might be doubled in 1980. He also volunteered that the GOI is prepared to help Egypt market additional oil, including possible re-exportation.

When we sought clarification of Israeli thinking on the date of transfer, Bar-On, seconded by Vardi, stated that the present negotiating mandate for the team is to press for the transfer of the present operating arrangement to Egyptian suzerainty. If this transpires, the transfer could take place quickly. Contrarily, the Israelis hinted that Egyptian refusal to accept this formula might cause extended negotiations which, perforce, would delay the transfer.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Vardi and Bar-On argued that AMOCO is a key actor in the considerations, and that that company, by seeking to hold the GOE to legal obligations, might impede progress. The thrust of this remark was that the USG should intervene to move AMOCO towards a compromise along the lines proposed by the GOI (Bar-On made this point to Korn again more specifically as the meeting broke up). We pointed out that we do not feel in a position to tell either of the two American companies what to do. Korn said Neptune’s Counsel, Bill Rogers⁵ of Arnold & Porter, had called at the Department earlier in the day and that we had suggested that he speak to the legal counsel for AMOCO. Finally, we noted that USG responsibility to private commercial firms is essentially to help protect such firms against uncompensated expropriation action.

⁵ William D. Rogers previously served as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1976 until 1977 and as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1974 until 1976.

99. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Recommendations for United States Assistance to Egypt

During the visit to Washington in mid-September [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I asked him how he thought the United States Government could be helpful to Egypt. He has made the following two suggestions for the support of the military sector, which would have the highly beneficial effect of ensuring the continued support of the Egyptian military during the peace process:

A. The United States could aid in the retraining of Egyptian enlisted personnel who will be released from the military in the upcoming reduction of forces. U.S. assistance in providing training in the skills that would enable military enlisted men to phase into civilian life would be very beneficial.

B. A commodity support program would be helpful to the Egyptian military who complain that their low salaries make it difficult for them to buy supplies in their PX systems. The U.S. Defense Attache in Cairo has arranged for a U.S. Air Force Exchange specialist to examine the Egyptian PX system. As further assistance, a commodity support program would place basic consumer goods produced outside Egypt into the PX system. An initial input could start a self-generating system that might eventually support itself financially.

Stansfield Turner²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: Non-Meeting: 2-12/78. Secret.

² Turner signed "Stan" above this typed signature.

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jidda, undated

Participants

Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
John C. West, American Ambassador

SUMMARY

Crown Prince Fahd, in a two hour late night session at his Jidda home on October 24, outlined in detail the actions which he and SAG are taking to provide all-out support for President Carter's efforts to implement the Camp David accords. Actions taken or underway include: (1) A message of "strong" support to Sadat including assurances of continued economic and political support. Specific assurances include commitment to \$108 million in aid for purchase of military vehicles and a "set aside" of \$350 million as down payment on purchase of F-5s. On political side, Fahd has guaranteed that Egypt will not be embarrassed at Baghdad Summit;² (2) A message to King Hussein urging him to support the Camp David accords by at least encouraging Palestinians on the West Bank to join the process; (3) In communication with Iraq, making plain that the Saudis will not tolerate any action at Baghdad designed to embarrass or isolate Egypt; (4) To insure that Baghdad Summit does not embarrass Egypt, a "time bomb" understanding with YAR to raise the abortive October 15 coup³ as issue with consequent embarrassment to Libya and Iraq; (5) Visit by FonMin Saud to each of Gulf states to make Saudi position clear and secure support therefore.

Further, the Crown Prince said he was summoning Yasser Arafat to Saudi Arabia and proposed to tell him in clear, unmistakable terms: (1) that Saudi Arabia is supporting the Camp David accords and strongly recommends that the PLO do likewise; (2) that if the PLO is truly the leader of the Palestinians, its leadership can be affirmed and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 6–12/78. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an undated covering memorandum from Vance to Carter in which Vance observed that Fahd's comments "appear to represent a real breakthrough in our effort to obtain Saudi support for Camp David." At the bottom of the covering memorandum, Brzezinski added the handwritten notation, "To save time, see marked passages on pp. 6–7." At the top of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote, "Excellent! J." Carter extensively underlined the first page of the memorandum of conversation.

² See footnote 7, Document 85.

³ On October 15, a coup attempt, launched against the government of Yemen Arab Republic President Lt. Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh, was crushed by the YAR armed forces. ("North Yemen Crushes Revolt," *Chicago Tribune*, October 16, 1978, p. C16)

strengthened by the political processes of the accords; (3) that SAG thinks that the Camp David accords offer an unusual opportunity for the Palestinians, one that they cannot afford to reject and SAG does not want to share in the responsibility of a rejection as they see no feasible alternative for the Palestinians in the future; (4) that SAG recognized that Arafat may have political problems in an immediate, public acceptance and endorsement of the accords; therefore Fahd will understand if he “froths” publicly for a while. However he (Fahd) will insist that Arafat encourage quietly rank and file Palestinians including West Bank PLO to join the political process immediately.

The meeting ended with Fahd reviewing the Russian threat and making a plea for USG to take a firm stand to counter Soviet aggression in the Gulf. END SUMMARY.

Isa Sabbagh and I met with Crown Prince Fahd at his home in Jidda on the evening of October 24. Our appointment was for 9:30 pm and lasted until nearly midnight. Only the three of us were present.

I opened the meeting by giving to Fahd three multi-colored maps of the area which indicated the progress Russia was making in extending its influence in the area. He and Isa had discussed some weeks ago the possibility of such maps to show visually the rapid extension of Soviet influence in the area. Our USMTM group, headed by General Cathey, working with our Embassy, had produced three maps which the Crown Prince seemed to appreciate.

I next told Fahd that I had asked for the meeting even if it had to be late at night as I was leaving for Washington early the next morning; that I was terribly worried and concerned about the success of the Middle East peace process; that for the process to move forward, President Carter desperately needed additional Arab support, especially from Saudi Arabia. I told him that I recalled vividly the meeting I had with him last April⁴ just before I returned to the United States for the final round of the F-15 “battle”. At that time he had sent President Carter a message of friendship, faith and encouragement, epitomized by the words of his five year old son Abd al Aziz who said “Daddy Carter, we love you.”

I said that I knew on this critical occasion President Carter would truly appreciate any words of encouragement or support which Fahd could send.

The Crown Prince interrupted at that point. “If you don’t mind,” he said, “I’d like to tell you about some of my feelings and some of the things I’ve been doing since I saw you last.”

⁴ The record of this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

"First of all", he said, "I firmly believe that President Carter was sent by God to help us secure a just and lasting peace in the Mideast. I have the utmost faith in his integrity and high motives. We cannot fail to support him in this time of need. And I want you to take to him personally what I am about to say to you." "I was terribly pained," he said, "Yes, actually in physical distress when I could not offer more support at our last meeting (October 18) with the President's representative, Mr. Saunders.⁵ However, I could not tell him that I would do that which at that time I was not certain that I could do. So I had to be frank and honest although I'm sure he felt that I was negative and not giving the support which he would have liked."

"After that meeting", he added, "I went into a period of deep thought and concentration on what I and Saudi Arabia could do to give the support to the President which he wanted, needed and deserved. As a result of that period of concentrated thought and study I would like to tell you what I have done, what I am doing, and what I am going to do" he added with a smile.

"First of all" he said, "I sent a message to President Sadat that I would like him to send here a trusted emissary. He immediately sent his special advisor, Sayid Marii. I gave to Marii the strongest possible message of support for Sadat and Egypt. The message should make President Sadat feel strong, independent and good. I assured him that Sadat could count on continued support, both economic and political from Saudi Arabia. I told him that we would not allow any action to be taken against him as a result of the Camp David meeting." Marii said that this strong message of Saudi support would definitely make Sadat heave a big sigh of relief and resume breathing comfortably.

"Sayid told me that Egypt now needed badly some funds to pay for some military equipment. He said \$108 million was needed now to pay for some military vehicles. I told him that this was no problem, and he could get it anytime."⁶

"We then discussed the payment for the F-5s. I told him that we had a cash problem; that our oil production was down from last year; that the decline in the value of the dollar had substantially affected our purchasing power. However, I told him that I was setting aside \$350 million now to be applied on the F-5 purchase; that I would work with them on the balance and it would be taken care of somehow. Perhaps the U.S. would help."

"I asked Marii to urge Sadat not to heed what he might hear or read about Saudi frigidity towards him, or that Saudi Arabia does not

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 86.

⁶ An unknown hand wrote "!" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

want to continue to support him. Sadat, I said, as well as the USG, should by now realize that the attitudes we took and the statements we made at both times (the Jerusalem visit and the Camp David announcements) have proved to be very beneficial to him and Carter, both of whom we decided to support in our own style based on refurbishing our credibility with our effective brethren in the area. Our attitude at the Baghdad Conference will be one further proof of our honest intentions towards both Presidents, if one were needed! I then told Sayid that Sadat must come to the Arab Summit, and I would see to it that no action would be taken which would embarrass or hurt Egypt."

"Let me tell you about the Baghdad Summit," the Crown Prince said. "Some weeks ago Saddam Hussein contacted me and discussed the possibility of an Arab Summit meeting in Baghdad. I promised to think about it. Down deep I thought it was good to have it especially in Baghdad. We have been trying for some time to break the Iraqis away from the Russian influence there and I have seen recently some positive signs. I felt that if they arranged for the Summit to be held in Baghdad they would feel, as the hosts, a special responsibility for its success. Therefore, after a decent lapse of time, I agreed that there should be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on October 30–31, followed by the Summit on November 1 and 2 if everything went well."

"When I began to get indications that the Summit was going to be used as a platform for the Rejectionists to condemn Egypt and isolate them from the rest of the Arab world, I became concerned and determined that this could not be allowed to happen. I took the occasion of the visit here of Foreign Minister Sadoum Hammadi to make plain Saudi Arabia's position. We have invited the Foreign Minister to visit us in order to "discuss the arrangements" for the Baghdad Conference."

"I told him in blunt terms," Fahd said, "that SAG would not tolerate or support any action to boycott or to isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia will oppose any condemnation of Egypt because of its participation in the Camp David talks."

Hammadi said, "Well there won't be any, because without Saudi support no action can be taken."

"I replied that I didn't know about that" and he answered, "Oh no, don't kid me: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Abu Dhabi, YAR, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco will all follow you."

"Later," the Crown Prince said, "I talked by telephone to Saddam Hussein and made plain to him our position. He agreed that the Summit would deal only with lofty purposes (e.g., UN resolutions, Palestinian rights, etc.) and not be an instrument of condemnation for Egypt or a platform for the mouthings of the radicals of the Rejectionist movement."

"But," added the Crown Prince with a somewhat mischievous grin, "Let me tell you what I have done to guarantee that the Summit will not get out of hand and be used by the Iraqis and the Libyans to condemn Egypt and the moderate Arabs."

"Just after the attempted coup in North Yemen on October 19", Fahd said, "President Salih of North Yemen called and said he wanted to break off relations with Iraq and Libya because they were behind the attempted coup."

"Salih told me that sometime ago one of the YAR ministers met Qadhafi at a Libyan national celebration and that he (Qadhafi) said he had been fearing disturbing things about a possible uprising or revolt in YAR. He seemed to intend it as a friendly warning."

"I told Salih", Fahd said, "that Qadhafi reminded me of the old Arab proverb of the man who commits the murder and then becomes a pall-bearer at the victim's funeral!"

"Salih sent FonMin Abdullah Asnaj to see me," Fahd said, "and I advised him not to break off relations with these two countries, but to let them stew in their own juice for a while. I suggested, however, that YAR come to the Baghdad Summit prepared to raise that issue if the Rejectionists say anything nasty about Egypt."

"Both Asnaj and Salih have agreed to this," Fahd concluded, "and what do you think of this as a political maneuver?" he asked.

"A masterpiece, literally a stroke of genius" I replied.

"I also have had a visit, at my request, from Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Chief of the Royal Diwan of Jordan," Fahd said. "I explained to him our policy and told him to tell King Hussein that he should encourage the West Bankers and Palestinians to join the peace process. Hussein would thus exhibit his renowned courage and we would support him. He should urge the "inside" (West Bank and Gaza) Palestinians to agree to the Camp David agreements even if he (Hussein) could not yet openly do the same. I asked Sharaf to impress on his King that I think President Carter wants to see nothing but good happen to his Arab friends. Now is the time to support this unique friend, Carter, I concluded."⁷

"I sent Prince Saud to the Gulf countries (Tonight he is in Oman) in order to explain our policy and urge them to take the right stand at the Baghdad Summit."

Fahd next turned to the question of the PLO. "I am inviting Arafat to come to Saudi Arabia," he said, "and I am going to talk plainly and

⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.

frankly to him. I am going to remind him that we have been and still are his strong friends and supporters.”⁸

“However, the time has now come,” Fahd said, “and I will tell Arafat so—for the Palestinians to take advantage of the opportunity which is now given them. If they don’t take what’s been offered them now, I don’t see any alternative that provides any real hope at any time in the future, and I will tell Arafat just that”, he added.

“I do not want to be a party to the Palestinians passing up this opportunity as they have others in the past,” Fahd said. “I will tell Arafat that if the PLO truly represents the Palestinian people, they will strengthen and solidify that leadership through the political process that the Camp David accords provide and that he should encourage all to go in and take part.”⁹

“On the other hand,” the Crown Prince said, “I can understand if Arafat finds it difficult or impossible to endorse openly the Camp David results. It may take him some time, and I will tell him that we will understand if he has to make public speeches, even if he has to froth at the mouth in them. However, I want him to pass the word to his followers, especially in the West Bank and Gaza, to join in the negotiations and the peace process.”

“I will tell him to be reasonable,” Fahd said. “I will also add that I know that a reasonable approach will ultimately appeal to President Assad, and that’s important,” Fahd emphasized.¹⁰ The Crown Prince added, “I will further tell Arafat that if the Palestinian self-rule entity takes up its task seriously, then, in my opinion, within the first three years the world, including the US, would be so favorably impressed that everybody would turn to Israel and say ‘These are responsible people, the Palestinians; what do you need to keep your armed forces on their territory for?’ Obviously guarantees should be enough to convince you of your security. In fact, by the end of the three years Israel herself may come to this conclusion and start dealing with the Palestinians in this new light.”

Fahd assured me he intends to be frank, indeed almost cruelly so, with Arafat and would urge him not to heed the opinions of such extremists as Abu Iyad¹¹ and the others who are trading on this “Palestinian commodity”. The Crown Prince further promised to impress Ar-

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this and the next paragraph.

⁹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.

¹⁰ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.

¹¹ Also known as Salah Khalaf, Abu Iyad was Deputy Chief and head of intelligence for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the second most senior official to Arafat.

afat with Saudi Arabia's and the Crown Prince's personal deep trust in President Carter and his administration. "I will tell him," said Fahd, "that we did not rush to applaud or support Sadat's Jerusalem visit or the Camp David agreements. But after careful study of the latter we've come to the conclusion that supporting Sadat's and Carter's efforts would produce such worthwhile results as no other Arab, or group of Arabs, could begin to bring about."

At this point Fahd, almost plaintively, urged me to reassure Saunders of his best wishes and appreciation. "I hope," said the Crown Prince, "that what I've managed to do, and will continue to do, will make up for the stiff encounter last time with you and Saunders!"

Fahd then discussed the situation in South Yemen (PDRY). He related that the PDRY President was constantly sending him messages seeking to patch up their relationship. He said he did not trust PDRY, but wanted at least to keep the lines of communication open and to continue to coordinate with the USG and the YAR.

He then concluded with an emotional appeal to President Carter.

"Please tell the President," he said, "that Saudi Arabia is the real, true friend of the U.S. We have always been your friend, even in the days of Nasser. It was then that the voice of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia alone was raised in defense of the U.S. in the Arab world."

"I hope we have shown you in times passed as well as now how deep and meaningful that friendship is. It is not only a recognition of our mutual self-interest but also the mutual admiration and respect which has developed between our people as well as the leaders over the years. It has now reached its brightest point under the magnificent leadership of President Carter."

"I now ask you to plead with him for the sake of both our countries and our people to stop the Soviets from their expansion here. Draw the line and don't let them go any further." The Crown Prince said with obvious emphasis "Please tell the President that in us he has the most constant friend in the region. In me he has a person who is proud of this friendship. We therefore urge him not to lose sight of this friendship but, instead, to examine it and see whether or not it deserves America's concern for our safety and security and her consequent determination to strengthen Saudi Arabia. Thus we can be more readily and adequately cooperative in driving away the Communist dangers encircling your interests and ours: so obvious even by only looking at your very clear maps!" concluded Crown Prince Fahd.

"I will certainly give that message to the President," I replied, "and while I cannot speak officially on this specific point for my government, I feel that your support of the Camp David accords will be of major assistance to our government in the formulation and implementation of the kind of Mideast policy which would meet with your satisfaction. If

the Arab-Israeli controversy can be settled, then our government will have more freedom and more flexibility to counter any threat by the Soviet Union in this area.”

With tongue in cheek, Fahd brought up another topic which further illustrated his untiring efforts in the right direction, this time in Lebanon.

“We’ve been bending every effort,” he said, “to keep the lid down in Lebanon. We’ve talked to all the leaders: Phalengists, Chamounists, Muslims, Palestinians, Syrians, everybody! President Numeiri of the Sudan wanted to withdraw his forces from the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon. When I heard this, I immediately ordered that 2–3 Saudi battalions be made ready to go to Lebanon to replace the Sudanese. At the same time I sent Abd al-Aziz Thunayyan (Deputy Foreign Minister) to Khartoum to convince Numeiri to keep his forces in Lebanon. The Sudanese President agreed. Now, when the Saudi forces replaced the Syrians in certain areas of Beirut they were received with flowers. This is our way of doing things,” asserted Fahd. “We decide where we want to go and we go toward the goal, whenever possible without fanfare, or rough stuff with anyone unless absolutely inescapable,” he concluded.

I next told Fahd that I was sure that the President would like to know what his thoughts were about accepting the invitation to visit the U.S. which had been extended at the time of Secretary Vance’s visit.¹² I added that in view of our conversation this evening it would probably be even more important for him and the President to meet as soon as possible.

Fahd replied that he would like to come to the U.S. as soon as possible after the King’s return to Saudi Arabia. He said in view of all of the international developments, he thought it essential for him and the President to meet periodically.¹³

He then mentioned that he would like to suggest that the King not be burdened with any substantive discussions during the luncheon on Friday. I assured him that it was to be a social occasion and that we would not impose on His Majesty to discuss any subject which might cause a strain on his physical condition, and that I know the President would be especially sensitive and solicitous in this regard.¹⁴

Fahd replied that he was sure that such subjects as our “special relationship” and the merits of hunting with falcons vs. quail shooting as

¹² Vance was in Saudi Arabia September 21–24, to review the Camp David Accords with King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd. See Document 59.

¹³ In the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, Carter wrote “good.”

¹⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this and the next paragraph.

well as horses, agriculture, etc. would be enjoyable topics for the King and the President.

I thanked the Crown Prince as profusely as I could and assured him that I knew the President would be most happy and reassured at my report of the evening's meeting.

Fahd then requested again that we keep the matters discussed completely confidential, as much of the Saudi strategy depended for its success on there being no leaks.

Isa and I took our leave shortly before midnight.

Ambassador's Comment

Had we attempted to write Fahd's script for the meeting, I doubt that we could have improved upon it. He gave back to us as the SAG position the rationale and argument which all of us including Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Saunders have been advancing for the last month with only limited apparent success.

His actions including the messages to Sadat and Hussein are basically what we have wanted and asked him to do. His solution to the problem posed by the Baghdad Summit is in my opinion (and his as well!) a near genius political stroke. If he is as firm with Arafat as he indicates, it should at least defuse the opposition of the PLO. (Fahd recognizes and does not hesitate to use the leverage which money provides, and he knows as well as we do that Arafat's sustaining power comes from the Saudis annual contribution of \$40–50 million to him.)

In reviewing and trying to assess in realistic terms the meaning and future results which should be forthcoming following this meeting with Fahd, I would like to offer the following precautionary observations:

Fahd was in a good, relaxed, even exuberant mood; he had no staff or aides with him. From past experience, we know that he is far less restrained under those circumstances especially when talking only to Isa or me, or the two of us. His enthusiasm for his subject noticeably warmed as the evening progressed. As evidence of this, he asked at the outset how much time we needed and I told him 30 to 45 minutes. He said that would be fine as he did have some other visitors coming. The meeting actually consumed over two hours and I had to take the initiative to break it up.

Therefore, it is possible that he stated the Saudi support in stronger terms than he might have done in a different setting. The ultimate test now is how Sadat and Hussein are reacting to the message Fahd sent them and if they interpret it as Fahd explained it to us. Of equal interest and importance will be to observe the effect of Fahd's moves on Arafat and the Baghdad Summit.

It is probably appropriate at the Friday¹⁵ luncheon for the President to mention with appreciation to the King the Fahd message.

In conclusion, I would like to note the key role that Isa Sabbagh has played in bringing about this new and positive position. His personal rapport with Fahd, and his unsurpassed knowledge and understanding of the Arab mind in general and the Palestinian problem in particular have contributed much to the progress which I believe has been made.

¹⁵ October 27.

101. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Letter from Foreign Minister Dayan

In his letter at Tab A,² Dayan asks how we propose to discuss with Israel the question of our "assurances as to the full implementation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel."

I propose, and State concurs, that Secretary Vance should meet with Dayan after his return on Friday³ to find out what he has in mind. Insofar as Dayan wants us to commit the moral authority of the United States to the good faith implementation by the parties of the peace treaty, we can state this in a number of ways, including your signing the treaty as a witness. It is hard to see how we can go further and guarantee the performance of Egypt or Israel.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 49, Israel: 10/25–31/78. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed. Dayan's October 21 letter to Carter stated: "During our discussions last night we proposed that the United States give assurances as to the full implementation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, in its role as signatory to it. I would be grateful if you could, upon my return from Israel, be kind enough to inform me as to the channel through which talks would be held concerning this issue."

³ October 27.

Dayan may also have in mind getting commitments from us on aid and codifying other bilateral assurances in a “memorandum of understanding.” In the first instance, I believe Secretary Vance should talk to Dayan about these issues. We also have a military team going to Israel on November 1 to survey the airbase problem. At some point, we may want Secretary Brown to talk to Weizman, but the Israelis do not yet have a very precise notion of what their military requirements will be in conjunction with the relocation of their forces.

Before we commit ourselves, we should keep several points in mind:

—The signing of the treaty should not⁴ become contingent upon any specific new commitment on our part to increase aid levels.⁵

—We should avoid tying ourselves to any specific project or item of equipment at this point. It might make more sense to think of a “peace package” for both Egypt and Israel which would commit us to a certain level of aid during the period of implementation of the treaty, but which would put the burden primarily on Egypt and Israel to determine their own priorities in how they use the aid.⁶

—In general, the simpler our commitment, the better. Eventually, we want to think of cutting back on aid to the Middle East, not increasing it indefinitely.⁷

⁴ Carter underlined this word.

⁵ In the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Carter wrote: “Be firm on this.”

⁶ In the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “good idea.”

⁷ In the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Carter wrote: “correct”.

102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, and the Consulate General in Jerusalem¹

Washington, October 26, 1978, 1519Z

272326. Cherokee for Ambassador From Saunders. Subject: Message for Begin From the President: Decision to Thicken Israeli Settlements. Ref: Tel Aviv 15588.²

1. Please deliver³ to Prime Minister Begin as soon as possible the following message to him from the President.

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was encouraged by your message regarding the action⁴ which your Cabinet has taken on the draft treaty between Egypt and Israel, but I am deeply concerned by the reported decision that you plan in the coming weeks to “thicken” Israeli settlements in the West Bank. At a time when we are trying to organize the negotiations dealing with the West Bank and Gaza, no step by the Israeli Government could be more

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Brzezinski; approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2506)

² In telegram 15588 from Tel Aviv, October 25, Lewis conveyed a message from Begin to Vance, through Dayan. The message informed the USG that the Israeli Government had decided to “move ahead promptly” with its plan to permit “‘a couple of hundred’ families” to move into existing settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. It continued: “There are to be no new settlements during this period (i.e. the next couple of months), only expansion of the existing ones.” The telegram pointed out that the Israelis had previously proposed this to Carter at Camp David, but that the United States had persuaded them to “delay” action. Moreover, Dayan stated, “Begin was anxious that the Secretary understand the GOI was not attempting to mislead anyone or disguise what was about to happen. The operation would be undertaken at a slow, steady pace and ‘nothing bombastic’ was planned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2595)

³ Lewis reported in telegram 15747 from Tel Aviv, October 26, that Begin’s office had requested that Carter’s message be delivered on the morning of October 27. However, in order that its contents could be discussed with Dayan, a copy of Carter’s message would be delivered to Ciechanover on the evening of October 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2597)

⁴ On October 25, Dayan telephoned Viets to inform him that the Israeli Cabinet “endorsed in principle” the draft peace treaty, by a vote of 14–2, (a parenthetical addition by the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported Ciechanover’s count of 15–2). Dayan also stated that he and Weizman had been authorized to table several amendments to the treaty, though “he did not consider these to be modifications of a substantial nature.” Moreover, the Israeli Cabinet had provided Dayan and Weizman with instructions to “complete work on the treaty expeditiously ‘unless the Egyptians make any major new changes.’” (Telegram 15580 from Tel Aviv, October 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780438–0922)

damaging. Although I know you have mentioned in our earlier conversations the possibility of some small increases through family reunification, I do not believe that the reported decision is in the spirit of what we have discussed and what we are trying to achieve. I have to tell you with the gravest concern and regret that taking this step at this time will have the most serious consequences for our relationship. Moreover, I believe that it may also jeopardize the conclusion of the peace treaty which we are negotiating.

Given the grave consequences for everything we have worked together to achieve, I must ask that you avoid any move on matters of this kind until they can be addressed in the course of the negotiations to establish the Palestinian self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter

End text.

Vance

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, October 26, 1978, 2025Z

23648. Subject: Sadat Letter for President Carter. Ref: (A) Cairo 23635,² (B) Cairo 23479.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the document, indicating that he saw the telegram. The original signed copy of Sadat's letter, forwarded from Tarnoff to Brzezinski under a November 16 covering memorandum, is *ibid*.

² Telegram 23635 from Cairo, October 26, conveyed press reports that indicated that the Egyptian Government was considering withdrawing its delegation from the peace treaty talks in the aftermath of the Israelis' announced plans to expand Gaza and West Bank settlements. In the telegram, Eilts also reported on an October 26 telephone conversation with Khalil in which the latter criticized this statement and a further Israeli announcement indicating an intention to move the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem, describing the actions as "totally unhelpful to Egypt" and making "a mockery of Israeli claims to want a just and equitable peace." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780441–0279)

³ In telegram 23479 from Cairo, October 24, Eilts relayed an oral message from Sadat to Carter, through Khalil, indicating Sadat's three main reservations with the draft

1. Met with PriMin Moustafa Khalil for two and a half hours this evening. On instructions, he was busy preparing a letter from President Sadat to President Carter. Khalil said the purpose of the letter is to emphasize to President Carter the importance of resolving satisfactorily the three “major” points that Sadat needs in order to sign the treaty (ref B) and to convey Sadat’s deep concern about Israeli statements on settlement expansion and East Jerusalem.⁴ The letter had first to be typed and then cleared with Sadat before it could be given to me.

2. Text of letter follows:

Quote:

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to thank you for your great personal efforts for the progress which has thus far been achieved in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. I appreciate very much what has been done concerning solving many problems to make the signature of the peace treaty very much anticipated in the near future.

There are essentially three main points that must be met before the treaty is signed by Egypt, namely:

1—the duration of the treaty.

The nature of peace and peaceful relations may be of a lasting nature. But the specific obligations contained in the treaty of the Egyptian land should be limited in time.

Therefore, making the duration of the treaty 25 years pertains essentially to the obligations contained in the treaty.

2—Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai.

The treaty must emphasize the full sovereignty of Egypt over the Sinai. The exercise of this sovereignty will be linked to the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the two stages.

3—No preferential treatment should be accorded to Israel. Therefore no priority of obligations should be stipulated in the treaty.

I would also like to bring to your attention my deep concern about the statement made today by Minister Dayan about strengthening the settlements on the West Bank, and equally so the statement made by Prime Minister Begin about moving the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to East Jerusalem. These statements are not

treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2731) In telegram 272016 to Cairo, October 26, Vance acknowledged that Carter received Sadat’s oral message. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/23–31/78)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 94. Dayan informed Viets, in a conversation at the airport before the former’s departure for Washington, that Begin was “seriously considering” moving the two Ministries to East Jerusalem. (Telegram 15650 from Tel Aviv, October 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780440–0215)

consistent with the spirit of Camp David and I know that you share my concern.

I hope that the Government of Israel can be persuaded to desist from such actions which only complicate the peace negotiations in which we are all engaged in, and which we all want to succeed.

I would like to assure you that your own efforts in securing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East are recognized by the whole world and I look forward to welcoming you to attend the signing of the peace treaty in the very near future.

Jehan joins me in extending our very best wishes to both Rossalyn and yourself.

With warmest personal regards.

Yours sincerely

Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat

Unquote.

3. With respect to the point on the duration of the obligations, Sadat asked that I convey orally rpt orally his suggestion that language to the effect that the specific treaty obligations on Egyptian land be for 25 years could be included in a paragraph at the end of the document. Khalil noted that there is at present no language on duration included in the draft treaty.

4. Khalil indicated that Sadat wanted me to get the letter out right away.

Eilts

104. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Israeli Settlements Announcement

I would like to report a conversation which I had with Minister Hanon Bar-on, who is second in the Israeli embassy to Ambassador Dinitz. Mr. Bar-on had called me to discuss some economic issues. During the course of our conversation I expressed concern about the Israeli announcement on strengthening existing settlements. I indicated to him that it was very poorly timed and not conducive to the peace process. His reply is instructive and I thought you should have his view. He stated that while the visit of Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders to the Middle East was not widely reported in the United States, that it caused an absolute furor in Israel. He indicated that Mr. Saunders' provocative statements² stretch beyond any reasonable meaning of the Camp David accords and that together with the United States' answers to King Hussein's questions provoked an uproar in Israel. He indicated that just as we felt the timing of the settlements was ill-timed, so, too, did they feel that Saunders' visit and statements and the United States' answers were ill-timed. He stated that all of this had made the situation extremely difficult for Prime Minister Begin. The Cabinet debate which resulted was very heated and Begin, Dayan and Weizman did as much as possible to keep the situation together. He said that the Cabinet statement was undoubtedly in response to the above factors and would probably not have occurred otherwise.

¹ Source: Carter Library, White House Central File, Box CO-34, CO 74 3/1/78-1/20/81. Administratively Confidential; Personal. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Stu—Begin's statements are endangering the peace treaty. He's blaming his displeasure on Saunders, who simply delivered our answers to Hussein's questions. J."

² See footnote 2, Document 94.

105. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, October 26, 1978, 4:15–4:30 p.m.

Subject

Covert Action—Egyptian Proposal

Participants

<i>State</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Secretary Cyrus Vance	Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)
<i>Defense</i>	<i>JCS</i>
Secretary Harold Brown	General David C. Jones
<i>White House</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)	Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI [name not declassified]

The committee, which had just concluded a meeting on SALT, met with principals only to consider a CIA proposal² [5½ lines not declassified] Admiral Turner provided the text of a Presidential Finding. After brief discussion of possible risks and the scope of the aid to be provided, the Committee agreed unanimously that the proposal should be approved. Admiral Turner was advised to clear the finding with the Attorney General, after which it will be presented to the President.³

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-020, Minutes—SCC 1978. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnote 2, Document 97.

³ In accordance with the Attorney General's view that the proposal needed to be reviewed in the physical presence of a representative of the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget, the SCC reconvened to consider the proposal on October 30. At the meeting, "no reservations" were raised by the Department of Justice or OMB representatives and the Chairman's suggestion for the re-ratification of the proposal and presentation of a Finding to Carter "as soon as possible" was agreed to unanimously. (Ibid.) Brzezinski presented a memorandum to Carter requesting his signature on the attached Presidential Finding, dated October 31. (Ibid.) A November 2 Department of State note stated that Carter signed the Finding on November 1. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 6, Egypt 1973–1974–1975–1976–1977–1978–1979)

106. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, October 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Preliminary Cost Estimates for Replicating Israeli Military Installations in the Sinai

Set out below are our preliminary estimates for replicating Israel's military installations in the Sinai. Considerably higher costs have been mentioned both within DOD and by the Israelis, but these have, I believe, been based on assumptions going beyond replication; we have been careful to make clear both in the Pentagon and to the Israelis that no commitment has been made except with respect to the airbases and then only on a replication basis at most.

	(\$ million)
Etam and Etzion airbases	\$1,220
Ground force installations	120
Naval facility at Sharm-el-Sheikh	<u>95</u>
	\$1,435

In addition, the Israelis will probably want and need a military road, with laterals to bases, paralleling the Negev-Sinai border. Our estimate for this is \$345 million, based on 400 km of road which Israel says it needs—a requirement which may well be overstated. Some portion of these funds would need to be expended as a precursor to construction of the facilities.

The estimates assume replication of current operational capability and support facilities, as best as these can be determined from aerial photography and other data sources. The estimate for the ground force installations could be lower if based on the tentative Israeli plan to transfer one of the two Sinai regular divisions to the reserves; it also could be reduced by taking advantage of the fact that many of the structures are relocatable. The other Sinai airbases, all small, are not costed since no aircraft are permanently deployed there and the bases probably will not be replicated; costs for any possible replication of the J-1 early warning station have not been estimated. Costs of providing water and power are included but are especially uncertain.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 10/78. Secret; Sensitive.

The estimates take into account geographic location, inflation (at US rates), time compression (three year design and construction period), and other factors; but the uncertainties are necessarily large. In particular, if the construction time was shortened from three to two years, costs might rise by as much as 50%. Also some degree of in-country procurement of material and labor is inevitable and, given Israel's high inflation rate, this will drive costs up.

I can provide further details on these estimates if you wish.²

Harold Brown

² Brown added the following handwritten notation after this sentence: "We will continue to be both very tight-fisted on these costs and very non-committal toward Israeli requests. HB."

107. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Israeli "Thickening" of Settlements

After seeing the President's letter² to Begin last night, Dayan informed Roy Atherton that there is no chance of getting Begin to reverse his decision. In brief, we will either have to back down or we are on a collision course.

If we do back down or let this issue slide by, as I suspect we will, we should recognize that there will be consequences. Our credibility with both Begin and the moderate Arabs will be damaged. Begin will conclude that he can proceed as he chooses on new settlement activity in the West Bank. We should have no illusions about the effect this will have on our efforts to organize West Bank/Gaza negotiations. There

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside System. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski added the following handwritten notation: "Let me know what happened with Vance. ZB."

² See Document 102.

will simply be no takers. In brief, a completely separate Egyptian-Israeli peace is all we can hope for. The Saudis and Jordanians will retreat back into their passive, possibly even negative posture, just as they were beginning to emerge.

If instead we decide to make an issue out of Begin's most recent decision, we will have a big political flap on our hands and we may delay the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations. The steps available to us are the following:

- Suspend McGiffert trip³ to Israel indefinitely.

- Review outstanding economic and military programs and delay some items.

- Ignore Begin's visit to New York in early November—no invitation to Washington.

- Presidential statement at next week's press conference condemning settlement activity as an obstacle to peace.

- Release publicly answers to King Hussein's questions.

- Suspend US involvement in Egypt-Israel peace negotiations.

- Suspend routine high-level visits to Israel.

I realize that the President faces a very difficult choice, especially on the eve of elections. On foreign policy grounds, I think a case can be made for sticking to our position and trying to put some teeth into it, even if the Egypt-Israel negotiations are temporarily affected. But any such decision should be made only after very careful analysis of all the alternatives. My point in this memo is simply to highlight some of the main considerations.

³ As part of a Middle Eastern trip which was also scheduled to include Egypt and Jordan, McGiffert was scheduled to visit Israel for talks November 1–5. (Telegram 266572 to Amman, October 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780431–0230)

108. Editorial Note

On October 27, 1978, President Jimmy Carter received King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, at the White House for a luncheon meeting. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Khalid in the Map Room from 12:04 p.m. to 12:22 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) After an exchange of courtesies, Carter discussed the Palestinian situation and the United States' "need

to talk” with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Carter “explained that we had given our word of honor not to do so unless the PLO recognized Security Council Resolution 242. In the meantime, we would like the help of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to be go-betweens.” Khalid responded that “he and his government would be happy to be helpful.” He added, “The trouble with the Palestinians is that they are being pulled in every direction not only by the Communists, but also by some Arab countries!” “King Hussein,” Khalid continued, “could have his negotiating delegation made up of Palestinians. Egypt could have Palestinians in its delegation. This together with the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian delegation, could be a very good combination.” In response, Carter commented that this “is why we would be happy to have the influence of wise counsel such as that offered by Saudi Arabia prevail.” (Memorandum of Conversation between President Carter and King Khalid, October 27; Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—President)

Following a luncheon hosted by Carter for Khalid and other Saudi officials in the Family Dining Room from 12:22 p.m. to 1:17 p.m., the Saudi party returned to Andrews Air Force Base in a helicopter with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) During the trip, the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, commented to Vance that the Saudis were “impressed with the quick U.S. response” to Begin’s statement about Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Sultan added that “this is the way to do it—strike while the iron is hot!” Vance agreed with Sultan, stating that the U.S. response had to be “quick and clear.” Following this exchange, Khalid repaired Vance’s eyeglasses, which had broken, and commented, “Pressure, pressure. Sometimes you can repair things with pressure.” (Memorandum of Conversation in Helicopter Returning King Khalid to Andrews Air Force Base, October 27; Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—President)

On November 2, Carter sent a letter to Fahd summarizing their meeting in Washington and expressing his appreciation of Saudi support. The text of the letter was sent in telegram 279224 to Jidda, November 2. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/1–11/78)

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, October 28, 1978, 0201Z

274418. Subject: Israeli Settlements Question and Next Steps in Washington Negotiation.

1. During early evening meeting² October 27 with the Secretary Egyptian delegation advised us that Sadat and Khalil will meet at noon October 28 to decide whether to recall three senior members of Egyptian delegation for consultations in light of Israeli decision on settlements.³ Simultaneously, we learned that CBS was running story to effect that delegation was being recalled, apparently based on Reuters item attributed to Prime Minister Khalil, with authorization of Egyptian delegation, we informed media that Egyptian delegation had authorized us to say that question of whether they should return for consultations would be decided in Cairo Saturday⁴ but as of now no repeat no decision had been taken.

2. Secretary strongly urged delegation that it would be mistake for President Sadat to call them back. If Sadat did decide to do so, President Carter would want to talk to him first to advise against such a move. The Secretary also told Egyptians that at President's lunch today for King Khalid, Prince Sultan had agreed that delegation should remain in Washington. Egyptian delegation undertook to report foregoing immediately to Cairo.

3. You should reinforce our views in this matter with President Sadat, stressing following additional points:

—President Carter has sent a strong message to Prime Minister Begin on the settlements question and we are still awaiting his reply.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/23–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Niac Immediat; Stadis; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S-O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2536)

² No other record of this meeting has been found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 103. Khalil telephoned Eilts on the evening of October 28 to inform him that Sadat had decided to "postpone" the recall of the Egyptian delegation, adding that Sadat's decision was "in response to President Carter's direct request." When asked by Eilts whether the Egyptian postponement had a time limitation, Khalil responded that this will "depend upon developments in the negotiations and on Israeli actions with respect to settlements expansion and East Jerusalem." (Telegram 23813 from Cairo, October 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2756)

⁴ October 28.

—We took initiative today to say publicly that we have determined in light of all the circumstances that no trilateral negotiations should take place today. In our view, which we have conveyed to Egyptian delegation, there should be no trilateral meetings for next few days while we deal with this issue.

—If Egyptian delegation were recalled, even if it were made clear this was for consultations with intention to return to Washington in a few days, onus for disruption of negotiations would shift in public mind to the Egyptians. Many would see a parallel with Sadat's recall of his delegation from Jerusalem in January. As matters now stand, the focus is on Israeli decision with respect to the settlements and on our publicly declared position which makes clear we do not think this is the time to carry on business as usual.

—With respect to East Jerusalem issue, it is our clear impression that this was an idea that was floated in Israel and has now been put on ice. (The Secretary made this point also to the Egyptian delegation.)

Vance

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the White House¹

Tel Aviv, October 30, 1978, 1235Z

15996. Subject: Begin's Reply to President's Letter on Settlements.

1. Following is text of copy of letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Carter dated October 29. Text received by Embassy at 1230 local time October 30.

2. Begin quote: Dear Mr. President, I acknowledge the receipt of your message² dated October 26th, 1978, which I read with deep regret. At Camp David, I informed you, Mr. President, that whilst undertaking not to establish new settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza during the next three months—the agreed period for our negotiations with Egypt—we shall add several hundred families to the existing settlements. In fulfillment of this, the Cabinet decided unanimously that the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 46, 10/21–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 102.

addition of those several hundred families should be carried out in the near future; in other words, we are fully complying with what I told you and wrote to you at Camp David.

May I, Mr. President, also draw your attention to the following exchange³ that took place between Assistant Secretary Saunders, Ambassador Lewis and the Director-General of our Foreign Ministry, Mr. Y. Ciechanover. In your replies to King Hussein, the following sentence, *inter alia*, appears: “whatever number (of the settlements) that might remain beyond the transitional period, and their status, would presumably be agreed in the negotiations concerning the final status of the West Bank and Gaza envisaged under paragraph A.1.(c).”

I drew the attention of Mr. Saunders to the gravity of such a statement, which may be clearly interpreted as a possibility of removing, at least, some of these settlements. Mr. Saunders promised to give specific replies to my remarks to Mr. Ciechanover. Two days later the following conversation⁴ took place:

“Saunders: As to question 9, I understand the Prime Minister’s position. The question of settlements must, however, be settled in discussion.

Ciechanover: According to your phrase, there is a presumption that some settlements might be removed: is this the U.S. position? There has never been a discussion of such a possibility.

Saunders: That possibility is conceivable.

Lewis: Everything is left open on this issue. To be very legalistic: all the settlements might be removed or some of them or none.”

Mr. President, I will refrain from characterizing the replies of Mr. Saunders and Mr. Lewis; but it is my duty, on behalf of the Government of Israel, to state that our people will never accept the possibility called by Mr. Saunders “conceivable” or the two first alternatives in the reply of your Ambassador.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will understand the position of Israel.

Yours sincerely,
Menachem Begin
End quote.

Lewis

³ See Document 91.

⁴ The Embassy transmitted the U.S. record of this October 22 conversation in telegram 15449 from Tel Aviv, October 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2574)

111. Letter from the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (Dinitz) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 29, 1978

My dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by Prime Minister Begin to transmit to you the following message:

“Dear Mr. President,

This is the third letter I am writing to you today.² I feel it my duty to do so at this crucial moment. My words are addressed to you not as by a Prime Minister to the President of the United States of America, but as man to man and, mainly, as friend to friend.

My colleagues and I hear very often the argument that we must understand the delicate situation of President Sadat vis-a-vis the Arab World and the Rejectionists. Today, may I ask: What about my situation, my difficulties? To prove the point, I will inform you of the following facts:

The men of the Irgun³ whom I led from the underground into a fight for liberty for five years are my most beloved friends. As far as I studied history, I can say that there were never cleaner fighters, nor more idealistic volunteers. For five years we were always together, through thick and thin, in good and bad days. Now, for the first time in thirty-four years a group of them is in ‘revolt’ against their brother and former commander.

Nearly half of my own party members in the Knesset either voted against or abstained. Some young people dabbed on the walls of Zeev Jabotinsky House the words: ‘Begin—Traitor.’ I have to live with all this phenomena.

Let me speak frankly: President Sadat’s regime is a dictatorship supported by the Army and a totally controlled press. We do not talk about democracy, we practice it. At the latest Cabinet session, of which I informed you, in order to gain a few votes I had to make an hour-long speech which was a real exertion not only in the intellectual sense of the word.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79. Personal for the President’s Eyes Only. At the top of the document, Carter wrote: “Zbig—do not distribute. C.” The original signed version of the message is *ibid*.

² Begin’s other October 29 letter is printed as Document 110. A further, third letter has not been found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 91.

One of my predecessors, Mrs. Golda Meir, having received the so-called Rogers Plan, said to the NEW YORK TIMES that an Israeli Government that would accept such a Plan would commit treason to our people.⁴ I hope, Mr. President, that your Administration will not bring forth plans or make proposals—as exemplified by the Saunders Mission—that will compel me to repeat my predecessor's statement.

Please excuse me, Mr. President, for having written this long letter. But it is a crucial moment and I feel, with all my heart, that we deal with the future and, indeed, with the lives of the Jewish people who have returned after all the age-long suffering to the land of their ancestors.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,
Menachem Begin"
Respectfully yours,

Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

⁴ On December 22, 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir stated her opposition to a Middle East peace plan proposed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers that called for Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 border in return for a binding peace agreement with its Arab neighbors. She stated, "The Government cannot accept a paper of this kind," adding "[i]t would be treasonous for any Israeli Government to accept it." (James Feron, "Mrs. Meir is Indignant," *The New York Times*, December 23, 1969, p. 1)

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, October 30, 1978, 1445Z

16006. Eyes Only for Executive Secretary Tarnoff from the Ambassador. No other distribution. Subject: U.S. Strategy Options on Settlements Problem.

1. You will appreciate the extreme sensitivity of this message. I suggest you personally distribute it to the Secretary, Roy Atherton, and Hal Saunders only rpt only.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 46, 10/21–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

2. The Begin government's decision to thicken a number of settlements on the West Bank has raised our ongoing test of wills with the GOI on the settlements issue in the post-Camp David period from one of words to one of deeds. While Begin's domestic political vulnerabilities, not to say his own deeply held convictions, make it nearly impossible that we could bring about a formal revocation of the decision, neither can we allow it to go unchallenged or to become just another in an ongoing series of steps toward unlimited expansion and proliferation of Israeli settlements in occupied territories. There are already suggestions by government sources that the U.S. is overreacting, that Washington will come to understand this and that the problem will fade away, this despite the extraordinarily stiff phrases in the President's letter of October 26.² Israelis, of course, have many examples in the history of our relationship which lead them to conclude that the U.S. will eventually back down in order to avoid a bilateral crisis. Because of this history, it will be especially difficult to convince Israel that on the settlements issue, we are prepared for a long and, if necessary, public and vehement disagreement. In the following paragraphs are set out what we believe are the options for American policy and actions on this crucial matter.

3. The problem:

To limit to the greatest extent possible the scope of implementation of the GOI's decision to augment existing settlements on the West Bank, and to dissuade the GOI from inaugurating any new civilian settlements, at least until negotiations over the establishment of the self-governing authority are completed.

4. Background and analysis:

During the Knesset debate over the Camp David Accords, Begin assured his critics that the decision to withdraw from the Sinai settlements constituted no precedent for the settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights, which are far more important to Israelis for both security and emotional reasons. He promised that existing settlements in those areas would be strengthened and new ones set up. Thereafter, Begin ducked the issue for several weeks. During the Cabinet debate over the draft Israel/Egypt treaty, and especially the linkage issue, which was conducted under the shadow of an extremely emotional overreaction to the U.S. replies to Hussein and to tendentious press accounts from Arab sources about the Saunders visit, Begin encountered unexpectedly strong criticism. He apparently felt this ministerial resistance could only be propitiated by an explicit decision to augment the West Bank settlements. The overwhelming nature of the Cabinet

² See Document 102.

endorsement of the draft has been widely attributed, in part self-servingly, to this decision. In reaction to the Cabinet pronouncement, initial public and press reaction in Israel for the principle of expanding the settlements has been almost universally favorable. At the same time, the Labor opposition and some of the press have criticized the public announcement of the decision as needlessly provocative of the U.S. and the Egyptians, as well as its reported applicability to the Samaritan Highlands rather than to the "defense line" in the Jordan Valley. Gush Emunim, on the other hand, has condemned it as being pitifully inadequate.

5. Strategy:

We assume that Begin took this decision fully aware of the storm it would trigger in the U.S. We are also certain that it will now be virtually impossible, for domestic Israeli political reasons, to get him to rescind the decision or to forego its implementation completely. If he reversed himself, he could precipitate several resignations from his Cabinet, face a severe undermining of this parliamentary majority, and shatter Herut. The personal effect of this on Begin would be enormous. We therefore believe that our maximum objective in the short run is to prevail upon him to limit implementation of the decision to the smallest number of people in the fewest places over the longest period. Further, we should try to extend this restraint into a *de facto* prolongation of the moratorium on new settlements beyond expiration of the ninety-day freeze that Begin accepted.

6. No Israeli Government will under present circumstances renounce its right to establish new settlements or to add families to existing ones. Indeed, we believe that a GOI decision even to defer new settlements beyond three months will require that Begin be convinced that such cessation is essential to avoid grave damage to the U.S.-Israeli relationship. And even this may not be enough to deter him from implementing life-long beliefs concerning Jewish rights to Eretz Yisrael, especially since these views are shared by some of his closest associates in the Cabinet.

7. If there is to be any hope of moving Begin, our policy on this issue in the weeks ahead will have to generate virtually irresistible domestic political pressure on the GOI to avoid a prolonged crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Even then, the most we are likely to achieve would be a personal and private commitment by Begin to the President to slow down and minimize thickening of existing settlements and postpone new settlements during negotiations to set up the self-governing authority. Less desirable would be a *de facto* Begin decision which would be acknowledged neither to us nor to the Israeli public, but he would have great difficulty sustaining this for very long without admitting to his Cabinet and the public at large that such a *de facto*

freeze was in effect. Neither of these possibilities can be realized unless we are prepared through words and actions in Washington to prove our steadfastness and seriousness to Israel on this issue. Suggested below are two possible alternative strategies for achieving this purpose.

8. The options:

A. Such an approach could include *inter alia*, the following measures:

- Slow down or suspension of treaty negotiations with Egypt
- Delay of discussions concerning U.S. commitment to assist Israel in building two Negev airfields
- Indefinite suspension of Matmon C consultations
- Conspicuous footdragging on already committed aid deliveries
- Publicized recall of the Ambassador to Washington to discuss the settlements issue with the President
- Consideration of having the President not visit Israel (or Egypt) in conjunction with the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty
- Plus measures outlined in option B.

Pro

—Could shock Israeli body politic into realization that unlimited continuation of settlement activity is incompatible with attainment of peace, even with Egypt, and immediately jeopardizes Israel's all-important relationship with the United States

—Would demonstrate to the Arabs the seriousness of our commitment to minimizing further Israeli settlement activity

—Recalling the Ambassador would be almost uniquely strong demonstration of our displeasure with Israel (Note: we do not believe this step has ever been taken during any previous confrontations with Israeli Governments.)

Con

—Such a massive response is much more likely to trigger a backlash against the United States and Egypt and be seen as attacks on Israel rather than as directed at the Begin government's policies. Result could be rallying of support behind Begin and further acts of defiance in the settlement area, rather than the desired result of internal pressure on Begin and his government to desist from such activities.

—Suspension of negotiations by Egypt because of the linkage issue would convince many Israelis of Sadat's bad faith, lead to renewed accusations of Egyptian-American collusion, and run grave risk of aborting Israeli/Egyptian treaty, despite fact that agreed text is within reach.

—Even suggestions of suspension of aid already committed to Israel would invite charges of violation of U.S. commitments at the highest levels not to use aid as a form of pressure and would trigger outrage both here and among Israel's supporters in the U.S.

—This package of pressures may be required at a later, much tougher point in the negotiating process over the West Bank and Gaza; if employed now, its effect will be weakened then.

B. Without triggering a uniformly defensive reaction in Israel, this strategy would carry the clear message that both U.S.-Israeli relations and the hard-won gains in the peace process are bound to suffer acutely if the Begin government does not accept the necessity to suspend settlement activity at least until the first phase of West Bank-Gaza negotiations are completed, and that restraint can bring positive benefits. Elements of this strategy could include some of the following:

—Delivery of stern face-to-face message by the President to Begin during the latter's upcoming visit to the U.S., with a forthright public acknowledgement, if necessary, of their deep disagreement

—Regular and frequent expressions of hope by high level U.S. officials that GOI will not take provocative actions concerning settlements in occupied territories

—Explicit statements or calculated leak to press that U.S. willingness to help GOI with costs of relocating infrastructure and materiel from Sinai to Negev is directly linked to freeze on settlement activity

—Continuing delay of overall Matmon C discussions, while continuing approvals of essential military deliveries and authorization to purchase a few selected priority new items.

—Mustering support of key Congressional figures and influential private supporters of Israel for administration's position on settlements issue. This can be brought to bear when Begin is in the U.S. and during the already planned visits of several important senators and congressmen to Israel over the next few weeks

—Hint willingness to reconsider financial assistance for relocation of Sinai settlers if Israel demonstrates prudence and restraint in the settlement field

Pro

—Without reneging on our standing commitments to Israel's security requirements or undermining the negotiations with Egypt, forcefully brings home the real cost of Israeli obduracy on the settlements issue in terms of U.S.-Israel relations.

—Over time could assist moderate elements in Israel, including members of the coalition, to isolate Begin on this issue, rather than leaping to his defense. This type of approach seemed to produce such an effect in the period following the breakdown of the Jerusalem talks

in January, after which almost no new settlements were set up, as well as in the period following the GOI's inadequate answers to the U.S. questions in March, which were changed to a more favorable formulation several weeks later

—Will permit congressional and private friends of Israel to support the administration's opposition to Israeli policy on a specific critical issue about which many of them share our concern rather than triggering an indiscriminating defensive reaction on their part as a more heavy-handed approach might do

Con

—Could produce the same kind of defensive and defiant reaction that option A would probably trigger

—Might not convince Israelis of our determination to see this matter through.

9. Between these two options: I strongly recommend option B. However, I must add that the odds of achieving our goal of a de facto settlements freeze and great restraint on "thickening" are considerably less than 50–50, under option A, they would approach zero.

10. Whatever package of measures we decide to employ, we should begin immediately and proceed steadily. Each passing day may lead Begin and Israel to conclude that this bilateral conflict, too, like so many others, shall pass away.

Lewis

113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Status Report on Egypt-Israel Treaty Negotiations

Secretary Vance met separately today with both the Israeli² and Egyptian³ delegations. Substantial differences still remain, and the Israelis want to discuss with us a number of bilateral issues.

Israel

—*Treaty Text*. Problems with preamble, reference to Gaza, proposed review clause, and "priority of obligations." All other articles have been agreed. Awaiting Israeli comments on Annex III ("normalization"); trying to accelerate drafting of Annex I (security and withdrawal); US proposal required to break deadlock in oil talks.⁴

—*Exchange of Letters*. Israel will send a letter to Sadat agreeing to begin negotiations with Egypt within one month of ratification of the Egypt-Israel treaty on the modalities for establishing the self-governing authority. Israel will not, however, discuss the "powers and responsibilities" of the self-governing authority with Egypt alone.⁵ Israel will also insist that Sadat commit himself in writing to an exchange of "resident ambassadors" within one month of the completion of the interim

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78. Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the memorandum, and wrote, "Zbig—cc Cy."

² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

³ Vance summarized his meeting with the Egyptian delegation in an October 30 memorandum to Carter. During the meeting, Vance informed the Egyptians that the Israelis were prepared to accept a solution to the problem of exchanging ambassadors through a letter from Sadat to Carter and a letter from Carter to Begin; the Egyptians, Vance reported, also found this acceptable. Vance also reported that Ali and Weizman agreed that Egypt would have an early warning station in Zone A in lieu of air defense missiles. Lastly, Boutros Ghali asked Vance for help persuading the Israelis that Egypt needed "help from Israel on the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian set of issues." In the margin next to this point, Carter added a handwritten comment: "Israel will try to obstruct progress on W[est] B[an]k/Gaza." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 71, Brzezinski, Chron: 10/20–31/78)

⁴ Carter wrote in the margin next to this section: "Cy work out."

⁵ Carter underlined "Egypt alone" and wrote in the margin next to this phrase: "I'm sure Egypt can recruit some Gaza Palestinians. We can help w/Jordan, etc."

withdrawal. This could take the form of a letter to you, and then you would write to Begin.⁶

—*US Security Role*. Israel will accept a US-manned early warning station⁷ in central Sinai which would provide information for both Israel and Egypt. Israel would also welcome a continuation of the US reconnaissance role. Dayan would like to talk further about our “responsibility”⁸ for the implementation of the treaty.

—*Side Letters*. Israel has asked for a letter from us confirming that there is no “legal linkage” between the treaty and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations.⁹ Weizman also wants a letter from us stating that the timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai will be contingent upon the completion of the new airfields in the Negev.¹⁰

—*Memo of Understanding*. Dayan wants to “review and update” all of our previous memoranda of understanding.¹¹

—*East Jerusalem*. Secretary Vance has asked to see Begin in New York on Thursday to discuss Israeli plans concerning east Jerusalem.¹²

Egypt

—*Priority of Obligations*. The Egyptian delegation has agreed to consider new draft language proposed by Secretary Vance. Their preliminary response has been quite encouraging.¹³

—*Joint Letter*. The Egyptians want some reference in the letter to a target date for holding elections for the self-governing authority. They also insist on making some reference to Egypt’s “special responsibilities” in Gaza.¹⁴

—*Exchange of Ambassadors*. The Egyptians will agree to the procedure suggested by Dayan whereby Sadat will write to you, and you will write to Begin concerning the exchange of ambassadors.¹⁵

—*Security Arrangements*. The Egyptians no longer favor an American-manned early warning station in Zone B. They prefer to have their own

⁶ Carter wrote “ok” and drew an arrow pointing to this sentence.

⁷ Carter underlined “US-manned early warning station” and wrote a question mark with an arrow pointing to this phrase.

⁸ Carter underlined “responsibility” and wrote a question mark with an arrow pointing to this phrase.

⁹ Carter wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “only if Egypt agrees.”

¹⁰ Carter wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “Camp David letter should be adequate.”

¹¹ Carter wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “Be cautious.”

¹² Carter wrote in the margin next to this section: “no.”

¹³ Carter wrote in the margin next to this section: “Cy work out.”

¹⁴ Carter drew quotation marks in the margin next to this section, indicating as in the above section, “Cy work out.”

¹⁵ Carter wrote in the margin next to this section: “ok.”

station in Zone A, and claim that the Israelis have indicated agreement to this concept. The Egyptians have, however, accepted the idea that the United States will continue to perform aerial reconnaissance over the Sinai.¹⁶

—*Unilateral Gestures.* The Egyptians are still anxious for Israel to make a commitment to some unilateral gestures in the West Bank and Gaza which would help build confidence as the negotiations for the self-governing authority begin.

Secretary Vance will meet with the Egyptian delegation tomorrow morning,¹⁷ and will chair a trilateral meeting at Blair House at 11:00 a.m.¹⁸

¹⁶ Carter wrote in the margin next to this section: "Better."

¹⁷ See Document 114.

¹⁸ No record of this meeting has been found.

114. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 31, 1978

SUBJECT

Status Report on Negotiations and West Bank/Gaza Issues

Today's talks with the Egyptians and Israelis² resulted in some progress toward agreement on the treaty text and the exchange of letters on West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Both delegations have undertaken to recommend that their governments agree to our compromise proposal on *Article VI, on the "Priority of Obligations"* (Tab A).³ In addition, we drafted the text of a *joint letter* that both parties will refer to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 10/19–31/78. Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the document.

² No memoranda of conversation of the October 31 meetings with the Israeli and Egyptian delegations have been found.

³ The tab was not found attached.

their governments (Tab B).⁴ Dayan's position throughout the talks was to try to get the Secretary to deal directly with Begin on the remaining hard issues.

I had a long talk with Dayan about the West Bank/Gaza issues. My oversimplified conclusion is that there is very little real prospect for getting agreement on the transitional regime for the West Bank/Gaza. For example:

—Dayan claims that *Israel did not agree at Camp David to abolish the authority of the military governor*. In extremis, Israel would have the right to go back into the West Bank/Gaza.

—While agreeing that the military government would be withdrawn, *Israel has not agreed that this would happen immediately after elections*. It might take several years to complete the withdrawal of the military government.

—If the issues of *future settlements, disposition of public lands, and the right of the Arabs in east Jerusalem to vote in the elections* are raised now, the negotiations will drag on for two or three years. These questions should not be addressed now, but should await the election of the self-governing authority, after which they will be resolved in a practical manner.

—*Israel plans to establish about 18–20 new settlements in the Jordan Valley in the next five years*. Therefore, the self-governing authority cannot dispose of all the public domain lands. Israel may need to keep 20% or so for itself.

My prediction is that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty negotiations will be concluded within ten days, depending largely on how Begin reacts. On the basis of my understanding of the Israeli position, I doubt if we will ever get very far with the West Bank/Gaza negotiations.

⁴ The tab was not found attached.

115. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, November 1, 1978, 1622Z

8507. Subject: Letter to President.

1. There is below text of letter dated October 31 to President from King Hussein which has just been received from palace. King told Ambassador earlier today he was sending letter on eve of Baghdad conference² and as response to President's answers³ which he regards as personal communication from President (signed original⁴ being pouched).

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you for your letters⁵ which have kept me informed regarding all the recent developments and your thinking thereon. I wish also to take this opportunity to reaffirm our sincere appreciation for the ceaseless efforts that you, Mr. President, and your top officials are devoting in pursuing the goal of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East region.

As I prepare to travel to attend the Arab summit conference in Baghdad. I feel I must communicate to you my thoughts on where we stand and what questions and common responsibilities we face. We are determined in Jordan to press for a positive summit conference. One which would take responsible decisions and keep the doors open for a just settlement of the Middle East conflict. We have been in touch with other Arab countries which are close to us in thoughts and attitude to cooperate in this effort. Allow me to summarize to you our views here regarding the Camp David Agreements and what we regard as a viable basis for future peace efforts. Some of these views were discussed with you and relayed to Mr. Vance⁶ during his recent visit to Amman. I believe that we should share these views with frankness and openness hoping this would lead to the clarification and understanding necessary to reach positive conclusions.

From the very beginning there were some fundamental questions in our minds regarding the results of the Camp David Agreements. I

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Jordan: King Hussein, 2/77–2/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnote 7, Document 85.

³ See footnote 4, Document 85.

⁴ A copy of the signed original of the letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 56, Jordan: 11/78–6/79.

⁵ See Documents 55 and 85.

⁶ See Document 58.

have always recorded with satisfaction the repeated assurances and statements by the United States Government that what it sought was a comprehensive and just settlement. Despite this, one was led to believe that what emerged from the Camp David meeting was essentially the outline of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel not connected in any legal or binding way with a comprehensive settlement on other fronts. If such a course is pursued, I fear that this might lead to a more radical polarization in the area leading ultimately to the isolation of Egypt and the causing of a major setback to the peace process on other fronts.

Furthermore, there was a major difference between the two documents which emerged from Camp David regarding the question of the future status of the occupied areas. While the Egyptian-Israeli Accord was explicit on the question of Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, the future of the West Bank and Gaza had been left open to negotiations. I believe that there was no balance in this, particularly as the document dealing with the West Bank and Gaza was very explicit in its provisions regarding the transitional agreements and the Jordanian role and responsibilities in them. Jordan was invited to participate in arrangements of administrative, legal, military and political character during a "transitional" period before knowing the shape or outline of the future settlement it is invited to conclude. We fear that at the end of the proposed transitional period, the results reached might be totally unacceptable. This particularly in view of the fact that Israel is repeating continuously its categorical claims about the final annexation of Arab Jerusalem, the expansion of the settlements in the occupied areas and the rejection of Arab sovereignty in the occupied Arab lands. Jordan was called upon to participate in security arrangements with Israel and for Israel, against potentially Palestinian subversion. Without any assurances that, as a result of the transitional period, there would be a just Palestinian solution based on self-determination and an end to the occupation. As I indicated to Secretary Vance, we feel in Jordan that the Agreements have not provided clear answers regarding the four main issues of a comprehensive settlement, namely withdrawal and future borders, Palestinian self-determinations, the basis for the solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees and the future of Jerusalem. I also indicated to him, to your other envoys and repeatedly in public that Jordan will not close any doors which may lead to the termination of the occupation and the emancipation of the people under occupation in the context of a peaceful settlement. Our interest in the cause of peace is genuine and it has for long been a cherished objective of ours. In this spirit we formulated the questions that we addressed to your government for the clarification of the unclear aspects of the Camp David Agreements and the United States positions. I am very grateful that your government responded quickly to these questions and that

you found it fit to sign the answers yourself and send them with a special high-level envoy.

The answers to our questions have been most useful in clarifying the issues and explaining your government's policy. I am afraid, however, that they did not alter the situation in a major way. We still feel, here in Jordan, that we are asked to participate in arrangements with the Israelis in the occupied areas prior to a definite knowledge of the outcome of such arrangements. We also still feel that there are no definite answers to our fundamental concerns, namely the ultimate total Israeli withdrawal, self-determination for the Palestinians and the return of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty.

Mr. President,

As I suggested to you in an earlier letter, I believe it may be time for a return to a collective context for the peace efforts. In the meantime I have announced that we in Jordan would not impose our views on the people in the occupied areas and would encourage their collective effort to positively seek new avenues for the improvement of their conditions [garble] the development of their national entity. We will give them all our support. I am consulting with other Arab governments in this direction.

In the forthcoming summit conference in Baghdad Jordan will remain, as always, a constructive force and a voice of peace. We have been active in promoting a positive atmosphere for the conference and will pursue this effort in the coming days.

I wish to assure you, finally, that Jordan will struggle to keep the door to peace open. I am hopeful that the impulse of peace in our area is stronger than the calls of war.

With my best wishes and regards. Your sincere friend, Hussein I.
End text.

3. Original being pouched to S/S.

Veliotēs

116. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Israeli Requests for New Commitments

Dayan has repeatedly raised three issues with us:

—How will the U.S. express its “responsibility” to “guarantee” the implementation of the treaty? In other words, what will we do if Egypt violates the terms of the treaty.

—What economic/military assistance is the U.S. prepared to offer to offset the costs of peace for Israel? Secretary Vance has been very lukewarm on this issue, making it clear that we want to conclude the peace treaty negotiations first.

—Which of our previous commitments are we prepared to reaffirm?

—Will we confirm that if the new airfields in the Negev are not ready at the end of three years, Israel should not have to relinquish the airbases in Sinai?

In the talks with my State colleagues, I have recommended the following courses of action:

—Concerning our “guarantee” that the treaty will be implemented in good faith, the President would write one letter to Begin and Sadat spelling out our willingness to take these steps: continuation of Olive Harvest reconnaissance flights;² commitment to help create a multinational peacekeeping force if U.N. forces are not available; a general statement that we will consult with both parties in the event of a breach of the treaty and that we will offer our good offices to resolve any disputes. There is no way that we can go much further in “guaranteeing” the treaty.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/26–31/78. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Agree. ZB.”

² Implemented in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Operation Olive Harvest was a program of reconnaissance flights undertaken by the U.S. Air Force designed to monitor the disengagement of Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli forces in the Sinai and Golan Heights.

—Defer discussion on aid for the moment. This may provide us with one of the few sources of leverage as the West Bank/Gaza negotiations begin.

—We should give the Israelis an oral assurance that we stand by all of our previous commitments, except where obviously overtaken by events or superseded by the Camp David agreements. If we open the door to negotiating and reconfirming each of our commitments, it will be an endless and painful process. The Israelis have no right to question our good faith in honoring our commitments and we should not go beyond an oral reaffirmation by the Secretary.³

—Brown's letter to Weizman⁴ should suffice to establish our commitment to help build two new airfields. It would be unfair to the Egyptians to make Israeli withdrawal from Sinai contingent upon whether or not we can get the airfields built. We have told the Israelis that we will get the job done and they should not expect more than that.

I realize that my recommendations will not be easily accepted by the Israelis, but I do not think we should put ourselves in the position of buying the treaty for Egypt and Israel or of giving written assurances that we will live up to our previous commitments. Only in the case of the contingency plan for U.N. forces and our willingness to perform a reconnaissance role do I believe we should offer new written commitments to both sides.

³ Brzezinski highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin: "Agree. ZB."

⁴ See Document 51.

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 2, 1978, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

ISRAELI SIDE

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
 Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
 Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
 Aharaon Barak, Justice, Israeli Supreme Court
 Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
 Yehuda Avner, Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Reuven Hecht, Advisor to the Prime Minister
 General Avraham Tamir, Chief of Military Planning
 General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Nahil Kadeshai, Advisor to the Prime Minister

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
 Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Prime Minister Begin and Secretary Vance: Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations, Bilateral U.S.-Israeli Issues

The Prime Minister opened by suggesting that the agenda for the meeting should cover the treaty negotiations including the proposed exchange of letters on what happens with respect to the West Bank and Gaza after the treaty is in force, and U.S.-Israeli bilateral issues.

Turning first to the proposed exchange of letters, the Prime Minister said he would have amendments to suggest. First, however, he wanted to make the following point: the situation now was different from Camp David. Then as Prime Minister he was empowered to take decisions. Now everything was ad referendum and must be decided by his Government. As Prime Minister, he had no powers to decide issues. What emerged from this meeting would be referred to the Cabinet Sunday² and Acting Prime Minister Yadin would conduct the Cabinet meeting in his absence.

The Secretary said that he had authority to take decisions on some issues while others would be ad referendum to President Carter.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Begin's suite at the Regency Plaza Hotel.

² November 5.

(At this point the Secretary was called to take a phone call from the President. When he returned, he said the President was in New York and asked if the Secretary could bring the Prime Minister to Arthur Krim's³ office a few blocks away at 1:30PM so that they could shake hands and greet each other. The Prime Minister said he would be pleased to do this.)⁴

Returning to the subject at hand, Begin read a proposed Israeli version of the side letter on the West Bank and Gaza (Attachment 1). The Prime Minister said Israel wants to preserve its adherence to the Camp David Framework and its proposed letter confirmed that Egypt and Israel will do so. Theoretically, they should wait until Jordan joins the negotiations, but Israel wanted to proceed. The letter should therefore make the point that although the Camp David Framework says there will be three parties to the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, Egypt and Israel will proceed on their own. It is indispensable to include this point in order to be faithful to the Camp David Framework.

The Secretary said if this was important to Israel, he would in principle go along and would try to get Egyptian agreement. His personal view, however, was that in the interest of getting Hussein to join the negotiations, it would be better not to mention Jordan.

On the form of the letter, the Secretary suggested there be an identical note.

The Prime Minister said there could be either two papers with one signature on each or one paper with two signatures, if the language was identical. If there were differences, Egypt and Israel could write different letters.

The Secretary asked if the Framework would be annexed to the letter. The Prime Minister said no; he had signed the Framework and did not want to create the impression that he had to again prove his adherence to it. The Secretary said this was important to Egypt and not a substantive issue; he urged the Prime Minister to agree. Begin said he would refer this question to his Government.

³ U.S. film studio executive and former chairman of the Democratic Party National Finance Committee.

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter talked with Vance from 10:23 a.m. to 10:26 a.m. on November 2. Carter greeted Begin at the New York residence of Arthur Krim at 1:32 p.m. before escorting the Prime Minister inside. Carter gave a short address, met with Vance, and departed the Krim residence at 2 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Carter and Begin has been found. Atherton reported the substance of the Vance-Begin meeting in telegram 280995 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, November 4, noting that Carter and Begin "exchanged warm personal greetings," but that there "was no substantive or private conversation" between the two leaders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-2351)

The Prime Minister read the language in the Israeli draft about Jordan. He then emphasized that the beginning of West Bank/Gaza negotiations must follow the exchange of instruments of ratification and not simply follow the signing of the treaty. The Secretary said we would need to see if this was possible under Egyptian procedures.

Begin said Israel wanted to add a reference to “related issues,” since other matters (e.g., security) were also covered in the Camp David Framework. Continuing, the Prime Minister said Israel was prepared to say that elections should be held “at an early date.” It is impossible to predict when they could be held; could take three months or seven months.

The Secretary replied that he wanted to make the counter-argument. The letter could say that negotiations would take place “with the objective” of holding elections by a given date. This would not fix a date but only set a target. It would demonstrate that all parties were serious about carrying out the Camp David Framework. It would have a positive effect on people in the West Bank and Gaza and encourage their participation which is important for success of the negotiations. It would have an important psychological effect in the region generally. President Carter had asked the Secretary to stress this point.

Begin said one cannot pick a date out of the blue; it may take six months. The Secretary asked why not say six months. Begin replied that the phrase “at an early date” means Israel is serious. The Secretary responded that it could do no harm to have a target date.

The Prime Minister said that “an early date” means months, not years, but it could take three months or ten months. It will be necessary to decide the form of the elections, constituencies, perhaps political parties. Specifying the number of months would mean nothing but if a time period were included in the letter and then not met, Israel would be accused of bad faith. There was no predicting, Begin said, whether the people would agree. The PLO may threaten them and force a boycott.

The Secretary said he would need to consult the President; he personally continued to think that naming the number of months was preferable and urged the Prime Minister to think further about our suggestion.

Barak suggested using the phrase “within a short period.” The Prime Minister said Israel cannot accept specifying the number of months but would consider any other phrase.

Barak said since we don’t know how long the talks will take, we should think in terms of a period of time following the end of the talks rather than from the beginning of the talks. The Secretary replied that this would not help and that he would have to talk to the President. Dayan said Israel would consider it if the Secretary thought the phrase

“within a short period” was better. The Secretary said this might be better; he would need to discuss it with the Egyptians.

In response to Dayan’s comment that Israel cannot commit itself to a number of months, the Secretary said it would be only a target. He was puzzled about what was wrong in setting a target. Dayan said that the date should be part of the modalities to be discussed in the negotiations. If we set a date in advance, this would have a negative reaction among the Palestinians who would see this as patronizing them; they would say that these are our elections and others are trying to tell us what to do.

The Secretary said let’s leave this subject; you reflect on it and I will talk to the President. Dayan responded that it would be important if agreement could be reached while the Prime Minister is here.

Barak commented that Israel would not want to say in a side letter that negotiations would start one month after ratification of the treaty. Israel did not want to give the impression that this matter is linked to the treaty. We should speak of x months after Camp David or “within a short period” after the exchange of letters, with the understanding that this meant one month. The Secretary said no, we cannot change this. Barak replied, let it stay as it is.

Turning to the treaty text, the Prime Minister read the third paragraph of the preamble beginning “noting that the aforementioned Framework . . .” The Israeli Government, he said, had decided unanimously to demand deletion of this paragraph. It took Camp David language out of context. One could also quote other parts of the Camp David Framework which were important to Israeli public opinion. Israel had accepted paragraph one of the preamble from the start although many of his friends had doubts about this. It is necessary, he said, to show that an Israel-Egyptian agreement is only the first treaty. Any addition out of context, however, is an insult to Israel. If the reason is Arab opinion, Israel’s problems are more serious than Sadat’s. Israel’s problems are internal. The Prime Minister therefore asked that this paragraph be deleted as detrimental in Israeli opinion and unnecessary. The Prime Minister then noted that the United States’ replies to King Hussein had been publicized in Ha’aretz; this was causing more problems.

The Secretary interjected that he was deeply concerned about the attacks on Mr. Saunders. He had spoken for the United States Government and these attacks must stop.

With respect to paragraph three of the preamble, the Secretary had two comments: without this paragraph there would be no treaty with Egypt; and both the President and he believe it is fair; it only repeats Camp David language and should be retained; we see no basis to change it.

The Prime Minister said he had never attacked Mr. Saunders personally. However, he wanted the Secretary to tell the President that the replies to Hussein⁵ had been the gravest matter in Israeli public opinion and in Israel's future. If Saunders had said that Ambassador Yost's speech⁶ was still binding, that East Jerusalem is occupied territory, this was a serious matter. The greatest wrong that had ever been done to a nation had been done in this case. Why should united Jerusalem not be recognized as the capital of Israel? The Prime Minister then recounted Jordanian actions in East Jerusalem and Prime Minister Eshkol's message to Hussein in June 1967,⁷ despite which Hussein had attacked. There was now free access to the holy shrines and Israel had rebuilt the Jewish quarter, yet East Jerusalem was called occupied. This had been said in the middle of negotiations with Sadat. It makes Israel's position difficult when Sadat hears what the United States says. The Prime Minister said he had not attacked Mr. Saunders but had spoken of the position of the United States which concerns Israel's future. He had also been attacked, the Prime Minister said, and called a traitor by his friends, all because Israel wants peace. This hurt deeply.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister said, the phrase "whatever settlements remain" as applied to the West Bank implies that the Camp David Sinai Framework is a model for Judea and Samaria and for the Golan. This is wrong.

Turning to the preambular language (at "noting"), the Prime Minister expressed deep astonishment that this should be made a condition for the treaty. He could not change the decision of the Israeli Government, which must decide. Israel will consider this problem but he, the Prime Minister, could do nothing without the Government. Perhaps he could speak about it today to President Carter. The Secretary said he had discussed this very issue with the President that morning.

Turning to the language on Gaza in Article II, the Prime Minister said that the accepted forum is to say "without prejudice to the position of either party." This was a simple issue. The Secretary agreed it was simple. Egypt wanted to remove some language and Israel wanted to add language. The Secretary said let's leave the present language as it was agreed ad referendum. The Secretary said Israel's additional language does not change the substance. The words "the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip" reflect Israel's position. This is not worth arguing about and should be solved by leaving the language as it is.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 85.

⁶ See footnote 12, Document 58.

⁷ For discussion of Israeli-Jordanian correspondence before the June 1967 war, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, footnote 2, Document 160.

After consulting his colleagues in Hebrew, the Prime Minister suggested leaving out the word "issue" and simply saying "without prejudice to the position of either party on the status of the Gaza Strip." The Secretary said this would be even more difficult and asked what is wrong with the language as it stands.

Begin said that the phrase "without prejudice" always refers to the positions of parties, not to issues. Egypt wants Gaza to be part of a Palestinian State. The Prime Minister said that he believed after five years Israel would seek sovereignty over Gaza. If this was not agreed, the autonomy regime would continue. Brzezinski had thought this reasonable. Israel wants to make clear that neither side's position is prejudiced. The Secretary said the present language accomplishes that. The words "the issue of" were an Israeli proposal. Sadat wanted much more about Gaza. We are trying to hold him to this single reference. The Secretary said he was concerned what would happen if we opened the language. Barak suggested dropping the word "issue." The Secretary replied that he would report this to the Egyptians; Begin said he would report to his Cabinet. The Secretary said it was best to leave this language alone; if the Egyptians sent it back to Cairo, this would open the whole thing up. The Prime Minister replied that he had no choice but to return it to the Cabinet. The Secretary said he was afraid this would open the whole issue with the Egyptians. Statesmanship could solve this problem and the Prime Minister is a statesman.

Turning to Article III, paragraph two, Barak noted that the word "anywhere" had been omitted from the first sentence. Rosenne said Israel had only included it in the second sentence but saw no problem with the Egyptians in adding it to the first sentence as well. The Secretary said, since it was not previously in the first sentence, if this agreed language was re-opened there would be a problem. If we keep changing agreed language, there will never be agreement. Begin said Israel would accept this language as presently written. The Secretary said "good."

Turning to Article IV, Begin said the Cabinet had rejected the idea of a five-year review period. While the Cabinet had not changed its decision, he was prepared to accept the present wording and recommend this to the Cabinet. He had talked to Yadin who would support him. The Secretary again said "good."

With respect to Article VI, Begin said the present title (The Relationship of Obligations) did not reflect the contents of the Article and suggested substituting "precedence" for "relationship." Begin also said Israel still preferred its original text of this Article. The Secretary said he would raise with the Egyptians the words "precedence" or "priority."

Rosenne then read Israel's original text which said that this treaty would "prevail over" other obligations. Begin asked if we could con-

vince the Egyptians to accept the word “prevail.” The Secretary said no; the Egyptians had not even accepted the present language but we thought they could be persuaded to. Begin said he would recommend that the Cabinet accept the present text as written while the United States checked to see if the title could be changed. The Secretary remarked that we were making real progress.

Dayan noted that, in addition to the treaty text, we needed to complete the annexes and the appendix to Annex I. The Secretary said the Egyptians wanted an appendix, and we did not know if we could get them to move off that position.

Begin then noted that the Israeli Minister of Energy had come to the United States to deal with the oil problem. This was a serious matter, and he hoped the United States could help; Israel needs Egyptian oil at market prices. The Secretary said there would be no problem about market prices.

Dayan then commented that, leaving the annex aside, there were three problems which he thought could be worked out in Washington: the preamble, the Gaza language and the side letter. The Secretary said he thought the problem of the letter could be solved. Dayan said this still leaves two points. Egypt cannot simply say that if Israel does not agree to the present language, there will be no treaty. A further effort is needed to overcome these problems. The Gaza problem is meaningless. If the preamble is the only problem, we need to seek agreement on this. On the whole, Dayan said, we are not doing badly if the gap is down to one and one-half issues. The Secretary said this is real progress to which Begin replied “I came to make progress.”

Begin then turned the conversation to bilateral issues.

Begin began by noting that we are at a turning point in the history of the Middle East with the coming of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The parties will go on to the next stage in the peace process but nevertheless this is a turning point.

Israel must face what is going to happen with the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli troops from the Sinai and the relocation of installations in the Negev, Begin said. It is a matter of gravest concern if Israel cannot deal with the financial aspects of this move. He noted that he is not an economist, but he does understand the tremendous burden which will fall upon Israel as a result of these moves. “We don’t want to bring about a peace treaty which would be accompanied by complete bankruptcy.” It is not an objective possibility for Israel to bear the full costs of this move.

Israel has therefore decided to request from the United States a loan to cover these costs. Israel is not seeking a grant; Israel’s record on repaying its debts is perfect. In this case, Israel would seek a loan for 25 years at 2–4 percent interest. The total would be \$3.37 billion, including

\$800 million for the airfields and \$300 million for resettling the settlers. Begin apologized again to the President for mentioning that cost but said Israel had to do something in developing new homes for the settlers who will leave the Sinai. Parenthetically, he acknowledged that President Carter had “never used any pressure” on Israel about the settlers in the Sinai. Begin said he had weighed their continued presence against the opportunity of peace and made his decision.

Begin suggested that “we agree today” that Israeli Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich meet with Secretary Blumenthal on November 6, when Ehrlich could pass through Washington on his way to a speech in California.⁸

Secretary Vance said that he would have to discuss this with the President. The President in turn would have to discuss the subject with the Congressional leadership before responding to Prime Minister Begin’s request. The Secretary noted that the President would not be able to focus on this until he returns to Washington late November 4. The Secretary said he would report to the President then. Meanwhile, he said it would be a mistake to discuss this publicly at this point until the President has a chance to mention it to the Congressional leadership since the leadership could be offended by public discussion of an issue of which they had not been informed.

Foreign Minister Dayan said he hoped that Secretary Vance could at least agree that the Israeli Finance Minister should deal with this matter so that he could get it off his own agenda.

Secretary Vance repeated that he did not want to make any commitment until he had talked with the President. *If* we get to such a point, he said, then we could agree that the Finance Minister would handle the issue.

Defense Minister Weizman intervened to note that, when we sign the treaty there will be other issues to discuss like MATMON C.⁹ Secretary Vance suggested that we not try to solve that now.

Begin returned to the subject of the airfields, saying they would have to be operational in three years. Secretary Vance responded by

⁸ Ehrlich and Blumenthal met at the Department of the Treasury on November 14. A summary of their meeting was transmitted in telegram 295850 to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Cairo, November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481–0844) The meeting followed a meeting of the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade in which the two officials participated. At the conclusion of the Joint Committee meeting Ehrlich and Blumenthal signed a summary statement of the meeting’s proceedings, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 292425 to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, November 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780475–0012)

⁹ See footnote 7, Document 24.

reading the last sentences of Secretary Brown's letter¹⁰ after Camp David to Minister Weizman. Begin noted in passing that the letter in the present negotiations on the exchange of ambassadors is satisfactory, and then he returned to the airfields. What happens, he asked, if it takes longer than three years to complete the airfields? He wanted an agreement that Israel would operate the two remaining airfields in the Sinai until the new ones could become operational. He felt this should be written as a protocol to the treaty.

Secretary Vance responded that he could not at this point agree that there will be such a protocol which would change the basic agreement. The Secretary said he could tell the Prime Minister that the United States will work with Israel and we have confidence that the airfields will be completed in time. The Prime Minister responded by asking again, "But what do we do with our planes if the airfields are not completed? Where will we put them?" Secretary Vance again quoted from the Brown letter the portion that states U.S. understanding for the special priority which Israel attaches to this and Israel's position that it cannot leave the Sinai until the new airfields are completed. The Secretary said he could not commit the United States to any more at this point. Weizman suggested that the problem might be helped if Egypt were to acknowledge its understanding of the Brown-Weizman letter. The Secretary noted that the Egyptians had already received a copy.

Turning to the subject of aerial surveillance, Secretary Vance said the United States is prepared to continue providing such surveillance for three years. If there is to be any extension, it would be agreed by all three parties. The Secretary said the United States side would take up this subject with Egypt and noted that this was being done in response to an Israeli request. He summarized by saying that the United States is committed for three years. Beyond three years, the issue remains open.

The Secretary noted to the Prime Minister that the United States had given the Israeli Delegation a draft letter relating to the UN Forces. The Prime Minister said the letter is satisfactory and the Israeli Government accepts it.

Secretary Vance indicated his desire to move ahead quickly to complete Annex I to the treaty and suggested trying to do so in the next 48 hours.

Dayan reminded the Secretary that we had also agreed to review commitments under the disengagement agreements. The Secretary suggested that we wait until after completion of the work on the treaty.

¹⁰ See Document 51.

Prime Minister Begin agreed with that approach, saying that we needed to take our time to it.

The meeting ended about 12:30 p.m. with the Secretary and Prime Minister agreeing that they would meet in the lobby of the hotel at 1:20 p.m. in order to call briefly on President Carter who would be spending a few minutes at that time at the office of Mr. Arthur Krim.

Attachment

Israeli Draft of Side Letter on the West Bank and Gaza¹¹

November 6, 1978

The Governments of Egypt and Israel, having signed the Treaty of Peace between them, will proceed with the implementation of the provisions of the Framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.

In the aforementioned Framework both Governments invited the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to join them in the peacemaking process; however, to date, there has been no acceptance by the Jordanian Government.

Notwithstanding this fact, the Governments of Egypt and Israel have agreed to start negotiations, within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratifications of the peace treaty between them, in order to work out the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), and subsequently, prior to the election, to define and agree upon its powers and responsibilities (as well as other related issues in accordance with the Framework) with the objective of holding the election at an early date.

¹¹ Secret.

118. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Status Report on Egypt-Israel Negotiations

As you know, Boutros Ghali and Usama [al Baz] have left for Cairo² and will probably not return until Tuesday.³ Weizman is meanwhile in Israel trying to get support for his proposal on withdrawal in phases to the interim line.

In our talks with Dayan today,⁴ he stuck to a tough line, even re-opening some issues, perhaps in anticipation that the Egyptians will do likewise after they return from Cairo. At present, several issues are still not resolved.

1. *Serious Issues:*

—*Preamble.* Israel wants to delete language that notes that the Camp David framework constitutes a basis for peace between Israel and each of its neighbors. Dayan implied that the only way Israel could agree to this language would be if we were to write a letter stating that there is “no legal linkage” between the Treaty and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. We have said this is not necessary and that the preamble cannot now be changed.

—*Gaza.* Israel will not accept our suggested language (originally proposed by Barak) on “the issue of the status of Gaza.” Egypt will not accept the Israeli draft. They are both adamant. We have said we will stick with our draft.

—*Letter on West Bank/Gaza.* Israel does not want a joint letter, does not want to refer to a target date for elections, and does not want to annex the Camp David Framework to the letter. Egypt insists on a joint letter, wants to set a target date, and wants to annex the Framework. Otherwise Sadat will want to include arrangements for Gaza in the treaty itself, which his delegation realizes is a non-starter.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information.

² On November 3, Boutros Ghali and al-Baz received instructions to return to Egypt for consultations with Sadat. (Telegram 280946 to Cairo, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2376)

³ November 7.

⁴ No other record of these talks has been found.

—*Oil*. The two sides are far apart.⁵ The Egyptians have just received new instructions which move away from our compromise draft. They do not want to give Israel “right of first refusal” on oil purchases.

2. *Medium Issues*.

—*Termination of Security Arrangements*. Sadat wants to set a specific date by which the security arrangements in Sinai will come to an end. His delegation realizes that the Israelis will not accept this, and will try to stick with a general review clause as is now in the draft.

—*Navigation*. The Israelis reopened this issue and suggested some new language. The Egyptians have it under consideration.

—*Obligations*. The Israelis want to title this article “Priority of Obligations”. The Israelis [*Egyptians?*] refuse. We suggested dropping the title.

Finally, we still have a series of bilateral questions to work through with the Israelis. On the whole, virtually no progress was made today except on the military annex. There will be some talks over the weekend, but we cannot expect much real progress until after the Israeli Cabinet meets on Sunday and the Egyptian delegation returns.

Footnote: Dayan repeated today that the negotiations for the West Bank/Gaza would be “ten times” as difficult as the Egypt-Israel peace treaty talks. This is especially true, in his view, now that we are insisting that the powers and responsibilities of the “self-governing authority” should be defined before the elections (is provided for in the Camp David Framework).

⁵ Among a number of issues, the question of the timing of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields divided the Israeli and Egyptian oil negotiation teams. On November 4, Atherton met with the Israeli Minister for Oil Yitzhak Modai and the Israeli oil delegation. In the course of the conversation, it emerged that Egyptian resistance to Israel’s original proposal for a continued role in Sinai oil operations after the implementation of the peace treaty stemmed largely from concerns that this infringed on Egyptian sovereignty. Atherton affirmed the U.S. belief that “there is no basis in international law for continuing exploitation of Egyptian resources” after the treaty came into force. Furthermore, Atherton noted, supply to Israel would be assured in that the treaty would include provision for non-discrimination in trade. (Memorandum for the Record, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Oil)

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, November 5, 1978, 0436Z

282012. Subject: Letter re Exchange of Ambassadors.

1. For your information, following is text of proposed letter which Sadat would send President Carter with respect to exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel; draft was given to Egyptians for consideration November 2.

2. Begin text: "Dear Mr. President;

In response to your request, I can confirm that, within one month after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line as provided for in the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident Ambassador to Israel and will receive a resident Israeli Ambassador in Egypt.

Sincerely, Anwar Sadat." End text.

3. Text of this draft letter has been shown to Egyptians but not as yet to Israelis.²

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/1–11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2413)

² In telegram 282010 to Tel Aviv, November 5, Vance forwarded a draft version of the letter Carter produced for Begin confirming Sadat's commitment to exchange ambassadors within one month of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/1–11/78)

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 8, 1978, 1309Z

24571. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter.

1. PriMin Khalil telephoned this afternoon to say he was sending over immediately a letter from President Sadat to President Carter on the Washington negotiations. Khalil asked that I forward it to President Carter as quickly as possible and before Boutros' arrival in Washington later this afternoon.

2. Text follows: Quote:

Dear President Carter:

I would like to express to you, once again, my profound appreciation of the role you have been playing relentlessly for the cause of peace, which I have fully acknowledged in my recent speech in the opening session of the Egyptian Peoples Assembly. As you know I am following the Washington talks. It is obvious that certain problems remain to be solved. I am confident that you and your able assistants will spare no effort to make the ends meet and promote agreement.

One of these problems which is of utmost importance and is crucial to the ultimate success of our efforts is the Palestinian problem. I firmly believe that we have to reach an unequivocal agreement on what is to take place in the West Bank and Gaza in implementation of the Camp David Framework. Thus, we should lay down the format for establishing the self-governing authority and the abolition of the Israeli military government and its administration as provided for in the "Framework." This would be accompanied by withdrawal of Israeli forces and redeployment of the remaining force in the specific security locations. A target date should be set for all that if we expect all parties to take the concept of transfer of authority seriously. This would require agreeing on the substantive aspects of the elections rather than the procedural ones. Also, the transfer of authority requires a clear definition of the powers and authority of the self-governing authority. All this requires a binding commitment from Israel to take these measures in a specified time. The logical date for that is the completion of the interim withdrawal in Sinai.

The implementation of these measures could proceed in the Gaza Strip first, for a variety of reasons. First, we have a certain responsibility

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2773. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. A signed copy of this letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78.

there as you know. Thus, an Egyptian presence is certain to facilitate the process. Second, the political climate there is much more conducive to prove to all Palestinians that the change we agreed upon in Camp David, to bring about in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, is both genuine and feasible. This formula is apt to whip up support in Jordan and the West Bank for joining in with us before it becomes too late. It is also certain to generate more enthusiasm among the Palestinians at large for the Camp David Accord.

If I sign a peace treaty without having the agreement of the Israelis on what to take place in Gaza and West Bank, I would be concluding a separate agreement indeed.

This could be in contradiction not only with the basic line of our policy, but also with what we agreed upon in Camp David. You will undoubtedly recall that I told Prime Minister Begin in the clearest terms during our tripartite meeting on September the 7th and the 8th that I refuse to conclude a third disengagement agreement, a partial peace settlement or a separate agreement.

Needless to say that what I am proposing is the only course of action which serves the cause of peace. Postponement would lead to a veritable crisis in the near future and may abort all our previous efforts, and is apt to discourage and demoralize Palestinians who are willing to cooperate, leading to a situation over which we will have no control.

Israel would also be expected to take certain measures in the coming few weeks to improve the political climate in Gaza and West Bank, and stimulate the interest of their inhabitants. Such measures include permitting political activities, granting amnesty to political prisoners and permitting the reuniting of families by the return of their displaced members.

Dear President Carter,

In order to overcome the other problems, which have arisen in the course of negotiations due to the insistence of Israel to have a privileged position, the normalization of relations with Israel can only be realized on treating her on equal footing with other nations within the context of our laws, the international law and the United Nations Charter. Friendship and cooperation would only grow if there is a sense of fairness. For the treaty we are going to sign with Israel will be an example and model for the others. I am sure that you agree with me that such a model needs to be a solid and well founded one to stand any test.

In conclusion, please accept my best wishes and warm regards.

Mohammed Anwar El Sadat. Unquote.

Eilts

121. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Middle East Strategy

The Issue

As discussed in our meeting² Wednesday, we need to decide whether and, if so, how we relate our policies and actions in the Egypt-Israel negotiations and in U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations so as to improve chances of getting serious negotiations started on the West Bank/Gaza promptly.

In the current negotiations an impasse may be shaping up, with Sadat having sent his negotiators back with instructions to insist on more explicit and far-reaching assurances from Israel concerning the West Bank and Gaza. In the light of this we need to decide:

—whether we should press Sadat and Begin to conclude the treaty as soon as possible, and to that end ask Sadat to drop his insistence on most of the “linkage” points he has now raised, while asking Begin to give a bit more in this respect; or³

—whether we should support Egypt in attempting to achieve more of the “linkage” Sadat wants, recognizing that if this succeeded it could assist our own objective of getting West Bank/Gaza negotiations off to a good start, but also that it could delay conclusion of the peace treaty.

—We also need to decide how we manage our response to Israel’s request for additional economic assistance so as to achieve our objectives.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 71, Brzezinski, Chron: 11/1–10/78. Secret. At the top of the document, Carter wrote: “Cy. J.” The memorandum was found attached to a November 10 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance indicating that Vance’s memorandum was being returned to him with Carter’s annotations.

² According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Mondale, Atherton, and Brzezinski in the Oval Office from 10:30 a.m. to 11:10 a.m., November 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

³ In the left-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote: “hold to present language.”

Egypt's Objectives

The letter⁴ that has just come in from Sadat concentrates entirely on the need for an “unequivocal commitment on what is to take place in the West Bank and Gaza in implementation of the Camp David Framework;” it does not mention any of the other issues over which the two sides are bargaining. From my meeting Thursday with the Egyptians,⁵ the West Bank/Gaza issue will clearly be the focus of the Egyptian delegation’s negotiating efforts now that Boutros Ghali has returned. How far they are prepared to push this remains a difficult question to answer, but they are starting off with a long list—e.g., setting dates not only for beginning West Bank/Gaza negotiations but also for the establishment of the self-governing authority and the end of the military government, plus a half dozen or so unilateral steps they want Israel to agree to now. Undoubtedly the delegation itself would be prepared to hold up progress on the treaty in order to achieve these commitments. But you will recall that at Camp David we dropped the paragraph on linkage when Sadat himself did not press very hard for it. The same pattern could repeat itself in the present circumstances. Sadat may be giving his advisors a license to achieve what they can for a period of time figuring that he will settle for whatever he can get rather than delay conclusion of the Treaty beyond a certain point.⁶

On the other hand, Arab pressures may be registering more keenly on Sadat in the wake of the Baghdad Summit⁷ than they were at Camp David. Secret resolutions⁸ were apparently passed at Baghdad calling

⁴ See Document 120.

⁵ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Excessive.”

⁷ The Arab League convened in Baghdad November 2–5 in response to the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. The conference resolved that the Accords harmed the rights of the Palestinian people, and urged the Egyptian Government not to ratify the agreements and to align itself with the Arab League. The League also froze its relations with the Government of Egypt. (“Arab League Appeals to Egyptians to Renounce Accord with Israelis” *The New York Times*, November 6, 1978. p. 1) On November 4, Sadat refused to receive a delegation of Foreign Ministers from Arab countries that had been sent from the Baghdad Conference to Cairo. (Boutros Ghali, *Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem*, p. 173)

⁸ During a November 7 briefing on the conclusions of the Baghdad Conference, Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Mansuri told officials of the Embassy at Jidda that the Saudi delegation had blocked an attempt by the “rejectionists” to propose an Arab break in diplomatic, political, and economic relations with Egypt by making the counterproposal that these items should be discussed at a “later” conference of Arab Foreign Ministers and Economic Ministers. (Telegram 7992 from Jidda, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780460–0171) Of the Saudi decision to “join” the “rejectionists” in their condemnation of Egypt, Carter wrote in his memoirs that, despite the Saudi explanation of their “moderating influence, he “was disturbed that the Saudis had not fulfilled their earlier commitment to me.” (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 410)

for sanctions against Egypt if it proceeds to sign a peace treaty. We cannot rule out the possibility that this time Sadat is more determined to get what he is asking for, even at risk of delaying the Treaty. Israeli backtracking on a commitment now to an accelerated schedule for withdrawal to the interim line could further stiffen the Egyptian position. If Sadat is more determined on this occasion, the issue for us will be whether we wish to support him, or to bring pressure to dissuade him because we decide it is not in our interest to see the Treaty delayed.

Israel's Objectives

The mood in Israel is one of growing querulousness and suspicion about the course the negotiations are taking. Weizman reports the Cabinet gave him a rough time, but summing up he told us Wednesday⁹ that if we can wrap up the Treaty package as it presently stands, Begin will be able to sell it to the Cabinet and Knesset. Even allowing for Weizman's propensity to optimism, we share that assessment. But Weizman warns that if Egypt now attempts to achieve additional linkage it will bring the whole Treaty seriously into question because of the present mood in Israel. We do not have to accept this literally: the question clearly is how *much* additional baggage can be placed on the Treaty package before a serious risk of rejection of the whole package is entailed.¹⁰

The Israelis are unquestionably in a very tender mood about having their hand forced any further on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Begin is coming in for heavy criticism that he gave away too much at Camp David. He clearly sees as a highly important objective maintaining freedom to approach West Bank/Gaza negotiations, if at all, in a manner and at a pace that will not cause political problems for him. The Israelis have been brought to accept a great deal in the last twelve months, and in terms of Israeli public opinion, it is possible that not too much more can be forced on Israel too fast.

The Options for the U.S.

In these circumstances the options for the U.S. in our judgment boil down to two:

—We can determine that we are best off getting the Treaty done with as soon as possible—that the momentum created by this event, together with the realization on the part of the other Arabs that they are being left out in the cold, is the process best suited to get negotiations going on the West Bank/Gaza. If we choose this course we will need to

⁹ November 8.

¹⁰ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "hold to present language."

devise a blend of pressure tactics and assurances which we would direct at Sadat to get him to back off most of his present demands as reflected in his latest letter and in the instructions given his delegation. We would at the same time need to insist on at least a bit more give from the Israelis—e.g., to set a target date now for West Bank/Gaza elections.

—Alternatively, we can determine that it is in our interest to face up to and resolve at least some of the problems inherent in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations in the context of the Egypt-Israel talks, even if it means delaying the conclusion of a peace Treaty. If we do this it would be on the grounds that to postpone tackling these problems would make it even more difficult for us to get negotiations started and going somewhere once the Egypt-Israel Treaty is signed.

The merits of these two strategies are finely balanced and we will need to consider the pros and cons of each course very carefully in making our decision.

The Pros and Cons

A case can be made that in getting Sadat to accept the ambiguities in the Camp David Framework about the West Bank/Gaza process we already issued a rather sizeable promissory note on the future in order to pay for the present, and that we should not compound this by attempting to postpone the tough issues any further. Our credibility in Arab eyes is already at stake in having announced publicly that we differed with Begin's understanding of what was agreed to at Camp David about settlements and our inability thereafter to get him to stop or even exercise restraint in continued settlement activity. In his public statements Begin has taken the line that what he agreed to in the Camp David Framework was really nothing more than the Begin self-rule plan.¹¹ This has fed the worst fears of the Arabs that the negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza will not be able to produce any real relinquishment of Israeli control over these areas. If we press Sadat now to abandon his insistence on further "linkage," he might, in order to explain to other Arabs, let it be known that it was we who pressed him to drop his insistence on this matter. This will only deepen Arab suspicions of our commitment to a comprehensive settlement, and could make it very difficult if not virtually impossible to get either Jordan or Palestinians to step forward to join the process envisioned at Camp David, or to enlist Saudi support for that process.

The actual signing of an Egypt-Israel Treaty will produce shock waves throughout the Arab world. So far Sadat's course of action has been seen as a potential threat to the other Arabs, but it will come as a

¹¹ See footnote 2, Document 5.

further disillusioning shock when he proceeds to an actual signing. The Arabs will see the withdrawal of the most powerful Arab state from the arena as destroying their leverage to get decent terms on the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian aspect. They will not be inclined to see U.S. assurances that we intend to deliver the goods in West Bank/Gaza negotiations as an adequate substitute for Egypt's retirement. While it is possible that Egypt's action might galvanize Jordan and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians into coming into the negotiations so as to get at least some kind of deal, we think it more likely that the Arabs in their present mood will retreat into a condition of sullen negativism and begin to turn their attention toward actions they can take against Sadat, even though King Hussein and the Saudis will not feel comfortable about being drawn into such a posture.

The problem is that we cannot be sure that the opposite course—that of engaging in a struggle with Israel in the context of the present negotiations to get better terms on the West Bank/Gaza aspect—will be the decisive factor in bringing in Jordan or representative Palestinians. And if we cannot be certain of this it can be argued that we may be better off playing it in a way that minimizes our problems with Israel. If we choose this option we would accept the fact that in the immediate post-Treaty situation we might not be in a good position to push Israel farther and for more than it chose to give on the West Bank/Gaza, but that in the long term we will get more out of Israel by managing the process in a way that is more acceptable to Israel.

On the Israeli side of the equation we need to assess whether we will be in a better position to move Israel now or in a post-Treaty situation. One thesis is that by trying to drive a bargain now we make it particularly difficult for Israel because it comes in a context of conditionality on the Egypt-Israel Treaty, something the Israelis were assured would not happen at Camp David. The opposing thesis is that once Israel achieves its strategic objective of removing Egypt from the conflict, it will see even less reason to give ground on its eastern front. Both theses have an element of truth in them.

Finally, it needs to be noted that the option to delay if necessary the present negotiations to achieve something more precise on the West Bank and Gaza obviously presents us with public relations and Congressional problems. The Israelis will argue that it is the U.S. rather than Sadat that is holding up the Treaty. They will also mount a campaign which will find receptivity in some quarters that it is unwarranted for the U.S. to be using the additional assistance Israel has requested to try to gain political concessions.

Conducting West Bank/Gaza Negotiations

In designing our strategy for extending the Camp David negotiations to the West Bank/Gaza, we need to keep in mind that it may

prove impossible, whatever we do, to induce Jordan and representative Palestinians to join the negotiations at the outset. That does not necessarily mean, however, that these negotiations need be stymied. We need to think in terms of a strategy of beginning the negotiations between Egypt and Israel while developing in support of those negotiations a network of our own private consultations with Jordan, with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, and perhaps with some Americans of Palestinian origin in order to build confidence in the seriousness of the negotiations so that we might think of Palestinians either joining the negotiations at a later stage or at least standing for elections when they are called. Our ability to engage the Palestinians in this kind of dialogue concurrent with the formal Egypt-Israel negotiations, which could eventually become a kind of once-removed negotiating process in itself, will depend on the terms of reference we are able to develop on West Bank/Gaza negotiations between now and when they start.

A Possible Course of Action

In my judgment there is a sufficient amount at stake for U.S. interests to warrant using Sadat's present posture to attempt to get more from the Israelis than they are presently offering on West Bank/Gaza linkage, though by no means all Sadat is asking. We need to calibrate what we try for under this strategy carefully in order to ensure that the risks are reasonable. We must obviously stop short of the point that we believe entails a serious risk of placing the Treaty as a whole in jeopardy. We will also want to keep sensitive antenna out to assess Sadat's position, since we cannot be in the position of pressing Israel for things that the Egyptians themselves are not prepared to insist on.

With these considerations in mind we suggest a course of action that will achieve something more for Sadat, but far less than he now seeks, on West Bank/Gaza "linkage," and will also ask a bit more of Begin than he has indicated he is willing to give. If this course works, we will have avoided a protracted delay and probable suspension of the negotiations. If it does not work, we suggest a fallback we could go to in an effort to get things moving again when we judge the time is right. The fallback (see below) could also be viewed as an alternative to pursue now if we wanted to try for more for Sadat.

The course of action I propose would be composed of the following components:

1. We would press both sides to try to wrap up all work on the Treaty so that the West Bank/Gaza issue could be isolated as the sole remaining obstacle before the Treaty can be signed.
2. We would tell the Israelis our understanding of what Sadat is asking for and then describe what we believe the minimum will be that we need to achieve if the Treaty process is not to be unreasonably de-

layed. If Israel will agree to this, we will endeavor to persuade Sadat to agree.

—We would seek inclusion in the joint letter of a specific target date for West Bank/Gaza elections. This could be either six months from signing or we might suggest a specific date such as September 17, 1979 (the first anniversary of Camp David), which will probably be about nine months after the Treaty comes into force.

—We would raise with the Israelis once again Egypt's requirement (which Sadat's letter mentions) that Israel carry out at least some of the unilateral gestures to improve the atmosphere for West Bank/Gaza negotiations that Sadat asks for in his letter, and which earlier Dayan told us were not out of the question. Sadat mentions lifting officially the ban on political activities, granting amnesty to political prisoners, and admitting some displaced persons back to the West Bank and Gaza on the basis of family reunification. We would not, however, make any of these a *sine qua non* for proceeding with the Treaty.

After an initial round with the Israelis and Egyptians here, I would recommend you phone and send written messages to both Sadat and Begin, telling them what you believe is needed from each of them to resolve this issue, along the foregoing lines. Additionally, with Sadat we will have to talk him out of his fixation about putting Gaza on a separate track from the West Bank. This makes little sense even from the standpoint of his own interests, and the Israelis in any case will not agree to it.

A Possible Fallback

If the foregoing proves more than the Israelis can accept, or too little for Sadat, or both, we may face a period during which negotiations are suspended while both sides reflect on the consequences of a stalemate. We would then need to reach a judgment on when and in what way we should try to break the stalemate. We could try a different kind of approach, which in effect constitutes a fallback to the one outlined above, as follows:

—We would take the position that the U.S. needs to have an understanding with Egypt and Israel on *the agenda* for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations in order to complete the exchange of notes on this subject. This need not be embodied in the joint note or be given formal standing as a Treaty document but should be something that we can convey to Sadat as an understanding we have reached with Israel on how to proceed. In proposing a side understanding on the agenda, we would be seeking enough that would be concrete so that Sadat could be persuaded to step back from his most extreme demands, but that at the same time would not commit Israel to substantive positions on the agenda items. The purpose would be to make clear what issues will be

negotiated. These will include questions of title to land, control over land transfer, the responsibilities of the Palestinian police force, control over water resources, control of the bridges, etc. Laying out these issues would by itself demonstrate that a serious negotiation is ahead.

—In addition to the discussion on agenda, we would have a discussion with the Israelis particularly on how to handle the question of the settlements during and in the negotiations. The purpose would be to explore possible understandings. If the Israelis question why we are doing this, the answer would be that President Carter made a promise to President Sadat on this subject at Camp David, and it was on that basis that Sadat agreed. Therefore, something must be done to clear up this misunderstanding. However, we would go beyond simply trying to sort out the Camp David misunderstanding and put the issue in the context of how settlements might be handled in the upcoming negotiations, but looking to the future, we might assure Israel that we are prepared to work for the right of Israelis to live in the West Bank, provided their living there is not part of a program of continuing land annexation.

Aid Strategy and Public Posture

On the question of aid, we would continue our consultations with the Israelis on the two airfields but would not respond otherwise to Israeli requests for additional aid for Sinai redeployment costs while our efforts go forward to get the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty completed and an agreed basis for West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Our position would be that the Administration will be delivering to Congress in January a message proposing authorization for a fund to support the peace effort. This would include everything from possible U.S. help with the costs of Israeli redeployment to assistance with a refugee solution, assistance for development in the West Bank and Gaza, and support for regional projects. We would tell the Israelis that we are not prepared to discuss the cost of evacuation from Sinai now. We would have the option of saying explicitly that we will not discuss this until it is clear how the West Bank/Gaza negotiations will be organized, or we could leave this implicit. When we are satisfied that Israel is working in good faith for implementation of the Camp David general framework, we could begin listening to the Israeli presentation on this subject, but we would hold off a response until sometime next year when we are satisfied with the progress in those negotiations.¹²

Publicly, we would try to seize the high ground, starting immediately making the following points:

¹² Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: "mandatory."

—The Treaty negotiations are virtually completed. It is a good Treaty, meeting the legitimate interests of both parties. It has demonstrated that a negotiation can produce peace between Israel and its neighbors.

—During these negotiations, each party has committed itself to begin promptly the next round of negotiations envisioned at Camp David, those on the West Bank/Gaza.

—The Administration is developing for submission to Congress early next year a plan for a U.S. financial contribution to the several elements of the peace process. In that context, we will have to consider special programs and needs generated by implementation of the peace agreements and to seize opportunities offered by the new environment in the Middle East.¹³

—We will, of course, continue our ongoing programs to support the economic and military security of Israel and the efforts of President Sadat to improve the lives of the people of Egypt.

—We do not see our financial support as in any way payment to one side or the other for concluding this Treaty. They have done that in their own interest. The United States, however, will want to play a constructive role in building on the foundation which they have laid.

¹³ Carter wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

122. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Negotiating Strategy

In a strategy session at State this morning,² two views were argued:

—We should basically reject Sadat's new demands as going beyond Camp David. The President should tell him that the Treaty text as it now stands must be accepted. In other words, we would not try to pin the Israelis down on any of the West Bank/Gaza issues prior to the conclusion of the treaty negotiations. It was generally recognized that this would reduce Israel's incentives for moving seriously on the West Bank/Gaza, although we would continue to have some leverage in the form of aid.

—We should meet Sadat part way in trying to clarify West Bank/Gaza issues now. If we do not do so, he may be unwilling to sign the treaty; and it may be harder to move the Israelis later than it is now. (This last point is not unanimously agreed upon). If we took this approach, we would essentially try to establish two things with the Israelis:

1. The side letter on the West Bank/Gaza must include a target date by which elections will be held.

2. We would prepare and discuss with both sides a draft agenda³ for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. It would specify talks on how the elections will be organized; the definition of powers and responsibilities; the powers of the local police; the initial redeployment of Israeli forces; and the question of reciprocal rights of residence and land acquisition. We would not necessarily expect the Israelis formally to accept the draft agenda, but it would give Sadat something concrete to point to as evidence that we, at least, will work seriously for the success of these negotiations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 11/6–13/78. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information.

² No other record of this November 9 strategy session has been found.

³ Not found.

In either of the above options, we would be very restrained in dealing with Israeli aid requests at present. In essence, we would not go much beyond a minimal commitment on the airfields.

In the second scenario, we would begin talks immediately with Dayan on the draft agenda idea. He will almost certainly reject the notion and he will have no authority to agree in any case. Nonetheless, we could then go to Sadat and explain that we have begun talks on the agenda, that we support the idea of a target date for elections, and that with these assurances we expect Sadat to accept the treaty text as it now stands. Without saying so explicitly, we would be rejecting the idea of getting the Israelis to committing themselves to specific unilateral gestures according to a fixed timetable and we would ignore his suggestion that the practical implementation of any agreement should begin first in Gaza.

In brief, we would be picking up one of Sadat's demands that fits closely with what most of us feel is already implicit in Camp David—namely, an agenda for the next round of negotiations—and we would press the Israelis to accept a target date for the holding of elections (subject to agreement having been reached by that time). Politically this should be defensible as consistent with Camp David. It could delay the talks, but it also might give Sadat enough to justify accepting the Treaty as it now stands. In any case, this is the recommended strategy which will go to the Secretary at noon today. If you have any reactions, I will try to get them into the final memo.

123. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 9, 1978

MR. SECRETARY:

Boutros Ghali called tonight to report on his and Ghorbal's three-hour meeting² with Dayan, Weizman and Rubenstein. I record below in some detail what he reported because it is clearly relevant to your

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 11/6–13/78. Secret; Nodis.

² In his memoir of the treaty negotiations, Boutros Ghali recalled that his November 9 meeting with the Israelis "was perhaps the most important work session on negotiations so far." (Boutros Ghali, *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem*, p. 173)

breakfast discussion³ with the President. In passing this on, Boutros said he emphasized that he was raising nothing new; all the points he made to the Israelis he has been making since the Washington talks began. What is new, he said, is President Sadat's insistence that these are prerequisites for signing the peace treaty. He said the Israelis had seen a "new Boutros" tonight.

Exchange of Letters

There must be a timetable as follows:

- Negotiations begin one month after ratification.
- Elections five to six months after that.
- Military government withdrawn one month after elections.
- Redeployment of troops one month after the military government is withdrawn (this could be in an Israeli letter to the U.S.).

Boutros said Dayan agreed to everything except fixing the date for the election but without that date, the others which follow are meaningless. Sadat insists on a timetable which makes clear that all of the above will be completed by the end of the interim withdrawal period.

Boutros also asked for Gaza elections to be held first, which Dayan adamantly refused.

Boutros said he heard for the first time tonight that Israel's interpretation of Camp David is that the Military Governor will be transferred but not abolished. This obviously came as a disquieting revelation to him.

Unilateral Israeli Moves

Boutros said Dayan agreed on moving military government headquarters, an amnesty for political prisoners, and an end to restrictions on political activity but rejected any unilateral steps to permit the return of displaced persons for family reunification purposes.

Boutros says he did not suggest it to Dayan, but would be prepared for these unilateral steps to be recorded in an Israeli letter to us.

Gaza

Boutros said Sadat is adamant on the need for an Egyptian presence; what he really wants is a military presence but Boutros knows this is not possible. He suggested a resident Egyptian Mission which the Israelis could describe as a consulate. Dayan said this might be pos-

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Vance participated in a breakfast meeting with Carter, Brzezinski, and Jordan from 7:31 a.m. to 9:02 a.m., November 10. No memorandum of conversation for this breakfast discussion with Carter has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

sible after the interim withdrawal, with visiting, non-permanent missions prior to that time.

Settlements

Dayan raised this, saying that Israel planned new settlements after three months. Boutros says that he responded that if Israel does this, even though they conclude a peace treaty, it would quickly begin to crumble. There has to be a gentleman's agreement at least that new settlements will stop.

Finally, Boutros said when he finished the Israelis argued that all of these details went beyond Camp David. He replied that all of the details on normalization in Annex III also went beyond Camp David, including in particular the exchange of Ambassadors after one month. If Egypt had agreed to such detail in its bilateral treaty, why should Israel not agree to comparable details which were important to Egypt on the West Bank/Gaza issues.

Boutros said the Egyptians would be drafting a letter or letters which would incorporate their foregoing requirements. He looks forward to hearing the results of my talk tomorrow with Dayan,⁴ which I have set for 10:00AM. Boutros says Dayan and Weizman told him they would be going to Canada to see Begin tomorrow to report all of this.

I suggest we not make any firm decisions on what we will do and when until we can assess the results of this interaction between the Egyptians and the Israelis.

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.⁵

⁴ On the back of the memorandum are handwritten notes related to Atherton's November 10 meeting. No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁵ Atherton signed "Roy" above this typed signature.

124. Letter From President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, November 11, 1978

To Prime Minister Begin,

The successful conclusion of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is in doubt.

Only with your personal courage, determination, and direct involvement in the negotiations were the Camp David discussions successful. The Nobel Peace Prize was one of the recognitions of your contribution to peace. The same contribution is needed now.

We have done all we can. Although we have been honored by the opportunity to work with you and President Sadat, there is a limit to what we can accomplish without some flexibility during these final days—by both Israel and Egypt. Public statements from both sides are damaging. Negotiations have limited authority. Renegotiation of mutual agreements have been demanded time and again.

Secretary Vance must soon turn to other duties which have been partially neglected by both him and me.

The present draft of the treaty and associated documents² adequately fulfill the agreements reached at Camp David and protect the present and future interests of both nations. Further public statements deploring the negotiated language or public demands for unattainable concessions from the other side will make it impossible to achieve approval of the terms of agreement.

It is obvious to all of us that, compared to *any* remaining differences, the advantages of a peace treaty are *overwhelming*.

I urge you to approve the existing drafts brought to you by Secretary Vance. I will urge President Sadat to do the same. This, I believe, may be our final chance for the peace we all seek.

Respectfully,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 49, Israel: 11–12/78. No classification marking. The letter is handwritten.

² See Document 125.

125. Editorial Note

On November 11, 1978, two meetings took place in Washington between the U.S. and Israeli delegations on the outstanding issues of the proposed West Bank/Gaza negotiations letter, the proposed Israeli letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance covering the list of unilateral actions Israel would take in its relations with the Palestinians prior to the opening of autonomy talks, and the time-phasing of the Israeli withdrawal to the agreed interim line. No memoranda of conversation for these meetings have been found. However, the Department of State sent a summary of the talks written by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Saunders in telegram 287424 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, November 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2234) In addition, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan provided an account of the meetings in his memoirs. (Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pages 238–243)

The first meeting, lasting approximately three and a half hours, among Vance (who was involved only for the first two hours), Saunders, and Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., on the U.S. side and Dayan and his negotiating team on the Israeli side, produced “essentially sterile discussion.” (Telegram 287424 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, November 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2234) In his memoirs, Dayan noted that Atherton provided him with a U.S. draft of the letter on unilateral Israeli moves vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Intended for Dayan’s signature, this draft committed Israel to lift restrictions on “the freedom of political expression” of the Palestinians and “their freedom to engage in political activities,” to relocate the Israeli military government headquarters from Gaza and Bet El to “new locations outside of the Arab municipalities,” to grant “amnesty for certain prisoners and detainees” in the West Bank and Gaza, and to agree to the establishment of an Egyptian Liaison Office in Gaza. A copy of this draft letter is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, unlabeled folder. Upon receiving the text, Dayan promised only to forward the draft letter to Begin and to Jerusalem, informing Atherton that he believed its terms were “not acceptable.” (Dayan, *Breakthrough*, page 239)

The second meeting, involving Vance, Atherton, Dayan, Israeli adviser Aharon Barak, Department of State Legal Adviser Herbert J. Hansell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Michael E. Sterner, and Israeli Attorney General Meir Rosenne, lasted until 1:30 a.m. the following morning. This meeting, however, produced agreement to revise the West Bank/Gaza letter, converting the format to a letter from President Jimmy Carter to Egypt.

tian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. (Ibid.) The Department sent a copy of this revised draft in telegram 287408 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, November 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2221) On November 13, the Department sent a revised copy of the letter that had a clause that referred to a negotiation deadline of December 17 removed. This point was one the United States had not discussed with either the Egyptians or Israelis. (Telegram 287766 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, November 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2250) The meeting also produced a new proposal on the phasing of the Israeli withdrawal in Sinai to the interim line. The draft appendix to Article I, Annex I of the peace treaty stipulated detailed sub-phases for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai; the Israeli delegation suggested that the sub-phases should be left for “later discussions among military representatives.” The Department sent the revised draft of Article I and the appendix in telegram 287387 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, November 12; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/12–17/78)

The following afternoon, November 12, Atherton and Hansell presented the drafts of the West Bank/Gaza letter and the Article I appendix on withdrawal phasing to the Egyptian delegation for their consideration. The Egyptian delegation’s reaction was “largely negative.” Vance noted: “On West Bank/Gaza letter, principal objections were that it has been watered down in form (from joint letter directly committing Begin to letter from President Carter) and in substance (elections in six months to target date of end of 1979).” On phasing, the Egyptians stated that “anything less” than “accelerated phasing with specific times specified is unacceptable.” (Telegram 287424 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, November 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2234)

The Department cabled a full draft copy of the peace treaty, including annexes and letters, in a series of telegrams to the Embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv on November 12. (Telegrams 287386–287397 and 287406–287408 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, November 12; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/12–17/78) In Israel, leaks of the draft treaty text to the press prompted the government to publish the documents. A copy of this published version is in *Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, pages 577–581.

126. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, November 12, 1978

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation between President Carter and President Sadat,
November 12, 1978

President Carter: I am going to send you a personal message² later on today which will have the most recent documents on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and will be delivered to you by Ambassador Eilts. I think the negotiations have gone as far as we can go. As you know, I have put in literally hundreds of hours into this matter. Secretary Vance has almost abandoned his other duties. We have worked out an agreement which is fair and which is balanced. I don't think it's possible to get any substantial changes made in it by the Israelis or by you. I would like your assurance in backing me in my final decisions. I am going to call Prime Minister Begin³ after I talk to you. Tonight Secretary Vance will be going to New York to meet with Begin⁴ and to deliver to him the same draft treaty and the same documents. My belief is that the outcome of the entire negotiations for peace will depend upon your willingness and Prime Minister Begin's willingness to accept the present draft.

President Sadat: When will I receive the documents from Ambassador Eilts?

President Carter: We will get the documents to Ambassador Eilts this afternoon, Washington time.

President Sadat: I will study it very carefully.

President Carter: I understand that. If there are a few things that you still do not like, I would like for you to accept the document as it is rather than to demand additional changes.

[Missing text?]

President Carter: Yes, of course, I have.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat from 12:07 p.m. to 12:42 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter's handwritten notes related to the conversation are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

² See Document 130.

³ See Document 127.

⁴ See Document 128.

President Sadat: Very good, because it will be a bad thing for both of us here in the area if we don't make the peace at least with Gaza.

President Carter: At least with Gaza?

President Sadat: Yes. It will be detrimental for both of us.

President Carter: The part about having a separate language on Gaza creates problems because it tends to separate Gaza from the West Bank.

President Sadat: Gaza was taken from Egypt. I am asking them to return Sinai and leave Gaza. This is difficult. Those who were in Baghdad⁵ must not get the upper hand.

President Carter: What specifically do you want with Gaza, Mr. President?

President Sadat: I want Gaza to go on the line that we have agreed upon in Camp David and in the timing of the withdrawal.

President Carter: We have in the document the fact that negotiations will begin in one month.

President Sadat: It is very essential to know when the first phase of the evacuation will take place. This is the most of Sinai that we will be receiving and will be celebrating. We shouldn't do this without Gaza.

President Carter: Suppose the Israelis agree to move their military headquarters from Gaza as a unilateral step?

President Sadat: The full autonomy still remains.

President Carter: We agree that the full autonomy will be returned to Gaza and West Bank, and that elections will be held before the end of next year. But, I hate to separate Gaza from the West Bank as a separate case.

President Sadat: Gaza has been taken, as I told, with Sinai. It will not be that this is a separate agreement. We should be upset, you and me.

President Carter: I don't quite understand why you want to separate Gaza, because this was not the agreement at Camp David.

President Sadat: I don't agree with the West Bank and Gaza being separated. Gaza was taken from Egypt. I cannot accept Sinai and leave Gaza.

President Carter: Mr. President, I am not specifically sure what you want them to agree to on Gaza.

President Sadat: This Gaza land was taken from Egypt along with the Sinai land.

President Carter: What I have in mind on that is to have the Israelis agree, whether as a unilateral step to permit political campaigning; po-

⁵ Reference is to the Baghdad Conference. See footnote 7, Document 121.

litical meeting without restraint, as long as they are peaceful; to withdraw their military headquarters from Gaza, without any reciprocal action on the part of Egypt; to commence the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza within a month; and to agree that the elections for the autonomous self-government would be completed next year. All of those things would apply to the West Bank and Gaza, except the military government would be removed, the headquarters would be removed from Gaza without regard to anything else.

President Sadat: When will the first phase of withdrawal be, Mr. President, in Sinai? We can finish the whole thing about Gaza and the West Bank by keeping them together.

President Carter: The first phase of withdrawal has to be within nine months. Is that correct?

President Sadat: Right.

President Carter: And complete withdrawal within three years.

President Sadat: From two to three years.

President Carter: Yes, from two to three years. What I am saying is that we will have the elections actually conducted for the self-government in 1979 which would be just next year.

President Sadat: When you say from six to nine months, it will be next year.

President Carter: Mr. President, I understand that. I don't care what you and the Israelis do, but I don't think that this is reasonable request of you. I don't think it is right to separate Gaza and make it a special case.

President Sadat: This I can't do, because it is detrimental for both of us. I am trying to make it easy for them and find some point to agree on the timing and the West Bank. It is because of the West Bank. If it takes six to nine months, this will mean June 1979. This may mean separate agreements. I want Sinai and nothing after six or seven months and nothing about Gaza, except negotiations. After June this will take more than one year in the negotiations.

President Carter: I think they will agree to have elections by the end of 1979, so there would not be a delay.

President Sadat: By the end of 1979?

President Carter: That is correct.

President Sadat: Quite frankly, I have found that in seven, eight, or even nine months to accomplish the first phase of withdrawal on Sinai without anything in the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank could be at the end of the year. This is okay, but without Gaza, it is a separate agreement and this is detrimental for both of us.

President Carter: President Sadat, I don't agree with you because the final withdrawal from the Sinai is two or three years. There would

be a self-government set up in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank before you give the entire Sinai back. It would not be a separate agreement.

President Sadat: It would be a separate agreement without anything in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The difficulty is that Gaza is something that they have already taken from Egypt. Our European friends are behind the idea of Gaza—Callaghan, Schmidt, and all the others. This I cannot accept.

President Carter: What do you see as an alternative, Mr. President?

President Sadat: If they agree about 1979, it is okay for me. The first phase of withdrawal in Sinai can be nine or ten months, but with it let there be Gaza and the West Bank. The West Bank can be at the end of the year, but Gaza should be linked with our timetable, Mr. President.

President Carter: It would be hard for me to explain why we treat Gaza better than we treat the West Bank because the Palestinians move back and forth between the two. I thought that you and I had always agreed that we should not separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank.

President Sadat: I don't agree with the first phase of withdrawal without at least Gaza. If it is Gaza and the West Bank, it is okay. I can wait until October for Gaza and the West Bank to come together with the first phase of withdrawal in Sinai.

President Carter: When you say Gaza and the West Bank, you are talking about the self-government elections, correct?

President Sadat: I am talking about the start of full autonomy with the first phase of withdrawal in Sinai.

President Carter: In other words, you want the first phase of withdrawal in the Sinai to be the same time as the elections for the self-government and autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza.

President Sadat: Not the elections, but the start which will mean nine months from now. In one month we can sit down and discuss and then make the election, but in nine months the first phase of withdrawal will take place at the same time the autonomy starts. We should complete it before the elections.

President Carter: The autonomy will start at the time of the elections. It is going to be a complicated matter, as you know, to arrange for the elections because its a long tedious process to get people registered to vote. As you know, women have never voted in those elections. I just believe that if you insist upon this it is going to delay the first phase of withdrawal from the Sinai even if everybody works as eagerly as possible to get the elections completed. I don't believe that we can do it, Mr. President, before the end of 1979.

President Sadat: No, this process will not take more than one month: but I am giving nine months from the first phase of withdrawal and the start of autonomy. I can't take the first phase of withdrawal and

leave anything in Gaza and the West Bank. I am trying to make Gaza a compromise. Let the withdrawal from Sinai be postponed, instead of nine months let it be ten months. I am ready to accept this.

President Carter: I see. Mr. President, I am not sure what this is going to do to the negotiations. There is a limit to how much time I can spend on it.

President Sadat: I know the effort that you have given to this. Frankly, I cannot do anything detrimental for both of us. Even with the Baghdad meeting and what is happening, I am in full control. But such a step like the first phase of withdrawal without anything happening in Gaza and the West Bank, it would be detrimental. It would be a separate agreement. As I told you, Mr. President, I don't want this first phase of withdrawal from Sinai so early. We can postpone it. I have given the Israelis the biggest concession they could want in starting the normal relations after the first phase of withdrawal while they are still occupying my country. I have been blamed all over the Arab world and even by the critics of my country. Wherever I have given you my word, I will stick to it. Let's look to anything that will damage this.

President Carter: Not having discussed this particular point with you, what you specifically want to occur in Gaza is . . .

President Sadat: The first phase of withdrawal in Sinai will take place the same day the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank start autonomy. This will mean that before the first phase of withdrawal is completed we shall work together with the Israelis and you on this. The day withdrawal is completed the same day autonomy begins in the West Bank and Gaza or Gaza and postpone the West Bank. I don't want to do it alone in Sinai.

President Carter: Let me ask you in the worst case suppose it takes two years to do that?

President Sadat: Two years for the elections.

President Carter: Yes.

President Sadat: In this case they don't want peace. They want anything to wait until the next election in your country. You know the weight of this.

President Carter: Suppose you, the Israelis and I work as hard as we can and we cannot get the Palestinians to cooperate; we cannot get the Jordanians to cooperate; we have difficulty getting people to register to vote; and elections may not be held inspite of our best efforts. This is what I fear might happen. I am not predicting that it will happen and I hope it will not, but to tie the two things together may mean that there will be a great delay in the whole process even if the Israelis and you work in good faith. It is a very complicated thing to arrange for the first

time, complete elections and the establishment of a new government where people have never voted before.

President Sadat: Mr. President, the first phase of withdrawal in Gaza is my responsibility. Gaza was taken from Egypt. I am ready to force this issue and I have given you my word that I am ready to proceed in both places, Gaza and the West Bank, if King Hussein is not going to do it.

President Carter: Let me ask you this question then, Mr. President. What will be the reaction in the Arab world if Gaza is given special treatment and the process takes place in Gaza and does not take place in the West Bank?

President Sadat: This will be a victory for both of us, because it is not a separate agreement in Sinai only. I have declared already that I [am] ready to force this on Gaza because I am responsible for Gaza. Whatever delays there are in the West Bank it will be done to their position with King Hussein.

President Carter: I understand your position and we will do the best we can.

President Sadat: Please, Mr. President.

President Carter: I will try.

President Sadat: You know I am ready to take any risk since you have known me. This time this will be detrimental for both of us.

President Carter: Let me talk about a couple more things before we hang up. It is very important that you do two things, if you can. One is to emphasize in your public statements the positive aspects of the negotiations and the peace treaties to prepare not only your own people, but the rest of the world for the benefits of peace. I think there is an inclination on the part, and I am going to tell Begin the same thing, of Israel and Egypt to point out the problems with the negotiations because that is what we are trying to discuss at this point. People tend to lose sight of all the many advantages that will accrue to Egypt, the Arab world and the Middle East, if peace can be brought between you and Israel. Let it be possible for us to defend the Middle East against the Soviets, it would make it possible for you to turn your tremendous political and military support to Sudan and the Saudis and others. I hope that you will emphasize the positive result that will be achieved if and when a peace treaty is concluded. Please do that for me.

President Sadat: Sure, Mr. President.

President Carter: The other thing is that I need to have you to be as flexible as you possibly can on these individual points. I am perfectly willing to come over there to talk to Fahd and to talk to Hussein or to have them come over here to meet with me to try to encourage them to participate in the West Bank negotiations. I need for you to do the same

thing to try to do what is possible to encourage the Saudis and the Jordanians to support the West Bank discussions. If you can do that, I would be very grateful.

President Sadat: I shall do this and you have my word. If the Israelis agree on my point, everything will be easy for both of us. They will see the results in the end. They will see that real autonomy in Gaza will move the hold [whole] thing, Mr. President.

President Carter: I understand that. Is it possible for you to meet personally with Fahd and/or Hussein?

President Sadat: Not yet. I am punishing them for what happened in Baghdad. I am in full control. Nothing makes me waver. There are forty million Egyptians, the supreme of the Arab world, behind me. There are more than 90 percent of the Arab world behind me.

President Carter: I don't disagree with that. I think you are absolutely right. But how soon do you think you might be able to meet the Saudis or Hussein?

President Sadat: Give me Gaza. With the first phase of withdrawal and I am responsible to continue the whole thing. With that I make my whole proposal. The West Bank is a bit hard and I know their schemes for the West Bank. It is hard, but let us do in Gaza with the Sinai. As I tell you, it will be very easy after that. There should be something on the ground so their eyes see it. But the Israelis are considering now that they have much to do with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, this makes the other camp think that this is a separate agreement.

President Carter: I will try to work on the how the Gaza Strip issues impact on the others because there is a real limit to how much more time I can put on this effort and everytime we negotiate a final draft over here with the negotiators, including Israelis and Egyptians, they go back home and we have to do it all over again because new points are raised and new disputes arise. I just hope that if you'll let me try to work on this Gaza question that you have just raised, that you will really try to be flexible on the other points. We have negotiated a good document, and I hope that you will go over it with Ambassador Eilts and be as flexible as possible on it and back me as you did at Camp David.

President Sadat: I shall always respect you, Mr. President, but let me in all candor tell you. I must tell you the truth because we are saying together the same thing.

President Carter: Well, you know we never have let the Iraqis and the Syrians negotiate for us before, and I think that the benefits of peace, as supported by you and me, will be obvious to all. I have very good hopes that the Saudis will give us support. I think Hussein will come later on. But, I don't think that you and I can hope to please the more radical Arabs, no matter what we do.

(Temporary Disconnection.)

President Sadat: We are ready to treat them according to the United Nations Charter like any other people in the world—like you, like the United States. But they want preferable positions. We don't agree to this principle. These are small points, but believe me, it is very hard. At the same time I will be ready. I shall be telling all of them. As I have agreed with you, even the normal relations part before the Israeli withdrawal, I have done all I can, Mr. President. They are already greedy. They won't buy everything?

President Carter: Mr. President, they feel the same way about you and I think both of you are wrong. I think both sides need more peace.

President Sadat: That is my oil. They think that it is theirs.

President Carter: They want to have a chance to buy it, not take it, Mr. President.

President Sadat: We are ready, Mr. President. We are ready to sell them. And in the future the difficulty with them is that they need nothing for the future. Well, I don't agree to this at all. You know, Mr. President, I have seen other schemes in [missing text] and so and so. Well, they don't give me any opportunity to do this. Opportunity for agreement. No Egyptian will agree to this. Imposing their conditions on us. I am ready for full recognition, normal relations, good neighborhood, a joint committee between us and them to put the whole thing together. I am sure in six months everything will be judged. [missing text] agree to put in the treaty such things like they ask for, because this imposes conditions.

President Carter: I understand. When you go over the document with Ambassador Eilts . . . it's one that I think is a sound document and fair and please go as far as you can, even though there are some parts in it that you may not like to accept, because there are parts in it that the Israelis do not like and I am trying to get them to accept it too—both of you in the spirit of compromise.

President Sadat: I shall do, Mr. Carter, as I have always done with you. I shall work very close and I shall tell you on every point why I don't like.

President Carter: I understand. Make those differences as few as possible, Mr. President.

President Sadat: [missing text]

President Carter: Good luck to you.

President Sadat: [missing text]

President Carter: Thank you, sir.

President Sadat: Good-bye.

127. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, November 12, 1978

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin,
November 12, 1978

President Carter: I have sent you a personal letter today by Secretary Vance.²

Prime Minister Begin: He will give it to me at the airport?

President Carter: Yes, as soon as he sees you.³ The essence of it is, in my own opinion in spite of all of the efforts that Vance and the negotiators have made, the prospects at this point of approving an agreement are quite remote. My own belief is that the deep feeling and demands on Israel on one side and Egypt on the other, without substantial courage and flexibility, are incompatible. We have tried to explore, as best we could, language that would be a reasonable compromise, and that would be fair to both nations and would carry out the commitments made at Camp David. We also realize very clearly that to translate the general language at Camp David into specific agreements is a major step forward and also very difficult. Secretary Vance met last night until about one-thirty this morning with your negotiators⁴ and I suggested yesterday that he bring them up with him to save your own time and to let you know what the tentative agreements are.

Prime Minister Begin: I don't know yet what they discussed.

President Carter: I realize that you don't. He'll bring along the Israeli negotiators with him. We have just about reached the end of our ability, because on several occasions, as you know, including about three weeks ago when I personally met with both negotiators,⁵ once we reach an agreement here and it goes back to either you, the Israeli Cabinet, or President Sadat, the negotiated agreement is thrown aside and additional demands are made. I don't criticize anyone for it, but it has

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations, 11/6–13/78. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from 2:43 p.m. to 2:53 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter's handwritten notes related to this conversation are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79.

² See Document 124

³ See Document 128.

⁴ See Document 125.

⁵ See Documents 90 and 92.

been increasingly obvious that the divisions, instead of becoming resolved, are becoming deeper. My hope is that, within the bounds of your own principles and beliefs of what is best for Israel, that you look with favor on the present draft⁶ of the treaty and the other documents attached. They are not exactly as you would prefer, or President Sadat would prefer, but I hope that you, along with President Sadat will be as flexible as possible. I talked with President Sadat this afternoon⁷ just before calling you.

Prime Minister Begin: I will, of course, read with great attention your letter, but as I don't know yet any news about the decisions that took place during the night. I can only say, Mr. President, that you didn't tell me that the draft presented to me is, in my opinion, a deviation from the Camp David conference. I have told my friends that we hold true and faithful to the Camp David framework. We shall not deviate from it whatsoever. The demands brought by Mr. Ghali from Egypt are a deviation from the Camp David agreements. It is absolutely clear. I had heard that if the Government of Israel does not agree to set up a timetable corresponding to the time of withdrawal to the Ras Muhammad and al-Arish line, then the Egyptians will not fulfill their commitment to exchange resident ambassadors.

Ezer Weizman might have said something to General Ali, which was his right, but he does not decide the issues, as none of your representatives do, Mr. President. The Government of Israel decides. If the decision of the Government of Israel goes against any hints given by Ezer Weizman, then that decision stands. The Egyptians cannot say you broke your promise. We didn't break any promises. The decisions are, in a Parliamentary regime, with the Government of Israel, not even with the Prime Minister. I am also one of the Cabinet.

At Camp David, the Israeli delegation had full powers of the Cabinet to decide. This is not the case. If the Egyptians threaten us with not sending ambassadors, then we shall ask them to agree that ambassadors will be sent before we start any withdrawal, after the documents of ratification come into force and the peace treaty itself comes into force, as actually it should be. The peace treaty is signed, confirmed, and ratified, then we should have normal relations as written at Camp David. We agreed to postpone it actually for ten months. This was a very great concession. Now we are threatened that there won't be any ambassadors whatsoever if we don't comply with their demands. So that is not the way to negotiate in good faith. We do negotiate in good faith. The draft letters about the changes that will take place with Egypt only, because Jordan does not join them, without the administrative

⁶ See Document 125.

⁷ See Document 126.

council, is not in conformity with the Camp David agreements. We never talked about a timetable of five or six months. We cannot say because there is the PLO.

The people, Mr. President, who met your friend, Mr. Atherton,⁸ are threatened with their lives. We have to give them our protection. We are prepared, although Jordan does not join, to negotiate with Egypt alone the modalities, the responsibilities, and the powers. But we cannot sign a document in which it is plainly said the elections will take place in six months. They may take place in three months, and they not take place in nine months. We cannot say. We don't have candidates. So, how can we sign such a document? I wrote a draft which was fair to everybody, although Jordan does not join. Notwithstanding this fact, we are prepared to negotiate within a month after the exchange of letters of ratification, everything which is written at Camp David, but do not ask us to sign a document that the elections will take place for the administrative council between five or six months. That is absolutely impossible. This I am going to explain to Secretary Vance.

Then, Mr. President, may I say a word about the financial issue. I had the broad idea that we should not ask for a grant at this time, but for a loan for twenty-five years. I was almost stoned in my country because of it. I do not make any exaggeration. Then there is the question of the two air fields. I read the last draft sent by Secretary Vance—just absolutely non-concrete. I don't know what is the plan. Secretary Vance said he would talk to you and then you will talk to Congressional leaders. I also wanted to talk to Congress. They are my friends. Secretary Vance advised me not to talk to the Senate. Until now we don't actually know anything. What can we do? The evacuation of an army of tens of thousands and installations which were built for eleven years is connected with a very serious expenditure. I didn't want to ask for a grant, I asked for a loan. We shall repay it. But, we have no reply yet; and we don't know.

Mr. Atherton made a very grave remark to Dayan during their talk that the question is being raised that we combine peace with money. I take exception to such a remark. We don't combine any money with anything; but we put the facts before the Secretary. Without any answers, we are walking through darkness. We are not beggars, Mr. President. I go into the city of Jerusalem and look at the walls and read "Begin traitor". I have a debate with my own friends all the time. We have to care for the security and the future of our people. We have made great sacrifices, Mr. President. You know very well that at Camp David I did not promise to remove the settlements from Sinai. I did it

⁸ See Document 69.

later for the sake of peace. I brought it to Parliament. My old friends were in revolt against it. I don't think that the peace talks should be suspended. For every draft I will give another draft. This is the nature of negotiations.

President Carter: I think it is important that Secretary Vance explain to you personally at some length because some of the matters that concern you are not compatible with President Sadat's position. He has never intended to reverse his commitment once it was made, as far as I know, on any issue. Although I went to him on the ambassadors, at the request of your own negotiators, who told me they would withdraw from al-Arish and the central part of the Sinai early, and on that basis I went to President Sadat and asked him for a one-month commitment on the ambassadorship exchange and that's why he gave it to me.

Prime Minister Begin: Mr. President, may I interrupt you for a moment. But everything was ad referendum. The Government makes the decisions, not our negotiators.

President Carter: I understand, Mr. Prime Minister, but that proviso was not mentioned at the time that Dayan and Weizman and Barak all told me there would be an early withdrawal from el-Arish. But in spite of that, President Sadat told me this afternoon that he was not going back on his commitment to me to exchange ambassadors within one month.

Prime Minister Begin: I got this information from my own friends yesterday on the phone.

President Carter: Mr. Prime Minister, I just talked to President Sadat on the telephone. I think the time schedule for the elections and the establishment of the self-government are very important to President Sadat. I think here again Secretary Vance can explain what President Sadat's position is. I think that he is not as interested in an exact number of months as he is in the certainty of the elections being held. But I think that he has one advantage. Once he tells me something through his negotiators, that it is a final and definite commitment, I don't have to worry about it. I live in a democracy also in which I know that I have to refer agreements made to the Senate if they are in the treaty form. It is very difficult to negotiate over and over with the Israeli Government on the same issues once we thought it had been concluded.

Prime Minister Begin: No, sir, we don't negotiate over and over. We found two points on which we did not agree. We proposed compromise proposals which were not acceptable by the other side. The Government has to take decisions. We don't negotiate over and over again anything as far as we are concerned. When we got the draft letter, which was unacceptable to us, which Dayan told the Egyptian negotiating team, then again those five or six months are uncertain. We

cannot accept. We have another draft. So, why should our draft letter be thrown into the basket and the other letter be the document? Because President Sadat wants it—you know I am his friend and I wish him well. How can we say that the elections will take place in five or six months? If the PLO comes with its pistols—we shall do our best to talk to them, to convince them. We invited Jordan. But we cannot force anybody either to join our peace-making process, or to come into our election process. We can only convince people. This is the point. I don't think that we read about renegotiations of points. We have our point of view in the Cabinet. We have a real objection to including those words, "Noting, etc . . .", taking them out of context. If that is taken from Camp David, why shouldn't other sentences be taken. This is one of our objections. There was a decision by the Cabinet. The majority of the Cabinet decided not to make a precipitate withdrawal. I wasn't even there. We must obey by these decisions. What Ezer said wasn't binding.

President Carter: I am not trying to reopen that discussion. It was not only Weizman; it was Dayan and Barak. But, that is not the main concern that I have. There is a limit to how much longer we can go on with the negotiations and I hope that you will read my letter very carefully within the bounds of your own commitment.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir. Surely I will.

President Carter: I hope you will be as flexible as possible.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, I think I will write to you from Jerusalem, answering your letter.

President Carter: I think the answers can be accomplished in your discussions with Secretary Vance.

Prime Minister Begin: I will get back home on Monday⁹ in the afternoon. I will convene a session of the Cabinet on Tuesday or perhaps on Wednesday. During the week I will answer you. Believe me, Mr. President, we will do our best to have peace. We have done all our best. Sometimes we are not understood by some members of your Administration, Mr. President, with all due respect.

President Carter: I will tell Secretary Vance to discuss this again with you tonight and to explain the present draft document—by the way, which your negotiators have agreed to this. I hope you will also agree.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir.

President Carter: Good.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

⁹ November 13.

128. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 12, 1978, 7:40–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

ISRAELI SIDE

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
Simcha Ehrlich, Finance Minister
Yitzhak Modai, Petroleum and Infrastructure Minister
Aharon Barak, Justice, Israeli Supreme Court
Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Colonel Shatila, Aide to Minister Weizman

AMERICAN SIDE

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA

SUBJECT

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations

Prime Minister Begin opened the discussion by suggesting that the agenda should include the draft exchange of letters on the West Bank/Gaza, financial issues and the draft peace treaty. Noting that certain drafts were discussed between the Secretary and Dayan the previous night, he asked what are the latest Egyptian demands.

Secretary Vance summarized the status of negotiations as follows:

—Treaty text—each side still had some questions; we believe it should be considered complete.

—Annex I and its Appendix—complete except for the question of the sub-phasing of withdrawal.

—Annex III—complete.

—Maps—complete.

—West Bank/Gaza letter—unresolved.

Begin interrupted to ask if Egypt had rejected the letter. The Secretary said the Egyptians were studying it; Sadat had not yet seen it but we had given the text to the Egyptian Delegation this afternoon.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 5, L Papers Camp David. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the El-Al Lounge at Kennedy Airport. Begin was in transit from Canada to Israel.

The Secretary continued his status report as follows:

—U.S. commitments letter—okay.

—Airfields letter—complete.

—Interpretive minute—Egyptians still have a question about the second paragraph.

—The minute to Annex I—okay.

—Letter on unilateral Israeli steps in the West Bank/Gaza—discussed among the parties but not resolved.

—Oil—discussed between the parties but not resolved.

The Prime Minister then turned to financial issues. He had originally spoken of a U.S. loan,² for which he had almost been stoned in Israel. He had subsequently corrected his mistake. Israel's needs should have been clearer from Camp David, although the discussion there had singled out the issue of the airfields. The Minister of Finance has a memorandum on this subject. Israel's problem is that, if it is to evacuate Sinai in three years, moving army installations and civilian settlements will involve great costs which Israel has no way of covering.

Begin recalled that the Secretary had told him at the Regency Hotel (November 2)³ that he would discuss this question with the President who would consult Congress. Begin said he had read our letter on the airfields which also hints at other financial issues. It is so general that Israel still knows nothing. The letter contains no pledge. Israel does not want peace with bankruptcy. Israel needs to know before the next Cabinet meeting—today or tomorrow—what the President will suggest to Congress. The Finance Minister had wanted to see high U.S. Treasury officials; he had been told he would be welcome but could not discuss this subject. The Finance Minister will see Blumenthal on Tuesday, and the Prime Minister wanted to know if he could now discuss the question of financial assistance.

The Secretary said we are studying Israel's request as part of our regular budgetary process covering economic assistance for FY '80. We must proceed in a constitutional way. We need to complete the budget by December. In arriving at a figure, we always take into account Israeli security requirements.

There are two new items, the Secretary said:

1. The airfields on which Secretary Brown had written what we were prepared to do.⁴ We need information in order to decide what we

² See Document 117.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Reference is to Brown's September 28 Camp David side letter to Weizman. See Document 51.

can do. We have sent a team to Israel which will report the facts.⁵ Then we can make a decision.

2. In New York the Prime Minister had raised a new issue, namely, the loan request. We need to study this, the President needs to make a decision and then we need to consult Congress before informing Israel of our decision. We do not yet have the facts and cannot give an answer at this time. We must follow the regular budgetary process as does Israel. We are far along on the FY '80 military and economic assistance question. We need time to give answers on these new items.

The Prime Minister said he understood U.S. procedures but what would he tell his people. He hoped the treaty would be signed; then Israel would start to withdraw. He wanted to know tomorrow what the President would suggest. The Secretary said he could not promise a reply by a given date, but we would be glad to receive the memorandum from the Finance Minister. Dinitz interjected that it covers the airfields, special assistance, and regular FY '80 assistance.

The Secretary said we would need to study it to see if it contains sufficient facts for us to make a basic judgment. He could not give a decision now on whether we would provide further assistance or how much. The President has talked to Congress but needs more information about what is involved. The Prime Minister said there will obviously be additional expenses for Israel, and it is strange that the U.S. cannot say it will view Israel's request favorably. The Secretary replied that we do not have the necessary information.

Weizman suggested that the "second mission" be expedited to look at the other parts of the problem. The Secretary responded that he had not understood Israel expected a second mission. (Comment: Weizman's reference was apparently to the postponed McGiffert trip.)⁶

The Secretary said we are awaiting data from Israel. Begin said this was logical. The Finance Minister would discuss the matter with Blumenthal, who would need instructions from the President. The Secretary responded that, if Finance Minister Ehrlich has the figures, he would ask Blumenthal to listen to them. We could not now, however, make a commitment on a grant or loan in any given amount. Begin con-

⁵ Reference is to the Department of Defense team tasked with surveying potential sites in the Negev for the relocation of the Israeli airbases in Sinai due to be closed upon Israeli withdrawal. The leaders of the group met with Weizman on October 17 to discuss four possible locations for the new bases. (Telegram 263281 to Tel Aviv, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425–0818) Surveys of these sites were undertaken November 4–18 and a final report was drafted and forwarded by Brown to Carter on December 16. See footnote 3, Document 153.

⁶ A planned visit to Egypt and Israel by McGiffert, October 30–November 5, was postponed "indefinitely" on October 30. (Telegram 275500 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, October 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780446–0655)

cluded this subject by saying at least we were agreed there should be a meeting between Ehrlich and Blumenthal.

Turning to the treaty text, Begin said he understood we considered it closed, but this could not be the case until it was initialed. Israel did not reject Egyptian proposals. Israel, however, has objected from the beginning to the “noting” paragraph in the preamble and to the language on Gaza. Israel wants to solve these two issues but the Israeli Government had taken the position that the present language is not satisfactory.

Barak then read proposed Israeli compromise language on the preamble and Gaza. The Secretary replied that these suggestions had been considered and opposed by Egypt. Egypt had made proposals on Articles IV and VI which Israel opposed. If we opened up any of these issues, we would open up all kinds of issues. In our best judgment, the present draft is fair for both sides.

Begin said he had instructions from the Cabinet. This does not mean re-opening the treaty but making another attempt to find a solution. The Prime Minister said he understood that the Secretary said he could not accept opening the text, but the Israeli Cabinet had not accepted this. He had suggested an idea for balancing the language in the preamble but Atherton had said it was a non-starter. Why did the U.S. say this and yet consider Egyptian proposals. The Secretary said the latter were also non-starters. We think it would be a mistake to open the treaty; it would then begin to unravel.

Rosenne interjected that the interpretive note on the treaty had been agreed, yet now the Egyptians want to reconsider it. The Secretary said the Egyptians could not do this and he would speak to them.

Begin said the Israeli Delegation and he could not do anything in view of the Cabinet decision. The Secretary replied that he hoped the Cabinet would reconsider in light of the present situation.

Begin asked whether it was premature to discuss the exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza. In response to Dayan's query, the Secretary said we expected an Egyptian reply Tuesday at the earliest but could not be certain. Begin said should we discuss it or wait. Dayan said he preferred to wait; if the Egyptians turned it down, there was no use discussing it.

The Secretary commented that he thought his discussions with Dayan the previous night on the letter had led to a constructive result.⁷ President Carter had approved it and agreed to recommend it. Dayan then said it was perhaps better for the Prime Minister to give his views to the Secretary.

⁷ See Document 125.

Begin said he would try, noting that he had strong message from the Cabinet to the contrary. He then asked if the idea was that President Carter would send this letter to him and Sadat.

The Secretary said the suggestion had been made that it would be better for President Carter to write the letter if this would be easier than a joint letter or an exchange of notes. The President was prepared to do this if it would help the parties, but he preferred an exchange of letters between them. Begin said he agreed with President Carter. He asked what is the rationale for a third country to write about the views of two other countries. The Secretary said the idea would be to record views we had heard from those countries, if this would help. Barak interjected that this had been the Israeli Delegation's idea. Begin reiterated his question: why should the President of the United States write his views about elections in a third country? The Secretary recalled that at Camp David it had sometimes been easier and moved things forward when the President wrote on behalf of the other two. Begin said there was a difference. At Camp David they had dealt with specific issues—e.g., Jerusalem, Palestinian people or Palestinian Arabs of Judea and Samaria. Those were concrete problems different from the present issue.

Begin said he had heard the first draft⁸ of the letter included a clause saying the treaty would be carried out independently of the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, but this had been deleted. The Secretary responded that this point was already in the treaty. Begin said that the "noting" paragraph in the preamble was already in the Camp David Framework but had not been deleted; therefore why delete the "independently" phrase. The Secretary replied that this was President Carter's letter, and he preferred simpler language. But the parties must accept it, Begin said. The Secretary replied that he agreed it was up to the parties. Begin commented that he understood that Israel should change things when Egypt demanded it. The Secretary responded that the language deleted from the letter had never been seen by the Egyptians. Begin responded that he had never said that; he had made a general comment that, when Egypt demands something be taken out, it is taken out.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 77.

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 13, 1978, 1927Z

24770. Subject: Meeting With Sadat. Ref: A) Cairo 24767,² B) Cairo 24762.³

Summary. Sadat somewhat disturbed about his telecon with President Carter of last night.⁴ He wished confirm to President Carter various positions that he had stated in telecon. Specifically, in absence some kind of specific linkage between first phase of Sinai withdrawal and full autonomy for the Palestinians, at least in Gaza, he cannot agree sign Sinai treaty. Doing so would be a separate peace. Such separate peace would be detrimental to him and to President Carter in area. He insisted that his position is consistent with Camp David Accords and that he is not seeking introduce any new element. If West Bank/Gaza settlement cannot be obtained at this time, linkage should at least include Gaza. He does not at this time wish contact Hussein and Saudis, but plans "punish" them. Hussein, in his view, will not join negotiations until after he sees successful effort in Gaza. If Israelis insist they will not be ready before end of 1979 to establish autonomous self-governing body in West Bank/Gaza, Egypt can wait and delay first interim withdrawal in Sinai by several months in order permit some synchronization. Israelis are seeking to stall in West Bank/Gaza. Exchange of ambassadors, if it takes place without anything having happened in West Bank/Gaza, will be bad. He professed to have been "hurt" by charge that he is now demanding more than Camp David Agreements. He stands by everything he promised, but contended that there are limits to what he can do. He asked that President Carter reconsider various points mentioned in telecon; otherwise he cannot sign treaty. I sought to explain to Sadat what President Carter had in mind in his comments. Sadat asked that I report on our talk so that President Carter can take it into account before sending promised follow-up message. Sadat's back is up. This is partly a negotiating ploy, but we should not

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokees; Niact Immediate; Nodis. At the top of the telegram, Carter wrote: "This is a very accurate description of Sadat's (final?) position. We should try to recognize this & work accordingly. J.C."

² Telegram 24767 from Cairo, November 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

³ Telegram 24762 from Cairo, November 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1499)

⁴ See Document 126.

underestimate importance he attaches to meaningful linkage formula. He wants withdrawal in Sinai to begin, but has come to realize need for some sort of synchronization of Sinai and West Bank/Gaza activities if his tarnished Arab credentials are to be maintained. End summary.

1. Met this afternoon with Sadat, at his request, in Ismailia. Meeting lasted hour and a half. VP Mubarak and PriMin Khalil were also present.

2. Sadat recounted his half hour telecon of last night with President Carter. He was somewhat disturbed about some of the things that had been mentioned and said that he had summoned me to confirm to President Carter the positions that he had stated in telecon. He asked that I convey following to President Carter:

A. President Carter had told him of a new American draft,⁵ which I would hand to Sadat. The President had asked that Sadat not make any alterations so that the existing gaps between the parties can be bridged and the text accepted as the final treaty. Sadat said he has no objection, but if there is no specific linkage between the first phase of Sinai withdrawal and full autonomy for the Palestinians, at least in Gaza, he cannot agree. President Carter, according to Sadat, had seemed perplexed at Sadat's position. The President had noted that there is no legal connection between the Sinai and West Bank/Gaza problems. Sadat claimed that he made it clear that there is such a connection in the Camp David framework document. (PriMin Khalil then cited para B-2 of the "Framework for Peace," which invites the other parties to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving comprehensive peace. The "other parties," Sadat and Khalil contended, include the Palestinians.) Sadat insisted that, contrary to Israeli charges, he has not sought to introduce any new element. Egypt's position has always been clear on this point. GOE insists on timetable for Israeli actions re West Bank/Gaza. As President Carter aware, the Israelis want no fixed dates synchronizing Sinai and West Bank/Gaza activities. If such a linkage does not exist in precise form and with dates, Sadat said, it will in effect mean that the Sinai treaty is a separate peace. Such a situation will be exploited by the USSR and the rejectionists, the latter, he noted, are trying to win the Saudis over. He had made it very clear, both in his speech to the Knesset⁶ and in the Camp David tripartite talks, that he will never sign a separate agreement. Unless the Palestinian question is resolved, there cannot be peace.

⁵ See Document 125.

⁶ Sadat addressed the Knesset on November 20, 1977. The text of his speech is in *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, vol. 5, pp. 182–190.

B. If linkage cannot at this time include the West Bank, Sadat said, it should at least include Gaza. President Carter had noted that a separate Gaza arrangement had not been discussed at Camp David. Sadat claimed that he tried to make clear that in suggesting a linkage timetable in Gaza, he had sought to make a "concession." He emphasized that Gaza is part of the area seized by the Israelis from Egypt and is also part of the Palestinian question. GOE would prefer joint West Bank/Gaza negotiations, but if there is difficulty in getting West Bank talks underway, a start should be made with Gaza. This idea, he claimed, had commended itself to Callaghan, Schmidt and Giscard. Sadat wanted President Carter to know that if USG and Egypt give way to Israel on this point, i.e., without fixing early dates for negotiations on West Bank/Gaza or at least on Gaza, this will be detrimental both for Sadat and for President Carter in the area. He will not agree to sign a Sinai treaty, he repeatedly stated, without some such linkage. If that is to be the breaking point, so be it. He repeatedly stressed that in suggesting beginning negotiations with Gaza he was not introducing a new element. He was simply seeking to "facilitate" President Carter's task. The Israelis, as President Carter is fully aware, do not want to go ahead. Bowing to their unwillingness, Sadat reiterated, will be "very grave" for him and for President Carter in the area. It will mean that the Sinai treaty is in effect a separate agreement.

C. President Carter had also asked that Sadat contact King Hussein and the Saudis. Sadat had refused to do so at the present time. He had told President Carter that Prince Fahd had sent him a message, but that he had refused to receive it. He is trying to "punish" Hussein and the Saudis for "putting themselves in the other camp." He intends to put all kind of "pressure" on Hussein and the Saudis so that they can "regain their reason."

D. He wished to emphasize to President Carter that Hussein will not join the negotiations, at least not for now. Perhaps after Hussein sees a successful effort in Gaza, he may do so. At the moment, in Sadat's view, it is simply too profitable for Hussein to stay out. At one and the same time Hussein gets Baghdad Conference money⁷ and asks more questions of the U.S.

E. Sadat said President Carter told him that the Israelis will not be ready before the end of 1979 to establish an autonomous self-governing body in the West Bank/Gaza. He, Sadat, had responded that if the Israelis are not ready, Egypt can wait. He could not envisage Sinai withdrawal steps in the absence of some similar West Bank/Gaza, or at least

⁷ According to a November 7 briefing given to Jidda Embassy officials by the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, the Baghdad Conference participants voted to extend \$1.2 billion in aid to Jordan. See footnote 7, Document 85.

Gaza, steps. He had sought to explain to President Carter his idea. On the day that the interim withdrawal is completed in Sinai, there should also be full autonomy celebrated in Gaza. This means that one month after signature of a Sinai agreement, Israel and Egypt should sit together to agree on a date for elections, Israeli troop deployment, abolition of military government, etc. President Carter had said the Israelis will not be ready before the end of 1979 for elections. Advance preparations are needed. Sadat reiterated that his response had been that he is not in a hurry to have the first interim withdrawal in Sinai. The linkage issue with West Bank/Gaza should first be settled. If it takes 10 or 11 months instead of the 9 months stipulated in the Sinai framework, this is agreeable. The peace process, he contended, should not be damaged through actions like completing a Sinai agreement without defining what happens when in West Bank/Gaza. President Carter had noted that two years after the establishment of a self-governing authority, the parties will sit down to work out modalities for (as Sadat put it) self-determination. Sadat had responded that in two years time, the USG will be in the midst of presidential elections. The Israelis, he charged, are deliberately seeking to stall in order to ease President Carter's pressure on them. They are playing for time. Begin was in effect forced to sign the Camp David Agreements. It had never been his intention to do so. Begin is now trying to redress what he failed to achieve at Camp David. If Begin succeeds, this may indeed help him in the short run, but in the long run it will be against Israeli interests.

F. Sadat also asked that I emphasize to President Carter the concessions that he, Sadat, had made in agreeing to normalization after the first withdrawal. He had done so even though the Egyptian/Israeli framework document says nothing about exchanging ambassadors so soon. He had given President Carter his word regarding ambassadorial exchanges and he will not go back on this. It will be difficult enough to have this happen when part of the Sinai is still occupied by the Israelis, but his people are behind him. However, if this takes place with nothing having happened re West Bank/Gaza, this will be bad.

G. Sadat contended that he had been "hurt" when President Carter said that the Israelis claimed that he, Sadat, is now demanding more than the Camp David Agreements. He insisted that he is not doing so. He had always made it clear, including at Camp David, that a firm linkage was an absolute prerequisite to a Sinai agreement. With some show of testiness, he said that he did not like to be compared to the Israelis.

H. PriMin Khalil interjected that the Israelis also object to a meaningful Egyptian presence in Gaza. Sadat said the Israelis will accept only a nominal Egyptian presence, but Egypt will not agree to this.

I. In conclusion, Sadat asked that I convey the following to “my dear friend, President Carter”: “if you choose these Israeli claims, either in opposing specific linkage between the Sinai treaty and West Bank/Gaza arrangements or on priority of obligations or on other demands such as oil, our entire treaty negotiations will collapse. As a friend of yours and of the United States, and not as President of Egypt, I want to say that we will in that case lose everything that has been built together.” He, Sadat, would not agree. He had, in fact, made most of the concessions, the Israelis had made hardly any. “If the Egyptian and American positions differ on these matters, it will not be my fault,” Sadat said. He wanted President Carter to know that he stands by everything that he promised, but President Carter should also know that there are limits to what Sadat can do. He asked that President Carter reconsider the above points as they had been conveyed to him in last night’s telecon and in what he was telling me; otherwise he cannot sign the treaty.

3. After he had finished, I told Sadat that I was sure that President Carter had no desire to offend him. As he knew, President Carter has worked long and hard to try to bridge the gap between the parties (Sadat readily agreed). In making the points that he did to Sadat, President Carter was acting in good faith. I reminded Sadat that he had specifically told President Carter at Camp David that no linkage was necessary between the two framework documents. Sadat intervened to deny this; he claimed that he had never made any such statements; perhaps there was a misunderstanding based on his agreement to separate the two framework documents. I allowed that perhaps there had been a misunderstanding on this point, but I thought Sadat was asking more than the traffic will bear. There is already reference in the preamble and the accompanying note to the general framework document. The Israelis do not like this and contend that it is contrary to Camp David. Nevertheless, President Carter and the Secretary have pressed hard to retain that degree of linkage. To be specific in terms of timetable, is hardly feasible. Sadat insisted that in view of Israeli statements and actions regarding settlements, some specificity in timetable is needed; otherwise Egypt will find itself with a separate peace on its hands.

4. On separating Gaza, I recalled that when VP Mubarak had first mentioned this idea, I had told him that I thought it was a non-starter. The objective should be to get West Bank/Gaza negotiations underway as soon as feasible. Gaza by itself is hardly enough to serve as a model. Sadat insisted that if a Gaza self-governing body is negotiated, this will put pressure on Hussein to join the negotiations. He was not seeking to separate Gaza from the West Bank, but simply to begin with Gaza if circumstances in the West Bank militate against an early negotiation

there. As soon as the West Bank is ready to participate, whatever arrangements are worked out for Gaza could be expanded. I told him that I would report his comments, but reiterated that I thought this was a non-starter.

5. On Hussein and the Saudis, I said I could understand his sense of annoyance, but suggested that it is in GOE's own interest to take steps to improve relations. Sadat said he is not prepared to do so now. "Let Hussein and the Saudis stew in their own juice awhile."

6. Sadat had a bad cold and was by then showing signs of weariness. He asked that I get back to Cairo quickly to pass on his message without delay. I undertook to do so.

7. Comment: Sadat's back is up. Whether this is due to the Baghdad Conference, various Israeli statements made publicly and to the Egyptian delegation suggesting a no-hurry approach on the West Bank/Gaza, the apparent Israeli reneging on a Sinai interim withdrawal timetable, the unresolved West Bank settlements issue, or a combination of all these, I cannot say. I suspect that all these factors have played a role. Of his several points, I believe Sadat's principal one is achieving some kind of specific linkage between the Sinai treaty and West Bank/Gaza agreement. He insists that it was his understanding throughout the Camp David talks that, even though the two framework documents were separate, they would be linked in terms of implementation. He is concerned at what he believes will be an effort on our part to press him on outstanding issues rather than the Israelis. He fears he is being asked to compromise further on what is already a compromise. He is once again bitter about the Israelis and speaks of Israeli "arrogance." Some of this is doubtless tactical bargaining, but he is genuinely concerned that he not appear to be concluding a separate peace with Israel. Hence, he is likely to continue to insist on some sort of implementation linkage, including if necessary delaying the initial interim withdrawal arrangements in Sinai by a few months. He wants withdrawal in Sinai to begin, but he has come to realize that some sort of specific synchronization of Sinai and West Bank/Gaza activities is needed if his already tarnished Arab credentials are somehow to be maintained.

Eilts

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, November 13, 1978, 1936Z

287747. Subject: Letter to Sadat.

1. We want to pre-position the message below from President Carter to President Sadat, even though we have not yet received your detailed report on your conversation with Sadat this morning.² We will read that as soon as it comes in and send you any changes it suggests in this text along with talking points designed to be responsive to points made to you by Sadat this morning.

2. Start text: Dear President Sadat:

I enjoyed talking to you on the telephone Sunday³ and am sending this letter to expand further on what I said then.⁴ Secretary Vance has reported to me after meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan on Saturday⁵ and with Prime Minister Begin Sunday evening.⁶ These discussions were at times difficult but in the end I believe Cy made some headway. The negotiations have clearly reached a decisive stage, and I want to give you my best judgment of how we should now proceed to bring them to a rapid and successful conclusion.

After four weeks of continuous effort during which your delegation has demonstrated persistence and skill in support of your positions, I believe, except on the oil issue which is still under discussion between your delegation and the Israelis, we have arrived at the text of a treaty, its annexes and accompanying side letters and notes, which rep-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Atherton, Quandt, and Jack Perry (S/S); approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2243)

² See Document 129.

³ See Document 126.

⁴ In telegram 288539 to Cairo, November 14, Vance instructed Eilts to insert the following after the first sentence before delivery to Sadat: "I have also received and carefully reviewed Ambassador Eilts' full report on his meeting with you Monday." Moreover, Eilts was instructed to have the following sentence beginning "Secretary Vance has reported . . ." start a new paragraph. Vance also provided Eilts with a list of talking points for his scheduled November 14 meeting with Sadat. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78)

⁵ See Document 125.

⁶ See Document 128.

resents a fair balance of interests.⁷ While the Israelis still wish to delete the references to the Camp David framework from the treaty preamble, we have told them that the present language is an irreducible minimum and that we will not support changes. I personally reemphasized this point to Prime Minister Begin. I strongly urge that, for your part, you not seek further changes in texts of the treaty and its annexes that have been worked out by our delegations. To do so would, in my view, lead the Israelis to re-open other issues of importance to you on which we have with great difficulty obtained their agreement.

Secretary Vance's meetings Saturday and Sunday focused on the two remaining major unresolved issues other than oil. They are, first, the question of what will be said in a side document about the manner and timing of the steps envisaged in the Camp David Framework for the West Bank and Gaza, and, secondly, the question of the phasing of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line.

As you know, the Israelis have resisted any specific timetable for next steps in the West Bank and Gaza, taking the position that there should be no linkage between these negotiations and the subsequent process in the West Bank and Gaza. They have been particularly opposed to mentioning a specific target date for the holding of elections. We have supported your position and we have finally persuaded Dayan to accept as a target date that elections should be held not later than the end of 1979.

I propose that these assurances be embodied in a letter⁸ which I would write to you and Prime Minister Begin, if this procedure is acceptable to you. I am asking Hermann to go over with you⁹ the precise text of this letter. I believe a letter will be the quickest way to get agreement on the best possible language. It will be written to record the agreement of both sides in a way that will be no less binding than an exchange of notes. In addition, it gives me a chance to demonstrate the United States commitment to continued progress on the West Bank and Gaza.

On the issue of phasing of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line, Dayan and Weizman will support in the Cabinet debate the language which we have sent to you. Weizman and Dayan cannot guarantee acceptance by the Cabinet but consider it of the utmost importance that they succeed in winning Cabinet approval.

Finally, we have asked the Israelis for a letter which they would address to us detailing certain unilateral steps they would take in the

⁷ See Document 125.

⁸ See Document 131.

⁹ Ibid.

West Bank and Gaza to improve the political atmosphere for negotiations such as allowing freedom of political expression for the Palestinians during the negotiating period, moving Israel's military government from their present locations in Gaza and Nablus outside the Arab municipalities and granting amnesty to certain prisoners and detainees who are inhabitants of the two areas. Dayan and Weizman said they would support such steps personally but would have to discuss them with the Cabinet first.

I am keenly aware of the importance—to Egypt, to the United States, and to the peace process—of moving promptly to achieve concrete progress for the Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. I firmly believe that the best way to do this is to move promptly into the negotiations dealing with both of these Palestinian areas. Progress in those negotiations is the best way to ensure the earliest feasible elections. We can make our best effort to hold those elections before the interim Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. However, I do not believe it will be possible to establish a commitment now to the exact date. The Israeli agreement which we now have is to the objective of completing the negotiations and holding the elections as soon as feasible but in any case no later than the end of 1979.

I believe what has been achieved in these negotiations with respect to both the West Bank and Gaza can be regarded as an important accomplishment for Egypt as a realistic promise of progress for the Palestinians. The language firmly establishes that this treaty is the first step toward a comprehensive peace and that such a peace cannot be complete unless [missing text] solves the Palestinian problem. The letter which Ambassador Eilts will show you sets a firm date for the beginning of negotiations and a realistic timeframe for the subsequent steps envisioned in the Camp David framework. In those negotiations, we will be defining powers and responsibilities for the Palestinian self-governing body that will make it autonomous and indeed worthy of the name of self-government. As soon as we complete those negotiations, you can be justifiably proud that the first Palestinian self-governing body would be brought into existence well before the full exercise of Egyptian authority is restored in the Sinai. Your government will be able to stand by this achievement in the eyes of the world with pride.

I know from our talk, Mr. President, that you feel strongly that the interim withdrawal should not be completed before the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza, or at least in Gaza. I also want to see parallel progress on the Palestinian issues. By continuing our efforts in the next phase of negotiations, we can establish a practical linkage between stages of withdrawal and steps on the West Bank and Gaza, but to modify the texts of the agreement now

under consideration for a specific Gaza date would, in my view, be impossible and would look like a new demand on your part which was not included in the Camp David Accords.

We will be a full partner in the next phase of negotiations and, as in the past, we can produce positive results by working together with you. We can let the world see that Egypt has not made a separate peace. By pressing forward, with our support, in the negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza these tangible, on-the-ground steps will be more convincing than any language we can agree upon today.

We now have the components of a peace treaty package which is fair to both sides, and I am urging both you and Prime Minister Begin, with whom I also spoke on the telephone,¹⁰ to move as quickly as possible to give your final approval to these documents.

It would help me, Mr. President, if you could give me your response as soon as possible. We are at a decisive moment which we must seize. Further negotiation will not yield significant gains for either side but could, on the contrary, place in jeopardy what has been accomplished thus far. Conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be a major achievement. It will be so recognized throughout the world and will strengthen our hands to forge ahead without delay toward the objective of a comprehensive peace which we set for ourselves at Camp David.

With my best wishes.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

3. You should make certain Sadat understands that his delegation here has not signed on to those elements of the treaty package which their instructions do not permit them to agree to. In particular, the letter on the West Bank and Gaza and the new language on phasing of withdrawal to the interim line were shown to them for the first time Sunday. What we are doing in effect is asking Sadat to approve a package which his delegation's instructions do not permit them to agree to in a number of respects.

4. One of the changes we anticipate making in the above text would be to add a new second sentence which would indicate that the President has read your report of your Monday conversation with Sadat.

Vance

¹⁰ See Document 127.

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 14, 1978, 1717Z

24816. Subject: Sadat's Reaction to President Carter's Letter. Ref: A) State 287747,² B) State 288539.³

Summary. Gave Sadat President Carter's letter and supplemented this with approved talking points. Sadat's reaction was one of disappointment. His first reaction was that we are "speaking different languages." He would not sign a treaty with Israel and put himself at the Israelis' "mercy" with respect to West Bank/Gaza, regardless of what the extent of USG involvement may be. Israelis will simply stall. Minimum GOE will accept, Sadat stated, is arrangement whereby self-government in Gaza will be established during first phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, even if completion of first phase has to be delayed for several months. GOE will also not agree to priority of obligations language in present treaty draft.⁴ Sadat plans meet later today with VP Mubarak and PriMin Khalil to study Carter letter and draft West Bank/Gaza letter.⁵ He will then instruct Mubarak, who leaves for Washington tomorrow, to carry an answer⁶ to President Carter. Mubarak authorized spend as much time in Washington as he deems necessary to work with President Carter "to search for a way out of this situation." Sadat professed to believe that a USG confrontation with Begin is needed. Mubarak will have considerable discretionary authority, but will have Sadat's instructions very much in mind. End summary.

1. I met with Sadat and VP Mubarak early this afternoon in Ismailia. I presented President Carter's letter to Sadat with addition authorized paragraph 1, ref B. I then read him, slowly, the text of President Carter's letter. Several times during my reading of the letter, Sadat shook his head in obvious disagreement. I also read him revised text of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Brzezinski wrote: "Sadat's response. ZB." Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the telegram to indicate that he saw the document.

² See Document 130.

³ See footnote 4, Document 130.

⁴ See Document 125.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ See Document 133.

letter re West Bank/Gaza minus clause re December 17, 1978 date (State 287408 and State 287766).⁷

2. I then went through the talking points provided ref B in some detail, noting West Bank/Gaza letter which I had read to him does contain timetable for moving to self-government and redeployment of Israeli forces. We recognize that period envisaged in draft letter is longer than Sadat or we desired, but emphasized that it does not preclude elections before end of interim withdrawal. Much as we appreciate Sadat's desire for precise timetable, I pointed out that this is objectively not possible. Camp David frameworks underscore relationship between Egyptian/Israeli Treaty and West Bank/Gaza negotiations, but as I was sure he would agree, they establish no requirement re timing of specific steps. To delay interim withdrawal, as Sadat proposed, would simply mean Israel will insist that West Bank/Gaza elections be delayed beyond end of 1979. I reminded him of how much has in fact been achieved in establishing a practical relationship between the two sets of negotiations, pointing out that this is more than we had thought possible. While many Israelis may want to go slow on West Bank/Gaza, treaty package creates built-in process which will require early negotiations. As he knew, USG from President Carter on down have interest in moving expeditiously and Sadat has our commitment to remain involved as full party. USG intends to make major effort, as it did after Camp David, to support treaty package and Egypt throughout Arab world. I pointed out that actual progress which will follow ratification of Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty will have more impact on Camp David critics than any treaty language.

3. Re Sadat's proposal on Gaza, we understand it and appreciate his desire for Egyptian presence. As he knew, however, Camp David Framework has no specific provision for Gaza and we do not want to appear to be attempting to split the Palestinians by handling Gaza separately from West Bank. Possibility that Sadat can achieve what he wants re Gaza once negotiating process starts, I noted, cannot be ruled out. Re timing of phases of withdrawal, I pointed out that early beginning of normalization, including exchange of ambassadors, will be an incentive to Israel to accelerate withdrawal. I also gave him view of Department's legal advisor that proposed letter from President Carter re West Bank/Gaza has same binding effect as an exchange of letters between Sadat and Begin. All things considered, therefore, I hoped that Sadat could accede to President Carter's request to accept the treaty package as it stands.

4. Sadat heard me out, but was clearly unhappy with the substance of President Carter's letter and my supplementary comments on it. (He

⁷ See Document 125.

had just come from speaking to a labor group, was tired and was still suffering from a bad cold.) Rather wearily, he said his first reaction is that we are “speaking different languages.” It is out of the question, Sadat said with some show of emotion, that he would sign a treaty with Israel and put himself at the Israelis’ “mercy” with respect to the West Bank/Gaza, regardless of what the extent of USG involvement may be. He asked rhetorically how Egyptians and Arabs will receive his exchanging ambassadors with Israel one month after the Israeli interim withdrawal is completed when part of the Sinai remains occupied and no meaningful negotiations have yet been begun re West Bank/Gaza. I reminded him that the parties are committed under the West Bank/Gaza letter to begin negotiations within one month of ratification of an Egyptian/Israeli treaty. Sadat responded that this does not mean much, especially since the Israelis have made it very clear that they are in no hurry to specify when elections will be held, troop redeployment dates, etc., in West Bank/Gaza. They will simply spin out talks. The Israelis are up to their old tricks and he was not prepared to mortgage his position to Begin’s good intentions. Such a development would hurt not only him, but President Carter in the area. As a “friend and a partner,” he wanted President Carter to know his view that “we must play it fair.” I said that this is precisely what we want and are trying to do. Sadat would have none of it. He did not question President Carter’s desire to be fair, but insisted that the present treaty package amounts to a separate Egyptian/Israeli agreement. He could not take the Israelis on faith re their West Bank/Gaza intentions.

5. The minimum that GOE will accept, Sadat stated, is a Gaza arrangement. There should be self-government in Gaza during the first phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai even if completion of that phase has to be delayed for several months—perhaps to November of next year. VP Mubarak interjected to note Egypt also still objects to item 5 of article 6 re priority of obligations. Sadat firmly endorsed Mubarak’s comment and said Egypt will not, under any circumstances, agree to giving priority to the Egyptian/Israeli treaty obligations.

6. Sadat reiterated that his preliminary reaction is negative. He said that he will meet with VP Mubarak and PriMin Khalil later today to study President Carter’s letter and the proposed draft West Bank/Gaza letter (which he insisted that I give him). He would then instruct VP Mubarak, who leaves for Washington tomorrow, to carry an answer to President Carter. In my presence, he instructed Mubarak to give all the time necessary to President Carter in order, as Sadat put it, “to search for a way out of this situation.” Mubarak would explain the whole thing to President Carter and could decide to remain in Washington as long as the Vice President desired. Mubarak’s future movements should be agreed upon by President Carter and Mubarak. Mubarak could also decide what other actions might be necessary.

7. Sadat closed by recalling that he had told Secretary Vance that a confrontation with Begin is needed. He had asked the Secretary whether the USG is prepared for “brinkmanship” and the Secretary had replied in the affirmative. What is now needed, Sadat said, is a confrontation between President Carter and Begin, if the latter remains adamant, in order to obtain the necessary Israeli concessions. I told Sadat that in a sense there is already a confrontation between President Carter and Begin. This is evident by the negative Israeli reaction to some elements of the treaty package. Begin is under no illusions as to President Carter’s view. I pointed out, however, that it is necessary to take one thing at a time. To escalate the confrontation with Begin to public dimensions would only rally public support for the Israeli Prime Minister. It would not achieve what both Sadat and President Carter want. What is needed is to conclude the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty and then proceed with equal vigor on moving ahead with West Bank/Gaza matters. Sadat said he disagreed. A confrontation with Begin is needed, as he saw it, if the outstanding issues are to be satisfactorily resolved. VP Mubarak, he reiterated, would amplify on his views.

8. As I was leaving, I noted that the treaty package is being deliberated in the Israeli Cabinet and Knesset. Many things will be said publicly which may seem outrageous. We urge that Sadat continue to avoid being drawn into public debate until the process is completed in Israel otherwise he will only weaken supporters of the treaty and give ammunition to critics. I said we would urge Israel to act in the same way. Sadat said he has no desire to engage in a rhetorical battle with the Israelis, but much would depend upon what comes out of Israel during the treaty debate. He recalled that GOE had made no public statement when Israel announced settlements expansion. Subsequently, Begin had pointed to Egyptian silence, claiming that this showed GOE has no objection to such expansion. This is clearly not correct and GOE will have to make a judgment on whether the protection of its interests requires answering the Israelis lest silence again be taken by Begin as acquiescence.

9. Comment: Sadat’s tough line continues. He was clearly disappointed in the President’s letter and unusually emotional in his comments. Sadat is a consummate actor and his performance was doubtless partly show. However, despite our efforts, he does feel that the treaty package, as presently constituted, is inequitable to him. He professes to believe that it will hurt him and, as he likes to point out, also President Carter in the Arab world. He is himself engaging in a game of brinkmanship, but I believe he will as a minimum insist on some change in the draft package if he is to sign it. I sense some unhappiness that Boutros Ghali may not have been tough enough in the negotiations. Hence, the dispatch of Mubarak at the very time Ghali is being recalled

on consultations. Mubarak will have considerable discretionary authority, but he will be difficult to deal with since he will come as the voice of Sadat.

Eilts

132. Memorandum From the White House Counsel (Lipshutz) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 14, 1978

RE

My conversations today with Leon Charney, American attorney for Ezer Weizman

This memorandum supplements the oral report which I gave to Dr. Brzezinski late this afternoon, and a copy of this memorandum has been given to him also.

At Weizman's request Charney came to Washington late yesterday, and he has talked with me here at the White House several times during the past 24 hours, and between his visits with me he has been with Weizman. This report reflects Weizman's observations.

The meeting of the Israeli Cabinet later this week obviously is quite important, and Weizman feels that it will be most helpful for the peace process if he is able to attend. However, since Prime Minister Begin had left him here to continue the negotiations, he was having a difficult time figuring out a basis upon which he could return for the meeting. He also has the personal interest in being at the birth of his new grandson on Friday.

Apparently he has felt the need of some significant message to take back to the Cabinet meeting, in order to justify his returning at this particular time.

In addition to the linkage question, about which I received very little information, the thrust of the message which he sent related to financial matters. Weizman apparently believes that the total financial

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 11/14–17/78. Confidential. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "cc Zbig. J." Under this notation, Vance wrote: "Pres and CV met Weizman this afternoon."

package which has been presented of about \$3.3 Billion is a great deal higher than is really needed to carry out the essential elements of the peace process relative to the Egyptian agreement. He has suggested that the sum of approximately \$1.5 Billion spread out over three to four years, would be sufficient to take care of the essential elements such as the construction of the two new airfields, the building of roads and infrastructures in the Negev, and additional electronic surveillance equipment. Little mention was made of the form of such financial assistance but I get the impression that long term, low interest loans would suffice.²

(As a personal observation from me, it is my understanding that whereas direct loans by the federal government would constitute expenditures under the budgetary process, loans from other sources with federal government guarantees might only cause a budgetary impact of the differential between total interest costs and the interest charged on such loans.)

Weizman had expressed some concern as no contact had been made with him during these current negotiations by our Defense Department, but I understand that this evening he is meeting with some representatives from the Pentagon.

Concerning the type of expression of financial support which Weizman thinks would be adequate for the purpose of getting the Israeli Cabinet to overcome a sufficient amount of its concern about this factor is a message which includes language such as: "the United States Government will consider", or "the United States Government will look into", or "the United States Government acknowledges this financial need", along with a caveat such as "subject to the review by the United States of the actual needs, and subject, of course, to Congressional approval". Along with such language, some indication of your understanding and general support for such financial assistance should be sufficient.³

Weizman also indicated that he as Defense Minister is prepared to reassess Israel's military requirements and would expect to have significant reductions in the projected needs as presently presented.

Charney came back this evening after having been with Weizman following Weizman's meeting here at the White House. Weizman apparently is anxious to be here to meet with the Egyptian Vice President when he comes on Wednesday.⁴ Presumably Secretary Vance called Weizman and urged him again to go back to Jerusalem in time to attend

² In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Give info to Harold."

³ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Info for Cy."

⁴ For discussion of Weizman's meeting with Mubarak, see Document 134.

the Cabinet meeting and Weizman apparently agrees that it is very important.

Also, Weizman has invited the Egyptian Defense Minister to have dinner with him either tonight or tomorrow night; it was not clear to Charney which night he is doing so.

Regarding the question of financial aid, Weizman states “the President did not tell me NO”, and apparently Weizman received this response in a positive way.⁵

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “I made no comment at all.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter, along with Vance, met with Weizman in his study at the White House from 3:01 p.m. to 5:02 p.m., November 14. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other record of this meeting has been found.

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 16, 1978, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

President’s Meeting with Vice President Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
 Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
 Mr. Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
 Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
 Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff

 H.E. Muhammad Husni Mubarak, Vice President of Egypt
 H.E. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.

The President: It is an honor to have you here. Please extend to President Sadat my best greetings and remind him of the personal friendship I feel for him. The Camp David agreements were an interim step in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 11/14–17/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Carter’s handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

the fulfillment of President Sadat's dream when he went to Jerusalem. It would [be] a tragedy if his effort were not to result in peace. It will help us for you to present the Egyptian position clearly.

Your negotiating team in Washington has done a superb job. They are competent, tough negotiators. It is hard for the delegations from Egypt or Israel to negotiate when the leaders of their countries are not present. At Camp David, Begin or Sadat could make final decisions. This resulted in hundreds of compromises. This is more difficult for the negotiators to do since they are uncertain of what the reactions will be back home. General Ali and Minister Ghali have done a great job and they deserve credit and appreciation for that. I am concerned about the future of the negotiations. Our most serious problem is that public statements are made in Egypt and Israel which can become a source of diplomatic incidents. This did not take place at Camp David. Now all the proposals that are made are in the international news and this causes serious problems.

We have tried to find common ground between the parties, and later Egypt or Israel rejects the agreements that have been reached by the negotiators. This has been frustrating for us but we will continue as a negotiating partner. Both Secretary Vance and I have many other responsibilities which we have been neglecting to some extent. We thought that the treaty negotiations could [be] done in a few days. We have other problems, such as with the Soviet Union, in Africa, Cyprus, NATO, and Nicaragua. We need a commitment now to succeed, and this requires understanding of the other side's political problems, and there is a need for flexibility on both sides. No ultimatum can help. That would aggravate the already difficult problems.

Your presence here will be constructive and we know that you speak for President Sadat. There have been some recent statements that have added a new dimension and I am sure that you will want to discuss them. We believe that to separate Gaza from the West Bank is a new development, if the news reports are accurate, and I am eager to hear directly from you on the Egyptian position. I hope your position will open the door quickly to a peace treaty.

Vice President Mubarak: Thank you for your warm welcome. I met with Secretary Vance last night² and bring you greetings from President Sadat. We want to thank you for the effort you made at Camp David. Ninety percent of the problems were solved there. The Egyptian people are aware of your efforts and appreciate them.

² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

There are two main points I want to make: the first deals with the West Bank and Gaza; the second deals with the priority of obligations. I want to explain both of these issues to you.

Since the negotiations began, we believe that there should be a link between our peace treaty and the comprehensive solution. If there is just an Egyptian-Israeli treaty without a solution to the Palestinian problem, this will not lead to peace. It will complicate matters. So President Sadat hopes that you will understand that there should be more done for the West Bank and Gaza, there should be a guarantee of the negotiations there. This does not mean that we want to divide the West Bank from Gaza at all. We are very keen to keep both tied together. But Gaza was under our administration in 1967 and may be easier to deal with. We could build a good model there to start. We have influence, and there are many Palestinians from Gaza in Egypt. We can start on the West Bank and Gaza, but Gaza will be easier. It can serve as a model for Hussein and others. We don't want to separate the West Bank and Gaza at all.

Sadat wants to start with the timetable for the West Bank and Gaza both, but he knows that the West Bank will be more complex. Gaza may be easier. We don't want to separate the two, but if there is a timetable for negotiating on both, this will be all right. But we think it will take time for the West Bank and we want to stimulate King Hussein to join the negotiations. He has to see real action taking place. I have met King Hussein several times. He is afraid of the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, as well as of the PLO. He wants peace, but he is in a difficult situation. He won't join the negotiations unless he sees something at least happening in Gaza and if possible in the West Bank too. If we neglect Gaza and the West Bank, the whole Arab world will attack—you saw what happened in Baghdad—and they will accuse Sadat and President Carter. They will raise hell. They will say that Egypt has gone for a separate agreement.

The President: They are already saying that.

Vice President Mubarak: We hear this everywhere, even in Europe. They are all pushing the Palestinian problem. They all say that if only an agreement is reached on Sinai this will amount to a separate peace. So President Sadat insists that we push the Palestinian problem along with Sinai, even if we must postpone the withdrawal in Sinai. Things will be easier in Gaza. It can be a good model to the Palestinians and King Hussein. This is the main point. It does not mean separation. President Sadat sees this as a concession. He wants both the West Bank and Gaza, but offers Gaza alone as a concession. He expects you to see that Gaza will make things easier.

The President: We have a wonderful relationship with Egypt. We also have an equally good relationship with Saudi Arabia, and a fairly

good relationship with Jordan. For there to be divisions among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan causes us deep concerns. It makes the achievement of our common purposes more difficult, especially when Egypt and Saudi Arabia are in disagreement.

My feeling is that President Sadat has not consulted enough with Saudi Arabia, and this makes my job more difficult. I asked President Sadat to talk with Crown Prince Fahd. Sadat said that he is punishing Saudi Arabia. I understand his concern, but I hope that you can keep in mind the concept that we have of the United States cooperating closely with Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and perhaps Jordan. This could form a strong, continuing alliance of friendly countries which would present a common front. We have very good relations with each of these nations, as do you. Divisions among these countries could weaken our cause. Beyond this, we believe that all of the Arab nations and Israel need protection against the Soviet Union and their hired help in North Africa and the Middle East. In the past, the priority among the Arabs was to fight Israel. Their secondary concerns were with the Soviet Union. President Sadat has helped me to understand that the stability of the entire Middle East and North Africa could depend upon the achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace. Your five divisions in the Suez Canal area could be relieved and they could help to balance threats elsewhere. So much has already been accomplished, and there is now a feeling of common purpose between Egypt and Israel. You can't expect to get the approval now of Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

Vice President Mubarak: Not even of Jordan.

The President: Jordan is weak, but we can't get the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the PLO to approve what we are doing. President Sadat has shown great courage. There is no way that I could violate my commitments to President Sadat, and to others, by approving a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel. We didn't need to go to Camp David if we were just seeking a separate agreement. If we had been willing to abandon the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians, then we had no need of Camp David. We don't want a separate peace treaty. We cannot abandon the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question.

The Israelis have already made great concessions. It is hard for you and President Sadat to know how difficult these decisions are for Prime Minister Begin. He gave more in Sinai than the Labor Party would have given. They wanted to keep a corridor to Sharm el-Sheik, and they wanted to keep the settlements. They would not recognize the Palestinians' right to self-government. Begin has made tremendous concessions, and President Sadat has also made generous concessions, but there is a tendency in Egypt not to see how far Begin has come. In the Camp David agreements, linkage is clearly spelled out. Camp David dealt not only with Sinai, but also with the West Bank, Gaza, and

Golan. This is just as binding an agreement as the peace treaty that is now being negotiated. Israel wanted no linkage at all in the documents. They have good reason, although I don't agree with them, but if there is linkage in the letters, in the annexes, then in the future, in three months or in three years, they are afraid that if there is no movement on the West Bank and Gaza, in setting up the self-government, and if Egypt does not approve of this, this could give President Sadat a reason to say the peace treaty with Israel is null and void. Once the treaty is signed, Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and I all want it to be permanent, just as Camp David is permanent. There should be no change unless both sides agree to it. The linkage is already there. After hours, after weeks, we have Israeli agreement on linkage. This is done both in the treaty and in other documents. Nothing could be clearer than the commitment to begin negotiations within one month of the ratification of the treaty on the West Bank and Gaza. This is tangible and clear. We have gotten that commitment from the Israelis. This will take place before anything else has happened in terms of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. This is a very clear linkage. In the preamble, there is also a specified linkage. This is more than Israel wants, but it is less than you want.

I feel very concerned about any inclination to separate Gaza from the West Bank. I am reassured by what you say. President Sadat told me on Sunday that he was making this suggestion in a positive way in order to make things easier for Israel. But the mistrust between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin is still very strong. It should not be there. I have confidence in President Sadat, but the Israelis do not share that feeling. So we have tried to reduce distrust by proven actions. The treaty text and its annexes, and all of the letters, will be permanent. If I sign a letter to both of you, the honor of the United States is at stake. I won't sign such a letter unless I am sure that it will be honored. I won't mislead either party. The treaty and the annexes and the letters are all equally binding. We cannot make more of a commitment in the treaty than was made at Camp David, and at Camp David there was already a complete linkage guaranteed and approved by Begin and Sadat.

We have a target date for beginning the negotiations and a date for the establishment of the self-government. I can see your concern. I have concerns myself, and I know that this is a very doubtful procedure even if Israel, Egypt, and the United States are ready to move. There has never been a registration of all the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to vote. There is no accurate census. We don't know whether women will vote, or whether eighteen year olds or twenty-one year olds, will vote. Just to register everyone will be difficult. The PLO may threaten them. There is a question of Hussein's attitude. To say that

elections will definitely be held in five months would be difficult at best. If the elections can be completed in nine or ten or eleven or twelve months, this will be a notable step. The Israelis think that it can be done. Foreign Minister Dayan is getting to the end of his career, but he personally wants to carry out the elections and oversee the withdrawal of the military government. This is one of his great ambitions, to end the occupation. But to tie this together with a specific date could cast doubt on the treaty. If Israel agrees, that would suit me fine. Anything you agree to is all right. But I am afraid of what will happen if you set a co-terminous date. The Israelis fear that even if they do their best, but if things fail, this could jeopardize the Egypt-Israel treaty. The entire process is very difficult. We have asked the Israelis for unilateral commitments to show good faith by allowing political meetings and the release of some political prisoners. They have said that they will do this as a unilateral gesture. I believe that we can be successful, and I hope that you will understand the special problems in Israel.

I see the peace treaty as being signed, and then within one month, there would be negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. There would be a registration of voters, elections would be held and the self-government would be established. The first thing on the agenda would be to define the duties and responsibilities of the self-governing body. If the negotiations go well, which I anticipate, then there will be an increase in trust, despite some difficulties. I assume that you saw our answers to King Hussein. I assume that these satisfied you, although the Israelis do not like them. We will take these views into those negotiations.

My preference is that Egypt and Israel will accept the treaty as it now is. If Israel is willing to link the elections in the West Bank and Gaza to the interim withdrawal date, I have no objections. I see Sadat's offer to wait on withdrawal until there is proof of progress in the West Bank and Gaza as a generous step. But it could make the whole peace treaty tentative instead of final. The Israelis say they are prepared to negotiate in good faith. President Sadat doubts that. There are some doubts in Israel that President Sadat can prevail over the PLO. I have no assurance that the Israeli Cabinet will accept the present document.

Secretary Vance: On linkage, there is now language in the preamble that is basically derived from an Egyptian draft.

Vice President Mubarak: That's okay.

The President: I met with Weizman recently,³ and I have met with Dayan.⁴ They see that linkage is there. They are prepared to begin ne-

³ See footnote 5, Document 132.

⁴ See Document 90.

gotiations in one month, and this is not in the Camp David agreement. They will go this far. If they were to violate this agreement or to act in bad faith, the whole world would see it.

Secretary Vance: The Israelis have now agreed to “continuous negotiations”, and to negotiate in good faith with the objective of holding elections by the end of 1979. This will lead to an end of the military government, and they will repeat their agreement to a withdrawal of Israeli forces as called for in Camp David.

Vice President Mubarak: The question is when.

The President: It says within a year. President Sadat is concerned by world reaction and especially reaction in the Arab world. He can either describe the language that we now have as establishing linkage, and he can point to this and remind people that at Camp David we had a solemn agreement on this. This will convince people around the world that there is linkage. If he takes the same language and says that it is not adequate, world opinion will be negative. It is important how we interpret the words. Many facets of Camp David were not entirely acceptable to either Egypt or Israel, but all of us could point to the benefits of the agreements. Lately, both sides have begun to emphasize the differences rather than the advantages.

Vice President Mubarak: Camp David already achieved ninety percent of what is needed.

The President: Now we have solved ninety-five percent of the remaining ten percent! But we still have obstacles.

Vice President Mubarak: We are anxious about when the full autonomy will begin. We want something tangible, even if we have to postpone withdrawal. That would be better in the Arab world. No one now believes that Israel will give full autonomy. If full autonomy and withdrawal of the military government can take place by January 1980, this will give us satisfaction.

The President: Suppose you sign an agreement and then Arafat and his supporters might try to prevent the holding of the elections which would then put an end to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. They could mount tremendous pressures to block the elections. The United States, Israel, and Egypt might not be able to do anything about that. I can assure you that Dayan and Weizman are completely committed to rapid movement toward self-government and autonomy, and they will agree to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to designated areas. I can't speak as clearly for Begin.

Vice President Mubarak: The point is that we want to show the world that we are just not taking Sinai without something in the West Bank and Gaza. We know the West Bank will be more difficult. This is the reason we want Gaza to be a model. We have connections to the

people there. The PLO can make trouble in the West Bank, and that is why it will take more time. This is why we want to give a model. We want to be able to defend our agreement in front of the entire world.

The President: The idea is generous, but it could create new problems. Israel distrusts Egypt and when you say that Gaza should go first, Israel sees Egypt as wanting Gaza back. We hope that you can consult with the Saudis and the Jordanians if possible. I don't know what their reactions would be. I would guess that they would resent any unilateral move in Gaza. Let me clarify my understanding of your position. You want to sign the peace treaty, and as soon as it is ratified Israel will be able to use the Suez Canal and to enjoy free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Within one month, negotiations will begin on the West Bank and Gaza, and the Egyptian delegation will include some Palestinians from Gaza, and maybe some from the West Bank also. The negotiations will define the duties and responsibilities of the new government, and will establish modalities for the elections—how voters should be registered, and how the elections should be carried out. Then voters will be registered, and the election will take place and the self-government will be established. The self-government might not be completely representative. Some people may boycott the election. Maybe only ten percent of the voters will vote in the West Bank and fifty percent in Gaza. We hope that Hussein will join and the Saudis will support this process. But if all of this is done in good time and in good faith, whenever those elections are completed, you want to have the self-government established, and then simultaneously you want the interim withdrawal in Sinai to take place. One month after the interim withdrawal, you are prepared to exchange ambassadors with Israel. Then there would be another two or three years before full withdrawal in Sinai—the earlier the better from our point of view—and then within five years of the establishment of the self-governing authority, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in negotiations. You prefer to see the West Bank and Gaza kept together, but if Hussein and the PLO prevent the establishment of self-government in the West Bank, then you favor progress in Gaza because of Egyptian influence there. If there is no progress in the West Bank, but there is some in Gaza, this would be adequate for you to conclude the interim withdrawal and to exchange ambassadors. Is this correct?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes.

Secretary Vance: When the peace treaty is signed, will the Suez Canal be opened to Israeli ships immediately?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes, there is no problem. The only point is the full autonomy in Gaza.

The President: I am trying to minimize what you demand from the Israelis. In the Camp David Agreement, it says that the military gov-

ernment will be withdrawn “as soon as” the self-governing authority is established. It would be easier if you were to set the interim date at the time of elections, not tied to the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Vice President Mubarak: We want the self-government to start functioning at the time the interim withdrawal is completed.

Secretary Vance: After one month, negotiations will begin. Do you see two sets of negotiations? One dealing with Israel, Egypt, and Gaza and the second involving Israel, Jordan, with the West Bank issue?

Vice President Mubarak: We want to start with the West Bank and Gaza together.

The President: This is your preference?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes. We are sure that the West Bank will be delayed. It would be very good if they were ready. It would be ideal for both to go together.

Secretary Vance: Gazans would be in the Egyptian delegation, and this would be a sign of your positive relationship.

The President: There is nothing to prevent West Bank Palestinians from joining your delegation, if they have someone to speak for them.

Vice President Mubarak: We are making contacts with them. Khalid al-Hassan is coming in one week. I'll meet with him secretly. He is very moderate. Even Arafat is moderate, but he has a problem with the Syrians. They once put him in jail. The Palestinians in Kuwait are also in contact with us. Some Palestinians are totally opposed to any solution, but not all.

The President: You will be pleasantly surprised to know the quiet support for this process that the Saudis are giving. King Hassan has the same attitude, as does Numeiri. They expressed this support quietly.

Vice President Mubarak: I have been in touch with the Saudis.

The President: Good. This places a responsibility on us not to take any action or make any statements that will make it difficult for the Saudis. They want unity and moderation in the Arab world and they want to have some influence over the Iraqis and others. We shouldn't make it hard for them to keep one foot in that camp. President Sadat should recognize their constructive role. It hurts the Saudis to be publicly criticized, and Fahd particularly feels this. The Saudis tried at Baghdad,⁵ and perhaps they made too many compromises, but I would like to see close cooperation between Sadat and Fahd.

Vice President Mubarak: We have contacts, but we keep them quiet. I saw Fahd before Camp David for four hours. He was very convinced. He approved the trip of President Sadat to Camp David. President

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 85.

Sadat is in full control of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, we are in touch, but neither of us talks about it.

The President: I am glad to hear this.

Secretary Vance: I still don't see clearly how you will explain to the Arab world that you are prepared to complete the process with Gaza, while leaving the West Bank out.

The President: Let me try to answer. The world will see that Egypt prefers to move in both the West Bank and Gaza, and only if there are uncontrollable factors which prevent movement in the West Bank, Egypt would then continue with Gaza regardless.

Vice President Mubarak: When Sadat gives his word, he never deviates. If it is only going to be in Gaza, we will tell you. If we say both, we mean both and as quickly as possible.

The President: If you had the choice between getting progress in the West Bank and Gaza by next October or just in Gaza by next April, would you prefer October?

Vice President Mubarak: Yes. We would prefer to finish with both, even if it takes three or four or five months longer.

Secretary Vance: We still have the problem of how to explain this in public.

The President: Only President Sadat can do this. He needs to emphasize the importance of keeping the West Bank and Gaza together. Otherwise he gives the impression of wanting to separate Gaza.

Vice President Mubarak: I said there would be no separation.

The President: I hope you won't raise the question of the priority of obligations. I understand the problem and we have had tedious negotiations on this. We understand the problem posed by some earlier agreements with Arab nations. It is clear that the present treaty is in conflict with those obligations. We have looked at our own agreements, and we have contacted international lawyers, and we have tried to put in common internationally accepted language of what is necessary in cases of this sort. Secretary Vance can explain it to you.

Vice President Mubarak: What is mentioned in the treaty will not do anything, but it will hurt us internally and the Communists and extremists will use it against us. They will say that Egypt and Israel are allies.

The President: We can't satisfy the Iraqis and the Syrians ever.

Secretary Vance: If Syria is attacked by Israel, you can still help Syria.

The President: And President Sadat can say that. Egypt has the advantage of being able to explain this in a positive way. He can defend his Arab brothers in Syria and Jordan if they are attacked by Israel. But

if President Sadat remains silent, then others may make criticisms. We think that this language allows Sadat to make a statement dealing with the self-defense. I understand your problem.

Vice President Mubarak: President Sadat is very annoyed on this point. We don't want to add to your problems. Article VI, paragraph 2, adds nothing, nor does paragraph 5.

The President: We spent so much time on this.

Secretary Vance: If you open it up, Israel will go back to the preamble, and that is where you have the linkage, and they will reopen the language on Gaza.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll talk to Weizman, but I'll be going back to Sadat to explain this to him.

The President: When the treaty is signed, Sadat can say that his obligation to defend other Arabs from an Israeli attack is still binding. He can say this. He can even quote me that this is the U.S. interpretation.

Vice President Mubarak: I won't argue over these two points. But I'll tell Weizman that we do not agree to the letter and we do not agree to Article VI. I will be very vehement with him.

The President: (To Secretary Vance.) What will the Israeli reactions be?

Secretary Vance: The Israelis want to talk with us before the Cabinet meeting on Sunday.⁶ On linkage, there will be problems with Begin and Dayan. They will see this as an effort to split off Gaza and they are very sensitive and suspicious on this point.

The President: When you see Weizman, I hope you won't separate Gaza from the West Bank in his mind.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll talk about the Palestinian problem and the West Bank and Gaza together. I will take one line and I'll pursue this. It will be easiest for me to proceed this way.

The President: That seems to be your preference.

Vice President Mubarak: I will speak of the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question. I will let any separation between the West Bank and Gaza be a concession only if you request it and it is needed.

The President: That is better.

Vice President Mubarak: I will leave Gaza as a concession for you.

The President: Don't make it an Egyptian proposal.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll talk about the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian question. I will not talk about Gaza alone. I will leave that for the President.

⁶ November 19.

The President: That is very helpful. I am glad to get to know you. I have heard fine things about you. I know President Sadat has confidence in you. We should try to minimize our public demands and statements. They have a way of becoming matters of national honor. The Israelis also do this, and we hope that neither side will talk so much to the press.

Vice President Mubarak: We were very upset about the Israeli settlements. When we decided to keep quiet, they said that we approved of what they were doing.

The President: They say that Egypt doesn't care and that this is just a U.S.-Israeli problem.

Ambassador Ghorbal: When we talked to Weizman and Dayan, we took a very strong position on the settlements.

Secretary Vance: One issue which you have been pressing has been an Egyptian presence in Gaza, especially the presence of Egyptian police. This is a very explosive issue with the Israelis. Are you still insisting on it?

Vice President Mubarak: We are only interested in a symbolic presence. I'll speak to Weizman. We don't want police there to fight Israel. We know the situation in Gaza. We just want to send some police and have a presence.

Secretary Vance: I hope you can get this cleared up.

Vice President Mubarak: We mentioned it before.

The President: This is an additional problem. Even if there are only fifteen police, it opens up a new area. One possibility might be that when negotiations take place, when there is a registration of voters, when the elections are held, there would be some kind of international monitoring. This could involve the U.N., or perhaps a joint Israeli-Egyptian presence. They could attest to the fairness of the elections. This would be the best way for there to be an Egyptian presence.

Vice President Mubarak: We could think of an Egyptian-Israeli presence.

The President: Why don't you explore this with Weizman?

Secretary Vance: The fear is that you want to take over the Gaza Strip.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll explain to him. We want to finish with this problem. We don't want Gaza.

The President: Try to make this clear to the Israelis.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll talk about the priority of obligations with him. I won't tell the Israelis that we agree yet. Mr. President, if you want to see me while I am here, I will be available.

Secretary Vance: There is only one other major issue and that is oil. There should be some way to work this through.

Vice President Mubarak: I'll talk to Weizman. We can't give them any privileged position, but we are ready to sell them oil. Why do they need a written note?

Secretary Vance: They are concerned over the present unstable oil situation. They are concerned over how they will get their oil. They want to be able to buy a certain quantity.

The President: We have an agreement with the Israelis to help them meet their oil needs.

Vice President Mubarak: We will sell them petroleum. Their mistrust should disappear.

The President: Maybe you can find some language that acknowledges that they will have an equal opportunity to purchase the oil.

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 16, 1978, 2:40–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary Vance's Meeting with Minister Weizman

PARTICIPANTS

Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Hon. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
H.E. Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
Colonel Ilan Tehila

Minister *Weizman* began by describing his meeting with Egyptian Vice President Mubarak. He said that it had not been very enlightening. The Egyptians did, however, promise to provide some written comments on the two main problems: the West Bank and Gaza linkage issue, and Article VI of the treaty on the priority of obligations.² *Weizman* made it clear to the Egyptians that Israel does not want to re-open Article VI. Ambassador *Dinitz* explained that Minister Weizman had told Mubarak that his purpose was to understand what the Egypt-

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Vance's office at the Department of State.

² See Document 89.

tians want. Mubarak explained that the Egyptians want a redraft of what they call the American letter, or the Israeli letter, and some slight changes in Article VI, paragraphs 2 and 5.

Weizman told the Egyptians that he was not in a position to negotiate, but that he could report to the Cabinet on what was agreed and on what were the differences. He asked the Egyptians to put their positions in writing, and they said they would do so. *Weizman* feels that there are important differences, but they should not be exaggerated or distorted. *Weizman* said that he had the strong impression that the Egyptians do not want to break off the talks. Mubarak said that he would even [be] prepared to come back to Washington, if necessary. He was reluctant, however, to accept the idea of meeting with Prime Minister Begin or other Israeli leaders in Jerusalem. In brief, *Weizman* believes that there will be no break in the talks; Article VI is a problem; and the West Bank and Gaza issue remains to be solved. On the West Bank and Gaza problem, they want a time period that is somewhat less than the end of 1979. They did not raise the question of substages of withdrawal in Sinai. In private, Mubarak told *Weizman* that Egypt will not go to war again. *Weizman* said that he believed that, but it was not so easy to convince his government.

The *Secretary* said that he agreed that the Egyptians want to continue the talks. He asked *Weizman* what issues he would take back to the Cabinet. *Weizman* said that he would have to raise the question of the letter, but that he would not reopen the question of the preamble. He would also report that the Egyptians want to change Article VI, paragraph 5. He also understands from the Egyptians that if the West Bank does not go as expected, the Egyptians are prepared to proceed with Gaza alone. *Secretary Vance* asked if the Egyptians would give them a written statement on Article VI and on the joint letter. *Weizman* confirmed that they would. He also expressed some question concerning Mubarak's basic message to him. He did not seem sure what the Egyptian position was. The *Secretary* asked *Weizman* when he would return. The *Minister* said he would wait until Sunday.³ The *Secretary* said that he hoped that it would be clear that *Weizman* was only returning on a temporary basis for the Cabinet meeting and that he would be coming back to Washington. *Weizman* said that he would be seeing Mubarak again at three-thirty. Ambassador *Dinitz* explained that this would not be for the purpose of negotiations, but rather to get an idea of [what] the Egyptians really want. *Weizman* said that Mubarak had made it clear that he does not want Gaza as a part of Egypt, but that he does have to face the Arab world. Therefore, he wants a specific date and an Egyptian police presence in Gaza. *Weizman* said that

³ November 19.

the Egyptians want a fixed date, whereas it would be better to stick with the idea of a target date. This seemed to be acceptable to al-Baz. *Weizman* also said that al-Baz had raised the difference between the abolition of the military government and its withdrawal. He wants to include language on the abolition of the government; Israel will insist on sticking with the language of Camp David. *Weizman* said that he had explained to Mubarak that the Israelis want to stay in the West Bank and Gaza and share responsibility there, and that they do not intend to leave completely. They expect to have some settlements there.

Secretary *Vance* said that anything the two parties could agree upon would be fine with us. He did not think it was wise, however, to reopen the treaty text. This would pose lots of problems. *Weizman* said that his understanding of the Egyptian position is that they want the full autonomy implemented by the end of 1979. *Weizman* added that he had told Mubarak that it might be time for Sadat and Begin to meet again, or perhaps to have the Vice President come Israel.

Weizman asked what remained to be done if he were to come back to Washington. Secretary *Vance* said that we had proposed a package and we will stick with it. *Weizman* said that he understood that the treaty should be considered as it is. Annex I is virtually finished except for some language on subphasing. *Weizman* said that he would do his best with the Israeli Cabinet. Ambassador *Dinitz* noted that Minister of Finance Ehrlich had had a good talk with OMB Director McIntyre and that this represented a serious professional analysis of the economic issues. *Weizman* added that he was concerned by the mood back in Israel. People should be happy at the prospect of peace, but instead there is a heavy feeling and *Weizman* has spoken of the “peace calamity”. He then said to the Secretary that despite the differences that we have with Israel over the West Bank and the question of settlements, we should understand that the key to success is still in Begin’s hands. He is not now in a positive mood, but he does want peace and he did invent the concept of autonomy. The Central Committee of the Herut Party will be meeting on Sunday. *Weizman* said that he wanted to be there. He had had his differences with Begin. *Weizman* still believes that he is the key to a solution. He needs to have some encouragement. He needs to see that everything is not collapsing around him. *Weizman* said that his talk⁴ with the President had been helpful, and that we now need to draw Prime Minister Begin back to the point of wanting to reach an agreement.

In closing, Secretary *Vance* said that he would like to talk with Minister *Weizman* at some point about UNIFIL. He said that he was worried about its renewal.

⁴ See Documents 76 and 90.

135. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, November 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin,
November 21, 1978

President Carter: Good morning.

Prime Minister Begin: Good afternoon or good morning to you.

President Carter: I hope you had a nice . . .

Prime Minister Begin: Today our Cabinet votes² on a tremendous issue—namely, that we are prepared to sign the peace treaty with Egypt, if Egypt is prepared to do so. In other words, we give up our reservations.

President Carter: Mr. Prime Minister, that is very good news. We are very pleased to hear it.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir.

President Carter: We will encourage President Sadat as we have in the past to accept the treaty text without change.

Prime Minister Begin: The text alone.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 11/78–2/79. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from 9:33 a.m. to 9:55 a.m. on November 21. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) The transcript was found attached to a November 21 covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski stating that "[a]t times it was very difficult to understand Begin and his remarks are not completely recorded here," though Carter's were "verbatim." Quandt also noted that this was a "more complete" transcript of the conversation. An earlier, draft summary version, bearing Carter's handwritten corrections, is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79.

² The Israeli Cabinet issued a statement on November 21 that "The Government of Israel is prepared to sign the treaty of peace with Egypt that was presented to it for consideration by the delegation of Israel to the peace negotiations, if Egypt is ready to act likewise. The latest proposals submitted by the Government of Egypt are inconsistent with the Camp David Agreements, and are unacceptable to Israel. After the signing and ratification of the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, Israel is prepared to start negotiations in order to reach agreement on the implementation of the administrative autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, in accordance with the provisions of the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East,' agreed at Camp David." Dinitz delivered a copy of the statement to Ghorbal and Atherton to Vance on November 21. (Telegram 295235 to Tel Aviv, November 22; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/18–30/78. A copy of the version delivered by Dinitz is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, unlabeled folder.

President Carter: I understand and we will also encourage him to not insist upon any change in Article VI of the treaty. I think you know that there will still remain one outstanding issue that needs to be resolved and that is the commitment by the parties to negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: This is what I want to explain. We also decided that the latest proposal by Secretary Vance³ and agreed by Egypt are inconsistent with the Camp David Agreements. As far as the negotiations about the autonomy, we have decided that we want after the signing and ratification of the peace treaty with Egypt to start negotiations in order to reach an agreement on Judea, Samaria and Gaza in accordance with the Camp David agreement. What we did not accept is a timetable. We cannot agree. If you agree, Mr. President, I will tell you something. It is very bad for us in order to really justify this timetable. We cannot accept. Yesterday was the horrible terrorist attack⁴ of which your spokesman, Mr. President, apologized to us. We are grateful. But we are aware that there are people who want to build on the bodies of the Israeli people, they want only the destruction of the Israeli race. And this is why we cannot go. Of course, nobody can force it upon us. We want an early agreement, a real agreement. Therefore, we cannot accept the timetable. There was not a timetable. As far as this goes, we are prepared to say that in three weeks or five weeks, that doesn't matter, after the signing and the ratification of the peace treaty, we are prepared to start the negotiations with Egypt. What we cannot accept is a timetable for the elections, for finishing the negotiations. There are many problems to arrange after the timetable with Egypt. We want to find out if Egypt intends to start. After a while, the negotiations with Egypt alone or with Jordan should take place. We should sit around the table and negotiate. If we reach an agreement, then there will be eventually established the autonomy.

Mr. President, you know there are two different problems. One is about the oil. This is the most serious problem for us. Therefore, we would like to have a document as an annex to the peace treaty. You can be sure that we will pay for the oil. The second point, and believe me, Mr. President, is very unpleasant for me to mention it, but I have to fulfill my duty. After all the inquiries I have made personally, it is now clear that we cannot bear all the burden of moving all the armies from Sinai to the Negev without help. We will have bankruptcy. I am not an

³ Not further identified.

⁴ On November 19, a bomb exploded on a bus near the West Bank settlement of Mizpe Jericho killing four passengers and wounding sixteen. (Telegram 3146 from Jerusalem, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780477-0382)

economist, but it was absolutely made clear to me. The people should rejoice in the peace. It will be for them disaster. So, I ask the Secretary of State about the financial assistance, if it should be a grant. This is what I actually meant, although it was my mistake at first.⁵ Then we need a loan for a longer period of time which we shall repay. This is the form of help. Of course, I can only present it to you as a most serious problem not connected with the peace treaty. It will not be a linkage or condition. But I present to you with respect. These are the problems that we have still. Mr. President, thank you for listening to me. Now I would like to hear you.

President Carter: All right, sir. Let me say again that the instruction by the Israeli Cabinet in approving the text of the treaty is very much appreciated, I know, by myself and the world. We will proceed to encourage President Sadat to accept the treaty text also without change, including, of course, Article VI which has been so troubling concerning the priority of obligations. I have no idea whether we will be successful, but we will be very eager to seek his approval of the treaty text. I don't want to mislead you, however. I think that there is still one outstanding issue that needs to be resolved and that is concerning some assurance to President Sadat about the West Bank and Gaza, the elections, and the establishment of the autonomous self-government. President Sadat has expressed to me by telephone and also through Vice President Mubarak, who I also think met with Defense Minister Weizman, that he would prefer not to have the interim withdrawal from the Sinai until the election process has been completed. In our side-letter⁶ which was worked out, as you know, by your own negotiators, including Foreign Minister Dayan, there was a target date—I think the words used were a goal—of the end of 1979 for the conclusion of these elections. I have no particular views to put forward except that I think our draft of this letter is a fairly good compromise. We will, of course, continue our efforts to get President Sadat to agree with your views and vice versa. I will now be in touch with President Sadat to report to him on your communication to me by telephone this morning and also to encourage him to accept the draft of the treaty. I think that is very important that the negotiations continue and my expectation is that President Sadat will want some clear understanding with you, not through the treaty text, but through a separate letter that there be some definite commitment on the West Bank and Gaza.

⁵ In a marginal note on an earlier draft of this transcript, Carter underlined the word "grant" and wrote beside the paragraph: "He [Begin] said he asked for a loan—it was an error—he meant a grant." See footnote 1 above.

⁶ See Document 125.

We will also help to resolve the question concerning oil. My understanding from Secretary Vance is that this is not as difficult a problem as we had anticipated. The Egyptians are willing to assure Israel that you will have access to the oil, not to the exclusion of everyone else. I understand that is their position, but certainly your proximity to the wells gives you a natural advantage. In the meantime, because at this moment oil supplies are somewhat doubtful in the Middle East as you described yourself, I have already instructed Secretary Schlesinger to carry out our own obligations to you to fulfill Israel's oil needs, so you need not be concerned about any transient or temporary problems with your energy supplies. We will assure that you have access to enough oil to take care of any temporary absence of oil supplies caused by the problems in Iran.

Prime Minister Begin: I am very grateful.

President Carter: Overall the situation has moved forward substantially, but we still have the same basic question not resolved yet concerning the West Bank and Gaza elections as it relates to the schedule for implementing the Sinai agreement. This is very important, as you know, to President Sadat. I hope he will be as flexible as possible on this issue and I think obviously the Israeli decision to adopt the treaty text is a step in the right direction. As we have contact with the Egyptians, we will let you know what President Sadat's response is. Mr. Prime Minister, let me ask you about your plans concerning Dayan and Weizman coming back to Washington. Do they have plans to come back to continue the negotiations concerning oil and other matters.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir.

President Carter: All right. I will get in touch with President Sadat⁷ as quickly as possible. I'll be meeting with Secretary Vance⁸ in about ten or fifteen minutes on another matter. I'll discuss my conversation with you to him.

Prime Minister Begin: The financial help, what I discussed with you?

President Carter: Yes, I'll discuss it with my advisors, too. Obviously we recognize that Israel has special financial obligations. We have been reluctant, as you know, to make any specific commitments on this until we see the prospects for having a peace treaty between you and Egypt. But we recognize your special difficulties, Mr. Prime Minister, and we have historically been willing to give to Israel and we will

⁷ See Document 137.

⁸ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter held a meeting with Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi from 10 a.m. to 10:40 a.m. on November 21, at which Vance was also present. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

be prepared to discuss this in more definite terms as the negotiations progress.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Now, Mr. President, I only want to say that there shouldn't be any doubt in your mind or with President Sadat that we want to implement the autonomy. The two delegations must meet and reach an agreement on the autonomy. It will take some time. As it happened yesterday, four people were killed. The PLO is around. You will not wish and President Sadat will not want it, if the PLO should take over. We are in complete agreement. There will be two delegations. Then when we have the agreement, then there is the question of the elections, and it will not present any difficulty. Then the people wish either to elect or to be elected. Therefore, this is the reason why we took that decision. Indeed, on a timetable we cannot accept. What we want to do is to start the negotiations quickly, a few weeks after the signing. I think it is very reasonable. It is absolutely appropriate to take the first draft written by Ambassador Atherton on your behalf, Mr. President.⁹ This [is] the whole difference now. I hope it is reasonable, because this is an objective situation. We have the PLO with their submachine guns. We have made great progress. We want peace and the peace treaty, so let us sign the text.

President Carter: Mr. Prime Minister, let me ask you if you are opposed to agreeing that the negotiations themselves would start within a month?

Prime Minister Begin: No, we are not opposed to it.

President Carter: Let me ask you a key question. This is the key question in President Sadat's mind. If we do not establish a definite date for the elections and autonomous government in the West Bank, would you be willing to delay the interim withdrawal without any date being specified until those elections can be held? If the peace treaty is signed without delay, and if Israel has access to the Suez Canal, and so forth, as is intended in the treaty agreements?

Prime Minister Begin: I must admit, Mr. President, that I would hesitate to state my point of view. I need to consult with my colleagues.

President Carter: This is just a possibility for resolving the difference and I am not trying to speak for President Sadat. I am not trying to speak officially on that.

Prime Minister Begin: If the interim withdrawal does not start and is not completed, we don't have the normal relations. I understand that as we are now that the peace treaty would only be signed and ratified.

⁹ Reference is to the initial negotiating draft of the treaty presented at the beginning of the Blair House talks. See footnote 2, Document 77.

President Carter: But you would have the free use of the Suez Canal, and then you would have the commencement of relations. This is something that we need to explore. I think that President Sadat is perfectly willing.

Prime Minister Begin: I have to consult with my colleagues.

President Carter: We need not put it to them as an official proposal, because I need to talk to President Sadat. This is just a thought. We will be in touch with you as soon as we get President Sadat's response back. Secretary Vance will let you know when it's appropriate for Dayan and Weizman and others to return. Is that okay?

Prime Minister Begin: They are prepared to return whenever you tell me.

President Carter: Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister. It is always a pleasure to talk to you. Good luck, good-bye.

136. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Eilts' Meeting with Sadat

Ambassador Eilts met with President Sadat early today to urge him to accept the peace treaty and its annexes. President Sadat's considered reply was that he was not ready to give us an answer until he consulted with his advisers. Eilts estimates that it may be two or three more days before we have Sadat's final answer.

Sadat made the following comments to Eilts:

—He wants you to know that 90 percent of the problems have been solved and he hopes that you will not be deterred from seeking the solution for the remaining 10 percent.

—A U.S. presence will be required and essential in all future negotiations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Aaron initialed the memorandum on Brzezinski's behalf. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

—Sadat was extremely negative in his comments about Begin, but concluded that we would have to deal with him nonetheless. Sadat repeated his belief that a confrontation between you and Begin is essential at some point.

—Egypt will be patient even if it takes one month or more to conclude the negotiations.

—Sadat wants to reassure you that there will be no military confrontation, that he will not suspend the negotiations and that he is prepared to have his delegation return to Washington whenever they are needed.

—Sadat said there were still some bad elements in the treaty and that Boutros Ghali had been careless in looking after Egyptian interests. He specifically noted that Article IV places no time limit on the security arrangements in the Sinai and he again termed Article VI unacceptable.

137. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, November 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and President Sadat,
November 22, 1978

President Carter: President Sadat, this is Jimmy Carter. How are you doing?

President Sadat: Good evening, Mr. President.

President Carter: It's a great pleasure to hear from you. How are you getting along?

President Sadat: Very well. And you? I'm very happy.

President Carter: That's fine.

President Sadat: It's good to hear your voice.

President Carter: Thank you for that. I'm glad to hear your voice too, good friend.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 9–12/78. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat from 12:03 p.m. to 12:12 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

President Sadat: The last time you were really frustrated.

President Carter: Yes, I was. I've been that way several times, but you have always helped me get over a frustrating moment. I hope that is the same situation now.

President Sadat: You have already achieved 90 percent of the most dangerous problems that have almost lasted thirty years, but it is thousands of years. Believe me, you have achieved 90 percent. My assessment is that we shall reassess the situation here. I shall send you every detail, everything.

President Carter: That sounds good. I think you know what the Israelis' position is now. I am looking forward to your reassessment. I hope you will let me make a few comments to you before you send it to me. Do you have time to listen for just a moment?

President Sadat: Yes, yes.

President Carter: The Israelis have accepted the treaty text and all the annexes—the one that we have negotiated. We support the treaty text and annexes as well. I hope that you can do the same. This leaves the letter which we also support, by the way, and which was drafted by us. As a matter of fact your proposal² which was made by Mr. Mubarak when he was here is a very constructive document and reasonably acceptable to everyone, to us at least, except for the police force which would create new problems. I hope that you will look at your draft of the letter and see if you can leave out the last paragraph.

President Sadat: I will see to this. As I told you, Mr. President, I will be sending you everything in detail, even before I send you the reassessment.

President Carter: When will I receive this from you?

President Sadat: Well, I will send it next week. Our week starts on Saturday, in two days.

President Carter: All right. It is very important, President Sadat, that you not get in a position with the world public opinion where we and Israel agree and you don't, because I know that you have been very constructive.

President Sadat: I know this, Mr. President.

President Carter: What I hope that you can do is to accept the treaty and the annexes and also accept the letter that we have put forward. I mentioned briefly to Prime Minister Begin yesterday³ the need to move on the West Bank and Gaza election and the self-government and the fact that it may be advisable to delay the interim withdrawal until that

² See Document 133.

³ See Document 135.

self-government is established after the elections. Begin did not respond. He said that he was not qualified to respond to that. I told him that this was not an official suggestion, but just an idea. As you know, this is what you outlined Sunday before last when I talked to you.⁴

President Sadat: Right, Mr. President.

President Carter: If we can conclude the negotiations on the treaty and accept it as it is and then concentrate on the letter which would tie the West Bank/Gaza self-government to the Sinai withdrawal or to a date to be concluded at the end of next year, that would put you in a very favorable position, and would open an opportunity for success.

President Sadat: Hermann told [me] about this.⁵ I get your point, Mr. President.

President Carter: Good. I just don't want the world to think that we and Israel agree, and that you are the obstacle to peace, because obviously that has never been the case.

President Sadat: For that I am really intending to make this reassessment and I can contact you in two days.

President Carter: I will be looking forward to that.

President Sadat: Very good.

President Carter: How are you personally? Are you getting along okay?

President Sadat: Very good. How are Rosalynn and the children?

President Carter: They are fine and all of us are going to Camp David for our Thanksgiving late tonight. We have invited our family and Rosalynn's family to join us there.

President Sadat: Marvelous, marvelous. I wish you all happiness and success, Mr. President.

President Carter: Thank you very much. I really appreciate a chance to talk to you. The other point that I want to make with you, Mr. President, is that whatever you can do improve the communication with the Saudi Arabians would be very helpful to us.

President Sadat: Fahd sent me the ambassador today.

President Carter: That is very fine.

President Sadat: Yes. But we shall be doing it discreetly.

President Carter: That's understandable and I approve of that, of course. Well, good luck to you, Mr. President.

President Sadat: Never worry about this question.

President Carter: All right.

⁴ See Document 126.

⁵ See Document 136.

President Sadat: As I told you, I am in control and everything will go smooth.

President Carter: I look forward to that and I will be very pleased to get your assessment.

President Sadat: I shall also tell you about what happens between me and Fahd.

President Carter: I need to know that.

President Sadat: The Vice President met with him today. He sent me a message and I shall be sending you everything.

President Carter: That's good. Let me add one other comment. All of us were very favorably impressed with Vice President Mubarak.

President Sadat: I am happy to know this.

President Carter: He did an outstanding job for you. I think you can be very, very pleased with him.

President Sadat: Thank you, Mr. President.

President Carter: Good day and good-bye, my friend.

President Sadat: Thank you very much and good-bye.

138. Editorial Note

On November 29, 1978, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo. Appointed as a presidential emissary by President Jimmy Carter on November 15, Byrd stopped in Egypt as part of a 16-day trip to the Middle East. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, page 2059) A full report of Byrd's mission, which included talks in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and submitted to Carter upon the completion of the trip, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Senator Byrd Report on Trip, 12/78. Byrd urged Sadat to accept the draft treaty as it was written "with the condition that this is contingent upon reaching an acceptable resolution of the West Bank/Gaza linkage issue," noting that he "had never seen President Carter as determined as he is on this issue." Moreover, he noted, Carter was "fully committed to continue working with Sadat" to resolve the remaining issues, including Egyptian problems with other Arab states. Sadat replied that he "saw no purpose in accepting a treaty which would be overturned within a year by the weight of Arab opinion," observing the treaty "can not stand because it is not accepted at all." Sadat rejected Byrd's suggestion that Egypt had allowed Israel a

“public relations advantage” by refusing to accept the draft treaty. “Israel,” Sadat stated, “is asking for concessions in Egypt unparalleled by any other state;” Egypt, he felt, had “given Israel everything.” Similarly, Sadat countered Byrd’s argument that reopening negotiations on treaty language posed “danger” by stating that “he would prefer to see the text unravel than accept a treaty which heavily damaged his position or President Carter.” As currently drafted, the treaty for Sadat was “against the aspirations of the Egyptian people” and he could not agree to it. The Embassy transmitted a full summary of this meeting in telegram 25977 from Cairo, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492–1036) Analyzing the meeting later on November 29, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts observed that he had “never” seen Sadat “as emotional or upset as he was today.” “Sadat,” Eilts continued, “is clearly disturbed about what he considers as unfair pressure on him to accede to our request” to agree to the treaty. To explain Sadat’s resistance, Eilts proposed eight explanations: realization of Egyptian “isolation” following Baghdad, the “vacillating” Saudi role, “total distrust” of Begin, a “conviction” that the Israelis “have no intention of moving expeditiously on West Bank/Gaza” and intend to “interpret Camp David Framework as requiring no more than Begin[s] self-rule plan,” “annoyance” at “unhelpful statements,” annoyance at settlement issues, “frustration” that the United States “does not really understand his problems in the Arab World,” and annoyance that the United States “seems to consider him to be line of least resistance whenever Israelis take hard stance.” (Telegram 25978 from Cairo, November 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492–1029)

The following day, November 30, Byrd met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for 90 minutes in Jerusalem. He conveyed to Begin Sadat’s reservations with the draft treaty text, especially his objection to Articles IV and VI. Prefacing his remarks by stating that he understood Begin’s domestic political situation, Byrd emphasized the need for Egypt and Israel to “avoid public statements that poisoned [the] atmosphere” and continue their dialogue. “The U.S. could not accept a take it or leave it attitude on the part of either side.” Byrd emphasized that “there must be a target date for elections and there must be a resolution to the West Bank/Gaza problem.” In response, Begin stated that the Israeli Cabinet had rejected the idea of a timetable for elections “because Israel did not have the power to make that come to pass itself, and because it presented a ready-made excuse for Egypt to abrogate the treaty.” Begin, however, agreed with Byrd’s suggestion that the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel could be resolved by “reasonable men.” In a separate meeting with Byrd, November 30, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan (who was “clearly discomfited” by the idea of reopening text negotiations according to the

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis) pointed out that if Egypt wished to reopen discussions on Articles IV and VI, Israel “might respond by reopening discussions on the Preamble and the other provisions which it had found objectionable.” The Embassy transmitted a full summary of both conversations in telegram 18491 from Tel Aviv, November 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1645)

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 29, 1978, 2214Z

25990. Subject: President Sadat’s Letter to President Carter. Ref: Cairo 25779, para 2.²

1. During Codel Byrd’s meeting³ with Sadat this morning, VP Mubarak whispered to me that he wanted to see me this evening, after PriMin Khalil had left. I met with him at 2000 at NDP headquarters. He said that Khalil will be presenting a written message from Sadat to President Carter during upcoming Friday meeting.⁴ He claimed to have persuaded Sadat to give me an advance text of that message for President Carter’s information. He asked, however, that we not rpt not give any indication to PriMin Khalil that an advance text has been provided to [us?].

2. Text of Sadat’s letter to President Carter follows: Quote: Dear President Carter,

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 4, Middle East—Misc. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² On November 27, Mubarak informed Eilts that he wished to meet with him “immediately after Khalil’s departure” for Washington. Eilts reported November 28 that Mubarak “said he would have some things to tell me at that time, but gave no specifics. I suspect that he wants to brief me on Egyptian position after Sadat’s review of technical committee recommendations.” (Telegram 25779 from Cairo, November 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780489–1282)

³ See Document 138.

⁴ See Document 142. The signed original of the letter, dated November 30, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. Quandt wrote that the letter was “probably” written by al-Baz. (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 285)

Pursuant to our telephone conversation,⁵ I would like to share with you some thoughts on the present state of the negotiations and how best to proceed in the days ahead. I am doing so in the spirit of friendship that binds us together and in all appreciation of your relentless effort in the pursuit of peace. I am also undertaking this exchange of views with full awareness of the historic significance of the task we have assumed for the good of our two nations and that of mankind.

I believe that the negotiations held in Washington have reached a crossroads. Much has been accomplished with your help and determination. However, what remains to be finalized could affect the outcome of our endeavor at present and in the future. I also believe that this could be achieved without any undue delay.

As I stated before, most of the task was done in Camp David. There, we laid down the foundations of a comprehensive peace that addresses itself to all aspects of the conflict. Special emphasis was placed on the Palestinian problem as it was agreed that it remains the heart and core of the dispute.⁶

Thus, it was only logical that we made it crystal clear that any attempt to work for a separate agreement must be rejected. You would recall that I told Prime Minister Begin that it is absolutely unacceptable to us to conclude a separate agreement, a partial agreement or a third disengagement.⁷ This was the overriding theme in the Camp David talks. Hence, it should be clearly reflected in the outcome of the current negotiations which are held under the umbrella⁸ of the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East”. This should be achieved, not by the insertion of a few words, but by reaching agreement on specific measures to be taken on certain dates in the direction of transferring authority to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

In all candor, I find the Israeli attitude in the Washington negotiations and the statements issued by members of the Israeli Cabinet rather alarming. Apparently, they are still thinking and behaving with the old mentality and complexes. The pre-initiative spirit persists, even though the Israeli people left no doubt that their yearning for peace is the paramount factor in their life. They received my message with enthusiasm and hope. To me, their response was gratifying. Nonetheless, the Israeli delegation remained seized by the worn-out concepts and the old suspicion. They fail to conceive the process as one of peace building for this generation and the generations to come. Their attitude toward the Camp David Accords is very telling. They want to pick and

⁵ See Document 137.

⁶ Vance underlined the final two sentences of this paragraph.

⁷ Vance underlined this sentence.

⁸ Vance underlined the phrase “held under the umbrella.”

choose from it whatever they deem to be in their interest while evading as much as possible what they conceive of as being in the interest of the cause of peace. They cite it to support their exaggerated claims, and forget it when they are confronted with a decision they think is painful. You have done your best to moderate their demands and attitude. But I believe that much remains to be done, for I am determined to make the peace we are working for a solid and lasting structure. I want to leave it as a legacy for our grandchildren as well as the history of mankind.

In view of this situation, I decided to take the step of addressing a message to Prime Minister Begin to draw his attention to the real nature of what we are doing and ask him and his colleagues in the Israeli Cabinet to view the matter in a different light. I believe that such a step is a necessary and needed supplement to my initiative. In a nut shell, I want them to wake up, look beyond mere words and rise to the level of the great events we are creating. In addition to that, I do not want you to carry all the burden. You have been most understanding and patient. You kept your pledge to be a full and honest partner.⁹

I trust that you agree with me on the futility of any attempt to conclude a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is both morally wrong and practically not workable. Nevertheless, the Israeli Government seems to be aiming at that. From their tactics and maneuvers throughout the negotiations, it appears that they are determined to bring the treaty as close as possible to a separate agreement. They misrepresented, and even distorted, the linkage issue. Consequently, they approached it from a negative angle.¹⁰ But as I told you before, I am determined to prevent this from happening. To me, working for a genuinely comprehensive peace is a conscientious commitment not a matter of political expediency.

Our delegation left for Washington with clear instructions to emphasize the comprehensive character of the peace we are making.¹¹ To this end, we demanded, on October 13, the insertion of the following article into the text of the peace treaty:

—“Egypt and Israel pledge themselves to work for the solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects on the basis of the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”

On the same day, our delegation submitted to you a memorandum on measures to be taken towards improving the political conditions in

⁹ Vance highlighted this sentence.

¹⁰ Vance underlined this sentence and the preceding sentence.

¹¹ Vance underlined this sentence.

the West Bank and Gaza with a view to facilitate the implementation of the Camp David “Framework”.¹²

As the Israelis balked and insisted on omitting any reference in the treaty to the Palestinian problem, you proposed dealing with the issue as follows:

A) Emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the peace settlement in the preamble;¹³

B) Spelling out the steps which must be taken for the implementation of the provisions of the “Framework” in the West Bank and Gaza in a letter to be exchanged between Egypt and Israel and signed simultaneously with the treaty.¹⁴ The content of that letter as inunciated (sic) by you was to include taking certain steps on specified dates,¹⁵ namely the entering into negotiation and the holding of elections for the establishment of the self-governing authority, in implementation of the Camp David plan for full autonomy.

C) Obtaining a letter from Israel to the United States on measures to be taken unilaterally for the purpose of improving the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza, such as lifting the ban on political activities, freeing political prisoners and allowing the return of some displaced persons for the unification of families.¹⁶

Although the idea of an exchange of letters was at variance with our concept, we cooperated with it and submitted several drafts for the letter. Discussions of these drafts, together with the U.S. draft, revealed an Israeli reluctance to be committed to any step beyond beginning the negotiations. With this Israeli attitude, the proposed date for holding the elections kept moving backward, from three to six months and finally to a full year.¹⁷ After being conceived as a fixed time, it was watered down to a target date which might and might not be met.¹⁸ Furthermore, the form of the document was changed from a letter to be exchanged between Egypt and Israel to a note issued by the United States.¹⁹ This was done despite the fact that Israel has accepted for several weeks the form of an exchanged letter. I honestly believe that this

¹² Vance underlined this sentence.

¹³ Vance underlined the portion of this phrase beginning with “you proposed” and ending with “the preamble.”

¹⁴ Vance underlined this sentence.

¹⁵ Vance underlined and highlighted the phrase “taking certain steps on specified dates.”

¹⁶ Vance underlined and highlighted this point.

¹⁷ Vance underlined this sentence.

¹⁸ Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “target is fixed date” in the right-hand margin next to it.

¹⁹ Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: “form” in the right-hand margin next to it.

trend is likely to complicate rather than facilitate our task when we start negotiating with them on the West Bank and Gaza in the weeks and months ahead. They are likely to think that they can go back on what they consented to and water it down systematically as we proceed from one stage to the other. This would be quite a regressive development as it would confront us with a situation no one would benefit from even though the Israelis do not seem to be aware of that.

Our common experience has thought (sic) us to be very specific on every point if we are to guarantee any real movement.²⁰ We should do all what (sic) we can to eliminate the causes of controversy or misunderstanding in the future as we are engaged in a continuous process which is likely to reach full fruition within a few years. Therefore, I suggest that we stick to your original idea of an exchanged letter between Egypt and Israel witnessed by the United States as our full partner.²¹ The letter can be meaningful and significant only if it includes a timetable²² for the basic steps:

A) Beginning the negotiations for establishing the elected self-governing authority (not the administrative autonomy the Israeli Government is talking about these days) as well as defining the powers and responsibilities of that authority;²³

B) Holding the elections for the self-governing authority;²⁴

C) Inaugurating that authority, abolishing the Israeli military government together with its civilian administration, and effecting the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations.²⁵

An Egyptian presence in the Gaza strip is vital to the success of our plan, not only in the strip but also in the West Bank.²⁶ It is only fair to deduce that the Israelis are not acting in good faith when they oppose the presence of some Egyptian police units or frontier guards in Gaza during the interim period. First of all, they had previously consented to this very idea as they realized that it would be quite useful. In a reversal of their position, they contend that such presence would be inconsis-

²⁰ Vance underlined this sentence.

²¹ Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: "exchange of letters" in the right-hand margin next to it.

²² Vance underlined "includes a timetable."

²³ Vance underlined this sentence with the exception of the parenthetical clause.

²⁴ Vance underlined this point.

²⁵ Vance underlined "Inaugurating that authority, abolishing the Israeli" and "effecting the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations" and put brackets around "abolishing."

²⁶ Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence. He wrote: "Egyptian presence?" in the right-hand margin next to it.

ent with the “Framework for Peace”²⁷ in the Middle East” signed in Camp David. Nothing could be further from the truth, for the “Framework” does not contain one word that could weigh against such presence.²⁸ The framework provided that the local police force will maintain a continuous liaison with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers.²⁹ Furthermore, there is a provision concerning the participation of Jordanian forces in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts. There is another provision which allows the recruitment of Jordanian citizens in the local police.

By analogy, the some (sic) concept could apply to the Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip.³⁰ Our responsibility with respect to Gaza is more sanctioned in legal and political terms than the Jordanian role in the West Bank. We have never claimed sovereignty over Gaza. No one questions our intentions there. In fact, a tangible Egyptian presence would reassure the Palestinian population, a factor which is certain to generate enthusiasm for the Camp David formula. Thus, we would be building a model which would be envied by Jordan and the West Bank inhabitants. In short, our presence in Gaza would facilitate the implementation of the Camp David formula.³¹

If we are to require an explicit mention of every detail in the Camp David Accord, why, then, is Israel insisting on many points which were never mentioned directly or indirectly in the “Framework”? Such points include the priority of obligations, the exchange of ambassadors one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal, setting a specific date for the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce, the conclusion of a cultural agreement following the interim withdrawal and the preservation of war memorials.³²

Dear Friend,

I have given careful consideration to your idea of treating the present draft of the treaty as final. I fully understand the reasons behind that, namely putting an end to limitless controversy that could go on indefinitely. However, I must confide to you that we have serious problems with certain provisions. It was for this reason that our delegation requested your assistants not to state that you considered the text

²⁷ Vance underlined “they contend that such presence would be inconsistent with the ‘Framework for Peace.’”

²⁸ Vance underlined this sentence.

²⁹ Vance underlined “local police force will maintain a continuous liaison with Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers.”

³⁰ Vance underlined this sentence.

³¹ Vance underlined this sentence and the preceding sentence. He wrote: “good argument” in the right-hand margin next to it.

³² Vance underlined and highlighted this sentence.

as final until we work out together a formula that would meet our minimum. We realized that the closure of negotiations on the text could confront us with an undesirable prospect, namely the prospect of having to oppose something which was proposed by you. For these reasons I would like to seek your help in solving the main problems and I am quite willing to forego the less important ones.

As it stands now, the provision of Article 6 remains explosive and detrimental.³³ As the negotiations evolved with respect to that issue, the successive proposed drafts tended to be harsher and more difficult to accept.³⁴ Your fifth draft, presented on October 19, carried the following text for paragraph 2 of that article:

—“The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under the present treaty”. The seventh draft, submitted on October 21 added a phrase to that text as follows:

—The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other party.³⁵

The latest draft went further to state that:

—“The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any existing instrument external to this treaty”.³⁶

Such a sweeping provision which came at the last minute cannot be taken lightly. It could be used by Israel or any other party to prove that the treaty is in fact and by law a separate agreement.³⁷ If one stretches the argument further, it could be alleged that the treaty is independent even of the “Framework” of Camp David,³⁸ for it is merely “another instrument external to the treaty”. If it becomes plausible that the treaty constitutes a separate peace agreement, then it would be a violation of the “Framework”.

You can imagine the devastating impact of such a provision. Suffice it to refer to a statement made by the Israeli Foreign Minister on November 23 in which he said in effect that Egypt’s commitments to Israel have acquired priority over her Arab commitments. This trend is

³³ Vance underlined this sentence.

³⁴ Vance underlined “the successive proposed drafts tended to be harsher and more difficult to accept,” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “not so.”

³⁵ Vance highlighted this sentence, and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Pres. language.”

³⁶ Vance highlighted this sentence.

³⁷ Vance underlined this sentence.

³⁸ Vance underlined “could be alleged that the treaty is independent even of the ‘Framework’ of Camp David,” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “No.”

apt to continue and escalate in the future as we all know, thus creating a most unfavorable atmosphere.

On the other hand, we find the provision of paragraph 5 of the same article extremely difficult to accept. Like that of paragraph 2, it is both harmful and unnecessary. It gives rise to future controversy and contention.³⁹

As you certainly know, we proposed a solution to the problem which the Israelis raised with respect to the conflict of obligations. Following your conversation with Vice President Mubarak on November 15,⁴⁰ I instructed our delegation to prepare a new draft⁴¹ which was submitted to Secretary Vance and subsequently discussed with Defense Minister Weizman before being forwarded to the Israeli Cabinet. We proposed deleting paragraph 5 and amending paragraph 4 to read as follows:⁴²

—“The parties undertake not to enter into any obligation or take any action in conflict with this treaty.”⁴³

I trust that you agree with me that this formula meets the concerns of the Israelis if they are genuine. It covers all obligations so long as the parties are undertaking not to take any action which is inconsistent with their obligations under the treaty. Why should Israel insist on the present offensive language?

Is it not significant that they reversed their acceptance of certain provisions and concepts after they had secured certain benefits in return for their acceptance? A case in point is their sudden reversal of their position on the sub-phases of the interim withdrawal. This was done 26 days after informing both of us of their willingness to withdraw from El-Arish in two months and from the oil fields area on the Gulf of Suez in 4 months. This was also done after obtaining your support for their request of exchanging ambassadors within one month from the completion of the interim withdrawal. When you met with our delegates on October 17,⁴⁴ you used two arguments in order to persuade us to accept such a demand. The first was that Israel accepted to reduce the time for completing the interim withdrawal from nine to six months. The second argument was that Israel has offered to withdraw from El-Arish within two months. In other words, their previous position was used to extract some benefits for them. By legal norms, a

³⁹ Vance underlined this paragraph.

⁴⁰ Presumably, a mistaken reference to Document 134.

⁴¹ Not found.

⁴² Vance underlined and highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph. He wrote in the right-hand margin: “Rejected by Israelis.”

⁴³ Vance underlined this sentence.

⁴⁴ See Document 83.

strong case could be made for withdrawing our tentative acceptance of exchanging ambassadors within such a short period. When they re-neged on the sub-phases, they upset the quid pro quo equation.

I realize that the process of negotiations entails a series of accommodations by both parties. But the outcome should present a reasonable balance between the rights and obligations of both of them. You and your able aides have devoted your time and energy so generously to help the two sides strike this equilibrium. But I feel that the Israelis insisted adamantly to have it their way. They invoke the Camp David "Framework" when it suits their purpose and ignore it when it requires them to honor certain commitments which they do not like. They insist on specificity when it comes to their benefit and ambiguity as to any of their obligations.

They do not seem to appreciate our flexibility and willingness to be responsive. It might be revealing to review the situation since we went to Camp David last September. If we examine the "Framework of a Comprehensive Settlement of the Problem of the Middle East"⁴⁵ which I submitted to you and Premier Begin on the opening of conference and compare it with the document we signed, we will find that we went a long way to make both ends meet.

We responded positively to their need to feel secure and we reflected this in the security arrangements we agreed to. Reciprocity was applied in a liberal rather than a literal sense. In addition to that, I accepted to start the process of normalization, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations after the completion of the interim withdrawal. Legally speaking, we had every right to defer that until the completion of the final withdrawal. We accepted your concept of solving the Palestinian problem including Arab Jerusalem in stages while leaving certain points to be settled in future negotiations.

The Israelis did not commit themselves to adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nor did they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes which emanate from the application or the interpretation of the parties' contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, I decided to proceed in the hope that these shortcomings will be remedied in the future with the progressive development of peace, as I have believed and still believe that the real peace process starts only after the signing. Despite the risks involved, I took the decision to go ahead. I did this mainly for you and on account of my full faith that you are committed with us to work for a comprehensive peace which safeguards the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

⁴⁵ See footnote 8, Document 28.

I firmly believe that the negotiations should continue until we conclude a treaty we can accept without reservation. I would like to sign a treaty which is likely to start a new chapter in the history of the area and put an end to controversy, not one which adds to the old grievances or gives rise to endless claims and counterclaims.

With this in mind, I appeal to you to reopen the text of the treaty for certain rectifications which are necessary to redress the existing imbalance between the positions of the parties. The Israelis have to demonstrate the same flexibility and understanding we showed. I do not like anyone to misinterpret your request concerning the finality of the present text as a means of applying pressure on the cooperative party. Thus, I welcomed the statement Secretary Vance made on November 25 on the state of the negotiations and the draft proposals.⁴⁶ I also hope that my message to Prime Minister Begin⁴⁷ will persuade him to cooperate.

Before I conclude, allow me to raise a less significant point relative to the duration of the security arrangements which is a matter of concern to the Egyptian people. We would like to be sure that entering into negotiations for the purpose of amending these provisions becomes mandatory upon the request of either party. So long as these measures are intended to solidify the structure of peace, they should be subject to review as the normalization of relations between the parties reaches different horizons. Here, what is needed is a minor linguistic adjustment rather than the introduction of a new text. I am sure that you will be able to find the proper formula for that. My confidence in your sense of fairness and good judgment has no limit. May God Almighty grant you all the support you need while you discharge your awesome responsibilities.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat

Unquote.

3. Mubarak noted that PriMin Khalil will also be presenting an oral message.⁴⁸ Asked what that oral message was, he said it will simply be an elaboration of some of the points in the written message. Among

⁴⁶ Reference is likely to an interview with Vance which appeared in the *The New York Times* on November 25, in which Vance was reported to have stated that "acceptance by Israel of the draft text of a peace treaty with Egypt was insufficient in itself to permit the conclusion of negotiations" and that the "draft text did not meet Egypt's insistence on a timetable for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Says Israel and Egyptians Need to Continue Talks," *The New York Times*, November 25, 1978, p. 1)

⁴⁷ See Document 140.

⁴⁸ No written version of Khalil's message has been found. For discussion of the December 1 meeting between Khalil and Carter, see Document 142.

other things, Khalil will cite for President Carter all of the concessions that Sadat has made since the beginning of the peace process and compare them to the few that the Israelis have made.

4. Request that no indication be given to Khalil that Mubarak has provided us with an advance copy of the Sadat message.

Eilts

140. Letter From Egyptian President Sadat to Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Cairo, November 30, 1978

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

I am addressing this letter to you with full awareness of the historic responsibility we both share before our peoples who gave us a solemn mandate to build a solid structure for peace. We owe it to this generation and the generations to come in both countries not to leave a stone unturned in our pursuit of peace. The ideal is the greatest one in the history of man and we have accepted the challenge to translate it from a cherished hope into a living reality.

You will recall that when I addressed the Israeli people from the rostrum of the Knesset more than a year ago, I said "In the history of nations and peoples, there come up certain moments when it becomes imperative for those who are endowed with wisdom and vision to penetrate beyond the past with all its complications and residue to usher in an undaunted elan toward new horizons".² I believe that we are now witnessing one of these moments. It is a moment of truth which requires each one of us to take a new look at the situation and reexamine his thinking and calculations. I trust that you all know that when I undertook my sacred mission to Jerusalem against all odds and in the face of the most formidable complications, I was not trying to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78. No classification marking. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the letter, indicating that he saw the document. Quandt wrote that the letter was "probably" written by al-Baz. (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 285)

² For the full text of Sadat's November 20, 1977, address to the Knesset, see *Israel's Foreign Policy, Historical Documents*, vols. 4–5: 1977–1979, Document 73. Begin's speech to the Knesset, which followed Sadat's, is *ibid.*, Document 74.

strike a deal. I was and I am still determined to make peace. If our commitment to that great cause is profound and unwavering, then our task should transcend words and legal formulations. Then also, the challenge before us ceases to be a contest of oratory and scoring points here and there. It becomes converted irreversibly to one of winning the hearts and minds of our peoples and enabling them to look beyond the unhappy past.

It was in this spirit that we entered into direct negotiations with you in a sincere attempt to build new bridges for the future. These negotiations reached their high and low points as we went deeper into the core of our complex problem. We have achieved some progress. However, I feel that valuable time has frittered away in futile arguments and discussions about issues of little or no real significance. Apparently, some are still seized with the notion that the solution could be reached at the expense of the other party. Still others remain captives to concepts like that of David and Goliath instead of being inspired by the brotherhood of Ismail and Isaac. Evidently, some old barriers do exist and it is our joint responsibility to break them. A few days ago, one of your colleagues chose to speak of the present state of affairs in terms which are in clear contradiction with the new spirit of peace. He said that Egypt must not forget that part of its territory is occupied and could remain occupied. We reject that logic and I am sure that the vast majority of the Israeli people shares our view.

It might be appropriate to remind you of what we have offered to enable you to make the necessary decision for the establishment of peace. First and foremost, we proved our willingness to look seriously and sympathetically to your need to feel secure. Of course the need for security is mutual and not confined to you alone. Still, we lent an attentive ear to your concern for security in view of certain historical and psychological factors. This must not go unappreciated. Nor should it be misinterpreted or abused.

We offered you full recognition, not as a mere formality but as a dynamic process of coexistence that includes diplomatic relations, economic and cultural exchange for the mutual benefit of our two peoples and in fact for the good of the entire region. By conventional norms, this process can take place only after the completion of withdrawal. However, I accepted the request of our good friend President Carter to start the process after the completion of the interim withdrawal. I did so as a token of my full confidence in the future as well my faith in our peoples who are going to be the final arbiter.

We said, and still maintain, that we are most willing to establish with you normal relations that exist between good-neighbors. No discriminatory barriers shall stand in the way of free movement of people

or goods.³ Individuals and groups will have an opportunity to know more about one another and learn to live together in peace and amity.⁴ You shall enjoy the benefits of the freedom of passage⁵ through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Boycotts will be terminated.⁶ All of this is conceived with the understanding that neither party is to seek any special advantages or ask for the position of a favored nation. This can not be forced upon two sides which are terminating a state of war that lasted for over thirty years. It could not be achieved by ignoring the facts of our contemporary life. Only the natural development and growth of our relations in the future can lead to the intensification of exchange in the areas where the interests of both parties meet. It is much better to start on a solid basis and then proceed to add to the structure a brick every day. This operation of peace building will not be viewed or judged today or tomorrow, but several years after. It is still my conviction that the real peace process starts only after the signing. Thus, what is important is to start now and on the right foot. Once we started, the door will be wide open. We have not asked for any privileged position⁷ and I assume that this is reciprocated on your part.

Let me make another point crystal clear to you in this respect. When we express our readiness to offer you all what I just mentioned, we are not doing so in return for your commitment to withdraw from our territory. We think that this is an obligation you bear under all accepted norms of international law and contemporary international relations. While we are changing the course of history, we must not attempt to tamper with the law of nations. I think I made it abundantly clear on every occasion that we do not accept any bargaining over our sovereignty or territory. Sooner or later, our land will be liberated.

The proper return here must be a genuine acceptance on your part to coexist with your Arab neighbors. Your relations with them should not be viewed in terms of conquest or exploitation. Rather, it should be founded on mutual respect and a firm belief in the equality among nations. Coexistence with your Arab neighbors starts with coexistence with the Palestinian people.⁸ This is the message I have been trying to deliver to you since I arrived in Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. In Camp David, we reached agreement on a formula which we think can bring about an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem. If we value the ideal of peace highly, then we should not at all detract from

³ Carter underlined "free movement of people or goods."

⁴ Carter underlined "live together in peace and amity."

⁵ Carter underlined "freedom of passage."

⁶ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁷ Carter underlined "not" and "privileged position" in this sentence.

⁸ Carter underlined "coexistence with the Palestinian people."

that formula. On the contrary, we should add to it and give it every chance for success. In my view, you should not attempt, or appear to attempt, to evade your obligations under the Camp David “Framework”. Since we agreed that certain steps shall take place in the immediate future to effect a transfer of authority to the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza,⁹ I frankly see no reason why we should not agree on a timetable for these steps. You have asked for a timetable for such steps as the exchange of diplomatic relations,¹⁰ the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce,¹¹ the conclusion of another agreement on cultural exchange and the conclusion of a civil aviation agreement.¹² Is it not equally, if not more, important to fix a timetable for the envisaged transformation in the West Bank and Gaza?

An argument has been advanced in this respect which we do not find convincing. It is said that you do not want to be bound to produce certain results which require the cooperation of a reluctant party. My answer is that one should not assume the worse if we really believe in the necessity and wisdom of the course we are taking. If the implementation of any of these steps is hindered because of reasons beyond your control, you will not be held responsible for that.¹³ There is always an assumption of rationality. Furthermore, I must tell you in all candor that you are not doing much to encourage the moderate elements among the Palestinians to cooperate. On the contrary, much of your acts and words seem to be designed to dissuade them from joining in with us. I need not list to you any examples of these deeds and words for you are quite aware of them. If the Palestinians are left with the impression that the self-government plan, and not the administrative autonomy as you call it, is a sham, they will remain embittered and the voice of reason will be drowned among them. As you well know, peoples never abandon their cause in the face of neglect or force. You might recall that your predecessor Ben Gurion¹⁴ once said: “forgive . . . but never forget”. This admonition applies to the Palestinians too.

The issue of “linkage” underwent much distortion and confusion. Let me tell you that we are not seeking that linkage as a means of shirking our commitments or breaking our promises. If we make a commitment, we intend to honor it fully regardless of the cost. Our

⁹ Carter underlined “authority to the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza.”

¹⁰ Carter underlined “exchange of diplomatic relations.”

¹¹ Carter underlined “agreement on trade and commerce.”

¹² Carter underlined “cultural exchange” and “civil aviation agreement” in this sentence.

¹³ Carter underlined this sentence.

¹⁴ David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister from 1948 until 1954 and from 1955 until 1963.

record speaks for itself in this respect. If we have any doubt that we can honor a certain commitment, we shall not make it in the first place.

We are talking about linkage because we are both committed to work for a comprehensive peace settlement not a separate agreement. If you go back to the days of Camp David, you will remember that I told you on September 7 that I am for permanent peace and not for a separate agreement, a partial arrangement or another disengagement. This attitude was clearly reflected in my address to the Israeli people through the Knesset last year, exactly as it is reflected in the outcome of our deliberations. The "Framework for peace in the Middle East" bears ample evidence to the nature of the peace we are working for. If this is the case, Why should it not be spelled out and reaffirmed.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Parties often make mistakes in the course of negotiations which is an arduous process. They think that their task is to insist on their demands rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly. But if this attitude is tolerated in negotiations for an armistice agreement, it should not at all be adopted when nations are making peace. I am not stating that to point a finger of accusation at you. I am merely referring to two unfortunate developments:

First: Your Delegation insisted on certain unreasonable provisions¹⁵ that serve no useful purpose. Certain concepts were blown out of proportions or stretched beyond the tolerable limit. This was the case with respect to the proposed draft of Article 6.¹⁶ What you are entitled to is a commitment from us to discharge our obligations in good faith as we hold you responsible to do the same. It is inappropriate for any of us to attempt to interfere with the way the other party conducts its relations with third countries. It is the responsibility of each party to reconcile its commitments to various partners.

Much of the language used in your proposed text in this respect is meaningless and self-contradictory. One way of dealing with it could be challenging the relevance of a certain provision in application. But you know that this is not my style. I always like to be clear and decisive for I believe that I am doing the right thing for my people and yours. I would like to set a model for others to follow.

Second: Your delegation retracted its acceptance of certain provisions or concepts after this acceptance had been acted upon. It is not my intention to get into a detailed account of what happened in this respect. Suffice it to cite a few examples:

¹⁵ Carter underlined "unreasonable provisions."

¹⁶ Carter underlined "Article 6."

a—withdrawing your proposal on the sub-phases of the interim withdrawal;¹⁷

b—Going back on your offer to reduce the period of the interim withdrawal to six months;¹⁸

c—Opposing, after consenting to, the formula of an exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza;¹⁹

d—Opposing a tangible Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip.²⁰

e—Reversing your previous position on the elimination of the arms race;²¹

f—Insisting on deleting a paragraph from the preamble after having accepted it.²² That paragraph spoke of the necessity for maintaining the balanced and reciprocal implementation of the Parties' corresponding obligations.

Again, I am not stating the abovementioned for the purpose of chastizing your Government or attributing malice to anyone. I am simply urging you and your colleagues to reconsider your position and take a new look at recent events as well as ways and means for breaking the present impasse. I do not want to see a resurgence of suspicion and ill-feeling as I am mainly concerned for the future. I hope you will find it possible to respond to this new initiative in the same spirit which prompted me to write to you.

With best wishes,

Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat

¹⁷ Carter underlined "withdrawing," "sub-phases," and "interim withdrawal" in this point.

¹⁸ Carter underlined "reduce the period" and "interim withdrawal to six months" in this point.

¹⁹ Carter underlined "an exchange of letters on the West Bank and Gaza."

²⁰ Carter underlined this point.

²¹ Carter underlined "the elimination of the arms race."

²² Carter underlined "deleting a paragraph from the preamble after having accepted it."

141. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 30, 1978

SUBJECT

Initial Reaction to the Latest Middle East Difficulty

Here are some personal and initial thoughts, stated in a telegraphic style and therefore overly simplistic:

- 1) You succeeded at Camp David because:
 - a) You kept both parties under your control;
 - b) Neither dared to assume responsibility for failure;
 - c) The Agreements offered something beneficial to both;
- 2) The Agreements are coming apart because:
 - a) The negotiations are no longer under your control;
 - b) The Camp David Accords created the impression that in fact a separate peace between Egypt and Israel was acceptable to both the US and to Egypt—and for a while I even thought that perhaps you and Sadat had secretly agreed on this;
 - c) Begin probably does not want to move on the West Bank part of the Accords, and he might be genuinely intimidated by his domestic opposition (though he is also doubtlessly exploiting it);
 - d) Sadat became frightened by the Baghdad Conference² reaction, and notably by the more critical Saudi attitudes;
 - e) Sadat and the Saudis may be concluding that the US is too irresolute either to protect the region from the Soviets or to obtain from the Israelis genuine progress toward a wider peace.
- 3) What is to be done? Not knowing what Khalil is bringing,³ I can only tentatively recommend:
 - a) A strong U.S. public posture on behalf of broad implementation of the Camp David Accords. If we can set a deadline for the Israeli/Egyptian Peace Treaty, we can surely have a target date for the West Bank/Gaza elections;

¹ Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Top Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

² See footnote 7, Document 85.

³ See Document 142.

b) A full-press effort to get Sadat to accept the treaty; perhaps with a public interpretation by him of Article VI to the effect that it does not negate his defense commitments and a Saudi blessing for this position;

c) Followed by a similarly energetic effort to get Israel to accept the target date and to initiate a substantive dialogue with the Palestinians and a negotiation with Egypt on the scope of authority for the autonomous regime.

4) How is it to be done?

a) Have the Vice President go back with Khalil to tell Sadat that U.S.-Egyptian cooperation will in effect come to an end unless Egypt accedes to the treaty, but if Sadat does agree, then the US would engage in long-term military and economic cooperation with Egypt and with the Saudis on behalf of regional security and specifically to contain Soviet influence. We would need to tell Sadat specifically what we are prepared to do in the military assistance field for this approach to have credibility; and we would have to tell him that if he accedes to our request that we will proceed as in c) below.

b) Have him repeat essentially the same message to the Saudis;

c) Then—if he is successful—proceed to Israel and tell Begin that Israeli failure to accept the timetable and to begin positive movement on the West Bank/Gaza will mean that the US will take the entire matter to the UN Security Council, and consequently that the U.S.-Israeli economic-military relationship will not be allowed to perpetuate a stalemate which will inevitably radicalize the Middle East and reintroduce the Soviets into the region;

d) For the above to work, we must be genuinely prepared to be as direct and blunt as is stated above; so far, we have never managed to be and we have always backed off at the last minute. In fact, I am not sure that anyone on your team could carry this out in the proper manner, and perhaps, in the final analysis, the only way would be for you to do it by letter, maybe reinforced by an additional verbal message delivered personally by the Vice President.

142. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter met with Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil at the White House on December 1, 1978. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met privately with Khalil in the Oval Office from 1:46 p.m. to 2:06 p.m. before the President escorted the

Prime Minister to the Cabinet Room where they were joined by Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan. The meeting continued from 2:06 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No formal record of this meeting has been found, though three sets of handwritten notes from the meeting were made by Carter; two sets are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Policy File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81, while the third is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Policy File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79. William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff subsequently wrote that during the meeting Khalil "pressed hard on the importance of the simultaneity of Israeli withdrawal to the interim line and the establishment of the [Palestinian] self-governing authority." Moreover, Quandt wrote, Khalil wanted to "revise article 6 of the treaty. Carter objected to the idea of revising the treaty, but did suggest that interpretive notes could be appended to it." (Quandt, *Camp David*, page 285)

Following the meeting, Vance announced to reporters that "[i]t was emphasized [in the meeting] that the negotiations will continue in fulfillment of the accords reached at Camp David." Moreover, Vance acknowledged Khalil had given Carter a letter with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's latest proposals. (See Document 139) On continued Israeli participation in negotiations, the Secretary of State stated that Israel had informed the United States that it would resume the negotiations "at such time as will be useful." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Egypt and Israelis Will Resume Talks, U.S. Aides Disclose," *The New York Times*, December 2, page 1) The Department transmitted a full, unofficial transcript of the remarks Vance and Khalil made to the press in telegram 304945 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jidda, Jerusalem, and Damascus, December 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0103)

Khalil again met with Vance and Mondale on the morning of December 2, joined by Quandt, Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. and Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Osama al-Baz. According to a summary of the meeting transmitted in telegram 305342 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, December 3, the meeting focused "largely" on Egypt's proposed changes to Article VI of the draft peace treaty and the Egyptian "desire" for a side letter on the "relationship between [the] Egyptian-Israeli treaty and West Bank/Gaza steps." On Article VI, despite the U.S. delegation's continued urging of the Egyptians not to reopen negotiations on treaty language, it was "clear" from the "strength and tenacity of Khalil's instructions that Sadat has serious problems with paras 2 and 5 of Article VI—not so much with the concepts under-

lying these paragraphs but with the language in which they are expressed and which he seems convinced will increase his vulnerability to charges he is making a separate peace and abandoning his obligations to other Arabs.”

On the proposed side letter, the Department noted the talks with Khalil made clear Sadat’s attachment to the idea that Israel “will not be held responsible if West Bank/Gaza steps cannot be implemented because of reasons beyond Israel’s control—i.e., because Palestinians and/or Jordan refused to cooperate. Khalil has emphasized to us that this point was introduced in [an] effort to meet concerns which Israelis have expressed on this score” and that this point could be incorporated into the side letter.

The Department concluded: the “Egyptians are clearly waiting hopefully for positive Israeli response to Sadat’s letter” (see Document 140), viewing it as “a serious effort on their part to suggest a basis for resuming negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2548)

143. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

New Egyptian Proposal (U)

On instructions from President Sadat, Prime Minister Khalil gave us this morning² a new Egyptian proposal (Tab A). Simultaneously,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document. Brzezinski added the following notation to the top of the memorandum: “For the 5:30 p.m. meeting.” An additional notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the memorandum reads: “11.4.78.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Jordan, Powell, Brzezinski, Quandt, Atherton, and Saunders in the Cabinet Room from 5:35 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. on December 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, though Quandt wrote that the meeting reviewed the details of the proposals made by Khalil. During this meeting, according to Quandt, the decision was taken to send Vance to Cairo to meet with Sadat. (Quandt, *Camp David*, p. 285)

² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

Ambassador Eilts has reported from Cairo³ that Sadat did not accept our suggested variation of the proposal for delaying the interim withdrawal so that it could coincide with the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, Sadat still insists on carrying out the interim withdrawal within nine months, and simultaneously establishing a Palestinian self-government at least in Gaza. (S)

Prime Minister Khalil suggested that Secretary Vance or you should meet directly with President Sadat before formally answering his letter. He clearly feels that he has done as much as he can to persuade Sadat to change his views and wants to leave the remaining task to us. (S)

With reference to Articles IV and VI of the treaty, the Prime Minister expressed his view that Sadat might eventually accept the idea of leaving the text of these Articles intact, while accommodating Egyptian concerns in interpretive notes. Nonetheless, the Egyptian proposal now contains language concerning the need for amendments in both of those Articles. The Egyptians also have left out of their proposal the idea of not holding the Israelis responsible if elections cannot be held because of Jordanian or Palestinian obstruction. Khalil maintains that this has already been conveyed to the Israelis in Sadat's letter⁴ and they do not want to include it in any of the documents related to the peace negotiations. (S)

In brief, the Egyptians have come back to the idea of a target date for elections which coincides with the interim withdrawal. Compared to their earlier position, however, they are most insistent that the interim withdrawal and the establishment of a self-governing authority must occur simultaneously, unless otherwise agreed by both parties. As you know, this will be extremely difficult for the Israelis to accept. (S)

In a meeting this afternoon with Secretary Vance,⁵ Khalil strongly urged the Secretary to come to Cairo to see Sadat as early as this coming Sunday.⁶ He also informed the Secretary that he will be meeting, at Weizman's suggestion, both Weizman and Dayan somewhere in Europe later this week.

³ Telegram 26225 from Cairo, December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1725)

⁴ See Document 140.

⁵ No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

⁶ December 10. The Department reported to Khalil, who was traveling in Belgrade, the decision to send Vance to Cairo on December 10. (Telegram 306812 to Belgrade, December 5; Carter Library; National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 12/1–14/78)

Tab A**Egyptian Proposal⁷**

December 4, 1978

1. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be signed after effecting the amendments⁸ requested by Egypt in Articles 4 and 6. Simultaneously, identical letters will be exchanged between Egypt and Israel (witnessed by the US) providing for the election and inauguration of a self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza. The letters will provide for the holding of the elections not later than September 1979 and the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority within one month thereafter. The military government and civilian administration will be withdrawn from the West Bank and Gaza as specified in the Camp David Framework. The letters will also state that a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of Israel's remaining forces into specified locations, as provided in the Camp David Framework. Simultaneously with the signing of the peace treaty and the exchange of letters, Israel will sign a letter addressed to the United States on measures it will take for the purpose of improving the political situation in the West Bank and Gaza.

2. Within one month after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the peace treaty, the parties agree to start negotiations to work out the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority and to define and agree upon its powers and responsibilities as well as related issues, prior to the elections, in accordance with the Camp David Framework. The parties will agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith.

3. Unless otherwise agreed, the interim withdrawal in the Sinai shall take place as provided for in the Camp David Framework simultaneously with the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority, possibly starting in Gaza. In order to facilitate the transfer of power to the self-governing authority in Gaza, Egypt will maintain a police force and a liaison office there.

4. One month after the interim withdrawal is completed, resident ambassadors will be exchanged. This will be covered in a separate exchange of letters and not in the letter referred to above.⁹

⁷ Secret.

⁸ An unknown hand put brackets around "amendments," and inserted "interpretations" in the margin above it.

⁹ An unknown hand put brackets around this sentence.

5. Full implementation of the peace treaty, including final withdrawal from the Sinai, will take place within three years from the signing and ratification of the peace treaty.

6. The letters shall have the same binding force as the treaty.

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the Embassy in Egypt¹

Tel Aviv, December 4, 1978, 2018Z

18708. Subject: Begin Letter to Sadat.

Begin letter to Sadat delivered to Embassy in unsealed envelope. Text follows:

Begin text;

Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your kind communication delivered to me on November 30 by the United States Ambassador in Israel.² I read its contents with deep attention.

The biblical reference you cite concerning the kinship and brotherhood between our peoples is very moving. I share its sentiment. May I say, however, that the comparison between David and Goliath does not apply in our time. We believe in the brotherhood and equality of all nations.

Let us now turn from ancient to contemporary history. To conclude, to sign, to ratify the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel; to reach, if possible, appropriate peace treaties with the other neighbors—Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs through the full autonomy of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, together with genuine security for Israel and her citizens—this, truly, is history in the making. We wrote a page of it at Camp David with the great and unforgettable assistance of our good friend President Carter. Surely, we must persist together to bring our efforts to fruition.

First, we should and can finalize the peace treaty between our two countries. In the Camp David Framework we agreed that:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.

² See Document 140.

“In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area.”

This is our commitment. With respect to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, it is an absolute commitment. It is not predicated on any other factor, including acceptance of the invitation as quoted above. Certainly, we both seek a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. As you know, I have never suggested to you to conclude a separate peace with Israel. The envisaged peace treaty between our countries constitutes the first indispensable step towards the broader settlement we seek.

In order to make this momentous prospect possible, the Government of Israel a fortnight ago took the decision that it was ready to sign the draft Egyptian-Israel peace treaty as it stands.³ In so doing, the government expressed its willingness to forego two amendments to the draft which it had held to throughout the negotiations. Those amendments are important, but I will not dwell on their significance now because of the action we took in favor of what we hoped would lead to the immediate achievement of our common goal.

As far as the text of the peace treaty is concerned, it seems that the obstacle in the way of our two governments putting our signatures to it—a turning point, indeed, not only in our mutual relations but for the whole region—is your insistence on changing or deleting sections of Article VI and, I am informed, also Article IV. These articles, as they read, were negotiated and renegotiated by our delegations. They are vital and indispensable.

In this context may I comment on your remark about “legal formulations.” To put it simply, everyone tends to display a preference for his own formulation while showing little sympathy for that of his partner. Beginning with the paper you read to President Carter and myself at Camp David⁴ and continuing through all the other Egyptian draft documents, I have found numerous “legal formulations.” I say this without any recrimination. We should both agree, surely, that this is in the nature of things, for after all, we are dealing with political documents that should have proper international standing. Hence, by definition, they are formulated in judicial language. The “legal formulation” to which you address yourself in seeking to change both the letter and substance of Article VI of the draft peace treaty is an immediate

³ See footnote 2, Document 135.

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 28.

case in point. May I tell you that a number of the greatest authorities in international law share our view that under the circumstances this Article VI is absolutely vital to make our document a treaty of peace.

Therefore, should you, Mr. President, now give your approval to the text⁵ of the draft peace treaty as elaborated by our delegations, then no obstacle whatsoever exists to its signing within the specified three months, before the 17th of December 1978. This is the positive suggestion I make to you today.

On page nine of your letter you enumerated six points about which you express criticism of the attitudes of the Israeli delegation and government. May I respond:

A) and B): It is true that your delegates and our delegates talked about the possibility of sub-phases in the interim withdrawal and the feasibility of reducing this withdrawal period to six months. Never did they reach an agreed protocol on these two subjects. In the natural course of discussion it was mentioned by the Israeli representatives as an idea, as a concept, or a possibility to be looked at. And, indeed, as the negotiations proceeded, the Government of Israel considered the issue and decided that we could not undertake to reduce the interim withdrawal period to six months. We will fulfill completely our commitment under the Camp David Framework of the interim withdrawal within three to nine months. On the other hand, sub-phases will be considered, in accordance with the decisions of the government, within the framework of a joint Egyptian-Israeli commission.

C): We have not objected to the concept of an exchange of letters concerning Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

D): We do, indeed, reject what you call "a tangible Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip." Such a tangible or any other presence in Gaza is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David Accord.

E) and F): In the course of the negotiations we objected to several of your proposals as you did to ours. Certain of our objections were approved by your delegation and vice versa. Such is the nature of free negotiations.

Respectfully, I must take exception to the sentence in your letter that reads:

"In my view you should not attempt, or appear to attempt, to evade your obligations under the Camp David 'Framework'".

We shall carry out our commitments fully under the Camp David Agreement. We signed the framework. Our signature is the commitment. We live by the famous rule: *pacta sunt servanda*.

Permit me to illustrate this truth by referring to the matter of the autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The Camp David Framework states:

⁵ See Document 125.

"Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza."

Had Israel sought to resort to "evasion" we could have declared that since Jordan—as one of the three above-mentioned parties—does not join now the negotiations, they should be held in abeyance. We have not said so, on the contrary, we have agreed that, notwithstanding the absence of Jordan, Egypt and Israel will conduct the negotiations with the aim of achieving an agreement. No further proof is necessary, if any, of Israel's sincere intentions towards its commitments. Elsewhere in your letter you employ the phrase, "what you call administrative autonomy." You put it as a negation. This is unjustified.

At Camp David we agreed on autonomy, on full autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We did not agree on sovereignty. We did not agree on a "Palestinian state," nor on a nucleus for such a "state." As the text declares, we both clearly agreed on a freely elected "self-governing authority (administrative council)". This is the commitment we have both underwritten.

As far as a timetable is concerned, it is of course not indicated at all in the Camp David Agreement. Moreover, as I have already mentioned, we have to negotiate freely together with the aim of reaching an agreement in accordance with the Camp David Framework on the modalities, the powers, the responsibilities and other related matters concerning the administrative council and its election.

We, perforce, object to a timetable in connection with this matter. The example you give in your letter to determine the timetable for the exchange of diplomatic relations, for the conclusion of an agreement on trade and commerce, for the conclusion of another agreement on cultural exchange, or of a civil aviation accord—all these are proof of my thesis that a timetable cannot be applied to the matter of autonomy under the given circumstances. Each of the elements you mentioned are under the absolute control of the two sovereign states concerned, the states that sign the peace treaty and its specified annexes.

This is not the case with regard to the issues concerning the autonomy. As matters presently stand very many, if not all the elements are beyond our control. To hold an election one needs an electorate and candidates. At present, we have neither and they cannot be forced. I could send you a collection of original, exact quotations by PLO men threatening every Palestinian Arab with death if he dares support or cooperate with the autonomy scheme in any way. Recently, in Judea and Samaria, three meetings were held in which thousands participated. Words of incitement of the worst kind were voiced. We reacted with restraint although in other countries such inflammable incitement is either not tolerated or is punished. To my deep regret you, too, Mr.

President, were violently attacked by, among others, the Mayor of Ramallah whose insulting words were uproariously applauded. Out of respect, I will not put his words into writing.

Suffice it to say, it is not a matter, as you put it to me, of Israel not being held responsible if developments beyond our control prevent certain desired results being realized. I am speaking of simple reason. All of us must learn from experience. Unwarranted charges may be made. It is our perfect right, *a priori*, to be in a position whereby we will not be required “to justify” ourselves.

Very soon, let me say one month, as agreed, after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of a peace treaty, it is Israel’s desire to enter into negotiations with you (even without Jordan’s participation) on all the issues relating to the election of the administrative council. We want the elections to be held as early as possible and we shall, of course, do all that we can to facilitate the necessary preparations. However, any attempt to fix a date before such preparations are made would not only be unreasonable but could also be very detrimental.

Dear President Sadat,

I entirely agree that both of us have taken upon ourselves an historic responsibility. In the course of our meetings and negotiations there have been good hours as well as some difficult ones. Were not the days in Jerusalem days of friendship and understanding? Did you not tell me that we should put our “cards” openly on the table, to speak with each other in complete candor? Did we not understand after our respective speeches⁶ from the rostrum of the Knesset that we have differences of opinion? Did I not tell you of my unshakeable faith in our people’s right to return to the land of our forefathers and to live in it with our Arab neighbors together in peace and in understanding? Did I not sincerely suggest to you to put behind us, all the memories of the past—and each one of us can speak about his memories—and then together we declared: no more war, no more bloodshed—we shall negotiate?

In Ismailiya we brought you a peace plan.⁷ We reached several serious understandings just as we agreed, as is the nature of things, to differ on several issues. But we found common language and, again, we pledged to each other to continue the negotiations.

Then, suddenly, and I will admit I was taken totally by surprise, there came a turning point towards a non-desirable direction. I will not go into details because—and this is the all important thing—there came

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 140.

⁷ For a report of Begin’s December 1977 discussions with President Sadat in Ismailiya, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1981*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 180.

Camp David, the agreement, the evening at the White House, the joint reception by the Congress of the United States and the actual detailed negotiations on the peace treaty.

I feel it is the duty of both of us to overcome the remaining hurdles and strive to find the common language and understanding in order that we might, insofar as it depends upon us, realize all that we have undertaken and put our signatures to.

In conclusion, therefore, I put to you two positive proposals—one: let us sign the peace treaty as formulated on November 11, 1978. Two: let us, a month after the exchange of instruments of ratification, commence our free negotiations on all the issues relating to the aforementioned elected administrative council.

I can but repeat what I told you on the phone when congratulating you on the Nobel Prize award "... and the real prize is peace itself."

Let us give peace to our nations and joy to the world.

With best wishes, Menachem Begin.

End text.

For Cairo: As noted previously, Prime Minister Begin requests that original of letter be delivered to Sadat, not telegraphic copy.

Lewis

145. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 5, 1978

SUBJECT

Financial Support of Israeli and Egyptian Security Measures Implementing the Peace Treaty

This memorandum describes one Middle East aid issue, not treated in the OMB papers, that may need to be resolved by the time of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "We will take the most conservative, least costly option—when it becomes absolutely necessary. J." Brzezinski wrote on the memorandum: "WQ, HO hold tight."

the treaty signing. We have worked with OMB on this matter, but in line with your instruction no copy of this memorandum is being made.

Discussion

On November 2, Begin presented to Vance² an estimate of \$3.37 billion as being needed to pay for the costs of Israeli military redeployment and establishment of new bases, and asked us to pay the entire amount with a \$700 million grant and the balance as concessional loans. On November 16, Finance Minister Ehrlich and associates provided some particulars: \$750 million for replication of the Etam and Etzion air bases on a three-year schedule, \$140 million for related air control facilities, \$715 million for army redeployment, \$655 million for infrastructure to support redeployed air and ground forces, \$70 million for replication in Israeli territory of their Sinai naval base, \$740 million for additional defense equipment and \$300 million for resettlement of 1,550 families from Sinai. The Israelis are pressing for detailed bilateral discussions of this request.

As you know, we have never undertaken to do more than “consult” with Israel on the costs of the two replacement air bases. A Defense Department survey team’s on-site estimates of air base replication costs is to be completed by December 8 and submitted after DOD review about December 15.³

Egypt will incur much smaller costs, probably limited to establishing an early-warning system in the Suez area. We have not yet received an Egyptian request for help in meeting these costs.

The scale of any US contribution turns on three variables:

- Inclusion or exclusion of redeployment costs, apart from the air bases.

- Inclusion or exclusion of local costs of projects.

- Inclusion or exclusion of marginally related Egyptian items in the interests of political balance in the US support package.

Options

These considerations are summarized in two cost options. Each is additional to annual US aid currently totalling \$1,785 million for Israel and \$950 million for Egypt. We favor the lower, Option A. We suggest deferring a decision, if the treaty negotiating process permits, until refined cost estimates are known in mid-December.

We do not see how a US guarantee of private foreign lending to Israel would help meet these airfield costs, since Israel’s debt servicing

² See Document 117.

³ See footnote 3, Document 153.

capacity is already fully mortgaged and movement of these airfields would not enhance that capacity.

Option A is to make incremental grants to Israel and Egypt in FY 1979, FY 1980 and FY 1981 equalling the agreed *foreign exchange* costs of replicating the two Israeli air bases, including essential associated air control and communications systems and other directly required logistical support facilities, and of establishing the Egyptian early warning system, both on a construction schedule within three years. In both countries, “foreign exchange costs” would be defined to permit substitution of imported goods and services for domestic ones when necessary in our judgment to avoid extreme dislocations of their domestic economies. We would refer the Israeli request for military equipment not essential to the air base relocation to the regular process of US-Israeli consultation on annual FMS credit assistance, without indication of predisposition to increase regular aid levels. As to the economic impact of other military redeployments or civilian resettlement, we would point out that our regular economic assistance provides generous relief of these burdens, to the extent that dollars can help. Our present rough estimate is that this approach would cost the US about \$220–\$250 million a year (additional to current aid levels) for three years; at least 85% of this would be for Israel.

Option B would offer *full-cost* financing of the same facilities as in Option A, thus releasing more Israeli budget funds for the other purposes. We would insist on US control of the construction schedule and take this program into account in responding to Israel’s annual aid requests. Our rough estimate is that this approach would cost the US about \$1.3–\$1.4 billion, spread over three years, that is, \$425 to \$475 million per year (additional to current aid levels), 90% for Israel.

Legislation

We recommend that any US contribution toward costs of implementing the treaty be sought from the Congress in special legislation, which would authorize appropriations in annual installments. Keeping this aid out of our regular foreign aid program would help to avoid building in radically heightened annual aid levels to either country. Offsetting Congressional cuts in your other aid programs could probably still be expected, however.

146. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 6, 1978

SUBJECT

Strategy for the Vance Trip to the Middle East (U)

My approach (unpoutful) would be as follows:

Key Objective (U)

—Signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and a letter on West Bank/Gaza negotiations by December 17. The failure to meet the deadline will be seen as an erosion of the Camp David agreement.² (TS)

—Alternatively, position ourselves so that our links to Egypt and moderate Arabs will be preserved even if the negotiations reach an impasse.³ (S)

Substance (U)

—Urge Sadat to accept treaty text as it now stands. (Fallback of minor change in Article VI, paragraph 2).⁴ (C)

—Rely on interpretive letters to explain that Egypt can honor collective defense commitments, or a strong unilateral Egyptian statement.⁵ (U)

—Side-letter on West Bank/Gaza negotiations with target date for elections by end of 1979. (Some variants may be possible; e.g., objective of concluding negotiations within nine months of ratification—to coincide with interim withdrawal—and holding of elections within three months thereof).⁶ (S)

Tactics for Egypt (U)

—Prospect of expanding cooperation with U.S. as part of regional strategy. Would entail greater military assistance. (C)

—Our willingness to press Israel hard on target date and on settlements issue. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Top Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

² In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

³ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

⁴ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "[paragraph] 5."

⁵ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

⁶ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

—Forthcoming Presidential statement on Palestinians at outset of West Bank/Gaza negotiations. (We could repeat most of our previous statements and hint at willingness to expand direct contacts with Palestinians of various persuasions.)⁷ (S)

—Our willingness to lean on the Saudis now, and eventually the Jordanians, to gain their support for the peace process. (S)

—We should frankly explain that U.S.-Egyptian relations will be hurt if Sadat is seen in our public opinion as responsible for failure of negotiations. This is a political reality, not a threat nor a wild reaction. (S)

Tactics for Israel (U)

Our short-term problem is with Sadat, but our more fundamental problem is likely to be Israel's unwillingness to agree to real powers for the self-governing authority. *Begin needs to understand:* (S)

—Whatever the treaty may say, the quality of the peace between Egypt and Israel, as well as our relations with Israel, will be influenced by how the full range of commitments at Camp David are carried out.⁸ (TS)

—We will oppose future settlement activity by reducing our aid budget by whatever amounts the Israeli government allocates to support of the settlements. We do not intend to subsidize illegal settlements and we will so inform Congress. We will also vote against them in the U.N.⁹ (S)

—A positive Israeli response on the target date will be followed by early agreement on bilateral economic assistance¹⁰ issues. Until this issue is resolved, we cannot make decisions on aid. Disbursal of aid will be conditional on actual progress on the West Bank/Gaza. (S)

—If Israel is seen as responsible for the deadlock in negotiations because of a failure to honor the spirit of the Camp David agreements, U.S.-Israeli relations will be adversely and tangibly affected. We would not be able to continue our intermediary role and the U.N. Security Council might be seized of the Middle East issue. (TS)

Summitry? (U)

In my judgment, Vance may be able to persuade Sadat to accept our proposal, but I am not optimistic. In any event, Begin is likely to

⁷ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

⁸ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

⁹ In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "OK."

¹⁰ In the margin next to this word, Carter wrote: "?"

refuse. Therefore, you may have to deliver the messages suggested here directly to both leaders. This argues for a summit. (TS)

You have credibility with Sadat. Begin would have to be told that decisions would have to be made on the spot if he came to Washington. He should not be allowed the excuse of referring back to his cabinet. If we pursue this course, the risks of failure will be substantial, and we will have to posture ourselves carefully to preserve our ties to Sadat and the integrity of the Camp David Framework.¹¹ (S)

¹¹ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "OK."

147. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 7, 1978, 11–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President's Meeting with Ambassador Dinitz, December 7, 1978, 11:00–11:25 a.m., Oval Office (U)

Ambassador *Dinitz* commented on the two substantive problems in the negotiations: Article VI and the timetable. On Article VI he emphasized the importance of keeping the text of the treaty intact. Any reopening of the text would encourage some members of the Israeli Cabinet to ask for review of other articles, including the preamble. *Dinitz* warned against an interpretive side letter to the effect that Egypt would be able to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Since any Arab war with Israel is defined by the Arabs as a defensible war, this interpretation would dilute the meaning of Article VI. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President, 12/78–1/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "OK. J." According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Dinitz from 11 a.m. to 11:32 a.m.; the only other attendee at the meeting was Quandt, who attended from 11 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Quandt sent Brzezinski a draft of the memorandum under a December 7 covering memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand on the covering memorandum indicates that the original of the memorandum of conversation was to be hand-carried to Clough. Brzezinski wrote an additional notation directing Inderfurth to deliver the memorandum of conversation to Clough for delivery to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 11/78–2/79)

The *President* said that we prefer to keep the text of the treaty as it now is. But if there is a difference between having no treaty at all and a treaty with an interpretive letter, would Israel be better off with no treaty? *Dinitz* said no; it would be better to have the treaty. The question of collective self-defense is already covered by reference to the U.N. Charter in Article VI. The *President* repeated that our preference is to accept the treaty text as it is. If Sadat is adamant, he has the right to reopen this issue for negotiations. (S)

Ambassador *Dinitz* said that Israel had agreed to a form of political linkage by accepting four references in the preamble to the Camp David agreements. While opposing any mention of a target date for elections, *Dinitz* said that if a target must be set, he would make two personal suggestions. The target date should be after the period when normalization of relations should have begun, for example, 12 months after ratification. Second, there should be no conditionality between the successful conclusion of the negotiations to establish the self-governing authority and the completion of the interim withdrawal and the beginning of normalization of relations. (S)

The *President* said that this would be difficult for Sadat to accept. If there is a normalization of relations at the end of nine months, an exchange of ambassadors, and if Israel and Egypt cannot agree on the modalities for elections and for the powers of the self-governing authority, this would put Sadat in an indefensible position with the other Arabs. He would have taken his own land back and not achieved any agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. The *President* said he feared that in those circumstances the treaty might then be abrogated by Egypt, along with claims of Israeli bad faith. Sadat does not feel that Begin is sincere in his determination to carry out the Camp David agreements on the West Bank and Gaza. He needs assurance that there will be some time constraint working on Israel. (S)

The *President* said that we have considered a proposal to remove the nine-month deadline for the interim withdrawal and to tie the withdrawal to the establishment of the self-governing authority, while maintaining the three years deadline for the full implementation of the Egypt-Israel treaty. In any event, the *President* said that he was worried that the whole discussion of target dates might become moot if agreement were not reached by December 17th. This would set a horrible precedent. (S)

Ambassador *Dinitz* said that he agreed that it was important to reach an agreement by December 17th, but the difficulty of doing so demonstrated why a target date for the West Bank/Gaza elections was unwise. The *President* said that the alternative to setting a target date may be that there will be no treaty and there might then be a possible rapid deterioration in relations between the two parties. Egypt and Is-

rael can agree to sign the treaty, to carry out the interim withdrawal, to exchange ambassadors, to start negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, to set a goal for reaching agreement on the holding of elections, combined with a clear exclusion of any responsibility on Israel's part if the Palestinians and Jordanians are the obstacles to progress. If Egypt tried to hold Israel responsible in an unwarranted manner, then our opinion and world public opinion will be important. Sadat considers his letter to Begin to be significant.² He said that he would not hold Israel responsible if other parties block progress. We would be prepared to make statements to Sadat and Begin and to assign a high-level negotiator to help carry out the Camp David agreements. The *President* again repeated that he attaches importance to December 17th. (S)

The *President* added that Israel is demanding too much in Article VI. In his view, Article VI should say no more than that the present treaty is not contradictory to any other obligations and that no actions will be taken in the future which are contradictory to the treaty. Ambassador *Dinitz* pointed out that there are Egyptian commitments that are contradictory to this treaty. The *President* replied the Egypt-Israel treaty would take precedence since it is the most recent and it would be understood to prevail, even if it is in conflict with previously signed documents. This is hard for Sadat to say publicly. (S)

The *President* concluded by saying that he did not see why it would be difficult for Israel to set a goal of concluding the negotiations by the end of 1979 and for Sadat to say that Israel will not be held responsible if other parties prevented the elections. This should be an adequate compromise. The *President* said that he is not recommending any position of his own and that anything Egypt and Israel can agree upon we will support. (S)

² See Document 140.

148. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, December 8, 1978

To President Sadat

I extend to you my warm friendship and best personal wishes—to you *and* your family.

Secretary Vance will deliver this brief letter to you as he comes to pursue with you the historic peace which your courageous initiative has made possible. We must not fail. The triumph of radical elements who have attacked you would indeed bring the prospects of a dismal future to the entire Middle East.

With the threat of disarray in Iran and further intrusion of Communism among your friends, the success of your noble effort has now become of even more importance.

We are close to a settlement and a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, based on the vital harmony between your country and mine which was so effective at Camp David.

It is extremely important that you and I present to Israel and to the world a proposal which is obviously generous and fair and which fulfills the letter and spirit of the Camp David accords. A crucial element of those accords is a time limit on the current negotiations of three months. As you know, only a few days remain. A violation of this timetable by the two principals would set a very bad precedent and would cast doubt on any future time agreements of the new treaty.

You know that we are committed with you to a *comprehensive* peace settlement. We have proven this in every negotiating session. Secretary Vance, in accordance with my personal instructions, will explore with you every feasible option in assuring that this goal is reached.

The long range strategic necessity for you and me to stand together is obvious—whether or not the Israelis ultimately carry out their obligations and commitments. The Middle East must be kept stable. Our friends must be protected. The focus of others must turn away from the destruction of Israel toward peace, stability and the repulsion of alien forces in your region of the world.

I am glad to have you as a partner in this great endeavor.

Your friend,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). No classification marking. The letter is handwritten.

149. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, December 10, 1978, 2135Z

Secto 14022. White House for Dr. Brzezinski. State for Christopher only. Subject: My Meeting With President Sadat 12/10/78.

1. I had a very good 1½ hour meeting alone with President Sadat this afternoon. We have come close to reaching agreement with him on the major outstanding issues, although he wants a bit more time to consult with his advisors and to reflect further. They, of course, may unwind some of what we agreed on this evening. Nonetheless, based on our first discussion, I believe that Sadat will accept the treaty text as it is, with interpretive notes on Articles 4 and 6, and that he will accept a revised side letter along the lines that we discussed in Washington on Friday.

2. We began our talk with a broad discussion of regional problems and of the need for us to have a common strategy in the area. I also gave President Sadat your letter,² which he read with interest and which he agreed with virtually in its entirety. Our strategic overview discussion laid a good basis of common understanding, and I think it is fair to say that we see problems in Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, Sudan, Turkey, and elsewhere in very similar terms.

3. Turning to specifics, I emphasized the need to find a satisfactory solution for the West Bank/Gaza linkage question in the side letter. I indicated that we could also discuss additional steps that would reinforce whatever is in the letter. I gave Sadat a copy of a revised side letter,³ and his only immediate concern was the reference to including Palestinians in the Egyptian delegation. He said that he would not want to promise more than he could deliver, and that we might try to revise that language. He also wants some reference to Egypt's special responsibility to Gaza. He was pleased that our reference to a target date for elections by the end of the year included the phrase "at least in Gaza."

4. Sadat returned to his own idea that the interim withdrawal should be coterminous with the establishment of the self-governing authority. I told him this was not possible in our judgment, but that we

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1507. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance arrived in Cairo on December 10.

² See Document 148.

³ Not found.

had thought of an alternative. I then read to him the revised note on the exchange of ambassadors, the key element of which was the exchange of resident ambassadors one month after the establishment of the self-governing authority. I explained that we felt this change was justifiable, particularly in light of the fact that the Israelis had withdrawn their previous agreement to withdraw in sub-phases. Sadat reflected for a moment and said, "I think that solves my problem. You can consider it agreed." In brief, as of this evening, he feels that we have found an adequate solution to the linkage problem. We will have to explore with his advisors tomorrow to make sure that they understand fully that Egypt would still be obliged to establish diplomatic relations after the interim withdrawal, but that the actual exchange of resident ambassadors could be delayed until the self-governing authority had been inaugurated.

5. Turning to Article 4 of the treaty, I read him our interpretive note,⁴ including an additional sentence which states that a review will be held after five years. He said that this was acceptable and that we could consider this issue closed.

6. On Article 6, I gave him a copy of our draft letter and our legal opinion.⁵ I explained that Article 6 does not mean that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty "prevails over" his other treaty obligations. I expressed my opinion that we should only send this letter to Egypt, and that he should confirm this as his interpretation. He said that he would have to consider this further, but that it helped meet some of his concerns. I also urged him to leave paragraph 2 of Article 6 as it now stands. Once again, he seemed to understand my reasoning, but said that he would need to discuss this with his advisors.

7. In conclusion, I urged him to leave the treaty text as it now stands, relying on the interpretations of Articles 4 and 6 that we had discussed. We could then focus all of our attention on the side letter. I told him that this would help change public opinion, which has put him on the defensive for not having agreed to the treaty. Sadat mentioned that he still hoped for some reference to Egyptian police in Gaza, which I termed a non-starter. He asked me to raise it with the Israelis again, but indicated that he would drop this if it does not work. He clearly does, however, want some Egyptian presence in Gaza. He then said that he thought we had the basis for an agreement, but that we were in for a period of confrontation with Israel and we should be ready for it. He said he wants to wind things up before the 17th, but we

⁴ The text of this draft of the U.S. interpretive note on Article 4 has not been found.

⁵ No copies of this draft letter and legal opinion have been found.

should be prepared to wait for another month if Israel will not now go along. He said he wants to conclude the negotiations, that he wants a treaty, and that he wants to coexist and cooperate with the Israelis. He recognizes that once the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza begin, there will be a dynamic process under way which will bring about significant changes. He now seems to appreciate that the key to breaking the deadlock is to reach agreement with us on the basis that I presented.

8. Sadat is still worried about Article 6, but he generally seems to be in a positive frame of mind, and I hope that we will make good progress with him in the next few days.

Vance

150. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, December 12, 1978, 2225Z

Secto 14043. White House for Dr. Brzezinski only. State for Christopher Only. Subject: Secretary's Negotiations With Egyptians—Dec. 12.

1. Following my return² from Israel today, I had two hours of further meetings with the Egyptians this evening, first with the Prime Minister and Boutros Ghali and subsequently with Sadat and his advisors at the Barrages. In the earlier meeting, we again had a tough time with the Prime Minister over the problem of Article VI, but at the end of our meeting with Sadat, after the President had given his advisors a full opportunity to express their views, Sadat overruled the Prime Minister and agreed to accept our approach to handling the Article VI problem through the letter and legal memorandum previously proposed. To-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1484. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance arrived in Cairo on December 10.

² Earlier in the day on December 12, Vance attended the funeral of former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Jerusalem before returning to Cairo.

gether with the other texts which we worked out yesterday³ and today⁴ with the Prime Minister, we now have U.S.-Egyptian agreement on a package which is along the lines of the one we hoped for and which will enable us to demonstrate in Israel that Sadat has shown considerable flexibility.

2. Sadat's advisors fought the Article VI question to the very end, arguing that we should insist on an interpretive note that would be annexed to the treaty, therefore requiring Israeli concurrence. In overruling his advisors, Sadat stressed to me that he was doing so in order to create a "package deal" that would have to be put to the Israelis on a this-is-as-far-as-I-can go basis. He said candidly that the Egyptian concern was that the Israelis would put his concession on Article VI in their pocket and then bargain for further concessions on the other issues, by which he means primarily the approach we have worked out on the West Bank/Gaza side letter and exchange of ambassadors issue. Sadat said, "I must make it clear Cy, this is a final position and there is no room for further compromise."

3. After Sadat made this decision, Khalil asked what we would do if the Israelis refused the package. Before I could answer, Sadat commented he was prepared to wait "a month or two" if necessary to get Israeli agreement. Addressing the Prime Minister, Sadat said the important thing was that he would be fighting "this last round" with the U.S. at his side. He said it had taken us nine months to get Begin to

³ On December 11, Vance met with Khalil, Ali, Boutros Ghali, and al-Baz to go over the formulations of the linkage letter, and the interpretive notes to Articles IV and VI. Summarizing the meeting, Vance noted: "In general, I believe the Egyptians were impressed by our concept, which I discussed with President Sadat last night, of linking the exchange of ambassadors to inauguration of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. They seem to have made a constructive effort overnight to solve a number of points, and although we still have a problem on Article VI, I feel we are in a good position to take things up in Israel having demonstrated that some definite progress has been made here." (Telegram Secto 14033 from Jerusalem, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1494) The texts of the revised set of documents resulting from this meeting were sent by Vance to Washington on December 11. (Telegram Secto 14030 from Jerusalem, December 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1502) Vance met with Sadat later in the afternoon of December 11. On the discussion, Vance reported: "The tone of the meeting was characterized by Sadat's comment at one point as he brushed an el-Baz comment aside: 'I don't want to make things more difficult for my friend, Cy.'" (Telegram Secto 14032 from Jerusalem, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1500)

⁴ The textual changes to the treaty documents agreed in this meeting were compiled and sent by Vance to the Department and the White House in telegram Secto 14042 from Cairo, December 12. A copy of this telegram, bearing Carter's handwritten comments approving the agreed changes, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Another facsimile version of this document package, bearing a handwritten notation indicating its acceptance by Sadat on December 12, is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East—Reading—December, 1978.

Camp David; now we should be prepared for it to take another month or so to wrap up the treaty.

4. In accepting our approach on Article VI, Sadat said he would defend the Egyptian position in his Parliament by saying he had asked me to convey to Prime Minister Begin what in effect is the U.S.-Egyptian interpretation of what this article means. I readily agreed to do this.

5. On the exchange of ambassadors letter, the Egyptians today accepted our proposal to link the exchange of resident ambassadors with inauguration of the self-governing authority. Egyptians accepted slightly revised wording to our proposed change to Article I of Annex III.

6. At the very end of our meeting with Sadat, he also sliced rapidly through two remaining minor unresolved problems in Annex I—concerning whether Egyptian transports could land in Zone C and the number of aircraft Egypt could station in Zone B. In both cases he overruled General Ali, who was present, agreeing in effect to accept the Israeli position on these points. This will not mean a great deal to the Israelis in comparison with the other issues but it will be helpful in the atmospherics of my presentation tomorrow.

7. This will be a difficult package to sell in Israel (as indeed anything attainable would be), but I think we have done about as well as could be expected here. Sadat has in effect agreed to our strategy by being as flexible as possible on both the Article VI issue and in accepting a target date instead of a fixed timetable in the West Bank/Gaza letter so that the full weight of our persuasive powers can be concentrated on getting the Israelis to accept our new proposition for a linkage trade-off.

Vance

151. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Jerusalem, December 14, 1978, 0030Z

Secto 14053. White House for Dr. Brzezinski. Department for Christopher. Subject: Discussions With PM and Cabinet Members.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840158–1480. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance arrived in Israel from Egypt on December 13.

1. Secret Nodis Cherokee entire text.

2. I had two meetings with the Prime Minister today, the first with his small negotiating group, and the second with about one half of the Cabinet present. Dayan and Weizman were present on both occasions. We will be meeting privately tomorrow morning before another large meeting.² I may also pay a farewell call on the Prime Minister later in the day before heading back to Cairo to report to Sadat that evening.

3. At this point the results at this end are about what we might have expected. The Israelis reacted negatively and argumentatively to most of the elements of the package that we brought from Cairo.³ To what extent this is an initial reaction that may to some extent soften over time is difficult to judge at this point. Toward the end of our second meeting there seemed to be one or two glimmers, particularly from Dayan, to suggest that the Israelis may become somewhat more flexible when they have had a chance to think about the proposition.

4. I started out by stressing the strategic objectives we shared in shoring up the forces of stability and moderation in the region, and said an Egypt-Israel peace would be an important component of this. I followed by outlining the degree to which the Egyptians had made concessions from their previous positions, and then explained the rationale for each document which had been developed.

5. They were most disappointed, as we might have expected, about the proposal to link the exchange of resident ambassadors to the inauguration of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan at one point said that he would rather go back to the wording of the Camp David Accords for Annex III without any mention of ambassadors than to accept the concept that an element of this treaty is conditional on steps in the West Bank/Gaza. Begin argued strenuously that such a proposition was totally outside of, and contrary to, the Camp David Framework. They tried to depict Sadat's withdrawal of his offer to exchange ambassadors one month after completion of withdrawal to the interim line as a violation of faith, and I had repeatedly to remind them that Sadat had originally offered this in return for subphasing, and when the Israelis withdrew that, Sadat, felt free to withdraw his offer as well. I pointed out that Sadat was making only one aspect of normalization of relations out of many contingent upon West Bank/Gaza developments, but Begin insisted that to establish conditionality on one point would set a precedent for the other aspects of normalization as well.

² See Document 152.

³ See footnote 4, Document 150.

6. Almost as troubling to the Israelis was our proposed treatment of Article VI (2) and (5). Most of their comments focused on the Egyptian interpretive note on Article IV (2) which they saw as fundamentally altering the meaning of paragraph 2. I pointed out that the Egyptians thought the present wording in the article could be interpreted to negate the preambular language, but the Israelis insisted that the effect of this note would enable the Egyptians to delay implementation of the treaty provision because of anything that was not congenial to them on the West Bank/Gaza.

7. On the West Bank/Gaza side letter Begin said, several times that the Israelis could not accept a target date, emphasizing that this concept had been rejected by the Cabinet by unanimous vote. He said if a Cabinet date could be avoided, there were several possibilities along the lines of more general language such as "as soon as possible," etc. In general, however, the Israelis seemed somewhat less upset by the West Bank/Gaza letter than by the linkage and Article VI questions. Dayan at one point said that if we could resolve the question of interpretive note and of linkage between this treaty and West Bank/Gaza steps, he thought a solution could be found for the question of a side letter on the West Bank and Gaza, suggesting that in these circumstances even a target date might be acceptable. We had the feeling that on this issue we were beginning to get into an area which the Israelis even at this point saw as negotiable.

8. They also did not like the proposed Egyptian note on the review clause in Article IV, but this I think should prove to be solvable. The Israelis were sympathetic to strengthening the present language in the article to make review obligatory if requested by either side but they are opposed to the second paragraph which called for both sides to make a review five years after signing.

9. I should report that in the small meeting held earlier this morning, Begin criticized us for having sprung these proposals on him without adequate consultations as provided for in our undertaking to them. I told him that I did not think this charge was even remotely justifiable. We had been in the closest consultations with the Israelis throughout this treaty process and I told him that what we were bringing from Cairo were Egyptian proposals which the Egyptians themselves asked us to present to the Israelis.

10. We also provided the Israelis with the text of our legal memorandum on the subject of Article VI (5) but they made no extended comment on this subject in today's meetings.

11. After dinner tonight I met privately with Yadin, Dayan and Weizman and told them very bluntly just where things stand with us

and Sadat. At their urging, I will see Begin alone tomorrow morning⁴ to repeat the message before we meet further. They will be helpful, and all three are almost desperate not to lose the treaty. We explored some possible approaches, but the political complications within the Cabinet are serious obstacles.

Vance

⁴ See Document 152.

152. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Jerusalem, December 14, 1978, 1445Z

Secto 14061. State for Christopher only. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Secretary's Meetings With the Israelis December 14.

1. I met this morning with Begin alone for about one-half hour and conveyed the message² you and I discussed yesterday evening. We had a very frank talk. His response was tinged with sorrow. I suggest that no statements be issued by us until I return tomorrow afternoon and have a chance to look at them.

2. Following this we joined our groups which on the Israeli side consisted of the same large group of Israeli Ministers that were present yesterday. Begin led off by saying that he would call a special Cabinet meeting tomorrow morning in order to discuss the issues that we had brought with us from Cairo. He then asked Dayan to sum up the Israeli position at this point which Dayan did in these terms:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the document. Vance arrived in Israel on December 13.

² The text of Carter's message has not been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Vance on the telephone from noon to 12:11 p.m., December 13. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) On December 13, Carter wrote in his personal diary that Vance reported that the treaty text which Vance had agreed with Sadat received "a very cold and negative reaction" in Israel. (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 265)

(A) The Egyptian proposed interpretative note on Article VI (2), and the proposed linking between the exchange of ambassadors and West Bank/Gaza autonomy are unacceptable rpt unacceptable.

(B) On Article IV, the GOI feels that Sadat is putting the wrong construction on the present language. GOI fully accepts that each party should have the right to initiate a review of the provisions covered on this article. While the GOI does not accept Sadat's proposal for a mandatory review in five years, it believes that the problem presented by this article can be resolved. (It is worth noting that Dayan said nothing about the Article VI (5) issue.)

(C) On the West Bank/Gaza letter, Israel believes this too can be resolved and is prepared to continue negotiations in an effort to find a formulation that is mutually acceptable.

3. The rest of the meeting was taken up by Begin allowing his Ministers to express their views. Burg and Sharon made statements, the latter being predictably negative and critical of the U.S. for "unfairly pressuring" Israel to make concessions.

4. I did get the feeling, however, that the Israelis were taking a somewhat less gloomy and totally negative view of the situation this morning. They are still adamantly opposed to linkage and the Egyptian note on Article VI, but there was more stress today on the areas that might be resolved.³

Vance

³ Before leaving Israel for Egypt, Vance met for one hour with Dayan where they discussed a number of Dayan's ideas for solving the current textual problems. On Article IV, Vance reported that Dayan "indicated that he thought a solution could be found, perhaps even with a slight change in the treaty text." On Article VI, paragraph 2, Dayan said that "he thought they might be able to accept" the Egyptian language of the interpretative note if Israel could add a sentence of its own, though "he did not explain what he had in mind." Moreover, Dayan also proposed using the Camp David language in the exchange of ambassadors as well as further negotiations to find a solution to the joint letter problem, and stated that the Israelis would draft their own legal opinion on Article VI, paragraph 5. After arriving in Cairo, Vance briefed Sadat on his discussions with the Israelis. (Telegram Secto 14065 from Cairo, December 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1476)

153. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Relocating Israeli Airbases from the Sinai to the Negev

At Camp David you indicated that, subject to Congressional approval of the necessary funds, that the United States would help in the relocation to the Negev of Israel's two Sinai airbases at Eitam and Etzion. In pursuance of this agreement, on September 28, 1978, I sent a letter to Israel's defense minister² proposing that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases. In November 1978, I sent a survey team to Israel to begin these consultations. A summary of the team's report is attached.³

Eitam and Etzion presently accommodate up to four aircraft squadrons (120 planes). Israeli plans had called for expansion to five squadrons in 1979 with subsequent further expansion to an eventual 8 squadrons. Israel is asking for U.S. assistance in building airbases to accommodate 5 squadrons within three years. This would require constructing three bases, given the available land in the Negev. The cost would be about \$1.5 billion.

I recommend we confine any assistance on our part to no more than the basing of the 4 squadrons now at Eitam and Etzion, and leave to Israel the full expense of any expansion. This would entail construction at two sites in the Negev (Ovda and Matred) rather than three. The cost for construction of the two bases, accommodating two squadrons each, would be \$988 million for operational facilities and \$57 million for necessary (family housing and recreational facilities for example) but non-mission essential facilities, for a total of \$1.045 billion. This does not include costs for off-base infrastructure and related expenses such as road construction and maintenance, utilities, port and terminal expenses, and the like, which we have assumed Israel would bear. One way we could reduce the U.S. contribution (alternative forms of which are discussed later in this memo) below \$1 billion would be by agreeing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78. Secret.

² See Document 51.

³ A notation in the right-hand margin next to this sentence reads: "(Available upon request.)" A summary of the team's report was not found attached, but a draft executive summary is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78.

to fund only the operationally essential facilities (\$988 million). These costs include inflation based on the assumption of construction over the three year period CY 1979–81.

If the two new airbases are to be operationally ready in three years it will be necessary for DoD to undertake overall management responsibility and to use accelerated construction techniques; Israel lacks the management experience to complete the task in three years. Also, a non-Israeli construction firm will be required to do the work because Israeli firms lack both experience and capacity. Almost all the essential ingredients—management, equipment, manpower, materials—will have to be imported. If a U.S. contractor is awarded the contract, the bulk of the money will be spent in the United States.

The requirement to have operationally-ready bases in three years is a substantial task having important budget and legislative implications. If a treaty were signed in December 1978, funds would be required as follows: \$5 million immediately for site investigation and planning; 49.5% of total U.S. costs (roughly \$500 million) by March 1979; 39.5% in FY 1980; and the remaining 10.5% in FY 1981. Thus, money for the first year must be from FY 1979 funds and available in March 1979, if the peace treaty is signed this month. A delay in signing obviously would allow a corresponding delay in funding.

There are, of course, various ways of reducing the cost to the United States either by cutting back on the scope of the assistance or by the method of financing. The former is connected with broad political questions. As to the latter, there are at least three ways the costs could be funded:

1. *Direct grant for the full amount.* This is the simplest and most convenient way to assure the construction is funded adequately and on time, and therefore holds open the best prospect that the work would be completed on schedule.

2. *FMS Credits (50% "forgiven").* Israel now gets \$1 billion annually. This could be increased (or perhaps in part reprogrammed) for FY 1979–1981 to cover the U.S. share of the airbase costs, i.e., of the total U.S. share of about \$1 billion, Israel would receive \$500 million as grant and the remainder as a long term loan on current FMS terms (no payment on principal for 10 years, payback over the next 20 years, prevailing interest rates).

3. *Long term loan for the full amount.* The terms might correspond with the FMS loan arrangements, or be separately negotiated.

The extent and method of assistance are matters that will require your decision, and you may want to reexamine them in the light of recent events. I am undertaking on a close-hold basis the necessary preparatory work so that we are ready when you decide, and when a peace treaty is in hand, to complete negotiations with Israel and to pre-

pare and support legislation before the Congress. DoD personnel have been instructed to make no commitments to the Israelis on amount, or nature of assistance, and I believe they have observed those instructions.

Harold Brown

Negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Part II: December 17, 1978–March 26, 1979

154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

White Paper on Middle East? (C)

Secretary Vance has sent you the draft of a "White Paper" on the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations, (Tab A). We have several choices in handling this: (S)

—*Release the White Paper* (with any appropriate revisions). The paper itself will then become the target of debate, possibly obscuring the issues in the negotiations. (S)

—*Release the documents*. This would force attention to the issues directly, but would be viewed by some as inappropriate for a mediator. (S)

—*Systematic backgrounding of press*. This should be done in any event, but may be adequate without actually releasing documents. The draft "White Paper" would become the basis for the backgrounding. (S)

Secretary Vance is not in favor of releasing the White Paper or the documents. The more I think about it, the more I think we could accomplish our purposes by extensive press backgrounding. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That we not release the White Paper² or the documents, but that we draw on them for extensive backgrounding. (C)³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 10/78–1/79. Secret. Outside System. Sent for action. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw the document.

² Carter underlined "not release the White Paper" and wrote "?" in the right-hand margin.

³ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation and wrote beneath it, "Just mark it 'SECRET' and let S people see it. It will be published without delay. J."

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to
President Carter⁴**

Washington, December 18, 1978

Attached is a draft of white paper which was completed over the weekend. When you have had a chance to go over it, I would appreciate the chance to talk to you about it. I have reservations as to how much this really advances the debate. Perhaps it might be better simply to release the documents, which speak for themselves, and handle the questions and amplification either by on-the-record or background sessions with the press.

Cyrus Vance⁵**Attachment****White Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶**

undated

*EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS**Where They Stand on December 17*

On September 17, 1978, at the end of the historic meetings at Camp David, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin set for themselves a goal of concluding a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within three months. Since October 12, difficult but productive negotiations have taken place between their delegations at Blair House in Washington with the help of the United States. While it has not been possible to meet their goal, these negotiations have produced the main elements of a treaty package. But several issues remain to be resolved. Some reflect basic differences. Others are less important. In the United States' view, these few remaining gaps can be closed. The United States, as a friend and partner of both parties, remains committed to helping Egypt and Israel resolve these issues in a continuing negotiation.

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ Vance signed "Cy" through this typed signature.

⁶ Secret; Nodis. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the paper: "It's a factual & balanced analysis. J.C."

The purpose of this paper is to explain what has been achieved, the role the United States has played, and the issues that remain. While much information has been made public about the negotiations, preserving the integrity of the negotiating process has required that the talks be conducted confidentially. In such a situation and when issues of a highly technical nature are involved, some confusion and misapprehension are bound to arise.

The United States has been a full partner in this process, as at Camp David, because peace in the Middle East is crucial to its national interests and to the peace and security of its friends there. We are involved in the Middle East because of our permanent historic and moral commitment to the State of Israel, because of our friendships and important interests in the Arab world, because of the strategic importance of moderate government there, and because renewed tension or warfare in the area carries the risk of confrontation between the major powers, severe global economic dislocation, and strains in relations with our friends and allies. We have been able to participate in the process and to play the role of partner because we enjoy the confidence of both sides.

Where the Treaty Package Stands

Two Framework Agreements were signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President Carter, on September 17: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.⁷ The first sets out broad guidelines for peace between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and its other neighbors including the Palestinians, with the objective of achieving a comprehensive peace; it describes in some detail a framework for the West Bank and Gaza; it enunciates general principles governing negotiations between Egypt and Israel; and it sets out associated principles that should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors. In the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Parties set out the broad outlines for this peace treaty.

As a result of the negotiations that began on October 12, the framework agreed upon at Camp David has been translated into a set of detailed documents which comprise a treaty package. Agreement has been reached on most of these documents. But as of December 17, neither Party is prepared to agree on all of the elements of the treaty package. Until there is agreement on the complete package, there cannot be a peace treaty.

⁷ For the text of these two documents, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1523–1528.

The complete treaty package now before the Governments of Egypt and Israel contains the following documents:

- a Protocol concerning Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and accompanying security arrangements;
- maps delineating the line for an interim Israeli withdrawal and the security zones to be established in the Sinai and the Negev after Israel's final withdrawal;
- a Protocol concerning the normalization of relations between the Parties under conditions of peace;
- a set of letters and interpretive notes.

In those documents, the two Parties have reached agreement on: the basic text of a peace treaty, the Annex on withdrawal and security arrangements, the maps, virtually all of the Annex on the normalization of relations, the beginning of the next round of negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza one month after ratification of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty.

There are three principle outstanding issues:

—*How to express the relationship between the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and the political process in the West Bank/Gaza which both sides agreed at Camp David should be negotiated and set in motion.* Egypt wants assurances that the sequence of steps leading to Palestinian autonomy will take place within a specific timeframe. Israel agrees to start negotiations promptly, but takes the position that it is impossible to determine when those negotiations can be concluded. Israel does not want implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty conditioned on other negotiations. Egypt has insisted since President Sadat's visit to Israel in November, 1977, that Egypt can make peace with Israel only in the context of progress toward peace between Israel and its other Arab neighbors.⁸ This issue is touched on in two proposed letters—one specifying the time period within which these negotiations would be concluded and another in which Egypt relates the exchange of ambassadors to inauguration of a Palestinian self-governing authority.

—*How to define the relationship between the obligations under this Treaty and those under other international obligations.* Israel wants the obligations under this Treaty to have priority over Egypt's commitments to other Arab nations. Egypt has insisted on the right, under the UN Charter, to honor the several mutual defense pacts it has with other Arab States in the event of armed attack against them. These issues are dealt with in Article VI of the Treaty.

—Both sides agree to the *principle of a review* in Article IV of the Treaty and that any changes must be by mutual agreement. Egypt wants it made explicit that review is mandatory upon the request of either side and has suggested a fixed date for review. Israel agrees that review should be mandatory if either side requests a review but does not accept the mention of a review in 5 years.

⁸ Carter underlined "other Arab neighbors" and wrote "Palestinians, W Bk/Gaza" in the right-hand margin next to it.

How these issues are dealt with in the documents of the treaty package is discussed in greater detail below.

How the Negotiations Have Been Conducted

To understand where the negotiations stand as of December 17, it is important to understand several points about how the negotiations have been conducted.

First, it is essential to understand *the process by which agreement is reached* in a negotiation of this kind. The Egyptian and Israeli Governments sent to Washington highly qualified negotiating teams headed by Cabinet Ministers. These two teams came empowered to negotiate but not to give final approval. Each could and did frequently accept certain provisions *ad referendum*—that is, subject to later approval by their governments. In a few instances provisions that were agreed to by each of the negotiating teams were disapproved when referred to the home government. This is a normal and accepted part of the negotiating process. When the recommendations of the negotiators are overruled, the solution is further negotiation to settle the unresolved issues.

Second, it is important to understand *the U.S. role in these negotiations*. As at Camp David, we have worked separately and together with the negotiating Parties. We have served as communicators between them, helping each to understand the other's positions. We have helped them to crystallize and write down the positions that evolved from their discussions. At the beginning of each phase in the negotiations at Blair House, we put to the Parties draft texts to be used as a basis for negotiation. These texts were not intended to be binding upon anyone; their aim was simply to give the Parties a point from which to start. In later instances, when the Parties had negotiated for some time but found themselves unable to reach agreement, we proposed drafts that we thought represented fair and reasonable compromises which would advance the negotiations without prejudicing the fundamental interests of either Party. In short, most of the documents now in the Treaty package have resulted from a combination of all of these methods and from intensive discussion of the issues after a prolonged period.

Third, it may be useful to have in mind a simple *chronology of events* during the period of these negotiations:

- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| October 12: | Negotiations begin at Blair House. |
| October 20–21: | Intensive sessions with President Carter. |
| October 22: | Ministers Dayan and Weizman return to Israel to consult the Cabinet. |
| November 11–12: | U.S. effort to present a complete text of the Treaty, of Annex III, and of a letter on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. |

- November 13: Egyptian Acting Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali returned to Egypt to consult with President Sadat. Egypt did not agree to two Treaty articles and the West Bank/Gaza letter.
- November 15–18: Egyptian Vice President Mubarak visited Washington.
- November 21: The Israeli Cabinet approved the Treaty text and Annexes while rejecting an Egyptian draft of a West Bank/Gaza letter and not approving a U.S. draft.
- November 30–December 4: Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil visited Washington.
- December 8: Secretary Vance left for Egypt and Israel.

The Outstanding Issues

The differences between Egypt and Israel have been reduced to very few. Both Parties are now prepared to accept the Treaty text,⁹ subject to Egyptian request for two clarifications, Annex I on withdrawal and security arrangements, the maps, and Annex III with the exception of disagreement on one sentence.

Side understandings relating to Annex I had been agreed, and extensive work had been done on a letter which would deal with the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Because of the sharply divergent positions taken by Egypt and Israel on this last issue, the United States had put forward a compromise draft calling for negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza to begin one month after the ratification of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty with a goal of concluding those negotiations and holding elections not later than the end of 1979. After extensive discussions on November 11–12,¹⁰ the Israeli negotiators accepted the U.S. proposal subject to approval by the Israeli Cabinet. The Cabinet on November 21 did not approve the U.S. draft. The Egyptians initially rejected the U.S. draft, but accepted it during Secretary Vance's talks in Egypt December

⁹ On December 15, the Israeli Cabinet issued the following statement: "The GOI is prepared to sign without delay the draft peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, including the annexes as formulated on the 11th of November 1978 with the approval of the United States Government. Full responsibility for the fact that the peace treaty has not been signed rests entirely with the GOE." The Cabinet rejected the three new "demands" from the Egyptians, as "inconsistent with the Camp David Framework or are not included in it and change substantially provisions of the aforementioned peace treaty." Moreover, the GOI rejected "the attitude and the interpretation of the United States Government with regard to the Egyptian proposals." (Telegram Tosec 140109/316098 to the Secretary's Aircraft, December 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780518–0276) At the time, Vance was en route to Washington from Israel.

¹⁰ See Documents 125–128.

10–12.¹¹ A special word is also required about one aspect of the negotiations on Annex III, dealing with normalization of relations between the two Parties. Early in the Blair House talks, agreement *ad referendum* was reached between the negotiators that in return for Israel's willingness to detail a sector-by-sector timetable for accelerating its interim withdrawal in the Sinai, Egypt would agree to maintain the momentum of rapid implementation of the Treaty by agreeing to exchange ambassadors one month after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line. Neither of these understandings had been agreed at Camp David; both were reached in an atmosphere of trying to show quick results from the signing of the Treaty. Subsequently, the Israeli Cabinet disapproved detailing the phases for an early withdrawal. The Egyptian Government then withdrew its reciprocal agreement for an early exchange of ambassadors. The issues that remain following Secretary Vance's December 10–15 talks in Egypt and Israel are the following:

Treaty Text

—*Article IV* of the Treaty, paragraph 4, which provides that: "The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either Party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties." President Sadat has agreed to accept this paragraph but wanted an interpretive note which would make clear that a review would be mandatory if requested by either Party. Egypt has proposed the following note:

"Paragraph 4 of Article IV shall be construed to mean that review provided for in that Article shall be undertaken promptly on the request of either Party, and that an amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of the two Parties.

"It is understood that such a review will occur when the Treaty has been in force for five years."

—*Article VI* of the Treaty, which concerns the obligations of the Parties toward each other under this Treaty and toward third parties to whom they also have commitments. President Sadat was concerned mainly over paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article:

—*Paragraph 2* states: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty." President Sadat wanted clarification that this language did not contradict the fact that the Treaty is concluded in the context of a comprehensive peace in accordance with provisions of the Camp David Framework. He prepared the following interpretive note:

¹¹ See Documents 149 and 150.

“The provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article VI of this Treaty shall not be construed in contradiction with the fact that this Treaty is concluded in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.” Israel has not yet responded formally to this proposal.

—*Paragraph 5* states that in the event of conflict between the obligations under the Treaty and those stemming from other international undertakings “. . . the obligations under the Treaty will be binding and implemented.” President Sadat was troubled that the Article might be seen as abrogating legitimate defense commitments undertaken by Egypt pursuant to the Arab League Charter. Egypt has indicated willingness to accept a U.S. legal opinion “. . . that the obligations which Egypt assumes under the proposed Treaty text would not prevent Egypt from legally coming to the assistance of any state with which it has a collective security or mutual defense agreement in the event that state is the victim of armed attack by a third state.” It is also true that Egypt would have no duty or right to assist an Arab country in initiating an attack on Israel.

It seems to the United States that each of these problems with the Treaty text has a solution that is consistent with the agreements reached at Camp David and with the interests of each Party.

The Letters

—*The letter concerns the establishment of a self-governing authority on the West Bank/Gaza.* President Sadat agreed that negotiations for the West Bank/Gaza agreement should begin one month after the ratification of the peace Treaty but was concerned over having no assurance that they would progress satisfactorily. Rather than a good faith target date, he wanted a firm date set for the establishment of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza; furthermore, he wanted this date to coincide with the date of Israel’s withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line in Sinai, which was the starting point, under the Camp David Framework Agreements, for beginning normal relations, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, and the termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people. During Secretary Vance’s recent trip to Egypt, however, President Sadat accepted the idea of a target date to be stated as “not later than the end of 1979.” No part of the implementation of Annex III, except the exchange of ambassadors, would be coupled with that date.

—*The letter concerning exchange of ambassadors.* As described above, Egypt had earlier agreed that, in order to maintain the momentum of rapid implementation of the Treaty, ambassadors would be exchanged within one month after completion of the interim withdrawal. Egyptian negotiators regarded this as a significant concession while Israel

would continue to occupy a substantial portion of the Sinai. Egypt has now proposed to send the following letter to President Carter: “In response to your request, I can confirm that within one month after the self-governing authority is inaugurated, which may take place in Gaza first as a step towards full implementation of the Camp David Framework, Egypt will send a resident Ambassador to Israel and will receive a resident Israeli Ambassador in Egypt.” Egypt regards the decision to exchange ambassadors as the prerogative of the President of Egypt, not an appropriate subject for inclusion in a peace Treaty. They regard the exchange of ambassadors as an element in the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel which will in part depend—in a political though not in a legal sense—on the progress in the negotiations establishing peace between Israel and its other neighbors.

155. Letter From Israeli Chargé d’Affaires Bar-On to President Carter¹

Washington, December 25, 1978

My dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by Prime Minister Begin to transmit to you the following message:

“Dear Mr. President,

I thank you wholeheartedly for your moving holiday message.²

We shall, indeed, continue praying for peace and spare no effort to achieve it. You know best, Mr. President, how great were the sacrifices we made and the risks we undertook for the sake of this blessed goal. I

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 9, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 7–12/78. No classification marking. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the letter, indicating that he saw the document.

² On December 22, Carter sent a brief holiday greeting to Begin in which he observed that “the spirit of the season moves me to try to recapture the feelings that we shared at Camp David. I am confident that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt will continue. When they do, the United States will play its role as it did at Camp David with patience and perseverance.” (Tosec 150037/322133 to Tel Aviv, December 22; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 9, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 7–12/78) The same day, Carter sent a similar message to Sadat. (Tosec 150038/322132 to Cairo, December 22; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/79)

fervently hope that the spirit of Camp David will be speedily revived so that the work you and all of us invested there shall not have been in vain.

It is a pity, indeed, that the target date of December 17 was not met. But, with a clear conscience I can say that the fault was not ours. We did our very utmost, just as we remain ready now to sign that draft which was agreed upon in the prolonged tripartite conferences.

Certainly, we do not lose hope and believe that the peace talks will be resumed so that, after all the ups and downs of the last year, the new year of 1979 will be the year of peace.

My wife joins me in sending to you, to Mrs. Carter and to all your family our very best wishes for a Happy Holiday and a Happy New Year.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

Menachem Begin"

Respectfully yours,

Hanan Bar-On³

Charge d'Affaires ad interim

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

156. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Status Report on Egypt-Israel Negotiations (U)

As Secretary Vance has no doubt informed you, the talks with Dayan and Khalil in Brussels went surprisingly well.² The two men

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 76, Peace Negotiations: 1–12/78. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for information.

² No memoranda of conversation for the December 23–24 Brussels meetings among Vance, Dayan, and Khalil have been found. Vance sent a preliminary report of the talks, which he described as "good," in telegram Secto 15035 from the Secretary's Aircraft, De-

seemed to respect each other and for the first time there was a highly sophisticated discussion of broad regional strategic concerns. (S)

Khalil took the lead in arguing that events in Iran and elsewhere increased the importance of concluding an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that would not isolate Egypt from the other Arabs. As he sees it, Egypt should be in a position to play a stabilizing role in Sudan, North Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is better suited to take action in support of moderate forces there than is Israel, and he implied that Israel would profit from peace with an Egypt which has influence in the surrounding area. The Soviet threat to the region was also discussed in some detail. In brief, compared to anything that could have been talked about between an Egyptian and an Israeli leader just a year ago, this was a remarkable performance. (S)

On the specific issues in the negotiations, Dayan made useful suggestions on how to handle the less controversial items: (S)

—*Article 4*. Dayan agreed to an interpretive note saying that there will be a review of security arrangements at the request of either party, but he urged deletion of reference to a mandatory review after five years. Khalil agreed.

—*Article 6*. Dayan proposed dropping the interpretive note to paragraph 2, but said that a US legal opinion on the entire Article could be provided to both parties which would include the language of the interpretive note. Israel would probably also ask us for some additions to our legal opinion. Khalil seemed to think this procedure would be acceptable. We may find that Begin will be unwilling to proceed in this manner, but it does seem to be a reasonable approach.

—*Joint Letter on West Bank/Gaza Negotiations*. Dayan now agrees that there should be such a letter signed by both parties. He still opposes any mention of a target date, but did suggest that the letter could be strengthened in other ways to make it more attractive to Sadat. *This remains a major problem.*

—*Exchange of Ambassadors*. This is the most difficult issue for both parties. Dayan offered to strengthen the joint letter if Egypt would agree to return to the original formulation on exchanging Ambassadors one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal. Both sides are pretty well dug in on this and we are in a weak position to urge Sadat to reconsider.

Procedurally, both Dayan and Khalil agreed that further talks at their level, with our participation, would be useful. After they have re-

ember 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1449) Quandt, who was present for the meetings, later wrote that though Dayan and Khalil "appeared to get along well," the Brussels talks made "no real headway." For his account of the meetings, see *Camp David*, pp. 292-293.

ported to their respective leaders, they will contact Secretary Vance and a decision will be made on when and where another meeting should take place. (I anticipate a meeting in Washington or Europe in about mid-January.) (S)

While the tone of the talks was constructive, *I do not think we are much closer to solutions on the most difficult issues*. Dayan may also have difficulty, as he has in the past, in delivering Begin on some of his proposed compromises. At best, we may be able to resolve the differences over the interpretive notes in another Dayan-Khalil meeting. That would leave the “linkage” issues—the target date and exchange of Ambassadors. I doubt if these points can be resolved without a Carter-Sadat-Begin Summit, perhaps in February. (S)

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State and the White House¹

Amman, December 30, 1978, 1325Z

9618. Subject: Message to President From King Hussein.

(S-entire text)

1. Embassy has been requested to forward following letter to President Carter from King Hussein.

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. President, you were kind enough, some time ago now, to ask me to keep in touch with you on developments in the Middle East. I am writing to you once again in the spirit of friendship that has grown between us, on the Arab-Israeli problem which is the core of instability in this entire area.

Mr. President, I do not belittle the genuine desire you have shown and the continuing and relentless efforts you have made for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I recall that in our meetings² you have been

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 71, Brzezinski, Chron: 1/1–16/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Carter wrote: “CC Cy & Zbig. I am not interested in any visit by Hussein. No need to answer this for a while. JC.” The telegram was found attached to a January 2, 1979, covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance. (Ibid.) A signed copy of Hussein’s letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Jordan: King Hussein, 2/77–2/79.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 30–31 and 182.

gracious enough to give me more of your valuable time on this subject than any of your distinguished predecessors.

It is indeed unfortunate that the concerted efforts, which began shortly after you assumed the responsibilities of your high office, of bringing together to the Geneva peace conference, on the one hand, all the Arab parties to the conflict particularly the Palestinians, without whose participation no solution to the Palestinian problem is logically possible or meaningful, and Israel, on the other hand, were overtaken by events and prematurely abandoned. It had been our fervent hope that the Geneva peace conference would have made headway with the assistance of its co-chairmen, the United States and the Soviet Union, and under the auspices of the United Nations would have elaborated the details of a durable peace based on the eleven year old Security Council Resolution 242 and Security Council Resolution 338. Sadly, when such a process appeared almost within reach, an unexpected series of events limited the scope of possibilities and subsequently led to Camp David.

Most Arab parties, including Jordan, see the Resolutions drawn up by the United States, Egypt and Israel as successfully achieving the well-known Israeli objective of isolating Egypt from the Arab camp, and thus weakening it further, which is one of the reasons for our finding them unacceptable. Despite the inherent justice in the Arab cause, the Arab position has been weakened by Israel's superior might, bolstered mainly by the United States championing Israel's cause and generously accommodating her demands. Furthermore, there is a real imbalance between a process which leads Egypt to restoring her sovereignty over all her occupied lands, and the vagueness that shrouds the future of all the other occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem. The rights of the Palestinians on their national soil have been neglected, while Israel continues to create new facts, altering the character of the entire area.

It is not difficult for any impartial body to understand the Arab attitude towards the Camp David Agreements. Evidently if any Egyptian-Israeli peace is forthcoming, it will not mean a comprehensive solution to the principal issues which are left outstanding.³ Nor can autonomous self-rule for the inhabitants of the Palestinian occupied territories, whichever categories are included in it, be a solution to the problem, when the end of any process is unclear and Israeli intentions are infinitely more clear to us all.

I believe the heart of the problem to be sadly clear, despite our fullest confidence in your sincerity, Mr. President, the United States, where the Zionist lobby is so strong, cannot be the champion of Israel,

³ Carter underlined this sentence.

committed at all times to supporting the said state with her material needs and almost unlimited military strength, and concurrently be the sole impartial and objective mediator with Israel's opponents.⁴ That is why, sir, I suggested to you in my letter just before the Camp David meetings,⁵ that it may be wise, in the face of possible Israeli intransigence, to consider returning to the United Nations Security Council which sponsored Resolutions 242 and 338, from which the Geneva conference emerged, to seek guidance and to regain the momentum for a comprehensive lasting peace.⁶

The Arab Summit at Baghdad⁷ affirmed the Arabs' objective of seeking a just and comprehensive peace based on total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June of 1967. The summit placed great emphasis on the essential Israeli withdrawal from Arab Jerusalem, which is of equal importance to hundreds of millions of believers in God. It emphasized the resolution of all aspects of the Palestinian problem in accordance with United Nations Resolutions, and the granting of the unconditional rights of self-determination to the people of Palestine. Following all these developments, I suggest again that this troubled Middle East, which threatens the interests and lives of many in the world, and even world peace, can only be saved by regaining the momentum for peace, in accordance with my earlier suggestion, regardless of what has or may transpire between Egypt and Israel.⁸ I see no other option or possibility.⁹ We must maintain the search for a comprehensive settlement of all the issues, with all parties concerned in the area, including the Palestinians. Initially with the help and direct involvement of the Security Council, and then with the help of the United States and the Soviet Union, and possibly some of our European friends, including France and the United Kingdom. I have written to you, sir, most frankly and candidly, which is, I believe, the only way I could as a friend. I am happy to contribute all I can for a better future for this area, and for the people I am honoured and proud to serve, as did my forefathers throughout Arab history. I hope to hear from you, and look forward to meeting you whenever you deem the time and circumstances appropriate for me to visit you.¹⁰ I wish you good health and every good fortune in the new year.

⁴ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁵ See Document 17.

⁶ Carter highlighted this sentence.

⁷ See footnote 7, Document 85.

⁸ Carter underlined "I suggest again that this troubled Middle East" and "can only be saved by regaining the momentum for peace, in accordance with my earlier suggestion, regardless of what has or may transpire between Egypt and Israel."

⁹ Carter underlined this sentence.

¹⁰ Carter underlined this sentence.

Noor joins me in sending our highest regards to you and to Mrs. Carter, and our best wishes to the family. Your sincere friend, Hussein I. End text.

Veliotēs

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, December 30, 1978, 1654Z

328036. Subject: Presidential Message to Prime Minister Begin.

(S) entire text

1. Please deliver the following message from the President to Prime Minister Begin before Sunday's² Cabinet meeting.

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I received on Christmas Day your message³ of good wishes for the holidays and your hope that the new year we are about to enter will be a year of peace. I want to tell you how much I share that hope and that prayer with you.

Much has been achieved in this past year, and your initiatives and decisions have been critical ingredients in the progress that has been made. It is sad that having come such a long way we have not been able to overcome the few remaining obstacles.

Secretary Vance has reported to me on the discussions in Brussels,⁴ where the genuine political and security needs of both Israel and Egypt were made clearer to Prime Minister Khalil and Foreign Minister Dayan. These needs do not seem to be incompatible provided both governments continue to seek the implementation of the Camp David Accords through friendly and constructive negotiations. I hope that it will

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 12/15–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by the White House; cleared in substance by Vance; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S-O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2531)

² December 31.

³ See Document 155.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 156.

now be possible to resume the talks and finish the task we set for ourselves at Camp David.

As always, I am keenly aware of the commitment which you and I share for a secure, peaceful and prosperous future for the people of Israel.

My prayers will be with you and the Cabinet this Sunday as you decide how to take another step toward peace.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter. End text.

Vance

159. Memorandum From the President's Special Adviser for Middle East Affairs (Sanders) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Observations on Where We Stand.

I have returned on January 1st from a week on the West Coast, and would like to take this opportunity, as we begin the New Year, to relate how the Jewish community views our actions, our policies and the current status of the peace process.

Unfortunately, everything I heard reinforced my apprehensions (expressed in my memo to you dated December 14, 1978²). Jewish opinion in the country is almost totally agreed that the Administration is insensitive to Israel's concerns about the peace treaty and its security requirements. In the view of the community, our posture is not only a cause for concern in the current talks, but portends real pressure on the Israelis in the upcoming West Bank negotiations.

The opinion has obviously been influenced by negative editorial comment in the major metropolitan newspapers. For example, in the week following Secretary Vance's trip to the Middle East, we were criticized by a host of newspapers, including the New York Times, Wash-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 5. No classification marking. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "c.c. Cy, Zbig. J."

² The memorandum has not been found.

ington Post, Wall Street Journal, Washington Star, Philadelphia Inquirer, Baltimore Sun, Miami Herald, Houston Post, and San Francisco Examiner. My own mail is 100% negative. The White House mail count for the week ending 12/24/78 was 85% negative.

The position we find ourselves in with respect to the Jewish community (and the Israeli public) is potentially disastrous for the attainment of a comprehensive peace.

Israeli public opinion today is not only bitter over our negotiating positions, but also deeply suspicious of our motives and concern for Israel's security. The erosion of Israel's confidence in the United States will probably not prevent ratification of any prospective Egyptian-Israeli treaty, but it will make it infinitely more difficult for the Begin Government to meet its commitment to full autonomy for the Palestinians. If Israel retreats too far on this issue, I fear that the peace process will grind to a halt in 1979. We must act to prevent this.

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, January 7, 1979, 1256Z

358. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Egyptian Response—PriMin Khalil's Letter to Secretary Vance. Ref: Cairo 0357.²

(S-entire text)

1. Set forth below is the text of Prime Minister Moustafa Khalil's letter to Secretary Vance giving the Egyptian response to how negotiations should be resumed. Although it is undated, it was completed last night (January 6) and given to me at midnight. Attached to Khalil's letter is a statement which he made on January 3 after the Egyptian Cabinet discussions of the results of the Brussels meeting. Khalil tells me that GOE does not intend to publish the letter, but that he would be willing to consider doing so if you think there might be some advantage in publication. He wants a copy given to Israelis.

2. Quote: It is with great pleasure that I express our deep appreciation for the untiring efforts exerted by the Government of the United States of America in the cause of peace.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009-0348. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv.

² Sent January 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156-1910)

I believe that our discussions³ in Brussels have been very beneficial in defining the points of difference, and in explaining the logic behind our points of view concerning these differences.

The meeting also gave us the opportunity to discuss the latest world developments in the Middle East, with special emphasis on Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and various Arab and African countries. I have fully explained to you and to Mr. Dayan, the utmost importance of achieving a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours, as a factor for ensuring the Arab world against foreign aggression or internal destabilisation. I also stressed the importance of linking the question of the settlement in the West Bank and Gaza with the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, I made it clear that it would not be in the interest of peace in the world, and particularly in the Middle East, if Egypt were isolated from the other Arab and African countries, as a result of concluding the peace treaty with Israel. Such a situation would be against the interest of security in the whole area. It would also make it more difficult for Egypt to assume its natural and essential role as the defender of other Arab countries when threatened by aggression or destabilisation attempts.

During our meeting, I also pointed out the fact that all the other Arab countries, even the hardliners among them, have not rejected the principle of solving the Arab-Israeli confrontation by peaceful means. It is also worth noting that the pact of the Arab League,⁴ signed in 1945 before Israel was created, does not contain any provision that may be construed as being directed against Israel. Furthermore, the Arab League Common Defense Treaty,⁵ which was signed in 1950 and came into force in 1952, does not contain a single word against Israel. Thus, if peace is established, this treaty cannot be interpreted as directed against Israel. Rather, it will be the instrument enabling Egypt to cooperate with the other Arab countries for mutual defense, and for the maintenance of peace and stability throughout the region.

I also stressed that the treaty between Egypt and Israel, along with the solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects according to the Camp David Framework, must be of such a nature as to attract the Palestinians and the other Arab countries to accept it and participate in the peace process, not to isolate Egypt, force even the moderate Arab countries to take a harder line and reflect negatively on the constructive role of the United States in the peace process.

³ See footnote 2, Document 156.

⁴ The full text of the Pact of the League of Arab States, signed March 22, 1945, is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, pp. 1243–1249.

⁵ The full text of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League, signed June 17, 1950, is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, pp. 1249–1253.

I would also like to state the fact that the Israeli insistence on inserting religious concepts as a pretext for its expansionist designs in Gaza and the West Bank has encouraged extremist Moslem movement in Iran and Turkey, and will no doubt give momentum to similar extremist movements in other Arab and Moslem countries if we fail to reach a comprehensive peace settlement. Unfortunately, the recent statement of the Israeli Cabinet does not conform with the optimistic remarks and suggestions of Mr. Dayan. Moreover it did not reflect enough progress, a fact that sheds serious doubts as to the value of molding new meetings similar to the Brussels meeting, since the Israeli Government insists on reaffirming its decisions⁶ of December 15, 1978 in their totality, and completely rejects the American interpretation of Article 6 of the peace treaty. Israel also refuses the setting of a target date for the realisation of full autonomy in Gaza and in the West Bank as it had previously agreed in Washington.

Dear Secretary Vance,

I will now try to explain the Egyptian position as expressed in the communique issued by our Council of Ministers on January 3, 1979 which I attach to this letter, and then I will suggest a procedure to be followed for future steps, subject to your acceptance or modifications.

A. Concerning the Israeli refusal to set a date, or even a target date, for the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza, we are of the opinion that the Egyptian-American agreement reached, in this regard, during your last visit to Cairo,⁷ is the correct way to solve this problem, for the following reasons:

1. It is the only way that will make the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel fall within the context of a comprehensive peaceful settlement according to the Camp David Framework.

2. It was mentioned in the Framework that 'the parties express their determination to reach a just comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties ... etc; ... for peace to endure it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict'. This clearly refers to the Palestinians. Furthermore, the Camp David Framework is divided into three major parts: a. West Bank and Gaza. b. Egypt and Israel. c. associated principles.

In our opinion, this order of priority is a strong indication of the importance attributed by the Framework to the solution concerning the West Bank and Gaza, which must be solved before the question of peace between Egypt and Israel.

⁶ See footnote 9, Document 154.

⁷ Vance was in Cairo December 10–12. See Documents 149 and 150.

You will also notice that all important elements of the settlement mentioned in the Framework, had been included in the last Egyptian American proposal.

The Framework also mentions that the transitional arrangement will be for a period not to exceed five years, and that it begins when the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated. The Framework also mentions that negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, will take place not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

Thus, fixing a date for the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority is of utmost importance, it completes the time-table adopted by the Camp David Agreement, because, if such a date is not mentioned, then the inauguration of this authority will be left to the unilateral will of Israel. It will also mean that it may start after an unlimited number of years, which would practically make the treaty between Egypt and Israel a separate solution. In such a case, it will neither attract the Palestinians nor the other Arab countries, to accept it and participate in it. It will also cast great doubts about the real Israeli intentions concerning the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Such doubts are reinforced daily by official statements coming from Israel.

The Israeli contentions that they will be held responsible in case of the refusal of the other parties concerned to participate, is not really valid. Such a matter has been taken care of in paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the draft treaty which stipulates:

‘The parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this treaty without regard to actions or inactions of other parties’.

The same point is stipulated in the Camp David Framework under paragraph C of the associated principles. Article 5 states ‘the United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements, and working out the time-table for carrying out the obligations of the parties’.

B. Concerning the interpretative note attached to the treaty:

As you are aware, the Egyptian position concerning Articles 4 and 6 of the draft peace treaty was consistently unchanged. Egypt has accepted the American proposal of the interpretative note as a means to bridge the differences between Egypt and Israel. We still believe that they represent the most reasonable compromise, and that your support in this respect is the only way to convince Israel to accept such an interpretation.

In Brussels, Mr. Dayan proposed as a solution, that each party would forward his questions to the United States, who in turn would put down answers that are acceptable to both parties and will be attached to the treaty and constitute an integral part of it. To our great

disappointment the Israeli Cabinet refused any interpretation of Article 6.

Our point of view concerning paragraph 2 of Article 6 is well known to you. We accept your interpretation that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed in a way to contradict the fact that this treaty is concluded in the context of the comprehensive settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed upon in Camp David.

We firmly believe that this interpretation is the only correct one and conforms with what President Carter confirmed in my meeting with him.⁸ The Israeli refusal to accept this, reinforces the allegations that what is intended is a separate peace treaty. When Israel says that the treaty with Egypt should stand on its own feet, this must not be interpreted that the treaty must be a separate one. Rather, it means that the obligations of the two parties must be respected and honoured within the context of a comprehensive peace settlement.

For all the above mentioned reasons, a mutually accepted interpretation of this paragraph, along the lines which the United States and Egypt agreed upon, is of utmost importance.

As to paragraph 5 of Article 6, our point of view is also well known to you. If Israel really wants peace, it must not try to prevent us from meeting our obligations to defend the other Arab countries against foreign aggression. As I told Mr. Dayan in Brussels, the Arab countries never started war against Israel, and will not accept to see Israel launch a side war with Syria in Lebanon.

Egypt cannot accept any compromise in this respect, otherwise we would be acting against our own interest, against the security of the Arab world, and indeed, against the interest of the whole world.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Concerning paragraph 4 of Article 4, it seems to us that the Israelis have accepted in principal our interpretation agreed upon during your last visit to Egypt. Their only reservation is that they do not want to set a fixed date for the revision of the security arrangements. In our opinion, a solution can be found in this regard.

C. Concerning exchange of ambassadors:

The recent Israeli Cabinet statement did not mention this point at all. We consider that the text of the letter⁹ agreed upon between you and us during your last visit to Egypt is still valid.

⁸ See Document 142.

⁹ For a discussion of this letter, see Documents 149 and 150.

Dear Secretary Vance,

I will now attempt to suggest a future course of action in order to overcome the present situation.

In this regard, you will agree with me that it is very difficult to enter into any negotiations with all the preconditions set by the Israeli Government. If we accept to start negotiations in these circumstances, it will relieve Israel from its responsibility for not accepting the interpretative notes and the joint letter of December 17, 1978,¹⁰ and Israel will seize this opportunity to try to convince the whole world into believing that Egypt will be responsible if the negotiations fail.

Your support is essential to overcome the present stalemate, for the benefit of world peace. Israel must realise the dangers that its position creates for the whole world. The special relations between the United States and Israel should be directed towards establishing peace, security and stability in the Middle East. We do not ask you to put pressure on Israel, but rather to open Israel's eyes to the serious dangers which would result from a situation where Egypt would be isolated and unable to assume its role in the defense and stability of the Arab world.

The Americans, as full partners in the peace process, should also convince Israel that the insistence of the extremist religious groups to build new settlements or reinforce the existing ones, is a very serious matter which has already had its impact in the Islamic countries, feeding the animosity of extremist governments hostile to Israel and to the United States.

In our opinion, the two sides must agree on the main principles concerning the solution of the points of differences. This can be achieved through you, either by holding a meeting with Mr. Dayan alone, or a meeting between the three of us. I do not think that a meeting on the technical level would be beneficial. On the contrary it might further complicate matters.

Another suggestion would be for you to resume shuttle diplomacy. I very well know your responsibilities, and very tight schedules but I also know that you are the only one who can assume such a delicate mission.

You could also think of inviting the parties to forward their suggestions to you, or, as Mr. Dayan suggested, to submit questions concerning the points of disagreement, the answers to which would be agreed upon by the two sides.

I believe that we would then be ready for a new round of negotiations.

¹⁰ See Document 154.

I would very much appreciate hearing from you on the above mentioned suggestions. I wish to express the confidence of my government that the United States shall be able to help overcome the last difficulties. We are also confident in your sense of objectivity and good judgment.

Yours very truly

Dr. Moustapha Khalil. Unquote.

Attachment: Quote:

January 3rd, 1979.

Statement by Prime Minister, Dr. Moustapha Khalil

Prime Minister, Dr. Moustapha Khalil presented a report to the Cabinet today about the results of his talks in Brussels, December 23–24, with the American Secretary of State and Israeli Foreign Minister.

The Cabinet reviewed developments of the situation in the light of Egypt's continuous efforts to realize a just, comprehensive and permanent settlement in the Middle East.

The Cabinet, reaffirmed Egypt's continued interest in working for a stable peace in the Middle East area, especially in the light of recent world developments and variables.

The Cabinet reiterates what Egypt has always emphasized; that for peace in the Middle East, to be durable and permanent, it must be comprehensive and just. Therefore Egypt will never sign any separate agreement, as this would constitute a deviation from the spirit of the Camp David Agreements which embodied the framework of a global settlement.

To achieve that, Egypt insists on linking the signing of an agreement regarding procedures for holding elections and establishing Palestinian full autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank with the signing of the agreement between Egypt and Israel, so that the establishment of Palestinians' full autonomy and the abolition of Israeli military rule will be accomplished according to a time table agreed upon by the two parties in exchanged identical letters signed by the two parties and witnessed by the U.S.A. and annexed to the peace treaty.

The Cabinet stressed also that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel should lead to the establishment between them of normal relations similar to their relations with other countries and on equal footing, giving neither party any privileged or preferential status in this respect. Thus it is not acceptable that this treaty should have any priority over other treaties.

The Cabinet also expressed its appreciation for the United States role as a full partner in the peace process. It also noted with satisfaction the worldwide support for Egypt's stand and efforts, a support which will have its bearing in paving the way towards the just and compre-

hensive peace to which peoples in the Arab world and the world at large aspire.

The Cabinet affirmed Egypt's keen desire and readiness to continue exerting all possible efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Israel according to the above-mentioned principles which will ensure durability and stability for the comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East.

The Cabinet also reviewed the Egyptian forthcoming diplomatic moves in all directions to inform all countries of the developments of the situation. Unquote.

3. Signed original¹¹ will be pouched to the Dept, attention NEA/EGY, for delivery to the Secretary.

Eilts

¹¹ Not found. On January 10, Lewis met with Begin to discuss the contents of Khalil's letter. Lewis reported that Begin "rejected Khalil's and Sadat's proposition that because of recent events in the area Israel should be more responsive to Egypt's latest proposals in the treaty package. He went over in lengthy and familiar terms Israel's position on the outstanding issues. Indicating he would like to resume Ministerial level negotiations as soon as possible, Begin strongly suggested that these talks occur in this area, and said that the Sinai Field Mission would be ideal. He said it would be preferable for the Secretary to come to the area this month to chair the meetings; not for a 'shuttle,' but if that were not possible, he hoped he could come at least by early February. He showed no interest in a trilateral Ministerial meeting in Washington." (Telegram 622 from Tel Aviv, January 10; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 47, 1/1–16/79)

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, January 12, 1979, 1030Z

760. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Next Steps in Peace Process. Ref: State 008958.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1875. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House.

² Telegram 8958 to Tehran, January 12, conveyed a message from Carter to the Shah of Iran, thanking him for his account of his recent meetings with Sadat and the Saudi leadership. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2389)

Summary: Conveyed to PriMin Khalil this morning our ideas on how to proceed. He was generally agreeable, but asked that Atherton/Hansell come to Cairo January 17–18³ since he is scheduled make second trip to Khartoum January 19 and will stay there for two days. He wants to conduct Article IV and VI talks with Atherton/Hansell and does not want Boutros Ghali to do so. Khalil emphasized that it is not only para 5 of Article VI that needs to be covered by interpretative note, but also para 2. Latter, he stressed, is of great importance to GOE in connection with linkage letter. Whole exercise, Khalil said, must be in context of Camp David Accords, not as Dayan had just put it, “stand on its own feet.” He understands that Israelis have not yet been approached and that our concept should for time being be kept in strict confidence. In subsequent telecom with VP Mubarak it developed that Khalil had informed him. VP was also agreeable to our proposed procedure. End Summary.

(S-entire text)

1. I was able contact PriMin Khalil this morning in order to tell him of our tentative thinking on how to proceed. After telling him that Israelis share his preference for moving directly to Ministerial-level talks, I also gave our view on importance of first laying careful groundwork. He agreed. I then told him that we would first like to try to resolve the Articles IV and VI problems. Of these, Article VI is the more difficult and, as we see it, requires in first instance further discussions between ourselves and Israelis in order to ascertain if we can clairfy for them the kinds of questions about our legal interpretative note that I understood Dayan had raised with Khalil in Brussels.⁴ Khalil recalled that the subject had been discussed there.

2. I then told him about proposed Atherton/Hansell visit to Tel Aviv and Cairo next week. Their mission will be to explore possibility of resolving Articles IV and VI problems and thereafter returning to Washington to report to the Secretary. Depending upon results, the Secretary would then be in better position to make a judgment on

³ Telegram 9775 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, January 13, confirmed Atherton and Hansell's proposed visit to Tel Aviv and Cairo, beginning January 16, in order to explore ways of resolving outstanding issues related to Articles IV and VI of the peace treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1866) On the eve of the arrival of the Atherton/Hansell Mission, Atherton observed that in addition to their work on Articles IV and VI, they might also “be able to do some useful work on the oil problem. With Israel now very likely cut off from Iranian supply, it is already clear that the Gulf of Suez oil issue is going to assume a substantially more important place in the peace negotiations.” Atherton noted that their objective should not be to achieve a final resolution on oil, but rather to build on the “considerable work that has already been done in this area.” (Telegram 11571 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, January 16; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 1/15–24/79)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 156.

utility and timing of Ministerial talks designed grapple with West Bank/Gaza side letter problem.

3. Khalil thought our concept makes sense and said Atherton/Hansell will be welcome. He wondered, however, whether Dayan and Begin will be prepared try to work out issue at Atherton/Hansell level. I said that we have not yet sounded out the Israelis on the subject, but we believe they will be receptive. We wished first to get preliminary Egyptian reactions prior to Khalil's departure for Khartoum later to-day. As I had earlier said to him, our present thinking is tentative and we will not be in a position to make formal proposals for another day or two, i.e. until after we have also sounded out Israelis.

4. Assuming Israelis agree, Khalil asked that Atherton/Hansell come to Cairo January 17–18. His reason is that he will again go to Khartoum on January 19 and will remain there for Sadat's speech the following day. Thus, he will not be available at the end of next week. He made point that Atherton/Hansell discussions will be with him and not with Boutros Ghali.

5. Alluding to the Article VI problem, Khalil emphasized that it is not only para 5 of that Article that needs be covered in legal interpretation, but also para 2. The latter, he stated, is "very important to Egypt" in connection with the proposed side letter on West Bank/Gaza. The Israelis must not be able to claim that para 2 of Article VI vitiates the binding nature of any linkage letter. He recalled that he had told President Carter that USG had added para 2 of Article VI. President Carter had explained that the USG purpose had been to meet Israeli concerns with respect to possible Palestinian refusal to cooperate. The final clause of para 2, however, President Carter had said had never been intended to call for an independent Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty. The Secretary had even expressed a willingness to delete the final clause, although this idea had been overtaken by our decision close text. Hence, USG had decided on interpretative note route. This is agreeable to GOE, but Khalil reiterated such an interpretative note must cover paras 2 and 5. The whole exercise, he contended, must be in the context of the Camp David Accords, not as Dayan had just put it, "stand on its own feet."

6. Khalil said that he will wait to hear from us upon his return from Khartoum, probably on Monday, January 15. He understands that we have not yet approached the Israelis and that our tentative idea should for the time being be kept in strict confidence.

7. About an hour later VP Mubarak telephoned on another matter. It transpired that Khalil had told him about our idea. Mubarak also indicated his agreement and his understanding that for the time being it should be treated in strict confidence.

162. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, January 18, 1979, 1122Z

174. For the Secretary from Atherton. Subj: Meetings January 17 With Dayan and Begin.

1. In addition to morning and afternoon sessions with Israeli negotiating team January 17 (septel),² Sam Lewis and I had tete-a-tete lunch with Dayan and Ciechanover and, at Dayan's initiative, Sam, Herb Hansell and I met privately for hour and three-quarters at the end of day with Begin and Dayan at Prime Minister's residence.

2. At lunch, Dayan spent considerable time probing our view of events in Iran, their significance for area situation, and reasons for Sadat's invitation to the Shah to visit Aswan.³ I used occasion to make point that, in our view, Iranian developments only underline importance of completing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. In response to Dayan's question whether Sadat still wants to complete treaty, I said we believe he does and that he sees Egyptian-Israeli settlement as necessary element in dealing with overall strategic situation with Egypt playing stabilizing and moderating role in area.

3. I stressed to Dayan that the President and you continue to be committed to helping achieve Egyptian-Israeli settlement. Having said that, I emphasized the importance you attach to having some better evidence than we now have that your personal involvement in resumed Ministerial talks would have reasonable prospect of producing successful outcome. I said we realize issues relating to West Bank/Gaza side letter and ambassadorial exchange would have to be dealt with at a higher level than Hansell and me, but that you did not want to re-enter the talks only to get bogged down in haggling over Articles IV and VI legalisms. It was therefore important to be able to demonstrate that these issues could be cleared away. This could not be accomplished by simply rejecting Egyptian proposals now on the table. We needed to start from common acceptance of fact that we are where we are and look for ways to deal with those proposals which meet Israeli concerns while retaining substance of what Sadat believes he needs.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-0492. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

² In telegram 177 from Jerusalem, January 17, Atherton summarized at length the first two discussions with the Israeli team on Articles IV and VI, held from 10 a.m. to noon and from 4:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-0498)

³ The Shah of Iran and his wife, Empress Farah, arrived in Aswan on January 16. He was escorted by Sadat to a secluded hotel on an island in the Nile. (Christopher S. Wren, "Shah Lands in Upper Egypt, Looking Gaunt and Weary," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1979, p. 1)

4. Dayan agreed fully on importance of resolving remaining treaty text issues and gave his personal opinion that this was achievable. He agreed it was important to show results from Hansell's and my visit. To achieve this, he said, it was important to persuade Begin of the points I had made to him, so that Israeli negotiating team would be given the right instructions. In response to Lewis' question as to whether Begin would have problems with the Cabinet even if he agreed to some variations on Sadat's proposals, Dayan replied that, if Begin were convinced, he could carry the Cabinet. He urged that we have several sessions with Begin while in Jerusalem and arranged on the spot for an initial meeting at the end of day.

5. Dayan showed no interest in getting into details of treaty article problems but came back several times to problem of how to resolve problem of West Bank/Gaza side letter. He is clearly increasingly attracted by the idea of concentrating on getting agreement with Egypt for establishing autonomy regime in Gaza and felt that in Brussels⁴ Khalil was more receptive to this idea, even if no parallel results were achievable on West Bank, than he had expected. He thought Egyptian-Israeli negotiations could well lead to agreement on West Bank/Gaza autonomy regime in nine months so that Sadat would not have to send ambassador to Israel before autonomy regime was in place in Gaza. It would simply not work, however, for Sadat to make ambassadorial exchange conditional on this; Sadat would have to drop this idea, Dayan said.

6. Meeting with Begin was relaxed, serious and free of polemics. At Dayan's suggestion, I went over much of the same ground with Begin that I had covered with Dayan at lunch. I stressed the President's and your commitment to finish the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Both Lewis and I made clear that your inability to respond at this time to his desire that you come to the area reflected no diminution of your commitment to help complete the negotiations. I noted other urgent foreign policy demands on your time and your desire to have a better sense of the prospects for success than was now the case. Begin listened thoughtfully to my presentation and at no time engaged in recriminations about your December visit.⁵

7. In his comments, Begin dwelt at some length on overall trends in the area which clearly weigh on his mind. He cited concerns that Iran would be lost to the West if Khomeini takes over there, current Palestinian National Council meeting in Damascus, talks about Syrian-Iraqi union and King Hussein's recent statements⁶ and visit to Damascus.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 156.

⁵ See Documents 151 and 152.

⁶ In a January 11 interview with *The New York Times*, King Hussein stated that Jordan had no interests in joining Sadat's efforts to arrange a transition to Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hussein said that it was Egypt's interest to understand that "the Arab world is a family, that it is not a situation where Egypt is the shepherd and the rest are a herd that can be moved in any direction without question."

8. Revolutionary changes in Iran, Begin said, had made it imperative that oil issue be resolved in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in a way which gives Israel guaranteed supply of oil from Egypt of 2.5 million tons annually. Dayan added that, without such guarantee, Knesset would say that Israel was “committing suicide” and would not approve peace treaty involving relinquishment of Gulf of Suez oil fields. I told Begin and Dayan that we were sensitive to their heightened concerns about secure oil supply in light of Iranian developments, that I had already met with Energy Minister Modai Wednesday afternoon (septel),⁷ and that I would be discussing this issue also in Cairo.

9. Both Begin and Dayan expressed considerable unhappiness over recent statements by Boutros Ghali that Camp David Framework would lead to independent Palestinian state; this greatly complicated their job of selling peace treaty to Israeli public. They both also raised statement by Khalil in Khartoum, reported in yesterday’s press, that Egypt could not stand idly by if Israel attacked Syrian forces in Lebanon. Dayan said that this statement, which had been made in context of latest Israeli military retaliation against PLO in Lebanon, was in complete contradiction to assurances Khalil had given him in conversation between them in your presence in Brussels.

10. In course of conversation, Begin also made strong pitch that recent trends in area underline strategic importance to the US of a strong and stable Israel. US should be strengthening Israel, not weakening it. In this context, Begin referred to, but did not press, Israel’s request for increased US economic assistance.

11. At the end of our talk with Begin, I reemphasized our judgment that it was important in current round of talks here to deal with Egyptian proposals on treaty articles as a reality and look for ways to make them acceptable to Israel while preserving essential elements of political importance to Sadat. I said that if Israel simply took the position that the interpretations and legal opinion now on the table should be eliminated, we would get nowhere. Begin did not say he agreed, but Sam Lewis believes the fact that Begin did not argue the point may be an encouraging sign. Dayan suggested and Begin agreed that we meet with Begin again on Friday⁸ morning to assess progress on negotiations.

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(Christopher S. Wren, “Hussein Appears to Oppose Israel-Egypt Dealings,” *The New York Times*, January 12, 1979, p. A2)

⁷ Atherton summarized his January 17 meeting with Modai in telegram 175 from Jerusalem, January 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790038–0040)

⁸ January 19. Telegram 214 from Jerusalem, January 19, reported the meeting between the U.S. delegation and Begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0612.)

163. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift)¹

Washington, January 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Status of Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (U)

The negotiations have been stuck for the past month over two sets of issues:

—*Minor points associated with the text of the treaty*: an interpretive note to Article IV dealing with the right to review security arrangements; an interpretive note to Article VI (2) on the relationship of the treaty to the Camp David agreements; our legal opinion on the relationship of this treaty to other treaties as defined in Article VI (5).

—*The "linkage" issues*: the text of a letter on West Bank/Gaza negotiations, including the question of a "target date"; the timing of the exchange of ambassadors to coincide with the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank/Gaza. These will be the most difficult problems to resolve. (S)

Atherton has been able to make only modest progress in his talks with the Israelis. He has been told that Article IV can be settled if the Egyptians drop their insistence on a mandatory review of security arrangements after five years.² In addition, the Israelis have proposed the text of a draft letter which would clarify some of the legal controversy over Article VI (5).³ It includes language that would amount to a blank

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 76, Peace Negotiations: 1–10/79. Secret.

² Atherton, Hansell, and Lewis reported Israel's position on Article IV in telegram 193 from Jerusalem, January 18. They noted that having gone over both of the disputed articles "exhaustively" with the Israelis, January 17–18, "we have had no indication so far of any give in Israeli positions" with the exception of Article IV. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0487)

³ The Consulate General forwarded the Israelis' proposed revisions to Article VI, presented January 18, in telegram 196 from Jerusalem, January 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0641) Atherton, Hansell, and Lewis discussed these with the Israeli team on January 19. (Telegram 213 from Jerusalem, January 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0595) Atherton and Hansell produced a compromise letter, reconciling the U.S. and Israeli positions, and sent it to Vance in telegram 211 from Jerusalem, January 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0605) The Department made further revisions to this compromise draft, in consultation with Vance, conveyed in telegrams 15643 and 15646 to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, January 20 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0577 and P840171–0570, respectively) and telegram 15647 to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, January 20. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 1/15–24/79) The Consulate General reported

check endorsement of any Israeli retaliatory military action and goes considerably beyond what we had proposed. Nonetheless, it appears as if we are coming closer to agreement on how to settle this issue. Unfortunately, the Israelis have been adamant in insisting that the interpretive note to Article VI (2) must be dropped altogether. (S)

We can anticipate that the Egyptians will not be much impressed with what Atherton brings from Jerusalem.⁴ At best we will still confront the hard linkage issues, as well as Article VI (2) after Roy's trip. In assessing our next move, we will then have to take the following points into consideration:

—*The time factor.* Time is working against accommodation. It also means that the debate over West Bank/Gaza issues is being pushed into 1980, which will not make it easier for us to use our influence.

—*Israeli hawkishness.* Sharon is rising in influence; Weizman is lying low; Dayan is cautious. Begin is under attack from left and right. Virtually no one supports the "autonomy" approach to the West Bank/Gaza. Settlement activity is picking up.

—*Arab realignments.* Iraq and Syria are moving closer, drawing Jordan into their sphere of influence; Jordan and the PLO are going ahead with their dialogue; West Bankers are thoroughly demoralized; the Saudis are afraid and therefore cautious; Egypt is still snubbing the Saudis and Jordanians.

—*Israeli concerns.* The Shah's departure⁵ has increased Israeli anxiety over regional instability and over oil supply. Israel is demanding 50,000 bpd of oil from Egypt, which may be more than Egypt is willing to sell. Israel is also upset that we have been unresponsive to aid requests associated with Sinai withdrawal. (S)

Secretary Vance has taken the position that he would be prepared to invite Dayan and Khalil to Washington if Atherton makes some

these revisions, discussed in three separate meetings with the Israelis January 20–22, in telegram 224 from Jerusalem, January 21, and telegrams 228 and 249 from Jerusalem, January 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1886; P840171–0546; and P850011–1389, respectively)

⁴ This view was shared by Eilts, who reported to Atherton on January 19, "you are going to find the Egyptians no less tough than the Israelis" on Article VI. (Telegram 1312 from Cairo, January 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1859)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 162. The Shah of Iran and his wife left Iran on January 16, 1979. In the midst of widespread anti-government protests in the aftermath of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return from exile on February 1, the Iranian Army's Supreme Council announced on February 11 its decision to call its troops back to their barracks in order "to prevent further bloodshed and anarchy." The provisional government of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar collapsed shortly thereafter. (Nicholas Gage, "Army Withdraws its Support for Bakhtiar; Iranian Prime Minister Reported to Resign," *The New York Times*, February 12, p. A1)

progress. He expects that he might be able to finish off the treaty issues, but that a summit toward the end of February might be needed to resolve the final “linkage” problems, as well as oil and aid questions. (S)

164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 30, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East Strategy (U)

Secretary Vance has sent you a report on the results of the Atherton mission (Tab A). In brief, the only promising result was the possibility that both Egypt and Israel might agree to drop the idea of asking for our legal interpretation of Article VI (5).² Otherwise, no real substantive progress was made in twelve days of talks. Atherton’s conclusion is that the remaining issues cannot be solved in isolation and must be settled at the political level as a package. (S)

Before we take any new initiative, we need to ask ourselves some hard questions about the developments surrounding the negotiations:

—Time is working against the Camp David approach. The longer the negotiations go on, the greater the likelihood that any agreement reached will only be a separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Our own political realities must be taken into account.

—Neither party wants to appear overly anxious to conclude the talks. They both know that we will be tempted to ask further conces-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 2/79. Secret. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

² Atherton and Hansell met with Khalil, Boutros Ghali, and el-Baz in Cairo on January 26 to discuss the remaining issues in the treaty text. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0775) In the course of these discussions, Khalil proposed addressing the impasse over Article VI (5) by suggesting replacing the U.S. memorandum of law with an agreed statement on the two sides’ problems with the paragraph. When Atherton and Hansell proposed this to Begin on January 27, the Prime Minister stated that he would “not reject” Khalil’s proposal “out of hand.” (Telegram 326 from Jerusalem, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–1343)

sions from the more eager party. Sadat in particular fears that we will turn to him as the more pliant of the two parties.

—Talk of a summit may have the effect of precluding progress at any other level. Both Sadat and Begin may prefer not to play any cards until they deal directly with you.

—Our refusal to discuss aid questions has not had the effect of softening the Israeli stand. At some point we will have to decide how to respond to Israeli aid requests. The more we commit now, the less we will have to work with when the West Bank/Gaza negotiation gets underway.

—The situation in Iran has produced a greater degree of caution in both Israel and Egypt. (S)

Within the very near future we will need to make fundamental decisions on the substance, procedure and timing of another round of negotiations. (C)

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter³

Washington, January 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Status of Middle East Negotiations Following Atherton Trip

We are preparing a paper⁴ on the options we have for pursuing the Middle East negotiations, for discussion with you later in the week. Meanwhile, I want to give you this assessment of where things stand following Atherton's talks with the Israelis and Egyptians.

It is our judgment that Begin and Sadat both still want to conclude the Treaty negotiations and have the political strength to sell domestically whatever they may agree to, even though both are under mounting pressures from elements of their respective political constituencies who feel they have already gone too far. The more time that passes, however, the greater is the danger that growing second thoughts in Israel about Camp David will undermine Begin's ability to have his way with the Cabinet and the Knesset.

³ Secret; Nodis. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 165.

While both leaders want to proceed to wrap up the Treaty, both are having trouble with their respective political constituencies and this fact has increased the perceived advantages for both in bargaining hard over the remaining issues. In addition, events in Iran have probably caused both sides to stiffen as they have perceived increased risks in concluding a peace Treaty, resulting from potential area repercussions of what is happening in Iran. Israel is more concerned than ever about giving up Gulf of Suez oil fields without ironclad Egyptian supply commitments. It is also more determined than ever to ensure that Egypt will be firmly committed to peace and normalization regardless of developments elsewhere in the area, before giving up the security of its position in Sinai. The Egyptians for their part stress increasingly that the peace Treaty must not isolate Egypt and thus weaken its ability to play a leading role for stability in the area. They therefore want the Treaty package to include credible evidence that they are not making a separate peace.

As a result of these perceptions, the “linkage” issue has taken on even greater importance for both sides, with Egypt determined to maximize, and Israel to minimize the linkage between their bilateral Treaty and implementation of the Camp David Framework for the West Bank and Gaza.

Following Atherton’s trip, it is clear that both sides see all of the remaining issues, and not just the West Bank/Gaza side letter and ambassadorial-exchange question, as “linkage” issues which can only be dealt with and resolved together, if they are to be resolved at all. This, more than the intrinsic difficulty of any one of the three Treaty text issues Atherton tried to resolve, probably accounts for their unwillingness to make significant headway during his trip. The linkage question is fundamental to both sides, and they want to see how all of its parts will be dealt with before trying to resolve any aspect of it. It is also clear that, if these issues are to be discussed with any hope of success, this must be done at the political level. Begin must be intimately involved on the Israeli side, either through moving the talks back to the summit or through ministerial-level talks in the area where Dayan can have frequent direct access to him.

It is also clear from Atherton’s talks that the Israeli Government is so locked into its rejection of the proposals⁵ I took to Jerusalem from Cairo last month that it cannot agree to any of them in their present form. It is equally clear, however, that Sadat cannot agree to any major departures from the substances of those proposals. The issues we confront, therefore, are twofold: (1) whether we can find new ways to

⁵ See Documents 151 and 152.

package an overall proposal for a solution of the remaining issues that will still meet Sadat's needs and yet be acceptable to Israel, and (2) what negotiating format has the best chance of bringing both Sadat and Begin along. The paper we are preparing for your consideration later this week will focus on these two issues. As background for your review of our future options, the following summarizes where matters stand on the three paragraphs in the Treaty and on the oil question which Atherton discussed during his visit (he did not, as you know, get into the West Bank/Gaza side letter and ambassadorial-exchange issues or the aid questions pending with the Israelis and Egyptians).

Article IV—The Egyptians still insist on specifying that a review of Sinai security arrangements must be undertaken “promptly” when requested by either side and must in any case occur within a specified number of years. They are willing, however, to use a synonym for “promptly” (e.g., “without delay”) and to specify a six-year rather than a five-year review period. The Israelis remain opposed to either concept, however expressed. I still feel this is the least difficult question to resolve, but both sides clearly want to hold off on any compromise until they see what they can get on the other outstanding issues.

Article VI (2)—There does not seem to be any way the Israelis can accept an interpretive note to this paragraph of the Treaty, which the Egyptians want in order to make clear that the phrase “independently of any instrument external to this Treaty” does not mean they are making a separate peace. Both Begin and Dayan acknowledged to Atherton, however, that this issue would have to be dealt with, and Dayan suggested that this might be done in the context of the West Bank/Gaza side letter.

Article VI (5)—At the end of Atherton's trip, as you know, we were close to agreement with the Israelis on an ad referendum text of a letter to them responding to questions they raised, as a result of the legal opinion we offered the Egyptians, dealing with the circumstances under which Egypt would and would not be justified in joining hostilities against Israel under the Arab mutual security and collective defense pacts. The Egyptians, however, have reacted sharply to the idea of such a letter. This has raised the question of whether, in the process of overcoming Israeli objections to the legal opinion, we risk losing the Egyptians. Khalil suggested to Atherton that a way out of this dilemma would be to drop from the Treaty package both the legal opinion and the letter to the Israelis and to seek a brief statement agreed to by both parties which would make clear that Article VI (5) does not define any priority of obligations one way or the other between the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and other obligations of the parties. Begin did not reject this alternative approach when it was described to him by Atherton, al-

though we have not explored possible formulations sufficiently to know whether it can be made to work.

Oil—Khalil indicated to Atherton a possible opening for resolving the problem of a supply commitment to Israel. On the one hand, he firmly maintained the Egyptian position that, while Israel will be able to purchase its requirements on a commercial basis from Egyptian sources once there is peace, Egypt cannot put this understanding in writing. On the other hand, he suggested that arrangements which would assure a fixed supply to Israel could be made on a company-to-company basis, with the Egyptian Government giving its permission to the selling company (presumably AMOCO) to enter such an arrangement with a company purchasing oil for Israel.

165. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Secretary Vance's Middle East Strategy Paper (U)

The paper at Tab A² describes the essential substantive problem in the negotiations concerning the "linkage" issue. It recommends that we try to repackage the outstanding issues by persuading Sadat to drop the direct conditionality between the exchange of ambassadors and the holding of West Bank/Gaza elections in return for a stronger letter on the Palestinian issue. (S)

Secretary Vance also suggests two procedural steps: a ministerial meeting in the area and a summit. I understand that he is increasingly leaning toward the idea of a summit without a prior ministerial meeting. (S)

What I find lacking in this discussion is a sense of broader regional strategy and the importance of time. We have a window, I believe, of about two months within which to conclude the Egypt-Israel negotiations. It is becoming more difficult, not less, to bring about accommoda-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(1/79–2/79). Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document, and wrote: "for Friday a.m. breakfast."

² Attached but not printed.

tion on the remaining issues. In order to do so, we need to convince both parties that we view the Egypt-Israel treaty as a step toward building a more secure regional environment in which we are prepared to play an increasingly important role. (S)

As things now stand, we have been talking of the treaty primarily as a step toward further negotiations on the Palestinian question. But equally important, the treaty could be the take-off point for a more coherent approach to regional security problems. Secretary Brown's upcoming visit³ to the area provides the opportunity to begin to emphasize this theme. Increasingly, we need to relate the peace negotiations to a broader strategic framework which takes into account the developments in Iran, the weakness of Saudi Arabia, the assertiveness of the Soviets, and the new alignments in the Arab world. (S)

³ For a discussion of Brown's visit to the Middle East, see Document 166.

166. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 1, 1979, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary Brown's Trip to the Middle East (U)

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>JCS</i>
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary	Gen. David Jones
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)	LTG William Smith, Assistant to CJCS
<i>Treasury</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Anthony Solomon, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs	Adm. Stansfield Turner
Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs	Robert Bowie, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
<i>Defense</i>	Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia
Harold Brown	Vice President Mondale
Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary	Denis Clift, National Security Affairs Adviser
David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs	<i>White House</i>
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs	Zbigniew Brzezinski
<i>OMB</i>	David Aaron
James McIntyre	<i>NSC</i>
John White, Deputy Director	Gary Sick
	Fritz Ermarth

Secretary Brown opened the meeting by noting that he had promised to make a visit to the Middle East when he had met with various Middle East leaders a long time ago. Many things had happened in the meantime. The Camp David meeting had occurred with its initial

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 73, PRC 090, 2/1/79, Secretary Brown's Trip to Middle East. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The complete minutes of this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula. Found attached to the minutes was a February 2 note from Sick to Aaron relaying a telephone conversation that morning in which Barry Blechman of ACDA informed Sick that ACDA Director George M. Seignious was "furious at being excluded from the PRC yesterday on Harold Brown's Middle East trip. They [ACDA] were under the impression that the meeting had been cancelled." Sick reported to Aaron that he "pleaded ignorance" and noted that perhaps "because of the fact that I see only one dimension of the problem, I do not understand the circumstances when ACDA is invited and when they are excluded." (Ibid.)

agreement and the subsequent slowing of the negotiation process. There had been the evolution of the Iranian political process and fall of Iran as a major regional security contributor at least with respect to U.S. advantage. It was now time to realign our security relations in the region and the trip provided a timely opportunity to discuss security issues with the nations of the region. The purpose of the meeting was to seek answers to three basic questions. First of all, should we seek closer relations with these nations in some cases? That question on the trip was at best preliminary. However, it could set the stage for further action later on. Secondly, what sort of security cooperation do we want with these nations? In the case of Israel and Jordan, we have had a close cooperation for a long time. However, it should be possible to draw attention to the fact that the threat emanates not from each other, but from the outside. This might be hard to do, but on the other hand these nations are not likely to do it for themselves. Thirdly, if we wish to pursue this path, what is the state of U.S. willingness to carry out its end of the agreement? This turns on questions of public attitudes, congressional attitudes, and economic capacity. In addressing these issues Secretary *Brown* proposed to use the general outline which had been distributed to members of the PRC the previous day entitled, "Secretary of Defense Trip to the Middle East, PRC Discussion Paper."² He proposed dividing this into a series of five questions. First of all, are the general objectives as spelled out in the first page of the paper satisfactory? Secondly, are the proposed initiatives for each country acceptable? Three, how should we treat the linkage between oil and security of financial aspects and security issues? Four, what financial support is available on our side to meet some of these requirements in the various areas? And, fifth, what sort of public posture should be adopted, specifically with regard to the press who will be accompanying on the trip? He then turned to the question of the general objectives spelled out in the paper and asked for comments around the table. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion of Middle East regional security issues.]

Secretary *Brown* then turned to Egypt. He wondered whether we should encourage Sadat to play a role outside his own country in line with his own idea of providing an intervention force for Africa and other regions. He said that if you examine the whole region, looking for a replacement for Iran except for money, Egypt came the closest.

Mr. *Duncan* said that he thought the list of initiatives presented for Egypt were very good, especially the fourth one which called for the initiation of FMS credits.

² The final version of these draft instructions is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

Secretary Brown thought that FMS credits to Egypt were more salable in Congress than arms sales to Saudia Arabia, although the former required US funding and the latter did not.

Mr. Christopher felt that until a peace treaty had been signed, we should not plan on large-scale consultations even on a survey team to Egypt.

Secretary Brown said we could take the line that we want to do it, but we can wait until after a treaty is signed.

Mr. Christopher agreed.

Mr. McGiffert wondered if that applied to all five items on the list.

Mr. Christopher said that there could be talks about what the Egyptians might want from us. The first point was certainly alright. They need to know that it is a good thing to diversify their sources of supply.

Secretary Brown said that when we tell countries to go elsewhere for their source of arms, they take it as a lack of interest from us.

Mr. Christopher said we should not hold out the hope that we will be the sole source of arms for Egypt and also provide money.

Secretary Brown said that may be difficult, since the Egyptians just came out of that kind of relationship. We need to talk to the Saudis about the level of support for Egypt.

Admiral Turner said that it will be difficult to turn Sadat away from his concept of being a Middle East policeman, but there are real dangers in our encouraging that role. There is a danger that he will ignore his domestic problems, ignore the military dissatisfaction with such a policy, and that he could end up generating the same kind of problems that we have just seen in Iran.

Secretary Brown said perhaps our position should be that he would be in a better position to play that role after a peace treaty was concluded.

Mr. Christopher said he hoped we would not divert Sadat from the hard problems of a peace treaty and domestic problems.

Mr. McGiffert said he thought it would be bad if *Secretary Brown* goes to Egypt and offers only a few contingency possibilities. That would have a negative effect.

Mr. Christopher said that some APCs could be offered after the treaty is signed with the numbers to be determined later.

Mr. McIntyre noted we already provide \$750M in SSA to Egypt.

Secretary Brown then turned to Israel. He noted that the specific proposals called for security consultations on a regional basis. This would be something new in our security discussions with the Israelis. He would also need to talk about the relocation of the air bases. Our

commitment to assist on air base relocation is ill defined. The President must discuss this with the Israelis, but he could lead the way.

Mr. McIntyre said that opposition [*our position?*] should be that we will make no cash commitments, but after a settlement is reached we will assess the request and make recommendations. That is the line he has been taking on the hill—it implies some additional funding, but that is all. How would we rationalize that position if we now go forward with new commitments as a result of this visit?

Secretary Brown said he was only talking about 1981. Obviously, this would not apply before that budget year.

Mr. McIntyre said that there are general totals that we are operating on with regard to 1981, and that we have to tread very carefully on that.

Mr. Christopher said that the air base and other issues of that sort should be discussed under the general context of the peace process.

Mr. McGiffert noted that the \$1B figure in the paper is new. We have never given that to Israel before, although that is in the air base study.

Secretary Brown said we have never talked about \$3B in total aid, even if that is understood to include air bases and other factors.

Mr. Christopher said it would not be desirable now to make a commitment for \$1B for air base relocation. There are already big numbers there as far as the Israelis are concerned.

Secretary Brown said he had not intended to make a commitment on this, rather he intended to discuss the study and the estimated costs that came out of it. It would be a mistake to say that we would provide loans or grants of money to Israel for that purpose.

Mr. Christopher said that the words of the Secretary of Defense are heard as a commitment whether it is 81, 82 or any other time. Any discussion of the study should be prefaced with a clear statement that this would involve no commitment as to when or how we would provide funds.

Mr. McIntyre said he would want to [talk?] to the President to see how he would deal with the question of budget levels.

Secretary Brown said that he had told Weizman on several occasions that there would be \$1B in FMS credits and \$750M in SSA, and not more than that on an annual basis.

Mr. McIntyre said that we should not leave the impression that that level will continue in perpetuity; however, that is a subject that is probably left unsaid at this point.

Secretary Brown said he was worried about talking security with these countries without something to offer his own.

Mr. McGiffert wondered how he could possibly be quiet on the entire list.

Mr. Saunders said that there were certain items that they had requested that certainly could be granted which didn't cost money and could be incorporated within the current aid levels.

Secretary Brown said he was afraid that such discussion would not send a positive signal. However, he thought he could avoid making new financial commitment.

Mr. Saunders said he didn't think it would be so negative. He thought the general objectives spelled out in the paper were excellent and provided a good basis for talking seriously with them about security needs. We could also discuss their specific needs and relate those to the situation in Oman and Yemen and elsewhere in the region.

Secretary Brown said that that was true as far as the Saudis, and that it was easier since there were no financial problems there; however, on the Saudi case there were Congressional problems.

Mr. Christopher wondered what you could say to the Israelis on any of these subjects without making a commitment.

Secretary Brown said there are some things on the list that could be discussed without any new financial commitments. By discussing the study, we could show we have done something on the airfield situation. We can assure them that some work can be done on the airfields without an impact on the Israeli economy; however, no decision can be taken at this time. He felt that what was required was a decision memo for the President which had to be done immediately for him to examine some of the critical specific issues.

167. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Gaza First? (U)

Since Sadat first started pushing this line, I have been amazed that the Israelis have not tried to make something of it. Dayan seems tempted, but Begin is wary. My personal assessment is that this is a mediocre idea, but that it may well catch on nonetheless. (S)

Sadat sees the "Gaza first" approach as putting pressure on Hussein and moderate Palestinians to join the peace negotiations. He assumes that whatever is worked out for Gaza will be a model for the West Bank. What he does not appear to understand is the predictably negative response to a further fragmentation of the Palestinian issue into manageable (digestible?) bits. Camp David was largely rejected by other Arabs for dividing the one-third of the Palestinians under occupation from those in the diaspora. The "Gaza first" approach will be seen as dividing the one-third of those under occupation in Gaza from the remaining two-thirds in the West Bank. (S)

For the Israelis, the idea of trying to set up the "autonomy" regime in Gaza should be attractive. It avoids awkward questions concerning Jerusalem's status; there are relatively few settlements in Gaza; and the emotional and historical ties of Israelis to Gaza are minimal. If Gaza is enough of a fig leaf for Sadat, the Israelis should be interested. *Their fear, of course, is that anything they accept in Gaza will be a model for the West Bank.* After all, the Camp David agreements make no provision for treating Gaza and the West Bank differently. Thus, if Israel agrees, for example, to turn over state-owned lands in Gaza to the local authorities, it will be difficult to argue against doing so in the West Bank as well. This is no doubt one of the reasons that Begin has been cautious about proceeding with Gaza first. (S)

Since Sadat seems hooked on his idea, there is probably no way of avoiding dealing with it. The question seems to be how to make something worthwhile out of a basically weak proposal. I suggest the following: (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 75, Palestinians: 5/78-2/79. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information.

—Egypt and Israel will negotiate the modalities for elections and the powers and responsibilities for the self-governing authority in *both* the West Bank and Gaza.

—Egypt and Israel will state that they favor the establishment of a self-governing authority in *both* the West Bank and Gaza, as provided for in the Camp David frameworks, but are prepared to begin implementation in Gaza first if that proves to be easier.

—In practical terms, this would mean electing a Gaza regional council, which would presumably later merge with a comparable body in the West Bank. It is hard to know how administrative functions would be carried out—presumably a Gaza regional branch of each administrative unit would be formed.

—To the degree that Gaza can genuinely be treated as a model for the West Bank, the greater the chances that other Arabs will not condemn it merely as a “separate” Palestinian agreement designed to cover for a “separate” Egyptian-Israeli treaty. (S)

Even if the “Gaza first” approach is followed, several sticking points will arise:

—The status of present Israeli settlements and future settlement activity.

—The nature of any Egyptian presence. (Sadat wants police, and we have spoken of “liaison officers”. The Israelis oppose anything that suggests a special Egyptian responsibility for Gaza.)

—The status of public lands and control over water resources.

—Likely opposition on the part of the large refugee population which has had close ties in the past to the PLO.

In brief, if the responsibilities of the Gaza self-government are extensive, there will eventually be support for whatever is proposed. We cannot, however, expect active Gazan participation in the negotiations. Instead, we will end up doing most of the negotiating with Israel, with Sadat making occasional suggestions, and with Gazans discreetly hinting at their preferences through indirect channels. (S)

We should not place much stock in the idea that the “Gaza first” approach will lead to early agreement. Nor will Sadat and Begin work this out directly. We will be stuck with the unwelcome job of moving the negotiations forward. It will not be an easy task. In light of this, I would prefer to make the marginal extra effort to treat the West Bank and Gaza together, at least at the outset. I really believe that it is illusory to think that we are significantly simplifying our problems by trying to split off Gaza. (S)

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 6, 1979, 1749Z

31592. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: (S) Message From President Carter to Prime Minister Begin on Resuming Middle East Negotiations.

1. (S entire text).

2. Please deliver following message from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin at the earliest opportunity.²

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for making Foreign Minister Dayan available for the useful talks with Prime Minister Khalil and Secretary Vance in Brussels,³ and for the time you spent with Ambassador Atherton during his recent visit to Jerusalem.⁴ Their reports have been helpful to me as I have reflected on how we can help President Sadat and you move forward in the peace negotiations. I want to share with you my thoughts on this critical question.

I am deeply concerned that the more time that passes, the less favorable will be the prospects for success. I believe we should now make a major, determined effort to complete the task we started with such high hopes at Camp David in September.

Secretary Brown will soon be in Israel,⁵ and I have asked him to discuss with you, among other things, our perception of the strategic

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061-2373. Secret; Niact Immediate, Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Quandt, Sterner, Hansell, and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S-O); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House. A draft version of this letter, bearing Carter's handwritten amendments, and an attached, undated covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter upon which Carter initialed his approval is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(1/79-2/79).

² Begin formally accepted Carter's invitation in a letter to the President dated February 12. In his acceptance, Begin added, "I respectfully agree with you, Mr. President that the events in our region—the upheaval in Iran is one of them—make it necessary for the United States and the Israeli Government to hold serious consultations about the future, including consideration of contingency plans in connection with any possible development. We hope that such consultations will be held during the important visit of Secretary Brown to our country." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 1/79-2/80)

³ See footnote 2, Document 156.

⁴ See Document 162.

⁵ See Document 170.

situation in your region. Recent trends make clear there is a tide running against the kind of stable and moderate Middle East we both seek. Developments in Iran have contributed to this trend. I know they are of great concern to you, not only because of their immediate impact on the supply of oil to Israel, but also because of their broader implications for the region and for Israel's security. As I told Ambassador Evron recently, we attach great value to the contribution a stable, strong and democratic Israel can make to security in your region. It seems to me self-evident that the single greatest contribution to stability in the Middle East would be the early successful conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. This would create a new reality with which those forces that have been hostile to the Camp David Frameworks would have to reckon. In the absence of early progress in the negotiations, I fear this opportunity may be lost and the security of our friends in the region as a whole will become more vulnerable.

Despite the difficulties that have prevented completion of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, I continue to believe that we can achieve the objectives we set for ourselves at Camp David. It is clear to me that all of the remaining issues are closely interrelated and need to be dealt with and resolved together. It is also clear that we must address ourselves to this task as a matter of some urgency, before time begins to work against us and in order to free our energies to deal with our common strategic concerns in your region. The question is how best to proceed. As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, I recently said that I would, if necessary, be prepared to meet again with you and President Sadat. I do not believe, however, that we have sufficiently tested whether such a meeting is necessary or would be fruitful.

I want to suggest for your consideration, therefore, that the negotiations be resumed at the Ministerial level in Washington among Prime Minister Khalil, Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance. I would be happy to make Camp David available for these talks, so that the three Ministers and their aides would be able to work in private, without interruption, and away from the pressures and glare of the news media. If it is convenient, I suggest that the Ministerial talks begin soon after Secretary Vance and I return from our forthcoming visit to Mexico,⁶ specifically, on Wednesday, February 21. I am also communicating this suggestion to President Sadat.

I recognize that Foreign Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Khalil would need to consult closely with you and with President Sadat, respectively, as the talks progress. For this reason, I would anticipate

⁶ Carter was in Mexico February 14–16, where he met with Mexican President Lopez Portillo and addressed the Mexican Congress.

that, after several days of intensive discussions, the Ministers might then wish to return home to consult with their governments.

In making this suggestion, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to assure you of my continued personal commitment to the implementation of the Camp David Agreements, beginning with the successful conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. I also want to assure you that I recognize and appreciate how fully you share this commitment. I am convinced that President Sadat also remains fully committed to a successful conclusion of the negotiations. The differences remaining between you touch upon matters of vital importance to the national interests and security of your two nations. I do not underestimate their importance. To resolve them will require difficult decisions. I believe, however, that they are not insurmountable. We have travelled most of the road already, and it would be a tragedy if we failed to complete the journey which began with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem⁷ and the statesmanship and vision with which you responded to that visit.

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience, Mr. Prime Minister, and meanwhile send to you my warm personal regards and continued high respect.

Sincerely yours, Jimmy Carter. End text.

4. We believe it would be desirable to announce⁸ that Ministerial-level talks will resume at Camp David as soon as this has been agreed by both sides—hopefully in the course of this week. Our intention would be to issue a brief statement along the following lines: Quote: At President Carter's invitation, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have agreed that negotiations between Egypt and Israel should be resumed at Ministerial level. Prime Minister Khalil, Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance will participate in these talks, which will begin at Camp David on February 21. In agreeing to these talks, all sides have affirmed their commitment to the Camp David Accords and their determination that these negotiations be completed as quickly as possible. Unquote. Please ascertain GOI reaction to an announcement along foregoing lines.

5. I would like you and Hermann Eilts to return to participate in these talks. You should plan to arrive in Washington by Sunday, February 18, which would give us a chance for in-house discussions with you and Hermann before talks with Khalil and Dayan begin.

Vance

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁸ The U.S. invitation to Egypt and Israel to resume talks at the Ministerial level was announced by Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter III, February 7. ("U.S. Invites Egypt, Israel to Resume Talks in Washington," *The Washington Post*, February 8, p. A26)

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, February 6, 1979, 1753Z

31594. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: (S) Message From President Carter to President Sadat on Resuming Middle East Negotiations.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Please deliver following message from President Carter to President Sadat at the earliest opportunity.²

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

I have been giving much attention to how [we] can move forward in the peace negotiations and want to share my thoughts with you. In my judgment, the more time that passes, the less favorable will be the prospects for success. I believe we should now make a major, determined effort to complete the task we started with such high hopes at Camp David in September.

As you have clearly perceived, forces hostile to peace in the Middle East are active in your area. Developments in Iran have dramatized the need for a strong common front to achieve peace and security in the region. Secretary Brown will soon be in Cairo³ to discuss with you, among other things, the strategic situation we face together in this period of challenge to stability and moderation. I am sure you will agree that the achievement of peace between Egypt and Israel would eliminate one important source of uncertainty and insecurity, and would in the long run have a stabilizing effect in the area as a whole.

I am convinced that Prime Minister Begin still wants to complete the treaty and move on to the next stage of negotiations. I know that you also want to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Despite the difficulties which have prevented completion of the negotiations so far, I believe that we can achieve the objectives we set

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0723. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Quandt, Sterner, Hansell, and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House. A draft version of this letter, bearing Carter's handwritten amendments, and an attached, undated covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter upon which Carter initialed his approval is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(1/79–2/79).

² Eilts delivered Carter's letter to Sadat on February 8. Upon receiving the letter, Sadat verbally informed Eilts of his acceptance of the invitation. (Telegram 2882 from Cairo, February 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0858)

³ See Document 172.

for ourselves at Camp David. It is clear to me, after studying Secretary Vance's report⁴ of the useful talks between Prime Minister Khalil and Foreign Minister Dayan in Brussels and Ambassador Atherton's report⁵ of his latest visit to Egypt and Israel, that all of the remaining issues are closely interrelated and need to be dealt with and resolved together. It is also clear that we must address ourselves to this task as a matter of some urgency, before time begins to work against us and in order to free our energies to deal with our common strategic concerns in your region. The question is how best to proceed.

As you know, Mr. President, I recently said that I would, if necessary, be prepared to meet again with you and Prime Minister Begin. I do not believe, however, that we have sufficiently tested whether such a meeting is necessary or would be fruitful, and we both recognize the risks inherent in a summit meeting that failed to result in final agreement.

I want to suggest for your consideration, therefore, that the negotiations be resumed at the Ministerial level in Washington among Prime Minister Khalil, Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance. I would be happy to make Camp David available for these talks, so that the three Ministers and their aides would be able to work in private, without interruption, and away from the pressures and glare of the news media. If it is convenient, I suggest that the Ministerial talks begin soon after Secretary Vance and I return from our forthcoming visit to Mexico,⁶ specifically, on Wednesday, February 21. I am also communicating this suggestion to Prime Minister Begin.

I recognize that Prime Minister Khalil and Foreign Minister Dayan would need to consult closely with you and with Prime Minister Begin, respectively, as the talks progress. I would anticipate that, after several days of intensive discussions, the Ministers might then want to return home to consult with their governments.

In making this suggestion, Mr. President, I assure you of my continued personal commitment to the successful conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and to the implementation of the Framework agreed at Camp David for a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East. I also recognize and appreciate how much you have already contributed toward making a successful outcome possible. We now owe it to ourselves, to the peoples of Egypt and Israel, and indeed to all the peoples of the Middle East, to make a determined effort to realize the vision which led you to Jerusalem. I look forward to hearing from you

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 156.

⁵ See Documents 162 and 164.

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 168.

at your earliest convenience, Mr. President, and meanwhile send to you my warm personal regards and continued high respect.

Sincerely yours,

Jimmy Carter

End text.

4. We believe it would be desirable to announce⁷ that Ministerial-level talks will resume at Camp David as soon as this has been agreed by both sides—hopefully in the course of this week. Our intention would be to issue a brief statement along the following lines:

Quote: At President Carter's invitation, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have agreed that negotiations between Egypt and Israel should be resumed at Ministerial level. Prime Minister Khalil, Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance will participate in these talks, which will begin at Camp David on February 21. In agreeing to these talks, all sides have affirmed their commitment to the Camp David Accords and their determination that these negotiations be completed as quickly as possible. Unquote. Please ascertain GOE reaction to an announcement along foregoing lines.

5. I would like you and Sam Lewis to return to participate in these talks. Perhaps you could come back on aircraft with Secretary Brown who, we understand, will leave Cairo Sunday, February 18. This would give us a chance for in-house discussions with you and Sam before talks with Khalil and Dayan begin.

Vance

⁷ See footnote 8, Document 168.

170. Letter From President Carter to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, February 9, 1979

To Harold Brown

The immediate purpose of your trip is to restore and reinforce confidence in the United States among our friends in the region. In doing so, you should begin to lay the basis for security collaboration among

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Security, 5/79–9/80. Secret.

the U.S. and key states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Consistent with our strategy in the peace negotiations, we should be aiming for a situation in which Egypt and Israel are not isolated from the rest of the region.

To that end, you should place very high emphasis on the need for the rapid conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as the first step in a wider process of Israeli-Arab accommodation. You should make it clear that our ability to develop regional cooperation will be severely handicapped, and perhaps even negated, by continued Israeli-Arab hostility. That hostility intensifies internal strains in the Arab countries, contributes to growing radicalization, and opens doors to the reentry of the Soviet Union. You should, therefore, indicate that the United States expects a forthcoming attitude from our friends on this issue in order to facilitate greater regional cooperation on wider strategic matters.

With the foregoing as a key point of departure, you should forcefully express our recognition of the strategic importance of the region, its strategic location, its vital resources, and its crucial role in establishing healthy patterns of internal development and North-South relations. Make it clear that we see the region to be under serious threat from Soviet power which is systematically exploiting internal instability as well as regional conflicts.

With or without a grand plan, determined Soviet efforts, as evidenced in the Horn of Africa, the PDRY, and Afghanistan, now abetted by turmoil in Iran, could lead to general disorder or the imposition of dominant Soviet influence, which the U.S. and its friends cannot tolerate.

To counter these threats, the United States sees the need for an integrated strategy for regional security to which it is prepared to make a strong political and military contribution. This strategy should be comprised of several elements:

- Rapid progress in bringing peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors, first and foremost between Israel and Egypt, but in a manner which progressively draws support from Arab moderates for subsequent peace negotiations.

- New forms of bilateral and multilateral collaboration in security management, including military assistance, intelligence cooperation, and contingency planning.

- Increased U.S. military presence in the region, possibly including increased naval presence and new collaboration on basing arrangements. You should explore reactions to possible forms of enhanced U.S. presence, without making any specific commitment at this point. Upon your return, I expect a full report on steps that can be taken to strengthen our position in the area.

—Concerted measures to counter radical forces that now provide a base for the intrusion of Soviet influence.

—Cooperation in oil matters that builds on the common interest of the U.S., its allies, and the region's moderate states in security and economic development.

You should emphasize our conviction that a new strategy for peace and security in the region will require new policies on the part of the U.S. and the governments of the region, demanding the resolve to effect them at home and internationally. We will do our part, but will expect in return enhanced cooperation from each of the states that you will be visiting.

Saudi Arabia

In addition to a review of regional security along the lines indicated above, you should discuss with the Saudis the nature of the "special" relationship they say they desire. You should seek their views on specific security concerns. At their initiative, this could include discussion of oil field security. You should agree to more systematic security consultations, including the possibility of some joint contingency planning directed at threats from Soviet surrogates in the region.

In conversations with Saudi leaders it should be emphasized that it is vital that American policy have the support of the Congress and the American people. You should note that it is a reality of our political system that the success of our cooperation with them on security issues is dependent in considerable measure on U.S.-Saudi cooperation in the peace process and on economic issues.

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you should indicate that a decision on air munitions will be made by me after my conversations with Fahd. You might also indicate to the Saudis that, subject to my final approval after the Fahd visit, we expect to continue with the modernization program for two Army brigades and four National Guard battalions. Following the discussions with Fahd, I will review also the issue of nominal FMS credits for third country military assistance.

Egypt

President Sadat believes that Egypt can play a constructive regional role in support of moderate states and in limiting Soviet influence, provided a peace treaty with Israel can be achieved and Egypt receives American support. Egyptian leaders should be encouraged to think realistically in these terms, consistent with their objective of alleviating Egypt's economic problems, and to focus on specific situations, such as Sudan, Oman, the Emirates, and Yemen where an Egyptian contribution to security may be possible. We should seek to initiate the

development of a close U.S.-Egyptian security relationship for the post-treaty environment. It is particularly important that the Egyptians understand that our ability to sustain a long-term security relationship with Egypt depends upon peace with Israel.

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you can offer to send a survey team to survey Egyptian air defense requirements; indicate to the Egyptians that the United States will review the question of FMS in the light of regional developments; and that I am prepared to consider favorably the sale of 800 APCs for Egypt in the context of progress on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. You should make the Egyptians understand the congressional sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

Israel

In your meetings with Israeli leaders, you should provide assurance that the U.S. commitment to Israel's security remains firm. You should seek to gain understanding of Israeli perspectives of their security problems, especially those that would arise from a reduced military presence in the West Bank and Gaza. You should also encourage Israeli leaders to develop a regional approach to security matters, building on the common interests of Israel and the moderate Arab states in limiting hostile Soviet and radical influences within the area. The critical relationship between the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional security should be emphasized.

On specific bilateral issues, you should:

1. Convey the conclusions of the survey for the relocation of two Israeli air bases from the Sinai, but without commitment as to the extent or terms of U.S. financial assistance;
2. Agree in principle to provide equipment and technical assistance in overcoming the loss of intelligence and early warning stemming from Sinai withdrawal, the details to be developed in the course of ongoing security consultations.
3. The air base relocation aside, avoid any commitment in regard to Israeli requests for FY 1980 financial assistance in excess of the \$1 billion in FMS and \$785 million in security supporting assistance.
4. You can indicate to the Israelis that I am prepared to consider favorably the sale of 960 APCs and 200 Howitzers in the context of progress on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. You should make the Israelis understand the congressional sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

Jordan

King Hussein will be seeking both general assurance of American support and specific commitments to supply arms of greater sophisti-

cation. You should encourage him to adopt a supportive role toward the peace negotiations, particularly as they turn to the West Bank/Gaza issues. You should also open the prospect of greater U.S. assistance in meeting his legitimate security needs in the future as Jordan becomes more actively involved in the peace process. You should specifically:

1. Discuss Jordan's security requirements now and during a period of protracted negotiations about the future of the West Bank, reaffirming our commitment to continue with military modernization programs which have already been agreed.

2. Agree to consider Jordan's additional defense needs, but without commitment to a favorable outcome.

3. Agree to continue detailed defense consultations through the existing Joint Military Commission in the spring with regard to Jordan's future security requirements.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

171. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 79–10094

Washington, February 16, 1979

SUBJECT

Implications of Iran for Middle East Peace Negotiations [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The collapse of the Shah's regime² and the current uncertain situation in Iran have, along with a host of other factors, caused Israel and Egypt to strike more rigid positions on key unresolved issues in peace negotiations. Although the upheaval in Iran has directly affected only one issue—Israel's desire to secure oil supplies from Egyptian fields in the Sinai—it has caused both sides to reconsider their approaches to negotiations in light of broader concerns, which include:

—The diminution of US influence in the region;

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 77, Implications of Iran for Middle East Peace Negotiations. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² See footnote 5, Document 163.

- The inspiration that religious revolutionaries in Iran have given right and left-wing extremists elsewhere; and
- The consequent potential for a wider spread of instability in the area. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We do not believe these concerns have eroded either side's fundamental commitment to continuing the peace effort. Nevertheless, both countries have been shaken by the fall of the Shah, and seem more determined than ever to protect their own equities and less inclined toward the kind of flexibility necessary to hasten the conclusion of a treaty. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Concern over US losses in Iran and the perception that Washington was either unable or unwilling to act in ways to protect its interests there seems to be at the heart of Egypt's greater caution and to have reinforced longstanding Israeli suspicion about the value of great power security commitments. President Sadat's decision to embark on a high-risk pursuit of a peace settlement was based on a calculation of US power in the region and a belief that the US would be able and willing to use those strengths to engineer a comprehensive settlement and stand as its guarantor. Israel, although much less inclined to depend on the benefits of superpower guarantees, nevertheless has integrated its special relationship with the US into the basic assumptions underlying its peace moves. Although both sides have expressed some appreciation of our difficulties in dealing with rapidly unfolding events in Iran, confidence in US power and reliability has clearly been shaken. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We have detected an attitude emerging in Israel and Egypt of stricter self-reliance which contains the seeds of an uncertainty as to whether a treaty can be concluded which could withstand new shifts in the power balance and political currents in the region. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The tide of Islamic fervor in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini's explicit endorsement of the Palestinians, and the collapse of the de facto security system in the Persian Gulf region have added significant pressure on President Sadat to demand from Israel a more explicit commitment to a comprehensive settlement and respect for Egypt's sovereignty and pan-Arab obligations. Even before the crisis in Iran, the Egyptians were deeply disturbed by the force of Arab rejection of their independent dealings with Israel and particularly by Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the anti-Egyptian resolutions of the Baghdad summit. Now the Egyptians face:

- A coalition of Arabs spearheaded by Syria and Iraq, which has added reason in the wake of events in Iran to maintain an alliance.
- A Saudi leadership [*less than 1 line not declassified*] seemingly less willing to risk taking positions unacceptable to the Palestinians and other Arabs.

—An emboldened Palestinian movement which is exploiting its relationship with Iranian revolutionaries in order to enhance its image as a force to be reckoned with.

—Early signs of greater assertiveness among Egypt's own Muslim conservatives on such sensitive issues as Egypt's relations with the US, Israel's designs on Arab territory, and inequities and decadence in Egypt's political and social system. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Sadat has countered these pressures with the argument that regional stability depends now more than ever on a just Middle East peace settlement. Implicit in this argument, however, is a notice to the US and Israel that a stable peace must include greater satisfaction of Arab demands and greater assistance to Egypt and other moderate Arab governments. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Israeli perceptions of the Iranian crisis seem to have reinforced their determination to nail down specific language and commitments ensuring that a peace treaty with Egypt outlives President Sadat and minimizes as much as possible the need for US security guarantees. The Israelis have not substantively changed their negotiating positions, but they have in recent months dug in their heels further over a number of issues they consider vital, including:

—Guaranteed access to quantities of Egyptian oil equal to those Israel currently obtains from its operations in the Gulf of Suez;

—US commitments to provide generous financial assistance and advisory support to facilitate Israeli military relocation from the Sinai to the Negev;

—Ironclad language in the treaty minimizing if not neutralizing Egypt's options to intervene on the Arab side in future Arab-Israeli conflicts. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The Israeli leadership believes that one effect of the Iranian crisis has been to deepen Egypt's reluctance to depart from Arab consensus attitudes. Foreign Minister Dayan and others in the leadership anticipate that Sadat, in an effort to reaffirm his solidarity with Arab interests, have taken a tougher position on major negotiation issues still at impasse. This assessment has probably contributed to the stiffening of Israel's own negotiating posture. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

172. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, February 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East Trip Report

You know from my personal messages² about the highlights of my meetings with Sadat, Begin, Dayan, Weizman, Hussein and the Saudi Princes. I will therefore confine this report to a general assessment and some suggestions for future action.

Conclusions

My overall conclusions are these. First, we must press forward as quickly as possible to an Israeli-Egyptian accord. Time is probably running against success. To make this step by Sadat digestible to the other moderate Arabs, we need to do three things besides portraying the treaty as part of a process designed to achieve a comprehensive peace: be forthcoming on regional economic development; be forthcoming on arms supplies, although not nearly to the extent of the announced demands; and find some form of US military presence which will provide reassurance without carrying the political burdens of a presence so intrusive as a US military base.

These actions will also lay a basis for a greater degree of regional security cooperation, with US support. That cooperation will come, if at all, on an evolutionary basis unless the perception of the threat intensifies. All the countries were concerned about the events in Iran; but there was no panic and, indeed, less anxiety than I had expected. None of the leaders thought we should do more than “wait and see” on Iran for the moment.

My second conclusion is that the most likely threats lie in internal violence supported from across borders or from internal political, economic, and social instability. The first will hardly, and the second not at all, be cured by major military hardware, which can however inhibit direct aggression across borders. We need to promote regional security cooperation, particularly where there is a threat from a Soviet surrogate as in North Yemen, and perhaps Oman, from the PDRY. And we need

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East—1979. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Sec State Eyes Only.” A different version of Brown’s memorandum is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

² Not found.

to continue forcefully to assert our willingness and ability to oppose direct Soviet aggression in the area. But most important of all, we need to do our best to forestall development of internal instability. Our influence is necessarily limited on this score, but the steps outlined above may help to enhance it. In particular, assistance in sensible economic development is needed. Several leaders stressed in private that this took priority over arms, though this wisdom did not extend to moderating their own long lists of arms requests.

My trip had four main objectives. Pursuant to your instructions, the first was to restore confidence among the moderate states that the United States understands the dangers to the region and intends to act to protect its interests. This was achieved. But there will be backsliding unless we now follow through on the commitment to play a more active role in the Middle East—in frustrating Soviet interference, in displaying some modest presence of our own, and in cooperating more actively with the moderate states in security terms.

The second objective was to stimulate the development of a general strategy for the region. I outlined the major elements: close cooperation between the United States and the individual states, concerted actions among moderate states, bilateral politico-military consultations about hypothetical contingencies, a potentially greater US military presence, cooperation on economic issues (oil) and economic assistance, and, above all, rapid progress on Arab-Israeli peace.

In response, the countries' leaders acknowledged a commonality of interest. However, not surprisingly, the Arabs do not see Israel as having a regional security role, and tend also to criticize each other's efforts. Several urged a US military presence in other countries "which are weak and need it" but see it as a lightning rod in their own (the exception was Israel, which would welcome such a presence for reasons both plain and, to us, unattractive). It is quite obvious as well that each country views US interest in promoting regional security as a lever to obtain more US arms for itself. This presents opportunities for the United States as well as problems, for we may be able over time to establish some degree of implicit linkage between bilateral arms supply relations and regional cooperation.

The third objective was to emphasize the peace process, and its importance for regional strategy. I did this at each stop. I pressed hard the argument that sustained progress toward peace would make an essential contribution to the security of the region. While all professed dedication to peace, recognized the threat to stability posed by its absence, and wished to exclude the Soviets from the negotiations, reactions to the Camp David Agreements were along predictable lines.

Sadat and the Israelis are wedded to the Camp David process, but holding to their positions that progress be on their terms. Each is

seeking maximum reward in US security support as an incentive for moving forward. Hussein and the Saudis are convinced that the Camp David process carries more immediate danger than eventual safety. They appear to have no constructive, practical alternatives and have difficulty focusing on the threat that stalemate in the peace process poses to their security. Neither wants to close the door completely—their desire for our support in security matters precludes this—but they both seem to be hoping somehow that the moment of decision will go away. I believe concentration on Gaza with respect to the autonomy issue would be a good tactic.

The final objective was to strengthen bilateral relationships. Overall, I sought to convey the idea that a comprehensive peace settlement and other forms of defense cooperation are far more important to regional security and well-being than additional arms. I made very few commitments, handling most requests by undertaking to consider them on my return to Washington or to arrange for US teams to survey requirements or make staff visits in order to examine the need in greater depth. In some cases, I was frank in warning them not to expect approval.

In the main, however, offers of consultations and joint planning and intelligence exchange were welcomed but were not enough. We were judged in this functional area by how favorably we responded to arms requests. My approach was all right as a stop gap but will not work for more than a few months. No one was satisfied. Everyone had his list. Saudi Arabia renewed earlier requests for advanced systems, such as the XM1 tank, without addressing quantities or timing. Jordan presented a \$2 billion plan for filling shortfalls and for force modernization, including F-16 aircraft and ROLAND missiles. Israel scrapped MATMON C, substituting a new eight-year force development plan for equipment which could cost \$6–8 billion. The new plan does cut back significantly on MATMON C's planned force expansion and is said to be 20–25% less expensive, but most of the savings appear to be in the later years. Egypt listed equipment which would total \$15–20 billion, in effect an "Americanization" of Egyptian forces.

I'm sure none of these nations expected us to respond fully to their requests. We cannot ignore them, however. I believe we should now approve military hardware items at a somewhat faster rate (without increasing dollar levels where credit is involved) than we have in the recent past for Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. I believe we need to plan for a sharply increased arms supply to Egypt, including FMS credits, although not to anything like the extent of Egypt's full request. The Egyptians have a genuine self-defense need to reverse the continuing decay of their military forces flowing from loss of Soviet support. And, with Iran gone, Egypt's role in regional security becomes more impor-

tant; no other country in the region can play a comparable role. The expanded relationship must, of course, be paced by the peace talks; our survey teams will tide us over until May–June. Also, we will face a difficult task in adjusting Egyptian appetites downward to fit the threat and competing economic development needs.

You also asked that I report on the view of the regional states toward a greater US military presence. Israel favors a US presence, preferably one in Israel, but even one in the Arab states would be all right with them. Dayan and Weizman raised the possibility of our taking over the Sinai air bases. Weizman distinguished between a naval base at Haifa, which he said would not be antagonistic in an Arab-Israeli context, and other kinds of ground or air bases which would be.

Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia wants a base on its soil, although they might acquiesce in a US base in some other Arab country. Sadat thinks a US base would be a sign of Egyptian weakness and showed no interest in a US presence in the Sinai. The Saudis did not think direct Soviet military action sufficiently likely to warrant the political risks to them that, in their view, would follow from a major US military presence. Some Saudis thought a US presence somewhere else in the Gulf was worth considering, but it is by no means clear this represents a consensus.

It may be that, on reflection, one or more of the Arab countries may be interested in a form of US presence less intrusive than a military base, such as periodic aircraft deployments, joint exercises, and the like. It may be that we can develop arrangements for use of facilities in a crisis, perhaps with some pre-positioning of critical items. This would give us some of the military advantages of a base with fewer of its political burdens. We will learn more about this as our security consultations progress.

There remain two other “presence” questions. First, the possibility of base facilities in another country, such as Oman. In 1977 Oman agreed in principle to our use of Masirah, the former British base, but at a very high cost. I did not get a clear view of Saudi Arabia’s or Egypt’s attitude on such a base, although I understand Crown Prince Fahd had expressed reservation about the idea in late 1976. We should examine this further within our government and perhaps with Saudi Arabia, to see whether the question should now be reopened with Oman. More importantly, I believe we ought to promote assistance from moderate Arab states to Oman to replace the capability withdrawn by Iran. The sooner this is done, the more South Yemen will be discouraged from seriously considering renewed efforts against Oman.

Second is the question of increasing US military presence off-shore. I believe we should carefully consider augmenting the Middle East Force (which now consists of 3 ships) and expanding the facilities

on Diego Garcia. This is not for purposes of reassuring the moderate Middle East states, who showed little interest. Rather, its justification would rest on broader geo-political grounds or on improvement in our rapid deployment capability. I will send you a separate memorandum on this.

My impressions of the military capabilities of these countries can be only very sketchy ones, but I'll give them anyway.

Israel's forces are very capable, very tough, and very ready. In a short war with Egypt and Jordan, they should have no trouble winning, but could take casualties substantial for their small population. I have no way to judge their expressed strong concern about Syrian and Iraqi capability (the latter is touted in many of the countries of the region as the coming military power) but I hypothesize that during the next few years this would not change the outcome.

Egypt's forces have rather good morale, are quite large, and claim to be ready. I doubt the last, and their denials of equipment unreadiness are undercut by their expressed concerns about spare parts. They are competent technically and professionally. I think they'd do well against anyone in the area except the Israelis, if we help them solve their equipment problems.

The Jordanians show spit and polish, are probably well trained (I saw only the honor guard!) but their forces are both small and very modestly equipped. They probably have considerable defensive capability, but would be wise to stay out of offensive operations. They can make a useful military advisory contribution in the Peninsula (there are said to be about 1500 Jordanian military personnel seconded to various countries in the Gulf and North Yemen).

The Saudis, though they are moving ahead toward a professional air force, seem to me a military zero at this time.

Recommendations

Our assurances of greater US interest and involvement are perishable. *We need to follow through:*

1. By means of the follow-on security consultations with the four countries to which I have agreed, we should:

(a) Further explore forms of US presence—short of permanent bases—which would be politically acceptable to host nations and militarily useful to the United States in deterring Soviet adventurism or enhancing our capability for rapid deployment of US forces in a crisis.

(b) Lay the basis for multinational regional security cooperation. We should concentrate on situations where stability is threatened by Soviet surrogates, in particular North Yemen and potentially Oman.

2. We should modestly step up the pace of our arms supply approvals within present dollar levels with Israel, Jordan, and Saudi

Arabia. In the case of Egypt, we should substantially increase our program, post-treaty, both quantitatively and by extending significant FMS credits. We should not, however, lend our assistance to force structure expansion in any of the four countries, and we should in particular encourage post-treaty force structure reduction in Egypt in exchange for our help in modernizing its forces. In Saudi Arabia we should encourage the development over time of a more professional army, not based solely on heavy and sophisticated equipment, but equipped and tailored to the environment and the Saudi capabilities to absorb. We should recognize that, at least in the case of the Army, the prospects for real military capability are very limited.

3. We should not encourage at this stage build-up of arms in the Gulf states. This issue needs further analysis.

4. The most serious threat to security is likely to be internal instability. We should review in depth our assessment of the political, economic and social conditions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states to make sure our policies are best designed to minimize the development of internal instability in those countries. This is particularly important in the case of Saudi Arabia, for reasons that are self-evident. It is also true in Egypt, where former MOD Gamasy told me privately he is worried about the effects on Army morale and attitudes of an eroding economic position military personnel experience in their personal lives. Where we have to make a choice we should give priority to economic assistance designed to promote internal stability over arms transfers.

5. We should plan further speeches and statements—by you and others—built around the themes of my visit. This declaratory policy will help maintain momentum and credibility. In doing this, we should recognize that declaratory policy is no substitute for action and, indeed, can be counterproductive if not matched with concrete implementing steps.

Harold Brown

173. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff for the Record¹

Washington, February 19, 1979, 6–7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Camp David II, February 19, 1979, The Cabinet Room,
6:00–7:15 p.m. (U)

Participants: The President, The Vice President, The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador Hermann Fr. Eilts, Ambassador Samuel Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, Ambassador Alfred Atherton, David Aaron, Jody Powell, William B. Quandt

The President asked Secretary Brown to comment briefly on his trip to the Middle East.² *Secretary Brown* said that all of the leaders in the area are in general agreement on the general security situation that confronts us all. But they are less clear on what we should do. The Saudis were pleased with what the Secretary said, but were taken back by the specifics.

The President then asked Amb. Eilts to comment on President Sadat's thinking. *Amb. Eilts* reported that Sadat says he has no further concessions to make. Prime Minister Khalil will not come with specific concessions, but he will be prepared to discuss alternative formulations on Articles IV and VI. Linkage may not be the primary focus of discussions, although the Egyptians still feel that they need something on this topic. The draft side letter as it now exists should be satisfactory as a basis for discussion. Khalil will have a positive attitude and he has some discretionary latitude in negotiations. Concerning oil, the Egyptians will approve to accompany an agreement, but do not want to put this in writing. We have not really pressed them on this issue and there will be some scope for negotiation.

The President asked if Egypt would find it easier to sell 1.5 million tons of oil to us, and then let us resell it to whom ever we wish. Amb. Eilts said that this might be possible, and Amb. Lewis agreed, although he emphasized that the quantities involved would be closer to 2.5 million tons and that the Israelis would much rather prefer to get the oil directly from Egypt.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 135, Quandt: 2/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See Document 172.

The President commented on the strategy paper and noted that it would be best to put forward any U.S. proposals in complete privacy to Dayan and Khalil. If their advisors are present, they will be obliged to take harder positions. *Amb. Lewis* agreed, but added that ultimately Prime Minister Begin will have to be involved personally in the negotiations for them to succeed. *The President* added that if this were true, we would have to leave something for Begin to do and to take credit for. *Amb. Eilts* added that President Sadat was also expecting to be invited to a summit.

The President said that the only new idea that he had involved splitting off Gaza from the West Bank. We should perhaps encourage Sadat to withdraw his offer to represent Hussein's interests in the West Bank. This would let him off the West Bank hook. Sadat does not care as much about the West Bank as he does about Gaza. If he can represent Gaza, this would allow him to conclude a separate treaty with Israel and to embarrass Hussein. This would let him claim that he has done his part, while increasing pressure on Jordan. Otherwise, the President said he had no new ideas on how to proceed.

The Vice President said that there is widespread expectations that there will be a summit. It is important then to state that a summit will only take place if progress is first made at the Foreign Minister level. *The President* said that perhaps he should send a personal message to both Begin and Sadat asking them not to reject any individual points in the proposals that we will put forward. We want to avoid any public confrontations. We need to show progress, and then try to pin down details at a later date. It would be better for both parties to reject our package, but not to go into the details, and to acknowledge that progress was being made. If there must be a summit, the President said, there should not be too much delay.

Amb. Eilts added that the most serious problem for Sadat would be the timing of the exchange of Ambassadors. *The President* acknowledged that he would have to deal with Sadat directly on that issue.

Both Ambassadors Lewis and Eilts agreed that the "Gaza first" approach made sense. *Amb. Eilts* added, however, that if this is to work, it must involve a significant degree of authority in the hands of the self-government, and it must be seen as a precedent for the West Bank.

Dr. Brzezinski added a comment on procedure. He said that the President himself would have to be directly involved in the negotiations. The success or failure of these talks would be of political importance. The President might consider meeting both Dayan and Khalil at the outset to stress the regional security concerns that underlie our policy. This should add a certain urgency to the negotiations. *Dr. Brzezinski* also said that he felt it would be a mistake for the Ministers, after having been softened up at Camp David, to go back home not having

reached agreement. There is a danger that positions will harden, that there will be leaks, and that we will lose control. Therefore, if progress is made in the talks, it would be desirable to move directly to a summit. This would help add to the sense of urgency.

Secretary Vance said that he was sympathetic to this idea and that it should not be ruled out. But he is afraid that it will expose the President too soon, before a proper framework has been laid. Perhaps the President could come up Friday³ night and meet with the two heads of the delegations. *Dr. Brzezinski* said that if the talks fail, the President will be blamed in any case. If he must be involved, he should start at the beginning. *Secretary Brown* stated that he shared the concern of involving the President prematurely. We should hold back someone, but if the President could confine his comments to regional security, then it would be worth having him meet with both delegations right away.

Ambassador Lewis noted that it might be difficult to get Cabinet approval for an immediate summit. The Cabinet is very determined to review everything that happens in the negotiations. If Begin is invited, he will probably try to bring half the Cabinet with him. Nonetheless, Ambassador Lewis saw merit in the idea of an immediate summit. The President said we should keep this as a desirable option. The Vice President asked if we could give something to Dayan to take back to the Cabinet, possibly private messages that he would just pass on to Begin.

Turning to the Gaza option, *Secretary Vance* asked if the letter should be changed. The President said we should just urge the Egyptians to drop their commitment to negotiate the West Bank. Sadat should get his foot out of the West Bank, and this would allow him to put pressure on Hussein. The President felt that two errors had been made at Camp David. First, too much emphasis was placed on the exchange of ambassadors. Second, Sadat should not have been asked to negotiate for the West Bank.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what the incentives were for each party to conclude the negotiations. In particular, what do the Israelis fear from the failure of negotiations? The President thought they were afraid of Egypt turning to a more hostile posture. This would contribute to the general malaise in Israeli society. *Ambassador Lewis* thought that the primary concern was the deterioration of U.S.-Israeli relations. The President felt that the Iranian situation should make the Israelis want peace with Egypt more. *Ambassador Lewis* noted that the majority of Israelis may feel that way, but that others are reacting more cautiously. The President also felt that there was an increase in threat from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the Israelis, and that the situation in Iran has

³ February 23.

emboldened the Palestinians. *Ambassador Lewis* felt that the increased national consciousness of the Israeli Arabs was more of a problem. The *Vice President* added that he felt the Israelis were worried about the loss of public opinion here, and *Ambassador Lewis* agreed. *Secretary Vance* reminded the group of *Dayan's* statement that "Israel cannot afford to win another war". *Ambassador Lewis* said that *Dayan* was the most aware of all Israeli leaders of the U.S. connection and its importance.

The *President* said that when we get to the question of oil, we should check with the Egyptians to make sure that the language of any letter is satisfactory. *Sadat* may want to sell the oil to us rather than to Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we ought to convey the point that this was the last effort that we would be able to make in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. *Secretary Vance* said that he had already told *Ambassador Evron* that, the *President* stated that we should not be saying that publicly. We do not want to be seen as giving up on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but practically everyone should recognize that we cannot start over from scratch. There is a tenacity to *Sadat*, that he cannot hold in limbo indefinitely. *Ambassador Eilts* agreed that if the talks fail, Egypt will go back to the Arab world. *Ambassador Lewis* added that the Labor Party favors a quick settlement, and *Secretary Brown* noted that the Labor Party supports the Gaza first option. *Ambassador Lewis* said that the Israelis widely believe that this [is] the last serious round of talks. We don't need to say it publicly. *Secretary Vance* added that the process of erosion is clearly under way.

The *President* asked about Egyptian-Saudi relations and *Ambassador Eilts* said that *Sadat* wants Saudi support, but does not see it as crucial at this stage. He feels that the Saudis will have to be confronted with a *fait accompli*. The *President* added that there is no place for the Saudis to go once the treaty is signed. They have to work with the United States and Egypt. *Secretary Brown* said the Saudis will take a negative public line, but in private they will not be so upset. Discussion ensued on the comparative strength of various personalities in the Saudi ruling family, and it was generally agreed that *Fahd* remains the single most important figure, but that *Sultan* and *Abdallah* have been gaining in influence as well.

174. Summary Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, February 21, 1979

First Day of Camp David Talks

The talks got off to a good start today, although no real negotiating was done. Khalil and Dayan get along quite well and are able to carry on a strategic discussion of developments in the Middle East in a very impressive manner. They work well together and with Secretary Vance. The real test will come in the next few days when we see if the good personal and intellectual relationship that exists between the two negotiators can be translated into agreements.

Khalil has come with broad authority to negotiate and he seems genuinely anxious to conclude the talks as soon as possible. At the same time, he is deeply worried about the risks inherent in any agreement which appears to be a separate peace. He is trying hard to develop a regional strategic context in which the negotiations can be concluded. His main point to Dayan is that it is not in Israel's interest to see Egypt isolated from other Arab countries, particularly in light of the developments in Iran. Dayan acknowledges the point, but asks what price Israel is being asked to pay.

In contrast to Khalil, Dayan is under more constraints as a negotiator. He says that he has authority to negotiate and to recommend but ultimately the Cabinet must approve any agreement. He is worried about the regional situation and talks about this as the last opportunity to reach a peace agreement, but as usual he gives no indication of optimism. He is clearly anxious to see draft proposals on the specific points we have discussed, and in particular on the West Bank-Gaza side letter.

The "Gaza First" option has been discussed in some detail, without any specific agreement in sight. It is not clear that a detailed understanding can be achieved in these talks, but each side seems to feel that a new element is in play and that creates the impression of some positive movement. I personally doubt that any agreement that can now be reached on Gaza will have sufficient credibility to provide Sadat with the political cover in the Arab world that he feels he needs. Nonetheless, this is an idea which will get a full hearing in the next few days.

By Friday or Saturday, it is likely that the talks will have gone about as far as possible, given Dayan's limited authority. At that point, he will want to return to Israel to talk to Begin and to get Cabinet ap-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 2/79. Secret; Eyes Only. No memoranda of conversation for the day's meetings have been found. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

proval for any positions he wants to recommend. He speaks of returning by mid-next week, with Begin if necessary. By contrast, Khalil says that Sadat will only come to a summit to sign an agreement, not to negotiate.

My impression thus far is that both sides do want to reach an agreement, and are worried about the regional situation. But each feels that the other side should make [the] most of the remaining concessions. The Egyptians are quite anxious to maintain the appearance of a common position with us, while Dayan is particularly interested in negotiating U.S.-Israeli bilateral agreements on aid and assurances that we might provide in the event the Egyptians do not honor the treaty. This leaves us with a large and difficult agenda ahead and the good feelings of the first day will come under considerable strain if we get down to specific cases. It would be a serious mistake to ease up the pressure on either side at this point, and if there must be a break in the negotiations, it should be as short as possible and should be followed by a summit immediately. We do have a chance to bring these talks to a successful conclusion, but it will be a close thing.

Tomorrow we will put forward a good draft on the West Bank-Gaza negotiations and the so-called linkage problem. We have some ideas of possible alternatives to introduce into the negotiations at a later date, but we want to hold back some of these ideas in the first round.

175. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Second Day of Camp David Talks (U)

As Dayan and Khalil turned their attention to specific issues in the negotiations today, there was a noticeable backsliding in comparison to yesterday's relatively positive atmosphere. Dayan stuck to a narrow

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 2/79. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. No memoranda of conversation for the day's meetings have been found.

Cabinet-approved brief, reminding us on several occasions that the idea of a target date was unacceptable and that Israel will not agree to any interpretive note dealing with Article VI, paragraph 2. No residue of the broad strategy overview of yesterday could be seen in today's talks. (S)

Khalil cut through much of the verbage in our draft letter, but stuck firmly to the need to change Article VI, paragraph 2, either by an interpretive note or by deleting the offensive language in the present draft which indicates that the treaty will be implemented "independent of any other instrument external to the treaty." In brief there was no real give from either side. Little progress was made in discussion of the "Gaza first" option. It still has some life left in it, but the more it is discussed the greater the confusion it generates. (S)

We will be receiving textual suggestions for change in the West Bank/Gaza letter from both delegations in the course of the evening. We will use these as the basis for a new draft which will be discussed tomorrow. I continue to feel that we should try to put together a treaty package for Dayan to take home with him this weekend, if indeed he must return for Cabinet authorization; and we should urge him to return by mid-week with Begin in tow. There is a limit, which we are rapidly reaching, on how much can usefully be done at this level and in the absence of decision on non-treaty related issues. (S)

If there are any surprises late this evening still from our discussions with the Egyptians or the Israelis, I will call your office just before the Friday² breakfast meeting. (U)

² February 23.

176. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Third Day of Camp David Talks (U)

The atmosphere in the talks between Vance, Dayan, and Khalil was considerably better today. We submitted a new draft letter,² along with suggestions on the other outstanding issues. Khalil showed some flexibility on the question on the timing of the exchange of ambassadors, and we appear now to have agreement on the easiest of the issues, Article IV. (S)

Dayan now sees the question of a target date, Article VI of the treaty, and the exchange of ambassadors as the remaining difficult issues in the negotiations with Egypt. In addition, he has presented us with an outline of a memorandum of understanding which he would like us to respond to. (S)

I anticipate some serious difficulties in the talks Saturday³ and Sunday,⁴ but I think that we can expect to conclude this round of talks by Sunday afternoon with a package of proposals⁵ for Dayan to take back to the Cabinet. The most difficult decisions for us will come in the next round of the talks, when we will be obliged to address bilateral issues and to deal with Begin directly. (S)

If you have the time on Saturday or Sunday, I think it would be worthwhile to talk with both Dayan and Khalil about broad regional developments. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 2/79. Secret. Outside System. Printed from a copy that does not bear Quandt's initials. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document. No memoranda of conversation for the day's meetings have been found.

² Not found.

³ February 24. No record of the meetings held between the delegations on this day has been found.

⁴ February 25. No record of the meetings held between the delegations on this day has been found.

⁵ On February 25, the Egyptian and Israeli delegations were presented with drafts of the letter on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations as well as the agreed minutes to Articles I, IV, and VI and Annex I. Copies of these drafts bearing Carter's handwritten annotations are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David II: 2/79.

177. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 25, 1979, 2:03–2:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 Secretary Vance
 Prime Minister Khalil—Egypt
 Foreign Minister Dayan—Israel
 Zbigniew Brzezinski

The President: We are running out of time. Therefore, it is important when you go back for there not to be any public rejection of any facets of the proposals advanced here. There should be no categorical statements that one will never yield, etc.

The interim between this and the next meeting will cause problems. The longer a decision is delayed, the more difficult it will be to reach it.

My own hope is that we can get together for a summit this coming weekend and I hope Prime Minister Begin can attend. I can spend some time on this in the latter part of this week. (To Khalil) You have full authority to negotiate a full settlement, don't you?

Khalil: Yes, unless we can conclude an agreement now, it will be difficult to do so in a month and impossible in two or three. Our region is threatened. Nimeiri and Fahd have urged an Arab summit before an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is concluded. President Sadat has confirmed that our desire for peace is consistent, but we cannot isolate ourselves from the Arab world. The remaining difficulties are trifling. The proposed formulas are fair to Israeli security and our position in the Arab world.

The President: The most stabilizing action would be an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Once it is done, the other Arab countries cannot reject Egypt. An Arab summit after the treaty could be fruitful. Without peace, things will deteriorate.

Dayan: I agree on the urgency.

The President: Does the Cabinet sense it?

Dayan: All agree, but some might feel that now is not a good time for a withdrawal or for autonomy. I feel that we should do away with the military government. But there are differences of view among us on autonomy.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(1/79–2/79). Secret. Drafted on February 26. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

From the Israeli point of view, there has been no progress this week; if anything, the other way. At Blair House² there were fewer disagreements. The latest U.S. draft on article 6–2 involves adoption of the Egyptian position, and thus the Egyptian proposal has become the U.S. proposal.

I would like the Prime Minister to come and reach agreement, but in my report I will have to say that there was no progress from the Israeli point of view. The gap is now wider than at Blair House.

Vance: The Blair House formulas were ad referendum. What is really left is article 6.

(Discussion of article 6—of the difficulties of finding good language.)

Dayan: Other elements include full withdrawal and full normalization. Now we are told that ambassadors would be linked to the autonomy issue.

The President: Your version of history is not compatible with mine. The ambassador issue arose subsequent to the Camp David agreement. Besides you can have a situation where one is obligated by treaty to have an ambassador. As a final step there should be a commitment to exchange ambassadors, but even then each side can withdraw the ambassador.

In any case we are operating under narrow time limits, but if a treaty is signed other Arab countries will have to accept it. The Gaza negotiations could be separated to some extent and that might be constructive.

Finally, I hope Prime Minister Begin will come over here. We must avoid a breakdown. Also, we need to have bilateral talks. Our budget is in the final stages. We therefore need to discuss these matters with someone who has authority.

The importance of all this is very high to the United States and to the world at large. The United States will accept whatever the two of you can accept; there is no U.S. position as such.

(To Dayan) Have you agreed on the statement³ that I can now read to the press?

Dayan: Yes.

² See Documents 78, 80–81, 84, and 88.

³ The prepared statement, summarizing the February 21–25 Camp David talks and announcing the possibility of moving the negotiations to the “head-of-government level,” involving Begin and Khalil, by the end of the week, was read by Carter on the South Lawn of the White House on February 25. The full text of the statement is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1979, pp. 39–40.

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 26, 1979, 0540Z

46434. For Charge from Secretary. Subject: Message for Prime Minister Begin.

(S-entire text)

1. Please deliver following message to P.M. Begin from President Carter.²

2. Start text:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I know Foreign Minister Dayan will be reporting to you fully on the talks at Camp David over the past few days, but I want you to have this formal invitation to join me there later this week to continue the negotiations.

I have concluded that we must move the negotiations to a higher level in order to conclude a treaty now. I am mindful of the ever-increasing need for stability in the area in light of current developments. I understand that President Sadat has given Prime Minister Khalil full authority to conclude a peace treaty on behalf of Egypt.

As Secretary Vance and I have both told Foreign Minister Dayan, I believe a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is within reach, but I also believe that it will be difficult to develop a new opportunity for peace if we do not conclude a treaty in the near future.

I hope I may look forward to seeing you later this week. Your visit would come at an appropriate moment for us to discuss important elements in the relationship between the United States and Israel as we look to peace between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

3. Viets from Saunders: Please tell PAO³ this was drafted after I talked with him.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 2/14–28/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Brzezinski and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2295)

² No telegram confirming delivery of Carter's letter to Begin has been found. For Begin's reply, see Document 179.

³ The PAO at the Embassy in Israel was David I. Hitchcock.

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the White House¹

Tel Aviv, February 27, 1979, 1603Z

4000. Subject: Letter From Prime Minister Begin to the President.

1. Secret-entire message.

2. Ciechanover's office has just telephoned us following text of Begin's letter to the President. We understand Ambassador Evron has been instructed to deliver the letter to the White House immediately upon receipt.²

Quote Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your letter of February 26³ and for the invitation it contained to participate this week in a meeting, under your sponsorship, with the Prime Minister of Egypt, Dr. Khalil.

Foreign Minister Dayan today reported in detail to the Cabinet on the talks at Camp David. It is clear that no progress was made towards an agreement between the parties on the outstanding issues. Indeed, Egypt actually hardened its positions and, in addition to its previous proposals which Israel could not accept, has now put forth further proposals which are either inconsistent with the Camp David Accords of September 17, 1978, or make the peace treaty so meaningless as to be totally unacceptable to Israel. My colleagues and I were compelled, therefore, to ask ourselves whether, under these circumstances, a meeting between Dr. Khalil and myself could be of value to advance an understanding between us in the peacemaking effort. Regretably but unavoidably, we reached the conclusion that such a meeting would not be useful. Mr. President, in your letter to me of February 6, 1979,⁴ you wrote: "I recognize that Foreign Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Khalil would need to consult closely with you and President Sadat, respectively, as the discussions progressed. For this reason, I would anticipate that, after several days of intensive discussions, the Ministers might then wish to return home to consult with their governments."

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 1/79–2/80. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the telegram, indicating that he saw the document.

² A copy of this version of the letter, transmitted to Carter by Evron on February 27, is *ibid.*

³ See Document 178.

⁴ See Document 168.

Upon hearing the Foreign Minister's latest report it became apparent to us that the deliberations of the Cabinet required more time in order to take, after due study, appropriate decisions.

In your aforementioned letter you also wrote: "Mr. Prime Minister, I recently said that I would, if necessary, be prepared to meet again with you and President Sadat. I do not believe, however, that we have sufficiently tested whether such a meeting is necessary or would be fruitful."

Now that the "test" has been made it is evident to my colleagues and to me that a meeting between myself and Dr. Khalil empowered—as we have learned from President Sadat's public statements—to stand obstinately on Egypt's demands, could not be useful and perhaps even be detrimental.

I therefore am regretfully compelled to inform you, Mr. President, that I cannot leave tomorrow for the proposed meeting at Camp David.

I am, of course, prepared to meet with you as is the custom between us and in the spirit of our traditional friendship, for talks on all subjects bearing upon the peacemaking process, the regional issues in the wake of recent developments and our bilateral relations. I shall be ready to make a journey to you for such a meeting at your convenience at any time in the near future.

Yours sincerely and respectfully,

Menachem Begin.

Unquote

Viets

180. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 79–10104X

Washington, February 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Possible Arab Acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli Treaty [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The White House suggestion that the Arabs would accept a treaty if presented with a *fait accompli* may have been prompted by two statements made during Secretary Brown's recent visit to the Middle East.² [*handling restriction not declassified*]

—The Secretary told Sadat that he had found the Saudis less critical of the Camp David Accords in private than in public, and that King Husayn was “less intent” on pursuing the issue at the UN or Geneva. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

—Sadat, during his conversation with Brown, said that all Arabs but the “rejectionists” (presumably Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen) and Kuwait (because of its large Palestinian population) would accept a treaty. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We do not believe that either statement should be interpreted as indicating that Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia would “accept” a treaty based on the Camp David Accords. Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would “accept” the “present draft” treaty *only* in the sense that there is little they could do to prevent it. Our reporting [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is nearly unanimous in its rejection of the CDA as not sufficient from the Arab point of view. That view, if anything, has hardened. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

It is, of course, theoretically possible to devise terms and linkages that would satisfy most Arabs. Broad Arab support could be secured by a treaty that provides for specific time-tables making performance

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 84, Possible Arab Acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The memorandum was found attached to a February 26 note from the Director of the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, Robert R. Bowie to the NIO/NESA, reporting that Turner informed the attendees at that morning's DCI Staff Meeting that “the White House had suggested that the other Arabs would accept an Israeli-Egyptian accord if it was actually signed. Specifically, the Saudis, Syria and Jordan were mentioned.” On this, Bowie asked: “What do we think of this, assuming that the linkage positions are no better than in the present draft? How much further linkage would make the difference?” (Ibid.) Also attached is a February 27 note from Director of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis Helene Boatner to Bowie stating that the intelligence memorandum was drafted in response to Bowie's memorandum. (Ibid.)

² See Document 172 for a report of Brown's visit.

on Egyptian-Israeli issues dependent on progress on Palestinian issues. That would enable Sadat and potential supporters to argue that Egypt's military and diplomatic leverage was being applied on behalf of the Arab cause. Israel, however, is not likely to accept such linkage. Almost any treaty, therefore, will provoke Arab criticism. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

In the Arab view, an Egyptian-Israeli treaty must contain some Israeli commitment to withdrawal, and it must, at minimum, not foreclose the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. More specific Arab demands revolve around two issues; Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory—including East Jerusalem—captured in the 1967 war; and Palestinian self-determination. NFAC has no reporting to indicate a significant softening of these terms. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

If a treaty does not make some allowance for such views, the Saudis probably would feel compelled to reaffirm the sanctions voted against Egypt at Baghdad³ though they might seek to delay implementation. They would be under great pressure to align themselves more closely to hard-line Arab states such as Iraq and Syria. Syria, the toughest on terms, would quicken its efforts to form a new Arab consensus around its leadership. King Husayn would initially equivocate if confronted with a treaty, but because of Jordan's contiguous border with Syria and Iraq and its heavy dependence on external financing, he would follow the lead of Damascus, Baghdad and Riyadh. He would not isolate himself with President Sadat. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Insofar as a treaty would require the early participation of other Arabs in negotiations, we do not believe that Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia would "accept" the treaty and participate. Their willingness over time to adjust to the situation and allow Egypt to return to the Arab fold would depend on several developments, including the attitudes of the Palestinians and President Sadat, and on Israeli policies. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

³ See footnote 7, Document 85.

181. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Analysis of Substantive Positions in Camp David Talks (U)

The proper point of comparison for the most recent set of proposals put forward at Camp David II is the package carried by Secretary Vance to Israel last December.² Although these were Egyptian proposals, we stated that we thought they were reasonable. The table below compares the December proposals with those that we presented to the two delegations on February 25.³ (S)

	December Proposals	Camp David II
<i>Article IV</i> (Review of security arrangements)	Included mandatory review after five years.	<i>At Israeli request</i> , dropped mandatory review after five years.
<i>Article VI</i> (Priority of obligations)	<i>Paragraph 2</i> interpreted to mean treaty is being concluded in "context of Camp David accords." Lengthy memorandum giving our views on <i>paragraph 5</i> (how this treaty relates to other obligations of the parties).	Same language dealing with <i>paragraph 2</i> , but included as part of a more general statement on all of Article VI. No substantive change. <i>On paragraph 5</i> , both sides preferred to drop legal memoranda and replace by simple note. <i>Israelis object</i> to statement in note that Article VI establishes no priority of obligations other than that of the U.N. Charter.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 7, Camp David II: 2/79. Secret. Sent for information. The date is handwritten.

² See Documents 151 and 152.

³ See footnote 5, Document 176.

<i>Exchange of Ambassadors</i>	Egyptians propose letter stating that exchange of Ambassadors will take place one month after the establishment of self-governing authority, at least in Gaza.	Khalil agrees to withdraw letter and make no mention of timing of exchange of Ambassadors. Substantive position, however, would not be changed.
<i>Letter on West Bank/Gaza Negotiations</i>	<i>Target date:</i> "goal of holding elections not later than the end of 1979."	<i>Target date:</i> "goal of completing the negotiations so that elections can be held within one year of the start of those negotiations."
	Reference to "Egypt's former administrative responsibility in Gaza."	Deleted reference to Egypt's former administrative role in Gaza. (S)

The net result of the Camp David II talks was to modify the negotiating documents only modestly. Compared to the December proposals which were rejected by Israel, some of the current proposals are better from Israel's point of view and some are basically unchanged. *Israel has reason to view the changes in the letter on the West Bank/Gaza as generally favorable.* The formulation on *Article VI* is no better from the Israeli point of view, and Begin probably reacted badly to the factually correct statement that nothing in the Treaty establishes any other priority than that of the U.N. Charter. (During Atherton's last trip,⁴ however, Begin indicated that he might accept such language.) On *bilateral issues*, we also indicated a willingness to discuss how the U.S. might "guarantee" the Treaty through a *memorandum of understanding* with Israel. We also said that we would be prepared to discuss aid. On oil, Khalil said he would discuss this after agreement on the Treaty was reached but before it was signed. From Dayan's point of view, these were positive developments. (S)

In brief, *there is no basis for Begin's statement⁵ that new proposals were made which are inconsistent with the Camp David agreements and which nullify the meaning of the peace treaty between the two countries.* (S)

⁴ See Document 162.

⁵ See Document 179.

182. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, February 27, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prime Minister Begin

The President: How are you?

Begin: Wonderful to hear your voice.

The President: I got your letter² to the effect that you could not negotiate with Prime Minister Khalil at a summit.

Begin: I apologize, but after hearing a report from the Foreign Minister, I felt it would not be useful. We need to reflect for a while and then decide how to proceed.

The President: For me it would be better if we could meet later this week. It is late in terms of the Congress, particularly as to budgetary matters. Later than this week would delay any future participation by the Egyptians.

Begin: When should I come? I need to consult my colleagues in the Cabinet.

The President: I was hoping that we could meet this Thursday³ or Friday.⁴

Begin: I could leave Friday and arrive late Saturday. We could talk on Sunday. I could spend the sabbath in New York City. I cannot leave tomorrow. At the earliest I could leave Thursday a.m.

The President: I hate to quibble, but the end of this week is better for me. Is there any way you could be here Wednesday night?

Begin: I could leave Thursday morning and be with you Thursday evening and Friday, until the sabbath.

The President: That would be better for me. We will provide you with transportation from New York.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. Secret. At the top of the transcript, Carter wrote "OK, C." According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from the Oval Office from 2:33 p.m. to 2:39 p.m. on February 27. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

² See Document 179.

³ March 1.

⁴ March 2.

Begin: I will leave Thursday morning and then the plane can take me to Washington Thursday evening. We can meet then and again Friday morning. Will you announce it?

The President: We will announce it at 4:00 p.m. our time.⁵

⁵ Carter announced Begin's visit at the beginning of his February 27 news conference. The complete text of the announcement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1979, p. 7.

183. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, February 27, 1979, 3:16–3:23 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
President Sadat

The President: This is Jimmy Carter. How are you? Can you hear me?

Sadat: Good evening. How are Rosalynn and the children?

The President: When are you coming to see me?

Sadat: I am always happy to see you.

The President: Let me report to you. I have arranged² for Begin to come here Thursday and Friday for one or two days of discussions. I will let you know his attitude and then we can decide whether we can go ahead on the treaty negotiations. Khalil was very helpful, but Dayan had no authority to negotiate. Therefore, it would be good for me to get together with Begin and then you or Khalil can join me for three-way negotiations, if that is possible. I will give you a thorough report.

Sadat: You have to know that I have no more concessions to make. I shall be getting your assessment.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. Secret. At the top of the transcript, Carter wrote: "OK, J." According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat from the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

² See Document 182.

The President: Will you let me negotiate for Egypt and make concessions for you?³

Sadat: On the linkage and priority issues I cannot.

The President: I won't do anything until I get back to you. I will keep you fully informed and appreciate your attitude. I look forward to seeing you.

Sadat: The whole thing is nearly complete. All it needs is your decisiveness with the Israelis. Look at what is happening in the area.

The President: I will do the best I can, but don't overestimate what I can do. Be patient and trust in me, and we will have success.⁴

Sadat: We will help you. We have given them everything already.

The President: I will negotiate with Begin and be back to you as soon as possible.

Sadat: I shall never let you down.

³ A handwritten notation next to this sentence reads, "(laughter)."

⁴ A handwritten notation inserted after this sentence reads, "You overestimate our influence with Israel, & they overestimate my influence with you."

184. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 2, 1979, 10 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State, (NEA)
Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Herbert Hansell, Legal Advisor, State Dept.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File Box 36, Serial Xs—(3/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes relating to the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79.

William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
Ed Sanders, Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yehuda Blum, Ambassador to United Nations
Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Hanan Bar-On, Minister, Israeli Embassy to the U.S.
Dr. Marum Gottesman, Prime Minister's Physician
Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman
Yehial Kadishai, Director of the Prime Minister's Bureau
Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

The President: I want to welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister. We had a productive meeting last night where we discussed strategic relations in the Middle East,² threats to our joint security, and the importance of Israel in the Middle East, and the benefits to the United States of a strong, independent, and democratic Israel. Our strategic interests are obvious.

Camp David opened a vista of peace and provided for Israeli security in ways that have not been possible for thirty years. This prospect of peace is important to our country. Since the Camp David agreements, we have been unsuccessful in getting a treaty. I told the Prime Minister last night that the United States has no position on the substantive issues. There is no paragraph or sentence in the text that we want to impose on either Israel or Egypt. Anything that they agree on we could accept. When there is a deadlock, we put forward suggestions and we will keep on trying. But we have no desire to enforce an American position on either nation. I pointed out to the Prime Minister the value that we derive from our partnership, as well as our strategic interests in the entire region. We have strong and valued relations with others in the region as well, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and these must be maintained.

We touched on some of the textual difficulties last night, but it might be worth reviewing them here. Our contribution to Israel in the context of peace would be important to us and to Israel, and we will have time to get into bilateral issues this weekend. My suggestion is that you outline your views, Mr. Prime Minister, and then we will discuss them. Secretary Vance has been more involved in the texts than I have. Again, I want to welcome you here.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin in the Oval Office from 6:32 p.m. to 8:25 p.m. on March 1. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for the meeting has been found.

Prime Minister Begin: I am grateful to you, Mr. President, to Secretary Vance, and to your colleagues for the efforts that you have made to save our people in Tehran.³ This was a great service to Israel and we will not forget. I would like to say something that I said before. I will have to quote myself from the first time that I met you in July 1977.⁴ At that time I said that the free world was shrinking, that it was becoming an island battered by hostile winds. This was the truth. Since that time, the Soviets have taken over six countries: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and now Cambodia.

Saudi Arabia is in direct danger from South Yemen. They are a rich people, but they are weak. Libya is pro-Soviet. Iraq and Syria are under Soviet influence, and the Baath parties in those two countries are coming together. There are between two and three thousand Soviet advisers in Syria. There are more Soviet tanks in Syria—2,800—than in Egypt—between 2,200 and 2,400. Jordan has aligned itself with Syria and Iraq. Now we have the upheaval in Iran, and we must ask ourselves about its meaning. We see this as an awakening of Islamic fanaticism, just as in the Middle Ages. It could be contagious. Iraq has a majority of Shiites. Sadat has had to warn his own people about the fanaticism of the Muslim brotherhood. Sadat sees this problem and he knows what happened in Iran. It could happen in Egypt, where the poverty is so much of a problem. When Sadat was in Jerusalem,⁵ he talked of inviting me to Cairo, but he could not do it. I believe it was because he could not guarantee my security. There are nine million people in Cairo, a city full of slums and poverty. The Nile Valley is very narrow.

I told the President that the United States has only one stable ally in the Middle East, and this is Israel, whose stability is inherent because it is a democracy. This is also true of the United States, where change comes by the ballot, not the bullet.

In Iran, a mighty Army collapsed in twenty-four hours in the face of fanatical masses. The story has not reached an end in Iran. Khomeini

³ On February 13, in the midst of the Iranian revolution, the Israeli Embassy in Washington requested that the United States provide refuge to remaining Israeli officials in Iran should they find themselves in “physical danger.” (Telegram 37964 to Tehran, February 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840126–2351) Five days later, on February 18, Iranian radio announced that all Israeli citizens in Iran had been ordered to leave the country. (“More Top Officials Arrested in Iran,” *The New York Times*, February 19, 1979, p. A6) The same day, the Israeli Ambassador to Iran and his staff were evacuated from Tehran to Frankfurt, along with hundreds of U.S. official personnel, aboard two chartered Pan Am aircraft. (Telegram 1419 from Frankfurt, February 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790077–0611)

⁴ For the memorandum of conversation produced during Begin’s first meeting with Carter in July 1977, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 52.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 4.

is old, and there are many leftists and Communists. The border between Iran and the Soviet Union is the longest, except for the Soviet border with China. We should not forget the old czarist ambitions and we must be very careful. What can Israel do? I will not exaggerate, but Israel can play a role. The Israeli Army is a good instrument, it is efficient, and we have land and air forces. Israeli pilots have confronted Soviet pilots, and in 1970 we shot down five Soviet-piloted planes.⁶ We have had combat experience. We can manage any threats against Israel.

I have suggested that you take over the two air bases in the Sinai, and that they not be turned over to the Egyptians for civilian purposes. Etzion could be most vital for the protection of Saudi Arabia. You would not have to send F-15s to Saudi Arabia if you could have an air base at Etzion. We are prepared to give you that base, but Sadat apparently is not. Israel can do whatever is necessary to prevent Saudi Arabia from being taken over by Communism. We cannot lose Saudi oil to Communism. I would like to note that we used to ask for arms in order to defend Israel, but we have now reached the end of this thesis. From now on we will contend that Israel should be in order to fulfill the common interests of the free world. This is the situation as we see it, and we hope that you will look at it carefully. The world is in turmoil and the Soviets are taking over by proxy.

Now I will turn to the negotiations with Egypt. It is my duty to say as a free man, and I am speaking frankly, that the negotiations are in a state of deep crisis. We reached an agreement at Camp David and we want to be true and faithful to that agreement, both in spirit and in letter. We accepted a draft of a treaty on November 11th,⁷ and the Cabinet decided that we would sign that treaty on November 21st. We gave up serious reservations that we have on parts of the preamble. Secretary Vance urged us not to reopen the text of the treaty. Then in Cairo they found a way to reopen the text of the treaty indirectly through interpretive notes on agreed minutes. In my opinion, there is no difference in how one reopens the treaty, through the texts or through notes. It means reopening the text because it changes the content. Now let me turn to the main issues.

First the good news. The Government of Israel has accepted the American proposal⁸ on Article 4 (the Prime Minister reads the text of the interpretive note to Article 4).

⁶ In a meeting at the White House on August 5, 1970, Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin briefed Kissinger on the air engagement on the night of July 29–30 in which four of the five Soviet-piloted MiGs were shot down. A record of this conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

⁷ See Document 125.

⁸ The text of this proposal has not been found.

The President: That is the text that Israel wanted, and now Egypt has accepted it.

The Prime Minister: It says nothing about a review in five years.

First I will deal with Article 6. The delegation of Israel was presented with the following proposal by the American delegation at Camp David. This refers to the second paragraph of Article 6. (The Prime Minister reads paragraph two of the text). The note concerning the fifth paragraph of Article 6 provides for the unique priority of the United Nations Charter and does not acknowledge “any other priority”. Now for the analysis. (The Prime Minister reads Article 6, paragraph 2 in its entirety). If we were to accept this note, I would say that we would be interpreting away the content of Article 6 paragraph 2. The words which say that the treaty is concluded “in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement” would mean that peace must be achieved between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, and autonomy must be established in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Israel wants this comprehensive peace; it does not want a separate peace. If there is a separate peace, then there is still hostility on the northeastern front. They have 5,600 tanks there, and 1,000 combat planes. Israel does want a comprehensive peace settlement, but it is not up to Israel or Egypt alone to reach this. Sadat cannot persuade Assad. He cannot bring Jordan to the table. These are beyond his control to do. So what may happen? Israel will sign a treaty, and we will withdraw. But these words would allow Sadat or to his successor to say legitimately that if there is no comprehensive peace, Egypt can take back its ambassador, or can declare that parts of the treaty are null and void. It is absolutely clear that this would be the meaning of this interpretive note.

The second sentence of the interpretive note is even more serious and dangerous, although the first is bad enough. Article 103⁹ of the U.N. Charter is referred to and this establishes a unique priority, but the note goes on to say that there is “no other priority”. If we were to accept this, then this would automatically give priority to Egypt’s obligations to the Arabs over its commitments in the treaty. Egypt has agreed with all of the Arab states in 1950, through the Arab League, that implacable enemy of Israel, to enter a defense relationship. Egypt has an alliance with Iraq and Syria, dating from 1962. The aim of that treaty is the liberation of Palestine, which means the destruction of Israel. Most important is the defense treaty with Syria of November 1966, which was invoked in 1967 and again in 1973 against us.

⁹ See footnote 6, Document 92.

When we say there is no other priority, and we know of these other pacts, then this means that they in fact have priority. This is a rule of international law. Let me quote from the Law of Treaties by McNeil.¹⁰ “If Country C is aware of an earlier inconsistent treaty between A and B, he contracts a treaty with them at his own risk”. If we do not say that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty must prevail, then we are acknowledging the validity of those other obligations. (The Prime Minister quotes from Lauterpacht¹¹ to the effect that the treaty is null and void if it conflicts with a prior treaty). This means that at any time Egypt could join a war against Israel. If we have a war on our northeastern front, we will be able to defeat our enemies, but we will do so by counterattacking. We cannot defend ourselves from Tel Aviv. We will take the war to the other side. If we counterattack in self-defense, and if we approach Damascus, Egypt may call this Israeli aggression. Egypt will be able to carry its commitments to Syria. I am not boasting when I say that we may get within ten kilometers of Damascus. Israel will never initiate a war, but if Israel is attacked, we will counterattack. Egypt could then join the war, and the peace treaty would be null and void.

These proposals are totally unacceptable to Israel. We had a letter¹² from Mr. Hansell which has now been nullified by this minute. It should be nullified. That also gave Egypt the means to attack Israel. There shall be no interpretive notes to Article 6, neither for paragraph 2 nor for paragraph 5. A Cabinet decision was taken before I left. We will not sign any so-called peace treaty unless Article 6 stands as it is. There can be no interpretation. This is the heart of the peace treaty. We cannot be derelict in our duty. Israel has been attacked five times, and each time Israel has been branded the aggressor. Israel wants to be sure that the treaty will not be nullified suddenly because a comprehensive peace has not been achieved.

Now let me turn to the question of the letter on the West Bank and Gaza. The draft¹³ of the letter that our delegation received at Camp David contains deviations from and contradictions with the Camp David agreement. We want to fulfill the Camp David accords faithfully and completely. I signed those agreements for Israel, but I cannot agree to deviations. Here is the list of deviations. First, there is a proposal to distinguish between Judea and Samaria on the one hand, and Gaza on the other. Where is this written in the Camp David agreements? There is no difference there.

¹⁰ Likely an erroneous reference to *The Law of Treaties* by British legal scholar Arnold McNair.

¹¹ Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, jurist and scholar of international law.

¹² See footnote 3, Document 163.

¹³ See footnote 5, Document 176.

The President: Do you object to the concept of dividing the two?

Prime Minister Begin: The Camp David agreements talk about a single autonomy for Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District. This is my preference. We may talk of this subject of a difference, but in writing we must stick to the Camp David accords.

Second, it is written that Egypt will assume Jordan's role. Where is this in Camp David? Did we ever agree that Egypt would assume Jordan's role? The Camp David accords say that Egypt, Jordan, and Israel shall negotiate for the self-governing authority or administrative council, a vital concept, but it has become clear that Jordan will not join the peace-making process. So Israel said that it would negotiate with Egypt alone. Let me explain. We had the right to say that until Jordan joins there would be no such talks. It is vital to have Jordan along with Egypt. Egypt has no role in Judea and Samaria, and was only in occupation of Gaza because of an illegal act of aggression which gave Egypt no rights there. Egypt has nothing at all to do in Judea and Samaria. Nonetheless, we undertook to negotiate with Egypt on the modalities, the powers and responsibilities of the administrative council in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We did this to prove that there was no Israeli intention to avoid negotiations if Jordan stayed out of the talks. We wanted to banish this idea, and to show our goodwill. So we are prepared to negotiate with Egypt alone. This is our concession, which we can give and we can take back. We are not obliged to do it under the Camp David Agreements. We can wait for Jordan.

The President: In the Camp David Accords, it said that Egypt would assume the Arab role.

Prime Minister Begin: It only said that in a letter,¹⁴ not in the Camp David Agreements.

The President: All of the letters were discussed at Camp David. We never heard before of an Israeli objection to that letter. We heard that Dayan would prefer reference to Egypt taking the Jordanian role, rather than the Arab role.

Secretary Vance: Khalil, Dayan, and I talked about this recently at Camp David. Dayan said he preferred reference to Jordan's role instead of an Arab role, whereas Khalil preferred to talk about the Arab role. Dayan said that reference to Jordan's role was reasonable and he would refer this to the Cabinet.

Prime Minister Begin: On behalf of the Cabinet, I say this is unacceptable. It is preposterous that Egypt can take the Arab role, but Egypt cannot take the Jordanian role either.

¹⁴ See Document 51.

The President: This was a common agreement at Camp David. I heard no objection there.

Prime Minister Begin: We made our concession to show that we are serious about autonomy. So we will negotiate with Egypt alone.

Mr. Rosenne: Five letters were signed on September 27th. President Sadat never signed a letter dealing with the language on Judea and Samaria. Some of the letters were unilateral, as was Sadat's on the Arab role.

The President: I know. But there was no disagreement that Egypt would negotiate on behalf of the other Arabs. Israel raised no objection at the time.

Prime Minister Begin: You got my letter¹⁵ on the Palestinian Arabs, and I got your acknowledgment.¹⁶ Egypt is now asking for liaison officers. This is a third deviation from Camp David. In those accords it only speaks of liaison with the local police forces, once those have been formed. This means that there should be one liaison officer from each state, not only an Egyptian liaison officer, but also an Israeli liaison officer. We are not talking about Egyptian liaison officers in the Gaza Strip.

The fourth problem concerns the target date. There is no mention in Camp David of a one-year target date. Let me explain the problem. We talked about this at Kennedy Airport.¹⁷ At that time, Foreign Minister Dayan said that he favored a target date; but I opposed it on the spot. I took it to the Cabinet, and there a unanimous decision was made, including Foreign Minister Dayan, that we will not accept a target date. Let me give my reason. To have autonomy, you need to have electors, candidates, and you need to insure that no Palestinian state will arise. People go to Judea and Samaria and say to the Arabs that they should take autonomy as a first step, and that then they will have a Palestinian state later. We know this from reliable sources. If we thought a Palestinian state could arise from autonomy, we would never have agreed. At Camp David, you proposed the word self-governing authority. We accepted, but we added "administrative council", not a legislative council. A legislative council can declare independence, but an administrative council cannot. If the administrative council one day proclaims a Palestinian state, we will arrest them. But we don't want to arrest a legislative council. That is what the Bolsheviks did and we are not Bolsheviks. The administrative council will have 11 members, but it is not to declare independence. After five years, as I told you, Mr. Presi-

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See Document 128.

dent, we will claim our sovereignty and others may claim their sovereignty. If that happens, then the autonomy will go on. We will never agree to refer to the self-governing authority without mentioning the administrative council.

Let me explain why we do not want a target date. We must have a guarantee that there will not be a Palestinian state first. This would be a mortal danger to us. Arafat has taken over the Israeli Embassy in Tehran. There have been meetings in Nablus, the ancient town of Shechem. Thousands of people showed up and there was a proclamation that the Arabs should liberate Jerusalem and Jaffa. In such circumstances, we cannot accept the idea of a target date. As that date approaches, the PLO will use its Kalashnikovs to intimidate the population.

After Mr. Saunders met with the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria,¹⁸ we had to guard them to protect their lives. We cannot set a target date, because then there would be no candidates and no electors. It should be possible to introduce autonomy within six months, but it might take as long as two years. This is a question of life or death to Israel. We shall leave all of Sinai. But in seven hours the Egyptian army can be on our southern border. In the east, if the PLO takes over, they will be on the mountains with their Soviet weapons, and we will be in the valley with only eight miles between us. All of our children will be in the range of their guns, and all our airfields will be closed, because of their fire. This would be a mortal danger to Israel. It would be peril to the free world if there were a Palestinian state that became a Soviet base in this area. The PLO sent arms to Khomeini. There would be Soviet generals in Bethlehem. Does this free world need a Soviet base in Judea and Samaria? With all due respect, this would not be wise, it would be a grave danger. Israel must have iron-clad guarantees that there will be no Palestinian state. You have said that there should not be a Palestinian state in your public remarks. But some people give advice that autonomy is just a first step, so any target date is impossible. I understood from our talk last night that you might consider the phrase “as expeditiously as possible” as a substitute.

The President: I was also talking about that as the formulation on the timing of the exchange of ambassadors.

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll come to that. We have prepared a counter-draft of the letter. We propose using this phrase “as expeditiously as possible”. This is as far as we can go.

Egypt has suggested that autonomy might first be established in Gaza. They also talk of Egypt assuming the Jordanian role. The transi-

¹⁸ See Document 94.

tional period of five years would start from the time of the Gaza autonomy. This was not agreed at Camp David and it is not written. This is a contradiction to Camp David.

The letter¹⁹ also talks of the two Camp David Agreements being attached to this letter. I have not agreed to this. This is a novelty to me. The letter as now written talks about the self-governing authority with full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. This is a complete deviation from the Camp David framework. We are not talking about autonomy for or to the West Bank and Gaza, but only for the inhabitants. It is written so. (Mr. Rosenne reads from the Camp David Framework.)

These are two worlds apart. If the self-governing authority provides full autonomy to the West Bank, this means that the territory has full autonomy, and Israel will have no right to be there. But we do have that right, because this is the Land of Israel. We suggest that the inhabitants have full autonomy and this is the way it is written in the Camp David Agreements. It should be this way in the draft letter.

For several weeks, in our drafts we suggested that the negotiations should deal with the modalities of elections, the powers and responsibilities, and “other related issues”. Why was this latter phrase deleted? It is important to us. The Camp David Agreements talked about security for Israel in the transitional period and beyond. This is what we meant by “other related issues”. We are concerned about security beyond the transitional period. These words were deleted. These are my remarks. We cannot accept these proposals. We have prepared counter-proposals for you to study. I would like to sum up my observations. We have agreed on Article 4. Article 6 must stand without any notes. We have rephrased the letter and we ask that you study it. Now I want to raise the question of oil.

We have a commitment from you in 1975 on oil.²⁰ Recently you were asked at a press conference and you said that you would honor this commitment. Israel has been prudent and diversified its sources of oil even before the Shah fell. The Shah had already hinted that he might withhold oil from Israel in some circumstances and we could not afford to rely on one man. Israel provides a bridge for oil from Iran to reach the Mediterranean through our pipeline, but now that pipeline is dry. We used to get 60 percent of our consumption from Iran and now that is lost. We have looked for other sources, such as Mexico, Indonesia,

¹⁹ See footnote 5, Document 176.

²⁰ As part of the Egypt-Israel Agreement signed September 1, 1975, the United States and Israel agreed through a separate memorandum that in the event Israel was unable to meet its oil requirements through “normal procedures,” the United States would “promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel.” For the text of this memorandum see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227.

and others who might surprise you. We have not turned to the United States. Oil to Israel is not wasted. But if we have no oil, then our tanks and planes cannot move and we would be in deadly danger. This is a matter of life and death.

We now have oil in the area of Sinai from which we will withdraw. Israel now gets 1.6 million tons from those wells. In six months this will be up to 2.5 million tons. I want a commitment from Sadat in writing that we will be able to purchase 3.5 million tons of oil out of our 8 to 9 million tons annually. I also am asking you to give an American guarantee to the Egyptian commitment. If Egypt will not give such a commitment, we shall proceed to evacuate Sinai in the context of the peace treaty, but we will not give up the oil wells. And I will say so to Sadat. This is a matter of life and death. The Camp David Agreement was signed when the Shah was still ruler. We are asking for no favors. We will pay the market price. We are giving back the oil wells which we developed to Egypt, but we need a commitment from them.

On the question of ambassadors, Sadat agreed to normalization of relations. If he reopens the Annex dealing with the exchange of ambassadors, we will also reopen the question of the timing of withdrawal, and we may change the time for the interim withdrawal from nine to eighteen months or the time for the final withdrawal from three to six years. If there is a reopening, it should be done on both sides.

President Carter: I want Secretary Vance to respond to your comments on the letter, but I have some remarks to make.

Secretary Vance: Let me say one word. The President has indicated that we are trying to help the parties reach agreement. We have been asked to make suggestions. That has been our role. On the specifics, the letter does offer the possibility of making a distinction between the West Bank and Gaza. The suggestion was made that it might be easier to establish self-government in Gaza first. This was discussed among the three ministers at Camp David. Dayan said that the Cabinet had not made a decision on this, but that it was an interesting idea. He said that he would take it back to the Cabinet, and this was the basis for our developing such a proposal.

Prime Minister Begin: But Dayan told you that he would agree to this provided that Sadat would not have anything to do with the negotiations on autonomy in Judea and Samaria.

Ambassador Evron: We were, of course, not present, but Dayan told us that if an agreement is made on Gaza separately, then he would recommend that Egypt should have no role in the negotiations on Judea and Samaria.

Prime Minister Begin: I have his cable.

Secretary Vance: I don't recall it that way. Concerning Jordan's role, the suggestion was made by the Egyptians at the first Camp David

meeting that Egypt should assume the Arab role in the negotiations. Dayan objected to this, and one of us suggested that Egypt could assume the Jordanian role. There was no Israeli objection and that is the reason it is there.

Prime Minister Begin: This was ad referendum to the Cabinet.

Secretary Vance: We were trying to draft a letter so that the Cabinet could consider it. On the question of Egyptian liaison officers, this was also discussed, and Dayan said that it would have to be taken to the Cabinet. He said that it was an interesting idea in the context of the Gaza first option. It would help to bring about early elections. This was fully discussed.

Mr. Rosenne: From the second day of the Blair House talks,²¹ the Egyptians raised the possibility of separating Gaza from the West Bank in all of their proposals. They said that there should be an Egyptian police force and Egyptian liaison officers. This was rejected by the Israeli delegation. At the second Camp David talks, the idea of Egyptian liaison officers was raised again. This is in the seventh draft,²² although the Israelis have not gotten copies of all the drafts. Reports were sent by Dayan after each of the meetings, and it is clear on this question of liaison officer that Dayan rejected the idea in discussions. If we look at the Camp David Agreements, there was a difference concerning liaison with local police forces.

Secretary Vance: The idea of liaison officers has been in every draft. Dayan did point out that the idea of liaison officers from the start of the negotiations was new, and he said that it should be discussed in the Cabinet.

Ambassador Evron: All I can say is that when Dayan met with us he said that we should stick to the Camp David language and we suggest using Camp David language on the question of liaison.

Prime Minister Begin: The Cabinet has read the draft letter and took a decision against Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza.

President Carter: I have talked to Sadat . . .

Prime Minister Begin: We accept the Camp David Accords.

President Carter: I have talked to Sadat about the idea of separating Gaza from the West Bank. He thinks that this could help to break the present deadlock and might encourage the Palestinians in Gaza to participate. Egypt and Israel could use their influence. This sounds reasonable to me. There could be 1, 2, 3, 5, or 10 officers, not to govern in Gaza, or to work against Israeli interests, but to help carry out the Camp David agreements. They would not constitute any threat against Israel.

²¹ See Documents 78, 80–81, 84, and 88.

²² See footnote 5, Document 176.

Secretary Vance: They would be there to be helpful.

President Carter: We still think that this could be a useful idea.

Prime Minister Begin: This is not my idea. Egypt has nothing to do with Gaza.

President Carter: They will be part of the negotiations.

Prime Minister Begin: We can discuss Dayan's idea. If we deal only with Gaza, and if Egypt drops all interests in the question of autonomy in Judea and Samaria, then we can consider this.

President Carter: You talk of Egypt intervening in Judea and Samaria, but we agreed at Camp David that Sadat would negotiate if Jordan did not join the talks. This was discussed by us. You never objected to Sadat representing Arab interests.

Prime Minister Begin: I never agreed. I only said Israel was ready to negotiate with Egypt alone, if Jordan does not join. This was to show our good faith.

President Carter: I agree. What is the difference?

Prime Minister Begin: We did not agree that Egypt will replace Jordan. Egypt cannot make peace for Jordan.

President Carter: When Sadat sent a letter²³ concerning the Arab role, you made no objection. Sadat is not trying to intervene in the West Bank. He is trying to help in the negotiations.

Prime Minister Begin: This is a genuine misunderstanding. I have not given any commitment.

President Carter: You have a right to object.

Secretary Vance: We never suggested that the self-governing authority could declare independence.

Prime Minister Begin: You should write that it is an administrative council.

Secretary Vance: That can be added.

Ambassador Evron: In one draft, the words administrative and council were included, and then they were dropped.

Secretary Vance: This is not a big problem.

Mr. Rosenne: The Prime Minister objects to dropping administrative council, and he objects to the reference to full autonomy for the self-governing authority. Camp David talks about full autonomy only for the inhabitants. The self-governing authority does not have autonomy.

Secretary Vance: What is the difference?

Mr. Rosenne: We should refer to the administrative council and the goal of autonomy for the inhabitants. The powers of the administrative

²³ See Document 51.

council have to be established. When you say the self-governing authority should have full autonomy, this makes it appear as if the self-governing authority can make major decisions. There is no reference to a self-governing authority with full autonomy. We should stick to the language of Camp David.

President Carter: (Reading from the Camp David agreements on the self-governing authority.) There is no reason not to use this language.

Secretary Vance: "In order to provide full autonomy" . . .

Prime Minister Begin: "To the inhabitants."

Mr. Rosenne: The idea of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza is a different concept.

Prime Minister Begin: This is completely different.

President Carter: No one is trying to trick Israel by slipping in a word here or there. We are not scheming against Israel; we are not trying to hurt you; and neither is Sadat.

Prime Minister Begin: I never suspected such a thing.

President Carter: When there are doubts, let's stick to the Camp David language.

Prime Minister Begin: I speak for a brave nation surrounded by enemies. I cannot commit the sin of dereliction of duties.

Secretary Vance: Concerning the question of the target date, this has been discussed before. We never suggested that the self-governing authority could declare its independence. The idea of setting a goal or target was to give an impetus to the negotiations to encourage the Palestinians to participate. It is only a goal, not a fixed state. This seemed to be a positive idea, not a source of danger. We previously said that the end of 1979 should be the goal, but you objected, so we have now tried new language on completing the negotiations in one year.

President Carter: We originally talked of three or six months.

Secretary Vance: Then we talked of six or nine months, then the end of 1979. You turned all of that down.

Prime Minister Begin: Even if you suggest one year or three years, I cannot accept. This would be most detrimental to the idea of autonomy.

Secretary Vance: We also changed the language so that we are talking of making preparations so that the elections can be held. We are trying to meet your concerns. You talked about the transitional period starting in Gaza first.

President Carter: At Camp David, there was an agreement that we proceed on the Sinai and on the other Camp David agreements. Egypt's concern is that all of the negotiation has been on Sinai, and nothing on the other agreement. At Camp David, we set a three-month goal for

achieving an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. It was realized that the Egyptian-Israeli agreement was a first step. It is obvious to you and to me that we missed the three-month goal and the prospects are not good now. Sadat originally wanted a fixed goal for the establishment of the self-government before withdrawal had been carried out in Sinai. Now he will accept a target date. In his message²⁴ to you when he raised the question of Gaza first, he said that if the Palestinians or others refused to participate, Israel would not be held responsible. There has to be some element of good faith on both sides. We cannot envisage every possibility for abrogation of the peace treaty. Sadat feels that he made major concessions on the question of setting a goal. He won't hold Israel responsible if others fail to participate. You have apparently discounted Sadat's message and are afraid that he will use the idea of a target date as an excuse to break the peace treaty. I don't believe that Sadat wants that.

Prime Minister Begin: I remember President Sadat's letter. I sent you a copy of my reply.²⁵ We have had experience. We decided on a target date for the treaty negotiations at Camp David. When that date passed, Israel was then blamed for the failure. The target date was not met. The Egyptians blamed us, and not only the Egyptians. Israel should not be in a position to have to justify herself. Israel is blamed even though Israel was ready to sign the treaty. But this is not the only issue. The target date will be a stumbling block to the autonomy. Don't forget the PLO and their Kalashnikovs and their ability to intimidate the population. We cannot guard everyone. The PLO is a reality in Judea and Samaria. They will not let autonomy be introduced. If we set a target date, it will be dangerous. I contend that we should take the Camp David Agreement as it is. There were three parts to the Camp David Agreement: an Egypt-Israel Treaty; autonomy for Judea and Samaria; and an invitation to others to join the negotiations. We should follow the same sequence. There should be a treaty, then autonomy, then an invitation to others. There should be no target date, and we should simply say "as expeditiously as possible."

President Carter: Do you see any interrelationship among these three elements?

Prime Minister Begin: That is a very dangerous phrase. At Camp David we heard this phrase of interrelationship, but we also heard the word "unconditional," and then it was all right. But it is very characteristic, and I told this to my colleagues, that the word interrelationship would remain, but we would hear no more of the question of unconditionality. That is a fact. If we can say that there is an interrelationship

²⁴ See Document 140.

²⁵ See Document 144.

but do not say that is unconditional, then the treaty would depend on carrying out the autonomy, so the treaty could be annulled.

President Carter: If we report the results of these talks to Sadat and there can be no further progress on the treaty, would you be willing to negotiate on the autonomy before concluding the treaty with Egypt?

Prime Minister Begin: I cannot give an improvised reply. I would suggest that we not accept. We are not committed to do this by Camp David. We should not start with the autonomy.

President Carter: Camp David says nothing about the sequence, as far as I can see.

Prime Minister Begin: It is not a coincidence that we decided to start with the treaty.

President Carter: We are looking at the possibility, at the probability, that a Sinai agreement cannot be achieved. If that happens, rather than ending the process and going back to animosity, would you consider shifting to negotiations on the West Bank? Sadat is concerned that Israel does not intend to go forward with autonomy for the West Bank. He sees more of a possibility of progress in Gaza. If the Palestinians don't cooperate, West Bank autonomy will be difficult. Because of his influence in Gaza, and with Israel's help, there would be a better chance. Rather than have everything end, would you consider this?

Prime Minister Begin: My colleagues in the Cabinet have already raised this. I said no. There are serious reasons. The majority of the Cabinet rejected this approach. We have to negotiate with Egypt, but we cannot then tell what the results will be of the talks on autonomy. Meanwhile, the great revolutionary change in the area would be the treaty between Egypt and Israel.

President Carter: I am just looking for a way to get the Camp David Agreements moving simultaneously. This would not cancel out what we have achieved on the treaty. We would try to have both negotiations simultaneously.

Prime Minister Begin: The way it is now written, it would be almost simultaneous. We would start the negotiations for the autonomy one month after the treaty is signed.

President Carter: But you must see that the possibility of the whole peace process could break down. I want to avoid that.

Prime Minister Begin: I will take this idea to the Cabinet. Two of my colleagues have suggested it. I opposed it. It is not a healthy development. It is not the sequel envisaged at Camp David, but I will take it to the Cabinet.

President Carter: It says nothing in Camp David about negotiations starting one month after the treaty. A goal was set to conclude the treaty negotiations in three months and you said it could be in two.

Prime Minister Begin: I also agreed to start the negotiations on autonomy one month after the treaty.

President Carter: There is nothing in Camp David that says the treaty must precede the West Bank /Gaza negotiations. It might go a long way to removing obstacles to the peace treaty negotiations. It could help overcome the linkage problem. This might be the only door to keep open if there is a deadlock.

Prime Minister Begin: I will tell you what I have told my colleagues. There should be no judicial linkage. The American view is that there is a political linkage.

President Carter: That's right.

Prime Minister Begin: But I say there is no judicial linkage and there is no political linkage, there is just a time linkage. We are prepared to start the negotiations on Judea, Samaria, and Gaza almost immediately. But there can be no political linkage, only a time linkage.

Secretary Vance: On the question of the annexed documents, there is no mystery. You had it in your own counterdraft.

Mr. Rosenne: We met on Saturday at Camp David to talk about the agreed minutes. The draft we got on February 24th had different language on Article 6.

Secretary Vance: We are not talking about Article 6. I am talking about the annexed documents. This was mentioned in our first draft, and your counterdraft included it.

Mr. Rosenne: Previous drafts had said that there would be just one annexed document. This was only the document on the autonomy. We object to having both documents annexed. When we included in our draft that both documents could be annexed, it was because there was a sentence that said that implementation of both frameworks would be independent of each other, and there was a phrase about unconditionality that was dropped, but the two documents were left. Egypt also did not want the two documents. At least Khalil was prepared to delete the first two pages of your draft. Our position is that we object to both documents being annexed with the deleting of the phrase about independent implementation.

Secretary Vance: We talked about the problem of full autonomy for the inhabitants. On the question of "other related issue," there should be no difficulty.

Prime Minister Begin: But we want it understood that this means security for Israel in the transitional period and beyond.

Secretary Vance: There is no problem. On Article 6, paragraph 5, let me review how we got to this point. Originally there was language that this treaty would "prevail over other treaties." This was dropped. Agreement could not be reached on that. Then we reached agreement

on the language in Article 6–5 on *ad referendum* basis. Later Foreign Minister Dayan said that this meant the Egyptian-Israeli treaty prevailed over other treaties. Once this was said, Egypt raised questions and pointed out that this was contrary to the negotiating history. Therefore, they asked for an interpretive note.

Prime Minister Begin: This is unacceptable to us. It interprets away what is written. What is written is that if there is conflict between the obligations under this treaty and other obligations, this treaty would be implemented and binding. This is the weakest of all the formulations, but it must be included. This note would let Egypt join any war against Israel. They would reserve their right to interpret what is aggression in the case of an Israeli war with any Arab country. This is not a matter of legal formulations.

Mr. Rosenne: We reached agreement with Mr. Atherton on the note²⁶ of a legal opinion that would be given to the Israeli Government, but Egypt did not agree to that note. We did not see your note to them. Some thought that this could solve the problem.

Prime Minister Begin: I prefer that both letters be nullified. We should not have letters from the United States which contradict each other. The letter to Israel is contradictory to the letter offered to Egypt. The United States should be careful not to do this. This is my advice as a friend.

President Carter: They are not in contradiction.

Secretary Vance: I would not sign such letters.

Prime Minister Begin: It is better to forget both letters. Egypt should hear that the letter you gave them is null.

Secretary Vance: On paragraph 2 of Article 6, an attempt was made to find language to indicate that all of this is part of the search for a comprehensive peace. This was not made to nullify this treaty or to give any party a right to do so. The language that is there does not do this.

Mr. Rosenne: In our second meeting at Camp David, different language was put forward. The draft²⁷ now presented is identical to the December 13 Egyptian proposal. It was unacceptable to us then.

Secretary Vance: I have been trying to find a way to help. I have been breaking my back doing so. We made changes in this draft, and you rejected all of them, so I came back to this draft without making any special reference to paragraph 2 of Article 6. I thought this might help. I have run out of ways to help. You have rejected everything.

²⁶ See footnote 3, Document 163.

²⁷ See footnote 5, Document 176.

Prime Minister Begin: We are grateful to you, but this language cannot be accepted by Israel. It is written that this treaty is in the context of the Camp David Frameworks and a comprehensive peace. Mr. Baz will one day advise the Egyptian ruler to abrogate the treaty unless a comprehensive peace has been achieved. You can be sure of this.

Ambassador Blum: Article 31²⁸ of the Geneva Convention would allow Mr. Baz to make such a legitimate interpretation.

Secretary Vance: We tried to use the language of the Vienna Convention, but you rejected it.

Prime Minister Begin: This is the first time that I have ever heard that something Mr. Baz said might be legitimate.

President Carter: Will you agree to delete Article 6 entirely?

Prime Minister Begin: No! It is the soul and the heart of the peace treaty. (The Prime Minister quotes the language of Article 6). If Syria does not join in the comprehensive peace, the treaty must still stand. If this Article is deleted, it would cancel the peace treaty. If I may quote Dr. Kissinger in this room, he used to say that what Israel is being asked to give is tangible, and what the Arabs promise is intangible. Egypt gives us a peace treaty and recognition and for that we should not be thankful. They should have done it in 1948. This is what Sadat gives us, plus an ambassador who can be recalled. In return we give him Sinai, two wonderful air bases, our settlements, and this represents the greatest sacrifice ever made for peace. If Article 6 is not left in the treaty, then the treaty stands on whether the rulers in Damascus will make peace or not. If Article 6, paragraph 5, is weakened Egypt, could go to war at any time. This article must stand as it is. It is the soul of the peace treaty.

President Carter: Let me close by saying that we will meet again on Sunday.²⁹ I suggest that we each get together with our own sides to discuss these issues.

Prime Minister Begin: We can meet again on Saturday night.

President Carter: We can decide on our next meeting at a later time. Before closing, I want to say that we have talked today a lot about words and technicalities. You seem to be assuming that Egypt is looking for written excuses to attack Israel. This is the same fear that you had two or three years ago, but there have been changes since then.

²⁸ A mistaken reference to Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which posits a "general rule that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the treaty's purpose." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1969, p. 736) The complete text of the treaty is at KAV 2424.

²⁹ March 4. See Document 186.

Prime Minister Rabin told me the first time I met him³⁰ that Israel wanted direct negotiations, diplomatic recognition, and a recognition by Egypt of Israel's security needs. Israel has achieved all of those things now.

We have an interest in a relationship with Israel, and it is to our mutual advantage, because it enhances stability in the region. We also have an interest in good relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as others. We want to see Israel strengthened. If there is no peace, if there is a reversion, and if the Arab world turns totally hostile, then our help to Israel, will be seen as a threat to Egypt. We lived with that in the past, and we can go back to that again. You know the dominant role that Egypt can play in the Arab world. Egypt needs a stable relationship with Israel, obviously. Saudi Arabia needs stability in the Middle East. I don't believe that there is a direct threat to Israel in the near future, not for the next five, eight, or ten years. At the least, the threat will not come from the military forces of Egypt, even combined with Jordan and Syria. Israel can defend herself and would be able to punish anyone who would threaten her. This alone should be able to deter war. But after Iran, radical elements in the Middle East may be encouraged. I know for a fact that the major restraint on PLO activity has been the influence of Egypt and the benign influence of Saudi Arabia. They cannot fully control the PLO. I know about the bombs that go off in Israel, but an Egypt-Israel accommodation would be a major stabilizing factor and a restraint on radicalism, dissention, and revolutionary Palestinian groups.

Sadat has never spent any time with me talking of an Israeli attack on Egypt. But the major topic here today has been the idea that Egypt will attack Israel. Sadat has proved that he wants peace for Egypt, not just a temporary truce. There is no way to guarantee what happens when we are all gone. I hope while you and Sadat are in office that the treaty can be concluded. It will open up the way for a new Egyptian-Israeli re-relationship, so that you can show the advantages of peace to everyone. The advantages of trade, cultural exchange, economic exchange, and the beneficial influences of Israeli technology, the example of democracy. This help reduces the risks of war. At present, Egypt has a more benign relationship with Israel than it does with Syria. After the treaty is signed, the euphoria of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and of the Camp David agreements will be restored. This can evolve into a permanent Egyptian-Israeli ties. I have never heard Sadat threaten Israel or try to break off the negotiations. He has negotiated in good faith, as have you.

³⁰ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 18.

There was a change when the two of you exchanged visits. We all agreed to work for a comprehensive settlement. You are afraid that Egypt will renege on its treaty commitments, and Egypt fears that you will not carry out the West Bank/Gaza agreement. Neither of these fears is warranted. We want to avoid a hardening of positions by either of you. We cannot lose this opportunity. You expressed my views yesterday when you said that talks were in a “deep crisis”. We are all concerned. Where do we go from here. This is very serious. If you show no flexibility, then Sadat will not accept the agreement. If he shows no flexibility, you won’t accept. I would then see no reason for more negotiations. We hope you will try to maintain the spirit of Camp David and to search for accommodation. Let us make the final attempt today to put together some new ideas.

I hope you won’t reject the idea of negotiating on the West Bank and Gaza, or maybe Gaza alone, rather than dropping everything. You know Hussein’s views on going to the Security Council. Others favor a return to Geneva.³¹ Sadat could withdraw from contacts and go back to the Arab world where he would have support from the militant Arabs. I want to avoid this. To be frank, the language differences to me are relatively inconsequential compared to what has been achieved, and they are in some cases very minor. If you assume that Sadat does not want peace, they may take on very great significance. If Egypt were to accept totally your views, Egypt could still allege you broke your word and then could go to war. That could be suicidal for Egypt, because of Israel’s military capability. It is hard to imagine that happening. But that possibility can’t be overcome by a mere change in language. I don’t know how to express my concern more clearly. The whole effort could be abandoned. We want to avoid this.

Prime Minister Begin: I want to clarify one misunderstanding. I have never said that Egypt is looking for an excuse to make war against Israel. I tried to explain that we cannot sign any document which legitimizes a revoking of the peace treaty or making war on Israel. The peace treaty with Article 6 could be broken. I have read history and I know that treaties are torn up. I remember about the neutrality of Belgium. I know that this may happen and we must all take risks. In Sinai, even with the demilitarized zone, there would be no resistance if Egypt decided to send its army back to our border. Israel needs three days to mobilize reserves and then Israel can fight everyone. If there is surprise, there would be a high cost. Egypt is building tunnels underneath the Suez Canal. Why? Israel has taken all of the risks so far. But Israel will not openly sign a document that would legitimize a war against her.

³¹ See footnote 5, Document 24.

President Carter: That would be a completely unwarranted interpretation of the current drafts.

Prime Minister Begin: I am sorry, but that is our view. We are responsible for the lives of our people. We need arms, not American soldiers. We need to be careful. There is a red line that we cannot cross. We cannot legitimize an attack from a country that signs a peace treaty with us. If there is a breach in the peace treaty, we will fight. President Sadat gave me a pledge of “no war”, but that is not real peace. If he breaks his pledge, Israel will fight its way across the Suez Canal. But Israel cannot knowingly sign a treaty which would give legitimacy to an attack on her or to an abrogation of the treaty. To say that Israel is adamant after all the concessions that we have made, the removal of settlements and all of that, is unfair. When I went home after Camp David, I read that if the settlements question was not resolved that Camp David would be null and void. I took a stand and I made the sacrifice for the treaty. I will bear the pain of this to my grave. It is the most painful decision that I have ever made since my days in the underground. I will go visit the settlers in Sinai. They have made the desert blossom. Now we must uproot them, 3,000 of them. How can there be charges of adamancy against Israel? Our only compensation is that we may get a real peace treaty, but we can’t cross the red line.

Dr. Brzezinski: As I see it, the dilemma is the following: For you any language in Article 6 that does not fully meet your needs is inadequate, because it may legitimize the use of force against you. The very need for Article 6 requires the most binding of language from your point of view. By its nature, that language means that Egypt is not signing a treaty with Israel, but is also explicitly disavowing its political and military relations with other Arabs. So Sadat wants to dilute the language, which you cannot accept. I think the fact that Sadat is signing the treaty will be a fundamental breakthrough and it will cause a split between Egypt and the other Arabs. To ask him to acknowledge this publicly is too much. Not only is Sadat being asked to make peace with Israel, but he is also being asked to renounce his ties to the other Arabs. The peace treaty itself is a *de facto* disengagement by Egypt from the other Arabs. This is a genuine dilemma which cannot be solved by any language. It might, therefore, be better to eliminate the article entirely. That would be better than having weak language.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you for your understanding of our point of view. There is no word in Article 6 that derogates from Egypt’s commitments to the Arab world. We don’t ask for any abrogation of these commitments. The real interpretation of Article 6 is that those commitments should be able to stand, except in the case of conflict. Without this, Egypt would be able to make legitimate war against Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski: If there is bad language, it could be construed to legitimate war. The language that you want makes the signing of the treaty almost impossible for Sadat for political reasons. Therefore, it might be better to have no article at all.

Prime Minister Begin: I want Sadat to have a good standing in the Arab world, but we cannot sacrifice ourselves on the alter of Sadat's prestige in the Arab world.

Mr. Rosenne: Don't forget that the preamble already establishes in six different paragraphs a linkage to the Camp David frameworks. The linkage is there.

Secretary Vance: We had the concept of "prevailing over", and it has now been dropped. Each treaty stands on its own feet. That was accepted. It was Foreign Minister Dayan's statement that caused the added problems.

Prime Minister Begin: Prevailing over, supremacy over, all of that is good language. This is the weakest version, but we need at least this.

Secretary Vance: Would you be willing to say that this treaty does not prevail over, but stands on its own along with others.

Prime Minister Begin: No. It is no equal. The others are hostile to Israel. We need to solve the problem of what happens in the event of conflict.

Ambassador Blum: In Europe, it is common in treaties to abrogate principles in previous treaties that are in conflict. We have not insisted upon this.

Secretary Vance: You have said that this treaty should prevail over the other treaties.

Mr. Rosenne: We gave that language up.

Secretary Vance: But Dayan stated it publicly and it has not been retracted.

Prime Minister Begin: We gave up the word prevailed.

Secretary Vance: But you haven't said it does not prevail.

Mr. Rosenne: The draft at one point was titled "priority of obligations". Dayan said that only where there was conflict between these obligations and others, then the terms of this treaty should be honored. Egypt's objections came later.

President Carter: We'll work on this later today.

(At the end of the meeting Prime Minister Begin handed Secretary Vance a letter³² on oil.)

³² Not found.

185. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, March 4, 1979, 1536Z

4429. Subject: (S) Meeting With Sadat—March 4. Ref: (A) State 53031,² (B) Cairo 4426.³

1. (S-entire text).

2. Met with Sadat for hour and one-half this morning at Pyramids Rest House. VP Mubarak was also present. Sadat had obviously read media reports about hard line Begin has taken in Washington talks and was very somber.

3. After I had gone through points cited reftel and supplemented these with oral instructions that President Carter had given me prior to my departure, I noted talks to date have not been particularly promising and that no one could say whether situation would improve at today's session. I had been asked to alert Sadat to the possibility that we might not get anything further out of Begin at this time and noted that President Carter would welcome having Sadat's thoughts on what might be done in such a situation. President Carter was deeply appreciative for what Sadat has done up to now to facilitate peace effort and would not want anything to happen that might hurt Sadat or Egypt's image. I made a point of telling Sadat that President Carter had commented that there are few people for whom he has the regard and affection that he has for Sadat (Sadat was deeply touched). In this context, the President thought it important that he be fully candid with Sadat.

4. After he had heard me out, Sadat said that he had foreseen this eventuality. The situation, he stated, is at a "turning point." He deeply appreciated President Carter's efforts to date and reiterated his total

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0909. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.

² Sent March 4, telegram 53031 to Cairo and the White House conveyed a list of points for Eilts to make in his conversation with Sadat. Vance instructed Eilts to inform Sadat that it would not be possible to convene a new round of talks involving Begin and Khalil and that Carter had concluded that it was important for him to meet with Begin "as quickly as possible in an effort to overcome present Israeli objections." Vance also instructed Eilts to present some "preliminary observations" on the talks between Carter and Begin and to reassure Sadat that the United States continued to negotiate from the documents discussed with Khalil and Dayan at Camp David in February and that it remained "prepared to discuss with both parties what we can do to ensure that the treaty is a strong and viable one." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0812)

³ Sent March 4, telegram 4426 from Cairo provides Eilts's preliminary assessment of his March 4 meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0808)

confidence in the President. He also appreciated the President's candor and said he wished to analyze situation as he sees it. He then spoke along following lines:

— (A) Just as President Carter does not want anything to harm Sadat and Egypt, he, Sadat, is concerned that nothing that happens damages President Carter's position. This, Sadat thought, is especially important since, as he views situation, Begin is simply playing for time. Begin is against everything that was signed at Camp David. Begin was "forced" to sign CDAs against his desire and has ever since been seeking to undermine the CDAs. Begin first violated the December 17 target date and is now playing his "last card" in order to try to return the situation to a pre-Camp David configuration. At minimum it will be several months before Begin can be brought around to sign treaty.

— (B) If we agree that joint US/Egyptian actions should not harm either President Carter or Egypt, Sadat viewed this as an important starting point. This should mean that our policies be identical. If this is agreed upon, Sadat thought it essential that a new, bold initiative be taken before the House, Senate, American and world public opinion in order to demonstrate who is genuinely interested in peace. Sadat said he could guarantee European support for such an initiative. He thought that the majority in the U.S. will also favor his position when it is fully explained. Time for confrontation (with Begin) has come. He did not wish to leave the initiative in Begin's hands. Why should we appear to be defensive before House, Senate, American and world public opinion? Best defense, Sadat noted, is an offense.

— (C) He had given Israel everything that is reasonable between equal parties. But he would not accept Israel as a "super power," as Begin seems to be demanding. If we agree to Begin's demands and views, he was sure that the Israeli PriMin will only ask for more.

5. Alluding to his comment that a new initiative is needed, Sadat outlined following scenario that he has in mind:

— (A) He would ask me to tell the waiting press after our meeting that I had given him a preliminary report on the talks with Begin. Before commenting himself, he would want to get a full report on today's session. He had asked me to meet with him again tomorrow morning in order to provide him with a full report. At that time he would also give me his responses. (I did so with press after our meeting.)

— (B) After our meeting tomorrow, Monday,⁴ he plans to announce that he had talked with President Carter this evening and that he had received a follow-on report of the Begin talks. Here he noted parenthetically his hope that the message he will receive from Presi-

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 187.

dent Carter tomorrow will be one that clearly states the negative Israeli position without in any way making President Carter appear to be prejudiced. He will then reply that he had decided to go to the U.S., departing Tuesday, March 6, and arriving in Washington on the following day.⁵ Sadat noted that he will go even if uninvited. I assured him that President Carter would be happy to have him come at any time.

— (C) In the U.S., Sadat's theme will be the following: he had assured the Congress and the American public that he will never let them down. His purpose in coming is not to discuss anything with Begin, since he has nothing to discuss with the Israeli PriMin. Instead, his purpose will be to hold discussions with President Carter, to whom he had given major concessions, and to brief the House and the Senate on the "more dangerous situation" that currently exists in the area following the Iranian collapse. At a later point in our discussion, Sadat said that he did not wish to exclude a tripartite summit, but reiterated that he has nothing to discuss with Begin. He left it entirely up to President Carter as to whether to ask Begin to remain in the U.S. for a few more days. He emphasized that Begin should not rpt not be told at today's session of his proposed announcement tomorrow or upcoming trip to U.S. The Arab/Israeli problem, Sadat repeatedly insisted, is merely a small part of the major area problem, but charged that Begin is unable to see this.

— (D) He will plan to be frank with the American public. Before leaving, he will release his letter of November 78 to President Carter (78 Cairo 25990),⁶ as well as his letter to Begin of November 78 (78 Cairo 26045)⁷ and Begin's reply (78 Tel Aviv 18708).⁸ He hopes that these letters will show that he has done everything humanly possible to meet the legitimate Israeli concerns. Sadat commented that, as we knew, he has long been convinced that there is no hope of concluding a peace treaty as long as Begin is in office. Begin is not capable of accepting peace because it is against the Israeli PriMin's fundamental principles. He thought President Carter and he should now try to manage situation so that Begin "either bends or breaks."

⁵ Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs that the "decision for Carter to go to the Middle East was precipitated" by Sadat's proposal to come to Washington. Brzezinski continued: "We all felt that Sadat's initiative was not exactly a constructive one, for its immediate effect would be to underline the degree to which the Camp David Accords had come unstuck." (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 281)

⁶ See Document 139.

⁷ Telegram 26045 from Cairo, November 30, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1710; P850067–1779) The text of Sadat's letter to Begin is printed as Document 140.

⁸ See Document 144.

— (E) In meeting with congressional committees, Sadat intends to brief them on current area situation. He noted Numeiri/Mengistu meeting in Freetown had been a failure and that Qadhafi had only a few days ago spoken of concluding a military pact with Ethiopia. He also alluded to the PDRY attack on YAR as further evidence of the deteriorating area situation. The Sudan, he contended, is now in grave danger. He might have to act to defend it. In saying this, he did not mean that he contemplates an attack against Libya, but that he has to take into account that the Sudan is now likely to be threatened both by Ethiopia from Eritrea and in the west from Libya. He saw situation developing in accordance with Soviet desires. Soviet purpose, Sadat insisted, is to neutralize Egypt. For this reason, he noted, GOE is prepared to assist Oman and Somalia. He hoped Congress would recognize seriousness of situation and be willing to assist him in meeting it without insisting on previous conclusion of treaty.

— (F) Sadat continued that he will invite House and Senate “to write a treaty as they would between USG and any friendly state” for use with Israel. He would sign it without reading it. His sole condition is that treaty must be on equal basis and not rpt not try to make “super power” out of Israel. Later in our talk he modified his earlier statement somewhat by saying that President Carter and he should, during their upcoming meetings, agree on what they regard as a fair and just treaty and present it to the Congress for endorsement.

— (G) The primary purpose of his visit to the U.S., Sadat reiterated, is to place the Israeli problem before the American Congress and people in proper perspective after the Iranian situation. Everything in the area, he pointed out, is heading toward area-wide “hatred” for Israel. He hoped that USG will not accept Israel as its “vanguard” in area because this would mean that USG receives same “hatred.” Israel will do nothing without getting something for it.

— (H) After he had asked Congress and American public to “relieve me of my commitment to you because Israel is not ready” Sadat said that he would call UN Security Council to meet in order to discuss situation. He would discuss details of what he has in mind when he meets President Carter. USG support will be necessary.

— (I) Sadat reaffirmed that he remains committed to the two CDAs and is prepared to reaffirm this.

— (J) Towards end of our meeting Sadat indicated that he hopes to come back with USG commitment to increase economic assistance to Egypt for development purposes (“Carter Plan”) and to provide arms for use in meeting Soviet threats to Middle East and Africa.

6. If President Carter disagreed on certain points or has other views, Sadat said that he will be pleased to have them. He hopes it will at the very least be possible to agree on general lines. If what he pro-

poses is in any way harmful to President Carter's position, Sadat can if necessary carry out his proposed scenario from here. Even if Congress and American public go against him, he will continue his efforts. Egypt is part of this area and must do what it considers necessary to defend itself and other friendly, moderate governments.

7. I told Sadat that President Carter has been thinking on purely hypothetical basis about the possibility of shifting the focus of the current Egyptian/Israeli treaty negotiations to establishment of West Bank and/or Gaza autonomy and asked for his views. At first Sadat did not understand the question and I explained the point again. When he understood it, he said that such an arrangement is perfectly agreeable to him if it can be worked out. In querying him on this point, I emphasized that this thinking is purely exploratory and no one knew as yet whether the idea would commend itself to Begin. Sadat indicated understanding.

8. Sadat will expect President Carter's phone call⁹ this evening from 2300 local time onwards. I am scheduled to meet with Sadat again at 1130 local tomorrow, Monday, morning, at Pyramids Rest House.¹⁰ It will be helpful have any follow-up instructions, including definitive account of last meeting with Begin by 1100 local (0400 GMT), for use with Sadat. Will also be helpful have some reading at that time of President Carter's telecon with Sadat.

Eilts

⁹ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke to Sadat by telephone from the Oval Office from 4:28 p.m. to 4:31 p.m., March 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 187.

186. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 4, 1979, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser, State Dept.
William Quandt, NSC Staff
Ed Sanders, Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yehuda Blum, Ambassador to United Nations
Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
Hanan Bar-On, Minister, Israeli Embassy to the United States
Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman
Yehial Kadishai, Director of the Prime Minister's Bureau

President Carter: Last night we spent two hours together.² This is the most stubborn problem that I have ever dealt with. We made little progress. There is a need for flexibility on both sides. There has been no proposal put forward by Israel that would be easier for Egypt to accept than those that are now on the table. I want to ask Secretary Vance to address three basic issues: Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, and the question of the target date.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(3/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter held a second, private meeting with Begin in the Oval Office from 2:58 p.m. to 3:27 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this second meeting has been found.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, the President and Mrs. Carter hosted Begin and Mrs. Begin at the White House from 6:59 p.m. to 10:08 p.m., March 3. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

Secretary Vance: We want to build on the talk we had at lunch on Friday.³ You made a helpful suggestion, Mr. Prime Minister, concerning Article 6, paragraph 5. Let me hand out suggested language on Article 6 for you to consider. We suggest a short, simple statement. We have not reviewed this with anyone else. At lunch you said that you did not insist that Article 6 meant that the treaty prevailed over other treaties. I said that this was a major step, and we should build on this. We want to try to couple this with the principles that are already in paragraph 5 as now drafted. The proposals would say that there is no assertion that this treaty prevails over other treaties, but this does not derogate from the language in paragraph 5.

Prime Minister Begin: Is the first paragraph of your draft connected to the second part of Article 6?

Secretary Vance: Yes. Let me explain. You objected to the words “comprehensive peace” and “in the context of the Camp David frameworks”. We have come up with the language which is very simple and which says that the provisions of Article 6 are not in contradiction to the Camp David agreements.

Prime Minister Begin: I shall have to study this and consult with my Cabinet. You see I have less power than Mr. Khalil.

President Carter: You had more power at Camp David. You didn’t have to refer to the Cabinet then. You signed the agreements without referring to your Cabinet.

Prime Minister Begin: (Speaks for some time with his colleagues in Hebrew). The first remark deals with the second part of your proposal that there is “no assertion that this treaty prevails over”. It should also say “and vice versa”.

Secretary Vance: I see no problem.

Prime Minister Begin: With that addition, and if the letter from Mr. Hansell is withdrawn, then I personally favor this proposal to deal with Article 6, paragraph 5. I need Cabinet agreement, and I need a majority. I cannot promise such a majority. Without “vice versa”, it would be wrong.

President Carter: We will present this to the Egyptians. They have not received a copy of it yet.

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll cable it to my Cabinet. We won’t wait until I return. I will have a Cabinet session called for tomorrow. I’ll be able to tell you from New York their decision. If they reject it, I will go back and argue it with them. But please do not tell the Egyptians of the proposal yet. If we accept, you’ll know tomorrow. If they reject, I’ll try to

³ March 2.

convince them later. Now let me come to the first paragraph in your draft. I need to study it more. I would like to ask for an adjournment. There is some difficulty here.

Secretary Vance: Let me explain.

Prime Minister Begin: As far as saying that there is no separate peace, that is a first step, we have already done this in the preamble. This still implies that Egypt's ruler could one day say that the Camp David Agreements foresaw comprehensive peace. If there is no such peace, then they could abrogate the treaty. We need more study at this period. I'll consult today with my colleagues.

Secretary Vance: This says that the treaty will not be construed as being in contradiction to the Camp David accords. It is a truism.

Mr. Rosenne: There is a problem here. The Vienna Convention⁴ in Article 30, paragraph 2, says that where a treaty is referred to in relationship to previous treaties, the previous treaties should be understood to prevail. Could this be put in a letter concerning the autonomy rather than as part of Article 6? It would make it easier.

President Carter: You want us to put this elsewhere?

Mr. Rosenne: We don't want it attached to Article 6.

Secretary Vance: We would have to think about that. This says nothing in the treaty that purports to contradict Camp David.

Mr. Rosenne: But there are six references in the preamble to the Camp David frameworks. Article 6 refers to the independence of this treaty. If there is a problem of interpretation, you could say that the treaty depends for its interpretation on language in the preamble which refers to Camp David. For example, if Israel were to withdraw and Egypt were to say that the framework agreements had not been carried out. They might say that they do not have to normalize relations, but Article 6 says that the treaty is independent of any other instrument.

Prime Minister Begin: We are among friends. There is a possibility that we could leave these three lines as you suggested them, but we would like to add lines from the middle of the second paragraph. In other words, we would like to say that this first sentence does not derogate from the language of Article 6, paragraph 2, which we would then want to quote in total. This is not a final proposal.

Secretary Vance: Let's leave this.

Prime Minister Begin: This would add symmetry. We could use the same language "does not derogate from".

⁴ Article 30, paragraph 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: "When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail." For the citation to the complete treaty text, see footnote 28, Document 184.

Secretary Vance: Let us consider that.

President Carter: I hope that Egypt will accept these proposals. It will be difficult. We will have to do our best.

Prime Minister Begin: May I boast. I said that if we make an intellectual effort, we will find solutions. I said that we should not be discouraged. I need the approval of my Cabinet and I need to consult with my colleagues. I'll tell a story. In Ben Gurion's Cabinet after independence, there was a very religious member and there was an all-out atheist. Sometimes Ben Gurion tried to get the two of them together. But in my Cabinet I have to get five generals together. They have all led armies to victories. They are used to command, not to taking commands.

President Carter: And I have to deal with a Senate. The Senate has at least five presidents or future presidents in it.

Secretary Vance: The third issue involves setting a goal for the self-governing authority. You said that the date for elections could pose problems, because it would increase the incentive for extremists to attack inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. We have tried to set a goal while meeting your concerns. We suggest saying that "Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations in one year so that the elections can be held at the earliest possible date thereafter." They would be setting a goal just for the negotiations, not the elections.

Prime Minister Begin: You could say "as expeditiously as possible". I will have to study this. It is a serious proposal. I can't give you a reply now. I'll have to send a cable to the Cabinet. It is a change.

Secretary Vance: It is a major change.

Prime Minister Begin: We will have to consider this again. I do not have a counterproposal to suggest. I have to consult with Ambassador Blum who is a jurist. (The Prime Minister then recounts an incident from his interview on Issues and Answers concerning a question of why he had appeared on the show.) Do you have any idea about how to handle the question of the exchange of ambassadors?

President Carter: I plan to talk to President Sadat this afternoon.⁵ I will try to get him or whomever he sends over here to discuss this issue. I will talk to him about it.

Prime Minister Begin: It shouldn't be changed. We should leave annex 3 as it is. In that annex it says that the ambassadors should be exchanged "upon completion" of the interim withdrawal.

President Carter: He agreed to that, Mr. Prime Minister, because Dayan and Weizman proposed an early withdrawal. I then called Sadat

⁵ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat on the telephone from 4:28 p.m. to 4:31 p.m., March 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation has been found.

and asked him to agree to an early exchange of ambassadors. He agreed with my proposal. Later your proposal was withdrawn. Sadat then called me, and he said that it was wrong for the Israelis to have withdrawn its proposal. Sadat said that he would not go back on his promise to me about the ambassadors, but he had made no commitment directly to Israel. Could Israel return to the idea of accelerated withdrawal?

(Ambassador Blum enters the room at 2:30.)

Prime Minister Begin: We cannot go back on this. We do not rule it out. We agreed to set up a mixed commission to discuss this. The government decided that this commitment cannot be made a priori. The committee must decide.

President Carter: When would the mixed committee meet?

Prime Minister Begin: After the ratification of the treaty. (Lengthy discussion in Hebrew with Ambassador Blum.)

President Carter: It might be good if you could keep this language confidential within your Cabinet.

Prime Minister Begin: I'll do my best.

Ambassador Evron: Do you plan to call President Sadat this afternoon?

President Carter: I won't tell him about this on the phone. I'll just tell him that we made some progress.

Prime Minister Begin: We still have the problem of oil.

President Carter: The Egyptian position is that when other issues have been concluded, they will be forthcoming on this. I have talked to Sadat. We can guarantee your supply of oil. With our guarantee and with Sadat's willingness to sell you oil, we can reach an agreement. If the oil must come from the Sinai wells, I am not sure that Sadat will agree.

Prime Minister Begin: We know of your 1975 commitment.⁶ It could raise psychological problems in the United States. We want other independent solutions. We have several sources. We don't want to have to invoke the U.S. commitment, but we may have to in the future. We need oil to safeguard our lives. We only need 2.5 million tons. Egypt doesn't need the oil.

President Carter: There may be more problems in Egypt on this than in the United States. Our country is deeply committed to Israel. We don't expect it would cause any problems for us to supply you with oil.

Prime Minister Begin: We need an iron-clad guarantee from that source.

⁶ See footnote 20, Document 184.

President Carter: We can't guarantee that Egypt will be the source of your oil.

Prime Minister Begin: We need a serious commitment. We get 1.6 million tons now from the Alma field.

President Carter: You agreed at Camp David that you would give up those wells.

Prime Minister Begin: But if there is no guarantee, that is a change. We gave that commitment on the assumption that we would get the oil.

President Carter: I don't remember that being raised at Camp David. (A pause during which each delegation talks within its own members.)

President Carter: (To Ambassador Blum jokingly). Are you trying to help?

Prime Minister Begin: I will talk to my colleagues.

Vice President Mondale: As I understood the Prime Minister, he said he wanted to keep the first three lines of our proposal and then would want to make an addition.

Prime Minister Begin: This is an idea. I am not sure.

President Carter: I want to close our discussion by saying that we hope these are constructive ideas. After we get your reply, we will discuss with the Egyptians these questions, plus the question of ambassadors and of oil. We can't force them to sell you oil. If that proves to be impossible, we will guarantee you that level of oil. We prefer that it come from the Sinai wells. We are faced with a deteriorating situation in the Middle East. We are not looking for a policeman of the Middle East, Israel or anyone else. Some Arabs fear Israel more than they fear anyone else. You have said that you don't want any more weapons for the defense of Israel. In the context of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, the treaty between our two closest friends, we could discuss increased security arrangements. I hope we can expedite the negotiations. We will contact Sadat. One other question is what we should say in public. We have no preference on what to say, or when to make a comment, but we should agree on a statement.

Prime Minister Begin: We can say that the United States delegation under the President's chairmanship made a proposal to the Israeli delegation under the Prime Minister's chairmanship. The Israeli delegation undertook to study the proposals and to refer them to the government for discussions. We should say that they will study them.

President Carter: Let's have Jody Powell and Mr. Pattir work on a draft statement.

Prime Minister Begin: We will give nothing to the press.

Secretary Vance: If we mention proposals which have not been discussed with the Egyptians, they might object. Let's use the word formulation.

Ambassador Evron: Or we could use the words suggestions.

Secretary Vance: I like the word suggestions.

187. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, March 5, 1979, 9:36–9:43 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter

President Sadat

Exchange of pleasantries.

President Carter: Have you seen Eilts?

Sadat: I saw him² and agreed to your theory.

President Carter: We put forward to the Israelis after 2–3 days of negotiations some suggestions on article 6 and the target date. They were not exactly what you want but should be acceptable to you. Begin just called me³ to say the Cabinet accepted them by a close vote. We have not addressed the time of withdrawal issue nor the question of ambassadors.

I would like to come to Egypt as soon as possible to discuss these items with you as well as the regional security issue and the U.S. inter-relationship with Egypt.

Sadat: I told Eilts it would be a great event but let us agree on the treaty first . . . it will be something marvelous.

President Carter: I don't quite understand your answer. It would be best if I first came to Ismailia.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. Confidential.

² Eilts met with Sadat, Mubarak, and Khalil on March 5 to discuss Carter's conversations with Begin, the proposed U.S. reformulations of Article VI, and the proposed exchange of ambassadors. Sadat informed Eilts that he did not take Begin's decision to take the U.S. reformulations to the Israeli Cabinet "seriously," arguing "[a]ll authority rests in Begin's hands and Cabinet ploy is no more than a cover." (Telegram 4491 from Cairo, March 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2101)

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from 8:55 a.m. to 8:57 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation has been found.

Sadat: Why not Cairo? What you told me about article 6 and target date, maybe we could invite Begin to come and sign.

President Carter: We are not that close yet. We need to talk first about bilateral and regional security issues, and then we could wrap it up.

Sadat: Would you visit Israel?

President Carter: After visiting you. When would you want me to come?

Sadat: Any time you want.

President Carter: I would plan to leave Wednesday⁴ evening.

Sadat: Thursday here? Very good, very good.

President Carter: In my judgment these proposals can be accepted by you even if they are not exactly what you want. We have to settle in a week or so or simply call the whole thing off.

Sadat: I shall be waiting. When shall we declare it?

President Carter: Wait until you hear from me. I have not discussed it yet with Begin or my people. A little later today Washington time.

Sadat: It will be a great event.

President Carter: If we don't agree we will let the public know we stand together as partners.

Sadat: Marvelous, marvelous.

⁴ March 7.

188. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, March 5, 1979, 10:54–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
President Sadat

Exchange of pleasantries.

President Carter: We are prepared to announce at 12:00 noon today.²

Sadat: Fine.

President Carter: What time do you want me to arrive?

Sadat: No later than 2:00 P.M.

President Carter: We will do that. I told Begin.³ He asked me to come to Jerusalem Saturday⁴ evening.

Sadat: Let's wait. I want to show you the millions of Egypt.

President Carter: If we need more time we can arrange it then. In the meantime we will announce Saturday evening for Israel. Where would you prefer me to come, Ismailia or Cairo?

Sadat: Cairo. I am very, very excited. Will Rosalynn come?

President Carter: Rosalynn will come. My advance team will leave this afternoon.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. Confidential.

² The formal announcement of Carter's trip to Egypt and Israel was read by Powell to assembled news correspondents on March 5. The full text of the statement is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I*, p. 383.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin from 10:10 a.m. to 10:20 a.m. on March 5 (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation has been found. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that Carter telephoned him in his office shortly after 9 a.m. that morning and instructed him to bring Begin to the White House in order to inform him of his decision to go to the Middle East. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 281–282)

⁴ March 10.

⁵ Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that Carter had instructed him to leave for Cairo at midday on March 5 "so that Sadat would not do anything rash before the President's scheduled arrival" on March 8. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 282)

189. Handwritten Note by President Carter¹

undated

(1) Israel prepared to delay. Privately describe their motives in doing so.²

(2) Emphasize need to shift Egypt's attention from Israel to more real threats—Libya, Ethiopia, etc. toward Egypt, Sudan & others.³

(3) Need for U.S. to have a strong & free Egypt. (Let me make any commitments)

(4) Give strategic briefing—PRC, India, NATO, etc.—Emphasize U.S. gains and resolves. Friendship with Sadat one of most important assets of U.S. & me personally.⁴

(5) Use of PRC, Egypt & others to recruit doubtful nations away from Soviet influence.⁵

(6) Listen to Sadat & forward directly to me his views & concerns so I'll be prepared.

(7) Describe U.S. political situation re SALT, Israel, Taiwan, etc.⁶

(8) Emphasize administration's harmony & unified purpose.⁷

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2-4/79. No classification marking. Another version of Carter's note, bearing Carter's handwritten title, "Instructions for Zbig. 3/5-79," is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 12/78-3/79. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that he was given these instructions during a "last minute meeting" with Carter, Vance, and Mondale, "shortly after 5 p.m." on March 5. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 282) According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jordan, and Powell in the Oval Office from 5 p.m. to 5:47 p.m.; Brzezinski joined them from 5:25 p.m. to 5:47 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found. Brzezinski met with Sadat in Cairo the afternoon of March 6; the memorandum of conversation of this meeting is printed as Document 192.

² In the margin above this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "ZB summary of Begin's [motive?]" Below this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "Begin diff. but [Arab Israel][unclear], US people want peace—JC."

³ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "also Begin anti-Soviet."

⁴ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "positive trends."

⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "NAM."

⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "President stood up vs. Israel." In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "our internal difficulties. 1980 problems. How he can help."

⁷ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "complete [unit?] on ME. Cy; Vance-[unclear]-JC reports concerns on."

(9) Israel-Egypt peace blow to USSR & victory for me & U.S. Arab opposition—will it fade? Can Sadat handle it?⁸

(10) Threats from *any* spread of radicalism in the Mid East.

(11) Get Sadat's ideas on the concept of a broad security consultative arrangement in Mid East/N Africa region.⁹

(12) Post-treaty steps re Saudis & Jordanians? Syrians? Iraqis?¹⁰

(13) Post-treaty steps re Palestinian problem?¹¹

(14) Cautiously seek Sadat's assessment of U.S. military and/or monitoring presence in Sinai (Etzion).¹²

Zbig: Your assumption & demeanor should reflect *absolute conviction* that proposals on peace treaty are in Egypt's interests. Do not acknowledge any doubt about this.

We must implement Camp David accords together.

Sadat should not insist on speaking for W Bank Palestinians.¹³

⁸ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "Begin anti-Soviet."

⁹ Under this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "(Brown visit)" and "broad strategic initiative needed. US-Egypt—his ideas needed."

¹⁰ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "how to widen the scope of our relations."

¹¹ Below this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "West Bank."

¹² In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "peace related." Below this sentence, Brzezinski wrote "(15) Need your assessment. Tell him what you're doing." In the right-hand margin, next to this 15th point, Brzezinski drew a box within which he wrote: "The beginning of a strategically [important?] relationship."

¹³ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "*you prevailed*." Under this sentence, Brzezinski added two separate notes. In the first, he wrote: "broader strategic perspective which [only?] a President can have—not a legalistic approach." In the second, Brzezinski wrote: "Presidential level—[ignore?]" In the right-hand margin, Brzezinski wrote: "he had to have: 2 things.—[target?] date.—no previous treaty.—Begin? will never [interpret this?] language on 6." Next to this last point, Brzezinski added, "this [draft?] does not prevail."

190. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, March 5, 1979

To President Sadat:

In recent months we have been through a lot together—both in times of success and times of impatience. As you know, we have always worked in harmony, and I have done my best to protect the interests of Egypt throughout the peace negotiations. During the most recent discussions with Israel we have, of course, continued this effort.

In my opinion, we have succeeded. The language may not be exactly what you want, but the target date issue and the “priority of obligations” issue are such that you can accept them and legitimately claim a victory.

You may or may not completely agree with me on the nuances of the exact words but, in any case, the differences are minimal when compared to the overall strategic considerations which you and I must address together.

It is important that Dr. Brzezinski inform you, for instance, of our plans concerning the Yemen dispute,² and to have him relay to me immediately your assessment and advice on what else might be done by the United States, Egypt and others.

Both bilateral and multilateral long range security interrelationships must be discussed when I arrive in Cairo. I look forward to seeing you, my friend, and to a visit which will be one of the great events of my life.

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter’s Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. No classification marking. Carter wrote in his memoirs that he gave Brzezinski this handwritten letter to deliver to Sadat. It was “designed to encourage his [Sadat’s] generosity on some of the treaty language.” Carter also provided Brzezinski with copies of the treaty texts for Sadat so that Brzezinski could “explain some of the more difficult parts and to review the strategic considerations which might help to ease Sadat’s anticipated objections to the wording itself.” (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 417)

² On March 5, the NSC held a special meeting to discuss the U.S. response to the situation in Yemen. The summary of this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

191. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, March 6, 1979, 1649Z

1442. Subject: (S) Oral Message to President Carter From King Hussein.

1. S-entire text

2. King Hussein called me to palace today, March 6, and made following presentation which he allowed me to take notes on.

3. King said he had received news of President Carter's forthcoming visit to Egypt and Israel and King wishes "as a friend to the U.S." to convey his "deep concern" if there is any possibility that U.S. is contemplating concluding a mutual defense agreement with Israel. King said he knows this idea has been under consideration in U.S. from time to time and recalled that Sadat himself has mentioned subject in the past.

4. King stated that, as a friend, he believes taking such a step before there is a withdrawal of the Israelis from the occupied territories and a resolution of the Palestinian problem would be "an unwarranted slap in the face of the Arab friends of the U.S." King said that he hopes and prays this surmise is not correct, but indicated that the gravity of the issue in the absence of any substantive information from the U.S. thus far on the President's forthcoming visit had caused him to wish to register these views. He had thought of writing a letter to President Carter but has instead chosen this means in view of the short time remaining before the President's visit.

5. I attempted to draw King out further on background to his concern but he declined to elaborate.

6. In reply, I said that I would convey his message immediately but indicated that I had no information whatsoever to indicate that a U.S.-Israeli mutual defense treaty is under consideration. Although the U.S. has not released any information regarding the substantive issues of the current negotiations, I noted from press accounts that there have been denials by U.S. officials that security agreements were under consideration. I then went over with the King the White House announcement² of the President's visit and mentioned White House spokesman's statement that in our judgment President's trip offers the greatest hope for success of current phase of the peace negotiations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–2555. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

² See footnote 2, Document 188.

7. King Hussein seemed somewhat comforted by this presentation, but reiterated that he certainly hoped his fears of a possible U.S.-Israeli security agreement were unfounded.

E. Comment: I recognize that time is short before forthcoming visit and that we necessarily wish to minimize discussion of substantive issues outside of actual negotiations. However, anything that we can provide King Hussein on forthcoming visit, particularly in reply to his concern over issue of U.S.-Israeli mutual security agreement, would help make King and GOJ more receptive to other substantive aspects of the negotiations during President's visit.

9. Suggest Department repeat this message to Cairo and Tel Aviv.³

Suddarth

³ The telegram was repeated in telegram 55254 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790002-0508)

192. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance¹

Cairo, March 6, 1979, 1839Z

619. From: Brzezinski, Cairo 619 part 1 of 2. To: The White House, for the President and Secretary Vance only. To be handled directly by the Senior Duty Officer in Situation Room White House.

1. I met for two hours today with President Sadat, on a one-on-one basis, from 5:30 to 7:30 pm. Before providing a more detailed readout, let me summarize my central impressions:

2. First, Sadat is extraordinarily eager to make your visit a massive success. He stressed this over and over again.

3. Secondly, he wishes to use your visit here and to Israel to bring the peace process to a rapid conclusion. He asked me explicitly whether

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2-4/79. Top Secret; Flash. Sent via privacy channels for Carter and Vance only. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the message, indicating that he saw the document.

the President is prepared to insist that Begin sign a peace treaty in the course of his visit. In response to my query, he indicated that he would not be prepared to go to Jerusalem but would welcome the President and Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia in order to sign the agreement. I pointed out to Sadat the psychological importance of inviting Begin to Cairo and, after some exchanges, he conceded that this was psychologically important and said that he would be willing to invite Begin here, immediately after the President's visit to Jerusalem.

4. Third, with regards to our specific language, Sadat made only indirect comments which seem to indicate that he himself was not raising any objections and was prepared to accept it. He went on to raise additional issues, such as oil, indicating a willingness to be accommodating. My impression is that you will have his support on our new formulations unless tomorrow his colleagues talk him out of it.

5. Fourth, Sadat was extraordinarily delighted by your willingness to consider the issue in a wider security context. He interrupted me several times with exclamations to the effect that this is "marvellous, marvellous" and that it represents his own thinking exactly. In fact, he told me that to him the regional security issue is now the more important one.

6. You will note in the more detailed account which follows that he is anxious to give us some "secret weapons" to take to Jerusalem, though the issue of ambassadors still gives him difficulty. Having noted his uneasiness over that issue, I did not probe any further but merely registered the point that you will discuss it with him in greater detail. The most important "secret weapon" he wishes to offer, but please note that it is only to you and that it is not to be incorporated in any formal agreement, is the willingness to build an oil pipeline from the Sinai to Israel.

7. Insofar as the conversation itself is concerned, I started by covering all of the points that you asked me to make. Sadat listened very attentively, interrupting only to express agreement regarding my characterization of Begin's motives, regarding the impact on U.S. domestic politics of the Middle Eastern crisis, and particularly regarding the point that the U.S. wishes to see a strong Egypt. At that moment he interjected with a number of comments, expressing enthusiastic approval of your approach, stressing the positive results for the U.S. of a friendship with a militarily and economically strong Egypt.

8. After I handed him our proposed new language, Sadat read extremely carefully and out loud. With respect to Article VI, he simply said "ah-ha, you made it neutral," and then asked Roy Atherton to come in in order to make certain whether that would or would not be part of the treaty or would be a side letter (and Roy told him that it would be attached to the treaty). Regarding the target date language

Sadat said “believe me, they are idiots. I gave them a better proposal on Gaza, and they will come to regret the fact that they did not accept it.” After finishing reading the proposed U.S. language, Sadat turned to me and asked “what if I accept? Why doesn’t the President plan to sign the treaty during the trip?” I told Sadat that you had that eventuality in mind if things go well, and he expressed the strongest support for such an approach.

9. He then went on to say that he wishes me to convey to you his “two directives”. The first is his directive to all of his associates to make your visit to Egypt “A devastating and unprecedented success, at whatever cost.” The second is that the U.S. and Egypt should join in a partnership and go forth together, whether Begin agrees to a settlement or whether he doesn’t.

10. It was at this stage that I told Sadat of Begin’s desire to visit Cairo and that it would be a mistake to shunt him aside to Ismailia. After some exchanges, Sadat smiled and said that I might well be right for psychological reasons, and that he will give you an invitation to convey to Begin, if things go well, to visit Cairo. He would propose that the three of you stay at the Mena House at the foot of the pyramids, and that by pre-arrangement a day or so be spent on “bargaining” so that Begin can protect himself at home, following which the peace treaty would be signed.

11. Sadat kept reiterating the importance of success in this venture and asked me what are the things you might need “to hammer Begin.” It was at this point that I ventured that you might need some help from him on oil and on the ambassadors. He then made the aforementioned proposition on oil, which he will authorize you to take with you to Israel. On ambassadors, he said he might be willing to do it immediately after the first phase of withdrawals is completed, but he added that he needs to discuss this with you. I stressed to him the symbolic significance of this issue to the Israelis and how it could prove to be a decisive element in making it impossible for Begin “to stall”, a tactic which Sadat fears Begin will employ.

12. The foregoing essentially completed the bilateral part of the discussions, with Sadat being deeply touched by your letter and expressing, in a manner which impressed me as very genuine, his warmest feelings for you. He was particularly responsive to my frank discussion of our domestic political aspect of the problem.

13. The second part of the discussion involved a geopolitical review. Sadat had a globe brought out into the room and he gave me an overview of the regional situation as he sees it. Its essentials can be reduced to the following points: he described Saudi Arabia as a scarecrow and a U.S. protectorate, to which we attach excessive importance. He indicated that he could give additional assistance militarily to Saudi

Arabia through planes and pilots, but it is important for the U.S. not to exaggerate the Saudi role. The Saudis are indecisive and incapable of action.

14. With regard to Syria, he sees the internal situation as rapidly deteriorating, and he expects a major and violent change this year. He believes that the Syrians would be interested in discreet arrangements with the U.S.

15. With regard to Iraq, he reiterated the point that discreet arrangements with the U.S. are timely and that the U.S. has much more in common with Iraq than Iraq has with the Soviet Union. He encouraged us to move towards a relationship.

16. He was scathing and contemptuous of King Hussein. He accused him of already now trying to undermine the Camp David Accords, and he urged that we dismiss him altogether. He emphasized the strong position he has in Egypt, which he believes is based on the fact that the Egyptian people no longer have a complex over Israel. That complex was shed during the 1973 war.

17. In talking of the Arabian Gulf, he stressed that he enjoys a great deal of support in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Oman. That support cannot be openly expressed but the fact is that there is sympathy for his policies. Turning to other regions, he asserted that he will shortly be transferring 200 tanks to Somalia, and he would wish them replaced by us. He expressed the view that the situation is deteriorating in Libya and may soon get out of hand. In his view Algeria will henceforth pursue more genuinely neutral policies, and considers that to our collective advantage.

18. Finally, at the very end of the conversation he floated the idea that Egypt might propose, after the Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai have been completed, that U.S. forces be made part of the UN Sinai force. He thought that this might provide an international cover for the introduction of an U.S. military presence in the Sinai. At the same time, he expressed reservation regarding Begin's idea that Etzion be made into an U.S. airbase.

19. Throughout the discussion he emphasized his desire to work closely with you either in reaching accommodation with Begin or in working together in spite of him. He also responded favorably to my strategic overview of your policies.

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, March 7, 1979, 1646Z

55737. Subject: Message for King Hussein.

1. Please deliver the following message from the President to King Hussein.²

2. Start text.

Your Majesty,

Our two governments have worked together on crucial matters for many years and I place great importance on our continued ability to work together in the cause of peace and regional stability. I know of your deep concern about progress toward resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and I want to share with you my objectives in my coming trip to Egypt and Israel.

I remain deeply committed to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The only peace which can endure is a peace, involving all parties who have been affected by this conflict. Our present efforts to conclude a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel are in the context of our commitment to that larger objective.

We have reached a critical stage in the peace process. After the most recent round of discussions, I have decided that the time has now come for me to visit Egypt and Israel in response to invitations from

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Jordan: King Hussein, 3/79–9/80. Secret; Immediate. Similar letters were sent to Khalid, Assad, King Hassan II of Morocco, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, and President Jaafar Numeiri of Sudan. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Quandt and Tarnoff; approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790105–0371) An undated draft template of the letter, attached to a March 6 covering memorandum from Aaron to Carter, upon which Carter initialed his approval, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 3–6/79. The Department sent the letter to Khalid in telegram 55735 to Jidda, March 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790105–0362) The Department sent the letter to Assad in telegram 55733 to Damascus, March 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790105–0366)

² Suddarth delivered the letter to Sharaf, who received it on behalf of Hussein on March 8. (Telegram 1475 from Amman, March 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–2558) Suddarth, as instructed in telegram 56112 to Amman, March 7, also made a number of oral points to Sharaf acknowledging Hussein's concerns over Carter's visit to Egypt and Israel (see Document 191), and stating that the United States remained committed to the "goal of a comprehensive peace embracing all the parties that have been affected by the conflict" and would not "give assurances to one side that will make the other feel less secure." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/1–8/79)

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. History must not say of us that peace was not achieved because of failure of will or of serious effort. Peace is too important to us all—to you and to your people as well as to mine—for us to leave any stone unturned, no matter how difficult the obstacles. My trip is taken in that spirit and in the conviction that a treaty between Egypt and Israel is a necessary first step in the process of achieving peace between Israel and each of its neighbors.

I fully understand the major role that Jordan can play in enabling us to move quickly beyond this treaty, if it can be achieved, to negotiations on the issues of concern to you and to the Palestinians. I therefore want to keep you as fully informed as I can of the developments in the next few days, so you will be able to develop your policies in full knowledge of the facts.

Jordan and the United States have vital interests in common in preserving the national independence and integrity of each state in the Middle East and in resolving the causes of conflict which open the door to exploitation by outside powers. We will continue to work closely with you on each of these fronts. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

3. Guidance for your talk with the King when you present letter being sent septel.³

Vance

³ See footnote 2 above.

194. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the President's Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 7, 1979

SUBJECT

Financial Assistance to Israel and Egypt

We have discussed with you a number of times previously the implications of various levels of US assistance which might accompany a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 50, Israel: 3–4/79. Secret. Sent for information.

Middle East settlement. While we would not presume to predict the focus of your ultimate negotiations, we do want to highlight for you several key elements which may be useful to you in the talks. (C)

First, prior year assistance levels tend to become unbreakable minimums or floors later. That argues in our view for defining any settlement aid as a special one-time package with no hint of continuation in subsequent years. (C)

Second, the US budgetary impact varies significantly with alternative forms (FMS credits versus Security Supporting Assistance) of aid, so that by moving to less “costly” forms, we can hold down our budget costs even as we look at higher dollar totals of aid. Along these same lines, our current FMS credit programs are basically off-budget, unsubsidized loans, except for Israel. For Israel, we have recently (and automatically) forgiven 50% of the FMS loans, thus making the program half grant and costing us 50 cents in outlays for each FMS dollar. (C)

Whatever the dollar level you contemplate in the settlement, these elements—special one-shot rather than ongoing package, more FMS than SSA, and making the FMS “regular” as opposed to “half grant”—would help to mitigate what will in any case be a major budget cost and serious threat to your present fiscal ceiling, as well as a significant threat to our other aid, particularly development aid. (C)

With these concerns in mind, we offer suggestions on three foreign assistance issues that may require your decision if a Middle East settlement is reached. (C)

I. Israel's \$3 billion request for extraordinary aid.

The Israeli request is for full US funding of the costs of (a) replicating in the Negev two Sinai airbases (estimated by DOD to cost about \$1 billion, without all required infrastructure, if constructed in three years under US Corps of Engineers control with largely imported resources); (b) other Israeli military redeployments to new facilities (estimated by Israel to cost about \$1.2 billion); and (c) military equipment additional to current procurement levels (estimated by Israel to cost about \$750 million). (C)

We see two options:

Option 1. Full US financing of the airbases only (\$1 billion), either on standard FMS long-term credit terms or—if a more liberal offer is required—on the unique terms (half grant, half long-term credit) now applicable to FMS credits to Israel. If this option is chosen, we would respond to the remainder of the Israeli request by a noncommittal offer to consider, as peace treaty implementation proceeds, requests for military or economic aid in the course of annual security assistance consultations. The commitment of \$1 billion would result in budget outlays of \$500 million about as follows: FY 79 \$150 million; FY 80 \$250 million;

FY 81 \$100 million; FY 81 \$50 million. We would seek a one-time FY 79 appropriation for the entire funding of the three-year airbase construction program. (S)

Option 2. Increase the present \$1.8 billion annual aid program by \$500 million, to \$2.3 billion, and indicate a willingness to continue at this level over the four years FY 79–82, so as to cover about \$2 billion of the \$3 billion special Israeli request. Under this option, outlays would rise by about \$250 million in FY 79 and annually thereafter. We would request a supplemental appropriation of \$500 million in FY 79 and amendment of your FY 80 foreign assistance budget request in the same amount, largely or wholly in the FMS account. (S)

Recommendation: We recommend Option 1 with standard FMS credit terms, because it:

- costs less and is hence more consistent with your overall fiscal policy (we are already getting complaints about rumored FY 79 supplementals from the Hill);

- minimizes the risk of locking us into a permanent higher level of aid (current aid levels already exceed Israel's requirements);

- makes any aid over the cost of relocating the airfields dependent on actual Israeli expenditures and on clear evidence that additional economic aid is required;

- insulates the foreign assistance budget for other countries from offsetting Congressional cuts better than Option 2 because it is confined to the costs of a single event—airbase relocation—and because it does not involve annual aid requests for four years. (S)

In declining order of acceptability, we suggest two fall-backs:

- a. Option 1 with the usual half-grant terms of FMS to Israel;
- b. Option 2, with a hardening of the terms of at least the incremental aid to those of standard FMS credits. (S)

II. Egypt's request for military aid.

You have a current proposal from Secretary Brown for military assistance to Egypt, involving annual arms sales of \$500 million, with \$200 million of this being on FMS credit terms. We have no basis for comment on these figures. We do suggest that you limit the time period of the commitment, so as to preserve latitude for tactical use of aid commitments as the peace process evolves and Middle East security requirements change. We would prefer two to three years, and would recommend not going beyond three years, at a maximum. (S)

III. Economic aid to Egypt and to regional development.

Sadat has frequently and publicly discussed a massive "Carter Plan" for Egypt and possibly other Middle Eastern countries; he may ask you to adopt this foundling. State and AID agree that a significant

increase in US economic aid to Egypt cannot be justified on economic grounds; more aid would simply back up in the pipelines. If there is a political need to create a multi-donor Middle East Regional Development Program after the peace treaty, it should focus on Palestinian resettlement-employment, development of public services in the West Bank and/or Gaza, and private trade/investment in Egypt. If the political need exists, and if Sadat will agree to redefine his proposal in these directions, you might indicate that you would join him in proposing international consultations with other countries, including potential donors, on the modalities. Even if these consultations prosper, only a modest amount of planning money would be required in FY 80, unless creation of a West Bank/Gaza self-governing authority moves rapidly. (S)

195. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, March 7, 1979

SUBJECT

Possible Security Measures for Israel

Listed below are possible security measures (most of which don't rise to the level of "guarantees") which the President might offer (or might authorize you to offer) the Israelis should that seem appropriate in the course of the peace process. These measures would be additional to current United States commitments (see Tab A),² deriving largely from the Sinai II agreement, to:

(1) provide oil to Israel if it cannot secure its oil needs (applicable for five years after signing of Sinai II, with a one year termination provision thereafter);

(2) conclude a contingency plan for a military support operation to Israel in an emergency situation (not yet accomplished)

(3) maintain Israeli defense strength through the supply of advanced equipment such as the F-16s; and

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, Old Files, FRC 330-81-0447, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Top Secret.

² Attached but not printed.

(4) submit annually for approval to Congress a request for military and economic assistance.

The possible additional measures include:

Materiel Support

(1) joint planning with Israelis for US logistical support without European bases being available, thereby implementing Sinai II commitment

(2) a commitment to follow-through on such plan in an emergency

(3) creation of Israel WRM

— earmark items in US inventory: for example, from CONUS equipment of POMCUsed divisions

— alternative: build up general stocks

(4) put in President's budget an item called "Israeli contingency fund" to use if requirement—which could be a war or something less—arose.

(5) pre-position some US materiel in Israel which could be diverted to Israel if appropriate.

(6) extend Sinai II oil guarantee³ for additional definite period.

Arms Sales

(7) commitment to expansion and/or modernization of Israeli forces

(8) cut off supplies to countries opposing Israeli in war

— variant: to "aggressors" against Israel (raises question of what happens if Israel preempts).

(9) Change Israel's PD-13⁴ status

— equal to NATO

— almost equal

Exercises

(10) US maritime exercises in Israeli waters.

(11) US exertion of maritime rights in international waters relevant to Israel, e.g., Suez.

³ In the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States, signed in Jerusalem on September 1, 1975, the United States pledged to "promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel" to meet all its domestic oil needs should Israel be unable to meet all its "normal requirements" for domestic consumption. (*Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 227)

⁴ The text of Presidential Directive 13 on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, signed by Carter on May 13, 1977, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control.

(12) US/Israeli joint maritime exercises (e.g., as with South American countries)

(13) US air exercises with Israeli's

—with US aircraft from carrier

—with USAF fly-in (fly-in need not include exercise)

(14) US joint ground exercise with Israelis (as with Koreans)

—need not include US troops although it could, but could be limited to logistical support/air support

(15) conduct overflights on Israel's behalf

—e.g. like SR-71 flights over Cuba

Training

(16) provide Israelis training in US

—e.g., vs. Red Flag squadron

Intelligence/Warning

(17) provide Israel US reconnaissance/early warning support (either in war and/or peace)

—E2C/AWACS

—could have Israeli member in crew

Facilities

(18) home port US ship in Israel port

(19) establish maintenance facility for US forces in Israel

(20) US base in Israel

Diplomatic

(21) Initiatives to reduce Israeli isolation

—support in US, including initiatives to keep/put back Israeli in US organizations

—initiatives to increase number of countries recognizing Israel

National Disclosure Policy

(22) Increase Israel status in National Disclosure Policy (from CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET or TOP SECRET)

David E. McGiffert

Assistant Secretary of Defense

International Security Affairs

196. Summary of Meetings¹

Washington, undated

*March 8, 1979: 7:00 to 9:00 p.m., Abdin Palace, Cairo**American Side**Egyptian Side*

President Carter

President Sadat

Secretary Vance

Vice President Mubarak

Dr. Brzezinski

Prime Minister Khalil

President Carter and Sadat one-on-one, followed by President Carter, Vance, Brzezinski/Sadat, Mubarak, Khalil.

President Carter assured Sadat that he would represent his interests as well as our own.

Sadat responded by stressing the gratitude of his people and repeated his “two directives”² (which were previously communicated by Brzezinski to the President). The Egyptian people admire you. We are not governed for the first time in 2,000 years by foreigners. We want friendship with the United States. I shall always be proud of your friendship and brotherhood.

President Carter: I hope we will never let you down. You are probably the most admired statesman in the United States. I hope to conclude the peace process during this trip. The Israelis will be very difficult with implementation of the accords.

Sadat: Proposes an Egyptian-U.S. economic board under Prime Minister Khalil to cut through red tape in U.S.-Egyptian economic relations.

President Carter agrees in principle and stresses the importance of U.S. private enterprise having access to Egypt.

This is followed by detailed review of all negotiating issues and basic U.S.-Egyptian agreement.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter’s Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79. Secret. The summary of meetings was found attached to a March 15 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter in which Brzezinski pointed out to the President, “You will note that for some of them we have full memcons, and for some of them *only you* have any record since no one else was present. At some meetings, for example your last one with Begin, no record was taken because the format was conversational.” (Ibid.)

² See Document 192.

March 9, 1979: 7:00 to 8:00 p.m., Maamura Rest House, Alexandria, Egypt (full memcon³ available)

American Side

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Secretary Brown
Dr. Brzezinski
Amb. Atherton
Hal Saunders
Amb. Eilts
Jody Powell
Bill Quandt

Egyptian Side

President Sadat
Vice President Mubarak
Amb. Ghorbal
Prime Minister Khalil
Hassan Kamel
Hamid Sayah

Subject: President Carter reviews with President Sadat the proposals he will discuss with Prime Minister Begin; indicates that Secretary Brown will discuss military relations; reviews economic assistance problems. President Sadat conveys encouraging message from Mayor of Gaza; raises economic relationships; asks Economics Minister Sayah to brief on economic priorities; indicates to President Carter that he has authority to negotiate best possible agreement on behalf of Egypt.

March 10, 1979; 4:00 to (?) p.m.,⁴ Mena Rest House, Giza, Egypt

American Side

President Carter

Egyptian Side

President Sadat

Private conversation; no record available unless President Carter has one.

March 10, 1979; 8:00 to 10:00 p.m., Prime Minister Begin's Residence, Private Dinner, Jerusalem, Israel

American Side

President Carter

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

Private conversation; no record available⁵ unless President Carter has one.

³ See Document 197.

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter was escorted by Sadat to the Scherazade Room at the Mena Rest House after attending a luncheon for U.S. and Egyptian officials. At 3:58 p.m., Carter went to a holding room before proceeding with Sadat to the terrace of the Mena Rest House at 4:47 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

⁵ No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found. Carter provided an account of this meeting in his memoirs, including an excerpt from his personal diary, characterizing it as "extremely unsatisfactory." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 420–421)

March 11, 1979; 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., Cabinet Room, Jerusalem, Israel
(full memcon⁶ available)

American Side

President Carter
Full American Delegation

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin
Cabinet Defense Committee

Subject: President Carter and Secretary Vance present full package of proposals. Prime Minister Begin reacts negatively to changes in notes to Article 6; rejects language in draft letter on West Bank/Gaza concerning implementation in Gaza first and possibility of Egyptian liaison officers.

The Prime Minister begins meeting by introducing his Cabinet. The President thanks him for his hospitality and his working throughout the previous night. He stresses close ties with Israel. He notes that we are now at a historic point. Peace can be achieved with Egypt and then with others and that in turn will enhance the relationship with the U.S. All of this is important to regional stability.

We recognize your need for security and for oil, and we will guarantee it. We will do our best to contain the negative Arab reactions. You have been forthcoming and we appreciate it.

The President then reviews specific points of the agreement.

He notes the extreme importance to the U.S. of the Gaza issue. The deletions are of great importance to the U.S. There must be access to the people of Gaza. The omission of the liaison officers would be a serious loss to us and to Egypt. I cannot send Secretary Vance otherwise to Egypt. I consider this to be crucial.

The Cabinet earlier agreed to withdrawal in stages. We need to know what these stages will be so that we can resolve the issue of ambassadors.

Oil issue: The demand for permanent pledge by Egypt is rejected. The U.S. is prepared to provide guarantees.

Only issue to be resolved: access to Gaza. This is not only for the U.S. but for Egypt.

Begin responds by noting that after normalization the Egyptians would be free to travel anywhere. He is very rigid on the subject of the letter and will not accept the inclusion.

The President: To me this issue is crucial. Your response is not adequate. Only once have we taken such a position. Unless negotiating teams have access, I do not feel I have fulfilled my obligations.

⁶ See Document 198.

Begin: We will sign only to what we have agreed. None of this is in the Camp David agreements. (Begin keeps interrupting the President and the President has to say “let me finish.”)

March 11, 1979; 3:00 to 3:35 p.m., Cabinet Room, Jerusalem, Israel (full memcon⁷ available)

American Side

President Carter

Full American Delegation

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

Cabinet Defense Committee

Subject: Continued discussion of Gaza First option, text of West Bank/Gaza letter, discussion of bilateral memorandum of agreement on assurances. Prime Minister Begin asks for two changes in letter of assurances. President Carter concludes with strategic overview, asks each delegation to develop alternative language on Article 6, urges Israeli decision on accelerated withdrawal in exchange for early sending of ambassadors.

March 11, 1979; 5:00 to 5:35 p.m., Cabinet Room, Jerusalem, Israel (full memcon⁸ available)

American Side

President Carter

Full American Delegation

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

Cabinet Defense Committee

Subject: Discussion of words for notes to Article 6; Prime Minister Begin agrees to convene Cabinet Session in the evening to make decisions on all outstanding issues, including oil and exchange of ambassadors. Begin suggests that Vance then go to Cairo with Israeli proposals. President Carter strongly urges conclusion of all issues of the negotiations during visit. Begin resists, saying that Knesset must be allowed to have full debate.

President Carter makes a strong regional review, emphasizes the importance of progress to U.S. national interest and then adjourns the meeting, having clearly impacted on the Israeli Cabinet.

March 12, 1979; 10:20 to 11:20 a.m., Cabinet Room, Jerusalem, Israel (full memcon⁹ available)

American Side

President Carter

Full American Delegation

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

Full Israeli Cabinet

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See Document 200.

Subject: Prime Minister Begin reports on Israeli Cabinet decisions of previous night and Prime Minister Begin responds. Begin explains reason for removing reference to comprehensive peace in note to Article 6, paragraph 2. Begin explains rejection of language in West Bank/Gaza letter on Gaza First and Egyptian liaison. Offers language to the effect that Israeli will consider proposals on Gaza first in next phase of negotiations. Begin insists that Egypt must supply 2.5 million tons of oil annually over long term at market prices. President Carter says that Egypt will not accept this arrangement on oil and asks for Israeli reconsideration. Prime Minister Begin says he can go back to the Cabinet again, but not today. Other Cabinet members discuss importance of oil.¹⁰

March 13, 1979; 8:00 to 10:00 a.m., President's Suite at King David Hotel, Jerusalem, Israel

American Side

President Carter

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

No record available unless President Carter has one.¹¹

March 13, 1979; 10:00 to 11:00 a.m., King David Hotel

American Side

President Carter

Secretary Vance

Dr. Brzezinski

Israeli Side

Prime Minister Begin

Foreign Minister Dayan

¹⁰ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter had an additional working luncheon meeting with the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset, following his televised address to the assembled legislature on the afternoon of March 12. The meeting, held at the Knesset, began at 2:02 p.m. and continued until 3:02 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, but Carter's handwritten notes and a list of talking points are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79. In his memoirs, Carter stated that during the meeting he listened as "the leaders of the various political factions expressed their hopes and concerns to me" and described the meeting as an "excellent, constructive exchange of views." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 423) For the details of Carter's speech to the Knesset and of the round of U.S.-Israeli Ministerial-level meetings during the afternoon and evening of March 12, see Document 201.

¹¹ No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found. Carter's handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79. According to Vance, the meeting took place at Dayan's suggestion (see Document 201), following a round of discussions at the Ministerial level the evening of March 12. Carter recalled in his memoirs that during the meeting Begin and he "reviewed again the proposals which were necessary for Egypt and seemed to me advantageous for Israel." "I could easily see a clear resolution of the remaining issues," Carter remembered, and assured Begin that the United States would "guarantee" Israel an "adequate supply" of oil if Israel could not get access to Sinai supplies, that Sadat would agree to an exchange of ambassadors if Israel kept its "promise" to an "early withdrawal" from Western Sinai. Pressed by Carter, Begin also agreed that the Palestinians would "be permitted peaceful political activity" and limits on the movement of West Bank and Gaza residents would be lifted. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 424)

Subject: The President pressed for Begin's commitments on the issues of oil and withdrawals.

Begin would make no commitments but merely promised to bring this up at the Cabinet next Sunday¹² or perhaps on Thursday.¹³ In general Begin insisted that these issues have to be negotiated out and one must not press for immediate resolution.

*March 13, 1979; 3:00 to 5:00 p.m., Cairo Airport*¹⁴

American Side

President Carter

Secretary Vance

Dr. Brzezinski

Egyptian Side

President Sadat

Vice President Mubarak

Prime Minister Khalil

Tuesday, March 13—Meeting at Cairo Airport

The President: I believe my assignment has been carried out satisfactorily. You will be pleased.

Sadat: Marvellous.

The President: First 2 days Begin himself—unpleasant, interrupting. Then moderates convinced Begin to be more accommodating. Begin will wait to hear your position. He will go to the Cabinet this Thursday or Sunday. I believe the Cabinet will approve but I have no guarantee. Then Knesset approval. Begin will pledge to resign. If approved, all invited to Washington for signing ceremony—then exchange of visits between Cairo and Jerusalem.

Items: On commitments—unilateral steps—letter by U.S. to Egypt.

Article 4—no change.

Article 5—technical Egyptian change accepted.

Article 6–V–2 contravene instead of derogate (discussion—Egyptians prefer “inconsistent with”)

Oil—Israelis wanted 2.5 million tons. Finally agreed that in context of normal relations Egypt would sell oil—and U.S. would guarantee for 15 years the needed amount. They have not accepted yet.

¹² March 18.

¹³ March 15. Vance recalled in his memoirs that Begin agreed to take the U.S. proposal assuring the Israeli oil supply discussed by Dayan and Vance, March 12–13 (see Document 201), to the Israeli Cabinet “immediately.” Moreover, Carter agreed to Israeli suggestions regarding Gaza, whereby references to elections in Gaza first would be deferred to the planned post-treaty autonomy talks and references to Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza would be dropped from the West Bank and Gaza letter attached to the final treaty text. Carter also asked Begin whether “unilateral steps” could be taken by Israel on the West Bank to “improve the atmosphere,” a request Begin said he would consider “sympathetically.” (Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 251)

¹⁴ Carter's handwritten notes from this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

Subphasing of withdrawals/ambassadors—Cabinet also to review this. It would be helpful to have diplomatic relations—also El Arish would be evacuated. (Cy reads details of subphasing withdrawals.)

Targetting language—o.k.—“can” changed to “will”

Gaza—prolonged discussion. Could not arrive at acceptable language. Israelis would not agree that formal commitment be made to start with Gaza and Egyptian presence. Agreed to free passage. Israelis finally agreed if Israelis can move freely in Egypt, then Egyptians can do so in Israel, West Bank, Gaza. After diplomatic relations, Consulate or Cultural Center could be established—maybe on the fringes of Gaza.

Sadat: This depends on opening Egypt to Israelis?

The President: Even before treaty is signed any Gazan can travel to Egypt. After one month the negotiating teams can travel. The highway between Gaza/El Arish can be opened within three months. After normal relations, consulate or cultural mission.

Khalil: Designated liaison offices?

The President: No designated liaison offices but consulate OK. Israelis do not want to split off the West Bank from Gaza—not write it into documents.

Secretary Vance reads the proposed letter.

The President: It's a very good letter, and it leaves you flexible.

Khalil: Wouldn't it be better to have Gaza first?

The President: It's better to have a genuine invitation to Hussein stand—for a while at least.

Khalil: When does the five-year transitional period begin?

The President: If the West Bank Palestinians and Jordan refuse to participate, Sadat/Carter would have to resolve the future of the West Bank without their participation because the clock has run out. So we fall back on the Camp David language. I would like to induce Hussein and the Palestinians to take part.

Khalil: Suppose Hussein doesn't come in? He can block the whole thing. Discussion about implementation letter doesn't cover it.

Discussion of this issue and intent of Camp David.

The President: I would like to have your approval of what we have negotiated, including U.S. position on oil and phased withdrawal/ambassadors (if Cabinet approves).

Sadat: Ambassadors—one month after? Yes, if the Cabinet approves the withdrawals.

The President: One month after interim withdrawal—we need your approval. I would like to ask two more things as gestures of goodwill:

—Open the borders to movement of people, maybe in three months after El Arish.

—Encourage Egyptian TV & newspapers to have a more friendly attitude toward Israel.

I hope you can help on these two things.

Sadat: According to the laws of every country.

The President: Yes, even without waiting for normal diplomatic relations. Begin would respond immediately.

Unilateral commitments—

—no peaceful political activity forbidden;

—no restriction on free expression;

—no restriction on freedom of movement and travel abroad;

—amnesty—under existing British law—32 under current detention. Begin will have the law abolished (others have been tried—range 2,000–3,400);

—will expand program on family reunification;

—there is a limit on return to West Bank/Gaza

—planning to move military HQ out of populated areas. No more military maneuvers in above areas.

I will give you a letter to that effect.

Last item: I don't know if you can do this. I told Yadin I would ask you to invite Yadin to visit Cairo museum, pyramids. A small personal thing . . . maybe you can do it.

This is what I would like to say: that I reported to you; on all items there was agreement, you accept; on other issues there are U.S. proposals—and that you have agreed (oil/ambassadors-withdrawal); and that Begin has agreed to put these proposals to his Cabinet. This will be a U.S.-Egyptian agreement and the Israelis will have to accept or reject.

(Discussion of meaning of Article 6. The President makes the point that you should interpret the language as your victory. The Israelis always do that.)

The President: For the last 18 months I, the President of the most powerful nation on earth, have acted the postman. I am not a proud man—I have done the best I could—but I cannot go back to try to change the language. (Above in response to Khalil's request for word change.)

Egyptians will send letter to Cy saying that “not consistent” = “not contravene.”

Sadat: Will invite Yadin after the signing; will open the frontiers after El Arish.

Hassan has asked for \$22 [million] help in arms. Will need your help. Bokassa also asked for arms. SR-71 will have facilities for Yemen flights.

The President: Let Brown handle this—his military team.

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Alexandria, March 9, 1979, 7–8 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter's Meeting with President Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser, Department of State
William Quandt, NSC Staff Member

President Anwar al-Sadat
Muhammad Husni Mubarak, Vice President
Mustafa Khalil, Prime Minister
Lt. General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
Hasan Kamil, Chief, Office of the President
Butrus Butrus Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Hamid Abd al-Latif al-Sayeh, Minister of Economy, Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade

President Carter: My visit here and your reception of me and the reception shown by your people has been an inspiration to me and has been very reassuring. I am convinced that we cannot fail to give the people what they want. We recognize that in going to Jerusalem² you started the whole process. You knew there will be divisions in the Arab world. Other Arab leaders have condemned you and this is not unprecedented. But whatever happens in the future, my life is bound to yours, and that of the United States to Egypt. We hope for success. It would be a tragedy if we failed. Success would be great for us. Prime Minister Khalil and others have had good talks with Secretary Vance. We understand your concerns. When I go to Israel, within the bounds of propriety, I'll represent the Government of Egypt as I often did at Camp David. Then we would agree on our views, with some flexibility, and the results showed that we prevailed, because we gave Israel little things. I'll leave you with the commitment to honor your concerns and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 3/1–11/79. Secret. The meeting took place at the Maamura Rest House.

² See footnote 3, Document 4.

try to get a peaceful resolution of the differences. I would like to end my visit with a peace treaty, following which we need to prepare for a massive interaction between our two governments, not only in the military and economic relationships, but only in the private sector. We need to get American business leaders to the White House to get them to come to Egypt to work on problems of food, housing, and infrastructure. It would be good for us both. The prospects are good if Israel wants peace. If they don't, I can't help. I'll represent your interests and concerns.

President Sadat: I am happy. Let me express the gratitude for your sincerity and your generosity. You have shown brotherhood to my people and have held out the promise of peace. I was with my aides and I told them that I gave two directives for the negotiations. This trip of yours, which is very daring and very courageous, should end in a smashing success. Second, we shall always feel proud and happy to keep our positions identical. This is our intention. What you saw today and yesterday is the magic of the word peace. Last Christmas, in 1978, I was in upper Egypt and I visited a small remote village. I saw there the same feelings that you saw today.³ You even feel this in the remote areas.

My people admire you, your principles, your morals, your assistance and your help. We have suffered from foreign domination here. The last were the Soviets, before then the British. For two thousand years Egypt has been ruled by foreign rulers until the Egyptian Revolution. That was the first time that Egyptians could take pride. It was really something to be proud. Now we are proud that the relations between Egypt and the United States have been established. In the bottom of the heart of each Egyptian is a feeling of friendship for the United States. We had 18 years of confrontation, but you saw the sentiments that they expressed today. Any American citizen can feel how much they cherish American friendship. When we started in 1973 with the peace process, my people were proud to have the United States as friends. I got hundreds of letters from ordinary American citizens.

I want you to know that we shall always be friends. I will always be proud of your friendship and brotherhood whatever happens. To make this trip a success is a success for all who value morals. I would like to show you more of my country.

President Carter: I'd like to come back.

President Sadat: You know our position. You have spent your time on this problem in a marvelous way. We shall never be able to meet

³ Carter wrote in his memoirs that he and Sadat were met in Alexandria, having traveled by special train from Cairo on March 9, "by the largest and most enthusiastic crowds I have ever seen." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 419)

your generosity. I just hope that God will help in your mission. You can count on us as peace loving friends in happiness and in sorrow.

President Carter: I hopefully pray that in spite of difficulties that I'll never disappoint you. You are the most admired person in my country. That is a justified feeling. The situation in the Middle East has greatly changed since I first met you. We have just a few more hours together. When I get to Israel on Sunday,⁴ I'll start the substantive talks. I'll try to conclude the talks as quickly as possible. It shouldn't take long. The differences that remain are relatively minor compared to the past. Begin and Dayan have behaved well in the last few days. They have not made any claims of victory, they have been cautious, and there is an attitude of hope. Even in New York,⁵ Begin struck a very moderate tone. This is possibly a good omen. I know that Begin is strong, courageous, and honest. He has made difficult sacrifices in Israel. He has gone further in his actions than his predecessors. He has suffered at home. He can get his own party to support him. I've tried to understand Israel politics. The Israeli people are as anxious for peace as those in Egypt. This may also be true in Syria. The leaders are not in step with the people there. I hopefully expect that after a few months of difficulty, the attitudes of the people in Jordan and Syria will change their leaders' attitudes. We'll do all that we can to prevent punitive actions against Egypt. We will use our maximum influence with Jordan and Saudi Arabia to get them to accept the accomplished fact. I'll let them sound off for a while, but I intend to quietly lean on them. Then I will do all that I can to bring it to an end. I'd like to leave the Middle East with the peace treaty. If I go back, it will be hard to reopen the negotiations.

President Sadat: Right.

President Carter: On the prospect of the SALT talks, I need to meet and to prepare for those. My hope is that if the Israelis provide me with a good surprise, we can conclude and sign the whole thing early next week. If so, I would like to leave with good feelings between Egypt and Israel. There should not be a grudging acceptance. There will be problems in the future and they can be worked out with cooperation. Israel can exaggerate little difficulties. Within the limits of expectation, we are trying to put a good spirit into the whole process. A negative reaction in the Arab world will be minimized if they see that there is not a grudging acceptance. If they see things hanging by a thread, then Hussein may try to stir up the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. No

⁴ March 11.

⁵ Following his meetings with Carter in Washington, Begin visited New York March 6–7, where he gave a series of speeches to Jewish-American groups. (Edward Walsh, "Begin Urges U.S. Jews to Back New Peace Plan," *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1979, p. A17; Edward Walsh, "Begin Says Treaty Now Up to Carter, Sadat," *The Washington Post*, March 8, 1979, p. A26)

Arab leader has done anything to restore the rights of the Palestinians, except for you. I need your advice on how to open negotiations with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. I know that some of you, such as the Vice President and Mr. el-Baz, have contacts. We'll do what we can to bring them in in a constructive way. Israel will be reluctant to carry out Camp David with enthusiasm. When they have a choice, they'll go for a narrow interpretation. We'll have to urge them to be more forthcoming. This plays into the hands of the Israelis when the Palestinians don't cooperate. We need some mechanism through which Vance can give me advice on this. Secretary Vance or the Vice President could return. We'll try to choose a top-level negotiator to work on this problem. We want to try to make this permanent and to prove by events that it is a step toward comprehensive peace. Next would be Gaza, and possibly the West Bank, and then Jordan, and last Syria. I am available to meet with you. This is the greatest thing that I have ever worked on. You have taken the bold steps.

President Sadat: You instigated it. You remember your letter.⁶

President Carter: Secretary Brown will talk about our military relationship. We are revising our aid programs. We have planned a reorganization. You can help by having Ambassador Ghorbal advise us on private investment opportunities. We have some bureaucratic problems in carrying out projects. We need to show that things can move rapidly. I'll try to change the bad situation in the United States and hope that you will look at your Cabinet to see if obstacles can be removed. Our business relations could improve.

Secretary Vance: We'll do all that we can to help.

President Carter: Secretary Vance went over with me his talks with Prime Minister Khalil. I'll do my best. I can't shuttle, but we'll communicate through Ambassador Eilts. My intention is to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

President Sadat: This is a very encouraging development. A few moments ago the Mayor of Gaza sent me a letter. He is taking a positive attitude. He is saying that he is waiting and is sure that the efforts that we are making will reach agreement for the comprehensive peace in the area. He knows that you have helped the Palestinian people in their self-determination. He wants you to continue your blessed efforts.

President Carter: Once the treaty is an accomplished fact, I hope this attitude will develop.

President Sadat: Gaza I am sure of. In the West Bank, because of King Hussein and the PLO, there is a question. There are the interests of the mayors. They are businessmen. On the economic interests, I suggest

⁶ Not further identified.

a joint board headed by the Prime Minister. We should drop all of our work on this board. We can guarantee your investors what is needed. We can have feasibility studies.

On the other question, do your best to get an agreement. Vance has heard Prime Minister Khalil. From my side, you have full authority to reach an agreement. You know the situation here and there. You join us as a full partner for years to come. You have my authority to do what can be done. If Israel refuses, that is a new situation. But let us be identical.

Secretary Vance: The Prime Minister has given me a note⁷ on unilateral actions. We'll raise this.

President Carter: Let us review the contents of the note. We'll try.

Prime Minister Khalil: I have the greatest esteem for you, and as you know, I spent many years in the United States. I want U.S.-Egyptian relations to be close. I am a staunch defender of peace on a solid basis that can be defended.

President Carter: I'll never forget this.

Prime Minister Khalil: I cherish your idealism.

President Carter: Your contribution at Camp David gave us an education [on] the issues that made this possible. When you came, there were bad prospects. I need a Prime Minister Khalil to run my government for me.

Minister Sayeh: If you'll allow me, I'll be brief. Due to certain elements, our economy is growing at about nine percent annually. After 1967, we fell to zero. Due to the open-door policy of President Sadat and due to the economic help of the United States, the economy is improving. We now have democracy and the rule of law. There are no confiscations or expropriations. Private investors have confidence, as do foreign investors. All is working well. If I may add, we are with the IMF on economic reform. The IMF always wants higher prices. With all this, these need to be done in a non-traditional way. We are one and one-half million housing units short. We now only have 80,000 new units being built. We won't catch up. This is causing big problems. We can't have an open or a closed door if we have a poor telephone system. We always have problems of sewage and water supply. We are beginning to work on rural electrification which is very important. The public sector is very poor and needs to be renewed, but we have 10–15 billion Egyptian people tied up in it. It needs help. We need a non-traditional approach. Your one billion dollars helps, but we need massive help. I sense that you want to use American investment. I am ready for it. Coca Cola is already moving. The boycott has ended. Peace, and

⁷ A copy of Khalil's note has not been found.

the expectation of peace, will bring foreign investments. We used to depend on Arab countries for about \$2 billion recently. Now we are in good shape. We pay our debts on time. The Arab sources won't work so well in the future. They are talking of cutting back. How can we deal with this? We consider that peace is a joint venture. People need benefits. I hope that their situation will improve.

President Carter: We helped Taiwan and South Korea. These are two of the best examples.

Minister Sayeh: The Third Consultative Group will meet in June.⁸ The American side sends very high-quality people. This is very helpful. We have a club of friends and donors. But we need to move the IMF. We are talking about increasing prices. To summarize, there is the June meeting of the IMF and the link to the Consultative Group. We need more commodity credits. That is the only way to generate local currency without inflation. We need to get more aid for infrastructure.

President Carter: The IMF you'll have to handle. The American private sector looks at the IMF as putting a stamp of approval on a country. We'll help, but the IMF is so respected, that if the IMF says that Egypt is okay, then you have an excellent basis for an investment. If temporary adjustments are needed to get IMF approval, that would be good. We don't want too many consultative groups on new organizations. We'll put Egypt as a top priority. It is better not to build up excessive expectations.

If it looks as if we have everything settled here, Israel might raise their demands. We need to keep the emphasis on the problems that remain to be solved. And Egypt should be tough in her negotiating demands. We should be cautious because prospects for peace depend on whether Israel is forthcoming in meeting Egyptian demands. We should be cautious.

The same applies to economic matters. We should not build up the expectation that everything will be working well one year after peace. There will be many difficulties. We want to avoid extreme disappointments. We will do all that we can. I'll stay cautious in my public statements. And Egypt will be one of our top priorities.

(The meeting ends at 8:00 p.m.)

⁸ Reference is to the third scheduled meeting of the Consultative Group established by the World Bank in 1977 to address Egyptian economic and financial problems.

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, March 11, 1979,
11:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.; 3:08–3:35 p.m.; 5–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
Jerry Rafshoon, Assistant to the President for Communications
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
Ed Sanders, Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State
Richard Viets, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Israel
Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
Yigael Yadin, Deputy Prime Minister
Moshe Dayan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture
Eliezer Shostak, Minister of Health
Yitzak Zamir, Attorney General
Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Minister of Foreign Affairs Office
Harry Hurwitz, Prime Minister's Information Officer
Ayre Naor, Cabinet Secretary
Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman
Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, Chef de Cabinet, Prime Minister's Office
General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister

Prime Minister Begin: I welcome you to the Cabinet Room. It is a great honor to have you visit this room. We have taken many democratic decisions here. It is the custom that the host preside, but since I

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 3/1–11/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes from this meeting, as well as a list of talking points, are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79.

am only a Prime Minister, we will elect the President as chairman of our meeting. This is unanimously adopted.

President Carter: Now I see how you prevail!

Prime Minister Begin: The word prevail is dangerous!

President Carter: I hope that we can keep the discussions here confidential. Some of what I say about my meetings with Sadat should not be revealed. I am honored and gratified to be in Jerusalem on the free soil of Israel. My own deep feelings mirror those of the American people, including non-Jews. We feel a friendship toward Israel, we see mutual security interests, and we see a deep historical relationship with one another that fills my heart. When I was riding in from Tel Aviv last night, it was pointed out to me that Jerusalem was the city of peace, but that it had suffered in thirty-six wars. I would like to end my public service with actions that helped insure that there will be no more wars over Jerusalem. We have come a long way together against great odds. When we have reached the final moments of negotiations, you have never disappointed me. You have always helped to bring the negotiations toward a success.

I have just come from Egypt where I have seen an outpouring of feelings by the Egyptian people for peace. I know that the Israeli negotiators in Egypt found this same welcome and the broad desire for an end to war. I would like to conclude the negotiations and settle all of the terms of the peace treaty today. President Sadat is eager to conclude the negotiations. I share that desire. It is very likely that if we are not successful it will be difficult to bring the talks to a conclusion in the near future. There are Arab pressures on Egypt. Saudi Arabia may cut off all aid to Egypt, which amounts to about \$1.6 billion yearly.² There is a threat of boycott. Sadat accepts this possibility. Some of his ministers are reluctant, but he is not. We have resolved most of the difficult issues. There are many that you consider to be more important than I do. I recognize that what we see as semantics may take on a difference for you. You are more directly involved. In our talks with the prime

² On March 6, Saud commented to West that he hoped Carter's visit to Cairo would not result in a "separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt without adequate provisions for Palestine and withdrawal," stating that such an action "would result in the automatic imposition of sanctions," including Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League, the League's headquarters being moved from Cairo, and imposition of a boycott and economic sanctions on Egypt. When asked by West what this would mean for Saudi aid to Egypt, Saud replied that Saudi Arabia "would fill all of its existing monetary commitments," including funding for F-5 fighter aircraft for the Egyptian Air Force, "but would provide no further assistance." (Telegram 1902 from Jidda, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790129-0638) Following West's protest on March 11 that sanctions on Egypt would "cause deep strain in U.S.-Saudi relations," Fahd assured West that Saudi Arabia would "not rush into anything." (Telegram 2056 from Jidda, March 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036-2417)

minister in Washington,³ we clearly saw the difficulties. If there were not difficulties, we would have solved these problems long ago. But I hope to have a complete treaty text. On Articles 6–2 and 6–5, there is substantial agreement. There are some minor problems. On the target date there has been some controversy. We also need to clear up the letter.

President Sadat has told me that if the negotiations are successful based on what he needs to protect Egyptian interests, he would come to Jerusalem to sign the final documents, and he would invite Prime Minister Begin to Cairo to sign them. This could be done in the next couple of days, after assessing the remaining issues, the Egyptian positions are sufficiently forthcoming for Israel to accept. We are prepared to spend the time that is needed to reach an agreement on the remaining issues. I told Sadat that I would give him a report this afternoon. I need not trouble you with describing the strategic advantages of the treaty. A treaty would improve the prospects for better relations between us on economic and military matters. It would help two of our best friends not to continue to be in a state of war.

Prime Minister Begin: As you remember in our private talks, we can proceed by talking about either procedure or substance. I told the President that we had taken decisions in the Cabinet to hold debate in the Cabinet on our proposals for autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, before the signing of a treaty. We also had a commitment to the Knesset to have a debate before any signing. This stands. This is not an insurmountable problem, but we need some time to hold a debate in our Cabinet. We can discuss this. I suggest first we hear from you on all of the Egyptian proposals on all of the outstanding issues. We agreed in Washington to certain formulations on Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, and on the target date. The Cabinet approved of these proposals by a majority vote. We also need to discuss the question of oil. Sadat has made some proposals. Then I will reply.

President Carter: There are three basic questions on substance. They involve the West Bank and Gaza letter and Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5. Secretary Vance has worked with Egypt most directly on these questions. We feel that there should be a slight modification on Article 6. It should be acceptable to you. If these changes are made, it should be possible to reach agreement. You can look at the letter. The procedure for handling the other Camp David Framework is important. There is a question of whether Gaza and the West Bank should be kept together, or separated, as well as the degree of Egyptian presence in Gaza, and whether there could be a small number of Egyptians to help prepare for

³ See Documents 184 and 186.

the elections there. Let's take up Article 6 first, then the letter, then oil, then the question of ambassadors.

Secretary Vance: The Egyptians have made slight suggestions for change in Article 6, paragraph 2. (Secretary Vance passes out a copy⁴ of the new proposal).

President Carter: The Egyptians found the word "derogate" difficult to accept. We have tried to find a synonym that would be acceptable to you.

Secretary Vance: The Egyptians have suggested using the phrase "is not inconsistent with" instead of "does not derogate from". They have suggested that the same change be made in Article 6, paragraph 5. In paragraph 2, they also want to have, after the reference to the Camp David Accords, the phrase "which express the determination of the parties to reach a just, durable and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict".

Prime Minister Begin: May I respond? Let me begin with Article 6, paragraph 5. We agreed in Washington to the text "does not derogate from". If there is no difference, then there is nothing wrong with that phrase. If there is a difference, then we will stay by what we agreed. Then the United States and Israel will agree, and Egypt will disagree. If the United States changes its position, that is okay, but it will be a deviation. The Cabinet would have rejected these proposals if the words "does not derogate" had not appeared.

Sadat is entitled to make counterproposals. The United States can change its mind. But we are free men and we can approve or reject. We will reject. Let me explain why. Why does Sadat play with words? Why does Sadat pay attention? I would like to hear what is the difference. In our view, the two phrases are worlds apart. Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, are the heart and soul of the peace treaty. Without this article, it would be a sham. What is the great difference? If we used the phrase "does not derogate," it means that Article 6, paragraph 5 stands, the heart and soul of the treaty. If we replace that phrase, then the first part of the note prevails. It would mean that the first sentence is the key, and it would put this treaty after other treaties. It would be the worst version, even worse than that offered at Camp David. We would knowingly sign a sham document. It would lose its meaning. The assertion is that other agreements between Iraq and Egypt that call for the liberation of Palestine would prevail over this treaty. It is not a matter of theory or legal form, but a matter of life. Syria may attack Israel, and Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia may join. The Baghdad Conference⁵

⁴ A copy of this text has not been found.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 85.

countries object to all of this. They are against Sadat. Now there is a very serious problem on Israel's northeastern front. They have 5,600 tanks there, and 6,000 guns. Israel has more than 3,000 tanks. That means they have a two to one ratio. We can defend ourselves only through counter-attack. We cannot withdraw to Haifa or Tel Aviv. If we reach the gates of Damascus, and this is possible, Syria may invoke its agreements with Egypt. Egypt would then be obliged to come to Syria's aid. If these words "are not inconsistent with" are crucial instead of "do not derogate", it means that Egypt will start a war while having a peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, we cannot accept.

President Carter: Egypt is not trying to attack Israel, nor is the United States. The top sentence was added at the request of Egypt. They are not trying to preserve those parts of the 1960 and 1967 treaties⁶ which are inconsistent with this treaty. We can make it clear in the note that Article 6, paragraph 5, does prevail. We could add the phrase "are not considered to be inconsistent with".

Prime Minister Begin: Respectfully, I differ. That doesn't change one iota of the meaning. We stand on the agreement we made in Washington. We do not accept this proposal from Egypt. Egypt cannot threaten war now. We would have five divisions across the Suez soon. But when the Baghdad states attack us, Egypt will have to join. I will read to you from the controlled Egyptian press. On February 20, 1979, one of Sadat's close advisers wrote a letter to Khomeini in which he violently attacks Israel. He says the peace treaty will cease to exist. On January 26, 1979, another writer talked of Israel becoming a second Taiwan, an artificial entity established by force on others' lands. Anis Mansour wrote in the magazine, "October", that the Jewish people lie and are deceitful. Another author wrote of Israel not being a state and said that Israel was run by the Mafia.

President Carter: What is the purpose of your reading this to me?

Prime Minister Begin: This is the atmosphere in which the peace talks are conducted.

President Carter: I have never detected any of this in my talks with Sadat.

⁶ Carter's reference to a 1960 treaty is unclear, though it may likely be a mistaken reference to the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League. (See footnote 5, Document 160) The second reference is likely to Resolution 3, adopted by the Conference of Arab Heads of State at Khartoum in August 1967, under which Egypt had agreed to unite its political efforts on the international and diplomatic level with other signatories "to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5 June [1967] aggression." Moreover, this was to be accomplished within "the framework of the main principles to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country." For the text of the Khartoum resolutions, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967*, pp. 590–591.

Prime Minister Begin: You asked us to have confidence in Egypt. But it is a very bitter pill for us to read these attacks on the Jewish people. I ask your ambassador to call this to their attention. This is the atmosphere in the official Egyptian press. Now I am asked in two days to sign a peace agreement with Egypt. I place this complaint before you. As we read these passages, we must be careful. Now we will turn to paragraph 2 of Article 6.

President Carter: Do you have a counterproposal?

Prime Minister Begin: No, sir. We stand by our previous position. We may think and we may discuss later and will consult. The previous draft of Article 6–2 was adopted by the U.S. delegation. The Cabinet approved it. The additional words on the comprehensive peace are not completely unacceptable. We will consider them. But I have an amendment to make. It should be stated that the treaty between Egypt and Israel is the first step toward a comprehensive peace. It makes it clear that it is not a condition of the Egyptian-Israel treaty to have a comprehensive peace. We are not talking about a separate peace treaty. I will suggest that we accept these words with this amendment. But the main problem is the use of the words “not inconsistent”. We stand by “does not derogate from”. This would mean that the first part would prevail, not the second, if we accepted the Egyptian change. This is my first response. After the break, I’ll consult with my colleagues and we’ll decide on any amendment to your addition to Article 6–2. We have the same opinion on the language “does not derogate from”. May I hear your further proposals?

President Carter: Would you consider “does not contradict”?

Prime Minister Begin: It’s the same. Let us consult. Remember the talks we had in Washington. We’ll break our brains. We stand by “does not derogate from”.

President Carter: What does “derogate” mean to you?

Prime Minister Begin: We state something in the first part that is very dangerous for Israel. But then we say it does not derogate from the terms of the treaty and that brings back the original meaning. So it does not do any harm to the treaty. It is a wonderful expression, it is strong and proper.

President Carter: Is there some way of saying the same thing?

Secretary Vance: Let’s turn to the draft⁷ on the West Bank and Gaza.

President Carter: This deals with the self-governing authority. It is the result of months of tedious negotiations. This is the best that we can do.

⁷ Not found.

Secretary Vance: I will read the letter. (The Secretary reads the text of the draft letter).

Prime Minister Begin: We'll have to break with consultations to discuss this. There are improvements compared to the drafts submitted at Camp David. There is a return to the Camp David language, but there are problems. I will start with page 3. You have changed the word can to will. I remember that we agreed on can. And you accepted the phrase "as expeditiously as possible".

Mr. Rosenne: The Prime Minister suggested the change "as expeditiously as possible".

Prime Minister Begin: I said so. I sent this to the Cabinet. Then there is the phrase "possibly first in Gaza". This is put in the sentence on setting up the self-government one month after elections. I never heard such a proposal. I cannot agree. (The Prime Minister misunderstands, and corrects himself when he notes that the establishment of the self-government one month after elections is part of the Camp David Agreement.)

Here is the idea of starting with Gaza. I use the words Judea and Samaria. We exchanged letters⁸ on this. We can't use the phrase West Bank. This is a serious matter. It is a distortion of geographical and historical facts. The West Bank refers to all of the area west of the river, not just the area annexed by King Abdullah. If we sign a letter, either in parenthesis or as a footnote to the Israeli version, we must refer to Judea and Samaria.

President Carter: No problem.

Prime Minister Begin: The idea of implementing the self-governing authority first in Gaza is a deviation from Camp David. If we both agree, it would be okay. What is the idea? I'll say openly that Secretary Vance asked me if autonomy could first be established in Gaza. I replied that if we have the commitment from President Sadat that he will not then interfere in Judea and Samaria, then we will consider this possibility, with the authority of the Cabinet. We cannot agree that we will go first in Gaza leaving Judea and Samaria, and then later negotiate Judea and Samaria separately with Egypt. That would be completely paradoxical. We agreed to negotiate with Egypt alone in order to show our good faith. No one wants to be truer to the Camp David Accords. Why did we agree? We could have waited for Jordan. Autonomy was our idea, and it is one of the most beautiful ideas ever proposed by Zionism and Judaism. Egypt has no right to Gaza. Gaza is a foreign

⁸ Reference is to the September 22, 1978, side letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging that the "expression 'West Bank'" would be "understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria." The letter was attached to the Camp David Accords. See Document 51.

country to the Egyptians. They unlawfully occupied it. It was invaded by Farouk.⁹

President Carter: They don't claim Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: I agree. We stand for that. But they were there for nineteen years. So we must take that into account. We will negotiate Gaza, and Judea and Samaria, also if Jordan does not join. But if Sadat suggests Gaza first, I would not reject it, provided he leaves Judea and Samaria. Sadat cannot give us peace in the east. Only Jordan can do that. Only Jordan can work with us to introduce autonomy in Judea and Samaria.

We must also write the words administrative council after self-governing authority. We are not Bolsheviks. They dismissed the democratic elected assembly in 1917. This was the end of the only democratic assembly in February. We don't want to disperse a legislative council. If it is an administrative council and it declares a Palestinian state, we shall arrest them. We need iron-clad guarantees. The words administrative council should be added. We will negotiate with Egypt on Gaza, if they give us a clear commitment that Egypt will not then be a party to the negotiations on Judea and Samaria.

President Carter: That is a deviation from Camp David.

Prime Minister Begin: A deviation begins with the idea of Gaza first. If Sadat departs by taking out Gaza, then we can change it. Let us go by Camp David. If there is a deviation, we may consider it, but only on this condition. I speak on behalf of the Government of Israel. Even if we get together with Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, or we separate Gaza, then we don't deal with Egypt on the autonomy for Judea and Samaria. I reserve my right to consult with my colleagues on this.

Secretary Vance: Under Camp David, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan have responsibility for negotiating the establishment of the self-governing authority in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This letter precedes to do just that. But if the implementation of the agreement on the West Bank proves to be difficult, then the letter suggests that the implementation might take place first in Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, but then Egypt cannot be a partner to the autonomy in Judea and Samaria. Together is all right, but if they are separated, Egypt has no more to do with Judea and Samaria.

Secretary Vance: Let me clarify. There will be negotiations for one year after ratification. There are three tasks: agreement on the modalities on elections; agreement on the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority; agreement on other related matters. Agreement would have to be reached on three topics. Then there would be

⁹ Farouk I, King of Egypt from 1936 until 1952.

the question of implementation. Maybe it would not be possible to implement the agreement in West Bank, so we might start in Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: I am sorry, I have to differ. If we deviate from Camp David, and we agree to deal with Gaza first, then that is the end of Egypt's negotiations with Israel on autonomy in Judea and Samaria. Egypt can give us nothing on the eastern front. We can't change our mind on this. Our foreign minister likes the idea, provided that Egypt drops Judea and Samaria. We'll call on the Jordanians and the Palestinian Arabs to negotiate. Autonomy is our idea, but not with Egypt. I suggest that we return to the original language.

Secretary Vance: You will have done so in the letter. The only question is the implementation, not the negotiation.

Minister Weizman: If we finish in Gaza, and if Jordan does not come in, will Egypt act for Jordan in the West Bank? We prefer to talk to the Palestinian Arabs.

President Carter: Let me preside.

Secretary Vance: The modalities, and the powers and the responsibilities for both areas will have been negotiated together.

President Carter: Then the question of holding elections arises.

Secretary Vance: Later, the West Bank Palestinians may say okay we'll join, but we need some adjustments for the West Bank. They would want to just add to what had already been negotiated.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Let me repeat what I said to you and Prime Minister Khalil. It would take more than just one change to adjust what had been agreed for Gaza to the West Bank. Now we are talking about one unit of the autonomy. There will be representatives from Gaza, and from Judea and Samaria. There would be one council.

If Gaza goes first, then you have to make a change. Gaza would have the full power to run the self-governing authority in Gaza; while in Judea and Samaria, it would not be done that way. We would have to agree that there would be two units first. The self-autonomy in Gaza alone is possible. I told Khalil and Secretary Vance that I don't exclude it. People in Gaza are not Jordanian citizens. They have no close ties to Jordan, but Hussein may retaliate against the Gazans. We can't be sure that they will like the idea.

If we do go Gaza first, then we have to look at the second part. Some West Bank representatives go to the Parliament and are members. Khalil was surprised to learn this. They sit there as part of the Jordanian parliament. At Camp David, we agreed on Jordanian participation in the police force. I said this was no problem since all of the inhabitants in Judea and Samaria are Jordanians. King Hussein won't send people from Trans-Jordan. He will choose locals. It doesn't matter to us which side of the river Jordanian citizens come from. In Jerusalem

and Hebron, you can find ex-ministers of the Jordanian Government. If Hussein comes in, he will work with the Jordanians and the Palestinians. They are already there, people like Anwar Nuseibeh. If you replace Jordan with Egypt, Khalil will say that he wants to send Egyptians, and we will say no sir. We agreed that in Gaza, after the autonomy, there would be some Egyptian liaison. They would not necessarily be in Gaza. We only agreed to Jordan and the police force, and to joint Israeli-Jordanian patrols. The Egyptians can't do this. We have a special relationship with Jordan. It is bad to divide Judea and Samaria from Jordan. They are the same families. I would object to introducing Egypt to replace Jordan. At Camp David, we assumed that King Hussein would like Sadat to represent him. This seemed a good possibility. Now we assume that Jordan will oppose the negotiations. We have to wait until Jordan is willing to negotiate. The Palestinians won't just accept what Egypt has accepted.

President Carter: What Foreign Minister Dayan said is accurate. If Jordan delays coming into the negotiations, Egypt would represent the Arab peoples after consulting with the Jordanians and Palestinians. This is what Sadat wrote me in a letter.¹⁰ I thought that Israel had agreed. Last November, the question of the autonomy seemed to be a major obstacle. Sadat called me¹¹ to try to break the deadlock. He said that he was ready to go ahead in Gaza alone. He is not trying to put off Gaza, nor is he trying to claim Gaza. He was trying to break a deadlock. It is not possible for Egypt to help in Gaza without some kind of liaison.

I am anxious to hear Israeli suggestions on how to resolve this problem. Sadat doesn't want to have Egyptian police on the Jordan River, but he does want to work out the modalities for the self-governing authority. There are doubts in the Arab world and some feel that Israel wants to delay the establishment of the self-governing authority. I share these doubts. If actions can be taken by Israel to keep the Jordanians and the Palestinians from participating, then you can keep the area forever. Mr. Sharon talks about one million settlers. This makes it impossible for the West Bank Palestinians to join the talks. I can't see how much you really want the autonomy to work. But my word of honor is at stake. We agreed to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

¹⁰ Presumably, a reference to the September 17, 1978, side letter from Sadat to Carter, attached to the Camp David Accords, stating that Egypt would "be prepared to assume the Arab role" in the implementation of the provisions of a comprehensive settlement related to the West Bank and Gaza "following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people." See Document 51.

¹¹ See Document 126.

Prime Minister Begin: We said also the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We also have rights. It is written this way.

President Carter: What do you suggest? If Jordan does not participate, and the Palestinians are reluctant, how can we carry out the autonomy?

Foreign Minister Dayan: I would personally distinguish three phases. We should invite all of the parties first. If they don't come, then we could negotiate on Gaza alone. We talk about the powers and responsibilities just for Gaza. They could take a different form, and the areas would not have to be unified.

President Carter: Do you agree that the basic goal is to prescribe a self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza both?

Foreign Minister Dayan: There should be three stages. The general invitation, then if there is agreement on Gaza first, a specific negotiation for Gaza only and not the rest of the area. Then the invitation should stay open for Jordan and the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria to come in. It should be an open invitation. But the negotiations should not be done by Egypt, just by the people in the area and Jordan. So we would leave the door open. They would have to have their own negotiations on different issues.

Secretary Vance: I agree on the general invitation. There should be negotiations on the powers and the modalities, and the invitation should remain open. But the negotiation of the powers and responsibilities would be largely common to both, and the modalities would be similar.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Khalil said why shouldn't the West Bank residents have both Jordanian citizenship and Palestinian citizenship.

Deputy Prime Minister Yadin: Let's forget about who wants what. Let's look practically at the question. I was hurt when you said that you shared the views of those who think we are reluctant about the autonomy. There is a debate here in Israel. I was politically offended. We want to implement the autonomy on our terms. Now things are being turned upside down as if Sadat suggested autonomy. We should be practical. We should deal with the modalities in the whole area, and then implementation could come in Gaza first. But that might be counterproductive. If Jordan doesn't join, why should we agree to what Sadat negotiates? Who gave Sadat power to negotiate for the West Bank? If Sadat can deliver the goods in Gaza, or Shawa, that is okay. But elsewhere Egypt can't deliver. If we were to go Gaza first, we should forget the rest. Let them come when they are ready.

President Carter: At Camp David we agreed that Jordan and Egypt would negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza combined. We also agreed that Egypt would participate on behalf of the other Arabs. It would vio-

late Camp David if Israel, the United States, and the Palestinians were to exclude Egypt from these discussions.

Prime Minister Begin: Let's follow the Camp David agreements. We can't help suspicious minds. What we can do if Jordan does not join is to negotiate with Egypt alone. But Israel never said that Egypt will replace the Arabs or Jordan. We can't do more. We could agree on one year of negotiations. We can hold the elections as expeditiously as possible. We can take one month to set up the self-governing authority. I have read about people who suspect Israel and the Jewish people. But that belongs to a different period. This autonomy is the focus of our debate. The parliamentary opposition is against it, and so are many of my friends. But we stand by our plan. I believe that one of the best ideas of Judaism and Zionism is the autonomy. We don't want to interfere, but we need security. Minister Sharon has spoken of one million Jews in Judea and Samaria. There is nothing wrong for the Arab inhabitants in this. The number of Jews in Judea and Samaria is not a problem. We have the idea of living together. We only want security and no Palestinian state. I have a suggestion.

President Carter: Before we change the subject . . .

Prime Minister Begin: Minister Sharon will wait. He can obey.

Minister Sharon: Only for a little while.

President Carter: Egypt will have a liaison relationship in Gaza. (The President reads from the draft letter.)

Prime Minister Begin: We should delete that whole sentence. There should be no Egyptians in Gaza. They won't be there. We will never agree to Egypt doing this. There is no provision for liaison officers in the words of Camp David. Each state will have liaison officers with the police. I suggest deleting the whole paragraph. There can be no Egyptians in Gaza.

Minister Sharon: I believe we could have moved forward more quickly if you understood our plans for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This is my personal opinion. We decided to have a debate on autonomy in the Cabinet and we will do it. I'll emphasize that I believe in the idea of autonomy. We can live with it. But when we speak of autonomy, we don't mean the establishment of second Palestinian state. There is already one Palestinian state. Israel should emphasize that Jordan is a Palestinian state. There are 1.5 million people in Jordan. 1.2 million are Palestinian. They are exactly the same Arabs as in Judea and Samaria. They are the same Palestinian Arabs who lived in the pre-1967 borders of Israel. They are represented in the Jordanian Parliament. Thirty of the 60 members of the Parliament are Palestinians from Judea and Samaria. Fifteen out of 30 members in the Senate are Jordanian citizens from Judea and Samaria. Jordan is a Palestinian state. The Hashemite

Kingdom is the only non-Palestinian element in Jordan. I am not recommending anything. Jordan is a Palestinian state.

You are trying to convince us to establish a second Palestinian state. We'll go far, but we will never agree to a second Palestinian state. You should make that clear now. We should make clear what we plan to do. There is no way to prevent Jewish settlers from settling in Judea and Samaria. We can't prevent this while Israel has one-half million Palestinian Arabs in its pre-1967 borders. No geographical line can divide the Jewish people from the Arab population. We have to live here together. When I use the figure of one million Jewish settlers in twenty or thirty years, I can assure that they will live there. In Jerusalem, in greater Jerusalem, there is a crucial problem to have one million Jews. They will live there and elsewhere. We were very careful to settle Jews. We fill all of the empty houses. We don't settle them in areas of heavy population. We settle in empty areas or where there is only a small Arab population. This is our homeland. But our approach is not religious. It is only based on security. We are settling people there. This is part of our national security concept. It is a vital means for protecting our population. It is easier to proceed if things are clear.

We have the problem of water. One-third of Israel's water comes from the aquifer in Judea and Samaria. This is a matter of life and death for Israel. We have problems of internal security, of Arab terrorism. If the day comes of true peace, with no terrorism, Israel will be the first to stop our activities in the inhabited Arab areas. We only put settlements in the most vital areas. There is plenty of land for one to two million Jews. We won't restrict the Arab population, but we won't restrict the Jews living there. This is a matter of life. My generation has seen war. We have seen many terrible things. Remember we can only make a mistake once. We want to exist. We are striving for peace, but you can't frighten us by war. We want peace, but we will go on for ten wars to preserve our security and independence.

Minister Burg: One should be enough.

Prime Minister Begin: We should adjourn now. We are having lunch downstairs together. We can then come back, or take a break. We have one other problem with the letter which has to do with the counting of time from the establishment of the administrative council in Gaza. This cannot be accepted. The transitional period can only begin when the autonomy is established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. This is an important remark for the record.

President Carter: The liaison relationship must be established. Egypt must be able to use its beneficial influence to work with the Palestinians. I thought that Dayan and Khalil had resolved this. We need to bring this to a head. We'll try to use the language of Camp David.

(The meeting breaks for lunch at 1:30 p.m. At 3:08 p.m. the meeting resumes.)

President Carter: Secretary Vance will respond to some of the technical problems. Then I'll summarize. Then I would like to meet with my people for an hour or so and then we can meet again at five o'clock.

Secretary Vance: On Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, we have discussed these problems and have some suggestions. We should deal with this first.

President Carter: I talked to Sadat at length. He didn't understand your concern on the 1960 and 1966 treaties until recently. But he wants a new word for derogate.

Secretary Vance: On the letter, there is no problem in the first one and one-half pages. There are problems concerning liaison in Gaza. It is important that there be a method to bring Gaza along.

Prime Minister Begin: The first page is okay with us. Please add the words administrative council after self-governing authority. Also the Israeli version of the letter should say Judea and Samaria in a footnote when the West Bank and Gaza are referred to.

Secretary Vance: We can use a footnote in the Israeli version. There is a problem on when the transitional period begins.

Prime Minister Begin: The problem starts on page two. Here is the Gaza first idea, and here starts the problem.

Secretary Vance: On page three at the top, there was apparently some misunderstanding of what the Cabinet approved.

President Carter: We proposed the language.

Ambassador Evron: You remarked that the term "as expeditiously as possible" should be used.

Secretary Vance: We said that we would look at it.

Mr. Avner: As expeditiously as possible was discussed.

Secretary Vance: I said "or something like that". We will look at this. I gave Foreign Minister Dayan a draft memorandum of agreement.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Why say anything about the transitional period?

Secretary Vance: When does it start?

Prime Minister Begin: When the self-government is established in both areas as is written in Camp David.

Secretary Vance: If you leave it that way, and it is established only in Gaza, it nonetheless would be operating.

Prime Minister Begin: It is not written.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Suppose that the autonomy begins in Judea and Samaria two months later. Then it makes no difference. But if it

starts four years later, then there is a problem. Why should we mention it at all?

President Carter: We understand. Let's try to work it out.

Secretary Vance: I gave a memorandum of agreement to Dayan. It covers all the points you want covered.

Prime Minister Begin: I have read it and will have to consult with my colleagues. At the end of page two, it says the United States will not supply arms for "unlawful" armed attack. There cannot be such a thing as "lawful" attack on Israel.

President Carter: We'll be the judge of that, Mr. Prime Minister. We will leave out the word "unlawful". We are trying to be accommodating.

Prime Minister Begin: On the first page, we want no reference to the possibility of a violation of the agreement by Israel. It says either party. This should not be in a bilateral agreement. You can say the same thing to Egypt if you want. But Israel cannot sign a document that says Israel might violate the agreement. It is a good document, Mr. Secretary.

President Carter: Let me summarize before the recess. If Israel and Egypt want a peace treaty in the context of a comprehensive peace, it is important to conclude the treaty during this visit. There is a limit on my time. I have SALT negotiations and other matters to attend to. If we fail to reach an agreement, it will be difficult to revive the momentum. We hope to resolve all of the differences today. We are trying, representing Egypt within the limits of our ability, to resolve the wording on Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5. Sadat has no aversion to saying that this treaty takes precedence over the commitments to destroy Israel. But the word derogate is one that they object to. In my opinion, the word is okay. We hope you can find a synonym to say the same thing. I have no objection to derogate, but they have a problem with it. The Egyptians are not pushing for Gaza first. They put this idea forward to break a deadlock. If both of you see it as necessary, you can proceed in Gaza alone. In Gaza, I see the sensitivity about liaison for Egypt and Gaza. But I don't want the agreement between Egypt and Israel to be just a piece of paper marked by distrust. I have seen the euphoria of Camp David and of the Jerusalem visits. If we have the treaty signed, Israel will have to treat Egypt with the same respect that you show the United States and vice versa. We have to have a sense of working for common goals. We'll do our best. There is a question of oil. I can assure that if the other matters are resolved, we can find a solution to this. The same is true on ambassadors. But in Sadat's mind, it is tied to the early withdrawal to the interim line. On that basis, I went to Sadat and he gave me his commitment. He has not reversed. I want an Israeli commitment to a faster withdrawal, in return for which I can get the exchange of ambassadors after one month of the interim withdrawal. The memorandum of agreement is very important. There will be new relations and advantages for

Israel and Egypt after peace. Egypt makes up about forty percent of the Arab world. If Egypt is a friend and ally, guided and corrected by us when there is a departure from what has been promised, within the limits of our influence, the agreement should work. If Sadat is weakened, we will do everything we can within the limits of our power to insure Egyptian compliance with the agreement. You have my personal commitment. We stand behind all of these documents. Israel still feels threatened by terrorism and the Arab build-up over the next 10 to 30 years. The Arab world is capable of persuading some countries because of oil. The United States can withstand such blackmail. Egypt is a partner of Israel. We place a restraint on the PLO, and on the radical Arabs as threats to Israel. We plan to go to the Saudi leaders to caution them against overt acts against Egypt. Saudi Arabia fears the Soviet Union and we help protect them. We stand with you as equal partners. What we do for you is more than balanced by what Israel does for the United States. A democratic and stable Israel is a tremendous strategic asset to the United States, but this is especially true if Israel is at peace with Egypt as a friend. We can work more closely with both countries then. There will be difficult days ahead. You have different views on autonomy for the Palestinians. We have never put pressure on Israel to sign an agreement that is contrary to your interests.

The treaty could open a new day for Israel that would bring advantages and permanent peace. You would have diplomatic relations with your largest Arab neighbor. I asked you to be forthcoming and generous. My belief is that Sadat has been very generous and forthcoming in the last two days. He has asked us to use all of our influence to bring an agreement now. Sadat is waiting to hear from us. I am willing, if you agree, to work all night to conclude the agreement. The remaining differences are minor compared to the differences we faced a year ago.

(The session ends at 3:35 p.m.)

(The meeting resumes at 5:00 p.m.)

Prime Minister Begin: I have good news. We have found a synonym for the notes to Article 6. We propose “does not affect in any way”.

President Carter: That is much worse than it was. It means it has no significance at all.

Secretary Vance: Let me try “contravene”.

Prime Minister Begin: We’ll have to think again. I don’t reject. I have to think about it. We shall consider. In Article 6–2, I made a provisional amendment about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a first step. I have decided to give up the amendment and to delete my addition to that amendment. I would rather stick to what was agreed in Washington. We will drop the word derogate. We want to expedite things. We will have a Cabinet session tonight and take all the decisions. In a session

with the Cabinet tomorrow, you'll get a complete reply. On the bilateral letter, I'll take it to the Cabinet tonight. We think the pledge of economic and military assistance is perhaps too general.

President Carter: Secretary Brown can talk to Weizman.

Prime Minister Begin: We'll include the questions of ambassadors and oil. You will have a Cabinet reply on all issues. After the session of the Cabinet, we will have agreement on some issues, and maybe it will be some issues on which the United States will have to [go] back to Cairo. Secretary Vance could go to Cairo if you must leave. Then you can bring the reply of Egypt. If there is agreement, we'll tell you. We will have an agreed communique. Before signature, we will have to deal expeditiously with the question of autonomy in the Cabinet. We will have to bring it to the Knesset. This will take eight to ten days. That means next week there could be approval before we were ready to sign. Tomorrow morning we will give you a full answer between eight and nine o'clock. Then Secretary Vance can go to Cairo with our proposals. Then next week between Monday¹² and Wednesday,¹³ we will possibly get Knesset approval. If we do not get approval, then the government will resign.

President Carter: Secretary Vance knows the Egyptian position intimately. Instead of your Cabinet meeting now, I suggest that you let Secretary Vance consult with you as you evolve your language. Secretary Vance will not shuttle between Cairo and Jerusalem. Let him work with you before your Cabinet decision.

Prime Minister Begin: Dayan can meet with Secretary Vance.

Foreign Minister Dayan: On Article 6, that can be clarified before the Cabinet meeting. Rosenne, Zamir and I will meet with the Secretary and his group. We can find agreed language. That is not so easy on the joint letter. There are matters of substance there. In a short hour we cannot solve this. It is not just a question of words. There are matters of substance. Maybe during the Cabinet meeting we can be in touch, but not before the Cabinet meeting.

Prime Minister Begin: I am very tired. We need time. I asked for an adjournment. The two foreign ministers will sit together. On Article 6, we need Cabinet agreement. We can't convene again for these matters. I am totally tired. I have reached my limit.

President Carter: Let Secretary Vance and Dayan work through the banquet.

¹² March 12.

¹³ March 14.

Foreign Minister Dayan: There is no point in discussing it with me.

Prime Minister Begin: You will have the full powers of Dr. Khalil. Let the two foreign ministers meet.

President Carter: I think if we conclude this visit without a public expression of agreement, there is serious risk of not reaching success. I understand that you cannot sign the treaty without Knesset approval. We need to sign some kind of declaration or letter. We need at least an ad referendum agreement. But if this slips, and I leave, it will [be] hard to rekindle the forces for success. I hate to let this opportunity go by for discussing the basic issues. I could stay over until Tuesday, but no later. I don't know if you want a joint ceremony with Sadat.

Prime Minister Begin: If we reach agreement, why not? But not before the Knesset has discussed the matter. If after Secretary Vance goes to Cairo he comes back with an agreement, good. If there is no agreement, the sky doesn't fall. We will continue. If we agree, Cairo can accept, and we will have a common declaration by the three governments. We can have a common communique. We can inform the world that we have reached agreement on all outstanding issues. We can say that there are no problems with the peace treaty. Then the Israeli Government will bring to the Knesset the treaty for a vote next week.

President Carter: Would you sign together?

Prime Minister Begin: We can make a declaration without a meeting. I suggest I don't go to Cairo for this, or that he come here. Only when we sign the peace treaty, should we do that. We should be patient. If we reach agreement, I will make this a matter of confidence for the Knesset and I will fight for it. But we shouldn't need to do this to issue a one sentence statement. You can issue the communique in Washington if we agree.

Minister Burg: I understand what the President is saying. The President is suggesting that we should take this up in the Cabinet tonight.

Prime Minister Begin: I agree.

President Carter: Let me add a word of caution. If we leave the Middle East without Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat appearing together, as demonstration to the Israeli and Egyptian people, we may miss an opportunity. I don't care about the communique. I want the public agreement. If not, you'll never go to Egypt, and he'll never come here. My belief is that my presence has a stabilizing effect. I want to see some friendship between you. If there is a communique, and then a Knesset debate, there will be controversy in public. You will say that Sadat has promised oil, and he is willing to do it, but if you say that, he may be embarrassed. There will be problems on the debate on autonomy. The whole agreement could come apart.

Minister Weizman: Let's discuss it in the Cabinet.¹⁴

President Carter: It's not just a symbolic matter. I want to leave here with a solid expression of friendship between the two governments.

Prime Minister Begin: This group of ministers cannot now decide this issue of a meeting with Sadat. We will take this to the Cabinet and give you a reply tomorrow.

Foreign Minister Dayan: If the Cabinet approves tonight and Secretary Vance brings the approval of the Egyptians, then the Knesset will approve. We don't underestimate the ceremony, but if it doesn't work out for Tuesday, that should not be a problem.

(The meeting ends at 5:35 p.m.)

¹⁴ According to Vance, the Israeli Cabinet met from 11:30 p.m., March 11, until 5:30 a.m., March 12, ultimately agreeing to the Egyptian wording of the interpretive note to Article VI, as well as deciding both to omit any references to establishing autonomy first in Gaza in the treaty's joint letter and to inform Vance that Israel would be willing to purchase from Egypt the total oil production from the wells that Israel had drilled in the Sinai. (Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 247–248) Dayan's account of the Cabinet meeting is in *Breakthrough*, pp. 273–274.

199. Message From Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. to the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts)¹

Jerusalem, March 11, 1979, 11 p.m.

Conveyed to Eilts by ALA by secure phone from Jerusalem about 11 pm 3/11/79

Please inform Sadat that President had long and difficult talks with Begin and a number of his Cabinet colleagues last night² and today,³ and that Secretary supplemented these in follow-on meeting

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Atherton—Egypt, Geneva, Kissinger 1973–1982 1 of 2. Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the document states that Atherton conveyed the message to Eilts by secure phone from Jerusalem. The message is handwritten.

² See footnote 5, Document 196.

³ See Document 198.

with Dayan this evening.⁴ President is making major effort to persuade Begin to agree to positions on remaining issues as discussed with Sadat and Khalil at end of our visit to Egypt. Begin has called Cabinet meeting for tonight⁵ (after state dinner for President) which will probably last into early morning hours, and we expect to hear Israeli positions Monday morning. Until then, we will not be able to judge whether our efforts have been successful. If Cabinet approves reasonable positions, Pres. will ask Sec. to go to Cairo Monday. Will be in further touch Monday morning.⁶

⁴ Not further identified. However, Vance, Atherton, and Saunders met with Dayan and Rubenstein on the morning of March 11. In his memoirs, Vance recalled the meeting covering “the idea of a memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel on the American political role as de facto guarantor of the treaty,” as well as the joint letter on autonomy, the Israeli oil supply, Article VI, and the meeting between Begin and Carter on the evening of March 10, which, Vance assessed, “had not been helpful.” (Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 247)

⁵ See footnote 14, Document 198.

⁶ On March 12, the Embassy in Cairo drew up contingency plans for Vance’s early return to Egypt from Israel. (Telegram 4960 from Cairo, March 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0217; Telegram 4982 from Cairo, March 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0365) Ultimately, Vance and the U.S. delegation opted to stay in Jerusalem.

200. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, March 12, 1979, 10:20 a.m.–11:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
 Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 3/12–31/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser, State Department

William Quandt, NSC Staff Member

Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President

Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President

Richard Viets, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Israel

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister

Yigael Yadin, Deputy Prime Minister

Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior

Simcha Ehrlich, Minister of Finance

Shmuel Tamir, Minister of Justice

Moshe Nissim, Minister Without Portfolio

Gideon Patt, Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism

Eliezer Shostak, Minister of Health

Chaim Landau, Minister of Transport

Moshe Dayan, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense

Yitzha Modai, Minister of Energy and Infrastructure

Zevulun Hammer, Minister of Education and Culture

Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture

Aharon Abu-Hatzeira, Minister of Religious Affairs

David Levi, Minister of Immigrant Absorption

Israel Katz, Minister of Labor and Social Betterment

Mordechai Zippori, Deputy Minister of Defense

Yitzak Zamir, Attorney General

Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.

Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman

General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister

Eli Rubenstein, Assistant to Director General to the Foreign Minister

General Avraham Tamir, Assistant Minister of Defense for National Planning

Jossie Chiehanover, Director General, Foreign Minister's Office

Dr. Eliahu Ben-Elissar, Chef de Cabinet, Prime Minister's Office

Arye Naor, Cabinet Secretary

Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor

Schlomo Nakhdimon, Advisor to the Prime Minister for Press

Ilan Tehila, Military Secretary to the Minister of Defense

Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

(The Prime Minister begins the meeting by introducing all of the members in his Cabinet).

President Carter: I want to thank you for your hospitality and seriousness with which you have addressed the treaty. I deeply appreciate your having met all last night in order to accommodate my time problems. It was very gracious of you. We have very close ties to Israel. We value your strength, and your democratic form of government. They are matters of deep admiration to us, and are a great benefit to the United States. I believe the benefits are mutual.

We are close to an historic achievement. This could be the first of many steps to establish even more securely peace in Israel. Israel can defend herself. But we want your security to be based on peace with

your neighbors as well as on military power. We admire this special strength and spirit of Israel. You and Egypt are fated to be neighbors. This could be a first and major step in cementing your relations with your neighbors based on fundamental changes. Israel could be at peace with the most important Arab nation. This could be the basis for a strengthened relationship.

In the context of peace, we will be more forthcoming on economic and military issues. As cooperation grows, we can work to enhance regional stability and to meet Soviet designs of intrusion. The events in Iran and elsewhere show the effectiveness of dedicated martyrs to a radical cause. Egyptian-Israeli relations will be a restraint on radicalism. We recognize the risk that Israel is taking in withdrawing from Sinai. We know you need a secure supply of energy and oil. Egypt is prepared to transmit this oil to us and then to you, and we'll guarantee the supply.

We will also try to minimize adverse Jordanian and Saudi reactions. We may have some influence on Syria and Iraq as well. The danger of losing this opportunity is very great. Once lost, it would be almost impossible to redeem. I consider you to have been very forthcoming. You have often been very generous. You have taken sacrificial steps in the past to save the negotiations. Camp David was good for Israel. When we are done, we will relay the results of our meeting to Sadat,² without any public discussion. I hope you will join us in keeping down public discussion of these issues until we have communicated with Sadat.

I would like to explain the points on which the Cabinet has acted. On Article 6–2, you have deleted language from Camp David on a comprehensive peace. You have often spoken of the comprehensive peace. This is not crucial to the United States and it does not contradict Camp David, but it is very important to Sadat. He has to justify his actions. It would be a matter of generosity, with no harm to Israel, if you could leave this in. It is important to Sadat and would be very much appreciated.

The formulation on Article 6–5 should be acceptable to Sadat. On the letter, the changes in the first sentence are all right. The addition at the end of page 1 and the top of page 2 is okay. But on page 2 there is an important issue to the United States. I am a signatory of the Camp David Agreement. I am honor bound to carry out Camp David. On page 2 Israel has asked for a revision on the part dealing with Gaza and Egyptian liaison officers. This is of great concern to the United States. It

² The President's Daily Diary records that Carter spoke with Sadat by telephone from 8:42 p.m. to 8:45 p.m., March 12. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other record of this conversation has been found.

is of great importance to us that the negotiations on the self-governing authority and on the modalities should proceed as we agreed. There must be access to the people of Gaza to help prepare the elections. We are talking of a political process. The people in Gaza should be able to freely express their views. We and the Egyptians need to be in touch with them. I have no preference on Gaza first, but the implementation of any agreement may be easier there. Raising doubts about Gaza is bad. The omission of liaison officers is bad. We need to have arrangements for the negotiating parties to work actively with the people of Gaza. I ask you to reconsider this. I hope we can instruct Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance to work out new language. I can't send Secretary Vance to Egypt unless we have some assurances that Egypt will have access to Gaza. This is a crucial issue.

Page 3 is okay and the footnote you suggest is okay. We have not gotten any reply on the technical amendment to Article 5. We understand that the Cabinet approved it.

Prime Minister Begin: The amendment to Article 5 is acceptable.

President Carter: You said that the Cabinet agrees to staged withdrawal. I want to know about the stages so that we can resolve the question of the exchange of ambassadors. The American proposal on oil, including a guarantee from us, should be adequate. Egypt does reject Israel's proposal to sell 2.5 million tons of oil annually to Israel. We have worked on an "evergreen" contract approach. There would be an annual renewal, and if there were any interruption, we will guarantee your supply. I suggest that you review this. We will provide an iron-clad agreement of the kind that Israel seeks.

The Cabinet's proposals are very forthcoming. The only one from our point of view which causes problems concerns access to the inhabitants of Gaza during the negotiations and elections. I do not want my own commitments to be violated. Any access that the United States would have in Gaza should also be available for Egypt. When the early withdrawal from al-Arish was discussed, Israel said that there would be free access between al-Arish and Gaza. The Cabinet then took a contrary position. I can't take a proposal to Egypt unless this is provided. I am not wedded to any exact words, but the spirit is crucial.

Prime Minister Begin: We considered Article 6–2. The Cabinet was forthcoming. We approved the word "contravene". We consider this a synonym of derogate. We can say that Article 6–2 stands. In Washington, we agreed on the first part of this note. The provisions of Article VI will not be construed as contradicting Camp David. The United States and Israel agreed. In Cairo, an Egyptian proposal was made that Israeli Cabinet has now rejected. It is legitimate to accept some proposals and to reject others. The first formula was agreed to by the United States and Israel. Egypt has sought to make a very serious

change. There is danger that it will be interpreted as meaning “in the context of a comprehensive settlement”. We stand by what the United States and Israel agreed to in Washington. On behalf of the Cabinet, it is my duty to say that this is all that we can accept.

On Article 6–5, there is no problem. We found a synonym. We do not want to add or detract. It is up to Egypt to accept the agreed U.S.-Israeli proposal. We cannot do any more about it. We have to think of Israel’s problems. We have done our best. We can’t do better.

On the bilateral letter, thank you for accepting our two amendments. The aid references may be too general, but we will deal with aid later. This is a bilateral problem and has nothing to do with Egypt. We shall have some amendments to make at the proper time. This is not now the issue.

On the letter, thank you for accepting my amendments to page 1. On page 1 there is no problem. We are glad that you have accepted the language on “as expeditiously as possible”. We are in full agreement. Thank you for accepting our footnote. It is important morally and historically. We are also glad that you included reference to the administrative council. This makes it clear that autonomy is the goal, not sovereignty or a Palestinian state. To us, this is the most vital issue after the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. It should be clear to all that a Palestinian state is out of the question. We only favor full autonomy. This is a fine concept of Judaism and Zionism. It proves our liberal approach. Israel recognizes the Arab nationality in Israel. There is no problem for us in also recognizing the rights of Palestinian Arabs as we did at Camp David. The administrative council reference applies everywhere that the self-governing authority is mentioned.

On the question of Gaza first, we had a very serious debate. We decided to leave the issue open. We could not agree to the American proposal. We cannot let Egypt deal with Gaza first, then with Judea and Samaria. We prefer to just keep to Camp David. To prove our good will, we express our agreement to deal with Egypt if Jordan does not join the negotiations. There will be no delay. We have left open for consideration the Gaza proposal. Israel has proposed substitute language that if Egypt should propose autonomy in Gaza first, Israel is prepared to consider such proposals. Secretary Vance is empowered to say this. If there is a concrete Egyptian proposal, Israel will consider it.

We cannot approve the reference to liaison officers. This is a matter of principle. Egyptian occupation of Gaza gives Egypt no rights there. Egypt cannot come to Gaza with liaison officers. We stand by Camp David. If there is a strong local police force, then there should be liaison officers of the three governments on this issue. This is an Egyptian proposal to change Camp David. The two sides are free to change if they wish. But we do not want to and we cannot do so. This is the decision of

the Cabinet. Secretary Vance can say that after signing the peace treaty, and after the normalization of relations, anybody is free to visit anybody, we can go see the pyramids, Egyptians can go to Jerusalem, and they can visit Gaza as we can visit Luxor. This shows our complete good will. There will be no special deal for Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza.

Annex 1 provides for entry points, and there will be free entry subject to normal checks. This is agreed.

President Carter: I don't want to pass over this. This is crucial. Your response is not adequate. Only once in the negotiations has the United States taken a position that we consider important to our own integrity. We are a signatory . . .

Prime Minister Begin: It is not written in Camp David.

President Carter: Unless there are clear assurances that the negotiating teams can have access to the inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank, I don't feel that I can carry out my commitment to Camp David.

Prime Minister Begin: We will sign only what we agreed to.

President Carter: But I am asking you to agree.

Prime Minister Begin: We won't sign if we don't agree. We will carry out every word of Camp David. It is not written in Camp David that there should be Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza or in Judea and Samaria. There is specific language. We will be faithful to Camp David.

On the question of oil, we agree that Egypt must supply 2.5 million tons of oil at market prices. They will get the oil wells that we developed. We want access to this oil through Egypt. If Egypt doesn't keep its agreement, then the U.S. should guarantee the oil.

President Carter: To use your words, this is not in Camp David. There will be differences from Camp David as we work for a peace treaty. I have made our position clear. Israel has the freedom not to sign an agreement and you can insist upon your position. But this is so important that I think you should designate someone to work with Secretary Vance on this. I don't want the negotiations to break down over the negotiators having access.

Prime Minister Begin: I can bring this again to my Cabinet. I can't do more. I can only speak about the decisions that were made today. If you wish to bring it up again, I will. On oil, there is no misunderstanding. I thought we had a complete agreement. I thought there would be an Israeli-Egyptian agreement with a U.S. guarantee. We don't want to turn to the United States. Your Sinai II commitment³ will be honored. But we don't want this matter of oil to hurt our relations. We don't want Americans to complain about Israel. We haven't used the 1975

³ See footnote 3, Document 195.

commitment. We are not asking for any infringement of Egyptian sovereignty.

Minister Modai: The Prime Minister has covered our views. This is the basic situation.

Secretary Vance: Egypt has made it clear that they will not sell a fixed amount of oil to anyone. They do not enter into multi-year contracts, only the “evergreen” type. Therefore, there are two elements of the Israeli proposal which Egypt has refused. I have discussed this before with you. They won’t change their position. I have argued with them and they stick to their position. You have posed two conditions that can’t be met.

President Carter: If there are interruptions, we can guarantee the supply.

Minister Sharon: On oil, we should be thinking of this in the context of real peace. It is hard for us to accept that we have to get oil via the United States. This is not an issue between the United States and Israel. We are going toward true peace. We don’t accept any restrictions on selling oil to Israel.

There should be no liaison officers or mission in Gaza. There is a third point that worries me. We agreed that you should be a full participant, but I don’t see any situation where you would become a mediator between the Palestinian Arabs and the Government of Israel. This is impossible.

You spoke of free passage from al-Arish to Gaza. But this should be mutual. We are ready when we sign the normalization of relations. Then we can go freely to Egypt. It should be entirely mutual.

On settlements, you said nothing. But you raised a question that worries you. There should not be any misunderstanding about the future. You should take it for granted that we will settle Jews in Gaza, especially the southern part. We need a barrier between the 400,000 Palestinians in Gaza and the 40 million Arabs in Egypt. We will not stop our settlement plans in the Jordan Valley, in the Golan, or in Gaza. But we will do our best to avoid heavily populated areas. We will only settle in areas that are crucial for our security.

President Carter: I understand your position and you know ours.

Minister Tamir: We have Annex 3 which could cover oil. There should be a removal of all of the discriminatory barrier upon completion of the interim withdrawal. Your proposal is to get Egyptian oil under the cover of the United States.

President Carter: Egypt will sell oil to Israel on a competitive basis, or we will guarantee your supply. What Israel is demanding is contrary to all international law contracts. You are asking for a special relationship.

Prime Minister Begin: Did Egypt accept our proposal on a letter for oil or 2.5 million tons?

Secretary Vance: It was rejected.

President Carter: We also don't approve of that approach.

Prime Minister Begin: My impression was that you agreed.

Secretary Vance: I agreed to raise it with them.

Prime Minister Begin: Then I am right. They have rejected it.

Minister Tamir: There are two aspects. I realize what you have said. We would be reintroducing the Arab boycott idea of an untouchable Israel. They won't sell us oil directly. We have heard you, often make the point that we should not be stingy about the peace process, about the new relationship, and that we should have faith in the next steps. But this is the only tangible test that we can put to Egypt. You stressed the urgency because of the fall of Iran. Iran's fall has hurt you, but it is a completely serious blow to our oil situation. Now we are asked to give up the oil that is under our own control. We have no oil of our own. We have a neighbor which refuses to consider us as a neighbor. In the oil market, the idea of free competitive bidding allows everyone to play tricks. It is then totally up to their discretion on whether they sell. We have to think of our security. Our whole war apparatus depends on this. It is the only tangible test of the new relationship. This raises doubts of whether they really want peace.

Prime Minister Begin: Let me call attention to the timetable. We don't have agreement on oil with Egypt. Now you will have to go to prepare for your speech. At 11:45 you will leave for the Knesset. There are now thousands of children waiting on the road to see you. I suggest that we move on now. We do not have agreement on oil, and we will have to reach an agreement. The other issues I will bring to my Cabinet.

President Carter: Will there be any further meetings?

Prime Minister Begin: At noon, we go to the Knesset. That will last one or one and one-half hours. The speaker will greet you. Then you have a lunch with the Foreign Affairs Committee. We do not participate. During that time, we will sit with Secretary Vance. If there is agreement, we will now decide that the Cabinet will meet after the Knesset speech. Our delegations will hold talks. We will either have a full Cabinet meeting or the Defense Council meeting with Secretary Vance. We should hear Minister Burg.

Minister Burg: Iran is a debacle for Israel. Another evergreen contract would hurt Israel. This is absolutely contradictory to peace.

President Carter: The American assurance takes care of the problem. We also have no answer on the accelerated withdrawal.

(The meeting ends at 11:20 a.m.)

201. Editorial Note

Following his morning meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Israeli Cabinet on March 12, 1979, President Jimmy Carter accompanied Begin to the Knesset where the two leaders addressed the assembled legislature. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recalled in his memoirs that the “session was a stormy one with much shouting and hectoring of Begin by the Communists and some members of his own Likud party.” (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 248) In the midst of the proceedings, one Likud member of the Knesset, Geula Cohen, was ejected from the chamber. In his address, Carter delivered what he termed “the speech of concern and caution and hope.” Noting the “somber responsibility of us all to exert our energies and our imaginations once again to contemplate the tragedy of failure and the legitimate exultation if we bring peace,” the President urged Israelis and Egyptians to continue to work toward achieving the peace treaty. The full text of Carter’s speech is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pages 424–428. During speeches made by Begin and opposition leader Shimon Peres, Carter instructed Vance to meet with the Israeli Cabinet that afternoon, asking him to “concentrate” on the Israeli oil supply and Egyptian access to Gaza. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, page 423) To guide the Secretary’s conversation, Carter’s handwritten notes posed two questions, upon which Vance added his own handwritten responses. First, Carter asked, “Can the negotiating nations—or their designated liaison teams (representatives)[—]have free access to the inhabitants of Gaza or the West Bank during the time of negotiations to determine the modalities of the establishment of self government—and during the elections?” In the margin next to this question, Vance wrote, “yes—but.” Second, Carter asked, “Is the sale of oil from Egypt during coming years under normal marketing procedures adequate, provided the U.S. will guarantee adequate supplies of oil to Israel under all circumstances?” Vance answered, “No.” (Notes made by President Carter during Begin’s Speech to the Knesset, March 12; Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79)

At 4:45 p.m. on March 12, Vance and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski met with Begin and his Cabinet. No memorandum of conversation or official record of that meeting has been found. Vance recalled in his memoirs that the meeting “got nowhere. Each side repeated its prior positions and we remained deadlocked. Finally, when it became clear that nothing new would emerge, we adjourned.” Begin, Vance recounted, “gave me a draft of a joint statement to be issued by him and Carter. I read it grimly. It tried to paper over the harsh reality that after the Camp David summit, the Blair House talks, the ministerial sessions at Camp

David, my rescue mission to Cairo and Jerusalem, Begin's visit to Washington and the president's trip to the Middle East, we had failed to bridge the last narrow gap." "The remaining three issues," Vance contended, "seemed so insignificant compared to the prize that could be seized with a little flexibility and imagination." (Vance, *Hard Choices*, pages 248–249)

On the evening of March 12, Vance met again with Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan at the King David Hotel. No memorandum of conversation or official record of the meeting has been found, but Vance and Dayan recorded the substance of the exchange in their respective memoirs. (Vance, *Hard Choices*, pages 249–250; Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pages 275–276) During the meeting, lasting "several hours," Dayan "urged me [Vance] to persuade the Egyptians that we should drop the idea of Gaza first and make no mention of Egyptian liaison officers in the West Bank and Gaza letter. He stressed that the Egyptians could propose advancing elections in Gaza ("Gaza first") at the autonomy negotiations. He also underscored that when Israel withdrew from El Arish and normal relations began, 'any Egyptian could travel to Gaza on an Israeli visa, just as any Israeli would be able to go to Cairo on an Egyptian visa.' I was prepared to accept Dayan's suggestion if we could reach an agreement on the oil supplies question." On oil, Dayan told Vance he "understood that the Egyptians could not agree at this time to sell Israel oil on a long-term basis and at a preferred price." "When I heard this," Vance later recalled, "I knew that we were approaching a breakthrough." Dayan suggested to Vance that Carter invite Begin to a breakfast meeting the following morning, March 13; Vance telephoned the President who immediately agreed to the suggestion. (Vance, *Hard Choices*, pages 249–250)

After this, Vance and Dayan "turned to constructing the final pillars of the bridge." Vance asked Dayan "what Israel could live with in terms of U.S. guarantees. He replied that it would be necessary for the U.S. oil guarantee to last for twenty years rather than the five we had offered. I said I felt we could move in his direction on this. Dayan said further that there must be a clause in the treaty stating that Israel had a right to buy oil directly from Egypt. He pointed out that without such a clause the Egyptian boycott would remain in effect. It would be difficult to do, but I felt we could draft language to meet his point and persuade the Egyptians to accept it. I so indicated to him, saying I would, of course, have to discuss these matters with the president but that I was hopeful." After gaining the President's approval for a U.S. oil guarantee to Israel for a fifteen-year period and for the revisions to West Bank and Gaza letter proposed by Dayan, Vance met with Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Saunders, Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Amba-

sador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Michael E. Sterner, to draft the new treaty clause. "By early morning [March 13]," Vance wrote, "we had an acceptable draft, which we took to the president. He approved." (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 250)

The following morning, March 13, Vance again met with Dayan and presented him with the U.S. draft of the oil agreement; the two then adjourned to join the breakfast meeting between Carter and Begin. (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 250; Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pages 276–277) The oil agreement was prepared as an attachment to Annex III of the treaty text, the section that addressed the normalization of Egyptian-Israeli economic relations. For Carter's breakfast with Begin and the subsequent quadripartite meeting with Vance and Dayan, see Document 196. The final text of the agreed minutes on oil stated, "The treaty of peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for oil." (Telegram 64008 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2651) A draft version of the memorandum of agreement on oil between Israel and the United States proposed by Vance, along with two alternative draft versions produced on March 16, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Oil.

Shortly after 1:30 p.m. on March 13, the U.S. delegation left Israel for Egypt, where Carter met with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat at the Cairo airport. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) The substance of their meeting is in Document 196.

202. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in Israel¹

Aboard Air Force One, March 13, 1979, 2030Z

For Ambassador Lewis from Secretary Vance.

1. Please deliver following revised message to Begin from President.²
2. Start text.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

As I write this message, my heart is filled with emotions. When I left you this morning in Tel Aviv, I had hoped that my talks³ with President Sadat would be successful. I am pleased to inform you that they were. Consequently, we are on the verge of consummating the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel for which you, President Sadat, and I have worked so hard. I think we can feel justifiably proud of our work in pursuit of peace. In the difficult weeks and months ahead, we must all remember how far we have come in the past two years, how many obstacles we have overcome together, and how many times hope has triumphed over despair.

With President Sadat, I reviewed the progress that we made in Jerusalem. The Egyptian delegation had reservations about the formulations on Article VI and was concerned about the deletion of the references to Gaza and to liaison. After discussion, however, President Sadat agreed to the text of the letter without mention of Gaza or liaison and to the agreed minutes on Article VI.

We also discussed staged withdrawals and the exchange of ambassadors. If the Israeli Cabinet reinstitutes phased withdrawal as we discussed, namely the approval of the sub-staging which was proposed and discussed at Blair House, President Sadat will send me a letter confirming his agreement that ambassadors will be exchanged one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal.

During our discussion of oil, President Sadat has accepted the agreed minutes to Annex III which we proposed. For our part, we will proceed to formalize the oil guarantee from the United States which

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Pre-Signing Negotiations: Cairo, Tel Aviv, Washington, & New York 3/20–26/79. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State and the White House Situation Room. The telegram is not numbered.

² Lewis delivered the letter to Begin on the morning of March 14. (Telegram 5154 from Tel Aviv, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2668)

³ See Document 196.

you and I discussed. He has also offered to construct an oil pipeline from the existing wells to Eilat, providing Israel considers this to be desirable. This offer is not to be made known to the public.

I described to President Sadat your willingness to undertake unilateral actions to improve the climate for the next phase of negotiations. He was appreciative and I offered to confirm our understanding in a letter to him.

Finally, I raised with President Sadat the importance of opening the borders after withdrawal from Al-Arish and of encouraging the Egyptian press to adopt a more friendly attitude toward Israel. He responded favorably.

In conclusion, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to express once again my appreciation for your statesmanship and for your courage and leadership. Your country and history will record the great role you have played in bringing peace to Israel and Egypt and, we pray, to the Middle East. I am confident that your impressive qualities of leadership will insure positive Cabinet approval of the proposals that you will put before them. I look forward to seeing you and President Sadat soon in Washington.

With my best personal regards.

Jimmy Carter

203. Memorandum From the White House Counsel (Lipshutz) for the File¹

March 13, 1979

This memorandum is being dictated as we return on Air Force One from Israel and Egypt on March 13, 1979.

Approximately one hour ago, President Carter announced at the Cairo Airport, with President Sadat of Egypt standing at his side, that President Sadat had accepted in full all of the proposals for settlement of the various problems involved in the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. President Carter announced that he had just talked with Prime Minister Begin, which I witnessed at the Cairo Airport, advising him of

¹ Source: Carter Library, Vertical File, Camp David Accords. No classification marking.

this decision by President Sadat.² And Begin stated that he would submit the final matters to his Cabinet. We heard shortly after takeoff from Cairo that Begin had called a meeting of the Israeli Cabinet for 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning,³ Israel time, to discuss and decide upon these last outstanding matters.

Clearly, the final decision is in the hands of the Israelis on the few remaining and relatively less important questions, the resolution of which has been recommended by President Carter and agreed to by President Sadat, and which Begin previously had agreed with Carter to submit to the Cabinet (although he had not stated whether or not he would recommend them to his Cabinet).

On board Air Force One the atmosphere is one of exhilaration, tempered somewhat by the realization that there are still many weeks and months of difficult implementation lying ahead, assuming that the Israeli Cabinet will agree to the final details and that the Knesset of Israel will ratify these actions. The President himself has walked through the plane, thanking everyone who has been involved in the process for their help, and Secretary Vance has received particular expressions of admiration and congratulations along with the President for his role in this process, which has included 10 trips to the Middle East during the past couple of years.

In addition to the President and Mrs. Carter on board, also on board are Secretary and Mrs. Vance, Secretary Harold Brown, Dr. Brzezinski, Hamilton Jordan, Gerald Rafshoon, Ed Sanders, Roy Atherton, Harold Saunders, Bill Quandt, Herbert Hansell, et al. Secretary Vance commented very forcibly that this was a successful team effort and that everybody on board this plane particularly, as well as others, had made a significant contribution to the success of this long effort. One of the obviously important items which must be worked upon is the selection of the United States' representative for the future negotiations between the parties, which are going to be extremely tedious, time-consuming, and complex. Secretary Vance mentioned that it is extremely difficult to find someone like Sol Linowitz, who was excellent in the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, to handle such a project.⁴ Every effort obviously should be made to find a person who has the right characteristics and

² For the text of Carter's statement at the Cairo airport following his meeting with Sadat, March 13, see *Public Papers: Carter*, 1979, p. 430. Although Carter references a telephone conversation with Begin in his remarks no memorandum of conversation of the call has been found, nor is the call logged in the President's Daily Diary.

³ See Document 205 for a discussion of the Cabinet meeting.

⁴ Carter announced the appointment of Special Trade Representative Robert S. Strauss as his personal "Ambassador-at-Large" to the Middle East negotiations on April 24. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Strauss Appointed Envoy for Mideast," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1979, p. A1) Sol Linowitz would succeed Strauss in this role on January 29, 1980.

tenacity to represent the United States government, because these negotiations have proved that it is essential that our government play a key role in the relationship between Israel and Egypt.

In reviewing many of the details of the agreements which have been worked out, it is obvious that the various specific recommendations which I passed on to the President as a result of my communications with Leon Charney, which resulted from his communications with Ezer Weizmann, have been both accurate and helpful.⁵ It is important that first I write an appropriate letter to Leon and further that something from the President be sent to him as an expression of appreciation. This does not mean that the relationship is ended; to the contrary, it probably will continue for a very long period of time and hopefully be as helpful as it has in the past. It is obvious that Ezer Weizmann and Harold Brown have an excellent relationship established and therefore that it may be that many matters which we had handled through these "back channels" can be handled in a direct manner in the future. I have not discussed this with Harold Brown, I do not know if he is interested in getting into the diplomatic or political aspect of relationships, but we should determine these things to make sure that we are coordinated and utilizing this entire relationship with Weizmann in the most effective manner. Perhaps I should discuss this with the President first, and then with Harold Brown.

Having been so close to the day-to-day and hour-to-hour negotiations and other activities in connection with this matter, particularly over the past several days, it is difficult to comprehend the magnitude of the entire situation. Several of us have discussed this and realize that it really is a mammoth undertaking which the President embarked upon, and it appears that the success of it will have a profound effect on both the United States and Israel, as well as many other millions of

⁵ Charney, who was Weizman's U.S. attorney and attached to the U.S. delegation in Jerusalem, wrote that the lack of progress in the March 12 talks had left Lipshutz "depressed." Meeting with Lipshutz, Charney stated that he "pressed" him to "write a memo to the President urging him to insist on taking a signed paper back to the States with him; further, the Americans and Israelis should agree on what had been previously agreed upon and let time settle the outstanding matters." (Charney, *Special Counsel*, pp. 132–133) Following this meeting, Lipshutz produced a handwritten memorandum for Carter at 10 p.m., March 12, which is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 12/78–3/79. As Lipshutz was delivering this memorandum to Carter, Charney wrote, Weizman summoned Charney to a meeting later in the evening of March 12. (Charney, *Special Counsel*, pp. 134–136) At 11:30 p.m., March 12, Lipshutz wrote a second memorandum for Carter, conveying the suggestions made during the Charney-Weizman meeting, including proposals for an exchange of Israeli and Egyptian military personnel in lieu of Egyptian liaison personnel in Gaza and for Egypt to sell Israel a fixed number of barrels of oil at world market rates "provided it does not jeopardize (conflict with) Egyptian national interests," backed by a U.S. guarantee. This memorandum is *ibid*. Charney noted that this memorandum was passed to Carter on the morning of March 13. (Charney, *Special Counsel*, p. 137)

people throughout the world. That is what makes it so difficult to comprehend when you are involved in the minutiae, as well as other things relating to a situation like this.

It is interesting to recall now how Jody and others handled the press treatment of this entire project. From the beginning it was represented, properly, as a mission which had no assurance of success and, to the contrary, had significant likelihood of not succeeding. It is obvious that many cynics felt that President Carter already “had it wrapped up” before he embarked upon the venture, but that is now quite obviously false.

The expectations of success for this trip were correct for two reasons:

1. In fact it was a high risk venture with no assurance whatsoever of success and with every possibility of failure.

2. By keeping the expectations low, should it prove to be successful (as it has) then the accomplishment would of course, seem even greater.

President Carter throughout this entire Middle East situation has demonstrated some amazing characteristics, and even though I have had almost unlimited faith in him for many years, even I did not comprehend his capacity to handle this situation in the manner he has. Among these characteristics are:

1. The ability to study and understand this tremendously complex situation involving so much history, emotions, geopolitical considerations, etc.

2. The ability to establish personal relationships with people who are attractive and people who are unattractive, but all of whom were necessary to give any hope of succeeding in these negotiations.

3. The willingness to devote the amount of time which he has devoted to this entire matter, much more than he has devoted to any other matter since he became President. (I personally believe that he really has taken this on as a “mission” not only because he is President, but because of his personal feelings and concern about this entire situation.)

4. His patience and tenacity in pursuing this basic objective of peace in the Middle East, which he has expressed over the last three or four years, and which he has demonstrated over the last two years. This obviously is in the face of tremendous opposition, frustration, and discouragement.

5. His ability to handle the numerous legal problems involved in negotiation of a treaty, injecting not only the necessary technical abilities, but also the psychological and other factors which have proved to be so necessary in order to reach some type of resolution.

6. His ability to use personal relationships in such a constructive manner as this, which heretofore I personally had seen only in much less significant situations.

For me personally, this of course is a tremendously meaningful experience. To play even a very small role in the achievement of peace in the Middle East between Israel and Egypt, hopefully portending a long term of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors throughout the region, is something that I would have hoped to do, but never dared expect to do, or to be even a small part of, except for the fortuitous relationship which Jimmy Carter and I have developed with each other over the past six or seven years.

Perhaps incorrectly, I feel that one of the reasons which has made Jimmy Carter so tenacious in his efforts to bring about this peace in the Middle East, even though probably subconsciously, is his relationship with me, personally. Obviously there are even more compelling reasons for him to have done so, but it is a source of tremendous satisfaction to me that I have this particular feeling and it makes a lot of the effort of the past four or five years worthwhile.

And, it also makes the “slings and arrows” of the last two years, particularly from Jewish people and Jewish groups, lose their sting and dull the pain.

Bob Lipshutz

204. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 14, 1979

The attached reflects an oral expression of opinion by Secretary Vance in a discussion² at the Cairo airport on March 13, 1979, with President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Khalil.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Final Treaty Package. Secret. On March 14, Vance sent the letter to Cairo in an unnumbered telegram while en route to Washington in Air Force One. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 48, 3/6–15/79)

² See Document 196.

Attachment

Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil³

Washington, undated

Dear Mustafa:

I am writing this to follow up our discussions on March 13 at the Cairo airport concerning the Agreed Minutes to Articles VI (2) and VI (5) of the Treaty of Peace. Those Agreed Minutes are as follows: Quote:

ARTICLE VI (2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

ARTICLE VI (5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented. Unquote.

This will confirm that in my opinion these Agreed Minutes to Articles VI (2) and VI (5) are interpretations of those Articles.

Sincerely yours,

Cyrus Vance⁴

³ Secret.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

205. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, March 14, 1979, 9:25 a.m.

JC: . . . wonderful to hear your voice again.

MB: May I congratulate you on your speech.² I have good news. The two outstanding issues today have been resolved in the Cabinet.

JC: . . . credit to your leadership.

MB: Suggestion in Cabinet that Ezer (Weizman) go to U.S. as soon as possible, and would like to have a meeting with competent advisers of Egypt—Perhaps General Ali (or McDoo [*Macdoub?*] Tamir will also come. And they will finish the (Sinai) withdrawal stages, to be made final from Blair House.

Would like to ask you to use your good offices of Eilts and make suggestion to Egyptians. Either General Ali, ?, or Mubarak.

JC: Have you picked out a time?

MB: Ezer could leave tomorrow or within a few days.

JC: I will tell Eilts to work out schedule with Ambassador Lewis.

MB: Oil also approved. Minister of Energy has a suggestion to make. There are no conditions. Would like him to speak to Vance and Vance to you. He has something of interest to tell you.

JC: Okay. I will tell Vance to expect the call.

MB: Last issue, in conjunction with your letter regarding unilateral action—please send to me (Begin) first the draft letter³ before sending it to Sadat.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Peace Treaty—1979. No classification marking. The President's Daily Diary notes that Carter spoke with Begin from 9:20 a.m. to 9:26 a.m., March 14. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) At the top of the transcript, Carter wrote: "ok. cc: Cy, Zbig, take action on all items. J."

² Upon his early morning arrival from Cairo at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland on March 14, Carter delivered a short address on the success of the Middle East trip. The full text of Carter's speech is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 430–431.

³ On March 20, the Department sent the Embassy in Tel Aviv a draft copy of a letter from Carter to Khalil, informing Khalil of a number of assurances made by Begin to the President during their March 13 breakfast meeting to unilaterally improve political conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, including the lifting of restrictions on political activity and freedom of movement in the territories, as well as the repeal of detention without trial and the relocation of the Israeli military headquarters in Gaza. (Telegram 68933 to Tel Aviv, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79) Lewis delivered the text of the letter to Begin on March 20. (Telegram 931 from Jerusalem, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–1318) The final text of the letter is printed as Document 230.

JC: I will do so.

JC: Let me respond. I think the entire process is gratifying to all of us. I want to express my thanks for your hospitality, and my admiration to you as a strong leader.

MB: Strength from Abraham. Thanks.

I also want to ask Secretary Brown to meet with Ezer to discuss bilateral matters.

JC: Secretary Brown will be glad to meet with Ezer.

MB: I have now been empowered by the Cabinet. You may think now I didn't make a mistake when I said you would leave the country with satisfaction.

JC: Thanks. We will be extending to you and Sadat an invitation at the earliest convenient date and will clear the schedule with you and Sadat before making the invitation public.

MB: The debate will take place next week, perhaps Monday,⁴ Tuesday or Wednesday. The debate will last for 10–12 hours. I hope to get a majority, and even a strong majority.

You saw our democratic process. You have had the experience.

JC: It was a very interesting experience.

MB: In Parliament you know you have to know how to take and how to give. I must still meet coalition parties. I suppose the opposition will vote with us. I hope to get a majority. If not, government will resign, as I said yesterday to the Israeli people.

JC: Israel cannot afford to lose you as Prime Minister. Good luck.

MB: Best to Rosalynn . . .

JC: Our love to Alisa . . .

MB: Only one thing, if the Egyptians prefer the meeting to take place at American encampment at Sinai or in Washington, we will accept either proposal.

JC: I will inquire through Hermann Eilts

MB: Let me know through Lewis.

JC: This is good news indeed.

MB: God bless you.

JC: Good bye.

⁴ March 19.

206. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, March 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Supply of Arms to Egypt and Israel in Connection with the Peace Treaty

During our trip I discussed the supply of arms and other facilities and services and their funding with Egyptian Minister of Defense Kamal Ali and with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman. With the Egyptians, I described an implied release, after a peace treaty was concluded, of a number of equipment items (Tab A), with USG financing of \$1.0 to \$1.5 billion over three years. The funding would be part cash, part FMS credits, the mix and terms to be determined. With the Israelis, I indicated that, in the case of a peace treaty, we would make certain equipment items available (Tab B) and would assist in the relocation of air bases from the Sinai to the Negev. The total funds would (in addition to the current annual \$1.785 billion) be \$2.0 to \$2.5 billion over three years. Again, the mix of grants, credits, and sales was to be determined. With both, I stressed that the U.S. Government was prepared to make these commitments in the context of the Peace Treaty and subject to consultation with and approval of Congress. (Weizman will be in Washington Friday for discussions on this subject.)²

Financing will be critical to accomplishment of these commitments. The options for financing as I see them now are as follows:

	OPTIONS		
	A	B	C
Egypt (\$1.5 billion)			
Terms: credits	40% (\$0.6B)	50% (\$0.75B)	60% (\$0.9B)
cash	60% (\$0.9B)	50% (\$0.75B)	40% (\$0.6B)
Israel (\$2.5 billion)			
Terms: grants	none	\$1.0B	
FMS credits	\$2.0B	\$1.5B	
Other loans	\$0.5B	none	

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 13, Egypt: Arms and Military: 1–7/79. Secret. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, “LD, WQ—need quick reaction. ZB.” Smith forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Vance, at Brown’s request, under a March 15 covering note. Vance’s copy, bearing the stamped notation “CV,” indicating that Vance saw the document is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East—1979.

² See footnote 2, Document 211.

We should begin negotiations on a conservative level of U.S. commitment, but be prepared to move to a level you now decide on. For Israel, I would strongly recommend that you decide now that we will be prepared to seek grant aid for the airbase relocation, in the amount of \$1.0 billion. Since the U.S. intends to perform all the work on the contract, much of this amount would be spent in the United States and not adversely impact on balance of payments. The rest, \$1.5 billion, would be FMS credits (of which half is customarily forgiven). This extra \$1.5 billion could be spent, in a mix to be determined by the Israelis, among equipment, extras for the relocated airbases, and other Sinai relocation costs. For Egypt, I recommend a 50–50 credit-cash split. The cash for sales would have to be found by them, presumably from Saudi Arabia, though this is chancy given likely violent Arab League reactions to the Peace Treaty. We could also seek grants from other western countries and from Japan. If Egypt obtains such a Saudi or other grant, then their terms would be equivalent to the terms we extend Israel for FMS credits, i.e., half forgiven. Alternatively, we might extend Egypt the FMS terms (half forgiven, the rest paid over 20 years beginning 10 years later, at commercial interest terms) that we customarily provide Israel.

The total package shown amounts to \$4.0 billion over the three year period, although the amounts required to be appropriated would be much less. The first year costs and their financing will have to be determined based on how quickly we can get programs going. We can envisage, for instance, that an Egyptian program, front-loaded, might require \$300 million in FMS financing in the first year. The airbase relocation will require as much as \$500 million in the first year, in order to insure completion within the three year limit. These would require an FY 1979 supplemental to get going, while other initial costs might be accomplished by a change in the FY 1980 budget proposal.

The U.S. Government will also need to consider economic aid for Egypt. Egypt's economy is not in good shape, and such aid might be very important to Sadat's political survival. He may well have difficulty in obtaining continued assistance from other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, which in the past has amounted to around \$500 million a year in non-military aid.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to negotiate financial arrangements (covering a three year period) with Israel and Egypt up to, but not exceeding the following:

- a. Israel: \$1.0 grant assistance for airbase construction (Israel would pay all costs above this amount), and \$1.5 billion FMS (half forgiven) credit.

- b. Egypt: \$750 million (none forgiven) FMS credit, and \$750 million in cash sales to be financed by others.

Harold Brown

Tab A

List Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

EGYPT: EQUIPMENT

\$ Million

INDICATED AS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE (but requiring choices among them by the Egyptians to stay within 1.5B\$)

One cruiser (the ALBANY)	34.5
Up to four Gearing Class Destroyers (two for active service; two for cannibalization if necessary).	34.7
Reasonable quantities of Armored Personnel Carriers (e.g., 1000)	125.0
Twelve I-Hawk missile batteries	500.0
Additional F-5 aircraft (50)	500.0
Additional C-130 aircraft (20)	230.0
CH-47 "Chinook" helicopters (40)	350.0
Pressure test of Egyptian Soviet-built submarine hulls	12.0
Technical Data Package for retrofitting current Egyptian tanks	300.0

TO BE CONSIDERED:

- F-4 aircraft in moderate numbers (35)
- One or two diesel submarines (Guppy type or Tang class)

TURNED DOWN:

- F-15 or F-16 aircraft
- Attack helicopters
- M60 tanks

³ No classification marking.

Tab B

List Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

ISRAEL: EQUIPMENT

INDICATED AS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE

Acceleration of 55 F-16 aircraft, but keeping the same original total of 75, with deliveries to begin in January 1980 instead of April 1981.

600 AGM-65B (MAVERICK) Precision-guided bombs	24.0
600 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles	56.0
200 M60A3 Tanks	231.0
800 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers	108.0
200 M113 Armored Self-Propelled Howitzers	33.2
14 Phalanx Close-in-Weapon Systems	65.0
4 Encapsulated Harpoon Fire Control Systems	15.0
Intelligence and Early Warning Equipment	Indef.

TO BE CONSIDERED:

Adding to the 75 an additional number of F-16 aircraft up to 55 for a total up to 130.	500.0
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⁴ Secret.

207. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 79–10152.

Washington, March 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Arab Reactions

Arab renunciation of President Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is building toward a crescendo. We expect the effort by Iraq, Syria, and Libya to stampede the more moderate Arabs into unqualified condemnation of the treaty to be largely successful. The culmination of the effort will be a new conference in Baghdad—possibly timed to open the day a treaty is signed—and a vote to impose sanctions against Egypt. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We detect some initial ambivalence on the part of Saudi Arabia and Jordan toward “punishing” Sadat. It will be difficult to keep them that way until the early, largely hostile Arab reaction has run its course. The sentiment, moreover, is tentative and the full weight of anti-Sadat pressure has not yet been applied. That will occur at Baghdad, where there will be few significant countervailing pressures. We doubt that the moderates have the self-confidence to stand against the hardliners given their own reservations about the treaty. We should not rule out that the Iranians will ask to participate, adding to the pressure on Saudi Arabia. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The day of reckoning that the Saudis have long feared appears to be at hand. In their eyes a treaty forces them to choose between two pillars of Saudi foreign policy—Arab unity and a special relationship with the United States. They seek a middle ground, but developments since Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem seem to have denied them this option. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The signs in recent months indicate that—for the Saudis—the Arab option is in the ascendancy, although the issue is a contentious one within the leadership. Foreign Minister Saud told Ambassador West on Wednesday² that the immediate and “automatic” consequences of Egypt’s signing a treaty would be ouster of Egypt from the Arab

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 119, Arab Reactions. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A notation on the first page reads in part: “Prepared by the Office of Regional & Political Analysis.”

² Likely, a mistaken reference to West’s March 13 meeting with Saud and Turki in Riyadh. A full report of the conversation is in telegram 419 from Riyadh, March 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790118–0437.

League, transfer of League headquarters from Cairo, and expulsion of Egypt from the Arab Mutual Defense Pact. Such sanctions were agreed to at the Baghdad summit last November.³ On the important question of economic sanctions, Saud said his government would “maintain its economic contacts with Egypt” and continue “current commitments.” Further economic commitments were ruled out. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A contributing factor to Saudi attitudes is skepticism about US willingness to guarantee Saudi security. Such doubts will not be easily or quickly overcome. Prince Saud did say, however, that Crown Prince Fahd wants to reschedule his visit to Washington—an indication in part of the great apprehension among Saudi leaders that their “Arab commitments” will undermine the “special relationship.” [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We expect considerable vacillation from the Saudis as their key leaders consider their next step. Barring dramatic treaty language or unilateral Israeli gestures on linkage, however, we expect a gradual and reluctant slide by Saudi Arabia into an Arab consensus position condemning the treaty and imposing sanctions, possibly including new limits on economic aid. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Iraq, Syria, and Libya will do their best to quickly push reluctant Arab governments into unqualified condemnation of the treaty and President Sadat. The actual treaty language is probably immaterial and unlikely to affect the attitude of the hardliners. The moderating role played by Syria and Iraq in the recent Yemeni conflict—after Saudi efforts to defuse the crisis had failed—probably gives them added leverage with the Saudis. In the short term, the peace treaty will quicken the pace of Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation, particularly in the area of foreign policy and military cooperation. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

We look for Palestinian groups to show their anger over a treaty by:

- Attempted acts of terrorism by radical Palestinians against Egyptian, Israeli, and perhaps US targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Israel proper.

- Encouragement for continued protests by Palestinians in the occupied territories, and Palestinian demonstrations in Lebanon.

It is possible that Yasir Arafat and the more moderate Palestinian majority will temporize briefly while they examine the terms of the peace for Palestinian gains and assess the reaction of other Arabs. Such restraint will likely soon give way if the Arab world, as seems likely, in-

³ See footnote 7, Document 85.

interprets the treaty language as confirming a “Sadat sellout.” [2½ lines not declassified]

Arab support for a treaty is meager. An Omani official reportedly said his government would take a moderate line at any conference on sanctions. Sudan’s President Numayri has continued his steadfast support of Sadat, but he is not in line with popular sentiment in Sudan and his position is costing him politically. Numayri told the US Ambassador that the key was continued US efforts to work toward peace on the West Bank and Gaza. Numayri hinted that his stand made US support for his regime all the more important.⁴ [handling restriction not declassified]

Tunisia, flanked by rejectionist Algeria and Libya, has withheld official comment, [1 line not declassified] Because of increasingly difficult domestic problems and his need for Arab support for Morocco’s deteriorating position in Western Sahara, Hassan has been muting his support for Sadat. [handling restriction not declassified]

⁴ No other record of this conversation has been found.

208. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 15, 1979

SUBJECT

[1½ lines not declassified] Fatah Leader Yasir Arafat

1. [1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]
2. [1½ lines not declassified] Arafat denies having threatened American officials, accuses the Israelis of the murder of his aide on 22 January 1979,² and berates the United States for failing to denounce this murder. Arafat then asks the following questions on the current peace talks:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 136, Quandt: 3/20–31/79. Secret.

² Reference is to the January 22 assassination of Ali Hassan Salameh, reputed to be behind the attack on the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. (Edward Cody, “Bomb Kills Palestinian On Israeli Wanted List,” *The Washington Post*, January 23, 1979, p. A11)

a. Is it true that the U.S. has agreed to guarantee that Israel will receive its needed oil supplies, at OPEC prices, from either Egypt or the U.S.?

b. Is it true that the U.S. is handling the issue of Egypt's defense pacts with other Arab states by obtaining a specific Israeli guarantee not to attack Syria or Jordan? [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Arafat sees this as an "open invitation" for the Israelis to strike at the Palestinians in Lebanon, rather than protection for Syria or Jordan.)

c. Is it true that the U.S. will agree to a clause making any "self-rule" timetable contingent upon "cooperation" by the inhabitants of the occupied territories? [*handling restriction not declassified*]

3. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

4. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

5. This information is also being provided to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.³ (U)

Stansfield Turner⁴

³ Quandt produced a draft response to Arafat's March 10 message. The draft was edited from an earlier March 22 draft by Saunders, and forwarded to Brzezinski on March 23. The message repeated U.S. commitment to "focus its primary attention on the issues of concern to the Palestinians" in the coming negotiations and urged the Palestinians to consider providing "quiet authorization" to some West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to work with the United States and Egypt to bring about an Israeli military withdrawal and create a self governing authority. On Arafat's concern over the January 22 assassination of his aide, Ali Hassan Salameh, the response states that the United States "had no association whatever" with Salameh's murder. At the same time, the message concludes, the United States "seeks comparable assurance that all components of the PLO will take measures to prevent violence" against "American officials or installations." Both Quandt's and Saunders's drafts are *ibid*.

⁴ Turner signed "Stan Turner" above this typed signature.

209. Letter From President Carter to King Hussein of Jordan¹

Washington, March 16, 1979

Your Majesty:

I have asked² my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General David Jones, to meet³ with you to insure even stronger bonds of friendship between our two countries. My own son⁴ is accompanying the delegation at my request to convey personal best wishes to you and to your family.

As should be the case between friends, consultations on matters of mutual concern are essential. Recent developments in the Middle East have raised questions which we need to assess together. Events in Iran, in Yemen, and, most recently, the agreement reached between Egypt and Israel, have introduced new realities into the region which affect the interests of your nation as well as my own. I am particularly anxious that we fully understand each other's views on these matters.

As you know, Your Majesty, I am personally committed to work for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, a peace which addresses the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. I well appreciate that this goal has not yet been achieved and that continued efforts will be required. Those who do not want to see a stable and peaceful

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Jordan: King Hussein, 3/79–9/80. No classification marking.

² In a March 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, Christopher, and Jones, Carter outlined his instructions for their mission to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In particular, he instructed them to "emphasize the following points": 1) the "strong and enduring friendship which binds our nation" to Saudi Arabia and Jordan; 2) U.S. efforts in the "latest round" of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations remain directed toward the "goal of a comprehensive peace" and that the "imminent" agreement between Egypt and Israel is "only the first step toward a wider peace;" 3) the United States "understand that true peace cannot be achieved until the Palestinian issue is resolved;" 4) the "broad support" the U.S. peace initiative enjoys in Congress and among the U.S. public; 5) the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Jordan should understand the "strident criticism, political attacks, and economic sanctions" against Egypt "could only place new strains on our relationship with each nation;" 6) the United States wishes to "share" its view of the "strategic dangers" facing the Middle East; and 7) to this end, they should reiterate U.S. pledges for close security cooperation and consultation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 1–3/79)

³ See Document 213.

⁴ James Earl "Chip" Carter III.

Middle East will try to exploit the situation in the area to the detriment of the Arab peoples. We are not prepared to allow this to happen since our friendships and our interests require that the bonds of cooperation that have marked our relations in the past should continue in the future.

Dr. Brzezinski, who was with me on my recent visits to Egypt and Israel, will review with you my thinking on how the agreement between those two countries can serve as the cornerstone for a broader peace settlement in the area. I firmly believe that a stable pattern of peaceful relations can develop among all of our friends in the Middle East. This would greatly enhance our ability to meet the many challenges to stability from within and without the region.

Your Majesty, I know that you share my view that we must always look for opportunities to advance the cause of peace and to strengthen the bonds between our countries. This is a time for leadership and vision as we work together for a peaceful Middle East. I know that you will share your views frankly with the members of my personal delegation. I look forward to seeing you personally in May.

With my best personal regards,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Egypt and Israel¹

Washington, March 17, 1979, 0341Z

65822. Subject: Joint Letter.

1. Secret-entire text
2. Following is final text of joint letter concerning West Bank/Gaza negotiations:
3. Begin quote:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0868. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hansell; cleared by Atherton and Joseph Hulings (S/S-O); approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

The President, The White House

Dear Mr. President:

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Government of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 1978, the annexed documents entitled 'A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David' and 'Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel.'

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty. In accordance with the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East,' the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree prior to the elections on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Israel and Egypt.

The two governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self governing authority, as specified in the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East.' A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.

Sincerely Yours,
Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat
Menachem Begin. End quote.

4. Israelis wish to add footnote following signatures reading as follows: Quote: in each paragraph in which expression West Bank appears it is being and will be understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria. Unquote. Since Egyptians have been very insistent that letter be a joint one signed by both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, we need to include the footnote in a manner that will meet Israeli objective without directly associating Sadat with it. We propose to prepare the letter so that the signatures will be at the bottom of a page and the footnote will be on an attached page which the Egyptians can disregard if they wish. To avoid misunderstandings, the above footnote should be reflected in the letter as you deliver it to both governments.

Vance

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, March 17, 1979, 0345Z

65824. Entire text. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Weizman March 16.

1. Secretary met with Weizman for about an hour afternoon March 16, for first half hour with group comprising Evron and Tehila on Israeli side and on US side Mrs. Benson, Atherton, Saunders, Hansell and Korn, and for second half hour alone. Following are main points that came up in group session.

2. Weizman expressed concern that in their talks this weekend on sub-phasing General Ali might press him for withdrawal from Al Arish in three months. He said Dayan has already told the Likud Knesset group that withdrawal from Al Arish would be in four months; short-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Joseph Hulings (S/S–O); approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2633)

ening of that time would cause problems. Secretary said he would do his best to help get agreement on four months. He could not guarantee that Ali wouldn't start by asking for three months, but he did not think this was something the parties should get hungup on. Secretary pointed out that there are two other things that might cause problems in the talks on sub-phasing: 1) the fact that Alma comes at the end of 9 months instead of 5 or 6 as earlier agreed; and 2) only allowing Egyptian civilian police into evacuated areas when full withdrawal is completed. Weizman indicated that if Israel could get some further assurance on provision of oil from Egypt transfer of Alma could take place earlier than nine months.

3. Weizman's main concern was with levels of assistance.² In Knesset debate on the treaty next week he wanted to be able to say that "our defense problems are being taken care of." He would like to leave the US with assurances on this. Israel had asked only for \$3 billion in redeployment assistance but it now looks as though actual cost will be \$4 billion, or \$3.5 billion at minimum. Airbases³ will cost \$1.1 billion; if US assistance is \$2.5 billion this will leave only \$1.4 billion for all other costs. Weizman stressed magnitude of work Israel will have to do to build infrastructure in Negev and value of infrastructure and installations it is giving up in Sinai. Furthermore inflation is steadily eroding value of US annual \$1 billion FMS program. Weizman asked that annual assistance program be increased by \$500 million and that another billion dollars be added to proposed USG redeployment aid package. This would cover Israel's needs and give Israelis a feeling of security. It would be very good if I could go back with this, Weizman said. If not, Israel will still sign the treaty but "there will be much less joy," in later remarks, Evron expressed concern over what he had heard concerning terms of our redeployment assistance package. Evron said there had been talk about commercial bank loan and this was worrisome (owing to an interruption Evron was unable to spell out fully his concern and there was no time for further discussion of it).

² Meeting with Weizman on March 16, Brown stated that the annual foreign military sales level was "likely to remain at present level given congressional attitudes and state of American economy." Moreover, Brown indicated that the United States intended to budget \$2–2.5 billion to assist with Israel's redeployment from Sinai. (Telegram 65826 to Tel Aviv, March 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)

³ On March 16, Department of Defense officials briefed Weizman on the conclusions of the U.S. airbase survey group, and informed the Israeli Defense Minister that the United States would "take responsibility" to make operational four Israeli squadrons from the proposed Ovda and Matred bases in the Negev desert within three years. (Telegram 65825 to Tel Aviv, March 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)

4. Evron said he had instructions from Prime Minister to raise Sadat's statement⁴ that the treaty should be signed only in Washington. Evron said the Prime Minister was surprised that Sadat seems to be changing his mind about signing in Jerusalem and Cairo; he wonders what else President Sadat will change his mind about. Prime Minister would like to stick to the original plan. Secretary and Saunders explained that it was our understanding that Sadat was not ruling out signing in Jerusalem and Cairo but that this was a matter that he and Begin would discuss in Washington. Evron said word he had from Jerusalem was that Sadat had made specific statement that there should be signing only in Washington. Secretary said we would look into this.

5. Weizman said he was "awfully sorry" about killing of the two West Bank youths at Halhul.⁵ With Begin in bed and his (Weizman's) absence, Yadin had convened a conference of army and political leaders and given an instruction for a court of inquiry. Weizman said he would look into the matter personally on his return.

Vance

⁴ Speaking with journalists in his village of Mit Abul Kom on March 16, Sadat stated that there should be a single signing ceremony in Washington for the Arabic, English, and Hebrew texts of the peace treaty, a view Khalil asked Eilts to forward to Washington. (Telegram 5453 from Cairo, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0872) Earlier, on March 14, Sadat had communicated to Begin his view that Washington should serve as the site of the first treaty signing ceremony as Carter should "receive full credit" for the treaty, a position Begin endorsed. (Telegram 5225 from Cairo, March 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0890; Telegram 5309 from Tel Aviv, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2640) On March 17, Ciechanover informed Lewis of Begin's "great concern" over the possibility of a single signing ceremony. Begin believed Sadat's presence for a signing ceremony in Jerusalem would be "a powerful political symbol" and would be "very upset" if Sadat chose not to come. (Telegram 5386 from Tel Aviv, March 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2623)

⁵ Reference is to the shooting of two Palestinian demonstrators by Israeli troops in the West Bank town of Halhul on March 15. A summary of the incident is in telegram 882 from Jerusalem, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790119–0350.

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, March 17, 1979, 6:30–8:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>United States</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski	Crown Prince Fahd Abd al-Aziz
Warren Christopher	al Saud
Ambassador John West	Prince Abdullah Abd al-Aziz al
General David Jones	Saud
Chip Carter	Prince Sultan Abd al-Aziz al Saud
Gary Sick	Prince Saud Faysal al Saud
David Ransom	Dr. Rashad Pharaon
Isa Sabbagh	Mr. Abd al-Rahman al-Mansuri
	Note taker

Crown Prince Fahd opened the meeting by noting that the audience with the King had been excellent.²

Dr. Brzezinski said that he brought greetings from the President. He hoped that the Crown Prince would soon be able to visit Washington and continue these talks. The President believes that our countries are linked not only by interests but by a shared belief in God and a special spiritual bond. There is a very special relationship between us. We wish to preserve that. We believe those relations today are challenged by internal and external threats to our interests. As a consequence we must respond to the challenge, to determine if the future world will be dominated by moderate or radical forces. The external threat originates with the Soviet Union, and its effects have been seen in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. The internal threat consists of forces creating regimes favorable to the Soviet Union. The United States is determined to respond to both challenges. In recent weeks we

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the King's Palace.

² The U.S. delegation met with Khalid at the King's Palace from 5:45 p.m. to 6:10 p.m. on March 17. The memorandum of conversation from this meeting is *ibid*. Earlier the same day, the delegation met with Saud in the latter's office from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., where the discussion covered the state of U.S.-Saudi relations, the threats to the Middle East posed by the Soviet Union and by "radicalism" in the region, U.S. efforts to promote a wider security framework, U.S. relations with the Arab world, and Washington's efforts to broker a comprehensive regional peace for the region. On the last point, Brzezinski highlighted three results of the impending Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty: the establishment of the principle of Israeli withdrawal and dismantlement of the settlements, the initiation of Palestinian involvement in the peace process, and the cementing of Arab/American friendships. The memorandum of conversation for this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

have demonstrated our intent to respond. We are prepared to use force if necessary to protect the vital interests of ourselves or of our friends.

We are willing to work with all Arab countries who have shared security concerns, to shape a consultative security framework. This is not an attempt to split the Arab world, though we recognize that some Arab countries are better friends than others. It is in our longer term interests to increase our relations with Syria and Iraq, and we would welcome your suggestions on how that might be done. I have already spoken to King Khalid about the intellectual and spiritual revival of Islam and the importance that we attach to it. In this context, we want to find a solution to the Arab-Israel dispute.

We see the Israel-Egyptian treaty as the beginning and a cornerstone of a comprehensive peace settlement. The President has made very clear his determination to use this treaty to work to protect and preserve the rights of the Palestinians. This [is] a point of personal principle. We hope that the treaty will establish the principle of Israeli withdrawal and Israeli dismantlement of settlements in occupied territories. It should also lay the basis for the United States Arab friendship since it will result in changing attitudes on both sides. The treaty opens the door of redressing justice for the Palestinians and creating new conditions for giving the Palestinians their legitimate rights. We also believe that anything that hurts or undermines the treaty helps our adversaries. The Soviets do not wish a treaty, the Arab radicals do not wish one, the anti-Arab forces in the United States oppose it, and those Israelis who want to retain all of their lands also oppose it. So we want your cooperation over the next few months when it will be particularly difficult after signing the treaty.

We believe at this new historical stage you and we are ready for new wider relationships; but any economic or political sanctions against Egypt would hurt us as well [as] Egypt. We have been encouraged to hear that it is not your intention to do anything to disadvantage or hurt Egypt and that you will exert every effort to maintain normal relations with Egypt. This is a statesmanlike position. The President in Cairo pledged himself to work to solve the problem of the Palestinians. I cannot imagine any President in the future willing to do so much for the Palestinians. I would like to be able to tell him from you when we go back that there will be no tangible actions by you that would hurt Egypt or us. The President hopes that you will be able to visit Washington soon to discuss these matters and joint decisions to be taken. In the meantime, we remain committed to relations with you which we think are very deep.

Crown Prince Fahd said he was pleased when he first heard of the visit. He saw a clear indication of the interest of the President of the United States. All we hope for is that the efforts of President Carter con-

tinue to another stage to see the objective achieved with justice. I can assure you it is one of our salient principles that Saudi Arabia will not hurt anyone, so it stands to reason that we will not hurt Egypt which is our friend and relative. It suffices to mention two things—last week we signed with Egypt a \$120 million agreement for purchase of machinery and another \$525 million contract. Would we do that if we wanted to hurt Egypt? Of course one must admit as a realist that you cannot tell what will happen next week. But I reiterate we will not permit harm to come to anyone through us.

Saudi Arabia is thinking seriously about sending a special emissary to Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinians. Perhaps this will cause them to reduce their enmity and bring them closer to moderation. This is just a hope. Circumstances are not settled. Our hope is that the treaty involving Israel, Egypt and the United States will embody something with which we can work and put to rest those anguished souls who wish to do something drastic. We need something we can use as a counter-argument. Does the treaty indicate the path on which the Palestinians travel to determine their own future.

Dr. Brzezinski said the treaty has provisions which create the circumstances for Palestinians to participate in the political process. This will probably not be satisfactory initially but if it is exploited by the Jordanians and Palestinians the situation on the West Bank can be transformed.

Mr. Christopher said that the crux of the negotiation over the next several months will be the efforts of President Sadat to find linkages or relationships between the treaty and a comprehensive settlement. If Sadat wanted only a bilateral settlement, he could have had that long ago, but he held out and now he has a strong commitment that negotiations will begin one month after the treaty is ratified with respect to arrangements on the West Bank. The timetable has been laid out under which, within one year, the modalities had to be determined with regard to election and self-government. Both Palestinians and Jordanians are free to participate. He wants to make it clear that Sadat fought hard for the process leading beyond the bilateral stage.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was predictable that the radical Arabs would say this is not enough. But we want to start a process which over the next few years transforms the conditions on the West Bank. Those Israelis who want to retain permanent control are very fearful about the provisions of the treaty. He had recently been to Israel with President Carter, and he could say truthfully that he was surprised by the political difficulties that Begin is encountering. That is why we are anxious to start a process as soon as possible to insure that the process is not derailed. The creation of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty helps to overcome difficulties in the United States thereby creating possibilities for a wider

relationship on security issues with Arab states. This is why the President asked him to come here. You understand that we are walking down the path of history together.

Crown Prince Fahd asked is there nothing in the treaty that the Palestinians after a certain time will get self-determination? The Palestinians will ask us that.

Dr. Brzezinski said the words “self-determination” have not been used. To Israel that means a separate Palestinian state. We have used the words “participate in determining their future,” because we believe that the next five years will bring conditions in which Palestinian and Israeli objectives are not incompatible. He mentioned the Peres speech in the Knesset on Palestinian rights as evidence that change does take place over time. Golda Meir said there was no such thing as a Palestinian.³ Begin said one year ago that the Israelis are Palestinians. Peres may be the next Prime Minister and he spoke of the rights of the Palestinians. President Carter and President Sadat created a framework in which we can redefine existing reality into something very different within the next five years.

Mr. Christopher said that difficult questions lie ahead in determining the scope of self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The concept of full autonomy is to a large degree self-government. Institutions can be created on the West Bank and Gaza Strip which would eliminate most of the objectionable aspects of outside involvement. It is important that the Palestinians find a means of becoming part of the negotiations themselves. We are prepared to welcome the Palestinians into negotiations on the basis of their acceptance of Resolution 242. Your government earlier made efforts along those lines. We hope you will do so again to insure that moderate Palestinians join the process.

Crown Prince Fahd said of course they would continue the process toward the results mentioned, but they are asked questions and they need an answer when the Palestinians ask them. They hear the pronouncements of the ultimate aim but they want assurances that they have a choice of their own future.

Dr. Brzezinski said the answer is that in the course of the next five years the situation can be altered in ways not specifically predictable at present. If the United States now stated flatly that there would be a Palestinian state in five years, they would not get a single Israeli prepared

³ Referring to the Zionists who arrived in Palestine in the early 20th century, Meir was quoted in the June 15, 1969, *Sunday Times* [London], as saying: “There were no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.” (*Sunday Times*, June 15, 1969).

to cooperate in the process. But many Israeli critics of Begin in the Knesset say the result will be a Palestinian entity with self-government. Therefore, we hope and ask for two things. First, we want the Palestinians to show the political wisdom to seize this opportunity; secondly, we want our friends, and especially our close friends with whom we can cooperate on regional security, to give this process a chance and not join into actions designed to derail it. I am very encouraged by what his Royal Highness said that Saudi Arabia has an overriding interest in shaping a moderate Middle East.

Mr. Christopher said that we live in a world of alternatives. This alternative (the treaty) is much preferable to others. Leaving the *status quo* only creates a dangerous situation. If the present situation continues and the Israeli occupation continues, there is no chance of progress.

Crown Prince Fahd said that he would speak as a friend and that he shared the desire for a stable Middle East, but he wanted to mention and make clear that no one can guarantee that what we say will be heeded by Iraq, Syria, or the others. We will do our best because we share this view. We will try to knock some sense into them. He would like to have something clear, however; if the area experiences acts of destruction and we find ourselves keeping quiet or following a policy not readily understood, you should know that we are not being destructive but dealing with the matter in our own way. We are happy to consult but you should not misunderstand our motives. It simply underscores the need of both sides to get together on what is happening. Things are not predictable.

Dr. Brzezinski said that his mission is an example that we are always ready to do that. We hope that you will soon be able to consult with the President, since there is no substitute for consultation at the highest level. He deduced that our fundamental objectives are similar, that we share the same concern regarding the external threat and internal security and to continue to help Egypt set in motion the peace process so that we can go on to the next phase. We are talking about a partnership for moderation and stability in the Middle East.

Crown Prince Fahd said this is what is required.

Crown Prince Saud noted that there were certain Arab League technical measures that would be taken.

Dr. Brzezinski said we would hope the Arab League would not force you to do things that you would not want to do, such as economic sanctions.

Crown Prince Saud said the technical measures are not punitive but jointly agreed upon by the Arab League including such things as a boycott.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the Arab League measures would not have the effect of economic sanctions. (All said no.) He noted that we are launching ourselves on an effort to help the area. We intend to help Egypt militarily, and other damage to Egypt would hurt us. We might as well be frank about it.

Prince Saud said that the measures stipulated by the Arab League are not to be taken as punitive measures against Egypt or the United States.

Mr. Christopher said that he was heartened by the indication that Saudi Arabia will not take unilateral direct steps to interfere with the peace process. We are anxious to report that to President Carter. In the candor of our friendship it should be pointed out that the U.S. people and the Congress may not distinguish so clearly between acts taken unilaterally or collectively with Arab friends. If you do make efforts to persuade others, it would be desirable if this became known, even if it fails, and I hope that it does not. We have asked Congress to do some extraordinary things in our mutual interest so it is very desirable to be able to explain to Congress the acts that have been taken.

Crown Prince Fahd said that the point was well taken with regard to your attempts to bring Congress around. He hoped that you would bear with me when he says that in this part of the world we know best how to make friends. Some things are better done quietly.

Dr. Brzezinski said we are not asking you that, and not giving you advice on how to conduct your relations. We wonder what is behind the words used by Prince Saud. We do not want to surprise you and we do not want to be surprised by you. We understand the Foreign Minister says that collective actions will not prevent Saudi cooperation. This is really important to us. We are going to the Congress to ask money for Egypt, to undertake measures to enhance security for the region as a whole to promote moderation, and to prevent the Soviets from gaining a position. So we need to know what you will be doing.

Prince Saud said the measures to be taken would consist of three categories. (The interpretation of what might be harmful to the bilateral relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia would depend on the nature of those relations.) These actions will stem directly from the Arab League and the Mutual Defense Pact. In the event the Egyptians sign a treaty, the automatic results or the measures to be taken will be based on the regulations and charter of the Arab League: First, suspension of membership in the Arab League; second, moving the headquarters from Cairo elsewhere; and, thirdly, to apply Arab boycott regulations to Egyptian companies or institutions dealing with Israel. This means changing the relationship not only between Egypt and Saudi Arabia but between all the members of the Arab League. They will change the responsibility of Egypt to the Arab League and vice versa. It is some-

thing like a member of NATO having a treaty with the Soviet Union. What relations would they then have with the rest of NATO?

Dr. Brzezinski said there were two questions:

—First, what economic effect would the boycott have with regard to Egyptian-Saudi relations?

—Secondly, are you telling me that at a time when the United States is starting to help the Egyptian military become stronger in the region with respect to Israel, you would terminate assistance to Egypt for military purposes?

(All the Princes shake their heads no.)

Crown Prince Fahd said that he had explained at Baghdad⁴ that he would not stop aid to Egypt. He cited the two examples that he had given previously as evidence that Saudi Arabia had no such intention.

Prince Saud said there was one point that needed to be clear. We consider Israel to be the enemy, not just any state. Therefore, any agreement that Egypt makes with Israel is not just like any agreement. With respect to cooperation with the United States, that will continue forever. That is not a question.

Mr. Christopher asked if Egypt will lose some aid due to its departure from the Arab League. (Prince Sultan shook his head no.)

Prince Saud said he wanted to be careful in his reply because he was not sure what the Arab League might pay to Egypt. In fact Egypt might gain by not being required to pay its dues to the Arab League.

Crown Prince Fahd said that the situation was very delicate. He repeated that they would lean over backwards to help obviate the problem facing Egypt, but if they fail they are only human.

Dr. Brzezinski said that in all relations with Saudi Arabia, now and in the past, we have found them to be men of their words. President Carter has given his word that we will work for the West Bank. They should remind their Arab colleagues that we see the Egyptian-Israel treaty as the first step to a comprehensive settlement. Even the Baghdad conference called for a comprehensive settlement, so on that basis we can work together.

Crown Prince Fahd said that when they talk to the Palestinians and their Arab friends who have ears to hear, can we say we have it as word from President Carter that this treaty is only the first step to the larger goal and that he is committed to work for a settlement of the Palestinian problem so that they will have freedom and self-determination?

Dr. Brzezinski asked him to use the phrase “self-expression” rather than “self-determination”. We cannot signal a Palestinian state. We

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 85.

have used the phrase that they would “participate in determining their own future”.

Crown Prince Fahd said that was an exceptionally anglo-Saxon phrase. There is nothing like that in Arabic. (Some discussion ensued about how to translate the various phrases.)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how President Carter’s speech⁵ in Cairo had been translated. He thought they should use that translation. That was a very careful choice of words.

Crown Prince Fahd said that the status of Jerusalem had a very special significance for this country. Muslims first turned to Jerusalem to pray until God declared that they should turn to Mecca.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had been asked this specifically in Israel, i.e., to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. There are also demands for such an action in the United States. Our position remains unchanged. This issue will be resolved only in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement.

Mr. Christopher said that we stand by our position not to recognize any unilateral steps by Israel which claim that whole territory. It is recognized by us as occupied territory to be dealt with in the context of a settlement of the West Bank and Gaza.

Crown Prince Fahd said that this had been a very fruitful exchange. He would like once more to reiterate their determination to be helpful in lessening the problems. We will be sending out words and emissaries to lessen the problems. We urge you to recognize human limits. We will come to you at once and say, “This is the problem that remains.” We must stay in close contact and look at the whole area. We are surrounded by more than just nuisances. Try to see the situation that we are in and never attribute ulterior motives to us. Saudi Arabia will not dig the U.S. in the ribs or harm relations with Egypt.

[Omitted here is discussion of regional security issues.]

⁵ The text of Carter’s March 10 address to Egypt’s People’s Assembly is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, pp. 412–414.

213. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Amman, March 18, 1979, 3:15–4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>United States</i>	<i>Jordan</i>
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski	King Hussein
Warren Christopher	Crown Prince Hassan
General David Jones	Prime Minister Mudhar Badran
Chip Carter	Abdul-Hamid Sharaf
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotis	Abd al-Salam Majali
Michael Sterner	Hasan Ibrahim
Gary Sick	

(At the beginning of the meeting there was a brief photo opportunity by the press.)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had asked him to give the King a personal letter.² *Dr. Brzezinski* said that our countries are bound by certain common interests and shared expectations. We have entered a particularly turbulent situation which affects social systems and the distribution of power. Perhaps the central choice in future international arrangements will be whether domination will be by radical or moderate forces. This is a problem that is both local and regional.

The President is seeking a just and lasting peace. No President since 1948 has been committed as deeply personally and willing to take risks to himself as this President with regard to this issue. If this President does not succeed, the next President will not try. His failure will be taken as an object lesson that it is better not to touch the problem because of the political risks. President Carter has staked his personal political fortunes on this issue. He wished to help moderate forces prevail. We would like to shape an Arab Middle East which is moderate in nature and at peace. Our premise is that what hurts U.S. power helps the Soviets and hurts our friends.

There are two basic threats—internal and external. The internal threat is the rising appeal of radicalism which is rooted in many social causes. The conflict with Israel contributes to this, particularly in the Palestinian case. So the internal struggles are strong, perhaps growing. The external threat is the Soviet ability to extend its power, to increase its military strength. The Soviet ideology is not congenial to the U.S. and does not have great appeal to very many people anywhere. But

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Hashemite Palace.

² See Document 209.

they do have an ability to project their military power, and that is serious.

The U.S. is prepared to respond to both threats. For the external threat, we are willing to use military power if our vital interests require it. An example of that was our sending of the carrier *Constellation* to the Arabian Sea.

There are three basic principles which guide our approach.

—First of all, we want to work with those Arab countries that are willing to work with us. We wish to have a consultative security arrangement which would be nothing like an alliance; however, there may be circumstances susceptible to bilateral or multilateral security arrangements, depending on the situation.

—Secondly, we are ready to cooperate with all Arab states. It is not our intention to split the Arabs. We wish to work closer with our friends and moderates, and we are not excluding others. Iraq, for example, has been helpful in Yemen. We see the Islamic resurgence as terribly important. It marks the rebirth of Arab vitality which is the best bulwark against communism.

—Thirdly, we wish to promote a process of a comprehensive peace in the Arab-Israel dispute.

The Israel-Egyptian treaty will be concluded shortly. We have promoted it and we see no other choice. Trying to solve all differences at once is, in fact, to solve nothing for a long time, or ever. Rather, we believe that setting in motion a process will establish the principles of withdrawal and the dismantling of settlements. It establishes a precedent. Maybe this will not be universally applied. However, if it is exploited intelligently it can help the Palestinians. The President has made a public pledge to that effect, both in Cairo and in Israel. Once that process begins, people will have to focus on clearcut issues such as elections, registration, who votes, and other clear problems. That will have an important political effect and help to mobilize world public opinion on this issue.

We have been asked why do we not state clearly or precisely what the final outcome of this process will be. First of all, we do not know the answer to the question. Secondly, to state it would, in fact, be counter-productive. If we state an outcome favorable to the Arabs, the Israelis will not join. If we state an outcome favorable to the Israelis, then no Arabs will join. And if we require major concessions of both sides, neither will join. Rather, we need to set in motion a process which is somewhat open-ended. Let the process shape attitudes. There have been major changes, both among the Arabs and the Israelis. Mr. Peres now speaks about the rights of the Palestinians. Begin once told me at Camp David that he would rather cut off his hand than to see a settlement dismantled. However, now he says that he will resign if they do not dis-

mantle some settlements in the Sinai. This is a dramatic change in attitudes.

Arab stereotypes have often been found offensive in the U.S., but that is changing radically today. If credit is to be given, Sadat has to be given credit for this change. The American public now sees a difference in those most interested in peace.

Therefore, we intend to persist. We intend to complete the treaty and move on to the next phase. We want to seek through negotiations to resolve the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. This will certainly be more difficult than the first phase. But what we have is an opening wedge to a serious, sustained effort leading to respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Our own vital interests are involved. This is the only way to real security. The only way to stop an inimical process. We wish that our friends not engage in actions which will make our job more difficult. We also hope that in quiet ways our friends can help us. We recognize that our friends have constraints and may possibly have to act indirectly.

We hope to engage the moderate Palestinians in negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza. We want to give local government as much power as possible and ensure that elections are real political exercises. This will not be easy. The Palestinians are suspicious. They live under a military occupation which challenges their sense of dignity. We recognize that a treaty could result in a frozen situation. We want to avoid that. We hope those who consider themselves friends will help, or at least not obstruct that effort.

King Hussein thanked him and expressed pleasure at this very brief visit. He asked that Dr. Brzezinski convey to the President his deep appreciation for the kind message, also for the opportunity to talk frankly about a subject that is important to all of us. It is a problem that [will] affect our hopes, our dreams, our rights. Perhaps my response will meet some of the points you raised.

First, for the sake of historical fact, this city and its people during the years I have had the privilege of being involved, has had the courage to stand by its convictions and defend them at a time when forces threatened the dignity of the Arabs. Israeli expansionism is a long-standing fact. It is the story of twenty years or more. When we speak to friends from the U.S., we know the limitations of our country, but our relations are based on mutual respect. The dignity of the people of this country is most important to me. When we saw a leftist tide almost overcome us, we stood, we were vocal, and we paid a price. Always, we thought we had a just cause and the American people believe in justice. If the U.S. had different positions from us in the past and we suffered, we felt it was partly our fault in the way we presented our cause.

I had the privilege of meeting President Carter, who gave me more time than any previous President. I know that he desires peace and stability and I respect that. Unfortunately, to the pain of myself and others, we have lost touch with each other. From a good beginning, we went our different ways. In the beginning we spoke of mutual problems. Then the President was the first to speak of Palestinian rights, then of going to Geneva.³ We began to prepare to go to Geneva, then came the surprise visit⁴ of Sadat to Israel.

This is a chance for me to express the feelings of the people as a whole. The visit to Jerusalem under occupation had great religious significance. My grandfather is buried there.⁵ He was involved in the Arab revolt against colonial rule and he died because he would not compromise. We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command. We knew we would lose, but we went into that war anyway. Under Egyptian command and responsibility, the West Bank was lost. The Sadat visit was a very, very big shock. Yet we chose to take the moderate path and describe the visit as a courageous move. Sometime later, I asked Sadat, "Why did you not tell me. Why not ask what you could get for 242." I never got a positive answer. Also in 1973, there was no consultation. Egypt has given much to unity, but it cannot be a unity of one. The losses and expenses since 1973 are losses that we suffered.

The real peace process was derailed by Sadat. We were close to Geneva. We were all getting ready to go. Sadat wrote me about Camp David and reiterated his determination to demand Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Jerusalem. I wrote to President Carter also.⁶ I told him that if Israel was intransigent, to consider going to the Security Council. I talked to Sadat while he was at Camp David and reiterated that position. Then came the agreement, a very limited agreement. We were told that the vagueness was intentional. The role provided for Jordan under the Camp David agreements was that of a policeman, to ensure the security. Of whom—the occupied? We tried to keep as quiet as possible. But that is not a role that we could play. What we wanted to know was what was the final object. Perhaps if we knew that, we could work it out.

The Arab view about Egypt is that it has been an abnegation of moral responsibility for those who took risks and suffered. Egypt is the largest of the Arab states, but they cannot first take in the Soviets then throw them out—make war, then make peace—without regard to our

³ See footnote 5, Document 24.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁵ Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah I, was assassinated in July 1951 while visiting the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

⁶ See Document 17.

concerns. A small country, we here on these hills have the longest ceasefire line with Israel. Frankly, in recent time we have felt that we were both weak and strong. Strong because experience pulled us together as a nation. We have to face it the best we can. We are attached to the past of our nation. None of us can see ourselves being a weakling or giving up the fight for the rights of millions of people in East Jerusalem. We may cease to exist. But what interests us is the judgment of future will respect. I wish the weather were clearer today so that you could have seen Jerusalem from the window. The security question could be answered by how close we are. What makes the difference is the feelings on both sides. I agree this is a turbulent and dangerous period. Many things have shocked us in the recent past. The whole approach is involved in asking us to keep quiet. In the past, you did not ask, for at that time we were your only friend in the Arab world.

How does one draw the line between the extremist and the moderates? I know that our U.S. friends were upset by the Baghdad Conference.⁷ From my perspective and responsibility, this was the best that could be done. In light of Afghanistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa, all of these things were seen as threats to our very existence. That, plus the Palestinians, comprised the worst of all possible circumstances. South Yemen posed a serious threat; fortunately collective action was taken, successfully.

In 1950 Egypt took the initiative of ensuring that any country which signed a unilateral peace with Israel would be expelled from the Arab League, as well as certain other things. At the time this was probably aimed at Jordan. How can you have the Arab League at Cairo or the Chief of Staff of the Arab forces an Egyptian, when Egypt has signed a unilateral peace treaty? (At this point, Dr. Brzezinski passed a note across the table pointing out that the time was 4:15 which was when the American delegation was due to depart.) King Hussein continued, the last time Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Egypt was over the possibility of establishing a United Arab Kingdom⁸ to ensure the exercise of self-determination.

Unfortunately, this is not an inter-Arab dispute only. It involves the U.S. and we are very sad when this occurs. It is difficult to see how

⁷ See footnote 7, Document 85.

⁸ On March 15, 1972, Hussein announced a proposal calling for the Israeli-occupied West Bank to be joined with Jordan in a unified kingdom under his rule. In protest, Sadat broke diplomatic relations with Jordan on April 6, 1972. (William Dullforce, "Egypt Cuts Relations with Jordan," *The Washington Post*, April 7, 1972, p. A1) Following a joint conference between Sadat, Assad, and Hussein in Cairo, the Egyptian Government announced the re-establishment of Egyptian-Jordanian relations on September 12, 1973. (Jim Hoagland, "Egypt, Syria Renew Jordan Ties; Palestinians Silent," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1973, p. A27)

the U.S. can play a role as a mediator when it is so committed to the support of the Zionists. If they have everything, why should they consider giving anything up? Always they have had the strategy of separating Egypt from the Arab world. They have always wanted to turn this problem into an East-West problem. At times like this, Jordan becomes an embarrassment.

In the regional security plan, where does Israel fit? The holocaust did occur. Although this area had nothing to do with it, this city has suffered the most, receiving the victims of another kind of holocaust. Should we tell our people to cooperate with Israel? Here is the greatest threat to stability. I have known no President to take as many risks for peace; however, it is not like '48, which was a disaster from our point of view, but like 1956. No one here is discussing the existence of Israel, but we are wondering what about the rights of others. Jordan could be an embarrassment if it relies totally on its friends. But I want to come back to the great problem.

Arab unity and coordination have always been resisted by our friends. The problem has been Israel. It must be addressed before it is too late. With regard to the precedent, the facts and figures that we have regarding the West Bank and the occupied territories, we have to bring before the Security Council. We were asked to postpone it for the third time; however, we went ahead because there were serious changes taking place on the ground. We saw postponement as being worse. What is the alternative to bringing it up? Could our friends prevent this? You may be right that the treaty will cement U.S.-Arab relations, but it is contrary to all of my expectations and experience.

Mr. Christopher said that he had listened intently to the eloquent and somber presentation by King Hussein. It seems that events in the last month may assist to achieve the rights of the Palestinians. This is your goal and we share it. It has given the U.S. a new sense of authority. A timetable has been agreed upon. There is a new sense of confidence in carrying out provisions leading to providing a homeland for the Palestinians. Before you act, we hope you will ask if it is in our interests and your own self-interests. Leave the door open to the possibility that we may be right. Do not take an irrevocable act or close doors. This is the thought I would like to leave with you.

King Hussein responded that he would not act on personal whim. His fears are genuine, even for Sadat.

Dr. Brzezinski thanked the King for the time he had given us and indicated that he would convey his views to the President. I think we understand each other. We will persist because we think it best. It would not be good for us or you if the problem were reduced to an East-West conflict. That is all the more important that we not be alone in what we are doing. There are different ways of being helpful, or un-

helpful. We recognize that all parties have to act in different ways but we hope you will bear in mind that we have common interests. The final result, we hope, will be acceptable to those countries—to the Palestinians—not today, but as the consequence of a process over some years. We will persist.

King Hussein said that his main aim is to present the voices of the majority. All must have a voice. He had told Arafat the day before that he wished to maintain close contact with all those whose role will be critical in the future of the area.

214. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, March 18, 1979, 8:20–9:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Warren Christopher, Dep. Sec.
State
General David Jones, Chairman,
JCS
Chip Carter
Ambassador Hermann Eilts
Michael Sterner, DAS/Near East
Affairs
Gary Sick, NSC Staff Member

Egypt

President Anwar al-Sadat
Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil
Hassan Ahmed Kamel, the Chef
de Cabinet

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had asked us to go to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to get their attitudes and get a feeling for their pattern of behavior in the weeks and months ahead. We had very extensive talks. We had prolonged sessions with Prince Saud² and Crown Prince Fahd³ then Prince Sultan⁴ and a courtesy call on the King.⁵ We stressed the importance of the process that has been set in motion. The President sees the prospect of a stable Middle East tied to a peace

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place at the Barrages Guest House.

² See footnote 2, Document 212.

³ See Document 212.

⁴ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 212.

treaty. We indicated that we are very concerned that any reaction by Saudi Arabia directed negatively at the treaty, such as attacks or tangible economic actions, could adversely affect our interests. We had intense discussions.

In the eyes of the Saudis this initiative greatly complicates their situation. They are faced with conflicting pulls from the U.S. and the other Arabs. They feel that you (Sadat) have not consulted with them and they see a difficult period following the treaty. They see themselves bound by collective obligations of the Arab League. We pressed them with regard to the differentiation between the collective obligations and bilateral actions. We noted that we are involved in a growing relation with Egypt and it would be senseless if the Saudis diminished their relations.

I believe it is fair to say that our discussions usefully conveyed to the Saudi leadership the gravity with which we would view such action. We sought an understanding from them that they discuss very precisely the technical steps they intend to take, distinguishing between symbolic steps as opposed to those that have tangible, bilateral effects. We heard the answer from Saud and from Fahd with unanimity. We find ourselves encouraged.

They made a point which struck us as sensible, that you have not done enough to explain your motives and actions. They find themselves in the position of explaining your actions to others. It would be helpful if you could make a public case using the kind of argument that we made to them, stressing that the victims of any freeze in the present situation would be the Palestinians. Dr. Brzezinski then invited Mr. Christopher to comment.

Mr. Christopher said that Dr. Brzezinski's account was entirely accurate. He would say that Saudi Arabia was pulled in three directions. First, by their Arab brothers; secondly, by their friendship with the U.S.; and third, by their friendship and admiration for Egypt. They want to do everything in their power not to hurt Egypt over the next weeks and months. On a bilateral basis they are prepared to continue the aid relations and they referred to two substantial aid programs as recent signal or talisman of their good faith. They were careful to note that things may change, but they intend to be a good friend of Egypt.

On the collective side it is different. They intend to send an emissary to the other Arab countries to promote moderation. They will join only in the technical outcome, i.e., the move of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo, suspension of Egyptian membership in the Arab League, and the application of the boycott to Egyptian companies dealing with Israel. They could not stop action short of that.

We are in for a period of very careful waiting and watching. They will try quietly and in their own way on the collective front. We got the

collective responsibility of the Saudi leadership. They had met in advance and decided. I am encouraged. Their attitude was warmer toward you and toward us than I had feared.

General Jones said that he had talked with the Saudis about the Yemen situation, noting that ammunition had moved in only a few hours and that the F-5s were arriving in Dhahran today. The carrier task force was now in the Gulf of Aden, with the carrier *Constellation*, a cruiser, three destroyers and three frigates. It had very good fire power on board. It could take out the South Yemeni Air Force in a matter of hours. The AWACS was performing command and control training, and surveillance and other actions were underway. We want to shore up the situation in Yemen and develop closer and warmer relations with the Saudis. A planning team is going to be coming soon to Saudi Arabia. We hope the ceasefire will hold since other nations have now come to Saudi and Yemen's aid.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Saudis realized that if they take any actions it will have an effect on their relations with us. We were quite reassured. They indicated that we may face unpredictable acts, but they felt that we gave more assurances on the strategic side and on the relations between you and ourselves. They know where we stand.

Jordan is more difficult to describe. The discussion⁶ did not focus on tangible things. For one thing, there was less chance to talk. The King was in a very somber mood. He had a tone of sadness and disappointment about the future and about relations between us and you. I cannot precisely summarize exactly where he stands. We did make clear that any obstruction of the peace process would affect them and us. (President Sadat interjected, "This is Hussein. This is Hussein.") We suggested that although it might be difficult for him to join in, he could possibly encourage the Palestinians to join in. He did not rule this out, but gave us no positive indication. He talked at great length, but all in very dark, somber tones.

Mr. Christopher said that the King feels events have moved away from the direction he had hoped. We urged him to keep doors open, but we cannot honestly report any encouraging result.

Dr. Brzezinski said the best we can say is that it was not negative. All we can express, all we can expect from him is a wavery course. I believe that covers the essence. Then *Dr. Brzezinski* said he wanted to mention the question of the signing ceremony.

⁶ See Document 213.

President Sadat said he had received a message from Begin.⁷ He would show it to him.

Dr. Brzezinski said it was psychologically important not to exclude Begin from visiting Cairo, or you from visiting Jerusalem.

President Sadat said we will be good neighbors, and we have no objection if he comes here. However, the whole show is Carter and for that reason he had suggested signing all three of them in Washington. He then read the message from Prime Minister Begin which indicated that the Washington signing was acceptable, with two additional signings in Cairo and Jerusalem, with the order to be determined later. President Sadat then read his proposed answer which was that "All that President Carter told you, as you mentioned in your message is correct and I _____⁸ everywhere. My statement about signing three copies in Washington was motivated only by the fact that it was entirely a Carter show. Until we meet in Washington, please accept my warmest wishes and congratulations."

Dr. Brzezinski said it was especially President Sadat and Carter, since you started the process by your trip to Jerusalem.⁹

Mr. Christopher said I am very reassured. I am sure the President will be also. I assume the modalities will be agreed upon in Washington.

President Sadat said yes. He said you have seen my people.

Dr. Brzezinski said they are your great strength.

Mr. Christopher said the treaty is also extremely popular in the United States.

President Sadat said yes and the whole world, except among the Arabs. Referring to the Mubarak visit to Saudi Arabia¹⁰ he said that he

⁷ The message, sent by Begin to Sadat through Lewis on March 16, conveyed the substance of an exchange between Begin and Carter on the sequence of the signing ceremonies for the Arabic, English, and Hebrew versions of the peace treaty. Begin agreed with Carter's suggestion that Washington should serve as the first signing location for the peace treaty and also stated his willingness to go to Cairo to sign the Arabic version before Sadat came to Jerusalem to sign the Hebrew version. (Telegram 5309 from Tel Aviv, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2640)

⁸ Text missing in the original document. The final version of Sadat's message, conveyed to Begin through Eilts and Lewis on March 18, reads: "All that President Carter told you, as you mentioned in your message, is correct and I will honor every word of it. My statement in saying that the three copies should be signed in Washington was motivated solely by the fact that it should be President Carter's show. Until we meet in Washington, please accept my warmest wishes and congratulations." (Telegram 5486 from Cairo, March 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790126–0268)

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 4.

¹⁰ On instructions from Sadat, Mubarak visited Jidda and Riyadh on March 15, following meetings with Numeiri in Sudan, in order to discuss the peace treaty with Saudi officials. The same day, Sadat briefed Eilts on the talks, described by the Egyptian President as "more than good." Sadat reported that Fahd proposed to Mubarak a "joint plan"

had set a target date before which he could not send anyone to Saudi Arabia. They (the Saudis) are scared about the Palestinians, the Iraqis, the Syrians. I had not intended to send Mubarak from Sudan to Saudi Arabia. I was in the garden when President Numayri called me and told me of his proposal that Vice President Mubarak go to Saudi Arabia after Sudan. He said Mubarak was beside him there (when he called). Why not send him to Saudi Arabia? I said that it goes with the target date. But then I agreed to do it if Numayri would contact the Saudis. He did so and they welcomed Mubarak.

Dr. Brzezinski asked when.

Prime Minister Khalil said two days ago.

President Sadat said that before Mubarak went to Europe to report he met with King Khalid and Abdullah and Sultan. He received an open reception. King Khalid asked someone in his entourage why will he go to Jerusalem in 1977. He did not yet know that 1977 or 1978 had passed. He asked some questions and Mubarak gave him the answers. Abdullah rode with him on the way back to the airport. He said please do not tell President Sadat what King Khalid asked you. Mubarak said that the question is not anything important. Abdullah told him that all of us are behind Sadat. He then proceeded to Jidda where Fahd was keen to meet with him. Indoors, the Saudis say one thing; outdoors, it is something completely different. But this time Fahd went too far in support. He proposed a plan which he will give to Mubarak when he returns from Europe. The situation in Saudi Arabia is exactly as you analyzed it. The Saudis are important, first of all, on the Gulf where all except Kuwait are with me—Oman, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain. But since Saudi Arabia is the big one, they will not proclaim this until the Saudis do. Secondly, I received yesterday a Japanese delegation, a Deputy for Economic Aid, to discuss the possibility of economic cooperation with us. What they fear is that Saudi Arabia, which is their main source of oil, may join with the Baghdad group and, for example, boycott them in Japan if they deal with Egypt. I agree they will think twice before doing that. They will not cut aid off or oil. The most important thing is that we send this message—Egypt and you too—since others will try to put pressure on us. There will be a hysteric state for one month maximum. After the second disengagement agreement, it was much more vehement than now. You should have heard it.

Dr. Brzezinski said they had mentioned the boycott as applying to Egyptian firms dealing with Israel. If they try to extend it to the coun-

for the Saudis and Egyptians to manage the “post-treaty situation” in the region, though he did not provide details of the proposal. Eilts relayed a full report of the briefing, observing that “pending harder evidence of a shift in the Saudi position, Mubarak’s report of the Saudi reaction should probably be taken with caution.” (Telegram 5403 from Cairo, March 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790152–0605)

tries which deal with Egypt, that would affect us. We were very clear about the limits of what we would accept: they are very narrow. There are things that you and we could do to mobilize the moderate Arabs. Urge the moderates to speak up. I have thought that Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and others would be willing to speak up.

President Sadat, referring to his critics, waved his hand and dismissed them as “all those scarecrows.” At best, they are protectorates.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had promised to do something about Japan. My Deputy, Henry Owen, is going to Japan with instructions to stress the importance we attach to Japanese assistance to Egypt. I also talked to David Rockefeller to organize a meeting of lots of U.S. business leaders during President Sadat’s visit to the U.S. (President Sadat interjected “Marvelous.”) Private enterprise is much more important than government in our country.

Ambassador Eilts said he had received an invitation for President Sadat to consider speaking at the New York Economic Club and wondered if he wished to consider it.

President Sadat responded “Right.” He continued that, with regard to the Saudis, our main effort should be to persuade them not to come to the point of involving other nations, such as Japan. I will drop them a line. In the end they would have only you and us as friends. With respect to Hussein, he was visiting an aide in London and announced that he was ready to come to Camp David. I called and asked what is your program. This came during a bad period at Camp David when things were not going well. King Hussein cannot miss any show. I could not ask him there when I was fighting Begin. He always tries for show, not for substance. I told him that when we decide anything, I will let you know. We can discuss it. Later on TV I was watching Barbara Walters.¹¹ Hussein said that he had been contacted by me and I had asked to meet him in Morocco, but he had no time and was proceeding back to Jordan. After we reached our agreement, I met Barbara Walters and I told her that I was going to choke her, since she misled everybody. She said “But the King told me that.” That man is a showy one. He thinks himself the most clever politician in this area, so this tactic. He wants me and President Carter to come and beg him to save the situation. There are three main influences on him. First, the Saudi; second, the U.S.; third, the Syrians, whom he fears. He does not heed the Palestinians, despite what he says, and he does not protect Palestinian rights. If President Carter and I give him the West Bank, he will be shouting

¹¹ U.S. television journalist.

praises. No objection to Jordan getting it after five years. This is his way. He is an opportunist. He waits for anything to collapse then save it. He is a schizophrenic. President Carter said to be patient with him, but be fair. I am not boasting. You have seen my people. I intend to submit the treaty to my Parliament on my return. I will ask if I should keep the Arab League when it is Libya, Syria, and Iraq who pretend to protect the Palestinians. If that is so, take it away. All of them are shaking. We are not shaking here. No leader in any of these countries in Africa goes around in an open car. These 40 million people (in Egypt) are the dream of the Arab world. The others are bedouins. We are committed to defend Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It is marvelous that you acted so promptly. I told Congress two years ago, at that time it was Angola. I said next it is coming to East Africa. This was a good move. There must be a U.S. presence in the area. Where? The near future will tell me what to advise you. When we check the Soviets, then we have the upper hand. South Yemen, that boy Qadhafi, are nothing. The important thing is not to lose the upper hand. I sent a military team to Yemen. Also, I have antitank missiles. They shot 400 Israeli tanks in three days, the ones you tried to replace. They are very accurate, though they use the primitive Soviet material. Now we have the British Swingfire. It is better. If the situation deteriorates, I will send them. They will shoot every tank in the South Yemen Army. We are always ready. We have the Mirage, two squadrons of MIGs. From their base in the Red Sea, it is only one and one-half hours to the Gulf and one hour anywhere in Saudi Arabia. Tell them I am always ready to rescue them, whenever they ask. For Hussein, we will be patient and fair. He will now undermine the whole thing in the West Bank, but not in Gaza. It is his benefit. Whatever happens, I will fulfill this in Gaza. I will make it a model. I was asked about autonomy after one month. I said yes but Begin will raise hell. I am very optimistic. Before one year things will come to shape.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there has been a great change in Israel. Peres spent one-half of his speech on Palestinian rights. This is your effect. We will work together to keep Saudi Arabia in line. We were quite clear with Hussein.

President Sadat said that he (Hussein) is always pessimistic. It is a psychological thing. He is a schizophrenic like his father. He is full of show. Now he is not able to make any show.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Hussein had asked what the results would be after five years. I told him that there were three things that we could say. If it was pro-Arab, the Israelis would not join in. If it was pro-Israel, the Arabs would not join in. If it required concessions of both sides, neither would join in. We need to shape an outcome that is acceptable. No one can predict what that is now. It would be ridiculous to try.

President Sadat said Hussein wants the West Bank for his United Kingdom. I will tell in my speech why did he not form a Palestinian state when he had it. His grandfather, Abdullah, agreed against every code of morals. Whenever we stand together, all will come together. I anticipate a Syrian change. An important fact is that no one opposes me who has strong ground to stand in their own country. If Israel had not lost the last fifteen months, things would be much better. It is my theory that the peace process starts *after* the signing, not like Begin who wants to get everything. We will bring the Israelis to something you cannot imagine. In Jerusalem I said that 75% of the problem is psychological. We will give all of them psychological satisfaction. Do not fear the scarecrows.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if there was anything we could do to help.

President Sadat said the economic and military aid is important. We need 200 tanks with crew maintenance. We need surface-to-air missiles. That will change the situation there and around the Bab al-Mandeb when we give them to Somalia. In my speech I will call on Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine and tell them that I am ready to receive them in Al-Arish, which has been liberated. Are they ready to take the cause in their own hands and fight? Egypt did and made peace.

Dr. Brzezinski said that is a good idea—to build popular pressures.

Prime Minister Khalil said that he agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that the Saudis would not boycott the country, but can boycott individual firms. This will not happen in the near future since it must wait for the normalization of relations and that is not imminent. He felt that we can neutralize the members of the Arab League. The most will depend on the outcome of the negotiations with Israel on the West Bank.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we are with you as is world public opinion. Israel is now talking about survival and people listen to that. But when they are talking about Palestinian rights, their right to vote, water rights and such issues, it will be a different matter.

Prime Minister Khalil said that if we succeed in the West Bank negotiations, I think our position will be strong. But if it drags on more than a year . . .

President Sadat said I think we will succeed. It is in the interest of Israel.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Mr. Begin does not see it that way. He is suspicious about Gaza. It is only with some effort that those suspicions were overcome.

President Sadat said what about the military, looking at General Jones. I shall choke you in the Pentagon.

General Jones noted that Defense Minister Ali is in Washington and will be talking with Secretary Brown.¹² He mentioned that he had seen Ezer Weizman¹³ and he sent his regards (Sadat interjected. “I like that Ezer.”) General Jones continued that a treaty is like a marriage license. You sign it and throw it in the drawer and it is what happens after that that counts.

President Sadat said that he had been sent a list of ten countries to send weapons to in Africa. All are asking because they know I am your friend and that you support me. I have a hard problem with Siad Barre.¹⁴ He sent out the Soviets and then he asked me to come and hold Berbera for him. He fears a Soviet push and that the Ethiopians will take it. He has turned very bitter. He supported whole heartedly the treaty signing since he knows that I will send tanks. Let us not depress those who ask. You know that I do not seek an empire or others’ lands. I seek to stop the game of the Soviets, mainly against Egypt as the leader of the Arab world, especially after Iran faded. So I would like you to put into consideration this idea. The Soviets chose agents of no importance. That boy in Libya, South Yemen, they are all despised. Iraq and Syria are of no real significance. You do not need a base. You can get facilities better than any base. I could be asking for your help in building a very big base, a naval base at Berenice for the Red Sea Fleet. This is a very important location because of the Bab al-Mandeb, which is in North Yemen and must be protected.

Ambassador Eilts said that after Secretary Brown had talked to General Kamel, he sent a list of military equipment. I sent it to Secretary Brown.

President Sadat said that he had asked for a team from the Pentagon. With an Egyptian team, it would visit everywhere and reach an agreed certain strategy. All must be planned, not haphazard. We have Sudan with us. We shall defend Saudi Arabia. The last time Numayri met with Mengistu¹⁵ in Nigeria, Mengistu adopted a very hard line. He will cause trouble in South Sudan. That is my border. Our waters come half from Ethiopia, half from Sudan. Western Sudan alone is the size of Egypt plus the East and the South. I would join them in the next moment if anyone tried . . .

Dr. Brzezinski said you are a factor for stability and we will work with you. Dr. Brzezinski noted that he (Sadat) was an optimist and that

¹² Ali met with Brown in Washington on March 19 to discuss U.S. military aid to Egypt. The conclusions reached during this meeting are printed in Document 224.

¹³ See footnote 2, Document 211.

¹⁴ Mohamed Siad Barre, President of Somalia from 1969 until 1991.

¹⁵ Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Derg and Head of State of Ethiopia from 1977 until 1987; President of Ethiopia from 1987 until 1991.

only optimists shape history. He thanked President Sadat for the time that he had given the delegation.

As the meeting broke up, *Chip Carter* said to President Sadat that he considered him “one of the two greatest men in the world.” President Sadat put his arm around Chip and walked with him to the door.

215. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

March 19, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I consider it necessary to write to you on the question of the situation in the Middle East. In the past I set forth more than once my considerations on this matter. What makes me return once again to this question is the situation emerging now in connection with the steps taken by the United States to push forward a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Our principled attitude to attempts to solve the Middle East problem on the road of separate deals is known to you. We have expressed this assessment of ours both through diplomatic channels and publicly, in particular in connection with the US-Israeli Egyptian meeting in Camp David last year.

So far we do not know yet all the details of the agreement being prepared, and the fact that they are kept secret is symptomatic in itself. But whatever these specific details might be, the main thing is already clear.

This agreement is not designed for and cannot lead to a just and thus a lasting peace in the Middle East. No matter what statements are made, what explanations are given we are deeply convinced that the prepared separate deal is advantageous only to Israel. Not only does it fail to resolve fundamental issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict but it does not even bring us closer to their solution.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation delivered by Dobrynin at 6 p.m. on March 19. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote “Susan [Clough] file J.” The Department sent its official translation to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 68930, March 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840167–2098)

I will tell you with all frankness, Mr. President: what is said in your oral message of March 14,² has by no means shaken that conviction of ours, rather on the contrary.

Let us face the truth. All what is happening now means an actual departure from a solution of the Palestinian problem. It was simply drowned in various political manoeuvres which may appear subtle to someone but in fact are not in any way tied—neither from political nor from humane viewpoints—to the legitimate demands of the Arab people of Palestine. What kind of peace is that if more than three million people who have the inalienable right to have a roof over their heads, to have their own even a small state, are deprived of that right. This fact alone shows how shaky is the ground on which the separate agreement between Israel and Egypt being imposed by the United States is built.

They want to convince us that since the achievement of an overall settlement in the Middle East would not come out now, one should start, they say, with an agreement between Israel and Egypt and only afterwards to try and seek a comprehensive settlement.

We are of a different opinion. What is being done now may suit the Israeli and Egyptian leadership but it by no means suits the Arab peoples. We think that Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries as well as the Palestinians have equal rights and are equally interested in these rights being ensured. Indeed, the present agreement itself has been achieved entirely at the expense of the Egyptian side. But let the Egyptian leadership answer itself for this before its own people, before the other Arab peoples. It is clear, however, that in connection with a possible conclusion of the separate deal the number of acute issues will not diminish but will increase.

Besides, there is a desire, behind all this, which one even hardly attempts to conceal, to solve questions on the sly, bypassing the Soviet Union. In this connection one cannot help wondering what is more here, naivety or deliberate disregard of the legitimate rights of the Soviet Union particularly in view of the closeness of that region to our borders.

But the position of the USSR in the world cannot be changed at someone's wish. And we do not need at all someone's authorization to take interest in the development of the situation in the Middle East. No one can shake our interest in establishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

² Reference is to Carter's March 14 announcement of the Israeli Cabinet's approval of the proposals discussed with Begin on March 13. The text of this announcement is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 432.

Strange, to say the least, is an approach when despite earlier agreements the US evades joint efforts with the USSR to ensure a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and then we are even asked to support separate deals.

And indeed, the fact is that provisions of principle regarding future course of action in the Middle East were agreed between the USSR and the US already when you, Mr. President, were in office. A Joint Soviet-US statement on this score was worked out and published on October 1, 1977.³ Shortly after that, however, it was nonchalantly dropped by the US side. This not only dealt a blow at the efforts aimed at achieving a Middle East settlement but in general was indicative of how Washington sometimes treats achieved agreements.

In the light of the present US position a situation emerges where we follow completely different roads in the Middle East and it would be more than unjustified to count on our support of what is schemed with regard to that region. Now we do not see how the positions of the USSR and the US can be bridged. We tried to do it more than once but each time the US side destroyed those bridges. Such are the facts.

In this connection I wish also to tell you beforehand that we shall strongly object to having now the UN Security Council or the General Assembly—which, by the way, is not competent at all to decide such questions—involved in all that business in order to sanctify, so to say, the separate deal between Israel and Egypt by the authority of these international bodies.

Finally, I wish to draw your attention, Mr. President, to one more question fraught with very serious consequences. According to the incoming information, attributed also to US officials, efforts are now made to establish a new system of military relationship in the Middle East under the US auspices, to introduce in fact permanent military presence of the United States there. I must say that if the question really were of the presence of the US armed forces in the Middle East region it would only further complicate the situation. And in general the increase of the US military presence in that and adjacent areas would seriously destabilize the international situation on the whole.

I express these considerations in all candor, Mr. President, being guided by both the interests of ensuring really lasting and just peace in the Middle East and the interests of the Soviet-US relations in a broad sense. I had more than one occasion to give my views on the questions of Soviet-US relations. Now I would like only to note that there is a number of issues the solution of which requires our joint efforts. On our

³ For the text of the joint communiqué issued by the United States and the Soviet Union on the situation in the Middle East, October 1, 1977, see Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 343–344.

part we are ready—and we prove it in practice—to seek mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

One of these problems is a Middle East settlement. In our deep conviction the policy of the Soviet Union on this issue meets the interests of not only the Arab but also of other states including the US if, of course, one is to proceed from the real interests of peace and not from some considerations of momentary nature.

In conclusion I wish to stress the following. Whatever direction the course of events in the Middle East may take the Soviet Union's resolute position was and is that there should be no war there, that a lasting and just peace be established, that the possibility be really ensured for all the Arab peoples, including Palestinians, as well as for the people of Israel to exist and develop as sovereign states. This is our unswerving policy and we intend to follow it in future.

At the same time we would like to count on the restoration—and on our part we are ready for that—of active cooperation between the USSR and the US in the matters of the Middle East settlement, obviously, on a principled basis which requires taking into account the legitimate rights and interests of all sides and their full and equal participation in such a settlement.⁴

Sincerely

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁴ A March 21 analysis of the "content and motivations" of Brezhnev's letter, prepared by EUR and the Secretary of State's Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs, Marshall Shulman, and forwarded to Vance, suggested sending Atherton to Moscow in order to brief Soviet officials "on how we see the negotiations on Gaza and the West Bank developing." This, the analysis argues, "might serve to head off" the Soviets' "most troublesome propaganda," though Atherton's mission would have to be discussed with the Egyptians and Israelis beforehand. (Telegram Tosec 30022/69516 to the Secretary's delegation, March 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840126–2087)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

216. Memorandum From Reginald Bartholomew of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter¹

Washington, March 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Egyptian-Israeli Dispute over Subphasing of Withdrawal (U)

The Egyptian and the Israeli negotiating teams in Washington have apparently reached an impasse over the question of accelerated withdrawal from the Alma oil field. The Egyptians had expected a return to last fall's formulation of withdrawal from the oil field within four–six months. The Israelis were prepared for early withdrawal from al-Arish, but Weizman is under strict instruction not to agree to withdrawal from the Alma field until the end of the nine-month period. (S)

The Israeli Cabinet voted today on the full package of proposals,² but included in that package is the Israeli proposal of not withdrawing from the oil field until the end of the nine-month period. As a result, Weizman has no more negotiating authority to deal with this issue, and Begin has specifically ruled out any possible compromise. (S)

The Egyptians have reacted badly to this development. In their view, the Israeli proposal does not constitute genuine subphasing of withdrawal and therefore Prime Minister Khalil has informed us that Egypt will not be bound to the exchange of ambassadors one month after the interim withdrawal has been completed, nor will Egypt agree to talks on the orderly transfer of oil fields and on company-to-company arrangements to insure continued supply of oil to Israel during the period of turnover. (S)

Secretary Vance will be available later this afternoon to discuss this issue with you. Minister Weizman, who is quite unhappy with his government's position, will be leaving at 6 p.m. today. It might be worth having Secretary Vance call Weizman before his departure.³ (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty: 10/78–3/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

² On March 19, the Israeli Cabinet confirmed the full treaty text and the attached annexes. The following day, Begin presented the document to the Knesset for debate and approval. The text of Begin's opening statement to the Knesset is printed in *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, pp. 665–685.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter himself spoke with Weizman on the telephone from 4:31 p.m. to 4:36 p.m., March 19. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No other record of this conversation has been found.

The attached cable⁴ reviews the status of the talks on this issue as of last night. (U)

⁴ The cable was not found attached. The Department relayed the status of talks through March 18 in telegram Tosec 30002/67722 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 19; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79.

217. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 19, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S.-Israeli Agreement on Military Issues (U)

Secretary Brown reached agreement this afternoon with Minister Weizman on the outstanding military issues. With the President's approval, Secretary Brown offered \$3 billion over the next three years, of which \$800 million would be in the form of cash grants. The remainder will be FMS credits (10 years grace period of repayment of principal and 20 years repayment after the grace period). This was a smaller grant component than the Israelis had hoped for, but Weizman seemed satisfied. (S)

Brown also informed Weizman of the following equipment approvals:

600	AIM-9L's
600	MAVERICKS
200	M-60A Tanks
200	M-109 HOWITZERS
800	M-113 Armed Personnel Carriers
14	PHALANX Gun Systems
	Encapsulated HARPOON Systems ² (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel 1-3/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "ZB has seen." In the lower left-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "What did the Israelis *not* get?" In the lower right-hand corner, Brzezinski added the notation, dated March 20, "WQ, where is the Egyptian list? Can you give me a parallel list?"

² The number of HARPOON systems is missing in the original document.

There are number of other minor issues on which agreement was almost reached. The most important of which was a memorandum on research and development. (U)

218. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹

Washington, March 19, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S.-Israel Agreement on Airbase Construction: Circular 175 Authority

We request authority to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the Government of Israel relating to construction by the United States of two airbases in Israel in connection with Israel's withdrawal from Sinai under the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. We would like to have a DOD-State-Embassy team begin negotiations in Israel on March 23, 1979. We will continue to keep the Congress informed on this matter.

A Memorandum of Law is attached.²

Recommendation

That you authorize the negotiation and conclusion of a U.S.-Israel Agreement on Airbase Construction along the lines of the draft text at Tab 2.³ Any subsequent changes to this draft will be subject to prior approval by NEA, T, PM, L and the Department of Defense.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780044–1989. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Deputy Director, Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Department of State, Charles M. Hill.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Newsom initialed his approval on March 21.

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1979, 1426Z

5638. Dept Pass USDel Secretary. Subject: Egyptian-Israeli Military Talks. Ref: State 68313 (Tosec 30006).²

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary. Khalil insists that, with Sadat's agreement, there can be no further Egyptian compromise on sub-phasing agreed to at the Blair House talks and on oil arrangements.³ Israel, having gotten virtually everything it demanded as a result of Sadat's acquiescence in President Carter's proposals, should now be pressed to honor its word. He is sending, through Ghorbal, a message to the Secretary on the subject.⁴ We are now translating Arabic text and will send English translation by septel. End summary.

3. Met with PriMin Khalil early this afternoon to urge greater Egyptian flexibility in sub-phasing.⁵ I found Khalil primed for bear and

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 13, Middle East—(10/78-7/79). Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv, the White House, and Bonn. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Carter wrote: "Zbig—Let Cy handle for time being. J." The telegram was found attached to a March 20 handwritten covering note from Brzezinski to Carter which reads: "Mr. President—The sub-phasing issue is becoming very hot. Vance ought to put a cable through to Dayan, because Sadat has a point. Zbig." (Ibid.)

² In telegram Tosec 30006/68313 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 19, Newsom conveyed a summary of Atherton's March 19 meetings with Weizman and Ali on the sub-phasing of Israel's interim withdrawal. On these meetings, Newsom wrote, the "positions of both parties have hardened further." At the end of the telegram, Newsom provided instructions to Eilts and Lewis "for approaches to Khalil and/or Sadat and to Begin in effort to get some flexibility into both sides' approach to sub-phasing negotiations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-1906)

³ Carter underlined this sentence. During a meeting between Atherton and Ali in Washington on the afternoon of March 19, the Egyptians indicated that they could not "sell oil to Israel or authorize Amoco to do so during any interim period following Israeli withdrawal from oil fields and prior to completion of interim withdrawal" since this would be a "violation" of the Arab boycott against trade with Israel, to which Egypt was a party. The legal adviser accompanying Ali's delegation stated to Atherton that under the peace treaty the boycott "will be terminated only upon completion of interim withdrawal" of Israeli forces. If there was no agreement on sub-phasing for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields, Ali stated, Annex III "could simply note that interim withdrawal would be completed in nine months with withdrawal from El-Arish in three months and details of interim withdrawal to be worked out in joint commission." (Telegram Tosec 30009/68893 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17-21/79)

⁴ The Embassy conveyed Khalil's message to Vance in telegram 5662 from Cairo, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].

⁵ Carter underlined this sentence.

in a more emotional state than I have yet seen him. He had obviously had a report from Kamal Hassan Ali on talks with Weizman and with Atherton and was visibly upset. He had trouble controlling his sense of outrage as he spoke. He said flatly that “we cannot go back on what has been agreed upon” and that he had earlier in the day sent the Secretary a message through Ghorbal on the subject.⁶ (I have obtained a copy from Boutros Ghali and will send English translation by septel.)

4. Specifically, Khalil said:

— (A) GOE will under no circumstances agree to a company-to-company oil arrangement with Israel as the Israelis are demanding.⁷ The treaty annex which provides that Israel may bid on the international market for Egyptian oil will not be implemented before Egypt and Israel enter into negotiations on normalization. Furthermore, Egypt will under no circumstances specifically agree to sell Alma oil to Israel.⁸ It will only be in terms of surplus Egyptian oil.

— (B) In the meantime, Israel has USG guarantee to provide Israel with its oil requirements. If USG wishes purchase oil from Amoco for this purpose, this is USG business.

— (C) Moreover, he could not accept what he called the new Israeli proposal not to withdraw from the Alma fields until seven months after signing of the treaty.⁹ This is totally inconsistent with letter and spirit of earlier sub-phasing agreement developed during Blair House talks¹⁰ and, Khalil insisted, with what he had been told by President Carter and the Secretary during President Carter’s visit.¹¹ The same applies to the Al Arish withdrawal. When I pointed out our view that three months Al Arish and seven months oil fields strikes us as a reasonable compromise, Khalil hit the ceiling. He reiterated that this is not consistent with what was said here during President Carter’s talks.¹² I noted that Atherton had told Kamal that he was confident that nothing specific about a two month or four month date had been said in those talks and I also knew of no such statement. Khalil responded that Atherton was only part right. He claimed to have specifically asked President Carter about the sub-phasing dates and that the President had replied he could not remember the dates, but that they would be those

⁶ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁷ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁸ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁹ Carter underlined this sentence.

¹⁰ Carter underlined, “totally inconsistent with letter and spirit of earlier sub-phasing agreement developed during Blair House talks.” See Documents 78, 80–81, 84, and 88.

¹¹ See Documents 196 and 197.

¹² Carter underlined this and the preceding two sentences.

reached during the Blair House talks. This statement, Khalil insisted, represents a USG obligation to support what had earlier been agreed upon, especially since Sadat had, against Khalil's advice, agreed that ambassadors would be exchanged one month after completion of the interim withdrawal.

— (D) Khalil also insisted that he had told the Secretary in Cairo that GOE will not rpt not be involved in the oil for Israel question before the end of the interim withdrawal period and that this will come only in the context of normalization.¹³ I noted that neither the treaty nor Annex III, including the agreed new minute, preclude normal trade relations before the negotiation of an Egyptian/Israeli trade and commerce agreement. I urged that GOE consider the matter on practical rather than legal basis. Khalil was clearly expecting this one. He simply said no, he could not agree with our point of view. USG has committed itself to provide Israeli oil requirements, he reiterated, and this should be source of Israeli oil in the interim period.

5. In response to my warning about disastrous effect on Israeli Knesset debate which Egyptians again raising question of exchange of ambassadors would have, Khalil said that is simply too bad. There would be no problem if Israelis would for once honor their word instead of constantly renege.¹⁴ Sadat had reinstituted his earlier agreement that ambassadors will be exchanged one month after termination of interim withdrawal. He had done so, Khalil insisted, on clear understanding Israelis would reinstitute sub-phasing arrangement worked out at Blair House—not something totally new and different. Once Israelis get what they want, Khalil charged, they constantly seek whittle down their obligations.

6. By this time, he had worked himself into quite a stew and stated emphatically that GOE has had enough of this. USG, including President Carter, must be aware of what Sadat has done to facilitate the peace process.¹⁵ He expressed distress that American negotiators now seem to be looking for further compromises instead of pressing Israelis to honor their word. I assured Khalil that we are all aware of what Sadat has done on the peace treaty issue, but emphasized that it is in all of our interests find suitable compromise on the remaining issues. Khalil's response was that Egypt has compromised all that it can.

7. To make the matter more personal, he recalled that he had spoken on TV about sub-phasing based on the Blair House arrangements. That TV interview is to be repeated tonight. Was he to be ex-

¹³ Carter underlined this sentence.

¹⁴ Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.

¹⁵ Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.

pected to stand up and say that he was a liar? Or that Egypt has given way to more Israeli demands? And all of this in the face of Begin's totally unhelpful statements yesterday about Jerusalem;¹⁶ re Jerusalem, no independent Palestine state or anything else that might help Egypt in its present difficult period with the Arabs.

8. Khalil asked me to make it clear that there can be no further flexibility in the Egyptian position on sub-phasing or oil. This, he claimed, has been made clear in the letter he has sent to Secretary Vance.¹⁷ He emphasized that everything that he had said in that letter had been included with the full approval of President Sadat. Sadat, he said, is as disgusted as he about the Israeli position put forth during the Weizman/Ali talks.

9. Comment: As predicted, the new Israeli position on subphasing has aroused Egyptian hackles. They are disappointed that we do not seem willing to press the Israelis to abide by the Blair House sub-phasing agreement. They feel that once again they have been taken—Sadat, in response to President Carter's urgings, accepted the compromise brought by the President only to find that we are now asking for more compromises. I do not believe that the Egyptians will allow the treaty to founder on these issues, but they are going to insist on the Blair House arrangements being honored and that the USG has guaranteed Israel oil supplies, hence no Egyptian/Israeli arrangements, even through private companies, will be permitted during the interim period.

Eilts

¹⁶ Reference is presumably to Begin's March 20 statement to the Knesset in which he said: "Dear and distinguished Dr. Khalil, please take note: United Jerusalem—the one—is Israel's eternal capital and will never again be redivided. It will remain one for generation unto generation." (*Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents*, vols. 4–5, 1977–1979, Document 247)

¹⁷ Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.

220. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 20, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S.-Egyptian Military Assistance Agreement (U)

We have come close to agreement with the Egyptians on the following terms:

—We will be prepared to request Congressional approval of up to \$1.5 billion in military sales to Egypt over the next three years.

—FMS credits could cover as much as 50% of the total sales. The Egyptians would be expected to pay cash for the other 50%. If, by chance, the Saudis and others are more forthcoming than expected, we would not cut back on the FMS credits offered. But the credits will be on standard terms with no forgiveness (e.g., 10 year deferred payment on principal, with 20 years thereafter to pay off the loan). We have told both the Egyptians and the Israelis that they will receive equal treatment on these new FMS credits. (We can expect a joint Egyptian-Israeli lobbying effort to convert the credits to grants. The impact on the budget is a major consideration, since we only have to authorize funds to cover 10% of the credits. In brief, we buy \$3 billion in FMS credits with \$300 million of the taxpayers' money).

On specific equipment, Brown has discussed the following major items with General Ali:

—F-4s. Egypt wants 50. Brown has said we will provide something "more sophisticated" than the F-5, which would probably be the F-4.

—10 C-130s. OK.

—20 CH-54 helos. OK in principle.

—800 APCs. OK.

—350 M-60A tanks. No. Suggest Egypt look to British for Chieftans.

—12 battalions I-HAWKs. OK.

—4 destroyers (five-year life). OK in principle.

—Submarines. Maybe.

—Coastal patrol boats. OK. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1-8/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "ZB has seen."

In order to stay within the \$1.5 billion limit, the Egyptians will probably have to choose among these items. The equipment list is pretty good; the financing arrangements are less attractive. (C)

In answer to your question² on whether there is anything the Israelis did not get, the answer is essentially “nothing” among their priority requests. They did hope for a larger grant component in the total and will probably work on Congress to get this reversed. (C)

As things now stand, we are committed to sell equipment and services worth \$4.5 billion to Israel and Egypt. If present terms are maintained, the U.S. Treasury will be hit for only \$1.1 billion of that amount and this is all that Congress will have to authorize. This is on top of the normal annual aid of \$1.785 billion to Israel and \$1 billion to Egypt. (S)

In sum, the total of resources (goods and services) which we will transfer to Egypt and Israel over the next three years will be almost \$13 billion, of which over \$3.5 billion will be financed directly by the U.S. taxpayer. (S)

² See footnote 1, Document 217.

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 20, 1979

SUBJECT

Peace Treaty Signing Ceremonies

I have forwarded your comments on Begin's cable to Vance² for action.

At the same time, let me suggest again that it might be easier for Sadat to live up to the promise, which I asked him to reaffirm two days ago in Cairo, to have a signing ceremony both in Cairo and Jerusalem if a senior American official takes part in it. Having either Vance or Mondale participate will make it less awkward for Sadat to have Begin in Cairo.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt: 1-3/79. Confidential. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Let me approach Sadat directly—send msg. JC." At the bottom of the memorandum, Carter added the following handwritten message: "To Pres. Sadat, Believing that it was acceptable to you, I have told Begin and my own people that there would be brief signing ceremonies in Israel and in Cairo for the Hebrew & Arabic treaty documents. Both of these events could be completed during one afternoon, and I would be pleased to send a top level American delegation to represent me. I hope you will approve this request. Your friend, J.C." No evidence of the delivery of this message has been found.

² Attached but not printed. In a March 20 meeting with Lewis, Begin requested that a personal message be passed to Vance, conveying Begin's insistence that "Sadat honor his promise" to sign the Hebrew and Arabic versions of the treaty in Jerusalem and Cairo respectively. The details of this exchange were conveyed in telegram 930 from Jerusalem, March 20. On a copy of the telegram, Carter added the handwritten notation: "I prefer the extra signings, but it's up to Sadat." (Ibid.) The signing issue was still not solved on March 22 when Sadat remarked to journalists that while Begin's proposal for three signing ceremonies was still a "possibility," he repeated his view that all three versions of the treaty should be signed in Washington "in order to give full credit to President Carter." Eilts reported that due to worries about Arab public opinion, Khalil was urging Sadat not to go to Jerusalem. Sadat, Eilts added, "clearly expects the issue to be discussed in Washington" when the three leaders convened later in the week. (Telegram 5968 from Cairo, March 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790134-0838)

222. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Credits for Egypt (U)

Harold Brown is preparing to sign a letter² to General Ali today which promises Egypt that we will be prepared to recommend to Congress that the United States will provide military equipment and services to Egypt over the next three years of a value of at least \$1.5 billion, \$750 million of which is to be in the form of FMS credits comparable to those we provide to Israel, i.e. current interest rates, ten year grace, twenty additional years to repay. The remaining \$750 million would have to be financed by Egypt. (S)

I am concerned about the lack of comparability between our assistance to Egypt and Israel. Israel is getting \$3 billion, all of which is FMS credits and \$800 million of which will be entirely forgiven. Even allowing for the additional military expenses Israel faces in its relocation of facilities from the Sinai, the proposal is extremely lopsided in Israel's favor. (S)

FMS credits place very little burden on the American taxpayer and on the budget. (Congressional authorization of 10% of the credits as a guarantee is all that is required.) I believe we should offer credits for the full \$1.5 billion of the Egyptian program. I am not concerned that this will remove incentives for continued Saudi military assistance to Egypt. Egypt will still be faced with the need to pay interest, and eventually to repay these loans. It would be easier, in my view, for Egypt to persuade Saudi Arabia to pick up these finance charges than it would to get them to fund large new military programs at this time. Similarly, it could provide the basis for persuading Saudi Arabia to increase its non-military assistance on the grounds that it would free up Egyptian funds to repay the FMS loans. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you consider again the desirability of informing Egypt that the United States will provide FMS credits of up to \$1.5 billion over three years following the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 18, Egypt: 1-6/79. Secret. At the top of the memorandum, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the document.

² Brown's letter to Ali is printed in Document 224.

_____ Approve \$1.5 billion in credits. Notify Harold Brown to prepare the letter to General Ali accordingly.³

_____ Approve \$1 billion in credits.

_____ Approve \$750 million in credits.

³ Carter approved this option and initialed "J."

223. Memorandum From Willam B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Unresolved Issues (U)

1. *Subphasing of withdrawal.* Israel is sticking with the position of not withdrawing from the Alma field until the end of the nine-month period.² Egypt says this is contrary to the concept of subphasing and has suspended its agreement to send an Ambassador one month after the completion of the interim withdrawal. This morning, Roy, Hal and I developed a possible compromise proposal: withdrawal from the oil-field in six months; arrangements to insure continued supply of oil to Israel until normalization of relations begins; exchange of Ambassadors on schedule. The six month figure is eminently defensible. We

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 1–3/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "ZB has seen."

² When discussing the issue of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields with Lewis on March 20, Begin "articulated with great animation his resistance" to reducing the 9-month withdrawal period. "Israel, he said, does not want to activate the U.S. oil supply agreement if it is not absolutely necessary." On the oil supply agreement, Begin added that his "only quarrel" with the present formulation "is that he prefers two distinct periods of ten and five years duration, rather than a single period of fifteen years. Begin said he strongly prefers the latter, thus allowing [the] 1975 [U.S. oil] Commitment to [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin to fade into the history books. I [Lewis] told Begin there was absolutely no chance that we would agree to an extension to twenty years of the U.S. commitment and Begin replied he had no intention of requesting one." (Telegram 5599 from Tel Aviv, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Files of Alfred L. Atherton, Lot 80D166, Box 8, Pre-Signing Negotiations: Cairo, Tel Aviv, Washington & New York, 3/20–26/79)

referred to the subphasing as discussed at Blair House. That means four or six months, depending on which set of talks is referred to. A message to Begin will probably be needed. (S)

2. *Memorandum of Agreement on Oil*. The Israelis have submitted a counterdraft³ which would include a price subsidy formula and an option to extend the guarantee almost indefinitely. (C)

3. *Memorandum of Agreement on Assurances*. Senator Church has said that anything more than what we have in our draft would virtually constitute a treaty and would require Senate approval. The Israelis are asking for significant changes. (C)

4. *Unilateral Steps Letter*. Begin wants to discuss this with the President. His initial reaction suggests that we will have problems.⁴ (C)

³ The text of the Israeli counter-draft has not been found. On March 18, the United States amended the draft text of the oil supply agreement from the originally proposed fifteen year guarantee. Under the new formulation, the agreement would become effective for a five-year period “commencing blank months following the entry into force of the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, and shall be extended for an additional period commencing at the end of that five-year period and ending ten years later, at which time the arrangement will terminate.” (Telegram Tosec 30001/67721 to Tel Aviv, March 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2617)

⁴ On March 20, Lewis presented Begin with a draft version of the letter for Khalil on unilateral actions Israel would take guaranteeing freedoms for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. In response, Begin stated that he would take up the matter with Carter in Washington and that “he wished at this time only to remind us that during his discussion with President Carter on this issue, the President had asked only about the prevailing repeat prevailing situation on the West Bank and Gaza regarding freedom of movement, freedom of political activity, etc. Begin stressed that it is the particulars of the prevailing situation—which will continue to obtain in the future—which should be conveyed on his behalf by President Carter to Sadat.” (Telegram 931 from Jerusalem, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–1318) For the final version of the letter from Carter to Khalil, signed March 26, see Document 232.

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, March 23, 1979, 2102Z

72667. Subject: Brown-Ali Letter.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Following is text of letter from SecDef Brown to Egyptian MinDef Ali dated March 23 confirming discussions held between the two on March 19:

Begin text: Quote: Dear Mr. Minister:

In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of at least a portion of those sales, subject to such congressional review and approvals as may be required.

With respect to financing, the President is prepared to recommend to Congress that the United States provide military equipment and services during the next three years of a value of 1.5 billion dols, with up to 500 million dols annually in foreign military sales (FMS) credits. The credits will be made available on the following terms: current interest rates, a ten-year deferment of payments on principal, and twenty years to repay the loan thereafter.

The United States is prepared in general to supply the items of equipment we discussed and which are listed in a classified attachment to this letter. In this connection, the United States agrees to dispatch teams to Egypt in the very near future to survey and discuss Egyptian needs for naval forces, air defenses, and ground force armored and other vehicles. The United States is also pleased to receive an Egyptian team in Washington in the near future to discuss the needs of the Egyptian Air Force. Signed: Sincerely, Harold Brown. End text.

3. Following is text of attachment to above letter. Begin text: Quote. The United States is prepared to approve the sale of the following equipment and services to Egypt:

- Jet training aircraft (e.g., of the T-38 type)
- 10 additional C-130 aircraft
- 16 CH-53 helicopters
- aircraft ECM pods

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135-0375. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared for information by Keene, March, Small, Flaten, and Gaffney; approved by Marthinsen. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv. Sent for information to the White House and the Secretary of Defense.

- 12 improved HAWK batteries
- 4 TPS-59 three-dimensional radars
- 4 destroyers of the US Gearing class, henceforth to be referred to as quote frigates unquote
- Harpoon and Phalanx weapons systems for installation on frigates, number to be determined
- pressure testing of diesel submarine hulls
- 800 M113 armored personnel carriers
- technical data package to upgrade T-54 and T-55 tanks
- lorries and tractors, number to be determined.

The United States is willing to consider favorably the following items of equipment, subject to further discussion and definition:

- F4 Phantom aircraft
- radars for detecting low-flying aircraft, of a type to be determined by the Air Defense Survey
- diesel submarines of the Guppy type, following evaluation of the program for pressure testing existing Egyptian submarine hulls
- auxiliary equipment (e.g., ground radars, communication equipment, forward and side looking camera, equipment for frogmen)
- patrol boats

The United States also maintains its offers of the following equipment:

- cruiser (USS Albany)
- CH-47 helicopters
- additional F-5E aircraft.

Vance

225. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 24, 1979, 10:04–10:52 a.m.

SUBJECT

Security Assistance for Egypt and Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Daniel O'Donahue, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

David Zweifel, Office of Near Eastern/South Asian Affairs

OSD

Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

JCS

Lt. General William Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

Major William H. Cook, Mid East/African Expert

CIA

[*name not declassified*], Office of Economic Research

[*name not declassified*], Assistant NIO, Near East and South Asia

ACDA

Deputy Director Spurgeon Keeney

Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

OMB

Dr. John White, Deputy Director

Edward Sanders, Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs

White House

David Aaron (Chairman)

NSC

Leslie G. Denend

A mini-SCC meeting was called to review issues surrounding the security assistance which will be extended to Israel and Egypt in the context of a peace treaty. (C)

1. *Congressional strategy*: There was agreement that the entire \$1.17 billion in budget authority required to support \$4.5 billion in military

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 119, SCM 059, 3/24/79, Mini SCC, Security Assistance for Egypt and Israel. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The summary was found attached to a March 26 covering memorandum from Denend to Aaron, upon which Aaron initialed his approval of the summary and added the handwritten notation, "Circulate!" (Ibid.) Dodson forwarded the summary and Denend's covering memorandum to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Seignious, Jones, and Turner under a separate covering memorandum dated April 2. (Ibid.)

assistance should be sought in a single FY 1979 supplemental budget request. (C)

2. *Negev airbase construction*: DOD and OMB will develop options for alternative sources of financing to begin construction should final Congressional action be delayed until July. (C)

3. *Deliveries of military equipment to Egypt*: DOD will review options for the prompt delivery of some of the items on the Egyptian list which we feel Egypt is sure to ask for. (C)

4. *Further review of sales to Egypt and Israel*: As specific sales contained in the lists for Israel and Egypt move forward, agency comments on timing and the U.S. view of Egyptian and Israeli priorities (e.g., submarines for Egypt) will be sought through the normal arms transfer review process. (C)

5. All approved the scope and composition of the proposed military assistance package being considered by the President. ACDA added that the proposal seemed modest when compared to what had been expected. (C)

226. Draft Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel¹

Washington, undated

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel

Recognizing the significance to Israel² of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between it³ and Egypt and considering the importance

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Peace Treaty—1979. No classification marking. The memorandum is stamped “CV,” indicating that Vance saw the document. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote: “My suggestions. JC.” An earlier, March 16 line-in, line-out draft of the memorandum text, containing Israel’s proposed deletions and additions, is *ibid*. The final version of this memorandum of agreement, dated March 26, is printed in Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pp. 356–357. A similar draft memorandum of agreement with Egypt, replicating most of the points of the agreement with Israel is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance—Secretary of State 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Peace Treaty March 1979.

² Carter struck through the phrase “to Israel.”

³ Carter deleted “it” and replaced it with “Israel.”

of full implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Israel's⁴ security interests, the contribution of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the security and development of Israel⁵ as well as its significance to peace and stability in the region, and to the maintenance of international peace and security;

Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional heavy security, military and economic burdens on Israel;

The Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel, subject to their constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows:

1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the parties' desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace.

2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the parties with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure observance of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures as described below.

3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for actions taken by Israel in proper⁶ response to violations⁷ of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, *inter alia*, a blockade of Israel's use of international waterways, a violation of provision of the Treaty of Peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.

4. The United States will support the parties' rights to navigation and overflight for access to either country through and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty of Peace.

⁴ Above this, Carter wrote "[Egypt]."

⁵ Above this, Carter wrote "[Egypt]."

⁶ An unknown hand moved the word "proper" up between "for" and "actions" in this sentence to read "The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel."

⁷ An unknown hand inserted the words "such demonstrated" between "to" and "violations" to read "to such demonstrated violations."

5. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the United Nations which in its judgement adversely affects the Treaty of Peace.

6. Subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, the United States will endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.

7. The United States will continue to impose restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any country which prohibits their unauthorized transfer to any third party. The United States will not supply or authorize transfer of such weapons for use in an armed attack against Israel, and will take steps to prevent such unauthorized transfer.⁸

⁸ The final version of the memorandum added two further paragraphs. Paragraph 8 reads: "Existing agreements and assurances between the United States and Israel are not terminated or altered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 of Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States (United States-Israeli Assurances) of 1 September 1975." Paragraph 9 reads: "This Memorandum of Agreement sets forth the full understandings of the United States and Israel with regard to the subject matters covered between them hereby, and shall be implemented in accordance with its terms." (Dayan, *Breakthrough*, p. 357)

227. Letter From Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil to Secretary of State Vance¹

March 25, 1979

Dear Secretary Vance:

It was with great surprise that we learned today of the proposed Memorandum of Agreement² between the United States and Israel in connection with The Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. We were never consulted on the substance of the proposed Memorandum which directly affects our position with respect to the implementation of the Treaty.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Peace Treaty—1979. No classification marking. Printed from a copy delivered by the Egyptian Embassy in Washington.

² See Document 226.

The content of the draft Memorandum is a source of grave concern to the Government of Egypt. At this critical juncture in the peace-making process, when Egypt has clearly, and with firm determination, opted for peace, the draft Memorandum presumes that Egypt's compliance with its obligations is in doubt. Such an assumption is completely unfounded. It, moreover, contravenes the provisions of Article VI, para. 2, which stipulates that the *Parties* undertake to fulfill *in good faith* their obligations under the Treaty.

I trust that you would agree that this new definition of the United States role constitutes a departure from our understanding of that role as a full partner and not as an arbiter. It also constitutes a distortion of that role in the eyes of others.

The United States assumed for herself the role of the arbiter in determining that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty. I wish to state that the Treaty provides for settlement of disputes procedured in Article VII. This equal right to have recourse to the procedure specified in the Treaty ensures that the balance of corresponding obligations will be maintained. The proposed Memorandum therefore constitutes a prejudgment of the outcome of future disputes, a matter which, in point of fact, amounts to negating the existence of an article on dispute settlement.

In addition, you have given Israel a commitment to take such remedial measures and to provide appropriate support for proper actions taken by Israel in response to violations of the Treaty. We consider such a commitment exceedingly dangerous as it binds the United States to acquiesce to action taken by Israel, however arbitrary under the pretext that certain violations have taken place.

We oppose any attempt to tamper with the positions of the parties to the Treaty by putting emphasis on the security of Israel with apparent disregard to the manifold elements contained in the Treaty.

We equally oppose the attempt to put emphasis on certain rights as navigation and overflight with total negation of the rights of the other party.

The draft Memorandum also refers to the action the United States would take in the event of an armed attack on Israel. We consider this concept both inappropriate and untimely as it comes with the signing of the Peace Treaty.

Furthermore, the letter³ addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel on March 26, 1979, by the President of the United States stipulates that: "In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or

³ See Document 230.

both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.”

The Government of Egypt therefore reiterates that the concept and orientation of the proposed Memorandum is detrimental to the peace process.

Needless to say that Egypt does not consider itself bound by that Memorandum or whatever commitments to which it was not a party or on which it was not consulted.

Mostafa Khalil

228. Letter From Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil to Secretary of State Vance¹

March 26, 1979

Dear Secretary Vance:

Pursuant to my letter of yesterday² concerning the proposed Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. and Israel³ I wish to inform you of the following:

While Egypt does not contest the right of the United States Government, or any other government for that matter, to take the decisions it deems compatible with its foreign policy, the Government of Egypt maintains the right not to accept any decision or action which it considers directed against Egypt. I would like to state that the contents of the proposed Memorandum will have a direct bearing on the Peace Treaty.

You are certainly aware of the keen desire of Egypt to strengthen the friendly relations between our two countries as well as to establish peace and stability in the whole region. This will be furthered by achieving a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as an important step towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Bearing this in mind, I want you to know that we were deeply disap-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Peace Treaty—1979. No classification marking. Printed from a copy delivered by the Egyptian Embassy in Washington.

² See Document 227.

³ See Document 226.

pointed to find the United States accepting to enter into an agreement we consider directed against Egypt. The Memorandum does not serve any useful purpose. On the contrary, its contents and purport would adversely affect the whole process of peace and stability in the area.

Egypt rejects the Memorandum for the following reasons:

1. It is contrary to the spirit existing between our two countries and does not contribute to the strengthening of relations between them. I wish to put on record that Egypt was never consulted on the substance of the proposed memorandum.

2. The contents of the proposed memorandum are based upon alleged accusations against Egypt and providing for certain measures to be taken against her in that hypothetical case of violations, the determination of which is largely left to Israel.

3. We have been engaged in the *final* process of negotiating the Treaty for over a month now, however, we have not been notified of the intention of the United States to agree on such a memorandum. Moreover, we learned of it by way of information and not consultation. Ambassador Eilts gave it to me at 2:00 p.m., March 25, only 24 hours before the scheduled ceremonies for signature of the Treaty.

4. The United States is supposed to be a partner in a tri-partite effort to achieve peace and not to support the allegations of one side against the other.

5. The proposed Memorandum assumes that Egypt is the side liable to violate its obligations.

6. The proposed Memorandum could be construed as an eventual alliance between the United States and Israel against Egypt.

7. It gives the United States certain rights that were never mentioned or negotiated with us.

8. It gives the United States the power to impose measures, or to put it bluntly, punitive measures, a matter which raises doubts about the future relations and could affect the situation in the whole region.

9. The proposed Memorandum even uses dangerously vague terms as "threats of violations" against which certain measures would be taken. We consider this to be a matter of grave consequences.

10. It implies that the economic and arms supply are subject to the sole judgment of the United States Government in connection with the alleged threats of violations being attributed to one side.

11. It makes certain aspects of Egyptian-American relations to be subject to elements extraneous to those relations and its commitments made to a third party.

12. It implies the United States acquiescence to Israel's embarking on measures, including military measures, against Egypt on the assumption that there are violations or threats of violation of the Treaty.

13. It gives the United States the right to impose a military presence in the region for reasons agreed between Israel and the United States. A matter which we cannot accept.

14. The proposed Memorandum will cast grave doubts about the real intention of the United States, especially in connection with the peace process. It could be accused of collaboration with Israel to create such circumstances that would lead to American military presence in the area, a matter which would certainly have serious implications especially on the stability in the whole region.

15. It will have adverse effects in Egypt towards the United States and would certainly drive other Arab countries to take a harder position against the peace process, and would give added reasons for them not to participate in that process.

16. It would also pave the way for other alliances to be formed in the area to counter the one whose seeds could be found in the proposed Memorandum.

For all these reasons, I hereby inform you that the Government of Egypt will not recognize the legality of the Memorandum and considers it null and void and as having no effect whatsoever so far as Egypt is concerned.

Mostafa Khalil

229. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1979, 11:08–11:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. SIDE

The President
Secretary Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski

ISRAELI SIDE

Prime Minister Begin
Foreign Minister Dayan

The President: opened by informing Begin that he understood that the announcement of the return of El Arish in two months instead of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2-4/79. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

the originally proposed three months will be made by him in Cairo as a surprise gesture to the Egyptians.

Begin: I agree but then my friends will say I have misled them, and therefore it is better to announce it now.

The President: Sadat agreed to return of the oil sector in seven months in return for uninterrupted flow to Israel. Is that right?

Begin: That is correct. On exchange of visits, I proposed that I return the visit to Cairo, but not on April 1—that is April Fool's day.

(Throughout these exchanges Begin smiled, was very friendly and obviously pleased with himself.)

The President: I got you the Gulf of Eilat formula. Now we have to resolve the reference to Samaria and Judea in the joint letter.

Begin: I can't change one word. I will have to resign. I have had Knesset approval.²

Vance: An attachment would be sufficient.

Begin: No, it must be an integral part of the joint letter. I am willing to write a footnote in my own handwriting underneath my signature.

Brzezinski: proposed in that case maybe Sadat should write in a footnote in his own handwriting disagreeing with Begin.

The President: proposed that he himself write in the footnote as a compromise.

Begin and Dayan accept.

The President then cites some gestures that Sadat will make for Begin when Begin visits Cairo—Synagogue, scholars, Jewish community.

Begin seems genuinely touched.

Begin then asked the President to intercede with Brezhnev to agree to direct flights from the Soviet Union to Israel.

Begin then asks that the \$800 million grant—\$2.2 billion loan ratio be changed to 50–50 as a personal gift to his wife. He really stresses the personal gift idea.

The President laughs but says he cannot grant this. I cannot give you any encouragement.

Begin responds by saying that we hope you will consider it. At least you are not discouraging me.

The President repeats that he cannot offer any encouragement. The President then says he wishes to raise a couple of sensitive issues. Sadat is a man of impulse and generosity. You, Mr. Begin, are also a man of

² By a final vote of 95–18, (with 2 abstentions and 3 members not participating), the Knesset approved the treaty on March 22. (*Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents, 1977–1979*, p. 685)

great generosity and bravery (the idea of bravery is then embellished). I want you to be sensitive to the fact that settlements pose a key problem for the future. I hope that your statements and actions will recognize the importance and sensitivity of this issue. The second matter involves Jerusalem. I understand your position, but if in your public statements you could refer to the role of the three great religions, if you could use or quote somehow from the Koran, and with your erudition you could find some appropriate words, it would really be helpful.

Begin responds by saying that as far as Jerusalem is concerned there are some self-evident truths which he need not reiterate all the time (that it is the capital of Israel, etc., etc.), and then reiterates his usual line on the settlements.

Dayan adds that it is a matter of proportion—what we do and how we do it.

The rest of the discussion involves the signing ceremony and mutual expressions of admiration and recognition.

230. Letter From President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On the basis of my discussions today with President Sadat and you,² I attach a summary of my understanding of the results of those discussions.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 1–3/79. Secret.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Sadat in the Oval Office from 10:02 a.m. to 10:44 a.m., March 26. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, though Carter's handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. An undated briefing memorandum for the meeting, prepared by the Department of State and forwarded under a covering note from Vance to Carter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 1–3/79. A memorandum of conversation for Carter's meeting with Begin, from 11:08 a.m. to 11:50 a.m., the same day, is printed as Document 229.

Attachment

Summary of Discussions Among President Carter, Egyptian President Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Begin³

Washington, undated

1. Israel will withdraw from southern Sinai and restore to Egypt the exercise of its sovereignty over that area, and over all the adjacent oil fields in the Gulf of Suez, two months before completion of full Israeli withdrawal to the interim Al-Arish—Ras Muhammad line.

2. Egypt will take the necessary steps to insure that oil from those oil fields will be made available for purchase by Israel on an on-going basis, at the world market price current at the time of transfer, from the time of Israeli relinquishment of the fields.

3. The Government of Israel will make all arrangements for the transportation of oil in question.

JC

³ Secret.

231. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, March 26, 1979

To President Sadat:

In accordance with our discussion this morning,² the documents have been handled in the following manner:

a) Only in the Hebrew text of the Treaty, the words “Gulf of Eilat” have been added in parentheses following the words “Gulf of Aqaba.”

b) Following Camp David procedure as you suggested, I have added a notation on my copy and the Israeli copy of the joint letter as

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/79. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner of the letter, Carter wrote, “Cy.” The letter is handwritten.

² See Document 229.

follows: “I am informed that the expression ‘West Bank’ is understood by the Government of Israel to mean ‘Judea and Samaria’.” No notation will be made on the Egyptian copy of the letter.³

I appreciate your helping me to resolve this final problem.

Sincerely yours,

Jimmy Carter

³ This amendment was added as an explanatory note to the joint letter to Carter from Begin and Sadat that comprised Annex III of the final peace treaty. See Document 233.

232. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil¹

Washington, March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This will confirm my previous conversation with you² in which I advised you of discussions with Prime Minister Begin³ concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as follows:

The Prime Minister has assured me that there are and will be no restrictions on the freedom of political expression or on peaceful political activities beyond the routine requirement for a permit which the Government of Israel assures will not be used to restrict such peaceful expression and activity.

The Prime Minister has assured me that there are and will be no restrictions on the freedom of movement of the inhabitants including the freedom to travel abroad, beyond the routine administrative procedures normally required for travel.

The Prime Minister has explained to me, with regard to persons detained without trial, that the British law permitting such detention has been repealed and the principles of the new law will be applied in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800158–0805. No classification marking.

² Reference is to the meeting between the U.S. and Egyptian delegations at the Cairo airport on March 13. See Document 196.

³ Reference is to the meeting between Carter and Begin on the morning of March 13. See Document 201.

the West Bank and Gaza and has assured me that all detentions will be subject to judicial supervision and control.

The Prime Minister has assured me that Israeli authorities will continue and make every effort to expand their present program for the reunification of families through the return of persons displaced since 1967.

The Prime Minister has assured me that when the Peace Treaty is signed and ratified he will undertake to obtain Cabinet approval for the transfer of the headquarters of the military government from the city of Gaza to a location outside the city. The Prime Minister also has assured me that in the Gaza Strip, to the extent possible, the Israeli defense forces will not conduct military maneuvers in populated urban and rural areas.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

233. Editorial Note

After more than six months of negotiations, the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel was signed by President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the North Lawn of the White House on the afternoon of March 26, 1979. The final agreement package consisted of the treaty text itself—comprised of a preamble and nine articles—supplemented by annexes dealing with post-Treaty security arrangements, including the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai, as well as the normalization of political, economic, and cultural relations, including the exchange of ambassadors and the termination of economic boycotts. In addition, the text carried agreed minutes to Articles I, IV, V, and VI and the letter from Begin and Sadat to Carter on West Bank and Gaza negotiations (see Document 210), along with an explanatory note from Carter explicating the Israeli use of “Judea and Samaria” to denote the “West Bank.” (See Document 231) The exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel was confirmed by three attached letters: one, from Sadat to Carter stating the exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel would occur one month after Israel’s withdrawal to the agreed interim line; a second, from Carter to Begin, affirming this pledge; and a third, from Begin to Carter, acknowledging receipt of Carter’s letter. Finally, U.S. assurances re-

garding its role in ensuring compliance among the signatories to the Treaty provisions were laid out in identical letters sent by Carter to Begin and Sadat. The complete English language version of the Treaty, including all annexes, minutes, and letters, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pages 495–517. In addition to this English version, the signatories also signed the Arabic and Hebrew-language versions of the Treaty during this ceremony.

In a separate ceremony held in the office of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on March 26, Vance and Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan signed two Memoranda of Agreement between the United States and Israel. The first, a Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel, pledged U.S. commitment to uphold the Treaty and to support Israel in the event of Treaty violations. (See Document 226) The second memorandum, a supplement to the September 1, 1975, U.S.-Israeli Agreement on oil, extended U.S. commitments to ensure Israel's oil supply from a period of five years to a period of fifteen years. This latter memorandum is printed as Document 235.

234. Letter From Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil to President Carter¹

March 27, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to refer to your letter dated March 26, 1979,² in which you have confirmed your previous conversation with me concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

I noticed with regret that the Israeli assurances concerning the transfer of the Headquarters of the Israeli Military Government from the populated areas is confined to the City of Gaza.

I, equally, regret that the Israeli assurance that the Israeli Army will not conduct military manoeuvres in the populated areas is confined to the Gaza Strip.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 5, Middle East Peace Treaty—1979. No classification marking. Printed from a version delivered by the Egyptian Embassy in Washington.

² See Document 232.

Since these Israeli assurances do not correspond to the understanding reached between the Egyptian and the United States Governments in this respect, I hope you would confirm to me that the aforementioned assurances be extended as well to the West Bank.

Furthermore, with regard to the issue of the retention of persons without trial in the occupied territories, I wish to point out that such practice is illegal and, therefore, all persons thus detained should be released. In this connection, I wish to inform you that Egypt believes that Israel, as the occupying power, has no right to introduce or apply Israeli laws in the occupied territories.

Moustafa Khalil

235. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, March 29, 1979, 1406Z

78095. Brussels for EC. Subject: Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and Israel.

1. Following is the text of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the State of Israel signed by Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance on March 26. This memorandum and the accompanying annex (also contained herein) describe agreements to be concluded regarding oil supply arrangements between the U.S. and Israel.

2. Memorandum of Agreement

Begin text:

March 26, 1979

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States and Israel

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790144-0694. Unclassified; Immediate. Sent to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Manama, Sana, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Doha, Kuwait, Dhahran, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat, Algiers, Paris, Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Bonn, Athens, Rome, Oslo, Lisbon, Ankara, The Hague, Madrid, Nouakchott, Khartoum, Tokyo, Moscow, USUN, and USEC. Drafted by Rosemary D. O'Neill (NEA/EGY); approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and London.

The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975,² between the Governments of the United States and Israel, annexed hereto, remains in effect. A memorandum of agreement shall be agreed upon and concluded to provide an oil supply arrangement for a total of 15 years, including the 5 years provided in the September 1, 1975 arrangement.

The memorandum of agreement, including the commencement of this arrangement and pricing provisions, will be mutually agreed upon by the parties within sixty days following the entry into force of the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel.

It is the intention of the parties that prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer, and that in any event the United States will be reimbursed by Israel for the costs incurred by the United States in providing oil to Israel hereunder.

Experts provided for in the September 1, 1975, arrangement will meet on request to discuss matters arising under this relationship.

The United States administration undertakes to seek promptly additional statutory authorization that may be necessary for full implementation of this arrangement.

(Signed)

Moshe Dayan

For the Government of Israel

Cyrus R. Vance

For the Government of the United States.

End text.

3. Annex to Memorandum of Agreement

Begin text:

Annex

Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.

(A) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to

² See footnote 20, Document 184. For documentation on the conclusion of this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976.

meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(B) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula, as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

End text.

Vance

The Search for a Broader Peace, March 27–December 31, 1979

236. Editorial Note

On March 27, 1979, in the aftermath of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, a conference of Foreign Ministers from eighteen Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization convened in Baghdad to consider the implementation of sanctions censuring Egypt's negotiation with Israel passed at the Baghdad Summit in November 1978. Reporting on the opening session, the United States Interests Section in Baghdad noted the "harsh rhetoric" used by Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Saddam Hussein, Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Saddam Hammadi, to condemn the Peace Treaty, the U.S. role in its negotiation, and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. In his speech to the first public session, Hussein "made it clear that any Arab state not remaining committed" to the Baghdad resolutions "was an ally of Sadat and thus an ally of the Zionist enemy." It was, he continued, "incumbent on Arabs to take actions against any backsliders lest decisions of Arab Kings and Presidents become mere ink on paper." Saddam also criticized the United States for "pushing Sadat in to a peace settlement," an action which he noted would cause U.S. interests in the Arab world to "suffer." Arafat called upon the Arab countries to "take decisions to punish the U.S. and to impose boycotts on it in the fields of petroleum, finance and commerce." Lastly, Hammadi stated that the United States "bore the 'primary responsibility'" for the "capitulationist treaty," adding it was the "nationalist responsibility of Arabs to check Zionist imperialist conspiracy through an increase of awareness and sacrifices."

Hammadi's speech outlined six demands for the conference: 1) "to expel Egypt from the Arab League and to isolate it both from Arab world and within the international community;" 2) transfer the Arab League headquarters from Cairo, along with all of the League's associated institutions; 3) stop all Arab economic, financial, and technical assistance programs for Egypt; 4) "withdraw all official and private Arab deposits from Egypt[ian] financial institutions;" 5) "freeze" Egyptian membership in all economic, cultural and other groupings; and 6) "call upon the Egyptian people to shoulder their responsibility by supporting collective Arab efforts to confront Zionist, imperialist plots which have turned the Egyptian regime into their executive tool." (Telegram 694 from Baghdad, March 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790142-0982)

However, the March 28 conference sessions were marked by intense debate over the proposed sanctions. Jordan announced it would recall its Ambassador from Cairo but would not break relations; the Omani Government, which had boycotted the conference, issued a statement praising the Peace Treaty as it brought the return of Sinai to Egypt. The delegation from Saudi Arabia only agreed to the “minimum sanctions” against the Egyptians which had been agreed at the Baghdad Summit the previous November, a position which drew rebuke from Arafat. (Marvine Howe, “Arabs, Deeply Split, Bar Stronger Steps Against U.S., Egypt,” *The New York Times*, March 29, 1979, page A1) Addressing the conference, Arafat attacked what he viewed as Saudi Arabia’s lack of support for the Palestinian cause and its “soft” position on imposing sanctions upon Egypt or the United States. The speech provoked a “heated exchange” between Arafat and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal, followed by a walk-out by the Libyan, Syrian, and P.L.O. delegations. The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Aziz al-Thunayyan informed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John C. West that Arafat’s attack was “most serious and completely unexpected.” “The Saudis,” West reported, “had expected to implement the Baghdad sanctions and to achieve a consensus but the Arafat accusation had upset all plans and calculations. Thunayyan said that he could not understand why Arafat attacked as he did and he did not know what the outcome of the Baghdad meeting would be.” (Telegram 2602 from Jidda, March 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790144–0446)

In the end, on March 31, a set of compromise resolutions, imposing an extensive diplomatic and economic boycott of Egypt, was unanimously approved by all the delegations in attendance. While no decision was taken to withdraw Arab funds from Egyptian financial institutions, impose exchange controls on Egypt, or impose an oil embargo on the United States, the delegations resolved to suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt; to suspend Egyptian membership in the Arab League and all associated ministerial councils as well as other specialized Arab organizations; to transfer Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis; and to halt all financial and technical aid programs. Moreover, the resolutions stated intent to seek the suspension of Egyptian membership in the non-aligned movement, the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity for “violating the resolutions of these organizations pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict.” The full text of the Baghdad resolutions is printed in *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pages 29952–29953.

Meeting with West to discuss the resolutions on April 3, Saud explained that his country had “worked hard to prevent radicals from carrying the day at Baghdad.” The Conference had ended in a “com-

promise absorbing the furor of the Arab world, which was, in Saudi view, [the] best that could have been expected.” Saud advised that if the United States was “going to pursue Phase II of peace process, it should take steps to open direct contacts with PLO.” Otherwise, he asserted, “it would be better to forget about [the] peace process for the moment and concentrate on bilateral relations with the Arabs while the dust settles.” (Telegram 2746 from Jidda, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790154–0337)

237. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, April 3, 1979, 11:56 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

MB: I had a wonderful visit to Cairo!² The people of Egypt opened their hearts to me. In the morning, tens of thousands lined the streets on both sides, and cheered and waved, and took me to their hearts. I am very moved. I left my car for a while, to the disturbance of the Egyptian secret service, and went into the crowd, which was crying, “We like you; we love you.” It was absolutely wonderful. Yesterday’s reception was at the Qubba Palace. The evening was a “thousand nights into one”. It was fantastic. The hospitality was marvelous.

President Sadat and I have some agreements—we will exchange Instruments of Ratification next week,³ after debate in the Egyptian Parliament on Thursday,⁴ likely concluding on Sunday; Monday⁵ or Tuesday we’ll exchange instruments at the American monitoring station in the Sinai in early morning. Butros Ghali with their document; Dayan will have our document. Will put up a tent with all three flags. If

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81. No classification marking. The time is handwritten. At the top of the document, Carter wrote, “OK. J.” Carter’s handwritten notes related to this conversation are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter’s Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2–4/79.

² Begin visited Cairo on April 2 for talks with Sadat.

³ The Instruments of Ratification were exchanged between the Under Secretary of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saad Afra, and the Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Eliahu Ben-Elissar, at the U.S.-Sinai early-warning monitoring station at Um-Khashiba on April 25. (*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1979, p. 29951)

⁴ April 5.

⁵ April 8.

you will give instructions to your man in charge; we want to have a tent with three flags, and armies of the three nations form the honor guards.

Secondly, on May 26, President Sadat will receive, in person, El Arish. On the 27th I will arrive and we will make two announcements: We will open the direct corridor between Cairo and the Ben Gurion airport, and will then have a 40 minute flight of what would take 1½ hours. We will also declare the borders between Egypt and Israel open for all citizens.

We also reached agreement on the committees. We will have five Ministers from each country; we will have five Ministers and Egypt will have five Ministers. We will meet first in Beer Sheba, then El Arish—(after Egypt resumes sovereignty the second in El Arish.) The chairmanship will rotate; first the Israeli will be chairman, and then the Egyptian will be chairman—each on his own soil.

(MB) The same will apply to the military committee; Ezer will be chairman, and General Ali will be chairman.

President Sadat asked for the return of Santa Catarina on November 19 of this year. I said I will do my best and will recommend this to the Cabinet.

We reached agreement in 50 minutes what would take others 6 months.

We wanted to call you together, but didn't want to wake you up. We decided that I would call from Jerusalem and President Sadat from Cairo, instead of calling at 5:00 in the morning.

JC: Thank you. Let me respond. I am not surprised the people opened their hearts to you because of the great courage you have shown and the great generosity of the Israeli people you exemplify.

We were thrilled to see the news reports about the compatibility which exists between you and President Sadat, his Ministers, and the Egyptian people.

I think one of the most significant things you did was to leave your car and let the people touch you.

We are very gratified at the generosity shown by both sides in expediting the exchange of territory and the agreement to meet again.

El Arish has a special place in President Sadat's heart. He served there as a young man. Your sensitivity about this will pay rich dividends.

I am also pleased at the direct air corridor—and the opening of borders is a tremendous event. I will immediately instruct our people to prepare for the exchange of the ratified documents. Do you know when?

MB: Next Monday or next Tuesday.

JC: I'll tell them to prepare for either day and you can let me know, through normal diplomatic channels, which day.

(JC) You are correct in identifying Santa Catarina as special to President Sadat's heart. He has mentioned it before to me. This is a very fine step. He also discussed this long ago with Mr. Peres.

MB: On November 19th. Very symbolic. Will do our best to transfer on November 18.

I also want to tell you how proud each of us will be to be with you on December 9th in Oslo, for the Nobel Peace Prize.

JC: (Laughing) . . . Your remarks are both very generous and presumptuous. All the credit goes to you and President Sadat.

MB: (Mentions a cable) . . . As I said, it was history-making and you did it. President Sadat and I absolutely concur.

JC: Thank you. I would like to say for future reference, no matter what time of the day or night it is, do not hesitate to call me. I get up very early most mornings, and was up at 5:00 this morning.

MB: Thank you. I won't abuse it; but will, if necessary, use it.

JC: I hope you all will explore every possibility of small gestures of generosity and cooperation above and beyond the treaty agreements.

MB: . . . President Sadat and I discussed the release of prisoners. This will take a few weeks. We will also take out the military headquarters from Gaza City. You gave him a letter,⁶ but he appreciated hearing it from me.

JC: I am very grateful, and want to express my congratulations and appreciation.

MB: Thank you. My wife and I send our best wishes equally to Rosalynn, Amy, and to your mother.

JC: My mother will never forget your embracing her first after the signing ceremony.

MB: All the time she was sending kisses to me in the air! The evening in the tent was beautiful.

JC: Hamilton Jordan may have expressed our feelings when he said, "Begin for President!"

MB: Hamilton. Hamilton is a wonderful man. He likes to make jokes. He is a wonderful man.

JC: Not all a joke.

(Ending pleasantries from both Heads of State)

⁶ Not further identified.

**238. Draft Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between
President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹**

Washington, April 3, 1979, Approximately 3:15 p.m.

JC: President Sadat?

AS: Good evening.

JC: How are you?

AS: Very well. And you?

JC: Fine.

AS: I was going to tell you after I met with Prime Minister Begin, but found it was 5:00 and didn't want to wake you.

JC: You should have called me.

AS: I have good news.

JC: How did your meeting go?

AS: Prime Minister Begin visited with us and returned very happy.

JC: How did you assess the meeting?

AS: As I told you in Washington, I shall be removing a lot of the load on your shoulders. We agreed to negotiate, and shall start in Beer Sheba for the Western Bank and Gaza. He has formed a committee and I have formed a committee. And we have agreed also on military committees to be formed.

JC: When will they meet?

AS: Yes. Immediately this month. We will ratify the treaty here on Sunday or Monday. The Foreign Ministers will meet on Sinai Monday or Tuesday.²

JC: Where will they meet?

AS: The Foreign Ministers only for exchange of documents. They will be meeting at the American Station in the Sinai.

JC: I will make provisions . . .

AS: Invited Begin to come to Arish on the 27th. Shall be receiving it on the 26th.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 66, Middle East: President Carter's Trip to Jerusalem and Cairo: 2-4/79. No classification marking. At the top of the document, Carter wrote, "OK. cc Zbig, Cy, + pers[onal] file." A final version of this transcript has not been found. Carter's handwritten notes related to this conversation are *ibid.* According to the President's Daily Diary, this conversation took place from 3:10 p.m. to 3:20 p.m., April 3. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter's handwritten corrections have been silently incorporated.

² See footnote 3, Document 237.

JC: The 26th of May?

AS: Yes. The 26th of May. When he comes to meet with me on the 27th, we shall take planes and visit BatSheba³ and then open the corridor between Egypt and Sinai. We didn't want to wake you up.

JC: Wish you would have. As a matter of fact, I was awake at 5:00.

AS: This is all a result of your efforts.

JC: You always say that. Let me ask you about the opening of the borders.

AS: On the visit on the 27th, we shall declare . . .

JC: All the borders? Or just through El Arish?

AS: All the borders.

JC: Very good.

AS: You know me. I want to keep the momentum going.

JC: I am so pleased that you and Prime Minister Begin have worked all this out together.

AS: I have a suggestion. Can you send Cy to us on the 27th?

JC: I will do almost anything you want. I will have to check with Cy to see what his schedule is like.

AS: We want to have your representative with us for this occasion.

JC: I will send a representative. If Cy can't come, I will send my personal representative of equal importance.

AS: I didn't tell Begin, but the land is my land.

(laughter from both Heads of State)

JC: It has always been your land.

AS: Yes. I wanted to ask you, the news of the nuclear reactor.⁴

JC: It is well under control now; was of concern for a few days. The press exaggerated the danger, as they usually do. I was there on Sunday in person, and I am personally familiar with the nuclear technology. I am very well pleased.

AS: We were very worried about it. I want to ask you to do something for me. I want to start a contribution for my scheme on Mount Sinai. I told Prime Minister Begin to deliver to me before Nov 19th.

JC: What did Begin say?

AS: He said he would do his best. As I told you in Washington, it's 85% psychological, not 75%.

JC: 95%!

³ Beersheba.

⁴ Reference is to the March 29 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania.

AS: I told you I would take the load from your shoulders.

JC: God has answered my prayers, if that happens. I hope you and Prime Minister Begin will do anything you can that's not required in the treaty to help improve relations.

AS: The Israeli delegation with him told me they were dreaming at the banquet.

JC: I am pleased; you have added a new dimension to my personal life. (mention of friendship)

AS: Without you nothing would have been done. I want you to declare your contribution, whenever it would be fine for you.

JC: Santa Catarina? I will make a personal contribution. When do you think it is appropriate?

AS: Whenever you like. My Vice President will form a committee, and we will build a church, mosque and synagogue.

JC: I will ask my Vice President to do the same.

AS: Shall commemorate on the 19th. Please give my best, and from Jihan, to Rosalynn and your children.

JC: To you too.

AS: With all my heart with you always. And if I can ever be of help to you.

JC: I won't hesitate. How concerned are you about the Baghdad action?⁵

AS: Just like the other shouting after the second disengagement and my initiative, it will calm down.

JC: That is good to know. You have my love, and so does Jihan.

⁵ See Document 236.

239. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Egypt and Israel

We initialed identical nuclear cooperation agreements with Egypt and Israel in August 1976.² It was our intent at the time to submit these agreements to Congress right away. President Ford, however, subsequently decided to withhold submission.

The agreements have remained in abeyance pending the Administration's review of our non-proliferation policy and passage of the new non-proliferation law. Over this period we have assured the Egyptians, who have continued to press us on concluding an agreement, that we intended to do so as soon as practical.

Aside from the question of renegotiating our initialed agreements to reflect the requirements of the new law, the Egyptian and Israeli agreements have always been informally "linked" with a tacit understanding that they would be substantially identical and move forward in tandem. Several developments have occurred, however, which make such linkage doubtful.

For its part, Egypt appears ready to comply with the added non-proliferation conditions specified in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978, but only so long as we guarantee it equal treatment with any agreement subsequently concluded with Israel. Israel, on the other hand, has not pushed us to conclude an agreement. Moreover, under the law we would insist on safeguards being applied to all of Israel's existing nuclear facilities (including the unsafeguarded nuclear facility at Dimona). The Israelis have resisted this in the past and will probably continue to do so.

The Israelis remain interested in a nuclear cooperation agreement and they might seek to have you waive the full-scope safeguards re-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—5/79–8/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document. The memorandum was found attached to a May 7 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, informing Vance of Carter's approval of the memorandum and instructing him that it should "be held very closely and regarded as particularly sensitive." (Ibid.)

² On August 4–5, 1976, Egypt and Israel initialed identical agreements with the United States to purchase atomic reactor plants which had been promised to both countries by President Nixon in June 1974. ("Egypt, Israel Agree to Buy Atomic Reactors From U.S.," *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1976, p. A8)

quirements both for the agreement and for export licensing purposes. Both waivers are subject to Congressional veto by concurrent resolution, and the export licensing criterion can only be waived on an annual basis. We do not favor such waivers because of their adverse impact on our entire non-proliferation policy, as well as on our policy in the Middle East.

Moreover, the law prohibits exports to any non-nuclear-weapon state found by the President to have engaged in activities since March 1978 involving nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, unless that state has taken steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities. If faced today with a proposed nuclear export to Israel, you might find it necessary, based on current evidence, to determine that the prohibition applied. Again, the law provides a waiver on non-proliferation or U.S. common defense and security grounds, which is subject to concurrent resolution Congressional veto, but we would be reluctant to recommend use of this waiver.

We believe we should now approach Egypt and Israel with identical agreements, which have been revised in accordance with our new law. We expect that this will likely result in an agreement only with Egypt in the foreseeable future. Egypt's longstanding and favorable attitudes toward non-proliferation and Sadat's enhanced image in the U.S. appear to make it possible now for us to consider moving ahead separately on an agreement on the assumption that an agreement with Israel will not be ready at the same time. The Egyptian's concern about "equal treatment" could be handled in the context of an explicit statement that they will receive treatment no less favorable than Israel would receive under any subsequent U.S.-Israeli nuclear cooperation agreement.

Israel, or its American supporters, may oppose a nuclear cooperation agreement with Egypt for a variety of reasons, but especially if Israel sees little prospect for an agreement with us because of our new requirements. The consideration of a separate agreement with Egypt, therefore, could become a contentious issue on the Hill which we must be prepared to deal with if we are to fulfill our promises to Egypt. In addition, it is possible that criticism could come from other sources for initiating nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT in a volatile region.

The United States' commitment to nuclear cooperation with Egypt has been reaffirmed on several occasions, along with assurances that we will move forward with the agreement as expeditiously as possible. In this latter regard we are behind schedule in providing the Egyptians with our suggestions for revising or re-negotiating the existing agree-

ment to conform to the requirements of the new law. Ambassador Eilts is concerned that the delays which have already occurred in concluding an agreement are undermining Egyptian confidence in our intentions on an issue which they view as a major bilateral concern, especially when they appear ready to agree with our non-proliferation policies and are willing to concede our requirements. Egypt and Israel already agreed in 1976 to much more stringent controls, excluding safeguards, than exist in our other agreements.

In our judgment it is desirable to avoid delays on moving toward concluding an agreement with Egypt. In this context, we need your agreement that we will vigorously support an agreement with Egypt recognizing the possibility that it could become a controversial issue in Congress. No time is an ideal time for this, but the treaty signing seems likely to provide the best atmosphere in which to send this to Congress. If we do not move soon, we will not be able to complete Congressional review this session.

If you agree to move forward quickly on the re-negotiations, we would submit to both Israel and Egypt, within a month, identical draft revised agreements for their consideration. We will also indicate our willingness to send a U.S. negotiating team to conclude agreements at an early mutually convenient time.

Under our current perceptions, we expect that the agreement with Egypt could be ready for submission to Congress during the current session. We will, however, have some control over the timing of various steps in the progress toward concluding an agreement. We also hope that the issue will be insulated to a large extent from domestic politics since our position on both the Egyptian and Israeli agreements will be based squarely on our non-proliferation policy, the requirement of the law and the energy needs of the two countries.

Recommendation:

That you agree to move forward quickly with renegotiating the nuclear cooperation agreements with Egypt and Israel, including a provision for equal treatment for both countries, understanding that Egypt will expect us to support our agreement with them even if we do not have a parallel one with the Israelis.³

³ Carter approved the recommendation, adding the handwritten notation: "Don't let Israel or a few Congressmen get into a position of controlling or vetoing our action. J."

240. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter announced on April 24, 1979, the appointment of Special Trade Representative Robert S. Strauss as his Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations. Strauss was appointed to the rank of Ambassador at Large, replacing Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., who had been named Ambassador to Egypt. The text of Carter's announcement, along with statements by Strauss and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the assembled press, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pages 687–690. Although Strauss had no prior experience in dealing with Middle East issues, he had recently returned from a trade and investment mission to Egypt and Israel. Strauss visited Egypt April 17–19, meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, Vice President Hosni Mubarak, and Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil, and other top Egyptian officials to discuss the global economic situation as well as U.S.-Egyptian bilateral business relations. An overview of the Egyptian talks is in telegram 8106 from Cairo, April 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790182–0362) Strauss's meetings with Sadat, Mubarak, and Khalil on April 17 are summarized in telegram 7910 from Cairo, April 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178–1064) The Embassy reported on further discussions with the Egyptian section of the Joint Business Council on April 17 and top Egyptian economic officials on April 18 in telegram 7980 from Cairo, April 19, and telegram 8050 from Cairo, April 19, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790180–0311 and D790180–0943) Strauss arrived in Israel April 19 for a 30-hour visit, meeting with Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan, Minister for Defense Ezer Weizman, Minister for Finance Simcha Ehrlich, and Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism Gideon Patt. On April 20, Strauss and Patt signed the U.S.-Israel Multilateral Trade Negotiation Agreement. In telegram 8383 from Tel Aviv, April 23, the Embassy summarized all of Strauss's meetings with the Israelis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790186–0233) Telegram 8242 from Tel Aviv, April 21, and telegram 8249 from Tel Aviv, April 21, respectively reported on Strauss's individual meetings with Dayan and Weizman. (National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D790183–0794 and D790183–1082) In telegram 8188 from Tel Aviv, April 20, the Embassy reported Strauss's discussion with Ehrlich on April 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy, D790182–0592)

Before making the public announcement of Strauss's appointment, Carter confirmed his decision with Begin and Sadat in separate telephone conversations on the afternoon of April 24. According to the

President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from 3:33 p.m. to 3:37 p.m. and with Sadat from 3:38 p.m. to 3:43 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) A transcript of the brief conversation with Begin is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81. No transcript of Carter's conversation with Sadat has been found, though the President indicated in his announcement that both leaders were pleased with the decision. Carter's handwritten notes related to the telephone discussions are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 27, 1979, 1855Z

8600. Subject: An Overview of Destabilizing Forces in Egypt. Ref: State 38873.²

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary. The threat of Sadat's assassination has been heightened by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This could be very destabilizing, particularly since there is no established successor of Sadat's stature. Assassination could polarize the country between those who unify behind a temporary successor (probably Mubarak) and those who would seek safety in return to the Arab fold. Over the longer term, it is difficult to imagine Sadat's successor being able to persist for long in a policy opposed by the rest of Arab world. Sadat's security, however, is good and the Egyptians are aware of the threat. The following assessment of destabilizing forces in Egypt, prepared in response to reftel, assumes Sadat's remaining in office at least until 1982.

Egypt learned important lessons from the January 1977 subsidy riots³ and is unlikely to repeat past mistakes. The economy has improved (the Ministry of Economy claims a per annum GNP growth in

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 11, Cairo. Secret; Roger.

² Not found.

³ Also known as the Egyptian Bread Riots, the demonstrations broke out January 18–19, 1977, when hundreds of thousands of lower class Egyptians protested the World Bank and International Monetary Fund-mandated termination of state subsidies of basic foodstuffs. Sadat ended the subsidies in an attempt to receive loans from the World Bank.

real terms of over 9 percent), but important sectoral snags remain. It is questionable how much improvement has trickled down to the lower income levels. Housing and public services are woefully inadequate; the urban fabric has been strained almost to the breaking point. Institutional weaknesses and a lack of resources limit the government's ability to address these problems.

Sadat remains physically and psychologically isolated; officials have difficulty in making and following through on decisions; and most of those close to the President will not give him bad news. Nevertheless, Sadat is widely popular, while his opposition is fragmented and without effective leadership. The Peace Treaty is backed by an overwhelming majority, including the military. Mass media and labor present no current challenge to the regime. Fundamentalist Muslim organizations oppose many governmental actions, including the Peace Treaty, but they are bereft of real leadership and do not constitute a present threat. The Soviets, opposing Sadat's leadership and the peace process, have few assets with which to work.

Continued stability depends greatly on the political and economic momentum generated in the critical months ahead. If forward movement is not maintained, destabilizing forces could present a threat to Sadat's regime. End summary.

2. In the charged atmosphere following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the threat of Sadat's sudden removal from office by assassination has been heightened. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the PLO, even Jordan, have as a primary objective the overthrow of Sadat. While Sadat's security is good, and the Egyptians are aware of the threat, we cannot rule out the possibility of a successful assassination attempt. Such an event could well be destabilizing, the more so since there is no established and automatic successor of Sadat's stature. Assassination could polarize the country—those who would react in rage and unify behind a temporary successor (probably Mubarak) and those who would seek safety in return to the Arab fold. Much would depend upon the wishes of the military leadership. Over the longer term, it is hard to imagine any successor to Sadat having the fortitude, vision, tactical flexibility and political base to persist for long in a policy opposed by the rest of the Arab world.

3. The following assessment is based on the assumption that Sadat will continue in office, at least until his current term expires in 1982. Should he then decide to transfer power to Mubarak, we assume the process would go smoothly. Nevertheless, even with Sadat in office, the Egyptian system is subject to a number of strains which have the potential to destabilize the situation. These are outlined below.

4. Egyptian vulnerability to destabilizing forces was best demonstrated by the January 1977 subsidy riots which severely shook this

government. For a few days there was some doubt as to the outcome. In the end the government did survive and in doing so appeared to learn some lessons that make it less vulnerable today. The proximate cause of the January rioting was the government's announcement of precipitous rise in prices of basic commodities. It has not repeated this mistake, but, rather, has achieved much the same goal by resorting to incremental price increases. There have been some grumblings, but there appears to be no mass discontent.

5. This is partly due to the fact that Egypt's overall economy has been steadily improving. Since January 1977, the Egyptian GNP has gone up by approximately 8 percent per annum in real terms (the Ministry of Economy says the figure is more than 9 percent). The balance of payments picture has dramatically improved and, for the first time in its history, Egypt is current on its external debt. Income from Canal tolls, oil exports, tourism, and remittances are all rising. Some sectoral snags remain, however, particularly in the construction industry.

6. There is some question, however, on how much of this improvement in the large has trickled down to the lower income levels. Certain sectors of society obviously have benefitted from Sadat's open door. Others, particularly lower paid government employees, have not. The frustrations of living in Cairo and other Egyptian cities increase daily. This is a function of population explosion, of urban migration, and of an infrastructure which was sorely neglected for 25 years. Cairo could comfortably house 2½–3 million; it is called upon to shelter some 9 to 10 million. The housing shortage is acute; perhaps as many as a half million Cairenes are camped out in a semi-permanent status in the City of the Dead, with virtually no government services. Cairo's water, sewage, transportation, and telecommunications are all woefully inadequate.

7. In addition to a lack of real resources, the government's ability to address problems is limited by institutional weaknesses, including considerable corruption. The Egyptian bureaucracy has grown so large that in many cases it barely functions. Everyone dealing with it, Egyptian or American, is fast frustrated. Egypt's bureaucracy has been notably inefficient and venal on at least a petty scale throughout history; with the increased money available in the economy this phenomenon is on the increase. This corruption is widely assumed to extend to the highest level of Egyptian society. Sadat's wife and his closest advisor are popularly believed to be involved, although hard evidence to support this charge is difficult to come by.

8. The government's ability to deal with major social and economic issues is further limited by Sadat's physical and psychological isolation. His peripatetic style of government makes it difficult for key officials to get decisions. Access to the President is strictly limited, and

most who surround him are very reluctant to give Sadat bad news. He has few close associates. This would be less damaging if subordinate officials were willing to make independent decisions. Unfortunately, the nature of Egyptian society pushes almost all issues to the top for resolution. Until Sadat reaches a decision, all too often nothing happens. (Frequently, little happens even after Sadat issues directives; there is little follow-up, and bureaucratic inertia is massive—see 78 Cairo 19822.)⁴

9. Sadat's popularity nevertheless continues to be wide and apparently genuine. The opposition which does exist is fragmented and lacks dynamic leadership. Thus far, to the best of our knowledge Egyptian security forces (military and civilian) are loyal to Sadat, cohesive and professional, and seem to genuinely welcome the peace treaty with Israel. The Egyptian military—specifically its lower officers and rank and file—reflects its society and is not an elite organization. On the one hand, the military is not cut off from the people. On the other, it is affected by the same economic and social problems which afflict society in general. Additionally, the armed forces are acutely aware of the fact that their military capability has declined in recent years, particularly when compared to Israel.

10. The mass media is government-controlled and uncritical. While there is no prior censorship, editors are government-appointed and are expected to know what should not appear in print. By and large they observe closely these unwritten rules. Labor groups, too, are amenable to government direction. There have been no significant strikes since January 1977, and recent wage increases have permitted workers to keep up with inflation, if only just barely. Labor leaders report no mass discontent, but say there is a pervasive sense of drift.

11. Student and fundamentalist Muslim religious organizations could cause the administration difficulty, as Sadat undoubtedly is now aware. The conservative campus-based Islamic societies (with links to the Muslim Brotherhood) are the best organized force in the country outside the military and the communists, and are deeply committed to their cause. They control student governments on many campuses, and

⁴ In telegram 19822 from Cairo, August 25, 1978, the Embassy provided a discussion of Egyptian economic policy-making responsibilities as background for Carter's preparations for the Camp David Summit. The analysis concluded: "In sum, decision-making at higher levels in the government-dominated Egyptian economy tends to be diffused, poorly coordinated, lacking in clear guidance from superior authority and unresponsive to out-of-the-ordinary requirements. Buck passing is a well-developed bureaucratic art; individual responsibility for decisions normally is accepted only if impossible to avoid. The extensive use of government committees is a device designed at least as much to arrive at collective responsibility for decisions as it is to reach a consensus on feasible, preferred courses of action." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780348-0998)

are in a strong position in the national student leadership. The Islamic societies, and their adult associates, oppose much of Sadat's peace policy, especially the failure to resolve the Jerusalem issue, and have strong reservations over the course of domestic developments. They fear modernization, and oppose Sadat's economic open door. The religious right, however, bereft as it is of real leaders does not at present constitute anything more than a latent threat. It has attracted no more than 10–15 percent of the student population, and the campus groups are fragmented geographically and ideologically. The lack of a hierarchical structure in Sunni Islam argues against the rise of large scale organized opposition from the religious right. It could develop, but it would take time. There is no charismatic leader, but the situation is ripe for one to emerge. Sadat has shown that he recognizes the potential threat and has initiated a two-track policy. He has warned that he will crack down on the Ikhwan and the Islamic societies while, at the same time, offering financial inducements to main line religious figures. More funds have been appropriated for mosque construction, wages have been raised in the religious sector, and a large number of mosques are about to be brought under government control.

12. The only significant minority group in Egypt, the Copts, has little ability to destabilize the country. At most, there are 4 million Copts in a total population of some 40 million. They are scattered around the country, with the largest concentration in rural upper Egypt. Despite their protestations to the contrary, the GOE does not seek to deliberately discriminate against Copts. Fundamentalist Islamic organizations do seek, however, to repress the Christian community. This is a problem for the government as well as for the Copts. Outbreaks of religious strife will continue but should be easily contained by the security forces, as they have in the past. Sadat has repeatedly stressed his commitment to communal peace. In doing so, he has done much to calm the Coptic leadership.

13. The Soviets continue to work against Sadat, but few assets remain with which they can work. Their consulates and cultural centers have been closed, and their activities are carefully monitored. They have considerable influence with domestic leftists, but these same leftists have little power or influence of their own. Many were discredited by their involvement in the excesses of the Nasser era. The domestic left continues to have a disproportionate amount of influence with Cairo's intellectual elite, but has made little inroad with the Egyptian masses. While the left retains the ability to exploit incidents (as it did in January 1977), it has so far showed itself incapable of instigating instability on its own.

14. Overall, our assessment at this time is that destabilizing forces are evident on the political-economic scene and that those forces in

some respects could pose potential problems for the continuation of moderate rule in Egypt over the coming critical months in which negotiations for a comprehensive peace will have to be pursued. The peace is overwhelmingly popular among Egyptians, but it has been bought at the price of near-total political isolation in the Arab world, with all that connotes for the continuation of economic support from the oil-rich, formerly "moderate" Arabs, and for the ingrained Egyptian claim to leadership in the Arab world.

13. Egypt's economy is improved; growth rates are up. But peace brings its own additional demands in the form of rising popular expectations on the standard of living, and built-in distortions in the economy limit the government's maneuverability in policy terms. (It would be a reckless policy maker, indeed, who would advocate attacking head-on the enormously costly subsidy burden.)

14. Continued stability in this potentially unstable setting depends greatly on the political and economic momentum Sadat is able to generate in the conduct of Egypt's affairs, and thus is subject to virtually continual reassessment by the Embassy. Sadat has just pulled off an historic political coup, and his Economic Ministers are able to point to significant, identifiable economic advances in some areas of their responsibility. The question now is: what follows? A brief pause of some few months in which negotiations remain inconclusive may be acceptable. After that, if forward movement is not maintained in Egypt's external and domestic economic problem areas, now quiescent destabilizing forces indoubtedly will surface and pose to Sadat's government basic questions of survival.

15. The above arguments are predicated on Sadat's remaining around and in power for the immediate future. As indicated earlier, should he leave office suddenly, the stability problem could become acute. There is no clear precedent for succession. According to the constitution, if Sadat dies in office the Speaker of the People's Assembly would become acting President, until Parliament nominates, and the electorate endorses, his successor.

16. At the moment, Vice President Mubarak appears to be the clear favorite, and Sadat's choice, for this office. His role in vetting the national Democratic Party's candidates for the coming election should give him considerable control over this body. Many, however, would oppose Mubarak's assumption of the presidency, undoubtedly emboldened by recognition of the fact that the Vice President lacks an independent power base. Up to now Mubarak is Sadat's creation. Without his mentor in the presidency, he would be a much weakened man. Some suggest, however that Mubarak is ambitious, and with his man Kamal Hassan Ali as Min Defense, might at some time decide to make a power play of his own. It is possible in this society, but there is

no tangible evidence that Mubarak is at present planning any such thing.

17. Despite these caveats, our current assessment is that Mubarak is the most likely person to succeed in a constitutional succession. The question remains how would he perform? Many consider Mubarak to be a lightweight, intellectually unsuited to manage Egypt's affairs. Yet the same, and more, was said of Sadat following Nasser's death. Sadat learned quickly and confounded his critics, although not without some difficulty.

18. While no Sadat in either wisdom or experience, Mubarak has had a longer apprenticeship under Sadat than the latter enjoyed under Nasser. Sadat has delegated far more authority to Mubarak than he, Sadat, ever received from Nasser. Mubarak now has had considerable experience in local government, party, and diplomatic affairs. He has tremendous energy and appears to have grown in the job. His greatest liabilities are his tendency to adopt simplistic approaches to complex issues, and his frequent attempts to personalize abstract problems. We believe he would be better qualified to rule after some more seasoning, but suspect he could handle the job if it were thrust upon him. His external and internal policies, at least initially, would not deviate from those of Anwar Sadat so long as the twin objectives of (a) further progress on Middle East peace front and, (b) economic development makes headway with our and other friendly states' help. In connection with the first, Mubarak is not rabid on the Palestine issue. He has several times told the Ambassador that if meaningful autonomy for the Gazans can be obtained, the West Bankers can be left to stew in their own juice, if they refuse to participate in the peace process.

Eilts

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, April 29, 1979, 1721Z

108592. Subject: Letter to Prince Saud. London for Under Secretary Newsom: Alert Tice at Hotel Europa; Jidda for Charge. Ref: Cairo 8604.

1. (C) Entire text

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790196–0134. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to Jidda and Riyadh. Drafted by Roger B. Merrick (NEA/ARP); cleared by Crawford, Sterner, Saunders, and Richard Castrodale (S/S-O); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo.

2. Please deliver² the following letter from the Secretary to Prince Saud at the earliest opportunity:

3. Begin text:

HRH Prince Saud bin Faisal al-Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Your Royal Highness:

I want to share with you my concern that the outcome of the Islamic Conference³ could affect Egypt's international position in a way that would have negative consequences for each of our countries. The United States believes that Saudi Arabia and its moderate Gulf neighbors understand that the survival of a moderate government in Egypt is important for the geo-political interests of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors and that the current Arab campaign to punish Egypt is turning toward extremes which can only undermine the security of the region and the position of the moderates in it.

Expulsion of Egypt from Islamic or international groupings which are not exclusively Arab can only work against broader long-term interests of countries like Saudi Arabia, and we hope that Saudi Arabia will lead in resisting such efforts.

I bring this matter to your attention because of the critical nature of the present period for all of us and because of the leading role Saudi Arabia can play in support of Egypt's rightful place in the Islamic Conference. A positive approach by Saudi Arabia on this matter would clearly benefit us all, while Egypt's expulsion would further damage interests which each of us considers important.

Sincerely, Cyrus Vance. End text.

3. FYI: Under Secretary Newsom will be making same points to Crown Prince Fahd.⁴ End FYI.

Vance

² The letter and a translation were sent to Saud on April 30. (Telegram 3390 from Jidda, April 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790196–1244)

³ In the aftermath of the Baghdad Summit, the meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers, scheduled to be held in Fez, Morocco, beginning May 8, was expected to consider Egypt's future place in the group. On May 9, despite efforts led by Libya and Iraq to expel Egypt completely, the Organization voted to suspend Egypt's membership, rendering it ineligible for all Organization activities as well as aid money from the group. ("Islamic Conference Suspends Egyptians," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1979, p. A7)

⁴ Newsom met with Fahd in Marbella, Spain, on April 30, to discuss the state of U.S.-Saudi relations. At the meeting, Fahd stated that Sadat "did not consult with the Saudis before his first trip to Jerusalem and that, because Sadat achieved so little, Saudi Arabia had difficulty in supporting Sadat or the peace process." Newsom responded by urging Saudi support for Sadat "to the extent Baghdad makes possible" and "active Saudi opposition to the expulsion of Egypt from international bodies." (Telegram 110491 to Jidda, May 2; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 116, 5/1–9/79) A full memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1979 Memcons—UN Secretariat (P).

243. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 3, 1979

SUBJECT

West Bank/Gaza Negotiations

Secretary Vance has sent you the memo at Tab A² in advance of our Friday morning meeting with Bob Strauss.³ At this point more questions are raised than answered. Specifically:

—*A deputy for Strauss.* Bob will not be able to assume full responsibility until later in the year. Even then, he may not want to get into all the details. One possible candidate to be his deputy is Jim Leonard from our UN Mission. He knows the Middle East well and is an experienced diplomat.⁴

—*Appropriate US role.* How active should we be? When should we begin to lay out substantive positions? Cy prefers to hold back for a while, letting the Egyptians and Israelis take the lead at first.

—*Broadening Arab support.* The positions we take on settlements, Jerusalem and a dialogue with the PLO will be important signals to the Arab world. The direction and timing of our moves will require careful consideration.

—*PLO.* Most Arab governments are urging us to open a dialogue with the PLO. This would cause an uproar in Israel.⁵ An alternative

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 5–11/79. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the memorandum, "Cy's memo to Bob [Strauss] J."

² Attached but not printed is Vance's May 2 memorandum prepared for Carter in anticipation of a their scheduled May 3 meeting on the "practical and substantive issues we will face in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations," also involving Mondale, Strauss, Brzezinski, and Jordan. (See footnote 3 below) The memorandum provided "a brief status report on questions connected with US staffing of the negotiations;" discussed "issues that arise with respect to the initial phase concerning arrangements, procedure, and agenda;" addressed "substantive issues on which we need early decisions if we are to have an effective strategy of winning Arab support for the negotiations," including Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and U.S. relations with the Palestinians, including the PLO; and presented "alternatives for our longer-term strategy toward the negotiations." In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of Vance's memorandum, Carter wrote: "To Strauss—for comment J.C." (Ibid.)

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter held a breakfast meeting with Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski from 7:30 a.m. to 8:56 a.m., May 4. They were joined by Strauss from 8:35 a.m. to 8:56 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

⁴ The appointment of Leonard, who had previously served as Deputy Representative to the United Nations, as Strauss's deputy was announced May 12. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 852)

⁵ In an April 30 letter to Vance, Begin protested reported comments made by Saunders and Hansell to Congress "to the effect that communications between the government of the United States and the P.L.O. might be considered compatible with the

means of attracting Palestinian support would be to stake out credible positions on settlements and the scope of authority of the self-government. (S)

After this preliminary discussion, we will need to accelerate our efforts to develop a coherent strategy for the next phase of negotiations. This meeting should try to resolve issues of staffing and to set broad guidelines for the conduct of the talks. (S)

commitments of the United States to Israel and that the United States Government is not obligated to obtain Israel's prior approval." Begin noted that the U.S. commitment neither to recognize nor negotiate with the P.L.O., as affirmed in the 1975 and 1979 Memoranda of Agreement between the United States and Israel, was "an absolute one." "The fact cannot be disregarded that any direct or indirect contact by the United States Government with a representative of the P.L.O.," Begin continued, "is tantamount to recognition of that organization and will inevitably confer on it a degree of legitimation. This is the case, whether or not the contact takes place in the context of negotiations." (Telegram 110026 to Tel Aviv, May 1; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 5–11/79)

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Lebanon and Israel¹

Washington, May 6, 1979, 1541Z

115270. Eyes Only for Ambassadors Dean and Lewis from the Secretary. Subject: Contacts With PLO/Fatah.

(S) Entire text

1. For Ambassador Dean: We have given further thought to the security problems in Lebanon which we discussed during your recent consultation in Washington. We agree that the personal safety and security of you and all members of the Mission, along with private American citizens, makes it essential that all appropriate precautions are taken.

2. In recognition of the decisive role that organized Palestinian groups have played and could play in the security of our Mission and the physical environment in which it must function, you are authorized to initiate and maintain such contact with an appropriate PLO/Fatah

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 10, Beirut. Secret; Roger. Drafted by Draper; cleared by Saunders, William McAfee (INR/DDC), and Tarnoff; approved by Vance.

representative or person associated with those organizations as is necessary to assure reasonable protection of your own security and that of your staff and American citizens in Lebanon. You should pick one individual for this contact. This contact represents a continuation of the liaison with PLO/Fatah for security purposes which was authorized for Embassy Beirut in 1976 and has never been rescinded. We recognize, however, that experience has shown that you must have discretion to conduct exchange with associate or representative of PLO/Fatah who may be accessible only to the Chief of Mission.

3. In the first instance you are authorized to conduct exchanges with Basil Akl, if he is your choice, on the understanding that you will inform us immediately if you believe it essential to be in touch with others in PLO/Fatah.

4. Your contact must not rpt not stray beyond the understanding we have with the Government of Israel, as recently reaffirmed in the memorandum of agreement.² Your contact, therefore, will at this time relate to security and security-related issues within Lebanon. Your contacts will not be construed as recognition of or negotiation with the PLO/Fatah on issues going beyond security.

5. For Ambassador Lewis: You should not rpt not raise this issue with Israelis but regard it as consistent with past policy in Lebanon which has been publicly acknowledged. If asked you should cite past practice and say you will query Washington. For your own background only at this stage, we would probably ask you to reply to such a query along following lines:

A. The security of American personnel and institutions in Lebanon depends on a large degree on the self-restraint of the various Palestinian groups. (There are 56 Americans in the Embassy and several hundred Americans working at the American University, American schools, financial institutions, and businesses.) Our inability to prevent incidents by routine measures was illustrated by the April 2 grenade attack on the Embassy and the April 16 bombing of the cultural center. Another example of the danger to Americans in Beirut was the threat made in mid-April of 1979 against Ambassador Dean's life by the same group that assassinated Ambassador Meloy in 1976.³

B. The Israelis will understand our vital security concerns and our determination to take all necessary measures to protect our personnel

² See Document 226.

³ Francis Edward Meloy, Jr., his aide, and their driver were kidnapped and later shot to death in Beirut. Although several members of Palestinian and Lebanese groups were arrested and charged, no one was ever convicted. (James M. Markham, "U.S. Ambassador and Aide Kidnapped and Murdered in Beirut Combat Sector," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1976, p. 1)

and citizens. They will recall our shared efforts to safeguard Israeli personnel in Tehran, when our concerns paralleled one another. They will recall that our Embassy in Beirut had contacts with Fatah on security matters in 1976. We have authorized our Embassy in Beirut—up to and including our Ambassador—to maintain, as required, contacts with a representative of PLO/Fatah or person associated with that organization for the purpose of assuring a reasonable degree of safety for the Ambassador, Mission staff and property, and American citizens in Lebanon. This contact, therefore, will relate to security and security-related issues within Lebanon. This contact will be limited to only a single person associated with PLO/Fatah.

Christopher

245. Telegram From the United States Liaison Office in Riyadh to the Department of State¹

Riyadh, May 7, 1979, 1055Z

718. From Charge Daniels. Subj: (S) Saudi Arabia Withdraws Offer of Funding of F-5s for Egypt.

1. (S)-entire text.

2. Summary: In meeting just before his departure for Fez, Prince Saud told me SAG saw no alternative but to withdraw offer of funding for F-5s for Egypt. He added that Islamic Conference preparation committee had decided to propose “suspension” of Egypt at Fez.²

3. Foreign Minister Prince Saud summoned me to meeting with him at Riyadh airport just prior to his departure on May 7 for Islamic Conference in Morocco. Meeting was also attended by Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Mansuri and Abdallah Alireza, Embassy Political Counselor, and Chief USLO.

4. Prince Saud referred to Secretary’s letter to him,³ asking for Saudi assistance in preventing expulsion of Egypt from Islamic Conference and other international bodies. He said he would of course be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1745. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat, Cairo, and Jidda.

² See footnote 3, Document 242.

³ See Document 242.

sending formal response but meanwhile he wanted to give oral reply. Saudi Arabia's desire to maintain relations with Egypt has been and remains very strong. Even at this time of greatest strain, SAG has tried to keep as strong relation as possible. Unfortunately, maintenance of relations apparently does not meet the interests of President Sadat. Sadat apparently saw some remaining links in the relationship and he "chopped" them in his May Day speech.⁴ He has made it impossible to maintain any relations or any of the commitments that SAG had made, even in such areas as military sales. Prince Saud then said in low solemn voice that he wished to inform me officially that HMG felt that it could no longer keep its commitment to purchase F-5s for Egypt. Commitments should be of equal importance to both countries. SAG has tried to keep its commitments in the face of many obstacles, but now SAG feels it cannot keep this commitment.

5. I said that I thought SAG position was that F-5 deal was considered to be completed transaction and that it would therefore be carried through. Saud replied that indeed arrangement had been considered as "completed" and thus outside boundaries of Baghdad decisions⁵ but this was no longer possible.

6. I said that I was indeed sorry to hear this news. I remembered that Crown Prince Fahd had told us on several occasions that SAG wished to do all that it could to help Egypt. The way relations between the two countries have deteriorated over the past few weeks has been great tragedy. I was certain that SAG decision on F-5s would not be taken lightly in Washington but would in fact cause great distress. Prince Saud said that this was not situation that Saudi Arabia wanted but it was one brought on by President Sadat.

7. I asked if SAG distinction between Egypt and Egyptian people still remained in effect. Would SAG now take actions, for example, against Egyptian expatriates in Saudi Arabia? Saud said distinction still existed and Saudi Arabia would take no action against Egyptians in Saudi Arabia but he did not know what actions Egyptian Government might take.

8. I asked Saud how he thought Islamic Conference would turn out. I pointed out, as Secretary Vance did in his letter, that ostracism of Egypt could harm the interests of both Saudi Arabia and U.S. in area.

⁴ In his May 1 speech, Sadat accused Saudi Arabia of "encouraging (or paying)" Arab states to cut diplomatic relations with Egypt, "discounted previous Saudi financial aid," and questioned whether the Saudis would honor their pledge to finance Egypt's purchase of F-5Es. Sadat also criticized the Saudi leadership, comparing it unfavorably with that of the late King Faisal, as well as Syria. A summary of the speech is in telegram 8815 from Cairo, May 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790198-0967.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 85.

Saud said that we must not confuse cause and effect. The Islamic Conference is not isolating Egypt. It is Egypt which has isolated itself. Differences between Egypt and the others are clear and arise out of commitments made by Egypt in Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty which contravene the commitments made by Egypt to the Arabs on Middle East peace process and to the Muslim states on Jerusalem. This is what isolates Egypt. If a change in the isolation is wanted, then a change in the causes of the isolation must be made, i.e. the Treaty. Closing the meeting, Prince Saud said that Islamic Conference preparatory committee has already decided to propose suspension of Egyptian membership in the Conference.

9. Comment. Saudi Arabia's withdrawal of funding for F-5s is a not unexpected shock in view of Sadat's blast at Saudi Arabia and reference therein to F-5s (Cairo 8815, para 2).⁶ We are not sure whether Saudi move is reversible, and perhaps we should consider letter from President to King Khalid⁷ on matter while taking all possible precautions to prevent Saudi action from becoming public. If that approach yields nothing, we should then dispassionately analyze the situation, recalling that the Saudi move is yet another step in a rabidly deteriorating relationship which, as Embassy Cairo points out (Cairo 8943),⁸ could get even worse. We think our policy should be to grit our teeth and bear Saudi Arabia's actions against our Egyptian friends in interest of U.S.-Saudi relations.⁹ Were we now to call into question, for example, the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that it was somehow packaged with the F-5s for Egypt, other, more overriding U.S. interests could be endangered in the process.

Gerlach

⁶ See footnote 4 above.

⁷ See Document 248.

⁸ Telegram 8943 from Cairo, May 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790200-0595)

⁹ In a meeting on May 8, Eilts informed Sadat of the Saudi decision in order "to preempt his hearing about it from other sources and again issuing public blast against Saudis." Eilts told the Egyptian President that the United States would "certainly try to get decision reversed and urged him to say nothing." Sadat responded that the Saudi action "did not surprise him and mused that, if reversal of Saudi decision cannot be obtained, he may ask administration and Congress for assistance." (Telegram 9359 from Cairo, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027-2544)

246. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East Initiatives (U)

You asked me to think of steps that might be taken to assert our commitment to the Egypt-Israel treaty and to the next stage of negotiations. It seems to me that we need to be clear concerning the target of our efforts. If we are trying to influence the Saudis, then public statements may be the wrong way to proceed. If we create an anti-Saudi mood in Congress, we may find that we have tied our own hands. If instead we are addressing a domestic audience, a different strategy is called for. (S)

Possible actions:

—If the Saudis are adamant in their refusal to fund the F-5Es for Egypt, we could publicly state the facts of the situation and request that Congress appropriate an additional \$52.5 million to guarantee \$525 million in FMS credits to cover the costs of the F-5E program. Simultaneously, to preempt negative Congressional action, we could say that the F-15 program is under review.

—Approach both the Saudis and Egyptians privately for a frank review of the dangers of letting their quarrel go further. Rather than taking sides, we would do our best to get them talking again.

—Background briefings attributed to “high Administration officials” that are critical of the Saudis and which are strongly supportive of Egypt, Israel, and the next phase of peace talks. Alternatively, an inspired Reston² column.

—Tell the Saudis to withdraw one of their diplomats [*1 line not declassified*].

—Public statements by the State Department spokesman, Secretary Vance, or the President. These have high visibility, but tend to reduce our flexibility.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 3-6/79. Secret. Sent for information. The top of the memorandum bears the stamped notation: “ZB has seen.” A copy of the memorandum was sent to Hoskinson.

² Reference is to *New York Times* columnist James “Scotty” Reston.

—The Saudis are asking us to begin paying interest on the very large account they maintain with DOD. This is now being examined. There are several other areas in tax policy and other economic issues where the Saudis would like us to take positions favorable to them. It might be helpful for Mike Blumenthal or others to let the Saudis know quietly that we are simply unable to move on these issues in the present climate.³

—It might be possible to persuade some of Saudi Arabia's newly found friends in Congress to talk to them privately or to write senior Saudis expressing their concern and indicating the high cost of maintaining a confrontational position. A campaign directed at Fred Dutton⁴ might not hurt.⁵ (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

I see no merit in getting into a public argument with the Saudis. We can say things in private that would be counter-productive if said in public. After all, Sadat brought some of this on himself and we do not want our policy toward Saudi Arabia to be set by Egypt. (S)

If the Saudis refuse to pay for the F-5Es, I would consider the idea of seeking FMS credits to cover the cost (using the 10 percent guarantee route) and placing the F-15 program "under review." I would then say nothing more in public about US-Saudi relations for a couple of months. (S)

³ Brzezinski placed a check-mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

⁴ Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs from 1961 until 1964, served as a consultant to the Saudi Government. In telegram 3096 from Jidda, April 24, 1978, the Embassy reported that the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv* detailed that Dutton "recently admitted that he receives an annual salary of \$200,000 from the Saudi Arabian Government. By his own admission, his sole task is to provide the Saudi Arabians with 'evaluation' of what is happening in Washington." The Embassy added that "Dutton is active in the Treasury Department, as well as in other branches of the government, in trying to prevent legislation that would harm the oil companies or otherwise harm Saudi Arabia." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780174-0346)

⁵ Brzezinski placed a check-mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

247. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 11, 1979, 10:10–11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Defense

David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for International Security Affairs

Robert J. Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs

Lt. General Ernest Graves, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, US Army

JCS

General William Smith

Major William Cook

DCI

Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

Charles Herseth, Office of Economic Research

WHITE HOUSE

David Aaron

NSC

William Quandt

Gary Sick

The Mini-SCC reviewed the background of the Saudi withdrawal of their offer to finance the purchase of Egyptian F-5s² and considered next steps in attempting to reverse the Saudi decision. The group agreed to recommend the following approach:

1. Assistant Secretary of Defense McGiffert will visit Egypt and Saudi Arabia to discuss the issue with Defense officials in both countries. Precise terms of reference will be worked out with State. The principal objective will be to sound out the Egyptians on their views of accepting the payment schedule previously proposed by the Saudi Minister of Defense, which will require about \$100 million in financing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 120, SCM 066, 05/11/79, mini SCC, Financing of Egyptian F-5 Planes. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 245.

by Egypt. Mr. McGiffert will take advantage of the letter from Prince Sultan³ to indicate that we do not consider the question closed, to provide the Saudis an avenue to reverse their decision gracefully, and to get a clearer reading of Saudi intentions. (S)

2. State will prepare a broader political approach which will attempt to get the Egyptians and Saudis together and to brief the Saudis on what we anticipate in the next round of negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza. This would be accomplished by Ambassador Hermann Eilts in discussions with both the Egyptians and the Saudis⁴ in the course of his departure from Egypt (currently planned for May 20).⁵

3. The group recommended that the Presidential letter⁶ to King Khalid on this subject be held for the moment. The Saudis are at a high peak of emotion at this point, and the response could well be negative. Such a letter might better be delivered by Ambassador West when he is out of the hospital and ready to return to Saudi Arabia in about ten days to two weeks. (S)

4. The group proposed that this issue be discussed further at the luncheon meeting between Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and Dr. Brzezinski later in the day.⁷ (S)

³ Not found. Brown wrote to Sultan regarding the F-5 issue on May 15. See footnote 4, Document 248.

⁴ Eilts met with Mubarak and Sadat on May 15, to inform them that he intended to meet with Fahd to discuss the deteriorating Egyptian-Saudi relationship. Both leaders "welcomed the idea and reaffirmed GOE's desire for good relations with Saudis." Eilts reported that though Sadat "blamed Saudis for 'accelerating' deterioration of relations between the two countries," the Egyptian President agreed to halt press attacks against Saudi Arabia, drop a proposed attack on the Saudis in a speech he was to deliver that day, and would be prepared to "re-establish a dialogue, even if covert, with Fahd." (Telegram 9875 from Cairo, May 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790219-0011) Eilts met with Fahd on May 16 in Rome. Fahd concurred that the "deterioration should be arrested" and agreed to a stop to Saudi press attacks on Egypt, but would not agree to a resumption of a dialogue. "Given [the] tenor of [the] conversation," Eilts noted, "it was inopportune to raise F-5 funding question." (Telegram 13183 from Rome, May 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790222-0919)

⁵ Eilts's appointment ended on May 20 and he was succeeded as Ambassador by Atherton on July 20. In the intervening period, Freeman Matthews served as *Chargé d'Affaires*.

⁶ See Document 248.

⁷ No record of this meeting has been found. The Egyptian F-5 issue was discussed further in the context of the Persian Gulf Security Framework in a meeting of the SCC which took place from 3:30 to 4:20 p.m. on May 11. The minutes of this meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, May 11, 1979, 2249Z

120410. Subject: Letter to Khalid. Jidda for the Charge. Cairo for the Ambassador.

1. Secret (Entire text)
2. Please arrange for immediate delivery of the following letter from President Carter to King Khalid.² Signed original being pouched.
3. Begin text. Your Majesty,

The spirit of friendship and respect that underlies the relationship between our two countries requires that I bring to your personal attention a matter of great concern to me. As Your Majesty is aware, we have consistently sought to coordinate our efforts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on behalf of stability, security and justice in the Middle East. While we have not always agreed on specific issues, I have felt that our broad objectives are fully compatible, rooted as they are in our national interests and our historic ties to one another. I am confident that you share this view of the importance of maintaining the closest possible relations between our countries.

4. It is thus with great concern that a statement³ has been attributed to Foreign Minister Saud that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to assist Egypt in acquiring the F-5E aircraft that we have agreed to sell. This report is particularly surprising in light of explicit commitments and promises made by your government.

5. Apart from my personal concern for the effect that such a decision could have on US-Saudi relations, I am also deeply worried about the encouragement such a decision could give to those who do not wish good US-Saudi relations. Egypt, which remains committed to a comprehensive peace, will be further isolated from her Arab brothers and may find it difficult to play an effective role in the next stage of negotiations dealing with the question of the Palestinians. In addition, the Soviet Union and its allies in the Middle East may try to capitalize on this

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Saunders (in draft) and Richard Castrodale (S/S-O); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House.

² On May 12, Daniels delivered Carter's letter to Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Aziz Thunayan, who said he would convey it to Khalid "immediately." (Telegram 3708 from Jidda, May 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2406)

³ See Document 245.

development to encourage radical and destabilizing forces in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world.

6. Your Majesty, I want you to know that I am a strong proponent of US-Saudi friendship. It has been my honor to meet with you and your colleagues. We have worked together to strengthen our relations in all areas, and the American public and Congress have been supportive of these steps. Now much of what we have achieved could be jeopardized by a decision which does not serve our common interests. I strongly urge that you not permit any modification of the assurances given to me to assist Egypt in purchasing the F-5E aircraft that are essential to her defense.⁴

7. In closing, let me repeat that I am fully committed to cooperating with Saudi Arabia in all fields. As friends, we have maintained a constant dialogue on matters of mutual concern, and I am confident that we shall be able to resolve our differences amicably.

8. With my best personal wishes for your health,

Sincerely,

(signed) Jimmy Carter

End text.

Vance

⁴ This point was repeated by Brown in a letter to Sultan, conveyed in telegram 123107 to Riyadh, May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790218–0703) Daniels delivered the letter on May 16. (Telegram 3807 from Jidda, May 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790223–0733)

**249. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review
Committee Meeting¹**

Washington, May 17, 1979, 9:30–10:20 a.m.

Subject

West Bank/Gaza Negotiations

Participants*State*Secretary Cyrus Vance
Harold Saunders, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near
Eastern and South Asian
AffairsMichael Sterner, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near
Eastern and South Asian
Affairs*Defense*Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Near Eastern,
African and South Asian
Affairs*JCS*

Lt. General William Smith

*DCI*Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
John Helgerson, Assistant NIO for
Near East and South Asia*White House*Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron*NSC*Robert Hunter
William Quandt*STR*Ambassador Robert Strauss,
Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations
Ambassador James Leonard

1. *Objectives.* Secretary Vance stated that the West Bank/Gaza negotiations would have critical importance for the stability of the Egypt-Israel treaty and for the trends in the Arab world. Early progress will be essential, despite the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the issues. (S)

2. *Trends.* Ambassador Strauss noted that nearly all the trends in the Middle East are negative. Arab opposition to Sadat is deeper than expected. Israeli settlement activity is likely to increase. We must do something to reverse these trends. (S)

3. *Settlements.* It was generally agreed that the best issue on which to take a stand is Israeli settlement activity. Secretary Vance said that he would talk to both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat about settlements. Sadat might then raise the issue directly with Begin. Amba-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 107: 5/17/79). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of this meeting are *ibid.* Quandt sent the summary to Brzezinski for approval under a May 17 memorandum in which Quandt noted that he did not feel it was “essential” for Carter to see the summary and that he would instead prepare a short note for him. A notation in an unknown hand in the margin indicates that this was done on May 18. Aaron initialed approval of the summary, presumably on Brzezinski’s behalf. (*Ibid.*)

sador Strauss emphasized the importance of preparing the way carefully in Congress and the American Jewish community first. Begin needs to see that restraint on settlements will be advantageous to him in terms of his standing in this country, however much it may be difficult for him in Israel. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Leonard also stressed the importance of Israeli restraint in Lebanon. (S)

4. *US Role in Negotiations.* Ambassador Strauss urged that we not stake out positions on sensitive issues from the outset. Dr. Brzezinski argued that we should base our initial statement on the Camp David accords, allowing the Egyptians and Israelis to go through an inevitable period of arguing over how Camp David should be implemented. At a later date, the US could step in with proposals to help bridge the differences. (S)

5. *Vance Trip.* It was generally agreed that Ambassador Strauss should make an effort to accompany Secretary Vance on the first part of his Middle East trip.² Ambassador Strauss felt that he should begin to be seen as directly involved in the West Bank/Gaza issues and would try to adjust his schedule. State and NSC will work together on a statement for Secretary Vance to make at the opening of the negotiations.³ (S)

² Vance's trip included stops in London May 20–24 for meetings with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and Begin; Cairo, on May 24, for a meeting with Sadat; and Tel Aviv and Beersheba, to attend the opening of the autonomy talks, as well as El Arish, to attend the ceremonies accompanying the transfer of power there from Israeli to Egyptian authorities May 24–27. Vance then visited Rome, Vatican City, The Hague, and Madrid May 27–June 2.

³ Vance's statement, delivered at the opening of the negotiations in Beersheba, May 25, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1979, pp. 48–49.

250. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, May 26, 1979, 1221Z

Secto 4053. White House to Dr. Brzezinski for the President from the Secretary. Subject: Opening of the West Bank/Gaza Negotiations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 49, 5/16–31/79. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The West Bank/Gaza negotiations began in Beersheva Friday² afternoon almost as planned with the one exception being the last-minute absence of Prime Minister Khalil. While the opening statements presented each side's starting positions, the meeting was conducted in a conciliatory and businesslike atmosphere. The principal achievement is that the opening session is now behind us and with that hurdle surmounted, it will probably be easier for the parties to get down to work. The meeting concluded with agreement to meet next on June 6–7 in Alexandria with efforts between now and then to work out an agenda for that meeting, perhaps through a private meeting between Khalil and Burg in Egypt in the next few days.

3. The one development that marred the day's events was Khalil's decision not to come. This had been developing since Wednesday when Khalil told our Charge in Cairo that he would not attend the meeting if Burg were going to chair it. When I got to Egypt, I found Khalil firmly opposed to attending a meeting on the Palestinian issues in Israel chaired by the Minister of the Interior rather than Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. I believe he was concerned both about the reaction in the Arab world and about Burg's lesser rank against the background of Begin's refusal to meet with him in Washington last February.³ He suggested either a roundtable with no chairman or a meeting chaired by me. Despite our late-night and early-morning efforts to resolve the issue, Burg with Begin's support ignored Dayan's efforts and held to the position that Sadat and Begin had agreed that each meeting in this negotiation would be chaired by the host country. The Israelis, for their part, were upset over Boutros Ghali's action in a meeting with Dayan in El Arish on Wednesday⁴ which seemed to the Israelis to reverse Sadat's commitment to Begin in Cairo to open the border this weekend. When Burg insisted on chairing the meeting himself, Khalil sent General Kamal Ali to head the Egyptian delegation in his place. Ali stated simply that Khalil did not come "for procedural

² May 25.

³ Boutros Ghali, in his memoir of the negotiations, explained Khalil's absence was due to the latter's refusal to "preside over the Egyptian delegation because the talks were at the ministerial level and he was the prime minister. He insisted that his counterpart was Begin." (Boutros Ghali, *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem*, p. 220)

⁴ Meeting with Dayan at El Arish on May 23, Boutros Ghali stated that the "terms of treaty would be observed and there would be no normalization in principle for another eight months, unless Begin and Sadat agreed to make exceptions. The frontier will be closed after the El Arish turnover, no Egyptian workers will work in Israel, no Israelis will fish on Egyptian side, there will be no moving back and forth across the line, except as agreed on [an] ad hoc basis (emergencies, illnesses, etc.), the air corridor will be used only on agreement of Sadat and Begin." Matthews reported that Dayan "agreed to this because this is what the treaty says." (Telegram 10630 from Cairo, May 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790234–0848)

reasons” but would be pleased to host the next session in Egypt. Sadat telephoned Yadin to send his best wishes for the negotiation, and that probably helped smooth over the situation.

4. I have found both sides ready to get on with the negotiations. Sadat told me he thought the Ministers ought to meet every week or, at least, every two weeks in order to maintain momentum and project a picture of steady work. Khalil and Boutros Ghali, for their parts, had spent several hours working through with Sadat their proposal for working groups each developing their own terms or reference to be approved by the Ministerial group. They are thinking of four working groups to cover election modalities, powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority, security measures, and confidence building measures (unilateral Israeli steps in the West Bank and Gaza). When I met with Burg Friday morning, I found him receptive to the idea of working groups and to the need in early sessions to sort out the issues that each group will cover. Burg volunteered his own understanding of Sadat’s need to show results and seemed quite perceptive in describing it. The disagreement will begin as soon as they start talking about the details of their agenda, but I was somewhat encouraged to find that they both seemed at least to be approaching their work in ways that should permit them to find agreement on an approach fairly early.

5. Both Ali and Burg in their opening statements expressed familiar hard positions, but in each speech there was an effort to say things that each side knows is important to the other.

6. Kamal Ali made five points:

(1) Egypt and Israel are not negotiating to determine the future of the Palestinian people. Self-determination is their God-given right. The task in the negotiations is only to establish the powers and responsibilities for the self-governing authority, the modalities for its election, and steps for the transfer of authority.

(2) The negotiations must be based on the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war as specified in the preamble to Resolution 242. This principle should be implemented in the West Bank and in Arab Jerusalem. Arab Jerusalem will become testimony to the ability of Jews and Arabs to coexist in peace.

(3) Resolution 242 in all its parts should be respected.

(4) The Geneva Convention applying to occupied territories means that Israeli settlements have no legal validity. Israeli measures to annex Jerusalem are null and void.

(5) The political rights and freedom of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza should be respected. In all of these negotiations, Ali concluded that the U.S. is expected to be a full partner.

7. Burg in his speech described the negotiations pretty much in terms of the Camp David Framework, although he spoke in terms of

the administrative council to be set up. While recognizing the complications ahead, he wished that the elections might take place speedily. The most difficult part of his speech for the Egyptians to swallow was his statement that autonomy “does not and cannot imply sovereignty.” He went on to reject an independent Palestinian statehood. Interestingly, he changed his text from “never” to “not” in saying that Israel will not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state but after citing Israel’s fear of such a state as a security threat, he turned back to a conciliatory tone of trying to solve these problems together. He concluded with the words from Ecclesiastes; “to everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven: a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; a time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.”

8. My talk with Sadat Thursday evening,⁵ as you would expect, included a review of the world situation. Analyzing the current state of the Arab world, he saw as the main element the efforts of Iraq to become the main Arab power. He saw Iraq’s efforts to seize the center of the Arab stage as the main explanation of the Baghdad Conference.⁶ He described his strategy over the coming months as trying to draw the moderate Arabs away from Iraq, and he said he would be seeking our help in doing this. He felt that the ceremonies at El Arish this weekend would play a major role in beginning to change Arab minds about the peace process. He felt that the dramatization of his getting important territory back would force the Arab world to face up to the fact that concrete benefits can be gained in this way. He felt that this would be a major factor in his gradually beginning to win moderate Arab support.

9. Sadat also feels that he now understands better how to deal with Prime Minister Begin. I would not be surprised to see him make another grand gesture towards Israel this Sunday⁷ in connection with the El Arish ceremonies in his effort to stimulate a forthcoming response of some kind from Begin.

10. My talk with Begin in London⁸ concentrated heavily at first on a number of emigration cases from the Soviet Union which he hopes we

⁵ May 24. Sadat summarized many of the same points he made to Vance in a brief telephone conversation with Carter from 8:40 a.m. to 8:42 a.m. on May 25. A transcript of the discussion is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. Carter’s handwritten notes related to the conversation are *ibid*.

⁶ See footnote 7, Document 85.

⁷ May 27.

⁸ Vance met with Begin in London on May 24. No memorandum of conversation has been found. The Embassy transmitted the text of their remarks to the press following their meeting in telegram 10261 from London, May 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790236–0104.

can do something about in our further meetings with the Soviets. We spent some time discussing the political situation in the Arab world. I then went into depth on the need to freeze settlements stressing the relationship of settlements to maintenance of momentum in the peace process as well as to help prevent further isolation of Sadat. Begin did not react strongly as usual. He said he recognizes the importance of this issue but we had also to take into account his political problems. He then told me at length about the ugly incident in the settlement near El Arish which was underway. In short, this time I got an evasive rather than a negative response on what he will do about the settlements. I did not have enough time to pin him down but I believe that he is thinking seriously about this problem, I have told Sadat about this and have asked him to raise the issue at El Arish on Sunday.

11. I also expressed in strongest terms the need for Israel to get some kind of control over Major Haddad in southern Lebanon. He said he recognized the need, again described Israel's difficulties in curbing Haddad, but said he would speak to Weizman immediately. I plan to discuss Lebanon further at El Arish.⁹

12. We had a long private dinner and evening with Dayan and Sam and our wives. It was an extremely interesting discussion. Sam and I also met with Shimon Peres for about an hour. Again that conversation was useful.¹⁰

13. I return now to Egypt where I will see Khalil Saturday afternoon before going with him to dinner with Vice President Mubarak. My main focus in this meeting will be to try to set the stage for a private meeting between him and Burg and him and Dayan to try to get the working sessions of the negotiations off to a reasonable start.

14. Jim Leonard will stay behind in Israel and Egypt and will begin working quietly with the two sides and will then attend the session on June 6–7. Depending on when the following meeting is scheduled, he might return to Washington in mid-June to brief Bob Strauss for his first trip out here at the beginning of July.

15. In short, although we have had our flap over Khalil's attendance and the preparations for serious negotiations are only now beginning to crystallize, it also was important that we be fully represented at this opening session. I believe our involvement and the statement which we made will help to persuade the Arab world and Israel that we are serious in our continued commitment to these negotiations. Both sides have told me that they wish to avoid if possible getting into a head-to-head confrontation at the outset and will seek to work quietly

⁹ See Document 251.

¹⁰ No memorandum of conversation from either discussion has been found.

to sort out the common ground as well as to define the issues of controversy which must be bridged.

Vance

251. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State, Secretary of State Vance in Rome, and the Embassies in Israel, Egypt, and the People's Republic of China¹

Jerusalem, May 28, 1979, 1436Z

1753. Pass White House for Brzezinski, Beijing for Ambassador Strauss from Saunders. Subject: El Arish-Beersheva Ceremonies—May 27.

1. (S) Entire text

2. Since the Secretary left directly from the Negev for Rome,² this has not been cleared with him. Nevertheless, I want you to have a report promptly on the assumption that he will add whatever he wishes on his own talks with Begin, Sadat, and others during the day.

3. Sunday's³ kaleidoscope events unfolded on three levels—the symbolism of the events themselves, the substance of the public speeches, and the private exchanges among the U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli principals and delegations.

4. The symbolism lay in the dramatization of the first major steps implementing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The actual military turnover of El Arish had taken place Friday—the day in which the West Bank/Gaza negotiations began in Beersheva, the Egyptians alone had

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 49, 5/16–31/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in Rome for meetings with Italian President Pertini and Prime Minister Andreotti, as well as Pope John Paul II.

² Vance departed for Rome on May 27. Arriving in The Hague for a NATO Ministerial Meeting on May 29, Vance discussed with the Foreign Ministers of France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom the present state of Middle East situation, including prospects for the autonomy talks, the political situations in Egypt and Israel, and civilian and military aid programs for both countries. The memorandum of conversation for this meeting, held at the French Embassy, is in the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1979 Memcons—Secretary.

³ May 27.

celebrated the transfer from Egyptian military to civilian control on Saturday. Today's events were really an exchange of visits—Begin to El Arish and Sadat to Beersheva—to dramatize the new relationship across the now "open border, on top of the exchange of visits was the inaugural flight in President Sadat's aircraft with Sadat, Begin, Secretary Vance and colleagues aboard opening the new direct air corridor between Israel and Egypt.

5. One of the decisions made during the talks today was to announce that the Egyptian-Israeli border would indeed be "open." Although Begin and Sadat had announced this during Begin's visit to Cairo shortly after the treaty signing, the Egyptians in the past week had told the Israelis they felt it would be premature to open the border at this point.⁴ Thus it took another one of those decisions by Sadat to overrule his staff to produce the announcement in El Arish that the border is now proclaimed to be open. Having made that proclamation, no one is sure exactly what will happen at the border tomorrow since it is still possible that any workers who might want to cross into Israel to their jobs on the Egyptian side might be stopped until border-crossing procedures get sorted out. Indeed, news broadcasts this morning from Cairo quote Khalil as indicating that many "technical" details need to be resolved before the open borders policy can be implemented and no one expects more than a trickle at the outset. Similarly, the air corridor is now "open" and any government aircraft wishing to go back and forth will use it, but for the time being most commercial carriers will avoid it because of the probable Arab boycott.

6. Perhaps the most moving of the day's events was also the simplest. On their way to depart El Arish, Begin and Sadat with Secretary Vance stopped in a meeting hall in El Arish for a brief ceremony with wounded war veterans from both sides. The statements by Sadat and Begin were very short and primarily on the theme of "no more war." It was plain from the expression on their faces that, to the veterans, this was a most meaningful experience. Begin's statement was used as the platform for proclaiming that the borders would be open, that President Sadat had invited him to visit Alexandria the first week in July, and that Israel would release a number of Ari's prisoners in honor of the occasion.⁵

7. The main exchange of public statements began when the party moved by helicopter to Beersheva. There were two separate events—one at the town hall and a second at the Ben Gurion University of the

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 250.

⁵ Telegram 11583 from Tel Aviv, May 30, reported that sixteen Palestinian "security prisoners" in Israeli custody were released subsequent to Begin's statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790245-0488)

Negev—with speeches by Israeli President Navon, the Mayor of Beer-sheva,⁶ Begin, and two by Sadat. The common themes of peace and normal relations flowed through all of the speeches. However, President Navon, who undoubtedly thought he was doing a good thing by giving his speech in excellent Arabic, used an Arabic word which Sadat heard as meaning “give”; (i.e. “giving the Sinai back to Egypt”). This caused Sadat to drop whatever prepared text he may have had and to extemporize quite simply but eloquently. His main points were that security does not lie in land but in a relationship of friendship and that peace can not come unless there is respect for the land of others. He almost explicitly said that sovereignty over the occupied lands belongs to the Arabs and that Israel is not giving back the land but simply restoring the appropriate exercise of Arab sovereignty in it. However, Monday’s *Jerusalem Post* reports that Navon had showed privately afterwards his actual text and the similarly sounding word in Arabic meant “returned”. The *Post* says Sadat and Navon got on well and the misunderstanding was put to rest. Later at an assembly at the university it was Sadat’s turn to offend. He commented that the Arabs had taken care of the Jews through their centuries of life in the Middle East. And Begin, in an otherwise temperate speech at the university, brought together in one compact paragraph virtually every negative statement he has ever made about the “so-called PLO.” President Tekoah, of the university, announced the university’s decision to establish a multi-million dollar fund for research in areas related to desert development, invited Egyptian scholars to participate and to join in the management of the fund. While claiming substantial achievements for Israel in this area, he graciously said that Israel has much to learn from Egypt and his remarks were an elevated point in the day’s proceedings. In short, all of the speakers were well-intentioned and for the most part managed not to sour the atmosphere but, one way or another, introduced enough sore points to keep the course from being completely smooth.

8. The day’s several meetings—from the Rest House at El Arish to the 1-hour inaugural flight aboard Sadat’s aircraft—seemed to all of us to enhance measurably the relationships between the two sides at all levels. From what we can tell, a good deal of useful business was done, although Secretary Vance will have to fill in some of the details in the following:

—The Secretary and Sadat were alone for a time before Begin arrived, and the Secretary intended to suggest that Sadat talk to Begin about the problems for the peace process caused by some Israeli actions, such as new settlements, the crackdown in the West Bank, and the bombings in Lebanon.

⁶ Eliyahu Nawi.

—Sadat, Begin, the Secretary were together for a time and then the Secretary left the two of them alone for almost half an hour. It was partly during this period that the two of them began mapping a political strategy for the next couple of months which includes the regularization of negotiating sessions, visits to Egypt by Burg and Dayan, and Sadat's invitation to Begin to visit Alexandria the first week in July. The hope is that out of the Burg and Dayan visits the new negotiations can be put on a sound footing. Burg and Khalil both want to talk about the precise organization of the negotiations by working groups. While Dayan wants to stay away from talking about the new negotiations and to concentrate on consolidating the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, Khalil sees Dayan's visit to Egypt as an opportunity to understand the political dynamics of Israeli decision making on this subject and to explore Dayan's creativity on solutions in the autonomy negotiations.

—Burg and Khalil seem to be having a good private conversation, apparently getting off to a reasonable beginning in their relationship as heads of respective delegations. Burg and Khalil sat next to each other at lunch and, while the substance of their conversation concentrated on problems of scheduling the next negotiating sessions, they did get acquainted.

—During the inaugural flight, Dayan got to talk with Sadat for about twenty minutes. This came after talks with Boutros Ghali in which Dayan was persuaded that the Egyptians genuinely wanted him to come to Cairo. Dayan clearly does not want to get himself out in front of Burg in discussing the autonomy negotiations and was clearly suspicious of Egyptian motives in pressing him to come to Cairo.

9. The plan of meetings over the next two weeks as it now appears probable has Burg going to Egypt at the end of this week, Dayan visiting Egypt at the beginning of the following week, and the next negotiating session beginning either June 7 or 10. At the first session⁷ in Beersheva last Friday it had been agreed that the next session would be June 6–7, but the Israelis in Sunday's talks mentioned that the Herut Party conference will not end until the night of the 6th so some slippage will probably be necessary. On the other hand, by the end of Sunday's talks, Burg's visit to Cairo was being described almost as a preliminary negotiation, dealing at least with semi-substantive issues such as the responsibilities of working groups.

10. Jim Leonard will use the next few days in Israel to call on each member of the Israeli negotiating team individually and to talk with other Israelis who can give insight into Israel's thinking on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Assuming the schedule remains pretty much

⁷ See Document 250.

as described above, he will probably stay in Israel long enough to talk with Burg after his return from Cairo. Then he will move to Cairo and go the rounds with the important Egyptian participants and then will be ready to participate in the first substantive negotiating session. We may begin to see how the negotiations will work more clearly after the Burg-Khalil talks, but by the time the first session is completed, it should be possible to begin to see how each of the issues will be tackled and to see more clearly what approach to the issues makes most sense for us.

11. The strategy we have already set for ourselves of letting Egypt and Israel take the lead in organizing these negotiations is a valid one. Although they have been slow in pulling their acts together, they now seem to be getting together with hopes of having a sense of how to proceed by the second week in June.

Newlin

252. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, June 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Situation in Lebanon (C)

The situation in Lebanon appears to be deteriorating.² Specifically, there appears to be a growing risk of renewed internal conflict which could trigger external involvement. (S)

The President would appreciate your analysis of the present situation and your suggestions of concrete steps we might take to minimize

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: 11/78–7/79. Secret. Copies were sent to Brown and Turner.

² In a June 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Sick observed that there was "growing evidence of a purposefulness in Israeli and Christian policy in Lebanon which could create a major crisis as early as this summer" and outlined a "worst case but plausible interpretation of present intentions and possible outcomes" of the situation. Sick concluded that the implications of the escalation of violence in Lebanon, including the continued shelling of UNIFIL positions by Haddad's forces and the bombardment of Palestinian encampments, for U.S. policy in the region were "sufficiently grave to demand more systematic, high-level consideration that has been the case to date." (Ibid.)

the risks of a serious conflict and promote Lebanese stability. Please let me have your comments by June 12, 1979. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

253. Letter From Egyptian President Sadat to President Carter¹

Cairo, undated

Dear President Carter,

During the recent celebration of the restoration of Egyptian authority to the capital of Sinai, El-Arish, the Egyptian people's feeling of pride and joy was equalled only by their gratitude and praise for the unforgettable role you played in bringing about this happy event. Without your thoughtful contribution, the conclusion of the Peace Treaty would have been impossible. I have no doubt that this role will continue until all remaining aspects of the conflict are tackled with the same sense of determination and commitment. It is with this in mind that we have been accelerating the pace of normalization of relations with Israel.

It is in this spirit also that we are approaching the second phase of negotiations. We are doing so with hope and optimism despite our realization that we are still faced with many extremely difficult problems. I firmly believe that we can achieve our common goal if we preserve the coordination and consultation we have maintained since we started the peace process. I am sure that Secretary Vance has conveyed to you what took place in the past few days.² I have also asked Vice President Mubarak to put you fully in the picture³ with respect to recent developments as well as our conception of how to move next in order to make meaningful progress promptly. As you know, I strongly feel that there is an urgent need to produce tangible progress soon with respect to Jerusalem. I hope that Prime Minister Begin can demonstrate more flexibility in this area as he realizes the favorable results this is certain to effect. The problem of settlements is another sensitive area to which all

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/79. No classification marking. At the top of the letter, Carter wrote: "Zbig, cc Cy J." The Department cabled the text of the letter in telegram 163814 to Cairo, June 25. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 116, 6/15–25/79)

² See Document 250.

³ See Document 254.

Arabs attach great significance. The statement⁴ which was issued a few days ago by the U.S. Department of State on the illegality of these settlements and the threat they constitute to the peace process was quite appropriate and timely. You might also deem it suitable to take this issue up with Mr. Begin in the near future.

In your forthcoming talks with President Brezhnev,⁵ it would be helpful if you persuade him to be more cooperative with regard to extending the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Forces especially after having agreed to the same on the Syrian front. Their position in this respect is rather weak and the arguments they are presenting are unfounded. The Legal Adviser of the United Nations Secretariat has concluded in a memorandum that the failure to extend the mandate of the Forces would be contrary to the Charter itself, let alone the difficulties it creates to the peace-keeping operation. If he remains adamant on this point, it might be worth exploring to get his consent to broadening the operation area of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The mandate of this Organization does not need to be extended and hence, a mere extension of the area of operation would be easier although the force is not equipped enough to handle this responsibility.

In an attempt to facilitate your task of proposing the formation of a multinational force in case your efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to cooperate fail, we are currently considering the setting up of an all-African force. It would be composed of friendly African nations that have a genuine interest in the maintenance of security and stability in this vital approach to their continent.

I am seizing this opportunity also to write to you about a matter of major concern to us. Undoubtedly, you know the importance we attach to the modernization of our armed forces with a view to enabling them to discharge their awesome responsibilities. You are also aware of the central role I assigned to them in the crucial field of transfer of technology in the era of reconstruction. I have emphasized the new role the armed forces should play in adapting sophisticated technology to our needs in the areas of housing, infrastructure, food production, agroindustry and land reclamation. Hence, I reiterated before the Egyptian

⁴ On June 4, the Department protested in a formal statement the Israeli Cabinet's decision to authorize the establishment by Gush Emunim of a settlement, Elon Moreh, near Nablus, describing it as "harmful to the peace process and particularly regrettable at this time." (Jim Hoagland, "U.S. Protests Israeli Plan for Settlement on West Bank," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1979, p. A10) Elon Moreh was formally established as an Israeli settlement with construction commencing on June 7. (William Claiborne, "Israel Quickly Erects West Bank Settlement," *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1979, p. A1)

⁵ Carter met with Brezhnev in Vienna June 16–18 to sign the SALT II Treaty. The two leaders discussed the situation in the Middle East in the fourth plenary session on June 17. See Document 259.

people that the armed forces have a greater mission in time of peace than their task at war-time.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been virtually excluded as a supplier of weapons for several years. Thus, we are confronted with the challenge of modernizing the weapons system at the same time we are faced with the problem of replacing our dwindling stock of arms. It was for these two reasons that we agreed on a new role for the United States as a major supplier of arms and military equipment. You would certainly recall that I told you that it was an absolute must to take twenty steps forward in this direction. Promptly, you dispatched your competent officials to coordinate with their Egyptian counterparts plans for this supply.

In all candor, I must tell you that the results of these contacts have not been satisfactory enough. While your representatives were quite appreciative of our problems and needs, what we have been offered to meet these needs was short of meeting our needs, both in quality and quantity.

At a time when the financing of the purchase of the F5 planes by Saudi Arabia is being blocked for reasons you well know, we have been offered only 35 F4 planes and twelve air defense batteries. We might understand the reasons why it is difficult to provide us with the more sophisticated F-15 and F-16. However, the supply of only 35 F4 planes, 16 of which to be delivered before October 6, is not the answer to our needs. Our Air-Force command says that it is crucial to increase the number of aircrafts and equip them with "Maverick" type of rocket in order to ensure effectiveness.

Perhaps the position of the naval forces is more precarious. U.S. officials have offered to provide them with two gearing class destroyers whose equipment and electronic gear are of a less sophisticated quality than the Soviet destroyers which have been in use in our Navy for some time. They also offered to sell Egypt a diesel-operated submarine which is of the same quality more or less. You are aware of the priority I am attaching to our naval forces in the light of the current situation in the area. Serving our purpose would require providing us with more advanced types of destroyers, submarines and fast patrol boats equipped with guided missiles.

On the other hand, the withdrawal of our three Arab partners from the Arab Organization for Industrialization⁶ confronts us with some

⁶ Established in May 1975 by Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in order to facilitate greater Arab self-reliance in military production, the Arab Organization for Industrialization was scheduled to be disbanded on July 1. Announcing the disbandment in Riyadh on May 14, Prince Sultan stated "the signing by Egypt of the peace treaty contradicted the reason and purpose for which the organization was established." (Christopher S. Wren, "Saudis Scuttle a Billion-Dollar Arms Consortium With Factories in Egypt," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1979, p. A3)

problems. First and foremost, it could have a negative impact on the manufacture of aircraft, the development of sophisticated anti-tank missiles and our drive to introduce a higher degree of modern technology and know-how. I believe that you do not want to see this happening. I also believe that the United States can step in and take part with us in this operation in one form or the other. To contain the negative impact of such reckless move on their part, we have turned the Organization into an Egyptian institution. Joint U.S.-Egyptian companies could be founded to boost our strategic industries and build the technological base we have committed ourselves to establish in the context of the post-war reconstruction. If this proves difficult at this stage, American companies could be encouraged to cooperate with our Organization one way or the other.

I trust that you agree with me on the necessity of demonstrating to our armed forces that our partnership in the peace process is mutually beneficial and that there will be no weakening of our defense capabilities whatsoever. This is so in the light of their realization of their role in the coming few years as an element of peace and stability in the region. Such faith in the future requires reassuring all our armed services that their weapons system is going to improve rather than deteriorate as a result of our bolstered friendship with the United States. It is equally important to reassure the Egyptian people of the state of their armed forces and their ability to bear their awesome responsibilities.

Needless to say that the absence of a genuine effort to remedy this situation promptly would give rise to misinterpretations and adverse reaction in the Arab World too. It will lend credence to the false allegation that the signing of Peace Treaty will signal a weakening of Egypt's defense capability. Certain circles are fond of making comparisons between the Soviet readiness to saturate its allies with military equipment and the United States more hesitant and cautious attitude with its friends. We want to dispel these notions.

Vice President Mubarak will also discuss with you a few points related to our economic cooperation. I have no doubt that you will lend our requests with regard to the "Carter Plan"⁷ your enthusiastic sup-

⁷ A term used by Sadat to describe an intermittently repeated proposal for a multinational aid and development program for Egypt. Described in an interview with journalist Joseph Kraft in November 1978 as an Egyptian equivalent of the Marshall Plan, the plan initially called for the provision of \$10–15 billion in U.S. aid to Egypt over a five year period. (Telegram 24572 from Cairo, November 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780461–0578) Speaking with a congressional delegation in Cairo on January 6, Sadat stated that the United States, Japan, and West Germany should be the "principal participants" in the plan, in order to "bring needed economic development to Egypt and strengthen Egypt's role as a stabilizing factor" in the Middle East and Africa. (Telegram 397 from Cairo, January 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790010–0116)

port. As you know, the success of our ambitious drive to rejuvenate our economy depends heavily on the materialization of this plan. The Summit⁸ which is scheduled to convene on June 29 in Tokyo would be a golden opportunity to give this plan the push it needs at this junction. Prime Minister Khaleel has submitted a memorandum⁹ to Secretary Vance during his recent visit to Egypt on an additional five hundred thousand tons of wheat and wheat flour equivalent. We received no official reply to this request although it has been said unofficially that there are certain problems involved. I trust your judgment and your ability to overcome such problems, if any.

It is not at all my intention to add to your already heavy burden. But I feel that through our special relationship we can achieve what is good for our two peoples and for World peace. May God Almighty grant you all the strength you need to translate all your dreams into a living reality.

Best wishes and warmest regards,

Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat

⁸ Reference is to the Economic Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, held in Tokyo June 28–29.

⁹ A copy of the document has not been found. In telegram 130645 to the U.S. Mission to the Sinai, May 22, the Department reported that the Embassy in Cairo had received a letter addressed to Vance from Khalil on May 19, requesting an additional 500,000 tons of wheat from the United States under Public Law 480. The letter stated that Egypt's shortage of foreign exchange meant it would not be able to purchase adequate supplies of wheat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790234–0020)

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 11, 1979, 5:30–6:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
Vice President of Egypt Mubarak
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt: 6/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

Mubarak conveys greetings, friendship, etc. and hands message² to the President.

The President reads and summarizes. Sadat appreciates U.S. position on settlements; wants more F-4s with Mavericks.

Carter refers to Mubarak's talks with Harold Brown;³ indicates we cannot now convey new destroyers; urges Egyptian acceptance of cruiser—could be symbolically very impressive. Why does Sadat dislike the cruiser?

Mubarak: The destroyers you offer have lower capability than the Soviet.

Carter: They will be equipped with Harpoons.

Mubarak reviews what the U.S. has offered—35 planes and two old destroyers—and compares that with what Soviets offered in the past. This is creating a bad impression in the armed forces.

Carter: I understand the problem. On the navy side the cruiser and destroyers would be symbolic, bold move.

Maybe you and Sadat could visit the ships. On the other points Harold Brown will give me a report.⁴

² See Document 253.

³ Brown met alone with Mubarak on the morning of June 11. Brzezinski summarized the meeting for Carter in a June 11 memorandum. "Mubarak's main point," Brzezinski reported, "was that we need to do more for the Egyptian military in order to ensure its loyalty to Sadat. He wants Egypt to be treated like Israel in terms of our overall military relationship. In particular, he argued that our approval of specific items of military equipment should not be constrained by the financing that is available at any given time." Mubarak asked Brown for more F-4 fighter aircraft and Chinook helicopters. He reiterated Sadat's unwillingness to accept the U.S. offer of Gearing class destroyers. Brown suggested that the Egyptians "look again" at these destroyers as the United States had "nothing else readily available." Brown also "agreed in principle" to develop "a long term defense plan for Egypt, including a program for the next five years." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Middle East, Subject File, Box 13, Egypt: Arms and Military: 1-7/79)

⁴ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert J. Murray prepared a draft report—drawing on the June 11 conversation between Brown and Mubarak—for Brown to sign and submit to Carter. The report proposed that Brown "refine" Egypt's defense requirements list "in the course of further U.S.-Egyptian defense consultations over the summer," ultimately developing a five-year equipment plan for Egypt that would encourage Cairo to "limit its arms procurement ambitions," demonstrate to the Egyptians ways to reduce the size of their armed forces, agree in principle to more aircraft and additional ships provided these fit Egypt's available financial resources, and look at ways to use Egypt's existing military industries in support of the program. In a handwritten note, dated June 12, on the report's undated covering memorandum from Murray to Brown, Brown wrote "6/12 R Murray—OK to proceed along these lines; e.g. 5 year planning, consider added ships & a/c in that plan over time, help w/defense industry. HB." (Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0205, Egypt 1979 Jan-July) A final version of the report has not been found.

Mubarak: We can accept the cruiser but need something better for the navy. Foregoing main issue. Secondly, when you go to Japan, please help to promote the Carter plan.⁵

Carter: Please don't call it the Carter plan.

ZB: You can call it the Sadat plan. Carter talked to Schmidt.⁶ He is willing to help more but the Egyptians are not spending the money that is coming in. We need to know how the money that is approved is being spent. We could send someone to see what the problem is—perhaps a retired businessman.

Mubarak agrees aid not being spent well. A highly qualified man should come as soon as possible.

Carter: To summarize: (1) we will get someone to come over to see what obstacles there are. Mentions Miller as a possible choice; (2) I will talk to the other heads in Tokyo about aid; (3) continue your bilateral efforts to obtain aid.

Mubarak talks about postponement of Sadat's trip to Japan.

ZB indicates how wary Japanese are about providing help to Egypt.

Carter asks assessment of other Arabs.

Mubarak: We stopped attacks and expect now new contacts with the Saudis through Oman. Hope for progress on Jerusalem. If there was some progress, especially a religious council, it would help with the Saudis. Reviews in general terms disagreements in the Arab world and notes Iraqis and Palestinians are main source of pressure. Kuwait investments are still continuing in Egypt and 10 days ago a new one was made.

Carter reiterates Camp David language good on Jerusalem. On UN peacekeeping, will bring it up with Brezhnev.⁷ Urges Egyptians to raise level of public concern over settlements. U.S. cannot be out front. Begin tells us Sadat does not care.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 253.

⁶ Reference is to Carter's June 6 meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The memorandum of conversation from the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

⁷ Carter and Brezhnev discussed the presence of United Nations forces in the Sinai during their June 18, 1979, meeting in Vienna. Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union was "resolutely opposed to any attempt to sanctify a separate Egyptian-Israeli deal through the authority and prestige of the United Nations, inter alia through involvement of U.N. forces presently in the Sinai. Whatever arguments are marshaled in favor of continuing the presence of U.N. troops in that area, such presence would mean complicity of and association by the United Nations in actions which cannot lead to lasting peace in the Middle East, but only the opposite. To expect the Soviet Union to support such a force in this matter would be hopeless. The full record of Brezhnev's conversation with Carter in Vienna is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 206.

Mubarak: Sadat does not want to spoil the peace process.

Carter: Egyptian silence weakens Israeli opposition to the settlements.

Mubarak agrees. We will move on this issue; some comments have taken place. On other issues notes that Israel would like to have the U.S. only the status of observer in the ongoing negotiations and have so informed the Egyptians. Reiterates that Nimeiri needs urgent help as per talks with Javits. Rhodesian statement underlines Egyptian desire for Chinook helicopters.

Carter concludes meeting by restating what he will do in Vienna⁸ and Tokyo.⁹

⁸ Carter was in Vienna June 15–18 for the signing of the SALT II Treaty.

⁹ See footnote 8, Document 253.

255. Telegram From the Consulate General in Alexandria to the Department of State¹

Alexandria, June 12, 1979, 0530Z

486. From Leonard USMEDEL 035. Subject: Alexandria Negotiations: Discussion of U.S. Role.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: Second session of Alexandria autonomy talks² were devoted almost entirely to Israeli questioning of U.S. role in the negoti-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 5–6/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Printed from a corrected copy. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² The Alexandria sessions of the autonomy talks opened at the San Stefano Hotel on June 11. Although the first meeting of the session was designed to deal largely with structural and procedural matters, a number of controversies came to the fore. Following a sharp exchange between the Israeli and Egyptian delegations over Israeli settlement policy, the first arose over whether the sessions would have a “chairman”—language favored by the Israelis—or a “host,” preside over the proceedings. A second “sharp difference of view” between the Israeli and Egyptian delegations occurred when Rosenne “casually mentioned that the participants in the talks were Egypt and Israel, with the U.S. ‘as an observer or full partner.’” The comment drew objections from Boutros Ghali and Khalil who stated the view that the United States was a full party to the talks. At Burg’s suggestion, the question of the U.S. role was deferred to the second session. (Telegram 485 from Alexandria, June 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790265–0079)

ations, possible agreement(s), and implementation. (Dayan insisted that although U.S. is “full and equal” partner in negotiations, agreement under CDA must only come between Israel, Egypt and possibly Jordan and Palestinian representatives.) Egyptians insist joint Sadat/Begin letter³ to President effectively amends framework agreement, making clear U.S. is “full partner” in all stages of the negotiations. I argued the philosophical question of our relationship to any agreement coming from these negotiations need not be resolved at this time, and urged parties to get down to real issues. Dayan demurred; Israel will seek formal response⁴ from Washington on how we view our role. Recognizing Dayan may have good legal point in that our role is qualitatively different from that of Israel and Egypt, I, nevertheless, recommend that our answer be couched in language which will not lead Egyptians to conclude there will be any lessening of U.S. involvement. Egyptians already fear Israel is trying to make these negotiations bilateral, after having succeeded in isolating GOE within Arab world. It is likewise important that Israelis be given no grounds for later challenging U.S. participation or initiatives in the negotiations. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

³ See Document 233.

⁴ See Document 258.

256. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, June 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Egypt (S)

In the light of yesterday’s discussions with Vice President Mubarak,² it would be useful to have a prompt review³ of the practicalities

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt: 6/79. Secret.

² See Document 254.

³ See Document 268.

of enhanced U.S. military assistance to Egypt, perhaps stretched out over a somewhat longer period of time. The President would like to have the above by the time of his return from Vienna.⁴ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 254.

257. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Thoughts on the Next Round of Negotiations (U)

One of the first judgments that we will need to make is whether Sadat really cares much about the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. My guess at this point is that he does *not*. The Israelis also seem to be reaching this conclusion. Unless Sadat is prepared to insist on some degree of “linkage” between Egypt-Israel relations and the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, the Israelis will have little incentive to make any serious modifications in the “Begin Plan”.² And without substantial changes, we cannot expect a serious agreement. (S)

If Sadat does not care, I doubt if we will be able to carry the full weight of the negotiations on our shoulders. Our relations with the Saudis may suffer if we fail to produce movement on the West Bank/Gaza, but without Sadat we will be unable to influence Begin. This would put us in the position of needing a strategy for managing the results of Arab disaffection and radicalism, but without a creditable approach to peace talks. (S)

Assuming that we do conclude that the Egyptians are serious, then we need to develop a negotiating strategy. Such a strategy could be built around the following elements:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 76, Peace Negotiations: 1–10/79. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information.

² See footnote 2, Document 5.

—*Timing*. Refrain from putting forward a US proposal until Egypt and Israel have developed their positions. This should be done over the next couple of months. The Egyptian proposal should be considerably harder than what we expect an eventual compromise position to be. We should become increasingly involved in the substance of negotiations in *October–November*. Some positive results need to be shown by early next year.

—*US Role*. The Israelis are trying to narrow our involvement in the talks and to put us on the defensive. Ambassador Strauss will need to establish his credibility with Begin from the outset.³ This may be unpleasant, since Begin has a tendency to test people by using some pretty rough tactics. Strauss cannot let himself be intimidated. On the contrary, he may need to win at least one round with Begin on some issue. I'm not a good enough politician to suggest how this can be done. Hopefully he is.

—*Concepts*. According to the Camp David agreements, we are trying to establish a *transitional regime* for the West Bank/Gaza built around the idea of a freely elected self-governing authority which will replace the Israeli military government in most areas except security. At this point, we should not be talking about final borders, self-determination, a Palestinian state, or any of the other issues that are supposed to be left for a second phase of negotiations. The importance of keeping the focus on the interim character of the next agreement is that it may make it easier for all parties to accept less than their maximum demands. The key ideas should be that no party will be worse off during the transitional period than they are today; final outcomes should not be overtly prejudged; and some positive incentive must exist to move from the present situation into the transitional arrangements. A major objective of this stage is to create a representative Palestinian leadership that will be able to participate in later negotiations (hopefully at the expense of the more extreme elements in the PLO.)

—*Substance*. The most difficult issues in the negotiations will involve land and security arrangements. I have tried to think of plausible negotiated outcomes. The best I can come up with is:

—*Land*. Privately owned land in Israel and in the West Bank/Gaza will be sold on a nondiscriminatory basis. Israel will not retain the right to expropriate private property in the West Bank/Gaza. But the Israeli

³ Strauss was scheduled to travel to the Middle East on his first trip as the President's Special Representative June 30–July 8. A June 28 memorandum from Aaron to Mondale that summarized the Department's assessment of priorities for Strauss's "get-acquainted trip," indicated that Strauss needed to "stimulate Begin to think of some gesture for his July 10 meeting with Sadat" and should raise the issue of settlements "almost *pro forma* this time, so that he can say he raised the issue." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 3–6/79)

military government will retain control of X percent of the public domain lands now under its control. In these areas, Israel can establish security installations and settlements. The remainder of the public lands will pass under the jurisdiction of the self-governing authority. In theory, Israel would not be required to give up the right to establish new settlements, but as a practical matter the scope for new settlement activity would be limited.

—*Water.* A joint water authority will be established with equal Israeli and West Bank/Gaza representation. The situation prevailing at the time of the establishment of the self-governing authority could not be changed unless both parties agreed. In other words, the worst outcome if no agreement could be reached would be a continuation of the status quo for five more years. If new wells are to be dug, joint decisions would be required. (This would establish a measure of equity which does not now exist. If an Israeli settlement needs more water, it would probably be necessary for the Israelis to agree at the same time to allow an Arab village to dig a new well, which is presently not usually permitted.)

—*Security.* The Israelis have undertaken to withdraw some troops and to redeploy those remaining into specified security locations. This implies some limitations on the Israeli military presence. The stages by which limitations will be set, however, are yet to be decided, and it might be possible to define the type of presence that might exist after three years without spelling out the intervening steps with great precision. It might be specified that the implementation of Israeli military redeployment will be discussed with the new self-government, along with the initial division of responsibility between local security forces and the Israelis. This is not an area where we and the Egyptians should try to be too precise. (S)

Conclusions

I do not honestly believe that the negotiations for a self-governing authority for the West Bank/Gaza are likely to produce positive results within the one-year target date. At some point, it may be necessary to revert to the earlier approach of trying to define the basic 242 trade-off—peace, recognition and security in exchange for Israeli withdrawal—with a staged process of implementation that might include a transitional regime of some sort. Begin, of course, will reject this approach, but Peres supports it. It has the advantage of dealing frankly with the principle of withdrawal, without which I see little likelihood of an agreement. The main advantage of the Begin Plan is that it makes Peres' idea of territorial compromise look increasingly attractive to the Arabs. I suspect we will find that "autonomy" will be a non-starter. Either we forget about the West Bank/Gaza for a while, or we will probably have to find a way of anchoring the transitional concept to 242. Unfortunately, we did not quite succeed in doing so in the Camp David accords. (S)

258. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, June 16, 1979, 0048Z

Tosec 50033/154608. For Secretary Vance from Saunders. Subject: Response to Israeli Query on U.S. Participation in Negotiations.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. For Mitchell: Following is the text of the response we propose to make to the Israelis on the U.S. role in the coming negotiations. The Israeli note² to which we are responding is in para 16 of Tel Aviv 12823, which we are repeating to you. Sam Lewis after discussions³ with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790271-0802. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Drafted by Saunders; cleared in draft by Strauss and Leonard and cleared by Richard Castrodale (S/S-O); approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and Cairo. Vance was in Vienna with Carter for the U.S.-Soviet Summit and the signing of the SALT II Treaty.

² Sent June 14. The note, believed by Lewis to have been "vetted (or perhaps drafted) by Begin" and distributed to the press on June 14, stated the Israeli Government's position on U.S. participation: "Egypt and Israel undertook commitments in the Camp David Agreement and in the joint letter from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin addressed to President Carter. These commitments are to be scrupulously carried out by both parties. In the Camp David Agreement, it is stipulated: 'The U.S. shall be invited to participate in talks on matters relating to modalities of implementation of the Agreement and working out of the time table for carrying out of the obligations of the participants.' In the aforementioned letter, dated 3/26/79, it is stated: 'This letter also confirms our understanding that the U.S. Government will participate fully in all stages of the negotiations.' This, therefore, is the United States' role. Nothing shall be detracted from or added to these definitions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269-0287)

³ Lewis met with Begin, Dayan, and Burg in separate meetings on June 14. Begin requested that the U.S. Government respond "very urgently" to Israel's request for a statement on how it viewed the U.S. role in the negotiations. In a conversation described by Lewis as "very depressing," Dayan stated that Rosenne had made a "stupid mistake" in using the term "observer" at Alexandria and emphasized that "no one disagreed that we [the United States] should be a full negotiating partner." However, Dayan added, if the United States were to be a "party" in the "formal sense, this would indeed require a revision of the Camp David Accords." In conclusion, Lewis commented to the Department: "The fundamental idiocy of the way the Israeli negotiating team and structure has been put together will put an enormous boulder in the road no matter how we try to ignore it. Dayan himself is determined to stay out of it to the maximum extent possible, since he cannot accept or agree with the way in which the GOI is approaching both the organizational side and the substance." Lewis added that Dayan "regretted very much the fact that at Alexandria there was so little private contact between the American and the Israeli delegations, and that the Israelis all felt an intangible but very real atmosphere of coolness between the delegations." Lewis noted that the "atmospheric issue" needed U.S. attention, since the Israelis "already are deeply suspicious that the U.S. and Egypt have mapped out the game plan together in a direction which is very contrary" to their "desires and purposes." (Telegram 12917 from Tel Aviv, June 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790270-1209) Lewis met with Burg earlier in the day, where among the issues discussed was the appearance of an article in the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv*, alleging that Leonard had been "unfriendly" to the Israeli delegation and that the United States had "tried to dominate" the talks, charges Burg dismissed as "totally fallacious." (Telegram 12823 from Tel Aviv, June 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269-0287)

Begin, Burg, and Dayan urges that we get this response to him for delivery⁴ Saturday before the Sunday Cabinet meeting in Israel. He and the Israelis to whom he has spoken believe there is considerable advantage in closing this chapter promptly. I have cleared the proposed response below with Bob Strauss and Jim Leonard. When the Secretary is satisfied with a text, would you please send his decision directly to Tel Aviv and Cairo with an info copy to us.

3. Begin text: The position of the United States with respect to the West Bank/Gaza negotiations is based on the Framework for Peace in the Middle East⁵ and on the joint letter of March 26, 1979,⁶ addressed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Carter. While as sovereign powers Egypt and Israel obviously have the right to reach agreements without U.S. assistance, the letter of March 26 confirms the understanding of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin “that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.” We consider this to mean that the parties wish the United States to be a “full partner” in the negotiations with Egypt and Israel. As President Carter said on April 24 when he announced⁷ his appointment of Ambassador Robert Strauss to serve as Ambassador-at-large for the United States’ participation in these negotiations, “I have personally promised President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin that the United States will contribute our good offices to see that those negotiations are as successful as those which resulted in the treaty which was signed between Israel and Egypt last month.” Our purpose is to help the parties specified in the Framework reach agreement on a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. As in the past, we will welcome any progress toward this goal that can be made by the parties. We are prepared, as we have been asked to do, to play the same kind of role that we have played in the negotiations which led to the two frameworks and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Should the parties agree among themselves to invite the United States to sign an agreement in any capacity, the United States would respond in accordance with its consti-

⁴ Vance and Brzezinski approved the text of the response on June 16. (Telegram Secto 5006 from Vance in Vienna, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272–0324) Lewis read the text over the telephone to both Begin and Dayan on June 16. On the conversation which followed, Lewis reported, “Dayan said it sounded quite satisfactory to him” and that Begin “also thought it would be alright, but characteristically, he wanted to study it in written form more carefully.” Lewis also reported that he would deliver the text to Burg after the Sabbath had ended. (Telegram 12947 from Tel Aviv, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272–1120) Burg’s more critical response is in telegram 13198 from Tel Aviv, June 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2703)

⁵ See Document 51.

⁶ See Document 233.

⁷ See Document 240.

tutional procedures after studying the nature of the request and of the agreement. President Carter's instructions to Ambassador Strauss are in keeping with the above position. End text.

4. For the Secretary: Please note the following origins of two points in the above text:

A. The next-to-last sentence is included to meet Boutros' request that we keep the door open to signing as a party. This is the one specific request the Egyptians made. Our reply is that we will decide in the light of the situation and the document produced. Bob Strauss independently suggested this point.

B. The April 24 quotation from the President and the last sentence are included at Bob Strauss' request. I believe they are useful additions because they show further continuity in our position reaching right down into the new negotiations.

5. For Tel Aviv: Please hold the above in readiness for delivery to the Israelis only when you receive a go-ahead from the Secretary in Vienna.

6. For Cairo: When you have seen the Secretary's approval, please give the Egyptians⁸ the text of the above for their information.

Christopher

⁸ Atherton delivered the U.S. response to Khalil on June 16. (Telegram 12413 from Cairo, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272-0794)

259. Editorial Note

During the fourth plenary session of the U.S.-Soviet Summit held in Vienna on June 17, 1979, which was devoted to a *tour d'horizon* of international issues, President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid I. Brezhnev discussed their countries' respective positions on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Speaking first, Carter stated that, on the Middle East, "our two countries have had differences in the past and in the present." Carter, the memorandum of conversation recorded, "had tried to bring together all parties in Geneva, including the Soviet Union, with a view to finding a solution to the differences in the Middle East. This was some two years ago, but Syria and a number of other countries refused and no progress had been made. President Sadat had taken an initiative—the President would add that this was without consultation with us—

and went to Jerusalem. Much progress had been made by Israel and Egypt. This was consistent with UN Resolutions 242, 338 and others, as well as the Joint Statement between the U.S. and the USSR. It was a fact that Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai. Israel was prepared to negotiate treaties with all its neighbors. Palestinian rights, under the Camp David accords, would be preserved. Security of all states was to be guaranteed." Moreover, Carter "hoped that the Soviet Union would give its support and encourage other states to join in this process. Total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was part of a process as prescribed by the UN. UN supervision was important. We would expect all Security Council members to approve such UN supervision by UN emergency forces. But the U.S., in the interests of a peaceful resolution of these differences, was pledged alternative supervision if that was necessary. However, our strong preference was for a UN force."

In response, Brezhnev said he wanted to "re-emphasize" the "Soviet position of principle in its appraisal of the U.S. policy." "The fact that the October 1977 Soviet-U.S. understanding on joint action in the Middle East was violated and supplanted by an anti-Arab policy argued nothing good for the people of that region nor for the relations between us. Brezhnev thought that it was clear to everyone now that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty had failed to tranquilize the Middle Eastern situation, but it has aggravated it. He called attention to the indignation and determination of the Arabs and noted the war which Israel, protected by Egypt, was in effect waging in Lebanon. This could at any time grow larger. It was necessary to prevent a resumption of armed conflict along the lines of the 1967 war, to prevent a major conflagration." "Therefore, unfortunately," Brezhnev continued, "the positions of the U.S. and the USSR were fundamentally different at this time and not through any fault of the Soviet Union. To be frank, the Soviet Union would resolutely oppose any efforts to use the UN to bolster the separate deal between Egypt and Israel, be it by using the present UN troops in the Sinai or any other manner. The position of the Soviet Union with respect to the Middle East remained the same as it was all along. The Soviet Union believed that there would be no firm peace there without the complete vacating of the Arab territory occupied in 1967 and without an opportunity for the Palestinians to set up their own state, without ensuring the security of all nations in that region, including Israel. As before, the Soviet Union considered it desirable for our two countries to interact on Middle East issues, using earlier UN resolutions as a foundation." (Memorandum of Conversation, June 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 75, Trip: Box 1)

260. Memorandum From the President's Senior Adviser on Middle East Affairs (Sanders) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Israeli Settlement Activity

I am aware of the seriousness with which the President views the recent Israeli settlement activity at Alon Moreh² and I know that he is considering various options. I am writing this memo to voice my opinion that the best way to handle this problem is to continue a low-key approach.

It is my view that both in Israel and in the United States there is a serious debate going on concerning the propriety of settlements such as Alon Moreh (see attached *Jerusalem Post* editorial)³ and that the natural evolution of such a debate will result in a policy more to our liking.

I believe that the interjection of a U.S. program to pressure Israel to change its policy would be counterproductive. It would unify Israel and the American Jewish community, and I believe, recreate a situation of the type that existed in 1977 (Joint US–USSR Communiqué) and December 1978 (Administration's statements taken to indicate tilt toward Egypt). Such a policy, I believe, would have a materially adverse effect on the peace process.

The consequences of such a policy could be an Israeli response designed to resist US pressure and demonstrate independence, and we might be in the position of losing credibility with both Israel and the Arabs. We would be seen as setting a precedent for pressure to be applied to Israel at every critical point in the negotiations.

I do not believe that we should interfere with the healthy debate going on in Israel and in the American Jewish community. Our interference will only boomerang.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 5–11/79. No classification marking. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "Cy FYI Zbig."

² See footnote 4, Document 253.

³ Not found attached.

261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, June 27, 1979, 1608Z

Tosec 60064/165809. Exdis for Ambassador Lewis; Tel Aviv for action only. Subject: Syrian-Israeli Air Battle Over Lebanon.

(S) Entire text.

1. You should get in immediate touch with Begin to deliver² the following as an oral message from the Secretary:³

—Today's engagement⁴ between Syrian and Israeli air forces over South Lebanon is a matter of most serious concern.

—At this time, when both the U.S. and Israel have committed themselves to a new and vital phase of negotiations in the peace process, and on the eve of the departure of Ambassador Strauss on his first mission in connection with these negotiations, this incident is particularly troubling in the potential it holds for damaging the atmosphere surrounding our effort to make steady progress toward a wider peace.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 6/79–7/80. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent Niact Immediate to Damascus, Jerusalem, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, and to the Secretary's Delegation; sent Immediate to Amman. Vance was in Tokyo, accompanying Carter at the Economic Summit Meeting. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Draper; cleared by Saunders, Tarnoff, Strauss, and Hunter; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790290–1221)

² Lewis delivered Vance's message in a June 27 meeting with Begin. Upon reading the message, Lewis reported, Begin "reacted with maximum emotion and zero responsiveness." He continued, "Angry and defiant, Begin said that no one had right to ask Israelis to sit passively by to await PLO terror attacks on their civilians. So long as 'all-out PLO war' continued, IDF would continue to hit their bases, staging areas, and headquarters." (Telegram 13877 from Tel Aviv, June 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790291–0605) The following day, Begin telephoned Lewis, requesting that he inform Vance that Begin "had additional evidence of Syria's aggressive intentions." (Telegram 13955 from Tel Aviv, June 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790293–0216)

³ On June 27, Christopher also sent instructions to the Embassy to inform the Syrians of the message to Begin and to explain that "we have urged strongly that Israel refrain from all further bombing attacks." (Tosec 60070/165836 to Damascus, June 27; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 6/79–7/80)

⁴ On June 27, while attacking Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon, Israeli aircraft clashed with Syrian fighters. In the ensuing engagement, Israeli officials announced, five Syrian aircraft were shot down with no loss to themselves; Syrian officials acknowledged four losses and claimed two Israeli planes destroyed by Syrian pilots. The engagement marked the first combat use by Israel of U.S.-built F-15 jets, a matter described by the Department of State as a "serious concern to us and members of Congress." ("Syrians and Israelis Clash in Air Battle," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1979, p. A1)

—We are fully aware of the threat posed to the Israeli people by terrorist attacks planned and launched from locations in Lebanon. We know as well the problems which the Syrian presence and role in Lebanon raise for Israel. At the present time, however, the internal political situation in Syria is tense and uncertain in the wake of the recent massacre of Alawite cadets.⁵ Any outside action that appears challenging or humiliating to Syria is likely to lead to countermeasures.

For this reason we now face the possibility that incidents such as today's air clash may seriously impair the negotiating effort. It could as well destabilize the situation in Syria and lead to wider hostilities which, whatever the outcome, could be detrimental to both our nations' interests.

—The Israeli Government's policy concerning retaliatory and preemptive attacks has long been a source of concern to the United States in terms of our interest in a stable Lebanon and a wider peace and we have discussed this with Israel on a number of occasions. Most recently, on June 13 we raised with Minister Weizman⁶ the pattern of Israeli military actions in and over Lebanon over the past two months. We were assured that it was not Israel's desire or intention to engage Syrian aircraft in hostilities. Because of the likelihood of Syrian reaction, we asked that Israel change its practice of significantly increasing the number of overflights of Lebanon. We also approached Syria at that time.⁷

—Against this background we are again urging Syria to exercise maximum prudence and restraint. We must ask Israel to do likewise. Specifically, we urge strongly that Israel refrain from further bombing attacks in Lebanon. Such actions cannot but be seen as carrying the conflict to a higher and more dangerous level. It is only fair to alert Israel to the fact that actions such as these by Israel will make more intense questions already raised in the Congress about whether the American equipment used by Israeli forces in these actions is being properly and legally employed.

Christopher

⁵ On June 16, a group of soldiers led by a Sunni army officer fired upon Syrian Alawite military cadets at an artillery school near Aleppo. The Embassy reported that the incident, resulting in an estimated death-toll of up to 27 cadets, represented a "quantum jump in security incidents that have occurred over past two and a half months. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, there has been serious communal violence within the army which has obvious ramifications to stability of regime." (Telegram 4075 from Damascus, June 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790277-0410)

⁶ The Embassy reported on the June 13 meeting between Lewis and Weizman in telegram 12714 from Tel Aviv, June 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790268-0009.

⁷ The Department ordered the approach of informing the Syrians that the U.S. Government had raised the issue of overflights with the Israelis in telegram 153428 to Damascus, June 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269-0893.

262. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 79–10305

Washington, July 1979

[Omitted here is a map.]

Israel's Goals in Southern Lebanon [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Key Judgments

The Begin government's new search-and-destroy policy against the Palestinians in Lebanon over time is likely to lead to an expansion of Israeli control over all of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River.

To this end, the Israelis probably will try to bolster the effectiveness of their southern Lebanese surrogates, the Maronite Christian militias commanded by Major Saad Haddad.

Some Israeli military figures probably hope that the new Israeli policy, combined with the provocations of Haddad's forces, will lead to the withdrawal of UN troops from the south and clear the way for expanded operations against the Palestinians.

In the event of a terrorist "spectacular" within Israel, the Israelis are not likely to be deterred by the presence of UN troops from aggressively seeking out the Palestinians, including sending Israeli troops into UN-patrolled areas.

Once installed at the Litani, the Israelis probably would refuse to withdraw or to permit a meaningful restoration of Lebanese Government authority in the near term.

Israel is not likely to be dissuaded from pursuing a more aggressive policy in Lebanon by considering its effect on the autonomy negotiations. Egypt would hesitate to take action in opposing Israeli moves that might seriously jeopardize the negotiations or the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

[*handling restriction not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the research paper.]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 06T00412R: Intelligence Publication Files, Box 1, Folder 65, PA 79–10305 Israel's Goals in Southern Lebanon. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The research for the report was completed on June 29. The report was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the NIO/NESA.

263. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, June 30, 1979, 1555Z

Tosoc 060166/169370. Subject: President Carter's Response to President Sadat. Ref: State 163814.²

1. (S-entire text.)

2. Reftel which is being repeated to you provides text of the Sadat letter which Egyptian Vice President Mubarak delivered to the President on June 11. There follows the text of a proposed reply which has been cleared within the Department (Ambassador Strauss, NEA, T, and PM), and by OMB, DOD, NSC and the President's speech writers. You may wish to have the final version³ cabled directly to Cairo because Roy Atherton expects to meet with President Sadat within the next few days.

3. Proposed text:

Quote

His Excellency

Anwar al-Sadat,

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Cairo.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for the letter you asked Vice President Mubarak to deliver to me personally during his visit to Washington. The Vice President and I had good talks, during which we covered most of the points raised in your message.

The Vice President's visit also offered us an opportunity to discuss the U.S.-Egyptian military supply relationship. I know that you have been concerned about both the quality and quantity of military items

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 117, 6/26–30/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Marthinsen; cleared by Draper, Jack R. Perry (S/S), McGiffert, Daniel A. O'Donohue (PM), Flaten, Benson, Aaron, Strauss, and Saunders; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840130–1980) Vance was in South Korea, accompanying Carter on a state visit.

² See footnote 1, Document 253.

³ On July 1, the Department informed Atherton that Carter approved the text of the message as proposed and authorized him to convey it to Sadat. (Telegram 170470 to Cairo, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004–1691) Atherton delivered the message to Sadat the next day, following the presentation of his ambassadorial credentials, at the Ras El Tin Palace in Alexandria. (Telegram 554 from Alexandria, July 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–2400)

we will be able to provide under the \$1.5 billion, three-year package. For my part, I recognize that Egypt has legitimate defense needs greater than those we have been able to meet within this particular package. As announced following my meeting with Vice President Mubarak, I believe that our two governments should now work closely and intensively to plan our longer-term military supply relationship beyond the three years envisaged in the equipment package associated with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. In that way, Egypt could satisfy a greater proportion of its military equipment needs over the next several years. Implicit in any longer-term relationship would be a U.S. assurance that necessary spare parts and follow-on support would continue to be offered. In this connection, I also want you to be assured that Maverick missiles will be included with the arms for the Phantom aircraft we will be delivering to Egypt.

I have therefore directed⁴ Secretaries Brown and Vance to begin this planning immediately in cooperation with Egypt.

To undertake a major, long-term military supply relationship will require the fullest possible support of the American public and the Congress. Congressional support for the current \$1.5 billion package is an essential first step, but we will have to be careful about overemphasizing the military side of our relationship. Your warmest supporters in the public and the Congress hope that Egypt will assign highest priority to economic development rather than to military programs. They are concerned that the major portion of our peace package has been for military equipment. People in the United States understand that Egypt has important defense needs and are willing to help, but they hope that this can be accomplished in a manner which will enhance rather than compete with our shared goal of accelerated economic development in Egypt. I am prepared to work with you closely, Mr. President, as our two countries develop together the most effective response to Egyptian needs. I am sure that this can be done while taking into account the political and financial constraints within which I must function.

I will be sending you a further message⁵ following the Tokyo Summit,⁶ where I will be pressing for sympathetic consideration of Egypt's economic programs. As you are also aware, Ambassador Strauss will be bringing with him a small group of business and labor executives to work further with your colleagues in developing areas of additional economic cooperation.

⁴ See Document 256.

⁵ See Document 269.

⁶ See footnote 8, Document 253.

In Vienna I raised with President Brezhnev the issue of renewal of the UNEF mandate.⁷ Our discussion was inconclusive. Though we will not be totally sure of the final Soviet position until the Security Council meets, I am not now encouraged that the USSR can be brought to cooperate with us. We have under study your concept of an all-African force. Whether it is feasible as an alternative has to be considered carefully. Our two governments and Israel will have to consult closely on a common strategy.

With regard to the peace process, Bob Strauss will be discussing the critical issues with you.⁸ He will speak for me and with full authority. We are determined to make progress, and I look forward to receiving his report when he returns.

With my warmest best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter, Unquote.

Christopher

⁷ See Document 259.

⁸ See Document 265.

264. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, the Consulate General in Alexandria, and the Embassy in Egypt¹

Tel Aviv, July 4, 1979, 1120Z

14348. Cairo and Alexandria for USMEDEL. Subject: Ambassador Strauss' Meeting With Prime Minister Begin July 2, 1979.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Ambassadors Strauss and Lewis met with Prime Minister Begin, who was accompanied by Minister Burg and Begin's aide, Yehuda Avner, for approximately one and one-quarter hours on morning of July 2. Minister of Justice Tamir joined for final ten minutes. Following

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 114, 7/1–8/79 Strauss Trip to Middle East: 6/79–7/4/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

this session, Begin and Strauss met more formally with all members of their respective delegations in adjoining conference room for what was largely a ceremonial encounter.

3. Begin/Strauss meeting was continuation of their initial *tete-a-tete* on previous day.² Main subjects covered were Israeli settlement activity in West Bank, increasing opposition to Israeli policies among certain segments of U.S. public opinion, impending meeting between Sadat and Begin in Alexandria on July 10, prospects for the impending round of autonomy talks at Alexandria on July 5–6, and the increasingly dangerous situation in Lebanon in the wake of the aerial dogfight between Israeli and Syrian planes on June 27.³

4. On settlements, Begin said that he knew with certainty that settlements are not a serious problem with Sadat, although he may raise it during our meeting. (In this connection, I heard from another source that Begin claims Sadat told him during their last meeting in Cairo that he understood Begin's problems about settlements and only wished he would hurry and get things done as quickly as possible so as to get the issue out of the headlines.) Strauss restated the U.S. position on the settlements issue⁴ in response, stressing the damage that he believed it was doing to the peace process.

5. On the Alexandria meetings, Begin urged Strauss to do whatever is necessary to reach agreement on the agenda, stressing the need for a limited practical agenda which will permit the two parties to get down to concrete business. Strauss assured him that we had every interest in doing everything possible to get the talks moving on concrete issues, and that he would do his best.

6. Begin told Strauss that he anticipated Sadat would make another effort on the Jerusalem issue when they saw each other July 10. He anticipated that would be the major topic on Sadat's mind, but he gave

² A record of this meeting has not been found. Strauss arrived in Israel on July 1, following a brief stopover at the Cairo airport where he held a press conference. The Embassy conveyed a transcript of Strauss's remarks in telegram 13322 from Cairo, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790298–0471.

³ See Document 261.

⁴ In a July 5 press conference, Strauss laid out his view of the Israeli settlements, which Sick transmitted to Brzezinski in a July 6 memorandum. Strauss stated, "I happen to think the settlements are illegal. The Israelis say they are legal. But I don't think the issue is whether the settlements are legal or illegal. I think that whether they are either one of those, they have proved to be an obstacle to two things: 1) progress toward peace, and, equally important almost, 2) Israel stating its case properly before the court of world opinion." Strauss continued: "Both of those things are vital to Israel's continued growth and viability and strength. If they're getting something out of it on the security end, is it, in the overall security and best interest of Israel, worth the price they're having to pay? I answer that in the negative. It's not worth it." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 3–12/79)

absolutely no indication that he had any receptivity to pursuing the issue with Sadat.

7. During a lengthy discussion of the reasons for the rising opposition in U.S. public opinion to certain Israeli policies, particularly those involving settlements and Lebanon, Begin expressed deep resentment about what he characterized as “deliberately hostile briefing of the press by the State Department about the air encounters with the Syrians,” and other subjects, in recent days. He said “we are very perturbed about this permanent anti-Israeli briefing pattern coming out of Washington,” and said that he had numerous reports from journalists about what was being said by State Department officials. He particularly resented the fact that the Department’s spokesman had issued a public statement branding us as aggressors before he had even received a report on the facts and on the Begin/Lewis meeting at which the Secretary’s message⁵ was delivered and discussed. He asked Lewis to take careful note and to make sure that Secretary Vance was informed of his concern. He insisted that the Israeli actions in the air over Lebanon were “a clear case of self-defense,” and then reiterated his position that Israeli actions in Lebanon are essential in the face of publicly proclaimed PLO intentions to continue terrorist attacks against Israel.

8. Strauss intervened in Begin’s monologue at this point to suggest as a personal idea that the Prime Minister should announce a moratorium on pre-emptive bombing for a fixed period (thirty, sixty, or ninety days), or perhaps as an open-ended commitment, and then challenge the PLO to halt its terrorist attacks in response. He stressed that this would put the Israeli policy in a much more favorable light in the United States, whether or not the PLO responded. There was lengthy discussion of this idea, with Begin showing some interest in considering it but worried about the impact if the PLO bombings within Israel continued after the moratorium had been proclaimed. He stressed his overriding responsibility to try to avoid the bloodshed of his citizens. He did not know whether he could conscientiously run the risks of such an appeal and moratorium on Israel’s part not being heeded by the Palestinian terrorists. (Note: Begin continues to be convinced that Israeli bombing of PLO bases effectively stops many terrorist attacks before they are launched.) This led to a long dissertation on the difference between “terrorists” and “liberation or freedom fighters,” with Begin stressing the despicable nature of PLO tactics in deliberately attacking innocent civilians and then “boasting about the murder of women and children.” At the end of the conversation, Begin seemed to be turning over in his mind Strauss’ idea. He assured Strauss he would give it very serious consideration.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 261.

9. Comment: It was evident throughout this conversation that Ambassador Strauss and Prime Minister Begin have established an excellent personal rapport which should stand us in very good stead in the weeks and months to come.

Lewis

265. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, July 11, 1979, 2048Z

178999. Subject: Ambassador Strauss' Trip to Middle East July 1–7.
(S-entire text)

1. Action addresses may use following to brief host government/NAC on Ambassador Strauss' visit to the Middle East July 1–7.

2. This was Ambassador Strauss' initial trip to the Middle East in his role as the President's representative and chief US negotiator for the West Bank/Gaza autonomy negotiations. Ambassador Strauss' purpose was to become better acquainted with the main players on the Israeli and Egyptian sides, to gain first hand knowledge of the situation on the ground and the main issues, and to attend the July 5–6 Ministerial [garble] of the autonomy talks in Alexandria.² He also visited

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790314–0833. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, Moscow, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Kuwait, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Sana, Khartoum, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Lagos, Monrovia, Dakar, Libreville, Lusaka, Brasilia, and Dublin. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Draper, Richard Castrodale (S/S–O), Jeffrey C. Gallop (EUR/RPM), and E. Walker (S/SN); approved by Saunders. Sent for information to Amman, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.

² The U.S. delegation conveyed a lengthy summary of the July 5 opening session of the autonomy talks, during which Strauss proposed the creation of three working groups (modalities, powers and responsibilities, and "other related issues"), in telegram 586 from Alexandria, July 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307–0345) The U.S. delegation summarized the July 6 concluding session, in which the final text of the joint statement (see footnote 5 below) and the timing for the meeting of the working groups were discussed, in telegram 581 from Alexandria, July 6. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 114, 7/1–8/79 Strauss Trip to Middle East: 7/5–12/79) Following his return to the United States, Strauss outlined his thoughts on U.S. objectives for the new working groups, welcoming advice and suggestions from Atherton and Viets, in telegram 179349 to Tel Aviv, July 12. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 7–8/79) Leonard responded in telegram 15094 from Tel Aviv, July 13, and Atherton in telegram 14255 from Cairo, July 14. (Ibid.)

Jordan and Saudi Arabia to hear the views of the leaders of those countries and become better acquainted personally.³

3. You may say that in talks with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin⁴ prior to the July 5–6 Alexandria session Ambassador Strauss was assured of the determination of both leaders to carry out the provisions of the Camp David Framework, and the joint letter of March 26, 1979, calling for the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy for the inhabitants. Suggest you give host government the text of the joint statement issued at the close of the July 5–6 meeting (which we are sending you by septel)⁵ and make following points:

—We are pleased over the outcome of this session and believe important progress was made.

—The decision to create working groups on election modalities and powers and responsibilities in effect establishes an agenda for the negotiations. These two working groups, and others which may be created subsequently, will provide a practical forum in which to give practical expression to broad principles and to define the full autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza which the parties agreed upon last fall at Camp David. While we do not expect working groups themselves to resolve all major substantive problems, they are essential for preparing the ground for their resolution at the Ministerial level.

—The presence and the efforts of Ambassador Strauss played an important role in giving impetus to the talks and helping the delegations reach agreement. Ambassador Strauss' vigorous and successful intervention in his first appearance in the negotiations demonstrates the determination and the ability of the United States to assure progress in negotiations.

—We are pleased also over the positive atmosphere that prevailed in the July 5–6 Alexandria session. Israelis and Egyptians showed an understanding of each other's problems and both demonstrated a sincere desire to move forward.

³ No memoranda of conversation or summary telegrams of Strauss's July 7 meetings in Amman and Riyadh with the leaders of Jordan and Saudi Arabia have been found.

⁴ For Strauss's meeting with Begin, see Document 264. Following this, Strauss travelled to Egypt, where he met with Sadat at Ma'amura on July 3. No memorandum of conversation or summary telegram of this meeting has been found, though the Consulate General conveyed the transcript of the statements made by both Sadat and Strauss following the meeting in telegram 562 from Alexandria, July 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790303–1094)

⁵ The Consulate General transmitted the text of the joint statement establishing the working groups for the autonomy talks in telegram 582 from Alexandria, July 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307–0174)

—We want to caution however that the parties have not yet gotten to the resolution of substantive issues. Many very difficult problems lie ahead and resolving them will be arduous. But this latest session shows that headway can be made. Their purpose in the working groups over the next few weeks will be to get the full range of issues on the table so decisions can be shaped on how to deal with them.

4. In Amman Ambassador Strauss met with King Hussein and in Riyadh with Crown Prince Fahd and heard their views on the negotiations. While neither had significantly new elements to add to past positions, there were very useful meetings. Ambassador Strauss advised King Hussein and Crown Prince Fahd of US confidence that the peace efforts would produce positive results for the Palestinians, of the US commitment to stick with the process over the long term, and of the encouragement that we have received from nations outside the Middle East. Both showed great interest and were pleased when Ambassador Strauss offered to return periodically to keep them informed of progress in the negotiations.

Vance

266. Letter From Israeli Prime Minister Begin to President Carter¹

Jerusalem, July 16, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

My two days² in Alexandria were good days. Wherever I went the people received me with great warmth.

President Sadat and I had two talks in complete privacy.³ During our first meeting we discussed several practical issues as follows:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 1/79–2/80. No classification marking.

² July 10 and 11.

³ During his meeting with Atherton in Alexandria on July 14, Sadat assessed the Alexandria Summit. Atherton reported, "Sadat is clearly pleased with himself and with the talks with Begin and, as he said in the end, that everything is going in the right direction." Sadat "reassured Begin that it is his intention to 'fortify' their bilateral treaty, not linking its implementation to any other developments. At the same time, Sadat said he had stressed to Begin that the time had come for them to make a 'big catch' and come to an agreement on final arrangements for Jerusalem. His vision, he said, was to reach agreement by the end of this year on full autonomy plus Jerusalem, then implementation could start with Gaza and Jerusalem. This would win support of the Muslim world and isolate

I addressed myself first to the open borders. I cited the disparity between the number of visa applications submitted and approved; more than 200 Israeli citizens have applied for visas to visit Egypt but 20 only were granted. President Sadat said he was not aware of this and he told me he would instruct the appropriate authorities to enable all applicants to travel to Egypt. The same will apply on our part to Egyptian citizens wishing to visit Israel. I spoke, in this connection, of an immediate humanitarian problem regarding members of the Jewish community. During synagogue services on the day of my arrival individuals approached me and expressed the wish, sometimes with great emotion, to visit relatives in Israel whom they had not seen in almost two generations. President Sadat assured me that all would be allowed to pay such visits. Indeed, the first family flew into Israel from Alexandria on our press plane.

A second matter that came up for discussion was the oil question. This has been positively agreed upon. On November 26 we shall transfer the oil wells along the Suez Gulf to Egypt. On the following day Israeli tankers will take their oil cargo from those wells to Eilat. We shall pay the market price as determined in the annex⁴ to the letter you addressed to me, Mr. President, following the signing of the peace treaty.

I raised with President Sadat the proposition of renewing the direct railway link between Egypt and Israel as it had existed until 1948. The President received the idea positively, both for the transport of passengers and goods. We will, in due course, invite a delegation of experts representing a railway construction consortium to do a survey in our two countries.

President Sadat and I spent time reviewing the situation in the region and we were in full agreement as to the nature of the Soviet designs in the Middle East and elsewhere.

During the second meeting on the following day it was President Sadat who opened the conversation addressing himself to the main issues concerning our mutual relations and other highly important matters. Our exchange, as before, was conducted in warm amity.

The President spoke about the future of Judea and Samaria (in his language, the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip. He said that the idea of full autonomy was seen by him as a positive one. He wished to make a suggestion about what will occur after the transitional period of five years. He proposed that following the five year transitional period a

the Arab rejectionists." (Telegram 611 from Alexandria, July 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–2413)

⁴ See Document 235.

Palestinian state be formed with an undefined link with Jordan. Understanding, so he said, Israel's security problem he thought this could be solved by demilitarization.

I put it to him that demilitarization is feasible and proper in the context of the Sinai desert as we had agreed. I added: "Besides the fact that we trust you there is an objective factor. In a desert demilitarization is verifiable. In a populated area it is a hoax. One can keep a katyusha in every garage and in every home."

On the matter of autonomy, President Sadat said that we may start with the Gaza Strip. When asked whether he meant that we begin with an agreement in relation to the Gaza Strip he made it clear that the agreement should be general and include, in his formulation, the West Bank. But, he explained, the introduction of the autonomy for the inhabitants could begin with the Gaza District first.

President Sadat turned to the matter of the settlements. He had mentioned the issue the previous day using the expression: "it creates difficulties" and "it is intimidating". Now he added that he had told Dr. Burg when they met a few weeks ago: "Even if you have the right to build settlements it shouldn't be done during the negotiations." I recalled my letter⁵ to you, Mr. President, on this issue, whose contents were confirmed by the Secretary of State a number of weeks ago. About Jerusalem he said: the city will not be divided. Part of the city where the Moslem and Christian holy shrines are located will be under "Arab sovereignty with a flag". (He did not say what flag). The "Wailing" (Western) Wall will be excluded. The city will be run by a common council.

In the course of our second talk President Sadat again mentioned an idea which he had first raised with me in private during our El Arish meeting,⁶ namely the construction of a water pipeline from the Nile to the Negev. He then went on to ask for an early return of Santa Katharina to Egyptian sovereignty. His wish is that this occur a day before November 18, the eve of the second anniversary of his visit to Jerusalem. Perhaps I will be able to give President Sadat a response during his forthcoming visit to Haifa.

In replying to President Sadat's presentation I said that a Palestinian state would be a mortal danger to Israel. It would inevitably be a PLO state, bringing with it permanent bloodshed. Furthermore, it would be a peril to the free world turning in no time to a Soviet base, menacing thereby Egypt itself.

⁵ See Document 253.

⁶ May 25.

I stressed that we have ahead of us, in fact, over six years during which time the problem of sovereignty is left open. At the end of that transition period we shall claim our right (as I have made clear time and again). But, I added, also under Israeli sovereignty the Palestinian Arabs should continue to enjoy autonomy in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

With reference to Jerusalem I said to President Sadat that we must distinguish between any matter which carries with it material gain and those questions which relate to spiritual, historic and moral values. Therefore, I added, let us speak separately of a proposed water pipeline from the Nile to the Negev and the question of Jerusalem. President Sadat interjected saying: "I did not mean the water pipeline as a prize. I only made this suggestion because it is important." I willingly acknowledged this remark. I read to him my letter to you, Mr. President, written in Camp David, on Jerusalem.⁷ I also read to President Sadat the two articles of the Israeli law concerning the Holy Places which I hereby attach.⁸

President Sadat spoke about Lebanon. He said he cannot agree to any kind of partition of Lebanon, referring specifically to the southern part of the country. He informed me that he was going to say this at the joint press conference we were about to hold. I told him that I agree unequivocally that the territorial integrity of Lebanon should be preserved. Israel has a grave problem of security there and what we do is a matter of the defence of our people against repeated planned attacks.

President Sadat said that he will, as he put it, "condemn the settlements" at the press conference. I asked him to state that on this issue "we differ". This was, indeed, the term he used in his statement to the press and I, on my part, confirmed that on this issue "we agreed to differ".

One of the most important statements President Sadat made to me was that we must continue the normalization process, that there will be "love between Egypt and Israel", and that the peace between our countries will endure. We agreed that our colleagues should continue with the negotiations in the working groups which Ambassador Strauss helped, with his initiative, to form.

Finally, we wound up our conversation with my extending to the President an invitation to visit Haifa. He told me he would come by sea

⁷ Reference is to Begin's September 17, 1978, letter to Carter, which was attached to the Camp David Accords, informing him of Jerusalem's legal status as "one city indivisible" and the "Capital of the State of Israel," in line with the Knesset's June 28, 1967, passage of a law empowering the Israeli Government to apply the law of the State of Israel to any part of Eretz Israel. See Document 51.

⁸ The two articles were not found attached.

after Ramadan and that this would probably mean at the end of August. Haifa, I know, will accord the President of Egypt an enthusiastic reception.

I thank you, Mr. President for your attention.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

Menachem Begin⁹

⁹ Begin signed “M Begin” above this typed signature.

267. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 17, 1979

SUBJECT

UN Resolution on Settlements (U)

This week, the UN Security Council will vote on a resolution derived from the report of the Three-nation Commission on Settlements.² The first draft (with State’s technical suggestions) is at Tab I.³ (U)

The issue: Should we vote for a “good” resolution (close to the draft) and incur the wrath of the Israelis (and possibly sidetrack the process of questioning the settlements in Israel)? Or should we *abstain*, while making a strong speech on settlements, thus minimizing the political damage? (There is agreement that we stand to gain little from the Arabs

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 23, United Nations (UN), 1–7/79. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.” Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “RG Fri. breakfast issue. ZB.”

² The United Nations Security Council Commission, established by Resolution 446 on March 22 and charged with examining the situation relating to Israeli settlements in Arab territories, including Jerusalem, occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, released the report on July 12. The report recommended that the Security Council launch a “pressing appeal” to the Israeli Government “re-emphasizing the disastrous consequences which the settlement policy was bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East” and to call upon the Israelis to “cease establishing and planning settlements in the occupied territories.” (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 387–388)

³ Attached but not printed.

on this vote.) Of course, if the draft resolution is amended by the Arabs to be totally unacceptable, we should consider vetoing it. (S)

Strauss, Saunders, and I met on this today. Strauss' recommendation (which he discussed and agreed with Vance) is as follows:

1) We should trail, not lead, on this issue;

2) Strauss will find an occasion to discuss "options" with Evron, and will "complain" that Israel's settlements policy has led to the difficulties posed by this resolution, thus complicating Strauss' job;

3) If the resolution is "good", we should probably vote for it, or perhaps abstain. In either case, our man at the UN should make a statement giving the *opposite* spin;

4) If we are forced to veto, Strauss would send messages to Hussein and Fahd explaining that their Arab colleagues made this necessary;

5) We should hope that the draft is awful. (S)

One consideration in this scenario, of course, is the likelihood that the President would support our voting "yes." (Otherwise, the generally preferred course of action would be to abstain—without being pushed—and gain credit with the Israelis on an issue that has little "plus" side.) (S)

Ed Sanders has urged abstention, with a strong anti-settlements statement (Tab II).⁴ (S)

If you concur with the scenario (above), no further decisions are required until we see the outcome of consultations at the UN. (U)

⁴ Sanders's July 17 memorandum to Newsom is attached but not printed.

268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown and Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Egypt

You asked² about the possibilities for enhanced military assistance for Egypt. We conclude that it is important for the United States to move beyond the immediate program of assistance agreed during the Treaty negotiations.

As you know, during Mubarak's June visit we undertook to develop³ a longer term (five year) military assistance plan with Egypt. We are now preparing for the first round of talks in Cairo on this plan,⁴ with the aim of completing the plan by October 1st. In the planning process we will be reviewing Egypt's force structure and missions as well as equipment requirements. It will be our aim to encourage Egypt to make reductions in its force structure and to limit equipment requirements to those needed for replacement and modernization of obsolete or unsupportable Soviet equipment. We will severely discourage force expansion.

Moreover, wherever possible, we will encourage Egypt to make the most of the Soviet equipment it has now, and will offer technical assistance for this purpose.⁵ We are looking at ways to help Egypt's de-

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0205, Egypt 1979 Jan-July. Secret. A typewritten notation in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "orig[inal] hand carried to the WH by S."

² See Document 256.

³ See footnote 4, Document 254.

⁴ A delegation led by McGiffert began four days of talks on the Egyptian supply relationship on August 11. McGiffert met with Sadat, Mubarak, and Ali in Alexandria, August 11, for a discussion of regional security concerns, a meeting Sadat described as "the start of a real cooperation between Egypt and the U.S. based on a mutual understanding and a mutual strategy." (Telegram 16352 from OMC/Cairo, August 13; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables) McGiffert had an earlier meeting on August 11 with Mubarak and Ali. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid*. The delegation's technical discussions with Egyptian military officials which culminated in the Egyptian presentation of an equipment "priority" list (estimated at \$10-12 billion) is summarized in telegram 16584 from Cairo, August 15. (*Ibid*.)

⁵ In response to a June 22 request from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a July 29 research memorandum evaluating the Egyptian military's need for maintenance on its Soviet-supplied weapons systems. The memorandum concluded that the economic sanctions imposed by the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, "will seriously delay Egypt's plans to reequip its armed forces with new weapons and will force Cairo to seek still more Western help to repair or retrofit existing Soviet equipment. Al-

fense industries adapt and maintain, and otherwise keep operating Soviet equipment now in the Egyptian inventory. A DOD team has already visited Egypt for this purpose. We expect to have specific proposals by October 1st.

Nevertheless, some new equipment will be a continuing requirement, and we should be prepared to continue our financial and material help. In this regard we will be considering further FMS credits at about the \$500 million per year level, beginning with the FY 1982 budget. This is the financial guide we propose to use in our long-term planning for Egypt. Such an approach would begin a program of regular military funding aid for Egypt outside the peace package. This aid would be similar, to but less than, the annual aid to Israel.

We may have a problem with the public and Congress regarding an enhanced program. If we should propose to provide \$500 million a year in further FMS credits beginning in FY 82, critics may argue that our one-time package was authorized for the period through FY 82. In addition, Israel might argue that our total economic and military assistance programs for Egypt would be approaching parity with Israel's and, therefore, might seek new increments for itself. We believe these are manageable problems.

We have also considered the terms on which FMS credits are offered. At present we have agreed to finance military purchases over a 30 year period, with an initial ten year grace period on principal, but we believe that debt service will be a growing problem, depending on how quickly, if at all, the economy prospers. It is preferable that military equipment be given second priority after Egypt's economic development needs.

So far as equipment releases are concerned, Egyptian requests for modern tanks, antitank helicopters, and advanced fighter aircraft could run into regional balance or arms control problems on the Hill. While our sale of such articles to Egypt may not be advisable now, we may have to consider them in the longer term. The Egyptians would see any joint planning which omits such equipment as a serious indication that the U.S. will not support Egyptian force modernization. The consultations we plan will give us an opportunity to channel Egyptian desires in directions we can politically manage.

Our longer-term planning will take place within our previously stated policy that the U.S. is prepared to provide a substantial amount

though such assistance could enable the Egyptians to prolong the useful life of such equipment beyond previously scheduled retirement dates, such measures will do little to reduce Egypt's growing arms imbalance with not only Israel but also with Syria, Iraq, and Libya." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 81T00031R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 64, Response to State's Request for Information on Western Retrofitting of Soviet Military Equipment in Egypt)

of Egypt's military equipment needs, but not all. Egypt should be encouraged to develop perhaps smaller but nevertheless significant supply programs with Europeans and others to complement our own activities.

In carrying out this policy, we need to begin conditioning both Congress and the public to the fact that Egypt has legitimate defense requirements in addition to needs for support in its economic development program and that both of these aspects of our effort serve U.S. national interests and are closely intertwined.

In our judgment, U.S.-Egyptian defense relationships are developing in productive ways, although the supply of equipment is naturally not as extensive, as inexpensive, or as fast as Egypt desires.

—We will deliver before October 6 the first of the F-4 aircraft, plus other equipment and, if Egypt makes a firm decision, a Gearing Class destroyer. These first deliveries are a high priority for Sadat and we have made every effort to make them available in time for this politically important date.

—We are exchanging a number of expert military teams on Egypt's high priority items, such as air defense.

—We have defined with Egypt the equipment priorities and delivery schedules for the full \$1.5 billion already agreed.

—We are starting work on the longer term plan decided above. While this will not initially provide commitments for financing and delivery, it will continue the military dialogue and help to cement defense relationships between our two countries.

In addition we earlier promised Sadat and Kamal Ali that we would welcome the opportunity for close defense consultations. To that end we would expect to have annual meetings at the Defense Minister level and periodic staff consultations during the year.

We believe we are well started on the road to enhanced defense relationships with Egypt. We will have to consult closely with Congressional leaders as we go along.

Cyrus Vance

Harold Brown

269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, July 21, 1979, 2212Z

189710. Subject: President's Response to Sadat: SALT II and Tokyo and Alexandria Summits. Refs: A. State 183955,² B. Alexandria 0611³

(S)-entire text

[Omitted here is the text of Sadat's June 30 message to Carter, congratulating him on the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna.]

2. Please transmit⁴ the following response from the President to President Sadat. No signed original letter will follow:

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

—I appreciate the very full report you gave Roy Atherton on your meeting last week with Prime Minister Begin. This can prove to be an important moment in the history of the Middle East, as you and the Prime Minister create the basis for constructive achievements this year and next.

—The Alexandria Summit has encouraged me in my belief that the peace process can and will move forward, further testifying to the courage and wisdom of your decision to go to Jerusalem only a year and a half ago.⁵ As you continue your work towards the goal of a permanent peace in the Middle East, both you and Prime Minister Begin will continue to have my strong support. Bob Strauss, with whom I have shared Roy Atherton's report, also stands ready to help in any way he can.

—Mr. President, during my recent visit to Japan I raised with Prime Minister Ohira—as I had during his visit to Washington in May⁶—the subject of economic assistance to Egypt. The Prime Minister

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 11, Egypt: 7/79. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² In telegram 183955 to Cairo, July 16, Strauss provided Atherton with responses to questions raised with Strauss by Sayeh regarding the Tokyo Summit, Carter's discussions with Japanese Prime Minister Ohira regarding Japanese economic aid for Egypt, and the status of Kuwait's economic relations with Egypt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1471)

³ See footnote 3, Document 266.

⁴ On July 23, Atherton delivered Carter's letter to Mubarak to convey to Sadat. (Telegram 14819 from Cairo, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790340–0259)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁶ Carter was in Japan June 24–29 for a state visit and the Economic Summit meeting. Ohira visited the United States April 30–May 4.

reaffirmed his government's commitment to continuing support of your development program, but said this position can be sustained only if it is handled with great political sensitivity. We must avoid any suggestion that Japan's decisions on aid to Egypt are in response to U.S. pressure. The Prime Minister should be given latitude to announce Japan's commitments—which I hope will be increased—in his own way and time.

—Finally, I want to thank you for your thoughtful message of congratulations on the signing of the SALT II Agreement.⁷ I deeply value your encouragement.

—This was indeed an historic event. The SALT II Treaty is an important part of the evolving mosaic of a peaceful world order. Because of the destructive power of modern weapons, it is essential that the United States and the Soviet Union overcome the mistrust and tension which have affected our relations for too long. The Treaty limiting strategic arms signed at Vienna represents our continued commitment toward that goal.

—Again, please accept my thanks for your comments on the Alexandria Summit, and my best wishes for your continued success and the welfare of you and the Egyptian people.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency

Anwar al-Sadat

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo

End text.

Vance

⁷ On June 17, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited the total of both nations' nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including MIRVs.

270. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, July 23, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East

The following is some up-dating requested today by Denis Clift:

UNEF. The Soviets informed us last week² that they would definitely veto a renewal of UNEF when it comes up for renewal on July 24.³ They would, however, accept the use of UNTSO, provided it would not be seen as a “replacement.” Waldheim could work out details (and said he would want to about triple it, to around 250–300). No U.S. or Soviet forces would be involved. (C)

This all seemed *pro forma*. Egypt concurred. But the Israeli cabinet on Sunday⁴ rejected UNTSO (too lightly armed; distrust of the UN). The Israelis are confusing the pledge we made for a peacekeeping force for after their withdrawal, and the interim phase. We are pressing the Israelis, but Dayan is holding fast to his line that we must provide some non-UN alternative now—perhaps through U.S.-initiated talks with Israel and Egypt. The Egyptians will also press Israel on UNTSO (they are willing to go ahead with UNTSO on their side of the line). (S)

Settlements. At the UN Friday,⁵ we abstained on a Security Council resolution on the report of the Settlements Commission, but made a strong statement against the policy. The stated reason for abstaining was that refugees and Jerusalem were shoe-horned in. There was also a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 7/79. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information.

² On July 17, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko informed the Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the use of UNTSO observers in the Sinai. (Telegram 18354 from Moscow, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2539) Two days later, an Austrian UN official informed the U.S. Mission to the Sinai of a conversation with a Soviet colleague in which the latter stated the Soviet Union would “certainly veto” a renewal of the UNEF mandate. (Telegram 1450 from the U.S. Mission to the Sinai, July 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790335–0500)

³ On July 24, Waldheim informed the UN Security Council that the UNEF would expire and that he would consult with Egypt and Israel on the use of UNTSO in Sinai. (Memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, July 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 4–7/79)

⁴ July 22.

⁵ July 20.

sense of not being party to yet another useless UN gang-up on Israel—while making our own position clear. Begin had wanted us to veto. (S)

Begin. The latest (unconfirmed) report is that the blood clot in a brain artery has cost him 25% of his vision in one eye, 10% in the other. Strauss and the President have sent messages.⁶ (U)

Palestinians. The UN Security Council is about to consider a resolution on Palestinian rights.⁷ Through the Kuwaitis, we have been told that the PLO is prepared to endorse 242 (our condition for talking with them). This subject will be the centerpiece of a “non-PRC” at 3 p.m. on Wednesday.⁸ Your attending would be of great benefit.⁹ (S)

Lebanon. From June 27 until Sunday, the Israelis had not used aircraft to strike at PLO bases in Lebanon. The Sunday strike¹⁰ was particularly bloody. State has put out a statement of disapproval. There are also growing signs of a possible major Israeli military action in Lebanon, though no hard information. Strauss suggested to Begin that he consider a moratorium. Begin said he would talk about it further when Strauss next goes to Israel. This subject—in broad context—will also be discussed on Wednesday. (S)

Autonomy Talks. Since Strauss’ visit, we have been working with the Egyptians and Israelis on the setting up of the two working groups (modalities of elections, and powers and responsibilities of the Self-Governing Authority). Each will have two members (Jim Leonard will be on both for us). Some Israeli members of the full talks wanted to attend, but we and the Egyptians have wanted to put the level down a notch, to give the groups a chance to work. We hope they can get to

⁶ The Department transmitted Carter’s message conveying wishes for Begin’s “quick recovery” following his hospitalization in telegram 189702 to Tel Aviv, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790333–0166) Vance sent a similar message on July 20. (Telegram 188605 to Tel Aviv, July 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790331–0456) The text of Strauss’s message has not been found.

⁷ The draft resolution was developed in response to letters produced on March 13 and June 27 for the Security Council from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People stating the centrality of the “question of Palestine” to the “problem” of the Middle East and the need for any solution to that problem to take into account the rights of Palestinians, the “full exercise” of which would “contribute to a solution.” Moreover, the Chairman reported, the participation of the PLO was “indispensable to all negotiations undertaken under United Nations auspices” and the “acquisition of territory by force was inadmissible and Israel must withdraw from any territory so occupied.” (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, p. 364)

⁸ See Document 271.

⁹ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹⁰ On July 22, Israeli aircraft struck targets in Naimah, Damour, Sarafand, and other locations in Lebanon, resulting in numerous civilian casualties according to press estimates. (Telegram 4070 from Beirut, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790335–0988)

work this week, and we have some ideas on structure to put forward at the appropriate moment. (C)

Alexandria Summit. Begin and Sadat seemed to get along during their three-day (three-hour) summit¹¹ (Strauss helped prepare the ground by relaying the positive comments each made to him about the other). They kept off really sensitive subjects, and agreed to disagree on settlements and on Lebanon. They agreed that Israel could begin buying Sinai oil the day after the field is returned; that they would see about reopening the Egypt-Israel railroad (there are some indications of Canadian backing); and there would be better processing of applications by Egyptian Jews to visit Israel. Not much; but the atmospherics were good, and the “routine” nature of meetings was established (the next to be in Haifa right after Ramadan). Remarkably, the Begin and Sadat reports to the President were almost identical. (C)

Strauss. He currently plans to go back to the area at the end of August, immediately after Sadat’s yacht trip to Haifa (after Ramadan). At the same time, he will in general seek to keep from being sucked into the day-to-day haggling at the Autonomy Talks. (C)

¹¹ For Begin’s and Sadat’s respective reports on the Alexandria Summit, see Document 266 and footnote 3 thereto.

271. Summary of Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting¹

Washington, July 25, 1979, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Cyrus Vance (Chairman)

Secretary

Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs

OSD

Harold Brown

Secretary

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Personal Representative of the President

Ambassador Robert Strauss

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

NSC

Robert Hunter

1. *Palestinian Resolution.* The meeting discussed the forthcoming UN Security Council debate on a resolution on Palestinian rights,² in the context of which we are informed that the PLO will issue a statement accepting UNSC Resolution 242, in exchange for (as a minimum) recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. (S)

It was agreed that the United States should take the lead on this issue in order to seek an outcome that will preserve the primacy of the Autonomy Talks, demonstrate our good intentions to the Palestinians (and others, like the Saudis), while minimizing the political risks with the Israelis. To this end:

—there could be a major speech, perhaps by Secretary Vance, deplo-
ring the continuing cycle of violence in the Middle East, stressing

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—5/79–8/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The summary was found attached to an unsigned July 27 covering memorandum from Gates to Raphael, stating that Carter approved the summary and that the check marks in the margins were the President's.

² See footnote 7, Document 270. At U.S. request, the interested delegations, including the PLO, agreed on July 30 to defer the continuation of the Security Council debate on the resolution until August 23. (Telegram 3181 from USUN, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0689)

the importance of the peace process, indicating our desire to see the Palestinians directly involved, recognizing indications of a PLO willingness to accept 242, restating our conditions for dealing with them, and indicating our constructive approach to the UN debate; and³

—at the UN, we would introduce a short, clean resolution of our own, drawn (in exact words, if possible) from 242 and 338, the Camp David Framework, and the Aswan Formula⁴ (which indicates the deficiencies of 242 in only mentioning refugees). It would also indicate the primacy of the autonomy negotiations.⁵ (S)

Initially, we should seek to postpone the UN debate until the middle of August, while making known to the PLO the value of inhibiting terrorism as part of this process; and we should indicate in the UN process our good will in taking this approach, but also the need for the resolution not to be taken beyond it.⁶ (S)

2. *Lebanon.* The meeting discussed the immediate need to deal with notification of Congress on Israeli use of U.S. equipment in Lebanon. It was agreed that Secretary Vance would use the occasion of a complaining letter from Congressman Findley⁷ to write to Chairmen Zablocki and Church, saying that a violation “may have occurred,” leaving any action (not anticipated) up to Congress. There would be no threat to reduce military aid, since this would be ineffective.⁸ (S)

At the same time, the State Department would proceed with a series of modest steps with each of the parties (along the lines of Tab 1)⁹ designed to defuse the situation as much as possible, while recognizing that changing the basic situation at this time is unlikely. In addition, Ambassador Strauss should pursue the idea of a moratorium on Israeli military action with Prime Minister Begin, pursuant to their earlier discussion and exchange of letters.¹⁰ (S)

The meeting discussed a forthcoming open letter to you from President Sarkis,¹¹ attacking Israeli actions. It was agreed that a rapid

³ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 3.

⁵ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

⁶ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

⁷ Representative Paul Findley (R-Illinois).

⁸ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

⁹ Attached but not printed. The document lists a series of “practical steps” that could be taken with the Israelis and Haddad, the United Nations, the Syrians, the Lebanese Government, and the contributors to UNIFIL to address the current situation in Lebanon.

¹⁰ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

¹¹ In a July 23 meeting with Dean, Sarkis stated that in light of the Israeli air attacks on Lebanese territory the day before he had decided to send an official letter regarding the situation to Carter “in the next few days.” (Telegram 4116 from Beirut, July 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2467)

reply¹² to his earlier letter¹³ to you should be dispatched, outlining in general terms the approach to Congress and some of the other steps referred to above.¹⁴ (S)

It was agreed that thought should be given to a meeting between you and President Sarkis next spring, perhaps in the context of an informal visit by him to the United States arranged by the Council on Foreign Relations.¹⁵ (C)

3. UNTSO. Secretary Vance reported that he will respond¹⁶ to Dayan's suggestion of a tripartite meeting by inviting him and an Egyptian representative to meet with us and Waldheim (or a representative) to discuss the future of UNTSO.¹⁷ (C)

¹² See Document 272.

¹³ On July 4, following the June 27 Israeli-Syrian air engagement, Sarkis sent a handwritten letter to Carter, warning that if "such confrontations are repeated, they will constitute without doubt a dangerous escalation with incalculable consequences for the peace of Lebanon, for the entire region, and perhaps for the world." Sarkis condemned the "declared policy of the Israeli Government" and the "utilization by it of American arms for offensive purposes against Lebanon, her territory and her citizens" which are a "challenge to the principles of law and morality, as well as a violation of the commitments made by Israel to the American administration." (Telegram 3738 from Beirut, July 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2461)

¹⁴ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

¹⁵ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

¹⁶ Telegram 196867 to Cairo, July 29, states that Dayan would present to the Israeli Cabinet Vance's invitation for him to come to Washington to discuss post-UNEF arrangements in Sinai. The Department instructed Atherton to approach the Egyptians in order to invite them to send an official of a level comparable to Foreign Minister to Washington for the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1449)

¹⁷ Carter placed a check mark in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon and the White House¹

Washington, July 26, 1979, 1443Z

193868. Special encryption for Ambassador Dean. Subject: Message to President Sarkis From President Carter.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 117, 7/19–31/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Draper; cleared by Brzezinski, Saunders, Tarnoff, and William Rope (S/S–O); approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1591)

(C) Entire text

1. Please deliver² as soon as possible the following message from President Carter to President Sarkis in response to the latter's handwritten letter to President Carter of July 4.³ (There will not be a signed original to deliver.)

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply touched by your confidential and handwritten letter to me on July 4. I appreciate fully the friendship and concern which led you to write to me with such candor.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that I have been deeply troubled by the many tragedies which have befallen your country and your people, including the bombing attacks last Sunday afternoon.⁴ I grieve over the terrible toll in innocent human lives, and the suffering imposed on your nation. Like you, I am also very much concerned over the risk of further confrontations in the air between Israeli and Syrian aircraft, and about the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon. I agree with you that these dangerous trends must be reversed, and that the integrity of Lebanon must be restored and respected.

Mr. President, as I work to help bring about a permanent and comprehensive peace throughout the Middle East, the special tragedy of Lebanon is very much on my mind. I believe it is imperative to build upon the foundation that was laid at Camp David and which has continued with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. In the coming months, I will redouble my efforts to see that effort through to a successful conclusion. It is in that context that I foresee the best chance also for bringing an end to strife and bloodshed in Lebanon, and for making possible the reestablishment of your government's authority over your entire country.

While the best hope for a final end to conflict in Lebanon may lie in the success of efforts to build a broader peace, so too these efforts themselves depend upon doing whatever is possible to reduce the spillover of conflict into your country. Since I received your letter, I have given new thought about the best means for achieving this vital goal. As a result, we will again approach Israel to stress the human suffering, the dangers of wider conflict, and the risks to the peace process posed by its continuing military actions. We will again do what we can to gain its restraint. At the same time, we will work even more intensely with the

² Dean delivered Carter's letter to Sarkis while attending a dinner at Baadba Palace the evening of July 27 (Telegram 4215 from Beirut, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2476)

³ See footnote 13, Document 271.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 270.

United Nations and the governments contributing troops to UNIFIL, as well as with Saudi Arabia and Syria. We will also be consulting with the Congress about the best course of action to take. Meanwhile, it will be important for us to persuade other quarters which contribute to the provocations and the cycles of violence to exercise restraint, and to cease terrorism.

Mr. President, all of these steps will take time and hard work; but I am committed to doing what I can to hasten the day when Lebanon will no longer be threatened by strife and conflict, and when you will be able to devote your energies solely to rebuilding your country and advancing the lives of your people.

I want to keep in touch with you, Mr. President, on these issues of great concern to us both. My heart will be with you as you shoulder your heavy responsibilities.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

3. For Ambassador Dean: Since you have to carry the message personally to President Sarkis, we believe you should either try to deliver it Thursday, July 26, or telephone Sarkis as far in advance as possible of your planned meeting-dinner with him on Friday, July 27, to say that you have a response from President Carter, explain that, under the circumstances, it would be better for us if we did not have to deal with an "open letter."⁵ Say to Sarkis that we very much understand and appreciate the domestic political problems he is facing, and the need to be seen as doing something about the problems Lebanon faces. In this connection, you might note that the U.S. made a strong statement condemning Israeli air raids and has taken a firm stand—publicly and privately—against the recent series of Israeli ground incursions into UNIFIL's areas of operation. Ambassador Tueini has also registered a strong message of protest over Israeli actions in the Security Council.

4. FYI. While we do not yet have report, we understand from secure voice telephone call with Tel Aviv that there may have been a useful exchange Wednesday, between Viets and Weizman on Lebanese

⁵ Dean met with Sarkis on the morning of July 27 and attempted to persuade him not to send a second letter to Carter. Sarkis replied that "too much publicity had already been given to the planned letter not to send it," but assured Dean that the text would not be made public. Dean reported: "Sarkis agreed that whatever he had to say had already been set forth in his July 4 letter. He reiterated that he was merely responding to local political pressure." Dean concluded that this second letter would likely receive a "courteous acknowledgement" and would "close the present exchange." (Telegram 4189 from Beirut, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2474) Telegram 4216 from Beirut, July 30, conveyed the text of Sarkis's second letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2477) The Department conveyed Carter's short reply, acknowledging Sarkis's concerns, in telegram 207377 to Beirut, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1595.

situation.⁶ You may be able to draw on that exchange, we hope, to persuade Sarkis that we are really working hard, but wait for our review of Viet's report. End FYI.

Vance

⁶ In a July 25 meeting with Viets, Weizman "indicated he would seriously consider" a moratorium on Israeli air attacks in Lebanon and "probed possibility of speaking directly to Lebanese leadership." (Telegram 16046 from Tel Aviv, July 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790351-0310)

273. Presidential Determination No. 79-13¹

Washington, August 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Presidential Determination under Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act—
Egypt

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act,² as amended, I hereby determine that the financing under the Arms Export Control Act of the sale of F-4 aircraft and as-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: 8/79-5/80. No classification marking. The attached Justification for the Presidential Determination, states, "Only the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in its broadest context can assure stability in the Middle East. Until there is stability in the region at large, the concerns of Arabs and Israelis for their security, independence, and territorial integrity cannot be completely allayed. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is to be the cornerstone of peace between Israel and all its neighbors. Egypt is leading the way toward the comprehensive peace that the Middle East so badly needs. Consequently, it is in the U.S. national interest to assist Egypt in meeting its legitimate security requirements, thereby bolstering Egypt's resolve to continue to seek a permanent peace. The Egyptian Armed Forces are beginning a modernization program by replacing their Soviet-made equipment. The FMS financing will support some of the highest priority items in the Egyptian multi-year modernization program, and is in accord with the findings of Department of Defense fact-finding teams that have visited Egypt this year." (Ibid.)

² In his July 14 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act: it "prohibits the use of funds appropriated under the Act in order 'to guarantee, or extend credit, or participate in an extension of credit' in connection with the purchase by an underdeveloped country of sophisticated weapons systems, unless the President determines that such financing is important to the national security of the United States, and so reports to the Congress." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: 8/79-5/80)

sociated air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, the Improved-Hawk surface-to-air missile system, and TOW antitank missiles to Egypt is important to the national security of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Congress, as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

Jimmy Carter

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, August 6, 1979, 1154Z

16882. Subject: (S) The U.S.-Israel Relationship and U.S. Support for the UNSC Resolution on Palestinian Rights: The Price. Ref: USUN 3187² and previous.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: As the proposed UNSC Resolution on Palestinian Rights comes to the top of the agenda, Israeli suspicion and anxiety over U.S. Middle East policy and goals—ever-present beneath the surface of our bilateral relationship with Israel—is building towards a climax. We recognize that a broad range of U.S. national interests will be considered and weighed by Washington³ in its deliberations on this resolution and we are not recommending a vote for or against. How-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840090-2491. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 3187 from USUN, July 31, conveyed the current version of the Arab draft of the resolution on Palestinian rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790349-0177)

³ In an undated briefing memorandum to Vance and Strauss, produced shortly after the Israeli Cabinet's August 5 statement rejecting the Palestinian rights resolution, Saunders analyzed whether the United States could seek a further delay in the planned August 23–24 resumption of the UN Security Council debate on the resolution. Among the considerations for U.S. policymakers, Saunders posed, was the "high state of tension" in U.S.-Israeli relations, the upcoming meeting between Sadat and Begin in Haifa, prospects for progress in the autonomy talks, and continued U.S. "credibility on the Palestinian issue." Saunders included an alternate draft resolution attached to the briefing "that would produce a more positive attitude among Palestinian and other Arabs toward the negotiations while remaining consistent with our past commitments." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 75, Palestinians: 8/79-12/80)

ever, we do want to alert the Department to the impact on this society and on U.S.-Israeli relations of the various options we may select.

—As long as we do not give the GOI assurances that we will veto a Palestinian rights resolution, as Israelis insist we are committed to doing, the GOI will accuse us of being prepared to violate our solemn commitments as it becomes, in an ironic and cynical exchange of roles, the defender of the sanctity of Resolution 242.

—Israeli reaction to a U.S. vote for or abstention on any repeat any Palestinian rights resolution will be strident, but so long as the U.S. stopped short of endorsing a Palestinian state explicitly or implicitly, we believe Israel would hold back from the most provocative actions which we expect would follow passage of a “maximal” resolution. However, even in the former instance, the damage to U.S. credibility would still be serious and we should not expect a quick return to business as usual. There is little we can do to soften the blow in Israel should a Palestinian rights resolution be adopted. Although the purpose of the exercise might be to broaden and quicken the peace process by bringing the PLO into it, few Israelis really want negotiations with the PLO under any circumstances. They would not be persuaded that we have enhanced the chances for a comprehensive peace. Our going along with a resolution which would be seen as “amending” 242 by specifying Palestinian rights—whether “national” or “legitimate”—an exercise which we have assiduously avoided until now, would galvanize a vocal national consensus which the GOI, carried along by its most hawkish elements, would manipulate to the hilt. Regardless of the policy we decide to follow, there are steps we should take to reduce Israeli suspicions over the period ahead as we grapple with the Palestinian rights resolution problem. It is in our interest to maintain a dialogue on this question with the Israelis as intensively as possible over the days ahead, in order to achieve the dual purpose of allaying as much as we can Israeli fears that we are up to a double game and pre-empting charges that we are violating our commitment to consult with them. Should we begin negotiations on the text of a draft resolution, we should provide drafts to the Israelis on a timely basis and brief them in as much detail as practical on the signals we are receiving and on the American position as it emerges. Such steps, however, will not prevent the storm of vituperation, possibly backed by provocative actions destructive of the peace process, which our support of a Palestinian rights resolution—or even lingering suspicion as to our intentions between now and August 24—would bring on. End summary.

3. Israeli suspicion and anxiety over U.S. Middle East policy and goals—ever-present beneath the surface of our bilateral relationship with Israel—has been mounting steadily in the wake of the UNEF/

UNTOSO flap,⁴ a more activist U.S. role in the autonomy negotiation, and new proposed U.S. arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Against this background, U.S. involvement in the postponement of the UNSC vote on the Palestinian rights resolution and what is seen here as the latest U.S. effort to draw the PLO into the peace process and establish a U.S.–PLO dialogue have set off a wave of emotional questioning of American constancy. The chain reaction has been given momentum by the ominous local interpretation of President Carter's August 1 comments⁵ to the *New York Times* on the plight of the Palestinians ("Carter Equates PLO, U.S. Civil Rights Groups", as one Israeli newspaper tentatively headlined its report). Israelis now believe that the U.S. is moving in the direction of supporting or at least acquiescing in a Palestinian rights resolution which will supersede and, to use the Israeli phrase, "empty Resolution 242 of all meaning." Hodding Carter's statement⁶ the same day that the U.S. is willing to "build upon" Resolution

⁴ The Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv* reported comments made by Dayan on July 30 "refuting US allegations that UNTOSO substitution was discussed with the GOI. Dayan said that 'The US had no reason to assume that Israel would agree to the idea of observers.'" On May 30, Dayan continued, "'Begin told an authorized American representative that Israel would agree to the stationing of a multinational force in the event that the Security Council did not approve the continued presence of the existing international emergency force. But beyond this the Prime Minister did not agree to any other idea.'" (Telegram 16275 from Tel Aviv, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346–1183) The following day, Bar-On protested to the Embassy in Tel Aviv an "alleged statement by an unnamed USG official" that Dayan was "making such a fuss over UNTOSO" because he was "envious of Burg's role in the autonomy talks." (Telegram 16467 from Tel Aviv, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348–0020)

⁵ On August 1, *The New York Times* reported that Carter had, in a conversation with a "visitor to the White House" on July 31, "likened" the Palestinian issue to the "civil rights movement here in the United States." The article continued, "If the Israelis permitted Palestinians to come back to the West Bank, Mr. Carter said, they would be satisfied with 'just the right to do it,' but relatively limited numbers scattered throughout the Arab world would want to return to the poverty of that area. On the other side, he believes that the Palestinian Arabs would be willing to accept the physical presence of Israeli military units as a safeguard of their national security. He maintains that a sizable majority of the Israeli people, based on polls he has seen, favor a generous settlement with the Palestinians, based on United Nations Resolution 242, as modified by the Camp David agreements." Lastly, Carter said, "the other Arab states did not want a new Palestinian state that he suggested would be a source of continuing instability and a radical threat even to themselves." (Leonard Silk, "Carter Expects Rise in Joblessness; Believes G.O.P. Will Pick Reagan," *The New York Times*, August 1, 1979, p. A1)

⁶ Reference is to the July 31 daily press briefing. In response to a question whether the United States would not be "rigid" on Resolutions 242 and 338 and "participate in a search for a new formula," Hodding Carter stated, "No. I don't want to say that at all. We believe that the Resolutions are central, are the linchpin to the whole structure that we have participated in creating in the Middle East peace process and that to abandon those two would be a mistake. And I would simply keep the imagery of building blocks and linchpins and suggest to you that you build upon them. You don't remove them. Now, what else might be feasible in the construction of a building large enough to encompass all of the views in the Middle East, that is the question that we are seeking to find an answer to." (Telegram 198880 to multiple posts, July 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0046)

242 only heightened these fears. Coming all at once, these perceptions of sharp turns in U.S. policy generate growing doubts about U.S. willingness to honor its commitments to Israel—as defined by the GOI. Emotion is rising to a crescendo, and only a U.S. pledge to veto the Palestinian resolution in the SC will calm the Israelis.

4. Of all their many concerns, Israelis are perhaps most obsessed by the prospect of an international consensus on a solution to the Palestinian problem sharply diverging from Israeli requirements. Thus, failure of the U.S. to block the passage of a Palestinian rights resolution would result in an Israeli reaction that could have profound consequences for U.S.-Israeli ties and the Middle East peace process. We recognize that a broad range of U.S. interests will be weighed and considered by Washington in its deliberations on this resolution and we are not recommending a vote for or against, acknowledging the limitation imposed on our judgment by our special vantage point. This message is only intended to alert the Department to the impact of the various options we may select on this society and our relations with it.

5. Cabinet dynamics. As we have seen over the past few weeks, Begin's hospitalization has not inhibited—and perhaps has even contributed to—the clashes we have had with the Israelis on a number of issues. The GOI's normal combativeness has been enhanced by the internal maneuvering of various Ministers who have been exploiting Begin's absence in order to expand their influence in key foreign policy/security issues. Unfortunately, the best way to win popularity points in this Cabinet and to a certain extent with the Israeli public is through rigid adherence to "principle" and uncompromising toughness in response to perceived "violations" of commitments. Thus, while any Israeli Government would go all-out to keep the U.S. from embracing a Palestinian rights resolution, many Ministers of this Cabinet are waiting—in some cases eagerly—for confrontations which can be turned to their personal political advantage.

6. The GOI and U.S. commitments on Resolution 242. As long as we do not give the GOI assurances that we will veto a Palestinian rights resolution, as Israelis insist we are committed to doing, the GOI will accuse us of being prepared to violate our solemn commitments as it becomes, in an ironic and cynical exchange of roles, the defender of the sanctity of Resolution 242. Indeed, the press reports Begin's personal advisor, Yehiel Kadishai, as saying that U.S. credibility has already been shattered by its failure to adhere to its commitments. We will be accused specifically of violating our commitment under the 1975 memorandum of understanding⁷ to oppose any attempt in the UNSC to

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 91.

change Res. 242 and 338 in ways “incompatible with their original purpose.” The Israelis would no doubt claim, in addition to their other criticisms of a Palestinians rights resolution, that a new text treating the Palestinian issue as other than a refugee problem would be incompatible with the original purpose of 242—and therefore “changed”—even though the GOI committed itself to a much broader interpretation at Camp David.

7. The GOI and U.S. commitments on the PLO. The Israelis recognize that the immediate purpose of a new Palestinian rights resolution is to clear the way for the initiation of a direct U.S.–PLO dialogue. The GOI would without doubt view PLO acceptance of a Palestinian rights resolution, even if it included within it references to Res. 242 and 338, as insufficient to meet the U.S. commitment under the 1975 memorandum of understanding.⁸ The Israelis would call “foul”, assert that these two Resolutions stand on their own, and reject our acceptance of this “package deal” instead of explicit and unencumbered PLO acceptance of Res. 242 and 338 and Israel’s right to exist.

8. A “maximal” resolution. Israeli reaction to failure of the U.S. to veto any Palestinian rights resolution will be strident, but U.S. acceptance (even by abstention in a SC veto) of a “maximal” resolution (one postulating Palestinian national rights) would probably elicit sharp retaliatory measures and touch off a major crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. There is not a paragraph in either the preambular or operative parts of the present draft text in refTel which does not contain language the Israelis will find unacceptable. The worst in Israeli eyes is, of course, operative para. 1, which “affirms that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national rights of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine.” Even if the explicit reference to a Palestinian state were dropped, any text using such euphemisms as “right to political independence” or even “self-determination” would be totally unacceptable. Failure of the U.S. to veto such a resolution would be considered by the Israelis as an outright violation of our 1975 commitment. It would also be seen as a negation of the Camp David Accords, in that it prejudged the outcome of the autonomy and final-status negotiations, and would be cited as proof of the dishonesty of President Carter’s statement that the U.S. did not favor a Palestinian state.

9. The Cabinet, with or without Begin, would react violently and punitively. It is important to remember that there are those in the Cabinet who are seeking to transform current GOI positions in a number of areas into “red lines.” Within the range of possible Israeli responses are the following kinds of retaliatory actions:

⁸ See footnote 7 above.

- an outright freeze on the autonomy negotiations;
- public announcement of an extreme, “final” Israeli position on autonomy which would torpedo the negotiations;
- a rash of new settlements in sensitive areas;
- measures which would further tighten the Israeli hold on East Jerusalem, such as the transfer there of more GOI offices;
- a law providing for the blanket acquisition of land when needed for settlement in the territories;
- approval of the right of Israelis to purchase land in the territories;
- additional moves toward the annexation of the Golan.

10. We cannot assume that concern over Israel’s relationship with Egypt will necessarily inhibit such GOI moves. Those Cabinet members who would advocate this kind of sharp Israeli riposte believe that Egypt’s own interests dictate continued adherence to the peace process. The issue would be played as U.S. support for a Palestinian state and a threat to Israeli security; it would be argued that any resultant damage in the Egypt-Israel relationship could in any case be contained. For its part, the Labor opposition is unlikely to have a moderating effect on the Israeli reaction. It has already expressed its concern over the new U.S. approach to Res. 242, although it has placed responsibility on the Likud for mishandling the issue, damaging both the U.S.-Israeli relationship and Israel’s political position.

11. A “minimal” resolution. We do not know if a resolution that uses Camp David-style language such as “legitimate rights” or “participation in determination of their own future” and does not posit Palestinian national rights would be acceptable to the Arabs. As far as the Israelis are concerned, such a resolution would not be seen as much better than the maximal language. The initial reaction is likely to be not much different than that to a “maximal” resolution, but as long as the U.S. stopped short of endorsing a Palestinian state explicitly or implicitly, we believe Israel would be inclined to refrain from the most provocative actions. Still, our support of or failure to block even a “minimal” resolution would have a traumatic effect on Israelis and seriously damage U.S. credibility. The wound on the Israeli psyche would be a long time healing.

12. Softening the blow. There is little we can do to soften the blow in Israel should we either endorse or abstain on a Palestinian rights resolution. There is no way we will avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Aside from a few cheers from the ultra-dovish side of the Israeli political spectrum, our bringing the PLO into the peace process will not be seen as a constructive act by the Israeli Government or public. Indeed, it is this eventuality that they most fear. And even if they recognized it

as a silver lining, few Israeli politicians would wish to publicize such perspicacity. Few would be persuaded that we have enhanced the chances for a comprehensive peace. Our going along with a resolution which would be seen as “amending” 242 by specifying Palestinian rights—either “national” or just “legitimate”—would create a vocal national consensus which the GOI, carried along by its most hawkish elements, would manipulate to the hilt.

13. There are steps which we should take to reduce Israeli suspicions over the period ahead as we grapple with a Palestinian rights resolution and the difficult choices involved, regardless of our final decision on U.S. policy.

—It is in our interest to maintain a dialogue⁹ on this question with the Israelis as intensively as possible over the days ahead in order to achieve the dual purpose of allaying as much as possible Israeli fears that we are up to a double game, and pre-empting charges that we are violating our commitments.

—Should we begin negotiations on the text of a Palestinian rights resolution, we should provide drafts to the Israelis on a timely basis and brief them in as much detail as practicable on the signals we are receiving and on the American position as it emerges.

—Such steps, however, will in no way avert the inevitable storm of vituperation, possibly backed by provocative actions destructive of the peace process, which adoption by the Security Council of such a resolution would bring on.

Viets

⁹ On August 8, Carter held a luncheon meeting with Evron. The meeting, Brzezinski wrote in a August 7 memorandum to Carter, was designed to “clear the air” between the United States and Israel. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 5–11/79) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 12:30 to 1:55 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) Although no memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found, Carter’s personal handwritten notes related to it are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.

275. Editorial Note

On August 15, 1979, Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young announced his resignation during a press conference at the Department of State in the wake of revelations that he had met with the

Palestine Liberation Organization's Representative to the United Nations Zehdi Terzi at the residence of Kuwaiti Representative to the United Nations Abdullah Bishara on July 26 in contravention of U.S. policy of avoiding meetings with the organization. (Telegram 213698 to all African Posts, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790379–1221) President Jimmy Carter was informed of Young's actions on August 14 and noted in his personal diary: "I learned that Andy [Young] has gotten himself into serious trouble by meeting with the UN PLO representative. This is understandable because Andy is president of the Security Council, but when interrogated about it by the State Department he told them a lie. Later he told the Israeli ambassador the truth and the Israelis very unwisely made this fact public, although Andy's meeting with the PLO was certainly designed to help the Israeli cause. This is an almost impossible problem to resolve without Andy leaving." The same day, Carter met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, and White House Press Secretary Jody Powell at which Vance stated "in his opinion Andy would have to leave." Carter wrote: "Cy's implication was that the choice was between him and Andy." (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 351) Earlier, on August 13, Department of State Spokesman Thomas Reston publicly denied that Young had had a "business" meeting with Terzi claiming instead that Terzi had "arrived unexpectedly and that Young departed after observing "social amenities." The following day, an official protest from the Israeli Government over the Terzi meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 17487 from Tel Aviv. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2097) Following the protest, and the revelation that Young had given a "more accurate account" to Israeli Representative to the United Nations Yehuda Blum, Vance reprimanded Young for the meeting; a second Department of State statement then acknowledged that Young "knew that Mr. Terzi would probably be there" when he went to Bishara's residence and that while there Young and Terzi "discussed the question of postponing the Security Council vote scheduled for July 31 on the Kuwaiti resolution" on Palestinian rights. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Chides Young for Holding Talks With P.L.O. Official," *The New York Times*, August 1, 1979, page A1) For additional documentation on the Young resignation, and the circumstances leading to the event, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XXV, United Nations; Global Issues.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in the People's Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Beijing, August 16, 1979, 0844Z

5526. Literally Eyes Only for Tarnoff from Maynes for delivery COB. Subject: Statement by Ambassador Young.

1. S-entire text.

2. I do not recall Andy ever using the phrase “official version” as a preface to his account to me of his meeting with Terzi.²

3. During our conversation Andy was initially fuzzy about the circumstances of the meeting. At the beginning of the conversation he made some reference to being “set up.” When I asked him whether Bishara acted in bad faith, he replied that on reflection he did not think so. He mentioned that he was out walking with his boy and decided to drop in on Bishara. On the basis of my conversation with Andy, I concluded that he thought that Bishara might try to set up a meeting with Terzi but that Andy honestly did not know Terzi would be there in part because Andy, not Bishara, according to the account I received decided when he would visit Bishara’s apartment. Moreover, Terzi was not there when he arrived.

4. I specifically asked what was discussed. There was no mention of any discussion with Terzi about postponing the Security Council meeting.³ Andy initially told me that Terzi was largely silent during the meeting. He subsequently mentioned that Terzi when he did speak, denounced our vote on the settlements resolution and contended that the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

² Maynes’s message was produced in response to an August 16 request from Tarnoff, in which the latter asked Maynes to clarify Young’s account of his meeting with Terzi in his resignation press conference. Tarnoff relayed Young’s answer to a member of the press, who questioned Young on his “failure to report accurately to the Department on what you [Young] had done—in effect, lied to the Department—and then went to another government before you leveled with your own government.” Young responded: “All of those things I did deliberately, but I did not lie. I didn’t tell all of the truth. I prefaced my remark: ‘I’m going to give you an official version,’ and I gave an official version which did not in any way lie.” Tarnoff asked Maynes to give his recollection of what Young told him about the Terzi meeting and to clarify Young’s reference to an “official version” of that meeting. (Telegram 213991 to Beijing, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–0117)

³ See Document 275. Earlier on July 26, Young hosted Bishara and Syrian UN representative El-Choufi for a luncheon meeting on the Kuwaiti-sponsored resolution on Palestinian rights, which was scheduled to be considered by the Security Council on July 27. During the meeting, the Arab representatives “gave no undertakings about the probable decision of the Arabs concerning the scheduled reopening of the Palestinian debate.” (Telegram 3150 from USUN, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–2476)

assassination in France of a top PLO leader⁴ was evidence that the U.S. was working to wipe out the PLO. I asked whether we could definitely say that Andy had not “negotiated” with the PLO. The answer was yes. I then reviewed with Andy the account of the meeting which the Department subsequently put out⁵ and said that this would be the official version.

5. I took notes⁶ on this conversation. I would have to refer to them to give you a fuller account.

Woodcock

⁴ Reference is presumably to Zuhayr Mushin, head of the PLO’s Military Department. Mushin was killed on July 26, 1979, while vacationing in France. (“PLO Official Dies of Gunshot Wound,” *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1979, p. A23)

⁵ On August 11, the Department issued a press guidance stating that Young did not hold a “secret meeting” with Terzi. “What happened in this case was the following:

“Kuwaiti ambassador Bishara on July 23 [sic] suggested that Ambassador Young drop by sometime that evening at Ambassador Young’s convenience for a talk about Security Council issues. Ambassador Young went for a walk that evening with his son, and decided to drop in on Ambassador Bishara.

“During their talk, Mr. Terzi arrived unexpectedly at the Bishara home. Ambassador Young did not know he was coming. The Ambassador, in accord with our policy on inadvertent social contacts with the PLO, observed the social amenities and departed as soon as convenient approximately fifteen minutes later.”

The guidance stressed that this was an “accidental meeting. Ambassador Young did not have a negotiating or substantive discussion with Terzi, and the Ambassador behaved exactly in accord with standing policy of the United States Government.” (Telegram Tosec 70012/209859 to the Secretary’s Aircraft and all Near Eastern and South Asian posts, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790365–0226) The same day, Maynes telephoned Evron to inform him that this guidance had been issued. (Telegram 209867 to Tel Aviv, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790365–0346)

⁶ Not found.

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the White House¹

Tel Aviv, August 17, 1979, 1718Z

17880. Special encryption for the President from Bob Strauss. Cairo for Strauss. Subject: Strauss' Initial Meeting With Prime Minister Begin.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. The two hour initial meeting with Begin August 17 took place in warm low key atmosphere with uncommon scarcity of PriMin's emotional rhetoric. Result, however, was stalemate.

3. With only Ambassadors Evron and Lewis present, I gave Begin a friendly but unvarnished assessment of your concerns, including your resentment over unwarranted personal attacks by Dayan and others. Stressed unwavering nature of your commitment to Israel and its security, and urged Begin to help produce positive achievements which could breathe some credibility (with the Arabs) into Camp David process.

4. Begin made lengthy, reasoned argument for strict adherence to SC 242, 338, and Camp David Agreement (CDA) plus joint letter, as authoritative guidance for autonomy negotiations. He cited examples from recent Alexandria working group meeting of alleged U.S. support for Egyptian ideas which contradicted CDA, (e.g. "legislative council"). I told him both you and I agreed thoroughly that CDA was our mandate to be closely followed.

5. I then described problem we face re Palestinian resolution in UNSC, and probed persistently for any hint that Begin might acquiesce in a U.S.-sponsored resolution—with total lack of success.² Begin said repeatedly and absolutely categorically that Israeli Cabinet stood unanimously behind its recent decision, i.e., if any repeat any new UNSC resolution dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict were adopted anytime before full implementation of CDA is completed, it would con-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 3-12/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. In the right-hand margin of the telegram, Carter wrote: "The United States will not approve any UN resolution which would change or modify UN 242 at all. We will pursue the goals of security for Israel w[ith]in secure & recognized borders and the right of the Pales. to participate in the determination of their own future. In all cases, agreements already reached by Israel, Eg. & US at Camp David and in ME Peace Treaty will prevail. J."

² In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line with an arrow pointing to it. Carter also underlined "probed persistently," "Begin might acquiesce," and "with total lack of success."

stitute a modification of SC 242, which was explicitly accepted at Camp David as the “agreed basis” for CDA. Inevitable result would be to make “null and void those CDA passages which refer to 242. Though Begin would not be drawn out further as to consequences, clear implication was that GOI might withdraw from or suspend its participation in autonomy negotiations.³ Begin said USG should carry out its 1975 written commitment,⁴ and that required veto of any and all new SC resolutions which treat the Palestinian or Arab-Israeli issues.

6. After having done everything possible to spread salve on the various latest abrasions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, I elicited Begin’s judgment that key step now needed to dispel ugly rumors and distortions would be for U.S. and Israel to agree that CDA and joint letter must be carried out in their entirety, to the letter, and to act in the negotiations accordingly.

7. At end of meeting, I told Begin that we had an honest disagreement about the question of a new resolution. We had tentatively decided to put forward a positive resolution of our own, not to amend 242 but to build on it. Gave him our rationale for going this route to avoid having to consider veto of resolutions put forward by others. Stressed any U.S. resolution would reaffirm 242 and 338 and contain essential elements from CDA concerning Palestinian problem. I did not repeat not show him any text.

8. Begin was rocked by this unpleasant news. He said he deeply regretted what I had told him, asked me to inform you that it would produce the most negative developments for all of us, and asked that you reconsider the tentative decision. He said again that any new UNSC resolution would, in the unanimous⁵ view of the Cabinet, cause “the agreed basis” of the Camp David Agreement (i.e. 242) to collapse. Later, Lewis and I agreed he was genuinely shocked and disturbed.

9. Over all, meeting was difficult but not mean or petty. Begin’s parting words to me were: Quote: Bob, I can only appeal to you and President Carter. Please reconsider your initiative to change the agreed basis for the Camp David Agreement.⁶ After all the effort we and you invested at Camp David, and after all our sacrifices to carry out the Agreement, to change the “agreed basis” now would be destructive of all we have done. We were never forewarned at Camp David that a

³ Carter underlined “clear implication was that GOI might withdraw” and “in autonomy” in this sentence.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 91.

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph ending with this word, Carter drew a heavy vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.

⁶ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.

year later there would come a new SC resolution which you would not veto, contrary to your 1975 commitment. I appeal to President Carter for reconsideration. Unquote.

10. Throughout conversation about resolution I remained firm and unyielding, pursuant to your instructions.

11. Met later in day with Dayan, Weizman, and Evron and went over same ground,⁷ stressing need for us to regain some credibility for Camp David negotiating process if it is to have chance of success. Their negative response was identical to Begin's. Dayan warned me that Begin would be reporting fully to the Cabinet on Sunday,⁸ and that by Sunday there would be at least 10 contradictory versions of my presentation appearing in distorted forms in the press. He advised me to make my position clear directly to the press before leaving for Cairo. With Lewis' agreement, I did so in brief departure statement at Dayan's home.⁹

Lewis

⁷ No other record of this meeting has been found.

⁸ August 19.

⁹ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a heavy vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.

278. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (Bowdler) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Constable) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, August 18, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 11, Cairo (Folder III). Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified]

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, August 19, 1979, 1242Z

16863. For the President from Ambassador Strauss. Tel Aviv/Jerusalem for Ambassador Strauss. Subject: Strauss Meeting With Sadat.

1. (S-entire text).

2. I met for an hour and a quarter in Ismailia Saturday² night with President Sadat, with only Vice President Mubarak and Atherton present. Sadat had clearly consulted with Mubarak and Khalil following my meetings with them earlier that day.³ I nevertheless reviewed briefly the background for my trip and the strategy we are pursuing to deal with the Palestinian rights issue in the Security Council, to make certain that Sadat understood our position and the reasons for it.

3. After a relaxed and somewhat rambling preliminary discussion, Sadat with increasing animation came directly and firmly to the point. He said he understood the need to do something to help Saudi Arabia "save face" but left no doubt he was deeply concerned that our decision to put forth a Palestinian rights resolution in the Security Council would "scare Israel" and upset the peace process.

4. As we talked, Sadat clearly stated that he fears our present approach for dealing with the situation in the Security Council will derail his strategy as he has described it to us on previous occasions. He reiterated very precisely that the way to bring Israel along is to move step by step, to show understanding of their security concerns, to give them time to work their way through their problems, and to proceed without hesitation to fulfill all commitments under the bilateral Egyptian/Israeli Treaty. He repeated several times that we must not "scare Israel" and at one point said, "let's first complete this step with Israel." He made clear that by "this step" he meant the present autonomy negotiations. Although at one point he reflected some anxiety about what would happen if no agreement were reached in those talks within the allotted 12-month period, Sadat basically exuded confidence that "we

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2067. Secret; Cherokee, Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

² August 18.

³ A summary of Strauss's meetings with Mubarak and Khalil is in telegram 16856 from Cairo, August 18. A typewritten White House Situation Room note on the text of the telegram reads: "Per ZB's instructions the summary portion of this cable was sent to The President." The telegram was also initialed by Hunter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 115, 8/16–22/79 Strauss Trip to Israel and Egypt: 8/79)

will succeed.” With an almost mystical confidence, he said that at Camp David “we jumped over obstacles to new horizons.” If the Palestinians were to join the autonomy talks at this stage, Sadat said, we would reach no agreement, just as we would have reached no agreement at Camp David if Hussein had been there. It is important first to complete the autonomy negotiations with Israel; then if the Palestinians refuse what we have achieved for them, this will be their responsibility. Their entry now would “doom the peace process,” he stated.

5. Recalling his report to us following his last talks with Begin in Alexandria, Sadat expressed confidence that by the end of this year there would be agreement on full autonomy and a solution to the Jerusalem problem. This agreement could then be carried out in Gaza and Jerusalem, leaving the West Bank aside for the time being because of its particular sensitivity to the Israelis and because this would provide an opportunity for Israel and Hussein to come to an understanding with respect to the West Bank. Sadat stated confidently that, when the present phase of negotiations with Israel is completed by the end of this year, Hussein would join the negotiating process and, by working with Israel, could arrange a plebiscite whereby the Palestinians would agree to join Jordan rather than insist upon an independent state.

6. To make certain that I had understood precisely Sadat’s position, I put certain questions to him towards the end of our meeting:

—I first asked how concerned Sadat would be if we vetoed an Arab resolution in the Security Council, thereby undermining our credibility with the other Arabs and reinforcing the Baghdad front. Sadat repeated that this would not harm Egypt or the autonomy talks but would harm the United States with Saudi Arabia.

—I next asked what Sadat’s views were on a milder resolution which would not call for a Palestinian state, which would basically draw on language we have used in the past, and which would be supported by the U.S. I told Sadat that in my talks in Israel it was clear that even such a resolution would be opposed by the Israelis. Sadat repeated that when Israel is frightened, this will harm the peace process.

—I then asked his reaction to a U.S. resolution which would be opposed by the Arab world but would, on the basis of my talks with Israel, still be opposed by them. Sadat repeated that anything which frightened the Israelis would be bad for the peace process.

7. When I described the Israeli position (characterizing it as unreasonable and asking for his advice) that any new resolution was unnecessary since the peace process is being implemented and progressing well on the basis of Resolution 242 and 338 plus the Camp David Framework, and that any new resolution would unbalance the Camp

David Framework, Sadat strongly differing with me said, “they are right.”

8. At various points during the conversation, Sadat reflected preoccupation with the Saudi position, saying he did not fully understand it and reiterating his sense of grievance with the Saudis generally and Prince Fahd in particular. He would, however, rise above this and was prepared to fulfill his commitments, in cooperation with the United States, for security in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. In this connection he repeated his earlier offer of “full facilities” for the United States to cooperate with Egypt in maintaining stability and security in the Gulf and in the Sudan. If the United States has a problem with Saudi Arabia in connection with the forthcoming Security Council debate, Sadat said, we should try to handle this in our bilateral relationship with the Saudis. He stressed that he fully supports strong U.S.-Saudi relations and that we should do what we need to in order to reassure the Saudis in our bilateral relations. Above all, however, we must be cautious about any move in the Security Council which could frighten the Israelis.

9. Noting Sadat’s repeated references to the Saudis, I took this opening to make the point to him that it would be helpful to us if he could avoid criticisms of Saudi Arabia. Sadat said he would refrain from such criticisms and, what is more, would repair his relations with them when that became possible, despite all that they had done to him.

10. Following our meeting and after our brief remarks to the press, I took Sadat aside to make certain he fully understood that our present position was to move ahead immediately with a U.S. resolution in the Security Council, if possible with the Israelis but if necessary without them, to pre-empt a harder line Arab resolution which we would have to veto and which would risk strong reactions from the other Arabs.

11. In reflecting on Saturday night’s meeting, I must admit to having been unprepared for Sadat’s almost total preoccupation with not “scaring” the Israelis, his confidence that there can be a breakthrough by the end of the year as a result of our support and his personal efforts with Begin, and his assumption that we can contain the Saudi reaction to a U.S. veto in the Security Council. He bases the latter on his conviction that the Saudis know they depend “100 percent” on us for their security, and on a basic assumption that we have already made a deal with the Saudis, although I did my best to disabuse him of this. Atherton and I were both convinced that he believes firmly that our basic reason for going forward with a resolution is to fulfill a deal we made with Fahd. I do not believe we ever convinced him to the contrary.

12. It is relevant to the foregoing to report that in a call on a senior Foreign Ministry official earlier Saturday afternoon, Leonard was told

very plainly that Sadat and Khalil were both very concerned over impact on peace process of anything in New York that would upset Israelis. This official (Ahmed Maher), who had just been briefed by Khalil, noted that some in the Ministry disagreed with their leaders but the leaders feel strongly on this.

13. Sadat's final statement to me was to return and prevent Jimmy Carter from weakening or destroying his great accomplishment at Camp David.

Atherton

280. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the White House and Department of State¹

Jerusalem, August 20, 1979, 0640Z

2656. For the President from Bob Strauss. White House please pass Amb. Strauss' Aircraft (86971). Subject: (S) Strauss' Wrap-up Meeting With Prime Minister Begin. Ref: Cairo 16863.²

1. S-entire text.

2. Summary. In a cordial two-hour meeting with Begin on Sunday,³ I reviewed with him our approach to tabling our own UN resolution, and Sadat's negative reaction. Begin was surprised and pleased by Sadat's views, and he visibly relaxed—I surmise because he sees that he is not long in opposition to us. He pressed me to recommend to you that we change our position. Politely but firmly, I told him I could not do that; but would faithfully report to you Begin's and Sadat's clearly stated objections to our initiative, and their emphasis on moving ahead with their own relationship instead. Finally, I prevailed on Begin to say a few positive words to the press about the strength of U.S.-Israeli relations. End summary.

3. After returning from Cairo I met for about two hours with Begin, accompanied by Ambassadors Lewis and Evron. Begin was markedly

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-1711. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

² See Document 279.

³ August 19.

fresh and vigorous considering the fact that he had chaired what was apparently a fairly difficult Cabinet meeting for much of the day.

4. I gave Begin a very brief summary rundown on my meeting Saturday night with Sadat (reftel), stressing Sadat's statements to me that his relationship with Begin is much better than before and that he looks forward to their pending meeting⁴ in Haifa for even more improvement. I told Begin that I explained to Sadat the rationale behind our position on putting forward a resolution of our own in the Security Council, and that I told Sadat of Begin's disagreement with our proposed course of action. Sadat's response, I said, was that he agreed with Begin's view and that any resolution would complicate the picture for the autonomy negotiations and distract from the progress which Sadat was confident would be made before the end of the year. I told Begin that Sadat had given as his reasoning for opposing any new resolution his "high hopes" that—as he and Begin talked further about the issues—they will gradually find solutions to most of the outstanding problems, and that any UN action would complicate this process. I concluded by telling Begin that I would now return to Washington and report to you and to Cy Vance both his (Begin's) and Sadat's reactions to our proposed view and strategy. There was no reason to avoid telling Begin of Sadat's attitude because Sadat in a speech delivered after our meeting had expressed his concern and negative attitude.

5. Begin was clearly pleased to learn that Sadat agreed with him. (I had previously suspected that they had talked by phone before I had seen Sadat; however, I now doubt that for it would have been almost impossible for Begin to feign the degree of surprise he registered when he heard my report.) He then said that it was all the more obvious that we should reconsider our course of action and drop the idea of any new resolution. He summarized the decision already taken Sunday by the Israeli Cabinet in support of his initial negative reaction to me on Friday. He again asked that you review your decision in light of my additional findings in Egypt.

6. During this discussion, I did not deviate from the position I had taken with Begin on Friday:⁵ that while our decision is still tentative, I would be less than candid if I did not say that this is the direction in which we are now moving.

7. I then asked Begin whether he was optimistic about the course of the autonomy negotiations. Begin said that he believed the approach was the correct one. As was the case before Camp David and during the Treaty negotiations, there were obviously major difficulties ahead.

⁴ See Document 282 and footnote 4, Document 283.

⁵ See Document 277.

However, he was convinced that the basic elements of agreement on autonomy had been hammered out at Camp David and that it should be possible to reach agreement on how to implement those elements, so long as the whole agreement is treated as an entity and no effort is made to separate it into various “chapters”. Begin went on to say that he agreed with Sadat that their relationship had greatly improved, beginning with their meeting in Washington the night before the Treaty was signed (March 25). He then reviewed at some length the ups and downs in their personal rapport. He seemed both pleased and somewhat bemused by the fact that Sadat and he were now able to disagree sharply about the issues without it affecting their friendship.

8. After some further discussion of Sadat’s personality and their increased ability to communicate with one another, Begin again said that since we had now heard both from him and Sadat strong objections to our proposed course of action, the whole idea of a US sponsored resolution should be dropped. He counted on Secretary Vance’s statements to Ambassador Evron and to Senator Stone that the Kuwaiti resolution would be vetoed if put forward. He said that we should continue to work energetically in the working groups and plenary on the various autonomy issues and put aside all UN action. He then asked me what I would recommend to you when I returned.

9. I told him I would report faithfully his views and Sadat’s to you in detail, along with the suggestions from both of them that we abandon our resolution option. However, I could not say that I would recommend a change in our position on the resolution. I left Begin in no doubt that that position still stands and that I could only assure him that I knew you would give careful thought to his views and to Sadat’s. Begin then reverted to the subject of his relationship with Sadat, describing in some detail their discussion in El Arish, and more recently in Alexandria, about Jerusalem. He took considerable satisfaction in the fact that in Alexandria he had been able to explain in detail the Israeli view of the Jerusalem problem without exacerbating their personal relationship, and that indeed it was after Begin’s explanation that Sadat had insisted that Begin and he use first names with one another (I have now heard this account from both Sadat and Begin. Sadat sounds as if he believes an arrangement on Jerusalem is nearly within reach; Begin on the other hand talks about their positions as being far apart but takes pleasure in fact that they can be frankly discussed without rancor.)

10. Begin also raised with me the subject of oil supply, describing the original commitment Sadat had given him in Washington which was covered in your letter.⁶ He said that the Israelis were now anxious

⁶ See Document 230.

to try to pin down in an aide memoire more details about quantities, prices, etc. He intends to raise this subject with Sadat at Haifa early next month since Modai and Hilal have not reached any agreement on these details and time is beginning to run out. I told him that Khalil had also raised the oil issues with me and wanted you to be informed of Egyptian concerns, just as Begin had wanted you to be informed of Israeli worries. I explained that the price issue is a complicated one, but said I would get into the subject and see if it cannot be resolved.

11. Our meeting concluded with a long discussion about what he and I might say to the press. Begin tried to persuade me to say that I would recommend to you reconsideration of our position. I told him that I would not get into any possible recommendations to the President and said to the press only that I had encountered serious reservations both in Cairo and Jerusalem, that I would report faithfully what I had heard to you, and that I was certain you and Cy would take into consideration the views of both Israel and Egypt. I impressed on Begin the increasing annoyance in Washington about the steady stream of unfair critical comments from Israel about the United States, our relationship with Israel, and the strength of our commitments. After some discussion, including some criticism by Evron of statements made in Washington about Israel, Sam and I succeeded in persuading Begin to join me in front of the cameras and to make a supportive statement about the US-Israeli relationship.⁷

Newlin

⁷ The text of the comments made by Strauss and Begin to the press outside Begin's office following their August 19 meeting was conveyed in telegram 2654 from Jerusalem, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790378-0281)

281. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 20, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East Trip: the Way Forward (U)

As you will have seen from Bob Strauss' reporting cables to the President,² the trip produced even more negative reactions to our UN Resolution plan than we expected in calculating the price to be paid. The Israeli reaction went about as far as thought; but all of us were unprepared for the vehemence with which Sadat flatly opposed the idea of a U.S.-introduced resolution—or indeed *any* resolution at this time. Strauss had an Ambassador with him at all times who later prepared the cables for his signature. (S)

Sadat's reasoning was as follows:

—any resolution which scares the Israelis is a mistake—and the U.S. resolution would do so;

—there is a good chance for progress in the autonomy talks, and in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship which needs to underpin anything else, provided they are left alone and the process is not disrupted by our (unnecessary) actions; and

—even if a resolution were accepted by the PLO, this would *not* be desirable, since it would lead to the entry of disruptive elements into the talks themselves before they are well-established; in fact, Sadat said, this (acceptance of the resolution) might be the worst outcome of all. (S)

To be sure, Israel and Egypt have different interests from us in this process (and in major respects from each other). But to be opposed publicly and forcefully by *both* Camp David parties increases the dangers of the Resolution course (while, ironically, making it somewhat easier to get off this course—if that were desired—since this is in fact, if not in perception, no longer just an “Israel vs. U.S.” issue). (S)

Conversations with our local Ambassadors (Atherton, Lewis, West, and Veliotis) also helped to cast doubt on 1) the likelihood of PLO

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 8–12/79. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. In an undated handwritten note, Brzezinski set out a list of short points under the headings of “substance” and “process.” (Ibid.)

² See Documents 277, 279, and 280.

acceptance of any resolution we could reasonably support—especially following the PNC meeting in Damascus;³ and 2) the benefits to be achieved with Jordan and Saudi Arabia (though, to be sure, the costs of a UN veto with these and other Arab countries remain). (S)

Bob Strauss has left Begin and Sadat with the understanding that we are at the moment going forward with a resolution that will indicate support for 242 and 338, affirm Palestinian rights, and deal with the refugees in some general way. (Despite press reports to the contrary, Strauss impressed upon Begin that he could not promise to recommend to the President against moving forward). Both, however, have high expectations that their own personal appeals to the President will have an effect, in getting our position changed. Both appealed for a face-to-face meeting with the President (Khalil, Begin) before we proceed; and both urged that the President not destroy through this act what he has built up in the Camp David process. (S)

What next?

I discussed with Bill this evening the thinking that went on today in Washington. It parallels ours on the plane, to wit:

—we should not go forward with a resolution of our own;

—we should seek to get the UN business behind us this week, instead of trying to stretch it out. (S)

Bill's three options seem best (and parallel to ours):

—seek a postponement (the attached cable⁴ indicates an inclination in Beirut on that point as well; if your meeting Tuesday⁵ morning goes in this direction, following up on this conversation with Tueni should be done urgently);

—Go for a neutral “consensus” statement out of the UNSC;

—simply veto. (S)

My own sense is that we should pursue them in the order stated. (S)

Strauss' inclination is to give a press conference tomorrow, indicating that we will not put in a resolution (indicating that we had been exploring several, but met negative reactions in both Israel and

³ In telegram 5410 from Damascus, August 16, the Embassy conveyed a report on the August 12 meeting of the Palestinian Central Council in Damascus. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372–0360)

⁴ Not found attached. In telegram 4641 from Beirut, August 20, Dean relayed a conversation he had with Tueni in which Tueni stated that he had called on Arafat on August 19 to “probe his receptivity” to a postponement in UN consideration of a resolution on Palestinian rights. Tueni told Dean that he had found Arafat “very receptive” to a postponement “in the event nothing constructive could be achieved at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2494)

⁵ August 21.

Egypt—emphasizing the latter, in order to move this as much as possible away from a “U.S.-Israel” matter). He could outline whatever option we have selected, and stress our concern with the peace process as the best way of achieving Palestinian legitimate rights. (S)

We would need to be doing our diplomacy quickly (with seeking a postponement being the “least cost” way out). This includes:

- communication with the Kuwaitis (and Beirut);
- approach to the British (on postponement);
- instructions for damage limitation to West and Veliotis (who have basic background and have asked for Wednesday appointments, pending whatever decision is reached in Washington);
- communications to Israel and Egypt, Congressional contacts etc. (S)

I am appending a broader options paper⁶ put together by Hal Saunders on the plane (and which he will revise for tomorrow). Option 3 is the one presented here. (C)

P.S. Strauss and Ben Epstein arranged with Teddy Kollek for an invitation to Andy Young to visit Jerusalem, “to see how people can live together.” It will be sent privately in the near future. (C)

⁶ Attached but not printed. A revised version is also attached but not printed.

282. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, September 7, 1979, 1655Z

18212. Subject: Oral Message From President Sadat to President Carter About Haifa Talks With Prime Minister Begin.

1. (S-entire text).
2. At Vice President Mubarak’s instruction, Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Osama El Baz called me to Foreign Ministry Friday morning, September 7, to convey following oral message from President Sadat to President Carter.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2456. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House.

—Begin message

3. President Sadat held talks with PriMin Begin on September 4 and 5. President Sadat found the talks satisfactory. The attitude of PriMin Begin and other Israeli officials was by and large positive.² They seemed to realize the necessity of achieving some progress on the Palestinian question. President Sadat emphasized the necessity of reaching agreement on certain key points in the coming few months to give the negotiations on the self governing authority the shot in the arm they need at this point.

4. President Sadat also emphasized the need for achieving progress on the question of Jerusalem. He indicated that the present status of Jerusalem was not acceptable to 800 million Muslims and many Christians. He added that it should not be impossible, however difficult, to reach an agreement that would meet the aspirations of Muslims and Arabs while maintaining a united city. In the absence of such an arrangement, Jerusalem would remain an explosive point of hot contention and would cloud the peace making process.

5. PriMin Begin reiterated his views but was not as forceful as before. President Sadat noticed that PriMin Begin's health was failing and that he was not in his best shape, so President Sadat did not want to press him harder on this issue at this point. But President Sadat left PriMin Begin with the impression that this is a *sine qua non* for progress and a point on which Israel must reach the necessary decisions.

6. President Sadat told PriMin Begin that they cannot reach a comprehensive peace without a solution to Jerusalem. Any solution perpetuating the status quo would be rejected by all Arabs, most Muslims and many Christians. President Sadat also said that East Jerusalem should be under the jurisdiction of the self governing authority as a first step, without prejudging the issue of its permanent status. Otherwise, most Palestinians would be reluctant to cooperate with the Camp David formula.

7. With respect to negotiations for the self governing authority, President Sadat told PriMin Begin that the Israeli conception of the powers and responsibilities of the self governing authority is too narrow and quite inadequate. He emphasized the need for giving the self governing authority real powers and responsibilities, without jeopardizing Israel's security. President Carter will notice that President Sadat made a point of mentioning in his public speeches during his

² Begin's account of the Haifa meetings, the outcome of which the Prime Minister was "exceedingly pleased with," was conveyed to Lewis and is in telegram 19336 from Tel Aviv, September 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050-2030)

visit that realization of the national rights of the Palestinians does not place Israel's security or interests in jeopardy.

8. PriMin Begin said that, as the negotiations develop, we would sort out points of agreement and disagreement about the jurisdiction of the self governing authority and would see what can be done to give the negotiations the push they need.

9. These two points were subjects of disagreement, but the disagreement was not as sharp or tense as in the past.

10. On bilateral issues, PriMin Begin raised two points: the supply of oil, and the stationing of forces in the Sinai. With respect to oil, Israel had two demands: (1) a written Egyptian commitment to supply Israel 2 million tons annually; and (2) to sell this amount at the OPEC base price—about 24 dollars a barrel. There was some disagreement between Egyptian and Israeli officials (Oil Minister Hilal and Energy Minister Modai) on these points. Israel also seeks this supply from the Alma field on the ground that it is now producing 1.9 million tons annually at the rate of 38000 barrels per day. Our officials think that this rate of production is detrimental to the Alma field and is causing a high level of attrition, and that production from Alma should be reduced to one million tons annually.

11. President Sadat agreed to provide an aide memoire to Israel to the effect that Egypt will supply Israel with two million tons annually without specifying the area of production from which it would come. With respect to price, President Sadat insisted that Egypt cannot give Israel a privileged position which would then have to apply to other buyers of Egyptian oil. Egypt cannot discriminate between customers. President Sadat indicated to PriMin Begin that if Egypt followed this practice, it would incur a loss of over 600 million dollars annually. PriMin Begin accepted the view of President Carter that the price should be left to the market. In other words, the prices charged will be the going prices at the time each contract is concluded.

12. With respect to the forces in the Sinai, this subject was discussed between President Sadat and PriMin Begin, and in parallel between Minister Weizman and Minister Kamal Hassan Ali. Weizman, who was opposed to UNTSO, met with President Sadat. Since Israel is opposed to UNTSO and is pressing for joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols, President Sadat indicated there was a need for U.S. participation. President Sadat instructed General Ali to take the position that we should follow the procedures provided for in the Peace Treaty, namely the establishment of a multi-national force, and should meanwhile resort to a temporary arrangement as follows:

—The U.S. would supervise Zone A, either through increasing the frequency of its aerial surveillance or through the use of representatives of the American Military Attache Office in Cairo.

—For Zone B, an Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. joint commission should be established consisting of one representative of each country. The American member could be from the Embassy staff and should preferably be a civilian or, if military, should not be in uniform. The joint commission would be on call to conduct inspections in Zone B at the request of any party.

—In the buffer zone, Egypt and Israel agreed in general that there should be observer posts, either with U.S. participation or manned by the two parties. There would also be a requirement for checkpoints, either with U.S. participation or bilateral, at points of entry into the buffer zone. The U.S. should supervise the Israeli technical installations in the buffer zone.

13. Egypt made clear that it prefers U.S. participation in all the arrangements. These arrangements would continue during the interim period until final withdrawal or until a multi-national force is established.

14. PriMin Begin and President Sadat agreed to meet again but did not specify a time. President Sadat feels it will not be soon because of PriMin Begin's health.

15. Finally, Israel agreed to withdraw from Santa Katerina a few days before November 19, and President Sadat agreed that tourist visits there could continue from the time of Israeli withdrawal. End message.

16. Comment: El Baz dictated the foregoing from a sheaf of notes in Arabic. When he reached his notes on the Sinai supervision arrangements, he found they were not clear, and he and I at that point spoke to General Ali on the phone to seek clarification. That portion of the oral message on dealing with this subject was then reconstructed from our conversation with Ali. It is still not entirely clear how many of the details of the Sinai arrangements have been agreed with the Israelis and how many represent Egyptian preferences. For example, in saying that U.S. supervision of Zone A could be carried out by more frequent aerial surveillance, General Ali said, "If the Israelis agree."

17. I reminded both Ali and El Baz that, on instructions, I had informed the Vice President that we were opposed to a U.S. role in policing the Sinai (State 231510).³ They both acknowledged that Mubarak had told them this but thought the arrangements they were now proposing might not be a problem for us since they did not involve full-time U.S. involvement in joint patrols on the ground. Of going more than half way to meet Israeli concerns on bilateral issues, has given up Egypt's former strong insistence on a continuing UN role in the Sinai

³ Telegram 231510 to Cairo, September 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-0475)

and has at least modified Egyptian opposition to joint Egyptian-Israeli supervision in some areas of the Sinai. At the same time, he has insisted on the principle earlier outlined in forceful terms by Mubarak that there should be some U.S. participation with the Egyptians and the Israelis and that there will be no Israelis, at least in western Sinai (Zone A), where the major Egyptian armed forces will be located. When this issue is discussed in Washington September 18–19,⁴ we will apparently again be faced with an Egyptian-Israeli position contrary to our own preferred course of action. End comment.

19. I assume the foregoing oral message is the only read out we will get from the Egyptian side until Bob Strauss meets with Sadat.⁵

Atherton

⁴ See Document 289.

⁵ See Document 284.

283. Letter From Egyptian President Sadat to President Carter¹

Cairo, September 9, 1979

Dear President Carter,

In keeping with our tradition of consultation on all matters of common interest, I have asked Vice President Mubarak to see you² and discuss with you a few issues that would interest you. I have no doubt that this practice would cement our relations which are already a model to be envied by many nations. The commitments we share are so vital, not only to the promotion of stronger ties between our two countries and people, but also for the maintenance of world peace and security.

As you well know, the Middle East is still witnessing much turmoil because of the events which are taking place at the instigation of outsiders. The situation in Morocco is a case in point. Thousands of foreign soldiers are being amassed near the border between Algeria and Morocco and used in combat. The purpose is not only to topple the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 287.

moderate regime of King Hassan, but also to tip the strategic balance in the entire area. It is an undisputed fact that Algeria has renounced any territorial claim in the Sahara. The late President Boumedienne stated that in the most unequivocal terms at the Arab Summit held in Rabat in 1974. Therefore, the reopening of the issue at this point and the introduction of more tension and violence should be attributed to another factor, namely foreign intervention. It is mainly for this reason that we have responded positively³ and without delay to King Hassan's request for military assistance despite his government's acquiescence to the unprincipled policy of Arab rejectionists. Within two days from his request, Morocco received some badly needed light arms and ammunition. We are currently reviewing with them other requests for defense material.

The situation in the horn of Africa is also a source of concern. The Soviets are trying to consolidate their grip on Ethiopia and South Yemen, thus threatening the Sudan and the Arab Peninsula. The use of Cuban soldiers and East German experts is growing steadily. Other countries in the region are watching these developments with apprehension.

On the other hand, both Iran and Afganistan are witnessing upheavals that border on civil war. The situation there requires vigilance and scrutiny. It is an aggravating factor to many governments, especially those of the Gulf-States where any degree of tension is apt to increase the sense of uncertainty and insecurity that is in existence already.

I believe that these events and any other developments which may take place in the future can be confronted effectively however alarming they might be. I believe that the Egyptian people, with their inherent moral and spiritual strength, together with their resourcefulness and historic awareness, are most capable of bearing that responsibility. We have a bright record of struggling against adverse influence in the most difficult circumstances.

When it becomes an established fact that Egypt is strong enough militarily, the forces of aggression and subversion are deterred. A greater measure of stability occurs. Both of us would avoid many complications which would have consumed much of our energy and resources. I have no doubt that this is your reading of the geopolitical realities involved. It is incumbent upon us to increase our preparedness to meet such situations before it becomes too late. We can not wait and

³ On September 1, Sadat offered aid to the Moroccan military in its ongoing campaign against the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. (Edward Cody, "Sadat Offers Morocco Arms to Fight Rebels in Sahara," *The Washington Post*, September 2, 1979, p. A32)

see because the other side is seizing every opportunity to be on the offensive all the time.

On the other hand, enhancing our defense capabilities and raising the standard of our armed forces is an important element domestically as well. These forces are called upon to perform many functions for improving the quality of life in Egypt. To fulfill this mission, these forces must acquire the latest technology in many fields. We need your help in this respect. Your assistants have been cooperative and sensitive to our needs. They see the situation and read the consequences the same way we do. Their Egyptian colleagues are cooperating with them fully. Exhaustive studies have been made and I believe that we are approaching the final decision on the issue. I have asked Vice President Mubarak to render you any assistance as you make the decision. He is accompanied by competent officers representing the three branches of our armed forces and they are instructed to cooperate fully with your officials. I have no doubt whatsoever that you make the decision that would reassure us and all your friends, not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa. I need not emphasize to you the necessity for making a long term arrangement for maintaining our military capability.

Other aspects of the bilateral cooperation are proceeding smoothly too. In the economic field, a marked improvement has taken place. Matters are settled expeditiously and promptly. Necessary adjustments are being made at the request of both parties. We have requested an increase of half a million tons in the amount of wheat and wheat flour we get under PL480. Vice President Mubarak will discuss this matter with Secretary Vance and I am certain that you would be most responsive to this request. You are aware of the considerations which prompt us to request this increase. It is so vital, under the present circumstances, to fulfill our needs in this regard. Machinery and other commodities are equally important to give our economy the shot in the arm it needs. As you know, we have been able to keep our economy in good shape in the face of all odds and despite tough challenges. We are determined to persevere.

The Sudan requires your attention too. Subversive intervention, conducted by the Soviets and executed by the Libyan unenlightened regime, is confronting the Sudanese leadership with a tremendous challenge. The country is unable to cope with inflation and the scarcity of many vital commodities. Naturally, this constitutes an element of pressure on President Numeiri and his colleagues. Arab countries which traditionally assisted that country are now withholding their aid to force the regime to follow their line of policy. Under such circumstances, you would certainly give the Sudan a high priority among the recipients of your aid.

Having said that, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the peace efforts we have started together since we met in Washington

in the early days of your administration.⁴ You know that I went to Haifa⁵ mainly to consolidate the steps we have taken and encourage the Israelis to take a more responsive attitude with respect to the Palestinian question. Noticing that Prime Minister Begin was not in good health, I deemed it more suitable to persuade him without resort to overt pressure or confrontation. I have put you fully in the picture on what took place during my visit in the oral message I sent you upon my return.⁶ Therefore, I will confine myself to some extra remarks.

By and large, I found the Israelis in a more relaxed mood. As the peace process is moving ahead, more barriers are falling everyday. They have become more secure and hopeful of the future and less suspicious of others. This is precisely what I expected and worked for. I believe that, as we proceed further, the atmosphere will improve considerably. In due course, we will achieve our goal.

As expected, Prime Minister Begin reiterated his views on the Palestinian self-government issue and Jerusalem. However, I made it crystal clear to him that any attempt on their part to prolong the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza, even under disguise, will not work. I also emphasized to him the inevitability of making a compromise on Jerusalem along the points I stated. The Muslims of the World, who number about 800 millions and many Christians in all four corners of the globe can not tolerate the present situation. The answer is to apply our formula which calls for restoring Arab sovereignty to East Jerusalem while keeping the City united in every sense.

I told him that, as a first step and without prejudging the issue, the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem should participate in the election of the self-governing authority. On the other hand, that government should be given a real jurisdiction that transcends that of local governments. In the absence of that, we will not be able to attract any Palestinians to the peace process and, hence, the issue will remain unsolved to the detriment of all parties.

As I did in my public statements, I indicated to Begin that the realization of the rights of the Palestinian people does not jeopardize Israeli security. This was a recurrent theme in my speeches and I believe that it will bear fruit in time.

One should not be pessimistic on the chances of reeducating the Israelis on that issue however difficult that task might appear.

⁴ For the records of Sadat's April 1977 meetings with Carter held in Washington, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1981*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 25 and 27.

⁵ For Begin's and Sadat's assessments of their talks at Haifa, see Document 282 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁶ See Document 282.

We discussed briefly the bilateral outstanding issues and there was no problem which we could not solve. As I informed you in my oral message,⁷ we reached agreement that Egypt will sell Israel 2 million tons of crude oil annually at the market price. I indicated to him that we can not possibly give Israel any preferential treatment in this respect as we can not discriminate between oil buyers.

With respect to the forces that would supervise the implementation of the Peace Treaty on the ground, we agreed tentatively on the general outline of a formula that could be employed until the United States forms the multinational force provided for in the Treaty. I made it quite clear to him that an American participation in this transitional arrangement would be very helpful. Of course, we do not mean to [initiate?] a physical American involvement that would cause you the slightest trouble. It is a symbolic presence through a limited number of officers, possibly in civilian cloth. At any rate, the subject will be discussed in length between Secretary Vance, General Ali and Dayan within a few days.⁸ I have no doubt that they will be able to reach agreement.

Prime Minister Begin offered to put forward the date of Israeli withdrawal from the Saint Katherine area which contains Mount Moses. Their forces will withdraw from that area before November 19 so as to enable us to hold the planned celebration of the second Anniversary of my trip to Jerusalem.⁹ I agreed to allow the flow of tourist into this area without delay as a gesture of good will.

I was quite touched by the response of the people of Haifa to my visit. It was overwhelming. This is a real guarantee for the coronation of our efforts. The Arab Israelis were also forthcoming and enthusiastic. They constitute a considerable proportion of the population in the City and its vicinity. They understand fully the nature of the situation and the peace process. I believe that they can be a positive force for peace. With this in mind, I have agreed to provide them with some cultural services they badly need since they were cut off from the Arab World for over three decades. It might interest you to know that they are very appreciative of your spirit and the role you are playing as the leader of a nation they greatly admire.

With best wishes and regards.¹⁰

Mohammed Anwer El-Sadat

⁷ See Document 282.

⁸ See Document 289.

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 4.

¹⁰ Sadat added the following handwritten notation: "Jehan joins me in sending Rosalin and the children all our best wishes."

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, September 10, 1979, 1731Z

18416. For the President from Strauss. Subject: Strauss Meeting With President Sadat.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Following a relaxed hour and a half private chat with Prime Minister Khalil, in which he foreshadowed what I would hear from President Sadat, I met for an hour and twenty minutes with Sadat at his Pyramids Guest House Sunday² night. Only Vice President Mubarak and Atherton were present. Sadat was relaxed, expansive, and confident, and reflected this mood in his comments to the press afterwards. Sitting on the balcony, overlooking the Pyramids with a full harvest moon shining, I was sufficiently impressed and emotionally moved to buy whatever he had to sell. Sadat took delight in contrasting the stability in Egypt with the disarray in the Arab world. He predicted confidently that the present negotiations would ultimately succeed in laying the basis for comprehensive peace and that Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians would join the negotiating process. With respect to the Palestinians, he said they were welcome to join anytime but it was not necessary for them to participate at the present stage. His description of the Haifa meeting³ with Begin was somewhat rambling and contradictory in places, but one message came through clearly: he has built a sound personal relationship with Begin and is fully committed to consolidating the Peace Treaty but now needs our help to make progress in the autonomy negotiations by the end of the year. In saying this, however, Sadat did not convey any great sense of urgency that matters had to be brought to a decisive head by that time.

3. Among the principal themes which ran through Sadat's comments, I was struck by his repeated expressions of concern about Begin's health and political problems at home. In view of Begin's health and other problems, Sadat said he did not press Begin on the issues of full autonomy and Jerusalem; he merely reaffirmed that his views remained as he had stated them in Alexandria in July.⁴ At one point, Sadat said he was not sure Begin would survive for more than a matter of months. Sadat reiterated several times his deep feelings of friendship

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-2464. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

² September 9.

³ See Document 282.

⁴ See Document 265.

for Begin and his admiration for Begin's political courage, interspersed with admonitions that we should not harass Begin in present circumstances. He said that even on issues where they disagreed, Begin was amiable but seemed fatigued. They had not agreed on a specific time for a next meeting, Sadat said, but he had invited Begin to stop in Egypt on his way back from the U.S. in November and Begin had accepted the invitation. Sadat spoke in glowing terms about his reception in Haifa by both Jews and Arabs, describing Haifa as a model for coexistence in the region.⁵

4. In discussing the future, Sadat made several points which he described as important and asked that we note carefully. Saying that he and Begin had not reached any agreement on the basic issues of full autonomy and Jerusalem, Sadat said, "until now I have built bridges with Begin; now is the time for the United States to take over." At another point, he asked us to note carefully his comment on Israeli television that "instead of conflict, we now have differences of opinion." Sadat said he and Begin agreed that Camp David and the peace treaty are the cornerstones for comprehensive peace and should be "consolidated every day." He said he had told Begin, "let us agree that, no matter what, we will stick to Camp David and the Peace Treaty; we cannot go back."

5. Toward the end of the meeting, stressing that we should note this carefully, Sadat said: "I ask you to resume your full partnership role. You should start convincing Begin, but you should not press him." Sadat said that as our friend and partner, he advised us to try to help Begin. We should ease Israeli suspicions. It is necessary, Sadat said, to give directives to the delegations in the autonomy talks so that they can make progress by the end of the year. Begin had said, though "not in an aggressive way", that he was not yet ready for this and in any case the negotiations have until next May to achieve results. Sadat said that he and Begin alone cannot agree on such directives, but this could be accomplished if the United States would help Begin. The United States, he said, must put forward its plans; the time had come for the United

⁵ In telegram 18883 from Cairo, September 15, Atherton reported two additional details of the September 9 Strauss-Sadat meeting. Atherton noted that during the meeting, Sadat said he had told Begin in Haifa that once Israel had withdrawn to the interim line, travelers from Gaza to Egypt would no longer need the Red Cross to serve as an intermediary in facilitating travel. Sadat also described a conversation with Weizman while passing over Qalqilya during his flight from Haifa to Ben Gurion airport. Weizman, Sadat said, had "pointed out the narrow strip of Israel between Qalqilya and the sea as an example of Israel's security problem with respect to the West Bank. Sadat commented to Strauss that Weizman was right; 'You can throw a stone from Qalqilya to the sea.' Sadat then commented that minor rectifications of the border are possible under Resolution 242, and this area is mainly where such rectifications should take place." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79)

States to take the whole matter into its hands; he and his people were ready to work with us.

6. In response to my probing, Sadat did not reveal any specific ideas about how to move the negotiations forward. He reiterated his earlier concept that there should be agreement on full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza and on Jerusalem, but that implementation in the West Bank should be postponed because of its sensitivity for the Israelis, while going forward in Gaza and Jerusalem. He acknowledged that Jerusalem is also a sensitive issue but stressed its importance for winning support of the Muslim world. Sadat also repeated his familiar position that Israel wants King Hussein to take the West Bank and that Israel and Hussein together could work this out, but that it must be done in a way which permits the Palestinians to make their choice. Somewhat contradictorily, Sadat said at another point that he had told Begin that self-determination and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza were inevitable but that this could be patterned on the Austrian treaty providing for full neutrality and need not be a threat to Israel. When I asked how Hussein might be brought into the negotiations, Sadat said it was up to us to find a way but, in his view, the key to Hussein was Saudi Arabia.

7. In view of Sadat's emphasis on the need for the United States to "take over," I thought I should inject at the end a note of caution that, while we must continue the effort, we had not found the answer to making a breakthrough on the autonomy talks. I said I did not believe anyone could convince Begin to modify his position at the present time. I also took the occasion to emphasize strongly your full commitment to the peace process and my commitment to continue my efforts unabated as your representative, and to put to rest reports of any problems in the personal and working relations between Cy Vance and myself.

8. While the bulk of our meeting was devoted to the subjects outlined above, Sadat also described the agreement reached with Begin on forces in the Sinai,⁶ which differs in important respects from the version we have had from General Ali but seems to accord with Begin's account. On the other hand, Sadat's description of the agreement reached with Begin on the supply of oil to Israel⁷ conforms to what we have already heard on this subject from other Egyptian sources and from the

⁶ In telegram 18504, from Cairo, September 11, Atherton relayed Sadat's account of the agreement struck with Begin on observer forces in the Sinai. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79)

⁷ In telegram 18503 from Cairo, September 11, Atherton relayed Sadat's account of his agreement with Begin on Egypt's supply of oil to Israel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790415–0160)

Israelis. (These two subjects will be covered more fully in separate reports.)

9. Finally, Sadat confirmed Begin's agreement to withdraw from Santa Katerina by November 16. He said he did not expect you to be present for the ceremony on November 19 this year but would want you to attend the celebrations there in November, 1980. He invited me to this year's ceremony, and I accepted.⁸

Atherton

⁸ The following day, September 10, Strauss met with Khalil. Strauss reported that during the meeting the Egyptian Prime Minister "filled in many of the blanks in my meeting with President Sadat." In what Strauss called "one of the most valuable talks I have had since embarking on the Middle East negotiations," Khalil suggested that the United States conduct policy on "parallel tracks: within and outside the autonomy talks." Moreover, after outlining Egypt's goals in the peace process, Khalil noted that to achieve these, "we must first stop all Israeli military action in Lebanon and all PLO terrorism within Israel." (Telegram 2941 from Jerusalem, September 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1695)

285. Message From the Special Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Strauss) to the Department of State and the White House¹

September 13, 1979, 1100Z

Subject: Strauss' Visit to Israel. For President Carter from Ambassador Strauss.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Summary. Day visit to Israel has resulted in more progress on two fronts than I would have expected. Our bilateral relationship is much calmer than it was in August, and I have the sense that last month's storm has passed, although substantial suspicion of the U.S. will undoubtedly boil up periodically as long as negotiations on Palestinian-related issues continue. In the autonomy talks, I believe we have established that the negotiations will move into "second gear" by

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. The telegram is not numbered. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

the end of the month with the existing working groups. Only on Lebanon have we not made much progress, but even there I sensed greater Israeli concern about the course they are on than their formal position reveals. Coupled with my talks in Egypt, this visit brings us into transition to a new and more active phase in the negotiations and on the broader Middle East stage. End summary.

3. My meetings² with Begin were, of course, the centerpiece of the talks here, and Sam Lewis is sending a more detailed report on those two meetings. I deliberately spent a good deal of time conveying to Begin Sadat's strong, positive feelings about his meetings with Begin in Haifa³ and Khalil's apparent newly heightened commitment to the success of the autonomy talks. Naturally, Begin and his colleagues are very pleased by Sadat's understanding of the Israeli Government's political problems. They were also relieved in my several meetings here to be assured that we are not going to press them to face the more difficult issues in the negotiations in the next couple of month. They agree to use the next three months for broadening and intensifying preparatory work on the most complicated issues in order to "tee them up" for the Ministerial group to address toward the turn of the year. I also assured Begin of your continuing deep personal commitment to the Camp David process and Agreements, and to Resolutions 242 and 338. Begin acknowledged the existence of an enhanced personal relationship with Sadat and expressed his pleasure that everyone strongly adheres to the target date of next May for the autonomy negotiations, and he was obviously pleased that press accounts of an American effort to force the pace on negotiations seemed unfounded.

4. On the other hand, my strong presentation⁴ on the importance of Israel's taking the initiative to help achieve a lasting truce in South Lebanon met with no positive response. Later, however, with Dayan and with Justice Minister Tamir during my ride with him to the airport, I found more concern about Israel's course than came out in my talk with Begin. Their problem is that they feel trapped and do not know how to change course.

5. I hit hard on the negative impact Israeli actions in Lebanon are having on U.S. public attitudes. He listened, but then insisted that he cannot change course unless all terrorist attacks cease, including

² Strauss met with Begin for an hour and three quarters on September 11 and for a brief follow-up meeting on September 12. Lewis sent a full report of these meetings in telegram 19734 from Tel Aviv, September 13; *ibid.*

³ See Document 282 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁴ Lewis sent a full report of Strauss's conversations on Lebanon with Begin on September 11 and with Dayan on September 12 in telegram 19737 from Tel Aviv, September 13; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79.

bombings inside Israel. The bomb which exploded Wednesday in the Jerusalem market only helped underscore his point. But once again he was not prepared to move first. He argued strongly that the PLO would use any period of quiet to rest, regroup, and re-equip.

6. My two meetings with Burg⁵ and a meeting with the Israeli team for the autonomy negotiations⁶ produced two positive developments: first, Burg himself said he would propose that the plenary session in Alexandria September 26/27 approve his scheme to establish a number of sub-groups under the two existing working groups to deal with specific issues in the negotiations on the modalities of elections and on powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority. I elaborated on his idea by suggesting that using more experts on various subjects could deepen the discussion of particular issues, and he responded positively. Both of us said publicly after the meeting with the Ministerial team that we hope that this could be done and that it would enable us to move the negotiations into “second gear”. Second, Burg said that he would go to the Alexandria plenary with a timetable for the plenary sessions for the rest of the year. This will impose certain interim deadlines on the working groups.

7. One intervention by Arik Sharon during this meeting with the Ministerial team provided interesting insight into his thinking. If we did not, he said, Israel would face a situation at the end of the negotiations in which it would be pressed to make concessions because by that time only one or two issues might stand between the negotiations and an agreement. Recognizing that Sharon’s intent was patently unconstructive, Burg turned him aside.

8. The combination of technical discussions to shape the issues for political-level consideration by the end of the year and work schedule for that same period is consistent with Khalil’s timetable of moving toward the difficult issues only at the beginning of next year. So out of these discussions here and in Cairo we have managed to shape the talks as we predicted in June, putting ourselves in position by the end of the year to show that the issues crucial to the Palestinians will be dealt with seriously in the negotiations. It also enables us to define and discuss these contentious and emotional issues in a non-political setting where progress can be made.

⁵ No other records of Strauss’s meetings with Burg have been found.

⁶ No other record of Strauss’s September 12 meeting with the Israeli Ministerial team for the autonomy talks has been found. Remarks made by Strauss and Burg to the press following this meeting were reported in telegram 2928 from Jerusalem, September 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790416–0644)

9. My talk with Dayan⁷ went over much the same ground on Lebanon, Begin had briefed him on our earlier meeting. Although Dayan seems much more worried about the political price Israel is paying abroad, he too insists that terrorist attacks must cease both from Lebanon and within Israel if a real truce is to be achieved. Dayan urged us to develop a longer range strategy for the whole Lebanon problem, including the ultimate settlement of the 350,000 Palestinians presently there. He says Weizman is the key to the near-term problem and urged us to hit Weizman hard while he is in Washington.⁸ I strongly recommend that we do so. He advised me that Weizman has been instructed to discuss Lebanon with us without waiting for Dayan visit.

10. I saw the Mayor of Bethlehem at our Consulate General,⁹ after carefully making clear to Begin that I would be meeting various West Bankers or Gazans from time to time. He raised no objection.

11. All in all the trip to Jerusalem was very worthwhile, if unspectacular. Begin seemed somewhat passive, frail and easily tired. But he is as unyielding as ever on anything which is not literally specified in the Camp David Agreement. And on Lebanon, he only hopes that things will remain quiet.¹⁰

Strauss

⁷ See footnote 2 above. Strauss met with Dayan on September 12.

⁸ See Document 286.

⁹ No other record of this meeting has been found.

¹⁰ On September 15, Strauss instructed Atherton to provide Khalil with a report on the substance of his conversations in Israel. (Telegram 242503 to Cairo, September 15; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 9–11/79) Atherton met with Khalil the same day to convey Strauss's report. (Telegram 18881 from Cairo, September 15; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 43, Robert Strauss, Middle East, 9/9–15/79)

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 15, 1979, 2245Z

243592. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Weizman.

1. (Secret entire text.)

2. Secretary and Weizman met for about hour and one-quarter late afternoon September 14, following meetings at Pentagon² that lasted through morning and early afternoon. With Weizman were Evron, General Tamir and Col. Tehila. With the Secretary were Ambassador Strauss, Saunders, Draper, Hunter and Korn. Following are main points of the discussion.

3. Weizman opened with discussion of Israel's need to assure itself of modern fighter aircraft and tanks for the 1980s and its desire to produce the F-18 or an Israeli equivalent thereof. This, Weizman argued, makes sense not only for Israel but for the US, since Israel's producing its fighter aircraft would ease the political burden on the US; for example, if Israel hadn't produced the Kfir³ it would have had to ask the United States to furnish an equivalent number of aircraft. Israeli production of aircraft would also reduce Israel's need for US financial assistance. Secretary thanked Weizman for his presentation and said he would be discussing the matter with Brown.

4. Turning to autonomy negotiations, Weizman said that as we knew "I've been autonomous on autonomy." He had not been very happy about the way the negotiations were being conducted. GOI wants to carry out what it signed but the country is in a state of "internal crisis" and there is a lot of doubt and negative feeling about the idea of autonomy. Israeli public is uneasy and suspects that the whole point of Camp David as the Americans see it is to get Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza and set up an independent Palestinian state there. Noting that position taken by the Egyptians at Haifa was "rather mild," Weizman said he expected Israel would have fewer problems with Egypt in the negotiations than with the United States. Weizman said the course to take is to stick to Camp David and make it work. Secretary

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2003. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Stapleton (S/S-O) and Draper; approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, and the White House.

² The memorandum of conversation for Weizman's September 14 meeting with Brown at the Department of Defense is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Israel Oct 1979.

³ The Kfir fighter jet was first built for the Israeli Air Force by Israel Aerospace Industries in 1975, and entered service in 1976.

and Ambassador Strauss said we agree entirely; our common objective is to make Camp David work. Secretary pointed out that Israeli fears that the US is trying to make the West Bank and Gaza into an independent state are unfounded and reviewed history of negotiations that led up to the accords.

5. Secretary said he would like to discuss Lebanon. Weizman said he expected that and asked if he could lead off. Obviously primed for the subject, Weizman then launched into a long and impassioned discourse. Fact that situation is currently quiet in southern Lebanon is mainly result of Israel's policy, Weizman argued, though efforts of US had contributed. Basic problem is that there is no authority in Lebanon. Lebanese Government doesn't control the country, Palestinians have wrought havoc and Syrians are in occupation of large areas; order reigns only in the Haddad area, Weizman said, terming Haddad a "genuine nationalist" and a "great man." On top of all this there are ten to fifteen thousand armed Palestinians in Lebanon and when bombs go off in Israel terrorist headquarters in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut claim credit. What, Weizman asked, can you do with a country that harbors thousands of armed terrorists and allows its territory to be used freely to attack its neighbor? Haddad was doing a good job but couldn't stop all attacks on Israel. UN was doing its best but there were 500 armed PLO in their area; and Israeli forces were working overtime to prevent attacks. In the past four months Israel had gone out and gotten the terrorists, and for that reason terrorists had not managed to carry out any major actions against Israel during that period. As a result the PLO had taken out its frustration on Haddad and "made life miserable for him," Weizman said.

6. The question for Israel, Weizman said, is what does it do when it gets information that a terrorist group is getting ready to hit it? Should it wait and try to catch them or go out and get them? After returning to this point several times, Weizman said that if terrorists keep quiet, Israel will too. But if it learns that terrorists are on their way to kill Israelis he would not recommend to the cabinet that the IDF simply wait for them to arrive. Weizman repeated that in his view the current quiet is a direct result of the hard hitting done by the IDF.

7. The Secretary said we don't question Israel's right to defend itself but realistically both the Israelis and we know that Israel has been hurt badly by the devastation it has wrought in Lebanon. The war in Lebanon has been covered on prime time TV both in this country and in Europe, and people's attitudes have been seriously affected by what they've seen. Secretary stressed that Israelis must find some different way to deal with the terrorist threat. Secretary explained that we have mounted a major effort to bring about a truce, a lasting end to the violence, and that we have been dealing through third countries in an ef-

fort to rein in the PLO. Secretary again stressed that Israel's actions in Lebanon have done it great damage and urged that Weizman give thought to what Israel could contribute to making the truce stick, since that is so much in its best interest. Weizman said he would do so. Israelis had for some time wanted to talk to Lebanese Foreign Minister Boutros but Boutros had refused. Weizman returned to the point that the problem is that the Government of Lebanon doesn't control Lebanon, again argued that it is Israeli actions that have brought current calm and remarked that Egyptians have not said anything to Israel about its actions in Lebanon. Secretary observed that Israelis are using American—not Egyptian—weapons in Lebanon.

8. Weizman said he would do his best to hold back but if things blow up again Israel would probably have to be more severe and might have to go into Lebanon again for an even longer time than before. Secretary pointed out that that would be even more damaging to Israel and urged again that Weizman think about ways to make the cease-fire lasting. Ambassador Strauss urged that Israel take advantage of the opportunity to get the edge on the PLO by announcing a moratorium on violence. Secretary seconded this suggestion.

Vance

287. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 17, 1979, 1:38–2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Mubarak Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

President Jimmy Carter

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert Strauss, Personal Representative of the President

Robert Hunter, National Security Council

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(5/79–9/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.

Egypt

Vice President Husni Mubarak

Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal

The President began by saying that he had had good phone calls this morning with both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat.² They were both in good spirits. There is growing trust and mutual respect between them, and a developing friendship. Both Begin and Sadat had pledged their commitment to a comprehensive settlement, and to resolve autonomy questions. To Begin he had said that the big impediment was the settlements. Begin acknowledged that this was a problem. He did not say when, or all of it, but it could be put in the past and resolved. It was a good talk. The President had called from Camp David. Begin's (?) attitude had been friendly and constructive in his assessment. He (The President) hopes and prays that there can be movement without delay on settlements. What does the Vice President think?

Vice President Mubarak said that he wants to convey President Sadat's best regards. He looks forward for good results of the autonomy talks by the end of the year. He has three points: first of which is a message from President Sadat.³ (President Carter read it.)

The President said that it was a good message.

Vice President Mubarak said that he had three issues to discuss, and had done so with Vance,⁴ Brzezinski, and Strauss: political problems, economic questions, and military equipment Egypt needs. Beginning with economics: he would present their requirements. After the Treaty, Egypt has had no source of currency except for the U.S. The Arabs are not providing them with hard currency. There is no other way but the U.S. He has asked for some requirements like wheat. He talked with Vance that they are getting 1.5 million tons, and need 500,000 more. Vance had said that the U.S. can afford 100,000 more; but that is very, very difficult for Egypt. He has talked with Khalil and Sadat; they said to speak with the President and his Administration, since this is vital: it

² No transcripts of these telephone conversations have been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat from Camp David from 7:39 a.m. to 7:44 a.m. Carter then spoke with Begin from 7:45 a.m. to 7:49 a.m. (Carter Library, President's Daily Diary)

³ See Document 283.

⁴ Vance met with Mubarak in his office at the Department of State on September 11, where the discussion covered the current state of the peace process, Egyptian military needs, and economic assistance. A full memorandum of conversation for this meeting was produced on September 13 and is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 18, Egypt: 7–9/79. Vance met with Mubarak again on September 14 to discuss Egypt's requests for more commodity and PL-480 aid for FY 1980. A summary of this meeting is in telegram 243222 to Cairo, September 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790422–0608)

is the food of the people. If Egypt could buy it elsewhere it would do so, but it can't. On maize, he asks for 100,000 tons more; 20,000 tons more of edible oils; frozen chickens, 5,000 tons more; and animal fats, 40,000 tons more. They have asked for rice since their population is increasing, and they must send some to Sudan, which is in a crisis. He had a message from Numeiry's aides asking for wheat and sugar; Egypt has to send it from time to time when it is needed. So, he is asking for 60,000 tons of rice. Also about 250,000 tons of iron. If it were a gift—as with the Japanese—this would be even better! These are nearly the whole requirements, and are very vital for the Egyptian people. He has talked with Vance and Strauss and Brzezinski. He told Vance that he would not leave here without a solution! Where can they buy it? So he insisted! (Note: all this with humor.) President Sadat two days ago had told him to tell of the urgency of increases, that they have no money to buy these commodities elsewhere.

The President asked what the level of wheat shipments to Egypt had been over the past five years.

Secretary Vance said that Egypt is getting about one-third of the world-wide total. It is very large. Shipments to other countries are in dollars; Egypt gets its in terms of quantity. Therefore Egypt gains the benefit that it does not have to worry about fluctuating prices.

The President asked how much was shipped three–four years ago.

Ambassador Ghorbal said it was one million tons. Last year it was 1.5 million. Now they badly need to have 2 million tons.

Vice President Mubarak said that this was the point: Egypt has a difficult situation on wheat. It has no relations with the Arabs; if it did, then it could buy elsewhere. But it can't find it.

The President asked whether other Egyptian aid programs could be reduced to provide more here. What about their CIP program?

Secretary Vance said that he would take a look at it, but there are difficulties there. Therefore we hadn't gone forward.

Vice President Mubarak said that he had talked with Khalil: this is difficult. Egypt needs all the items, and their sources are limited. This is a problem for this year.

The President said that he understood. The total is difficult, with the budget, the Congress, and our other aid programs.

Vice President Mubarak said that they can't find the money anywhere.

The President said that he understood.

Vice President Mubarak said he would stay until he gets it!

Ambassador Strauss said that if his wife stays, as well, that is ok.

Vice President Mubarak said that the second issue is military. He had talked with Harold Brown and David McGiffert on two items:⁵ the Air Force and the Navy. They had discussed the long-term plan. First, there are the 35 F-4 Phantoms. Then there would be other modern aircraft, starting in 1983. This puts the Air Force and Egyptian power in an awkward position. They have had no replacements since 1973. They had some MiG-23s, but they are all grounded or transferred to the States (sic!).⁶ The bulk of their planes are Mirages. These are not sufficient for their pilots and stability of the air force. There is Afghanistan and Aden; there is trouble involving Kuwait and Bahrain (which they had expected long ago). He has talked with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd about the Soviet position in Aden, which is dangerous. The situation could lead to a cancer in the Arabian Peninsula. It could be carried to the Gulf and oil. The UAE is open; Kuwait is open. Only Oman is strict enough in letting people in. With the others, it is easy for the Communists to work and build themselves up there. Therefore there is trouble in Bahrain and Kuwait. Two years ago, Bahrain froze its Parliament with six Communist members. They are afraid of the situation. Trouble has started. With regard to Sudan, the U.S. knows the problem, linked to Libya. Ghaddafi is doing what he can to remove the Sudanese regime. This means getting at Egypt, and means a Soviet plan. If they "reach" Egypt, they will push Communist groups, and find other countries easier to act against. On Morocco, Hassan asked for Egyptian help. Egypt sent four C-130s, each carrying eight tons of arms. They did this in secret, on request. Morocco wants to carry on relations, but secretly. So many Africans are against Morocco dealing with Egypt. So they have sent 27 tons and are contracting for other arms, with the Arab Organization. They said ok, and Morocco should send transport, to limit the amount of arms (?). Also, Somalia and Chad have asked Egypt for ammunition and machine guns. And these demands on Egypt affect the power of its armed forces. If the Soviets feel its power is going down, particularly in the Air Force, and the Soviets feed elements to other Air Forces, then there will be an imbalance. Egypt has 74 fighters; Ghaddafi has 154. Libya has 2,700 tanks, and will get 1,000 more later. Egypt has 1,700 tanks. In the correlation of forces, Libya alone has more arms. This doesn't mean it will dare do anything to Egypt, if they use Libyan crews in the tanks. But others are there—the East Germans and the North Koreans (which are said to be only for training, not for con-

⁵ The memorandum of conversation of Mubarak's meeting with Brown, September 17, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables.

⁶ According to an August 3 memorandum from Gates to Kimmitt and Sick, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski decided at their luncheon meeting the same day to "proceed quietly with the purchase of Egyptian MIG 23's." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 8-9/79)

flict with Egypt). But Libya has more planes and tanks. He said to Harold Brown on the Phantoms: 35 is not a fair number. That means no replacements, and there will be nothing else until 1983. But what about spare parts? Therefore they ask for more Phantoms: it is easier to get them than the F-15 or F-16, which would not come before 1983. Brown said that the U.S. could speed up some F-16s, before the end of 1981. Egypt needs more modern aircraft; and the quickest way to cover that is with F-4s, just to face what is going on in the area. If they have to wait for the F-16s, what can they do in these two years? With regard to Libya, the Soviets push from time to time. Egypt must face this, and help stability; it can't just sit on its hands.

With regard to the Navy, there was a plan for two destroyers. Brown had agreed that they are very old. One can get to Alexandria safely, but it is not sure that it can carry on; and the other one might not get there. This would create a very bad image in Alexandria. The Soviets would seize the opportunity to point that out. Egypt is keen to keep the image of the United States in good shape. He told Brown that a worsening image would be detrimental to both of us. The Arabs would raise hell; and the Soviets would point to it—therefore, there would be a bad image. Brown was convinced, and talked with Defense Minister Ali. There could be two frigates; but these are too costly—\$800 million each. The Defense Department is looking for a solution in lighter ships, on the condition that they would have enough range, to reach places like Oman.

There has been no answer on the Phantoms. Brown had said that it would be difficult to take them from the U.S. Air Force. This could not be in 1980, as Sadat had asked, but maybe a few. Egypt would consider this very vital. They need more Phantoms now. They need to train on them. They can't go to 1981–82 without covering this period with active airplanes.

His third point is what Sadat did in Haifa. He has sent this message. There is one other thing: Sadat found Begin not to be in good shape. He put no pressure on Begin at Haifa. Sadat says that he will build bridges, and prepare the floor, to give the President a chance to act in the good atmosphere which Sadat is working to create. Now there is the role of the U.S. Sadat is doing as much as he can in preparing the way for the U.S. Sadat says he knows the President will do his best. Sadat does not want to have heavy U.S. pressure on Begin now. The U.S. needs to start convincing Begin of the importance of the full autonomy issues. The U.S. should be talking issues now, building to the end of the year, to reach a precise conclusion.

Ambassador Strauss said he wanted to make the record clear. Do the Egyptians want a completion of Powers and Responsibilities by the end of the year? Our record shows that Egypt wants to start at the end of the year with possibilities.

Vice President Mubarak said that Sadat had said the U.S. should start convincing Begin now, and push the Powers and Responsibilities negotiations. By the end of the year, more pressure should be created. There should be increasing pressure and by the end of the year something precise, so that the Arab world (the Saudis and other moderates) would know something is being done. They wait for results by the end of the year. It is very important to start the convincing, and applying pressure after November 19. Sadat is therefore doing his best with Begin, building bridges, and preparing the ground for the President to go forward.

The President said that he appreciated that Vice President Mubarak could see Vance, Vice President Mondale, Brown, Strauss, and Brzezinski. It has been a constructive visit. He hopes the Vice President has learned of some of the limits on what we can do in our aid programs to Egypt, Israel, and others. The Vice President and Sadat know of the enormous demands on us from Asia, NATO, as well as the Middle East and parts of this Hemisphere. We have to balance what we can do with the Congress versus what we want to do to honor requests from our friends. He committed himself to Sadat, when they first met, to make a substantial increase in food. We have honored our commitment, with mutual benefits in our friendly relations. He wants Egypt, Sadat, and the Vice President to see us as their friend. We treat Egypt as a special friend, despite our worldwide obligations on aid, with other countries being even poorer. One-third of our PL-480 goes to Egypt. All other countries get allotments in dollars. If the price goes up, the quantity goes down. Egypt is special; it gets no tonnage cuts. He approved an increase in the 1.5 million tons of wheat by 100,000 tons. He doesn't know whether that can be increased. He will work with Vance, and consult with leaders in Congress to see if that can be modified in some degree. He doesn't want to mislead the Vice President: we are approaching our limit with Congress in this next year. On the other items, Vance should consider them, and report⁷ back to him (the President).

Secretary Vance said that some money is unspent. Only on rice would we have to go back to Congress. He thinks we can help, despite the limits, and work our way through.

The President asked if this means a short-fall on wheat and rice.

Secretary Vance said that rice can be handled.

The President said that we will do the best we can. He thinks that we will not meet the full Sadat request, but he will see about modifying the 1.6 million tons in wheat.

⁷ Not further identified.

On military issues, he had not heard a report yet on the Vice President's meeting with Harold Brown. He knows that it has always been the Egyptian attitude that the Gearing class destroyers might not be adequate. In Alexandria, he had proposed that the Egyptians take a cruiser, but they had said no. If they decide they want small, more modern ships, and no Gearings, then he will honor what Harold Brown recommends. There are increasing difficulties with the reduction of our F-4s. There is a feeling that the F-4 level is now minimal for us to have adequate reserves. He will wait for Harold Brown's assessment before responding.

On peace, President Sadat has been heroic. The Vice President should tell him that the President appreciates his good wishes. We will continue to work with Sadat in harmony. It is important that Egypt and the U.S. be close in the talks. We need to know Egypt's negotiating attitude, so we can honor the desires of Sadat. Sometimes it is difficult for him to be more forceful—as in protecting Palestinian rights, promoting the autonomy talks, preventing settlements—than is Sadat. It is hard when we take a strong position, and Sadat is more accommodating. We need to keep in touch, and keep our attitudes in a common approach. If Sadat is too sensitive about upsetting Begin, and expects him (the President) to be the only tough negotiator, then that is difficult for him (the President).

Secretary Vance said that he had talked with Ezer Weizman about Lebanon,⁸ who said that Sadat had not taken a strong position.

Vice President Mubarak said that Sadat did talk about this to the Israelis.

The President said that speaking about it, and being forceful, are different. On several occasions—concerning settlements, Lebanon, and the talks—he has tried to be forceful, but Israel says that the U.S. is being tougher than Egypt. He knows the need for good Sadat-Begin relations, but we also need to carry out Camp David. Begin is stubborn and courageous. He will say no if he means no; he will say yes if he means yes. On several occasions, we have been more forceful in carrying out the Camp David Accords than has Egypt. Israel takes advantage of the weaker country. Therefore, there is a need for us and Egypt to work more closely together.

Vice President Mubarak said that Sadat does not want the U.S. to be in an awkward position.

The President said that he does do it. We need to know beforehand if Sadat wants us both to be soft. It is no good for Sadat to be soft, and expect him (the President) to be hard. We need to deal with difficult

⁸ See Document 286.

issues—such as Jerusalem, settlements, and a comprehensive settlement. We both need to be forceful, in public and in private. Jews in America constantly say: why are we tough, when Sadat doesn't care? Therefore, there is a need to talk more closely and be more in concert—not only a part vs. Israel, not one weak and one strong.

Vice President Mubarak said that sometimes Sadat makes easy relations with Begin, so the President can get a good attitude from Begin in order for the U.S. to push forward. He does not want to put the U.S. in the position where it has to be forceful, and is in a corner. Sadat does not want to put the U.S. in any critical position.

The President agreed, but said that that is the result.

Ambassador Strauss said that Weizman had bragged on the President as a peacemaker, but had greater difficulties with the President than with Egypt. He (the Ambassador) told the Vice President this morning that this is a problem, and makes matters difficult. We agree—Khalil, Israel, the U.S.—on moving the autonomy talks. It is a little difficult to have no hard push until December, or after November 19. Therefore no positive results can be had on January first, if the pushing starts on December 15. Results will only come in the spring, if we are fortunate. The pace started with the Vice President, Sadat, Khalil (?) and him (the Ambassador). He sold this to Israel, to work at lower levels. This will take all of us to be successful.

The President said that it wasn't hard to get the Israelis to delay. He referred to the Israeli cabinet decision to permit Israelis to buy Arab land in the West Bank. What is the Egyptian position? We don't know. He assumes no Arab will like it.

Vice President Mubarak agreed.

The President said that if we speak, and Egypt is quiet, this will be difficult for us. If we make this most important, then there may be a problem with the talks. Therefore, it is important to have more consultation. He told Begin this morning that the settlements are their most difficult policy. Lebanon, as well. Both hurt Israel throughout the world.

Secretary Vance said that both cause trouble in the Arab world and in general. Unless we and Egypt work together, it will be tough to get our objective of a real truce in Lebanon. It takes time to get progress in the autonomy talks; if there is a Lebanon truce, that will buy time.

The President said that this discussion had been helpful. Most of the Egyptian requests we can accommodate, but not all. Vance and Brown will talk about it. He thinks there will not be much increase in wheat. We will look at the budget worldwide.

(The meeting ended at 2:30 p.m.)

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 19, 1979, 0239Z

246210. For Ambassador Leonard from Saunders. Subject: Alternative Approach to Powers and Responsibilities. Ref: State 243600.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. This telegram conveys to you the non-paper that we have been discussing with you and a message from Bob Strauss conveying it to you. The letter is self-explanatory, but I want to underscore for you Bob's desire that we put this paper forward in as informal a way as possible so as to avoid getting ourselves locked permanently into its contents. Given Bob's desire to approach this informally as described in the letter, we have therefore changed the lead-in to the document itself to establish in the text the informality of the paper. This message authorizes you to go ahead and give our non-paper to Burg Wednesday³ as we have discussed. If you feel the need to discuss it further, you could, of course, tell Burg that it will be arriving shortly and that you will have the paper Bob Strauss promised delivered to him as soon as it arrives, even though you may have departed for Egypt.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 9–11/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Robert S. Steven (S/S–O) and in substance in S/SN; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1989)

² Sent September 16, telegram 243600 to Tel Aviv forwarded an earlier draft version of the Powers and Responsibilities “non-paper,” encompassing the draft outline recommendations received by the Powers and Responsibilities working group at its meeting in Alexandria at the end of July. (National Archives, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1998)

³ Leonard gave Burg a copy of the non-paper during a September 19 meeting at the Knesset. At the meeting, Leonard also raised the recent decision taken by the Israeli Cabinet authorizing Israeli land purchases in the West Bank and Gaza. Describing the decision as “regrettable,” Leonard “explained that this, as well as other land issues, were things that should be discussed and settled in the autonomy negotiations. Burg disagreed and asserted that the Cabinet’s decision should not interfere with the negotiations. He explained that the Israeli idea of autonomy was coexistence with the Arabs within one political framework west of the Jordan; he saw nothing wrong with Arabs living in pre-’67 Israel and Israelis living on the West Bank and Gaza.” (Telegram 20187 from Tel Aviv, September 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840090–2476)

⁴ Leonard and Atherton met with Boutros Ghali to deliver the non-paper on September 22. Two days later, Leonard presented the document to Khalil. Khalil, Leonard reported, “reacted adversely to what he considered the ‘administrative’ focus of our paper, and was only slightly persuaded by my efforts to describe the potential in our suggested approach. Khalil expressed his strong preference for a U.S. paper highlighting the requirement for Israel to supply the documents necessary for a discussion of all powers and responsibilities currently exercised by the military government.” (Telegram 19590 from

3. In addition to the non-paper, following is the text of a message from Bob Strauss to you which, as the text states, he feels you might wish to give or show to Burg and Khalil in order to underscore the informal nature of this exercise.

4. Begin text: Dear Jim:

You will recall that I told you before I left Israel that I was going to get Ned and Ralph⁵ to take some notes I made and prepare a number of informal suggestions regarding the question of powers and responsibilities. I have attached these suggestions but want to make it clear to you and ask that you make it clear in turn to the Egyptians and Israelis that even I have questions about some of the ideas contained in these suggestions. I am aware that you will probably have similar reservations about some points as will the other two parties. I do hope, however, that at least a substantial part of these suggestions will be found to be useful by you and by our Egyptian and Israeli colleagues as we attempt to make progress over the next few months.

I would be grateful if you would make it clear to your partners that they need not worry about any formal response to these ideas which are suggested to serve as a basis for discussion. When you distribute the following, you should make clear the very informal nature of this non-paper. If it would help you to make this point, you should feel free to distribute copies of this letter to your colleagues. Sincerely, Robert Strauss. End text.

5. Begin text. Alternative approach to powers and responsibilities as a result of many conversations and after much staff work, we believe both sides might welcome informal thoughts on how to approach the subject of powers and responsibilities in further meetings. It is not expected that either Egypt or Israel will necessarily accept these suggestions in their entirety. Indeed, there may be aspects which may prove very difficult for one side or the other. They do, however, attempt to build on certain areas of agreement reached thus far and, in particular, on the common desire to move this portion of our negotiations forward so that we may begin to deal with these issues in greater detail at a technical level.

Under this approach, the plenary would authorize the formation of technical committees, composed of experts from each side, whose work would be guided by the working group and who would report to the plenary through the working group.

Cairo, September 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2495)

⁵ Edward S. Walker and Ralph J. Gerson, both Special Assistants to the President's Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

Several such technical committees might be formed at the outset, corresponding to the general areas represented by the spheres of activity on which there is presently agreement:

- 1) Economic affairs (for example, finance, trade, agriculture, industry and labor).
- 2) Social affairs (for example, education, culture, religion, social welfare, housing, transportation and health).
- 3) Local affairs and public order (for example, municipal administration, administration of justice, and local police).

A fourth technical committee might be formed to discuss the structure, composition and seat of the elected body, in light of the agreement to negotiate those subjects. This committee could also discuss those functions specified as responsibilities of the elected body in the appropriate portions of section A of the Camp David Framework (for example, representation on the continuing committee).

Either party should be free to raise any subject in the working group or its committees. Additional spheres can be discussed and additional committees can be formed if necessary, it being understood that each party must agree to any decisions taken.

The work program of the technical committees might include, but need not be limited to, the following:

—Identification and accumulation of the data required to discuss each sphere of activity with objectivity and in detail.

—Description of the major tasks that will have to be undertaken by the elected body in each sphere.

—Description of the major problems with which the elected body will be faced in carrying out those tasks.

—Examination of the existing laws and regulations pertaining to each sphere of activity, and identification of those which will remain relevant to accomplishing the tasks and solving the problems in each sphere during the transition period.

—Identification of those tasks and problems which will require additional measures during the transitional period.

Each technical committee could report the results of its work to the working group in accordance with a schedule decided by the plenary. The working group could then forward each report to the plenary, together with whatever comments it might choose to transmit.

The working group could also review the powers and responsibilities held in all spheres by the military government and its civilian administration under the present arrangements and report to the plenary a comprehensive listing of these powers, responsibilities and spheres. This would be undertaken without prejudice to the views of either

party on the disposition of powers and responsibilities in particular spheres under the transitional arrangements.

The work of the technical committees and working group would be facilitated by Israel's agreement to make available to them documents describing the powers and responsibilities held by the Israel military government and its civilian administration in the various spheres of their activity. End text.

6. Comment: Penultimate paragraph was suggested by L and upon reflection we believe it is worth your consideration for inclusion. We see it as being the only device readily available (which the Israelis so far have not formally rejected) that can broaden scope of working group discussions beyond spheres already agreed upon and therefore help to recommend this paper to the Egyptians.

7. Since you are much closer to the flow of events than we here in Washington, you should feel free to make adjustments to this text to meet the needs of your tactical situation. Our goal remains a document to which both Egypt and Israel can eventually subscribe and which will usher in a new and more concrete phase of negotiations, without opening us to argument at some future time that by putting forward this paper we have agreed that subjects not listed should be precluded from discussion.

Vance

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt¹

Washington, September 20, 1979, 0158Z

247541. Subject: Tripartite Talks on Security Supervision in the Sinai.

1. (Secret-entire text)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to Jerusalem, Amman, USUN, Sinai, Jidda, Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, and the White House.

2. The talks with Egypt and Israel² on peacekeeping arrangements in Sinai ended this afternoon with an agreement, subject to approval³ of the respective governments and in the case of the US, the approval of Congress, on the following points:

—With respect to Zones A and B, we would agree to assume the supervision and observation function during the interim period to ensure compliance with the treaty terms. Both sides accepted our position that we could only consider undertaking this role if it could be performed with a contingent of civilian personnel which did not exceed the presently authorized size for SFM.

—We also agreed to increase the frequency of Olive Harvest flights to an average of one per week.⁴

—With respect to the buffer zone, both sides have agreed to work out arrangements jointly between themselves without U.S. involvement.

3. We had several exchanges with Kurt Waldheim during the day to try to work out a letter from him which would enable the Israelis to accept UNTSO as the supervising mechanism for Zone B. Unfortu-

² The talks took place in Washington September 18–19. Memoranda of conversation for the tripartite talks have not been found. A memorandum of conversation for a September 18 bilateral meeting between the Israeli and U.S. delegations during which Vance outlined the requirements for any U.S. role in the peacekeeping arrangements in the Sinai (all U.S. personnel should be civilian and unarmed, the total number should not exceed present complement of SFM, the United States must obtain congressional approval before participation, some form of UN presence should be sought), is in the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1979 Memcons—Secretary. The Department of State produced a draft aide mémoire on Sinai peacekeeping arrangements, based upon the trilateral negotiations on September 29. See footnote 3 below.

³ The agreement was approved by the Israeli and Egyptian Cabinets on October 7 and October 13, respectively. The Israelis, however, insisted that the United States forge a multinational peacekeeping force at least a year before the IDF withdrawal reached its final completion in 1982. (David K. Shipler, "Israeli Cabinet Approves Temporary Plan for Monitoring Treaty in Sinai Without U.N.," *The New York Times*, October 8, 1979, p. A8; "Egypt OKs Agreement to Monitor Israeli Pullout," *Los Angeles Times*, October 14, 1979, p. A15) In response to the U.S. draft aide mémoire, the Israeli Foreign Ministry produced a counter-draft on October 9. Further minor revisions were agreed on October 18 in a meeting held in Washington among Evron, Sterner, Saunders, and Vance. Summarizing the meeting in an October 19 briefing memorandum for Vance, Sterner wrote: "Evron tried hard to get us to put language in the Aide Memoire to make it clear that UNTSO would not have an independent role, and that it should be there exclusively to support us." Sterner added that United Nations Under Secretary General Brian Urquhart had "asked specifically" that the United States avoid such language in the aide mémoire. He concluded that the new U.S. draft aide mémoire, dated October 19, "meets Israel's needs and that, together with the language in the previous aide mémoire, it fully reflects what was agreed to in Washington." Sterner's memorandum, along with all three draft aide mémoires, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880104–1380.

⁴ Previously, the U.S. Air Force reconnaissance flights undertaken under Operation Olive Harvest (see footnote 2, Document 116) numbered two per month. (David K. Shipler, "Israeli Cabinet Approves Temporary Plan for Monitoring Treaty in Sinai Without U.N.," *The New York Times*, October 7, 1979, p. A8)

nately, Waldheim felt unable to make any statement in the letter indicating that UNTSO's mandate would be to supervise the Treaty,⁵ and Dayan remained insistent that without this Israel could not accept UNTSO as having responsibility for verification in any of the zones. At the end of the day, however, Dayan indicated that he would be willing to recommend to the Cabinet that an UNTSO "presence" could be "integrated" into the peacekeeping arrangements. He and General Ali agreed that this "presence" (not spelled out in any detail) would be primarily in the buffer zone but could also extend to Zones A and B if the Egyptians agreed and we found it useful—and providing it was understood UNTSO would have no repeat no responsibility for supervision. As a first step, we are seeking clarification from Waldheim as to whether he would be willing to have UNTSO play this kind of limited role; the second step would be for Dayan to recommend this to the Israeli Cabinet as part of the overall package.

4. Dayan pressed hard for further U.S. commitments about the permanent arrangements at the end of the 3 years. He stated his position several times that Israel would not be expected to begin its withdrawal from Zone C until the multilateral force was in being. He also said he would be approaching us shortly with a proposal for the size and functions of this force. We made no commitments on these points, although we did agree to sit down with the Israelis a year before the completion of final withdrawal and begin to plan for the formation of that force.

5. Copies of memcons and associated documents will be pouched to Tel Aviv and Cairo ASAP.

6. The next few days will be a delicate period during which Dayan and Weizman will be putting this proposal to the Israeli Cabinet; Ali will be taking it to President Sadat and we will have to go through our own decision making process here, including consultation with the Congress about our own involvement. Therefore, you should not go into detail in discussing these terms with others beyond what you will have seen in the Secretary's remarks to the press following the conclusion of our meeting today.⁶

Vance

⁵ The U.S. Mission to the United Nations clarified this point in telegram 3871 from USUN, September 20, pointing out that Waldheim was "most willing" to "accommodate" the United States by making UNTSO available and to provide "written assurances that UNTSO could be expanded and its functions altered in consultation with Israel and Egypt." What Waldheim could not commit to in writing "was an explicit reference to the treaty because by doing so he would invite a Soviet-Arab reaction which would make UNTSO's continued participation impossible." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-2342)

⁶ The text of Vance's remarks was not found. The text of the Department's daily press briefing for September 20, during which the talks were discussed, was transmitted in telegram 247721 to multiple posts, September 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790431-0946)

290. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 20, 1979, 4:30–6 p.m.

Subject

Egyptian Military Supply Relationship (U)

Participants

State

David Newsom (chairman) Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown
Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary
David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary, International Security Affs.
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern African, and South Asian Affairs

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

OMB

John White, Deputy Director
Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for the Budget

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

White House

David Aaron

NSC

Robert Hunter
Gary Sick
Robert Kimmitt

The PRC recommended (with OMB to comment separately²) that a U.S. delegation resume talks with the Egyptians in early November. This delegation should be authorized to discuss a five-year U.S.-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 123; 9/20/79). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnote 4, Document 292.

Egyptian military supply relationship based on a proposed level of U.S. support as follows:

1. \$350 million of additional credits in FY 81.
2. Cash flow financing of the Egyptian program.
3. \$800 million in credits per year for five years (FY 82–FY 86).
4. Approval in principle to sell F–16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks. (S)

Discussion

Secretary Brown reported to the PRC on the results of the high-level delegation³ which visited Egypt in mid-August for discussions with the Egyptian military leadership, and on subsequent discussions he had conducted with Vice President Mubarak in Washington.⁴ It was his judgment that Egypt has very substantial legitimate security needs. Given the withdrawal of Arab financial support from Egypt, the fact that Sadat has in effect burned his bridges by turning to us, and our own political commitment to Egypt as part of the on-going peace process, he saw no alternative to the United States accepting a major program of support for Egypt for some time to come. This analysis was endorsed fully by the Department of State, the JCS, and the NSC. Admiral Turner added that, without substantial U.S. support, Sadat might be in trouble domestically. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that Egypt was previously reported to be receiving \$800 million per year from Arab sources. That funding was assumed to be available when we proposed the \$1.5 billion, three-year “Peace Package” for Egypt.⁵ Although Egypt has requested at least \$8 billion of military equipment, our own analysis of Egypt’s security needs indicates that it requires a military program of about \$4 billion through FY 86. He proposed that the United States consider a program of FMS credits over a five-year period (FY 82 through FY 86) of \$800 million per year. He also noted that some additional assistance would be required before FY 82 in order to permit Egypt to begin working out its military priorities and to begin placing orders. Otherwise, there would be no tangible progress on the Egyptian program during the next two critical years. He proposed that this be accomplished in two ways:

—That we agree to finance the Egyptian program on a “cash flow” basis. This procedure, which is now used with Israel and Jordan, permits available credits to be used to cover actual expenses in a year, with the implicit understanding that additional credits will be available

³ See footnote 4, Document 268.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 287.

⁵ See Document 206.

in future years. (The Egyptian program is now handled on a “full funding” basis in which credits are set aside from the start to cover the entire cost of a program.) By shifting to the cash flow basis, some of Egypt’s credits under the \$1.5 billion “Peace Package” would be freed to cover start-up costs on additional programs.

—That an additional \$350 million in credits be added to the FY 81 budget. This additional increment, *plus cash flow funding*, would smooth out the two-year gap until additional funds became available in FY 82. If this course of action were adopted, we would have to explain to Congress that the withdrawal of Arab support from Egypt required us to request additional funds before the end of the three-year period previously anticipated for the “Peace Package.” It would also provide leverage for Israel to request an increase in its own funding level. (S)

All agencies except OMB agreed that this level of funding was consistent with Egypt’s needs. OMB representatives stated that they would want to take a much closer look at the concept of cash flow funding. OMB indicated that they would submit their comments on this and the budgetary implications of this very large proposal to the President separately since they had not had time to study it sufficiently. (S)

OMB questioned the need to seek a decision on this issue now, rather than during the regular budget review process in December. Secretary Brown noted that we had promised General Ali to resume talks in early November. At that time we would have to be able to provide some indication of the size of the program we were prepared to offer. It was also noted that the proposed sums—although very large—required an appropriation of only ten percent of the total amount as a credit guarantee. (S)

The PRC reviewed the list of items which Egypt has requested. All agreed that we could not support its request to purchase F–15 aircraft at this time. However, all agencies, including ACDA, supported the OSD/JCS proposal that we indicate our willingness in principle to sell F–16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks to Egypt. Other items on the list, e.g. APCs, air defense, ships, etc., did not pose a significant problem in terms of arms transfer policy. The exact number, mix, and timing of any purchases would have to be worked out with Egypt. This program would not permit Egypt to purchase as much as they had requested, and further negotiations would be required to permit them to work out their own priorities. (S)

All agreed that consultations should be undertaken with the Congress as soon as possible after the President had had the opportunity to review the PRC recommendation and take a decision. We would probably wish to inform President Sadat personally of the President’s decision at approximately the time we begin consultations on the Hill,

but we should avoid leaks coming from Egypt before the Hill had been informed. (S)

291. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the Embassy in Jordan¹

New York, September 26, 1979, 2324Z

Secto 8020. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With King Hussein.

1. S (Entire text)

2. Summary: Secretary and King Hussein reviewed Mid East developments and King discussed at length, though in little detail, his goal of seeking Arab consensus which would bring the Palestinians/PLO to a position with which they, other Arabs, United States and eventually Israel could live. Hussein said that PLO ready now to talk about future of Palestinian-Jordanian relations, perhaps a confederation, and that PLO also seeking Jordanian advice on broader questions of PLO relations within and beyond Arab world. Jordan's current posture is to respond to PLO proposals. Secretary welcomed Hussein's description of these developments and stressed his view that what Hussein was suggesting was not necessarily in conflict with what U.S., Egypt and Israel now doing. Challenge is to assure that they do not become contradictory but converge later in time. Key to success in this regard will be timing: what we are now doing concerns transitional period, which we all are agreed is needed, and what King is engaged in concerns shape of eventual final settlement. Our process will continue to go forward and as King develops his concepts it should be as parallel track with view to eventual convergence of the two in most helpful way. On Lebanon, King agreed that improvement there critically important and said that he would be as helpful as he could; he welcomed suggestion that we keep in touch to assure that our Lebanon efforts are complementary. Secretary and King touched also on tank sales—King said deal with U.K. should be completed in week or so—on Maqarin Dam and on regional security. End summary.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 56, Jordan: 7-11/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in New York to address the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. A handwritten notation in the right-hand margin reads: "important talk."

3. Secretary met with King Hussein Sept. 24 for hour and a half. With King were Court Chief Abdul Hamid, Minister Hassan Ibrahim and Ambassador Salah. Secretary was accompanied by Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretary Saunders, Ambassador Veliotos and Country Director Cluverius. Secretary welcomed King and said it had been too long since their last conversation. King expressed his pleasure at renewing their friendship. Secretary then expressed his interest in idea of Jordan-West Bank/Gaza confederation which Anwar Khatib had publicly espoused recently in Amman. King simply said such ideas have been around for a time and moved on to put them in context which he described as willingness of PLO to take a fresh look at Palestinian-Jordanian relations. King said he has been working to bring the Palestinians and PLO to a course with which all, including US and eventually Israel, could live. He said he wanted to bring Arafat to political maturity and he felt Arafat was ready now to discuss future Palestinian-Jordanian relations and wanted to know King's views. Hussein said he had told Arafat that, on the contrary, it was up to Palestinian/PLO to tell him how they felt future relations should be shaped. Hussein continued that PLO does want dialogue "across the board" and he of course is ready to hear them out. Sharaf interjected that Anwar Khatib's statements about a united Arab kingdom apparently were inspired by his Majesty's meetings with Arafat.

4. Secretary then described Romanian envoy's report to him of Arafat's view which included PLO acceptance told Arafat that, on the contrary, it was up to Palestinian/PLO to tell him how they felt future relations should be shaped. Hussein continued that PLO does want dialogue "across the board" and he of course is ready to hear them out. Sharaf interjected that Anwar Khatib's statements about a united Arab Kingdom apparently were inspired by his majesty's meetings with Arafat.²

4. Secretary then described Romanian envoy's report to him³ of Arafat's view which included PLO acceptance of Israel within pre-1967 borders and, specifically, Arafat's conclusion that ultimate solution is confederation. Hussein said Arafat had told him that Ceaucescu had made some suggestions and added that Ceaucescu had access in useful places and could make a contribution. Hussein said Arafat was concerned about motives behind apparent and seemingly increasing USG desire to deal with PLO. Is USG doing it to involve PLO in a genuine way or as device to discredit PLO? PLO is worried that USG may be seeking contacts in order to keep PLO quiet. Nonetheless, King Hussein said,

² The repetition of the first phrase of this and the next paragraph suggests that this paragraph is likely a transmission error.

³ No record of this discussion has been found.

there are USG–PLO contacts, particularly in Vienna, and at Arafat's request Hussein was prepared to advise PLO on how he might handle the situation. Secretary said he had to clarify one point: Vienna contacts have been casual and not at all substantive. There are no substantive USG–PLO contacts. Hussein said he had the impression there were. Secretary said there definitely are not.

5. Secretary asked if Arafat is serious about confederation and, if so, how does King see it. Hussein said Arafat appears serious about seeking real cooperation with Jordan, including the peace process. In this respect in response to Arafat's request for his views on the future relationship between the PLO and Jordan King had said he wanted Arafat to provide a detailed proposal which Jordanians could study. Secretary said that confederation idea is not inconsistent with what we, Egypt and Israel are now doing and, indeed, is fully consistent with long-standing USG position that some kind of formal relationship between Jordan and West Bank/Gaza seemed to us to be most workable final arrangement. In context of discussion on subject, Hussein suggested Jordan and the PLO might be able to come to agreement on future relationship between Jordan and West Bank/Gaza by the time of the Arab summit planned for the end of the year. (Sharaf later noted the timing of the summit might slip).

6. Secretary then expressed his thanks for Jordanian role in delaying the vote on Palestinian rights resolution and turned conversation to Lebanon. He said we have gone to Israelis in strongest possible terms and, so far, ceasefire is fragile but holding. We have told Dayan and Weizman of our concern, and spent a great deal of time discussing it with them during their recent visit here. It is critically important that we move situation beyond ceasefire to real truce and build on truce to achieve some improvements on the ground. Saunders explained that we have a series of steps we intend to take toward this end. We do not have one grand design but a number of packages of steps to put forward over a number of months, perhaps beginning in a week or two. Saunders said Lebanon deserves this attention on its own merits—what is happening there is difficult for all of us to live with—and because of its inevitable effect on the peace process. Hussein agreed that help for Lebanon is critical and Arab summit on Lebanon is being considered. (Later Jordanians said Lebanon would be one item on agenda of summit expected in November or December). First, however, there needed to be some Arab agreement on what should be done. He said he is pressing hard for this and has raised issue with Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrians. Veliotis asked if discussion with Syrians had included idea of timetable for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Hussein did not respond directly but said Assad wanted to get out of Lebanon and would do so under the right conditions, and that such a timetable would be needed eventually.

7. Hussein turned discussion back to peace issues and said goal is to work out with PLO and key Arabs an agreed Arab position on major issues which would, in effect, provide PLO an Arab cushion for steps toward peace which it must take at some point. This would include agreement on what is needed to change SC Resolution 242 to be acceptable on Palestinian rights. Arabs must be agreed before a position can be brought to the world. Sharaf said an Arab consensus is needed to support PLO on such difficult issues as mutual Israel-PLO recognition and language of any new SC resolution. PLO is considering all of this and Hussein said that Arabs need such agreed positions whatever outcome of USG efforts and that USG might need this Arab consensus if its efforts do end in stalemate which is likely in his opinion due to Israel intransigent attitudes and harmful actions.

8. Secretary asked if King had any timetable on these inter-Arab consultations. Hussein said process, which Sharaf interjected are not yet really formal consultations, should be completed in two–three months. Sharaf said that first question other Arabs ask is what would U.S. view on these ideas be. Secretary said that of course depends on how they come out. What we are now working on is arrangements for transition period, which we all agree is needed, and what King is discussing with other Arabs is a vision of what should happen at the end of that period. They are not inconsistent. Saunders interjected that what is needed as we proceed along parallel tracks is mutual acceptance that what the other is doing is sincere and well-intentioned. We need a meeting of the minds and way to reach it is through mutual respect for the other's concerns. Hussein said there is no doubt of President Carter's sincerity and commitment but that peace process had gone astray and is headed for stalemate. Saunders said that of course we do not believe this is the case but, even if it is at some future point, there can be ingredients in a stalemate which can be used to move ahead.

9. Under Secretary Newsom wondered if King was confident that inter-Arab discussion would be completed before the issue of a new resolution comes up in the UN. Hussein said that ideally it should be and Sharaf added that Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria have heard his Majesty's ideas. PLO is seeking King's advice and guidance and has a great interest in a new SC resolution which would put Palestinian issues in truer perspective. PLO needs something major in this regard to justify acceptance of 242 and Israel. PLO also needs Arab support for such a move and this support is his Majesty's goal. Secretary said that Romanian reports of Arafat's position, about which he wanted Hussein to be fully informed, was that what Arafat needed is resolution acceptable to U.S. and Israel which would recognize Israel's right to existence within secure and recognized borders and the Palestinians' rights to self-determination would not be further defined in the resolution but it

was Arafat's position that it should be understood to mean confederation. Sharaf said Arafat also wanted a conference to settle this. Secretary said that this was true, according to Romanians but not very specific. Newsom said he understood it meant a conference to handle those Arab-Israel issues which are not yet settled. Sharaf asked if this was Romanian view or Arafat's? Secretary interjected that all this was more than Arafat seems to have shared with King; USG would be following this closely.

10. Ambassador's comment: Hussein appeared taken aback by Secretary's detailed description of Arafat's position as reported by Romanians. He might really be ignorant of any such specific, serious PLO positions; it is more likely he was unaware of such a detailed exchange and surprised Arafat would jump the gun with the Romanians on such sensitive issues before they were settled by other Arabs. On the other hand, Hussein might conclude that Arafat is doing his usual thing—telling different people different things. In any case, Hussein should react by becoming even more wary about how far he can trust Arafat as they go down the road of cooperation and address the—for Jordan—jugalur issue of Jordan's future relationship to the West Bank and Gaza. In discussing this and related subjects in subsequent conversation, Sharaf made clear Jordan's cautious approach to this subject—i.e. willingness only to respond to PLO suggestions, was calculated as best way to proceed for both tactical and longer range strategic reasons. Without being specific, Sharaf was clearly signalling that Hussein sensed he might be on threshold of achieving goal of Arab legitimacy for at least shared mandate re negotiating on behalf of Palestinians and he is going to be very cautious in next few months. End comment.

11. Newsom asked how King saw Assad's position. Hussein replied that his position is not good but that he is in no immediate danger. Lebanon is in part cause of his troubles. Secretary asked if Hussein thought, as we did, that Lebanese Army is gaining strength and cohesion. Both Hussein and Sharaf replied that Lebanese leftists and Palestinians are still not satisfied with Army's confessional balance. Hussein said that some major Lebanese factions are still opposed to GOL, that Syrian presence in Lebanon is lowering effectiveness of Syrian Army, but that major problem in the situation is Israeli behavior.

12. Secretary said he wanted to raise Maqarin Dam. He was looking forward to report of new AID Administrator Bennet's talks in Amman on Maqarin and other aid issues, noting he had recently testified in the Congress to assure that the funding for the Maqarin project is carried over. Secretary said he felt that the project was in good shape as far as Congress is concerned. Hussein said talks with the Syrians are moving along but that a different Syrian Prime Minister would help; present incumbent not really attentive to business.

13. Secretary said he wanted to mention the tank sale, which we hoped to move forward soon to Congress. He said he wanted King to understand that it would cause us no problem if King chose British or American tanks; whatever his decision, it is fine with us. Hussein said that, frankly, there are problems with U.S. offer: lead time is very long and tanks would not be equipped with sights which others (read Israelis) already have. In any case, deal with U.K. probably will be completed in a week or ten days. Saunders asked how many British tanks might be purchased. Hussein said one division at least. Veliotis noted that this might mean a U.S. purchase of about one hundred M-60s. King agreed. Veliotis added that an early decision of chieftains will help us with the Hill since the rather vague number we have been using has given some congressmen the impression that we do not know what we really want to do. Hussein, Sharaf and Veliotis agreed that it would be useful if all this was settled by time of October joint military commission meeting.

14. Newsom asked for King's views of Jordanian-Saudi cooperation in Yemen and of situation there. Hussein said there had been no real change in Yemen since situation there rather static. He had discussed it with Prince Sultan in Geneva enroute to New York. King said contingency planning is needed and that SAG and GOJ should look ahead to potential dangers and plan together how to meet them. Hussein said he shared Saudi doubts about Salih and felt his regime disorganized particularly in comparison with much better organized government in Aden. Veliotis said that King's officials had responded positively to Doug Bennet's discussions in Amman re need to strengthen North Yemen's institutions and that Jordan could play a helpful role. Hussein and Newsom agreed that much would depend on Saudi view of Salah which is not good at the moment. Hussein turned to broader aspects of regional security and said that Syria is not yet ready to participate and Iraqis feeling squeezed between events in Iran and Israeli threat. They are increasingly anti-communist, however, and this is to the good. Noting he realized he sounded like the late King Faisal, Hussein said Arabs felt themselves at present under pressure from Communists and Zionists.

15. Secretary wondered what King planned to say to the General Assembly.⁴ Hussein said he felt it would be positive and, hopefully,

⁴ King Hussein addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 25. During his speech, he accused Israel of refusing to treat Arabs as human beings "but as a human barrier which it must seek to demolish." The King also rejected calls for autonomy for the Palestinians as described in the Camp David Accords, insisting that the Palestinians must be given their own state. He noted: "Autonomy for the people but not the land" was a principle the Palestinians would not accept. (Bernard D. Nossiter, "Gromyko, at U.N., Calls Concern Over Soviet Units in Cuba Artificial," *The New York Times*, September 26, 1979, p. A1)

well received. Sharaf said his Majesty was not going to attack Camp David but simply explain Jordanian position had direct attention to the needs of the future. Sharaf said there was always chance one or two points might be misinterpreted by media. Veliotis quipped that those points should be dropped. Secretary said his speech⁵ would include the need to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and would stress the need to resolve the Lebanon crisis. He would give added emphasis to Lebanon in backgrounders.

16. Sharaf asked how President Sadat felt about changing SC Res 242. Secretary said Sadat looked at it in terms of timing. He did not feel time was right now. Once Israelis had moved back to El-Arish-Ras Muhammad line Sadat probably would be more comfortable with the idea of a new resolution. Sharaf asked how Secretary felt peace process would proceed. Secretary said he expected that by end of year we would have 50–60 percent of the powers and responsibilities of the SGA agreed, but not the tougher issues such as legislative authority and control over public lands. In answer to question, Secretary said he did feel, personally, that we would have agreed by end of year that East Jerusalem Arabs could vote for SGA. Meeting closed with brief exchanges on US-Cuban relations, SALT and the recent NAM Summit.

Vance

⁵ Speaking to the General Assembly on September 24, Vance called for a ceasefire and a "broader truce" in Lebanon. "There has been a cease-fire in southern Lebanon, the fragility of which is underscored by the events of today," Vance noted, referring to the dogfight that took place over Beirut between Israel and Syrian jets. (Bernard D. Nossiter, "Vance Says U.S. Seeks Firmer Truce for South Lebanon," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1979, p. A1)

292. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Military Assistance Program for Egypt (U)

As you know, the PRC met last week to consider how to respond to the Egyptian request for a five-year program of military cooperation and assistance. As indicated in the summary notes at Tab B,² Cy Vance, Harold Brown and I agree that a major program is required. Jim McIntyre has submitted his comments separately at Tab A, rightly pointing out the budgetary implications of a very substantial, long-term security relationship with Egypt. (S)

Egypt's very large military establishment is facing massive obsolescence in the near future. There is no inexpensive quick fix for this situation. There is also no realistic probability that other sources of military support will soon appear. The questions which Jim raises in his memorandum underline the difficulties which we all recognize are associated with a program of sufficient size to respond to Egypt's needs. A high-level Defense delegation visited Egypt in mid-August for frank and detailed discussions of the military supply problems Egypt faces.³ Our own subsequent analysis of the \$8 billion Egyptian request concluded that a program in the neighborhood of \$4.35 billion is required to meet Sadat's basic military and political needs over the next five years. (S)

We do not underestimate the difficulties of presenting a program of this magnitude on the Hill, and we recognize that it would be used as leverage to increase Israel's current aid levels. However, it is our reading of the mood on the Hill that the Egyptian predicament is understood and viewed with considerable sympathy. That viewpoint is substantiated by the findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, which recently conducted a fact-finding visit to Egypt.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 123, 9/20/79, Egypt. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document. The memorandum was found attached to an October 1 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance and Brown, directing them to produce by October 8 a joint State/Defense decision paper examining the implications of a long-term military assistance program for Egypt and advising them of Carter's view that "we be cautious about excessive U.S. commitments" and that "budget constraints will be very severe." (Ibid.)

² See Document 290.

³ See footnote 4, Document 268.

They concluded (and are reporting confidentially to the Committee) that there is need for an enduring U.S. military supply relationship with Egypt beyond anything discussed to date, probably including additional credits in FY 81 plus FMS credits in excess of \$500 million per year. The politics of this situation are very different from the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. (S)

Harold Brown is looking at possibilities of substituting materiel from our own inventory in place of new purchases with long lead times. However, the Egyptian problem of mass obsolescence is so great that we cannot expect to remedy it by drawing down our own active inventories. For example, Harold believes we could find about 15 F-4s from USAF inventories to offer the Egyptians, but that is only a small percentage of what they need. We may be able to find a number of M-48 tanks to replace Egypt's aging Soviet equipment. However, this is an issue which will have to be worked out in subsequent discussions with the Egyptians as we help them pare down their priorities to about half of what they have identified as their "minimum" needs. (S)

Similarly, the proposal to adopt "cash flow" procedures in managing Egypt's military account recognizes that we would permit Egypt to borrow against future credits. There is some risk associated with such an approach, but it is the same risk we have already accepted in dealing with large programs for Israel and Jordan. The fact is that continuation of the present "full funding" procedures will severely limit the mileage Egypt can hope to squeeze out of available credits and will inevitably lead to requests for significantly higher aid levels. (S)

Jim McIntyre's suggestion⁴ of a joint State-Defense decision paper is a good one. Since most of the analytical work for such a paper has already been done in preparation for the PRC meeting, I recommend that the paper be completed for your review and decision no later than October 8 in order to provide ample time for necessary consultations on the Hill and preparation of our presentation to the Egyptians in early November. I am concerned that we not delay very long on this issue, in view of the pressures on Sadat to show concrete results from his new association with us—pressures that are also related to the success of the

⁴ Attached but not printed is a September 26 memorandum from McIntyre to Carter. McIntyre concluded that the assistance package for Egypt should be "carefully structured to avoid the impression of entering into a formal five-year military supply relationship which is likely to be unnecessarily costly and politically and diplomatically awkward." Stating that "we can structure a better package," McIntyre recommended to Carter that he direct the Departments of State and Defense to produce a decision paper which considered the "budgetary impact on other programs (particularly Israel), alternative ways of structuring the program, and likely congressional and foreign reaction." Moreover, McIntyre urged Carter to delay a decision on the package "until you can see the full budgetary implications in November and December."

peace process. Thus *politically* there is need for some urgency, whatever we decide. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That a joint State/Defense decision paper be prepared for your review by October 8, examining the implications of a long-term military assistance program for Egypt along the lines proposed by the PRC, and alternatives.⁵ (S)

⁵ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation and added a handwritten note: "Be cautious about excessive U.S. commitments. Budget constraints will be *very* severe. J.C."

293. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 1, 1979

SUBJECT

A Course of Action on Lebanon

THE DECISION

This memorandum lays out for approval a concrete plan of action designed to transform the present ceasefire in South Lebanon into a longer lasting truce (a detailed scenario is attached). In the process we would seek to accomplish these specific additional objectives:

- enable the Lebanese Government to take several further steps to enhance its authority, particularly in the south, as part of the continuing implementation of Resolution 425;
- return internal Lebanese refugees to their homes and undertake an international program of rebuilding in limited areas of the south;
- strengthen UNIFIL's role and capability in partial preparation for the later day when it may be asked under Resolution 425 to help the Lebanese Government secure the Israeli-Lebanese border;
- lessen the likelihood of an Israeli-Syrian confrontation in the air;
- produce a token demonstration of Syrian willingness to begin withdrawing its forces while the Lebanese take increased responsibility for security in central and northern Lebanon;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 10/1–11/79. Secret; Nodis.

—begin turning the Palestinians from a military to a diplomatic strategy (through which terrorist attacks in Israel might be curbed substantially.)

THE PLAN IN A NUTSHELL

The centerpiece of the proposed program² is an *umbrella agreement* which would provide for the following:

- All parties will observe strictly the ceasefire.
- No element of the PLO will attack Israel by any means from bases in Lebanon. No element of the PLO will attack the Lebanese militias in southern Lebanon.
- The Lebanese militias will not attack Palestinian or Lebanese targets.
- Israel will not attack targets in Lebanon. Israel will assure compliance by the Lebanese militias in southern Lebanon with these arrangements.
- No party will attack or harass UNIFIL.
- Ceasefire violations will be the responsibility of UNIFIL and UN representatives to resolve. Communications to UNIFIL or UN representatives about ceasefire violations will be reported through appropriate means—including radio hotline—by Israel, Lebanon, the Arab deterrent force, the Lebanese militias in southern Lebanon, and the PLO. All parties will respect recommendations made by the UN representatives and UNIFIL to resolve conflict. (We will discuss with the UN and troop contributors how UNIFIL can be strengthened.)

Under that umbrella, working through different channels we would seek *implementing and complementary agreements in four areas*:

—Reduction and eventual elimination of Palestinian and Lebanese militia fighters from the *UNIFIL area*. UNIFIL would be given greater freedom of movement in the area held by the Lebanese militias, while upgrading its surveillance and detection capacities. (We would discuss the possible need for additional manpower.)

—Establishing and expanding stage by stage a “*zone of peace*,” *beginning with the city of Tyre*. Palestinian and Lebanese leftist fighters and offices would be withdrawn from Tyre, and a Lebanese military and civil presence would be established there.

—A *de facto* arrangement to forestall Israeli-Syrian *aerial confrontations*.

—Further *staged withdrawals by Syrian forces* from key areas in Beirut, with Lebanese Army units replacing them.

OVERALL STRATEGY

The detailed program of action outlined here is intended to establish for our own use a concept and the stages through which we would logically move in order to reach our objectives. We would not intend, however, to make all details and aspects of this plan available to any of

² Attached but not printed is a more detailed scenario for the proposed plan.

the parties (although we would share more details with Waldheim and one or two of his closest associates, because of their central role). To go into details, for example with the Israelis, could lead to an insistence that the details of the last stage of the plan be agreed upon before the first step is taken.

Our strategy would involve tailoring our initial presentation to the role which we foresee each party playing in the process and to anticipate—and thus to avoid—some of the difficulties which particular parties will have with certain aspects of the plan. As we proceed, we would retain the flexibility to refine or change some of the later steps we envisage.

THE ISSUES

Because there are so many actors, we have had to consider a number of issues that will arise in the implementation of this plan:

1. *Management.* We have reviewed various possibilities for the management of this program and have concluded that the U.S. will have to provide the motor to keep this effort going but will need to work in an almost co-manager relationship with the UN Secretary General. Ambassador Dean can well handle the U.S. role in Beirut. An important element in the UN's ability to play its role will be its ability to field a personality who can be a focal point for the negotiations among the parties in Lebanon. Both of us, of course, will work closely with the Lebanese President and Prime Minister.

It may prove useful at some point for Waldheim to send a special representative to the area for this purpose. We, the Lebanese, and the Arabs generally have supported Waldheim naming the just-retired UK Ambassador in New York, Ivor Richard, to this position. Neither the Soviets (because Richard is from a NATO country) nor the Israelis have been keen on the idea. If the Richard appointment does not materialize, we may be able to make use of an excellent Pakistani, Ambassador Akhund, who is now about to arrive in Beirut to coordinate UN development and reconstruction programs in Lebanon.

2. *Parties Involved.* Within Lebanon and in support of this plan we will need to marshal the support of the following parties:

—Secretary General *Waldheim* and the UN Secretariat generally. (We will resume consultations with them after you have agreed to this general approach.)

—*Israel.* (In both Washington and Tel Aviv, we would fill them in at an early stage on the broad outlines of our proposal, urge their cooperation, and promise to keep them informed of progress.)

—*The Lebanese Government.* (The U.S. and UN would jointly put forward a proposed course of action.)

—*The PLO.* (We would seek their cooperation through third parties primarily, but the UN would carry the major burden.)

- Syria*. (We might use a special U.S. envoy such as Phil Habib.)
- Saudi Arabia*. (We would use John West primarily and the Saudi Ambassador here, but we might want to send an envoy to Riyadh also.)
- Jordan*. (Hussein has shown a great deal of interest and has a working relationship with Arafat.)
- The Vatican*. (We will discuss Lebanon during the Pope's visit and encourage him to call for a moratorium on violence. Ambassador Wagner would remain in close touch.)
- France*. (Through normal diplomatic channels in Paris, Washington, and Beirut. It is probably the key European actor.)
- Kuwait*. (We would work closely with the useful Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UN. Kuwait, with the Saudis, has a watching brief on behalf of the Arabs.)
- UNIFIL Troop Contributor Governments*. (We would work particularly closely with the French, Dutch, Norwegians, and Irish.)
- UK*. (We stay in close touch with the British on all Middle Eastern matters.)

The *Soviets* should be briefed at some stage, since they will become aware of the details of the initiatives in any case. A briefing may reduce the chances of Soviet mischief-making. We will wish to ensure, however, that they do not become engaged in the process, since this could hurt the chances of gaining Israel's cooperation and also hurt general Middle East peace negotiations.

3. *A Focal Point for the Negotiations*. In order to make everyone feel that this initiative is not just "more of the same," we believe there may be a need to create some new forum, either to promote negotiations or to formalize the understandings reached. We do not envision a conventional conference with all interested parties coming to the same room because that would quickly degenerate into a stalemate. We have concluded that perhaps the formation of a "Consultative Group" in Lebanon might provide a sense of new dynamism while allowing us the flexibility to engage in separate negotiations with the parties until agreement on the proposal has been pretty well worked out. Specifically, it seems to us that a group in Beirut consisting of the following would serve this purpose:

—The Lebanese Prime Minister, the UN representative, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassadors of the U.S., France, Saudi Arabia, The Netherlands, the UK, and perhaps Italy.

Early on, after we have talked with the UN Secretariat, we may wish to set up a consultative mechanism in New York. We have in mind a small group (but not a formal "contact group" as in the Namibia case) which could meet periodically. Membership might include: the UN Secretariat, US, UK, France, a representative of the UNIFIL troop contributors (Norway and Netherlands) and a representative of the Arab group.

4. *U.S. Contact with the PLO.* Initially, we will probably be able to steer clear of any contact with the PLO apart from our normal security contacts in Beirut, which are publicly known. (The UN, the Lebanese Government, and members of the consultative groups in Beirut and Lebanon would have direct contacts right away with the PLO.) At some point, however, it may be necessary for us, if the potential gains are high enough, to decide to have contact with the PLO in the Lebanese context for the purpose of achieving an end of terrorist attacks on Israel, not only those launched from Lebanon but also those coming from within the occupied territories. The latter would be a particularly hard objective to achieve, but we believe we must try.

The Israelis would, of course, react sharply to any contact and charge that we had violated our Sinai II commitment.³ Any contact would have to be justified on the following grounds: (a) It is an extension of our publicly announced security contacts. The objective is to enhance the security of the American mission and the people of southern Lebanon. (b) The “Sinai II Commitment” was made in a Memorandum of Agreement entitled “The Geneva Peace Conference” and relates entirely to the peace process. Contacts in Lebanon on Lebanese problems were not addressed, nor were they intended. Israel has never objected to our contacts on security in Lebanon. (c) The Israeli argument that contact constitutes recognition is not tenable; governments, including Israel’s, often have contacts which they acknowledge do not constitute recognition (e.g., Israel with Jordan). The issue would not be contact but the purpose of the contact. In the Lebanese context, contact would not constitute recognition of the PLO in the peace process and would not in any sense involve negotiation on issues related to the peace process. Nevertheless, we would have to expect strong Israeli objection. Our defense would lie in whatever success we achieved in ending violence.

5. *Dealing with Israel.* We will clearly have to keep the Israelis fully involved in an effort to encourage an evolution in their thinking. However, as noted above, we will also probably have to delay until later discussions with Israel on specific elements of the plan. Initially, we would set forth general targets for a moratorium on attacks on Israel, and our overall purpose of carrying out Resolution 425 (which Israel has accepted). At the moment, Weizman—perhaps without Cabinet backing—has modified Israel’s preemptive strike strategy by saying that Israel would not hit the Palestinians if the Palestinians did not hit Israel. It seems unlikely that we will get more from the Israelis in the near future until we are able to describe the readiness of other parties to make certain commitments. At some point, however, we will have to

³ See footnote 5, Document 91.

seek an Israeli commitment not only to refrain from its own attacks but also to assure certain actions by the Lebanese militia forces under Haddad in the southern Lebanese buffer area.

6. *Risks and Pitfalls.* Achieving the objectives of this plan will be extremely difficult, and some may be impossible in the end. A particularly difficult handicap is that the PLO does not control certain radical Palestinian and Lebanese leftist groups and may not agree to do so through the use of its enforcement apparatus unless it has been given major incentives (e.g., increased international respectability and contacts). A major terrorist incident in Israel could undo totally at any moment what we may have accomplished in the meantime. We will have to monitor very carefully the timing and execution of our various steps so that we do not damage the autonomy negotiations or undermine Israeli confidence in our intentions. Soviet involvement could stimulate Israeli opposition to our overall strategy. As mentioned above, any direct U.S. contact with the PLO could be particularly risky and it would be even more of an issue if our contacts failed to bring about the objectives we would be seeking.

On the other hand, because of inherent dangers in the Lebanese situation, we would in any event be trying to do many of the same things contained in this plan of action, even if we stopped short of seeking our most ambitious objectives. The high risk of a major Israeli-Syrian conflict and a possible Israeli long-term occupation of southern Lebanon—if we did any less—makes a major and sustained effort essential.

7. *Financial Implications.* At an early point, we would have to analyze the financial implications for the U.S. and UN of an international relief program and expanded capacities for UNIFIL.

LAUNCHING THE INITIATIVE

If you approve, we will be pursuing this initiative through the sequence of steps shown in Attachment 2.⁴

⁴ Attached but not printed.

**294. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador to the United States
(Evron) to President Carter¹**

Washington, October 8, 1979

My dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by Prime Minister Begin to transmit to you the following message:

“Dear Mr. President,

I am taking the liberty of writing to you on an issue that is of great importance to Israel.

On March 26, 1979, the day of the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, you were kind enough to forward to me the following letter and enclosure:

‘Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On the basis of my discussions today with President Sadat and you, I attach a summary of my understanding of the results of those discussions.

Sincerely’

‘1. Israel will withdraw from Southern Sinai and restore to Egypt the exercise of its sovereignty over that area, and over all the adjacent oil fields in the Gulf of Suez, two months before completion of full Israeli withdrawal to the interim Al-Arish-Ras Muhammad line.

2. Egypt will take the necessary steps to insure that oil from those oil fields will be made available for purchase by Israel on an on-going basis, at the world market price current at the time of transfer, from the time of Israeli relinquishment of the fields.

3. The Government of Israel will make all arrangements for the transportation of oil in question.’

During our successful meeting in Haifa,² President Sadat and I discussed, inter alia, the issue of oil supply and we reached full agreement on the question of quantity, namely two million tons per annum. With respect to the matter of ‘world market price’ mentioned in your letter I proposed to President Sadat that we agree on the average price, neither the lowest nor the highest. President Sadat, however, preferred to leave this concrete question to the discussions between our respective Ministers. Our colleagues, Minister Hilal of Egypt and Minister Modai of Israel met again last week but without reaching agreement. The Egyptian Minister of petroleum maintained the principle that Egypt will decide

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 1–3/79. Secret.

² See Document 282 and footnote 2 thereto.

on a quarterly basis the price of oil to be supplied, guided by its own sole considerations, as is its practice with other customers. In other words, no a-priori criteria will be determined for 'the world market price current at the time of transfer'. This would mean that Israel may be faced with totally arbitrary prices that could even reach the level of the so-called spot-market. Such a situation is, of course, unthinkable considering the understanding contained in your letter to me which resulted from consultations with President Sadat and myself on the eve of the signing of the Peace Treaty.

It is for this reason that I turn to you, Mr. President, with the urgent request that you appoint an energy expert, a representative of the United States Government, to establish the necessary criteria whereby to determine 'the world market price'. I express the hope that this approach will be acceptable to you and will meet with the approval of President Sadat, thereby resolving this important outstanding matter.

I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind consideration and assistance.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,
Menachem Begin"
Sincerely yours,

Ephraim Evron
Ambassador

295. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 11, 1979, 9–10:18 a.m.

SUBJECT

Senior Level Meeting: Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Philip Habib, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
Ambassador Robert Strauss, Personal Representative of the President

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: Senior Level 10/11/79 Meeting: 10/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert Hunter, Staff Member National Security Council

(David Aaron and Hamilton Jordan joined the meeting while it was in progress; Zbigniew Brzezinski left before it was over.)

Ambassador Strauss noted that little progress is likely to be made in the autonomy talks by May. And either Begin and Sadat will be embracing one another by then, or there will be a total breakdown in their relationship. He is totally convinced that there is no chance of Egypt's and Israel's moving on the West Bank. Sadat does not even know what is going on; Khalil doesn't want it; and Begin won't move.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this means the situation is a mess.

Secretary Vance said that there is a lot to what was being said. On Lebanon, he said it was never our intention to get out in front, and to beat the drums on a Lebanon initiative. The effort goes back to a Khalil-Strauss conversation,² when Khalil said that peace in Lebanon would buy added time for the peace process. Lebanon appears ready to do something, and is better able to do so. But how far can it go? He can't say. Saudi Arabia would like greater stability, and would be of some help. Syria is interested in something happening, if it would increase stability and not be humiliating to it, so that it would be easier for it to wrestle with its internal problems. With Israel, how can it take care of its northern border situation and at the same time cut down on terrorism? With the PLO, indications are that it is becoming more sophisticated. It might see that more stability would advance its cause. The UN and UNIFIL want stability. Therefore, there may be the ingredients for something to move toward stability. For us, everytime Lebanon flares up, we have domestic problems as Israel over-reacts. The problem we must deal with is about dealing with the PLO. The President clearly can't have this happen now. But the Lebanese and others might try to get the PLO to make some advance on terrorism to satisfy the Israelis. Will it work? He doesn't know. Much of it is for Israel to decide. In advancing U.S. work, we would not be out front, but would work with others, and push others to advance the interest in getting more stability.

Ambassador Strauss said that, looking at the State Department plan³ in a vacuum, there would be no problem. But we really need something else, otherwise we will be blamed for failure. He doesn't like the paper—though it is crafted well—because it looks duplicitous: it starts us on the course inevitably towards the PLO, without saying so. Second, if we say that we are not dealing with the PLO, the President

² See footnote 8, Document 284.

³ See Document 293.

might think this would get him by (and it could be technically stated), but this is not a technical issue, and the facts would appear to be different. It would get him in trouble. These are political considerations. He (Ambassador Strauss) has no answers. If the President had no political considerations, then few changes to the plan would be needed. But if he wants something politically—like in Florida—he can't do both, or explain it away. If the PLO is in the equation, it is difficult. Therefore there is a basic decision, like the Sadat fiasco on the UN resolution in August.⁴ At the UN, we got into a position that wouldn't fly. We need a fail-safe idea, though even that might doom us. He (Ambassador Strauss) could say to the Israelis: you are portrayed, fairly or not, in a negative light, which is getting worse and worse. This impacts on the peace process. He has shown polls to Begin which bear out what is happening here to Israel's popularity. He can try to convince the Israelis to find positive things which it can do (and Begin is crippled politically). A cease-fire? A six-month moratorium on settlements? He (Begin) answers in the negative. He can't do these things. There is less of a government in Israel than one thinks. It hasn't got one. Therefore it can't take positive steps. Therefore can we get a fail-safe mechanism? He (Ambassador Strauss) may go to see Begin in London about 17 November. He could also go to Sadat. There is a problem in raising expectations. He could try to convince Begin to take the lead. He could lay the approach out to him, and give him assurances to get him involved as a leader with us. This will help Begin in Europe and here. He (Begin) could do this without political loss in Israel, or to Israel's security.

Secretary Vance asked whether Ambassador Strauss could see Begin before November 17. If not, would it be possible to split off the PLO piece of the plan, and work on others, in order to get something more solid?

Ambassador Strauss said he is looking for alternatives to progress on the autonomy talks. Is Jordan it? No. The autonomy talks are a fraud. It can be kept up until June, through the primaries. We might get to then. But if we want something positive, then it is difficult. Begin has shown he won't let this happen; Begin is through. Therefore he might grasp at something on Lebanon.

Secretary Vance asked whether Ambassador Strauss could see Begin sooner, without raising expectations.

Ambassador Strauss said that this is the problem, of doing it without having another U.S. initiative fail. Eppy Evron will say it can't be done.

Secretary Vance said that Eppy will say the approach is ok only if all terrorism stops.

⁴ See Documents 279 and 281.

Ambassador Strauss agreed, but added that that doesn't just mean terrorism mounted from Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib said that Eppy sees Israel's loss of image each time Lebanon blows up. He (Evron) worries about a rising tide of opinion, that could even lead to anti-Semitism. Therefore Eppy is not as negative.

Ambassador Strauss said that Eppy thinks Ambassador Habib has great credibility.

Ambassador Habib asked what would happen if Lebanon takes the lead—and Begin gets what he wants, which is the PLO (issue?) off his back?

Ambassador Strauss said that he wants Begin to bless our effort, and give us some room to maneuver. That means we must clearly be seen as not doing 1, 2, or 3. We want Begin to applaud what we are doing, even if it isn't likely to succeed. Therefore we need a political structure.

Ambassador Habib said we could give assurances to Begin on the PLO.

Ambassador Strauss said yes, since we can't do anything with the PLO anyway, unless the President says he doesn't want to run for re-election.

Ambassador Habib said that we do not want that flexibility anyway. We can set limits within the existing framework.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we go this route, the American press will look back, and say that Hal Saunders and the State Department have used Lebanon to do what they have always wanted: to deal with the PLO. Lebanon will be seen as an excuse. Therefore we would be on the defensive. Does Hal agree?

(*Assistant Secretary Saunders* nodded yes.)

Secretary Vance said it was never our theory to undertake our plan without Israel's ok. The lead must be taken by the Lebanese.

Ambassador Strauss said that Hal Saunders is on the right track *only* if what he (Ambassador Strauss) says is done.

Ambassador Habib said that we have to understand our limits with the PLO, irrespective.

Ambassador Strauss said that these limits are not clear in the State paper. He would restructure this effort differently—and back up. This would improve its chances of succeeding.

Ambassador Habib said our effort should not be dramatic, but low-key.

Secretary Vance agreed; otherwise it is doomed.

Ambassador Strauss asked why.

Secretary Vance said that if there is a spotlight, it will be harder to do.

Ambassador Strauss asked whether the spotlight would actually help.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the Israelis want a settlement in Lebanon.

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Strauss said yes.

Dr. Brzezinski asked why.

Secretary Vance said the Israelis see that they are losing over Lebanon, that it is hurting them. Weizman and Dayan and some others know this. The polls show that Israel sees it is being hurt.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Begin could see that Israel has a security zone in Lebanon under Israel's control; Lebanon is kept divided, and the Syrians off balance; and Begin keeps the PLO as a rallying symbol. If this is a tacit thing, then it will defuse the situation.

Secretary Vance said that in practical security terms, this is right. But it has gone beyond that now. Israel is worried about its image with its friends, like the Netherlands, England, even the U.S.

Ambassador Habib said that nothing in the plan takes away these benefits. Haddad will still be there as a buffer. There is no security threat to Israel (the threat is really terrorism). The communal divisions in Lebanon that are useful to Israel would still be there. But Israel would gain in its capacity to gain support for what it does with regard to a Lebanon truce.

Dr. Brzezinski said that for Begin, it is important to maintain the distance between the U.S. and the PLO. If this were reduced, there is the political danger that the Israelis would stick it to the President.

Ambassador Habib said we could define limits, which would not create difficulties. He would like to see this done.

Ambassador Strauss said he will not go for the plan until this is done. Before starting, we should say where we will *not* go. Say it and mean it.

Secretary Vance said that this is fair.

Ambassador Strauss said we need to be forthright about it, so the President will not get trapped.

Ambassador Habib said that Hal Saunders wants to protect the President.

Ambassador Strauss said that this plan is a stepping stone to the PLO. We need to guard against that. Maybe he should get in a plane, go to Israel, and talk about an initiative on Lebanon. And why not say that some progress has been made?

Secretary Vance said that it needs to be a little quieter.

Ambassador Strauss said he could say he is getting their thoughts. The problem is not to see the others. If he goes to Israel, he has to say why he is doing so.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if the approach is quieter, why would Israel be interested. It will see the U.S. inching towards the PLO, whatever we do. One they stop; second they will stick it to us here.

Secretary Vance said this might be right. But Israel sees damage from past Lebanon actions, and will again if the cease-fire breaks down.

Dr. Brzezinski said that there is a trade-off. It is after Cambodia, it is an ugly situation, and politically and morally something should be done. There would be an impact in the Arab world if we did nothing.

Ambassador Strauss agreed.

Secretary Vance raised the question of how to do something, and stick to it, on the PLO. It is up to Lebanon, Syria, and the UN to affect the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested the UN.

David Aaron said he had thought the PLO was interested in getting legitimacy.

Secretary Vance said that if we can't do that, how do we do something. Maybe we can go part way on a truce plan; then in time go on.

David Aaron asked why the situation is calmer now. Is it because we have this initiative going? Israel is worried that something might happen. Then should we just let it simmer, and keep the effort moving to keep the situation quiet?

Ambassador Habib said that this is a good point. Therefore we should move on a gradual, phased basis.

Secretary Vance said that we need movement on a phased basis—e.g., how can we get movement on Tyre? How can we get the LAF into Tyre? Therefore we need some understanding on how to do it. Pieces like that can be moved. Maybe we can do that without being inconsistent and without dealing with the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how great the U.S. role should be.

Secretary Vance said that we should first move to talk with the Israelis—and not see it slide past them.

Ambassador Strauss said we have to go to Begin first, and get him as a co-conspirator.

Secretary Vance said that second we should go to Lebanon and say that it must do more. Therefore, we should ask them what they will do. We should go to Syria and ask them what they will do—e.g., pulling some forces out of Beirut and the airport.

Robert Hunter asked what the incentives would be for the PLO to cooperate.

Secretary Vance said that they see progress, and are more sophisticated politically. Therefore they will take what looks like a constructive position, and they will get stronger. Eventually, they want a dialogue with the U.S. But they see this as realists, that it will not happen now.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how constructive the PLO would be. Would it be tacit? A cease-fire?

Secretary Vance said that complicated arrangements need to be worked out. The Lebanese should take the lead. We and others should help lead this to a more stable situation.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if there would be understandings.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the understandings would be written.

Secretary Vance said he didn't know.

Ambassador Habib said that some things were clear. The UN would need an expanded role. The UNIFIL role should be increased.

Dr. Brzezinski asked who would negotiate with the PLO.

Secretary Vance replied the UN and Lebanese.

Ambassador Habib suggested Syria.

Assistant Secretary Saunders suggested Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Secretary Vance said that we would not negotiate with the PLO.

Ambassador Habib said that the PLO has not met our terms, so that there would be no contact.

Ambassador Strauss said it isn't what we start out to do that matters, it's where we would get, and how the press puts it. It would take skill to assure the American people, the Jewish community, the Congress what we will *not* do. Therefore, is this worth it?

Assistant Secretary Saunders said we should see Lebanon on its own merits.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we say we will talk with the PLO in the Lebanon context, we will still get screwed.

Ambassador Habib said that we should have limits not to go that far. If we set limits we are ok.

Ambassador Strauss said we need a protective coating.

Secretary Vance said we must talk with the Israelis next.

Ambassador Strauss added that we should tell them the truth.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this (talking with Israel) seems to be a change from the State paper, which says that Israel should be brought in at some point.

Ambassador Habib said this should be before the initial phase.

Secretary Vance said that first we have talked with the UN about the role it will play; second we have talked with Lebanon about its role; third we should talk with Israel now.

David Aaron asked what this will do for them. They see that we are putting them on the spot over Lebanon. If they say no, they see problems. If they say yes, this is the slippery slope to the PLO. We need a plan, if they say no, not to leave this problem at their doorstep. We can't let this effort come to grief in Jerusalem. We need a plan for Begin that will not crowd the Israelis.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we go to the Israelis, we must have in our options one that we know they can accept—e.g., to do what they are now doing. We need an option they will accept.

Secretary Vance said we could lay out why they should be involved. He is not sure; this could put them on the spot.

Ambassador Strauss asked what he meant.

Secretary Vance said he meant on the autonomy talks.

Ambassador Strauss said that we did this before. It was bad. We need a little forthrightness, with an option the Israelis can say yes to, even if we don't like it.

Secretary Vance said he has the idea of dealing with this in small pieces—e.g., Tyre. Can we devise steps?

Ambassador Habib said that if the cease-fire is maintained, it could be done. If not, the PLO will not let Tyre be neutralized.

Secretary Vance suggested acceptance of the cease-fire as ok, even if fragile. Then on to the next piece. How can it be put together?

Ambassador Habib said that once Lebanon is there (Tyre) it would be hard to change. The PLO will have to agree to lots before we get to that point.

Secretary Vance said that it is at least a piece.

Ambassador Strauss said we should go back to premises. It is given that, for the PLO, there is nothing in it for them that we will give. With regard to Israel, there is damn little in it for the PLO to warrant their getting in, to crunch on a deal. Therefore there is nothing in the plan for the Israelis. Therefore how do we get them in? First, we could give them something; but we can't. Second, there is world opinion—this is the only thing. It is something positive, with low costs, and is a positive step towards peace in the world. This needs a bit of escalation of publicity. The only thing we have is that this is something positive for Israel, with low risks, and assurances of what we will *not* do. Then it reaches the launch pad, with political security and support here.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how this would be done.

Ambassador Strauss said we should say to Begin: you won't do anything on the autonomy talks or on settlements—for good reasons, etc. But Israel must take a positive step for world opinion. Therefore, here Israel can be on the side of the angels. The problem is in being crowded into dealing with the PLO. We would publicly say we would not do

this. This approach would probably fail, but it is our only chance. Maybe David Aaron is right, we should just let it bubble along.

Secretary Vance said we couldn't let it bubble along.

David Aaron and Ambassador Strauss said we should do something.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Ambassador Strauss should go to Israel now.

Secretary Vance said that to go would be good.

Ambassador Strauss said that is why he thought of London.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we can wait that long.

Secretary Vance said the situation will break before that.

Ambassador Habib said the visit should be before then. There will be an Arab foreign ministers meeting and a summit, with Lebanon as the number-one item on the agenda. The summit is set for November 17.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should proceed.

Secretary Vance said that Boutros Ghali said we should play it softly until Egypt gets its land back, and then work Israel over (Note: side comment on the autonomy talks).

Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should proceed.

Secretary Vance said first, is this worth pursuing further. He believes we can't drop it. The situation will blow up, and we will be blamed. Yet it will not do for us to be visibly in front. Therefore how should we structure how Ambassador Strauss will approach Begin? Second, what little piece is there—e.g., Tyre or Beirut—to keep the momentum going, to give a better chance that it will not fall apart in a) a Syrian-Israeli air battle; or b) some terrorist action in Israel mounted from the West Bank (since it is doubtful that the PLO would launch one from Lebanon).

Ambassador Strauss said that any PLO fool could commit a terrorist act.

Secretary Vance said that, to be specific, would Saunders, Strauss, and Hunter join forces on a couple of issues. How should we structure this, and what can we get out of it if Ambassador Strauss is to go soon?

Ambassador Strauss said going soon is possible, not good, but he will try to improve it. Tentatively, he is to meet Khalil and Burg in London soon.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about talking with Dayan.

Ambassador Habib said that Dayan would not want to get into this.

Secretary Vance agreed. It has to be Begin.

Ambassador Strauss asked, if there were a bust in the ceasefire, would that be a better or worse time to move?

Ambassador Habib said it would be worse. The Arabs would sit still for an initiative now. Lebanon embarrasses them.

Ambassador Strauss said that there could be a quick fact-finding trip, including Israel.

Ambassador Habib said that this is an idea for himself; he will not draw as much fire.

Ambassador Strauss suggested that Ambassador Habib go to Israel.

Ambassador Habib agreed. If he goes to Syria, he must go to Israel anyway.

Ambassador Strauss said it would be ok for Ambassador Habib to go to Begin. This would be better than himself. Would it be possible for him to go to three or four countries, and end up in Israel? If it looks like success, then he (Ambassador Strauss) could join him, and bring Eppy.

Ambassador Habib noted that Eppy is sympathetic.

Secretary Vance said that if this is fact-finding, what do we have in mind? What would Ambassador Habib look for?

Ambassador Habib said it would be to see whether the Lebanese have guts. Will Syria back them? The UN in New York will do so.

Secretary Vance asked if he would go to Syria to ask them to pull out of Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib said that Syria can't do that.

Secretary Vance said that if he (Ambassador Habib) could talk with Syria on reducing its presence. That would be a real selling point in Israel.

Ambassador Strauss agreed.

Secretary Vance said that this is the one thing Israel wants to see. Then we have a chance of Israel's encouraging this effort.

Ambassador Strauss said that we have to structure it. For Begin, we can expect nothing from the PLO. But maybe we can get something from Syria. We could say that this is a non-risk gamble: for Israel and us this is no risk.

Ambassador Habib said that therefore this changes nothing on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Ambassador Strauss said that Syria would be first. Therefore this is the plus for the Israelis.

Secretary Vance said that he raised with the Syrians the question of withdrawing from downtown Beirut and the airport. They said that this depends on the Lebanese. If they say they will do it, and can provide security, the Syrians will talk.

Ambassador Habib said that the Syrians don't believe this. They are devious in dealing with Lebanon.

Secretary Vance said that at least we can talk about it.

Ambassador Strauss asked about the way to structure it.

Secretary Vance said that we should seek to do two things: extend the sovereignty and control of the Lebanese government; and deal with the Syrian aspect.

Ambassador Habib said that the PLO would have to pull back under this plan.

Robert Hunter suggested that we offer to speed up arms deliveries to the Lebanese as part of Ambassador Habib's trip.

Secretary Vance said that this issue was raised by the Lebanese in New York. If we could move stuff faster, it would be a plus.

Ambassador Habib said he needs to have it in hand—by the last week in the month. This would give the Lebanese more guts.

Ambassador Strauss said that this is not a neat orchard.

Secretary Vance said that some help is required. Talking with the Lebanese, Syrians, and Israelis is needed to start with. Therefore fact-finding is the best we can do.

Ambassador Strauss said he has not signed off on this approach.

Secretary Vance said we should see what we can think of.

David Aaron said we should also look at the question, if we succeed, of what the PLO incentives are: to cooperate, or to blow it up?

Secretary Vance asked Hal Saunders and his colleagues to develop an outline⁵ of an approach.

(The meeting ended at 10:18 a.m.)

⁵ Not found. Vance sent a modified version of the Lebanese truce initiative, developed from discussions among Vance, Strauss, and Brzezinski, to Carter in an undated memorandum forwarded to Carter by Brzezinski on October 19. See footnote 2, Document 297.

296. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 18, 1979

SUBJECT

Letter from Begin on Oil Negotiations with Egypt (C)

At last Friday's breakfast,² you decided that we should not get involved in mediating on oil prices between Israel and Egypt, in response to Begin's request (Tab B).³ (S)

Subsequently, Dayan has come to us with a renewed plea for a positive response.⁴ Bob Strauss has suggested—and Cy and I concur—that we try a middle course that is still designed to keep us at a distance, without making your response a flat turndown. This would be to suggest a list of internationally-respected experts in the field, from which Begin and Sadat could choose one or more to help. Begin would have the responsibility for selling Sadat on the idea. (S)

This approach would put the ball back in Begin's court; though we should be under no illusions about the stakes involved, and the possibility that Begin will come back to us again in an effort to get us to assume responsibility. (S)

At Tab A is a message to Begin. The key element (paragraph 3) was drafted by Bob Strauss.⁵ The rest is a State draft. The speechwriters have cleared. (The cable will include talking points on our skepticism that this sort of mediation can work.) (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Begin at Tab A.⁶ (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 10/79. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter initialed "C," indicating that he saw the document.

² No memorandum of conversation for this October 12 breakfast meeting has been found. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting, involving Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Jordan, Cutler, and Donovan, took place from 7:30 a.m. to 9:05 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

³ See Document 294.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Brzezinski inserted a handwritten footnote at the end of this sentence that reads: "I added Vance's name."

⁶ Carter approved the recommendation.

Tab A**Draft Letter From President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin⁷**

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of October 8 about negotiations with Egypt on oil prices after the transfer of the Alma Field in November. I understand completely the importance of this issue and the heavy burden oil costs represent for Israel. I also understand the concern of the Government of Egypt to avoid losses which would result from charging Israel a price for oil lower than it does other customers.

As you know, the term “world market price,” as used in my letter of March 26,⁸ reflected my understanding of the language used by President Sadat and you at the meeting on March 26.⁹ It is subject to many different interpretations and is a matter on which honest people can disagree.

I have discussed this matter with Cy Vance,¹⁰ Bob Strauss, and other members of my Administration. We believe that the most useful step would be for us to suggest a half dozen or so internationally-respected, private experts in this field. You and President Sadat might then agree on one or more of these experts to assist you, as the two of you deem appropriate, on setting criteria for the world market price. I will also make known to President Sadat the concern of the United States, as a good friend of both Israel and Egypt, that this matter be settled amicably and equitably.

Meanwhile I suggest that Ministers Modai and Hillaal pursue their talks on this issue. I realize that it will not be easy to resolve. But I am confident that, if Israel and Egypt continue their efforts in the spirit of

⁷ Secret. The draft letter was found under an October 18 covering memorandum from Dodson to Tarnoff (Ibid.)

⁸ See Document 235.

⁹ No memorandum of conversation of a March 26 meeting among Carter, Sadat, and Begin has been found. See Document 227.

¹⁰ Brzezinski inserted “Cy Vance” into the text.

mutual understanding and accommodation that characterizes their new relationship, a satisfactory agreement can be reached.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter¹¹

¹¹ In place of his signature, Carter wrote: “OK. JC.” The Department of State transmitted the letter in telegram 273228 to Tel Aviv, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–2165) The list of oil experts was sent in telegram 274041 to Tel Aviv, October 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790480–0265)

297. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Lebanese Truce Initiative (C)

At Tab A is a memorandum from Cy²—incorporating Bob Strauss’ views—to implement the discussion of the Senior Level Meeting on October 11.³ (U)

The approach contains two safeguards:

—the need to get Israeli support—or at least acquiescence—through a direct appeal to Begin. Otherwise, the effort has little chance of any success; and

—a low-key fact-finding trip by Phil Habib to the area (Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, Jerusalem, and the Vatican), so that he can take to Israel whatever Lebanon and Syria are prepared to do. We would then review developments, to determine our next steps. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 10/13–31/79. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski added a handwritten date “10-19 ’79.” Below the handwritten date, Carter initialed “C,” indicating that he saw the document.

² Attached but not printed is Vance’s undated memorandum to Carter. In an October 19 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hunter stated that Vance’s memorandum was “largely drafted” by Strauss. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 295. A Summary of Conclusions from this Senior Level Meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: Senior Level 10/11/79 Meeting: 10/79.

With Begin, Habib will stress four main points:

- we will not deal with the PLO; others would have to exercise leadership in this area;

- we will not try to do away with the militia enclave on Israel's border;

- the need for Israel to improve its image by taking part in a truce effort (in the process, we will not try to make the PLO an equal with others); and

- humanitarian considerations. (S)

If you approve of this general approach, we would take the following steps:

- Ambassador Dean will talk with Sarkis and al-Hoss on our general thinking,⁴ and about their taking the lead;

- Habib will go to the area and find out how far Lebanon and Syria will go and, on that basis, what Israel is prepared to see happen;

- we will also be in contact with other parties, while keeping our role flexible (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, UK, France, Holland, Norway, UN, Vatican);

- close involvement of Waldheim; and

- further review here. (S)

This approach is not risk-free. But if we keep our efforts low-key at the start, and we are attentive to the need to gain Israeli support, we have the best chance of achieving at least some partial strengthening of the cease-fire. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Lebanese truce approach outlined above.⁵ (C)

⁴ Dean briefed Sarkis and al-Hoss on October 21 on the details of the administration's action plan for Lebanon. The two meetings are summarized in telegram 5890 from Beirut, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2514)

⁵ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation.

298. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 29, 1979

SUBJECT

London Meetings (U)

The meetings² with the Israelis and Egyptians went better than expected. For the Egyptians, the talks took place against the background of Sadat's expressing optimism in contrast with press reports of Strauss' testimony—i.e. the effect Strauss was trying to achieve. Khalil continues to be impressive, and his seriousness about the process is now complete. (C)

From the Israeli side, the hidden factor was Burg's near-desperation to come home with something, in order to counter Dayan's charges that he couldn't run the negotiations. He publicly announced that he was coming with new ideas; and when Strauss demonstrated that they were worth nothing (e.g. that Burg would go to visit West Bank leaders—who surely wouldn't receive him!), he flailed around for alternatives, which Khalil and Strauss obligingly provided. (S)

The agreement on supervision of the elections is the most significant—i.e. that the military will not take part, that Palestinians can (with approval of the Working Group), that there can be outsiders (unspecified), and that the world press can be there. This also covers the whole "process," not just election day. (C)

The agreement to continue the Israeli presentation on the current powers and responsibilities of the military government is less opti-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 10/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen."

² Strauss held trilateral talks with Burg and Khalil in London October 25–26. Summarizing the talks, Strauss reported progress on establishing procedures for supervising elections in the West Bank and Gaza, agreement between the Israelis and Egyptians to a procedure to move the Working Group on the Powers and Responsibilities of the Self Governing Authority away from arguments over discussing principles or details first into matters of "substance," and an "Israeli proposal for taking steps in the West Bank and Gaza that might encourage Palestinians to look more favorably on the negotiations and elections there." Strauss added that while the negotiators have acknowledged that "there is still a long, hard road ahead," they "have tried to project a posture of serious progress made here." (Telegram 21257 from London, October 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–1702)

mistic, though with real effort this *could* become a means of talking about specifics of powers to be transferred, thus getting away from the Egyptian insistence on sterile debate about “principles.” (C)

Thus modest progress was made, out of a sense that this was the only way to keep the United States from losing some interest. Both Khalil and Burg were privately prepared to see the process go faster and more effectively than the communique stated. Bourg was even on the verge of accepting language that would have committed Israel to a truly full transfer of authority, but pulled back. However, we shouldn’t overestimate what has been achieved, either. It was clear that meeting like this outside the area—and all the press and hangers-on—was a good idea. (S)

Privately, Khalil raised with Strauss the possibility of a new UN Resolution—citing his belief that we will be faced with one anyway. He wants to put one together that would have the blessing of Israel, Egypt, and most of the other Arabs, thus boxing in the PLO. Strauss explained all the difficulties with this proposal (which has the earmarks of the resolution the Egyptians sank in August!).³ (S)

³ See Documents 279 and 281.

299. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat and Saudi Crown Prince Fahd¹

Washington, November 1, 1979

I am writing the same letter to both of you because you must act together if you decide to honor a very important request from me.

One of my most serious problems as President is the lack of understanding and harmony between you, the leaders of Egypt and Saudi

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. No classification marking. The handwritten letter was found attached to a handwritten note which reads: “Personal to President Sadat.”

Arabia.² This situation is very damaging to me politically and also creates a major obstacle in the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We should be acting in concert, but instead we are divided.

I realize that some sharp differences will remain between you regarding what should be done immediately to make progress, but there is no doubt that we share common goals and purposes. My hope and prayer is that, either directly through your own emissaries or through me, you will explore every possible way to minimize the adverse consequences of those differences and to restore the mutual respect, consultation and understanding which should exist among the three of us.³

You have my personal best wishes and my standing offer to help in any way possible to resolve this most serious matter.⁴

Your friend,

Jimmy Carter

P.S. Give my love to Jehan and your family.

² On October 18, the Embassy in Cairo reported, "There seems to be no longer any effort by either Egypt or Saudi Arabia to carry out the moratorium on press criticism that Ambassador Eilts worked out last spring." (See footnote 5, Document 247) "Fueled by press charges and countercharges, the animosity between Sadat and Fahd seems to have reached a new level of intensity. Unless the lid can be put on the public rhetoric, the situation could get out of hand, with serious implications for our Middle East policy." (Telegram 21546 from Cairo, October 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790478–0028) Among the accusations leveled by Sadat were Saudi efforts to "starve" the Egyptian people" and an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq directed against his country. (Telegram 6781 from Jidda, September 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790439–0066) The Saudis also protested Sadat's assertion that the Saudis were "working with Kennedy forces to unseat President Carter." (Telegram 1574 from Riyadh, October 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463–0979)

³ On October 28, Atherton reported that Mubarak informed him of Sadat's desire to reinstate the moratorium on public attacks against the Saudis and sought U.S. intercession in persuading the Saudis to reactivate the "personal intelligence channel" between Egypt and Saudi Arabia "as a means of checking out the allegations against each other." (Telegram 22143 from Cairo, October 28; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 10/79) In a November 7 conversation with West, Turki confirmed that the intelligence channel with Egypt was "open and has in reality never closed." The Saudi Deputy Minister for Political Affairs in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abd al-Rahman Mansuri welcomed the Egyptian moratorium, but added that the Saudi Government would "remain passive and will only respond in a measured way to signals from Cairo—whether positive or negative." (Telegram 7788 from Jidda, November 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2298)

⁴ Fahd's response to Carter's letter, emphasizing the centrality of addressing the Palestinian issue to any peace settlement and rejecting the usefulness of a suggested meeting with Mubarak proposed by Sadat is in telegram 8618 from Jidda, December 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2446.

300. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 5, 1979

SUBJECT

The Lebanese Situation (U)

At Tab I is a memorandum from Habib to Vance reporting on his trip.² In summary:

—there is something approaching consensus among the Arabs on several points: strengthen the cease-fire; strengthen UNIFIL and UNSC 425;³ in principle, re-establish a Lebanese presence in southern Lebanon (especially Tyre); talk about the issue at the Arab summit;⁴ get the PLO to give some cooperation to the Lebanese; see Lebanon out in front; get the PLO to stop taking credit in Beirut for any attacks that do take place in Israel;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 11/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "Please set up with ZB, Linowitz/Strauss, VP (if here), Vance, Hal, L, etc." Another handwritten notation in the right-hand corner reads: "11/7-CD's ofc will handle."

² Habib's November 3 memorandum to Vance, reporting on his October 24–November 1 trip to the Middle East, which included stops in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Italy, and France, is attached but not printed. Habib submitted to Vance for approval eight proposals for U.S. action: "continue a strong effort" to support the Lebanese and the UN to bring about a "first-phase *modus vivendi*;" instruct Dean to continue a dialogue with the Lebanese; brief Waldheim on Habib's trip; "make representations to the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Moroccans, and perhaps the Sudanese" to help develop an "Arab consensus which would help neutralize the situation in Lebanon and gain full PLO cooperation;" send Habib on another trip to the region; discuss with the Israelis French plans for discussions with Arafat; continue to consult with the UN regarding UNIFIL's technical capabilities for detection and surveillance; and review the situation further following the Arab Summit.

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, March 19, 1978, called on Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon and established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

⁴ See Document 303.

—Begin had an almost *pro forma* meeting with Habib,⁵ stressing the need to a halt to attacks on Israel; the Israelis apparently accepted that the Habib effort is not a back-door approach to the PLO; they are skeptical but open-minded; Weizman will suspend the preemptive strategy for now, but will keep options open if attacks resume; and Israel will get Haddad out of the UNIFIL area if the PLO and Leftists leave it;

—France is trying to get a statement out of the PLO prior to the Arab summit, on Lebanese territorial integrity, the temporary nature of the PLO presence, extension of Lebanese authority, support for the cease-fire, and praise of the UNIFIL role. The sweetener (provided the statement came *before* the Arab summit) would be an Arafat visit to Paris. (S/S)

Phil is thus “reasonably optimistic” about the chances for moving forward. Formal written statements and all-party conferences are out. A *modus vivendi* might be possible, and he sees a “surprising degree of Arab confidence that Arafat would cooperate.” Given what is happening, there is no need for us to take a more prominent role. (S/S)

Where Next? Habib sees the near-term as important in seeing what the Lebanese can and will do to follow up—in thinking things through, developing details of an initiative, and securing Palestinian approval of next steps. The Arab summit could be crucial. (S/S)

Phil has asked for approval of a number of steps (pages 7–8). These are essentially non-controversial, except:

—should we talk to the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Moroccans, and Sudanese about supporting some effort through ambassadors, or send Habib out (the former minimizes risks of being seen as trying to interfere in the Arab summit; the latter has more chance of getting somewhere); and

—should we tell the Israelis about French thinking (*yes*: to keep from being accused of holding back; *no*: that we might be asked to turn-off an Arafat visit). (S/S)

⁵ Habib met with Begin on October 28 to discuss “cooling” the situation in South Lebanon and moving the ceasefire toward a permanent peace. Assessing their meeting, Lewis stated that the Israelis were “basically satisfied with current status quo in South Lebanon. At same time, they recognize that situation there does not provide best foundation for securing Israel’s northern front. Overall impression left is that Israel has no quarrel with long-term objectives of: perpetuating the ceasefire; eventual departure of unauthorized forces from area of a strengthened UNIFIL, and effort to enhance authority of GOL. As for practical next steps in Lebanon, Israelis are deeply skeptical, but apparently willing to let others give it a try so long as certain fundamental factors are kept in forefront of effort.” (Telegram 23165 from Tel Aviv, October 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790495–0901)

Regrettably, the cable⁶ of follow-up instructions to Beirut went out this morning without any NSC (or Strauss) consultation.⁷ Most is non-controversial, but it does reach conclusions on U.S. policy (page 2) which—while probably a consensus view—go against the senior level agreement⁸ that talks here would follow the Habib visit before further efforts were undertaken. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That this process be kept in line by convening a meeting of the Senior Level Group early this week.⁹ (C)

⁶ In telegram 288533 to Beirut, November 5, the Department instructed Dean to make contact with Sarkis and other Lebanese officials to ascertain the progress they had made since Habib's trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790508–1212)

⁷ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence in the left- and right-hand margins and added the handwritten notation: "RH, complain officially & in writing."

⁸ See Document 295.

⁹ Brzezinski approved the recommendation.

301. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 7, 1979

SUBJECT

Long-Term Military Relationship with Egypt (C)

At Tab A is the State-Defense decision memorandum on longer-term military assistance to Egypt, which you requested after the PRC met on this subject. I have held this memorandum awaiting Jim McIntyre's comments,² but they are still not available, and I think that a decision is needed now. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 11/79. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "State/DOD must assess Egypt/Israel military needs as part of the ZBB approach to '81 budget—compared to worldwide nation-by-nation priorities. J.C." The memorandum was found attached to a November 8 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance and Brown, forwarding to them the text of Carter's handwritten comment. (Ibid.)

² See footnote 2, Document 316.

The State-Defense memorandum provides the technical information you need to make the crucial decisions required, so I would like to address myself to the larger picture. With these decisions, we have the opportunity, and in my view the obligation, to cement a relationship of vital importance to the United States. President Sadat has nowhere else to turn for military assistance. He is in this position by virtue of turning away from the Soviets and moving closer to the United States and Israel—steps of unprecedented benefit to our interests in the Middle East. Our failure to support Sadat militarily at this critical juncture could have disastrous effect on our overall peace effort. (S)

It is important to stress that we have taken responsible steps to keep the assistance package at a reasonable level. We received a larger and more expensive list from Sadat,³ but we pared that list by projecting smaller, yet more sophisticated, Egyptian armed forces. Further, we are working with the Egyptians to build up their indigenous arms production base, and, if the moderate Arabs move closer to the peace process, we hope to encourage their resuming contributions to Egypt's defense. (S)

I strongly agree that we need to provide more assistance and preferred financing terms in FY 81, and that this funding should be in addition to the already strapped FY 81 security assistance budget. We do not want an arms delivery gap to occur during the next two critical years, nor do we want to affect adversely vital interests elsewhere as we move to protect the interests at stake here. (S)

Finally, I think that sufficient facts are presented here for you to make a decision at this time, rather than to wait until after the budget cycle runs its course next month. Sadat is expecting a reply shortly, and delaying the decision until December could affect the Strauss/Linowitz visit on November 17.⁴ (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve each of the five recommendations in the State-Defense memorandum at Tab A.⁵ (U)

³ See footnote 4, Document 268.

⁴ See Document 304 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁵ Brzezinski added a handwritten postscript to the memorandum, "P.S. I would recommend that you first look at *p. 8* of the joint State/DOD memo—and then refer back only if you feel you want more detail." Carter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter⁶**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Long-Term Military Relationship with Egypt

Issue for Decision

You asked⁷ for a decision paper examining the implications of a long term military assistance program for Egypt along the lines proposed by the PRC, and alternatives. In this paper, we have taken into account the budget impacts of continuing security assistance for Egypt, as you requested.

BACKGROUND

Following Vice President Mubarak's visit last June,⁸ you wrote to President Sadat⁹ suggesting that our two governments work closely to plan a longer-term military supply relationship, in order that Egypt could satisfy a greater proportion of its military equipment needs over the next several years. You also indicated at that time the hope that Egypt would assign highest priority to economic development rather than to military programs. DOD began the planning process with Egypt in August. Based on its report of the results of this first exchange,¹⁰ the PRC met on September 20 to consider the issues and make some recommendations.¹¹

The DOD report validated Egypt's priority military needs for the defense of its homeland. The analysis showed that whatever assistance we could provide within feasible financial assistance levels would not meet all their needs and would not create a significant threat to Israel; Egyptian force structure would in fact be less than that in the 1973–79 period. It is also clear that, with the cessation of Soviet assistance earlier and Arab assistance at the time of the Peace Treaty, the US is seen by Egypt as not only chief supplier of military equipment but practically

⁶ Secret.

⁷ See Document 292.

⁸ See Document 287.

⁹ See Document 263.

¹⁰ Not found. See footnote 4, Document 268.

¹¹ See Document 290.

the only source of substantial credit assistance. In view of present political circumstances and Egypt's economic situation, the US is likely to remain in this position for a while to come.

Our decisions on the scope of a longer term arms supply relationship thus have significant political content. This is true not only of the size of the program, but also its pace. The deliveries in the current "three-year" program are front-loaded. Therefore, if we simply phase in a five-year program after "the three-year program," we will have a severe interim "delivery gap" of 2–3 years which will put a serious strain on our overall relationship.

The PRC recommended a multi-year security assistance program for Egypt, involving \$350 million in FMS credits in FY 1981 and \$800 million annually for the five years thereafter, FY 1982–86, borrowing from the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion peace package¹² to assist earlier starts of selected new programs in order to minimize the gap in deliveries of equipment, and relying on future appropriations to ensure full funding of approved programs. The PRC also recommended that we agree to sell F-16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks to Egypt, as well as a few more F-4Es (i.e., about 15) if necessary.

There are several issues that require your decision:

- The multi-year nature of the US commitment;
- Annual funding levels;
- Whether to begin additional funding in FY 1981;
- Use of "cash-flow" financing;
- Sale of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks.

The Nature of the US Commitment

With the Peace Treaty, the \$1.5 billion FMS program, and your decision to enter into joint planning, we are already well on the road toward a long term security assistance relationship with Egypt. To move the planning process beyond this point, we need to indicate to Egypt what level of credits we might provide in future years.

Given extensive and pressing Egyptian modernization needs, and the high costs of the programs involved (e.g., 80 F-16s for \$1.8 billion or 900 M60s for \$1.2 billion), we would not be able to fully fund the most important programs with a single year's credits, nor delay the start of programs till the requisite credits had been accumulated. This means we must start selected major programs with available credits, e.g., drawing upon the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion program, taking the risk that Congress will appropriate in subsequent years the credits necessary to continue those programs (this is called the "cash-flow" ap-

¹² See Document 206.

proach). Nevertheless, we do not propose a formal multi-year budget commitment. Rather we recommend that we continue the planning process with Egypt, indicating the specific level of FMS financing we intend to seek from Congress in FY 1981 and FY 1982. We would make clear that financing is subject to annual Congressional authorization and appropriation. We would point out that we do not have a formal multi-year commitment with Israel. We would indicate that we intend to request substantial levels for the out-years, suggesting we use the FY 82 figure (and by implication its extension in future years) for *planning purposes only*. As programs are planned by the US and Egypt together under these sums, the US would carefully control the flow of letters of offer to them in order to avoid overcommitment.

FY 82 Funding Levels

We have studied Egypt's military needs and priority equipment requests in great detail. We examined alternative annual funding levels to see what militarily justified types and quantities of equipment could be bought by Egypt with our credit assistance. Illustrative alternatives are as follows:

—\$500 million a year would permit purchase over five years of some 50 F-16s, 300 M60s, 4 patrol gunboats, but a severely cut-down list of vehicles and other equipment, and no additional air defense. This is well under the quantities Egypt has said have priority and which we believe are justified from a military point of view.

—\$650 million a year would allow us either to add somewhat to the numbers of aircraft or tanks Egypt could buy or to offer a more substantial amount of the smaller equipment items the Egyptian services would like so much to have and we believe they urgently need.

—\$800 million a year would permit purchase of the full quantity of priority F-16s (80), but still only 300 M60s, plus other equipment, but no more aircraft and no more air defense weapons. This amount would neatly replace Arab military aid, which was \$800 million a year.

—\$1 billion a year—President Sadat's request and the same as Israel now receives—would permit the purchase by Egypt of 80 F-16s, the full priority complement of 900 tanks, additional air defenses, but no additional aircraft or frigate-type ships.

The PRC recommended \$800 million a year.

None of these alternatives meet all of Egypt's needs or priority requests. They would, however, provide some of Egypt's requirements for advanced weapons (which we support) over the next six years. Nonetheless, the lower alternatives shown above would result in considerable delays in the delivery of equipment, because of the slow pace of programs required. While we are also embarking on a program of

limited production assistance to Egypt, it will have minimal impact in satisfying Egyptian requirements for the foreseeable future.

The budgetary impact differential among these annual funding levels is not great, assuming no “forgiveness” (grant aid) is involved. For FMS credits extended by the Federal Financing Bank, the annual appropriation must cover only the guarantee fees, which equal 10% of the loans. Thus, the budget appropriation would range from \$50 million to \$100 million a year. OMB already assumes, in its budget projections for FY 1982, credit funding at the \$500 million a year level. (The possibility of FY 1981 funding is discussed below).

We are sensitive to the “proportionality” of the annual funding level to that of Israel. As it approaches Israel’s \$1 billion, Israel will undoubtedly feel the case for additional security assistance it has submitted is even more justified. They have asked for an additional \$800 million a year, but we do not believe the accelerated pace of military equipment deliveries which this would imply is necessary, and we have not encouraged them to think they will get it or even a portion of it. An increase for Israel, assuming that it contained the usual 50% forgiveness, would add greatly to the budget impact; e.g., an additional \$800 million a year for Israel would require an additional budget appropriation of \$440 million. If this initiative with Egypt did result in our also increasing assistance for Israel, we would want to strongly resist extending any forgiveness in that increase.

We do not recommend forgiveness for Egypt. Egypt’s external financing deficit appears just about balanced by the external assistance they receive. Egypt should be able to manage the interest and subsequently the principal repayments if we offer the same terms provided for under Peace Treaty package—10 year grace period and 20-year repayment of principal thereafter. By the same token, however, we do not recommend that Egypt directly fund a major portion of approved purchases from their own resources. It would merely divert resources from priority economic development. In our judgment, these recommendations would not lead to a requirement for an increase in currently projected U.S. economic aid levels to Egypt.

FY 1981 Funding

The original \$1.5 billion treaty package was supposed to cover a three-year period, but it is already committed and it satisfied only a small portion of Egypt’s priority needs. If we do not begin the new assistance program until FY 1982, we would face a politically difficult two-year gap before we can even announce a new sale to Egypt, and a three or four-year gap between completion of major deliveries from the \$1.5 billion program and the start of new deliveries. In the meantime, Egypt’s Soviet equipment will be seriously deteriorating, with attendant decline in Egyptian military morale.

There will be unspent credits remaining from the \$1.5 billion package—either \$520 million in FY 1980 or \$320 million in FY 1981 and we could draw upon those to start new programs for Egypt (“cash flow”). However, we would have to pay them back out of subsequent years’ appropriations.

Therefore, the PRC has recommended some new funds be made available in FY 1981 to permit a transition to be made to the new longer-term program. The PRC specifically suggested \$350 million for this purpose.

Additional credits for Egypt in FY 1981 could have serious implications for the overall FMS credit program. State and Defense have requested a global level of \$2.304 billion for FY 1981 (the present OMB mark is \$1.98 billion). \$1 billion of this is for Israel, \$175 million is for treaty commitments to Spain, Philippines, and Panama; \$250 million is for Turkey, leaving only \$879 million for Greece, Jordan, Thailand, and numerous smaller but crucial programs around the world. A program for Egypt cannot be undertaken with the security assistance financing levels cited above. A decision to begin a regular program of FMS financing for Egypt means the level will have to be raised by the amount earmarked for Egypt, for FY 1981 and beyond.

Alternatives for FY 1981 funding are as follows:

—*No new credits in FY 1981.* We could make some minor new program starts by borrowing from the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion, but this alternative would probably be insufficient to start any major program, like F-16. Egypt would see cash flow financing alone as simply an accounting sleight of hand. Some new U.S. resources need to be committed to meet our foreign policy objectives.

—*\$225 million in new credits in FY 1981.* This would make available a total of \$545 million in credits in FY 1981, permitting some new program starts. However, at the pace these amounts would permit, the delivery gap could be reduced in perhaps only one major program. The budget impact would be only \$22.5 million (10%) additional.

—*\$350 million in new credits in FY 1981.* This would make available up to \$670 million, and would allow substantial new starts and acceleration of deliveries to close the delivery gap. It would impose less of a “cash flow” payback burden in FY 1982 and thereafter. The budget impact would be only \$35 million (10%) additional. The PRC recommended this alternative.

Use of Cash Flow Financing

The foregoing alternatives for FY 1981 funding have assumed the use of cash flow financing to minimize the deliveries gap. Objections to cash flow financing, which we utilize in the Israeli program, have been raised because of the financial risk to the US involved unless a long-

term FMS financing program at substantial levels were established. Because of this risk we do not recommend cash flow financing across the board; rather we propose this method of financial implementation only on a selected basis to begin important programs in FY 80 and 81 and only drawing on committed but not yet spent funds from the original \$1.5 billion program. We believe that limiting the use of cash flow financing in this manner meets previous objections and limits our financial exposure to an acceptable level. Cash flow financing (up to \$320 million available) in combination with new FY 81 funds (e.g. \$225–350 million) would make available up to \$545–670 million to begin new programs in FY 1981. This will help bridge the gap until a more substantial program can begin in FY 82.

Equipment

Only F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks pose policy issues. Their release poses no serious arms control or arms transfer issues given the quantities under consideration and the quality of equipment in neighboring countries. We have sold identical or superior equipment to other friendly nations in the area. Tactically, Israel could object in hopes we will provide it more equipment and we will need to conduct extensive consultations with Congress before any formal proposal is made. Because of production line problems the tank sale may have to be notified to Congress relatively soon. F-16s might wait, although we need a decision in principle to permit us to continue our discussions with the Egyptians.

We have looked at less capable equipment such as F-4s and M48A5s from the U.S. inventory, but have concluded we cannot strip U.S. forces without adversely affecting U.S. combat capability. We might be able to provide up to 15 F-4s and some M48A5s if we can buy back M48s from Jordan. This may change over time and we will keep the situation under review.

Congressional and Israeli Implications

A substantial continuing FMS program for Egypt will come as no surprise to either Israel or to the Congress. Israel will probably not object as long as the program does not threaten its security—which any feasible programs do not—but it will certainly bring pressure to increase its own security assistance level. Congress has been supportive of our security assistance to Egypt. We will have to guard against Congressional attempts to wedge the Egyptian program in under the overall level or to cut crucial programs in other countries. Once we have your decisions, we plan to consult closely with key members and committees about the emerging program.

*Recommendations:*¹³

1. That we continue our five-year planning discussions with Egypt, without seeking a multi-year appropriation from Congress, on the basis of anticipated annual FMS credit amounts of up to:

- \$1 billion (equal to Israel) _____
- \$800 million (recommended by PRC) _____
- \$650 million _____
- \$500 million _____

2. That we begin new FMS financing in FY 1981 at:

- \$350 million (budget impact \$35 million) _____ (PRC recommendation)
- \$225 million (budget impact \$22.5 million) _____
- Other _____

3. That the amount of financing for Egypt in FY 1981 and in subsequent years be added to the projected FMS financing level.

4. That the “cash flow” approach be used in FY 1980 and FY 1981 to facilitate selected new program starts and sustain the momentum of programs.

5. That you approve in principle the sale of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks.

Cyrus Vance¹⁴
Secretary of State

W. Graham Claytor¹⁵
Secretary of Defense

¹³ Carter neither approved nor disapproved any of the recommendations.

¹⁴ A stamped notation indicates that Vance signed the memorandum on October 25.

¹⁵ Claytor signed the memorandum on behalf of Brown. A stamped notation indicates he signed on October 17.

302. Memorandum From the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs (Sanders) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 9, 1979

SUBJECT

General Assembly Resolutions on Israeli Settlements

In casting our votes, I feel that we should be mindful of the strong possibility that the Israeli 1978 reaction to our vote may not be an accurate barometer of their 1979 response.

It is important to remember that the domestic political situation in Israel today is extremely delicate—unlike a year ago—and that the fact that Israel raised few objections last year to these resolutions does not mean that they will not become the subject of heated debate this year.

In voting for these resolutions, there are several things that we do not want to accomplish. We do not want to put the Israeli Government in a position where it will be forced to increase settlement activity. We do not wish to jeopardize the orderly conduct of the autonomy negotiations. We do not want to make it more difficult for Cabinet moderates and the Labor Party to oppose settlements. And we do not want to further erode Israeli trust of the U.S. at a moment when Israel is particularly uneasy about our commitment in general terms and on specifics like aid and US–PLO ties.

Accordingly, I recommend that if we maintain our 1978 position, we first explain to the Israelis in New York and in Jerusalem that we are merely reaffirming prior US positions and not going beyond them. Moreover, I believe that we should take a low-key approach to these resolutions both here and in New York. We should avoid citing domestic Israeli developments (such as the Elon Moreh decision)² which might hinder debate within Israel. Finally, we should not support any resolution at the General Assembly or the Security Council which substantively alters our current position.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 50, Israel: 11/79. Secret. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Maynes, Saunders, and Hunter.

² See footnote 4, Document 253.

303. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Arab Summit

The Arab Foreign Ministers meet in Tunis Wednesday and Thursday,² and the Summit is on the 20th.³ I convened an interagency meeting this morning on the subject.⁴ The following were the conclusions:

—*Lebanon*: The Lebanese want this to be the first agenda item, to get some serious consideration for their initiative. The Saudis will not get out in front on this question, which they see as foundering on the future of Haddad. They are more concerned with using the Summit to mediate between Algeria and Morocco (which is unlikely to succeed). Boutros' meeting in Damascus⁵ over the weekend did not give much basis for real optimism. So far, we have stayed low-key, approaching

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner reads: "ZB has seen."

² The meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers, charged with preparation for the November 20 Arab Summit, took place in Tunis November 15–17. Although no final communiqué was issued, two working papers, one on the Arab-Israeli dispute and the other on the situation in South Lebanon, were produced. The papers are summarized in telegram 8924 from Tunis, November 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532–0812)

³ The Arab Summit, attended by 22 delegations, took place in Tunis November 20–22. The final public resolution of the conference, approved unanimously, addressed Middle Eastern political developments since the 1978 Baghdad Summit, specifically criticizing the Camp David process, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the U.S. role in both, and Israeli "aggression in South Lebanon." Telegram 9072 from Tunis, November 24, which summarized the resolutions, also reported that while "as far as we can observe, little was achieved in moving the Government of Lebanon and the PLO towards a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi, nor on strengthening the presence of the UN forces in southern Lebanon." "Secret accords" on Lebanon were "said to take note of PLO's commitment to abstain from military operations against Israel from South Lebanon and to abstain from announcing in Lebanon operations undertaken in occupied territories." Moreover, the Summit reportedly recommended the PLO and Lebanese Government conclude an agreement regarding both parties' armed presence in South Lebanon through bilateral accords and pledged a total of \$2 billion to Lebanon over the next five years. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790541–0904)

⁴ No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

⁵ On November 12, Boutros summarized for Dean his November 10 meetings with Khaddam and Assad and outlined the Lebanese position for the Tunis Summit. (Telegram 6304 from Beirut, November 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2534)

only the Saudis.⁶ *We should consider slightly more involvement, perhaps with talking points to selected Arab participants.* This can be judged on the basis of the Foreign Ministers meeting.

—*Rejectionists:* They will no doubt try to put together some rhetoric, if not some concrete action. They will set the tone of the meeting. Saudi Arabia, lacking a consensus among the moderates, is inclined to be passive. The pressure to move to consensus, however, is on the hard-line side, not the moderate side (as was true at Baghdad I and II). *We should make this point to Saudi Arabia and other moderates, in order to try shifting rhetoric, and also to give Lebanon a better chance of being a focus of attention instead.*

—*Israel:* A key factor in the Summit will be the impending deportation of Mayor Shaka.⁷ There is a consensus in Israel on this point, and not much give. But if it happens, the likelihood of stronger rhetoric out of the Summit, and coalescence around hardline positions, will increase considerably. The peace process will be damaged on the West Bank. *Newsom is talking to Nehushtan; we should consider going to the Vance/Strauss level immediately.*⁸ Revelation of their settlement plan before the Summit will also have a serious effect.⁹

—*Oil:* Even with Iran, it is unlikely that any new steps will take place on oil at the Summit, although 1) Ghaddafi is almost certain to raise it; and 2) there is a good chance that there will be a declaration on

⁶ West met with Saud on November 11 to discuss the issue of Lebanon at the Summit. West summarized the Lebanese Government's desire for a strengthened ceasefire in which "no armed elements" in Lebanon "would attack anyone else," cooperation of all parties with UNIFIL, and the introduction of Lebanese Army units and civil authorities in southern Lebanon. Moreover, West emphasized the U.S. effort to give "strong support" to Lebanon. (Telegram 7789 from Jidda, November 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790008–0629)

⁷ On November 8, the Israeli Government decided to deport Nablus Mayor Shaka from the West Bank following remarks in which he was alleged to have voiced support for terrorist attacks on Israel in a meeting with an IDF official. (Telegram 3600 from Jerusalem, November 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790516–0552) A transcript of the conversation between Shaka and IDF Coordinator General Danny Matt that was passed by the IDF to a correspondent of the Israeli newspaper, *Haaretz*, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 24144 from Tel Aviv, November 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790523–0918)

⁸ Vance sent a letter to Begin on November 14, expressing both his concern at the "repercussions that a deportation order would have on the overall political atmosphere in the West Bank" and hope that Israel would find "other ways to handle this problem." (Telegram 296222 to Tel Aviv, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2196) Vance's letter was delivered to the Prime Minister's office on November 15. Lewis reported that Begin's initial reaction was to regard the letter as "somewhat 'out of bounds' since Shak'a matter remains sub judice." (Telegram 24385 from Tel Aviv, November 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–2177)

⁹ On November 15, the Israeli Government announced plans to add 10–15,000 new housing units per year to settlements in the West Bank. (Dial Torgerson, "Israel OKs Huge Increase in Settlers on West Bank," *Los Angeles Times*, November 16, 1979, p. A7)

oil in relation to the future—e.g. the exchange of Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors in February.

—*Sanctions against Egypt*: New steps are unlikely to be taken; however, there is a good chance of a declaration listing a series of punitive steps following the exchange of Ambassadors.

—*Eastern Front*: It will probably be raised by Syria and/or Iraq and the PLO, but is unlikely to be established. At most, there will be a declaration of intention. If it does get serious consideration, it will sink the whole Lebanon initiative.

—*Hussein initiative*: It is essentially dead at the moment; in particular, Arafat has cancelled his trip to Amman this weekend (presumably because of Iran), and Hussein can't move without coordination with the PLO. Failure of this effort leaves the moderates without an issue around which to coalesce.

—*Hostages*: Iran will no doubt be discussed privately. If the hostage issue is still unresolved, it is possible that the Summit could take a position (most likely privately conveyed); *we should consider asking Waldheim to send a message to the Arab League Secretary-General if the situation is not resolved this week.*

—*Iraq*: It will work hard to dominate the Summit and drive it in a hardline direction, but might be disposed to be more moderate *if we were to have a preliminary discussion about common problems with Iran. This should not even be considered until the hostages have been released, and then balanced against the risks of our later being associated with any Iraqi action against Iran.*

—*Sadat*: *We should suggest to him gently that he say nothing publicly to inflame the Summit.*¹⁰ (S/S)

In general, Arab Summits are not helpful to our interests. We are helped, however, by the number of items on the agenda (also including the Euro-Arab dialogue and aid to Jordan, PLO, etc.), and a lot of disarray among the rejectionists. (S)

We also discussed the potential impact on the Gulf Arabs of the Iranian situation. The consensus was that we will be better placed for low-key discussions with countries like Saudi Arabia on security, and that the Iran situation would continue the Saudis' drift back to us (as

¹⁰ On November 14, the Egyptian media reported an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation in which Sadat asserted that Egypt had "overcome" the effects of cuts in aid from Arab states as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Moreover, Sadat predicted that the autonomy talks would be completed in 2–3 months, Hussein would join the negotiations and "assume responsibilities for the West Bank," and that a "hysterical" Arab reaction would accompany the scheduled exchange of ambassadors between Egypt and Israel. (Telegram 23421 from Cairo, November 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790524–0802)

with the Yemen operation and support for Morocco). The problem of military presence would remain, however, and there will be greater awareness of *internal* vulnerability. (S)

304. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations-Designate (Linowitz)¹

Washington, November 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Middle East Negotiations (U)

You take over² at a time of deep skepticism about the possibilities for success of the talks:

—the Begin government is on the edge of paralysis and, even if it survives, is unlikely to become much stronger; at the same time, the election/government-forming process in Israel is measured in months, not weeks;

—the Shaka affair³—if he is indeed expelled—threatens a collapse of any local government on the West Bank, deep disillusionment, and serious problems for the Egyptians at the Talks; and

—although the President is committed to the process, election developments here are leading to skepticism, heightened by the shift of command in our delegation;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 62, Middle East: 8–11/79. Secret; Sensitive.

² On November 6, the White House announced that Linowitz would replace Strauss, who had been appointed by Carter to serve as chairman of the President's re-election campaign, as Special Representative. Carter recalled in his memoirs that the decision to reassign Strauss was made in late October when the administration acknowledged that it would face "strong opposition in my own Democratic party and also from the Republicans." Strauss, Carter continued, "had been doing a good job in the Middle East," but he and his advisers "agreed that his skills could best be used in this political campaign position." The decision to appoint Linowitz was taken in consultation with "Mondale, Vance and others," in light of Linowitz's demonstrated ability in negotiating the Panama Canal treaties. (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 491–492) Linowitz recalled that Carter offered him the position on October 30, following informal inquiries from Brzezinski and Vance. (Linowitz, *Making of a Public Man*, pp. 213–215) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved Linowitz's appointment on December 4. ("Negotiator Approved," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 1979, p. E5)

³ See footnote 7, Document 303.

—in any event, the Israelis are reluctant to make the concessions needed to have a Self-Governing Authority that is more than a hollow shell. (S)

There are some major factors working in our favor, however:

—the President's deep personal interest and proven courage on this issue;

—the self-interest of the parties in not seeing Camp David collapse;

—Sadat's continuing optimism, his developing personal relationship with Begin, and the "sea change" in Egyptian and Israeli attitudes about one another;

—the fact that there *are* signed documents, with Begin's signature on them, and real debate and uncertainty in Israel about the consequences (both in the West Bank/Gaza and in relations with Egypt) of a failure of the Autonomy Talks to reach agreement on a Self-Governing Authority; and

—the political possibility of slipping the date for completion of the talks (May 24), provided they are seen to be serious and basically on track. (S)

Status of the Process (U)

The goal of the Autonomy Talks has been to get agreement on a Self-Governing Authority that would contain enough to induce residents of the West Bank and Gaza to go to the polls. If they don't vote, in effect the process fails—or at least goes into a holding period until something else can be worked out. As noted above, the May 24 date is not immutable; and ways could be found to finesse it for a time. The pressures would mount, however—in terms of a recrudescence of Sadat's isolation, an increasing squeeze on oil, and a delay in repairing our relations with a number of Arab states. Needless to say, President Carter's achievements so far would be tarnished. (S)

The talks are still in a "working up" phase. Publicly, we justify this in terms of the need for the political processes in Egypt and Israel to get used to dealing with the concept of autonomy, and the need to prepare issues for political consideration. All this is true. In addition, Sadat has asked that the talks proceed at this pace. Outside observers see in this his desire to get as much land (and oil) back as possible before reaching the crunch with Israel on Autonomy. He and Khalil argue, however, that the timing really relates to: a) the developing relationship with Begin and Israel; b) continuing proof to the rejectionists that Israel is meeting each of its Sinai commitments on time, and thus can be induced to meet its West Bank/Gaza commitments (and, by implication, that Egypt is getting land back while the rejectionists are getting

nothing); and c) the passage of time in weakening the rejectionist front. (S)

There is a school of thought which holds that Egypt will “turn” on the Israelis as soon as the Interim Line is reached (January 25). Khalil specifically dismissed this thought at the London meeting;⁴ and Egypt has publicly pledged that the exchange of Ambassadors will take place on February 25, whatever is happening in the Autonomy Talks. (S)

Thus the Egyptian preference is for the real issues to be met at the political level beginning next month or early January at the latest. However, they have argued that we should take the lead in pushing Israel, against the background of the “favorable climate” Sadat has engendered. In his meeting with Mubarak,⁵ President Carter firmly rejected this division of responsibility, and also stressed that we cannot be out in front of Egypt on issues like settlements. (S)

Sadat’s future role is a key mystery. He has shown himself capable of dramatic action (and turning on Israel is one such possibility); he has floated ideas like a new international conference in El Arish (though no one has taken him seriously—rightly, so far); and he constantly talks about the deal he will cut with Begin. Sadat keeps focussing on Jerusalem as the lead for such a deal (Begin, meanwhile, congratulates himself on his forbearance when Sadat raises the subject). And Sadat has floated the idea of diverting Nile waters to the Sinai and Negev—at first in exchange for a deal on Jerusalem, until Begin reacted harshly to this connection. (CIA tells us that this idea would be very expensive, ignores Egypt’s own water needs, and would be politically costly). (S)

From our standpoint, the Sadat-Begin relationship is central—which is one reason someone of your political stature on our side is vital to moving the process on with these two key leaders. Ultimately, agreement has to come “top down,” rather than “bottom up.” The Israeli delegation is deliberately weak politically—a factor contributing to Dayan’s resignation.⁶ On the Egyptian side, Sadat will ultimately call the shots; but Khalil is now firmly on board, and increasingly demonstrates his capabilities and importance in the process. (S)

We are doing what we can to protect Sadat’s domestic position. To be sure, there is not much concern for the Palestinians on the part of the Egyptian people; but there is popular concern to see that “peace pays.”

⁴ See Document 298.

⁵ See Document 287.

⁶ Dayan resigned as Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 21. An Embassy analysis of Dayan’s rationale for resigning, including his limited role in the autonomy negotiations, the state of Begin’s coalition government, and philosophical differences between himself and the coalition’s membership, was forwarded to the Department of State in telegram 23041 from Tel Aviv, October 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790511–0153)

Thus Bob took businessmen to Egypt to work on high pay-off projects (shirts, pumps, soy protein for bread and milk). We have stretched our aid dollars, providing Egypt with nearly one-third of PL-480 (and denominating the commitment in tons, not inflatable dollars). We have sent Doug Bennet, Irwin Miller and others to Egypt. We press the Europeans and Japanese—even those not behind Camp David—to try easing Egypt's isolation with development aid and investment. At some point, there has to be an Egyptian payoff for peace if Sadat is to continue to be secure. (S)

Egypt's isolation is harder to deal with. Only Oman and Sudan support Camp David—with Morocco tacitly there. Thus we have put in some effort to support all three countries (though for other reasons as well). And the President has been personally involved in trying to stop the mutual recriminations between Sadat and the Saudi leadership.⁷ So far, Sadat has not been wrong in his predictions about the weakness of the "steadfastness front"—as witness the collapse of Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts. The Arab Summit on November 20 may repair the front somewhat—though probably more in rhetoric than in action. A far more important date is February 25—the exchange of Ambassadors. Then, there will be intense pressure to boycott the Suez Canal and Sumed pipeline, cut travel arrangements, and end worker remittances—which together (with oil) now make Egypt slightly better off in foreign earnings than before Camp David. (S)

We are not meeting all Egypt's aid requests, however. The President decided to lift wheat shipments from 1.5 to 1.6 million tons—400,000 short of the "minimum" requested by Sadat and Mubarak, and which they again pressed upon Bob Bergland. (The Egyptians have not been told this yet; it was held up pending some basically "good news" on the military side—but that military aid decision has now been held up at the behest of OMB). This aid relationship will clearly be important as we move forward, and your input will be vital. (One school of thought holds that Sadat wants a relationship with us equivalent to that of Israel: hence, the demand for aid and the squabble with Saudi Arabia. Whether or not that is true, we clearly can't finance such a relationship). (S)

In Israel, the Palestinian issue is now clearly a subject for debate—and it won't go away. The psychological momentum—however halting—is in the direction of doing something to deal with the problem. But it (and other factors) may tear the Government apart even before the tough issues at the Talks are broached at the political level. From our perspective, however, having Labor in might not be a

⁷ See Document 299.

blessing. Not only is there the time needed to put a new government in place; but also “autonomy” is Begin’s concept (though he didn’t go very far with it). Labor has favored territorial readjustment, the Allon Plan,⁸ etc., and it will not be easy for Labor to shift gears. Because of Begin’s personal commitment to Camp David, having a strong Begin government would probably be best from the standpoint of the talks—but this may now be a pipedream. (An alternative school of thought holds that Begin’s leadership on peace is played out anyway, and that only an alternative political constellation can now move forward). (S)

The choice for Israel is fairly stark: between having five more years of effective “control” over the West Bank/Gaza—with the legitimacy of Camp David (as far as it goes)—or a breakdown of a framework for dealing with the Palestinian issue, further isolation in the world (where Israel is probably at its low point) and even more terrorism. The nature of this choice is added reason for trying to get a Self-Governing Authority more or less on time: thus preserving *some* “framework,” instead of seeing diplomatic anarchy again. (S)

One angle is worth exploring—though not much weight can be put on it: that this is probably Begin’s last chance to make peace for his nation, and to assure his place in Judaism’s history. (S)

We should also not rule out the possibility that Dayan will re-involve himself in the peace process (provided his health⁹ holds out). He played a key role in Camp David, etc., and is never without ideas. (S)

The Begin government may collapse in the near future¹⁰ (the smart money gives him only a few more weeks; yet the sizeable Labor lead in the polls will concentrate Likud and NRP minds, and creates a strong incentive for soldiering on). If the government does collapse, implementation of the Egypt-Israel treaty will most likely proceed on schedule. But it is unrealistic to expect the Autonomy Talks to make any progress (though the form and actual meetings will most likely proceed). The timetable will almost certainly slip, though we must not rule out Israeli political ingenuity (e.g. a government of national unity that could take *some* decisions). (S)

The aid relationship with Israel will be important. It gets \$1.7 billion now (in effect, “straightlining” for the past three years, discounting the special \$3 billion peace package). This means real erosion from inflation. Israel has asked for a doubling in FY 81—to \$3.45 billion. It does not expect to get that (and may realistically not hope for more than an

⁸ See footnote 10, Document 58.

⁹ Dayan had been diagnosed with colon cancer in June. (Dayan, *Breakthrough*, p. 289)

¹⁰ See Document 307.

inflation factor—about \$500 million). This is now being considered in the regular budget process, though at some point it will be lifted out of that process. Again, your role will be vital in relating the aid package to the peace process (one novel idea is to ask for X dollars now, with a pledge of an added Y dollars in a supplemental once the Autonomy Talks are completed. Using aid as a *negative* bargaining lever is unlikely to work, and in military aid should be ruled out in any event). With other budgetary constraints, clearly this is a difficult subject. (S)

As indicated above, even with successful conclusion of the Talks, the real test will be whether the Palestinians resident on the West Bank/Gaza will vote. (If they do not, Sadat could claim he did his best and wash his hands—but that is a risky course; he is more likely to stretch the process out until/unless he were sure the Self-Governing Authority were at least credible). Here, the role of the PLO is important—if not vital. During recent months, two schools of thought were current in the U.S. government: a) to try resolving the question of our talking with the PLO, perhaps through a UN resolution, which would give it “legitimacy” sufficient for it to give a green light to Palestinian voters; or b) to get a Self-Governing Authority good enough to attract voters, and perhaps even to challenge the extent of PLO veto authority in the territories. There were indications over the summer of PLO movement in a direction that might have made course a) possible; but that never really had a firm base in the politics of Israel and Egypt, as Sadat worked to build his special relationship with Begin and to develop the “sea change” in Israeli-Egyptian attitudes. Sadat confirmed that in rejecting the idea of a compromise U.S. resolution (“making Begin’s arguments better than Begin,” in Bob’s words). And the USG is now committed to course b). However, it is possible we will face other UN resolutions, and other suggestions within the government to try course a). Whatever the political traffic might have borne in August, however, it will clearly not bear course a) between now and May. (S)

Camp David does provide for a Palestinian role in the Talks. This will not happen; however, some form of informal consultation might be possible. It is also possible that King Hussein could work out something with Arafat that would be a “complement” to Camp David, in terms of the future of the West Bank following the autonomy period. There have clearly been some soundings; but little progress. (S)

Hussein has still not recovered from his anger and disillusionment with us and especially Egypt over Camp David. His not seeing the President during his visit to the UN did not increase his willingness to play a constructive role, though in his conversation with Cy Vance¹¹ he

¹¹ See Document 291.

did play with the idea of a complementary initiative. We could encourage an initiative along the lines of a federal or confederal relationship between the West Bank and Jordan, which Hussein has advanced in the past. The Begin government would not accept it (it has residual claims to sovereignty over the West Bank); but it is consistent with the Labor approach. The important thing is to seek progress in the Talks that will increase the incentives for Hussein to be involved in the West Bank in some way during the next few years, to avoid being frozen out by an autonomy regime in which he has no part. At the moment, this is a long-shot. (S)

In the next few months, Saudi Arabia will also be important, both in showing confidence in the possibility of some success in the talks—by keeping oil production up; and in trying to play a moderating role in Arab politics (beginning with the Arab Summit on November 20). In general, the Saudis have been reluctant to use oil in politics; with the exchange of Ambassadors—or outright failure of the Talks—it might not be able to sustain that position. (At the same time, economically Saudi Arabia probably wants to sustain at least an 8.5 million barrel a day output, and it will see its oil production decisions in the context of its total relationship with us). We should keep up our discussions with the Saudis on the peace process, while continuing efforts on Saudi military problems, Gulf security, etc. (S)

At some point, Bob had intended to go to Syria. The object was to keep Assad informed, and also to indicate the ways in which completion of Camp David could lead in the direction of a comprehensive peace. The Syrians would not receive him in the context of Camp David; it is unlikely that they would soon receive you, either, though it is something to keep in mind (the Saudis could be helpful in arranging a visit). (S)

*The Talks*¹²

State will be briefing you on the detailed issues. Suffice it to point out here the tough problems, which include:

- the status of East Jerusalem (for purposes of voting), where some sort of dual voting might be possible;
- the voting status of returnees from 1967 (as provided for in Camp David);
- the “legislative” vs. “administrative” character of the Self-Governing Authority;

¹² Hunter sent a follow-up memorandum on the state of the autonomy talks with a list of strategy suggestions to Linowitz on November 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 62, Middle East: 8–11/79)

- land and water (including settlements);
- the source of authority for the Self-Governing Authority; and
- both internal and external security. (C)

The issue of supervision of elections was more or less resolved in London—but that was child’s play compared to the other issues. (C)

In terms of your role, there are a number of steps, which you undoubtedly have already thought about:

—talking with Evron, Ghorbal, the other Arab Ambassadors, selected regional UN Ambassadors, and Waldheim;

—visiting Egypt and Israel soon, and establishing contact with Sadat, Khalil, Begin, Burg (and other Israeli leaders); attending an early meeting of the Talks;

—meeting with American Jewish leaders, the Hamilton Subcommittee, and the Stone Subcommittee;

—working towards meetings with non-PLO Palestinians;

—meeting with Habib on Lebanon.

Because of the interplay of issues in the Middle East, there are other issues where your involvement will be important, so that everything stays on track, including:

—*Lebanon*. The “initiative” is being pursued in terms both of Lebanon itself, and of preventing a recurrence of violence from damaging the Autonomy Talks. (Sadat has not let the talks be affected by past Lebanese incidents, but might not be able to sustain that position). Our position rules out any dealing with the PLO (there was some opinion in the Administration to use the Lebanon initiative to resolve the larger problem of talking with the PLO). The initiative is low-key, and depends on Lebanese leadership and effectiveness with the Arabs. Yet its course will have an impact on your work;

—*Settlements*. How we play this issue in our ongoing diplomacy is important, in addition to any effort we consider to try getting a “good-will” freeze on settlements. It is important that you be in the loop on USG approaches to Israel and public statements on this subject (as on others, such as any resumption of strikes in Lebanon);

—*Aid*. As noted above, you are the key person to work with Cy and Zbig in helping the President relate levels of aid to Egypt and Israel to the peace process;

—*Arms sales*. These are important with regard to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both politically and concerning the stance these countries take towards Camp David;

—*UN Resolutions*. As noted above, we may have to face one or more new resolutions on the PLO. (Khalil has played around with an Egyptian initiative, which Bob has tried to turn off);

—*Collateral peace issues*. These include oil (now hopefully resolved, though the terms of the agreement have been reported to us by the two sides in different terms), Sinai observer arrangements, etc. (S)

305. Briefing Memorandum From the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State (Habib) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 17, 1979

SUBJECT

Lebanon—Discussion with Dobrynin

As instructed,² I called on Dobrynin today to inform him of our views on the situation in Southern Lebanon and our support for the Lebanese initiative in that regard. I outlined for him the nature of the Lebanese initiative and its purpose, emphasizing that we believed it was worth supporting for humanitarian as well as political reasons. I noted the existence of a fragile ceasefire which we sought to make permanent, the relationship to Security Council Resolution 425,³ and the dangers of confrontation and escalation if the situation in Southern Lebanon was to heat up again.

I then gave him a brief account of my recent visit⁴ to the region and ended up by referring to the forthcoming discussion of this problem at the Arab Summit meeting in Tunis.

Dobrynin had obviously been informed of Soviet conversations on the subject with the Syrians and with the PLO. He said that the Syrians

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall D. Shulman—Jan 21, 74–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 2, Memorandums of Conversation, 1979. Confidential. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Christopher, Newsom, Saunders, Shulman, and Vest.

² On November 14, Hunter presented the proposal for the Habib-Dobrynin meeting to Brzezinski in a decision memorandum for the latter's approval. Brzezinski initialed his approval, but asked in a handwritten notation, "Won't this scare Sadat-Begin?" In a typed response on the back of the memorandum, Hunter wrote, "Habib thinks it will not scare Sadat and Begin—since it is kept separate from the autonomy talks (which he will *not* discuss). In fact, he says that the Israelis and Egyptians probably expect that we will be briefing the Soviets in a low-key way on what we are doing in Lebanon. The reason for doing it is to avoid the misimpression that it is a full-scale effort to get the Syrians out, etc." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: 11/79–3/80)

³ See footnote 3, Document 300.

⁴ For a summary of Habib's visit to the region, see Document 300.

to some extent, and the PLO to a much greater extent, were suspicious of the proposals. Both were concerned that the initiative was some sort of U.S.-Israel-Lebanon scheme to produce a Lebanese Camp David. That is, having in mind another partial settlement in the Middle East in place of dealing with a comprehensive peace in which the Palestinian question would be to the fore. The Syrians were also suspicious that the initiative was designed to reduce their influence and bring about an early end of their troop presence in Lebanon.

In describing the PLO position Dobrynin stressed their view that the initiative was also designed to squeeze them out of Lebanon, or to limit their presence there, before they had anywhere else to go and before the overall Palestinian question had been resolved. He said the PLO considered it important to be able to maintain pressure in and from Lebanon as a means of assuring that the overall issue of Palestine would not be forgotten internationally.

In response to my counter-arguments he pointed out that he had outlined the views of the Syrians and PLO, but he did not indicate that the Soviets disagreed or had in any way sought to dissuade them. He did confirm that the Lebanese had spoken to the Soviets, seeking support for their initiative which they described in the same manner as I had outlined to him.

He said he would inform Moscow of our conversation and left it that we would now await the results of the Arab Summit meeting.

Comment: I came away with the distinct feeling that the Soviets are not inclined to be helpful, although to what extent they may have stimulated the Syrian and PLO reaction is unclear. On balance, I would think they did not need to be stimulated. The various aspects will have to be thrashed out first at the Arab Summit, where hopefully the Lebanese can make some limited gains. Once we know the results we can re-view the matter and decide what needs to be done next. I do not think we need to conclude at this point that the prospects are all bleak, although it is probable that the suspicions on all sides will be such that progress will be slow and in small increments.

306. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 21, 1979

This supplements my series of reports from the field (attached).

INTRODUCTION

At your request, I visited Cairo, Jidda and again Cairo during the period November 13–November 20. While in Cairo, I met twice with President Sadat and also with Vice President Mubarak, Prime Minister Khalil and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali. In Jidda, I met first with Islamic Conference Secretary-General Chatti and, subsequently, had a four-hour conversation with Prince Fahd. In both capitals, I briefed the ambassadors on my mission and the results of my talks.

Both Sadat and Fahd asked that I pass on to you their warm regards and best wishes.

You had asked that I take up with Sadat and Fahd (a) the Iranian hostage situation, (b) the need for a thaw in Egyptian/Saudi relations in the interest of progress on the Middle East peace process, and (c) any other matters that they might wish to raise. With Chatti, you asked that I take up the Iranian hostage problem. This report is divided into three sections: (a) Iranian hostage problem, (b) Egyptian/Saudi relations, and (c) other matters.

[Omitted here are the portions of Eilts's report relating to the Iranian hostage situation.]

*EGYPTIAN/SAUDI RELATIONS**First Talk With Sadat (November 14)*

During my first meeting, I told Sadat that you had asked me to visit Cairo and Jidda in order to transmit to the Saudis Sadat's letter to Fahd.² You had been very appreciative of Sadat's quick and positive response. I planned to leave for Jidda the following day in order to meet

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 54, Middle East: Eilts Report, 11/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President. In the upper right-hand corner of the document, Carter wrote: "Good report—Also had long talk w/Eilts by telephone (secure). J." The memorandum was found attached to a one-page summary of the report to which was attached a November 21 hand-written note by Brzezinski to Carter, proposing that the report be forwarded to Vance. The portions of the memorandum pertaining to the Iran hostage crisis are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979—January 1981.

² Not found.

with Fahd and wondered if Sadat had any additional thoughts that he might wish me to convey.

Sadat asked if I had read his letter to Fahd, and I said that you had shown it to me. Sadat then asked what I thought of the letter. I said that it was certainly a constructive initiative on his part and that I knew that the views expressed were a true reflection of his pertinent thinking. At the same time, my estimate was that Fahd would react negatively, especially to the long recital of Egyptian complaints of Saudi actions. (In saying this, I made it clear that I was speaking for myself and not suggesting any criticism on your part of the letter.)

Sadat was slightly taken aback, and asked what I thought should be said to Fahd. I told him that I would carry whatever he wished, but that in my view the recital of past complaints should be dropped. Sadat responded that he wanted to “shock” Fahd. I said that I realized this, but I could only tell him, as a friend and as someone who knows Fahd well, that the effect would be counterproductive. Sadat then said that the circumstances had changed since sending you his original letter. He had thought that you would first send the letter to Fahd and that this would be followed by the visit of a special representative. Since these two actions were now taking place simultaneously, it seemed reasonable to change the letter. What would I suggest?

I told him that I would suggest something to the effect that he, Sadat, understands the Saudi position and respects it, that he hopes the Saudis also understand the Egyptian position, that the moratorium on public attacks ought to be reestablished and that some kind of direct dialogue be reestablished between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I said it was important to show that Sadat did not wish to embarrass Fahd or the Saudis and that any communication between Sadat and Fahd would not be published.

In this connection, the last several pages of his original letter were just the kind of constructive language that is needed.

Sadat thereupon gave Mubarak general instructions on rewriting the letter along the lines that I had suggested, but said he also wanted included a series of questions about the area situation which should be of concern to both countries. Wagging his finger under my nose, he did turn down my suggestion that he say he respects the Saudi views. He did not respect the Saudi view, but I did not have to tell them that. I told him I had no intention of doing so.

Sadat asked me to pass on two additional oral points to Fahd.

(a) Despite the differences between the two countries, he is prepared in the event of a security threat to Saudi Arabia to help in any way possible, and

(b) With respect to the Saudi interest in amending UN Resolution 242, Camp David had already enabled this situation to be “jumped

over.” The current West Bank/Gaza negotiations aim at obtaining “full autonomy” for the Palestinians and a satisfactory resolution of the Jerusalem problem.

The revised letter was in fact prepared by Osama Al-Baz and given to me late that night. The original English translation prepared by Al-Baz is attached to this report. The Arabic version was in a sealed envelope and I could not therefore check it, but I have no reason to question that it corresponds to the English translation.

Talk With Fahd (November 17/18)

The greater part of my four-hour meeting with Fahd focused on Egyptian/Saudi relations. Fahd remains leery of any direct or indirect contact with the Egyptians, is deeply suspicious of Sadat, thinks Sadat has deliberately betrayed the Arab cause at Camp David and that nothing will come out of the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks. He is also convinced that, despite Egyptian promises, they will leak any messages between the two countries.

I first told him that you are concerned that a continuation of the Saudi/Egyptian contretemps makes it more difficult for you politically to move ahead in a meaningful fashion in the Middle East peace effort. It is unhelpful to have the two Arab countries with which we have the closest relations be so publicly at odds with each other. I recalled your messages to Fahd and Sadat and said Sadat had sent you a letter in reply, enclosing a letter to Fahd and asking that you arrange to deliver the letter. You had asked me to undertake this mission. I then gave him the letter and suggested it would be useful if he read it so that we could use it as a starting point for our discussion. He did so, sometimes nodding in slight approval, but otherwise making no substantive comment.

He then gave me an hour and a half litany of his complaints against Sadat very much along the lines of what he had said to me in Rome last May,³ but updating it to include more recent Sadat attacks. The thrust of his complaints was that Sadat had lied to him, that Sadat’s earlier protestations of wanting to go to Geneva⁴ had been a sham as evidenced by the sudden Jerusalem trip, that Sadat was not authorized by anyone to speak for the Palestinians and that, judging from what he could tell from Israeli settlement policies, nothing meaningful would come from the current negotiations. He went to great lengths to defend

³ See footnote 4, Document 247.

⁴ On the Geneva Conference, see footnote 5, Document 24.

his actions at Baghdad⁵ and insisted Saudi policy is not dictated by any sense of fear of Palestine or anyone else.

When I finally had a chance to say something more, I tried to set him straight on the history of the efforts to get to Geneva, stressing that the Syrians had pulled the rug out from that effort. I told him Sadat is determined to get a Palestinian self-governing authority with wide powers and responsibilities and a satisfactory solution of the Jerusalem problem. Fahd might disagree with Sadat's tactics, but I could assure him that their objectives are very similar.

Fahd thought that only a statement from you to the effect that there must be an Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 borders with minor rectifications and that Jerusalem must be returned to the Arabs would help. If Sadat succeeds in his negotiations in achieving these two objectives, he, Fahd, would be the first to applaud and to urge the other Arab states to support the peace effort. But he doubted that this would happen. I told him that you are determined to do your utmost to move the peace process forward, that we should all by now recognize that public statements do little to achieve this objective. I urged that he have confidence in your purposes and support them. Fahd said he has full confidence in you, but as for Sadat—that was something else.

We then went to the question of a possible dialogue. He turned down Sadat's suggestion of a meeting with Mubarak in Washington—either bilateral or with an American present—or even of having someone else do so. What is first needed, he said, is a "period of tranquility," i.e., a cessation of mutual public attacks. He said that he was happy that Sadat agrees with this, but charged that Sadat is the guilty party. I said I was not seeking to blame anyone, but noted there had also been unhelpful Saudi press articles. Fahd said that he had given instructions to the Minister of Information to muzzle the press and not allow attacks on the Egyptians.

Since you had authorized me to try out what I thought might be useful, I then suggested the establishment of a hot line between the two. Fahd didn't like that, and noted that they already have a secure channel between them. I said that I assumed he was referring to the intelligence channel, but noted that Mubarak had told me a message sent four months ago had not yet been answered by the Saudis. Fahd simply shrugged his shoulders. (It may be that Fahd's growing doubts about Turkibin Faisal make him uninterested in the intelligence channel.)

I told Fahd that the mischievous efforts of ill-wishers on both sides, who were seeking to spread disinformation, could only be curbed if some kind of a channel between Egypt and Saudi Arabia exists and is

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 85.

used. This would permit charges and rumors to be checked out before they escalate to a point where they result in public attacks. I mentioned, as an example, the article in the Egyptian opposition newspaper, *Al-Sha'ab*, that the Saudis are financing the Kennedy campaign, an article which had prompted Fahd to issue a public denial. This kind of thing could be checked out before it becomes a public issue. Fahd agreed in principle, but made it very clear that he does not trust the Egyptians. They will at some point leak news of any such direct dialogue, however secret it may be.

After we had gone round and round on this for a time and he would not budge, I suggested that perhaps this kind of checking out of malicious gossip could be done through our embassies. He seemed agreeable. Again, however, he spoke of a "period of tranquility" of several months after which the matter of an indirect dialogue could again be considered. (I am convinced that he will do nothing on reestablishing a dialogue with Egypt, direct or indirect, until after the exchange of Egyptian/Israeli ambassadors in later February and after the inevitable ensuring flap has abated. He is scared and considers himself vulnerable in the eyes of the other Arabs.)

Fahd said he will reply to your letter after he gets back from Tunis and, with a little pressing, he also agreed to reply to Sadat's letter. I urged him to make his replies as constructive as possible and not to give a long recital of past complaints. He gave me no commitments, but said he would consider carefully what I had asked him to do. We shall see.

Second Talk with Sadat (November 18)

I briefed Sadat in Ismailia about the results of my talks with Fahd. I frankly put the best face possible on them, but made it clear that Fahd is not yet ready to resume any kind of dialogue. I also made it clear that Fahd believes the Egyptians will leak any such dialogue.

Sadat took it very philosophically. He said that he had not expected anything more to come from the talk with Fahd, but was glad that Fahd had agreed to the need to reestablish a moratorium on public attacks. He assured me that he will honor it. He also agreed that our embassies be used to try to prevent any misunderstandings from escalating to a point where they become public attacks. (Sadat will have to be carefully watched on this, since he tends to get carried away when he is making a speech.)

Fahd, Sadat said, is afraid. He feels himself vulnerable before the other Arabs. Fahd will do nothing, Sadat opined, until after the exchange of ambassadors and the resultant flurry. Even then, Sadat thought, Fahd will be very leery. This should not trouble us, Sadat

added, since there is nothing that Fahd or the Saudis can do to impede the peace process.

Sadat said that it is important that the United States retain the closest possible relations with Fahd and the Saudis in order to prevent them, as he put it, from collaborating with the Iraqis or Libyans in actions against our allies. He mentioned the Japanese and Europeans, but did not spell this out. If we retain such close relations with the Saudis, Sadat said, this will suffice for him. We can all look at the situation again early next year.

OTHER MATTERS

Middle East Peace Process

Sadat felt pleased with the way things are going. He was on cloud nine about the return of St. Catherine⁶ and his visit there. He said that during his last meeting with Begin, he had told the latter not to fight the Jerusalem issue or self-determination. To his surprise, contrary to Begin's earlier "hysterical" reaction to any such suggestion, Begin had this time simply said, "The time is not right." When Sadat had spoken of Begin's brave deed in giving up the Sinai settlements, Begin had commented, "I will take those settlements to my grave." Sadat remained optimistic about how things are working out. He had asked Ezer Weizman to repeat his ideas to Begin, but acknowledged that Begin may still be reluctant.

Sadat spoke of the desirability of getting the autonomy and Jerusalem questions resolved by the end of January. (His objective is clearly to find a way to make an exchange of ambassadors the following month a little more palatable to the Arab world.) He said that he is pressing the Israelis, but thought that perhaps the time had come for the United States to apply a bit of pressure on Begin on this matter.

Since it was not my mission to discuss the peace process and Bob Strauss was scheduled to be there the following day, we let it go at that.

Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Sadat asked me to tell you that he is sending an ambassador to Moscow. It will be Samih Anwar, the present Egyptian ambassador in London. (Anwar, who is a former minister of state and was once a counselor of the embassy in Moscow, is a very responsible and able man. I have known him for many years and he has always been helpful

⁶ As a good-will gesture to Sadat, Begin agreed on November 15 to return Mt. Sinai, including St. Catherine, to Egyptian sovereignty, two months ahead of schedule as required under the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (Christopher Wren, "Israel Relinquishes Mt. Sinai Region to Egypt Ahead of Schedule," *The New York Times*, November 16, 1979, p. A3)

and cooperative.) Sadat said he is doing so in an effort to see if he can improve relations with the Soviets. He recalled there has always been a Soviet ambassador in Cairo. This action on his part, he wished you to know, will in no way change the Middle East peace process in which you and he are engaged.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) Sadat remains strong, self-confident and optimistic. In contrast, his Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are less so. Boutros Ghali is speaking of the need for a “mini-crisis” around the end of January because the autonomy negotiations will not have gotten very far. This would be useful, in his view, as a smoke screen for the exchange of ambassadors. Although Sadat does not seem worried about the ambassadorial exchange, Khalil and Boutros Ghali are very worried about it, especially in the absence of progress on autonomy. Sadat did say the Egyptian ambassador will not go to Jerusalem, only to Tel Aviv.

(b) Fahd wants to be helpful, but is not anxious to be counted in at this stage of the game. I do not think he should be pressed too hard, though he should be continued to be reminded of the facts of the Middle East peace effort and who prevented going to Geneva. After yesterday’s Mecca incident,⁷ he will be even more cautious about sticking his neck out.

(c) Our embassies in Cairo and Jidda should monitor closely so that the moratorium on public attacks (including press) is honored.

(d) A follow-up should take place in a few months.⁸

⁷ On November 20, hundreds of Islamic militants seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca during the annual hajj pilgrimage. The attack was led by a former member of the Saudi National Guard who called for a revolt against the Saudi monarchy, accusing it of betraying Islamic principles by becoming close to Western countries. (Philip Taubman, “Mecca Mosque Seized by Gunmen believed to be Militants from Iran,” *The New York Times*, November 21, 1979, p. A1)

⁸ See Document 317. Below this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Eilts will be going back to S.A. & Egypt late in Dec. He will give me prior notice, & I’m sure we will use him in some way. J.”

307. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Assessments of Israeli Political Developments (U)

At Tabs A and B are State's assessments² of Begin's prospects and the potential of a Labor government, as you requested. (C)

In summary:

Begin. State notes that most observers give Begin and Likud only about 6–8 months. Conflicts within the Cabinet are rife, with personal differences coming to the fore. (Begin has a 4–5 seat majority; 0–1 if Agudat Ysrael formally leaves the coalition and lines up with the opposition). Thus the government could fall over even a relatively minor issue. By contrast, the threat of defeat (Likud would suffer severe losses at the polls and almost surely be out of power) is likely to concentrate the minds of the fractious elements. (S)

Begin may now venture more into foreign affairs, playing to the domestic audience with a renewal of conflict in Lebanon, a crackdown on PLO activity in the West Bank, and stressing the relationship with Egypt even more. Only the last would be helpful to the peace process. (S)

State argues flatly that the May 1980 date for completing an autonomy agreement is dead. And the chances of extending the date would depend in large measure on Israeli activities in Lebanon and on the West Bank. The agreement with Egypt will continue to be implemented, however. (S)

Labor. The polls now indicate that Labor would get about 40% of the vote, and Likud about 30%. Labor's flexibility in power would depend in large measure on whether it had to make a coalition with the National Religious Party. The NRP could split, however, over territories issues, or through attraction of its right-wing to the new hawkish Tehiya Party. But this is unlikely. (S)

Labor has mixed views on the autonomy process—which derives from Begin's orientation, as opposed to Labor's long-standing preference for partition and a deal with Hussein. Yet Labor does have to deal

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Good, helpful. C."

² The assessments are attached but not printed.

with the autonomy talks as a fact, and could peruse them, demanding: Israeli control over East Jerusalem and over security in the territories; inclusion of some West Bank areas (uninhabited by Arabs) in direct Israeli control; authority over water and capacity to deal with terrorism; and seeking some arrangement with Jordan. (S)

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, November 30, 1979, 1500Z

25310. For DAS Draper from Amb. Lewis. Subject: Lebanon After the Arab Summit. Ref: A. Tel Aviv 25017,² B. State 308393.³

1. (S-entire text)

2. It seems to me that, in the wake of the Tunis Summit,⁴ some high level U.S. contact with the GOL is needed concerning where the “initiative” can go from here; without such contact, the U.S. risks being seen as abandoning its effort to help the GOL move toward a stable peace. A visit by Phil to Beirut following his Pakistan trip thus has my support.⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850050–1796; N790009–0444. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, USUN, and the White House.

² In telegram 25017 from Tel Aviv, November 26, Lewis pointed out that despite the three Lebanese objectives for the Tunis Summit (see footnote 3, Document 303), the outcome of the Summit “as it now appears from here is that Palestinian positions south of the Litani will remain, with no undertaking to curtail infiltration into the UNIFIL AO nor to refrain from launching the major external threat to Israel: seaborne attacks.” Moreover, while a “statement of support for GOL sovereignty and LAF deployment emerged, so did an assertion of the Palestinian’s ‘right of resistance’ against Israel on all fronts, and a statement blaming Israel for the problems of South Lebanon.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790544–0535)

³ Telegram 308393 to Beirut, November 29, concluded that the outcome of the Tunis Summit provided “a few elements which, if effectively implemented, could be basis for some further progress in South Lebanon” and suggested that Habib could be made available to return to the Middle East following a scheduled visit to Pakistan on December 9–12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2222)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 303.

⁵ Dean raised the possibility of Habib’s return with Sarkis on November 28. Sarkis replied that “GOL would first have to see for itself what action could be taken to implement Tunis resolution on South Lebanon.” (Telegram 6682 from Beirut, November 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2545) Dean confirmed Sarkis’s response in a December 8 meeting with Boutros. (Telegram 6854 from Beirut, December 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790566–0926) Telegram 319229 to Beirut, December 11, confirmed that that any Habib trip would be post-

Should a visit to Beirut eventuate I also think that Phil should come here—to do otherwise would feed Israeli suspicions that we are cooking up something behind their backs. In addition, while Israeli restraint in the aftermath of the November 18 Palestinian seaborne attack⁶ indicates that the lid Weizman put on the IDF is still firmly in place, Phil's presence here could only be helpful in reinforcing the current Israeli policy of "not hitting until hit."

3. This being said, however, such a visit would need to be handled carefully, and keyed just about as low as possible. As in the case of Phil's late October visit here,⁷ it will be difficult at first to turn the GOI—and contain the Israeli media—from the suspicion that the purpose of the visit is not "fact-finding", but to advance a substantive U.S. initiative. And those we do convince will again be likely to scorn our effort as bereft of accomplishment or solid prospects for progress in any way that can benefit Israel's security. Although the Israelis are not yet as informed as we about the events or outcome at Tunis, they have digested enough of its product to have concluded that, at the least, the PLO gave up nothing while GOL hopes to bolster its integrity and authority were rebuffed. While it may be useful to explore with the GOL whether there is anything positive that can be built upon the "few elements" cited in ref A, I believe we should be very circumspect about presenting these to the Israelis as causes for even slight optimism. From what we now know of the Arab Summit's handling of the Lebanon problem it does not appear even remotely in line with the four foundation-stones of "the Lebanon initiative" as understood by the Israelis: an evolution from cease-fire to truce; removal of PLO and unauthorized fighting elements from UNIFIL's AO; a measured expansion of GOL authority; and no impingement on Haddad's area for the time being. An illustrative footnote to the Israeli attitude is the statement which Ciechanover and others made during Phil's last trip: that it would help if the PLO in Beirut would cease taking credit for terrorist attacks initiated inside Israel. This idea was put forward as something that would, in the context of an initiative such as that sketched above, help Israel maintain the ceasefire as part of an overall movement toward a truce. In context of the negative Tunis Summit outcome, how-

poned pending "indication" from the Lebanese "that such a trip would be useful." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570-0246)

⁶ On the night of November 18–19, an Israeli patrol boat intercepted a rubber boat piloted by Palestinian infiltrators off the Israeli coast near Nahariyya. In the exchange of fire which followed, two Palestinians were reportedly killed and two captured. (Telegram 24566 from Tel Aviv, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532-0996)

⁷ For a summary of Habib's October 24–November 1 visit to the region, see Document 300.

ever, PLO acceptance of this point looks more like public relations one-upmanship and is being seen by Israelis as a way for the PLO to heighten international criticism of future Israeli retaliation against such terrorist attacks.

4. All in all, then, it seems from here to be a good idea for Phil to proceed to the Middle East after Pakistan. If this is the decision, I definitely feel he should come—at the end of whatever itinerary is chosen—to Israel. But we should be most careful in my opinion not to characterize this swing as an attempt to build upon the Arab summit, but rather as an opportunity for Phil to be briefed by those who participated at Tunis and get the reactions of those affected by the outcome as it pertains to the Lebanon problem.

Lewis

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, December 2, 1979, 2318Z

311093. Subject: Responses to President Sadat's Message to President Carter. Ref: State 293463.²

1. Secret-entire text.

2. In a manner and at a time you deem most suitable, please convey the following oral response³ on behalf of the administration to President Sadat's letter of September 9⁴ (assistance to Egypt). Septel⁵ pro-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Samuel R. Peale (NEA/EGY); cleared by Kirby, Keene, Edward Casey (E), Gaffney, Hunter, and Robert Steven (S/S-O) and in EB and AID; approved by Draper and Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790556-0550)

² Telegram 293463 to Cairo, November 10, conveyed from the Department to Atherton instructions for his meeting with Mubarak scheduled for the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790518-0019)

³ Atherton conveyed Carter's message to Mubarak in a meeting held on December 6. (Telegram 24946 from Cairo, December 6; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 12/79)

⁴ See Document 283.

⁵ Telegram 309367 to Cairo, December 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790552-0659)

vided like talking points in response to Sadat's October 6 (Soviet/Cuban security threats) letter.⁶

3. Assistance to Egypt:

—The various aspects of U.S. assistance for Egypt have, of course, been the subject of a continuing dialogue between our two governments. A number of the points raised in President Sadat's letter were discussed with Vice President Mubarak during his September visit,⁷ not only by the President but also by other senior officials. And we in the Embassy have similarly had frequent contacts with you and others here on these matters.

—On the subject of our longer-term military supply relationship, Vice President Mubarak's visit was very useful, coming as it did in the immediate wake of Dave McGiffert's Mission to Egypt⁸ and during the initial course of the decision-making process in Washington. This latter process has taken longer than we had hoped, but future programs for Egypt cannot be considered in isolation—the relationship to other budgetary requirements and the need for congressional support, to cite but two examples, must be considered.

—President Carter and his top advisers are taking a careful look at your requests for military assistance. We hope in the near future to hold discussions again in Cairo with Minister Ali and General Bedawi which will allow you to prepare definite plans.

—As Vice President Mubarak noted, your needs are great. On the one hand, we will not be able to do all that you might desire, particularly in the short term, because of budgetary ceilings. On the other hand, there have already been pluses, such as our achievements in getting some of the F-4s and APCs to Cairo in time for the ceremonies on

⁶ Conveyed in telegram 20675 from Cairo, October 7, Sadat's October 6 letter responded to an October 1 message from Carter, informing the former of the measures the administration would take in response to the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. In the letter, Sadat proposed four measures to counter "the exploitation by the Soviet Union of unjust situations still prevailing in various areas of the Middle East, in Africa, in the Far East, and in Latin America:" 1) a "long range" program of economic and military assistance to the countries "most directly affected by the Soviet efforts at penetration and destabilization;" 2) "increase the capabilities of countries willing to take a firm stand against the Soviet plans;" 3) "increase efforts to solve the international problems which are exploited by the Soviet Union;" and 4) support "genuine liberation movements who should not be left in a position where they feel that their only support comes from the Soviet Union and other Soviet-leaning countries." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-2248)

⁷ See Document 287.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 268.

October 6.⁹ We will do our best to meet your critical needs and look to a continuing relationship which will enable us to do more in the future.

—In that connection, we welcome the signing last month of the memorandum of understanding¹⁰ covering future cooperation that we may be able to undertake with your domestic defense industry. This is a complex field and we need to work carefully together to ensure that our efforts are fully successful. But it is also an area which offers the possibility of sustained benefits not only to your military but with possible application to the civilian side as well.

—On the economic front, we are pleased that you perceive an improvement in the area of economic cooperation, a subject which, as you know, was a major focus of conversation in Washington with Vice President Mobarak. Here too, while we may be unable to respond as comprehensively and swiftly as you might desire, Egypt's needs are a matter of prime concern to us.

—In the wake of Vice President Mobarak's visit, we have reconsidered what we could do to help you finance Egypt's wheat imports. Our desire to be helpful is, as you know, limited by the absolute necessity to restrain the large U.S. budget deficit and the compelling needs of many developing countries. Nevertheless, we have proposed to the Congress that we raise our provision of wheat to Egypt under the PL-480 concessional credit program in the current U.S. fiscal year from the originally planned level of dols 198 million to dols 275 million, plus dols 14 million in shipping cost subsidies. This means an increase by 100,000 tons to 1.6 million tons.

—Our PL-480 assistance to Egypt is by far our largest in the world. We took dols 60 million from our food aid planned for other countries in order to maintain the planned 1.5 million ton program for Egypt this year against grain price increases, and we have asked the Congress for dols 17 million more to provide the extra 100,000 tons. In the current fiscal year, Egypt will receive about one-third of our worldwide food aid provided on concessional credit terms.

⁹ Reference is to the October 6 commemoration of Victory Day, during which the Egyptian military paraded weapons that had recently been obtained, including U.S.-built F-4 fighters and Chinese aircraft. The Egyptian press, according to the Embassy in Cairo, emphasized the appearance of these weapons as a way to illustrate the "success of Sadat's policy to diversify sources of military supplies." (Telegram 20621 from Cairo, October 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790457-0382)

¹⁰ On October 21, U.S. and Egyptian officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing Egyptian industry to manufacture U.S.-designed military equipment, including missiles, spare parts for aircraft, electronics, armored vehicles, ships, and optical equipment. (Telegram 21772 from Cairo, October 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483-1136) The text of the agreement is in telegram 270477 to Cairo, October 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474-0924)

—Our total economic assistance to Egypt is today over dols 1 billion a year. We have provided over dols 5.5 billion in such assistance to Egypt since 1974.

—Looking to the longer term, aid has obligated dols 200 million for various agricultural programs which, when combined with steps your government is considering, should facilitate increased yields, thus promoting more effective use of Egypt's land and water resources. My government is now studying how we might best facilitate cooperation between your public and private sectors and American companies in the development of new agricultural lands as well.

—As for the other commodity requests which Vice President Mobarak presented during his Washington visit, these have been carefully studied, and the President has asked me and members of the Embassy staff to discuss with your ministers opportunities that exist for making the best use of resources already in hand or now being programmed. As you know, we have in the last few months signed up some dols 335 million for commodity assistance. With congressional completion of action on the 1980 funds, we will soon be in a position to discuss the best way of using these funds, relating them to the substantial progress which Egypt has achieved in enhancing its foreign exchange earnings.

—As you may be aware, over dols 2 billion exist in the aid pipeline; these are funds obligated for use in Egypt's development but still not put to use. There would thus seem to be some room to speed up implementation of existing, agreed projects. There would also seem to be an opportunity to accelerate the designing of new projects. If your government and mine can obligate funds sooner in the year, Egypt would benefit sooner from funds which our Congress has already approved.

—Again, I want to emphasize that we are indeed mindful of Egypt's needs and of our commitment to help as we can. That has been our objective on the offers we have been able to make to date and this will be our intent with future programs. While our efforts may fall short of our own wishes—and Egypt's expectations—we do expect to be able to assist in maintaining your military strength and improving the welfare and prosperity of the Egyptian people.

Vance

310. Editorial Note

Following the formal approval of his appointment as the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations by

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 4, 1979, Ambassador Sol Linowitz paid his first “get-acquainted” visit to Egypt and Israel in his new capacity December 8–13. Linowitz provided an overall summary of his trip in an un-numbered telegram to multiple posts, December 13. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 12/79) Arriving first in Cairo on December 8, Linowitz initially met with Egyptian Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Characterizing these talks as “very good and helpful,” Linowitz reported to President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance his impressions of both men and their respective outlooks on the peace process. Sadat, Linowitz noted, “remains fully committed to the negotiating process in which Egypt, Israel and the United States are engaged and believes that things can fall into place,” despite his view that the moment “when difficult issues in the negotiations must be addressed” was “now approaching.” The Egyptian President “defines the ‘big issues’ which he wants to see resolved as Jerusalem, full autonomy and self-determination,” attaching particular significance to Jerusalem “in light of its significance to the whole Arab world from which he feels understandably isolated.” In contrast, Linowitz continued, Khalil viewed Palestinian self-determination as the key issue and “has a definition of this controversial term which he obviously hopes we can be persuaded to agree to—not an independent Palestinian state but the right for the Palestinians to determine their own future through a freely-accepted link with Jordan.” Khalil “agreed that if this concept were accepted almost all other problems—including those of South Lebanon and the PLO—would fall into line.” (Telegram 3944 from Jerusalem, December 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1585) Linowitz reported on further conversation with Egyptian Minister of State Boutros Boutros-Ghali on December 8 in telegram 25140 from Cairo, December 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1797; N790009–0728) An additional meeting was held with Egyptian Minister of Defense Hassan Kamel Ali.

From Cairo, Linowitz travelled to Tel Aviv for his first meetings with Israeli officials. His first meeting was with Israeli Minister of the Interior Josef Burg on December 10, which he summarized in telegram 3981 from Jerusalem, December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1558) The next day, December 11, Linowitz met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who Linowitz found “responsive and even effusive at times,” for one and three-quarters hours. Linowitz reported to Carter and Vance that while his main objective “was to establish a rapport of friendship and confidence,” he also wanted to “start a process of suggesting new ways of thinking about some of the key issues.” “On the matter of Begin’s concern that autonomy might lead to an independent Palestinian state,” Li-

nowitz wrote, "I pointed out that Camp David gives no authority for such a development. I suggested, however, that if he had any doubt about this perhaps we could reach some form of agreement on the issue. Begin showed interest in the idea and he also responded when I reminded him that the Camp David Accords guarantee Israel a say in the determination of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. I told Begin of the importance that President Sadat attaches to a solution on Jerusalem and suggested that we as lawyers might try to find ways to express the ingredients acceptable to both parties. Though he bridled when I mentioned a Moslem flag, Begin did not reject my suggestion that we explore ways of drafting language on Jerusalem that would meet the needs of both sides." (Telegram 3968 from Jerusalem, December 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1575) The same day, Linowitz met with the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Israeli Knesset, where the membership gave their views of the Middle East situation. (Telegram 3975 from Jerusalem, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1566)

The following day, December 12, Linowitz convened a meeting of the heads of the negotiating delegations to the Palestinian autonomy talks in Cairo. The discussion among Linowitz, Khalil, and Burg covered the pace of normalization in relations between Egypt and Israel, election modalities and the powers and responsibilities to be invested in a new Palestinian polity. Linowitz cabled a summary of the conclusions of this meeting to the Department of State in telegram 26219 from Tel Aviv, December 13. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 12/79) A more fulsome account of the course of the conversation is in telegram 321978 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, December 14. (*Ibid.*)

311. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 10, 1979

SUBJECT

US Access to Facilities in Egypt (U)

(TS) By your note on the report of the 30 November meeting between Ambassador Atherton and Egyptian Vice President Mubarak,² and separately in a telephone conversation with me, you asked for a report on how the US could, and whether we should, help develop naval and air base facilities for Egypt on the Red Sea, usable by the US in future emergencies. This memorandum contains a preliminary analysis.

(TS) Recent events reinforce my conviction that an expanded US military presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region is a strategic necessity. In the long term, the appropriate level of such presence will require access to a small number of selected air base and port facilities in the area. I will shortly submit my proposals on these broader measures to enhance our flexibility for rapid deployment and sustained operations in the area.

(TS) In the shorter term, as you know, we are in the process of obtaining a very modest foothold in Egypt by virtue of the limited access to Wadi Kena Air Base extended by the Egyptian Government. We have proceeded quietly to insert a base warm-up team and necessary equipment to support operations by two E-3A AWACS aircraft. We will soon withdraw the personnel but leave behind under Egyptian Air Force caretaker status, the modest support infrastructure items now in place at this Egyptian field. Thus, we will be able to introduce E-3As into Wadi Kena with supporting personnel with little notice and be able to conduct operations shortly after arrival.

(TS) During our consultations with Vice President Mubarak regarding Wadi Kena, he repeated President Sadat's earlier suggestion of the desirability of having the US upgrade the Red Sea port/airfield complex at Ras Banas (Berenice). Preliminary information (see attachments)³ indicates that this complex is very austere and would require a substantial effort to develop a permanent base. Both the port and airfield lack a potable water source and a reliable fuel supply system. The

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, Old Files, FRC 330-82-0270, Box 1, Egypt 1979. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent via Alpha Channel. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Vance.

² A record of this meeting was not found.

³ Attached but not printed.

harbor would require some dredging in order to berth destroyers and frigate-sized ships at the single dock. On the other hand, a collocated port and airfield (less than three miles apart) on the Red Sea would offer some attractive operational possibilities. Moreover, the remote location (140 miles from the nearest significant population concentration at Aswan) would serve both US and Egyptian political interests.

(TS) It would be premature to define a concept of operations for the use of Ras Banas at this time. We will have to weigh the costs versus the benefits of two options. One is a substantial investment of money for base development at this austere airdrome. The other is a more modest investment of funds to improve existing facilities at a less remote, but more developed air facility such as Wadi Kena. I will be able to give you a more definitive recommendation in this regard after we have analyzed the findings of the facilities survey team which I recently sent to Egypt with Vice President Mubarak's concurrence.

(TS) Further, we should recognize that there are likely to be significant political limits on our use of Egyptian bases which we will need to weigh against the costs of making those bases useful to us. My conversations earlier this year with President Sadat and Vice President Mubarak lead me to believe that they wish to avoid the permanent presence of US personnel. They have emphasized to me the political liabilities associated with foreign presence and their desire not to repeat the experience with the Soviets, who sent a large number of military personnel to Egypt. Their concept has been that the US would improve Ras Banas for Egyptian use in normal times and US use in an "emergency". We will need further to explore whether these limits to their political tolerance for our presence still apply.

(TS) In the near future, I will provide in cooperation with the Department of State a detailed proposal for how we should respond to the Egyptian suggestion.

Harold Brown

312. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (Evron) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 12, 1979

My dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by Prime Minister Begin to transmit to you the following message:

“Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of December 6, delivered to me by Ambassador Sol Linowitz.² Your generous words of appreciation are very dear to me.

In the course of his visit, Ambassador Linowitz had the opportunity to meet with my colleagues³ and received detailed information on the various aspects of the negotiations relating to the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. These negotiations continue apace and we are all hopeful that we shall succeed in overcoming the difficulties and reaching agreement.

On January 7, 1980, I am scheduled to travel to Aswan at the invitation of President Sadat for a direct personal exchange of views between us. Meanwhile, here in Jerusalem, Ambassador Linowitz and I held a lengthy private talk which we both concluded was immensely useful and enjoyable.

Permit me now, Mr. President, to turn to you with an urgent personal request.

As you are aware, Israel has, over the years, been confronted with objective difficulties in the economic domain emanating mainly from

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner of the letter, Carter initialed “C,” indicating that he saw the document.

² Reference is to a short letter from Carter to Begin, dated December 6, and presented to the Prime Minister by Linowitz on December 11. Linowitz, Carter wrote, “has my complete confidence and will speak to you on my behalf and with full authority. “Now that we are halfway through the period for negotiating full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza,” Carter continued, “I believe we should look forward, with our Egyptian partners, to demonstrable progress that can be made in the near future. We have set a difficult task for ourselves, but one that is vitally important for the security and future of your nation and for the prospects of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. I am fully committed to support this effort.” Carter concluded: “Your courage and determination to move the peace process forward is a source of inspiration to me. You again demonstrated your commitment in turning back the oil fields on schedule—an act of statesmanship that has not been adequately recognized.” A similar letter was prepared by Carter for Sadat. Both letters are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/79)

³ See Document 310.

the fact that we are compelled to expend some thirty percent of our GNP on defence. This year our problem has increased substantially.

In your letter to me you were kind enough to make reference to the significance of the transfer of the Alma oilfields to Egypt which is, indeed, one of the greatest sacrifices we have made in the cause of peace. With this, we must buy every drop of oil from abroad at rising prices, having now to expend an annual outlay of hundreds of millions of extra dollars for the supplies from the Suez gulf. Simultaneously, we have been compelled to undertake stringent measures to curb a very high rate of domestic inflation. In so doing we have abolished subsidies of the most basic commodities and have sharply reduced public expenditure across the board. These measures, in their totality, naturally create additional burdens in the daily life of our people.

It is in this context that the Government of Israel submitted its request for additional aid from the United States. Given the objective facts, which I have described only in part, our submission for increased aid is most urgent and objectively unavoidable.

I therefore respectfully ask of you, Mr. President, to give your personal attention and support to this request, the fulfillment of which will help Israel through an exceptional period of economic strain arising, inter-alia, from the sacrifices we have made—and which we do not regret—for the sake of peace.

May I thank you in advance for addressing yourself to this, my appeal, on a matter so crucial and urgent. I venture the belief, Mr. President, that you will give it your sympathetic and positive consideration based upon your deep understanding of our problem and your friendship for Israel.

I cannot conclude this letter without reiterating the sentiment I expressed to you in my previous message of our profound feelings of identity, support and admiration for your steadfast courage and leadership in this time of trial as you work unsparingly for the speedy and safe return home of the American hostages in Iran.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,
Menachem Begin"
Sincerely yours,

Ephraim Evron
Ambassador

313. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 13, 1979

SUBJECT

My Lunch with Ambassador Evron

The Ambassador told me that Begin is extremely concerned about the proposed U.S. military aid package for Egypt,² on which he was briefed by Sol.

I explained to Evron that we have no intention of scaling it down because we have legitimate long-term interests in Egypt that we need to protect, and that these interests are also to Israel's advantage. More specifically, I said:

1. That Israel's qualitative edge over Egypt will be preserved in the years ahead in part because of what the U.S. is doing for Israel and in part because of what the Israelis are doing for themselves. And we are confident of this;

2. That the U.S. has to make certain that there is a wider constituency in Egypt favoring U.S.-Egyptian ties, and it is especially important that the military be part of that constituency. The Egyptian military capabilities have become degraded and the Egyptians cannot help but notice that the Soviets are providing very advanced equipment to Syria and Algeria. It would be damaging to all concerned if the only basis for Egyptian-U.S. ties and for further progress of the Camp David peace accords were Sadat himself;

3. That we are encouraging the Egyptians to redirect the focus of their defense efforts away from Israel and toward regional stability—including the Sudan and perhaps eventually some contingencies in Saudi Arabia. This is clearly also in Israel's interest.

Evron is going home for Christmas and he would like to be able to convey the above as an authoritative expression of U.S. thinking. He says he has spoken about this to the Vice President and he hinted that he would like to see you personally in order to get a message to that effect. I made no promise, but an alternative would be for me to phone him and restate the three points above as representing an oral comment

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 5. Top Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig. J."

² In the right-hand margin next to this phrase, Carter wrote: "What pkg. have I approved?"

by you. (Evron himself said that a written message would probably not be helpful, given Begin's sensitivity and inclination to pick it apart word by word.)

What is your guidance?

314. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

Subject

Following up on Prince Bandar's Approach

The Issue

Prince Bandar saw the President secretly on December 5² and made a two-part proposal:

—In return for a U.S. statement of his policy toward the Middle East along lines he specified, The Saudis would be willing to lift the boycott, provide recognition to Israel, engage in a comprehensive regional economic plan (with a figure of up to \$20 billion being mentioned) and assure a freeze of oil prices for a couple of years.

—In return, the U.S. would make a statement on its policy (which Bandar apparently had someone draft) in which the U.S. would (a) state its commitment to protect the integrity and security of Israel within [approximately] her [pre-1967] secure³ borders, (b) call for an Israeli end to military occupation with safeguards in the context of Arab

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 12/79–1/80. Secret; Eyes Only. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Cy. J."

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Bandar in the Oval Office from 2:04 p.m. to 2:31 p.m. on December 5. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In his personal diary for December 5, Carter provided the following account: "I met with Prince Bandar, who brought a message from Crown Prince Fahd. They were eager to pursue the Mideast peace settlement by establishing a Marshall Plan-type fund of about \$20 billion, recognizing and lifting the embargo against Israel, reestablishing ties with Egypt provided Israel would carry out the spirit of the Camp David Accords and pledge to take care of the Palestinians and withdraw from occupied territories. They made it plain they were not talking about all occupied territory." Commenting on the entry in the published version of the personal diary, Carter wrote "the Saudis were inclined to tell me what I wanted to hear, but this was a profoundly important offer." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 376)

³ An unknown individual added the handwritten word "secure" here. The words "approximately" and "pre-1967" also bear handwritten brackets.

recognition of the integrity and security of Israel and agreement to establish normal diplomatic relations, and (c) state its readiness to accept “a Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza provided it and any negotiators on its behalf first agree to accept the existence, security, and integrity of Israel within its 1967 boundaries and to undertake a permanent non-aggression agreement with all of the existing states adjoining it.” In connection with the last point, there is a statement that the United States would prefer that such an entity be confederated with Jordan or Egypt for a period of at least five years, but the U.S. would abide by any reasonable solution acceptable to the states adjacent to such an entity.

It is significant in the Bandar approach that there is no mention of Jerusalem, although that may be subsumed in the commitment to the 1967 borders.

Analysis

[1 line not declassified]

—On the one hand, the idea of close Saudi-U.S. collaboration in some sort of Middle East Marshall Plan has been in Saudi minds for several years, and we have heard it on other occasions. Also, the fact that the Saudis are asking for U.S. support for a Palestinian entity associated with Jordan and Israel’s returns to lines approximating those of 1967 is not surprising.

—On the other hand, the idea that the Saudis would shift to open support of the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement and acceptance of Israel would be a major and important shift in Saudi policy. Doubts are raised because none of Fahd’s recent communications to you, including one just a few days ago, indicates that the Saudis are ready for such a shift. It is true that the Mecca Mosque takeover⁴ is a new factor in their thinking, and only that would seem to explain such a sharp change in their position, if any, since Hermann Eilts visited Saudi Arabia just a month ago.

[1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified]

Nevertheless, the approach is important enough to be investigated. Hermann Eilts’ visit to Saudi Arabia in early January would provide an opportunity to probe [less than 1 line not declassified] (Hermann will leave for Cairo the evening of December 27 to receive an honorary degree at Cairo University and could be in Saudi Arabia at the end of the first week in January.)

Before giving Hermann instructions to do more than probe [less than 1 line not declassified] however, you will want to consider seriously whether you really want to deal with such a Saudi proposal of these dimensions in the next few months.

—Saudi support for the peace process and recognition of Israel would be a major endorsement of the success at Camp David and,

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 306.

through Saudi encouragement of Jordan and the Palestinians, could spell the difference between further delay in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations and Palestinian/Jordanian acceptance of a modest outcome of those negotiations. We have to keep in mind, though, that such a Saudi shift would also arouse fear in Israel because some there would not trust the Saudis and would see such a move as a further tightening of the Arab noose around Israel. Depending on timing, Israelis would also argue that we were “abandoning” Camp David. The autonomy talks would become even more difficult, if not impossible.⁵

—The difficult side of Bandar’s proposition for us is that it would require U.S. endorsement of a Palestinian entity—albeit in association with Jordan—controlling the West Bank virtually up to the 1967 lines. This has been the U.S. position quietly for a number of years, but to take it openly would provoke widespread opposition in Israel and among Israel’s supporters here. The Labor Party in Israel has never accepted the 1967 lines as secure, and the Likud coalition wants to keep open Israel’s right to assert its claim of sovereignty on the West Bank. Moving in this direction would produce a major crisis of confidence with Israel and a political issue in the U.S.

Bandar’s offer to roll back oil prices provides an additional dimension that would be attractive to many in the U.S. if it could be carried out on the Saudi side. Our judgment, however, is that the Saudis do not have the capacity any more to swing the OPEC price levels. Also, an equation of oil for Israeli withdrawal would fuel the domestic charges that we are selling out Israel’s security for oil.

How to Follow Up

It seems to me at least questionable whether we could move as far as Bandar’s approach suggests in our public posture at this point—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Therefore, we might want to see whether there would be some intermediate step whereby we might accept this proposition as where we would agree to come out in 1981 but to see whether there might be some intermediate step whereby the Saudis would quietly urge the Palestinians and Jordanians to support the autonomy negotiations.

The intermediate step we have in mind could be to probe the Saudi position by placing the Arab-Israeli issue in a wider context. The Saudi concern is not just to help us deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, or to help them get off this particular hook with its Arab allies. More important are Saudi concern with its own security and overall position in the region. Since the loss (in Saudi terms) of both Iran and Egypt in a single year, the connection with us has assumed new importance—with new fears and doubts, but also new opportunities if we play it right. The Mecca Mosque takeover may also have sharpened their concern about

⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “How much can we reveal SA attitude without endorsing it as a US proposal? (Secretly? Publicly?)”

the internal situation. The posture we strike as we come out of the hostage crisis will have an important and long-lasting impact on the Saudis, and on their willingness to look to us for the long term.

Thus Hermann's mission could usefully get to the Bandar approach by indirection, by emphasizing the overall context of our policy towards the region. Indeed, if his presentation (and our policy) is credible in terms of overall Saudi interests—centering on security, the Saudi connection with us, and the overall future of the region—then any move on the Arab-Israeli problem would assume its rightful place, and we will be better able to relate what Fahd may have in mind to what Bandar told us.

We recommend therefore, that the Eilts mission to begin with focus on our overall strategic thinking for the region. He would use this to probe Fahd's thinking about Arab-Israeli questions, without himself raising the particular points (and contentious issues) in the Bandar approach. If Bandar speaks for Fahd [*less than 1 line not declassified*], then Fahd can speak for himself. Elements of this approach might include:

—Our views on the strategic importance of the region, including the Soviet dimension, Gulf security, nature of regional friendships, the flow of oil, the cooperative international framework on energy and economic issues. Hermann would indicate that the Arab-Israeli dimension (as well as concerns for Egypt and countries as far removed as Turkey, Sudan, and even Morocco) is a vital factor in this overall picture.

—Our attitudes about the importance of some U.S. involvement and the role of power (in its largest sense). The Middle East (as a whole) will be central to our global strategy; our efforts are directed to integrating our policy into an overall strategic conception with our friends.

—We will want to work closely with Saudi Arabia—in ways that make sense to it. We recognize the dangers of stop-and-go policies and approaches, or of trying to impose forms and methods that do not accord with Saudi Arabia's own conception of regional problems. We must pursue our interests and relationships; but we want to take into account the interests of our friends.

—There are a number of areas in which we would like to continue an active dialogue: some directly U.S. military (recent Murray mission; fleet deployments, Rapid Deployment force); some indirect support (FMS, role of particular countries in military supply support for regional nations—e.g. Sudan, Yemen, Morocco); a political framework for thinking about the region; possibilities (if any) for regional security cooperation (where of course Saudi Arabia's views will be the most significant); economic cooperation (both within the region and in terms of the Gulf States' involvement/responsibility for the international economic system).⁶

⁶ For documentation related to U.S.-Saudi bilateral military relations, the Carter administration's efforts to construct a Persian Gulf security framework, and other bilateral and multilateral political and military issues in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

—Clearly, the Arab-Israeli dimension is important. We recognize the significance and importance of moving forward towards a comprehensive peace on the development of events in the whole region. We are working hard on Camp David and want to find a way to work closely with our friends to build on that.

This approach is reflected in the attached instructions for Hermann.

Recommendation

That you approve Hermann making the exploration with Fahd outlined above.⁷

⁷ Carter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

315. Presidential Determination No. 80-9¹

Washington, December 20, 1979

Subject

Determination under Section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979—Assistance for Jordan.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979, I hereby determine that Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, and that the expenditure of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: 8/79-5/80. No classification marking. In an attached December 20 memorandum to Carter, forwarding the Presidential Determination for signature, Brzezinski pointed out that without Carter's official determination "virtually all military assistance" to Jordan "halts immediately." Brzezinski continued, "Despite our differences over Camp David and the King's ill-advised intemperance earlier this year, the fundamental relationship is very important to U.S. interests," citing Jordanian cooperation on Iran and Yemen and the possibility of cooperation in contingency planning for Saudi Arabia. A termination of military assistance, Brzezinski argued, would "irreparably damage" the security relationship with Jordan and "terminate any chance of a positive Jordanian role in the Camp David process over the coming year. It would tend to reverse Jordan's present efforts to repair the damage done to our ties and would drive them toward the rejectionists and Moscow." In a handwritten note at the bottom of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "It is a *very* close call, & difficult for me—but ok this time. J." (Ibid.)

funds appropriated or otherwise available to carry out chapters 2 and 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act, for Jordan in the fiscal year 1980 will serve the process of peace in the Middle East.

You are requested to report this determination to the Congress on my behalf, as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

Jimmy Carter

Attachment

Statement of Reasons for Determination²

Washington, undated

Statement of Reasons for Determination Under the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–92) Relating to Security Assistance for Jordan

Section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–92) prohibits the use of funds authorized to be appropriated in the fiscal year 1980 for military assistance and international military education and training under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for foreign military sales financing under the Arms Export Control Act for Jordan, unless the President determines and reports to the Congress that “Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and that the expenditure of such funds will serve the process of peace in the Middle East.”

During the early period of this administration, Jordan cooperated in our efforts to reconvene the Geneva Middle East peace conference.³ Jordan continues to contribute to area stability by effective action against terrorists’ attempts to attack Israel from Jordan. Jordan has not accepted the Camp David Accords. It differs with us on the likelihood that these Accords can lead to a broadly acceptable final settlement. This is a deep, but essentially tactical difference and has not changed Jordan’s adherence to the fundamental goal of peace in accordance with UN Resolution 242.

² No classification marking.

³ See footnote 5, Document 24.

The most recent, public and authoritative statement of Jordan's policy was given by King Hussein in his speech to the United Nations on September 25, 1979. He said that Jordan "would continue to stand for a just, honorable, viable and durable peace." This accords with private assurances received from King Hussein and is accepted as an accurate characterization of Jordan's policy. Jordan's cooperation remains essential to a stable West Bank settlement. Our military assistance relationship is a vital element in this cooperation and in Jordan's ability to follow a political course independent of pressure. It is important that we continue to work with Jordan, as a friendly Arab state, in the search for a just and comprehensive final peace.

Therefore, I have determined that Jordan is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and that the expenditure of funds for security assistance to Jordan in FY 1980 will serve the purpose of peace in the Middle East.

316. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 20, 1979

SUBJECT

Longer-Term Security Assistance to Egypt (C)

I have reviewed the memoranda of Jim McIntyre² and Cy and Harold³ on security assistance to Egypt in the context of the stringent budget guidance you have given. I believe that you should approve a middle ground between their positions, one that provides Sadat with essential near-term support but that moderates the long-term budget impact. (C)

At the outset, I wish to state my unequivocal support for a longer-term security assistance relationship with Egypt. Sadat's courageous decision to join the U.S. and Israel in seeking a lasting peace was an

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 12/79. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig. J."

² Attached but not printed.

³ See the attachment to Document 301.

event of unprecedented importance for our interests in that vital area. Temporarily at least, the decision has left him with nowhere else to turn for much-needed security assistance. While we should strive to minimize the cost of that assistance, I believe that costs we do incur are justified because they will contribute to the eventual realization of a major U.S. foreign policy objective. (S)

Sadat's greatest need at this critical point in the peace process is for major assistance in rebuilding his obsolescent armed forces. Even with some of the items we have provided, his forces still are relying primarily on deteriorating Soviet equipment. In my view, a central threat to Sadat's stability is from military leaders who are becoming more and more dismayed with Egypt's second-class readiness state. These military men convinced Sadat to request over four times the amount of assistance we are discussing here, but we told the Egyptians that this amount was clearly excessive and that force reductions, coupled with equipment modernization, would be a better and less-costly alternative. (S)

These facts lead me to support fully the near-term items recommended by Cy and Harold: \$350 million in FMS credits in FY 81, \$800 million in FMS credits in FY 82, and approval in principle of F-16s and M-60s. I might note that approval of the F-16s does not exclude consideration of the F-X fighter if you approve its development, since a mix of F-16 and F-X fighters might best fit Sadat's needs. However, to turn him down on F-16s while Israel and Saudi Arabia are obtaining more advanced F-15s, and possibly F-18s, would be a severe blow. (S)

Sadat's longer-term needs are less clear at this time, however. I would thus join Jim McIntyre in recommending cash flow financing only through FY 81 (with program amounts to be determined by your decisions on equipment and FY 81/82 funding levels), and informing the Egyptians of the FY 82 planning level without committing the U.S. to similar amounts in succeeding years. By so doing, we will encourage Sadat to consider less-costly alternatives for his future needs, as well as to seek other sources of assistance if moderate Arab countries move closer to the peace process. (S)

These levels of assistance are well within the tolerance of the Egyptian-Israeli balance. Israel will receive qualitative improvements that Egypt does not get, and Israel must understand the importance of a U.S.-Egyptian military relationship (within reason) as being in its own interest. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve \$350 million FMS in FY 81, \$800 million FMS in FY 82, and, in principle, F-16s and M-60s; also, however, cash flow

financing only through FY 81 and no out-year commitment beyond FY 82. (S)⁴

⁴ Carter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation, but instead wrote: "Worked out with Jim & Harold. J."

317. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 23, 1979

Subject

Following up on Prince Bandar's Approach (S)

At TAB A is Cy's memorandum² for you on this subject, developed at State and NSC. In summary:

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Bandar approach is a highly significant step on the part of Saudi Arabia: offering to recognize Israel, lift the boycott, freeze oil prices, and underwrite a Marshall Plan for the Middle East—in exchange for our calling for an end to Israeli military occupation to about the 1967 lines (with safeguards for Israel), and our calling for a West Bank entity, preferably confederated with Jordan or Egypt for at least five years;

—however, the Bandar presentation has been reflected in no other communication from Saudi Arabia, including Fahd's rather negative response to the Eilts mission,³ sent to you a week after Bandar was here; and

—there are inherent problems, including Saudi Arabia's limited capacity to swing oil prices; a predictable (and justified) Israeli perception that we were shifting away from Camp David before the autonomy talks had failed; and the risks of a political confrontation with Israel if we publicly endorsed the idea of a Palestinian entity—albeit one in association with Jordan. (S/S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 12/79–1/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Zbig. J."

² See Document 314.

³ The text of Fahd's response has not been found.

Cy therefore proposes—and I agree—that we test the Bandar proposition with an intermediate approach, centering in the first instance on a visit Hermann Eilts is paying privately to the area (he leaves for Egypt this week; but will not arrive in Saudi Arabia until January 8). This approach would be to put the Arab-Israeli conflict in the broader context of U.S. strategy and involvement for the Middle East, thus showing that we are prepared to discuss (and to respond to) key Saudi concerns about security of the region. This would a) go to the heart of Saudi pre-occupations—where the Bandar approach is only one means to an end; and b) enable Eilts to smoke Fahd out [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of the Bandar approach, without committing us to steps which, at the very least, would provoke a political crisis with Israel and cause problems for the autonomy talks. (S/S)

The draft instructions we have prepared for Eilts (appended to Cy's memo)⁴ would also give coherence to a number of efforts we are considering (or you have decided) for a long-range Middle East strategy. His visit would thus be a first effort to bring Saudi Arabia along—a key step in our effort to seize the initiative in Middle East policy as soon as we come out of the Iranian crisis. (S/S)

By our current thinking, if Fahd does reinforce Bandar's presentation to Eilts, we would then consider how far we could usefully proceed at a time when the Camp David framework is still controlling. In any event, we would have intensified the dialogue with Saudi Arabia on the whole range of issues, and begun to restore our credibility. (S/S)

Cy, Sol, and I will meet Wednesday⁵ afternoon to discuss the Bandar approach and to refine Eilts' instructions, pursuant to the guidance you give us. (S/S)

RECOMMENDATION: that you approve the guidance for a mission by Eilts to Saudi Arabia (page 6 of Cy's memo)⁶

⁴ Attached but not printed. The draft instructions for Eilts stated the objective of his Mission was "to continue a direct dialogue with the Saudi leadership—a dialogue we would like to broaden and deepen in the coming months." To the list of attached talking points for Eilts's meeting with Fahd, which focused on the Middle East strategic situation and the administration's desire to see the development of a "credible regime" for Palestinian autonomy, including agreement on Jerusalem, Carter added, in a handwritten note, an instruction to "ask Fahd *specifically & persistently* for his best proposal (step by step) for a comprehensive Mid E peace."

⁵ December 26.

⁶ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation, adding the handwritten notation: "See addendum. J." See footnote 4 above.

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, December 24, 1979, 0743Z

26218. For Ambassador Linowitz From Atherton. Subject: Autonomy Negotiations and the Sadat/Begin Summit.² Ref: State 322609.³

1. (S-entire text).

2. You already have my views, conveyed by Jim Leonard to Ned Walker over secure phone, about a Presidential phone call to Sadat and Begin.⁴ This message sets forth my thoughts about how we can help advance the negotiations, as requested by you in reftel.

3. I start from the premise that the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators, even at the plenary level, will not be able to resolve any of the basic substantive issues in the negotiations until there is agreement at the Sadat/Begin level on how they should do so. My second premise is the obvious one that it would be desirable for something to come out of the negotiations prior to the exchange of ambassadors [at] the end of February and, preferably, prior to the beginning of normalization and the establishment of Embassy offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv the end of January. Since it is not realistic to expect sufficient results in this timeframe

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 116, 1/7/80 Aswan Summit: 12/79–1/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. The memorandum, along with undated draft covering memoranda from Brzezinski to Carter and from Brzezinski to Vance, was conveyed from Hunter to Brzezinski for approval under a December 28 memorandum. Brzezinski neither approved nor disapproved the memoranda, but wrote "hold here" on Hunter's memorandum. Under this notation, Dodson wrote "no distribution." (Ibid.)

² Sadat and Begin were scheduled to meet in Aswan, Egypt, beginning on January 7, 1980. See Document 321.

³ In telegram 322609 to Cairo, December 15, Linowitz instructed Atherton to "remain, insofar as possible, intimately involved in the planning and execution" of U.S. policy toward the autonomy negotiations. Linowitz added, "I would especially appreciate your personal participation in the forthcoming plenary and your views upon its conclusion as to how we can best advance the negotiations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1774)

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin on the telephone from the White House from 11:28 to 11:33 a.m., January 1, 1980. Carter followed this with a telephone conversation with Sadat from 11:46 to 11:49 a.m., the same day. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memoranda of conversation for these two exchanges have been found. However, in his personal diary entry for January 1, Carter wrote: "I called Begin, and he said the January 7 meeting in Aswan was very important. He thanked us for the \$200 million increase in loan assistance to Israel, but said they need much more. When I called Sadat, he was prepared for Aswan and said, typically, he was absolutely committed to help on any issue, militarily or politically." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 387)

to persuade any representative Palestinians to join the negotiating process, it seems to me our objective should be to produce sufficient evidence that things are moving in the negotiations to defuse Arab and third world reaction to normalization. In other words, we should try to have enough to show after eight months of negotiations not only to demonstrate that we take seriously the May target date but to give pause to the Saudis and other moderate Arabs, including moderate Palestinians, about launching new efforts to further isolate and punish Egypt.

4. Proceeding from these premises, my conclusion is that we need to take a hard look at ways in which we can help make something happen at the Sadat/Begin summit. Therefore, while I subscribe to much of Sam Lewis' analysis (Tel Aviv 26726),⁵ I do not agree that we can wait until after the summit to decide whether and how we can begin to inject some substance into our full partner role.

5. Trying to influence what comes out of the summit can admittedly be a tricky exercise. We cannot get out in front of Sadat or appear to be pressing him to move more rapidly than he is prepared to do. This would be dangerous vis-a-vis the Israelis, and could also arouse Egyptian expectations that we are prepared to deliver more than may be possible through our own efforts with the Israelis.

6. At the same time, Vice President Mubarak and Prime Minister Khalil have independently suggested that President Carter communicate with President Sadat about the need to seek concrete progress at the summit. This suggestion results from their concern, based on the experience of the last two Sadat/Begin summits, that Sadat will again be reluctant in the intimate atmosphere of the summit to introduce a note of controversy and will, in fact, end up making further gestures to Begin on bilateral issues (e.g., accelerating the pace of normalization beyond what is called for in the peace treaty) without getting anything in return. An additional consideration is that, even if Sadat decides to press Begin harder this time than he has before, he will do so in such a

⁵ In telegram 26726 from Tel Aviv, December 21, Lewis analyzed the upcoming summit between Sadat and Begin, concluding "we should not jump the gun by priming either of the parties for action. If, however, Roy and others close to the world of Sadat conclude that autonomy really is not on his agenda for the summit—which I find hard to believe—then a message urging that substantive issues be addressed there should go to Sadat, not Begin. And, finally, that if a call is made to Sadat, one should of course be made to Begin, but that specifics should be avoided, and no suggestion of U.S. pressure should be imparted. The message left with the Prime Minister should be simply this: that the second stage of the Camp David process is, if anything, even more important than the first in bringing about a settlement for the Middle East conflict and a lasting peace for Israel, and that President Carter continues to watch closely how it is evolving. The unspoken message will be heard clearly: 'If things don't begin to move, I will have to get into the act.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2545)

general and elliptical way that the point will be lost on Begin, or that Begin's response will be at such a level of generality that it will have no practical relevance for the specific nuts and bolts issues the autonomy negotiators are grappling with. This is a real risk, since Sadat has taken little interest that we are aware of in the specific issues under discussion in the autonomy talks and probably does not have a very precise picture of the specifics.

7. Despite the impatience of Sadat's advisors, his tactic of not pressing Begin has probably been the right one up to now. If Sadat decides to let another summit go by without bringing any of the issues to a head, there is nothing we can do about it. But given the problems it will create for our own position in the area if the autonomy talks continue to be perceived as getting nowhere, it seems to me that at a minimum we need to take the initiative to compare notes on strategy with Sadat and plant a few ideas with him. I believe there is a way to do this without the risk of seeming to get out in front of Sadat or of being seen to press him to move faster than he desires. I have in mind the following two-part approach:

—First, I believe it would be desirable for the President to send letters to both Begin and Sadat which should be similar if not identical in content.⁶ In such letters, the President could note Ambassador Linowitz's impressions from his recent visit to the area that all concerned feel the time has come to step up the pace of the negotiations. The President could say that he agrees this is desirable and note that if Begin and Sadat come to this conclusion in their meeting, the U.S. stands prepared to make its contribution to early progress in the negotiations.

—Second, I could be equipped with points to make orally to Sadat when delivering the President's letter. This oral presentation could note that after both the Alexandria summit (Alexandria 0611)⁷ and the Haifa summit (Cairo 18416)⁸ Sadat had asked that President Carter be informed that the time was coming when he would ask us "to resume" our full partner role, that this third summit (then foreseen for October)

⁶ On the recommendation of Linowitz, Carter approved messages to Begin and Sadat praising the "dedication" each expressed for "achieving success" in the autonomy negotiations and impressing upon them the "critical" importance of the period ahead. In approving the draft messages, however, Carter noted on the undated action memorandum from Brzezinski, "It's just baloney, but if it's what Sol wants, OK. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 12/79–1/80) The message to Begin was conveyed in telegram 4052 to Tel Aviv, January 6. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 116, 1/7/80 Aswan Summit: 12/79–1/80) The message to Sadat was conveyed in telegram 4053 to Cairo, January 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1032)

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 266.

⁸ See Document 284.

could be decisive, and that the U.S. should be ready when the time comes. The objective, Sadat said on both occasions, was for he and Begin to reach agreement on giving directives to their negotiators. Against this background, we could ask Sadat if his comments after the last two summits still represent his views and how he plans to proceed in the January summit since, if he is looking to us to play a role, we need to know what his strategy is and what he expects from us. As part of such an oral representation, we should be prepared to note specific issues in the negotiations where we believe attention at the summit could usefully be focused with some hope of reaching agreement on appropriate directives to the Egyptian and Israeli negotiating teams.

8. I have given considerable thought to what those specific issues should be, and have also discussed this question with Jim Leonard and with my senior political section staff who have participated from the beginning in the autonomy talks. I agree with Jim Leonard (Cairo 26211)⁹ that it would be desirable to encourage specific agreement at the summit in three areas: something in the autonomy negotiations, something on Jerusalem, and something for the Palestinians. I also agree that the best issue to focus on arising out of the autonomy negotiations would be the size of the elected self-governing authority. (Incidentally, Boutros Ghali singled this out as one of the three issues on which he believes there should be an effort to reach early agreement; the other two were amnesty for Palestinian prisoners and giving an international flavor to the commission that would supervise West Bank/Gaza elections). I also agree with Jim that, so far as something for the Palestinians is concerned, the idea of a return of deportees is better than seeking Israeli agreement to amnesty prisoners who have been tried and convicted for security crimes.

9. With respect to Jerusalem, I have reservations about Jim's fall-back idea of suggesting discussions between Israel and representatives of the Christian and Muslim faiths about the holy places. My own view is that this would be perceived as accepting the long-standing Israeli position that the only questions related to Jerusalem that are open to discussion are those pertaining to the status of the holy places. My own preference would be to go for agreement on the right of Arab residents of East Jerusalem to vote in and stand for the elections to the self-governing authority. (Boutros Ghali is concerned that this would be seen as accepting the Israeli position that autonomy applies to people but not to land. I consider this a legalistic argument outweighed by the political symbolism of giving the vote to East Jerusalem Arabs.)

⁹ Telegram 26211 from Cairo, December 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2099)

10. If we are to engage Sadat in a discussion of specific issues in the negotiations that might be on the summit agenda, it would be desirable to have some preliminary discussions with Khalil and Boutros Ghali to find out what they are recommending Sadat take up at the summit.

Atherton

319. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 28, 1979, 12:15–12:51 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman
Ambassador Ephraim Evron
Mr. Illan Tehila, Israeli Notetaker

The President began by discussing Afghanistan,² noting that the Soviets had tried to blame their actions on intervention by a third country. Asked who this could be, they could not think of one.

Minister Weizman said he was glad there were no Soviets in Egypt!

The President (laughing) said that he hopes Pakistan and India will feel this way.

Minister Weizman said there could be this feeling in Syria later, which is now getting T-72s and the MiG-25.

The President said that Iraq may clear out the Soviets.

Minister Weizman said he hoped so.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Iraqis had shot 21 Communists in recent months.

Minister Weizman said it is a nice area he lives in.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² On December 27, Soviet military units crossed the border into Afghanistan. In his personal diary entry for that day, Carter estimated that 215 flights had brought "8,000 or 10,000 people" into the country. (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 382)

The President said he had noticed.

Minister Weizman said he called it the Muddle East.

The President said that you have the situation well in hand. We appreciate how you control the situation.

Minister Weizman said that Lebanon is quiet.

The President said that this is good news.

Minister Weizman said he would try to keep it that way.

The President asked about the Iranian troops in Lebanon.³

Minister Weizman said that they are still in Damascus. Neither the PLO, Syria, or Lebanon want them in Lebanon. They are doing their best to keep the troops from moving there. He personally is not particularly worried about them.

The President asked how Israel is getting on with Egypt in the peace discussions.

Minister Weizman said that they could and should do better. He is not active in them, and thinks that this is a good tactic. Eventually he will probably get into them.⁴ The next Sadat and Begin Summit is very important.

The President mentioned the 7th of January.

Minister Weizman said it would be in Aswan. He will go to Egypt afterwards, at the end of January, to see Minister Ali and Sadat. Sadat is a great fellow, courageous and clever. Last month he had a half hour alone with Sadat, and two hours with other Egyptian leaders. Sadat said to try something on Gaza first, and to see if a solution is possible on Jerusalem. There is nothing new about that. He (Weizman) hopes at Aswan they will find a way to carry on. Afterwards he will see what he should do. What has been done, despite pitfalls, and less than the President would have liked to see done, he thinks is so strong that nothing can change the course, even though there are ups and downs. Between the two militaries, there are no problems. The interim line will be reached at the end of January. It is working out nicely. There will be no UN, and no US troops. It is a neat and clean withdrawal to the interim line.

³ Following a conversation with Syrian Presidential Advisor Daoudi on December 22, Seelye reported that 125–150 Iranian volunteers had arrived in Damascus with the aim of traveling on to Lebanon to aid the PLO. (Telegram 8471 from Damascus, December 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790589–1135)

⁴ During a series of conversations with Linowitz while in Washington, Weizman reiterated his intent to become involved in the autonomy negotiations “at some point.” Weizman “said he planned to go to Egypt after the summit and then would try to find the appropriate time to get involved.” (Telegram 334907 to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, December 31; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 119, 12/25–31/79)

The President noted that both sides are accommodating to one another.

Minister Weizman said that with Minister Ali he has no problems. He called Gamasay in New York, and will see Ghorbal while he is here.

The President said that this weekend or Monday⁵ he will telephone Sadat and Begin,⁶ for end of the year greetings. He will compliment them on their heroic progress towards peace. He will have a word on expectations for Aswan, and encourage them to move forward. If Minister Weizman has any thoughts about what should be said in these phone calls, would he pass them to Eppy for Zbig. This applies to both phone calls.

Minister Weizman said he saw Sol Linowitz for lunch yesterday, and will see him again. He thanks the President for seeing him. He knows he is busy with Afghanistan and Tehran. He came here to try to influence, convince the President, share his thoughts, on what interests have changed from a few months ago. He does not like trips to ask for an increase in aid.

The President said he knew.

Minister Weizman said he prefers to say what he can do to help, and would like to be able to help with Tehran, etc. This would give him more than the greatest pleasure. Their feeling is that they are giving up a lot, especially on oil.

The President said he understood.

Minister Weizman said he has a photo which he will send, in color, taken by some Israelis in Sinai, of a sign saying "we did not withdraw, we handed back this land for peace."

The President asked him to send the photo through Eppy.

Minister Weizman said an Army unit did this. Israel is now doing what it should have done two years ago: it is taking the bull by the horns, and making difficult economic decisions. The President will understand this, too. The new Israeli Finance Minister⁷ is tough. He is the first to speak neither English nor Yiddish, but only proper Hebrew! (The President laughed). The new economic laws and measures⁸ are good. It most likely picks on the defense budget. In the last two and a half years, he (Weizman) has reduced the budget by 10%. Part of this is

⁵ December 31.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 318.

⁷ Yigal Hurvitz.

⁸ In order to address a growing balance of payments deficit and an annual inflation rate estimated at nearly 100%, the Israeli Cabinet approved the budget policy outline submitted by Hurvitz for FY 1980/81 calling for a 4% cut in real expenditure by the Israeli Government on November 18. (Telegram 24568 from Tel Aviv, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0896)

because of peace with Egypt. He will be a little happier with that border. He hopes and prays there will be no war. The economic measures are tough. Pilots have taken a 20% cut in salary.

The President said that this is important symbolism.

Minister Weizman said exactly. With the military budget, he will try to get a voluntary 5% reduction in salaries in the armed forces. 100% inflation is terrible. He prays that within the next five years he will be able to cut their aid request by \$500 million.

The President (laughing) asked what role the Minister would be in at that time.

Minister Weizman (laughing) said he hopes he will be defense minister. He asked to come here as Defense Minister and as a member of the Cabinet, to ask whether a way can be found on aid. He knows U.S. problems and the President's desire for a balanced budget. Israel wants him to succeed.

The President said there is no way he can get a balanced budget, though he would like to.

Minister Weizman said that, without going into facts and figures, there is U.S. inflation and reduction in the value of the dollar. M-60 A-3 tanks now cost \$1.4 million each, and we are talking about 200 of them. He has no problems with Harold, and none with Cy either. Israel's military forces are going down, but there are heavy burdens. Their oil is gone, and will cost \$2 billion a year. They have not gone to rationing, but have put the price up. They could go to rationing, but he doesn't think so. For the first time, the Cabinet has asked Israelis to tighten their belts. In parallel with this, and in parallel with the peace process, if a little more U.S. aid could be provided . . . He was asked in Israel if he could get \$3.6 billion. He said the answer was obviously "no." He repeated on Israel Television that between Haifa and Tel Aviv there is a half-way point. He is making no suggestions to the President, only asking. He had a lot of misgivings in coming here. For Israel, an increase in aid would help them through a difficult period, and would keep the army in good shape. There is no argument about 600 planes (?) and 10 divisions. There was discussion before about 260 F-16s and 14 divisions, but Harold Brown and he had cut this down. Therefore, he asks whether there is anything the US can do. It would be a great help if the US did give something, especially understanding the situation. Egypt and Israel are trying to be steady. This is not political or military, but economic. He is sure Israel's economic measures are right. For 2 to 4 months more, inflation will go up; then it will level off; and then he hopes it will start to go down. They will produce, work, and export more.

(The President left the Oval Office from 12:28 to 12:33 to speak on the phone with Italian Prime Minister Cossiga).

The President said that he had not yet met Prime Minister Cossiga. He (the President) thinks we will call for a North Atlantic Council meeting this weekend.

Minister Weizman said he only had a few words. One thing that has been a pleasant surprise has been public acceptance in Israel of the new restrictions. They have ended subsidies on some foods. He worries that people will forget the peace process, and say that, if there is peace, why does milk cost me so much? It is the same in Egypt. Khalil has talked with him about this. Israel worries about Egypt; they are in the same boat. But with a little bit more, Israel can get over the hump. He will do what he can to cut down the size of the military. He will try keeping Lebanon quiet, unless there is trouble there, which he hopes not. Egypt and Israel are working well together. He will go to Aswan in February. The best Ambassador in Egypt is his wife! Israel will not get 2 or 3% off the course we have talked about. The two sides are happy; and this is needed. It is good for Israel, Egypt, and the US.

The President said that he is totally committed to the peace process. It looks now like a time of assimilation, discussion, and implementation. The basic process has a positive trend. A key date will be with the diplomatic exchange. He has intervened personally with Saudi Arabia and Egypt,⁹ to try to assuage their difficulties, and hold down public condemnation of one another. We have had some interesting messages from Saudi Arabia recently, possibly reflecting a change in attitude on a Middle East peace, and increasing awareness of the benefits of a strong Egypt and Israel and future improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Jordan, at least. His current aloofness from the peace process is temporary. He does not want to mislead the Minister: part of this is because of the election year; and part is because Israel and Egypt need to go as far as they can. But he will be there, even in an election year. He is not timid or fearful about being involved. If he is re-elected, then one of his life's major commitments will be to the completion of the peace process. He will stake his reputation as a leader and as a statesman on its conclusion. Along with that, he will pursue a strong, peaceful Israel, accommodating, in a way suitable to Israel, with its neighbors. He will expend as much time and effort as is needed when it is appropriate, as at Camp David and on his trip to the Middle East. It is not finished yet; progress is needed. It is more than likely that his role will be needed. If it were not, that would please him. But if so, that is all right. He needs the trust of Israeli and Egyptian leaders, and has moderate trust, though it goes up and down. When he weighs in, he thinks he will be successful, and the Minister can depend on that. We will not be able to do anything substantial on aid to Israel. However, as part of

⁹ See Document 299.

the Peace Package, he will try to make some modifications. He will talk with Harold about it this weekend.¹⁰ By Monday, we will tell Eppy. It would be a mistake to expect much. We have an extremely tight budget. This is not Israel's fault. The Soviet threat has gone up, and we have had to increase the defense budget (partly in relation to the SALT debate). We will put a higher profile on our commitment to the Persian Gulf region, which will help Israel some, as well. Therefore he has had to cut down funds for social programs below what they would have been—for the aged, the poor, for education, though they will be adequate. Foreign aid has suffered severely. But he is determined not to cut aid to Israel or Egypt. Jordan, Syria, Greece, Turkey—including some good friends—will be cut back in dollar amounts. In addition, the dollar is decreasing in value. This will not happen to Israel. He will try—and he believes he will succeed—in getting a little more than a symbolic amount. This will increase the value of the Peace Package. He cannot be more definite now, and doesn't know the amount. He will meet with McIntyre on it. He understands Israel's problems, and wishes we could be more generous.

Minister Weizman asked if there is anything he can do. Some people in Israel said that he should shut up on the peace process!

The President said he doesn't know what will happen with combined developments in Iran and Afghanistan. Maybe there is a silver lining in the clouds. He has a sense that many of the so-called moderates are deeply concerned about the consequences for them. If the Soviet Union moved into Pakistan; if the Iranians tried to unsettle the ruling family in Saudi Arabia; if there is Iranian-Iraqi violence, over the three islands¹¹ or otherwise—then the importance to them of having a strong and stable Israel and Egypt would greatly increase. We see the strategic importance of a friendly and strong combination of Egypt and Israel. This can be a stable rock, about which the waves of the region swirl. The last time he talked with Giscard, he began to see for the first time the value to France of a strong and friendly Israel. He (Giscard) was always the most critical of Israel, because of historical ties to Lebanon and other factors. He (the President) does not condemn Giscard for this. But France has begun to change its attitude toward Israel. The most serious aggravation in the entire world is the settlements. He understands the Israelis need to do something, but for us in dealing with the French, the Japanese, and the Moslem world, they are no help. They

¹⁰ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Brown in the Oval Office from 5:43 to 5:50 p.m. on December 28. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation from this exchange has been found.

¹¹ Reference is to the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Persian Gulf, over which Iraq had claimed sovereignty rights since 1971.

are a constant aggravation to us. It is hard to say to the French that Israel works for peace if it builds settlements. He knows that the number of settlers is small. The settlements have symbolic importance for Israel; but on the contrary, they have extreme symbolic importance as well. He has had a long-standing argument with Begin and others about this. Begin has seen public opinion polls for the US, that indicate that the support and esteem for Israel have gone down, because of a few dozen settlers. This (reduction in esteem) is of great concern to him (the President). He doesn't know how important the settlements are for Israel: for the majority coalition, yes, but in popular opinion he doesn't know, he is not a good judge. But for him, for the Europeans, and for the moderate Arabs it would be easier to reach the ultimate objective of peace if this obstacle were overcome. Jerusalem is something to be dealt with down the line. The Saudis would protest, but must accept, the Camp David paragraph on Jerusalem, perhaps modified. The Minister should not underestimate Sol Linowitz's ability. He is superb. He is a highly qualified negotiator and lawyer. He (the President) would guess that Begin and Sol would find it easier to deal with one another than Begin and Strauss.

Minister Weizman said he believes this is right.

The President said that Sol sees both sides. He works to bypass catch phrases that are difficult. In the next month or so—up to the exchange of ambassadors—Sol will be a student, and can make some progress. Later, his work will pay rich dividends. On this side of the ocean, Sol is more compatible with Cy and with the State Department than Strauss. He wants to tell the Minister this so that there will be no feeling in Israel of a reduction of interest because he put Linowitz in place of Strauss. There is no lessening of commitment or interest, and Eppy will agree with that. He (the President) is available.

Minister Weizman said he knew Sol from the time he was in business.

The President said that he is a top man.

Minister Weizman said that he had lunch with Sol.

The President said that Sol is quiet, does not brag, and is willing to give credit to others.

Minister Weizman said that Sol is a clever man.

The President said that Sol has a way with words. We would never have got the Panama Canal Treaties without him.

Minister Weizman said it was good that Sol was not at Camp David, or they would only have been able to be there a week!

The President said that Panama took 14 years. In part, this was because his predecessors didn't bring them to conclusion; they couldn't find the right words. Sol is a treasure.

Minister Weizman asked about Bob Strauss' being in the re-election fight.

The President said that he is good at it, and this was what he wanted to do.

Minister Weizman said that maybe he should give Bob Strauss some ideas, since he ran the Likud election campaign two years ago.

The President said that this was one of the great surprises in the world. Perhaps Begin will give the Minister a vacation so that he can come here to help Bob and him (the President).

Minister Weizman said anytime. He has bet some cases of whiskey on the President, and did so when the polls were down. He would correct something the President said—"if" he wins. He would say "when" the President wins.

The President said that he is pretty confident.

Minister Weizman said that he appreciates that he cannot expect a substantial increase in aid. It is important to Israeli morale that the President took time to see him.

The President said he will let Eppy know no later than Monday.

Minister Weizman said he will be on Face the Nation Sunday.¹²

The President said he would watch it. He said that we are making good progress, in part because of what they are doing together.

(The meeting ended at 12:51 p.m.)

¹² December 30.

Stalemate: January 1, 1980–January 20, 1981

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and the Consulate General in Jerusalem¹

Washington, January 5, 1980, 0137Z

3230. For the Ambassadors and Consul General from Amb Linowitz. Subject: Approach Toward the Negotiations.

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. I want to outline my present thinking about the negotiations in which we are engaged to give you an opportunity to challenge my approach or improve on it.²

3. My basic concern is that we seem to be trying to back our way into the critical issues. I do not think we can succeed in this way, and I fear that we are spending valuable time on peripheral issues which will in any case defy resolution until the fundamental questions are resolved.

4. An example of this is the number of representatives for the transitional authority. It seems to me that Egypt wants it to “look” like a legislature—this may be possible—but only if Israel is first convinced it will not “act” like a legislature. The issue here is not the number but the powers. Once we have established the latter, the former may more easily fall into place.

5. I think similar arguments can be made on the other key issues which remain outstanding on modalities: East Jerusalem and the electoral system. Frankly, it would not discourage me in the slightest if we were to mark time on modalities while we focused almost exclusively on powers and responsibilities.

6. In the area of powers and responsibilities, I am also concerned about our approach. We seem to be gearing up for a yet another cloning process of creating sub-groups as a substitute for a clear idea of what we are trying to achieve. The conventional wisdom seems to be that in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–0665. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Walker; cleared in NEA and by Calvin Konner (S/S-O); approved by Linowitz. Printed from a corrected copy.

² Responses were received from Amman, in telegram 79, January 7; from Jerusalem, in telegram 55, January 9; from Cairo, in telegram 698, January 11; from Tel Aviv, in telegram 763, January 12. All telegrams are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 1/80. A response from Jidda was not found.

order to attract the Palestinians we have to produce a detailed program for life on the West Bank with all the relationships between Israel and the SGA spelled out. I question that assumption and, in any event, question whether we could possibly accomplish such an ambitious program by May, or even soon thereafter.

7. It seems to me that we should be striving to establish a number of guarantees and some limitations for both sides and set up an equitable framework wherein the inhabitants of the West Bank can order their own lives and establish their own interrelationships with Israel and Jordan. My thinking is that we should strive to accomplish the minimum agreement that has a better than even chance of drawing in the Palestinians.

8. With this objective in mind, I wonder how much fact gathering and expertise we need and, more important, how much time we must spend on this process. It seems to me that we already know the Israelis are prepared to transfer full authority in a number of spheres subject to the restraints that will be necessary to protect the security of Israel and the economies of both Israel and the West Bank/Gaza under conditions of open borders. I do not see that it is necessarily our business to detail those restraints—instead, should we not put our energies into devising an equitable framework whereby both the Israelis and the Palestinians can, in the transition phase, work out their interrelationships confident that their interests will be protected?

9. All of this leads me to think that our energies over the next month should be devoted to attaining a statement at the next plenary along the following lines: the three delegations have agreed that full authority over internal policy formulation and implementation shall be transferred from the military government to the transitional authority in at least, but not limited to, the following spheres: education, transportation, etc. (to include as many spheres as possible). The delegations recognize that within these spheres certain economic and security questions may arise which affect the mutual interests of the transitional authority, the Government of Israel and other governments of the area. The three delegations have therefore instructed the working group on powers and responsibilities to develop equitable mechanisms for resolving such questions which will protect the rights and interests of all the people in the area.

10. I would welcome your comments. Obviously this message is not all inclusive and I look forward to your suggestions as to how we might build on it for the future.

Vance

321. Editorial Note

On January 7, 1980, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin arrived in Egypt for a four-day official visit to the country. The centerpiece of the visit was Begin's summit meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in the Egyptian city of Aswan, the ninth since Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem. The two leaders held three substantive conversations spread over two days. At the first, the two leaders agreed to proceed with the normalization of relations, including the exchange of ambassadors, the establishment of an air transport link between the two countries, as well as the opening of telephone lines and postal services. The second meeting was concerned with the current state of the autonomy negotiations, with considerable differences emerging over the interpretation of the proposed Palestinian self-governing authority and the future status of Jerusalem. Moreover, no agreement to increase the pace of negotiations was reached. Sadat and Begin also discussed the impact of political developments in Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, upon the Middle East, agreeing that these developments posed dangers for the region. Although it was not discussed, the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Kamal Hassan Ali, had earlier stated in an interview with *The Washington Post*, that the United States would be allowed to use Egyptian military facilities on a "temporary basis to defend any Arab state," but would not allow any permanent U.S. bases in his country. ("Egypt Offers Bases for Limited U.S. Use," *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1980, page A14)

Upon his return to Israel, Begin telephoned President Jimmy Carter to provide the President with his impressions of the summit. According to the President's Daily Diary, the two leaders spoke from 10:06 a.m. to 10:08 a.m. and from 10:47 a.m. to 10:58 a.m. on January 10. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Although no memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found, Carter's handwritten notes from this telephone conversation are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81. Begin provided Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis a more substantial briefing in a meeting on January 14, in which Begin conveyed his disappointment that no agreement on "moving the negotiations ahead" had been made, but stated that he and Sadat had a "common language" on strategic issues. Lewis provided a summary of this meeting to the Department of State in telegram 846 from Tel Aviv, January 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–0625) Similarly, Sadat provided the Ambassador to Egypt, Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., with his impressions of the Aswan summit in a meeting between them on January 12. During the course of the meeting, Sadat stated that he had told Begin that Egypt and Israel

“needed to help the U.S. prove that it is the ‘first superpower’ and to restore the balance” in the Middle East, a statement, Atherton assessed, that reflected “Sadat’s continued preoccupation with the strategic situation in the area, the Soviet threat and the need for U.S. to establish a position of strength.” In connection with this, Sadat also observed that this “new strategic situation and Egypt’s role should be reflected in an entirely new approach to Egyptian arms requests” in Washington. Atherton transmitted a summary of his meeting to Washington in telegram 701 from Cairo, January 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1082) He also provided a brief addendum to this summary in telegram 737 from Cairo, January 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1093)

322. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, January 10, 1980, 1038Z

206. Subj: (S) Meeting With Crown Prince Fahd. Ref: State 4054.²

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Ambassador Eilts, Special Counselor Sabbagh, and I met with Crown Prince Fahd at his home in Jidda for nearly two hours on the evening of January 9 to comply with instructions reftel. Fahd was most cordial although he expressed strong disappointment and great concern at the continuing attacks by President Sadat. He singled out the recent article in “October Magazine” as causing great concern throughout SAG. He stated that it was extremely difficult to restrain his editors and newspaper writers from replying to the attacks but he had given specific instructions that no rpt no attacks on Egypt or President Sadat would appear in the Saudi press. He reiterated throughout the meeting, at times in almost emotional tones, that he wished Sadat success; that he would be the first to call and congratulate him if he were able to find a solution to the Palestinian and Jerusalem problems. He added that he prayed each day for President Sadat’s success despite the abuse which continued to come from Egypt.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1440. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 4054 to Cairo and Jidda, January 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–2281)

3. Fahd discussed the general strategic situation in the area, including both the plight of the hostages and the Afghanistan invasion. He expressed concern about the hostages, SAG's continuing willingness and desire to help, and admiration for President Carter's handling of the problem.

4. With respect to Afghanistan, he added that this was simply a continuation of the Soviets' aggressive moves and he was glad to see the U.S. recognize the danger. He stated that he had encouraged Somalia to cooperate with USG in the granting of base facilities.

5. With respect to the steps that the U.S. should take for a comprehensive Middle East peace, Fahd reiterated the familiar theme that USG must take a strong stand with respect to Israel; that we should not continue to provide unlimited economic and military support as long as Israel continued its expansionist policies. He stated he welcomed Ambassador Linowitz's coming visit and hoped that some progress could be made in the autonomy talks, although he remained extremely skeptical in the absence of a major shift in USG support policies for Israel.

6. Ambassador Eilts has not seen this message. He will give a more detailed report³ to the President and the Secretary upon his return to Washington.

7. Department please pass to AmEmbassy Amman for Ambassador Eilts.

West

³ Not found.

323. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Longer-Term Security Assistance to Egypt (C)

The President has approved in principle the sale to Egypt of F-16 aircraft and M-60 tanks, and this decision should be communicated to Vice President Mubarak during his upcoming visit. In addition, the Egyptians should be informed that we would also authorize sale of the intermediate export fighter (F-X), if developed. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 1-4/80. Secret.

324. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 17, 1980, 1:08–1:39 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Gary Sick
 Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak

Secretary Vance opened the discussion with a quick review of his discussion with Vice President Mubarak the previous day² where they had discussed the progress of the autonomy talks and the need for some pressure to make it move forward. We are fully in agreement on this. Secretary Brown had met with Vice President Mubarak today.³

The President said there must be more progress between now and May. The end of this month marks a major turning point and it must not be upset. Before we get to the next stage, we must compare plans on how to speed up the process on Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian rights. The President had just talked with Prime Minister Suarez of Spain⁴ and he thought that European countries will be willing to play a stronger role in the coming months in support of efforts to get resolution of the Palestinian and related issues. Since the Iranian revo-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Sick forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 18 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on Sick's memorandum, dated January 18, reads: "ZB has seen." (Ibid.)

² Vance discussed several topics with Mubarak in their January 16 private meeting including the current situations in Afghanistan and Iran, U.S. aid to Oman, the improving outlook for the Egyptian economy, the Aswan Summit, and Libya. On Egypt's military aid request, Vance informed Mubarak that the administration was seeking \$350 million in FMS credits for FY 1981 and had a planning figure of \$800 million for the following year. In response to Mubarak's request for F-15 aircraft, Vance stated "he did not think this was in the cards," but that F-16 fighters would be approved. (Telegram 13813 to Cairo, January 18; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Jan/Feb/Mar, 1980, MemCons)

³ Brown's January 17 meeting with Mubarak is summarized in telegram 20199 to Cairo, January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800041–0008)

⁴ Carter met with Suarez and a delegation of Spanish officials at the White House on January 15. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

lution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan⁵ there has been a growing realization of the need to cooperate more closely among the moderate Arab nations and also Israel. There is now an opportunity to make real progress.

The U.S. needs a closer relationship with Egypt even than in the past few months. Ambassador Linowitz is the best negotiator in our nation. He is a strong, capable, intelligent man. He will be able to take positions which are unpopular in our country if he is convinced they are in the interest of peace. Once normalization has occurred, it would be useful for Egypt to present its case against settlements and for Palestinians to participate more strongly. We will do the same. In the President's view, the majority of the people in Israel support that, including many of the people in leadership positions.

We are grateful for Egyptian friendship, especially the help which has been offered in the Iranian situation. The air support given to our planes strengthens our determination to persevere. We also appreciate your encouraging other Moslem nations to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even if the leaders of those nations do not profess friendship, they listen carefully to Egypt as the dominant economic, political and military power.

We appreciate Vice President Mubarak's coming here to try to persuade the North and South Koreans to settle their conflict. We are always ready for a three-country meeting if the North is willing to accept the political leaders of the South. It is necessary for each of us to keep the other fully informed on this.

Vice President Mubarak said that he had met with Secretary Vance yesterday and with Secretary Brown today. He had informed Secretary Vance fully about the recent negotiations⁶ with Prime Minister Begin—perhaps in greater detail than Ambassador Atherton had reported. He said that he had a hand-written report⁷ on the talks written by President Sadat following the meeting and wondered if the President would like to read it.

The President took the document and read it while the conversation among the others continued.

Secretary Vance said we had gone back to the Sudanese after the message from the Egyptians.⁸

Vice President Mubarak interjected that the Sudanese had now pulled out their Ambassador to the UN on the grounds that he had vio-

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 319.

⁶ See Document 321.

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Not further identified.

lated his instructions. He noted that he had not been satisfied by his talks with Secretary Brown.

Secretary Vance wondered if the problem was related to the kinds of equipment, delivery dates . . .

Vice President Mubarak said both. He said there was tremendous pressure in his country for arms. Secretary Brown had said the F-16s would not be delivered until 1984. What were they going to do all this time? He noted that Qadhafi had recently met with an Egyptian general who had been taking a course in London and who went secretly to Libya. Qadhafi tried to persuade him to “do something” in Egypt. The generals came and told them about the meeting, which took place three weeks ago. Qadhafi promised many things. Secretary Brown said he could not offer the F-15.

The President said that he had had a call from Prime Minister Begin⁹ which was a much more positive report than the one he had just read. Prime Minister Begin always emphasizes the things on which there was agreement or perhaps ignores or minimizes the areas of disagreement. However, there is no way to avoid the questions of autonomy and Jerusalem.

Vice President Mubarak said that solution of these issues would solve all the problems of the Middle East. President Sadat cannot understand why Prime Minister Begin spends all of his time talking about normalization. He talks for hours about normalization and leaves out the other problems.

The President said that some people know how to filibuster. We must recognize that Prime Minister Begin has a serious political problem in Israel and he does not want to talk about Jerusalem, autonomy and the Palestinian question. In the President’s own judgment, the paragraph in the Camp David accords will have to be the basis for agreement. Ambassador Linowitz wants to explore some reference to sovereignty and religion. On the Palestinian question, it needs PLO recognition of Israel’s right to exist and a statement of acceptance of Resolution 242. The Moslem nations must see evidence of some progress otherwise the U.S. position in the area will be damaged.

The United States will try to expedite the delivery of F-4s and F-16s. It is not desirable to propose F-15s at this time. The Congress would react adversely. The President was aware of Egypt’s desire to have the F-15, but he asked President Sadat to trust his judgment on this question. The President said he would consult with Congress about allocating additional grain for Egypt, although it might be corn

⁹ See Document 321.

rather than wheat. He noted that in the South where he grew up, people ate almost as much corn as wheat.

Vice President Mubarak said he had discussed the negotiations yesterday. When full autonomy is reached, it will be a good solution to the whole problem. Egypt and the U.S. must work together. He said he had recently gone to Tunisia for a meeting with an Islamic group. He had also traveled to Malaysia and to Oman. In Oman he had met with people coming secretly from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE. There was only one question: what did you do in Jerusalem? This is the vital question. Prince Fahd and the King know only Jerusalem. The President was right when he said some months ago that none of the Arab leaders really wants an independent Palestinian state. They are terrified of the Palestinians. They are afraid the Soviets will go there. Arafat has sent a private message. Every time he is going to make a public statement which is critical, he sends a message and says he must say this for Assad or for Qadhafi, and he asks for understanding. Egypt always gets the same message. He is trying to get some money from them, but still he is a leader who, when he finds the train is starting to leave, he will get aboard. For that reason, he has left his representative in Cairo. They have been trying to get him to take his representative out, but he leaves him there. Qadhafi has kicked out the PLO representative in Libya. In Oman, Vice President Mubarak met with the Chief of Cabinet of Shaikh Zayid of the UAE who had come from Pakistan to Oman to meet him. He said please convey to President Sadat our appreciation for all the steps he has taken, but ask his understanding that we cannot say it publicly. This is also what we hear from the Saudis. Not from the King. He knows nothing of politics, only Jerusalem. They need a way to save face. The object is not to kick the Israelis out of Jerusalem.

The President wondered if Vice President Mubarak had recently read the Jerusalem language in the Camp David accords? Was that language satisfactory to Sadat?

Vice President Mubarak said yes it is. Egypt wants something finished. Sadat told Begin nearly the same language as the Camp David language. Both he and President Sadat had said the same thing to Weizman: let us live all in peace. Jerusalem is a religious thing. We need only a small Council (Consulate?) with a flag. Weizman said Begin would not be able to accept the flag. But it is only something symbolic, he would see in time.

The President recalled that he had once spent two days with Begin talking about flags.¹⁰

¹⁰ Not further identified.

Vice President Mubarak said they (Israelis) would have access and be able to move freely. Time would make everything disappear.

The President asked Secretary Vance if Ambassador Linowitz was ready with his language.

Secretary Vance said yes, he would take it out with him. It is based on Camp David plus mention of religious sovereignty.

Vice President Mubarak said this is very important. It is something that is felt by all Moslems. He had spent a whole day in Tunisia on nothing but Jerusalem. They never mentioned the West Bank or Gaza. It is as if God stays in Jerusalem.

Secretary Vance noted that the next withdrawal occurs on the 26th of January. That is the last step until the final withdrawal.

The President said that after the 26th all of us will need to show each other our plans and try to put them into effect in order to get maximum influence. Ambassador Linowitz is good here at home and with Begin. He communicates with Begin better than Ambassador Strauss.

Vice President Mubarak replied that Begin is hard to get along with. He noted that Begin recently talked about Golan and how it would always remain Israeli territory.

Dr. Brzezinski recalled that Begin had told him at one time that he would give up an eye, part of his arm, before he would part with the Sinai. He says one thing, but later he changes.

Vice President Mubarak noted that Israel had said it was ready to negotiate with the Syrians. If some agreement could be reached, it would be very good to stop the Russians. The Soviets are doing their best with the Syrians. President Assad knows that it would be a disaster for his regime if Sadat succeeds in getting something. He knows he would have to follow.

The President remarked that lately Assad had been worse than Qadhafi. He was more subservient to the Soviets.

Vice President Mubarak said the situation was boiling internally in Syria.

Secretary Vance said that once we are past the 26th, it will require pressure by both Egypt and the U.S. If we are not together, Begin will try to drive a wedge between us.

Vice President Mubarak said that the recent meeting between Sadat and Begin was just to pave the way for pressure later. President Sadat feels 100% the same way about U.S. and Egyptian pressure. He wanted to pave the way with Begin psychologically and make it easier for the United States. Without the efforts of President Carter later on and with tremendous effort, we will get nothing.

The President smiled and said he would prefer to remain in the background but that he was available if it was essential.

Vice President Mubarak said the Egyptians were all praying for the President's success in the coming elections. They say to each other what would happen if President Carter were not there.

The President said to tell President Sadat that we understand his economic and military needs. In the President's judgment this was not the time to propose the F-15. He realized how much the Egyptians wanted it. He will direct Secretary Brown to expedite delivery of the F-4s and F-16s and will consult with Congress immediately about the delivery of additional grain under PL-480.

Vice President Mubarak said that the F-15 would give satisfaction to the Egyptian armed forces. If it can be given to Israel and Saudi Arabia, why not to them? It is being raised so strongly by the Egyptian military.

The President said he understood.

325. Editorial Note

Speaking to a conference of Jewish-American reporters in Jerusalem on January 18, 1980, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin stated that the Egyptian delegation to the Palestinian autonomy negotiations had attempted to "distort the Camp David accords" with its proposals for Palestinian self-rule. The Prime Minister called for a new tripartite summit to address the issue. "If President Carter will ask for a three-day summit to discuss matters of autonomy, Israel will go along with it," Begin stated. ("Begin Raps Egypt, Suggests U.S. Convene New Summit," *Los Angeles Times*, January 18, 1980, page A2)

Specifically, Begin's criticisms were prompted by a deadlock over the specific powers and responsibilities to be accorded a Palestinian administrative council, as the Egyptian and Israeli delegations had rejected each other's proposals. A verbatim transcript of the January 16 morning session of the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. working group meeting on the powers and responsibilities of the autonomy committee, held at Mena House in Cairo, at which Egypt rejected the Israeli draft proposal, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 116, 1/25/80–2/2/80 Linowitz Trip to the Middle East: 1/80.

326. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 24, 1980, 9–9:30 a.m.

Subject

Iran, Afghanistan/Soviet Sanctions, Pakistan, Persian Gulf, Intelligence, Sinai Mission

Participants

The Vice President

State

Deputy Secretary Christopher

Harold Saunders

Richard Cooper

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown

Graham Claytor

CIA

Robert Ames

JCS

General David Jones

Lt. General John Pustay

*Present first ten minutes

**Present last ten minutes

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Hedley Donovan

Lloyd Cutler*

Jody Powell**

Hamilton Jordan*

Henry Owen

NSC

David Aaron

William Odom

Gary Sick

Thomas Thornton

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

8. *Sinai Field Mission.* Mr. Saunders briefed the group on the status of negotiations. Israel demanded a formal agreement on the status of the Sinai Mission, then took three weeks getting cabinet clearance on the negotiating document. We have no problem with the Israeli-approved document. Because of the Israeli delay, the Egyptians received the text of the agreement only a few days before the deadline for withdrawal this weekend. Israel is now insisting that the agreement must be formally completed before withdrawal can proceed. Our position is that the Egyptians should be given time to consider the agreement and that in the meantime withdrawal should proceed and we will carry out the terms of the agreement as if it had been signed. Mr. Saunders raised this since we may be getting a lot of messages

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes, 1/16/80–2/29/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" in the right-hand margin of the summary, indicating that he saw the document.

from the Israelis asking us to bring pressure on Egypt to expedite the agreement. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, January 26, 1980, 1812Z

1813. Subj: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter on Egypt's Military Supply Requests.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Vice President Mubarak summoned me to meet with him at 1800 local today² (Saturday, January 26) to hand me the following letter from President Sadat to President Carter. Signed original will follow by pouch.³

3. Begin text:

Dear President Carter:

I have received a detailed report from Vice President Hosny Mubarak on his last visit to the United States and his extensive talks with you and with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and other personalities of the administration.⁴

I am gratified to know that we share the same analysis of the international situation and the dangers with which we are all confronted as a result of the new Soviet offensive which must be checked if the peoples of the world, and of our area in particular, are to live in peace

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner, indicating that he saw the telegram.

² Atherton commented separately on his January 26 meeting with Mubarak, in which the Egyptian Prime Minister emphasized that the points made in Sadat's letter were "vital and important." (Telegram 1814 from Cairo, January 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1915)

³ A signed copy of Sadat's letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80.

⁴ See Document 324.

and freedom, and contribute their full share to the welfare of the international community.

Based on this common analysis, I remain confident that you will continue to support our efforts aimed at establishing an era of just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Dear President Carter,

I do not need to reiterate the friendship and confidence which my people and I feel towards you personally as well as the great American people, and our determination to strengthen our relations and our co-operation in furthering our common aims, while maintaining the tradition of frankness and candour which has always prevailed between us.

It is in this spirit that I wish to tell you of my disappointment with regard to the reaction of the administration to our requests concerning weapons and in particular aircraft.

The importance of Egypt in any real effort to oppose the communist threat in the Arab world and in Africa is an irrefutable reality.

Despite the apparent success of the Soviet-inspired efforts to isolate us, Egypt remains the only power which, if properly helped, can oppose attempts to destabilize and to impose communist domination in our region. No other country in the area can assume this responsibility. Especially not Israel, as the lessons of the history of the last decades clearly show. Everytime the Western world has allied with her to defend its interests, this alliance has been counterproductive.

Dear Friend,

In the light of all these considerations, which I am sure that you share, I must ask you to give personally your most serious and urgent consideration to our demands concerning the acquisition by Egypt of the F-15; the increase in the number of F-16s which are to be provided and the speeding up of their delivery; and the spare parts of the F-4's which have had to be grounded for lack of spare parts.

In the present circumstances, this is the way to strengthen Egypt's position in its determination to fulfill its national obligations which coincide with those of all peace and freedom loving nations who feel duty-bound to oppose all attempts to impose Soviet hegemony.

Yours truly,

Mohamed Anwar el Sadat

End text.

Atherton

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, January 28, 1980, 1431Z

1978. For the President and the Secretary of State from Ambassador Linowitz. Subject: Meeting With King Hussein January 26.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. This is to report that I delivered your invitation to Hussein morning January 26 and that he was visibly delighted and gratified by it. In our subsequent conversation Hussein sought to show understanding for our Middle East peace efforts and to assure me that he did not want to do anything to make our task more difficult. The King was warm, friendly and positive throughout the talk, and I believe he regarded your invitation and this meeting as having established a bridge between himself and us closing a period of estrangement with which he was obviously uncomfortable.

3. Hussein and I met alone at the outset during which I extended the invitation, (after consulting with Ambassador Veliotis and giving further thought to the matter I decided it would be best to lead off with the invitation.) I said you had asked me to tell him that you would be very pleased if when he is next in the United States he would come to Washington for an informal chat. Hussein brightened immediately and asked me to convey to you his thanks and warmest regards. He said he plans to be in the U.S. in May. I said if Hussein should plan to come earlier he would be welcome even before May and he replied that perhaps there might be an earlier opportunity.

4. Following this warm and very friendly exchange, which set the tone for the rest of the conversation Amb. Veliotis joined us. Hussein led off and spoke at length about Jordan's place in the peace process, Resolution 242, his relationships with the Israelis, his reason for not joining the autonomy negotiations, and his relations with the US. Most of what the King had to say on each of these subjects is familiar to us. What he was obviously trying to do in going over this ground was to convey the impression that he had not deliberately taken a stance at variance with ours but rather that from his point of view at least there

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 56, Jordan: 12/79–2/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Linowitz's meeting with Hussein took place in London. (Telegram 591 from Jidda, January 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800048–1008) Linowitz then traveled to Cairo as part of his January 24–February 2 Middle East trip, which included stops in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. (Telegram 19007 to multiple posts, January 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–0055)

was good reason for what he made. He mentioned, for example, that he had followed Israeli politics closely and had had various contacts with Israeli leaders (he named Peres). He had consistently been disappointed and had concluded that on the matter of a peace settlement there is no real difference between Begin and Peres. In his only expression of criticism during the entire meeting, Hussein said he had been disappointed in the US. He had hoped to work closely with us. Then Camp David came along and he wasn't told of what was happening either by us or by Sadat. When the Agreement was signed he had "felt betrayed" by Sadat who had assured him that he would let him know in advance. He said people wondered why he hadn't gone along with the Camp David Accords; it was because he felt himself on the outside. Hussein acknowledged that his stance had affected his relations with the US and President Carter but said he felt he had been misunderstood. The President had interpreted his actions as challenges, which was not at all his intention.

5. When Hussein finished this discourse I briefed him at some length on our efforts in the autonomy negotiations. I said broadly speaking it seemed to me we have a choice of two courses in dealing with the Palestinian issue, either to proceed through the plan of Camp David to gain autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza and thereby further the lot of the Palestinians, or to go back to confrontation. I said we were not asking Hussein to support the Camp David Accords but we do hope to have his understanding for our efforts and would like to be sure he won't interpose objections or create problems.

6. Hussein assured me that he wanted to be helpful and had no intention to create problems. I said under the circumstances it seemed to me that our work under the Camp David Accords deserves Jordanian understanding and at least no opposition, since some sort of future linkage between the West Bank/Gaza and Jordan would seem to be in Jordan's interest and not inconsistent with our mutual objectives after the transition period. Hussein agreed that linking the West Bank/Gaza with Jordan might be the right solution. I said it seemed to me therefore that we are on parallel rails and in the end our courses may merge in the same rail. Hussein again assured me that he would not do anything that would hamper our efforts. Our dearest wish is that the negotiations succeed, he said. Hussein did say, however, that it would be important to him that the US come out and state its position on the issues clearly. He felt it important that the US say what it means, even if achievement of its goals may take a long time. He was not specific beyond a reference to 242.

7. Hussein then spoke of his concern over trends in the region, describing developments particularly what he described as the very worrisome situation in Saudi Arabia. He described Saudi leadership as

bankrupt, corrupt and incapable of action. Fahd lacks the ability to run the country effectively but he said the younger group such as Saud might be able to. Hussein said he had tried to warn the Saudis that they face trouble. He was obviously very disturbed by the situation in Saudi Arabia and by Soviet actions in the area, both of which he saw affecting his own position.

8. I asked about the PLO's refusal to accept Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. Hussein said he thought the PLO could eventually be brought around on both these issues but it will take time. The PLO will have to prove itself worthy of the Palestinian people. Perhaps, he said, the PLO could recognize Israel and Israel the PLO at the same time. Hussein said there must be self-determination for the West Bank and Gaza, to assure a stable result, but significantly he made no mention whatsoever of an independent Palestinian state.

9. Throughout our conversation Hussein was relaxed, gracious and lively. He told me that he hoped we could keep in close touch and that I would be welcome in Amman at any time. He was obviously very pleased with the meeting and your invitation which I think he sees as imparting a sense that the US values him and wants to build back toward a close relationship. Clearly he is concerned about his own position in the Arab world and will be careful in his public pronouncements. But he obviously feels that he has now renewed his line of communication to us after an uncomfortable period of estrangement. My guess is that if we can make real progress in the autonomy negotiations he will find some way to participate even if peripherally.

Linowitz

329. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, January 28, 1980

SUBJECT

Expedited Deliveries of Equipment to Egypt (S)

As we discussed at breakfast on January 25,² Defense has analyzed the options for expediting delivery of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks to Egypt (see attached paper and tables).³ The options are illustrative and designed to show a range of possibilities from which the Egyptians would be invited to choose when a US team visits Egypt the latter half of February.⁴ The object then would be to reach agreement on the sales which would constitute the initial increment of an Egyptian long-term defense program. The precise components of the program should be left to the Egyptians. A preview of the options could be presented to Ambassador Ghorbal and Defense Attache Abou Ghazala at the end of January.

The options show that:

(1) At the approved FMS credit levels the Egyptians could expedite aircraft deliveries if they are willing to limit themselves to a small number of M60 tanks and forgo other new programs until FY 1982. The more they accelerate aircraft deliveries, the fewer tanks they can buy. If they insist on F-16 deliveries beginning in December 1980, they could buy only 40 M60 tanks, and they would not be able to order more later because the production line will have shut down.

(2) With an additional \$200 million in FY 1981 credits the Egyptians could expedite an 80 F-16 aircraft program somewhat (beginning in December 1982) and still buy 700 tanks and have some \$70 million a year in FY 1980 and 81 to begin other new programs. Greater acceleration or insistence on F-15 aircraft would severely limit the total number of aircraft, tanks in some instances, and other new programs even with an additional \$200 million in FY 1981.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 2/1–15/80. Secret. The memorandum bears a stamped date of January 28. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Vance and McIntyre.

² The January 25 breakfast meeting, attended by Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Donovan, Jordan, and Cutler, took place from 7:30 a.m. to 8:56 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ See Document 337.

(3) The approved \$1.5 billion limit on cash flow financing does not affect our ability to expedite aircraft deliveries, but it does prevent us from offering initially more than a small fraction of the 120 F–16 aircraft and 900 M60 tanks requested by Egypt. If this limit were raised to \$2.7 billion and the Egyptians opted for F–16 deliveries beginning in 1982, we could sign Letters of Offer and Acceptance in 1980 for 80 F–16's and 700 tanks.

In a working level meeting during Vice President Mubarak's visit⁵ we gave the Egyptians tables of aircraft and tank delivery options assuming the approved FMS financing and normal production leadtimes. As the meeting progressed, the Egyptians appeared to gain a better appreciation of the way in which financing constraints and production leadtimes limit our ability to expedite deliveries. We think this understanding could be further improved by the discussions which Dave McGiffert will lead in Cairo in February, though the political importance attached by Sadat and Mubarak to early F–16 deliveries and/or F–15 sales is unlikely to change as shown by Ambassador Atherton's cables⁶ of January 26.

The following changes from the constraints already given the Egyptians would be improvements resulting from the Mubarak visit which, along with our willingness to accelerate F–16 and M60 deliveries, would give the US team a good basis for achieving agreement on the initial sales package for the long-term program:

(1) \$550 million of FMS credits in FY 1981 instead of \$350 million. This adjustment could be made during the foreign assistance hearings or submitted in a later supplemental (\$20 million extra in obligational authority, \$0 in outlays, covers the extra \$200 million in FMS credits).⁷

(2) \$2.7 billion limit on cash flow financing instead of \$1.5 billion.⁸

(3) Willingness to discuss options for providing F–15 aircraft, subject to your final approval. Given the late delivery (second half of 1983), high cost (\$1450 million for 19 aircraft), and potential for disapproval by you or Congress, the Egyptians may decide against going ahead with F–15's at this time, though my guess would be that they'll then press for early (and many) F–16's *and* the F–15's later.⁹

⁵ See Document 287 and footnote 4 thereto.

⁶ Reference is to the telegram conveying Sadat's January 26 letter to Carter, printed as Document 327, and the oral points presented by Mubarak to Atherton on January 26, discussed in footnote 2, Document 327.

⁷ An unknown hand indicated approval of this option.

⁸ This option was neither approved nor disapproved.

⁹ This option was neither approved nor disapproved. In a January 31 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hunter stated that Brown's proposal that the United States discuss provision of F–15s to Egypt at "some later date" was made in response to Presidential comments on Sadat's January 28 letter (printed as Document 327). (Carter Library, National

(4) Diversion of equipment in production for US forces instead of normal production leadtime assumed in discussions to date with Egyptians. (Secretary of Defense will approve.)

Harold Brown

Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80)

330. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Riyadh, February 5, 1980, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's and Mr. Christopher's Meeting with Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West
Eugene Bovis
Gary Sick
Arnie Raphel
Jerry Schecter
Robert Proctor

Prince Saud
Mr. Mansouri
Ambassador al-Hegalan
Abdul Aziz Thunayyan
Notetaker

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Building. The meeting was the third of three meetings with Saudi officials during Brzezinski's and Christopher's visit to Riyadh February 4–5. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to the memoranda of conversation for the first two meetings, as well as a February 20 covering memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, submitting the memoranda for approval with a further recommendation to pass them to Christopher. On the covering memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "They should be held *v. v. tightly*. Can they be at State? ZB." A second note on the covering memorandum, written by Dodson, reads: "Dispatched to [Executive Secretary to the Deputy Secretary John H.] Trattner after talking to him 2/27. CD."

[Omitted here is discussion of regional issues unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

[Prince Saud:] One area on which there is no consensus with the United States is the problem of Israel. That problem has made the both of us unable to make the kind of response to the Soviets that we would like. We have tried not to make this a fundamental contradiction in cooperation with the United States but it does come into effect with regards to the Soviets. Of course we want U.S. help. We see no U.S. threat to our independence. We have no fear of the United States which would act as a constraint on our actions. Our past strategy was based on alliance between Saudi Arabia and Egypt that worked for a decade. The Soviets lost ground in this area for the first time. They lost their positions in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which was capable of continuing to maintain its independence. However, the split between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has broken that without providing us with any alternative strategy to replace it. We have not been able to persuade Egypt and they have not been able to persuade us. We hope that the U.S. will be contributing to remove the reasons for this split. The Middle East problem is central at all levels. These thoughts reflect the situation as it is here. It is something that we live with. It is never far away from us. It is the way we face challenges to our independence and our way of life. Now we must devolve a way to meet these challenges.

Dr. Brzezinski said this raised the truly fundamental questions and very difficult questions that you and we face. In the talk with Prince Fahd yesterday we were very much in agreement about the nature and the scope of the threat. It is very real and there is very little time left. With regard to U.S. strategy the President's State of the Union message² represented a point of departure. It was a very important statement and in many respects it was a historical affirmation of the new realities we face. After World War II we established a permanent presence in Western Europe and linked our security with theirs. This was followed by treaties in the Far East. We now appreciate that events in this region also affect these other regions and the United States, so at present we have three strategic zones: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East. The conditions in these three areas are very different. It would be a mistake to try to deal with this region as if we were re-

² During his January 23, 1980, address before a joint session of Congress, Carter declared that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The text of Carter's address is in "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress," *The New York Times*, January 24, 1980, p. A12. See also *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

playing the old formal alliances of Europe. Rather we intend to create a framework of enhanced security. We envision six levels for directions of U.S. activity in the region. First on the Arab-Israel front, we recognize the pernicious effects of this problem in radicalizing the region. We are straining our resources. We are risking the President's political capital to try to resolve this issue. Ambassador Linowitz has just been here³ so you should have some idea of our strategy. We believe that autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza will lead to a new situation. We recognize that the Palestinians are a people and they must find a way to express this in a way which is acceptable to the Israelis. This process is underway and is moving fast enough for Egypt and that is something. However, we must also focus on Jerusalem. Once Ambassadors are exchanged⁴ we should be able to move with greater energy. We hope we can use the special religious character of Jerusalem as an opening wedge. We would like at a minimum to reduce the polemics between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and develop some tacit understanding on security issues recognizing that open relations are probably going to be very difficult. Sadat is very emotional (Prince Saud interjected so are we but we do not talk as much). We would hope that at least some tacit cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be possible dealing with the questions of Sudan and Yemen as these become more acute. Three, we will try to obtain military facilities—not bases but air and naval facilities which will permit us to project power into the area effectively, quickly, and decisively. We are also considering landings by marines or an airborne brigade. We need to work out the details with the host country. It might be Egypt, it might be Oman. If it is convenient for Saudi Arabia, that would be another possibility. Four, we want to cooperate with Saudi Arabia to reinforce Somalia and Oman. Both of us have a stake in the security of these two countries. We must talk to you more concretely about facilities and their security needs. This is especially important if we need to seal off Yemen. Cooperation is very important. We must also move forward on the Yemen issue. We hope you will tell us more about the emissary from North Yemen. Five, we intend to reinforce Pakistan. Something which six months ago would have been incredible has transpired. We will talk to the Pakistanis about their defense needs, send a military team to strengthen the northwest frontier, and take other steps to make it difficult for the Soviets to use Afghanistan as a military base. Six, we would like to work

³ See footnote 1, Document 328.

⁴ On February 26, Egypt and Israel formally exchanged Ambassadors in parallel ceremonies. Saad Murtada represented Egypt as its first Ambassador to Israel; Eliahu Ben-Elissar was installed as Israel's first Ambassador to Egypt. (William Claiborne, "Cairo, Jerusalem Ceremonies Accredit First Ambassadors," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1980, p. A14)

with Iran once the hostage issue is behind us. The natural reaction in the United States after the hostages are released would be to punish Iran for mistreating the hostages.

Prince Saud wondered what we meant by mistreatment.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that they had been isolated and bound. The US public will feel fiercely when they are finally released.

Mr. Christopher noted that the real issue was mental scarring from their treatment. He noted that Schmidt had remarked on the effects of only three days of being a hostage in Somalia;⁵ whereas, these people have been held for over ninety days.

Dr. Brzezinski said in any event we will resist the inclination to punish Iran for this. Iran and Pakistan together provide the forward line and depth against Soviet incursion so we are going to pursue a six part strategy: on the Arab-Israel question; relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt; to build up our own military strength; to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on Yemen; to reinforce Pakistan; and to leave the door open for cooperation with Iran. This is different from our strategy in Europe but if we pursue it we think there is a good chance of stabilizing the area. We would also like to open a dialogue with other Arab states. *Dr. Brzezinski* had spent several days in Algeria recently and now we have a relationship with them that we didn't have before. We would like the same thing with Libya and also with Iraq if that does not threaten Saudi interests.

Prince Saud said that on the Israeli problem the United States asks us to look at it dispassionately; we also ask you to look dispassionately from Camp David. How will we meet the real threats. The real hope in dealing with this issue is not to govern our actions with respect to the psychology of the Israelis. This will not make them willing to accept compromises and it will alienate the Arab side which is also needed in this process. The Saudis need national backing just the same as the United States does. It is incomprehensible here why the United States is not providing Pakistan with military support of the same level and nature that it does to Israel. With regard to Egypt and the speed of the progress on the Palestinian core issue we have long had relations with Egypt and we know the swings of activity, which are not new. They have existed since Nasser's⁶ time. *Prince Fahd* has said that if we are frustrated it is because Sadat is not succeeding, not because we want him to fail. Sadat has taken the lead in this process. He took the lead on 242 and all the rest of the Arab nations followed. He went to Camp

⁵ Reference is to the October 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

⁶ Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt from 1956 until 1970.

David and took another channel in the peace process and the rest of the Arab world is not fast enough to follow him in that direction. If damage is done to Egypt, the pendulum can swing just as fast. We have nightmares about this. We hope that Egypt will remain an open society and maintain its political direction away from the Soviets. We are far more interested in this than the Americans are, so we are very careful. As far as timing goes there is a need for Sadat to fulfill the expectations that he has raised. As far as the exchange of Ambassadors is concerned, why should it all be on one side. Why should the gestures always be something that Israel wants and not something that would satisfy Arab public opinion. We certainly hope the Ambassador will not go to Jerusalem. If time is given to one aspect of the question, then time should be given to all aspects of the question. The speeding up of this process must not be at the expense of the trust of others. If so, it will react badly on Egypt. Not all Egyptians are President Sadats. We hope that he will regain the leadership of the Arab world. If we feel frustration, it is not because we do not want cooperation with the United States but because we see the dangers involved. The Israeli problem will be solved over time that is certain but we see dangers of letting it go on for a very long period of time with no progress. Right now the Syrians are preparing for a war of attrition. Why is that? They see the acceleration of delivery of F-16s to Israel. It is important that the United States pay a little attention to the psychology of the Arab world who will be your allies against the Soviet Union. Israel is not a bulwark against the Soviets. They are rather the way the Soviets enter the region. If Israel is interested in maintaining a noncommunist Middle East, then they must cooperate. They cannot provide military hegemony in the region as a way of keeping the Soviets out. If I express my emotions, I can only say that you listen to Sadat when he is emotional. (Dr. Brzezinski noted that when Prince Saud was emotional he sounded like President Sadat when he was calm.)

Dr. Brzezinski said the President feels very much as you do. You are speaking to the converted. However, if we compare today as opposed to two years ago there has been staggering progress made. The Israelis have now given up the notion of retaining Sinai. They said that they would never give up the settlements. In a walk with Begin he said that his hand would fall off, his eyes would fall out, before giving up a single Israeli settlement. Yet, he signed the paper giving up Israeli settlements. This is not fast enough for you or for us. The problem is how to keep the United States people, the Congress and the Israeli people on our side. There has been a breakthrough in defining self-rule for the Palestinians. No longer is the issue how to incorporate Judea and Sumeria [*Samaria*] into Israel. This process is accelerated. Israeli public opinion shows a genuine shift in recognizing the need to hand over the West Bank for a true security settlement.

Prince Saud said yes, you do affect public opinion in Israel. On settlements the biggest change in Israeli public opinion came when the President said that settlements were illegal and stopped some deliveries of some economic and military equipment. In the same way you could influence the Palestinian question. If the Israelis feel that regardless of their policy they could count on unhindered aid from the United States, they will not change their policy. Who will argue with Begin if he succeeds.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he was uncomfortable in dealing with this since Ambassador Linowitz had been here only recently and he was better informed about the nature of the overall process. The question of course is how to choose the right moment and what issue to press. Both sides are forming their own view of home rule. At some point a positive intervention may move the situation forward. We do not intend to maintain a status quo. We know it is not tolerable. It is not even just.

Prince Saud said that the status quo would be a stumbling block.

Mr. Christopher recalled that Prince Fahd had said that Arafat was here and that it would be a service to his reputation if he was able to help with the hostage situation. He recalled that a year ago we had a close call in getting the PLO to accept Resolution 242. We came within an eyelash of getting that acceptance. Now that has slipped away. Is there a way to return to that?

Prince Saud said this is a representation problem. Keeping the PLO away from the negotiations does not result in security. Rather it is an unnecessary complication which the Israelis wanted to add to the talks. The Saudis had tried to get recognition of the 242 by the Palestinians at the time of Geneva,⁷ when there was a general Arab position to negotiate. They hoped to get the Palestinians into that negotiating team. Since that time many things have changed; the PLO is interested in US recognition and would be of benefit to the negotiations. How that would happen, I don't know. Ambassador Linowitz asked the same question. If the US in some way takes the position of solving the Palestinian question on the basis of self-determination, it could make them take the plunge. This issue is very important to them since it is one of the key negotiating cards which they would bring to the negotiating table.

Mr. Christopher noted that acceptance of Resolution 242 was not frivolous or pure formality since it involved the acceptance of the future viability of Israel. This would be a major contribution.

Prince Saud said yes, for US public opinion; but for the Palestinians resolution 242 involves the recognition of Israel without dealing with

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 24.

the Palestinian problem. It is a unilateral step without any guarantees from Israel. They see this as the end of the negotiations not the beginning.

Mr. Christopher said there are various forms which were suggested in the past which would make it more balanced. That has continued relevance and vitality. We hope it has not been dropped by your side.

Prince Saud said that the Palestinians would probably be willing to accept 242 if the United States could give some indication of its determination to resolve the problem on the basis of self-determination.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we use the formula that the Palestinians should participate in the determination of their own future rather than using the word self-determination. This is a result of Israeli security concerns which have not been inconsiderable in the past. The autonomy talks are not intended to create a regime which will last forever, but it is necessary that the Palestinians become engaged in the process.

Prince Saud said that what prevents them from becoming engaged is the unwillingness to recognize the PLO. When Israel says it does not want to talk to the PLO, they are really saying that they want to avoid dealing with the Palestinian problem.

Dr. Brzezinski said we recognize that but we also seek movement. There is a debate in progress about the West Bank, that is a breakthrough. More and more Israelis say that they should talk to the Palestinians—Dayan, Weizman, Evron—but it is not easy to force this process. It takes time.

Prince Saud said at the present time this is a festering sore that will remain that way unless the United States makes an incision.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we prefer healing to surgery. Begin used to say that the PLO was a gang of murderers. Now the PLO has begun to talk more intelligently. Both sides are changing.

Prince Saud said that we trust the motives of the United States to get a resolution of the problem based on justice, equity, and a stable solution. We do not question the US motives but on the timing we know that the Soviets want to implement their objectives now, not in the next decade. Whatever we can do to speed that process we must do it. One thing you could do would be to accept the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski said the fact that you keep pressing us is helpful. It not only makes us keep this issue in the forefront but also to recognize the need to consider the views of Arabs, just as we take consideration of the Israeli views. The Europeans are ahead of us on this issue. That also helps. We appreciate how deeply you feel on this subject.

Prince Saud said he would take advantage of this open door policy on the Palestinians and keep pressing.

Dr. Brzezinski said he had a number of scars on his back because of the position he had taken on this issue in the past.

[Omitted here is discussion of regional issues unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

331. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Expedited Deliveries of Equipment to Egypt (S)

Attached is the memo you requested from Harold Brown (Tab A)² following Vice President Mubarak's visit.³ It seeks to set forth possible options to speed up delivery of arms requested by the Egyptians within definite limits on funds and financing arrangements. Once you approve these limits, we would propose to present the relevant options to the Egyptians and have them make the necessary trade-offs. OMB and State comments are at Tabs B and C respectively.⁴

The package is sufficiently complex that it might be helpful to explain how the options were put together and the key issues that emerge for your decision. The principal considerations are:

—Timing: to be responsive, we want some options that will begin deliveries in 1980.

—Composition: the options should include both *advanced aircraft* which are important for overall political effect *and tanks* which are essential to strengthen Sadat's position with the Army—the main Egyptian military force.

—Production constraints: unless the Egyptians acquire more than 40 M-60 tanks, that production line will close forever and we have

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig. J." The memorandum was found attached to a February 9 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, Brown, and McIntyre summarizing Carter's decision.

² See Document 329.

³ See Document 287.

⁴ The referenced tabs were not found attached.

nothing to replace it. Over the next five years, 700 Soviet-built Egyptian tanks are projected to wear out and need replacement.⁵

—Our relationship: the military—the army in particular—is the most important political force in Egypt. We have replaced the Soviet Union as their main source of equipment; a long-term consistent supply relationship will not only help Sadat, it will advance our interest in the negotiations with Israel and enable us to count on Egypt, which is crucial to fulfilling the Carter Doctrine.⁶

OMB identifies two sets of issues. The first is whether we can separate acceleration of deliveries from an increase in the program. The analysis set forth below indicates that this is possible but not entirely feasible. The second set of issues is key to determining which options should be presented to the Egyptians:

—Are we prepared to increase FMS financing in FY 81 by \$200 million?

—Are we prepared to increase the limit on cash flow financing from \$1.5 to \$2.7 billion?

The options are set forth in Tables I and II at Tab A. I suggest you take them out for reference as you consider the analysis which follows. The two tables represent different FY 81 FMS levels but mix up the issue of the limit on cash flow. For this reason, I have reordered the options in the following analysis of the impact of different financial arrangements on the options and the implication of the various options themselves.

1. *No change in funding or financing arrangements* will enable us to offer Options 1 and 3 from *Table I*.

<i>Option 1</i>	<i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F-16s	Dec 81
280 M-60 Tanks	Dec 80
 <i>Option 3</i>	 <i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F-16s	Dec 80
40 M-60 Tanks	Dec 81

⁵ Carter wrote “?” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁶ Carter underlined “Carter Doctrine” in this sentence. Articulated in his January 23 State of the Union Address, largely in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter summarized the “Carter Doctrine” as a “declaration that any foreign attempt to take over control of the Persian Gulf area would be a direct threat to the vital interests of the United States and would be met by armed military force.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 394) Brzezinski modeled the wording of the Carter Doctrine on the 1947 Truman Doctrine in an effort “to make it very clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf.” (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 444) See also footnote 2, Document 330.

The problem with Option 1 (from Table I) is that there would be no aircraft delivery for almost two years. Option 3 (Table I) would solve that, but the tank buy (40) is too small to keep open the production line for M–60s. For this reason, Defense suggests increasing the level of cash flow financing.

2. *An increase in cash flow financing* permits us to offer Options 2 and 4 from Table I.

<i>Option 2</i>	<i>First Delivery Date</i>
80 F–16s	Dec 82
550 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
 <i>Option 4</i>	 <i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F–15s	Dec 83
370 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

Option 2 requires raising the cash flow limit from \$1.5 to \$2.7 billion. Option 4 raises it to \$1.7 billion. Both would meet the need for early strengthening of the Egyptian army. However, *neither option would provide advanced aircraft in the next three years*

3. *An increase in FY 81 FMS by \$200 million* would permit us to present Options 1 and 3 from Table II.

<i>Option 1</i>	<i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F–16s	Dec 81
700 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
 <i>Option 3</i>	 <i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F–16s	Dec 80
185 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

Option 1 (Table II) would meet the Egyptian tank requirement and assure the Egyptian army of a long-term supply relationship but fails to deliver any aircraft for two years. *Option 3 (Table II) meets all of our objectives and is DOD's judgment of the best option.*

4. *Increasing FY 81 FMS \$200 million plus raising the cash flow ceiling.* This would take us to Options 2 and 4 on Table II.

<i>Option 2</i>	<i>First Delivery Date</i>
80 F–16s	Dec 82
700 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
 <i>Option 4</i>	 <i>First Delivery Date</i>
19 F–15s	Dec 83
610 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

These options lay out a comprehensive and long-term program of modernization, but they have the defect of no advanced aircraft deliveries for several years.

OMB concedes that if you are to choose, they would prefer raising FY 81 FMS \$200 million rather than lift the ceiling on cash flow payments significantly. Jim McIntyre also raises other issues which must be put in perspective:

—Diverting F-16s and M-60s from U.S. forces; this is essential for any acceleration of deliveries and DOD believes the relatively small quantities involved are manageable.

—The program increases proposed by Harold are not supported by any threat analysis, and are unnecessary given the peace treaty with Israel; the external threat comes from Libya, which has powerful and modern forces, but this misses the point that Egypt is the major military power in the Middle East that we must count on for all our security interests. It is the key to implementation of both the Camp David Accords and the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. Far more than the facilities in Kenya, Somalia or Oman, we will be dependent on Egypt for facilities (the air base at Wadi Kena, prepositioned stocks for RDF, etc.). We need a stable Egypt with strong links to the U.S. and that means engaging in a long-term military supply relationship. This, in turn, means we must be prepared over time to replace the Soviet equipment that is wearing out.

—We should hold up on aircraft delivery acceleration because the F-16 has engine problems, and the F-X might be a better long-term solution; the quantities of F-16s to be delivered soon are small enough that DOD believes the present engine shortage will not be significant. Waiting for the F-X means no advanced aircraft for at least five years since that plane is barely on paper.

—Any increased funding or improved financing arrangements will lead to greater pressure for Israeli increases; I believe it will give the Israelis another talking point, but I doubt it will change any votes. More important would be the impact on the Pakistanis.

Finally, there is the issue of the F-15. After reviewing the options, I strongly doubt the Egyptians will want them because they would have to wait four years to get them. But by merely offering them, we might assuage a growing symbolic discrepancy that is adversely affecting our relationship with Egypt. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that Mubarak was misled by the diffident response of Javits and Church, both of whom now firmly oppose offering the F-15. I suggest we inform the Egyptians that we are prepared to consider supplying the F-15s provided we and they can work together to develop sufficient political support in the Congress. In this connection, we would also make clear the long delay in F-15 delivery. The option we would

present is Option 4 on Table I which involves a relatively modest increase in the cash flow funding ceiling from \$1.5 billion to \$1.7 billion.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe a prudent set of options can be presented if you agree to the increase in FY 81 FMS by \$200 million and avoid any significant increase in the cash flow funding. This would permit us to offer four options (Options 1 and 3 from Tables I and II). In addition, we would offer Option 4 from Table I to cover the F-15s while at the same time explaining the four-year delay and the political situation as described above.⁷

⁷ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation and added a handwritten note: "But tell Harold & Cy to be *absolutely firm* on these budget limits. J."

332. Editorial Note

On February 10, 1980, the Israeli Cabinet released a communiqué stating that the Israeli Government has "no objections" to Jews living in the West Bank city of Hebron, "as in any other part of the land of Israel." The Cabinet decision came ten days after the fatal shooting of a 23-year old Jewish student in the Hebron market, responsibility for which was claimed by a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization. (David K. Shipler, "Israel Moves to Allow Jews to Resettle in Arab Hebron," *The New York Times*, February 11, 1980, page A1) The Cabinet's move, reported by the Embassy in Tel Aviv, was not an entirely new statement of policy as the Likud government "has always supported the right of Jews to live anywhere in Eretz Yisrael; it has in practice, however, barred settlement of Jews within wholly Arab towns on the West Bank. The specific reference to Hebron in the context of the reaffirmation of this right possibly foreshadows a change in the application of that policy." However, no timetable for the implementation of the terms of the communiqué was set. (Telegram 2739 from Tel Aviv, February 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800074–0170) The complete Cabinet communiqué was forwarded to Washington in telegram 2669 from Tel Aviv, February 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800073–0779)

333. Summary of Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting¹

Washington, February 12, 1980, 8:03–9 a.m.

Subject

Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations (U)

Participants

President Jimmy Carter (8:07–8:09 a.m., 8:10–8:18 a.m.)

Vice President Walter Mondale

Vice President's Office

A. Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

State

Cyrus Vance (Chairman) Secretary

Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs

OSD

Harold Brown Secretary

Personal Representative of the President

Ambassador Sol Linowitz

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NSC

Robert Hunter

Both Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski indicated the importance of the May target date for concluding the autonomy talks on the West Bank and Gaza. While there is some flexibility in that date if real negotiations are clearly seen to be going on, it is important in terms of convincing the Arabs that the process has a real chance of success. Secretary Vance also indicated that, after the May target date, the EC–9

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: Breakfast 2/12/80 Meeting: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room. In the upper right-hand corner of the summary, Carter wrote: "Zbig. J." The summary was found attached to a February 13 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Linowitz, informing them of Carter's handwritten comments and instructing them to "insure that this report is held closely." A verbatim transcript of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 143, Middle East: 2/77–1/81.

would very likely take an independent line,² including a UN resolution on Palestinian rights. Mr. Saunders sketched two basic courses of action: pursuing the talks vigorously in hopes that success will isolate the PLO; or having some lines out to the Palestinians—and implicitly to the PLO—as a way of supporting the process politically beyond the target date and encouraging the West Bankers and Gazans to participate at the right moment. The Vice President and Ambassador Linowitz stressed the political factors of any involvement with the PLO, particularly the importance of not upsetting the Israelis in a way that would distract them from the Autonomy negotiations. It was agreed: that there should be no second Camp David,³ without complete assurances of success; that Ambassador Linowitz should continue to try gaining as much agreement as possible by the May target date—although a full agreement is most unlikely by then; that there should be repeated emphasis on conveying an impression of progress⁴ to the Arab world; that Ambassador Linowitz (and others) should step up their visible contacts with non-PLO Palestinians; and that there should be continued efforts with other Arabs to gain Palestinian openmindedness⁵ towards the Camp David process. We should consider what else will be needed if agreement is not reached by May.

On settlements, it was agreed that State will put out a strong public statement today,⁶ confirming our position and indicating that the Is-

² In a February 6 memorandum, Hunter wrote to Aaron that European countries “have been getting more and more nervous about the prospects for the autonomy talks, and are thinking about defensive actions they themselves might take to lessen the damage to themselves if the talks fail.” Hunter continued: “The British have been fooling around with the idea of a new UN resolution on Palestinian rights—which even the Arabists in State agree would be disruptive politically at this time. In general—with a German lead—there is also more pressure for a European-Gulf ‘dialogue’ in order to get a greater share of the oil pie (presumably with more ‘flexible’ attitudes on the Palestinian question). And all of these folks are fooling around with the PLO—with the French close to having Arafat for a visit.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 2/1–12/80)

³ Carter underlined “no second Camp David” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.

⁴ Carter underlined “an impression of progress” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.

⁵ Carter underlined “non-PLO Palestinians” and “Palestinian openmindedness” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.

⁶ In his press briefing on February 12, Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter III stated that “any steps, such as the movement of Israeli settlers into the city of Hebron would be a step backwards in the peace process and could well have serious consequences for the autonomy negotiations. It would damage the confidence of the parties, particularly the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the peace process because it raises a basic question of Israel’s commitment to full autonomy.” For the full transcript of his remarks, see telegram 39160 to multiple posts, February 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0866)

raeli Cabinet decision⁷ is a backward step and will have a negative effect on the negotiations. It was also agreed to recommend that the President take a similar line of disapproval in tomorrow's news conference,⁸ while being up-beat on the course of the Autonomy Talks.⁹

⁷ See Document 332.

⁸ The text of Carter's February 13 press conference is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 307–315.

⁹ Below this sentence, Carter wrote: "This approach is ok for now, but will be inadequate. J."

334. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Autonomy Talks: The Way Forward (U)

I must say I share the President's reservations about the course outlined at the breakfast,² yesterday—in terms of what will be required down the road—although it was a useful discussion that should be repeated frequently. (S)

Two particular ingredients seemed to be underplayed:

—the "wild card" possibilities as the final weeks approach. This includes a very high level of anxiety in Israel, fissures in Egypt as the lower levels press Sadat for significant pressure on Israel, a likely increase of PLO activity (which could include terrorism or even a major flare-up in Lebanon—both developments now building up steam), and some increased pressure on us by the other Arabs; and

—increased pressure for the President to become directly involved: either at the low end of the scale to provide the political excuse

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 2/13–29/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "You are right—we need to answer your questions. How about a 3–4 pp. paper + discussion? ZB."

² Reference is presumably to the February 12 Senior Level Group meeting, printed as Document 333.

for deal-cutting, or at the high end by putting into the crucible his past achievements in Middle East peacemaking. Unless attention is distracted elsewhere, I expect the U.S. media to make quite a thing of the end-game, and the President's involvement or lack thereof. (The Egypt-Israel treaty did go beyond the deadline; but the parallel is inexact—that one the Arab world did not want completed; this one it does, or at least will use the occasion of a missed deadline to make a real fuss). (S)

Thus while the "time buying" approach is fine for now—particularly your suggestion about the appearance of progress—I believe the time is fast approaching for serious consideration of what might be required to give a real "college try" at getting a basic agreement buttoned up by the end of May. Some basic questions for consideration on a close-hold basis:

- what should be the minimum prior agreement to justify Presidential involvement at some point, and what form could this involvement take? How should the risks and possible benefits be weighed?

- how should we calibrate our approach with the Egyptians as the end game approaches?

- is there a fallback that can include a Jordanian dimension?

- what U.S. carrots should we consider? E.G. security guarantee; no-Palestinian-State guarantee; aid sweetener; U.S. regional-security-relationship-with-Israel sweetener.

- how should we work with the Jewish community here on shaping approaches to Israel? (S)

In short, how do we shift from the negotiating process to the political process—and maintain good control? (S)

335. Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, February 15, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of January 26² and for sending Vice President Mobarak on his most welcome visit.³

In the area of military assistance, we have worked closely with you and senior members of your Government in an effort to meet Egypt's needs. We recognize the urgency of your requirements. At the same time, there are limits to what we can do in terms of timing and scope while meeting our other global commitments and the needs of our own armed forces. I ask for your understanding on these limits.

I was struck by the considerations Vice President Mobarak raised during our meeting. Even before he left Washington, I ordered a reexamination of our proposals to see how we might accelerate equipment deliveries. When Roy Atherton cabled your letter, I renewed and broadened that instruction. As a result of this review, I have decided to increase the U.S. effort to respond to your concerns. Within the context of this decision, I believe it is important that our military advisors intensify their examination of all the available options, in order to decide what is possible, when, and at what cost. I have asked Cy Vance and Harold Brown to send a mission, headed by David McGiffert, to Cairo later this month for this purpose. If you desire, this mission will be authorized to meet directly with any Egyptian military leaders whom you designate.

In view of the complexities of financing, ascertaining equipment availability, and selecting appropriate combinations of weapons

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80. No classification marking. The letter was attached to a February 15 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, presenting the letter for his approval "[a]s agreed at the breakfast this morning." At the bottom of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote: "Add sentence to last [paragraph] on p. 1. 'If you desire, this commission will be authorized to meet directly with any Egyptian military leaders whom you designate.'" Below this note, an unknown hand wrote: "(copy attached which includes the above)." Draper delivered the letter to Ghorbal on the evening of February 15. (Telegram 42471 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, February 16; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 2/16–29/80)

² See Document 327.

³ The memorandum of conversation of Carter's January 17 meeting with Mubarak is printed as Document 324.

systems, detailed discussions might best await the arrival of the McGiffert team.

With warm regards,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

**336. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State¹**

Jidda, February 16, 1980, 1507Z

1078. Subject: (S) Fahd Threatens Retaliation for Renewed Egyptian Media Attacks. Ref: Cairo 3428.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: Continued Egyptian attacks on Saudi Arabia, particularly royal family, have brought Saudi restraint and patience to breaking point. Crown Prince Fahd has warned that attacks can no longer be ignored, and, if continued, will result in actions which can only further widen breach between GOE and SAG. End summary.

3. We would appreciate Embassy Cairo forwarding by immediate cable full text of February 14 attack on Saudis, cited in paragraph 6 of reftel.³

4. We are concerned that this latest attack may well provoke strong Saudi response which would be extremely damaging to already tattered GOE–SAG relationship.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 2/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Sent for information to Riyadh. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. The telegram was found attached to a February 19 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, signed by Aaron, stating that Carter had read the telegram and had responded to West's suggestion that Carter send a "personal plea" to Sadat to "stop further attacks" by commenting, "Let Atherton see Sadat."

² Telegram 3428 from Cairo, February 14, conveyed, as part of the Embassy's daily Cairo press review, a report of an open letter to Khalid which appeared in the February 14 edition of the Egyptian newspaper *Al Mussawar*. The letter accused Fahd of "conspiring with Prince Abdullah to depose King Khalid" and of having a "penchant for gambling in European casinos." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079–0942)

³ Telegram 3785 from Cairo, February 19, conveyed the complete text of the *Al Mussawar* letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800088–0701)

5. Crown Prince Fahd telephoned Special Counselor Isa Sabbagh afternoon of February 12 requesting that Ambassador tell President Carter that Saudi patience and restraint were wearing out in view of continued attacks by President Sadat and Egyptian press on members of the royal family, specifically the King and Crown Prince. In fact, one attack, by innuendo, retells the late King Faysal's assassination in such a way as to incite, in the words of Fahd, a similar crime against the present King.

6. Article referred to in refTel therefore assumes special significance, especially that portion charging Fahd with conspiracy to depose King Khalid. Fahd's conversation continued as follows: "His Majesty King Khalid several times every day asks me why don't we respond in kind. Are we afraid of anything or anybody? Can't we frankly go ahead and destroy him (Sadat) morally and informationally?" Fahd added that SAG had refrained for two reasons: first, "our own good manners, and, secondly, our friend President Carter's constant urging and advice not to retaliate."

7. Fahd then said he was having difficulty restraining answers which would not necessarily be given by members of the royal family. He also stated that the responses may well include attacks of an extremely personal and scandalous nature on President and Mrs. Sadat. He concluded by requesting that Ambassador inform President Carter that unless these attacks ceased, especially those involving personal attacks on the royal family, he could no longer keep "the friends of Saudi Arabia" from responding in kind, although he personally did not want members of the royal family to "come down to the gutter of recrimination." He concluded with the Arabic phrase, translated, that (for the U.S.) "forewarned is forearmed."

8. Ambassador's comment: I was out of the Kingdom at the time Fahd passed this message, but I am not surprised at the continuing pressure on Fahd to allow some answer to be made to the Egyptian attacks. King Khalid has expressed, on at least one occasion, his strong personal feelings about the Egyptians. Accusations that Fahd and Abdallah have been plotting to overthrow him are bound to be disturbing to him in his present state of mind.

9. The answers which would probably appear in the Saudi press and otherwise would probably include revelations that Mrs. Sadat was involved with the Arab arms industry. (It was rumored that she held a ten percent interest therein.) Fahd, in his conversation with Sabbagh, referred to information furnished by Ashraf Marwan, the now deposed head of Arab arms. Saudi principal in this venture was Kamal Adham, now out of favor here. We are afraid to estimate the amount and extent of rumors which may well be published growing out of the Marwan-Adham departures from their respective governments under less than favorable circumstances, all reflecting unfavorably on Sadat.

10. In order to buy time, short though it be, we are indicating to Fahd that we are reviewing in detail all of the recent attacks both by Sadat and the Egyptian press on SAG and the royal family. For that reason, we need texts of article referred to in reftel as well as such other attacks of recent vintage (the Saudis monitor all and we are asking them likewise for the information which they have).

11. In the meantime, continuation of Sadat's attacks and resulting retaliation would be harmful to all concerned. It would push Saudis closer to those Arabs who want to punish Sadat and his supporters. Saudi Arabia would also find it increasingly difficult to caution even the slightest restraint in anti-Sadat moves and would be more vulnerable to pressure from other Arabs to exert influence on Sudan and Somalia to put greater distance between them and Sadat. It would also make it far more difficult to count on Saudi assistance when it will be needed to help reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world.

12. Sadat is doing himself tremendous damage and we think that intervention by the President through a personal plea to Sadat to stop further attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Saudi leadership may be the only way to avoid a regional crisis also affecting U.S.-Saudi relations.

West

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, February 20, 1980, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Kamal Hassan Ali, Egyptian Minister of Defense

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense David E. McGiffert
American Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
Lt General Ernest Graves, Director, DSAA
Vice Admiral Thor Hanson, Director, Joint Staff

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables. Secret. The meeting took place in the Ministry of Defense. Drafted by Colonel Edward C. Redican, USAF (OASD/ISA (NESA)) and approved by McGiffert.

Mr. Samuel R. Peale, State/NEA
 Lt Colonel Edward C. Redican, OASD/ISA (NESA)

Egyptian Side

General Kamal Hassan Ali, Minister of Defense
 Lt General Ahmed Badawi, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
 Maj General Gamal al Sayese, Assistant Minister of Defense
 Maj General Mahmoud Kamal, Assistant Minister of Defense
 Maj General Habib Shorab, DMI
 Maj General Mohamed Harudi, COS Land Forces
 Maj General Mohamed Abu Ghazala, Defense Attache, Washington

Meeting opened with Mr. McGiffert passing President Carter's greetings and the Secretary of Defense's greetings to Minister of Defense Ali. He then described his mission to Cairo as being one of the messenger to deliver President Carter's final decisions on the current phase of the US security assistance program for Egypt. He pointed out to MOD Ali that President Sadat's intercession with President Carter² had had a profound affect on President Carter's thinking, thereby causing him to revise his original decisions; but, given financial constraints faced by the United States, both domestically and worldwide, President Carter feels that he has done all he can at this time. Mr. McGiffert then explained in a summary way the decisions the President had made, passing a written summary (Aide Memoire)³ of these decisions to Minister Ali. Mr. McGiffert continued by outlining the objectives of his current mission to Cairo; namely, that the Egyptian MOD fully understand the decisions that they were receiving as well as the opportunities and constraints offered by these decisions. A short explanation then followed of the implications of cash flow financing with emphasis on the fact that this is a highly unusual decision for the United States to undertake in security assistance. Ambassador Atherton then commented that he was very pleasantly surprised by the decisions, feeling that they represented much more than he thought would be possible at this time. He further stated that there was little doubt that President Sadat and Vice President Mubarak had had an impact on this program. Minister Ali then thanked Mr. McGiffert for

² Reference is to Sadat's January 26 letter to Carter. (See Document 327)

³ Not found. In a February 20 plenary meeting between the U.S. and Egyptian delegations, McGiffert described Carter's decisions as falling into two categories: Financing and Equipment. "On the financing issue," the memorandum of conversation summarized, "the United States would be willing to make available to Egypt \$550 million FMS credit in FY 1981 and that a planning figure of \$800 million FMS credit could be used for FY 1982. At this point, Mr. McGiffert pointed out that the United States was willing to allow cash flow financing of new programs contracted for the FY 1980 and 1981 period up to \$1.5 billion." On equipment, "McGiffert explained that the United States was willing to make available all the items requested by Egypt last August on the high priority requirements list except more F-4 aircraft and frigate type ships." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables)

having delivered the decisions and almost immediately focused in on President Carter's decision to offer Egypt F-15 aircraft. He stated that the F-15 impact was definitely political in that the decision to offer to Egypt would have great impact throughout the entire region. He stated that "for the first time, we are in balance with Israel." On the F-15, "The time will come when we will ask for it. Now you have offered us many variants (options) so now we must decide."⁴

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, area and regional military concerns, and McGiffert's recent trip to China.]

⁴ McGiffert repeated Carter's decisions to Mubarak in a February 23 meeting between them, stating "the President's decisions were final for this budget cycle and that he [McGiffert] was not in Egypt to bargain." Mubarak "told Mr. McGiffert that the United States must set the numbers of F-15s that will be made available. Mr. McGiffert pointed out that within the financial constraints of the President's decisions, the choice was Egypt's, but that Egypt should understand that these prices were only estimates. The Vice President then exchanged views with Mr. McGiffert on the psychological and political impact of the F-15 issue. He stated that Egypt cannot be left to appear militarily weak in front of 'all these people,' i.e. Libya, Saudi Arabia and Israel" and appealed for "more equipment and faster deliveries." (Memorandum of Conversation, February 23; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables)

338. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 28, 1980

SUBJECT

UN Settlements Resolution: VBB (U)

Following a Vance-McHenry meeting this morning,² the issue of our vote on the UN settlements resolution³ has now come immediately to the fore. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 55, Israel: Settlements: 7/79-7/80. Confidential. Sent for action.

² A record of this meeting has not been found.

³ The proposed draft resolution (S/13827), drawing upon the reports of the United Nations Security Council Commission created on March 22, 1979, to examine Israeli settlements in the territories occupied in the 1967 war (see footnote 2, Document 267), con-

The text in play has some objectional provisions that USUN believes it can get out. The one element that it judges cannot be got out is the continuation of the Settlements Commission. Reportedly, it is Cy's judgment that we have in effect committed ourselves to the Israelis not to vote "yes" on a resolution that contains such a provision ("We would do what we could do . . . to get rid of the Settlements Commission"—Tab I).⁴ (C)

State canvassed the possibility of a delay in the vote from Friday⁵ until Monday,⁶ in order to see what decision the Israeli Cabinet takes on Sunday about Hebron settlements.⁷ McHenry said a postponement is not possible; working levels at State think an effort should be made anyway. (C)

Vance is reportedly going to raise the issue with the President today,⁸ noting his own view that we should *abstain* (with the Commission language in), and McHenry's view that we should vote *yes*. (State working level believes the best outcome would be to try getting a postponement, then either abstain or vote yes depending on what the Israeli Cabinet does on Sunday. However, they judge that there is little

demned Israel's refusal to cooperate with the Security Council Commission, requested that the Commission continue its work, and called upon it to "dismantle the settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to cease the establishment and planning of new ones." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 409 and 426–427)

⁴ Tab I, attached but not printed, is telegram 3423 from Tel Aviv, February 21. The telegram related a February 21 conversation between Lewis and Evron in which the former outlined the U.S. position on the Security Council's consideration of the settlements issue. In response to Evron's statement that he had raised the issue of the U.S. position "at least five different times" without response, a situation which made Begin "suspicious" of U.S. intentions, Lewis pointed out that McHenry had consistently "made clear our opposition to continuing the settlements commission." In spite of McHenry's pessimism that "even with our opposition it would be possible to preclude continuation of the commission's life," given Israel's announced intention to allow Jewish settlement in the city of Hebron, Lewis stated, the United States "would do what we could to achieve what Israel has consistently asked us to do: i.e., get rid of the settlements commission as part of whatever outcome is produced by the Council meeting" on March 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 55, Israel: Settlements: 7/79–7/80)

⁵ February 29.

⁶ March 3.

⁷ See Document 332. Following a February 13 request from Vance to Begin, the Israeli Cabinet postponed a formal decision on the future of Jewish settlement in Hebron on February 17. The text of Vance's oral message was conveyed to Lewis in telegram 39284 to Tel Aviv, February 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–0518) The Israeli Embassy conveyed Begin's formal response to Vance's message, which explained the Cabinet's decision, on February 18. The Department of State transmitted the text of this reply in telegram 44424 to Tel Aviv, February 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–0456)

⁸ No record of a February 28 conversation between Vance and Carter on this issue has been found.

point in going to the Israelis to make this a *quid pro quo* matter: it would have little impact on them). (C)

My judgment is that we should:

—try for a postponement of the vote until Monday;

—failing that, *abstain* tomorrow, with a very strong statement on settlements and explaining our opposition to the commission provision; and

—go to the Israelis and explain that position, stressing hard the importance that the Cabinet reject the Hebron settlements on Sunday. (C)

I recommend that you raise this with Vance at the VBB,⁹ today. (U)

⁹ No memorandum of conversation for the VBB meeting has been found. However, a February 28 memorandum from Brzezinski to Aaron and Denend, listing the decisions taken at the meeting, stated that the participants decided the United States would abstain in the U.N. vote on settlements. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80)

339. Editorial Note

On March 1, 1980, the United Nations Security Council passed draft resolution S/13827 as Resolution 465 (1980), condemning Israeli settlements in the territories occupied in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, including Jerusalem, by a unanimous 15–0 vote. Although the participants in the February 28 meeting among Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski had decided the United States would abstain in the vote (see footnote 9, Document 338), which was originally scheduled for the afternoon of February 29, it was decided at President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy breakfast meeting on February 29 that the United States would vote for the resolution if certain "objectionable wording," especially references to Jerusalem, were removed from the resolution text. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, page 441) The February 29 meeting was attended by Vance, Brown, White House Senior Advisor Hedley W. Donovan, White House Counsel Lloyd N. Cutler, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, and Brzezinski and took place in the White House Cabinet Room from 7:31 a.m. to 8:48 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting has been found.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations transmitted the text of the draft resolution, as tabled late on February 28, to the Department of State in telegram 779, February 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–0545) That afternoon, following “telephonic instructions” from the Department of State, the Representative to the United Nations, Donald F. McHenry, met with Tunisian Ambassador to the United Nations M’hamed Essafi and Jordanian Ambassador to the United Nations Hazem Nuseibeh. At the meeting, USUN reported in telegram 800, March 1, “we had successfully obtained deletion of operative para[graph] 7 of the resolution when we stated that this would enable us to vote for the resolution.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–0545) This paragraph called upon Israel to “abide by the pertinent Security Council Resolutions concerning Jerusalem, in particular Resolution 252 (1968) and to respect and guarantee religious freedoms and practices in Jerusalem and other holy places in the occupied Arab territories as well as the integrity of places of religious worship.” In his account of this episode in his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote that “later” on February 29, Vance had “phoned me to say that the wording of the resolution had been modified satisfactorily and that he therefore felt free to instruct McHenry to support it.” Brzezinski told Vance that “he should transmit the revised text to the President or at least speak to him personally just to be sure.” (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, page 441) No official record of this exchange or of Vance’s exchange with Carter has been found. Shortly before the vote, McHenry was informed that the “text of the resolution that the Secretary had discussed with the President did not include the wording in operative para[graph] 6 calling for Israel ‘to dismantle the existing settlements.’” McHenry “considered it essential, therefore, to check back,” with the Department of State and successfully obtained a delay of the vote to noon of the following day, March 1. (Telegram 800 from USUN, March 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–0545)

Upon receiving “telephonic instructions” from the Department of State on the morning of March 1, McHenry telephoned Essafi to inform him he had been “asked by the Secretary to urge strongly [the] deletion of the wording in operative para[graph] 6 of the resolution calling for Israel ‘to dismantle the existing settlements.’” After meeting with the other delegations, Essafi informed McHenry that the proposed excision on paragraph 6 would not be accepted and suggested revisions to the wording instead. McHenry informed Essafi that “these formulations would create even more problems. He was instructed only to seek deletion. Under the circumstances McHenry thought it was best to leave the wording as it stood and go ahead with the vote. He said he would vote for the resolution but would include in his statement [accompanying his vote] a comment on this provision.” Following his meeting with Es-

safi, McHenry also informed the Israeli Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations of his intention to vote for the resolution. (Telegram 803 from USUN, March 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–0938) The text of the resolution as unanimously passed was conveyed to Washington in telegram 801 from USUN, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–1249) For the text of McHenry's statement to the Security Council, see telegram 802 from USUN, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–1263)

The U.S. vote, however, drew sharp criticism from Israel and Jewish groups in the United States. When informed of this by White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan and Vice President Walter Mondale, Carter recorded in his diary, the President "told them that the Jerusalem references had been deleted. They showed me a copy of the resolution as it was passed, with 'Jerusalem' being mentioned six times. I couldn't believe it. I called Cy in Chicago. He said he thought 'Jerusalem' had been deleted." Carter continued, "My understanding with [Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin was that we would let the issue of Jerusalem and the issue of dismantling existing settlements be resolved in the peace negotiations. That's why the error was serious." (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 406)

On March 3, Carter issued a public statement clarifying the U.S. vote, stating that it "does not represent a change in our position regarding the Israeli settlements in the occupied areas nor regarding the status of Jerusalem." Carter explained: "While our opposition to the establishment of the Israeli settlements is longstanding and well-known, we made strenuous efforts to eliminate the language with reference to the dismantling of settlements in the resolution. This call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical. We believe that the future disposition of existing settlements must be determined during the current Autonomy Negotiations.

"As to Jerusalem, we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided, with free access to the holy places for all faiths, and that its status should be determined in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement.

"The United States vote in the United Nations was approved with the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted. The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote in favor of the resolution rather than abstention.

"I want to reiterate in the most unequivocal terms that in the Autonomy Negotiations and in other fora, the United States will neither support nor accept any position that might jeopardize Israel's vital security interests. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unqualified and unshakable." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*,

Book I, page 427) The same day, Carter sent a personal letter to Begin, in which he enclosed the text of his statement, adding "I trust that you will inform your Cabinet members about this inadequate communication between me and our U.N. delegation which caused a vote contrary to my understanding of the final text of the resolution." The letter was conveyed to Begin in telegram 57573 to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, March 4. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 3–12/80) Begin responded to Carter's letter on March 10, stating that "my colleagues and I accept without reservation and with full respect the facts of which you were kind enough to inform me." The Egyptians had a different response to Carter's statement. In a March 16 letter to Vance, sent in telegram 6045 from Cairo, March 17, Egyptian Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil characterized the U.S. vote on Resolution 465 (1980) as "certainly a positive step in the right direction." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 90, UN: Security Council Resolution 465 (3/1/80) re. Israeli Settlements: 3/8/80–5/80)

On March 20, Vance addressed the March 1 vote on Resolution 465 as part of a status report on the peace process to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The text of Vance's statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1980, pages 61–62. Before this appearance, Carter sent a handwritten note to Vance on March 20. Carter wrote, "Had I studied the UN resolution carefully, my concerns would not have been confined merely to Jerusalem references and to 'dismantling.'

"a) Implications of 'sanctions' against Israel under Chapter 7 should be refuted.

"b) Prejudging permanent status of the West Bank by words 'Palestinian and other Arab territories' should be explained, although I realize this language had been used before.

"c) My preference is that the Commission on Settlements *not* be continued, and that this issue be decided in C[amp] David follow-up talks as specified re Israeli pressure in military enclaves.

"An emphasis on UN 242 & CDA and on our commitment to the ongoing negotiations can be substituted for answers to deliberately embarrassing questions concerning the above points or answers to hypothetical questions in the future. Good luck, J.C." (Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81)

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, March 4, 1980, 1032Z

4921. Subject: Personal Letter From President Sadat to President Carter.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Vice President Mubarak asked me to call on him this morning to hand me a sealed envelope containing a personal letter² from President Sadat to President Carter which Mubarak asked be delivered urgently. We are sending letter with special courier, RSO May, who will arrive at Dulles on TWA 803 via New York at 1909 Washington time, Wednesday, March 5. Unless instructed otherwise, May will deliver letter to S/S in an envelope addressed to Peter Tarnoff for transmittal to the President.

3. Mubarak said that the letter had been handwritten and sealed by President Sadat and he did not know the details of its content. He believed, however, that it deals with the general subject of the autonomy negotiations. The President, according to Mubarak, has spent the past several days thinking about this subject and has developed some ideas which he wants to share personally with President Carter. Mubarak noted in this connection that Sadat has been briefed on the recent meeting in The Hague among Prime Minister Khalil, Minister Burg and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2258. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² In a handwritten, undated letter to Carter, Sadat discussed the lack of progress in the autonomy negotiations noting: "I must tell you in all candor that the time has come to accelerate the pace of progress and make a more meaningful breakthrough in connection with substantive issues of special importance in the weeks ahead." Sadat added: "In the coming few weeks, we should maintain close consultation and coordination. We can devise a joint course of action which could serve our purpose. It would be useful too, if we check with one another before submitting any ideas or proposals. On the other hand, it is obvious that the situation calls for a greater degree of persuasion with the Israelis. They should be brought to understand that the situation does not justify any further delays. I firmly believe that they are likely to moderate their views and agree with us on a formula that complies with the letter and spirit of the Camp David 'Framework,' if they feel that we both are determined to hold them to their commitments and reach agreement on a workable plan for the transitional period. For all these reasons combined, I am thinking of asking Vice President Mubarak to see you and convey to you directly my thoughts," before the next round of negotiations scheduled for March 25. Upon his copy of the letter, Carter wrote: "Zbig—You, Cy, & Sol read. Then see me." Next to this note, he also wrote: "No copies." (Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81)

Ambassador Linowitz.³ Mubarak also recalled that during my February 25 meeting with Sadat (at which Mubarak was present) Sadat had stressed the need for the U.S. and Egypt to coordinate their positions and for the U.S. to begin now to play an active role in the negotiations (Cairo 4263).⁴

4. According to Mubarak, President Sadat has mentioned to him in the past few days the possibility that he might send Mubarak to Washington to discuss the negotiations. Mubarak, who clearly does not relish that prospect, told me he does not know whether the President's letter is a substitute for such a mission by him.

Atherton

³ Linowitz conveyed a summary of the February 27–28 tripartite talks in The Hague in telegram 58694 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, March 5. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/1–15/80)

⁴ In telegram 4263 from Cairo, February 25, Atherton provided to Linowitz in Bonn a complete report of that day's meeting with Sadat and Mubarak on the autonomy talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1828)

341. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Israel

Several items:

—*Aid*. Strauss called, and asked that I pass along to you his hope that you will strongly oppose any cuts for Israel in the budget review. (C)

—*Aid II*. In trying to protect against cuts in security assistance, it has occurred to me that we “can’t beat something with nothing”—i.e. ask the President to make no cuts in this area when most of the rest of the budget is being cut. You will recall my earlier idea that we try get-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 51, Israel: 3–4/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for action. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner reads: “ZB has seen.”

ting Congress (e.g. Sam Nunn) to consider security assistance (especially for the new Gulf strategy) against the extra 2% in the budget for DoD. This might be the way to “square the circle,” by matching *potential* cuts in security assistance against *actual* reductions in *increases* in the military budget—thus giving us the best mix of increased security without seeming to weaken in our resolve to strengthen defense and U.S. security. Since this could be couched in terms of *not* cutting funds for Egypt, and especially for Israel, it could get strong resonance on the Hill provided careful consultations are carried out. I talked to Nimetz about it, who likes the idea. If you do, you might inject it into the discussions with the President. (C)

—Oil. Energy Minister Modai has asked to come here next week to see Vance and Duncan, to 1) activate the U.S. oil supply commitment and 2) ask for money to build underground oil storage facilities, as promised by Kissinger but never followed up. The consensus is that this is a poor time for the activation of the agreement (the need is simply not there; and diverting U.S. oil would play *very* badly here). *This could become a major issue with the Israelis if not played right.* I have alerted Ed Fried, and Hinton is holding a meeting this afternoon. The object is to turn off the visit, without letting the Israelis claim that we are not standing behind the oil agreement. Strauss is speaking to Eppy about it. I will come back to you for clearance of any cable coming out of today’s meeting.² (S)

—SFM. State has promised a draft cable³ to Lewis this afternoon for our clearance (I will run it by you). I have asked Saunders to throw the ball back into the Israeli/Egyptian court—i.e. we are prepared to in-

² In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Brzezinski wrote: “separate memo.” A separate memorandum on Israeli oil was prepared by Hunter and sent to Brzezinski on March 7. Hunter informed Brzezinski that Modai told the Embassy in Tel Aviv that he was coming next week and “could not be talked out of it.” “This,” he observed, “could have serious consequences—especially in the ‘honoring of commitments’ vein. We would honor it, though our terms and conditions would appear to be onerous to the Israelis, and would themselves result in a squabble.” Hunter reported, following Hinton’s meeting (talking points from which are attached to the memorandum), “our consensus is that quiet but firm efforts should be made at least to delay this visit for a significant period of time.” In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Vance will talk to Evron. ZB.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/1–15/80)

³ Reference is presumably to telegram 63446 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, March 8. In this message to Lewis, Vance stated that “we concur with you that it is important that SFM begin inspecting as soon as possible. If that is not possible because of objections by one side or the other, then U.S. intentions should be made clear and responsibility for delay firmly placed on the local parties. We should seek to begin SFM inspections on the basis of the articles already agreed while continuing to press for resolution of the remaining issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–2249) The final protocol establishing the multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai would not be signed by Egypt and Israel until August 3, 1981.

spect anytime, but it is up to them to tell us when, since they are the ones who have held up completion of the basic Sinai agreement. (S)

—*NAAA*. The National Association of Arab Americans wants to see the President to hear his story on the resolution. I am telling the schedulers not to consider it. Strauss and Clift both say that receiving this group is not the way to turn the issue off. (C)

—*Rabbi Goren*. Bentsur passed a message to me from Eppy (originating with Begin), asking for the President to receive Israeli Chief Rabbi Goren, who is in this country. Yet I was told informally they don't really mean it: the last time Goren saw the President, he had unhelpful things to say afterwards, but Goren leaned on Begin to make the request. Better, Bentsur said, that he see the Vice President in a low-key matter (and I will check to see whether there is any interest). As I pointed out to Bentsur, this is a hell of a box for them to try putting us in: if the meeting takes place, we gain little or nothing in terms of improving relations; if we turn it down, someone will squawk. OK to handle this through the VP, if he's willing?⁴ (S)

—*Jerusalem/Strauss*. Strauss called with another idea, which he has discussed with Solarz⁵ and will discuss with Vance. He would like someone (perhaps even the President) to be in a position to say for New York:

"While the ultimate status of Jerusalem remains to be resolved in negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, we believe that, in the context of a final settlement, Jerusalem should and will remain undivided, and should and will be (remain) the capital of Israel."⁶

Clearly, only the last clause raises a question—and Strauss says that maybe the words "should" could be dropped. I have not reached Saunders yet on this and will let you know his reaction. Strauss will welcome yours—and would like to have this decided as soon as possible. (S)

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Brzezinski wrote: "agree."

⁵ Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D-New York)

⁶ Brzezinski circled the last clause of this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin next to it, "Are you recommending this? Is this in Camp David?"

342. Article in the *National Intelligence Daily*¹

Washington, March 17, 1980

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

SYRIA: Assad's Prospects

President Assad has committed his minority Alawite government to a risky course with his reported decision to use the military more freely to crush civil unrest in Syrian cities. This may intimidate his domestic opponents in the short run, but unless Assad is able to reestablish order quickly, it will also further erode his domestic support and could eventually bring about his ouster. By committing the military, Assad is playing his last major card to keep his regime in power. Army discipline may well collapse in the face of widespread riots. This could lead to a bloody war between Sunni Muslim and Alawite units. The Alawites, however, may choose to topple Assad before such turmoil develops in order to keep their position secure. [handling restriction not declassified]

The latest round of antigovernment activity began late last month in Hamah, a conservative Sunni stronghold and a center of Muslim Brotherhood dissidence. Demonstrations soon spread to Aleppo, Syria's second largest city, and to several other important towns in northern Syria. Damascus remains relatively quiet despite terrorist bombings of some government stores and calls by the extremists for sympathy strikes. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

In Aleppo, the Army's elite Special Forces failed to force shopkeepers to reopen in the face of intimidation by armed extremists. Violent street rioting resulted. The commandos reportedly suffered substantial casualties, prompting Assad to order armor and infantry into the city. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

[less than 1 line not declassified] religious leaders and government officials in Aleppo arranged a cease-fire last weekend to give the Assad regime time to consider the dissidents' demands for greater political freedom and release of prisoners. The religious leaders gave the government until today to meet their demands, but threatened to renew their calls for antiregime activity at noon prayer meetings if the government did not respond. Assad clearly has no intention of meeting the religious leaders' demands. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00466R: Intelligence Publications Files ('80), Box 2, Folder 1, National Intelligence Daily—National Intelligence Daily Intelligence Sourced Copies—National Intelligence Daily Cable—FLS. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*.

Extent of Opposition

Government officials are said to be particularly worried by the extent of community support for the demonstrations. Although most demonstrators apparently are the traditionally volatile students, many laborers and small shopkeepers, already angry over the government's wage and price policies, joined the strikes voluntarily. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Prayer leaders in the mosques also supported the strikes. One mullah in Hamah evidently called for the creation of an Islamic state, reflecting conservative Sunni views that reject Alawites as true Muslims and oppose the regime's Baathist secular and socialist policies. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The recent demonstrations point to a growing Sunni alliance, including religious oppositionists objecting to Alawite domination as well as merchants, professionals, and laborers protesting the regime's economic and social policies. Assad so far shows no sign of making the major policy changes that would break this alliance. He has not made a sufficient effort to give Sunnis a greater substantive role in the government, has failed to follow through on promises to stamp out corruption, and has taken only limited steps to respond to the grievances of merchants and the wage demands of laborers. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Repression Begins

[*1½ lines not declassified*] departing their home base north of Damascus yesterday—probably heading for Aleppo. Assad probably has decided to intimidate the opposition throughout Syria by making an example of Aleppo, which historically has resisted political control by Damascus. Its distance from the capital also makes Aleppo a less sensitive area to begin a crackdown. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Assad's use of the regular Army in Aleppo and elsewhere, however, risks splitting the military along sectarian lines. Like the antigovernment activists, most Army recruits are Sunnis. Although the Army units in general probably would remain loyal, as they did during disturbances in Latakia last September, some Sunni troops probably would be reluctant to fire on their coreligionists. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

If significant numbers of Sunnis were killed on both sides, sectarian animosities almost certainly would spread in the military, undermining the effectiveness and loyalty of all but the elite and heavily Alawite Defense Companies and Special Forces. Extensive use of regular military units to quell Sunni-led civil disturbances could result in refusals to follow orders, widespread desertions, and clashes between Sunni and Alawite units. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Outlook

Although Assad appears in no immediate danger of being ousted, his dilemma is growing. He cannot allow civil disturbances to go unchecked, but repression risks increased popular resentment of his regime. He may be able to intimidate the general population and deter demonstrations for a time, but Sunni extremist attacks on Alawite government and military officials—violence that predates the recent demonstrations—almost certainly will continue. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Assad apparently has decided to launch a major campaign to give the appearance of mass public support for the government's effort to neutralize its domestic opponents. The regime probably hopes that displays of public backing would counter what probably is a growing perception in the cities that mass demonstrations are exclusively the province of the extremists. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

As part of its campaign, the government probably will step up its efforts to "prove" that the extremists are being manipulated by outsiders such as the Egyptians, Israelis, or the US—a theme Assad has already used in a series of speeches this week. Assad is not likely to follow through with his threat to arm peasants and trade unionists to "liquidate reactionary gangs," although additional militia units may be established. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The most dangerous near-term threat to Assad comes from his fellow Alawites, who are in the best position to mount a coup and want to preserve their dominance even at the expense of the present leadership. Some Alawite officers are said to be criticizing Assad's failure to allow Sunnis a greater role in decisionmaking and his inability to come to grips with the deteriorating domestic situation; further missteps could quickly cause opposition to jell in the military. The appearance of serious disciplinary problems in Army units assigned to quell civil disturbances could persuade these officers to make their move. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Assad may be able to hold onto power for some time, but the chances are increasing that the Alawite elite will conclude that he and his unpopular brother Rifaat must go. The Alawites have no obvious alternative to Assad, although men such as military intelligence head Ali Duba and Special Forces commander Ali Haydar are likely to play a key role in any succession struggle. The Defense Companies and the Special Forces are considered the most loyal troops in Syria, but their support could crumble if the President and his brother were confronted by an Alawite consensus favoring a change of leadership. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

343. Editorial Note

On the morning of March 18, 1980, President Jimmy Carter placed telephone calls to Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to invite them to separate bilateral meetings with him in Washington. Carter spoke with Sadat from 7:54 a.m. to 7:56 a.m. and with Begin from 11:28 a.m. to 11:34 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memoranda of conversation for these telephone calls have been found. In his personal diary, Carter noted on March 18 that during the respective conversations Sadat "responded enthusiastically" to his invitation and that Begin also agreed to come to Washington. (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 410) The invitations were announced by White House Press Secretary Jody Powell on March 19. (Terence Smith, "Carter Bids Sadat and Begin Visit U.S. for Separate Talks," *The New York Times*, March 20, 1980, page A1)

344. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance and the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)¹

Washington, March 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategies for Managing the Peace Process Through 1980

In response to Sol's request for personal thoughts on the autonomy negotiations, this memo looks more broadly at how we manage the whole peace process in its larger aspects through the remainder of the year because the autonomy negotiations must be dealt with in that context.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Eyes Only; Super Sensitive. Drafted by Saunders. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Vance wrote: "Mr. President—I believe this paper is worth reading. Cy."

Four Premises

First: I am writing from the premise that Sol with the President's full support will be pursuing his negotiations with every effort to conclude them as early as possible. A lot of good work is being done on possible solutions to the issues. I am leaving the issues and the tactics of the negotiations aside for a moment, although decisions on strategy could affect how Sol begins to talk with Sadat next week.²

Second: The main issue to be kept before us is how hard we can press to conclude the negotiations in May or June and how much attention we should give to the option of suspending negotiations. Whether or not we might choose that option, we have to address the issue soon because the Egyptians are already locking us into a May 25 final deadline and closing off options for keeping the negotiations alive beyond June or beyond 1980. Sadat may well be planning another dramatic initiative. If we are going to suspend negotiations this summer, we need to do so on the right issue.

Third: An immediate operational issue in the management of the larger peace process is how to deal with a number of issues outside the negotiations themselves. They will affect our ability to conclude them and to win Palestinian and Arab acceptance for them or to keep the door open for further peace initiatives if we cannot. I am thinking particularly of probable moves by the Arabs or the Europeans to bring the Palestinian rights issue back to the UN Security Council next month or after May 25. If we are going to shape those efforts we will need to make our views known soon.

Fourth: How we manage the peace process this spring will affect the cooperation we can expect on building our security framework in Southwestern Asia as well as Saudi cooperation in keeping oil production up and prices down.

My own view is that we should press the negotiations as long as substantive work is being done to define the issues and solutions to them. An active negotiating process is better than a void if it is serious. How big a milestone May 25 is will depend on how much we make of it—whether we and Sadat choose to make it a cut-off point or whether we continue and try to convince others that serious work is still going on.

However, there is a very real alternative of suspending negotiations over the right issues.

² Linowitz was scheduled to leave for the Middle East on March 21 for six days of talks with the Israelis and Egyptians.

Given the elections here and the shaky political situation in Israel, we may very well not be able to achieve an agreement this spring on terms that will meet our larger interests or Sadat's. Because that likelihood is so great, I believe we must carefully examine a strategy of deciding before May how the negotiations might be put into neutral or low gear through November while making fairly firm—if not precise—commitments on what we will do in early 1981 assuming the President is re-elected.

Some General Propositions

Even though all of us understand the larger context in which our decision on overall strategy will be made, it is worth having the larger considerations in front of us:

1. *The autonomy negotiations have a wider purpose.* The effort to achieve full autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is our response to the plea from most of the people of the Middle East to promise the Palestinians a state of their own. Since we are offering far less than that—even if we achieve the full goals of Camp David—we must achieve everything we envisioned at Camp David or we will have little hope that an agreement on autonomy will achieve our larger purposes in the Middle East. A lesser achievement will further isolate Sadat and assure that the Egyptian-Israeli peace cannot become the nucleus of a moderate coalition in the Middle East; achieving our goal is necessary to vindicate Sadat's policies—and ours. Vindicating Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty should be as important to Israel's interests as to ours because—whatever might be wished—the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and normalization of relations was never intended to stand on its own without progress for the Palestinians.

2. *A larger U.S. purpose in the Middle East* is to demonstrate American diplomatic power and continued Soviet inability to solve one of the area's main problems in a just and secure way. This has been true for a long time, but the point has been underscored by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.³ It is unrealistic to think that we will be able to realize our plans for building our security position in Southwestern Asia if we cannot demonstrate our power by dealing effectively and fairly with this problem. The Soviets in the period from 1954 through 1973 sought to strengthen their position in the Arab world by demonstrating that their military and economic assistance provided the answers to the Arab-Israeli problem and to the area's (particularly Egypt's) economic development needs. Three wars in that period demonstrated that So-

³ See footnote 2, Document 319.

viet arms were not the answer and Soviet economic aid showed little understanding of the development process. In 1973 Sadat went to war not to win a military victory but to get the United States involved diplomatically. American diplomatic power is not—as the Arabs see it—our ability to force Israel to make concessions but rather our ability to bring about a viable solution for all parties. It will serve Israel's interests far better to have a strong U.S. as the predominant extra-regional influence than to have Soviet-supported radical movements with no moderate counter.

3. *The Palestinian issue is a security issue for the Saudis and Gulf Arabs.* The Saudis and Gulf Arabs are increasingly blunt in telling us that their ability to stand with us on security issues in Southwestern Asia will depend on our ability to deal honorably with the Palestinian issue. The same point will be increasingly heard about oil production and prices. The Arab point is not simple blackmail for an ideological political purpose. Some parts of the Palestinian movement have roots in radical political philosophies and movements dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes. The Palestinians in the traditional societies of the Peninsula and Gulf are one of their principal security problems. The regimes there feel unable to identify with us on security issues when we do not appear to their sources of political support to be dealing with one of their main security issues.

4. *A significant part of persuading those Arabs will be persuading them that we take the Palestinians seriously.* That brings us to one of the toughest propositions of all—the question of how to deal with the PLO. I am not one of those who argues that a direct dialogue with the PLO would by itself resolve our problems. My long-term strategy towards the PLO would be to try to win their support for the autonomy in the transitional period and then to use that period to bring forward moderate leadership in the West Bank and Gaza so that the moderates in the Palestinian movement would ultimately have the capacity to isolate the radical elements. The PLO will probably split in that process, and that could be all to the good. But there has to be a subtly designed strategy for giving the PLO a sense—one way or another—that we regard them as part of the picture. Recognizing the Israeli side of this problem and the fact that a serious dialogue with the PLO is not on in 1980, I believe there are ways of doing just enough this year without the big splash of open meetings with Arafat's lieutenants. But doing something on this front will be almost essential at some point when we have decided on our strategy.

5. *We do not have to give the Arabs everything they want.* Although the Arabs will continue to insist publicly on an independent Palestinian

state and restoration of the pre-1967 Arab role in Jerusalem, I believe we can convince them of progress with less. Most moderate Arabs will tell you that they are prepared to go along with us in a transition to a Palestinian solution once they believe that our objectives are in the right ballpark and once they see again a U.S. ability to deliver. Although the Baghdad group will still not accept full autonomy, I believe in the end that the key Palestinians, the Jordanians, the Saudis, and the Egyptians will recognize that Palestinian autonomy and a lifting of the Israeli civil/military occupation could be an important step forward—if they are genuine.

6. *Israel can be approached by recalling to Begin his oft-repeated promise to fulfill everything agreed at Camp David and by negotiating in detail. We cannot ask Sadat to accept less, but we have to ask him to cooperate with us in detailed negotiation as long as we pursue the negotiations.* Begin himself, as I remember, was the author of the phrase “full autonomy”—which must have differed even in his mind from “self-rule,” which was his own earlier formulation. This coupled with the Israeli negotiating team’s statement that their proposals are negotiable provides a basis for insisting on achieving the fullest autonomy envisioned at Camp David. We must always keep in mind—and explain to the Egyptians—that the only way to move the Israelis to decision is by presenting detailed textual proposals. Neither the Israeli mind nor the Cabinet can make decisions on broad principles. Understandable Israeli fears can only be met, to the extent that is possible, by pinning down agreements in detail. Only if we can provide the detailed proposals needed for the Israeli decision-making process and convince Begin that the proposed agreement is within the limits agreed at Camp David do we have a shot at Israeli agreement. Despite predictions to the contrary since last fall, we cannot assume that Begin is dead politically even though the old spark may be gone and even though the government faces serious political and economic difficulty this spring. In any case, we must present our position as fully within the Camp David Framework.

The Situation Ahead: The Central Issue

The big issue through May 25 is how much to invest in pressing the autonomy talks to agreement by that date. While a maximum effort is desirable, I believe we would make a big mistake to lock ourselves into a May 25 cut-off point. For one thing, I doubt it is physically possible to put together a signable agreement by that time. For another, we can manage in the Middle East as long as serious work is going on. The important issues are whether the process can be serious enough to keep Sadat with us, to focus Israeli decision-making on the issues, and to sustain our involvement, including possible disagreements with Israel, here at home. In dealing with the May 25 date, we all should remember the three-month “deadline” in the Camp David Framework for the con-

clusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Because serious work was in progress when that deadline came, it was possible to keep going and conclude the negotiations three months later. It seems to me that the issue is not whether we can conclude the negotiations by May 25 but whether we can say with conviction that serious work is still going on with a prospect of achieving a reasonable agreement. But we need an early understanding with Sadat and Khalil on our longer term strategy so that we may maintain flexibility about the target date.

We can probably assume that Sadat is pressing the May 25 deadline and hinting at suspending the negotiation in order to get us more fully engaged. The choice we will need to discuss with him is whether he will play ball with us in conducting the negotiations our way or whether we should agree on suspension until 1981 with promise of a big push then. Proceeding with the negotiation will require more cooperation from Sadat and Khalil than we have at the moment. Khalil has never understood why we have to negotiate in detail, yet not to do so is to prevent our making a serious effort to get to the tough issues in ways that would enable the Israelis to deal with them. Sadat seems to be on the brink of calling the negotiations at an end without letting us get to the end. So the immediate need is an agreement with both Sadat and Khalil that wins their cooperation on negotiating strategy without making them look as if they have made unacceptable concessions on Palestinian interests. To have that exchange with Sadat, we must decide on our own long-term strategy.

On the Israeli side, as I suggested above, the approach has to be on the basis of fulfilling the Camp David commitments. We can show understanding of Begin's political (including economic) problems and concentrate on asking him to tell us how he can conclude the talks on a fair basis. In this context, we need to know how we would suspend the talks if that happens because the greatest pressure on Begin will not be anything we say but rather his assessment of the situation he will face in the light of how the issues will be positioned if and when the talks are suspended.

As we move toward decisions on how to deal with Begin and Sadat looking toward May 25, a central issue will be how to state our objectives so as to avoid politically unsustainable confrontations and to describe an achievable outcome. We will also want to give careful attention to sharpening the issues in such a way as to allow them to be the main sources of continuing pressure if negotiations are suspended.

The Situation Ahead: Managing Other Initiatives

In addition to the imperative exchanges with Begin and Sadat through a variety of channels, we will have to deal in the next three months with the following initiatives from other quarters:

1. We believe the Arabs (possibly stimulated by the PLO) will request a *Security Council meeting*⁴ on Palestinian rights at the end of March or the beginning of April. Very simply, the issue for us is:

—We could write a good resolution that would be intellectually responsible in taking into account both sides of the issue, but it seems unlikely that we want to take that issue on now, given our experience on this subject last August, the recent reaction to the latest Security Council resolution, and the other larger efforts in which we will be engaged. We do not need charges on top of the recent ones that we are now trying to “change 242.”

—If we do not introduce a resolution of our own, one will be produced which will face us with another difficult choice.

—I am already recommending separately that we try to get such a Security Council meeting postponed but to do so we may have to have some indication that we are prepared to handle this issue in some alternative way at a later time. Our credibility in seeking such postponements is worn.

2. The “*European initiative*” is gaining momentum. Key Europeans believe they have a signal from us that, after May 25, some noise from them might be useful.

—At worst the Europeans will seek to curry Arab favor by supporting objectives that we cannot support without any prospect of improving the situation on the ground. The Europeans may marginally help themselves while putting us on the spot without helping us to move any negotiation forward.

—At best, a party like the British might try to use the exercise to gain PLO acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel’s right to exist in order to fulfill our Sinai II commitment.⁵ At some other times this might be helpful, but it seems unlikely to me that we really want to open a dialogue with the PLO in 1980.

—One approach worth considering is whether we might propose to the British that they try to engage the Palestinians in a serious dialogue about how they could see themselves being woven gradually into the negotiating process. If the Palestinians knew we were behind the British initiative, they would view this as a significant step.

3. We have received and will probably receive further *suggestions on strategy from Arab leaders* that they will accept a hiatus in the peace process in the latter half of 1980 if we can tell them what we will do in 1981. We will have to deal with this question first with Begin and Sadat, but we should keep high on our agenda consultations with the other

⁴ The Security Council met seven times between March 31 and April 30 to consider the issue of Palestinian rights. For a summary of those meetings, see the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 377–380. On April 28, Tunisia submitted a draft resolution on Palestinian rights to the Security Council. For the Security Council’s consideration of that resolution and the April 30 vote which followed, see Document 359.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 91.

key Arabs lest the negative post Camp David reaction be repeated. Oil prices and our security framework in Southwest Asia are at stake.

—Fahd has already sent such a message to the President.⁶

—As early as last August when the Palestinian rights resolution was in the Security Council, intelligence reports indicated that Arafat recognized that the U.S. might well not be able to make serious moves until early 1981.

—Sadat, in presenting May 25 as a “deadline” and in wanting exchanges with us on strategy toward the autonomy talks, might well be on the verge of proposing some such strategy.

—If we are to move in this direction, we would want to talk along these lines with King Hussein when he comes in the second half of April

4. Throughout this period we will probably see continuing *Israeli moves to expand their settlements* in the West Bank. This possibility highlights the need to consider further how we might take a stand for restraint of some kind on new settlements. The ideal way to achieve this would be a sensible resolution of the land issue in the autonomy negotiations. But if these negotiations were to be suspended, there would be at least an argument for either positioning the talks so they will break down over the settlements issue or, as one means to that end, seeking a well-defined moratorium on specified actions during the period when the negotiations are suspended. The Israelis would not agree, but the issue would be clearly put.

The Decisions We Face

1. The basic decision that needs to be made is whether to press for an autonomy agreement this year.

—One possible strategy is to press the autonomy talks as far as they can go with the intent to bring substantive issues to a head whenever they are ready. This might require our putting forward our own draft agreement at some point in some form, knowing this would produce another serious crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. This would also re-

⁶ Brzezinski sent the Saudi aide mémoire containing the oral message from Fahd to Carter under a March 3 covering memorandum. The message conveyed Fahd’s deep concern that “with the end of May and the possible collapse of autonomy talks, the environment will be created for serious regional developments. In particular, the mood of any new Arab summit is likely to be immensely more difficult than the last two. The economic rationale for significantly lowering oil production is already being pressed with great vigour and persuasiveness. HRH’s lack of visible political ‘support’ by Washington on the Arab-Israeli issue compounds his constraints in these areas as well as in others related to cooperation in the face of Soviet encroachment.” Brzezinski reported the oral comments accompanying the message “indicate that the Saudis are fearful that they will no longer be able to support us,” to which Carter wrote: “(a) That will be a decision for HRH to make (b) We are doing the best we can. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 3/80)

quire pressing Sadat not to lock us into the May 25 date and to cooperate with our strategy of negotiating in detail.

—The alternative strategy is to press the negotiations as far as they can be pursued seriously in order to complete the foundation but consciously pave the way for suspension of the negotiations in the most favorable way possible with an eye to significant action in 1981.

—These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. The issue is exactly how to bring them together so that the second is a natural fall-back from the first and so the issues are correctly positioned.

2. In making that choice, we need to consider carefully that a decision to try to conclude the negotiations this year will force a choice between:

—Pressing Sadat to accept a deal that will have enough compromises in it to preclude selling it to the Palestinians and other Arabs. The temptation would be great if we set our sights on an agreement for agreement's sake and have to fall back to get agreement. Such an outcome could have serious consequences for Sadat's tenure and for our relationship with Egypt and the other moderate states in the area.

—Pressing Israel to decisions that would put in suspense the current government's policy of steadily tightening its grasp on the West Bank and Gaza. This could well provoke a government crisis in Israel where such a crisis may already be imminent for entirely separate economic and political reasons. Such a course would have serious repercussions in the U.S.

—The unfortunate aspect of this choice is that while we would be pressing Sadat for concessions on negotiating strategy, we would seem mainly to be leaning on Israel to make concessions with nothing concrete on the Jordanian or Palestinian sides.

3. If we were going to press ahead and try to achieve agreement this year, we will have to take some specific steps to pave the way on the Jordanian/Palestinian/Saudi side. Parenthetically, we should note that the need for a serious effort on this front argues for not locking ourselves into a May 25 deadline.

—The centerpiece of a serious effort on this front would be a dialogue with the Palestinians. Since there are strong arguments against taking on the burdens of a direct dialogue with the PLO this year, we need another approach. I see four complementary possibilities: (a) Set up a series of in-depth discussions with a group of non-PLO Palestinians or Americans close to the Palestinians. (b) Ask the British to hold in-depth talks with the PLO. (c) Ask Hussein when he is here to put certain questions to Arafat, implicitly on our behalf. (d) Sit down for a couple of days with one non-PLO Palestinian close to Arafat (a professor now in the U.S.) to brief him in detail on the autonomy talks and to ask whether there is any way the course we are on could intersect at some point with a course the PLO could endorse.⁷

⁷ Vance underlined this sentence.

—Whatever we do along the above lines with the Palestinians or with Begin and Sadat, we must tell the key Saudis as well as Hussein in depth what we are doing.⁸

4. As soon as we know where we are going this spring, we must tell the Europeans soon in order to fend off initiatives that might cut across our efforts. Our friends and allies will be highly skeptical that we can succeed in our negotiations, but they will probably stand back as long as a serious effort seems to be taking place. If we were to engage the British with the Palestinians, this would keep them constructively engaged.

5. If we are not going to go beyond the point where serious discussion is stalled and if we are prepared to let serious negotiations go into neutral for the remainder of 1980 and then to resume them in earnest in 1981, we would want to decide that as early as possible so we could position ourselves to use the prospect of movement in 1981 to fend off such initiatives as the Europeans may mount or as the Arabs may bring to the Security Council on the Palestinian rights resolution. We would also want to bring about a suspension in the most constructive way possible with the intent of resuming negotiations early in 1981.

⁸ Vance underlined this sentence.

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1980, 1257Z

6278. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin.

1. (S-entire text).

2. I was summoned on short notice to see Vice President Mubarak at 1100 local today. Purpose of meeting was to provide us with the text of a letter dated March 17 from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin (para 3 below) which Mubarak told me he will be giving to Israeli Ambassador Ben Elissar later today. Mubarak stressed that GOE has no re-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid-East, 4/79–12/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

peat no intention of publicizing this letter and was providing us a copy in confidence. In response to my question as to whether he would tell Ben Elissar a copy had been given to us, Mubarak said he would do so if asked. The letter deals with the negotiations, in which the U.S. is a full partner, so there was no reason why we should not have a copy.

3. Begin text. Dear Prime Minister Begin.

—In our last meeting in Aswan,² we pledged to do everything possible to ensure the success of the efforts we have been exerting along the road to a comprehensive and lasting peace. I need not reiterate, here, the factors which make it imperative for all of us to reach that goal without delay. Strategic considerations, both regional and global, render the continuation of the present situation most detrimental to the cause of peace and stability. This makes it all the more important to make real progress every day in the negotiations on the establishment of the self-governing authority for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That is also why we agreed to step in, when the need arises, and give the necessary directives to our delegations to the negotiations.

—It is with this in mind that I am writing to you today. I have been following very closely the course of the negotiations with hope and faith. I firmly believe that both our peoples are firmly committed to the cause of peace. It is my clear conviction, also, that they are aware of the necessity for reinforcing the historic step we took on the road to peace. That is precisely why we have been exercising patience and restraint even in the face of several discouraging and alarming signs. We had hoped that, in the course of the negotiations, a way would be found to give the process the shot in the arm it badly needs. However, I must tell you, in all candor, that I am deeply concerned over the present state of affairs. Enough time has passed without making any tangible progress on major substantive issues³ of special significance. Several months were spent merely on defining the positions of the parties and identifying the areas of agreement and disagreement. On the other hand, we noticed that certain attempts have been made to depart from the Camp David formula and treat it lightly. All this has been taking place despite our positive policy of taking every conceivable action to bolster the bridges of confidence between our peoples and eliminate any remaining barriers. We have been faithful not only to the letter of the peace accords, but also to the spirit of Camp David and my mission to Jerusalem. With all the good will nations can command, we accepted the early implementation of the provisions on normalization.

² See Document 321 for a summary of the meetings in Aswan.

³ Carter underlined "I am deeply concerned over the present state of affairs. Enough time has passed without making any tangible progress on major substantive issues."

—Nevertheless, we see no signs of any meaningful progress in the negotiations. The twenty sixth of May is approaching in a matter of a few weeks. If the negotiations fail to produce the necessary progress to keep the process alive, the consequences will be very grave indeed. Many people will question the wisdom of continuing the talks.⁴ On the other hand, the violation of the fixed date, be it a target date or a deadline, might give the impression that the talks have become open-ended since no other date is fixed. All this will expose us to charges and suspicions of procrastinating or lacking the sense of urgency which is required under the circumstances. The door will be wide open before any other efforts to seek a solution to the problem. It would be quite difficult for us to oppose such efforts or prevent any move within the United Nations for the purpose of establishing new terms of reference.⁵ On the other hand, this will give credence to the allegations that the peace accords we signed constitute a separate peace arrangement. We reject this categorically. As I told you in our first meeting⁶ in Camp David, I would never accept a separate or partial agreement. I need not emphasize this any further.

—Likewise, the success of our endeavor necessitates that you refrain from taking any action or making any statement that might poison the atmosphere or exacerbate the situation. Certain actions taken by your government lately have not been sensitive to the delicate stage of the negotiations. Statements made by Israeli officials lately have not been helpful, to say the least. This is not likely to generate the kind of response we would like to see on the part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose cooperation is vital to the success of our mission.

—In the coming few days, our representatives will be meeting to pursue their discussion.⁷ These talks will provide an indication of the manner in which the negotiations are developing. It is essential that they address themselves seriously to the major issues of substance with full awareness of the consequences of success and failure. It is also essential to set up a committee that would be entrusted with the task of discussing the issue of security⁸ for it is obvious that such issue is adversely interfering with many aspects of the negotiations. Hence, a real attempt to define it and clarify it would be a good step in the right direction. If the committee on security starts its function promptly and

⁴ Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.

⁵ Carter underlined this sentence.

⁶ See footnote 7, Document 28.

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 347.

⁸ Carter underlined this sentence.

in a positive manner, it will provide a hopeful sign that would contribute to the creation of a more favorable atmosphere.

—I am certain that you will take these thoughts as seriously as I am taking them. We both have a stake in strengthening the structure of peace by every feasible means. Accordingly, I expect to hear from you positively.

—With best wishes for good health and contentment.

—Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. End text.

4. At the end of Sadat's letter there is a handwritten addition reading: "Jehan joins me in extending our best wishes to Mrs. Begin and the family."

Atherton

346. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 20, 1980, 1:03–1:31 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Ambassador Sol Linowitz

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President

Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member

The President began by talking with Warren Christopher (?) on the phone to ask how Cy made out—in one word! He listened and said that he would get details later.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 3–4/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Another memorandum summarizing this conversation, written from Linowitz's perspective for his files, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL1, Government Service, Middle East, Carter, Jimmy and White House Staff 1980.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found, nor is the conversation noted in the President's Daily Diary. However, Carter spoke with Vance on the telephone from 2:35 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. on March 20. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

The President said (to the Ambassador) that Cy Vance had done well at the hearing.³ The problem concerns how we could have voted for it.

Ambassador Linowitz said that that is the key point.

The President said that Cy has been very stubborn on this. He had Zbig call him this morning, and wrote a note. In a political campaign, you can't go for a week before you know that you shouldn't answer all questions. You can get pinned down by hypothetical questions. He is glad to see Ambassador Linowitz, and to go over where we are. He knows that the Ambassador was a bit reluctant on the Sadat and Begin visits. But he needs to indicate the resolve of the Administration and its interest in the Middle East talks. There is an impression—reflected also in the Ambassador's talks—that we are not supporting the talks enough. He wants to let the world know that the talks are not dead. Austria, Portugal, Greece, and to an extent Germany are reacting as though the talks are dying away, and they want to fill a vacuum. He had urgent messages from Sadat, including through Khalil and to Mrs. Carter,⁴ that Sadat wants to see him (the President) urgently. He talked with Cy and asked him to sleep on it, that he (the President) had to let Sadat come. Then he also had to see Begin. When he (the Ambassador) is in the Middle East, he should keep in the back of his mind what the major obstacles are. On Israel, he wants to be blunt with the Ambassador: he wants to come up with a position we can take, and get accepted by himself, Sadat and the majority of Israelis and its political leaders—probably with the exception of Begin, but preferably with him. He needs to bring the talks to a head, probably in June. He can't let this thing continue through the Convention⁵ and the election period. He is prepared to resolve the issues. If this can't be done, then our position will be clear to American Jews, to the community here, to Sadat and others. He feels there will be a repetition of past negotiations in leading to a showdown with Begin, who wanted to do nothing, and was willing to let the process breakdown. Yet Begin is constrained, first by his sense of his historical and Biblical place in Israel's history—this is

³ On March 20, Vance appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to explain the March 1 U.S. vote on Israeli settlements. (See Document 339) In his testimony, Vance acknowledged that the U.S. vote in favor of the resolution had been made in error and accepted responsibility for the "failure of communications" which led to it. At the same time, *The New York Times* reported, Vance "made it clear in two hours of frequently argumentative testimony that the United States continued to regard Israeli establishment of settlements in occupied Arab territory as illegal and an obstacle to peace." (Terence Smith, "Vance Rebuffs Call for Full Disavowal of U.N.'s Israel Move," *The New York Times*, March 21, 1980, p. A1)

⁴ Neither of the referenced messages has been found.

⁵ The 1980 National Convention of the Democratic Party was held at Madison Square Garden in New York City August 11–14.

very important to him; and second by the political exigencies in Israel. Therefore he might act, reluctantly, contrary to his beliefs, and those of his party, because they would be acceptable to Israel and would keep his opponents out of power.

These are notable motivations. But until we can convince him—can lead him to understand—that both of them are true without violating his principles too much, then there will be no progress. There was an escape hatch at Camp David for Begin, when he said he couldn't accept dismantling of the Sinai settlements without approval of the Knesset. This can help put things on the back burner. If the Israeli people see that there is a choice between seeing a breakdown and having no settlements, voting rights for people in East Jerusalem, and the like—and if they vote it down, then so be it. He will have done what he could. His sense now is that the obstacle is not the Israeli people but Begin himself. Last time, they convinced Begin to act. Labor could not have done Camp David. Maybe Peres (with a united party) could have done the Egypt-Israel treaty. So he will give Begin the benefit of the doubt on this. In the upcoming process, he believes that Begin can't do it—though he (the President) would like to be proved wrong.

We need to keep Sadat flexible, and he would appreciate the Ambassador's advice on how to do it. The President will study this closely, and needs the Ambassador's thinking on what our position should be. Sadat can be resistant. He sees himself as the inheritor of the Pharaonic crown. He sees himself as a man of destiny and of courage. He takes big gambles, but it can be embarrassing if the gamble does not work. There are constraints on him. If he broke relations with Israel, then Fahd and others—whom he despises—would appear to have been right and Sadat to have been wrong. Sadat and he have a mutual affinity. If the Ambassador says there is an Israeli position we should go with (?), then he can sell it to Sadat. But once Sadat says he will not do something, then he can't be changed. It is important to keep him on generalities. The Ambassador and he (the President) should reach a firm U.S. position, and try to get some progress in dealing with Begin. There would be a chance to succeed.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would clarify the issues, and put in some positions. He thinks that Begin knows he is weak politically (*the President* agreed). Burg has told the Ambassador, in total confidence, that he has sent emissaries to Peres on early elections and dealing with Labor. Ehrlich is doing the same. Yadin is also playing around a bit.

The President said Dayan and Weizman, too.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this could crumble, and Begin knows it. In his (the Ambassador's) judgment, this has brought Begin to tough positions, instead of wanting to be a man of flexibility, in part because of his associates. (*The President* agreed). But Begin does also want to be

the peacemaker for Israel, and to insure its security for the future. Inside this there might be a way to find a way to movement, but it will be excruciatingly tough. His sense—shared by Sam Lewis—is that Begin will give nothing to the Ambassador on this trip; anything he might give he will give to the President here. Therefore it will be useful for him (the Ambassador) to sound out Begin. But he is also having meetings with Peres, Dayan, Weizman and others.

The President said that this is good, and that the Ambassador should also use Hedley Donovan for this purpose.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it would be useful to have Hedley along. He can take soundings; he will be helpful. He (the Ambassador) hopes he can come back from this trip with a better sense of where there is room for give with Begin. Is he beyond moving? His (the Ambassador's) guess is that Begin will want to do something—for example, the establishment of a security committee. Why? Because he (the Ambassador) had been tough with Sharon here.⁶ Sharon liked it—and had called to say so—and that they should meet alone in Israel.

There must be some masochism there. He had told Sharon that the President was personally concerned about the security issue. Sharon said that they should discuss this. The Ambassador had said that Sharon should tell Begin, and Sharon said he would. We should let Egypt know we are pressing on this.

The President asked what Egypt wants.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it has an understandable position. Israel says that everything touches on security—health, welfare (the President added “schools”). Therefore, with the lists of coordinated powers, they had agreed at the Hague⁷ that security was not in the first list of 18 transferred powers, and he had thought they (the Israelis?) were off the security kick on the first list. Khalil said he had tried to move them, and couldn't do it. He said that we should try to get the Israelis to define their security needs and tell them, and they will try to work around it. This concerns Khalil. We may be able to get something. He (the Ambassador) had told Begin that adding to the ring of settlements around Jerusalem was an affront to the President. This shook Begin; he does not want to be in the President's bad graces.

The President said that Begin had kicked him when he was down on this one. He was causing him the greatest hurt when he was vulnerable. But he (the President) survived!

⁶ A summary of Linowitz's March 13 conversation with Sharon was transmitted in telegram 71062 to Tel Aviv, March 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800136–0948)

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 340.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin was taken aback. He had had messages from Begin that this is not what he had meant. Because of that, Begin may want to show some flexibility, but it won't be much of substance. Therefore he would come back with appraisals and suggestions.

The President asked how long the Ambassador would be in Israel.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would be three days in Israel and three in Egypt: one and a half days for meetings and one and a half days in the plenary. In Israel, he will have lots of meetings, and wants Begin to know about it. He will see Peres and others.⁸ The issues are still there but they are solvable. He had repeated to Burg that if he is worried about security, then we are willing to be responsive (?). Sadat has said that he would be prepared to say publicly that there will be no Palestinian state.

The President said that if the Ambassador would write down items like these, that suit Ehrlich, Dayan, Weizman, etc., then this would be helpful.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had tried ideas like that; he had tried ideas like absentee ballots for East Jerusalem—which were foreign to the Israelis. But it could keep them from worrying about the Jerusalem issue. Sadat has problems, for example, the poor communications within his government.

The President said he thought that this was deliberate, except for Mubarak, who is not very much involved in this. Sadat trusts and likes Mubarak, unlike Khalil and Ghali. Sadat stays away from the nitty gritty—the President envies the Ambassador sometimes.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Sadat will talk with him on particular issues. He (the Ambassador) asks him to tell his Prime Minister, since he doesn't accept these positions. Sadat agrees, then doesn't do it, and Khalil takes a different position.

The President said that he had to be cautionary on this. There are times when Sadat says things he shouldn't. If he goes to Al Baz, to ask him what the Palestinians think, Al Baz will say that they disapprove. He (the President) needs to keep Sadat flexible. Sadat doesn't think enough of what the other Arabs think. Sometimes he (the President) has to protect Sadat. There are reasons to have positions acceptable to Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the other moderates—though not Iraq and Syria, etc. Therefore Sadat must be protected, so that he does not get too far out in front of Al Baz. Some movement, yes, but not so far out of line with the moderate Arabs.

⁸ A report of Linowitz's March 24 meeting with Peres was transmitted in telegram 277 from Alexandria, March 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086-0437)

Ambassador Linowitz agreed. Last time, Sadat had told him that settlements were not important. He said they could concentrate on Gaza and could forget the West Bank for years. This couldn't happen. There is a troublesome dichotomy that is hard to get hold of. Khalil is on a kick—how can we get him off it? He has switched his philosophies—the Ambassador hopes this does not mean Sadat, as well. Before, Khalil said that they could transfer some powers into the first list. Now his position is that under Camp David, all powers must be transferred, and then have the Israelis negotiate some back. This Israel will never do. Camp David says that the powers should be defined.

At the Hague, the most important conversation—which he was told he could not tell Khalil or Sadat—was with Burg, and was surprising. Otherwise it was a sterile session. One idea dealt with absentee ballots for East Jerusalem residents. He (the Ambassador) does not see Burg being independent enough to talk about something like this without Begin's interest in the idea.

The President said that Burg might be prepared to break with his boss.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Burg had said frankly that he (Burg) is dismayed by Begin's position. Shamir in Burg's view was worse. Burg said that he could not meet with Linowitz alone. But he (the Ambassador) believed that if he can persuade Shamir, then he could sell an idea. He is a man of integrity and speaks frankly.

The President said that the Ambassador would have to waste a lot of time teaching Shamir the issues.

Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to tell the President how things appear. He does not have great expectations for this trip.

The President said that if issues can be clearly defined, this would be good. Begin knows what happened at Camp David, and now he will be ganged up on—not just with Sadat, but with some of his own associates. Barak was good. He would take Begin off privately and get him to change his mind in a way that was not embarrassing. Dayan was close to this, though not as good. He is not sure that Shamir, Burg or Weizman could do this. Barak is like a bookkeeper, or a personal CPA, or a lawyer friend—that is, not a peer. Begin didn't care if Barak knew he had changed his mind, but he cared about the others. Sometimes he (the President) would work out a position with Barak, who would go off with Begin. Three hours later Barak would emerge and say what Begin had suggested! There is a need for some way for Begin to change his mind, without losing face. Begin might say that he had to let the Knesset decide.

The President said he was extremely eager to get into this. It might be unpleasant; and this is not the time (?). He thinks there will be no cutoff of the process, for example for this to be taken to the UN. Yet

with Sadat this is a real prospect; he could turn to the UN without acknowledging to the world that Hussein, Assad, and Fahd had been right. He (the President) hopes to prevent this.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, on the way forward, following the meeting with Sadat here, then we may sense a value in moving the negotiations to the Wye Plantation (between Washington and Baltimore), to work intensively for two weeks, and see what happens. If there are only a couple of key issues left, then perhaps the President should meet with Begin and Sadat together.

The President said that this sounded good.

Ambassador Linowitz said that doing the negotiations here would be better. Out there, there are other responsibilities and shifting back and forth on plenary sites.

The President said this sounded good. The Plantation might be better than Blair House. He wished the Ambassador luck, and told him to call anytime during the trip.

The meeting ended at 1:31 p.m.

347. Memorandum for the Files by the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)¹

Washington, March 29, 1980

RE

Memorandum of Conversation with President Carter

On Saturday morning, March 29th, I received a phone call from Phillip Wise, the President's Appointments Secretary, asking whether it would be convenient for me to come to the White House to see the President at 11:15AM. I had returned from Cairo about 7:30PM the previous evening, and obviously the President wanted to have a report as soon as possible.

I arrived at the White House and the President received me in the Oval Office. He was wearing a sweater and a jacket and was seated at his desk. I pulled up a chair and we talked for about 45 minutes.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL1, Government Service, Middle East, Carter, Jimmy and White House Staff 1980. Secret.

The President started off by telling me of his recent meeting² with Moshe Dayan in which Dayan had come forward with the suggestion that it might make sense for Israel to put on the table its intention with respect to future settlements and then to indicate what the correlative anticipated right might be for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan told the President that he thought Israel wanted about 15 or 20 more settlements; that he anticipated that all of the settlements would in due course have about 3,000 people additional; and that the Palestinians could be told that they could bring in about 50,000 Palestinians under the autonomy arrangement. The President thought this was a sensible idea, and I said that it was along the lines of Sharon's suggestion about a limited number of settlements, but that obviously Dayan had gone beyond that to limit also the number of people at each settlement.

I then gave the President about a 10-minute report on my meetings in Egypt³ and Israel⁴ including the final session at Alexandria.⁵ I

² A copy of the memorandum of conversation for this meeting, held in the Oval Office from 2:30 p.m. to 2:59 p.m. on March 26, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 1–4/80.

³ Linowitz summarized his March 25 meeting with Sadat in Alexandria, covering the state of the autonomy talks and Sadat's upcoming visit to Washington, for Carter and Vance in telegram 279 from Alexandria, March 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80) Following the plenary session of the autonomy talks at Alexandria, Linowitz met Sadat again at the latter's Giza residence on March 28; a draft memorandum of conversation is in telegram 6971 from Cairo, March 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2372) A copy of Linowitz's report to Carter on this meeting, dated April 1, is in the Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 48, Foreign Countries—Egypt [1980]. The report was also sent to Cairo in telegram 84998, April 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 4/80)

⁴ A summary of the first meeting between Begin and Linowitz on March 23, covering the Israeli Cabinet's March 23 decision to authorize settlement in Hebron, Sadat's recent letter to Begin, Arab voting rights in East Jerusalem, security arrangements, and proposed legislative powers for the SGA, was sent in telegram 916 from Jerusalem, March 24. A copy bearing Carter's handwritten notations is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80. The second Begin-Linowitz meeting on March 24 is summarized in telegram 952 from Jerusalem, March 25. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/16–31/80) Linowitz summarized his March 24 meetings with Peres and Weizman in telegrams 277 and 281 from Alexandria, March 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80) Linowitz summarized his last meeting with Begin on March 25, along with meetings with Sharon and Burg the same day, in telegram 281 from Alexandria, March 26. A copy of this telegram, bearing Carter's handwritten notation, "This meeting confirms my concerns re Begin's intentions. J." is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/16–31/80.

⁵ Linowitz's report on the March 27 Alexandria negotiating sessions, which were "marked by a clear desire on both sides to help the process and to understand the concerns of the other party," as well as agreement between the participants to form a Secu-

pointed out to him that there had been some real advances in a number of important areas which augured well for the future of the negotiations. He had read all of the cables and was, therefore, fully familiar with what had transpired except for the report of my last meeting with Sadat the day previous.

The President thought that making use of the Coordinating Committee⁶ for dealing with certain issues such as Water might be a good idea and at first blush felt that the addition of the United States to the Coordinating Committee would make sense. He agreed that this tactic might permit us to finesse the difficult problem of trying to work out details and answer Egyptian concern about trying to negotiate details for the Palestinians. I also told the President about the approach to avoiding the problem of transfer of authority by specifically listing the powers to be exercised and the notion of trying to shoot for getting Heads of Agreement agreed to by May 26th. He indicated that the term "Heads of Agreement" was new to him, and I explained it.

I also told him that we had made very little progress on the problem of the Arabs in East Jerusalem although Begin had seemed to be attracted by my reference to the absentee ballot to be exercised outside of East Jerusalem by the Palestinians who are now in East Jerusalem and who, as Jordanian citizens, apparently have the right to vote in Jordanian elections. As to settlements, I told the President that I had been unable to get the freeze until May 26 which I had tried to extract from Begin, but I thought it not impossible he would be willing to do something about it when he came to Washington. On the Security Committee I was confident that Begin is ready to agree to that and probably when he is in Washington. I also told him of Sadat's suggestion of a Gaza First approach, and the President said he thought Sadat had long been too optimistic about his ability to get the Gaza Palestinians to cooperate.

I tried to explain to the President why Begin seemed to be so intransigent and that his primary concern is the possibility of an independent Palestinian State. I pointed out that Begin needs reassurance on that score and needs to be told that Israel's security will be preserved. I also told the President that Begin feels that the President thinks that Begin went back on his promise to him about a settlements freeze following the Camp David talks. I pointed out that there was ob-

ality Committee, was conveyed to Carter and Vance in telegram 8 from USDEL AMVIP Linowitz Aircraft, March 28. In addition, it was agreed at Alexandria that Egypt would drop its demand that the SGA receive all of the powers currently accorded to the military government, and that "certain unassigned areas—such as water," and "residual powers" be placed under the aegis of the Continuing Committee. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 3/80)

⁶ Reference is to the Continuing Committee.

viously some disagreement, and the President agreed that upon reflection and after the emotions had subsided there was probably misunderstanding between them as to just how long the freeze was to run. He said he would make clear to Begin that he understood the basis for the misunderstanding. I told him that I thought this would be helpful.

We then talked about how to move the relationship along and the fact that Sadat will be concerned with large issues while Begin will be cautious about details.

I then went through a number of other areas which Sadat had discussed with me. With respect to military aid and the F-15's, I told him of Egypt's concern that the price to Israel was so much cheaper than that to Egypt and also that Sadat wanted 4 destroyers on a lend-lease basis.

I also told the President that Sadat had told me the Shah was very bitter about the United States and felt he had been betrayed; that 14 months ago Sadat had suggested that he remove his planes from Iran and bring them to Egypt and the Shah had said that even if he wanted to do so they would not come unless the United States directed them to. Sadat said he was trying to temper the Shah's feeling.

Sadat also asked me to convey to the President that he thought that there was now civil war in Syria and that Assad would be out by the end of the year. He thought that Iraq was working against Assad and cautioned the United States to be careful about Iraq.

With reference to Saudia Arabia, I told him that Sadat had said that the United States can control it whenever it wants to and that the Royal Family exists wholly because of the help of the United States. He said that Saudi Arabia could get Hussein to join the negotiations by a phone call, since Hussein and his family are on the Saudi payroll. Sadat did think, however, that this might be the time to improve Saudi-Egypt relations, and that the United States could undertake to do it.

The President then said that he was not surprised at the suggestion about Hussein; [2 lines not declassified] He also indicated that the Shah was a trouble-maker and was misstating facts to Sadat.

Quite clearly the President is eager to get back into the negotiations and said as much. He said that he had enjoyed the Camp David negotiations immensely despite their difficulties because except for his submarine duty it was the only time perhaps ever that he had devoted himself for an extended period to a single subject—entirely apart, as he put it, from the Congressmen on his neck, etc. He seemed to be immensely interested in every aspect of the negotiations and the attitude of the people involved. He is obviously not only knowledgeable but keeping current on every tactic.

The President then spoke again about Moshe Dayan's suggestion which he said was the best idea he had heard for weeks about the situa-

tion. He said that what was needed was imaginative approaches such as Dayan's, as well as my ideas with reference to religious sovereignty and Heads of Agreement as put forward, in addition to the absentee ballot for the Palestinian Arabs.

He asked me to work with Secretary Vance in putting together a briefing book⁷ for him preparatory to his meeting with Sadat and then said that he noticed that I wore cufflinks and wanted me to have a pair with the Presidential Seal. He gave them to me and I left.

⁷ The briefing book on U.S. strategy for the upcoming Sadat and Begin visits, forwarded to Carter under an undated 19-page covering memorandum from Vance and Linowitz, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 3, Egypt: President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, 4/80: Briefing Book.

348. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 8, 1980, 3:04–4:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Second Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Ambassador Roy Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)
His Excellency Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
Dr. Butros Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 4/79–12/80.

Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Osama el-Baz, First Under Secretary and Director of the Office of the Vice
President

The President began by suggesting that this afternoon² they talk about the procedural approach to be followed until the end of May. He believes it useful to get a sense of the key differences there are between Egypt and Israel. He would like to do what they did at Camp David and during his Middle East trip: to reach agreement with President Sadat, with flexibility, and then deal with Begin on that basis. Not everything can be agreed by May 26. We should proceed, as Ambassador Linowitz and Prime Minister Khalil had worked out, to hold continuing negotiations, preferably here. President Sadat can designate whom he wants—Burg would be here for the Israelis—because he understands that Prime Minister Khalil might not be able to be here all the time. That would give us only a month to iron out as many difficulties as possible. Ambassador Linowitz had suggested working out “heads of agreement,” and Khalil and Burg had agreed. This would be agreement on principles, and on specifics. Some of the details could be left until later. (*President Sadat* said fine.) It would not be possible to get Israeli and Egyptian agreement on all points by then, and since the Palestinians are not in the talks, and on some issues they are needed for agreement, this could be done with their elected representatives or with the mayors. We can negotiate for a month, and then the heads of agreement can incorporate what is agreed by May 26. Second, there should be definition of the specific responsibilities and authority of the SGA. We do not know how large it would be. Egypt prefers having it fairly sizable; Begin wants about a dozen members. One possibility would be to have the mayors on an interim SGA. For the Palestinians, this would give them a voice—either personally or chosen. We have not discussed this possibility with Begin, and do not know his view.

The SGA should have the right to issue proclamations, and to modify existing statutes, but not change the terms of the heads of agreement. It would have no right to change agreements reached between him, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. The Continuing Committee would include representatives of the SGA, Egypt, the U.S. (if

² On the morning of April 8, Carter met privately with Sadat in the Rose Garden and the Oval Office from 11:01 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found. At the same time, the U.S. and Egyptian delegations met in the Cabinet Room, where they discussed the proposed powers and responsibilities to be transferred to the SGA, as well as the future competencies of the Continuing and Security Committees in the autonomy talks. Carter and Sadat joined the delegations at 12:10 and conversation turned to the two leaders’ hopes for their discussions and touched upon Egyptian-Saudi relations, the Horn of Africa, and the agenda for the afternoon meeting. The memorandum of conversation for these meetings is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80).

Begin agrees), Israel, and Jordan (if and when it will join—he doesn't know when). We also need to specify that the SGA can act in ways to promote harmony with others. Its relations with us are secondary: what Egypt and the SGA agree to is all right with us. We need, President Sadat and him, to reach an understanding on external defense and foreign affairs. He sees no reason that the SGA should have any. There is no need to specify that any one has control of foreign affairs. The SGA is not a nation, and has no foreign policy to define. Israel prefers to have control over foreign affairs. He prefers just to say that the SGA does not have it.

Once this group is inaugurated—which he believes is the term from Camp David—then the Israeli military authority would be withdrawn, the civilian government would be disbanded, and Israeli forces would go to specified locations. We have discussed that this should be on the periphery of the West Bank. We can presume that this would take care of external defense. He does not want the SGA to have tanks, howitzers, or heavy weapons. Israel would continue to have these for the West Bank.

Difficult issues remain—e.g. public lands, water development, and the number and kind of refugees who could go back to the territories. This is a very important issue (the refugees), and could be decided by the Continuing Committee. Some were specified in the Camp David Accords, and in a number of 1967 refugees' going back. This committee could turn over an agreement—say in August—to the SGA, as with water rights, and it would then in turn be the responsibility of the SGA to administer the agreement. On another point, the security committee: He prefers that it be headed by General Ali and Minister Weizman. So far, when various issues come up, Israel says that they are security issues. It uses this argument to delay decisions that are not related to security. There is a difficult line to be drawn here. There are genuine defense needs and the control of terrorism. Israel requires some role in anti-terrorism. As to where to draw the line, we need negotiations. Camp David calls for strong police forces—the word “strong” was put in particularly—and they need to deal with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. He would like to see, over time, the role of the police increase. As it proved itself to be effective against terrorist acts, it would play a useful role.

He has written down, for President Sadat's study overnight, these various points.³ They reflect his best judgment. Sol Linowitz understands that these points are what he and Khalil worked out. He (the President) modified them to take into account some points made by the Egyptians this morning.

³ The list of points is attached but not printed.

(At that point, copies were passed—see attachment—and the Egyptians read them from 3:16–3:19).

The President said that one Iranian diplomat, scheduled to be deported, has had a nervous breakdown, and wants to stay in the hospital for 24 hours.

The Vice President said that he was fired last night by the Iranians, and fears for his life.

The President said he doesn't doubt it, but he can go to a third country.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that the diplomat had been our bet as the best man to handle the transition.

The President said he would not go to the American people and make excuses about a diplomat's not leaving. He can stay in the hospital for 24 hours, under custody.

President Sadat said that he would be pleased to offer this man asylum in Egypt. Any Iranian could come, openly before the whole world. They have recently taken two Iranian military officers.

The President said that 9000 Iranians have entered the country since the hostages were taken; and we have a total of about 70,000 Iranian students here. He asked Osama el-Baz whether the points in the paper suited him.

Mr. el-Baz joked that anything the President presents is acceptable!

President Sadat said that he and his team would chat together this evening.

The President said that on another issue, we may have problems with Begin on anything agreed here. (*President Sadat* said right). First, on the U.S.' being a member of the Continuing Committee, he doesn't know why, but often Begin would hold out on something like this as a bargaining point. That's his privilege.

Mr. el-Baz said that this can be seen in the context of the United States's being a full partner under Camp David. Therefore it can join any committee.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether this means that, if Israel objects, the U.S. could still be a "full partner" on the Continuing Committee.

Mr. el-Baz said that this is not the point: "full partner" means that the U.S. can join all committee.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether we can make the Camp David distinction as a "full partner", but not as a "party."

President Sadat said yes.

The President asked what the difference was.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that it would affect the principle of unanimity on the Continuing Committee.

The President said he sees. As he understands it, Egypt has no objection to U.S. membership. If Begin objects to there being a U.S. role with a veto, then it is up to us and the Israelis to agree.

Ambassador Linowitz said that if we can agree on “full partner” with Egypt, then the U.S. has flexibility.

President Sadat said that Egypt insists that the U.S. continue to be a full partner.

The President said that at Camp David, the U.S. was not included in the Continuing Committee. There was an argument at Camp David on refugees that related to this point, and it was decided that Israel and the SGA had to agree on refugees. A separate part of Camp David lists the major role the Palestinians can play. The Continuing Committee is powerful. It can continue what we are doing now, with the Palestinians and Jordanians involved.

President Sadat said right.

The President said it would be new if we were in the Continuing Committee, since that hadn’t been agreed at Camp David.

President Sadat said yes. If there is no U.S. presence as a full partner, he would do nothing.

The President joked that he would turn over the whole problem to President Sadat (laughter).

President Sadat said he had said at Camp David that 90% of the cards are in the U.S.’ hands.

The President joked that he would turn it over to President Sadat and King Hussein. (laughter)

President Sadat said he wants Hussein to take over responsibility for the West Bank (*the President* agreed). If we succeed here, then Hussein will come in.

The President said that the Continuing Committee should have some full powers—e.g. on deciding when to start the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. They have to start by the third year, but can start earlier. If there are differences between Israel and the SGA, or between Israel and Egypt, the Continuing Committee would be the forum, sort of like a supreme court. It can also coordinate, and keep things moving forward.

President Sadat said that Israel tries to exclude the U.S.—as it tried to do with the treaty negotiating.

The President said they tried it at Camp David, as well!

President Sadat said that he believes Begin will not insist on this now. The U.S. has proved itself as an arbiter between the two sides. It is very vital that the U.S. be in.

The President said we are willing.

President Sadat said that the Israelis should not want the Soviet Union to be happy, in saying that the U.S. was excluded!

Ambassador Linowitz asked if he understood correctly: if we continue as a full partner on the Continuing Committee, and under the Camp David Accords, is this agreeable to Egypt?

President Sadat said full partner. . . . There had been two turning points. With the first Disengagement Agreement,⁴ after the October war, there were hot feelings and emotions. It was a deadlock. The first Disengagement Agreement was a U.S. paper submitted after the deadlock. Also at Camp David, without President Carter and the U.S., Begin would not have signed. We will face this in the future. The fact is that the U.S. is a full partner.

The President said he wants to know what President Sadat envisions if we go for Gaza-first. How can we negotiate on one part of the territories only? He can't see it. Does President Sadat see implementing Gaza first?

President Sadat said he had talked candidly with Begin about this at Aswan. Begin was silent. He (President Sadat) had said, let us agree about Gaza and the West Bank first; but he (President Sadat) would have nothing to do with the West Bank, let us start with Gaza first. He said to Begin: "Do you hear?" And Begin replied: "I hear with three ears," which meant he felt it in his heart, as well. He (Begin) had asked the same question—do you mean agreeing on Gaza only? Does this mean postponing the West Bank? He (President Sadat) had said no. He (Begin) said in Cairo, that we could start with Gaza after agreeing on the West Bank and Gaza together. He (Begin) declared himself. He (President Sadat) proposed to help him (Begin) with problems of the West Bank. Also, why should they keep Hussein as an outsider?

The President commented that Hussein is throwing rocks.

President Sadat said that when he first proposed this idea to Begin, Begin refused immediately. Then after six months, all the Israelis—including Begin—said that this was a happy solution. There is no threat to Israel from Gaza. On the West Bank, even Israeli editors said that they had misunderstood him (President Sadat). Now they see this as a most happy solution—all the factions in Israel do. At Aswan, he had tried to ease matters for Begin, who heard with three ears, to go to the Cabinet. There was no answer. We need to get his (Begin's) answer.

⁴ For documentation on the First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, signed on January 18, 1974, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Documents 1–18.

The President asked, if the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza want to go together on implementation, is this President Sadat's first choice?

President Sadat said he would not advise it. There are difficulties on the West Bank: the PLO, Jordan, and the Israelis all maneuver against one another on the West Bank. He does not want to let King Hussein as an outsider upset our work. We should reach agreement, and say we will start implementing it in Gaza. Then the three of us can ask Hussein to resume his responsibilities for the West Bank as Egypt would be doing in Gaza. We could leave it for one or two years, to buy time, then the West Bank would come along.

General Ali said that he last met with the Israelis a month ago, with military authorities, with Palestinian leaders. He asked whether Egypt and the Gazans should apply the SGA in Gaza first. They are ready to start. They are ready.

The President said he has no evidence to contradict this view, but is less sure that the Gazans would be willing, without agreement by the PLO, Arafat, and Hussein.

President Sadat said that he agrees; he does not trust any of them. But if we have a model, he will impose it. Let us get a model in Gaza (and the West Bank?)—for there is no alternative—and Egypt will apply it to Gaza; he will find local mayors to do so.

The President asked if this is not acceptable to them, how will President Sadat impose it.

President Sadat said that Begin should simply have given full autonomy after the Camp David Accords were signed, then said to the Palestinians, when you are ready to sit with us, you can govern yourselves. If they are ready, they can discuss all that is in Camp David. Anyway, we will win, even if they refuse. Time is on our side.

The President asked whether Begin had taken the Gaza-first idea to the Cabinet.

Ambassador Linowitz said Begin is worried that Gaza-first would be a precedent for the West Bank. He thinks that maybe President Sadat means by "impose" that Israel will transfer authority, and let the Gazans pick it up or not. There is a question in Begin's mind: since there are more difficulties on the West Bank, if there is full agreement on Gaza, and some progress on the West Bank, will we move forward with Gaza-first before finishing on the West Bank?

President Sadat said that he will think of it. This is a breakthrough. It is a subtle idea. Maybe we will be forced to it. He would prefer agreement about both sides, then implementing Gaza first. The West Bank is a quagmire for Hussein, the PLO, and the Israelis.

The President said there is no water rights problem in Gaza. What may happen is that we will set up the SGA in Gaza, and the Camp David Accords say the Israelis withdraw. Therefore Begin does not want to go forward in Gaza, so that he will not have to go forward with the process on the military side. Did this come up in Cabinet, or get discussed?

Ambassador Linowitz said no.

Secretary Vance said that there was some discussion at the end of the Egypt-Israel treaty negotiations. It went to the Cabinet, which voted no, so it was not put in the (joint) letter.

The President said the first he had heard the idea was on the phone after Camp David with President Sadat.⁵

President Sadat said that he heard from Weizman—who is agreeable. Also the Israeli editors saw it as a happy solution.

The President said that we should pursue it as an alternative option. It sounds good, to avoid a breakdown. It may be acceptable to Israeli public opinion.

President Sadat agreed.

The President said that he hears that some Israeli military commanders have turned over some responsibilities, with no publicity.

General Ali said that some Cairo officials were there too, dealing with pupils, students, and passports.

Minister Butros Ghali said that this was not implemented.

President Sadat said the Gazans are against it.

General Ali said it was in his last report.

Minister Butros Ghali (disputing that report) said that the Gazans were still delaying.

President Sadat said they were resisting it.

The President said that some Israeli military commanders, without publicity, were turning over some powers: e.g. some police functions and schools.

Secretary Vance said Moshe (Dayan) had told us.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Mayor Shawaa confirmed this, and also discussed Gaza first.

President Sadat asked what the answer was.

Ambassador Linowitz said at first there was no interest. Then Shawaa indicated that this might be possible if we had not finished the West Bank. He said that this would have to mean there were not much time lapsing, however.

⁵ See Document 126.

President Sadat said he had no confidence in Mayor Shawaa anymore. Shawaa had sent many messages; but at the last moment the Gazans were intimidated by the PLO. And it would not be a short-time lapse: we must bring in Hussein.

The President asked Mr. el-Baz whether Arafat would permit a quiet takeover of responsibilities by the Palestinians under Gaza-first.

Mr. el-Baz said yes, some jurisdictions could be given to the Palestinians, but not as a long-term solution. For the transition period itself, the PLO would require it to be for the West Bank and Gaza.

The President asked what if it were done one community at a time, on a selective basis. Perhaps Hebron would say yes, and Bethlehem would say no. Would this approach be supported? They could be responsible for maybe 15–20 things, like schools, roads, police.

Mr. el-Baz said the mayors have no courage.

The President asked about Arafat's position.

Mr. el-Baz said he thought the answer would be no.

President Sadat said that Shawaa said in messages that Arafat had given the green light; then he denied it. We need to do this boldly, as Camp David and the peace treaty were done. Look at the problems of normalization and exchange of ambassadors. Now there is an Israeli flag flying in Cairo, and an Israeli Ambassador—who has not been boycotted. But he is unfit, doesn't know Arabic or the Arab mentality. He is Polish.

The Vice President asked if the Ambassador came from Poland.

President Sadat joked that he was, along with Dr. Brzezinski and Begin.

The President joked that he knows the trouble he has with all of them (laughter).

President Sadat said the Pope, too!

The President said he is asking about the Palestinians: will they accept responsibility? Will they accept anything?

Mr. el-Baz said that, in general, if there were a genuine transfer of authority, it would be all right, on a *de facto* but not *de jure* basis. Let the mayors do it. They will give the green light, while still cursing it and the U.S.

Secretary Vance asked whether the Palestinians would accept the SGA, or the mayors take the responsibility.

Mr. el-Baz said that they would accept the SGA.

The President asked whether they would prefer the SGA or the mayors.

Mr. el-Baz said that they would prefer an SGA leading to an entity. Doing it through the mayors implies fractionating and no entity.

The President said that if we can agree on 40 representatives for the West Bank, a date for elections, and voting for residents of East Jerusalem, would the PLO encourage Palestinians to participate in the election?

Mr. el-Baz said that *de facto*, yes.

The President asked whether the word would get out.

Mr. el-Baz said yes. Hikmat el-Mazri saw Arafat, and got this point.

President Sadat said that Hikmat el-Mazri had at one time been speaker of the Jordanian parliament.

The President said that there is a problem with Begin in East Jerusalem on voting. Ambassador Linowitz told him (Begin) that they had the right to vote in Jordanian elections. Begin was surprised, and checked to see whether it was accurate. It is illogical for them to be able to vote in Jordan and not in the West Bank. This is a difficult issue.

Ambassador Linowitz said they had only touched on settlements. Begin agonizes about this—even two months of a moratorium is a lot, and he (Begin) rejected his (the Ambassador's) appeal.

The President asked whether there was more to discuss on Begin.

President Sadat said no.

The President joked that Osama (el-Baz) has really mellowed!

Mr. el-Baz joked that he (the President) should wait until the drafting!

Minister Butros Ghali joked that it is age!

The President joked that he (el-Baz) always agreed with him in general but not in the drafting! He continued that Camp David was a miracle. He talked with Mrs. Carter at noon—and said look at what has been done; it is a miracle. He asked whether President Sadat is running water under the Suez Canal for the Sinai.

President Sadat said it would be done this month, but only opened in October.

The President asked if this tunnel is for traffic.

President Sadat said yes, and room for a pipeline. He had a feasibility plan to send water from the Nile done by Bechtel. The water will be for Ma'adi in the Eastern Desert, and for Suez. The tunnel is near Suez. A man from Bechtel visited him recently, and is doing a feasibility study, for free.

The President asked whether they needed water on the Cairo side.

President Sadat said yes, that they have lots of land in Sinai—and need water for agriculture and drinking, and for use inside.

The President asked whether there were any difficulties in turning over Sinai on time. Did they get good cooperation?

President Sadat said yes, the treaty was implemented very scrupulously. Obligations were honored. Mt. Sinai was turned over early.⁶

General Ali joked that everything had been painted.

President Sadat said that the Israelis used to plow before turning over. Now all was in good condition.

The President asked whether the settlers were still in Sinai.

President Sadat said that they were. The land had not yet been turned over.

The President asked whether they would stay until the end.

President Sadat said the fear of the Israeli government is that public opinion will be shocked the day they turn over Amit, the largest settlement, on the sea. But we have to face it.

The President said it was agreed.

General Ali said that the Israelis were doing two new settlements nearby in Israel. The reason that Weizman did not want to advance the withdrawal is that he was worried that the U.S. would not finish the air bases on time, and that the Amit people would wait until the end. These are problems.

President Sadat said that in the settlements near Arish, they burned everything.

The President asked whether the Egyptians had oceanographers working near Sharm-el-Sheikh.

President Sadat said they had them at Ras Mohammed. They are able scientists; but they had not had an opportunity to act.

The President asked whether *President Sadat* had instructed the oceanographers to maintain the environment.

President Sadat said he had given strict orders.

The President suggested that *General Ali* could check. Some scientists are concerned that there is damage.

President Sadat said he has asked a lady U.S. doctor to come to join him in April in Ras Mohammed. (He instructed *General Ali* to contact the governor).

The President said this would not happen by itself; hotels, for example, dump into the water. *President Sadat* may not know about it until too late.

Ambassador Linowitz asked *President Sadat*, as a philosopher, why *Begin* had been helpful on the peace treaty, but was harder now on full autonomy.

The President said he didn't remember *Begin's* being helpful before!

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 306.

President Sadat said that before Camp David, he felt they would reach nothing. There was a heavy campaign by each side against the other. He had an inner confidence that was tactical, not strategic. Now Begin gives nothing, because of what he has lived for the last 40 years: the West Bank. A mutual friend of theirs heard that Begin wants the West Bank. This raises difficulties. In history, Begin wants to go down as the man who made peace with Egypt, which has been important since Moses. Until Begin visits here, and the President hears him, then he (President Sadat) can't give his idea about the whole thing. He knows that Begin doesn't want to act in the West Bank as he did in Sinai, for ideological reasons. He (President Sadat) sent Begin a letter,⁷ saying that if Begin stayed in the middle of the road, then the person after him would take the whole credit: for both the comprehensive peace and the treaty with Egypt. He (President Sadat) will not make up his mind until Begin meets here with the President.

The President said that the hardest for Begin of all was dismantling the settlements in the Sinai. He (the President) does not believe Begin will give East Jerusalem to the Arabs, so it will need to stay unified. Except for Jerusalem, Sinai was the worst problem; it was torture for Begin on the settlements.

Dr. Brzezinski said that at Camp David he had referred to the settlements as colonial. Begin had asked him to go for a private walk, and had upbraided him for using that word. Begin said that his right eye would fall out, and his right arm would fall off, before he would agree to give up the Sinai settlements. But 10 days later he did.

President Sadat said Begin told him the Sinai settlements would go with him (Begin) to the grave.

The President said that Begin had had a good reception at those settlements.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that the problem of the West Bank settlements was worse.

President Sadat said that if he could solve the Jerusalem problem, he insists. . . . There should be public opinion here and in the whole world; why should Israel put the U.S. in such a position with 800 million Moslems? He tells Israelis, how many of you are there, 16 million? Why not take U.S. interests into account in the Muslim world? When Begin agrees on Jerusalem, then he (President Sadat) will give water.

⁷ Although Sadat had sent a letter to Begin regarding the state of negotiations on March 17 (see Document 345), the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram* announced March 30 that Sadat would send a "new message" to Begin in the next two days. (Telegram 7052 from Cairo, March 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800160–1041) The text of this second letter, likely the one Sadat referenced here, was not found.

The President said that they negotiated a paragraph at Camp David on Jerusalem. It is the most likely basis for agreement. No one will like it; but people will live with it. The next difficulty is getting Begin to carry out Camp David (not new proposals). There are many difficulties. The day Begin gives the order to the military authorities to withdraw will be tough for him (Begin).

President Sadat said he knows. January 25, the last withdrawal, was a funeral in Israel. 90% of the people are for peace, as he saw in Haifa. But Israel says: "what did we receive." Compare what Israel gives up: it is tangible, a lot. But if Camp David fails, Israel loses, and its future would be in danger. If it carries it out in good faith, then Israel can turn to the world for approval, with the West Europeans, the Canadians, the Japanese, the Australians, and get a lot of approval. Maybe in 100 years the Palestinians will still be demanding a separate state. But most Arab leaders would accept what is being done, *de facto*, while still insisting.

Secretary Vance asked, if there were agreement on the West Bank and Gaza, what will Assad do?

President Sadat said that Assad continues to raise dust. We are waiting for civil war. Assad is in grave danger. Assad is of no significance, now, following his Lebanon fiasco and the civil war. See him and Iraq. Assad provides arms. Therefore, he is of no significance.

The President said that, except for South Yemen, Syria is most subservient to the Soviet Union.

President Sadat said that it is also most despised in the Arab world. We have the upper hand despite Soviet actions, in Libya, Afghanistan, etc., because of the Soviet agents—South Yemen is despised in the Arab world; Assad will have a civil war by next summer, with the fall of Assad and the Alawites or a quagmire in Syria; and Qadhafi the Soviet Union knows is moody. We have the upper hand, therefore should not lose the moment. With any Soviet move, we must check it. We (Egyptians) must do it, or help the U.S.

The President concluded by saying it is good to have President Sadat as a partner.

(The meeting concluded at 4:18 p.m.)

349. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1980, 10:10–10:55 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
President Sadat
Prince Bandar
Zbigniew Brzezinski

President Carter: I read the message to President Sadat from Prince Fahd.² I am concerned that there be an improvement in relations. President Sadat wrote a good letter to Prince Fahd which was conveyed through Ambassador Eilts.³ There was no response to it from your side, which was a mistake.

Prince Bandar: I was just with Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Sultan. They have asked me to convey their highest esteem for President Sadat and for the Egyptian people. They strongly believe that the Arabs are successful whenever Egypt and Saudi Arabia work together. We have never disagreed with the strategic objectives of President Sadat. We are not convinced that the tactics are right. We do not think the Israelis will deliver. We would be happy to be wrong. If things don't go right, we will throw our weight into the balance, but we want to keep the Arabs together. We want to support both Presidents Carter and Sadat. The area cannot afford a failure.

President Sadat should not believe anything that is said to him about the views of Crown Prince Fahd or Prince Sultan. (Bandar adds that President Sadat's late brother was his flying student.) If things fail, we will use our "single bullet."

Dr. Brzezinski: How would you use it?

Prince Bandar: The time will come to support the American position. We will do whatever it takes to support it. We would be prepared to recognize Israel's right to exist within approximately the borders of 1967.

President Carter: What President Sadat has done to move things forward other Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, failed to support. This increases Israeli doubts that Saudi Arabia would eventually accept

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 3–4/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "OK. J." Brzezinski also initialed "ZB" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Not further identified.

³ Not further identified.

Israel. When Begin found a willing negotiating partner in President Sadat, there was no positive response from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or the Palestinians.

President Sadat: There has been a misunderstanding. What we have reached is not the end of the road. We have to start somewhere. Camp David is not an end but only a beginning. You are right in saying that I have done some things against my own convictions, but after 1977, when Geneva looked like a failure, I got a letter from President Carter.⁴ I was disappointed that the Palestinians welched out on their promise on 242. Also, when I met with Arafat he proposed an American professor to represent the PLO at Geneva and then reneged on that. The Syrians, Soviets and Palestinians maneuvered against us. By October 1977 we had reached a stalemate. President Carter was vehemently attacked here after the U.S.-Soviet statement,⁵ which he intended to be a source of pressure on Israel. President Carter was the first to speak of a homeland for the Palestinians; the first to demand immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and that is what the United States should also have done after the 1967 war. Under Carter, the U.S. has a solid position on the settlements. I took the initiative because Carter was under attack from the Jewish lobby and also in the Arab world. But again he emphasized that this is not the end of the road. I initially also thought that the Israelis would not withdraw, but they did. I have recovered 80% of the Sinai, all the oil, etc. We have started on a road, but we cannot insist that Begin promise everything at once. To ask for everything is to give him the golden opportunity to do nothing.

Yet he evacuated the settlements, then abandoned the airports there. It was President Carter and I who brought him to do this. We have thus created precedents for the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Sitting in our capitals and waiting for Begin to act is going to get us nowhere. I made the breakthrough not to recover the Sinai alone but because it is the only way. We now have U.S. and world public opinion on our side. Let us exploit it.

I am not optimistic for the first time about achieving full autonomy on schedule, but I will continue to work for it. Whenever Egypt and Saudi Arabia work together, the Arab world comes along.

What I ask is this: Why not wait till I could clarify my position to you after I signed Camp David? I have nothing against Prince Fahd or Prince Sultan. I have always been on good terms of brotherhood with

⁴ Reference is presumably to Carter's November 5, 1977, letter to Sadat. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 142.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 215.

them. But I am bewildered by Fahd. He is encouraging Iraq and the Palestinian dreams. The severing of relations with Egypt—I shall never forget it because I don't want the Egyptian people hurt. I don't ask for economic or diplomatic relations, but everything can be solved when relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia are normal. Moreover, somebody has to be able to sit down and argue with Begin.

President Carter: The most important thing is for Hussein and the West Bank mayors to join the negotiations. Saudi Arabia could help there. Also there must be a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It will take some courage for Saudi Arabia to withdraw from its close relationship with Iraq and the rejectionists.

Prince Bandar: The relationship with Iraq and Syria is not as close as it seems. We will support a peace process with all our weight.

President Carter: Your non-participation plays into the hands of those who oppose progress.

Prince Bandar: One final request: Please, no more speeches or press attacks on us. (Speaks briefly in Arabic.)

President Sadat: You have my word. A moratorium. As of now, no more.

President Carter: (to Prince Bandar) And that means both ways.

Prince Bandar: Yes.

(The meeting ended with warm greetings exchanged between President Sadat and Prince Bandar and personal best wishes to Princes Fahd and Sultan.)

350. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1980, 10:10–11:43 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Third Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Ambassador Roy Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)
His Excellency Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
Dr. Butros Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Osama el-Baz, First Under Secretary and Director of the Office of the Vice President

(From 10:10 a.m., the two Presidents met separately in the Oval Office.² The others—except for the Vice President and Dr. Brzezinski—met together in the Cabinet Room from 10:46 to 10:54, when the two Presidents joined them. The Vice President joined them at 10:57; and Dr. Brzezinski at 11:05).

Ambassador Linowitz began the meeting in the Cabinet Room by referring to the draft Egyptian paper on points of agreement (see attachment).³ First, he wanted to note that we hope that Israel can also agree to whatever is worked out here; therefore we should look at these issues with that factor in mind. Point one⁴ is ok. Point two⁵ is ok, but the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

² See Document 349.

³ The draft Egyptian paper is attached but not printed.

⁴ The text of point one in the Egyptian paper reads: "The objective will be to give new momentum to the peace process through the completion of a Heads of Agreement document by May 26, as another step towards a comprehensive peace settlement."

⁵ The text of point two in the Egyptian paper reads: "The Heads of Agreement document will, to the maximum extent, incorporate basic understanding on issues. Details will be tackled subsequently with a sense of urgency."

word “tackled” should be changed to something else. On point three,⁶ there is a problem: there is a difference between listing powers and responsibilities to be transferred, and providing for transfer of authority. He thought we could skirt this by simply outlining the powers transferred. On point four,⁷ Israel objects to “legislative” authority. Begin says that the SGA can do what has to be done. He said to Begin that you can call what it does a regulation, a rule, a law, or whatever: but the SGA needs authority. Begin did not deny this point; but he is troubled by the idea of legislative authority that could lead to a Palestinian state. Begin wants to avoid that.

Mr. *el-Baz* said that Egypt had avoided the word in this point of the draft, but not the concept. They need something like this point for afterwards.

Secretary *Vance* asked Mr. *el-Baz* to clarify the word “afterwards.”

Mr. *el-Baz* said that this would be during the negotiations, but it formed a concept in a manner to give the SGA legislative authority. If a different term is used, that is all right; but the concept must be clear. Egypt will not abandon the concept. We can decide to take the Israeli argument into consideration, and defer the question of “legislative authority” now, but then talk about certain forms.

Ambassador *Linowitz* said that [he] was troubled by the question of “afterwards.” When would this be?

Mr. *el-Baz* said after the 27th of April.

Secretary *Vance* asked whether Mr. *el-Baz* were saying that on the 27th, in the intensive negotiations, the question should be faced regarding words about laws, legislation, etc.

Mr. *el-Baz* said: yes.

Ambassador *Linowitz* said that we are kidding ourselves if we think that we could get that from the Israelis.

Mr. *el-Baz* said that they will try.

Ambassador *Linowitz* said that he had tried to find words (in the U.S. draft⁸ yesterday) that would not create problems for Begin. This is a prickly subject, and will provoke a strong reaction. Without a categorical change in Begin, it will get a violent reaction on “law” or “legis-

⁶ The text of point three in the Egyptian paper reads: “The Heads of Agreement document will provide for the transfer of authority to the SGA. Accordingly, a list will be drawn of the areas which fall under the jurisdiction of the SGA.”

⁷ The text of point four in the Egyptian paper reads: “The SGA will have all powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

“The SGA will not have the power to alter the terms of the Heads of Agreement. Nor will it have the power of conducting diplomatic or consular affairs or establishing armed forces during the transitional period.”

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 348.

lative." This approach is ill-advised. The Egyptians can get the authority (for the SGA) without the words.

Mr. el-Baz said that therefore on the 27th of April it can be discussed, accommodating on words. But he does not like many words to be ambiguous, since that would lead to further controversy. If they try accommodating, it is still necessary to know what is important. Can the SGA do these things or not. First there would be the principles (?); second is the right to amend existing statutes; and third, the details can come later.

Minister Butros Ghali said that if one accepted the U.S. paragraph four,⁹ in four weeks Israel will say that it won't negotiate, that the words don't require it. If the Egyptian fourth paragraph is accepted, then there can be talks.

Ambassador Linowitz said he did not object to the fourth Egyptian paragraph as such. At the negotiations, Egypt can put it forward and get Israel's reaction. We are trying to tell the Egyptians what the Pavlovian reaction will be. If the words do not raise problems, then all right.

(At 10:54, the two Presidents joined the larger meeting in the Cabinet Room).

The President joked that he understands that all the technical work was being done in the Cabinet Room, and that the group was trying to undo his and President Sadat's agreements! He thinks they should go over the paper we had presented and get the Egyptian response.

(The Vice President entered at this point).

President Sadat said that they had submitted another paper.

Secretary Vance said that Ambassador Linowitz sees no problem with the first paragraph. Paragraph two is ok, with a change in the word "tackled." With paragraph three, there is a fundamental problem, which he will describe later. Paragraph four's words are all right, but they hide a problem that will come up when the parties meet on the 27th. There is no reference to laws or legislative authority, but, when the parties meet on the 27th, the issue will be raised. Therefore there is a problem.

The President asked if this was a substitute paper.

Secretary Vance suggested that Ambassador Linowitz discuss that paper.

Ambassador Linowitz said that there are differences between us: whether all powers should be transferred, or the document should try

⁹ The text of paragraph four of the U.S. paper reads: "Within its specified areas of responsibility, the SGA (AC) will have all necessary and proper powers including the power to issue proclamations, decrees, regulations, or orders which may alter existing statutes. The SGA (AC) will not have the power to alter the terms of the Heads of Agreement and its Annexes." See footnote 7 above.

to get around that point by listing the powers of the SGA. We are back to “transfer of authority.” We need not get into that issue, if the Heads of Agreement just list powers. It will not advance the discussion to go back to “transfer of authority.” On paragraph four, again: Israel will react to “legislative authority” and “laws,” if described as such under powers and responsibilities, as leading to authority for an independent Palestinian state. Therefore we framed our language to get around this problem. The Egyptian redraft is all right, but we must recognize that it does not remove the problem. It is all right now. On the rest of the paragraph. . . .

The President asked: paragraph 4?

Ambassador Linowitz said: the second part. We are trying to reflect the Israeli position. They are trying to keep defense and foreign affairs for themselves. There is no question that Israel will agree to the SGA’s having diplomatic or consular relations or armed forces. Maybe this formulation (in the Egyptian draft) is all right, but Israel will assert that defense is with them. What does “defense” mean: it is just of Israel or of the West Bank, too? Israel insists on the latter. Second, on foreign affairs and relations with other countries, these would not be exercised by the SGA. Israel demands the right to handle communications and other types of international relations matters. We have no quarrel with the Egyptian language, but there is a problem of ambiguity. Paragraph five¹⁰ is fine, but why did the Egyptians change our language? The Egyptian language is all right. On the language on “coordinating,” the powers will not be unilateral if they are coordinated. Implicit in the Egyptian language is a practical change that will not be acceptable. Israel will say that both have to agree. The next paragraph¹¹ focuses on what would happen if there is no agreement. Therefore, we said that existing arrangements would apply. Why has this been changed? The Egyptian draft does not deal with an important aspect of the problem. Also, this paragraph deals with coordination; not dispute settlement or whether the Continuing Committee has some agreed full powers. Most troubling, from our point of view, is that there is no alternative provided if there is no unanimity. There is a need for a way to go if there is no resolution of disagreements. We thought our proposal was good. Khalil understood it; Burg and Shamir accepted it tentatively, as pro-

¹⁰ The text of point five of the Egyptian paper reads: “The document will stipulate that the SGA will exercise its powers in such a way as to promote good neighborly relations between the West Bank and Gaza and all their neighbors, including Israel. To this end, coordinating arrangements will be made.”

¹¹ The text of point six of the Egyptian paper reads: “It is agreed that certain areas that require coordination between the SGA and Israel will be referred to the Continuing Committee provided for in the Camp David Accords and consisting of Egypt, Israel, the United States, SGA, and Jordan. The Continuing Committee will operate on the basis of unanimity.”

viding for the continuation of the status quo. Our language¹² was even more precise. On the security committee,¹³ why change “agree to establish?” There is no security committee yet; or is this saying that that is implicit? “To examine security aspects” is all right. And we kept out references to 242, since it is clear in the Camp David Accords that they are under 242.

The President asked if we have an objection to including the reference to 242. Would it hurt?

Ambassador Linowitz said no.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said it would, since it gets into the question of Israeli withdrawal, and Israel may object.

The President said the inclusion of a reference to 242 caused him no problem.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the Egyptian paragraph 8¹⁴ is irrelevant. It may be good to urge this on Israel, but it has nothing to do with areas of agreement.

The President said that we could take the rest of the day to negotiate a draft. (To Secretary Vance: Cy will you sit down in the afternoon, with whomever President Sadat decides, and work this out,¹⁵ with

¹² The U.S. version reads: “It is agreed that certain areas, such as water and external economic relations, cannot be negotiated in detail without the participation of the inhabitants of the territories. Accordingly, such areas will be left for detailed negotiations under the aegis of the Continuing Committee provided for in the Camp David Accords and consisting of Egypt, Israel, SGA (AC), and Jordan, with the addition of the United States. The Continuing Committee will operate on the basis of unanimity. Pending agreement on a particular issue, existing arrangements shall continue under the aegis of the Continuing Committee.”

¹³ Reference is to point seven of the Egyptian paper. The text reads: “A Security Committee will meet during this month to examine security aspects related to the Camp David Framework and Security Council Resolution 242.” On this subject, the U.S. text reads: “The parties agree to establish a Security Committee to consider how to implement security aspects in accordance with the Camp David Accords.”

¹⁴ The text of point eight of the Egyptian paper reads: “Confidence-building measures in the West Bank and Gaza prior to the establishment of the SGA will be discussed with a view to creating a favorable atmosphere for the implementation of the agreement.”

¹⁵ Linowitz met with Boutros Ghali and El-Baz the afternoon of April 9, from which a new draft working paper was produced. In an April 10 memorandum to Carter, to which he attached a copy of the paper, Linowitz described the new draft as “considerably weaker than we had ourselves proposed” due to “continuing problems which will need to be resolved during the negotiations.” He listed these problems as the Egyptian assertion “(with few exceptions) that there must be a transfer of full authority from Israel’s Military Government and Civilian Administration to the SGA;” renewed Egyptian objection to “the notion that existing arrangements should continue if the Continuing Committee is unable to agree with respect to a particular issue;” whether “Residual Powers” would reside with the Israelis or the Continuing Committee; and the handling of Defense and Security issues beyond the creation of a Security Committee. Linowitz suggested that Carter use the paper in the upcoming meetings with Begin. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980)

brackets? I will try to do the best I can with the Israelis to get agreement on it). He does not want differences here, between President Sadat and himself, and to try guessing what the Israelis will accept. Let's do this, and he will then be in touch with President Sadat (after seeing Begin) and seek a common approach.

Mr. el-Baz said that we will not need brackets.

The President said he agreed. With Osama redrafting, though, you never know! When he (the President) was in the Georgia legislature, he had been a slow learner, and found out that in a conference committee, it is better to be the secretary than the chairman. In a meeting of 20 people, he would rather be the secretary. Whoever does the first draft has the advantage. We will try to get agreement and, if not, there can be brackets. President Sadat and he will decide. Did Ambassador Linowitz have anything else?

Ambassador Linowitz mentioned East Jerusalem.

The President said that there are two basic proposals and it may be necessary to discuss them. First, some form of absentee balloting; or second, delaying a decision by letting the Gaza and West Bank mayors, who are elected, select or appoint the SGA. He strongly prefers the first alternative. If we remove direct elections, this would modify a part of the Camp David Accords, and that might open the door for both sides to modify other parts. He expects that Begin will refuse (to move) on East Jerusalem. This is an untenable position. We will stand firmly and publicly on this. It is an important issue, and it needs to be addressed. Would Ambassador Linowitz like to comment?

Ambassador Linowitz replied: no.

The President said he feels that if Begin is intrasigent on voting rights for the residents of East Jerusalem, he (the President) will push hard and publicly. Instead of letting the SGA breakdown, we could establish it from the mayors. His opinion is that Israel would prefer not to have the SGA set up, since that means the automatic requirement to withdraw the Israeli military government and the civilian administration. A profound change is required, with no delay, to withdraw armed forces, and to assign the rest to specified security locations. Among ourselves, we should be more flexible on what the SGA is, in order to get it set up. When it is established, even without some things, this will be a major development, leading to a step by step increase in the authority and stature of the SGA.

(Dr. Brzezinski entered at 11:05).

Would Ambassador Linowitz like to comment?

Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to add a footnote. There are two things this skeleton agreement would let happen, in signalling to the Palestinians—as the Egyptians say is their view: first, the military

government would be withdrawn, with great consequences. The SGA makes this possible. Second, the Palestinians, as of right, would be at the table, at the Continuing Committee where they can vote on issues they must negotiate. This should be of great significance to the Palestinians in terms of unresolved issues like water, economic relations, and maybe land. If the SGA gets set up, there would be the withdrawal of the military government. This can be viewed by Israel as some departure. If so, they (?) should be ready for it.

Minister Butros Ghali said that unless the SGA has the minimum authority needed, the Palestinians will not come in. Therefore, we should try to show them they will be given a maximum number of powers. If they do not see flexibility, he knows they will not take part, and there would be no Palestinian participation.

The President said we will work for maximum authority. What steps will induce representatives of the West Bank and Gaza, plus Hussein, to join the negotiations?

Minister Butros Ghali said that they (the Egyptians) had sent a note on confidence-building measures.

The President said that was before; what process can be done now to induce their involvement—without involving Begin or the Israelis in the effort?

Minister Butros Ghali said that that was a big qualification.

The President said he knows. He guesses that Begin does not want them to join.

Mr. el-Baz said that the Palestinians want a settlements freeze and a U.S. commitment to what is at the end of the tunnel, nearing self-determination, and the liquidation of Israeli occupation. First, it should be cut down; later it should be liquidated. There must be some real movement on the ground, or a U.S. presence or forces in the area.

The President asked what the last idea meant.

Mr. el-Baz said that Hikmat el-Mazri said that maybe the U.S. could substitute for Israel in the transition period.

The President said he sees.

Mr. el-Baz said that this would be difficult. If we emphasize confidence-building measures, and if we do not get Begin to agree on a settlements freeze or an attractive definition of powers and responsibilities for the SGA, he would like something like the President's speech¹⁶ of last night (at the White House dinner). If this were repeated, it would be useful. The Palestinians attach importance to the U.S. position; they

¹⁶ The text of Carter's speech, delivered in the White House State Dining Room at 8:07 p.m. on April 8, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 617–620.

rely only on the U.S. and on Egypt. Others, like the Arab states, are unreliable.

The President said he would make the same speech to Begin, and underline the principles from Camp David. He needs to repeat his toast almost verbatim, for the benefit of U.S. supporters of Israel, and others. Second, Camp David could be carried out quickly, if the West Bank mayors, others, and Hussein would join the discussions. Absent some action by Begin and the Israelis, what can we do to get Hussein and the Palestinians to join? Should someone contact the Saudis, Arafat, or Hussein? They are playing into the hands of the enemies of Camp David. The whole world would rally to an Israeli withdrawal, and Palestinian rights would have a good chance to succeed if the Palestinians and Jordan were in. He understands why they are not. But where is the key to get them in?

Mr. *el-Baz* said that the Jordanian and Palestinian positions are different. Jordan and Hussein have their eyes on the West Bank, and would like to move to negotiations with Israel on the lines of the Allon plan.¹⁷ There could be some Israeli-Jordanian talks, perhaps non-governmental, or with Peres or others.

The President said that this is required to be done by Camp David in the second step, which could take place after a few months, and must begin no later than three years. If the Saudis were convinced that Jordan should be in, could the Saudis induce it to do so?

President Sadat said 100%. If only to guarantee their economic assistance, Jordan would immediately come in.

The President asked whether Saudi Arabia could convince Arafat and the West Bank Palestinians.

President Sadat said no, the Saudis are intimidated by them. But they (the Saudis) could bring in Hussein.

The President asked how we could bring in the Palestinians.

President Sadat said that if Hussein joins, then for sure there would be repercussions on the PLO position. They may say that Hussein has joined the Zionist plot, but in their hearts they would try to do their best. They know Hussein; they would not want him to take all the land himself.

The President asked whether Hussein, on balance, was more afraid of Syria and Iraq, or interested in pleasing the Saudis.

President Sadat said both. If Saudi Arabia backs him, he will come in, whatever the threats are from Syria and Iraq—and we should see what is happening in Syria. Saudi Arabia for sure can bring him in.

¹⁷ See footnote 10, Document 58.

Therefore, this would affect the Palestinian position, since they fear that Hussein wants a united kingdom.

The President asked if that included part of the West Bank.

President Sadat said yes.

The President said that Hussein wants others to do the negotiating.

Mr. el-Baz said that Hussein would not be blamed for anything; he believes it will fall into his lap, sooner or later. He would take the credit, but not the blame.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the Palestinians should join the process. They have no alternative for a better life; and they will get more at the table than absent from it. First, he can see them holding off, expecting a magic formula or a better turn of events after May 26. We should discourage the notion that they would get a better deal later. Second, if they stay away, someone else will speak for them. Israel will say that no matter what Egypt says, when the Palestinians get in they will press for more. Therefore, Israel will hold back: why give anything now, they will say, if they will be pressed for more later. The Palestinians can get the best deal now.

Mr. el-Baz questioned whether the fact of sitting down at the table were an important element. Is it an inducement? Egyptian contacts say this is not so, that it is not a big advance. The first liability is in the Palestinians' talking with the Israelis without equilibrium, since Israel is in control. Therefore, there is no equilibrium. This could work if the Israelis had said that they would withdraw completely. Without that—either a commitment that Israel would withdraw completely or under some other shield for their fears—i.e. of Israeli *de facto* control—then the outcome to the negotiations would either be the *status quo* or occupation. Without a commitment to withdraw there should be the shield of the U.S. position, to show that the Palestinians are not left to the mercy of the Israelis at the table.

Ambassador Linowitz said the Palestinians should welcome the Continuing Committee.

Mr. el-Baz said that they need to know the joint Egyptian-American concept of foreign affairs, with limited exceptions. First, they want a U.S. commitment to self-determination.

Ambassador Linowitz said he had told Crown Prince Fahd that the Palestinians have three courses open to them: to stay as they are now; to resort to force; or to pursue the path of the autonomy negotiations. What else is there?

Mr. el-Baz said that they see two other approaches.

Ambassador Linowitz asked what they were.

Mr. el-Baz said that could combine a UN resolution and some form of international conference, with people like Kreisky and others. The

fact is that that would be a multilateral approach, not just with two or three countries. They think others should be involved, including the West Europeans, and self-determination should be included. These developments the Palestinians believe should be done now. Such alternatives seem more promising to them.

Ambassador Linowitz asked how. Would they try to seize the West Bank and Gaza?

Mr. el-Baz said that if there were negotiations under a different umbrella . . . Israel is there, but there could be another 242, and add a resolution on self-determination. They could try to get the Soviet Union and the socialists in. The Palestinians believe objective factors would lead to a different outcome.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether *Mr. el-Baz* believed it in that approach.

Mr. el-Baz said he believed it was wrong, or Egypt would be pursuing it. They honestly tell the Palestinians their view. The Palestinians feel there are other options. Second, if the Israeli government doesn't give anything—and the Palestinians hear this from former Cabinet members and Kreisky and others, they believe there is a disincentive to join Camp David. They wait until Israel changes; they wait for another government.

Secretary Vance asked if the “they” was the predominate Palestinian element, or just some of them.

Mr. el-Baz said that this is hard to measure. But it is the prevailing view among many PLO members and on the West Bank and Gaza. They see the best alternative as waiting, and maybe to get a better deal.

The President said that the Palestinians would get a pretty good deal in Camp David.

Mr. el-Baz said he believes therefore that we should try to strengthen it. This would be the key work to attract the Palestinians.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said we don't know what the Israeli Labor Party would say about a better deal or a territorial deal. Therefore the issue is confused in Palestinian minds.

Dr. Brzezinski said that when the Palestinians see the map, it will not be a better deal.

Assistant Secretary Saunders agreed: since it is not concrete, the Palestinians don't see this.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this approach was a disservice.

Mr. el-Baz agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz asked *Mr. el-Baz* to say more.

Mr. el-Baz said that if we could get a good agreement, this would reassure the Palestinians about their fears of the Israelis. The Pales-

tinians are very pragmatic. It is in their self-interest to cooperate in gaining a better life. Therefore, they need something attractive that we can defend. This is our best argument. Lots of Europeans have been in contact with the Palestinians. With Begin's intransigence, these factors lead to a negative attitude of wait and see.

The President said that there is another aspect which might prevail, though he hopes not. This is that the Israelis, with the support and cooperation of Egypt and the U.S., might believe they can stay where they are, and blame the entire failure of Camp David on the failure of the Palestinians to take part. We need to do two things: to move forward with Israel, and to get points more clearly defined. Second, we should do all that is possible—with President Sadat's, Sol's, and his influence, and to try to get Jordan—at least—and some Palestinians in the talks. Is this hopeless? We should pursue it more. And we should get a clearer picture of what is acceptable to the Palestinians. This is not a final solution, but they should join the discussions. This would put Israel on the defensive. Everyone is concerned—Israel, Jews everywhere, the United States—that Western Europe is severing itself from Israel. This is a major concern to Israeli leaders, except for Begin. If it were obvious that Jordan and the Palestinians and the U.S. and Egypt were all trying to work out an agreement on Palestinian aspirations, and gaining them a voice in their future, this would be very helpful. He thinks we have to go forward. Would President Sadat designate someone to work on the draft?

President Sadat named Minister Butros Ghali and Mr. el-Baz.

The President asked whether they had agreed on a communique.

Secretary Vance said yes, but it had been referred for Israeli agreement. The Israelis had not yet responded. We had gone this morning to ask if it is all right to put it out.

The President said that if the Israelis don't agree, then delete the reference to the continuing negotiations. He asked if they would be meeting with the press when they left.¹⁸

Mr. Hunter said yes.

The President asked whether the communique could be released later.¹⁹

Minister Butros Ghali agreed.

¹⁸ The text of the remarks made by Carter and Sadat to the press on the South Grounds of the White House beginning at 11:45 a.m., April 9, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 622–623.

¹⁹ The communiqué of the talks, released by the White House on April 9, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, pp. 623–624.

(The meeting continued with conversation within the two delegations from 11:37–11:42,²⁰ and the meeting adjourned at 11:43).

²⁰ No memorandum of conversation for this portion of the meeting has been found.

351. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 15, 1980, 10:31 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's First Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
 Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
 David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy Negotiator for the Middle East Autonomy Negotiations
 Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
 Prime Minister Menachem Begin
 Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 Dr. Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
 Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the United States
 Chaim Kubersky, Director General, Ministry of Interior
 Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
 Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister's Bureau
 Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(4/15/80–4/30/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an April 25 covering memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski upon which Brzezinski indicated his approval of the memoranda of conversation from Carter's meetings with Begin. Also, in the covering memorandum, Hunter stated that copies of the memoranda of conversation were to be sent to Linowitz and Moses. (Ibid.) Carter's handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.

Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor Ruth Lapidot, Legal Adviser to Foreign Ministry
Gilad Stern, Assistant to the Minister of Interior

(Prime Minister Begin began by presenting the President with a book).

Prime Minister Begin said that this book shows how great is peace. It quotes ancient sources. It is dedicated to “President Jimmy Carter, the architect of the peace treaty, in gratitude and admiration.”

The President said that Prime Minister Begin was too generous.

Prime Minister Begin said that the book contains their greatest sayings.

The President said that he is grateful, and will keep the book the rest of his life. (The President presented a book on a section of Georgia called Jerico). He said that, since he had read about Jerico in the papers, he wanted to give Prime Minister Begin this book! (laughter) It is about the Southland, where the President lives.

Prime Minister Begin said that he understands the President has the right to live there! (laughter)

The President said that Jerico has a special meaning in the South. The book was written by James Dickey, who is a Georgian. It is beautiful. He wants to say that we are grateful and honored to have Prime Minister Begin here and his group. He (the President) is grateful that Prime Minister Begin has brought his new foreign minister to meet with us. He is also thankful that Minister Burg is here. The President has had reports that Minister Burg has been doing constructive work. He will say in public the comments he made to Prime Minister Begin in private. They covered the crucial elements of our relations. Our security is intimately tied together, in the Middle East and also in other parts of the world. Our purposes are the same; and enhancing the security of Israel also enhances the security of the United States. He would repeat: the U.S. is committed to the security of Israel. We have promised that we will not negotiate with, or recognize, the PLO until and unless it recognizes Israel’s right to exist and endorses Resolution 242, which is the basis for peace. We are adamantly opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. This is felt strongly by Sadat, as well, and Sadat said it here last week. He (the President) had outlined to Prime Minister Begin Sadat’s views. Sadat is eager to finish all of Camp David soon. Sadat wants continuous negotiations, for 40 days until the 26 May target date. Sadat is aware of Israel’s special concerns with security. And Sadat deplores, with him (the President) the constant threat to Israel of terrorist acts. We have common purposes, both in the immediate security of Israel, and also of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has changed adversely the alignment of forces there—which contains 90% of the

world's exportable oil. U.S. positions are well known, *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. We are taking strong steps to induce Soviet withdrawal. We do not see them getting out soon, if ever. Its forces are not going down, but up. Several units have been increased during the past week. The Soviets are killing thousands of Afghans a month, destroying entire villages, and directly and brutally violating the rights of the brave people of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union underestimates the Afghans' bravery and commitment to fight. It underestimates the revulsion in the world at the invasion; and it underestimates the condemnation of the Arab world.

We have a specific interest in the peace process—in addition to our friends Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. We have a direct interest in its success. Sadat is for it. He (the President) will add his own voice: we should carry out the Camp David Accords meticulously, at the earliest possible time. He is concerned about the Europeans—the Austrians, French, Germans, and to an extent the British—over their tendency to turn away from their historic support of Israel, and to accept increasing relations with the PLO and the militant groups. But to avoid this trend, we must carry out the Camp David Accords: including refugees, the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, and also the security of Israel. The Camp David Accords are complex, and difficult issues remain. Prime Minister Begin said that some minor issues have been solved. The major ones are left for intense negotiations. The American public is deeply committed to the peace process. If there is a failure to succeed, the American people will condemn all of us who are involved: him (the President), and also Israeli and Egyptian leaders, for sure, if we do not carry out all of the Camp David Accords.

We have a serious problem with the hostage crisis, and this is his (the President's) constant preoccupation. He gets advice, varying between taking strong action and exercising patience. He accepts the need for patience. He has called on the Allies to exert more pressure on Iran. After stronger economic efforts later, then we will need to decide on military moves. This option is open under international law. He will take it if he needs to.

We have a mutual interest in the security and peace of Israel; and also in the peace and security of Egypt. This is a three-way partnership: all are valuable. Sadat has shown both determination and patience. There is a difference of interpretation concerning the Camp David Accords. If there had been no flexibility in the language, then we would not have got agreement at Camp David. The Accords went far in specifics. We need to honor both the letter and the spirit of the Camp David Accords, and recognize the need for accommodation in resolving differences. What we get will be the measure of our success. There is some concern here that Sadat and Egypt are isolated in the

Arab world. Sadat is extraordinarily courageous, strong, and tenacious. He resists these pressures successfully. He (the President) is also full of admiration for Prime Minister Begin and Israel for their courage in carrying out difficult aspects of the peace treaty, often early. But we cannot rest on our laurels. There is an equal need for sensitivity, determination, and courage now. We need to get to determine the status of citizens on the West Bank and Gaza, and the terms under which the Israeli military government will get out, with adequate security for Israel, and with its troops in specified security locations. None of these issues are easy. There were some other points that Prime Minister Begin made—or would he (Prime Minister Begin) prefer to make them? He (Prime Minister Begin) is welcome. We are eager for progress in these two days, and to get continuing negotiations for 40 days. Ambassador Linowitz has proposed Washington; Prime Minister Begin prefers holding them in the Middle East. We would be happy to host them. Prime Minister Begin says that there are a number of cabinet members—such as Khalil—who have other duties. Therefore, Prime Minister Begin says that we should split the talks with 20 days each in Israel and Egypt.

Prime Minister Begin said that he is deeply grateful for the President's invitation to come here, for these crucial talks—crucial for the Middle East, Israel, Egypt, the U.S., and maybe half the world. The President is preoccupied in all senses with the international situation. The Iranian situation causes them (Israelis) great pain, as it does the American families connected with the hostages, with the crisis going into its sixth month now. Customs that had been sacrosanct for centuries, not just during times of peace but also in wartime, are being trampled underfoot. Israelis, more than other nations, feel with the United States in their hearts. Israel has had experience with hostages, who are killed if it does not submit. Only 10 days before Prime Minister Begin came here, five children were taken hostage in the middle of the night.² Four were saved, but were wounded, and one soldier was killed and 11 wounded, seven of them seriously. Israel paid with blood to try saving the four children. Therefore the Israelis feel this situation deeply. Given his time in Russia—which he did not love!—he should know them. What would have happened if their embassy had been seized? Russia would have marched to Tehran, with no concern for its

² Reference is to the April 7 attack on the Israeli kibbutz of Mishgav Am near the Lebanese border in which a group of kibbutz children were taken hostage by members of the Arab Liberation Front, an Iraqi-backed Palestinian group, in a bid to win the release of Palestinian guerrillas held in Israeli prisons. The hostage siege was broken by the Israeli army the same day, after an earlier attempt failed. (David K. Shipler, "Israelis Retake Kibbutz Nursery, Kill 5 Terrorists, Free Hostages," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1980, p. A1)

people held hostage. The American people cannot acquiesce in their people's being killed. Therefore, the President has been patient for 160 days and more. The world has been astonished by this patience. Even Sadat—at Aswan—said that the U.S. had lost 50,000 lives in Vietnam. Prime Minister Begin had had to tell Sadat that in the U.S. life is sacred. He (Prime Minister Begin) did not think that direct action would help: though Khomeini's army is weak, and would be crushed, the hostages would be dead. This patience honors America and the President. Israelis have the same pain, and the choices are difficult. Prime Minister Begin knows that it is a sacrifice for the President to see him (Prime Minister Begin). Therefore he is grateful for the President's taking time to see Sadat and now the Israelis.

Second, there are the Soviets in Afghanistan. This is one of the most serious events since World War II. Some people compare this invasion with Czechoslovakia in 1968. There was a tragedy at the end of its "spring," when the Czechoslovak people had begun to breathe. Warsaw Pact forces crushed them, and then there came the Brezhnev Doctrine.³ Yugoslavia and Romania and others denied it. But anyway, Afghanistan is not in the Soviet orbit. It could go through Baluchistan to the Indian Ocean in a few days, and change the balance of forces in the world. There is no force to stop them. Therefore this is one of the greatest events, and it is difficult to handle. Declarations by the President, Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski—they still found time to talk to us (Prime Minister Begin and Sadat). Therefore he is grateful. And therefore he will do his best to bring about practical results, and has come here with concrete proposals to discuss. Israel agrees on intensified talks. He suggests holding them in the Middle East for 40 days. This is not a deadline, it is not a target date, as was suggested at Camp David and Israel did not accept. It had said we need to be careful, and therefore accepted, on his amendment, that the two countries pledged with good faith to go for the goal of finishing in one year. Then elections can be held for the Self-Governing Authority as expeditiously as possible. This was confirmed in the joint letter of March 26 (1979).⁴ So, in candor, maybe we will have to continue after May 26. It will be no tragedy. But he and the other Israelis would like to meet the goal. Let's have intensive talks. As at Camp David, we can work every day and even day and night. There are 40 days, and they should be divided 20

³ As part of a speech he gave in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, Brezhnev justified the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous August, as a necessary move to prevent capitalist encroachment on the socialist camp. This principle, by extension designed to apply to any similar military interventions in the future, was informally known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

⁴ See Document 233.

and 20 between Alexandria and Tel Aviv. This will place the talks near the governments, and there is a need for consultations. Thank you for inviting us to Washington. But communications are difficult. The Soviet Union listens to all international calls, and cables are sometimes slow. Minister Burg and Shamir—and the negotiating team—will need to consult with the Israeli Cabinet, and with Prime Minister Begin, too. We will need to do this quickly, and can send emissaries in 45 minutes, to take decisions. This is his suggestion. He accepts the objective of holding intensive talks. If questions are asked of the President, Sadat, and himself, then they can talk by phone. We can see perhaps whether we can reach the goal of 26 May. Israel wants to carry out autonomy, as faithfully as the peace treaty—as Sadat said: “faithfully and with honor.” For nine months, all the burden has fallen on the Israelis’ shoulders—land, the removal of the flag. They don’t regret it. They gave back the Alma oil field, and now pay \$650 million a year to Egypt for oil; and next year it will be \$800 million, as the price goes up. This is equal to all of American aid. Israel spends 30% of its gross national product on defense: there is no precedent for this. This (the oil) is a burden on the Israeli economy, and is difficult. But they do it without complaint; they did it for the sake of peace. The treaty has been carried out scrupulously, and they will with the first (sic) part of Camp David—autonomy. If we carry the negotiations forward, he hopes we can succeed. As at Camp David, three months were provided to complete the treaty, but they kept at it for three months more. It was a pity, but what tragedy was there? In March 1979, at the treaty signing here, all were happy, those were great happy days. He hopes that more will come with effort.

Thank you for inviting us. We shall do our best and try to meet the goal. There will be intense daily negotiations in Alexandria and Tel Aviv. Let us try—we may succeed.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether Prime Minister Begin understood that we had proposed holding the talks here for one week, and then going to the Middle East. The U.S. feels the need for 8–10 hours of negotiations every day. We can’t do it there. It will be tough if Khalil is in Egypt—he could give one or two hours at most at a time because of his other responsibilities, as is also true of Ministers Burg and Shamir. He (Ambassador Linowitz) thought that only 2 or 3 people from each side would come here.

Prime Minister Begin said that his answer is “no.” He understands the idea of meeting in Washington. Ambassador Linowitz’s remarks do not matter. If Khalil were here, he would have to go home after a day or two. It would not be serious if we have to extend the negotiations a day or two. Let’s decide to start the day after tomorrow, or next week, in Alexandria and Tel Aviv. There are lots of people in the Israeli delega-

tion—ten or twelve—like Egypt. Let's do it a simple way: with the teams there, and only 45 minutes to be on the spot.

The President said that he had no objection. But Sadat favors having the first week in the United States. We can ask Sadat (about Prime Minister Begin's suggestion), or Prime Minister Begin can do so through the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. We can find this out today.

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

The President asked Secretary Vance to ask Sadat if Prime Minister Begin's proposal is all right.

Secretary Vance agreed.

The President said that there are some key issues, which Prime Minister Begin had described to him. They are controversial in some instances. Prime Minister Begin is talking from an Israeli paper. Israel is inclined to see the Self-Governing Authority as an administrative council—and no more—as a cabinet, with one person for each function to be performed. Sadat sees a much broader approach, with several hundred members: 200, he (the President) thinks. His response to both leaders is that the delineation of authority and responsibilities is more important than how they are identified. Ambassador Linowitz has language, so the group will not have allocated to it legislative authority. The idea of legislative, executive, and judicial would make (the SGA) like a nation. We agree with Israel that there should be no nation, or in effect an independent government. It will be difficult how to ascribe to the group some powers and responsibilities. Egypt wants it to have more members. The number is arbitrary. We suggest 40, elected in a free process. Obviously there are difficulties: e.g. settlements on the West Bank and Gaza and the Israelis living there. The U.S. understanding, under the Camp David Accords, is that when the Self-Governing Authority is formed, then the Israeli military government will withdraw and the Self-Governing Authority will have broad responsibilities. Israeli security is a special subject; the Camp David Accords guarantee Israel's security. A difference of opinion was inevitable in defining that security relationship. We have interpreted this, in the past, as covered in the "designated security locations," with strong police forces under the aegis of the Self-Governing Authority. Prime Minister Begin goes to subversion and violence, which can again lead to terrorist acts. This is a broader scope than Egypt has in mind. There is a dispute on who, how, and in what circumstances Israelis can live in the West Bank and Gaza. The right to settle; the official nature of the settlements; and Israeli government financial support—all these will be well discussed in the future. The U.S. positions are well known. He is trying to get this right. Would Prime Minister Begin like to comment?

Prime Minister Begin said that he will read his proposals.⁵ (See attachment). Some of them are open-ended. It is not correct that they are agreed, for the heads of agreement, but they are proposals. The first is about the Self-Governing Authority and its essence of government. First is what was at Camp David, and a number of proposals which he will read: "1) The self-governing authority of the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will be an Administrative Council freely elected by the aforementioned inhabitants." This makes clear that it is an administrative council. What it is based upon is at page 22 of the State Department book on Camp David,⁶ at point A/1/(c). Thus the only establishment is of an Administrative Council. If it were not so, the words "administrative council" would not be in parentheses. Therefore, how should it be interpreted where the words "self-governing authority" appear elsewhere? It was clear, when the President talked at Camp David with Barak and el-Baz—who are good lawyers. The suggestion was made by Barak in the President's presence. Barak says that everywhere the reference is to an administrative council. This is in the minutes, to which we can refer. Therefore, now at the moment of considering the most basic issues, there is a need to state what the self-governing authority is. Israel says it is an administrative council, freely elected. Then there is the number. In an Egyptian document,⁷ it is called an assembly, with 80–100 members, and with an executive of 11 members. Therefore, that clearly is legislative, and with a judiciary. According to Montesquieu,⁸ this would be a Palestinian state in all but name. It is a division of power (which exists here in the U.S., but not in Britain: Montesquieu was wrong about that).

Minister Kubersky said 1762.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel does not want a Palestinian state, nor does the President or Sadat. But it would be that in fact. Ambassador Linowitz says that Egypt does not stand by its document. He (Prime Minister Begin) has not heard from them that they have withdrawn it, and would like to hear it. It is unacceptable, and contrary to

⁵ The referenced Israeli draft proposal, attached but not printed, was comprised of four points: 1) "The self-governing authority of the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will be an Administrative Council freely elected by the aforementioned inhabitants;" 2) "The number of the members of the Administrative Council will be determined by and correspond to, the number and actual and practical functions to be fulfilled by the Council members;" 3) Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel;" 4) "External and internal security, including the fight against terrorism, conspiracy to commit acts of violence and subversion, will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities."

⁶ Not further identified.

⁷ Not further identified.

⁸ Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède de Montesquieu, eighteenth century French political philosopher.

Camp David. Camp David provided for no legislative council and no judiciary. The President will bear him out. Secretary Vance will bear out that there is to be “a” withdrawal of forces. The President accepted it. “A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.” We weighed all the words at Camp David. If it (the SGA) had legislative, executive, and judicial functions, that is a sovereign state. Israel doesn’t want that. Therefore, it must not be that in fact or in name. On numbers, Egypt wants 80–100. Ambassador Linowitz says 40, and Ambassador Lewis, too. These are arbitrary numbers. It is casual—why not 30? Or 50? Why 40? Israel is trying to draw the number from reality. How can it be done? Therefore Israel suggests that the number equal practical functions of the proposed Israeli model, with powers and responsibilities. He will not take time on this now, or Minister Kubersky can make a presentation.

The President asked if this model describes the powers and responsibilities of the central government.

Prime Minister Begin said that it says there are 11 functions. If there are 30, that is all right. If there are 15, that is all right. The number of members depends on the number needed to administer, not to be a debating society which one day will take us by surprise and declare itself independent. There is no wisdom for Israel in using force to oppose such a step. This would lead to world pressure on Israel. Israel does not want that. If in the self-governing authority, the members only *administer*, then Israel will not interfere. He hopes it will not be double the number of the U.S. cabinet, or of Israel’s 17. Does the U.S. have about 11 or 12?

Dr. Brzezinski asked if he could ask a question?

Prime Minister Begin said that he has one or two sentences more. Therefore, Israel will not stand on the number, that is not important. But the number of members must result, in the Administrative Council, in corresponding to the number of functions. If that is 15, all right. If it is an administrative council, that is proper, but not if it is a quasi-parliament. If all it does is carry out its duties, then Israel will not interfere.

Dr. Brzezinski referred to Prime Minister Begin’s reasoning. Is the question that he (Prime Minister Begin) is concerned that the number of members correspond to the number of functions, because he fears a precedent in a larger number?

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that maybe it would be better to have a larger number, since this would provide more political support and therefore make the agreement more acceptable—which is in Israel’s interest. Why does one function have to equal one person? Why not have

one person and two deputies? This would still be administrative, but it gets a larger number. Israel gets the principle: 13 functions could lead to 39 people.

Prime Minister Begin said: Professor Brzezinski, he (Prime Minister Begin) appointed a deputy, and was told by parliament that this was a waste of money. Minister Burg will answer in detail.

Minister Burg said that here the quantitative begins to be qualitative. A large body has to be seen as a parliament. On this rationale, we can derive 11 or 12 or 30. It is a question of quality expressed in quantity. And an individual would like to say who is his deputy. For example, Secretary Vance would like to name his deputy. In the elections, would there be 13 districts or 39 in Dr. Brzezinski's model? Where would they take place: 13? 39? Dr. Brzezinski says that there would be deputies, but if they do not respond to the temperament of the principles, that would not be good. If the 13 want deputies, they can appoint them.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that there be 13 three-man districts.

Prime Minister Begin said that if there were 15, there would be 45. What would be the result?

Dr. Brzezinski said that this would get Israel the principle, and they (the Egyptians) would get what they want in the number.

Prime Minister Begin said that Ministers Burg and Shamir have no deputies. There is one non-military deputy in the Defense Ministry, and there was objection in the country, which saw it as a waste of money. This way results in a quasi-parliament. Then there is the need to hold elections. Say 13 or 15 districts—then there are 13 or 15 members. It would depend on the number of functions, to be decided in negotiations, not in an arbitrary way.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would speak with candor. We believe that if numbers are being used as a target, then Israel won't get its objective. Israel wants no parliament with legislative powers. Israel is worried that it would declare a Palestinian state. We will say—in any form Israel wants—there can be no Palestinian state in this period. He doesn't care for calling the group an administrative council; and is not happy in Prime Minister Begin's definition of the Self-Governing Authority as an administrative council.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is Camp David, not him.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we agree on the need to convey certain powers to the Self-Governing Authority. Is this consistent with Prime Minister Begin's definition?

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz said next, what powers should go to the Self-Governing Authority? We will meet your concerns, and also do so within Camp David. The Egyptian model is not worked on; it is out.

Prime Minister Begin said he had never heard this from Egypt.

Minister Burg said that Ambassador Linowitz is partly right. They had talked about 1) transferred powers; 2) shared (like water) or coordinated powers; and 3) residual powers (like internal and external security) for Israel. Israel agreed on this. But Khalil got cold feet, and said that he can't agree on residual powers for Israel. His need is to see them all transferred. Israel says that what is security is Israel's.

The President said that he is not sure about the definition of internal security, but the rest is all right.

Minister Burg said that three categories . . .

The President said that with Ambassador Linowitz, Minister Burg had used the term "reserved."

Minister Burg agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we are not very far apart. We proposed that there be a list of transferred powers; and some for Israel, like security and foreign affairs (if anybody has the latter). This we agree on. And there should be a Continuing Committee to deal with a middle group—like water, internal security, maybe land. Why is there a problem? He thinks there is a misconception, from talks with Minister Burg, about the Continuing Committee. The idea is that there should be an agreed list of powers to go to the Self-Governing Authority. The Self-Governing Authority would then be chosen by the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. It would be understood that some powers—e.g. Israel's security—would go to Israel. The Continuing Committee would be set up—and Egypt says that the U.S. should be in—and it would take issues like water, economic arrangements, and maybe land. It would reach decisions on a unanimous basis, and if there were no agreement, then existing arrangements would continue.

Prime Minister Begin said he would come to the concept of the Continuing Committee—in the seven points⁹ (the U.S. had shared with Israel)—later. The issue of greatest importance is security. First, the Self-Governing Authority is an administrative council—not within the spirit but within the letter of Camp David. They had weighed every word for 13 days and nights. Second, the number of members (of the SGA) should be equal to the number of functions. The U.S. and Egypt should think this over. Israel stands by it. It is in accord with the Camp David Accords. On the seven points, he wants to quote one: "It is agreed that Israel will have sole authority to exercise the power of external defense and foreign affairs." This says "defense" instead of "security"—why? It is narrower. "Defense" refers to attack; and then Israel will defend itself. "Security" is another problem. There are Israel's

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 348.

eastern and northern frontiers. There are 5000 tanks in Syria, including T-72s. In Jordan, there are 400 Chieftains, among the best on earth. Saudi Arabia has the F-16, etc. What is its army worth? But the advanced weapons are there. Iraq has 1000 tank carriers it got from West Germany. It could move four armored divisions in 48 hours, whereas before it took them a week, and they were wounded when they got there (to the Syrian front). Israel is not frightened by all this. This comes under “defense.” But there is also infiltration—as at Misgav’am. This is “security.” Camp David always used “security.” “Defense” is not there. Therefore, we must not change Camp David. Foreign affairs is not a matter for this document. Of course there will be no foreign minister or ambassadors. This is only a transitional period. After five years, everyone can claim rights. This is five years long, and we should let it work. Therefore, we should leave foreign affairs out.

There is his other point (in his 4-point proposal): internal and external security are linked, including anti-terrorism. This is Israel’s. It is in accord with Camp David. At page 24 (of the booklet), point two says: “All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors . . .” That includes “neighbors,” too—why? With regard to Jordan, the PLO can do things to them, as it did before Black September.¹⁰ He would not want Palestinians to go from Israel to Jordan, to kill the King. This is the reasoning behind his proposal. If “External and internal security, including the fight against terrorism, conspiracy to commit acts of violence and subversion, will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities” is not the case, then in Israel there will be permanent bloodshed. Lebanon will be a playground in comparison. Last year, Israel captured thousands of detonators, and hundreds of kilograms of explosives, including 1000 half-kilogram bricks of delay-explosives. Therefore, Israel prevented their use. But it might not always do so. If Israel does not have responsibilities, and the police have it, they would not do it. Israel has had experience with police—as in Hebron where a student was left to bleed to death by the police until the IDF arrived. Therefore, Israel can’t rely on police. Then we can assure peace for all time. There is no need for foreign affairs; “defense” should not be substituted for “security”; and internal and external security should be combined.

The President said that he is deeply concerned. At Camp David, they talked of “specified security locations,” and talked about between three and twelve locations. If security is seen as anything that could

¹⁰ Reference is to the September 1970 clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian armed forces, culminating in the expulsion of the PLO headquarters from Jordan. For documentation on this, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970.

lead to a threat to peace, then Israel could say that it has to be on every block in Jerico and Nablus. Thus he is concerned.

Prime Minister Begin said that with all respects, he did not refer to the Army with any of this—as it is written. The President will know how many there will be in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza District. He will give numbers and numbers on a map.¹¹ The rest will be redeployed to specified security locations. (*The President* said: yes). He will give the President a map. Secretary Vance knows that they changed “agreed” to “specified.” This is a matter of Israelis’ lives. Therefore, it is not written down, but Israel will show it on the map. When the Self-Governing Authority is inaugurated—or even earlier—Israel will take some forces out. A number will stay, and be redeployed to specified security locations as on the map. This is a question of the Army. The question of incursions is wider. It is a daily problem. And there will not always be the Army there to deal with it.

Secretary Vance said that in the call to the Camp David Accords, it says: “A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order.” Therefore, this is to be worked out between Israel, Egypt and Jordan—if it is in; it is not specified how it is to be worked out.

Prime Minister Begin said that is a separate sentence—but he accepts Secretary Vance’s reading. Therefore, Israel will make proposals (on external and internal security and public order), and agreement will come. But not on the specified security locations.

The President and Secretary Vance agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that arrangements on the rest will be agreed. Now on the Continuing Committee: it is in Camp David. He saw the U.S. words—in the seven points. In the Camp David Accords, the Continuing Committee is only given one task—“to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 . . .”

The President asked Prime Minister Begin to read the rest.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes. “. . . together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.” Judea and Samaria are not in it.

The President asked if that is all. Please read it.

Prime Minister Begin read: “Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.”

¹¹ Not found.

The President said that this is a broad charge.

Prime Minister Begin said that means during the transitional period. That is the time to start it, when the Self-Governing Authority is established and inaugurated. First, elections will be held. Second, there will be the withdrawal of the military government. Third, then the Continuing Committee will be set up “during the transitional period.” It could be after four years, but that would be a distortion. It should be in the next few months. The question should be: what do we do about the Continuing Committee now?

Ambassador Linowitz said that we want agreement on what will be submitted for approval (of the Palestinians). Therefore, it can be set up after inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority. Is this agreed?

Prime Minister Begin said certainly: it is written. He says this in the President’s presence. Israel will not deviate from the Camp David Accords—they feel, however that it (the Continuing Committee) should be at the proper time.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the agreement among the parties calls for a Self-Governing Authority. It must be approved by the Palestinian people. Through the agreement—therefore as part of it—once the Self-Governing Authority is in being, there shall be a Continuing Committee, and to it will be referred water, economic relations, maybe land, for unanimous agreement.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is in “other matters.” It is agreed. (There was then discussion among the Israeli delegation). We agree. But we will not do it today (i.e. start the Continuing Committee). When it is agreed.

Minister Burg clarified: when the Self-Governing Authority starts functioning.

There are two things to try to keep up the momentum. First, here there was a misunderstanding of the Continuing Committee’s functions. It has been solved. Israel will abide by the agreement. Second is the question when it should start working; that is only after the Self-Governing Authority is set up.

The President said but we should delineate what it will do, and decide that now.

Prime Minister Begin said it may. We should have wide discussions.

Minister Burg said we can get our people—maybe 3 or 4 of them—today to work it out.

Prime Minister Begin said that his third point is that “Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel.” It is clear that autonomy is for the Arabs.

The President asked if this included the settlements?

Ambassador Linowitz suggested something like our Status of Forces agreements.

Minister Burg said he had not heard of this idea.

Prime Minister Begin said that Minister Burg speaks Rococo style.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Status of Forces agreements apply to our military people abroad, and mean that they are subject to our laws.

Minister Burg said that Israel's settlers are citizens, not soldiers.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he knows that Israel wants the law to apply to citizens, not property.

Prime Minister Begin said they will think it over. The Vice President had said,¹² and the President had said on European TV,¹³ that Israelis have the right to live on the West Bank, though they differ on the question of settlements. On an individual basis, they can't send their people to Jericho, though they have the right to live there (as Arabs live in Israel). When Sadat came to Haifa,¹⁴ Sadat said that he saw Jews and Arabs living together. If a man goes to Jericho and buys a house, he will be killed by the PLO. Therefore, historically, Israelis have lived in groups, with a fence. But at Misgav'am the Palestinians broke through. This was a technical failure. Therefore, the settlements should be under Israeli jurisdiction.

The President asked if this meant that, wherever an Israeli lives, Israel has jurisdiction.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is true in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district, not everywhere.

Minister Burg asked whether the President meant individuals or settlements.

The President said both.

Prime Minister Begin said that this does not apply in the U.S.—a person can become a citizen here after 5 years.

The President said he meant this.

¹² Mondale was reported to have made comments during a March 23 speech in New York that the United States recognized the rights of Jews to settle anywhere, including the West Bank. When asked about these reported statements the following day during the Department's daily press briefing, Hodding Carter III stated that he believed that Mondale had "in fact" made "a more general statement based upon some fairly universal statements about what should be the rights of human beings." (Telegram 77927 to multiple posts, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800150-0663)

¹³ A transcript of Carter's April 13 interview with representatives of the British Broadcasting Corporation, North German Television (ARD), France Télévisions Antenna 1, and the Italian RAI-TV, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, pp. 668–682.

¹⁴ See Document 282 and footnote 2 thereto.

Prime Minister Begin said that Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district are different from the U.S. They have left the question of sovereignty open for five years. Therefore, Israel has to carry out its obligations.

The President said that there is a difference between individuals' living in Jericho, and their being financed by the government.

Minister Burg said that if someone went to an Arab village, and buys a house, he does so as an individual. Many of his friends were killed in 1948—including only 20 kilometers south of Jerusalem. There are settlements there now. Surely these are under Israeli jurisdiction and not under the Self-Governing Authority. Since they are there as a group, surely this applies to Israeli settlements. There is a basic difference—Israel says that settlements are legal; he will not say what the U.S. thinks! (laughter)

The President asked whether they intend, during the transition period, to have military occupation and Israeli rule over the Palestinians there.

Prime Minister Begin said that "military occupation" does not apply to Judea and Samaria, although there is a military government. In practice, they have promised to withdraw the military government.

The President said: right.

Prime Minister Begin said that therefore there will not be a military government. The Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) will decide daily affairs.

The President said he did not want to talk semantics. He asked whether the area of the West Bank and Gaza would be demilitarized. Will Israel relinquish government control over them?

Prime Minister Begin said that one can't say "demilitarized," as at Camp David, with the specified security locations.

The President asked: only those?

Prime Minister Begin said: yes. Israel must have them for security.

The President said that the government now for the West Bank is the Israeli military government and civilian administration.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel will withdraw them.

The President asked whether it would be left to the Self-Governing Authority.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes.

The President asked whether it would have authority and responsibility adequate to replace the military government.

Prime Minister Begin said yes. What will be transferred should be a solid completion (of the discussions). Other powers will be shared; and others will be kept by Israel.

The President said therefore the issue is defining full "authority."

Prime Minister Begin said that that word (“authority”) is not in the Camp David Accords.

The President said that if Israelis and settlements—which have gone up rapidly under Prime Minister Begin’s government—are under the jurisdiction of Israel, the percentage of land—10 to 20—is under Israeli jurisdiction, therefore this is a subversion of the Camp David Accords. This is a matter of how much land and water. Any settlement, under Israel’s jurisdiction, is a subversion.

Minister Burg said that 20 per cent is too high.

The President asked if 15 per cent is better.

Minister Burg said it is much lower, primo, and secondo . . .

The President said he understands (what Minister Burg is saying).

Prime Minister Begin said that the President reads the Bible in Spanish!

Minister Burg said that secondly, Jews and Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza are about 2 per cent of the Arab population. Therefore, this is not as important as the President’s understanding.

The President said: yes.

Minister Burg said that there is a difference between individuals and settlements, because all governments since 1967 . . . and he has been in almost all of them . . .

Prime Minister Begin said: 31 years in the government!

Minister Burg said . . . all say that these are in Israel’s jurisdiction, not any other. Therefore, there are two points: first, the percentage of inhabitants, and second, individuals vs. settlements.

The President said he understands. Will they apply Israeli jurisdiction to all Jewish settlements and citizens?

Minister Burg said that if a citizen goes to Ramallah, there is no Israeli jurisdiction there.

Ambassador Lewis said that there are no individuals on the West Bank; only settlers.

Prime Minister Begin said that autonomy is for the Arab inhabitants. Israelis do not need it: they are citizens of Israel.

The President said that he is concerned. Israelis have the right to live anywhere—Arabs, too. If Israel says that, wherever Israelis live, Israel has jurisdiction, therefore this will subvert (the agreement) on Israel’s withdrawal. Therefore if there is Israeli authority wherever they live, all of the West Bank is involved.

Prime Minister Begin said that he had told the President why they can’t settle individuals: for security, there must be groups. They will be in a limited number of places, and not be subject to the Self-Governing Authority’s jurisdiction over them.

The President asked whether Prime Minister Begin can see his (the President's) concern in Prime Minister Begin's third point: "Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel."

Minister Shamir said that Israelis in the territories will not vote for the Self-Governing Authority. Therefore, they will not be under its jurisdiction.

Minister Burg said it can be clarified.

Secretary Vance said he has one question. "The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn"—from Camp David—adds "as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government."

Prime Minister Begin said: exactly.

Minister Kubersky said that it also says that powers and responsibilities are to be *defined*.

Secretary Vance agreed, but this *replaces* the military government.

Prime Minister Begin said: absolutely. But the *powers* are to be defined. If they have to be *defined*, then they are not transferred automatically or completely.

Minister Burg said that he and Ambassador Linowitz would be out of a job if that were so!

The President asked if they could meet again at 3:00.¹⁵

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

(The meeting ended at 12:07 p.m.)

¹⁵ See Document 352.

352. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 15, 1980, 3:02–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Second Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs
Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy Negotiator for the Middle East Autonomy
Negotiations
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the United States
Chaim Kubersky, Director General, Ministry of Interior
Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister's Bureau
Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor Ruth Lapidot, Legal Adviser to Foreign Ministry
Gilad Stern, Assistant to the Minister of Interior

(From 3:05 until 3:30, the President and Prime Minister Begin met privately on the Rose Garden Terrace and in the Oval Office.² They then joined the others in the Cabinet Room).

The Vice President said that Prime Minister Begin looks handsome.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(4/15/80–4/30/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an April 25 covering memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski upon which Brzezinski indicated his approval of the memoranda of conversation from Carter's meetings with Begin. Also, in the covering memorandum, Hunter stated that copies of the memoranda of conversation were to be sent to Linowitz and Moses. (Ibid.) Carter's handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.

² No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

Prime Minister Begin said: “handsome I was not born!” (laughter)

The President said that he understands that the two delegations had a discussion before the meeting on the Continuing Committee.³ He asked Ambassador Linowitz if that were correct.

Ambassador Linowitz said: yes sir.

The President asked Minister Burg if he would care to comment on the meeting.

Minister Burg said he had not been there.

The President called on Ambassador Linowitz.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we had framed this paragraph (see attachment)⁴ to codify the sense of the group on the Continuing Committee. We should read it, and then think about it. (He then read the attached statement).

Minister Kubersky said that this statement raised several questions. Maybe we should write it in general terms, and give examples. Good examples are water and economic cooperation; and Ambassador Linowitz agrees. His question is mainly on the last sentence: what will happen until there is agreement? When the Self-Governing Authority is elected and established in office, some spheres may not be defined—according to the original draft: “Pending agreement, existing conditions will continue.” What does “existing conditions” mean? It needs definition.

The President asked: where?

Minister Kubersky said it was now out (of the draft, where it had been the final sentence of the original U.S. draft).

Prime Minister Begin asked whether two deletions had been agreed upon.

Minister Kubersky said yes. But the problem of the (missing) last sentence is still a problem, along with “source of authority” and residual powers. Ambassador Linowitz had written: “Pending agreement, existing conditions will continue.” And the Continuing Committee may change its character. According to Camp David, the Continuing Committee is for discussions, not operations.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we have not described that it would “have certain authority.” If there is understanding on the source of authority and residual powers, maybe it would be easier.

The President said that to have a concept, in general terms, is all right now. He can’t speak for Egypt. The powers to be transferred to the Self-Governing Authority and retained for Israel are not in (this paper);

³ No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found.

⁴ Not attached and not found.

maybe other issues can be in the Continuing Committee. It could in a few months determine water rights. It will give flexibility for progress during the next 40 days, to determine the division of powers.

Minister Burg said that Prime Minister Begin had not seen this paper.

Prime Minister Begin said that he will study it.

Minister Burg asked if the understanding is that the question here has to be talked over with the Egyptians.

The President said that he guesses it will be all right. He has not seen the language.

Minister Burg asked if they could talk more about it.

The President agreed.

Minister Burg said “*primo*” and then “*excuse me.*”

Prime Minister Begin said Minister Burg should skip that and just say “*second.*”

Minister Burg said that residual categories are not mentioned (in the paper)! Where are they? There are three categories: those to be transferred—in principle; those to be shared and coordinated—here it says shared; and residual—where are they? He asked to be allowed to get this out of his system. What about the residual categories? He personally likes not to postpone deciding on economic cooperation. It is a legal question, and should be discussed now—not delayed. This is a small country, and we should do this before (the agreement). The idea of a veto is no good. Eighteenth-century Polish governments fell because of the veto, under Prime Minister Bishinski (?).⁵

Prime Minister Begin said that one man disagreed, and the whole parliament went home. Professor Brzezinski remembers!

Dr. Brzezinski said that is why the Prime Minister and he are both here! (laughter)

Minister Burg said that there were three partitions of Poland. Therefore, what if there is too much of a veto?

The President asked: a what?

Minister Burg said: a veto. It needs to be clarified. In between, what happens if the military goes out before the civilians are ready. It should be there on the same date, if a vacuum is to be avoided. If the veto is added, there will be a stronger problem.

⁵ Reference is to Wladyslaw Sicinski, a seventeenth century Polish-Lithuanian noble popularly credited with introducing to the Polish legislature the use of the liberum veto, a parliamentary device in which a single veto could block legislation already passed.

Minister Kubersky said that because of practical problems of daily life, water and other services must be supplied. When the military government is withdrawn, the civilian administration would continue to operate until there is agreement. When there is agreement, there will be a transfer. Would there be a vacuum? A veto on political problems is bad enough; but where it applies to the supply of services, the veto can cause paralysis.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, first, residual categories are not here (in the paper) and were not intended to be here. What the Continuing Committee would do is deal with issues not resolved before the overall agreement is finished. It would not deal with residual powers. Second, with regard to economic cooperation and similar issues, there would be three steps: try to get full agreement; if not, agree on principles and work in as much detail as possible; and if we can't gain even principles, then use the Continuing Committee. Third, Camp David says that the military government and the civilian administration go out at the same time. Israel's proposal is not in Camp David, and there could be a problem with Egypt.

Minister Burg said that if we cannot get to our target—but try to do so—then the Continuing Committee would become an incentive not to solve problems.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it would help to introduce this paragraph to indicate a joint commitment—to the heads of agreement, to May 26, and to accelerate the talks to get as much as possible.

Prime Minister Begin asked if he could have the floor.

The President said: "you have it."

Prime Minister Begin said that he has read the paper two or three times, and understands it. Therefore he will make some remarks, and think aloud. They will need to take the paper home to study it for tomorrow. In the meantime: first, today and tomorrow we need to agree on certain principles submitted by Israel this morning. He would like to know if they are agreed, to be suggested to Egypt for its consideration. He proposes that we not just agree on just this (U.S. paper), and leave out the most basic problems—such as the question of the Administrative Council and the Self-Governing Authority. If we can agree that the Self-Governing Authority is an administrative council, then we can come to the Continuing Committee. We should not just announce the Continuing Committee and accelerated negotiations: that will not suffice.

The President agreed that there should not be just this (i.e. the Continuing Committee).

Prime Minister Begin said that we need agreement on a set of points.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that second, the average reader will think we have agreed to abolish the Continuing Committee.

The President asked why.

Prime Minister Begin said that since Camp David originally says that it will deal with the 1967 displaced persons.

President Carter said he believes that the last sentence includes that. This is not a departure from Camp David.

Prime Minister Begin asked if it were clear.

The President said yes.

Prime Minister Begin said that at Camp David, Israel said they would accept a reasonable number of persons.

The President said 100,000!

Prime Minister Begin said several tens of thousands. On zeros, he never exaggerates. (laughter)

The President said: Okay, several tens of thousands.

Prime Minister Begin said that he will think it over. There are absorption problems; but he will think it over. It is a human problem. He would like to do it (expand the Continuing Committee?), but not make it look as though we are abolishing the Continuing Committee's main task of dealing with the displaced people of 1967. On the Continuing Committee, there are two possibilities: to be very specific or put it in general terms. He prefers the latter, since it is not in existence yet. Otherwise, it would be putting the cart before the horse: "economic"; "detailed negotiations"; "water." It would be better to agree on: "matters of common concern and cooperation"—that's enough—"are referred to the Continuing Committee." Maybe we can put further details in abeyance for a while. A partial detailing, with others left out, would leave the impression that our work is not finished. "Matters of common concern" is good. "Coordination will be required, etc." First of all, we have to reside on basic principles, not on this paper. The United States would be in the Continuing Committee (according to the U.S. paper): is this a change of Camp David?

The President said no.

Prime Minister Begin said: really?

The President said: well, go ahead and talk.

Prime Minister Begin said that he does not see it in the Camp David agreement. If it is *agreed*, then all right. The question is, why is the U.S. needed in this Continuing Committee? The U.S. is not in all committees, is it?

Minister Kubersky said that in the negotiations, the U.S. is in all committees. It is a full partner.

Prime Minister Begin asked: in all committees?

The President said: all.

Prime Minister Begin said that that is a serious answer. Then we don't need the line (in the paper referring to U.S. membership). We do not need to single it out. We should just agree that the U.S. will take part, as on all committees. Otherwise, it will seem as though we are changing Camp David. It (the reference) is not needed. Therefore, we should not write it down, but agree that the U.S. representative or delegate will be in when the Continuing Committee is set up. He would like to consult on the U.S. paper, and reply definitely tomorrow. (The Israeli delegates conferred among themselves).

Minister Burg said he would like to strengthen the last point. In his *Weltanschauung*, he has no ideological homeland but the West—that is the United States—ideologically or philosophically. The Prime Minister has said two things: Here it is written Egypt, Jordan, and the Self-Governing Authority. To add that the U.S. would be in would mean changing a paragraph of Camp David. Sometimes that is a little bit bad. Other changes would be possible. People would say: why were you not against this change? It is a matter of formulation. Second, the U.S., as a full partner, would also here become involved in administration in a certain sense. If the U.S. is interested in this, Israel would love and like it to do it. But does the U.S. need this? (laughter) These are two strong points: first, the change in formulation; and second, the U.S. will take a role leading to its being a full partner. If the U.S. were involved in the practicalities, therefore administratively there would be a “superauthority” on the Self-Governing Authority. Please think this over, as Israel will do.

Professor Lapidot said that Article 3 of Camp David says: “. . . representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee . . .” This expresses who should belong. To add the United States, we would need to amend Camp David.

The President asked Ambassador Linowitz to describe the Egyptian position. The U.S. is not asking gratuitously to inject the United States into the Continuing Committee. This means added problems. According to the Associated Principles, paragraph 5, the United States is in: “The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.”

Prime Minister Begin asked where this is found.

The President said in point C–5.

Secretary Vance said: on page 26.

The President said that if Egypt agrees that the U.S. will not serve, this is fine with us.

Prime Minister Begin said that they can do without it (i.e. a formal reference), and agree on it . . . in general terms, we need guidelines.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we want to deal with difficult problems. We are at a critical time, and near agreement. But the big issues have not been dealt with effectively. We can agree that there will be no agreement. The point now is that we have a formula with which Egypt can agree. The U.S. urges Israel to think seriously on what we can try to do with the Continuing Committee. If we can't agree on principles or details, they can go to the Continuing Committee. Israel's rights would be preserved in the interim; Israel should have no concern for it. Egypt proposed that the United States be in the Continuing Committee. This provides an added dimension to its discussions. It would be useful to Israel and to Egypt that the U.S. would be closely involved. The U.S. is not pressing; but Egypt wants the U.S. in badly. If Israel does not want that, it should tell Egypt.

The President said that this is the role the U.S. would play. Where issues are not resolved, the Continuing Committee could function for a while, and maybe resolve issues with experience. Exclusion of the U.S. is what Egypt is trying to avoid. If Israel feels that on unresolved issues—economic relations, water—if Israel and Egypt and the Palestinians want to do this without the U.S., then Israel should decide. Egypt wants to get us past May 26th, before there is an impression of failure. The Continuing Committee, with the U.S., goes ahead and works as the Self-Governing Authority is set up.

Minister Burg said that the U.S. is a full partner. This Continuing Committee is set up after the elections and the setting up of the Self-Governing Authority. This is not the answer for May 27th.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Egypt proposed that the U.S. be a member of the Continuing Committee.

The President said that this is so that the Continuing Committee can go on working on issues that are not resolved.

Minister Burg said that the Continuing Committee is for after the inauguration and the elections. Is something further needed for after May 26th?

The President said he thinks so.

Prime Minister Begin said: maybe yes or no.

The President said that if all issues are resolved, then the Self-Governing Authority can deal with water, etc. Security for Israel, therefore, is not concerned here, except for definitions. All he wants is that there be no failure on the 26th. The negotiating group can continue under Camp David.

Minister Kubersky said that it (the Continuing Committee) cannot be established on May 27th.

The President said that yes, it can.

Minister Kubersky said that there is an interval after May 27th.

The President disagreed. It can start at the same time as the inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority.

Minister Kubersky said this could take many months. We (i.e. the autonomy talks) can continue to exist.

The President agreed. He cannot speak for Sadat, but he guesses that, in 40 days, if there is obvious progress and good faith, then probably—he doesn't know, but he hopes so—Sadat will let us continue as we are now. When the Self-Governing Authority is set up, then issues can go to the Continuing Committee and be resolved.

Prime Minister Begin said that the problem of international communications is a serious problem. There are problems of taxation and customs. Israel wants an economic entity, with a free movement of goods—and there are other problems, they can make a list. Therefore, this (reference) should be expressed in general terms: "Matters of common concern shall be . . ." They would like to consult tomorrow, and submit proposals. The word "augmented" creates certain impressions. It is a change. They don't want Egypt to say it is a change, and therefore why not others? In practice, this may be a dangerous precedent. We need to keep to the Agreement. For two weeks at Camp David, it was hard to get an agreement.

The President said that he hopes before Wednesday⁶ afternoon, Minister Burg and others can talk about powers and responsibilities.

Minister Burg said there is too much.

The President asked if it was 20 areas? . . . And Israel should say which it would give, which it wishes to retain, and others—on which we would either say we failed or put into the Continuing Committee. Therefore, this list will undoubtedly be different from what Egypt decides. This is for the 40 days of negotiations.

Prime Minister Begin said that, on the categories, Ambassador Linowitz had suggested them, and so they were approved: those for complete transfer; those that are shared; and those that are reserved. This should be accepted. Does Ambassador Linowitz have comments on the Israeli paper?

Ambassador Linowitz said that the negotiators had agreed on 18 powers and responsibilities. This paragraph will not be put in the agreement for 30 or 40 days. The Palestinians will want to ask questions about land, water, economic relations—so it will help to have them in

⁶ April 16.

this document. He has two questions. First, if we use these as illustrations—"for example"—will this be all right?

Prime Minister Begin said he would think it over, and doesn't reject the idea on the spot.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, speaking as one lawyer to another, he is making progress. Second, if Israel would feel better, regarding the U.S. role, instead a Continuing Committee would be set up with the U.S. named to it.

Prime Minister Begin said no, this is not from the Camp David Accords: "During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee . . ." Very good; so it is written. There is the inauguration, then the Self-Governing Authority starts. Then there is the Continuing Committee.

The President said that Camp David doesn't say that. It says in the transitional period: "... will constitute a continuing committee ..." It doesn't say wait five days—that is in the entire period: as soon as the Self-Governing Authority is set up.

Prime Minister Begin said that it says: "during."

The President said that it does not say: "will be established."

Prime Minister Begin said: *during* the transitional period—after the Self-Governing Authority is inaugurated.

The President said that he reads English! It doesn't need to be set up.

Prime Minister Begin said: not the very day the Self-Governing Authority, the very day it is inaugurated. It says "During the transitional period . . ."

The President said that in Hebrew he doesn't know, but in English ... If it says "will be constituted," yes. But it says "will *constitute*."

Minister Burg said: but not before.

The President and Secretary Vance agreed.

Minister Burg quoted: "The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties."

Prime Minister Begin said that they would think it over.

The President asked Ambassador Linowitz when he would see a list of authorities.

Prime Minister Begin asked whether Minister Kubersky could speak.

The President said: please.

Minister Kubersky said that on January 16th, at Mena House, Israel presented its model.⁷ In it, Israel delineated powers and responsibilities, chairmen, divisions. It gave details on each of the divisions and the details of sections. The Israeli model has three categories. First, they described in the model all powers and responsibilities to be given to the Administrative Council—in Israel's opinion, all the elements needed for full autonomy. They did a comparative study with the military government and the civilian administration. They took the powers in category number 1, which cover more than 80% of those of the military and civilian government—there is a difference between military government and autonomy, under the Administrative Council. The second category includes powers and responsibilities of shared powers.

Prime Minister Begin asked what are the 18 powers?

Minister Kubersky said that they are 80%. He will tell what they are later.

Prime Minister Begin said that the list is important.

Minister Kubersky said that in the third category are the residual powers retained by Israel. This draft, this proposed model, is under Camp David. He asked Egypt to tell if Israel had forgotten something. Now for the details: the Administrative Council would have 11 members, including a chairman and 10 members. Each would be the head of a division. Therefore, they suggest general powers. They should have the power to issue regulations, set up a budget, issue contracts, sue and be sued, and to employ staff. The Administrative Council can delegate to heads of divisions. The divisions can function within the framework of the Council. (He then listed some of the powers of the following divisions: agriculture, health, relations (?), labor and welfare, finance, transport, education and culture, administration of justice, local affairs). Each division would be managed by a director general, with special assistants and helpers. The chairman will coordinate, and have non-elected functionaries, in statistics, civil service, publicity, and archives. There would also be legal officers, an ombudsman, and others. There would also be two zonal representatives, who would work with Israeli authorities on an ongoing basis. This represents responsibilities for coordination.

This is the Israeli model, which was rejected totally by Egypt. Ambassador Leonard said that he welcomed the Israeli model, and said that it seemed to mark the beginning of a new phase of the negotiations. The U.S. warmly welcomed it. No details were discussed after this, and

⁷ See Document 325.

the Egyptian model was submitted. Ambassador Linowitz was there at the Accadia (Hotel), where Israel stated the categories and prepared a listing. Israel worked and Egypt rejected it. There was no agreement on details, but on one point—with U.S. help—in technical planning. This is a meaningful agreement. This understanding could be the umbrella for many subjects. Israel said shared; Egypt said coordinated. They need to agree on two levels: planning and implementation. They have not agreed yet, even on the agreed list. The Israeli approach consists of three categories . . . there is understanding on many functions, a remarkable number. Ambassador Linowitz remembers. It was done *ad referendum*.

Prime Minister Begin said: thank you.

The President asked Ambassador Linowitz to explain the difference between the Israeli and Egyptian positions.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Egypt did not like the Israeli presentation. It told the Self-Governing Authority how to run itself. There was a number of asterisks on the transferred powers, which Egypt said took away too much. This was the heart of the Egyptian intemperate rejection. The Egyptian proposal rests on an assumption: there should be three areas—legislative, executive, and judicial. This went beyond Camp David. Israel—showing admirable restraint—did not reject the Egyptian model, but merely said that it was “totally unacceptable!”

Minister Burg asked to speak one sentence. Israel said that the areas to be transferred were quite a lot: more than for municipalities.

The President agreed.

Minister Burg said it was the majority of powers.

Minister Kubersky said that when Israel made its presentation, they said that it did not have to be taken *per se*. They took into account the care needed when negotiating. Therefore, there are many asterisks. Ambassador Leonard said 45.

Professor Lapidot said: 48!

Minister Kubersky said that the asterisks are not part of the Bible. Many are for negotiations, and were put in automatically.

The President said they had done so! In addition to “security,” they had not defined what else they would retain.

Ambassador Linowitz said that there are three additional areas: international commerce, security, foreign affairs, and settlements.

(A pause in the conversation followed).

Prime Minister Begin said that his impression is that the U.S. would like Israel’s answer to tell the Egyptians. They (the Israeli delegation) would like the U.S. reply to their paper. Or they could remain in Wash-

ington. They were planning to go directly from Washington to home at noon on Thursday.⁸

Minister Kubersky said it is in the afternoon.

Prime Minister Begin said that if the President wants a 24-hour postponement . . .

The President said that the U.S. would respond tomorrow, or later if need be. He has some questions for tomorrow.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes sir.

The President said that one concerns Sadat's being for Gaza-first, if we need an alternative to a Self-Governing Authority for all the territories. Sadat wants it for Gaza and the West Bank, but Gaza-first as a fall back.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel's position has been misunderstood. At Aswan,⁹ Sadat mentioned Gaza-first. In their third talk he (Prime Minister Begin) had asked Sadat whether he meant first dealing with and implementing an agreement there first. Sadat had replied: no, that he wanted agreement on *both* the West Bank and Gaza and *then* to apply it in Gaza-first. So there was no such proposal as Gaza-first. He had asked Sadat. Sadat said that first there must be a genuine agreement. Thus there is no Gaza-first in this sense.

The President suggested that they go on, since there are difficult issues to face, and he would like to have alternatives under consideration. He prefers—and Prime Minister Begin and Sadat do, too—that the Self-Governing Authority be freely elected on the West Bank and Gaza simultaneously. If not, then we should keep open our options on Gaza-first. There is a problem, important to Prime Minister Begin, of Jordanian citizens in East Jerusalem, regarding the vote. This is crucial for Egypt. How can they vote in Jordan and not on the West Bank? If there is no agreement on this issue, then it could be left open with implementation in Gaza-first. They don't need to vote, since Gazans are not Jordanian citizens.

Prime Minister Begin said that no, we should not leave this question open. He told Sadat at Aswan about a traditional story from the Middle Ages. A learned man served a prince. The prince asked the learned man to convert to Christianity, and he would make the man very great. The man refused. The prince pressed him. Finally, he said that he would give the man three days to think about it. The man went home and thought: what did I say? I need time to think? I have denied my faith in God. And he cursed himself. The prince cut off his legs. This is fact, not legend. Before he died, the man wrote the most famous prayer for Yom

⁸ April 17.

⁹ See Document 321.

Kippur—because of those three days. He (Prime Minister Begin) has said this to Sadat and to the President, too. He will not wait. He will answer now. Sadat said that his was not a proposal, it was just something to think about. Ambassador Linowitz said to think about a flag (over Jerusalem Holy places). To Sadat he (Prime Minister Begin) had said: does this mean sovereignty? And Sadat had said: yes and no. He had said to Sadat: Arab sovereignty and an undivided Jerusalem is a contradiction in terms. Never do Jordanian citizens cast votes in Jordan.

The President asked if this were right. Don't they?

Professor Lapidot said there hadn't been any elections in 13 years.

Prime Minister Begin said that there is a difference on Jerusalem. Israel put its law on Jerusalem *in toto*—but not on Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. Israel is sovereign *in toto*. Therefore, it can't be said that they vote for the Jordanian government. Elections were postponed.

The President asked: does that therefore mean no elections?

Prime Minister Begin answered: yes, there would be elections; but the President had asked about Jerusalem. In Jerusalem there are Judean citizens. Some opted for Israeli citizenship. They have 80–90,000 Jews in Israel who are not citizens, and they do not vote for the Knesset. To have a vote in Jerusalem for the Arab residents: this is out of the question. It is absolutely impossible. It means repartition.

The President asked about absentee voting.

Prime Minister Begin said that Ambassador Linowitz had brought that idea up. But what change does that make? Israel says that if the inhabitants in Jerusalem vote for the Administrative Council, then this is repartition, since there would be two jurisdictions, since the Arabs would be under the Administrative Council and the Jews would be under Israel. So he had said at Camp David. He never misled anyone.

The President said he knows.

Prime Minister Begin said that he and Sadat had written separate letters about it. There should be no illusions; there can be no repartition and no vote. The city cannot be divided.

The President said he sees how firmly Prime Minister Begin feels about it. If an American lives in either West or East Jerusalem, he can vote in the United States. This does not encroach on sovereignty. His judgment is that the entire prospect of elections on the West Bank would be destroyed. There can be no elections if we take away the franchise from these people who happen to live there.

Minister Burg said he would respond not in sentiment, although Jerusalem is in the Bible more than 660 times, and is in the Koran not once. He will speak as a statesman. The logic is this: a U.S. citizen in Jerusalem can vote for the President of the United States, because he wants to be ruled by the President here. A citizen in Jerusalem can vote

in municipal elections, which, in Israel, is independent from citizenship—one just has to live there. But a citizen, to vote for an authority with no authority over him (is different). The Self-Governing Authority has no say in East Jerusalem. So they can't vote for it.

The President said that he can understand what Minister Burg is saying, but does not see the logic. Can Israeli settlers on the West Bank vote for the Knesset? There is an exact parallel here. Minister Burg says that Israelis have the right to live there, and Arabs to live . . .

Minister Burg said that the Self-Governing Authority gives no citizenship.

The President said that they can vote in Jordan.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel had never said so.

Minister Burg said that that had never been excluded.

Prime Minister Begin said: thank you! If they have the right to vote for the Jordanian parliament, why not the Administrative Council?

Minister Burg said he disagreed.

Prime Minister Begin said: all right, but Minister Burg had quoted a thesis, and he (Prime Minister Begin) is a lawyer. (He continued): Mr. President, there is a great principle here. If Jerusalem residents do not vote, he (the President) is saying that this would destroy the elections.

The President said it was accurate.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel is being blamed. Why blame this on them? No one in Israel would agree to such an event. Only the Communists—6 out of 120 Knesset members—would agree. There is complete agreement. Therefore, how can it be changed. Israelis speak of this city. The Government of National Unity said that Israeli law should be applied to Judea and Samaria. It did not accept it. But it did—and the opposition led on this—apply Israeli law to Jerusalem. It is a city; it became one. When Jordan was there, Israelis could not pray at the Western Wall. Now it must be undivided.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that, therefore, people there can't vote.

The President said that he hopes that Ambassador Linowitz and he haven't taken the vote away in Jordan away from people of East Jerusalem! He thinks it would be a waste of time to hold elections; then there must be an alternative means to set up the Self-Governing Authority—some other procedure. He has some ideas. One he had suggested in private to Prime Minister Begin, who said he didn't like it.

Prime Minister Begin said he is speaking sincerely, and for all his colleagues and all but 6 members of the Knesset: Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and it is sovereign there, on the basis of the 1967 law.

Ambassador Linowitz said that they had talked at length about this several times. If Prime Minister Begin is concerned about any sugges-

tion for dividing Jerusalem, we should be able to draft something to take care of that. But Prime Minister Begin seems to feel viscerally that the right to vote leads to a divided Jerusalem.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes.

Ambassador Linowitz said he was sorry: he would like to assure Prime Minister Begin.

Prime Minister Begin said that it is not a matter of assurances. What could Israel want? What does it need? This is not religion or sentiment. It is a fact. Jerusalem is sacred to the three monotheistic religions. Israel does not interfere with the religions. The Copts and the Abyssinians ask Israel for help. Egypt can now get in and help if it wants—though it has problems with its own Copts.

Minister Burg said that the Egyptians would like Israel's Copts!

Prime Minister Begin asked what the Christians have to complain about?

The President said that this is not at issue.

Prime Minister Begin asked why the Muslims should complain. El Aqsa is there—despite the fact that it is on the Temple Mount, where there are two mosques. Jerusalem is sacred to Jews, Christians, and Moslems. But that is history: in our time, what is Jerusalem? It is the heart of the Israeli nation for 3000 years. The Moslems conquered it. King Abdullah¹⁰ did so, again. He desecrated the Mount of Olives cemetery. He destroyed the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University. Israel rebuilt one city. Should it suggest that Copts in Cairo vote for other governments? It is incomprehensible. It is one city. Teddy Kollek could be reelected for 3 elections more. It will still become a divided city if Israel permits voting for the Administrative Council.

Minister Burg said he would add a footnote. The President had mentioned absentee voting. They live in Jerusalem. It is their capital—though the U.S. does not recognize it. Does the U.S. want to give Israel a mortgage? It is too difficult.

Ambassador Linowitz said that no one here wants to divide Jerusalem. He would try an idea. Suppose that there were elections in the West Bank and Gaza, and the elected officials then selected from Jerusalem 8 or 10 people to serve with them as members.

Prime Minister Begin said that he doesn't think this would be possible. It is difficult. He speaks about the heart of the Israeli nation. Why play around? It has been the central issue of their lives for 3 millenia. The Eastern part is the real Jerusalem—West Jerusalem is an addition. He is now told that they should vote in the Judea and Samaria Admin-

¹⁰ See footnote 4, Document 58.

istrative Council—which was Israel’s idea—and destroy Israel’s connection with Jerusalem. How could this be done? For more than 3000 years, it has been a part of their life. It is not dead, it is alive. Their prayers, every day—Dr. Burg prays for return, after 1900 years.

The President said that he is not trying to take the Jews out of East Jerusalem. Under Prime Minister Begin’s definition, people and not land are under jurisdiction. Therefore, we are not talking about a territorial jurisdiction.

Prime Minister Begin said that at Camp David, they talked about Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. And in the letters!

The President asked if an Arab in Tel Aviv or Nazareth could vote.

Minister Burg said that there is no absentee vote under Israeli law.

Minister Kubersky said that even Ambassador Evron can’t vote.

Prime Minister Begin said that this was a problem of the constitution—one day it would be amended!

The President said we need to find an alternative to the election process.

Prime Minister Begin said that the President had asked that they think about it; therefore maybe it can be raised again tomorrow. The U.S. should not blame the Israelis’ attitude on Jerusalem.

The President said he was not blaming them for anything. But he doesn’t see any way to proceed with elections.

Prime Minister Begin said that Sadat said there are 700 million Moslems who do not agree. But for Israel, Jerusalem is sacred; it is their life.

The President said he did not want to change that.

Prime Minister Begin said: thank you.

The President said perhaps they could adjourn on a pleasant note! (laughter)

Prime Minister Begin asked when they meet tomorrow.

Ambassador Evron said 10 o’clock.

The President said there is another question. Sadat wants there to be a security committee, to work out the delineation of what is internal security, and what is for the police.

Prime Minister Begin said could he please ask permission. At 5:00 he is to meet with some Senators. The President and he have to speak at 7:30. He will reply tomorrow. Thank you.

The President said: thank you.

(The meeting concluded at 5:10 p.m.).

353. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 16, 1980, 10:09–11:29 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Third Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs
Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy Negotiator for the Middle East Autonomy
Negotiations
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the United States
Chaim Kubersky, Director General, Ministry of Interior
Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister's Bureau
Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Professor Ruth Lapidot, Legal Adviser to Foreign Ministry
Gilad Stern, Assistant to the Minister of Interior

(The Vice President and David Aaron entered during the plenary meeting.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 21, Hunter: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Basic Briefing Book [II]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes on this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Israel, 4/79–11/81.

The President began by saying that so far the meetings had been constructive.² We had an enjoyable evening at the White House last night,³ and he hopes that our Israeli guests enjoyed themselves. There are several important issues to be resolved. Egypt has replied⁴ to our message that it is all right if the intensive negotiations be in Egypt and Israel. However, Egypt very much wants the establishment of a security committee, as an integral part of the Camp David Accords. They told us that General Ali will represent Egypt if and when the committee is set up to carry out this provision of Camp David. We had alleviated the problem of the Continuing Committee in a way gratifying to Egypt. It is important under the Camp David Accords for it to function. For the U.S., we need to discuss alternatives if the Israeli position on East Jerusalem Arabs is that they can not vote in any elections that are carried out. If so, then we need Israeli suggestions for Egypt on alternatives to elections. We see only two such alternatives: to establish a procedure involving the mayors; or (less acceptable) to implement an agreement in Gaza first. As Prime Minister Begin has pointed out, Sadat is likely to insist on gaining agreement on both the West Bank and Gaza before implementing it in Gaza first. These are his (the President's) items for discussion in this group. He will also have a couple of items to discuss with Prime Minister Begin privately.

Prime Minister Begin said he wanted to be clear in his mind. Did Egypt agree on the venue for the intensive talks?

The President said yes. Khalil said he would devote full time to them; but he made strongly the point on the need for the security committee. Also, he (Khalil) would like to keep the option open, near the

² In an April 16 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski commented that during the previous day's meetings the President, "achieved more than our minimum objectives with Begin, including a commitment to work towards May 26; continuous talks (though not here); and a Continuing Committee that will have *both* negotiating and coordinating authority. We can be on the Committee *in fact*, provided that [it] is not made to appear to be a change to Camp David. And Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. can continue to work on unresolved issues in the current format until the Continuing Committee comes into being." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Visits: Box 10)

³ President and Mrs. Carter hosted a State Dinner in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Begin at the White House from 7:32 p.m. to 11:13 p.m., April 15. (Carter Library, President's Daily Diary) During the dinner, both Carter and Begin delivered short speeches to toast the occasion. The texts of these remarks are printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 686–693.

⁴ Atherton met with Khalil on April 16 to discuss the proposal for continuous talks to take place in Egypt and Israel. (Telegram 8395 from Cairo, April 16; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Visits: Box 10) On the meeting, Brzezinski reported to Carter in an April 16 memorandum that Khalil felt that without the creation of security committee, the talks would have "no value." Brzezinski continued: "Khalil would also like for the negotiators to meet for a few days in Washington near May 26—if enough progress had been made—to wrap up the heads of agreement approach." (Ibid.)

end of the 40 days, to have a brief session here to confirm what has been done. This is an option the Egyptians would like to have.

Prime Minister Begin said that this could be considered at the proper time. With regard to the draft on the Continuing Committee, in accordance with the Camp David Accords, in the transitional period the Continuing Committee could deal with other matters of common concern, with the U.S. invited to take part, and decisions to be taken on the basis of unanimity. First, he did not like to change Camp David, and this could be written into a protocol, that this is not a precedent. Second, we don't need all the words of Ambassador Linowitz (from yesterday's U.S. proposal),⁵ if they say "in accordance with the Camp David Accords." We should also put in the word "also," to show that we are leaving in the original text (on the uses of the Continuing Committee). It will "also" deal with other matters. He has accepted the U.S. idea on citing some examples (of the work the Continuing Committee might do). It should also cite the *development* of sources of water, for the benefit of all. In accordance with paragraph five (of the Camp David Accords Associated Principles), the United States would be invited to join. He had a problem with the word "operate" (in the U.S. draft). Rather we should say that "decisions will be taken."

The President asked the Prime Minister to reread his draft.⁶

Prime Minister Begin said that it was his handwriting. Nobody else could read it; and even he could only read it with difficulty! (laughter)

The President said he wanted to hear whether Prime Minister Begin could read it the same way a second time! (laughter)

(The Prime Minister reread his draft.)

The President said he preferred actually listing the three nations to be involved, as stated in Camp David that they "will constitute" the Continuing Committee.

Prime Minister Begin asked if the President wanted to list all the names.

The President said that if we were going to change the words of Camp David, then he would like to add the word "immediately," since the Accords just say the Continuing Committee should function soon.

Prime Minister Begin asked if the words "as soon as possible" would be all right.

The President said that Camp David did not contemplate any delay.

⁵ See footnote 15, Document 350.

⁶ Not found.

Prime Minister Begin said that Camp David actually says “during the transitional period,” but . . .

Minister Burg suggested saying: “As the Camp David Accords say.”

Secretary Vance said the words are “will constitute.”

Mr. Nehushtan said that Ambassador Linowitz’ draft had said “will be established.”

Prime Minister Begin suggested “in accordance with Camp David.”

President Carter suggested “immediately.”

Prime Minister Begin said that then they would have to repeat the names of the members. This would complicate matters. Perhaps we should just say “as soon as possible.” Or how about “without delay?”

The President said he preferred to repeat Camp David exactly.

Prime Minister Begin asked if this was with all the names.

The President said he preferred this.

Prime Minister Begin said he had no objection, and read: “During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-Governing authority will constitute a continuing committee.

The President and Secretary Vance concurred.

Prime Minister Begin said that then we should have a semi-colon, followed by the rest.

Secretary Vance concurred.

Prime Minister Begin said that, with agreement, we can print it.

The President said fine.

(At this point, Ruth Lapidot and Robert Hunter left the room to work out the precise wording of the statement.⁷ They reentered at 10:36, in the midst of a discussion on a possible security committee).

The President said that, in summary: if the Israelis accept his proposal, that would be fine. Security will be discussed soon at the plenary. Then advisors or some other sub-group will be established on issues of security. This committee will make recommendations back to the plenary and ultimately to the heads of state. He would like to be able to tell Sadat that, at an early plenary meeting, the issues of security

⁷ The text of the statement, as finally agreed, is attached to the memorandum of conversation as Attachment I. The text reads: “In accordance with the provisions of the Camp David Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

“The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern; e.g., the development of water resources for the benefit of all concerned, economic cooperation, etc. The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee which will take its decisions on the basis of unanimity.”

will be assigned to an advisory group, and this committee will make recommendations to the plenary and the heads of state.

Prime Minister Begin suggested that we go by stages—he is not prejudging the issues. The President may tell Sadat that we discussed this subject. He (Prime Minister Begin) wishes the President would accept his proposal: Issues of security will be discussed after Israel puts together its maps for the Egyptians. Then the main negotiating terms can take up the issues, as the Camp David Accords provide, with military experts taking part. Then what the plenary decides, he will accept. Today he can't accept the words "security committee."

The President said that this causes a problem. Sadat did not make this a proviso in regard to having continuous discussions, but Prime Minister Begin should not underestimate Sadat's concerns on this issue. Prime Minister Begin should be flexible—which is natural for him (the Prime Minister) and help him (the President). If the plenary just states that the advisors will discuss these issues, then there will be ten days to get the maps, and then report back—this will delay the entire process for 10 days, which is bad.

Prime Minister Begin said that the President had said he (Prime Minister Begin) is flexible: he is used to hearing different compliments! The negotiating teams will consider this approach.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Israel had said publicly that a security committee could be set up.

Prime Minister Begin asked who said it.

Ambassador Linowitz said Minister Burg.

Minister Burg said yes, provided he was quoted exactly!

Prime Minister Begin said he could always say that they had made a mistake in saying that. It had happened before, on Khalil's part, as well. It happened at Camp David and elsewhere. Minister Burg shouldn't be put on the spot!

Minister Burg said he liked to be quoted.

Ambassador Linowitz said: "primo."

Minister Burg said he had said that at some stage there would need to be talk about security issues. He had not excluded that there could be a security committee at some point.

Secretary Vance said that Minister Burg had said . . .

The President said that he hoped the Israelis would think it over. This is crucial to Sadat; and he has said so to his own people, in the Assembly, and to the Palestinians. Sadat and he (the President) see this as part of the Camp David process. What it is called is of secondary importance. If we continue the plenary without discussing security, there will be serious and unnecessary problems. We need cooperation to avoid problems.

Secretary Vance said that to accelerate progress in the talks, we need to deal with security problems promptly. This is important from the standpoint of general expedition.

Prime Minister Begin said that they would start on the maps now. It would take 10 days to two weeks to complete them.

Minister Burg said that there are no Egyptians here to speak for themselves. Why is this the crux of the matter? First there can be meetings (Note: accent on the plural), with security taken up, then the advisory committees can be set up.

The President said that this was fair enough.

Prime Minister Begin asked whether Minister Burg is suggesting this. Then it is his (Minister Burg's) suggestion!

Minister Burg said that Begin is the Prime Minister!

Prime Minister Begin said that, after Ambassador Linowitz's comment, he (Prime Minister Begin) had no option but to accept!

Ambassador Linowitz said he was glad he had found the right formula!

Minister Burg said: "advisory teams."

(*Prime Minister Begin* then read the redrafted statement on the Continuing Committee). He said that Professor Ruth wants the word "may" instead of "will" (on issues to be dealt with by the committee). Is this in Camp David?

Professor Lapidot said that it is, if we stick with Camp David.

Minister Burg said as with the 26th of "May."

The President accepted the word "may."

Prime Minister Begin agreed. (See Attachment II)⁸

The President said that if this flexibility continues, there will be no other matters!

Prime Minister Begin said that this is very good.

The President agreed it was very good (i.e. the agreement on the Continuing Committee). Next is the problem of alternatives to the electoral process.

Prime Minister Begin said he had told his friends of the President's two proposals.⁹ (He then conferred with his colleagues, who nodded agreement). This is a very serious issue.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that the soul of the Camp David Accords on the Administrative Council is elections. There should be no misun-

⁸ A mistaken reference to Attachment I. (See footnote 7 above)

⁹ See Document 352.

derstanding. The negotiating teams on security . . . all depends on the principles he presented yesterday. They expect an answer today or tomorrow. They could have said (at Camp David) that they would just appoint the Administrative Council. But people would say that this is a masquerade, and an indirect aid to Israel. So Israel proposed free elections—though they may be difficult to do. Sadat is mistaken in saying that he could impose autonomy on Gaza. Sadat can't do it; no one can. Can we drag people to the polls? In Belgium, there is a fine for not voting. But it doesn't help; people just pay the fine, of about 50 francs. So you can't drag people to the polls. Israel stands by the elections. It is objectively difficult if the Palestinian Arabs will not take part. First, the Mayors could appoint the Council—but this can't be done. It would be like having PLO-types. Israel would prefer known PLO people if it came to that. That is, if the mayors would agree anyway, which is doubtful. So what if we postpone the elections—as with the mayors—and they appoint the members? The same difficulty would arise. If there are free elections, the President says, PLO sympathizers could be elected anyway. Israel would say, so?—this happened through free elections. It would ask the elected individuals not to be with the PLO, but what can Israel do once there have been free elections? Therefore, there should be no proposal to say that anyone acquiesces in non-elections. His proposal is, let us work to get done in 40 days. Then after 30 days or so, we can assemble, and the President can empower Secretary Vance to come together with them, and to reason together. Now there is no other proposal that seems reasonable. We should stand by the democratic process of free elections. (At this point, Robert Hunter left the room for about two minutes).

Minister Burg said that surely, before May 26, talking about not having elections would be psychologically bad.

The President said that this was a wise statement.

Minister Burg said that since it came from a sage, it was appropriate. (laughter) He would add that if we leave the idea of free elections, it would be a grave deviation from Camp David. We do not wish that now, at least until May 26.

The President raised the other option—Gaza-first. Minister Burg has assessed it well: to say today that we would abandon free elections would be bad. But the Camp David Accords would not come into being if the elections are not carried out. When we reach the final stages of the negotiations, it all becomes a failure if there is no means to get the Self-Governing Authority in place, then it will fail, and other provisions will be lost. Maybe we need to keep our option open to have a brief transitional period—maybe a committee—in Gaza or of mayors—to negotiate on a limited number of issues . . . We don't need to cross that bridge now. We will work now, and with Israel and Egypt, on free

elections—as in the Camp David Accords. We won't put this issue aside, but keep it on the top of the agenda.

Secretary Vance asked: in 40 days?

The President said yes. If we get near the end, then we can look at this again.

Prime Minister Begin said there is a problem of control in the Sinai. In the peace treaty, a UN force is provided for. There is the problem of Sharm-el-Sheikh, in particular. But the Soviets vetoed this approach.¹⁰ And there is the U.S. letter¹¹ about efforts to be made to find acceptable alternatives—i.e. a multinational force. Maybe the United States had talks with the Soviet Union, and it said that it would use the veto. Therefore, it was necessary to try an alternative.

The President said that we had been talking primarily with Secretary General Waldheim.

Secretary Vance said we talked with the Soviets at the end.

Prime Minister Begin said that UNTSO was not for the time of the peace treaty; it was for the armistice period. The U.S., Israel, and Egypt joined in agreeing that members of the UN group should carry out the functions. This was not signed.

Then there was a promise that, a year before the ultimate withdrawal from the Sinai, we would meet again. The former foreign Minister (Moshe Dayan) said, and he (Prime Minister Begin) subscribed to his view, that if there is no UN force, and no multinational force—the former foreign minister would like it (multinational force) now. So they accepted the agreement, but stated that if neither of the forces is established, then Israel can't withdraw from its positions in the Sinai. They want the commitment to be fulfilled. Also, the U.S. commitment is one of the most vital parts of the peace treaty—bearing in mind problems like Sharm-el-Sheikh. Nobody knows what will happen. We could have a situation one day with the Straits (of Tiran) closed. That would be, in the European concept, a *casus belli*, but Israel does not want that. He suggests accelerating the talks on the tripartite agreement, where now there is no agreement. What should be done if there is no UN or multinational force? This should be decided bilaterally between Israel and the United States. Otherwise, a vital part of the peace treaty would be out. Therefore, he suggests that we accelerate the tripartite agreement and sign a bilateral agreement. The U.S. has noted Israel's announcement. There is a vacuum: let's fill it up.

The President called on Secretary Vance.

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 270.

¹¹ See Document 289.

Secretary Vance said that he would describe the negotiations. We want a tripartite agreement: let's work on it.

The President said he recalled that Israel had suggestions on Articles 4 and 6.

Secretary Vance said he had discussed them at breakfast, but can't remember the details now.

The President called on Ambassador Evron.

Ambassador Evron said that the problem is that Egypt now takes exception to the whole paragraph.

Professor Lapidot called on Mr. Rubinstein.

The President said he had not been in this issue.

Mr. Rubinstein said that Egypt did not see Israel's declaration, that if there is no agreement reached (on the follow-on force), then Israel will not withdraw in 1982. There is more than a hint of that in the document, in section (sic!—paragraph) six to that effect. Egypt says that it is not acceptable, any hint that Israel might not withdraw. The Israelis think that the Egyptians know the Israeli position.

Prime Minister Begin said that, therefore, let's have a trilateral and a bilateral . . .

The President said he sees.

Secretary Vance said we have . . .

Prime Minister Begin said: . . . and an exchange of letters. They should become an integral part of the treaty.

The President asked: who?

Secretary Vance said that this didn't need to be crossed to the year before withdrawal.

The President said that he could see that Sadat would be reluctant to sign a document saying that Israel might not withdraw. We need to reserve the prospects on that. It is not in the (agreement?). He sees a problem.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel would not require that of Sadat: the United States gave the commitment.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that this was central to it (the treaty?).

Mr. Rubinstein said that Egypt would object to a U.S.-Israeli agreement saying this.

The President said he knows.

Mr. Rubinstein said that this is a crucial thing, which Israel cannot accept.

The President said that it was not necessary to get agreement with Sadat, but we could see, and try to remove it (the problem?).

Ambassador Evron said that we did reach agreement on a text¹² here (in Washington last September), and he thought that took care of the Egyptian problem.

The President said that that was not the case.

Secretary Vance said that it was not *yet* the case.

Prime Minister Begin asked whether they (Israel) would be notified.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Prime Minister Begin asked for a reply on their 4-point document.¹³

The President said he wanted to save some time to meet privately with *Prime Minister Begin*.¹⁴

Prime Minister Begin asked whether the President wanted to see him.

The President said yes.

Prime Minister Begin said thank you, sir, it would be a pleasure.

Ambassador Linowitz said (in reference to the second document, attached), that he thinks *Prime Minister Begin* would agree that it is important not to change Camp David. The problem is not what the authority is called but what it does. This is what the negotiations are trying to do. This formula will not help in the negotiations. We should work now on what the authority should do, not on what it should be called.

Prime Minister Begin asked him to clarify.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the import of point one is that the Self-Governing Authority is an administrative council.

Prime Minister Begin said that it is in the book (the Camp David Accords).

Ambassador Linowitz said that therefore we should say it like it is in the book. Why give it a different name?

Prime Minister Begin said that there is a simple reason: for the last ten months, there have been proposals that there be 40 members. This is an assembly. We need to make clear what it is. What does it mean? We should not turn in circles. He contends, and Barak—whom the President likes, and who sends the President his regards—in an exchange with el-Baz in the President's presence,¹⁵ said that when the words

¹² See Document 289 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

¹³ See footnote 5, Document 351.

¹⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin privately in the Oval Office from 11:29 a.m. to 11:55 a.m., April 16; the two leaders were joined by Vance from 11:45 a.m. to 11:55 a.m. (Carter Library, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

¹⁵ See footnotes 51 and 52, Document 28.

“Administrative Council” appeared once, then it applied every time. This was agreed. In the year and a half since Camp David, attempts have been made to change the document, without the words “Administrative Council.” He has to return to the document. He showed Dayan, in a paper at the peace treaty signing, seven deviations from it (on not including the words “Administrative Council”). We are now at a stage, in the last year, where we see proposals to change the content and meaning. Israel wants it clear: if “Administrative Council” is not there, then Egypt will say it is an assembly. He wants to make clear that Egypt can’t say this, since it is an administrative council. He does not want a closet state, or a corridor leading to an independent Palestinian state. This is crucial. It is another idea, a proposal. He wants to remind the President that in the joint letter, Egypt and Israel repeated the words “Administrative Council.” Egypt did not want it, but we repeated it. In communiques (of the autonomy talks) it is always there. Therefore “Administrative Council” means something. It is a most essential point. The basic issue is, what is the self-governing authority? Everybody has interpreted it—so what is it?

The President said that he does not favor substituting the words “Administrative Council” for “Self-Governing Authority.” This is fruitless semantics. It is better to look at the powers and responsibilities it will have, not at the name. We put in “Administrative Council” once, reluctantly. We cannot accept giving up “Self-Governing Authority” in all references, and use “Administrative Council” in its place.

Prime Minister Begin said that he does not want to give up “Self-Governing Authority.” He repeats this.

The President said he understands.

Minister Burg said that “Administrative Council” means something.

The President said he knows.

Prime Minister Begin said that these words give an accent: that it is more administrative than political. Therefore, it gives more or less, but the words stand *per se*. What they are asking for all the time, and Ambassador Linowitz once agreed—then the Egyptians got cold feet—either bring (?) the Israeli model or talk about the three categories. But Egypt backed out. Therefore, there should either be an accent on “Administrative Council,” or use of the three categories. These are two possibilities, and. . . .

The President said he would prefer to accept the latter.

Minister Burg said that Egypt had not agreed.

The President said that there are good prospects for success. Problems of semantics are there all the time: Judea and Sumeria vs. the West Bank; Palestinians vs. Palestinian Arabs—there is always a problem of definition. He understands that Prime Minister Begin and

Sadat make statements about aspects of full autonomy that are justifiable, but letting them stand can be a problem. We need to find common ground. The second approach is good. We do not need to decide what, today, should be the division of powers and responsibilities among the three categories, but this approach gives us good flexibility.

Prime Minister Begin: Now there is the question of the number of members.

Ambassador Linowitz said that in the negotiations, Prime Minister Begin feels that this should correspond to the number of functions. Egypt has a different view.

Prime Minister Begin said that the U.S. has proposed a number which is arbitrary. What we need to do is create a basis for establishing the number of members.

The President said that this opens up additional problems: How many fragmented parts into which to divide actual responsibilities? Ambassador Linowitz's paper has 22 different functions.¹⁶ Should education and culture be one function or two? On administration of justice, is there a separate function for prisons?

Minister Burg mentioned Health, Education, and Welfare.

The President asked whether that should be one function or three. If there is one member for each function, then Egypt will work to get many functions, while Israel will try to get a few. This is a question of balance and imbalance. On agriculture, there can be a function for planting, harvesting, marketing. We do not favor anything that will lead to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. We are prepared to say so in a final signed document. He thinks there is a chance that Sadat would also sign that there is no authority ever (sic!) to declare itself an independent Palestinian state. He (the President) can't speak for Sadat, but the Israelis should think about it. He (the President) wants the Self-Governing Authority to have the needed authority, and no chance to declare itself an independent state.

Minister Kubersky asked whether there was agreement in principle that the number of members should equal the number of functions, for the negotiations?

The President said that this would make the negotiations more difficult. Then each time that Egypt proposes having more, there will be

¹⁶ Reference is presumably to an April 14 draft version of the draft Heads of Agreement, a copy of which is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Israel, 4/79–11/81. The draft agreement lists 22 responsibilities to be accorded to the self-governing authority: education, culture, religious affairs, administration of justice, agriculture, health, labor and manpower, social welfare, internal transportation, municipal affairs, housing, tourism, budget, taxation, civil service, administrative operations, police, internal finance, industry and internal commerce, internal communications and post, private property, and local banking.

fragmentation of functions. Israel will try to consolidate them. Why get into that problem?

Minister Burg said that we should talk more about it.

The President said: later.

Prime Minister Burg [Begin] said that if there is no agreement, then Israel will stand by these points. It can not be otherwise: *non possumus*.

The President said that Prime Minister Begin should not destroy his reputation for flexibility, which he and Prime Minister Begin worked to protect!

Prime Minister Begin said: "Here I stand; I can do no other."

Minister Burg said: Martin Luther,¹⁷ 1521.

Prime Minister Begin said: "you know? How did you know?"

Minister Burg said: "I was there." (laughter)

Prime Minister Begin said that he shouldn't quote Luther, who once said that all the Synagogues should be burned. He (Luther) did not like the Jews.

The President suggested that he and Prime Minister Begin have a short talk. Would the others please wait, and there would be a group photo for historic reasons. Anyone not wanting to be in the photo could leave!

(The President and Prime Minister Begin went into the Oval Office for a private meeting, where they were later joined by Secretary Vance. At 11:50, they emerged for the group photo and to discuss the press statement).¹⁸

¹⁷ German priest and theologian of the sixteenth century, Luther is best known as the initiator of the Protestant Reformation in 1517. Luther is reputed to have uttered the phrase which Begin quoted in the preceding sentence in his appearance before the Diet of Worms in 1521.

¹⁸ The text of the two leaders' April 16 remarks to the press is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 694–695. The White House's statement on the talks was released April 17 and is printed on pp. 700–701.

354. Editorial Note

On April 24, 1980, by a vote of 12–0, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 467 (1980), addressing the mounting violence in Lebanon, including Israeli military intervention and attacks upon troops attached to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL). The United States, along with the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, abstained. The resolution “reaffirmed” the Security Council’s “determination to implement its previous decisions in the totality of the area of UNIFIL operations, up to the internationally recognized boundaries. It condemned all actions contrary to these decisions and, in particular strongly deplored any violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity; Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon; all acts of violence in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon; provision of military assistance to the so-called *de facto* forces,” i.e., the Lebanese militia forces of Major Saad Haddad;” “all acts of interference” with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO); “all acts of hostility against UNIFIL and in or through its area of operations; all obstructions of UNIFIL’s ability to confirm the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, to supervise the cessation of hostilities, to ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, to control movement and to take measures deemed necessary to ensure the effective restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty; and acts that had led to loss of life and physical injuries among UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel, their harassment and abuse, the disruption of communication, and the destruction of property and material.” Moreover, the Security Council condemned the shelling of UNIFIL headquarters and “called attention” to the provisions in the UNIFIL mandate giving the force the right to self-defense. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 352) The complete text of the resolution is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pages 358–359.

The Resolution was passed in the aftermath of more than two months of increased skirmishing along the Israel-Lebanon border and attacks upon UNIFIL personnel. The issue was referred to the Security Council by Lebanon on April 13 in a letter to the Council charging Israel with “continuing acts of aggression against southern Lebanon and with “direct confrontation with UNIFIL.” (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 348) The same day, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim issued a statement condemning attacks on UNIFIL forces by Haddad’s forces around the At-Tiri area of Lebanon. A description of the situation around At-Tiri is in telegram 7147 from Tel Aviv, April 17 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800190–0992) A Lebanese draft resolution was circulated to the Security Council on April 17. Following the killing of two Irish UNIFIL peacekeepers on April 18, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Michael Newlin and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Saunders presented Secretary of State Cyrus Vance with an action memorandum outlining three options for a U.S. response: 1) “try to improve the present resolution,” deleting the “worst of the condemnatory language

directed at Israel,” followed by abstention; 2) “leave the resolution as it is,” then veto it; and 3) produce a new U.S. resolution “which focuses on the main problems in South Lebanon and directs attention toward possible ways of dealing with them.” Of these, Vance chose the third option. A copy of the new draft U.S. resolution, the Lebanese draft, and the action memorandum are in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, ES Sensitive April 1–30 1980.

However, the pace of events in the Security Council and the situation in Lebanon meant the U.S.-drafted resolution had little traction. On April 20, Representative to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry reported that if “an immediate improvement on the ground, plus some long-term improvements in UNIFIL’s situation were possible,” the Lebanese draft “might be avoided, but such developments are unlikely in light of Haddad’s wish to enlarge his area of control, Israel’s support of that objective, probable Lebanese inability to take the necessary steps, and the time required to accomplish any long-term improvements. Despite understanding among Western SC members and troop contributors for Israel’s security concerns, they consider a strong resolution, focused on Israel’s and Haddad’s misdeeds, justifiable in the present situation.” McHenry concluded: “U.S. failure to join in support of such a resolution will concern our Western allies and a U.S. veto, preventing action, will meet with no understanding.” (Telegram 1541 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, April 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: 4/80) Proposed revisions to the U.S. draft were discussed with the Lebanese on April 22. (Telegram 1588 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, April 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201–0157) A Tunisian redrafted version of the resolution was presented April 23. (Telegram 1610 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, April 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0801) On the redraft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski related to President Jimmy Carter in a April 23 memorandum that “other members of the Council” would not accept references to the Palestinian attack on the Israeli Mishgav Am kibbutz (see footnote 2, Document 351) and other “actions by the Palestinians,” “insisted” on “strongly deploring” Israeli military intervention. The instructions proposed by the Department of State, Brzezinski pointed out, were for McHenry to abstain unless a clause including a condemnation of attacks on Israel were included. Vice President Walter Mondale had advised dispatching a message from Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on moderating the situation in Lebanon, though Brzezinski saw this as “partially overtaken by events.” Brzezinski advised Carter to meet with Mondale, Vance, and himself on the instructions to be issued to McHenry; Carter

initialed his approval. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: 4/80) No record of this meeting has been found. The text of the U.S. statement to the Security Council which accompanied the U.S. abstention is in telegram 1620 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, April 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800204–0330) The proposed message to Begin was sent on April 25 and is printed as Document 356.

355. Summary of Discussion and Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting¹

Washington, April 24, 1980, 4:05–5:15 p.m.

Subject

Middle East Autonomy Negotiations (U)

Participants

State

Cyrus Vance (Chairman) Secretary

Warren Christopher* Deputy Secretary of State

Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Michael Sterner Deputy Assistant Secretary

Personal Representative of the President

Ambassador Sol Linowitz

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*²

NSC

Robert Hunter

*Attended only part of the meeting

Secretary Vance said that there are several areas that we should pursue in the next 30 days: voting rights, land, security, jurisdiction over Israelis in the territories, legislative authority, and the Continuing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 4/24/80 Meeting: 4/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs that he was called out of the meeting at 4:20 p.m. to receive a message from Brown on the status of the Iran hostage rescue operation which was then in progress. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 497)

Committee. Ambassador Linowitz said that water was the most amenable for solution, with security next. He expects that there will be little or no movement on land and East Jerusalem voting rights (Secretary Vance thought the latter issue was dead). It might be possible to get something on *private* lands, since the Israelis have not so far made a point of this issue. He would try out a new formula on East Jerusalem, permitting Jordanian citizens, in general, to vote. He also hoped to skirt the issue of legislative authority. The object should be to get enough agreement to keep Sadat interested in continuing the process, and to deflect any European efforts.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he doesn't expect very much on this 10-day trip,³ since both parties are still testing one another. Begin, for example, was chided in Israel for giving away too much here in Washington, and therefore is not ready to make concessions. The Ambassador is worried that the Israelis might not make a security presentation on the first day. If so, the Egyptians might go home. But if this issue can be resolved early, other issues could be easier. Mr. Saunders pointed out that this would be particularly so with regard to land, because of the security implications tied up with land issues.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what we should do if the parties prove too unyielding to get agreement before May 26. Secretary Vance said that then we would have to consider how to cut back our expectations, in order to get something to claim a partial victory. Ambassador Linowitz said that he might have at some point to go to Begin and indicate the risks of a breakdown unless Israel is forthcoming. Mr. Saunders said that a "pause" might be possible after May 26, if there are a few tough issues to be settled—as happened with the 1975 disengagement negotiations. Secretary Vance said that conditions are different: the press has made a lot of May 26, and the Europeans are waiting in the wings: that might not directly affect the situation in the area, but it would affect *our* interests. It is one thing to pass the date in a state of serious negotiations; it is another to have a pause. We should also not jump ahead too soon.

Ambassador Linowitz said that in his first meeting with Begin, he would try to disabuse the Prime Minister of the notion that the "four points" tabled here in Washington are conditions for forward movement.

He said that he would proceed on this trip by talking through issues for a couple of days, and then be prepared to table papers on in-

³ April 27–May 8.

dividual subjects. First, he would like to get agreement on a list of subjects for a Heads of Agreement. Second, he would try to fill in each of the subjects. Third, he would try to sharpen up the issues within this context. And fourth, he would try to resolve as many issues as possible. Mr. Saunders suggested that we build an agreement cumulatively, as in the peace treaty negotiations. It was agreed that the nature of the issues do not lend themselves to “trade-offs” within an overall package, as opposed to a constant paring down of difficult issues. Mr. Saunders suggested—and it was agreed—that a drafting group be set up early, so that the delegations could be working from actual drafts (e.g. on the Heads of Agreement) as they move along.

There was a lengthy discussion of the Gaza-first option. Secretary Vance reported Peres’ view that the issues in Gaza are easier to resolve, and that an agreement could attract significant support. Egypt can influence the Gazans, and this would be an achievement for Sadat. Peres had also reported that King Hassan had spoken favorably of Gaza-first. The Secretary also reported Ambassador Evron’s view that Begin might be prepared in time to see the value in negotiating and implementing Gaza-first, provided the precedent problem could be overcome. Begin’s objection would be more to having an overall agreement first, and then merely implementing Gaza-first.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we should try first to get a real agreement for both the West Bank and Gaza. In this coming round of talks, Egypt would not be ready to back off emphasis on a full agreement, and Israel is not ready for Gaza-first. Secretary Vance suggested overlapping the two efforts: building the list of powers to be transferred and tackling tough problems; and having the ability later to convert the effort to a Gaza-first approach. Sadat could probably be delivered on Gaza-first. On the timing for talking about Gaza-first, Mr. Saunders warned of the risks of introducing the idea too soon, because this deflects concentration from a full agreement. At the same time, Secretary Vance argued, the idea couldn’t just be dropped in at the end. Also, with only about 16 days left after Ambassador Linowitz returns on his second trip, there will not be much time to play with. It was agreed that Ambassador Linowitz should use his best judgment—or ask for guidance—on whether to introduce the Gaza-first approach before returning here at the end of this trip.

Secretary Vance said that we should think seriously of “sweeteners,” in terms of Israeli confidence-building measures on the West Bank. Weizman’s credibility is already at stake on this issue. Having these gestures—which needs to be sold to Begin—could be particularly important with a Gaza-first solution. With regard to the U.S., the Secretary said, there could be no “sweeteners” that cost money. Ambassador

Linowitz said that thinking about the general idea would be useful, and that co-production of the aircraft engines would be positive.⁴

⁴ On May 10, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that Carter had approved in principle Israeli co-production of jet engines intended for Israel's Lavi fighter aircraft project. (Telegram 123665 to Tel Aviv, May 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800231–0004)

356. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, April 25, 1980, 0108Z

108902. For Charge. Subject: South Lebanon and UNIFIL: President's Message to Begin.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following is text of message from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin which you should deliver as soon as possible,² either directly to him or through appropriate intermediary. In delivering this message, you should include a copy of Ambassador McHenry's statement of the U.S. position with regard to the April 24 SC Resolution on Lebanon and UNIFIL (septel³ from USUN).

3. Also see septel⁴ on talking points.

4. Begin text of message:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–1843. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by the White House; cleared by Newlin, Hunter, Vance (in substance), W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O), and Raymond G. Seitz (S/S); approved by Saunders. Sent for information Immediate to USUN and the White House. Carter initialed his approval of a draft version of this letter on an attached April 23 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 4/80)

² Chargé d'Affaires Brown delivered the letter to Begin on April 25. During the meeting to discuss the letter, which Begin described as "very important," Begin placed an "immediate phone call to Defense Ministry to order that Haddad be told to do all possible to control situation in South Lebanon." (Telegram 7646 from Tel Aviv, April 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800205–0511)

³ See Document 354.

⁴ See telegram 108893 to Tel Aviv, April 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800204–0319)

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you about the serious situation in Lebanon, which in recent days has led both to the tragedy at Misgav'am,⁵ and to attacks against the troops of UNIFIL, with the loss of several lives. If this situation continues, we may face another period of chaos and anarchy in southern Lebanon, with consequences not only for the people of the area and for the security of Israel, but also for the political climate we all need during this important and sensitive time in the autonomy negotiations.

While here, you expressed your concern to do whatever is possible to deal effectively with a deteriorating situation in southern Lebanon that would pose increased threats to Israel, as well as subjecting the inhabitants of that region to renewed conflict and suffering. It is imperative therefore, that everything possible be done to restrain the activities of Major Haddad, just as it is imperative to do everything possible to strengthen UNIFIL against Palestinian infiltration, while trying to increase the capacity of the Lebanese Government to be in control of its own territory.

We are working hard at the UN and elsewhere to try bringing about conditions that will increase UNIFIL's effectiveness and reduce threats to Israel emanating from southern Lebanon. Whatever you and your government can do immediately with regard to the forces of Major Haddad would be of immense importance.

In this sensitive period, there are some who do not wish us well as we work toward a resolution of the difficult issues in the autonomy negotiations. Therefore, we must redouble our efforts to prevent those who want to disrupt the political climate surrounding the talks from succeeding stabilizing the situation in southern Lebanon is an important part of that process, and I know I can count on you to do all you can.

With best regards,
Sincerely, Jimmy Carter
End text of message.

Vance

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 351.

357. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 26, 1980, 12:04–12:27 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting With Ambassador Sol Linowitz

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

The President said that he thought there were going to be negotiations for 40 days, and several had gone by!

Ambassador Linowitz said that there have been discussions going on at lower levels.

The President said he had been disconcerted by the report of the SCC² on Ambassador Linowitz's trip. There seemed to be no clear-cut decisions. Maybe he has a distorted view, but this is his impression. He is concerned that there is an apparent timidity about using Ambassador Linowitz's 10 day trip to the area. The Ambassador should be strong, clear, forceful, and aggressive.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this is what he got out of the meeting. He doesn't know what is in the minutes. He will not be timid. He will see Begin first thing on arriving in Israel, and take on Begin's four points.³ Since we did not actually reject them while Begin was here, Begin is saying in Israel, in effect, that we accepted them. Begin is using the notion that the President is known to view them as candidates. The Ambassador will discuss this with Begin. Begin knows that we have an alternative view on points one and two; and the Ambassador had talked with Burg about three and four. He will hit Begin hard on all four points. The first is on making the SGA an administrative council; the second is on the number of people on the SGA equaling the number of functions; the third is on Israel's having jurisdiction over all its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza; and the fourth is the combining of external and internal security under Israel's authority.

The President said that he preemptorily rejects all four points.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he will do it. On the third, he will try out our idea on Status of Forces.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 37, Serial Xs—(4/15/80–4/30/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² Reference is to the April 24 Senior Level Meeting, printed as Document 355.

³ See footnote 5, Document 351.

The President said let's not skim over these. He is bothered by them. Peres had told him that his view is that Israelis living on the West Bank should come under the jurisdiction of the SGA. How you could have settlers scattered all over the West Bank with it any other way bothers him.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we should look at the Panama Treaties, and how we worked it out with regard to the employees of the Panama Canal Company. If someone violates both Panamanian law and U.S. law, we can bring him back here to be tried under U.S. law. So it would be with Israelis on the West Bank. If a crime is not under Israeli law, then the SGA would try him.

The President said that this would be difficult for the Israelis (?).

Ambassador Linowitz said that he doesn't know whether the jurisdiction problem can be worked out. He thought he would explore it with Begin, and talked about it with Shamir when they were here. They haven't rejected the idea totally. So let's try this approach.

The last of Begin's points concerns security. We could try it on the basis of internal and external security as it affects *Israel's* security. And that includes having the assistance of the police, etc. But there must be arrangements to ensure cooperation and coordination.

He doesn't know what course Begin will be on now. Begin is having a difficult time politically now. Begin did not go back to Israel a hero.

The President said that they had said he had given too much. What was the basis for those allegations?

Ambassador Linowitz said it was the Continuing Committee. There was unhappiness that Begin had agreed to defer any decisions. Second, there was the Weizman caper,⁴ which will cause increasing problems. There is also talk among various groups about getting out (of the coalition) if Weizman leaves, as may happen soon. Third, there was Peres. He (the Ambassador) had talked with Peres,⁵ who is not being helpful

⁴ In an April 16 interview on Israeli television, Weizman called for early elections in an attempt to unseat the Begin government. "Going to the people now," he said, "in a situation of uncertainty on so many issues could restore public morale and help put the house in order." (David K. Shipler, "Weizman, in Challenge to Begin, urges Early Vote," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1980, p. A6)

⁵ No memorandum of conversation for Linowitz's meeting with Peres has been found. Peres met with Carter at the White House from 9:30 a.m. to 10:05 a.m. on April 24. On this meeting, Carter wrote in the published version of his diary: "I met alone with Shimon Peres, chairman of the Israeli Labor Party. He said he had asked Begin for approval of a meeting with King Hussein and Begin refused. Peres had [British Prime Minister] Jim Callaghan ask Hussein, 'Would you be willing to negotiate with the Israelis on the basis either of a partition or shared responsibility for the West Bank for a period of time?' Hussein's response was yes. He proposed an informal meeting of the U.S. with the Saudis, Jordan, and Egypt re a resolution of the Mideast crisis, and then a report of the results to Israel. He repeated his belief that a Gaza-first arrangement would be preferable." (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 420)

in talking about alternative ways to proceed—e.g. the Allon Plan;⁶ this is no help with the Palestinians. Begin is upset. We should try to help with Begin, but handle him differently from Israel, itself (in terms of the way we present the issues), so that the country will not see us as anti-Israel.

The President said that that is crucial. What about the ultimate question? Should we try to bring all this to a head next month, or be a participant in a willingness to find ways so that the talks can just go on?

Ambassador Linowitz said no (to the latter point), we should do this: Once we have made our position clear on Begin's four points, we should first insist on an Israeli security presentation early in the talks, so that the advisory groups can be set up. Weizman is going back to Israel⁷ early so that he can join the talks and meet with General Ali. Maybe we can make some headway on this. Second, there is water. There is a need to get some agreement on principles, so that it can then be put into the Continuing Committee.

The President asked when Weizman would be getting into the talks.

Mr. Hunter said that Weizman was leaving from here early, on Tuesday⁸ night.

The President asked when he was seeing Weizman.

Mr. Hunter said Tuesday at 1:00 p.m.⁹

The President asked whether Weizman's participation was Begin's decision or something that Weizman was doing on his own.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Weizman was all along a member of the negotiating team. Ali will be there, and Weizman will show up. This might be part of the internal struggle within the Israeli Government.¹⁰

On the first two issues, we will surface papers, and therefore leave the land issue. He doesn't know yet when we should surface our ideas. We will not hold back on our ideas.

The President asked what Ambassador Linowitz would surface on the first two issues.

⁶ See footnote 10, Document 58.

⁷ Weizman was in the United States to receive an honorary degree and for defense negotiations, having departed Israel on April 23. (Telegram 7444 from Tel Aviv, April 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201-0894)

⁸ April 29.

⁹ Carter met with Weizman at the White House from 1:01 p.m. to 1:32 p.m. on April 29. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

¹⁰ See footnote 4 above.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether the President had seen the papers.¹¹

Mr. Hunter said no.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he can leave copies with the President. Here is one on water, land, security, the Continuing Committee, jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, and legislative power. There are suggestions on fundamentals, with some details. There is one he will *not* use: on East Jerusalem voting rights. These are just ideas.

The President asked Deputy Secretary Christopher and *Mr. Hunter* if the papers were all right.

Mr. Hunter replied that they are very good.

Ambassador Linowitz said he thought the President had seen them. This is a real course that we are on. He thinks that now there should be more U.S. initiative. Egypt will welcome it.

The President said that he would, too. There will be a debacle on May 26 if the negotiations have not produced a document. Sadat will accommodate him without any real effort. But the Europeans will become active if Sadat and he do not get somewhere. The Egyptians will even try to get the Saudis involved, at the UN or otherwise. Also, if Burg, maybe Ehrlich, and Peres and Weizman—and Dayan would give his vote—are prepared to see matters brought to a head, and if we are seen as playing in Begin's camp, this will give our concurrence to delay. That will be seen in Israel, too. He feels strongly that we should bring the negotiations to a head. He doesn't know how accurate Peres is on politics. He (Peres) is almost as unpopular as Begin as a leader. Weizman is the most popular in Israel, and would work with Peres—though the question would be who is on top; Peres would want to be.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Weizman said that he would serve as defense minister under Peres.

The President said that Peres had told him that Burg had been planning to decide in May whether to stay with Begin and go down, or to try to stay alive.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Burg had told him this.

The President said that therefore Peres was accurate. He (the President) would be better off politically if the negotiations are brought to a

¹¹ Reference is to a series of position papers, dated April 22–23, that were produced by Linowitz on the "most important issues we will face over the next few weeks:" East Jerusalem voting rights, land, water, security, jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, the size of the SGA, and the Continuing Committee. Each paper sets forth objectives and proposed draft language for the Heads of Agreement. The papers, forwarded to Brzezinski under an April 24 covering memorandum from Hunter, along with two Department of State papers on overall negotiating strategy and strategy for engaging the Palestinians, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 4/80)

head. Begin sees that he will either move or fall (?). He (the President) doesn't want to make Begin fall, but if Begin sees that he can only keep Weizman and Dayan (?) by moving, this is a strong incentive. He (the President) would like to get as much of an agreement as possible—a reasonable agreement, even if no one loves it. If he goes to Sadat, then Sadat will accept it. He wants to put forward what Sadat will accept—and not attempt to assuage Khalil.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had talked with Sadat, and told him the substance of his recommendations. He had told Sadat how he planned to handle water . . .

The President said that Sadat didn't care about details.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had told Sadat that there could be agreement on principles, with the Continuing Committee taking account of the rest, such as the technical matters. Until there was agreement, then things like the rate of water sharing would continue. Sadat said that was all right; and he (the Ambassador) thinks this will be all right with the Israelis.

The President said good.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had talked about other issues with Sadat—such as security. Butros and Osama and others find this approach wrong. On public lands, they will try a formulation, even though neither Egypt or Israel will like it: it is that, after autonomy is set up, there can be *no* settlements by either side without agreement by the Continuing Committee. Therefore, there would be a freeze.

The President asked on which lands.

Ambassador Linowitz said on public lands. Private lands anyone could have.

The President said that Begin would not buy this.

Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to try it out with the President. If the idea were to leak, we would be pleased.

The President said that it would please him. It is, however, more generous than our position, since it doesn't call for dismantling.

Ambassador Linowitz said that it would give Israel a veto over Palestinians settlements, and Egypt wouldn't like that. It would be good if it leaked.

The President said good.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what would happen if Begin rejects it.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he would take the issues one at a time—e.g. water, security, and legislative authority. He can't see Begin rejecting all the ideas. Begin would reject land and East Jerusalem voting rights. If there is enough progress on other issues, then we can look at what to do with the Continuing Committee with regard to

them. We would not say that we are putting things off, and if we can produce for the Palestinians an SGA and the withdrawal of the military government and the civilian administration, with some other issues left over, then there will be a respectable package.

The President said he thinks that we should keep the Gaza-first idea alive. In private discussions, we should say that we think it should be kept alive. But it is also clear that early public revelation would lead to the conclusion that we are abandoning free elections, as we discussed when Begin was here.

Ambassador Linowitz asked when he should surface the idea.

The President said before the end of the 10-day trip.

Ambassador Linowitz said he was afraid the others would grab at it, and not negotiate seriously on the rest.

The President said that it should be surfaced at the end of the 10 days, before Ambassador Linowitz leaves to come home. There is no secret that the idea has been discussed.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, however, we have not said how we feel about the idea. It is Sadat's position, and is attractive. Weizman, Peres, and Sharon (?) like it.

The President said that Dayan does, too.

The Ambassador agreed. He thought he would go there for 10 days, then come home and report, and then go out again.

The President said he wanted to leave a thought in Ambassador Linowitz's mind. If it would not work out completely on the West Bank—and the President was sure this was the case—therefore we could start now on the circumstances under which we should go to Gaza-first. If we delay that to the second round of negotiations, it would not be possible for the governments to consider it seriously in the time remaining.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we will discuss it, and he will do it.

The President said that, on the authority for the SGA, he understands that the only difference is on the definition of security.

Ambassador Linowitz said no.

The President said he wasn't talking about a constitution, or the number of people to be on the SGA. He means that the only issue of significance is security. Is it deciding on the role of the police, anti-terrorism, and the army? Or is it just internal defense? Or is it internal defense and anti-terrorism?

Ambassador Linowitz said that also there is the question of what is wholly within the SGA's authority. First, there are questions like international communication and financial issues; there are four or five issues to be resolved, to get from 18 to 22 or so. Second, on the question

of “legislative authority,” he would try to skirt the issue, and not use the words, but try to ensure that the SGA has the powers that it needs. There are no other specific issues. The rest of the problems are like the one on what to do with water. If we can use . . . that is the beauty of the Continuing Committee, if we use it to make unnecessary agreement now on all details.

The President agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin should like this—since it means that everything doesn’t have to be decided now.

The President said that even if Begin wants it, he won’t agree on it. He likes to run down a string of tedious points, to see what they can be traded for. Finally he gets to the point of making major concessions.

Ambassador Linowitz asked if he could introduce a sensitive point: when—and he would like to keep this open—he should break off and come home early, if he hits a roadblock. This would show that we are serious.

The President said that when Ambassador Linowitz asks him, he will say yes. In fact, Ambassador Linowitz will be more reluctant than he will be to have the Ambassador come home.

Ambassador Linowitz said he just wants authority to do it.

The President said he guesses that Egypt would pull out first.

Ambassador Linowitz said that if Israel is not forthcoming on security, then Egypt might pull out then. He will tell this to Begin.

The President said that maybe he should send a message to Sadat, and even do so early, so it will arrive by the time that the Ambassador gets there. He will ask that Sadat permit a few days for security to be discussed. Or he would ask that Sadat not pull his people out over security—this is better.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this is good; it will keep the talks going.

The President said he would tell Sadat that we have plans for making progress on schedule, not just for discussions. Before Sadat decides to withdraw, even under difficult circumstances, Sadat should consult with him (the President) first.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this is a great idea.

The President said that, where possible, the Ambassador should (in his approach) quote Camp David directly. Even if it is a matter of three words, this would be better.

Ambassador Linowitz said he knows. Begin is almost Biblical about it!

The President said almost.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether the President had anything he wanted conveyed to Begin.

The President said that the Ambassador should stress how extremely important it is that we succeed. He has confidence in Begin as a dedicated and generous leader, to get success. He (the President) had joked with Begin here about Begin's flexibility, and had said this to ease the tensions.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin was talking about his international reputation for flexibility! (laughter)

The President said he thought Begin might do that!

Ambassador Linowitz said he knows what to convey.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said he had nothing to add, and would prepare a cable to Sadat.

The President asked Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Hunter whether they had anything to add and they said they didn't.

(The meeting ended at 12:27 p.m.)

358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, April 28, 1980, 2329Z

111991. Subject: Letter to the President From Prime Minister Begin.

1. Secret Entire text.

2. Following FYI is text of letter to the President from Prime Minister Begin delivered by Israeli Embassy April 28.

3. Begin text.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter² of April 24 which was brought to me on Friday, April 25, by the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Brown.

In accordance with your request I acted at once by asking the Deputy Defence Minister to instruct our military commanders to use whatever influence possible with Major Haddad to ensure that the UN-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–1818. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Edward J. Hull (NEA), Hunter, and Bremer and in S/S–O; approved by Korn. Sent for information Immediate to Jerusalem, Beirut, and the White House.

² See Document 356.

IFIL forces in southern Lebanon would not be shelled nor attacked in any other form.

Subsequently, I received reports that the request had been fulfilled. I can again repeat my promise, Mr. President, that Israel will do its best and utmost and will exercise restoration of peaceful conditions in southern Lebanon.

May I, Mr. President, use this opportunity to express to you and to the American people our deep condolences at the tragic loss of life during the rescue mission in Iran.³ May God console the bereaved families in their grief. The mishap which occurred can happen in any operation. However, the mission itself was noble in its concept and in its purpose—to save the hostages.

We all deeply regret that this mission did not succeed but that should under no circumstances change anybody's attitude towards the goal itself and the courageous decision which you took to try and bring home diplomats who are being held in captivity in violation of sacrosanct international laws and customs.

The people of Israel stand by you and the American nation at this difficult hour. It is our fervent hope that the freeing of the hostages will yet be accomplished.⁴

With best regards.

Yours respectfully and sincerely.

Menachem Begin.

End text.

Christopher

³ Reference is to the failed April 24 attempt to rescue the Tehran Embassy personnel held hostage by Iranian revolutionaries since November 1979.

⁴ In a brief response on May 2, Carter thanked Begin for his "considerate message" about the hostages in Iran and expressed his appreciation for Begin's "prompt action in instructing your military commanders to try influencing Major Haddad." "It is my hope," Carter added, "that UNIFIL will be able to turn its attention increasingly to the critical problem of infiltration, which directly affects Israel's security." (Telegram WH80487 to Tel Aviv, May 2; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 3–12/80)

359. Editorial Note

On April 30, 1980, in a vote taken by the United Nations Security Council, the Tunisian-sponsored draft resolution S/13911 on Palestinian rights, proposed on April 28, was vetoed by the United States. Under the proposed draft resolution, introduction of which restarted the round of Security Council consideration of the issue of Palestinian rights that had occurred from March 31 to April 9, the Security Council would affirm "that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise the inalienable right to self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine; the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors; and the right of those choosing not to return to receive equitable compensation for their property." Moreover, the draft resolution reaffirmed the principle that Israel "should withdraw from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem; decide that appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area, including the sovereign independent State of Palestine, and the right to live within secure and recognized boundaries; decide that these provisions should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the United Nations framework for the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East; and request the Secretary-General to take all the necessary steps, as soon as possible, for the implementation of the resolution and to report on the progress achieved." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 380) For the full text of the draft resolution, see telegram 1672, from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, April 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800262–0961)

With the introduction of the Tunisian resolution impending, the U.S. preference was to "avoid" a veto of the proposed text, as the perceived "decision" of the Palestine Liberation Organization to "force a vote" on the resolution "could provide a pretext for calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly." "To do so" the Department of State observed, "it will be necessary to prevent the resolution from obtaining nine yes votes." The United States could count on four abstentions, but some delegations previously thought to be abstaining, such as the Philippines and Mexico were "wavering" after revisions proposed by the resolution's sponsors. The text, from the U.S. perspective was also problematic as it did not "specifically reaffirm Resolution 242," though a paragraph critical of Camp David had previously been deleted. (Telegram 112025 to multiple posts, April 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800212–1008) In his statement to the Security Council issued in connection with the U.S. veto,

Representative to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry argued that given the search for a “comprehensive peace” in which the United States had taken an active role, “we should not be distracted by approaches that offer no prospect for making practical progress.” Further, the United States “should not adopt an approach that does not endorse UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the agreed basis for all peace efforts in the Middle East—an approach which, indeed, seeks to change Resolution 242. We should not allow the United Nations to be used in this way. The clash of opposites and the sharpening of contradictions has no place here, in this body dedicated to the maintenance of peace and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means.” For the full text of McHenry’s statement, see telegram 1714 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, May 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800216–0283)

360. Summary of Conversation¹

Washington, May 1, 1980, 8:45–9:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting on Oil Supply Agreement with Israel

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Henry Owen
Richard Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)

The President indicated that we should develop a reasonable approach on implementing the oil agreement with Israel that would be definitive enough to meet Israel’s needs, but that would not become a price-subsidy device. If Israel were being gouged on price, or couldn’t get oil, then it should be able to get oil through us, at cost price. But the triggering mechanism should not become an incentive to activate in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 85, Sensitive XX: 5/1–13/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The summary was found attached to a May 1 covering memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, upon which Brzezinski wrote: “Keep it in the NSC.”

terms of price. If Israel could get oil elsewhere, it should do so. He had no objection to a triggering device that cited either the top 10% or top 20% of the average cost of U.S. imports. (There was a general consensus at the meeting on 10%). He wished to avoid triggering now, and does not want to sell Alaskan oil to Israel. It was agreed that we should come up with a standard for automatic triggering of the agreement, in order to give the Israelis a sense of certainty, and to indicate that we stand by the oil agreement.

Further recommendations on the formula would be made to the President later in the day.²

² See footnote 2, Document 372.

361. Editorial Note

On May 8, 1980, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 468 (1980), which expressed the Council's "deep concern" over the May 2–3 Israeli expulsion of the Mayors of the West Bank cities of Hebron and Halhul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron and called upon Israel to rescind these measures. The final vote was 14–0, with the United States abstaining. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 411) The text of the resolution as passed is printed in the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pages 427–428.

The Israeli deportation of the Palestinian notables on the night of May 2–3, came in the wake of a period of heightened tension in the West Bank, culminating in a terrorist attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron, killing six Israelis and wounding 16, on May 2. For details of the attack, as well as the atmosphere leading up to the incident and its aftermath, see telegram 1360 from Jerusalem, May 1; telegram 1381 from Jerusalem, May 3; and telegram 1384 from Jerusalem, May 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800217–0100, D800220–0840, D800220–0740 respectively) Details of the deportation and the political aftermath in the West Bank is discussed in telegram 1385 from Jerusalem, May 3; telegram 1395 from Jerusalem, May 4; and telegram 1440 from Jerusalem, May 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800220–0840, D800221–1277, D800226–0566)

The Security Council meeting on May 8 was convened at the request of Tunisia on May 6 and a draft resolution was submitted by the Tunisian delegation on May 7. Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski submitted this draft, which made no reference to the killings in Hebron, to President Jimmy Carter for action under a May 8 covering memorandum. In the covering memorandum, Brzezinski informed the President that the Department of State would like to instruct Representative to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry to tell the Tunisian representative that the United States would be forced to veto a resolution which did not make reference to the Hebron incident; at the same time, the Department of State wished to instruct McHenry to “use his discretion” about “floating” a U.S. draft resolution for which the United States could give a “yes” vote. Carter did not take action on this memorandum. In a separate May 8 memorandum, sent for action to Carter, Brzezinski informed the President that the Security Council had “softened” the resolution, deleting references to Security Council Resolution 465 (1980) and to the “deploring of Israeli action.” Brzezinski recommended to Carter that he instruct McHenry to abstain on the resolution while issuing a “strong statement;” Carter initialed his approval of this recommendation, adding a handwritten note: “Check with me on final text. J.” Under a third memorandum, dated May 8, Brzezinski forwarded to Carter the draft text of the statement to be delivered by McHenry. After making textual changes, Carter initialed his approval of the statement, adding the handwritten note: “Tell McHenry to use the text as I’ve approved it. J.” All of these documents are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 5/1–11/80. The text of McHenry’s statement as delivered to the Security Council with the U.S. abstention is in telegram 1823 from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800228–0835.

The Security Council passed two further resolutions on the issue of the expelled Palestinian notables. On May 20, the Security Council passed Resolution 469 (1980), condemning Israel for failing to act on Resolution 468 (1980), by a vote of 14–0. In this vote, the United States again abstained, stating its position in the matter had not changed. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 413) The complete text of the resolution is printed in the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, page 428.

362. Memorandum From the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 10, 1980.

Dear Mr. President:

Having just returned from the Autonomy Negotiations in the Middle East,² I want to give you my impressions about where we stand and where we ought to go from here:

1. As you know, President Sadat has instituted a postponement in the Autonomy discussions³ on the ground that he wants to reflect on the developments during our recent negotiations at Herzliya and to consult with his advisors. Originally he had agreed that the working groups could continue meeting despite the suspension of negotiations at the Ministerial level, but later, at the urging of Boutros Ghali, he decided to suspend the working group discussions too. In my conversation with Sadat at Ismailia Thursday afternoon,⁴ Sadat indicated that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 4/27/80–5/8/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Muskie. The memorandum was found attached to a May 10 covering memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski in which Hunter commented on Linowitz's report and suggested, "It may be worth drawing out Linowitz (at the Monday [May 12] meeting [with Carter on the Linowitz trip]) on what the President might usefully do in an exchange with Sadat on Monday or Tuesday—before the speech on Wednesday that Sadat is scheduled to make. They need to be thinking along similar lines." On this point, Brzezinski added a handwritten note: "RH, let's talk by phone Sun. p.m. ZB." (Ibid.)

² This round of the autonomy talks was held in Herzliya, Israel, May 1–7. On May 1, the U.S. delegation presented a draft Heads of Agreement to both Egypt and Israel. The text of this draft is in telegram 8164 from Tel Aviv, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143-2089. On the course of the talks, see telegram 8130 from Tel Aviv, May 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005-0383; telegram 8186 from Tel Aviv, May 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]; telegram 8356 from Tel Aviv, May 6; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 5/1–20/80; and telegram 8463 from Tel Aviv, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143-2050.

³ Meeting with Linowitz in Ismailia on May 8, Sadat informed him that he wished to postpone the next round of autonomy discussions scheduled to begin May 12 in Cairo. This, Sadat noted, "would be interpreted as a signal of his unhappiness with the Israeli position during the Herzliya talks." Sadat, Linowitz reported, "made clear that, while he does not envisage more than a one-week postponement, he does not want to give any public indication at this point of when the talks could resume." (Telegram 10411 from Cairo, May 8; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 5/80)

⁴ A draft version of Linowitz's full report on his May 8 meeting with Sadat is in telegram 10457 from Cairo, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086-1876.

the postponement would be a relatively brief one, probably not more than a week or so. One of the key factors in his decision to postpone is the forthcoming major address he will be making on Wednesday, May 14,⁵ in which he will announce some significant Cabinet and policy changes. The Israelis were at first puzzled but then philosophical about Sadat's proposal to postpone the discussions, and they are anticipating that the postponement will not be an extended one. They can be expected to assert publicly that they had been perfectly willing to proceed with the negotiations and that Sadat's action makes it less likely than ever that there can be an agreement by May 26. For his part, Sadat now is clearly miffed at Begin's failure to move forward in the negotiations and tends to discount the possibility of making any real progress with Begin in the months ahead.

2. During the nine days we spent at Herzliya trying to find agreement,⁶ we accomplished little substantively on the major issues. For several days the Security issue was the major hang-up. Prime Minister Khalil and the Egyptian Delegation refused to discuss any other issues unless and until the Israelis agreed to move forward with discussions of Security by an appropriate group. Begin had asserted at the outset of this round of negotiations that Israel would not discuss Security on any continuing basis unless it were first agreed that Israel would have responsibility for both external and internal security. Predictably, the Egyptians refused to agree, there was almost a breakdown in the talks, and ultimately the Israelis dropped the condition and agreed to a discussion. The Egyptians then put forward their own security proposals which were dismaying to the Israelis and, in important respects, out of line with our own thinking. At that point the negotiations almost broke down for the second time. After some fast footwork and semantics, we were able to get things back on track again. (Reflecting the tone of the discussions and the hypersensitivity of the parties is the fact that I was able to get Egypt and Israel to agree on a formulation for security discussion by proposing that this be done by a "negotiating team" rather than by a "negotiating committee" or "negotiating group".) The heart of the matter is that the two sides are actually not so far apart in implementation of Security measures as they are in the jargon and rhetoric. Accordingly, I did my best to try to get Ali and Weizman in center

⁵ During his May 8 meeting with Linowitz, Sadat described his forthcoming speech as a "'turning point' in his government's efforts to institutionalize democracy and structure the government for taking decisive action in rebuilding the country." (Ibid.)

⁶ See footnote 2 above. Presumably, Linowitz intended to refer to the length of his entire trip, rather than the duration of talks.

positions for both teams and perhaps this can permit them to find common ground once the discussions resume.

3. It is worth noting that there were three potential breakdown situations, and after each of them the parties came together in good spirits and apparently with a determination to try to find a basis for agreement once a particular issue had been resolved. It seemed clear that although neither was disposed to give ground easily, both were unwilling to face a breakdown at Herzilya.

4. The Israeli negotiating team moved in a cumbersome and hog-tied fashion. Each point went through several steps: First, a position by Burg; second, an endless discussion and ultimate endorsement by the full Delegation of Ministers (including that great apostle of moderation General Sharon); and third, the telephone call to Jerusalem for the scrupulous scrutiny and ultimate grudging approval of Begin. (It is noteworthy that a couple of times Begin initially refused to approve a particular point but was later prevailed upon by Shamir and Burg to go along.)

5. For their part, the Egyptians were acting strangely. Khalil was impatient, hard-nosed, and uncharacteristically rough. Burg sensed this and seemed to be making a real effort to meet Khalil's concerns. A couple of times I thought that Khalil had made up his mind to search for a reason to suspend the negotiations, but then when he finally acceded I concluded that he was adopting his position in order to try to eke out some concession from the Israelis.

6. We played a central position in the negotiations, shuffling from one party to the other and helping them overcome differences. We also surfaced several position papers as agreed,⁷ including draft of Heads of Agreement; Water paper; Land paper; and Security paper. I gave copies of the Water and Land Papers directly to Begin and also discussed with him the draft of the Heads of Agreement point by point. At Sadat's suggestion I turned over to General Ali papers on Water and Land. It is perhaps significant that both the Israelis and the Egyptians focused on our Heads of Agreement paper and each presented written comments, suggestions and amendments. We are going to try to use these to put together a revised paper which may perhaps bring us closer to agreement. For the moment, however, the differences are wide. We have not yet had any significant reaction to the papers on Water and Land, although the Israelis have indicated that they find our water ideas very interesting.

⁷ See footnote 11, Document 357.

7. In a one-to-one discussion⁸ with Begin I tried out with him the Gaza First idea after I had already done so with Khalil and the other members of the Egyptian Delegation. Interestingly enough, Begin said that the only Gaza First proposal he knew about was one which would call for an overall agreement with respect to the West Bank and Gaza and implementation first in Gaza. I then asked him point blank whether he would approve an agreement which dealt only with a plan for Gaza for early implementation while further discussions continued with respect to the West Bank. He did not answer me directly but merely said that if such a position were presented “we will think about it”. The Egyptians, however, did not respond favorably when I put the same question, and Khalil said that Sadat had never intended that there be a Gaza First option which would not include agreement on an overall plan to be implemented first in Gaza. When I met with Sadat in Ismailia, the conversation was such that it simply was not possible to bring up the Gaza First option with him, therefore, I did not do so.

8. Begin’s political position is stronger than it was a couple of months ago. The recent Hebron killings⁹ and his visit to Washington apparently helped him in the polls since he now emerges as a tough fighter on behalf of Israel’s security. When I met with Shimon Peres¹⁰ he told me that there was no more than a fifty-fifty chance that there might be an election this year and asserted that he thinks Begin is stronger than he was earlier this year. Begin obviously feels this because he told me several times that he thought that his position on security had a national consensus behind it and the full support of the people. When I asked Peres and Rabin¹¹ about their own estimate, they said that the nation would, indeed, be deeply concerned about its security but they thought that this did not necessarily mean support for Begin’s position. Both are confident Labor would handily win any election now.

9. As to Sadat, he is about to unveil a new governmental plan which he thinks will make a dramatic difference in the governing of

⁸ On April 30, Linowitz met with Begin for over two hours, during which, Linowitz noted, Begin was “totally unyielding” and “the toughest I have yet seen him.” After touching upon Vance’s recent resignation and replacement with Muskie, the two men discussed the “four points” Begin had proposed in Washington. (See footnote 5, Document 351) Linowitz pointed out that the Israeli positions “were bound to create serious problems and might prevent any progress in the negotiations.” Linowitz “asked him bluntly whether he really wanted an agreement on autonomy. He responded emotionally and vociferously that there was nothing in the world he wanted more than an agreement and he would do everything he could to achieve one except prejudice Israel’s security and wellbeing.” (Telegram 7965 from Tel Aviv, April 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005–0378)

⁹ See Document 361.

¹⁰ A record of this meeting has not been found.

¹¹ A record of this meeting has not been found.

Egypt and his role as well as that of the Cabinet. When I met with him he was exhilarated and confident that his ideas would be of immense help to Egypt economically as well as politically. He regards his May 14 speech as a landmark.

10. At this juncture the prospects for significant achievement by May 26 are obviously not good. Assuming that the heads of delegation and Ministers reconvene around May 21 or 22 (as we had earlier agreed) then we will have about four or five days to come up with an acceptable agreement or at least significant and encouraging progress. Unless there is a complete breakdown, however, Sadat does not indicate any desire to terminate the negotiations, believing that ultimate agreement will have to await new elections both in Israel and the United States.

11. On this next trip, in about ten days, I would seek to accomplish the following:

A. Try to get agreement on Heads of Agreement or Points of Agreement which might be publicized as indicating acceptable progress. For reasons indicated, this is clearly problematical at this juncture.

B. Try to get agreement on paper on Water and, if possible, on Land.

C. Try to get agreement on one or more of the major legal issues now before us—Source of Authority, Residual Powers, and Jurisdiction.

D. Try to see what progress can be made with the Gaza First idea if it is clear that we cannot make any sufficient headway on the broader points.

12. If by May 26 there has been no progress worth talking about, then Sadat will, I believe, come down quite hard on Begin and will probably call for a suspension of the talks though he would refrain from terminating them. His attitude with reference to the European Initiative¹² is still uncertain, but I tried to make clear that his and our involvement in such moves at the United Nations would prejudice further negotiations under Camp David. Quite clearly Sadat presently intends that the Autonomy Negotiations go forward during the months ahead but he does not anticipate any real agreement before the end of the year.

Sincerely,

Sol M. Linowitz

¹² See Document 376.

363. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat¹

Washington, May 13, 1980

The President called President Sadat at 0605 EST this morning and asked about Sadat's speech to Parliament. The Egyptian president indicated he had just finished speaking and that "everything will be okay." Sadat confirmed the President's statement that Ali² would now be doing most of the negotiating. When asked about resumption of the talks, Sadat said he would tell Parliament tomorrow³ that because of the President's "interference" they will resume next week. (C)

The President informed Sadat that his daughter-in-law was doing fine and Sadat expressed his and his son's great appreciation for what the President is doing in that regard. The conversation terminated at 0608 EST. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 5/80. Confidential. A transcript of this conversation is *ibid*.

² Khalil had resigned as Egyptian Prime Minister on May 12, and was subsequently named vice chairman of the ruling Democratic National Party. With Khalil's departure from the government, Sadat assumed the office of Prime Minister as well as President, though executive responsibility was delegated to six deputy Prime Ministers. ("Sadat to be Premier, Promises Reforms," *Los Angeles Times*, May 15, 1980, p. B5)

³ A summary of Sadat's May 14 speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, is in telegram 10888 from Cairo, May 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800238-0948)

364. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs¹

Washington, May 13, 1980

SUBJECT

Autonomy Talks (U)

We may be doing enough to get ourselves past the May 26 "goal"—but I am not entirely convinced. At the very least we should follow through on the steps decided.²

—message to Sadat (done)³ and Begin (tonight);⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 4-5/80. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, a stamped notation reads: "ZB has seen." Under the stamped notation, Brzezinski wrote: "let's have a PRC on all this. ZB."

² On May 12, Carter met with Mondale, Muskie, Brzezinski, Linowitz, Lewis, Atherton, Saunders, and Jordan to discuss the status of the autonomy talks in the aftermath of Linowitz's trip and Sadat's suspension of the talks, and to develop a strategy for continuing the negotiations beyond the original May 26 completion target. No memorandum of conversation of the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room from 8:00 a.m. to 9:34 a.m., has been found. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) Carter's handwritten notes related to the meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 4/79-12/80.

³ A draft telegram conveying a message from Carter to Sadat was prepared but not sent. On the May 12 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, under which the telegram was submitted for his approval, Carter wrote: "I called him [Sadat]. He will announce 5/14 that talks should resume next week. Ali will be Egypt's negotiator. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 5/12-31/80) A summary of the May 13 telephone conversation between Carter and Sadat is printed as Document 363.

⁴ In his May 15 message to Begin, Carter informed the Prime Minister of the "thorough review" of the autonomy negotiations he had undertaken with his senior advisers and reminded Begin of the negotiators' need to "concentrate intensively on the issues left unresolved at the end of Herzliya round." Carter continued: "It is likely, in the period ahead, that other parties may strive to move the Mid East peace effort to a different forum or to disrupt our efforts to move forward with the Camp David process. More rapid progress in the talks is the best way of confounding such opposition and of silencing the opponents of our approach. At the same time, I have instructed Ed Muskie to tell the Europeans that we do not favor any alternative negotiating forum as long as the present negotiations are making progress. In that context, we will oppose any UN Security Council resolution which proposes to modify Resolution 242." (Telegram 128532 to Tel Aviv, May 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143-2026)

- Secretary Muskie’s talks in Europe;⁵
- Sol Linowitz’ talks in Europe;⁶
- a speech on autonomy⁷ (where Muskie is preferable);
- low-keying the importance of May 26 in our public presentations. (S)

In addition, we need some form of presentation for the moderate Arab states,⁸ and especially Saudi Arabia. Perhaps Sol should go to Riyadh—or a message could be sent to the Crown Prince. (S)

I also believe that both Linowitz—and the speech—should get at the security question, by reassuring the bulk of Israelis and reducing the capacity of Begin to wrap himself in the flag on issue after issue because of their “security” implications. (S)

I remain convinced that we need to intensify the talks in some way. Holding a Blair House or Rhodes-type⁹ set of talks may be impractical at this point. But I do believe that Sol should spend longer at a time in

⁵ Muskie traveled to Brussels for a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee May 13–15, before proceeding to Vienna for ceremonies commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. In his May 15 meeting with Kreisky, Muskie stressed the need to allow the autonomy negotiations to continue beyond May 26. Kreisky stated he was “very pessimistic” about the negotiations, citing Begin as one who “is not yet ready for a solution.” He also emphasized that peace was “impossible” without PLO participation. Kreiske continued that he “saw Begin’s continuation in power as bringing only ‘disaster and a new worldwide wave of anti-Semitism.’ Fortunately, he said, more and more Israelis recognize this fact. To demonstrate this latter point, Kreisky passed on very confidentially the news that 15 Knesset deputies recently asked him whether he could arrange a private meeting for them with Arafat.” (Telegram 6145 from Vienna, May 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800242–0011)

⁶ No memoranda of conversation from Linowitz’s talks in Europe have been found. In his memoirs, Linowitz wrote: “I met with the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Germany, and France in an effort to deflect, or at least delay, the “European initiative” that gave the Saudis, Hussein, and the West Bank Palestinians additional reasons not to play in what was—and still is—the only game in town.” (Linowitz, *Making of a Public Man*, p. 232)

⁷ The planned speech focused on the “critical issues” remaining in the negotiations (security, land, water, the powers of the SGA, and SGA elections) and emphasized the need for uninterrupted talks, the impediments created by Israeli settlements, U.S. support for an undivided Jerusalem, the need for all participants in the talks to accept Resolution 242 and the Camp David accord, and U.S. opposition to the use of the talks to “lay the foundation” for an independent Palestinian state. It was not delivered by Muskie until he spoke before the Washington Press Club on June 9. The text of the speech is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1980, pp. 3–5. However, a draft of the speech had been prepared by the Department of State and passed to Carter for his review on May 16 and conveyed to Muskie, who was in Vienna, in telegram Tosec 30088/129047 to USDEL Secretary, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800242–0533) Following revisions, a later version was conveyed in telegram 145299 to Paris, June 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800272–0224)

⁸ See Document 369.

⁹ Reference is to the talks held by Israeli and Egyptian delegations in February and March 1949, on the Greek island of Rhodes after the first Arab-Israeli war. The delegations met separately with UN mediator Ralph Bunche of the United States, where both indirect and direct negotiations took place.

the region, and shuttle back and forth to nail down individual points. This is an exhausting process; but past experience (e.g. the Kissinger shuttles) indicate that this is the recipe for success. Of course, given Sol's current status, at some point soon he will exhaust his remaining 50 days or so of his 120-day appointment, and some other status could be required. (S)

Intensifying the talks in this way—while being careful not to raise expectations unduly—could hasten the time (if at all) when enough work would be done to merit reconsideration of the option of bringing the talks to a head (perhaps through a summit). (S)

Under other circumstances, Muskie's going to the area next month could give an added fillip of senior authority. For the near term, however, his becoming that deeply involved would probably not be a good ordering of his priorities. (C)

We also need to be alive to the risks that there will be a continuing rise in violence on the West Bank. This may be, as Sam Lewis argues, something Fatah has decided upon for internal political reasons within the PLO, basically unrelated to the course of the talks. I am less convinced (since tactics on Camp David is the issue on which much of PLO politics turn). And it may be that violence—and Israeli counteractions—will go down now that the pressure of May 26 is off. But I suspect we will still face a recurring cycle of violence and counteraction, including UN resolutions. (S)

One approach would be to make greater efforts to explain what we are about to the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza (and working on the Israelis to "cool it" with regard to such steps as further deportations of mayors). (S)

There is another—more sensitive—line that bears thinking about (though I am not recommending it). I met this morning with Mustapha Zein, an American-educated Palestinian (who [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is close to the PLO). He argued that the PLO leadership, as well as Palestinians on the West Bank, are uncertain about the directions we are going, although he acknowledged that we have explained the process over and over in public. He suggested better flow of information (he did *not*, however, suggest any variation on our proscription on dealing with the PLO—since he argued there is nothing for us to talk with the PLO about!). (S)

Of course, he also took the argument a step further, in saying that an effort to isolate the PLO from the West Bank and Gaza is doomed to failure, and would only intensify Fatah's efforts to assert control there—and also to be active. (This was at least in part self-serving stuff). (S)

Nonetheless, there *might* be some merit in exploring ways to seek a reduction in the tolerance among West Bankers for disruptive violence,

through an intensified effort on the West Bank and in Gaza to explain how we see autonomy coming out, in terms of powers and responsibilities, etc. (S)

We also should think through our UN tactics. I believe there is merit in taking the position, *in advance*, that we believe in Camp David, and thus will just abstain on resolutions that would upset the process, unless they get at the basis for peacemaking (242) and require a veto. It could save us a lot of squabbling every other week. (C)

Finally, we will need to get on with the *talks*¹⁰ with the Israelis on the oil supply agreement (Sam Lewis says that the President told him that this was okay); that is different, of course, from agreeing to a formula that would permit triggering now. But we don't want to get accused (however unfairly) of renegeing on an agreement because we were unprepared to talk. (S)

¹⁰ See Document 372.

365. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, May 15, 1980, 1331Z

8927. Subject: Knesset Bill on Jerusalem. Ref: State 127291.²

1. (C-entire text).

2. The bill referred to in reftel was not "passed" by the Knesset, but was merely given a preliminary reading and referred to committee, where it is virtually certain to languish indefinitely. Any responses to press inquiries should reflect this fact.

3. The bill, which was introduced by Tehiya MK Geula Cohen to coincide with Jerusalem unification day, was primarily a publicity stunt by the theatrical right-wing MK. It contains three clauses: Jerusalem is the capital of Israel; the integrity and the unity of greater Jeru-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0356. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Cairo, and Jerusalem.

² Telegram 127291 to Tel Aviv, May 14, provided guidance for dealing with press questions related to the Knesset bill on Jerusalem. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800239–0289)

saalem, as delineated after the Six-Day War, shall not be impaired; the President of the State, the Knesset, the government, and the High Court, shall all have their permanent seat in Jerusalem. Virtually all Knesset factions were in agreement that such a law would be essentially superfluous, because most of its content has been basic GOI policy since East Jerusalem was annexed in 1967. To vote against such a bill, however, would be to oppose motherhood and matzah balls. Hence, rather than moving to strike the bill from the agenda, the Knesset voted to refer it to the law committee, chaired by Dovish NRP MK David Glass. Only the communists and Sheli voted “no”.

4. MK’s with whom we spoke did not expect the bill even to be seriously debated in committee. Should it somehow come up, however, the alignment faction has prepared its own bill which would supplement Cohen’s draft with provisions that guarantee the status of all the holy places, guarantee equal rights and responsibilities for minorities in Jerusalem, grant Jerusalem preference with regard to development and public resources, and give Ministerial status to the Mayor of Jerusalem.

5. The foregoing has been discussed with ConGen Jerusalem.

Brown

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, May 16, 1980, 1718Z

11060. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter on Suspension of Negotiations. Ref: Cairo 11043.²

1. Secret-entire text.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80. Secret; Flash, Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, indicating that he saw the document.

² Telegram 11033 from Cairo, May 16, outlined the substance of the message Sadat sent Carter in light of the Egyptian Government’s March 15 decision to continue the suspension of the autonomy negotiations following the Knesset’s decision to refer the East Jerusalem annexation bill to its legal committee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1919)

2. Under Secretary Osama El-Baz called me to the Foreign Ministry Friday at 1630 local to hand me the text of the following letter from President Sadat to President Carter. El-Baz said this was intended to supplement the oral message conveyed last night in reftel.

3. Begin text:

May 16, 1980

Dear Jimmy:

I was very pleased to talk to you on the phone³ and have another stimulating conversation with you. As you well know, I highly value the bonds of friendship and solidarity that bind us together and consider them among the main pillars of our policy. It is my deep conviction that coordinating our stands and agreeing on a common strategy should remain as an overriding factor in shaping our moves and actions. I view this as an important contribution to world peace and stability in the Middle East.

It is in this spirit that I am writing to you this letter to share with you some thoughts on how best to deal with the present situation. You will certainly recall that I told you, in our telephone conversation, that I was quite willing to agree to the resumption of the autonomy talks despite the discouraging signs which emerged from the Hertzliya Round. In that session, the Israeli Government took an unyielding hard line position on such sensitive issues as the settlements and the planned expansion of Jerusalem. To be sure, we are never deterred by such positions, however unreasonable, for they can be said to be merely negotiating positions. But the situation becomes different and those positions acquire new dimensions when they are accompanied or followed by certain steps which are designed to consecrate them and confront both Egypt and the United States with a *fait accompli* every now and then. Unfortunately, experience reveals that the Israeli Government is liable to interpret our willingness to continue negotiating despite its uncooperative actions and statements as a proof of our acceptance, or at least acquiescence, to its policy.

This has often resulted in encouraging the said government to take more untenable positions rather than moderating its views, a fact which has been recognized and regretted by many Israelis. It is for these reasons combined that my colleagues and I found it imperative to take a firm stand in response to a new Israeli move which could undermine our efforts if it goes unchecked. The move was initiated in the Knesset to turn the annexation of Arab Jerusalem into a basic law, an act which amounts to a constitutional amendment under the Israeli system. Such an act would be extremely difficult to reverse. Undoubt-

³ See Document 363.

edly, it was intended to intimidate future Israeli governments and curtail seriously their freedom of action. It has been suggested that such a move was undertaken by a Knesset member and not by the Israeli Government. However, it is evident that the government acted in parallel with the member's move and associated itself with it. Both Premier Begin and his chief negotiator found it opportune to endorse the move and state that it was nothing new. Furthermore, the Israeli Government submitted an additional draft of its own to formalize the annexation of East Jerusalem and render it irrevocable. One of the arguments Prime Minister Begin used was that he confronted us both with that at Camp David. On the other hand, Israeli officials have been making provocative statements about their settlement policy and their determination to build 14 new settlements [garble] The content as well as the timing of such actions came as a negative development to which we could not remain passive. It would not be in the interest of the negotiations and, in fact, the entire peace process to hold the talks in this atmosphere of rising tension and unilateral actions which run contrary to the spirit of reconciliation. As you know, the issue of Jerusalem is a sensitive one that invokes the interest and sentiments of eight hundred million Muslims. We recognized quite willingly the religious and cultural rights of sixteen million Jews in the city. By the same token, the rights of eight hundred million Muslims must be respected and observed.

Thus, it was inevitable for us to move to check such Israeli defiant attitude which is criticized by many moderate Israelis. We called for a pause, not a breaking-off of the negotiations. Such pause is intended to serve Israel notice that its policy of imposing preconditions and creating *fait accompli* is counter-productive. It is also meant as a signal to the Israeli public that their government is undermining the peace process with these rash and uncalled for actions. In the final analysis, the pause could, if utilized skillfully, help the peace efforts and boost the chances for reaching agreement. The Israeli Government must be brought to understand that it is under an obligation to exercise self-restraint and refrain from any precipitate action which is likely to affect adversely the peace process or render the negotiations meaningless. Afterwards, we will be ready to resume the talks in a more conducive atmosphere.

May I also suggest that we utilize this interval to discuss and coordinate our views of the major issues of substance which were raised in the course of the last round of talks. Our aides have started such thorough examination of substantive issues following the Hertzliya talks and I think that it would be fruitful to pursue this joint study prior to the resumption of the talks. Of course, you are at liberty to hold consultations with the other side as well. My confidence in you and your judgment has no limits. As usual, I will be delighted to receive your thoughts and observations.

With best wishes and regards.

Sincerely,

Mohammed Anwar El Sadat

End text.

4. As I did with Boutros Ghali last night, I told El-Baz that, according to our information, their interpretation of the Knesset action on the Jerusalem bill was erroneous; it had been introduced by an opposition member of the Knesset and the government had moved to bury it in committee. El-Baz refused to buy this explanation, saying that the government could have taken the position that submission of this bill was untimely and opposed its introduction at this time. Instead, the government had permitted the bill to be introduced and referred to committee.

5. I then asked El-Baz what the GOE considered should happen before negotiations resume. He said their position was as stated in last night's oral message—namely, that there should be assurances that the Jerusalem bill will not be voted into law while negotiations are going on. In addition, Israel should stop provocative announcements of plans for new settlements such as that in the recent Dobbles' report; it was one thing for Israel to state its position in negotiations that it had a right to settlements but quite another thing to announce specific plans to establish new settlements.

6. Noting that President Sadat's letter called for coordination and a common strategy between us, I reiterated the point I had made last night to Boutros Ghali that the GOE announcement which caught us by surprise was hardly an example of coordination and consultation and could not help but make a bad impression in the United States, after President Sadat's statement to President Carter and in his People's Assembly address that Egypt was prepared to resume negotiations. This would inevitably be seen as a reversal of the Egyptian position. I thought it useful to make this point again since Mansour Hassan, Minister of State in the presidency, with responsibility for information and cultural affairs, was in El-Baz's office during our conversation. Hassan was apparently there to discuss a press briefing which El-Baz was going to give immediately after our meeting to further clarify the Egyptian position on the autonomy talks. I believe the Egyptians are genuinely worried about the effect on President Sadat's credibility which their announcement has created and are seeking to minimize the damage, particularly with the American press.

7. Department may wish to repeat this message to Tel Aviv.⁴

Atherton

⁴ The Department transmitted the text of the telegram to Tel Aviv in telegram 128862, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800006–0404)

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, the White House, and the Embassy in Israel¹

Cairo, May 18, 1980, 1546Z

11149. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin. Ref: Cairo 11148.²

1. (S-entire text).

2. Following is the text of the letter from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin which was handed to Ambassador Ben Elissar earlier today (Sunday). In giving me the text, Foreign Minister Ali stressed that we should hold in strictest confidence the fact that it had been provided to us.

3. Begin text. Dear Prime Minister Begin,

—In our meetings and correspondence alike, we pledged to do everything possible in order to facilitate the process of reaching agreement on the establishment of a self-governing authority with full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. We discussed in length the necessity of making tangible and adequate progress in the autonomy negotiations in the light of our joint commitment to work for a comprehensive peace settlement of which all the parties benefit. In our meeting at Aswan,³ I emphasized to you the need for issuing new directives to our delegations with a view to accelerate the pace of progress and overcome the existing problems. Subsequently, we held separate talks with President Carter in Washington to stimulate movement in this direction.⁴

—However, I must tell you in all candor that I was disappointed by the lack of meaningful progress despite the intensification of the talks. You would recall that I drew your attention to the geopolitical considerations which make it imperative for both of us to set our priorities in such a manner that would enhance the prospects for reaching agreement. Despite our difference of opinions on several issues of substance, it has always been my conviction that it should not be that difficult to reach agreement so long as we are working in the context of a transitional arrangement and not that of a final settlement. We are not working in a vacuum either. We have the “Framework for Peace in the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 5/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Sent May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047-2414)

³ See Document 321.

⁴ See Documents 348 and 350–353.

Middle East” which outlined a viable formula for that transitional arrangement.

—Under these circumstances, it would not be advisable for any party to undermine the process through the imposition of any preconditions or the taking of any actions that threaten the essence of the negotiations or purport to confront the other party with a new *fait accompli* which might jeopardize the rights or positions of the parties. Thus we were pleased when the head of the Israeli delegation, Dr. Josef Burg, in response to a letter from Dr. Moustafa Khalil, stated on May 5 that you subscribe to the notion that no preconditions should be set for the negotiations and that the autonomy talks should be guided by the principles and provisions of the Camp David Framework.

—In this spirit, we did not give much weight to certain statements issued by Israeli officials on matters which are related to the negotiations. We took this as a way of taking a negotiating position in public for obvious political reasons. However, a regrettable development took place in the past few days when certain negative moves were initiated that would result in poisoning the atmosphere of the negotiations and make it very unlikely to reach agreement. I am referring specifically to the move which is being considered by the Knesset to turn the annexation of East Jerusalem into basic law.⁵ You are quite aware of our position on Jerusalem. While we are not calling for a division of the city or the introduction of any barriers between its different sectors, we insist on achieving that without resort to territorial annexation or violating the rights and interests of 800 million Muslims. It is true that we are familiar with your view on this issue and we are not asking you to forfeit your right to state your views in the course of the negotiations. But it is a different matter to take certain actions through your political institutions for the purpose of co-opting the outcome of the talks. These actions seem to be designed to render these issues, however crucial, not negotiable or useless to discuss. Instead of stemming these attempts on the basis that they adversely interfere with the peace process and create a situation which is hard to keep under control, it appears that the Israeli Government is encouraging or even endorsing such moves.

—Another case in point is your position on settlement issue. As that matter was being brought up for discussion in the negotiating chambers, an Israeli official revealed your plans to intensify settlement activities and establish new settlements in the coming five years, i.e., for the duration of the transitional period. I trust that you agree with me that such plans are incompatible with the spirit of negotiations. It is an attempt to predetermine the outcome of the talks through taking ad-

⁵ See Document 365.

vantage of your military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is for this reason that Minister Kamal Hassan Ali wrote to Dr. Burg during the Hertzliya talks to protest the statements your Minister of Agriculture⁶ made on that particular issue.

—On the other hand, at a time when you were expected to carry out the confidence building measures which we discussed several times and provided you with a list thereof as early as October 13, 1978, we witnessed an unfortunate escalation of action taken by Israeli authorities against the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

—How can we possibly win them over and enlist their support for the peace process in the midst of these actions?

—Dear Premier Begin,

—I believe that we have a historic opportunity to make a breakthrough that would bring about the reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. I also believe that, with good will and open minds we can make this cherished hope a living reality. With this in mind, I am urging you to effect the necessary change of attitude that would make it possible for us to resume negotiations. I leave it to your discretion and judgement to choose the ways and means for introducing such a change.

—With best wishes.

—Sincerely. End text.

Atherton

⁶ Ariel Sharon.

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, May 19, 1980, 2114Z

131696. For Ambassador Veliotos. Subject: King Hussein Visit to U.S. Ref: Amman 3237.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 42, Jordan: 1-5/80. Secret; Special Encryption; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Ronald E. Neumann (NEA/ARN); cleared by W. Nathaniel Howell (NEA/ARN), Saunders, Brzezinski, Chief of Protocol Abelardo L. Valdez, Deputy Executive Director Raymond G.H. Seitz, and Robert S. Steven (S/S-O); approved by Muskie.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Please deliver² following message from President Carter to King Hussein: Begin text:

Your Majesty:

I believe that an exchange of views between us on all issues of interest to both the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States would strengthen the relations between our two countries. I therefore would like to invite you and Queen Noor to pay an official visit to Washington, D.C. in the second half of June. Ambassador Veliotos will explore with you a mutually convenient date for your visit. Rosalynn joins me in expressing to you and Queen Noor the hope that you will be able to come at that time and we are looking forward to seeing you both. Best regards, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter End text.

[Omitted here are instructions for Veliotos regarding proposed dates for the visit and visit protocol.]

² Veliotos delivered Carter's message to Hussein on May 21. Hussein accepted the invitation for June 16–17 "with great pleasure." (Telegram 3420 from Amman, May 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–0485)

369. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, May 19, 1980, 2258Z

131748. Athens and Muscat for Ambassador Habib. Subject: May 26 and Beyond in the Autonomy Talks.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Consultations here in which Ambassadors Atherton and Lewis participated,² following Ambassador Linowitz's most recent round of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 4–5/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Niact Immediate to Athens. Sent Immediate to Amman, Jidda, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Sana, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, Muscat, Khartoum, and the White House. Sent for information Immediate to Baghdad, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and USUN. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Hunter, Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Constable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–0939)

² See footnote 2, Document 364.

negotiations in Herzlia,³ have led to a number of conclusions about the situation we face and the manner in which we should proceed through May 26 and beyond. In essence we believe that the negotiations are beginning to cut into the tough issues and while clearly there is little hope of concluding an agreement by May 26, we have concluded the negotiations should be pursued as intensively as possible until an agreement is reached. We recognize this may take some time and that in the meantime we will face a problem in maintaining credibility on the part of the Arabs and Europeans in the efficacy of our approach. With respect to the latter, the Secretary in his trip to Europe⁴ has begun to set forth the rationale for our approach and to make it clear that we consider it essential that the Europeans take no action that would make these negotiations more difficult. In one forum or another we will also begin to put out a public line that affirms our determination to pursue these negotiations until an autonomy agreement is reached and expresses confidence in the Camp David process as the only practical way to proceed toward a peace settlement.

3. With respect to the Arabs, we recognize there is little that we can do to influence the radical Arabs in any event. But we do want to keep in close touch with the moderate Arabs, and in particular to convey a signal to the Saudis and Jordanians at an early stage as to how we intend to proceed. In using the points below we want to give you maximum flexibility to adapt your presentation to your various interlocutors; the important thing is to get our message across as effectively as possible to the key officials in your host governments over the days ahead. We want to avoid appearing to be defensive. We do not think the Arabs (or Europeans) are going to have an easy time putting together an alternative strategy and we believe it will help to keep momentum from building in this direction if we project confidence in our own game plan.

4. Begin talking points:

—After a thorough review of the results of the recent Herzlia Round of negotiations and the overall status of the talks, we are convinced that, while agreement obviously cannot be reached by May 26, the negotiations should continue at as intense a pace as possible in the weeks ahead.

—It would of course have been ideal if the date set as a goal by the two parties could have been met. However, these are unprecedented negotiations in terms of their complexity and their objective, and it is

³ See Document 362.

⁴ Muskie attended the NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels May 13–15 and the ceremonies for the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna May 15–16.

hardly surprising that it has not been possible to conclude them in 12 months. We have had targets before that have been exceeded, but it is the ultimate success of the outcome and not meeting the target date that is important.

—What is important today is that serious negotiations are underway, and that we believe they are getting somewhere. The experience at Herzlia of engaging both Ministers and working groups simultaneously permitted the parties to begin grappling with some of the central issues for the first time.

—Ambassador Linowitz had to handle a tough confrontation over the security issue at Herzlia. But at the same time much valuable work was accomplished. We have now put forward our suggestions on most of the issues and these are being considered carefully by the two sides. There is a much closer common concept of what kind of document we should aim for as the outcome of negotiations than there was even a month ago. We are moving steadily toward getting both sides to accept a single text as the basis for negotiations.

—It is our intention to pursue these negotiations as vigorously as possible until an agreement is reached. We will play our role as “full partner” and will both put forward our own suggestions as we consider appropriate and intervene to break deadlocks to move the process forward. We are not interested in achieving an incomplete or inadequate agreement within some arbitrary time limit. We are determined to get a meaningful agreement on autonomy and will extend the negotiations if necessary to achieve it.

—There is already agreement on a significant list of functions to be transferred fully to the Palestinian self-governing authority. The two sides are now grappling with the remaining core issues: arrangements for control over land; the principles to govern an equitable allocation of water; designing arrangements that will fully assure Israel’s security while giving the Palestinian authority an appropriate role in security functions; arrangements in the economic sphere; voting rights for the East Jerusalem Arabs. These will be tough issues to resolve but we believe it can be done with patience and determination.

—The President remains convinced that Resolution 242 and the Camp David Framework offer the only practical way of building toward a comprehensive peace. He is determined to see this process through to success.

—The President has asked Secretary Muskie and Ambassador Linowitz to outline to key European leaders the progress made to date in these talks and to stress the complexities of the issues which can only be ultimately resolved by tenacious attention to the negotiating process itself in the months ahead. We will make clear to the Europeans that we

see no virtue in any alternate negotiating forum so long as serious negotiations are underway and both sides want them to continue.

—With respect to the present “postponement” in the negotiations that Sadat has brought about, the Egyptians are clearly upset by certain actions the Israelis have taken, but they assure us that they have no intention of breaking off the negotiations. We are in touch with both sides and are urging a resumption of the negotiations at an early date. We can understand the frustrations which each side periodically feels but past experience has shown that a tenacious application to the negotiating process is the best way ultimately to resolve the issues.

5. In making these points, we would like you to find the occasion to place them in the context of the President’s desire to maintain strong and close relations with your respective host countries. We want to continue our dialogue on the peace process, and we hope both governments will agree with our view that it is of utmost importance to do this in a manner which preserves our overall cooperation for the vital strategic objectives we share.

Muskie

**370. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador to the United States
(Evron) to President Carter¹**

Washington, May 20, 1980

My dear Mr. President,

I have been asked by Prime Minister Begin to transmit to you the following message:

“Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of May 15 which Ambassador Lewis delivered to me on his return to Israel.²

Indeed, the Ambassador, in the course of our discussion, added valuable details concerning the developments. Among other matters he made it clear to me that you, Mr. President, wrote your letter before

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 10, Israel: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 3–12/80. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the letter, indicating that he saw the document.

² See footnote 4, Document 364.

President Sadat had made the second announcement about a further postponement or suspension of the autonomy negotiations.³ Both announcements came to all of us as a complete surprise.

You will recall that at the end of the last round of talks⁴ in Herzliya on May 7 the three delegations affirmed that the intensified negotiations, as agreed upon in the wake of your conversations with President Sadat and myself, would continue in Cairo on May 12. A day later, without prior consultation, President Sadat decided to postpone the date of the continuing talks to which we had all agreed.

In his speech to the Egyptian Parliament on May 14,⁵ President Sadat declared that in response to your personal request he had decided to renew the negotiations. However, on the following day, he again surprisingly announced yet a further postponement.

On Sunday afternoon, May 18, I received from our Ambassador in Cairo President Sadat's personal message⁶ to me in which he listed three main complaints: The private Member's Bill in the Knesset pertaining to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel which elicited the almost universal consensus of the House,⁷ a statement made by our Minister of Agriculture⁸ in one of the negotiating sessions concerning the settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, and the latest measures in Judea and Samaria. I assume, Mr. President, that the Egyptians provided you with the contents of that message so I will not go into its details.

In my reply to President Sadat, dispatched today, I conveyed to him the following. I wrote that the aforementioned Jerusalem Bill does not differ whatsoever in its contents from the letter I communicated to you on September 17, 1978, at Camp David. I, likewise, drew his attention to the Resolution on Jerusalem adopted on April 1, 1980 by the Egyptian Parliament which completely contradicts our innermost beliefs. Israel did not, however, because of that Resolution, interrupt the negotiations.

On the matter relating to Minister Sharon, he legitimately made a statement in the course of the talks regarding our settlements. The Egyptian delegation voiced objections as did our delegation over General Ali's statement on security issues which we found to be totally unacceptable.

³ See footnote 2, Document 366.

⁴ For a summary of the talks, see Document 362.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 363.

⁶ See Document 367.

⁷ Carter underlined "which elicited the almost universal consensus of the House" and wrote "!" in the right-hand margin next to this phrase.

⁸ Ariel Sharon.

We did not see this, however, to be a reason for us to suspend the talks.

As for the measures in Judea and Samaria, a horrible atrocity was perpetrated in Hebron⁹ and we had the clear duty to seek out the murderers who had waited in ambush to cut down the worshippers returning from prayer. I conveyed to President Sadat our hope that peaceful conditions will soon be restored.

I wish to use this opportunity, Mr. President, to thank you for your efforts within the European Community about which you wrote. It is clear that the so-called “European initiative” can only impair our important negotiations conducted in accordance with the Camp David Agreement. I agree with you that we must continue to work together and do our utmost to bring about the successful conclusion of the negotiations which Israel wishes to see speedily renewed.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,
Menachem Begin”
Sincerely,

Ephraim Evron
Ambassador

⁹ See Document 361.

371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, May 29, 1980, 0040Z

140586. Subject: Mobarak Visit—Autonomy Talks.

1. (S-entire text.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2246. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner and Walker; cleared by Hunter and Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Draper. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House.

2. Following is a summary report on Mobarak's discussions here on autonomy negotiations.² Mobarak met alone with the President³ for 20 minutes May 23; had lunch with the Secretary (this was mostly a social occasion with no business of importance transpiring); and then met with Ambassador Linowitz later the same day for more than an hour.

3. In meeting with the President, Mobarak in essence sought the President's views as to whether a quick resumption of the negotiations was desirable or, alternatively, whether it would be better to have a more extended pause. The President later directed that Mobarak be asked to convey back to Sadat a brief message that (a) he would prefer that the talks be started again as soon as possible and (b) we would try to get an appropriate statement on Jerusalem.

4. On the way to the airport upon departure, Mobarak indicated some personal disappointment with the message, pointing out that Sadat's suspension of the talks had been favorably received in the Arab world, and this was important to Egypt.

5. In conversations with Ambassador Linowitz,⁴ Mobarak and former Prime Minister Khalil,⁵ whose visit overlapped with the Vice President's, made it clear that they do not expect the negotiations to register much progress before the U.S. elections in November. Both stressed Egyptian willingness to continue the talks provided we can get assurances from the Israelis that the Cohen Bill⁶ on Jerusalem will not be voted into law. Khalil agreed that either a letter from Burg to Linowitz or Burg's confirmation of Linowitz's understanding of the situation would permit Egypt to resume the talks.⁷ Mobarak said he be-

² In addition to the discussions on the status of the autonomy negotiations noted here, Mubarak met with Brown on May 23 on the supply of parts and munitions to the Egyptian military, the progress of the F-4 fighter program for the Egyptian Air Force, and the planned temporary deployment of U.S. F-4 fighter aircraft to Cairo West airbase in support of that program. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0446, DEM Memcons, Reporting Cables. Mubarak also discussed an Egyptian request for additional economic assistance with Muskie on May 23. The Department of State conveyed a summary of their conversation to the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 142653 to Cairo, May 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800266-0536.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met privately with Mubarak from 11:01 a.m. to 11:20 a.m., before joining Ghorbal, el-Baz, Muskie, Sterner, Brzezinski, and Hunter in the Cabinet Room from 11:20 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. on May 23. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memoranda of conversation of these meetings have been found.

⁴ No record of Linowitz's conversation with Mubarak has been found.

⁵ Carter met with Khalil in the Oval Office from 9:51 a.m. to 10:02 a.m. on May 23. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 5/23/80 Visit of Former Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt: 5/80.

⁶ See Document 365.

⁷ See Document 374.

lieved that even a unilateral US assurance that the bill would not go forward would suffice. Both Mobarak and Khalil expressed dismay over Israeli settlement activity and actions on the West Bank but did not go so far as to make Israeli assurances in these areas a pre-condition to resuming the talks.

Muskie

372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, May 23, 1980

SUBJECT

Oil Supply Agreement to Israel

At your request, the Israelis were told on May 2 that we wanted to defer talks scheduled for May 4–6 on the U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement on oil supply so that you and I could have a chance to discuss this problem. I have now reviewed the issue and have examined the memorandum of May 1 sent to you by Charles Duncan and Warren Christopher.² I think we should move quickly to resume discussion of this issue with the Israelis. As Ambassador Lewis explained in your meeting on May 1,³ further delay on our part in discussing the terms for activation of the Agreement is likely to introduce an unnecessary irritant into our relationship with the Israelis. If you agree, I would like to send a negotiating team to Israel sometime in June. Before we approach the Israelis to propose specific dates, we need your approval for our position.

The two basic principles which our negotiators will convey to the Israelis are: (1) that the MOA is a supply unavailability agreement, and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860146–1165. Secret; Nodis Attachment. Carter wrote “Ed. C.” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski returned the approved memorandum to Muskie under a May 27 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860146–1164)

² Attached but not printed. The memorandum recommended a threshold formula for the activation of the U.S.-Israel oil agreement and recommended that if the United States provided foreign oil to Israel it would charge Israel the acquisitive cost plus handling charges.

³ See Document 360.

we are working from that; and (2) the price charged for any oil supplied to Israel must be full replacement cost; it cannot contain any hidden subsidy.

My Recommendation:

We stay with the basic position contained in the May 1 memorandum (attached) with one change: increasing the requirement for short-term, indirect purchases from two-thirds to three-quarters. Our negotiators would have to seek additional instructions before changing this position. The position has the following main provisions:

When there is no physical shortage of oil available to Israel, the Agreement could be activated, subject to the concurrence of each of the governments at the time, if Israel:

(1) is paying for all its imported oil an average price higher than the average cost of the most expensive 10% of crude oil imported into the United States (\$38.61 per barrel in March) and;

(2) has to buy at least three-quarters of its oil through short-term, indirect purchases.

As to the matter of the price of oil that we would provide if the Agreement were activated:

(1) if the U.S. provides foreign oil to Israel, we would charge our acquisition cost plus any handling charges; and

(2) if the U.S. provides domestic oil to Israel, the price charged would be acquisition cost or the replacement cost whichever is higher. Replacement cost means the actual cost to U.S. refiners of replacing oil sold to Israel; if this cannot be precisely determined, replacement cost will be considered to be equivalent to the average cost to U.S. refiners of the most expensive 10% of crude oil imported into the United States.

This is a sound, tough negotiating position. We may have to authorize adjustments in the future, but I recommend that we *not* do so in advance.

I recommend, and Charles Duncan concurs, that we send a team to Israel in June, to proceed on the basis described above.⁴

⁴ Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation. Also attached but not printed is an update on Israel's oil supply situation.

373. Memorandum From Edward S. Walker in the Office of the President's Special Representative, Department of State, to the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)¹

Washington, June 3, 1980

SUBJECT

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The situation in the West Bank and Gaza, in the Arab world generally and in terms of the negotiations is deteriorating.

Begin's first act as Defense Minister² was to suspend publication of two out of three West Bank Arab newspapers. (His action was, strictly speaking, justified since the newspapers had evaded the censor by placing editorial comment in news stories.) The Israeli authorities also apparently suspended Arab women's organizations after an attempted sit-in organized by one such group in three homes which were sealed by Israeli authorities in Nablus (the comparison of Government action in this case to its lack of action against Israeli women sitting-in at the Hadassah building is vivid in West Banker's thoughts and in those of many Israelis, some of whom reportedly had come to Nablus in a show of solidarity with the Palestinian women). Attempts by shopkeepers to close their businesses in reaction to the bombings³ of West Bank mayors were forceably broken up by the IDF and two or three Arab youths were wounded by IDF fire during a scuffle at one Arab town. Several more schools have been closed just as students were preparing for critical examinations and, as Mayor Freij told Brandon Grove, since Weizman left there is no address in the Military Government to which the Arabs can turn. As you know, Mayor Shawa of Gaza has resigned⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 6/80. Secret; Nodis. Printed from a copy that does not bear Walker's initials.

² Begin assumed the office of Minister of Defense following the resignation of Weizman on May 25.

³ On June 2, Mayor Shaka of Nablus and Mayor Khalaf of Ramallah were wounded in separate bomb attacks on their automobiles. (Telegram 1768 from Jerusalem, June 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800269–0981) On June 7, the United States decided to offer medical assistance in the form of a military medical team and transfer to a U.S. medical facility to Shaka, who was in a hospital in Amman, and to Khalaf, who was hospitalized in Nablus. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Brown, June 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 6/1–19/80)

⁴ Shawa resigned on June 2, shortly after the bomb attacks in Nablus and Ramallah. (Telegram 10084 from Tel Aviv, June 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800270–0060)

and the few remaining West Bank mayors, including Freij, are considering similar action. The quality of life has plummeted in the territories and many, including Sam Lewis, expect a cycle of violence and repression which could turn the clock back ten years. This ultimately could lead to repugnance in Israel and even greater pressure for new elections.

Begin is no closer to solving his ministerial problem. He and Sharon engaged in a vitriolic exchange at Sunday's⁵ Cabinet meeting which will make it all but impossible for Sharon to support Shamir's appointment as Defense Minister and equally impossible for Begin to withdraw it. If Sharon votes against the government he is required by Knesset procedures to resign and Begin is apparently backgrounding the press that this would be no great loss. Sharon's defection would not bring down the government but would make Begin's majority and survivability very tenuous.

Begin, in an almost irrational Knesset speech,⁶ compared the German government to the Nazis and the French to the Vichy. He reiterated Israeli policy on Jerusalem and used the line that the government does not intend to "intervene" in the Knesset handling of the Cohen Bill.⁷ While the intent may have been to be helpful, the message was couched in a way which will be interpreted by the Egyptians and other Arabs as anything but helpful.

Burg talked to Sam and said he was anxious to come to Washington to see you and is ready to travel on 36-hour notice. Burg once again tried out Begin's formula of the Government not "intervening" in the matter of the Cohen Bill but asked Sam for any other suggestions. Burg would like to get a formula worked out before coming to Washington. Sam is skeptical that any formula Begin could agree to would satisfy the Egyptians and suggests we not spend much political capital in pursuing this track. He also points out that the government is beginning to press its own version of a basic law on Jerusalem which could come out of committee or at least be considered in committee in a matter of weeks or no more than months. Thus, even if we get a reassurance on the Cohen Bill we must be careful not to mislead the Egyptians and set the stage for a future walk-out which causes even more damage. Sam suggested getting Burg and Ali together (Ali is currently indisposed due to a recurrence of his rheumatic arthritis), back-to-back Burg and Ali visits or a shuttle by you in the area. However, Sam is

⁵ June 1.

⁶ Excerpts of Begin's June 2 address to the Knesset are in *Israel's Foreign Policy, Historical Documents*, vol. 6: 1979–1980, Document 97.

⁷ See Document 365.

having doubts about the value of any action, at present, given the sour atmosphere which he expects to persist for some time to come.

Sadat told Roy that the situation was very bad and urged us to try to calm things down. However, in a very brief aside during a group meeting he asked Roy to tell President Carter “when he wants to resume negotiations, I am ready.” This was not the tone of Osama El-Baz’ remarks to Roy who did not see how negotiations could resume under current conditions. Sadat makes it sound easy, but Osama may be more accurate in his sense of what is healthy for Sadat to do right now. Khalil is, meanwhile, off to London for discussions with key leaders there.

If Israeli extremists have set back the clock in the West Bank, Arafat and al-Fatah have done the same at a Damascus gathering by re-establishing the goal “to liberate Palestine completely and to liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically.” The conference went on to say that the only way to achieve this goal is through armed struggle. While the tougher formulation of Fatah’s goals is a product of frustration, and probably also a move by Arafat to out maneuver his extremists, it has given Begin a handle to rally support behind him.

The Jordanians are telling us that the US is being blamed for the attacks on the West Bank mayors and it seems to be a consensus in our Embassies and the Consulate General in Jerusalem that our stock has hit a new low. The Jordanian Prime Minister,⁸ a cool head, has urged us to take a strong public posture against Israeli action in the West Bank. A UN Security Council debate is likely in the next few days to discuss Israeli activities in the territories at which we will be pressed to come down hard on Israeli practices. This debate apparently has taken precedence over the proposed debate on Jerusalem.

⁸ Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf.

374. Memorandum From the President's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

Status of Egypt-Israel Autonomy Negotiations

I thought you might want to have this very brief report on where things stand now with reference to the effort to get the autonomy talks started again and how we have been going about it.

Ever since the visit of Mubarak,² I have been working with the Israelis and the Egyptians endeavoring to evolve a satisfactory formula which might cover the concern expressed by the Egyptians with reference to the Jerusalem Bill³ in the Knesset. I tried out several alternate approaches with the Israelis after first checking with Roy Atherton to get some assurance that the Egyptians would be agreeable to them.

As you know, the Israelis feel that they have not misbehaved in any way in connection with the Jerusalem Bill, and are unwilling to offer any assurances as to what the Government might or might not do if the Bill were to issue from the committee to which it has been referred. The most the Government of Israel is willing to say is that it will not "interfere" with the legislative process of the Knesset in connection with this Bill. This obviously will not satisfy the Egyptians, as I have forcefully indicated to the Israelis.

The central fact is that Jerusalem is such a politically sensitive and explosive issue and, therefore, Begin and his colleagues are unwilling to say anything about what they might or might not do if a Jerusalem Bill were to appear on the floor of the Knesset. As you will remember, all but very few members of the Knesset voted to refer Geula Cohen's Jerusalem Bill to committee when it was offered by her.

This morning I thought we had resolved the issue fairly well.⁴ The plan was for me to write a letter to General Ali indicating that the Is-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 6/80. Secret; Nodis. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Muskie and Brzezinski. The memorandum was forwarded to Carter under a June 6 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

² See Document 371.

³ See Document 365.

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter held a foreign policy breakfast meeting from 7:35 a.m. to 9:25 a.m. on June 6, attended by Mondale, Muskie, Brown, Donovan, Cutler, Jordan, and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In the published version

raelis had given assurances that they would not “interfere” in the legislative process in connection with the Bill—and that I understood this to mean that the Government would take no action in the Knesset in connection with the Bill. Burg approved this; but after he talked to Begin he telephoned to say that Begin had disapproved it.

In conversations thereafter with Roy Atherton we agreed that the best way to proceed in order to get the negotiations going would be as follows:

1. Roy will make an oral presentation to Ali and perhaps Sadat⁵ about the facts in connection with the Jerusalem Bill and the reasons why the Israeli Government finds it exceedingly difficult politically to say anything in writing about the plans with respect to the Bill. We hope that this may allay Egyptian concerns, even though it falls far short of what they had originally requested.

2. A letter would come from you to President Sadat⁶ calling upon him to resume the negotiations as soon as possible and pointing out that we are in a far stronger position to have an impact on Israel and her policies if we are in negotiations with her.

3. Roy will hand the Egyptians a copy of Ed Muskie’s forthcoming speech on the Middle East⁷ in which Ed will call for no further unilateral steps by either party and urging the parties to return to the negotiating table.

If all of this works as it should, then I would propose that the announcement be made by the United States about the resumption of the talks. We could merely say that after extensive discussions with Israel and Egypt and clarification of the situation with reference to several points raised, the parties have agreed to resume negotiations immediately. I would not think that it would be profitable to elaborate beyond this brief statement.

At the same time, we would hope to be able to say that General Ali and Minister Burg are going to be in Washington next week and meet

of his personal diary, Carter wrote of the meeting: “At the foreign affairs breakfast we discussed the Mideast peace talks. Begin is shaky and we don’t want to do anything to prop him up because he’s a major obstacle to success, but we’ve got to show our leadership, keep the Camp David process alive, and stop the abandonment of the process by Egypt.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 435)

⁵ The substance of the U.S. proposal was sent to Atherton in telegram 149590 to Cairo, June 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1871) Atherton met with Ali, el-Baz, and Amre Moussa on June 7 to deliver the U.S. proposal for the resumption of the autonomy negotiations. (Telegram 12674 from Cairo, June 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2490)

⁶ See Document 375.

⁷ Muskie delivered his speech to the Washington Press Club on June 9. See footnote 7, Document 364.

with me in order to discuss how to get the negotiations moving again and to make plans for the next negotiating sessions.

It will not be possible to get word from Egypt until sometime Sunday⁸ as to whether this course of procedure is agreeable, and we shall then have to make sure that Israel is fully in accord. Conceivably all this might be worked out in time for Ed Muskie to say something about it in the course of his speech Monday noon.

⁸ June 8.

375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt¹

Washington, June 7, 1980, 1220Z

150415. For Ambassador for Urgent Delivery June 7. Subject: Letter for President Sadat.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Please deliver the following message from President Carter to President Sadat as soon as possible.²

3. Begin text:

Dear President Sadat:

I have been, as you know, greatly concerned about the hiatus in the autonomy negotiations. I believe that it is of the foremost importance to the success of these negotiations that they be resumed as soon as possible. I am convinced that failure to resume the negotiations will only

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by A. Marks (S/SN); cleared by Sterner, Raymond G. Seitz (S/S) and Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Linowitz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1901) The draft version of the message was forwarded to Carter for his approval under a June 6 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. Initialing his approval on the covering memorandum, which states that the message was drafted by Linowitz, Carter added a handwritten note: "It sounds like nothing. I hope it works. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80)

² Atherton delivered Carter's message to Mubarak on June 8 for delivery to Sadat who was in Ismailia. (Telegram 12715 from Cairo, June 8; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 6/80)

strengthen those who oppose our course and will endanger our mutual efforts to achieve comprehensive peace in the area.

I am also convinced that the only sound way of meeting your concerns and achieving our mutual goals is to pursue the autonomy negotiations as actively as possible so that we can make demonstrable progress on the key issues critical to the autonomy concept.

I therefore urge, Mr. President, that you authorize us to tell the Israelis that you are prepared to resume the negotiations as soon as possible. If you will do this, I believe the next step might be to arrange a meeting among the delegation heads to draw up plans for the resumption of negotiations on lines that will ensure they proceed as productively as possible.

With warm personal regards,
Jimmy Carter
End text.

Muskie

376. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, June 7, 1980, 2219Z

150838. Subject: U.S. Position on European Middle East Initiative.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. As addressees know, Europeans are concerned about Middle East peace process and have conferred among themselves about an initiative they might take. There is much divided counsel, however, about what specific form an initiative should take, with some preferring the idea of a Security Council resolution while others believe this would be a mistake and that instead the Europeans should confine themselves to an EC statement. The Egyptians are apparently now weighing in with the Europeans against a Security Council resolution at this time: Vice President Mubarak reportedly took this line in his recent visits to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800279–1230. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate to Luxembourg, London, Paris, Bonn, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Dublin. Sent for information Immediate to all Near Eastern and South Asian posts and Khartoum. The telegram was repeated Immediate to Rome and The Hague and repeated for information Immediate to Brussels (for USEEC), USNATO, and Berlin on June 9.

London and Bonn, and Minister of State Boutros Ghali appears to be making same argument in Rome. The state of play as we understand it is that various options will be examined at meeting of political directors June 4, who will prepare final recommendations to their leaders in time for summit June 12–13.

3. In our judgment the Europeans have already made up their minds that they will have to issue some kind of statement and it will therefore probably not be possible to talk them into holding off entirely on an initiative. We believe instead our efforts should be directed toward channeling any statement by the Europeans in directions that are as constructive as possible and that will be less damaging to our own Middle East strategy. We can best do this, we believe, by defining our own concerns and requirements as precisely as possible.

4. As the EC governments formulate their final positions over the next few days, you should seek appropriate opportunities to get our views across as outlined below at the level you deem will be most effective. In your remarks you should stress three principal points: (1) We will view any statement they make or any action by the contribution it makes to a negotiated settlement; (2) anything that appears to offer the Arabs the false hope of an easy alternative would conflict with our purposes since it would take the heat off the Arabs to engage eventually in the autonomy negotiations; (3) we wish to be consulted about any initiative the Europeans propose to launch well in advance.

5. Begin talking points:

—The achievement of peace in the Middle East is, as we all agree, of vital importance to the West. In our view that cannot be achieved by actions which are designed primarily to satisfy one side. It can only be achieved by negotiations, as difficult as these can be, of the kind which flow out of the Camp David Framework. As the Secretary has already stressed, the President has determined that we will pursue these negotiations in the absence of any other alternatives which have a chance of achieving peace.

—We are now attempting to cope with Sadat's suspension of the talks² over the proposed Jerusalem legislation.³ Amb. Linowitz is at work attempting to get the talks back on the tracks because we believe both sides basically want to see the process through. In the meantime the Israeli Cabinet crisis⁴ and the increased violence in the West Bank have complicated matters. But we continue to hold the view that the

² See footnote 3, Document 362.

³ See Document 365.

⁴ Defense Minister Ezer Weizman resigned from the Cabinet on May 25 in protest of the government's "marking time" in the peace talks with Egypt. ("Weizman Attacks Begin on Talks," *The New York Times*, May 27, 1980, p. A18)

autonomy negotiations are viable and that they ultimately offer the best hope for progress. The negotiations are tough, but they are slowly getting somewhere.

—Our concept is that we need further work by the negotiating teams before the key issues are delineated in such a way that we can begin to plan for a major push to get trade-offs on these issues. We are working to get the parties back to the table as soon as possible so that we can work intensively toward this.

—We understand European concerns at the slowness of the talks but we would ask them to analyze carefully the pressures they believe are building on them. Are the Arabs really going to rush to actions that would be as self-defeating for them in the final analysis as they would be damaging to the West? Is the security of the moderate Arab states seriously threatened by the present negotiations? Our own judgment is that while the key moderates have reservations about the autonomy negotiations they have no alternative plan and do not plan to join any radical bandwagon to produce a confrontation with us on the peace issue. They are concerned but not seriously threatened. We believe we have the time to see this process through but also want to stress that it is our intention to help complete it as soon as possible.

—We and the Europeans have a shared interest in the fundamental importance of a comprehensive Middle East peace. Actions which the Europeans can take to further this objective would be welcomed by the United States. Our own specific reaction to any European proposal will be determined by whether an initiative will be supportive of a negotiated solution.

—Our reaction to any consideration in the UN of the peace process will be based on the fact that Resolution 242 is the agreed basis for a peace settlement and it is the foundation of the Camp David process and the current autonomy negotiations. Any effort to alter the ground rules of the negotiations would be fundamentally counterproductive. Resolutions which seek to establish or define “rights of the Palestinians” or “self-determination for the Palestinians” are likely to be construed in Israel as changing 242 and cause a similar adverse impact on the peace negotiations.

—We have another concern that bears on any initiative the Europeans might take. We should not offer the Arabs the false hope of an easier alternative that will save them from joining the negotiations or giving serious consideration to the eventual negotiated outcome of the autonomy talks in the cold light of available alternatives. You should stress that no other means has been suggested that offers the Palestinians the hope of as many real gains in the near future as the Camp David process.

—We are therefore open-minded but we attach utmost importance to the criteria which we have mentioned, and we want the Europeans to be aware of them. We would ask the Europeans to explain how they believe their specific ideas would contribute in real terms to advancing the negotiations.

—We hope that in continuing its dialogue with the Arabs, the European Community would not suggest concessions without a clear commitment on the Arabs' part to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East problem and recognition of Israel's right to exist. The recent Fatah conference in Damascus resulted in assertion of maximalist Palestinian demands for the liquidation of Israel and we would expect that this position would be strenuously opposed by our European allies.

—Finally, whatever ideas the Europeans finally come up with, we hope to be consulted well in advance.

6. In making these points, you should also make it clear that we are fully aware of the connection between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problems we face more broadly in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. We recognize the contribution that demonstrated progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israel settlement can make toward strengthening our strategy across the whole region.

Muskie

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, June 11, 1980, 1041Z

13017. Subject: Egyptian-Israeli Talks: Response From President Sadat to President Carter's Letter. Ref: A. Cairo 12715;² B. State 150415;³ C. Cairo 12987.⁴

1. Secret-entire text.

2. I was summoned to meet Wednesday morning, June 11, with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Osama El-Baz, who handed me the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2528. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See footnote 2, Document 375.

³ See Document 375.

⁴ Sent June 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2525)

text of the oral message from President Sadat in para 3 below, responding to President Carter's letter (reftel B) which I delivered to Mubarak for Sadat on June 8. El-Baz commented that President Sadat's reply contains nothing new but includes several points which GOE considers it important to have on the record. El-Baz said he thought the way was now clear for us to issue our announcement⁵ today about resuming the negotiations but that I should confirm this with Foreign Minister Ali in view of his comments to me the previous evening about reconsidering the timing of our announcement (reftel C). I have not yet been able to reach Ali this morning but will keep trying.

3. Begin text:

June 9, 1980

Dear President Carter:

Thank you very much for your message of June 8. As I told you in the message Vice President Mubarak conveyed to you last month,⁶ I am willing to do whatever you deem helpful despite our assessment of the current attitude of the Israeli Government. In this assessment, we are not resorting to passing any judgment on Israeli intentions. Rather, we are basing it on a careful analysis of their actions and official statements. There is every indication that they are determined not only to obstruct the process of reaching agreement, but even the creation of the atmosphere which is necessary for the continuation of the negotiations.

However, on the basis of your appeal, we decided to accept your invitation to the Washington meeting for the purpose of removing the existing obstacles and verifying the presence of the essential requisites for pursuing the talks. I think that it is important to make this point clear in any statement or announcement regarding the meeting in Washington.

On the other hand, I think that the timing of this meeting is equally important. As you certainly have noticed, I hastened to announce our acceptance of your proposal in order to strengthen your hand. You will always find us helpful and cooperative and we will do everything we can to make matters easier for you.

With best wishes and regards,

Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat

End text.

⁵ At 11:58 a.m. on June 11, Powell announced to reporters in the White House Briefing Room that Egypt and Israel had accepted the invitation of the United States to send Burg and Ali to meet with Linowitz in Washington to prepare for the resumption of formal negotiations. The text of the announcement is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, p. 1093.

⁶ Not found.

4. I recommend that Department repeat this message to Tel Aviv.⁷

Atherton

⁷ The Department sent the text of this telegram to Tel Aviv in telegram 154173, June 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800007–0313)

378. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1980, 10:40 a.m.–12:24 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's First Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert Hunter, National Security Council Staff Member (notetaker)
His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
His Excellency Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
His Excellency Ahmad Lawzi, Chief of Royal Court
Lt. General (Ret.) Amer Khammash, Minister of Court
Lt. General Sharif Zaid Bin Shaker, Commander in Chief of the Jordan Armed Forces
His Excellency Fawaz Sharaf, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States

(The President and His Majesty met briefly in the Oval Office,² then joined the others in the Cabinet Room at 10:40 a.m. Throughout, King Hussein addressed the President as "Sir.").

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

² Carter and Hussein met with members of the press in the Oval Office beginning at 10:37 a.m. on June 17. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

The President began by recalling his last meeting with King Hussein in Tehran at New Year's 1977 [1978].³

The Prime Minister noted that His Majesty had just been talking about that last meeting in Iran.

The President said that he was pleased and honored to have His Majesty come here again. He (the President) had said in his welcoming remarks⁴ that relations with Jordan are extremely important to us. They are founded on shared commitments and ideals, which have not and will not change. He was sorry that there had been this series of delays in his (the King's) coming here. But he looks eagerly to having this chance to talk. He welcomes Queen Noor; we are proud of her. Congratulations to His Majesty on his marriage and on the birth of his child. Second, in the brief time available to them, he hopes to explore as many common problems and opportunities as possible. We will present our analysis of what we face. He is eager to get his (the King's) advice and counsel on our policy for the future. There is a large measure of identity in their common agreement. There is a minimum of differences within a common approach. His Majesty is welcome. Their meeting will be fruitful.

His Majesty thanked the President. He welcomes this opportunity to be in a country he respects, admires, and loves. He is one of the few leaders in his part of the world who feels an identity with the foundations of the United States, with its ideals and principles, which they hold dear in Jordan, as well. U.S. and Jordanian aims and objectives must always be the same; their objectives are very much one and the same—objectives of peace with dignity, and of stability. He is in a position to see and observe the Islamic world, which is now the focus of attention, brought about by its location, its sources of energy, and its potential for instability. This area must now be part of the free world; there is no other way to go. If there are divisions, or weaknesses, or cracks in cohesion, that should be overcome. Unfortunately, all of this is related to the Palestinian problem, and the fact that it is not yet totally resolved in a way that future generations can live with. He remembers his meetings with the President, through their meeting in Tehran. He knows that the President has given him more time than any other president. In their discussions on the Middle East, he can see that the President has greater sincerity on this problem and on resolving it than he has ever experienced before. Unfortunately, their hearts had moved away (from one another)—but not from the objective of peace. We (Jor-

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 182.

⁴ The text of Carter's remarks at the welcoming ceremony for Hussein is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1121–1123.

danians) are always committed to it; it is dear to us; and we will try to contribute to it—to see it realized in any way we can. He remembers discussing with the President approaches to a comprehensive settlement—pre-Geneva, joint delegations, Palestinian involvement, etc. But events took a different course! Unfortunately, there was a lack of communication between him and the President; and both were “surprised” by events. There were gaps of time, understanding, cooperation—which he had always valued. He is very grateful to see the President, to talk, and to hear the President’s opinions on all matters. He will speak honestly and frankly on all of them. The area is one of danger. Conditions have changed since they met in Tehran—Iran, Afghanistan, and the changing attitudes of people in the area. He once thought that Jordan was on the front line, with dangers to Arab identity and the future. Others now face this as well. There is a history of struggle, going back hundreds, even thousands of years. Their future is in jeopardy. He will see what they can do in the area, to bring the countries closer together to face the challenge. The President looks clearly into the future, about our joint action to meet the threat, to our joint cause, and to our common future. He (King Hussein) is also concerned about the Europeans. It is true that Jordan is small—in its people and location. For many years past, they have struggled and made achievements. This is not a matter of survival, but of wanting something better than survival for his people. They want something: the future, defense, in the identity of people. There are limits there, too. It is a great problem they all face; they are at the receiving end of threats, developments, and events. They need to be with friends, dealing with contingencies, and need to play the role they can, defending their future. In the area of the Arab world, it is interesting to discuss that—the different attitudes, the problems they face. It is obvious that the Palestinian problem needs to be moved toward a solution. In particular, there needs to be a major role for the U.S., without which nothing will happen. What seems to be a step forward (*note*: Camp David) may be so in reality. But what is next? What about the real problems—Palestine, the difficult problems that need help and attention to be overcome. In all fields, our future cooperation is needed, in many fields. What can we do? Thank you very much for the opportunity to deal with you (the President). He (King Hussein) is ready to discuss with friends the President’s interests.

The President expressed his admiration for King Hussein, and for what he has done and tried to do in gaining a comprehensive peace. Also there is the history of His Majesty’s family—including his father⁵

⁵ Hussein’s father, Talal I, was King of Jordan from 1951 until 1952.

and grandfather⁶—in their courageous efforts to bring about the resolution of difficult issues. The President also complimented the courage of His Majesty and of his people, in preserving Jordan's independence, integrity, and supporting human rights. He admires Jordan's economic development, under His Majesty's wise administration. We have a conglomeration of challenges in the region, beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with close to 100,000 troops there. The Soviets are trying to subjugate a courageous and free people. This is of deep concern to us. We are resolutely against the invasion. We are encouraging our Allies to take a position of clear, tangible, and permanent opposition to this occupation. We are more resolute than some others. Some of the Europeans are timid, vulnerable, and dependent on foreign trade. We are trying to get them to stand with us, and with the Moslem world, to convince the Soviets that they have nothing to gain and lots to lose through the continued occupation of Afghanistan. He has seen and admired the combined efforts of the Moslem leaders, which sent a signal to the Soviets. We will not abandon our effort to get the Soviets out, to enable the Afghan people to choose their own government, and to keep the country non-aligned.

The changes in Iran caused us great concern. Some elements of the revolution only want the right to choose their own government; but the irresponsibility of seizing the hostages shocked the United States, and is his greatest problem. We want Iran to be united, independent, and secure. We will not interfere—and this is a deep commitment. The Shah had been a friend of the U.S. and we had tried to work with him. But we have no animosity to the new leaders. We hope that Iran eventually will see the wisdom in releasing the hostages, so that we can have normal relations. Iran's greatest threat is from the North. He appreciates His Majesty's advice and help with the hostage situation. He hopes that the world will not forget the plight of the hostages. This was an act of international terrorism, the first time that a government had endorsed and supported such an action. It is abhorrent. The UN and the ICJ have acted, as well.

On the U.S. presence in the region—with its energy, the potentially explosive role of religious belief, social change, and struggles for influence—we see the region as vital to the whole world, perhaps more than any other. It is not a secret that we have some military presence there. We are not basing troops, but will be using facilities—in Somalia, Kenya, and Oman. This will be transient; and they are not bases. Some

⁶ Hussein's grandfather, Abdullah I, was Emir of Transjordan from 1921 until 1946 and King from 1946 until 1951.

of the states welcome this. We have a large naval presence in the Indian Ocean, to stabilize it; then we will reduce the force.

Under difficult circumstances, we departed from His Majesty's ideas on resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, by taking advantage of the opportunity to resolve the Sinai problem. We laid the groundwork for the Palestinian people to participate in determining their own future. This is not perfect. But we have made progress. As for the future, it is difficult to predict. There are major problems—there is no responsible person to negotiate for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. We hoped at Camp David that this would happen, but it has not materialized. This has crippled the prospects for complete success. The issue was to induce Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, and to withdraw from the West Bank—keeping some outposts—as a way of helping to resolve the problems and to permit the Palestinian people to participate in determining their own future. Some people would be able to return to the West Bank. It is not easy to negotiate under Prime Minister Begin; but there has been progress. He (the President) is determined to continue. This is not incompatible with His Majesty's ultimate goals for the West Bank. It is an interim solution. After the Self-Governing Authority is set up, then discussions will take place on the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza. We support Resolution 242. There should be a withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories and guarantees for Israel's security. He would like His Majesty's advice on how to go about finding a way to get the Palestinian people to be represented. There is an obstacle: Israel will not talk with the PLO as long as it says it wants to destroy Israel and will not accept 242 and Israel's right to exist. If the PLO will do this, however, we will talk with it. Maybe there is something possible in the interim—perhaps some mayors: this would get us over a difficult time. If Israel and Egypt go on with the talks, and make progress, then we will continue, and resist efforts to subvert the process. We welcome efforts that would *add* to the peace process, and would not oppose the Europeans on that basis, or a Jordanian initiative, to build on the process. However, we would resist any modification that would cancel 242 or threaten Israel, or that tried to undo the Egyptian-Israeli achievement. He sees and appreciates His Majesty's efforts to reach the same goals: the right of self-determination; a withdrawal of Israeli West Bank forces; and the control of terrorism (where His Majesty has done an admirable job).

He sees changes taking place in Iraq—he sees it to be more responsible and moderate than before. Syria is going the other way; and it is more allied with the Soviet Union than any other state in the area. He would like to hear how His Majesty would approach the future—this would be helpful to him (the President). Maybe they have a different view of Sadat. He sees that it took an act of courage to resolve the con-

flict with Israel. He can't comment on Sadat's consultations with His Majesty and the Saudis: maybe this was inadequate. We saw—and were surprised—on how fast the situation moved after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem,⁷ and we tried to take advantage of it. He believes that the peace treaty will be implemented in its entirety. If it can be extended—on Jordanian or U.S. ideas—to allow the Palestinian people to participate in determining their own future, then ultimately there will be hope of success. In the last two years that has been a major step forward. The future is hard to predict; it is not easy to deal with the Israelis; it is not easy for His Majesty to deal with the Syrians, Iraqis, and Palestinians. His Majesty can help him (the President) with ideas and how to provide more stability in the Arabian Peninsula, with relations with the two Yemens and Saudi Arabia. Jordan's beneficial role in the Persian Gulf region is important to Jordan and to us.

Tomorrow, he will tell His Majesty about our concerns at the forthcoming Venice summit,⁸ and will discuss other issues. He has tried to present with candor our concept of the problems, commitments and concerns—about Iran, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the peace process. He doesn't believe that U.S. and Jordanian ultimate views are different. He is not sure, however, of His Majesty's view of self-determination: an independent state between Jordan and Israel would be a mistake; but His Majesty will have to judge this for himself.

[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Venice G-7 Economic Summit.]

[*Hussein:*] On the Palestinian problem, Jordan was working on it, then there were surprises! (laughter) It is not a matter of consultations, and not a question of Sadat's courage, as in his going to Jerusalem, etc. But it is a feeling he (His Majesty) developed over the years, that if there were a chance for peace, then they (the Arabs) should move together, and preserve cohesion between them to get Palestinian rights. Egypt has had a leading role in the area over the years; therefore Egypt has a moral responsibility to the rest of the Arabs. In 1967, Jordan went to war in support of Egypt, knowing what the result would be. This was done in response to an Arab league agreement. Jordan honored it—as did Syria. Since 1967, he (His Majesty) tried his best. He took a position on negotiating with Israel that was not against it. He tried to get his ideas and aims in all ways. He worked on Resolution 242 and helped to

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁸ Reference is to the G-7 Economic Summit Conference, which took place in Venice June 21–24.

get Egypt's support for it. He accepted Resolution 338. Jordan could not bargain over Palestinian rights. Was Israel willing to return the lands, either directly or under international auspices—with self-determination? If there is self-determination, he is sure the Palestinians will choose what we can live with. Most Palestinians are in Jordan. Most Palestinians carry Jordanian passports. The radicals do well only when hope appears closed. After many years—they only want to know the end of the process. The President was honest to say that he couldn't say what that is. Jordan had to rely on his (the President's) good will. But after so many promises and assurances, they couldn't go into the unknown without knowing where the process was going.

He does not want to divide Jerusalem. They say that there should be Arab sovereignty—sovereignty for the Christians and the Moslems in the Arab part of it. Let Jerusalem be a real city of peace. There should be self-determination for the rest (i.e. West Bank and Gaza). There should be an end to settlements. Jordan has prepared a slide show on the settlements, which he would be happy to show the President. This shows that all has changed; there are new obstacles. Maybe even stopping settlements now would not be enough. Water resources, the ecology—all have been changed. In Israel's opinion, Jerusalem is Israeli; the West Bank is Israeli. There are rights for some, but they are under Israeli occupation. He has had a vivid impression that Israel wants the West Bank to be forgotten. Israel had the impression that it could remove Egypt from the scene. And this has happened. With the support and help they get, he doubts that they will change. But the Palestinians *must* be involved. Without Palestinian participation, there cannot be a real solution. If there is agreement otherwise, it will sow seeds of distrust, and then the radicals will get the opportunity to destroy the agreement. He is willing to do all he can for a real process, with an end in view—on the future of the Palestinians, and of Jordan, and of the region.

He is in touch with the PLO—that is a title: leaders change. Recently he has tried a little opening—he is not totally encircled. After Egypt moved (i.e. 1977), they faced a state where the area seemed to be disintegrating between left and right. An idea was floated and a meeting was held (i.e. in Baghdad); but friends (*note*: the United States) did not see what this meant. For the first time, all the rest of the Arab world spoke of 242 as the basis of a solution—including some extremists and the PLO. This held the Arabs together, and avoided disintegration which would have helped the enemies of the Arabs. This situation has changed recently. Syria is closer to the Soviet Union, and there are pressures in that country. Syria's attitude tends to be negative on *any* solution—and this is more so, now. But they are part of a

group—including Libya and Syria. Algeria has a decent president,⁹ who is honest and courageous, who will have an impact on his country—though he is not yet totally in control. For a time, Algeria will be part of this group. He hopes it will change.

He sees pressure on the PLO to encourage the radical elements and extremist attitudes. He has tried to open the door to the PLO, and show that they can come towards us; that they do not face only this pressure. The PLO approached Jordan to talk with Jordan's friends to see what can be agreed on—for example, the future of Jordan and the Palestinians together, as in the early 1970s, while preserving their separate identities. He gets this from Arafat: the possibility is still there. And Sadat broke relations with Jordan when he (His Majesty) proposed this idea in 1972 (laughter)! So, something can be done there. Arafat said that he wanted to remove U.S. fears and Israeli excuses against moving to a just and durable peace. Arafat came to Jordan recently to see the Mayor of Nablus, and again spoke of his difficulties and pressures. His Majesty told Arafat of his coming here. The PLO is anxious to keep the dialogue going with Jordan. It tends to be closer to Jordan. He (His Majesty) promised to give what help he can in the interests of the Palestinians. The PLO has sent an envoy to the UN in New York now, if he (His Majesty) wants to convey anything.

Israel's recognition of Palestinian rights, and Palestinians recognition of Israel's right to exist have to come. But which should come first? It should be simultaneous.

Jordan admires the Afghan people's resistance. It is similar with the Palestinians. If there is a lack of progress toward a solution, there will be a movement towards violence. On the question of finding someone to speak for the Palestinians, he was ready—if Israel would go out of the territories and solve the Jerusalem question. If he can now get support for doing so, he will go back and say that this is what Washington sees as an end result. If they do not know the end results, it will be impossible to do anything, since it would serve no purpose. The mayors were elected under occupation. They are deeply concerned about the beginning of attempts to intimidate them into leaving. What will happen? He does not know. The President sees this even without Jordan's daily contacts. The President is sincere; he has put in lots of time on the problem. But Jordan lives with it every day. If this were 1967, maybe the experience would be different. He has tried every door, without results.

The situation in Syria . . . Lebanon is a problem. It is unfortunate. He does not even know the issues any more. Israel and Syria are there

⁹ Chad Bendjedid.

(i.e. in Lebanon), but it is not a clear-cut issue. There are three groups of Christians; Sunni and Shia Moslems; the Syrians; the Palestinians. The nightmare continues, with suffering and danger. He does not know the result. But Lebanon is a time bomb. This does not serve Lebanese or others' interests.

In Jordan, they are making progress. They are affected by oil price increases. Maybe the oil producers see their benefits going up; and the industrial nations suffer less than Jordan does. The majority of countries try to make progress and to catch up—they are suffering most from this instability (i.e. in oil markets). This is another area of danger. There is a danger of eruption of more radical regimes' taking over in the world as such.

Jordan is in touch with its European friends. It senses their concern for the future. What will happen next? He believes that we are not [*now?*] at a critical juncture, where misunderstandings are the order of the day, and lack of communication. Are we (i.e. Jordan and the U.S.) partners in seeking a better future? Will we share the making of the future? How can we ensure that we work together? The Europeans are reluctant to move. Jordan does not want something that is an alternative to what has happened (i.e. Egypt-Israel peace treaty) or to block it. But what can we do about Jerusalem, the West Bank, Palestinian rights, and how can we relate to other parties? The Europeans are anxious to avoid a U.S. veto. This leads to the idea of differences in the Alliance at a difficult time.

We can wait to see what happens. He hopes to go home knowing the President's ideas. But when that ends in disappointment, then he fears that hope will be lost, and only the extremists will benefit. In Jordan, they have problems. Jordan is close to the United States. Jordan is grateful for U.S. economic help—which has diminished—and he is not asking now. But the United States knows where Jordan stands. He wants to know: how did things go wrong (i.e. between Jordan and the U.S.)? How did it reach this point? Beyond that—if we are still partners—how can we reach common objectives?

The President said that this was extremely helpful. First, there is our friendship. The U.S. commitment to Jordan's security and prosperity is solid and unchanging. He was disappointed by the lack of Jordanian support for Camp David. He has a great deal of investment in it, and saw it as the only viable way to get goals that both he and His Majesty share. It has one defect, which can be corrected: the need to have a firm, recognizable voice of the Palestinians, making their demands on water, total withdrawal, land, a share in security, an end to settlement, and resolution of Jerusalem. No one does this now—with world attention and approval—negotiating with Israel, the U.S., and Egypt to get His Majesty's goals. Therefore it is very difficult for us when others say that

this avenue should not be pursued and that there is a better one—such as the U.N., or Geneva, where both the PLO and Israel would be represented. We went down that road. But the Arab nations could not agree on how to negotiate, or on the role of the PLO and the Palestinians. We tried it, with determination, and even got a U.S.-Soviet agreement.¹⁰ But we couldn't get Syrian or PLO agreement. The alternative was a surprise, but he was grateful for it: Sadat broke the log-jam.

If there is a desire to resolve the issues, and to capture world attention, to get support and to prevail over Israeli obstructionism, isn't the best way to get someone among the Palestinian Arabs to join the negotiations, with the tacit support of the PLO and Jordan? His Majesty says he cannot negotiate for the Palestinians, but will he support others—for example, some mayors—if they adhere to their principles—such as total withdrawal and Jerusalem? Now there is a vacuum; it is difficult for Egypt to speak for the Palestinians.

He (the President) is convinced that most Israelis want peace, and will go a long way towards self-determination and withdrawal—except from Jerusalem. At Camp David, they had a paragraph on Jerusalem that was satisfactory to Israel and to Egyptians who were even closer to the Palestinians than Sadat. Israel found it difficult to withdraw from the Sinai, to give up the oil, and abandon its strategic position at Sharm-el-Sheikh. It was torture for Begin to have settlers come out of the Sinai. This was very difficult, but he did it. The reason was that the Israeli people want a permanent peace that would make them secure. Israelis still have that feeling. Begin is not popular. He represents the majority on some issues—for example, the Israelis are terrified about a divided Jerusalem, under which they could not go to the Western Wall, as when Jordan occupied Jerusalem. Therefore we do not see the advisability of abandoning Camp David. Another process would be neither rapid or lead to a peaceful settlement. Jordan and the PLO are not in the talks. If you would get Palestinians to join, then Israel would be under difficult negotiating circumstances and it would arouse in the world a belief that there is a desire of Jordan and the Palestinians to resolve the issues. He (the President) has no desire to support Israeli positions against the Arab world. Sadat will tell His Majesty that. There is a U.S. and Egyptian position together. He (the President) would be happy to see Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza, with full autonomy and preparations for its final status. He would be pleased to see a total West Bank confederation with Jordan and see the Palestinians support it. This is what he wants. Many Israelis want it, as well, except for "total" withdrawal—they want some minor modifications. There is a stalemate now, though we are trying to make progress. His

¹⁰ See footnote 3, Document 215.

Majesty should see our determination. There is terrorism on both sides; and we deplore both.

In summary, to underline His Majesty's commitment, is there some way to pursue the process of Camp David, without Jordan or the PLO in? This brings him to the conclusion that if Palestinian representatives were in for the next few months, and we see nothing happen, then we will explore something different—though always within 242.

Perhaps it was a mistake to go so far with Camp David without Jordan. We understand that Sadat after Camp David was to go to Morocco to see you (His Majesty). Later, we got your list of questions¹¹ and responded¹² to them. If we made a mistake, it was not deliberate. He (the President) believes that without some other process, this (i.e. Camp David) is the best. It is not perfect, but it is the best alternative.

One last thing, concerning the PLO: when he has met with Assad, His Majesty, and the Saudis—including Fahd—and Sadat, he has always asked that they induce Arafat to endorse 242 and Israel's right to exist. Following that—or concurrently—we would deal with the PLO to look for a solution. This has not proved possible through private encouragement—Arafat talks about this as his bargaining chip—and is an element of the problem we have not been able to solve. Our commitment to Israel's security is complete. Israel does not ask for U.S. forces; we provide its security needs. Maybe there is an incompatibility in our hopes to resolve the problem. Does His Majesty see what is possible to do?

King Hussein said that they can see when they are at home, with the PLO, what can be done.

The President said that he expects that getting Palestinians into the talks would be hard. But negotiations and communications are important. He had been surprised how far Israel had moved on the Egyptian front, and on its commitment to principles on withdrawal, etc. He cannot predict success, but he has seen movement before.

King Hussein said that it is precisely 242. Perhaps we can look at it later. That was adopted after the 1967 war and only talked about countries. The Palestinians objected: 242 did not talk about their rights.

The President said that 242 just mentioned refugees.

King Hussein said that it was the missing ingredient.

The President said that with the Saudis, we drafted a statement the PLO could issue, putting forward its reservations on full Palestinian rights. He presumes that Arafat saw it, but it didn't work.

¹¹ See Document 58.

¹² See footnote 4, Document 85.

King Hussein said that at that point Begin arrived (laughter)!

The President said that Begin went further on Sinai than the Labor Government. But he is more extreme about the West Bank.

The Prime Minister agreed.

The President said that Labor, whether under Meir or Rabin, had not been prepared to withdraw from Sinai or give up Sharm-el-Sheikh, etc. Begin has done some difficult things, and went against his political allies.

King Hussein agreed.

The Prime Minister said that it was hard now with the West Bank.

The President said he understood.

King Hussein said that he understood the President's disappointment on Camp David concerning Jordan's not supporting it. He had sent the President a letter then;¹³ and sent an identical letter to Sadat.

The Prime Minister said that Sadat wrote to His Majesty from Camp David.

The President said that Sadat had told him so.

King Hussein said that Sadat wrote that he was adhering to the same line and to all the points he (Sadat) had made in the Knesset.¹⁴ Jordan had agreed about them.

The Prime Minister said that did not include separating the process into two parts. It was a shock, therefore, when Sadat did so at Camp David and backed off on self-determination.

The President said that from Sadat's and his perspective, he (Sadat) did not abandon this in a separate agreement. He (Sadat) did not give up self-determination or the return of Jerusalem. He (Sadat) did not abandon it. Rather they went round it, and said that the agreement would be an interim one, to provide later negotiations on the final status, including Palestinian rights. This is the difference between His Majesty on the one hand and Sadat and himself on the other.

The Prime Minister said that His Majesty is under the impression that the Israeli strategy has been to isolate Egypt, and they practically said to His Majesty that they wanted to solve the Egyptian problem and then Israel would absorb the West Bank.

The President said he doesn't doubt that goal. Israel prefers to keep the West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai, but at the root wants peace. Many Israelis see that, if they insist on keeping the West Bank, they will not have a permanent peace. At Camp David, it was agreed that Palestinians could join the talks in the Jordanian delegation, and others

¹³ See Document 115.

¹⁴ See footnote 2, Document 140.

could be brought in as mutually agreed. People from the West Bank and Gaza could come in as part of the Jordanian and Egyptian delegations. This still has promise. If Jordan is not in the talks—and he wished they would be—there should be another way.

The Prime Minister said that they had dealt with the Israelis for a long time.

The President said that he had read about it in the newspapers (laughter)!

King Hussein said that that had been a violation of the only agreement between Jordan and Israel (laughter)!

The Prime Minister said that Israeli actions are to absorb the West Bank—on the ground. Without a commitment that the result of the process is self-determination, Jordan couldn't join the talks. Jordan would be used as an umbrella while Israel absorbed the West Bank through settlements—in the Arab view. This was the dilemma after Camp David. This was the fear they tried to convey before Camp David, that Jordan would look like the obstruction, whereas Jordan is trying to provide the basis for a viable settlement.

King Hussein said that there is a basis for future misunderstanding. There are two schools of thought in the Arab world. Some say that there should be concentration on the remaining problems. Others like to undermine Camp David and return to the past. This camp is more aligned with the extremists. Security should be for all; Jordan wants assurances for itself, too. All right, they will think about it (i.e. what the President had said on Palestinian involvement).

The President said he hopes His Majesty will think about it. He sees differences between the Jordanian position and ours; they are important.

The Prime Minister said that they were not fundamental.

The President agreed. The most difficult issue is Jerusalem. As Begin says, its ultimate status should be resolved in negotiations. Second, there is the end of Israeli occupation and military government, which Dayan and Weizman support. The definition of full autonomy needs to be hammered out. How much Israel should get out is to be negotiated. The Labor Party is for partition. Begin says that the Palestinians should be left to manage their own affairs. He (the President) is for full autonomy. Begin is for full autonomy. Some difference! (laughter)! We need to find a means for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, with PLO support, to get in the talks—as long as we make progress. They can make strong demands, and Egypt will support them. If the process still breaks down, then all of us will look for alternatives. We will do our best now. He fears that otherwise the situation will get worse. There will be deterioration.

He feels much better after their talk. He regrets there has not been more communication.

The Prime Minister said that this was a good occasion.

The President said that, to be candid, he had felt that Jordan had led public condemnation of Camp David, even more than Iraq and Syria. He had had a grievance. Maybe he had expected too much; or assumed at Camp David to speak for Jordan. He (the President) has no criticism left; he understands better now. He had been grieved.

The Prime Minister said that that represented exaggerated reporting.

King Hussein said that they, too, have press problems (laughter)!

The Prime Minister said that, since Camp David, Jordan had worked on alternative routes, but had not denounced the United States or Camp David. The media in the West, and in the United States, were more influenced towards Israel. Jordan's position was shown in a negative light, whereas they thought they were being positive. At Baghdad, they had tried to get a resolution that was not extreme.

The President said that was accurate: the negative aspects were emphasized.

The Prime Minister said that Begin and Sadat had distorted Jordan's position.

The President joked that he couldn't imagine that happening (laughter)!

(The meeting concluded at 12:22 p.m.)

379. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 18, 1980, 10:36 a.m.–12:09 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Second Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Secretary of State Edmund Muskie

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Ambassador Nicholas Veliotis, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
 Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations
 Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
 Robert Hunter, National Security Council Staff Member (notetaker)
 His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 His Excellency Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 His Excellency Ahmad Lawzi, Chief of Royal Court
 Lt. General (Ret.) Amer Khammash, Minister of Court
 Lt. General Sharif Zaid Bin Shaker, Commander in Chief of the Jordan Armed Forces
 His Excellency Fawaz Sharaf, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States

Secretary Muskie began by asking His Majesty if he had enjoyed his visit to the Air and Space Museum.

King Hussein said yes; it had been his first visit.

The President said that His Majesty had had a good guide. Senator Glenn² had taken King Hussein and Queen Noor to the Space Museum after last night's dinner.

King Hussein said that it was extremely interesting.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the capsule was interesting.

The President said that now we are working on the space shuttle. It will carry a large payload, and is very flexible. Space on it will be leased to private corporations and governments. It will help with repairs to machinery in space and satellites.

King Hussein said that it meant a new era.

The President agreed. It is complicated to build one that can go out and back repeatedly. There is the problem of heat damage. He would be glad for His Majesty to go up in it sometime. We would try it out well, first (laughter)!

The Prime Minister said that next they should go to a naval museum; he had a preference for it.

The President said that this morning's meeting could be brief, here, and then they could talk in the Oval Office while the others continued their talk here. He apologized for keeping His Majesty so long yesterday—he only realized how long when he read about it in the newspaper! It was so fruitful, and he had been enjoying it so much. So he apologized for keeping His Majesty. He presumed His Majesty would be discussing with Harold Brown on defense matters, which are impor-

² Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) was one of the Mercury Seven astronauts. He was the first U.S. citizen to orbit the Earth on February 20, 1962.

tant to us, to Jordan, and to others. He had talked with Brown before His Majesty arrived. We are grateful for His Majesty's role. He (the President) will be going to Venice,³ and for two days before that he would stop in Rome, and would see the Pope. Venice is primarily about economics—e.g. the stability of the monetary system and dealing with energy. (At this point, Dr. Brzezinski brought a plastic model of the space shuttle into the room).

The President said that this is a model of the space shuttle, which His Majesty can take with him.

King Hussein said thank you.

The President (pointing to the model) said that it would be launched from here, and then separate.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out the rockets and the solar panels.

The President said that this is a good-sized model; and is an interesting thing.

King Hussein said thank you.

The President said that at Venice they would talk about economic matters, such as inflation and unemployment—and particularly about energy. We have cut down our imports of oil. We have had a success since the Tokyo Summit.⁴ We promised to reduce imports by 5% and did so; we were the only country to meet its commitment. This year, in the first five months, we reduced oil consumption by 12%, which is about 1 million barrels per day. At Venice, they would discuss how to continue, and make a recommitment to reduce imports between 1980 and 1985. Also they would talk about how to produce more energy, from coal, nuclear, shale, the sun, crops—including trees. We got through the Congress an amount over 10 years equal to \$227 billion in taxes for these purposes, and were setting up corporations to encourage synthetic fuels—technology we would share with our European Allies; we are eager to cooperate with Jordan on any projects it has. We are planning the biggest photo-voltaic project in history, jointly with the Italians. With other countries we will cooperate, and as technology evolves, we will be eager to share it with Jordan. We can learn both ways.

On other items at Venice, they will talk about how to deal with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; about Iran; and dealing with the LDCs, regarding the devastating impact of oil prices on their economies. Countries like Turkey and Brazil are importing about as much oil as their total exports. As a result, debt is a serious problem; inflation is

³ See footnote 8, Document 378.

⁴ Reference is to the G-7 Economic Summit Conference, which took place in Tokyo June 28–29, 1979.

high. How to accommodate to these problems and to share responsibility with OPEC—which is making the profits—will be discussed jointly. Then he will be going to Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. After his visit, the world will see the communique—we don't have any secret agreements—to analyze it, and to see whether we answer Jordan's questions.

We have discussed the Middle East. His Majesty has seen the European resolution. We do not see it as incompatible with the Camp David process. There was a resolute attack by the Israeli Cabinet and the PLO on the European resolution. Therefore, it must be fair and well balanced (laughter)! He doesn't know what can be done on the Maqarin Dam.⁵ Habib had been to see His Majesty and others. Would His Majesty like to comment? We do not want to interfere. We are trying to eliminate some obstacles that exist. He has studied the problem, including water rights for the West Bank and Syrian cooperation. We have gone as far as we can, without some agreement between Jordan, Syria, and Israel on what to do. Does the project have a life?

King Hussein said very much so. They have agreed to address themselves to the question of the West Bank, and prepare an answer for Phil (Habib) soon.⁶ He hopes the U.S. will continue. Would we please clarify the rules and the guidelines on shares so that they can tackle the problem of getting Syrian cooperation.

The President asked about the possibility of direct Jordanian dealings with the Israelis.

King Hussein said that they do this in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistic Commission (IJMAC), concerning the waters of the Yarmuk River and the Jordan Valley. There are direct and indirect contacts.

The Prime Minister said that they had had a meeting yesterday. Ambassador Veliotis said that they had solved a technical problem, and they met under the auspices of IJMAC.

The President said good.

Ambassador Veliotis said that these were technical issues.

The Prime Minister said that there is now no problem. He assumes that issues with Israel can be managed. Habib raised issues on which there was agreement. There was only one, raised by Israel, on water for the West Bank. Jordan is not ready to go into details. This must await a

⁵ On May 14–15, Habib met with Hussein and senior Jordanian officials as part of his four day mission to help resolve riparian issues arising from the Maqarin Dam/Yarmouk river project. Habib had earlier met with Begin and senior Israeli officials May 12–13. A full summary of Habib's mission and his meetings with both the Israelis and Jordanians is in telegram 3260 from Amman, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800241-0698)

⁶ Not further identified and not found.

broader settlement. How Jordan talks with Israel about West Bank water is for the future. The project has several stages. They are now working on the second stage, and water that exceeds the second stage should go to the West Bank. They can agree if the Israelis do not have a problem.

King Hussein said that Jordan is worried about becoming involved in greater discussions. Then there is a danger.

The President said he had no objection to such discussions (laughter)!

Ambassador Linowitz said that the issue is discussed under Camp David, concerning water and the West Bank. We feel it is desirable, in determining allocation, that Jordan be represented, along with Egypt, the Self-Governing Authority, and Israel, to get agreement. Is this possible?

King Hussein said not now, there is a problem, but maybe later, in the context of movement toward self-determination.

Ambassador Linowitz said that suppose there is already a Self-Governing Authority . . .

The Prime Minister spoke briefly about Jordan's use of water. Now, he said, non-allocated water, that Jordan did not use from the dam, would go to the West Bank in the future.

King Hussein said that it is an old story, the idea that some water would go to the West Bank from the Jordan River. He is a little worried about the possibility that Israel wants to discuss the future of the West Bank, and then Jordan will have to talk about their taking water from the Jordan River for the West Bank. Therefore this is difficult. Jordan needs to limit the talks now to Israel's and Jordan's share of the water, without prejudicing the future water supply to the West Bank.

The President said that as more water is taken from the Jordan River, the Dead Sea is drying up. Israel is assessing the possibility of bringing water from the Mediterranean. It is possible that this issue would affect Jordan.

King Hussein said that it would require . . .

The President said that there would need to be an assessment of the environmental impact. There would be some power generation. This would stabilize the level of the Dead Sea at a proper point. This is not happening now. It is being analyzed; and it involves Jordan.

King Hussein asked whether the water would come from the Mediterranean or the Red Sea?

The President said the *New York Times* said the Mediterranean.

Ambassador Veliotis said it was possible it would come from the Gulf of Aqaba. We are exchanging technical information with Jordan on a quiet basis.

The President said good.

Ambassador Veliotis said he hoped it would not show up in the Israeli press!

King Hussein said that this project could be done in the context of peace.

Secretary Muskie asked whether there were any problems with the authorization bill for the Maqarin Dam; Congress asks about it each year.

Ambassador Veliotis said that this is a problem.

The President said he knew.

Ambassador Veliotis said that there is \$50 million this year and previous appropriations. If agreement is not reached in this fiscal year, then we will have to tell the Congress we can't swing it. Hal Saunders and he will discuss this with the Prime Minister. The last issue with Israel is that Israel is asking a specific figure, concerning water Jordan would take from the Yarmuk to the West Bank. This is hung up.

The President said that if U.S. funds are available, we will need something for Congress to keep them.

The Prime Minister said that several issues have been resolved: the Yarmuk triangle, the weir, and others. Only one remains, which Israel raised recently: water for the West Bank. The major political issue is can Israel speak for the West Bank? We can find a formula.

King Hussein said that there are other issues with Syria.

The President said he knew. These are his items. Perhaps they could talk privately about self-determination. He wants to understand. He has listened carefully, but does not see how His Majesty sees this in a broader context. Perhaps they should talk privately?

King Hussein said: as you wish.

The President suggested that they stay here.

King Hussein said that they had talked about all subjects that had been raised; they should try to work them out together. Jordan's feeling now: as far as what else happens, they accept developments and progress in some areas to establish a comprehensive peace (i.e. the Egypt-Israel peace treaty). Now is the point to think again about what to do. In the Arab world, there is a division. Some—either in their thinking or from external suggestions—want to undermine all that has been done recently. Jordan's feeling is that what has happened has happened, and they would like to see how to go forward. Their object is a comprehensive peace settlement and security, to transfer the area to greater stability and hope.

Some points were raised yesterday on the Palestinians: can anyone speak for them? This is a dilemma. The natural answer is the PLO. Then

there is the second point, that the PLO would have to recognize Israel's right to exist before it could speak. The PLO counters that Israel should recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Jordan's impression is that the President's suggestion is to see if there is a Palestinian body which can come out with the Palestinian position. (By this idea) Jordan would be in touch with the PLO and others to encourage them to make a Palestinian contribution, at least at the initial stage. After yesterday's meeting, the Ambassador told them that this would need to be in the context of Camp David—with Palestinians in the Jordanian or Egyptian delegation. This would be very, very difficult to convince anyone to do now. If this could be clarified, it would be very important. He is very anxious that there be no misunderstanding. Should we go back to talk?

The Prime Minister said that it should be free from a specific mandate.

The President said that his thoughts could be difficult. First, we will continue with the Camp David process as long as it can succeed—and he can see that the Jordanians see it as inadequate. Second, he presumes that Jordan is not willing to join the talks—formally or informally, now. He would like it to be different, but will not try to change their minds. Third, the provision in the Camp David Accords is that Palestinians could be in the Jordanian and Egyptian delegations, plus others as mutually agreed. This is covered in Camp David. To get past the problem, he hopes there could be a responsible group of residents from the West Bank and Gaza who would meet with us, Egypt, or Israel, and present to us and to the world the Palestinian positions: the need to hold elections, to choose their own leaders, how to take over responsibility when Israel is out—for police, schools, highways, etc. Until now, the Palestinians are either too timid or intimidated. The mayors won't do it. He hopes that His Majesty and other leaders of the Palestinians—even the PLO—in Jordan will encourage the mayors, three, five, seven of them—he doesn't care, it is their initiative—to say that they will speak with us, Egypt, or Israel and Jordan later—if Jordan agrees—to be sure that Palestinian views are adequately considered. Now there is no effective consultation. If the mayor of Gaza City, who knows His Majesty and Arafat, says he will consult with Ambassador Linowitz, Secretary Muskie, himself, Foreign Minister Ali, or the foreign or prime minister of Israel, then we would not inadvertently not take account of the positions, desires, and interests of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Also this could expedite the withdrawal of the Israeli Military Government, turning it over step by step, giving responsibility to the Palestinians. Some of this has been tried in Gaza. Dayan says he is eager to get the Israeli Military Government out. Weizman feels the same way. When they tried to deal with the mayor—saying you take over the

schools, police, etc.—they found reticence. The mayor was fearful of being seen as betraying the Palestinian cause.

Maybe this (i.e. consultations) is a fruitless effort. He understands the difficulties of having a formal group. Perhaps 5 or 6 mayors would be willing, collectively, if they know they had the tacit approval of the PLO and of Jordan. They could speak for the residents, and demand that the Israeli Military Government be removed. They could demand responsibility to run their lives, to have elections, and for the Self-Governing Authority to have full responsibility. So far, we are playing into Israel's hands, by not being able to carry out the Camp David Accords. If Begin wants to slow down the process, he can blame it on the Palestinians, and say that he wants to do something, but can't get the Palestinians to take responsibility. This (i.e. the consultations) would be a public relations achievement, at least in the U.S., if the West Bank and Gaza mayors were trying to take their own rights under the Camp David process. Now it is felt here, in the press, that the Palestinians are not willing to negotiate, but rather are terrorists.

He is eager for progress. It is hard for us to meet with West Bank mayors. They are reluctant to talk with us. (Speaking to the Palestinians?): How can we help Jordan take over the West Bank, and get the Israeli Military Government out? One mayor is coming here.

King Hussein said Khalaf.

The Prime Minister said he has a relative here.

The President said that his (Mayor Khalaf's) brother is here. We will treat him,⁷ and hope it will succeed. We will try to break the stalemate (i.e. in the talks).

King Hussein said that there are many members of the PLO and other Palestinians who would be ready, if it worked out, to speak directly to the United States. The issue is how can they join the Egyptian delegation—there is no Jordanian delegation.

The President said that they do not need to be in a delegation.

King Hussein said it might be easy to discuss with them.

The President said that the problem is that if they are designated as representatives of the PLO, it will not work. If they come as individuals, we will not try to analyze whom they represent. Some mayors may be PLO members: we don't know. If they say they will negotiate, but represent the PLO, it would be impossible for us. We can't talk with the PLO.

The Prime Minister said that there is a practical difficulty for West Bankers to come in a context that would prejudge the result—i.e. the

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 373.

autonomy talks. This is virtually impossible. They can come to speak on the right of self-determination, freedom, and independence. This they can do; they can talk to others, in a peaceful channel. But within agreements whose end result is not clear, or is limited, what can they do? This is a block.

The President said that they do not have to acknowledge they are not getting all they want. They can demand that Israel get out, and that they take over their rights; that they want to take over their rights on land, etc. We will not say that they have to give up ultimate rights.

The Prime Minister asked whether Israel would permit a Congress in the West Bank? Jordan could arrange that. They could meet, and draw up a peaceful platform. Is this idea tolerable? Then Jordan would talk to other Arabs and the PLO. This is a peaceful channel. But it has to be outside of a presupposed course of action. If the Palestinians are asked just to take over providing services on the West Bank, we are not likely to get cooperation. They would say that this only relieves Israel of the burden, when Israel is going about annexing the West Bank. Therefore, this would only help Begin. Settlements would go on; absorption would go on. It is not likely that West Bankers would agree. Also there was the violence against the elected leaders.

King Hussein mentioned the expulsions, as well.

The Prime Minister agreed (and listed several of the expulsions). They were not engaged in violent acts; they would see Dayan and Weizman; they are not violent people. They could have been a rival force. The problem is that Israel is suppressive. If the Palestinians could assemble peacefully, have a Congress, write a platform, ask what they want, then they can talk with others, outside the Camp David context.

The President said that this is not prohibited under the Camp David agreements. The U.S. takes the Jordanian position. Israel wants only 12 people on an Administrative Council. Egypt wants it to be larger, and be a legislature or Congress. Nothing prevents the mayors or others from saying what they want to do as they proceed to get to ultimate goals: the right to vote, assemble, speak, exercise local responsibilities—as an interim stage.

Ambassador Linowitz said that when he met with His Majesty in London,⁸ he (His Majesty) had wished us well, but could not say we would succeed and we were not responsive to Palestinian needs and self-fulfillment. Since the Palestinians are not there, how can we respond? Israel says: how can the U.S. and Egypt know what the Palestinians want? Therefore there is the President's suggestion, to help us advance Palestinian positions, and ensure consultations—however

⁸ See Document 328.

they get their views across. If not, the Palestinians will suffer most: they will be held responsible for failure. The Israelis say they want to go forward, but the Palestinians do not—Israel does not hear their demands.

King Hussein said that there is a dilemma: Camp David dealt with two areas, Egypt-Israel in one and the Palestinians in the other. The Egypt-Israel treaty many see as progress and as a solution to part of the problem.

The President underlined that it was a part.

King Hussein said that the Palestinian side, unfortunately, was done in the absence of the Palestinians and Jordan. Egypt was unable to address this adequately, because it did not know what was involved.

The President said yes, this is what he is saying.

King Hussein said that Jordan passed maps to Egypt to help it avoid mistakes. Is there a way to say that what happened between Egypt and Israel exists, and take a fresh start on the rest? Camp David is telling people to fit into a formula which does not meet their needs. It brings into question the end results Jordan is asking about. The Palestinians do not know what rights they will secure at the end of the day—the future.

The President said that nothing in Camp David contradicts what His Majesty wants in the future.

King Hussein and the Prime Minister said that they understood.

The Prime Minister said that asserting the demands of the Palestinians is difficult for them to do under occupation.

The President said that we know what they want, and want to get there. But there is no mechanism to get there, if they will not participate. For Jordan and the Palestinians, if you are not in the talks until the goal is clear, and is 100% of what you want—then there will be no progress. Sadat knew what he wanted; he (Sadat) said so to Begin: withdrawal. Begin didn't want that, and wanted to keep the settlements. But world and Israeli opinion was with Sadat. Begin yielded, and said that the Knesset should decide. He (the President) believes that Begin is difficult. He has spent as much time with Begin as with his (the President's) wife—since each hour with Begin is magnified a hundred fold (laughter)!

We should remember that there will be other Israeli leaders after Begin—and he (the President) will be President. Also, the people of Israel want peace. Its public opinion indicates that, if settlements were an obstacle to peace, the overwhelming majority are opposed to them. Now there is no way for moderate leaders or public opinion in Israel to believe that Palestinian leaders demand rights: e.g. an independent state, a confederation, or Israel's getting out. Demanding these is all right. But no one is designated to work with Dayan, Yadin, us or

Egypt—with the private backing of His Majesty and Jordan—to say what they want. They should ask. How do they induce Israel to withdraw, and to realize a solution? There is no entity to deal with—no moderate responsible voice. That is all he (the President) asks. He is not asking the Palestinians to sit down and say they accept Camp David. He is asking Egypt, the PLO, and His Majesty to get the mayors to speak publicly, to say that they represent the Palestinians and this is what they want and how they will go about getting it. It will not be easy; there will be obstacles. He hopes His Majesty will think about this, and talk with the mayors and Arafat about it. If they see an opening leading towards a 100% solution, they can talk about how to proceed to realize their dreams, etc. This is what we need, and don't have it. Their position now is all or nothing.

King Hussein said that he can go back and carry these thoughts and ideas. Could they succeed or not? He is not sure. Jordan had never appealed for an engagement of a group from the West Bank and Gaza.

The President said that they (the Palestinians) think there is opposition to it.

King Hussein asked whether his friends (i.e. the U.S.) could think—if there is a lack of real progress—about a fresh start, including everyone.

The President said that a “fresh start” is easy to say and hard to do—it would take us back to where we were three years ago. There are hard problems. Even the Arabs could not agree among themselves. Should the Soviets be in? This is impossible.

The Prime Minister said that the emphasis before was on procedure, not on substance.

The President said that that is what we got.

The Prime Minister said that if we can get an idea—of self-determination—then the PLO and others could not resist. But to ask them to commit themselves to a dead end—the autonomy talks—would abridge their right to self-determination.

The President said that there is no abridgment on the final status of territories, after five years.

The Prime Minister asked about Israel's intentions.

The President said he didn't know.

The Prime Minister said that for the Palestinians, it would only be five years of legitimacy for Israel, while it absorbed the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan knows Begin and those who went before him.

The President said he was not trying to defend them.

The Prime Minister said that the Arabs were on the receiving side. There is a long record. Begin tries to negate U.S. pressure, and engages in the appearance of talking, while building settlements. Look at the

record. We need to broaden the basis for the Palestinians to assemble and talk—only in the context of eventual self-determination.

The President said that Jordan and the PLO see self-determination differently. The difficulty (between them) is that Jordan does not espouse publicly an independent Palestinian state—and he believes Jordan doesn't want it. Assad said two years ago that this was the worst thing that could happen, but doesn't say so publicly, because of Rabat.⁹ Therefore self-determination is a phrase in Israeli minds meaning an independent Palestinian state. In Jordanian minds, it means federation with Jordan. His (the President's) preference is Jordan's—confederation of the West Bank with Jordan. He had told the Israelis this. He has no group of West Bank leaders to present their case to the American people and himself, demanding the right of free assembly, to express their views and demand the right to vote, to choose a congress, and to take over administering their own affairs. No one is recognized to make these demands. He is asking the Jordanians to help it evolve.

The Prime Minister said that without Begin, Israel might let the Palestinians assemble. How can it be done? His Majesty is ready to talk to them (the Palestinians). But if they are not allowed to assemble in peace, with an elected body, how can it be done?

Ambassador Linowitz said that this issue has not come up in that form in the autonomy talks.

The President said (to Ambassador Linowitz) to forget Camp David (i.e. as the context). How can we get the limits removed?

Ambassador Linowitz said that let the Palestinians announce that they will be involved, with a mechanism to get their views, and ask for an assembly. We can support them in that.

The Prime Minister said that the U.S. says the Palestinians should participate in Camp David: this is a non-starter.

The President said he does not believe they have to do it that way; we can get around it.

The Prime Minister said that if that is just a future course of action, then all right—but it will be necessary to get Begin to allow it. They (Jordan) will ask.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Jordan should tell Israel it is doing this, and is taking responsibility for a peaceful assembly.

⁹ The Arab League Summit Conference, held at Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974, was attended by leaders from 20 Arab countries. On October 28, the conference voted unanimously for the creation of an independent Palestinian state anywhere "on Palestinian land that is liberated" from Israeli control. Additionally, the conference recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." (Henry Tanner, "Arab Leaders Issue Call for a Palestinian State; Arafat Given Main Role," *The New York Times*, October 28, 1974, p. 1)

The Prime Minister said that Jordan cannot be responsible; it does not control the Palestinians.

Ambassador Linowitz said the Israelis would see this as a basis for insurance.

The Prime Minister said that the Israelis are in control—there would be no real problems. The Palestinians will say that they want self-determination, and to elect machinery to talk with the U.S. and others, on machinery to reach self-determination. There will be no difficulty in doing that. But this has to be an untied process not linked to autonomy.

Ambassador Veliotis asked whether the Prime Minister would exclude that this group could talk with us on autonomy.

The Prime Minister said that they would seek to talk to the U.S.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we talk with some mayors, now. If a mechanism were set up on the West Bank to articulate positions, however, they would say they want an independent Palestinian state; they would say they would talk with us about an independent Palestinian state. That, in practice, is what they would do.

The President asked: then what?

Dr. Brzezinski said that they would then say let's talk outside of the Camp David framework. To be sure, we would have a fresh start, but that would take us back to three years ago. What the Prime Minister is doing is trying to get started a political approach which will derail the Camp David Accords.

The Prime Minister said that one has seen this situation so many times, as with Zimbabwe and Mugabe,¹⁰ who now seems a peaceful man: myths get exploded. He (the Prime Minister) is arguing that the majority living on the West Bank know that if they talk about an independent Palestinian state, the U.S. would say no; but if the discussion were about self-determination, that permits everything. It keeps options open. But the five-year transition means that the end is closed: the Palestinians would get only rights like the post office and sanitation.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we have a process that is for Arab aspirations. The other party—Israel—wants to incorporate the West Bank. This can't happen, but we need to see Israel's legitimate security needs. The outlook in Israel on the Palestinians in the last 3 or 4 years has undergone tremendous change. Lots of Israelis now see the reality of the Palestinians—e.g. General Harkabi. Camp David is a mechanism to get Israel to make concessions in practice. It can translate demands into reality. But if the demands are articulated in their totality, it will derail the process and set it back.

¹⁰ Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwean Prime Minister from April 1980.

The Prime Minister asked what changes there had been in Begin and Shamir.

Dr. Brzezinski recounted his discussion with Begin at Camp David, when Begin had told him that his (Begin's) arm would fall off and his eye would fall out before he would give up the Sinai settlements. But 10 days later, Begin agreed that a number of them should be dismantled. He (Begin) accepted autonomy for the West Bank; now we are trying to make that a reality. In five years more, it will be possible to translate an intolerable reality towards accommodation. But to start a new process would mean going back three years.

The Prime Minister said that the problem is that this view assumes the process of Camp David occurs in a vacuum. Begin sabotages it. They need something explicit on the end result—i.e. self-determination. With the vacuum, one party is in control, and tries to sabotage. There is a need for a mechanism guaranteeing fulfillment in the right directions—either self-determination at the end, or allowing an assembly in the West Bank and Gaza, with a platform shaped by two guidelines: self-determination and security for Israel.

The President said they had discussed this subject enough. He would summarize: first, some Israeli positions are not acceptable to Jordan. These can be negotiated, though some would not change—e.g. Jerusalem. Palestinian mayors can say that self-determination is their position, and they will not change, but are willing to negotiate to achieve that goal. This doesn't have to be under Camp David; they can say what they need. Only 1% of the American people know that the Palestinians cannot assemble and talk. But if there were a group of representatives of the Palestinians who could say they insist on an alternative—self-determination—we want them there as soon as possible. First is the need for them to peaceably assemble. If Jordan says, all right, it does not accept the Camp David Accords, but will help create a peaceful assembly, this kind of rhetoric would help us make progress. Without it, Israel is firm on the West Bank; Egypt tries, poorly, to speak for the Palestinians; and we try to get Israel out of the West Bank, etc.—without any way to deal with the Palestinians.

Secretary Muskie said the first phase of Camp David—the Egypt-Israel treaty—the Jordanians say is a fact and will continue. The second phase—Palestinian rights negotiations—are stalled because there is an absent party. We can make it a fresh start by following the President's idea. How else can we get to talk? Jordan says to give up on the talks for another approach. Negotiations are needed. Two parties are already talking; but the third is not there. Which is more likely to work: an on-going process or a new one which is not conceived? This is the choice. It is difficult to do the talks bilaterally with Egypt, so the talks are stalled; the Palestinians are not there or represented there. *That* can be a fresh

start. The President has shown that the process of evolution can work. We will persist in trying to bring the parties in, to get a new perception. Israel is concerned with security; the Palestinians are concerned with self-determination. Fundamental rights must be kept separate; it can't be done in a grand effort; only dealing with the nitty gritty can work. The powers and responsibilities of the Self-Governing Authority are largely resolved—though the tough ones are left. We need to work out answers to five issues, or the talks will fail. If they do, will a fresh start be possible?

The Prime Minister answered yes. The talks don't have to fail. He doesn't say they are finished. But one should allow a parallel course, for the Palestinians to articulate their demands outside a formula which closes the road to the future. The Israeli occupiers must relax their repressive policies for this. Without it, who can articulate a reasonable platform? If an alternative road is open—if the idea of self-determination is allowed—then the Israelis will get used to it.

King Hussein said he knows the President was disappointed on Camp David about the lack of participation. He (the President) knows that Jordan was out of the picture until the Camp David results were announced. Jordan sent its questions¹¹ to help in dealing with the other Arabs. If Jordan had gotten in, without knowing the end results, then the very danger Israel sees of a radical state would not be more real on the West Bank; but a similar threat would emerge on the East Bank—as a wedge threatening the entire area. Instead, Jordan kept in touch. The promises in the past were not fulfilled. Jordan knows the President's sincerity and his desire to see a solution. Jordan managed to keep the Arabs together, but there are almost two camps. There are other problems on Jordan: Afghanistan, etc. Regarding the PLO, Jordan has bridges. With Iraq, Jordan has dramatically improved relations. Regarding Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Jordan talks with all of them now. It hopes to play a constructive role; it wants peace and stability. The Jordanians will go back and talk to the PLO. They have covered it time and again: Jordan wants something to help move forward beyond this point. The Egypt-Israel treaty is something that has been achieved. But the Palestinian problem is still there—in Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Soon, there will be the next Arab summit in Jordan.

The President asked when.

King Hussein said: November. Soon, on the economic level of the Arab world, they will need to talk to the oil producers, regarding the future, and to see if there is a way of changing them. He sees they have not charted a course, but an erratic one. The next phase is the summit:

¹¹ See Document 58.

trying to regroup in the area. They will talk, but retain their identity; will others say that Jordan goes too far?

He will talk to the PLO, maybe in New York before he leaves. The Europeans are worried; he hopes they will be involved. The Soviet Union is not important; it only needs to know where we are going. Jordan can prevail on the reasonable elements among the Palestinians. He will not promise that he can deliver, with things as vague as they are. With Egypt and Israel in Camp David, everything was clear. On the Palestinian side, it was not clear. Therefore Jordan posed its questions. He wants the U.S. to understand totally where Jordan stands. Our objectives are one and the same. But how can we move? He wants to move as fast as possible.

The President said that what he would like for His Majesty to say—after consulting with the PLO, the Palestinian people, and the other Arabs—is to acknowledge that the U.S. will not abandon Camp David. His Majesty can deplore this if it [*he*] wants—he hopes he (His Majesty) will not condemn it; and His Majesty can say that the ultimate goal of Camp David is too limited. But second, please say that the Palestinians must have a voice in our affairs: a free assembly, the vote, the right to take over administration of the occupied territories, a congress to speak for the Palestinians, and that the ultimate goal—which is different from others’—will be pursued and not abandoned. This would be a step forward. He hopes that the code words could be avoided.

King Hussein said that there is one difficulty: Israel wants sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

The President said no, they prefer West Bank sovereignty, but this is for negotiating. Some Palestinians are for an independent Palestinian state; and some are for a confederation with Jordan. No one has to relinquish demands for a final solution. He wants His Majesty to say that the Palestinians must have a voice, a free assembly, the vote, the right to choose a body to represent them, and to state their ultimate goals and say they will work for them. He (the President) hopes that His Majesty will not condemn the Camp David process, but say that he (His Majesty) will not speak in favor of it or join it, but the Palestinians in the area must have a way to express themselves. This would add a new dimension, although it might not succeed. Palestinian leaders do not need to acknowledge acceptance of Camp David; but Egypt, Israel and he, himself will not abandon Camp David.

We can work in harmony. If His Majesty says this, that would be good. Please consult with us; and have the Jordanian foreign minister and prime minister come back and talk with Muskie, Linowitz, and with him. Perhaps Jordan will say that it didn’t work, or that the PLO said to say that, but please report and we will see how we can proceed. He wants to explore how to break the deadlock.

(The meeting ended at 12:09 p.m.)

380. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 28, 1980

SUBJECT

UN Resolution on Jerusalem (S)

At Tab A² is a memorandum from Warren Christopher, setting forth the arguments *either* for an abstention *or* a veto *or* non-participation in the vote on the UNSC Jerusalem Resolution—now scheduled for Monday afternoon.³ The memorandum does a good job in setting out the various arguments. (S)

Because of the gravity of this issue—and the risks in *any* vote—I believe it would be useful for you to meet on Monday morning with the Vice President, Ed Muskie, and me to discuss our vote and related statement. Given Don McHenry's deep involvement and concern, I believe it would also be useful for him to be present (his telegram to you is at Tab B—note, however, that the operative text of the resolution is that contained in Chris' memorandum). (S)

Sol Linowitz has asked to be recorded as follows:

We should not be party to any effort to make Jerusalem a political issue at this time. Under other circumstances, maybe we should abstain on a resolution containing many of these formulations. Under current circumstances, we should veto with a statement that deals not with the resolution's substance, but rather states as our reasoning that this resolution, at this time, would not advance the solution of Jerusalem or the Palestinian problem, and would indeed hinder the search for solutions. Therefore this resolution should not be permitted to gain the force of law, as it would if we only abstained. (S)

With regard to Chris' memorandum, I would only note that the option of "non-participation" might be a distinction that would be noted in the Security Council, but would make no practical political difference in Israel. With regard to the draft statement,⁴ I would note that

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.

² Attached but not printed is the June 28 memorandum from Christopher to Carter.

³ According to a June 27 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, the vote was postponed at U.S. request. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 6/20–30/80)

⁴ Attached but not printed is the undated draft statement.

it does not support the Camp David process, and have included a draft paragraph (Tab C) that might be inserted to correct that deficiency. (S)

I want to underline one other point: the vote we cast on this resolution will have some impact on the autonomy talks, and especially on the Burg-Ali-Linowitz meetings on Wednesday⁵ and Thursday. As Chris notes, a veto would cause problems for Ali; but an abstention would have problems for Burg—and could (if followed by unilateral Israeli acts) also spill over onto Egyptian attitudes. Equally important, we have been predicating many of our recent acts—bridging beyond May 26; softening the European statement; and taking a firm line on UN resolutions—on our commitment to Camp David. That position wears progressively thin as the talks do not restart, and as there is a widespread assumption that we will not make any serious effort to get a significant agreement before our elections. Thus the position Linowitz takes with Burg and Ali this week—and the position you take with them on Wednesday⁶—will largely set the tone for months to come: whether we will take an aggressive or relatively relaxed stance towards the pace and intensity of the negotiations. (S)

To help clarify the issues involved, we will convene a Senior Level Meeting⁷ on Monday afternoon, to present a strategy for the Burg-Ali meetings to you for your approval. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with the Vice President, Muskie, and me on Monday morning to decide on our UN vote:⁸

⁵ July 2.

⁶ See Document 381.

⁷ No record of a Senior Level Meeting on June 30 has been found. Under a July 2 covering memorandum, Brzezinski forwarded to Carter a July 1 briefing paper from Muskie for the Burg-Ali meeting. Copies of both documents are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 7/80.

⁸ Carter approved the recommendation to meet at the White House and approved including McHenry in the discussion. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale, Muskie, Christopher, Linowitz, Brzezinski, Saunders, and Hunter in the Cabinet Room from 9:18 a.m. to 10:36 a.m. on June 30. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) On June 30, the United States abstained in the vote on Security Council Resolution 476 (1980). The resolution passed 14–0. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, p. 402)

381. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 2, 1980, 4:22–4:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali and Israeli Interior Minister Joseph Burg

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the West Bank, Gaza and the Autonomy Negotiations
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert Hunter, National Security Council Staff Member (notetaker)
Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali
Israeli Interior Minister Joseph Burg

(The President met briefly with Minister Ali and Dr. Brzezinski in the Oval Office from 4:15–4:21;² after the Cabinet Room meeting with Minister Burg in the Oval Office from 4:35 to about 4:40).³

The President began by noting that West German Foreign Minister Genscher had just been here, following Chancellor Schmidt's talks in Moscow. Genscher is going back to Bonn tonight, for a cabinet meeting tomorrow. This is a difficult travel schedule, and Genscher is not well.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that Genscher has a heart problem.

Minister Burg said that Genscher has had to cut down on his food and his weight.

The President said that Genscher had spent three months recuperating last year.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

² In their meeting, Ali passed along to Carter a message from Sadat that the Egyptian President would "stand by" the message delivered by Mubarak, but "the unfortunate move by the Knesset on Jerusalem means that we have to concentrate on the measures that impede the peace process." In response, Carter asked Ali to tell Sadat that the situation "would be worse" if the talks did not "start now." Carter continued: "Israel is less likely to do something negative if the talks are going on than if they have been halted. My [Carter's] preference is to start the talks *right away* without any delay and without any preconditions." A copy of the memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 7/80.

³ A memorandum of conversation of this meeting has not been found.

Minister Burg said that his color looked better.

The President said that Genscher has cut his weight back.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that Genscher's colleagues had urged him not to go to Japan (for the Ohira funeral).⁴

The President joked that maybe he should have said "see you in Japan!" His (the President's) hope is that without further delay we can restart the autonomy negotiations. He asked Minister Ali to relate this to President Sadat. They should start without preconditions, with a firm commitment of both parties to negotiate under the Camp David Accords. It is his belief that any act by either side to disturb the talks would be. . . . (Secretary Muskie entered at this point).

Secretary Muskie said that Minister Burg has the world's best collection of stories.

Minister Burg said that it is one of his minor prides!

The President continued that his hope is that there will be no preconditions in restarting the negotiations. What concerns there are about future interruptions in the talks would be lessened by the fact of the talks itself. If Israel and Egypt are in talks, they would be less likely to take particular acts, and there would be more confidence. His hope is that the talks will restart with no further delay. If in the next few weeks, or perhaps in September, there are developments that cause one side or the other to withdraw, that problem can be faced then. He believes we can make progress. The history has been surprisingly good through the peace treaty. Both nations have concerns, but the talks can be successful. He has asked Minister Ali to convey this to President Sadat.

Ambassador Linowitz said that they had had a very fruitful three hours today, mostly clearing the air. The talks⁵ had been frank. Minister Ali had raised three issues: Jerusalem and the Knesset committee action; settlements; and confidence building measures on the West Bank, which are a cause of agitation. Minister Burg's concerns had included articles in the Egyptian press making unwelcome statements about Begin, plus Sadat's suspending the talks without conferring. The talks this morning were very helpful and beneficial. Afterwards, he thought that we could get the talks resumed. Minister Ali needs to consult with Cairo; Minister Burg is ready to start. After Minister Ali conveys his views to Cairo, he (Ambassador Linowitz) hopes that we can meet tomorrow morning and indicate that the talks will resume.

Minister Burg said he was prepared to say this.

Minister Ali said he was not.

⁴ Prime Minister Ohira died from a heart attack on June 12, 1980.

⁵ See Document 382.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Minister Ali could say what his concerns are.

Minister Ali said that he had done so.

The President said that this was adequate, and he hopes that Minister Ali will relay to Sadat his (the President's) hope that the talks can be restarted. We have all worked hard. If something should happen that could stop the talks again, it would be better if the talks were actually going on.

Minister Burg said that he would follow the President's line, which is reasonable. Quoting what the President had said in Venice, it was best to work for an ideal. Therefore, Israel is ready to restart the talks.

The President said he was gratified that Minister Burg saw it that way, and that he (Minister Burg) had noted what he (the President) had said in Venice!

Minister Burg quoted former Prime Minister Macmillan,⁶ saying that a statesman is a politician when he is abroad.

Ambassador Linowitz said that, if we can—after Minister Ali talks with Sadat—agree to restart the talks, we can get them structured, to lay out a plan for the next several months, to proceed in a businesslike way. The groundwork is laid, and now we wait for agreement.

The President said good. We will do all that we can to help. If either Sadat or Begin have a problem, they should call him (the President) directly. He had had a good report from Minister Burg on how the Prime Minister is feeling.

Minister Burg said that Prime Minister Begin is active despite his illness—and so he is also angry about what happened in New York (i.e. at the UN)! (laughter)

Secretary Muskie joked that we are helping to restore the Prime Minister's health!

Minister Burg said that this is a way of judging his (Begin's) health!

The President said it was gratifying to know that Begin is recovering. Will Yadin serve as acting Prime Minister for the next few weeks?

Minister Burg said sure—and he (Yadin) will also be defense minister.

The President asked if this had happened before.

Minister Burg said yes. It was part of the bargain three years ago. Yadin was the head of a strong faction. Then this deal was worked out. Now, it is continued out of propriety.

⁶ Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 until 1963.

The President asked whether Yadin had been able to see Egyptian antiquities.

Minister Ali said yes.

The President said that Yadin had asked him (the President) to arrange it.

Minister Burg said that Yadin had been to Memphis, and shown a strong interest in it.

The President said that he had asked Yadin if he (the President) could help arrange such a trip to Egypt. Yadin had said he would like to go. He (the President) had said that this would be the first thing he would raise with Sadat—that Yadin should go to Egypt and see its antiquities. Sadat said he would invite Yadin personally.

Minister Burg said that he was in Egypt 40 years ago, travelling from Geneva to Palestine via Lisbon and Africa. The trip took four and a half months.

The President said that people forget what has been done in the past two years. He does not want us to move backwards with disagreement or failure. If we continue to work we can succeed.

Minister Burg said that too much has been invested to permit failure.

The President agreed.

Secretary Muskie asked whether the Egyptians had removed all the artifacts before Aswan was flooded.

Minister Ali said yes.

Secretary Muskie asked if this was all of them.

Minister Ali said that it was all. They had teams that went throughout the valley to see whether there were other artifacts. They succeeded in digging out the ancient buildings.

The President said that it was a mammoth job in raising the sites above the water.

Minister Ali said that the biggest was Abu Simbel; it was more than 20,000 tons of stone.

The President said that autonomy should be easy in comparison (laughter).

Secretary Muskie said maybe we should build a new pyramid.

The President said he was very glad that the discussions have got so far. Minister Ali would talk to Sadat tomorrow. Does he have to wait? What time is it in Cairo?

Minister Ali said that sometimes Sadat goes out and comes in late.

The President asked whether Sadat goes to bed late. Minister Ali could tell Sadat that he (the President) considered this important enough to call him (Sadat) tonight.

Minister Ali said that by 9:30 a.m. here tomorrow he could report on his call.

The President said that he would have gone to California by then.

Secretary Muskie asked why the President was going to California.

The President said he was addressing the National Education Association convention.

Secretary Muskie said that that was non-political!

The President said absolutely!

Minister Burg said that the reasons were great.

The President said that the political reasons were great!

Ambassador Linowitz asked Minister Ali whether he (Minister Ali) could call Sadat now.

Minister Ali said he would try.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether a call could be put in now.

The President said that a call could be placed from the White House.

Ambassador Linowitz asked Minister Ali if he would like to do it.

The President asked Minister Ali if he would like the call placed.

Minister Ali said all right, he would call now.

The President asked Mr. Hunter to place the call to Cairo for Minister Ali.

Ambassador Linowitz said let's do it.

(The meeting ended at 4:35 p.m.).

382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt¹

Washington, July 8, 1980, 0103Z

178916. Subject: Washington Autonomy Talks.

1. (S-entire text)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 7/2/80 Visit of Interior Minister Burg of Israel and Foreign Minister Ali of Egypt: 6-7/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Wat T. Cluverius (S/SN); cleared by Hunter, Sterner, Walker (S/SN), and Robert S. Steven (S/S-O); approved by Linowitz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143-1255)

2. Summary: Following for the record and your information is report of meetings which lead to July 2 decision to resume autonomy talks.

3. Ambassador Linowitz met alone with Burg evening of July 1 and breakfasted alone with Ali July 2. Burg was bristly about Egyptian inconstancy and said Israeli Government and public increasingly doubtful of Egyptian intentions. He was particularly upset about media report he said he had heard to effect that Egyptian Parliament had passed resolution stating that Jerusalem was to be capital of future Palestinian state. However, he said he and his team ready to do business of course, without preconditions, and could work here on Sunday² if necessary. Ali reviewed for Linowitz the expected litany of Egyptian concerns—Jerusalem, settlements, conditions on West Bank—but did not reveal in breakfast meeting that he was not authorized to agree to resumption.

4. Wednesday³ morning trilateral meeting (for about three hours) consumed for most part by both Burg and Ali airing their grievances. Ali was unaware of report out of Cairo (above) which was agitating Burg so that issue was laid aside. Ali pressed Burg on Cohen Bill⁴ and Burg, helpfully, replied with some heat that he had not wanted the bill to move to full Knesset at this time, and that he felt almost betrayed by David Glass whose future in NRP would be dark if he, Burg, had anything to say about it. While neither was convinced by the other, Burg and Ali had an articulate and intelligent exchange on the settlements question. Ali did not raise with Burg question of movement of Begin's office to East Jerusalem⁵ (though Linowitz had in private meeting with Burg) but did review again the need for Israel to undertake confidence-building measures among Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza.

5. After air was to some degree cleared by these exchanges, Linowitz pressed hard for need to agree on first day to language on agreement to resume negotiations and gave them draft text to this effect. Ali said he would have to consult Cairo overnight and that text "could be discussed" on July 3. Linowitz said the three of them should discuss it

² July 13.

³ July 9.

⁴ See Document 365.

⁵ On June 25, Lewis met with Begin to discuss a series of press reports indicating that planning had begun to transfer the Israeli Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem. Lewis emphasized the negative impact a move would have on the course of the autonomy talks, the attitudes of U.S. leaders "from President Carter down," and "Israel's already battered image in the United States and Europe," as well as the "increased diplomatic isolation inevitable when cabinet-level visitors or Ambassadors from friendly countries were unable to call upon Begin in his East Jerusalem offices." (Telegram 11739 from Tel Aviv, June 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1807)

right then, before their afternoon meeting⁶ with President Carter. Ali then said he had no authority to agree to resumption but would try to contact Cairo immediately. Burg wondered what he was doing in Washington if Ali could not agree to resume talks. Burg and Ali agreed to meeting again with Linowitz just before meeting the President.

6. In this second brief trilateral meeting before seeing President Carter, Ali said he could not agree to announcement of agreement to resume talks. He said he had to consult further with Cairo. Ali proposed a draft announcement which would state only that three delegations heads had talked and would consult further with their governments.

7. Meeting with the President: At Ali's request the President met alone with him⁷ for a few minutes during which Ali delivered personal message from Sadat. Trilateral meeting then began. This was at first a replay of morning meeting with Linowitz, with Ali disclaiming authority to agree to resume and stating he had been unable to reach Cairo. President pressed Ali to call Sadat from White House with successful result⁸ you now know. Subsequently the President met alone briefly with Burg (with President out of town⁹ we have thus far been unable to get a read-out on his private meeting with Burg and specifically whether he raised issue of moving Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem).

8. Meetings July 3 at heads of delegation and other levels concentrated on text of resumption statement for that day's press conference and on the agreed schedule of talks already reported to you by septel. While talks at heads of delegation level were amicable, though candid, mood at lower levels was cooler than usual. Israelis were incensed by al-Baz' contacts with media, particularly his appearance on morning news show July 2, after heads of delegation had agreed there would not be such contacts until after meetings had ended. Egyptians accompanying Ali did not favor resumption and were frustrated by Sadat's willingness to resume and U.S. request for him to do so. Amer Mousa particularly rubbed Israelis against the grain. Kubersky and Gabbai sensed

⁶ See Document 381.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 381.

⁸ Following Ali's July 2 telephone conversation with him, Sadat assented to the resumption of the talks beginning July 10. (Telegram 14786 from Cairo, July 3; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D800320–0183) The following day, July 3, the Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. delegations agreed to a tentative schedule of meetings through August 5. (Telegram 176039 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, July 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2631)

⁹ President and Mrs. Carter departed Washington on July 3, for a series of public appearances in California and Florida, before returning to their home in Plains, Georgia, July 4–8. On July 8, Carter flew to Tokyo to attend funeral services for former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira and returned to Washington on July 10. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

Egyptian mood and tried to be helpful by giving way on a number of points in reaching agreement on text of resumption statement. Ali has substantially improved his image with Israelis although they still have questions about his ability to stand up to al-Baz as they believed Khalil had done. For his part, Burg left talks generally pleased and hopeful about the possibility for progress in the future. After talks with Amb Linowitz Burg was under no illusions about implications of any Israeli moves on Jerusalem and will be discussing this matter with Begin.

Christopher

383. Memorandum From Robert Hunter, Gary Sick, William Odom, and Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Syria (U)

We met, today, per your request, on CIA's Alert Memorandum (Tab I). We focussed not on the prospects for Assad's removal from power²—that is beyond our ability to predict—but on likely consequences and steps we can take now. (S)

In our judgment, the Israeli and peace talks angles identified by the CIA are less critical than two others: the impact on Lebanon and the potential role of the Soviet Union. It is possible—but not likely—that a change in government could be peaceful. Given the Alawite dominance over the Sunni majority (and the split in the military between officers and enlisted men along these lines), a change in government (other than from a random assassin's bullet) is likely to take both Assad and his brother from the scene (e.g. through an Alawite coup to protect a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Chron File, Box 128, Hunter: 7/16–24/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² On June 26, an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on Assad when grenades were tossed at the Syrian President when he arrived to meet President Seyne Kountché of Niger at the Presidential Guest House in Damascus. An account of the event was conveyed by the Embassy in Damascus in telegram 4061 from Damascus, June 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800311–0686)

deteriorating position) or through incipient civil war involving Sunni troops. Even with an Alawite coup, the risks of civil strife would be high; and so would be the opportunities for Soviet exploitation of the situation. The Soviets are not likely to remain detached from Syrian internal strife. Should Syrian internal conflict become tangled with Lebanese and Arab-Israeli developments, the Soviets would welcome the chance to distract attention from Afghanistan and to assume a role toward Syria that gave them leverage over Syria's internal affairs while appearing to protect against external threats. (S)

A critical scenario could involve Syrian force withdrawals from Lebanon. The risks of a chain of events leading to renewed civil war in Lebanon would then be high—including high incentives for Israeli military engagement in southern Lebanon (and—in the extreme—in Syria itself). A less likely—but still plausible—scenario could entail coincidence between Assad's collapse and Lebanon difficulties with paralysis in the autonomy talks occasioned by the (now virtually certain) passage of the Cohen bill³ on Jerusalem and the (highly likely) movement of Begin's office to East Jerusalem. At that point, Israel would have even less to lose through involvement in Lebanon in support of Haddad, etc. (S)

U.S. Efforts

We concluded that there is little that the U.S. can do directly to affect events in Syria. We do not have the position there now to influence events either way; and any efforts (e.g. pumping up foreign aid) would be unlikely to matter in the context of Assad's problems. (S)

We also discarded efforts to deal with Iran, the UAE, and Kuwait on this issue. We noted, however, that if there is a Saunders mission to Iraq, that fact would be duly noted in Syria, and that could have an impact with Assad—whether or not Saunders discussed Syria in Baghdad (which would need to be considered further). (S)

Our best approach, therefore, should be threefold: 1) gain more information; 2) share our concerns with appropriate others; and 3) at some point further increase sensitivities of interested parties to the potential problems of instability in Syria:

—CIA should further refine the analysis in its alert memorandum; begin identifying possible alternatives to Assad; and give us a good analysis of the Soviet role now, Moscow's interests and possible calculations (now and post-Assad); and the potential role of its direct involvement in Syria;

³ See Document 365.

—State should do a contingency paper laying out possible scenarios, risks, alternative regimes and their impact, and possible courses of U.S. action (precautionary and reactive);

—we should compare notes with our key allies who have some involvement in Syria, about the situation and possible course of events (UK, France, FRG, Italy, Japan);

—we should go now to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, along similar lines, but seeking to draw on their particular knowledge and concerns about Syria. With the Saudis, we should also stress the Soviet angle;

—we should also have lower key discussions with the Egyptians and Israelis on the issue—at some point stressing with the latter the need for caution during any transition beyond Assad;

—at some point later, there *might* be value in discussions with the Soviets on the seriousness of our concerns. This would be premature, however, until we know a lot more about the situation. (S)

When we get the results of these soundings, we will be in a better position to chart our course intelligently. This exercise would also get other countries sensitized to the serious risks involved, and could thus reduce the problems of ill-considered reaction to a change of regime in Damascus. (S)

Tab I

Alert Memorandum for the National Security Council Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, July 11, 1980.

SUBJECT

Syria

Although not imminent, Syrian President Assad's assassination or overthrow is significantly more likely today than it was before the 26 June assassination attempt. I believe that US policymakers need to focus sooner rather than later on the potential adverse regional consequences of Assad's removal from the scene. The attached Alert Memorandum outlines briefly some of these regional implications. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Frank C. Carlucci

⁴ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Brzezinski added a handwritten notation to Hunter, Sick, Odom, and Ermarth, dated July 15, in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Pl[ea]se get together and discuss—give me your recom[mentation]s. ZB."

Attachment

Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵

Washington, July 11, 1980

SYRIA

There is a growing likelihood that Syrian President Assad will be assassinated or ousted by a coup. Assad's departure could signal the return of an era of chaotic instability and regional isolation that typified Syria's first quarter century of independence. Virtually any successor regime would be initially more nationalistic and hardline, unable to propose or respond effectively to major foreign policy initiatives, particularly negotiations with Israel, until it felt confident of its hold on power. A new regime might also withdraw from Lebanon, raising the prospect of renewed civil war; seek to rally domestic support through limited clashes with Israel; and seek support from the USSR to help offset internal threats.

The recent assassination attempt against Syrian President Assad underscores his growing vulnerability and is likely to encourage further assassination attempts and increased terrorist attacks against Assad's minority Alawite regime. Although the beleaguered Syrian President may be able to hold power for many months, his removal by a coup or assassination—with little or no warning—is becoming increasingly likely. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

In the event of Assad's violent death or overthrow, Syria could easily revert to the pattern of chaotic instability that existed before his assumption of power in 1970. Alawites are in the best position to oust Assad but the absence of an obvious successor could soon generate a power struggle until a new leader consolidated his position. In any event, a new regime—whether Alawite or Sunni—would be dominated by the military. A Sunni regime might be able to strengthen its position by attaining an accommodation with Muslim Brotherhood extremists. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

At the outset, virtually any successor would be more unpredictable, nationalistic, and probably more radical than Assad. This sit-

⁵ Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. A notation on the first page reads: "The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level with CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR."

uation would generate increased tension with Syria's neighbors, especially Israel. A weak successor might seek a limited military confrontation with Israel—such as air clashes over Lebanon or artillery duels on the Golan Heights—to unite the country, but such confrontations, especially on the Golan, could escalate to wider war. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A post-Assad regime might extricate itself from Lebanon even though a complete withdrawal would increase the risk of renewed civil war there. An unstable leadership probably would not sustain the steady financial drain and corrosive effect on the armed forces without substantially greater Arab financial and military support. A new regime could also fear that keeping a sizable military force outside Syria would increase the likelihood of counter coup plotting within the military. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

It is unlikely that a successor regime would moderate Syria's approach to Middle East negotiations. There is no evidence that Assad's Alawite lieutenants, the officer corps, or Syrians in general support the existing peace process. Chronic domestic instability would make it extremely difficult for Syria to moderate its stance toward Israel and to play a constructive role in reaching a comprehensive peace settlement. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The Palestinians would welcome increased room for maneuver as a consequence of instability in Syria. They, and the Jordanians, however, would remain unwilling to enter peace talks under the Camp David framework and would also be unlikely to risk entering negotiations under a new framework until the policies of a successor regime in Syria had been worked out. By virtue of its central geopolitical position, any government in Syria would possess substantial capability to foil unilateral Palestinian or Jordanian peace initiatives. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A change of leadership would at least temporarily increase Syria's isolation in the region and further erode Syrian influence in inter-Arab councils. A weak regime would invite outside meddling in Syrian affairs by those who have done so in the past, notably Iraq. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A new leader in Syria, uncertain of his power base, might seek additional support from the USSR in an attempt to deal with the internal threat. While most successors will want to preserve some ties to the United States in an effort to keep a balance in Syria's relations with the superpowers, all will be compelled to maintain Syria's military supply line to Moscow. Soviet influence in Damascus is likely to increase initially, especially if Syrian-Israeli tensions increase. A new Alawite regime is likely to seek increases in Soviet aid and closer military and security ties, but, like Assad, is probably unlikely to request the sta-

tioning of Soviet ground forces in Syria. Given Sunni hostility toward Assad's closeness with the Soviet Union, however, a Sunni regime might begin to distance itself from the Soviets and move closer to moderate Arab states. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

384. Presidential Determination No. 80-23¹

Washington, July 16, 1980

Subject

Presidential Determination Under Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act—
Egypt

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act,² I hereby determine that the financing under the Arms Export Control Act of the sale of F-16 and associated missiles to Egypt is important to the national security of the United States.³

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Congress, as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Determinations: 6-9/80. No classification marking.

² See footnote 2, Document 273.

³ The Justification for the Presidential Determination, attached but not printed, states: "The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in its broadest context is the only way to achieve stability in the Middle East. Without such peace and stability, the concerns of Arabs and Israelis for their security, independence, and territorial integrity cannot be completely allayed. Egypt and Israel are leading the way in the search for such a comprehensive peace that the Middle East so badly needs, but the task is difficult. Consequently, it is in the U.S. national security interest to assist Egypt in meeting its legitimate security requirements, thereby bolstering its sense of confidence and resolve to continue the efforts towards a permanent peace.

"The Egyptian Air Force is beginning a modernization program by replacing elements of its aging Soviet-made equipment. This FMS financing will assist the Egyptian Air Force to obtain a limited number of aircraft armed with appropriate missiles."

385. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, July 22, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S. Response to Begin's Moving his Office to East Jerusalem

The Problem

Sam Lewis reports² that Begin is determined to go through with moving his office to East Jerusalem, despite our representations. There are now indications that the move may take place by early August. We need to devise a measured but firm U.S. response which will show both Arabs and Israelis that we stand by our position on Jerusalem. At the same time it will be in our interest to avoid pushing matters to the point where Begin would be given an issue he could use to bolster his failing position at home and use against the Administration.

Background

Begin has been thinking about moving his office to East Jerusalem for some time. Sam Lewis has had several talks with him about it, most recently on June 25,³ but all attempts to dissuade Begin have been unavailing, as have our talks here with Ambassador Evron and Interior Minister Burg. Sam believes that there is virtually no chance that Begin or his advisors will be swayed by a senior level appeal from the United States. His estimate is that a message from the President would at best meet with a polite rebuff.

Begin's reasons for wanting to make the move appear to be:

—The move is necessary to prove to the world that Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem is irreversible and that efforts by the world community, in particular the UN, will have no effect.

—Concern to make the move while he still has enough time as Prime Minister to carry it through and make it permanent. (Begin knows that the Labor Party will not make the move if it comes to office but apparently believes that he can face it with a *fait accompli* which it will be unwilling or unable to reverse.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 51, Israel: 7/80. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a July 23 memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, describing it as a "bootleg" copy.

² See telegram 13390 from Tel Aviv, July 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800352-0101)

³ See footnote 5, Document 382.

—Hope that the Israeli public will rally around him in the face of expected international criticism, and that his domestic popularity and political support will be strengthened.

Very likely a further consideration is that Begin sees the next few weeks as a period when it will be difficult for the Administration to react firmly.

Considerations

Begin's moving his office to East Jerusalem will put our credibility on the line in a way that few other actions could at this time. We are publicly committed to the position that we do not recognize Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and that we do not accept unilateral actions concerning Jerusalem by any of the parties. Our response will have to make clear that we continue to hold firmly to that position. Even then we can expect a very sharp response from the Arab bloc supported more broadly by non-Arab Islamic states, with demands that we force Begin to back off. If our response is merely one of verbal disapproval, with no action to back it up, it will be seen by the Arabs as U.S. acquiescence. We can expect that the Arabs will immediately call a Security Council meeting and put forward a resolution condemning Israel's action.

If we are seen to be wavering on our long established position on Jerusalem, reactions from the Arab side could be damaging. The Saudis would be particularly upset by a feeble U.S. response. Because of his close association with us, Sadat could be seriously hurt were we to fail to make clear our opposition to Begin's move, and he might feel obliged to take some action to put a distance between himself and us. We expect Sadat would in any case withdraw his Ambassador from Israel, but if he felt our response were feeble he might go further and break off diplomatic relations with Israel entirely or again suspend the autonomy negotiations.

In any event, it is important that Sadat and we ourselves not take totally different tacks in reacting to Begin's move. When we decide what we intend to do, we should have Ambassador Atherton consult with Sadat to sound out his views.

At the same time we want to avoid being carried beyond our previous positions into statements or actions which would be interpreted by the Israelis and their supporters in this country as denying even Israel's right to be in West Jerusalem, somehow implying that we intend to divide the city again, or threatening a cutoff of U.S. military or economic assistance. We are faced with the probability that they will interpret any opposition at all as evidence of one of these positions.

Options and Proposed Action

Within these limits there are essentially two steps we can consider:

1. A statement⁴ making clear that we consider the move detrimental to the peace negotiations, reiterating our position on Jerusalem, and calling on the Government not to implement the decision.

2. A determination that neither our Ambassador nor visiting Administration officials will call at Begin's East Jerusalem office.

In evaluating these steps, we need to consider carefully our basic alternatives in handling this situation.

—It may be difficult over the long run to sustain a position that U.S. officials will not call on the Prime Minister in East Jerusalem. Certainly there will be many Congressional delegations that would not feel bound to comply with such a restriction. Moreover, the Israelis would be able to mount a strong argument—one that would receive sympathetic resonance in some quarters in the U.S.—that such a posture was inconsistent with our policy of not seeking to redive the city. If we decide these considerations have the most weight, it may make sense to keep our response low key and try to get the issue behind us as quickly as possible.

—The alternative is to decide that to do less than this would do unacceptable damage to the credibility of our policy on Jerusalem—in terms of our relations with the Arab states, the stake we have in eventually persuading the Palestinians to engage in the negotiations, the difficult position in which we would place Sadat, and our own image of consistent and firm policy.

We believe that while the former considerations are important and must be seriously taken into account, they are outweighed by the latter arguments. We therefore recommend that if Begin goes through with his move, we be prepared to issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft, which would restate our policy on Jerusalem and have the Spokesman say, in answers to a question, that no U.S. official will meet with Begin in his East Jerusalem office.

Ambassador Lewis reports⁵ that all the Western European Ambassadors in Israel have received instructions that they will not be permitted to call on the Prime Minister in East Jerusalem. Ambassador Lewis has several times (most recently on June 25) told Begin that he would expect to be instructed not to call in East Jerusalem if Begin moves his office there; some time back Begin alluded to this publicly, remarking that he and the Ambassador “would do business by mail” in that case.

⁴ A draft statement, drafted by Korn on July 22, is attached but not printed.

⁵ Lewis's report is not further identified.

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, July 23, 1980, 0159Z

194130. Subject: Possible Move of Prime Minister Begin's Office to East Jerusalem.

1. Confidential-entire text.

2. The Secretary is deeply disturbed by the continuing reports that Begin intends to move his office in the near future to East Jerusalem. Please deliver the following oral message from him to Foreign Minister Shamir directly.² In conveying this message, you should make clear our intention to keep this exchange confidential.

3. Begin text:

I am asking Ambassador Lewis to deliver to you today this message about the continuing reports indicating that Prime Minister Begin intends to move his office to East Jerusalem in the near future. As a long-standing friend of Israel, I feel I have to be absolutely candid with you. Such a move in my judgment would have seriously adverse consequence for both our countries. As you know, since Camp David both of us have devoted intensive efforts to conducting the autonomy negotiations, designed to open a new chapter in relations between Israel and her neighbors. I know that you share our firm commitment to bringing these negotiations to a positive outcome, building further on the significant steps toward peace which we already have taken.

At Camp David we agreed to leave the issue of Jerusalem for the future. This was the wise and correct decision, given the unique significance of Jerusalem to all concerned. The move of the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem at this sensitive stage in the negotiations would not be a matter only affecting Israel; it would affect all of us. I am concerned that such a move would create very grave problems for our common negotiating effort.

I therefore urge you to discuss this matter most carefully with the Prime Minister and sincerely hope that the Government of Israel will decide not to proceed with such a move. We have gone far together in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1203. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by J.L. Hirsch (NEA/IAI); cleared by Sterner, Saunders, and Jane E. Becker (S/S–O); approved by Muskie. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and the White House.

² Lewis delivered the message to Shamir on July 23. (Telegram 13467 from Tel Aviv, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1176)

our search for peace in these years; I know that both of us want to persevere until we bring our efforts to a successful conclusion. End text.

Muskie

387. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Sadat and East Jerusalem (U)

At Tab I is Roy's Cherokee cable² on his meeting last night with Sadat on the East Jerusalem problem. The upshot is that Sadat is leaning toward a suspension of the talks, but that he really wants to do what will best help the President, and wants us to coordinate our approaches. It was not a definitive conversation, however, since Sadat hadn't really thought about it (he said). (S)

NEA feels—and I concur—that we should get back to Sadat in fairly short order, since the Israeli Cabinet decision is supposed to be made this Sunday,³ and we will need another full round of exchanges with Sadat before then. The Friday breakfast would be too late, therefore, and NEA will be working up a cable of instructions, for clearance around and ultimately by the President (probably tomorrow). Preliminary thinking is that it would say to Sadat:

—we will have a statement (Muskie?) for after the Cabinet decision (there is a draft in preparation that takes a “more in sorrow than in anger” approach, but which is straightforward on our Jerusalem position);⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(7/80–9/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “These are good p[oin]ts. Try them out on Hal S.” At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Hunter given c[opy] 7/31.”

² Telegram 677 from Alexandria, July 29, is attached but not printed.

³ August 3.

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”

—Lewis (and other USG officials) will not be going to East Jerusalem. However (one variant would state), we will not go public with this until the move actually takes place; and⁵

—we share Sadat's dilemma on the continuation of the autonomy talks, but believe on balance it would be better to keep them going.⁶ (S)

At the same time, Begin has complained⁷ to Sam about press stories (in Israel, before the Gwertzman piece⁸) about Muskie's remarks to the Cabinet. Muskie has asked that a response⁹ go to Begin about our efforts to keep this out of the press; recounting what our approaches had been to Israel on this; and indicating that the Cabinet session was private—but the Prime Minister will understand how leaks in a democracy can happen! (S)

Clearly, of course, we remain in a reactive position—though we have little choice, and USG has collectively been doing a good job lately in managing a complex effort. (The UNGA speech¹⁰—which everyone but Vanden Heuvel liked—drew praise *both* from Begin and from Es-safi (Tunisian Permrep), who also said that the PLO “understood” that we had to make such a statement. We must be doing something right/wrong!). (S)

There is no easy way out of the reactive position. One suggestion, however: that Muskie go out to Egypt and Israel to talk over the situation, in general—not keyed to Jerusalem (since that is virtually a *fait accompli*, etc.), but rather to go over the whole complex of issues, au-

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”

⁶ In the right-hand margin next to this point, Brzezinski wrote: “yes.”

⁷ In a telephone call to Lewis on July 29, Begin requested confirmation of media reports that Muskie used “sharp expressions” when speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate regarding the transfer of the Israeli Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem, particularly the alleged use of the word “provocation” in characterizing the Israeli action. (Telegram 13785 from Tel Aviv, July 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005-0410)

⁸ Reference is presumably to *The New York Times* reporter Bernard Gwertzman's May 27 article in which he reported that Carter administration officials viewed Weizman's resignation as a setback to the autonomy negotiations. Gwertzman added that senior administration officials believed that domestic politics in Israel might lead Begin to “surprise us and demonstrate more give” in the next round of talks.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “In Washington, Officials Express Optimism in Talks,” *The New York Times*, May 27, 1980, p. A18)

⁹ The response to Begin, stating that the United States has made “every effort to avoid public confrontation” and that Muskie's briefing for the Cabinet was “confidential and not intended for publication,” was conveyed in telegram 200886 to Tel Aviv, July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143-1093)

¹⁰ On July 24, before an Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly called to consider draft resolutions A/RES/ES-7/2 and A/RES/ES-7/3 on Palestinian rights, Vanden Heuvel delivered a statement of the U.S. position, which he confirmed in a second statement on July 29 following the passage of the two resolutions. The texts of both statements are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1980, pp. 66–69.

tonomy, and the psychology that is operating. Muskie, after all, has not been to the Middle East, yet, and needs to do so at some point. Of course, there are downsides—including not raising expectations; de-linking a visit from East Jerusalem—not an easy job; and not appearing to undercut Sol (to say nothing of Muskie’s probable disinclination to climb on a plane). To broaden the trip, Muskie might also go to Riyadh for a “get acquainted” visit.¹¹ (S)

Such a trip (perhaps next week or so) would not be the answer to our prayers; but it *might* help to calm the situation, and indicate that we are not just prepared to be passive as the situation gets more convoluted. (S)

FYI: Butrus Ghali has told Sol’s people that he would like Muskie to take the lead in trying to get Palestinian views into the negotiating process. That would probably *not* be a good thing for Muskie to attempt, at least on a first Middle East trip (the initial reaction from the Palestinians would be to demagogue in public); but this idea *is* consistent with the President’s approach to Hussein,¹² and Muskie might again float the *need* for some Palestinian “involvement,” which even Burg says could be worthwhile. (S)

¹¹ Brzezinski highlighted this and the following paragraph in the right-hand margin and wrote: “[what?] would he accomplish”

¹² See Documents 378 and 379.

388. Editorial Note

On July 30, the Knesset voted 69–15, with three abstentions, to approve the Cohen Bill, thereby making Jerusalem the *de jure* capital of Israel. (Christopher S. Wren, “Israel Enacts a Law Making All of Jerusalem the Capital,” *The New York Times*, July 31, 1980, page A1) The Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel had four articles: 1) “Integral [shlema] and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel;” 2) “Jerusalem is the seat of the president, the Knesset, the Cabinet and the Supreme Court;” 3) “The holy places will be guarded against desecration or any kind of offense or anything that might harm the freedom of access of members of [all] faiths to sites that are held holy by them or might hurt their feelings toward those places;” and 4) “The Cabinet will energetically take care to develop Jerusalem and make it prosper. It will also make efforts to care for the well-being of its inhabitants by allocating special resources, including giving Jerusalem municipality a special an-

nual grant. This will be done with the approval of the Knesset Finance Committee. Jerusalem will be given special preference in the activities of national bodies [rashuyot] in the development of Jerusalem in economic and financial areas, as well as in other areas. The government will establish a special body—or bodies—to carry out this article.” (*Documents and Statements on Middle East Peace, 1979–82*, page 89) Writing the following day in his diary, Carter commented that the vote “almost puts the final nail in the coffin of the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, page 452)

389. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, July 31, 1980

SUBJECT

Negotiating a Facility at Ras Banas (U)

(S) Given the President’s approval² in principle of seeking access to Ras Banas, I propose the following negotiating strategy, on which I request your agreement so that we can submit it promptly to the President. I regard this as a matter of urgency.

(S) *Rationale.* Early access to a facility into which we could stage up to a division and air wing in the relatively early phases of a crisis would: (a) enable us to move larger forces significantly closer to the Persian Gulf in response to warning, thereby greatly reducing closure time; (b) help to deter aggression against Persian Gulf states without having to position US forces in these states themselves; and (c) allow us to pre-position certain stocks, thus enhancing logistical support in the initial stages of a regional conflict.

(S) In order to support even the baseline RDF, (i.e. 3½ division ground force, plus corresponding air and sea forces), we also need a rear support base complex far enough from the area of combat to be safe from easy air interdiction yet close enough to be within unrefueled

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217B, Egypt (May–July) 1980. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Brzezinski.

² Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

C–130 range of forward operating bases in the Upper Gulf. This would: improve our ability to support actual combat operations; provide sites to assemble subsequent reinforcements; provide a secure logistics support complex; allow us to mount long-range operations.

(S) Third, we need at least one area site where if necessary we can train 2–3 times a year in modest strength, because we are experiencing difficulty in getting approval for individual onshore training exercises.

(S) Lastly, we probably need at least one base in the area for B–52 interdiction operations.

(S) These four needs rank very high on our list of near term priorities—at least as high as any facilities currently programmed.

(S) *Preferred Location.* We have looked into sites in Diego Garcia, Turkey, Israel, Somalia, Oman and Egypt. The chief advantage of Diego Garcia is ready availability. The chief disadvantage is that it is too small and remote (2700nm from Abadan). Real estate is very limited, and Navy and Air Force want priority for barracks, which are limited in any case to an estimated 4500 men—too small for a division-sized facility. Political obstacles to early availability or usability of Turkish or Israeli bases rule them out. Berbera is too remote (1250nm from Abadan) for a staging base, and we might not be able to rely on early access in a crisis.

(S) We sought a division-sized staging facility at Seeb in Oman this winter. The Omanis did not want so large and sensitive an installation near their capital. Masirah or Thumrait are within C–130 range of Abadan (800nm) but they would be within Soviet tacair striking distance in event of conflict, and are much farther from CONUS than an Egyptian site.

(S) Therefore, as we informed the April 23 SCC³ in our PG/IO “Basing Concept” paper, “Egypt is clearly the preferred location . . . to support large deployments . . . in advance of a major contingency” (p. 6). Our paper for the July 15 SCC⁴ further noted that “Egyptian facilities seem the most feasible politically.” Our analysis of these facilities (including the Sinai bases, were they to become available), confirmed by the Ras Banas site survey, has shown that Ras Banas is best suited for initial development into an austere early deployment base and subsequent rear-staging area for contingency operations. Moreover, given Sadat’s repeated suggestions that we build up Ras Banas and his gen-

³ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

⁴ Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

eral responsiveness to our exercise requests, Egypt would be much more likely to allow us to deploy sizable ground/air forces early in a crisis than Oman, the only other country with facilities within C-130 range. Oman is particularly unlikely to accept such deployments at Seeb, which is the closest Omani area to likely PG operations.

(S) Ras Banas is beyond the combat radius of potential hostile tacair forces. It is located astride both the primary sea and air LOCs to the region and between 150–250 miles from Saudi Red Sea ports. Only 800nm from Abadan, it is within C-130 radius of the Gulf. Furthermore, by the end of 1981 when refineries at Yanbu and Jiddah are completed, Ras Banas will have easy and direct sea access to POL. A rear-staging complex there would greatly shorten deployment times. For example, the combat elements of a pre-deployed air mobile or airborne division brigade could be moved to Dharan within 3–4 days. Finally Ras Banas is not located near any major Egyptian population center.

(S) As to rear support basing, we see Ras Banas as an entering wedge which would facilitate more extensive use of Egyptian rear bases in event of a major contingency. Egypt has far more in the way of skilled labor, industrial base, and other infrastructure than Oman and Somalia combined. If the US were willing to fund construction of Ras Banas, I believe Sadat would allow us full emergency use. I further believe that, if we agree to overbuild Ras Banas, Sadat will in turn agree to allow us to use it 2–3 times a year for exercises.

(S) Ras Banas may also turn out to be the preferred site for B-52 interdiction operations. It is much closer to Abadan (800 nm) than Diego Garcia (2700 nm). It is far less real-estate limited than Diego Garcia, though we might have less freedom to use it.

(S) In sum, access to Ras Banas would critically *complement* the facilities agreed upon with Oman and Kenya, and potentially with Somalia, which are mostly for naval and air use. They need to be complemented by a sizable ground force facility. If we can also preposition certain stocks there (e.g. ammo and POL) it would radically cut down on airlift requirements.

Estimated Costs

(S) We want to develop Ras Banas in a carefully phased manner. The first phase outlined below will meet initial staging base and rear support base requirements. A second and necessary third phase can be negotiated later, when our further needs have been analyzed.

(S) *Phase I:* Construction during FY 82–83, with capability to support full surge operations, pre-deployment of an Army brigade and AF tac fighter squadron, plus port upgrade to SL-7 (Ro/Ro) capability.

*JCS ESTIMATE OF CONSTRUCTION COST (IN 1980 DOLLARS)*⁵

Airfield Upgrade	\$57,796,000
Airfield lights/barriers	1,222,000
Water supply system	3,495,000
POL storage/supply system	23,595,000
Power generation and distribution	5,400,000
Cantonment facility (bde & sqd)	25,446,000
Airfield munitions storage and ammunition storage	1,420,000
Port Upgrade	50,300,000
Airfield spt/opns	<u>3,053,000</u>
TOTAL	\$171,727,000

(S) This Phase I package includes \$10–12m. in planning and design (P&D) funds in FY 81 with construction/upgrade to begin in FY 82. At this or some later date, we may wish to add funds for B–52 upgrade.

(S) *Phase II*: The above Phase I package is designed to dovetail into an expanded package (\$101m.) increasing from a brigade to a division-sized cantonment area, more aircraft maintenance, enlarged ammunition storage, etc. for a total cumulative cost of \$272.681m. in FY 80 dollars. Since the present FY 82–86 FYDP package of \$119.9m. for FY 82, \$87.6m. for FY 83 and \$32.0m. for FY 84 in then year dollars totals only \$239.5m. in then year dollars, additional funding will be required.

(S) *Approach to Egypt*. The urgency of our needs dictates promptly starting negotiations with Egypt. This raises the issue of whether a formal access agreement on the Kenya/Oman model is needed. Congress has made it clear, especially in the FY 81–A hearings, that no Milcon funds will be provided until adequate access agreements have been signed. Hence one is probably necessary, and strong Egyptian objections may not develop. Sadat may even lean on Foreign Minister Ali to conclude an agreement quickly without drawing out negotiations over quids. Our construction proposals, once access negotiations are underway, could then be folded into an improvements package, as was done with Oman, Kenya and Somalia. We would also want to indicate our interest in Egyptian participation in the development/construction plan. DoD is currently studying possible Egyptian funding and participation. An access agreement of 5–10 years duration is an absolute requirement.

⁵ Project totals include a nine percent planning and design (P&D) cost. Cost figures shown above are extracted from the draft inspection report and are tentative pending confirmation during planning and design phase. [Footnote is in the original.]

(S) *Congressional Approval of Preferred Construction/Funding Profile.* Getting Congressional approval and funding of expedited construction will be difficult. Beyond this, accelerated funding, design and construction will present special problems. Three options are presented below:

OPTION "A"—Normal Procedure. This would involve seeking construction funding in the FY 82 budget, or perhaps an FY 81 supplemental, with hearings beginning in January.

Perhaps we could reprogram modest funds now to begin design work, since Congress usually turns down any construction project on which design work is not 35% completed. While we doubt that 35% will be finished by January, Congress might relent if we can show that the project is vital and that the architects/engineers are hard at work. We estimate that Phase I construction can be completed by the fall of 1983, and Phase II by fall 1988.

OPTION "B"—Fast Track. This would involve combining the design and construction stages, as we've done in building Israel's new Negev bases. On an optimistic schedule, if all went well with Egypt and with Congress, we could award a planning and design contract by the end of this fiscal year (technically we can do this without Hill approval but it is prudent to advise Congress). If Congress then approved an estimated \$35m. we could begin runway upgrade by 1 June 1981 and complete Phase I by mid-1983 provided follow-on programming approval with FY 82 funds. However, we see many potential pitfalls in this expedited procedure, not least getting Hill approval. Moreover, these extraordinary actions would at best save perhaps six months in the construction cycle by permitting selection of a contractor(s), establishing a mob camp, ordering aggregate, finding a labor source, etc.

OPTION "C"—A combination of military construction funds and Security Assistance (FMS Credit). By this means we could, with the cooperation of the Egyptians, initiate construction in FY 81. Since upgrade of the airfield and port facilities are improvements to what are essentially Egyptian facilities, there is some good rationale in involving the Egyptians in these improvements through Security Assistance funding. Specifically, in FY 81 the Egyptians could undertake a portion of the Phase I airfield upgrade, the highest priority improvement, for about \$50m. One of two strategies could be followed.

—Request, in an FY 81 Supplemental, additional FMS credit funds (or possibly Security Supporting Assistance) for Egypt.

—Use FMS Credit funds already programmed for Egypt in FY 81, working out an agreement with Sadat to transfer some of these funds from projects already agreed upon with the promise of like, or increased, funding in FY 82.

US planning and design work to support, first, the projects which the Egyptians would execute could begin immediately by drawing on

SecDef discretionary funds. Additional planning and design funds could be included in an FY 81 Supplemental request.

Reprogramming

(S) Under any of the above options, DoD may have to reprogram \$10–12m. FY 80–81 funds in order to get started on Phase I P and D at Ras Banas in timely fashion. DoD regularly has to reprogram funds every year, but doing so with Milcon presents special Congressional problems and could involve some small slippage of funds we've promised to Oman and prospectively Somalia. Since we have not yet even begun to negotiate an access agreement with Somalia, we could request that \$1m. or so in Somalia P and D funds appropriated in the FY 80s plus the \$10.5m. in FY 81 money authorized by the HASC for Somalia construction be used for Ras Banas and then replaced with FY 82 funding for Somalia. Another source of reprogramming would be Diego Garcia, where the FY 81A package, which seems likely to survive, includes \$35m. for BEQ/BOQ facilities, which could be deferred to FY 82.

(S) We will probably have a severe Milcon funding problem for Oman/Somalia/Kenya as well as Ras Banas since the HAC approved only \$190m. out of the \$280m. the HASC authorized for FY 81. The SASC gave us greater flexibility by authorizing a lump sum for PG/IO contingencies, but limited it to \$200m. Therefore, our best bet is to seek the full \$280m. authorized by the House but the lump sum authorization of the Senate. This will be hard to get but is well worth the try.

Harold Brown

390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, August 2, 1980, 0130Z

204700. For the Ambassador from the Sec and Linowitz. Subject: Consultations With Sadat on Jerusalem Problem. Ref: (A) Alexandria 677;² (B) Cairo 16690;³ (C) State 202324;⁴ (D) State 202220.⁵

1. (S) Entire text.

2. You should convey⁶ following message to Sadat by whatever means is most effective in time for him to have our views before Sadat's own policy council on Jerusalem problem.

3. The President appreciates the opportunity to consult with Sadat with respect to the Israeli moves on Jerusalem. He has carefully considered Sadat's comments and is appreciative of Sadat's concern to devise a response that is helpful to our mutual objectives.

4. We are confronted here by two steps of different nature and implications, one of which, the Cohen Bill, is already an accomplished

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–2303. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Linowitz, Hunter, and Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Newsom.

² See footnote 2, Document 387.

³ In telegram 16690 from Cairo, July 30, Atherton relayed his July 30 exchange with Ali in which the latter asked if Atherton had received "reaction from Washington" to the report of Atherton's July 29 meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1864)

⁴ In telegram 202324 to Cairo, July 31, the Department informed the Embassy that "We have not been able to reach a final decision on the steps we would take in response to an Israeli move to transfer the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem. You should inform Mobarak/Ali that the matter is still under high-level consideration here and that we will need further time before conveying our views to Sadat." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–2301)

⁵ In telegram 202220 to all Near Eastern and South Asian posts and all NATO capitals, July 30, the Department conveyed the press guidance on the Cohen Bill used by the Department Spokesman in response to questions on July 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800365–1113)

⁶ Meeting with Ali on August 2 to deliver the message for Sadat, Atherton reported in telegram 16883 from Cairo, August 2, that "it quickly emerged that Sadat has already reached his decision" and that "Egypt is unable to go on negotiating with Israel under present circumstances." Atherton continued: "Ali stressed that Egypt remains committed to the Camp David process and to the negotiations provided for in the Camp David Agreement, but that Israeli actions have made it impossible to continue those negotiations now. Egypt will continue negotiating with Israel, he said, only if (a) Israel agrees that Jerusalem is negotiable, (b) there is a freeze on settlements, and (c) Israel makes some gesture toward easing conditions for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza." A copy of this telegram upon which Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner, indicating that he saw the document, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80.

fact;⁷ the other, a decision to move the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem, now appears a certainty but may be delayed for several weeks. The first point the President wishes to make is that, after having given careful reflection to the considerations Sadat has raised, he does not repeat not believe that suspending the autonomy talks in response to either of these moves would be a wise decision. It will clearly not cause the Israelis to change their position and would leave us in a quandary as to how subsequently we can restore momentum to the peace process. As difficult as this Israeli move is for us, we should not allow it to derail us from the peace strategy in which we, Egypt and Israel have invested so much. The President believes that the latest round of technical-level talks in the autonomy negotiations covered useful new ground and revealed a genuinely better atmosphere for making progress. We are sufficiently encouraged to believe that however our two governments decide to react to the Israeli moves on Jerusalem we should not allow this issue to place a further burden on the negotiations.

5. We nevertheless agree with Sadat that the Israeli moves pose a definite challenge and that our two governments must make clear we do not accept them as in any way determining the future of Jerusalem which can only be resolved through negotiations. We see the Knesset bill as essentially a legal matter. While we view it seriously, we believe our reaction to it can be adequately and effectively handled by the statement we have already issued (reftel D), which states in simple terms that we do not accept the new law as determining the status of Jerusalem. The bill does not change anything on the ground as far as we can determine and we do not contemplate any further action with respect to it at this time.

6. We would also be concerned about Israeli announcement of moving the Prime Minister's office to Jerusalem, which, as a physical act, is likely to evoke a greater reaction in Arab and Islamic countries, and to have a more negative impact on the prospect for negotiations. We plan to take the following steps if and when the Israelis carry out this move:

—(A) We will issue a statement expressing our clear opposition to and disapproval of the move and reaffirming our policy that we do not accept such unilateral acts as determining the future of Jerusalem.

—(B) We will maintain our present policy of refusing to allow our Ambassador or any other administration official to meet with Israeli officials (including the Prime Minister) in East Jerusalem.

⁷ See Document 388.

7. We have given careful thought to various ways of responding to the Israeli moves and believe the course we have outlined would offer the fewest long term disadvantages. We recognize, however, that the Government of Egypt will be subject to serious domestic and foreign pressures as a result of the Israeli move. Only Sadat can make the judgment as to what will be politically sustainable for him in the new circumstances that we will face, and we will of course understand and respect his ultimate decision.

8. FYI: For the Ambassador. If you find in your discussion that Sadat is determined to suspend the autonomy talks, you should urge him to do this only for a specific, limited period of time as a means of demonstrating his disapproval. End FYI.

9. Following is text of statement which has been approved for issuance in the event the Israeli Cabinet approves moving Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem. You may share text with Sadat.

Begin text: The decision announced by the Israeli Government yesterday is not in keeping with the vital international efforts flowing from the Camp David Accords to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.

United States policy on the issue of Jerusalem is of long standing, beginning with statements by our Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in 1967 and 1969.⁸ It has been restated on a number of occasions since then. Our view has been, and remains, that the final status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiations among the parties concerned; that the settlement which is worked out should leave the city undivided; that it should provide free access for people of all faiths to the holy places; and that it should take into account the interests of all the city's inhabitants. As President Carter stated on March 3, 1980: "we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided with free access to the holy places for all faiths."

Pending such negotiations, the United States does not believe that any party should take unilateral measures which alter the status of Jerusalem. We do not regard the action taken by the Knesset as precluding those future negotiations. We made clear to the Prime Minister and other Israeli officials that we would view the move of the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem to be contrary to the principles we believe will be most helpful to the current negotiations and to the broader effort to bring about a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The most vital objective for Israel, Egypt, and the United States is to pursue the Camp David peace process through to success. All the

⁸ See footnotes 11 and 12, Document 58.

parties should avoid any action that would detract from that central purpose.

We hope that the Government of Israel will suspend implementation of this decision in the larger interest of the success of the effort undertaken by Israel, in common with Egypt and the United States, to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict. End text.

Newsom

391. Editorial Note

On August 4, 1980, a letter from Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, expressing his dissatisfaction with Israeli actions which he viewed as impediments to the peace process, was delivered to the Prime Minister by Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Saad Murtada. In the letter, dated August 2, Sadat recounted the course of the autonomy negotiations, noting "to our disappointment and to the surprise of many of Israel's friends, events did not take the course which was likely to bring us closer to an agreement. On the contrary, provocative and negative actions have been taken unjustifiably and in open defiance to the process and its very essence." Sadat continued, "I am referring here to the actions which are being taken with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements, together with the repressive measures taken in the West Bank and Gaza." Sadat reaffirmed Egypt's "clear and unwavering" position on the peace process, outlining his country's wholehearted commitment to peace; its adherence to the "letter and spirit of Camp David;" its preparation to "help our partners in the peace process and provide them with solutions and way out even when they fail to see the realities of the situation;" its belief in the settling of "all matters" at the end of the process; its rejection of "actions taken by Israel unilaterally and against the universal consensus with respect to Jerusalem and the settlements;" the need to respect the "historic and legal rights of the Arabs and Muslims" in Jerusalem "while keeping different functions in the city united;" the need for Israel to "desist from all settlement activities" and remove settlements built in the West Bank and Gaza; Egyptian opposition to any encroachment on the rights of Palestinians to determine their own future; and Egyptian preparation to implement the establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority in Gaza as a first step to its implementation in the West Bank.

Sadat concluded the letter by urging Begin to “take the remedial action which is necessary for the removal of the obstacles which have been placed on the road to peace in the past few months. I leave it to you to choose the appropriate ways and means for achieving that.” The same day, August 4, Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali provided U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. a copy of the letter, which Atherton sent to Washington from Cairo in telegram 16922, August 4. A copy of the telegram, bearing President Jimmy Carter’s handwritten comment, “The situation is discouraging. Well worded, very good message. C.,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80.

Sadat’s letter began series of exchanges between the two leaders over the next three weeks. On August 4, Begin replied to Sadat’s letter, taking issue with a number of points. Begin asserted that Sadat had misrepresented the discussion between them at El-Arish on the subject of water for Israel, that the principles of “good faith, goodwill, mutual understanding, and promoting peace and cooperation” had been undermined by Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros Ghali’s influencing African governments to withhold renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, votes cast for “hostile,” anti-Israeli resolutions by the Egyptian delegation at the United Nations, as well as Egyptian public statements inconsistent with the Camp David Accords. Begin also restated the Israeli position on Jerusalem and stated a desire to bring Palestinians and King Hussein of Jordan into the negotiations. Begin concluded by pointing out that Egypt had unilaterally suspended the autonomy talks on four different occasions and urged Sadat to “dispense with further unilateral suspensions. Let us renew our negotiations.” Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron provided President Jimmy Carter a copy of Begin’s letter on August 6. This copy, attached to an August 7 memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter in which Brzezinski evaluated the letter as “not as bad or as ‘door closing’ as Israeli leaks had led us to expect,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 6, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 8/11/80 Meeting: 8/80.

Sadat followed up with Begin on August 14. While arguing that “it is not my intention to get involved into a verbal or rhetorical exchange which is not likely to serve the interests of any of us, not to mention the interest of peace,” Sadat provided a lengthy rebuttal of many of the points raised in Begin’s letter. At the end of the letter, however, Sadat suggested the convening of a “summit conference in an attempt to stem” the “lingering differences” between their two countries “before they jeopardize our mission.” The Egyptians provided Atherton an ad-

vance copy of the letter, and Atherton sent it to Washington in telegram 17872 from Cairo, August 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1535) Atherton met with Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Osama el-Baz on August 15 to suggest edits to the letter, including replacing the phrase “summit conference” with “high level conference at an appropriate time.” They also discussed the timetable for the resumption of negotiations. El-Baz rejected the U.S. proposal for resuming talks in mid-September and stated that the earliest the talks could be resumed would be mid-October. (Telegram 17881 from Cairo, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1848) The final version of Sadat’s letter, which was 35 typewritten pages in length, proposed the resumption of talks after the U.S. elections on November 4 and the convening of a tripartite summit conference after that date. (“Sadat Asks U.S. Role in Autonomy Talks,” *The New York Times*, August 16, 1980, page 1) This letter was delivered to the Israelis on August 15 and the contents made public through the press. This, in turn, prompted a lengthy August 18 response by Begin warning Sadat that “if you persist in your negative attitude, the negotiations will remain disrupted for the simple and only reason that Egypt repeatedly suspends the talks.” On the summit idea, Begin stated: “I understand that President Carter was not consulted. Permit me to say that both he and I should have been consulted through a diplomatic, confidential exchange. Let us at least now, however, quietly consider the matter, the venue and the date should all three parties accept the principle itself. This should not, under any circumstances, preclude the renewal and the uninterrupted continuation of the autonomy talks.” The text of Begin’s August 18 response was sent in telegram 15450 from Tel Aviv, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800395–0629)

Atherton met with Sadat on August 18, to discuss his most recent letter to Begin. Atherton stressed that Carter “understood the difficulties Sadat faces and that we were not pressing for immediate decisions, but that the President remains convinced the only way to make progress is through continuation of the negotiating process; it is important to demonstrate that the Camp David process is still alive.” “In this connection,” Atherton noted, “Sadat’s call for a summit after our elections could be misinterpreted to mean that the USG is unable to move in the meantime. This would not be a helpful impression to give.” Sadat responded that the “situation today was different from that which existed when he authorized Kamal Hassan Ali to agree to resume the negotiations during his and Dr. Burg’s visits to Washington. Prime Minister Begin was confronting both Egypt and the U.S. with challenges that could not be ignored—the Jerusalem bill, the pending move of his office to East Jerusalem and the recent announcement of three new settlements. The negotiations were stalemated and would remain so until

after the U.S. elections and, frankly, until after new elections in Israel. The only solution was for the U.S. to come forward with a proposal; this was why he had suggested a new summit meeting. Sadat said his position was strong and he could wait, if necessary until November, 1981. For now, he wanted to relieve President Carter of the burden of the Middle East negotiations." Atherton reported that Sadat "did not respond to my attempts to ascertain what moves Israel might take which would be helpful to him but promised to think about this." Sadat promised to continue the dialogue with the United States and stated he had invited Israeli President Yitzhak Navon to come to Egypt, was preparing to send a delegation to Israel to help the normalization process, and was calling Egyptian media representatives to "put a stop" to further press attacks on Begin. (Telegram 18065 from Cairo, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1557)

Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis met with Begin on August 22, to brief him on the meeting between Atherton and Sadat. Lewis stressed that Sadat was "anxious to try to keep the atmosphere as positive as possible," while efforts were underway to restart negotiations and cited Sadat's initiatives to improve relations with Israel. "It is clear to us," Lewis stated to the Israeli Prime Minister, "that Sadat hopes that these initiatives will make such a contribution and will in some way be reciprocated by Israel." Lewis suggested the Israeli release of prisoners in Gaza for the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr as a gesture to Sadat, a proposal Begin stated "he wouldn't object to." (Telegram 15690 from Tel Aviv, August 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1048) Begin informed Lewis on August 26 that he would be prepared to release 20 prisoners in Gaza to help the negotiating atmosphere. (Telegram 15861 from Tel Aviv, August 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1015) Meanwhile, on August 25, the Department of State announced that President Carter's Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations, Sol M. Linowitz, would be visiting Israel and Egypt beginning August 29 for talks with Begin and Sadat on restarting negotiations. (Telegram 226194 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, August 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800406–0410) Shortly before Linowitz's visit, Sadat sent a final letter to Begin on August 29, explaining that beginning with his first letter, it was not his intention to "start any rhetorical or polemical exchange," but was instead motivated by "my keen desire to explore every available avenue to ascertain whether a common ground existed for the resumption of the autonomy talks." He reaffirmed his interest in the convening of a summit conference and "looked forward to a meaningful and fruitful exchange." A copy of Sadat's letter was sent to Washington in telegram 19022 from Cairo, August 29. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 8/80)

392. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Scenario for the Autonomy Talks (U)

At Tab A is a memorandum Chris prepared, based on a meeting² I held yesterday on the way forward on the autonomy talks. It lays out a scenario for getting the talks restarted—one which, however, is highly dependent on reactions by both Sadat and Begin. Sol concurs in this approach. (S)

If you approve it, we would like to begin implementation immediately, since Roy Atherton may be seeing Sadat as early as tomorrow morning,³ and his being able to lay out our thinking to Sadat could be critical in shaping the Egyptian reaction to the recent Begin letter. The Egyptians are already talking of Sadat's responding to Begin tomorrow, in view of the Israelis' having published the Begin letter. (S)

The letter to Sadat which you requested (Tab B)⁴ would not be delivered, under the proposed scenario, until the last week of August; thus it can be revised further in light of developments. At that time, you might want to write it out longhand. (S)

If the proposed scenario worked, there could be as many as three public events in the near future to demonstrate that the peace process is moving forward:

—public announcement of continuing bilateral technical talks (late August);

—announcement in three capitals, during Sol's next trip, on restarting the talks (early September); and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 8/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote "Zbig. J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² A Senior Level Meeting, attended by Brzezinski, Christopher, Linowitz, Saunders and Hunter, took place in the White House Situation Room from 2:58 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. on August 11. A memorandum of conversation of this meeting was not found. A set of handwritten notes, likely prepared by Hunter, recording the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 6, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 8/11/80 Meeting: 8/80.

³ Atherton met with Sadat in Alexandria on August 18. Atherton summarized the meeting in telegram 18065 from Cairo, August 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1557)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

—a possible Begin-Sadat Summit (late September/early October), with high-level participation from here, where in my judgment Ed Muskie would be the ideal person. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the scenario presented in the memorandum from Christopher at Tab A, and provide comments on the draft letter to Sadat at Tab B.⁵

Tab A

**Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State
(Christopher) to President Carter⁶**

Washington, August 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Working Toward a Resumption of the Autonomy Negotiations

Attached is a draft letter to Sadat, along the lines you requested. It has the concurrence of Sol and Zbig. I am sending a copy of the draft letter to Ed Muskie in New York, together with this memorandum.

Sol, Zbig and I feel that the letter would be most effective if it came at a time after some preliminary work had been done in the capitals by our Ambassadors. The following sequence of steps appears to us to be the one offering the best prospects for success.

1. As an immediate first step, Roy Atherton will make it clear in Cairo that before the Egyptians send a further letter to Begin, he wishes to meet with Sadat. He will urge Sadat not to engage in further polemics but rather to use his reply to try to open doors for an eventual resumption of the talks. Our second objective with Sadat on this occasion would be to give him a sense of the timing of the sequence of steps that we have in mind as outlined below. In doing so, Roy would make it clear that while we were not pressing for an immediate resumption of formal trilateral negotiations, we want to continue work on the Heads of Agreement through publicly announced bilateral meetings with each side, and perhaps some technical-level trilateral meetings if Sadat will agree to them, until formal negotiations are resumed. Because of

⁵ Carter approved the recommendation and added a handwritten note: "But hold the letter text until I approve it later. J."

⁶ Secret. Christopher was acting for Muskie who was in Maine.

the religious holidays, Roy may not be able to see Sadat until the end of this week (August 15–16).

2. Concurrent with the approach to Sadat, we would ask Sam Lewis to see Begin and explore whether there is any flexibility for an Israeli gesture that would make it easier for Sadat to resume the negotiations. (We would take care in our contacts with Sadat not to imply we are promising to deliver something from the Israelis.) At present the possibilities strike us as being: (a) some gesture on the Palestinian front, e.g. an expression of willingness to meet with moderate Palestinians and allow them to articulate their objectives; (b) an Israeli concession that could enable us to show real progress on the Heads of Agreement; and, (c) the remote possibility that Begin might be willing to postpone the transfer of his office to East Jerusalem.

3. After we have had a chance to assess the results of these contacts, Atherton would deliver a pre-positioned letter from you along the lines of the attached draft on or about August 25–26. The letter would pave the way for a trip by Sol to the area in the first week of September.

4. Sol would go with the purpose of clinching an understanding with Sadat about resuming formal trilateral negotiations. If he is successful, Sol could report to you by telephone⁷ during his visit and an announcement of a resumption of talks could be made in Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem simultaneously.

5. If all of this works out, a further possibility might be to try to arrange a summit meeting between Begin and Sadat shortly thereafter, with Sol or possibly Ed attending for the U.S.

A number of general considerations led us to think that the above sequence of steps made the most sense:

—Sadat will be easier to bring around if we have given him a bit of time to maintain his present posture in terms of domestic Egyptian and Arab public opinion, and if he does not appear to be bowing immediately to U.S. pressure. With the passage of some time, he will be better able to blur the fact that he has gotten little or nothing from the Israelis.

—As long as we have Begin's office move to East Jerusalem hanging over our heads, it will be an added obstacle in persuading Sadat to agree to a resumption of the negotiations. The timing of the steps suggested above gives us time to explore with Begin what the possibilities are for dealing with this problem. If we can't get Begin to agree to postpone this step for a significant period of time, the next best thing would be for him to get it over with quickly (although we would of course not make that suggestion to Begin).

⁷ See Document 396.

—An announcement of a resumption of the negotiations in early or mid-September might be the optimum timing from many standpoints.

—Finally, we all felt it would be wiser if Sol did not make his trip until the ground has been prepared and we have a reasonable basis for thinking Sadat can be persuaded to resume the negotiations. Having Sol go prematurely would only expose a visible failure if in fact we were unable to persuade Sadat to come back in.

393. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1980, the United Nations Security Council voted 14–0 to pass Resolution 478 (1980), censuring Israel for the Knesset's July 29 enactment of the "Basic Law" on Jerusalem, effectively making the city the *de jure* capital of the country (see Document 388), characterizing it as an action constituting "a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East." The lone abstention in the vote was taken by the United States. Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie explained the U.S. decision in his address to the Security Council on August 20. While affirming his country's support for an undivided Jerusalem, "with free access to the holy places for peoples of all faiths," and opposition to "any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII [of the U.N. Charter]," he stated that the resolution was "fundamentally flawed." "It fails to reaffirm Resolution 242 as the basis for a comprehensive peace," Muskie continued. "Israel, for example, is to be censured—yet there is no censure, indeed no mention at all, of violence against Israel or of efforts that undermine Israel's legitimate security needs. Further, the resolution before us calls upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the holy city. In our judgment this provision is not binding. It is without force. And we reject it as a disruptive attempt to dictate to other nations. It does nothing to promote a resolution of the difficult problems facing Israel and its neighbors. It does nothing to advance the cause of peace. On these specific grounds, we abstain on the resolution." The complete text of Muskie's speech, as well as the text of Security Council Resolution 478, are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1980, pages 78–80.

394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, August 23, 1980, 1744Z

224677. Subject: Message From Secretary to Prime Minister Begin.
Ref: Tel Aviv 15692.²

1. Secret-entire text.

2. You should pass following to Begin as an oral message from Secretary Muskie.

3. Begin text: Ambassador Lewis has reported to me on his talk with you on August 22 and your expression of concern about the United States abstention recently in the Security Council and about a passage from my speech on that occasion.³

—I hope you will understand that the United States' decision to abstain on the resolution in question was not an easy one for any of us who were involved. We reached it after the most careful study and consideration. As I made clear in my speech, we view the resolution as being fundamentally flawed; we specifically reject the call on sovereign states to move their Embassies from Jerusalem; and we will firmly and forcefully resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel. At the same time we had to take into account the long-standing position of the United States on unilateral actions in regard to Jerusalem. In these circumstances we did not feel we could either support or veto the resolution.

—I thought it was important, however, that a clear and full statement be made of the United States' views on the resolution and on the harmful effect the Security Council's repeated resolutions are having on our work for peace. My desire to underscore that point and to try to stop a continuing succession of anti-Israel resolutions warranted by delivering that statement personally. I do not believe the statement needs

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1034. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Hunter, Newlin, Constable, W. Scott Butcher (S/S-O), and Raymond G. Seitz (S/S-O); approved by Christopher. A draft version of Muskie's oral message is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 8/15–31/80. Lewis delivered the text of the message to Begin over the telephone on August 24. (Telegram 15711 from Tel Aviv, August 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1027)

² During their August 22 meeting, Lewis reported, Begin opened the discussion on the U.N. Security Council vote "in a subdued, hurt, and martyred tone by saying how deeply the U.S. abstention hurt him." The discussion between Lewis and Begin was conveyed in telegram 15692 from Tel Aviv, August 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1045)

³ See Document 393.

elaboration, but the questions you have raised are understandable. I can assure you that the particular passage on Islamic states was not intended in any way to involve nations in the peace negotiations which are not directly and legitimately concerned, i.e., only those nations which are Israel's neighbors and which accept the principles of Resolution 242, chief among which is the recognition of Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders. There is no change in the United States' view of Resolution 242 or the means by which peace is to be reached. At the same time we continue to urge all parties to refrain from taking unilateral steps that could make the realization of peace more difficult. End text.

3. Along with foregoing you should convey to the Prime Minister the Secretary's assurance of his continued warm friendship for Israel and for the Prime Minister personally. Please say that the Secretary looks forward to continuing to work closely with the Prime Minister and his government for the strengthening of the very close relations between the United States and Israel and for the achievement of a comprehensive and lasting Middle East peace.

Christopher

395. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 26, 1980, 2:45 p.m.

Participants

U.S.
Secretary Muskie
Deputy Secretary Christopher
David Korn, NEA

Israel
Ambassador Evron

Subject

Delivery by Ambassador Evron of Letters to the Secretary from Prime Minister Begin

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Assistant Secretary's Files—1973–1983, Miscellaneous Middle East Documents, Lot 83D340, Box 1, 1980 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Muskie's office at the Department of State. Drafted by Korn on August 28; cleared by Christopher.

Ambassador Evron opened by saying that he had two letters to deliver to the Secretary from Prime Minister Begin, one replying² to the Secretary's oral message of August 23 on the U.S. abstention in the August 20 Security Council vote,³ and the other on the oil MOA negotiations.⁴

The Secretary first read Begin's letter replying to his oral message of August 23. The Secretary asked Ambassador Evron to tell the Prime Minister that he appreciated the Prime Minister's warm words of friendship. With respect to the Prime Minister's comments on the Secretary's use of the phrase "unilateral action" the Secretary said he wanted to make clear that he considers it the right of any country to determine where its capital should be established, but if there is a negotiating process going on in regard to that particular place many countries may be involved. In a circumstance such as this, unilateral actions are not helpful. It is obviously up to Israel to decide what Israel's position in the negotiation should be. But on the issues that are the subject of negotiations, no party should prejudice the result by unilateral actions. The Secretary said that was all the phrase was intended to convey.

The Secretary recalled the remarks he had made before the Security Council on August 20 in regard to the unhelpful nature of the resolutions that had been introduced in the UN this year.⁵ We have said this and we will continue to say this. The only way we have to salvage the

² Begin's August 25 letter described the U.S. abstention in the Security Council's vote on the draft resolution concerning the Jerusalem law, particularly following the Secretary's "strong speech," as "incomprehensible to us." Begin defended the Israeli naming of Jerusalem as the national capital, remarking on Muskie's "repeated reproach concerning the so-called 'Unilateral Action.'" Begin continued, "I am not ashamed to admit that I do not comprehend that complaint or accusation. The reason is simple. I am ready to ask any historian whether at any time in recorded history any nation, decided where its capital should be otherwise than by 'Unilateral Action.'" "As far as Jerusalem is concerned the Israeli Nation is fully entitled to decide where its capital is," Begin concluded, "as any other nation, old or new, has done." (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 5, ES Sensitive August 1–30, 1980)

³ See Document 394.

⁴ The letter, dated August 25, discussed the lack of progress made in the talks to reach an agreement on the implementation conditions for the U.S.-Israeli MOA on Oil Supply which had been signed in June 1979 and stated that, given Israel's current economic state and the relinquishment of the Sinai oil wells, it should not be "called upon to pay an average price [for oil] comparable to the highest marginal price the U.S. pays for oil imports," a condition presented by U.S. negotiators in the latest round of talks in July 1980. Begin concluded: "In light of the above, I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to direct your delegation to reconvene with Israel's representatives as soon as possible with a view to finalizing a practical agreement which takes into account Israel's difficulties and deep concerns from the standpoint of our national economy and the heavy burdens we have assumed." The text of this letter, as well as that of Begin's second letter on the U.S. abstention, was sent to Tel Aviv in telegram 227501 to Tel Aviv, August 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1009.

⁵ See Document 393.

Camp David process, the Secretary continued, is to concentrate on the negotiations and discourage those who seek to undermine them through unhelpful Security Council resolutions or through unilateral actions, which pose a great danger to the Camp David process.

The Secretary said that when he spoke of unilateral actions he was not seeking to deny Israel's sovereign rights. Israel has the sovereign right to go to war or to accommodate its interests to those of other nations. The Secretary said he did not contest the right of any country to determine where its capital should be. The problem, however, is that the Jerusalem issue must be resolved through negotiations. Speaking then in a more general vein, the Secretary commented that he realized that all these are hard questions. He wanted to make clear that our decision to abstain had not been an easy one. We had taken all of the elements into consideration. It is in the United States' national interest to see the Camp David process succeed. We have invested much time and energy in Camp David, but we have other interests as well and we have to protect them.

The Secretary said he could understand that Jerusalem is an emotional issue in Israel and it is very difficult to vote against any law on it. He wanted to make clear, however, that in his view the Cohen bill did not add anything to Israel's bargaining position in the negotiations—not one iota. The only effect of the bill had been to cause the Camp David talks to be suspended. In this regard the Secretary commented that he could not recall when his first class in physics had been, but he remembered clearly learning the law that for every action there is an equal reaction. This is what has occurred. The Secretary emphasized that the position he took at the Security Council was not hostile to Israel. In fact, his remarks had been supportive of Israel, and they were condemned by many Arab countries. The Secretary asked Evron to tell the Prime Minister that there was nothing personal in the position we had taken at the UN. He had had to give the President his best judgment, and abstention had been his recommendation. He did believe, however, that his remarks about the unhelpful nature of the repeated Security Council resolutions had had an impact on his listeners in the Security Council.

The Secretary said that as long as people think that by introducing UN resolutions that can interrupt the Camp David process and provoke Israel into steps that will further disrupt it, they will continue to do so. The objective of Israel and the United States must be to keep the negotiations going and maintain their credibility. The Secretary added that his only doubt about going to the Security Council was that his arguments in favor of Camp David might not seem credible in view of the fact that the talks were suspended.

Ambassador Evron said there should be no doubt in anybody's mind about Israel's dedication to the continuation of the Camp David

process. Referring to the Secretary's earlier comments, the Ambassador said he wanted to be sure what the Secretary meant when he spoke of "sovereign rights." Evron asked if he could tell Prime Minister Begin that in the Secretary's view the sovereignty of Israel in Jerusalem is not challenged by the United States and that Israel has the sovereign right to establish its Capital there. Evron said if he understood clearly, the United States does not deny Israel the right to have its capital anywhere within sovereign Israeli territory. The Secretary said this raises two points. First, whether East Jerusalem is part of the West Bank under Resolution 242 and thus not subject to any claim to sovereign rights by Israel. Second is the fact that it is agreed that the status of Jerusalem is an issue that has to be settled through negotiations.

Ambassador Evron said this raises a problem that he wanted to be able to report very precisely on. The Security Council called on all states with embassies in Jerusalem to remove those embassies. That involves not East Jerusalem but West Jerusalem, since all the embassies are located on the western side of the city. Ambassador Evron asked if he would be correct in saying that at least in regard to West Jerusalem Israel's sovereign right in that part of the city is not in question. The Secretary pointed out that he had made clear in his Security Council statement that we do not regard the call for movement of the embassies from Jerusalem as being binding. Mr. Christopher said it was his understanding that the United States had taken the position at Camp David that the ultimate status of Jerusalem as a whole would be the subject of negotiations between the parties, which is the position the President repeated in New York recently. Ambassador Evron replied that he had not been at Camp David but he was quite sure that never once at Camp David had any question arisen regarding Israel's sovereign rights in West Jerusalem. Mr. Christopher repeated that his understanding had been that the U.S. position is that the whole question is to be the subject of ultimate negotiations. He asked Mr. Korn if this was correct. Mr. Korn confirmed that such had always been our view, and pointed out that we have never formally recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty in West Jerusalem.

Mr. Christopher said what he understood Secretary Muskie to have said was that any country, for example Mexico, could establish its capital wherever it wants if it has the power to do so, but that governments that do this must take into account the consequences for an ongoing negotiation. Ambassador Evron responded heatedly that the United States appeared to be raising new issues here. The American Ambassadors have presented their credentials in Jerusalem, you fly your flag in Jerusalem, your leaders meet with our leaders there, he said. If a question is now raised about Israel's sovereignty in West Jerusalem, Ambassador Evron said, this will become a big problem for our domestic relations.

The Secretary said he had not meant to say anything different from what he had said in his UN speech. Defining the present status of Jerusalem is a most difficult and complex question. To return to the main point, the Secretary said, when I spoke of unilateral action my point is actions taken outside of the negotiations in regard to issues in the negotiations that tend to disrupt the negotiations. That, the Secretary concluded, is really all I have to say. I was not trying to establish Israel's sovereign rights in any part of Jerusalem, or anything else.

Evron said the result of the Security Council vote has been to cast doubt on Israel's sovereignty in West Jerusalem. He had been surprised when the State Department Spokesman the previous day had said that he was not aware that the State Department was taking any position on the question of other countries moving their embassies from Jerusalem.⁶ We were taken aback by this statement by the Spokesman, Evron said. Mr. Christopher said the Spokesman's statement was not inconsistent with our position as it has been stated at the United Nations. Christopher distinguished between the UN seeking to tell countries where to locate their embassies (which we opposed in New York) and the right of a country to decide on its own whether to move its embassy from Jerusalem (which we would respect). Evron asked what the United States would do to correct the impression that it does not care about the Security Council call for removal of the embassies from Jerusalem. Mr. Christopher said we have brought the Secretary's statement, that we do not regard the Security Council call as binding, to the attention of those governments which maintain their embassies in Jerusalem. Evron urged that the United States find an opportunity "to denounce" the ultimatum given by the Arab countries to the countries that maintain embassies in Jerusalem. The call for removal of the embassies is "an abuse of Security Council power," Evron said.

Evron then presented the second letter, on the oil MOA negotiations, and said that Israel urges the negotiations be resumed as quickly as possible. After reading through the Prime Minister's letter, the Secretary said the President had agreed that there should be another meeting in September.⁷ Mr. Christopher cautioned that this should not be made

⁶ The referenced comment was made by Department of State Director of Press Relations David D. Passage during the Department's August 25 daily press briefing. The text of the briefing is in telegram 226192 to multiple posts, August 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800406–0887)

⁷ The same day, August 26, Carter commented on the U.S. position for the oil negotiations in a handwritten note to Brzezinski (with a copy to Mondale): "Re oil for Israel, I think we could change our proposal to substitute: top 10% to apply to the kind of oil Israel actually uses rather than to top 10% of most expensive imports. Also, if strict conformance to formula is assured, we might let the triggering be automatic." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 8/15–31/80)

public until we have agreement on dates for the meeting. Ambassador Evron agreed, and there was agreement that the two sides would be in touch to set a date.

The Secretary said he would like to end the meeting on a light note. Prime Minister Begin had said he was “astonished” by my abstention in the Security Council. Tell the Prime Minister I am never astonished by what he says. On second thought, the Secretary said that it would be better not to do so.

396. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz), Vice President Mondale, and President Carter¹

Washington, September 3, 1980, 9:25–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Sol Linowitz in Cairo

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Vice President Walter Mondale

Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations

Ambassador Linowitz said he had just left President Sadat.² They had met with the press and had read a statement which made three points (text attached):³

1. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the Camp David process as the only viable path to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and they intend to see the process through.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter and Mondale were in the Oval Office; Linowitz was in Cairo.

² Linowitz met with Sadat in Alexandria on September 3, near the end of his Middle East trip which began on August 29. On the meeting, Linowitz recounted for Carter in a cabled summary that Sadat’s “principal concern was to make certain that he was not being asked to agree to an immediate resumption of the negotiations.” Moreover, Linowitz reported, “it is also clear that Sadat’s desire to be helpful to you was an important factor” in his decision.” (Telegram 5 from USDEL AMVIP, September 4; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, Egypt: 9–10/80)

³ The text of the statement is attached but not printed.

2. The parties recognize that the negotiations must rest on a foundation of mutual trust and friendship.

3. The parties agree to resume the autonomy negotiations and to consult on a summit meeting, with times and places to be determined.

The President said that this result made Ambassador Linowitz' trip worthwhile.

Ambassador Linowitz agreed and said he had gotten much more than he had expected. They had intentionally left open the dates for resumption of the autonomy talks and the summit. Sadat wants the talks to resume in mid-October, with the summit to take place in November after the elections. He said Begin had been tough as hell on the first day,⁴ and there had been a real fight. Perhaps for that reason, or his subsequent meetings with a number of Members of the Knesset, Begin was Mr. Nice Guy on the second day of the talks.⁵ Originally, Begin had wanted an agreement to go back to the table immediately. Linowitz had said that was impossible and he would not agree. Begin had also rejected the idea of a summit initially, then went along on the second day. Linowitz said he had talked very tough to Begin on the questions of moving his office to Jerusalem and on annexation of the Golan Heights.⁶ He felt he had received pretty good assurances on the Golan.

The President interjected that that was the best news he had had.

⁴ Of this first meeting with Begin on September 1, Linowitz reported "Begin was not prepared to do anything now to help restart the negotiations. During our three-hour meeting, he seemed resigned and ready to accept, if necessary, the need to stand against the outside world. He was determined in his insistence that he will not pay 'any price'—public or private—to Sadat for a resumption of negotiations." Linowitz's summary of their conversation was conveyed to Carter and Muskie in telegram 19407 from Cairo, September 3. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80)

⁵ Summarizing their September 2 meeting, Linowitz stated that while Begin "clearly had been moved—at least in his attitude—by the tough line I took with him the day before," there "appears to have been a great deal of political ferment in Israel these past two days, and the combined impact of seriousness of the situation, active efforts at persuasion by some of his Cabinet colleagues, and my own long talks with him the day before, led Begin to try to be helpful." Linowitz continued: "Begin did not go very far on the issues of greatest concern to Sadat"—the move of the Prime Minister's office to East Jerusalem and settlements—but agreed to a statement to restart the talks that Linowitz could take to Sadat. (Telegram 19408, from Cairo, September 3; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 119, 8/29/80–9/5/80 Linowitz Trip to Middle East: 8–9/80) During his visit to Israel, Linowitz also met with Shamir on September 1. A summary of their conversation is in telegram 238780 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, September 9. (*Ibid.*) Linowitz also met with a group of Israeli Cabinet Ministers, including Burg, Shamir, and Sharon, on September 2, to discuss the state of U.S.-Israeli relations. A summary is in telegram 238741 to Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv, September 9. (*Ibid.*)

⁶ Although a formal bill calling for the annexation of the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war, was not to be brought to the Knesset until October, reports indicated that support for annexation was growing. (Dial Torgerson, "Israelis Working to Annex Golan Heights," *Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 1980, p. B14) The bill was ultimately defeated in a Knesset vote on December 22.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had left Begin in a troubled mood, which was just right. Begin has a good sense that we will be quite demanding with regard to what Begin may do with respect to the Jerusalem move and the Golan annexation. Linowitz had also gone over with Begin in enormous detail the draft (on the autonomy talks?). It was a process he did not recommend, as the President would appreciate.

The President commented that he understood Linowitz had spent five hours with Begin.

Ambassador Linowitz said Sadat did not want to take the draft, but he would give it to Ali tomorrow. After their meeting, Sadat had agreed with his proposal and took Linowitz out directly to talk to the press and announce agreement.

The President said he was glad both leaders were constructive.

The Vice President congratulated Ambassador Linowitz on his efforts.

397. Summary of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin¹

Washington, September 4, 1980, 8:35–8:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Begin in Israel

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

The President: Good Morning Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Begin: Good Morning Mr. President. I want to congratulate you on the tripartite agreement to resume the talks.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 9/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter was in the Oval Office. Carter wrote, "OK. J." in the upper right-hand corner of the summary. The summary was attached to a September 4 covering memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski. A handwritten note from Denend to Brzezinski on the covering memorandum reads: "Gary reports that within an hour of this conversation Begin made a public statement to the effect that he had been invited to meet with President Carter after the US election." A separate handwritten note on the covering memorandum, in an unknown hand, states that Brzezinski hand carried the summary to Carter on September 5.

² See Document 396.

The President: I'm very happy about it and we are very eager to see it move forward. Commensurate with the desires of you and President Sadat, we will do anything you all want us to.

Prime Minister Begin: I want to tell you, Mr. President, Sol Linowitz did a marvelous job. I did a little to help him.

The President: Yes, I know you did. I'm looking forward to getting a personal report when he returns.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, he did a marvelous job.

The President: Well that's good news.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, that's good for him, and we are very grateful that you sent him over. He was pessimistic in the beginning, but then it developed. Mr. President, as far as the possible Summit meeting, I just want to tell you that I don't mind whether it takes place before or after the 4th of November. It is up to you to decide. I can come at any moment that you decide is convenient, but if it should happen after the 4th of November then I would suggest to start at the end of November or the beginning of December. I will be in your country on November 9–15.³

The President: Well good.

Prime Minister Begin: For the Centenary of the (indistinct) Institute, I will make several speeches and because of that I still have to be careful by doctor's orders.

The President: Yes I know, I want you to be careful.

Prime Minister Begin: Combining together the Summit with my other responsibilities would be difficult.

The President: I understand, we'll certainly accommodate your inclinations on the timing, as well as President Sadat's, and you need not be concerned about that at all.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, thank you very much.

The President: How's your wife?

Prime Minister Begin: She's all right. She will come with me.

The President: Oh, we look forward to seeing you then.

Prime Minister Begin: Our love to Mrs. Rosalynn.

The President: I'll tell her in a few minutes. When you come over even for your unofficial visit concerning the centenary, I hope that you will have a chance to come by and see me, either unofficially or officially.

Prime Minister Begin: I'll come over to Washington. I'll instruct my friends to put the day in the itinerary.

³ See Document 405.

The President: I understand. Well I look forward to that. Give all your friends my best regards. Thank you for calling.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you very much for everything.

The President: God Bless You.

398. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 18, 1980

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation: Thursday, September 18, 1980, The Pentagon, Secretary's Conference Room

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Participants (U)

Hon. Harold Brown

Hon. Robert W. Komer, USD/P

Hon. David E. McGiffert, ASD/ISA

Hon. Robert H. Pelletreau, DASD/ISA

Mr. Charles Hill, Political Officer

American Embassy Tel Aviv

BG Carl Smith

Israeli Participants (U)

Foreign Minister Shamir

Israeli Ambassador Evron

MG Meron, Defense Attache

Mr. Bar-On, Director General, MFA

Mr. Rubinstein, Asst Director General, MFA

Foreign Minister Shamir said he would like to discuss the strategic situation in the Middle East and its implications for the State of Israel.²

¹ Source: Washington National Record Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217B, Israel 1980 (August). Secret. Drafted by Pelletreau; cleared by Smith on September 24. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room in the Pentagon. An undated addenda to the conversation, drafted by Pelletreau, reads: "In reply to Foreign Minister Shamir's request for closer US-Israeli strategic cooperation in Southwest Asia, Dr. Brown stated that before discussing these possibilities, it would be necessary to look at Israeli capacities. These talks were ready to proceed but it was important that they not be scenario-oriented. After the U.S. had looked at the capacity of Israeli air bases to accept U.S. forces, and after we had a better idea of what would happen if the Soviets became involved, we could consider looking beyond. Meanwhile Dr. Brown reaffirmed, the U.S. was ready to continue its strategic dialogue with Israel." (Ibid.)

² Shamir also discussed this issue with Muskie on September 17. A summary of their meeting is in telegram 250624 to Tel Aviv, September 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–0890)

Israel, he said, had its own worries, did not rely on others and tried to take care of its own security. It was naturally interested, however, in the strategic situation in the area. In recent times, there had been many signs of free world weakness. Israel was very satisfied, however, with U.S. efforts over the past months to strengthen the position of the free world in countries surrounding it. These efforts, *Shamir* said, obviously affected Israel's security. (S)

Together with Israel's satisfaction with this effort, *Shamir* continued, concern had to be expressed that Israel with all its possibilities appeared to be omitted from U.S. planning. Israel knew its weaknesses and also its advantages. It had experience in the security field and a capable army. Its stability was assured by a democratic system. It was committed to free world values. With these possibilities, Israel could not understand why the U.S. was ignoring it. An additional element to be considered was that when people in the area, especially Egypt, saw that Israel was being ignored, this indicated to them that the special relationship was getting weaker. This, in turn, had an effect on the peace process. In other words, if the U.S. was building closer strategic cooperation with Egypt and Israel was not included, this meant to Egypt that Israel was not an ally of the U.S. and this perception harmed prospects for peace in the area. In short, Israel believed it was a mistake from the viewpoint of the free world to be omitted from U.S. strategic planning in the area. (S)

The *Secretary* noted that Minister Shamir had raised two sets of issues; one concerning Israel and its Arab neighbors and the other concerning Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. These were related but not quite the same problem. Regarding Israel and its neighbors, success in the autonomy negotiations would be critical to the area in the long term, both for Israel and for the moderate Arab states. The U.S. recognized that a precondition to this success was Israel's understanding of the U.S. commitment by others. This commitment was evidenced not only by a great deal of unnecessary repetition and reassurance, but also by U.S. actions. Since the 1973 war over \$12 billion had been provided to Israel, more than half of it during the current administration. Israeli capabilities had expanded dramatically at the same time as the threat against them had been reduced. Egypt was at peace with Israel. Despite all the assistance the U.S. was providing and would provide to Egypt, its military capabilities had decreased over the past five years and would continue to decline as its Soviet equipment deteriorated. (S)

In deciding on arms transfers to Israel's neighbors, the *Secretary* continued, the U.S. consistently sought to assure that these transfers would not have a damaging affect to Israel's military superiority. That was an important criterion. It was applied when the U.S. considered provision of F-15's to Saudi Arabia and also when the U.S. provided

equipment to Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, in its consideration of sales to Israel, the U.S. did not ask whether this or that sale would make Israel too strong vis-a-vis its neighbors. The U.S. recognized that Israel must be able to defend itself against all its neighbors. (S)

Turning to the overall strategic situation, the *Secretary* noted that the collapse of Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansion had adversely affected the strategic balance in the area. During the past ten years the U.S., Europe and Japan had become still more dependent on oil from that region. The importance of the Gulf as a Soviet objective had therefore increased. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a striking reminder of Soviet willingness to use force to obtain its objectives. These considerations taken together had caused the U.S. to begin planning, programming, creating new forces and redeploying existing forces. A new military headquarters had been created for planning and to carry out potential military operations in the area. In only six months, equipment had been prepositioned on ships in the area to support a full Marine Amphibious Brigade. Two carrier task forces were being maintained in the area—the most powerful naval force ever in the Indian Ocean. In the negotiation of access agreements with countries in the area, the U.S. had been very careful to keep its visible presence low. This was a drawback, but it was also a condition of access to those countries. A high level of U.S. visibility would risk destabilizing them and easily offset the military advantages of more permanent bases. This was true even in Egypt, though less so. The U.S. had to be very cautious politically. (S)

The *Secretary* said the U.S. saw real value in continuing its strategic dialogue with Israel even though the previous secret channel could not be used any more. Both General Jones and Ambassador Komer would be ready to continue the strategic dialogue during their visits. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir noted that when Israel heard of U.S. plans to develop Ras Banas³ it wondered why the U.S. was not equally planning to utilize the good airbases in Sinai and also the base at Sharm al-Shaykh. Since Sharm al-Shaykh, under the peace accords, would have a multi-national force to protect free passage in the Strait of Tiran, it could easily assume greater responsibility for defense of the Red Sea. There would be no political difficulties. (S)

The *Secretary* replied that the Sinai facilities would not belong to either Israel or the U.S. Moreover, the geographic considerations of a possible Soviet attack in Iran would not suggest the use of Israeli bases. *Dr. Brown* said that the U.S. had not looked into the nature of the multi-lateral force under the peace accords. There would be differing views

³ See Document 389.

as to whether the Israeli suggestion might complicate the issue. It went beyond supervision and enforcement of navigational freedom; it contained an active ingredient. Nevertheless, it was something which might be worthwhile looking into. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir referred to Iraq's effort to create a nuclear capability. Israel knew that a decision had been taken by the Iraqi government to create nuclear arms. This could not be done without French and Italian help. Israel was sure this was also a concern of the U.S. and asked that the U.S. act to stop this dangerous development. (S)

The *Secretary* replied that the U.S. had no direct influence with Iraq, unlike with certain other Arab states where the U.S. had the leverage of being the principal arms supplier. The U.S., therefore, would have to work through its European allies. We would continue to do so, pointing out to them the dangers of nuclear capability for Iraq. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir asked the Secretary for his assessment of the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel, he said, was concerned about recent developments in Greece and Turkey and wanted to know more. (S)

The *Secretary* replied that the military balance in that area was somewhat precarious. It had not greatly changed by the transfer of a carrier battle group to the Indian Ocean (land based aircraft could substitute for most of that capability), but the political problems were worse than the military balance. Greece and Turkey each depended for their security on the other being an ally. This was a necessary but not sufficient condition for each country's safety. Relations between the two, however, had been bad. There was some hope that the Turkish military government, however deplorable in terms of democratic principles, would feel freer to negotiate, and in the short run, this could help solve the problem. Thus there was some hope of improvement, but given the complicated problems of Cyprus and Greece's military reintegration into NATO, this area would continue to be a political weak spot. (S)

The *Secretary* continued that Turkey was particularly vulnerable to the loss of Persian Gulf oil. It had obtained a larger fraction of oil from Iran than most countries and the military takeover could create a problem in this regard. This was another reminder of the grave problem which would face many countries, Israel included, if Persian Gulf oil were cut off or fell under Soviet political or military domination. (S)

Foreign Minister Shamir said that Israel would welcome the visits of Under Secretary Komer and Chairman Jones. The success of their missions, however, would depend on the political instructions they received. *Dr. Brown* replied that these visits were part of the continuing dialogue between the U.S. and Israel. The Marshall talks had by agree-

ment been low key and secret, but this channel was no longer possible. (S)

The *Foreign Minister* reiterated his point that there was no need for a special effort to hide the strategic dialogue. On the contrary, during his recent visit to Egypt, he had concluded that the more the Egyptians realized the closeness of US/Israeli relations, the better Egyptian relations would be with both countries. (S)

Ambassador Evron amplified by noting that the U.S. and Israel had differing assessments of the impact of some outward forms of their association. Peace became a reality only when Sadat concluded that the U.S. could help deliver Israel eventually. Israel believed that U.S. sensitivities about Arab reactions to more open strategic cooperation with Israel were a little exaggerated. If the Arabs interpreted U.S. lack of enthusiasm as the beginning of a withdrawal, that would be dangerous. The two countries could prove that this was not so by doing what many Arabs suspected them of doing anyway. Why not, therefore, make part of this strategic cooperation more open? (S)

The *Secretary* replied that he had been the first American Secretary of Defense to visit Israel and General Jones would be the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit Israel. This kind of talk and continual reassurance, however, was not really necessary. The U.S. did not intend to turn away from Israel; Israel knew this. In fact, the two countries were so close that some kinds of formal detailed arrangements were not really necessary. *Under Secretary Komer* added that actually the U.S. was doing more with Israel but because it was also doing more on the Arab side, this had changed Israel's perception.⁴ (S)

The meeting ended cordially. (U)

⁴ Talks designed to "revitalize" the "strategic dialogue" between the United States and Israel took place between McGiffert and Zippori December 4–5. In a December 8 briefing memorandum to Muskie summarizing the discussions, which focused primarily on developments in the Iran-Iraq war and the situation in the Gulf, Saunders wrote that the talks were "useful and friendly, and the Israelis went away clearly pleased that these talks have been resumed and regularized at a higher political level than was previously the case." The Israelis raised the subject of joint U.S.-Israeli military contingency planning, suggesting the two countries could "cooperate in meeting potential threats to security" in the Middle East, but were told that it was not the U.S. "intention to enter into contingency planning at this time." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810005–0807)

399. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, September 19, 1980, 0138Z

249328. Subject: U.S. Policy Review on Syria.

1. (S-entire text).

2. At an inter-agency group meeting on September 8² Washington agencies reviewed U.S. policy toward Syria and the implications for U.S. interests of the Assad regime's problematic future. What follows reflects the meeting's consensus about the prognosis for the Assad regime and how we can best position ourselves to protect our interests over what is clearly an uncertain future for Syria. Selected addressees will be receiving specific instructions to follow up recommended actions with host governments.

3. The I-G meeting produced broad consensus on following:

A. U.S. and Syrian interests:

—Key U.S. interests with respect to Syria are tied to U.S. regional objectives of avoiding Arab-Israeli hostilities and promoting a comprehensive settlement, denying the USSR greater access to and control over Syrian policy, and achievement of an acceptable resolution of Lebanon's problems. We also have a strong interest in minimizing the risks that Syria will be drawn irrevocably into association with a constellation of radical Arab forces (most particularly Iraq) which could pose major dangers for the stability of the Gulf.

—U.S. endorsement and promotion of the Camp David approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement has led most Syrians to believe that the U.S. has paid inadequate attention to Syria's vital interests (recovery of the Golan, a Palestinian settlement that will protect Syrian interests and enhance Syrian influence in the region, and a resolution of the Lebanese crisis which will safeguard Syria's security interests and predominate

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 8-11/80. Secret; Immediate; Special Encryption; Nodis. Sent to Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. Sent for information Immediate to London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Jim Collins (NEA/ARN); cleared by W. Nathaniel Howell (NEA/ARN), Draper, George Q. Lumsden (NEA/ARP), Kirby, Sick, Joseph V. Montville (INR/NESA), and in NEA/EGY and CIA; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143-0750) Sick wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram: "Syria: OK. (ZB "reluctantly" cleared—see ER item) ¶ 2 added at my request." Brzezinski indicated his approval of the telegram on a September 11 action memorandum sent to him from Hunter, adding a handwritten note: "*reluctantly*. I still wonder if needed." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 8-11/80)

² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.

influence in Lebanon). Since these are essentially regional issues, they are not rpt not susceptible to bilateral solutions.

—The U.S. commitment to the Camp David process as the context for negotiations will continue to limit our ability in the near term to address Syrian interests in a manner sufficiently forthcoming to alter Syrian estrangement from the U.S. The one exception may be on Lebanon where Syrian and U.S. interest in maintaining stability and preventing partition continue to coincide.

B. Assad regime's future and probable successors:

—Though no one can predict how long the Assad regime will survive, it is clear that it is dying. Barring assassination, the transition process is likely to be a lengthy affair and the dynamics involved in Assad's struggle to hang on will strongly circumscribe his ability to respond pragmatically or positively to areas of primary interest to the U.S. In any case, we cannot count on Assad to act with the originality and pragmatism which characterized his rule in earlier years.

—In order of likelihood successor regimes would probably be: (a) a regime dominated by the Alawite hierarchy, but without the Assad brothers, (b) an Alawite/Sunni coalition, (c) a Sunni-dominated regime. A radical Muslim seizure of power is a remote possibility.

C. Implications for U.S. interests:

—From the standpoint of U.S. interests none of the anticipated successors would be preferable to Assad.

—Among them, however, an Alawite-Sunni coalition would probably be preferable and enjoy the best prospects for stability. It would stand the best chance of restoring confessional peace by redressing Sunni majority grievances while protecting minority Alawite/Christian interests. It would probably pursue the most moderate policies among the potential successors.

—An Alawite succession would be the most dangerous. A post-Assad Alawite regime would be ideological, tough, and have the strongest ties to the USSR among the potential contenders for power. A Sunni regime might well move to reduce Soviet influence. It would, however, meet resistance from the Alawite and Christian minorities in seeking to redress Sunni grievances at the expense of Alawite privilege. These tendencies would be accentuated to the degree that a Sunni regime found itself beholden to the radical Muslim Brotherhood for support.

D. U.S. policy

—The best posture for the U.S. at this time with respect to the succession struggle is one of neutrality and non-involvement. Despite a clear preference for Assad, it is unlikely that the U.S. can affect his staying power. At the same time, although we believe that a Sunni/

Alawite coalition would be the preferable successor from our standpoint, we lack the ability to influence the succession and efforts by us to do so could actually operate against U.S. preferences. Any effort now by the U.S. to support or encourage one of the groups arrayed against the regime would risk our remaining working relations with Assad without acceptable assurances that we would have influence with Assad's ultimate successor.

—While remaining out of Syria's internal struggle, the U.S. should take steps to protect our interests in this transition period by conducting ourselves in a manner that will maximize U.S. ability to work with Assad for now and with whatever regime emerges after him. In general, this will mean a policy tailored—within the constraints imposed by our broader regional objectives—to keep our distance from Assad while stressing U.S. interest in, and support for legitimate Syrian national interests. Specifically, our objective will be to stress with Syrians and selected third parties our determination to remain uninvolved in Syria's domestic political struggle and our long-range interest in maintaining Syria as an independent, moderate state.

E. After the regime changes

—Following a change of regime, we would have a limited but urgent agenda with Syria's new leaders. At the earliest possible moment, we would want to assure:

—(A) a cooperative relationship on Lebanon;

—(B) maintenance of the Golan disengagement agreement and Olive Harvest arrangements; and,

—(C) the safety of American official personnel, private citizens and facilities in Syria.

—In addition, we would want to make clear that Syria continues to have a Western option and to discourage any move that would take Syria toward a significantly closer relationship with the USSR.

—In the right circumstances, we would also want to consider tangible ways to underscore the U.S. interest in a constructive relationship with the successor regime. It is possible that conditions would make an offer of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance appropriate. We might also consider emergency financial and economic assistance in cooperation with other governments.

F. Syria-Libya merger

—The September 10 unity declaration³ by Assad and Qadhafi took place after the I-G meeting and was, therefore, not discussed. It is De-

³ Syria and Libya proclaimed on September 10 that they had become a single state. The declaration stated: "This unified state will be the base and means of confronting the Zionist presence and the means of liberating Palestine." (John Kifner, "Libya and Syria Sign Merger Agreement," *The New York Times*, September 11, 1980, p. A7)

partment's preliminary view, however, that this step does not alter the conclusions from the meeting.

4. For Cairo: By septel⁴ you will receive instructions on how to respond to Cairo 18176.⁵

5. For Jidda and Damascus: I–G meeting produced consensus that Saudis are the one moderate Arab power with real influence in Damascus now and under likely successor regimes. We will shortly be sending you an instruction to raise the Syrian situation with the Saudis in an effort to begin sharing our perception about, and interests in Syria's future. In the meantime, we would appreciate Jidda's best in-house assessment of the Saudi-Syrian relationship, including Saudi interests and objectives, points of actual or potential friction, and forms of Saudi assistance to regime and/or its opponents. Conversely, we would welcome Damascus' comments on Syrian perception of Saudi connection.

6. For Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Beirut and Baghdad: We are pouching for Ambassador copy of the discussion paper⁶ which served as the basis for the I–G meeting discussions. We could welcome comments and suggestions about paper, as well as conclusions from I–G meeting.

7. For all addressees: This cable is for your information only and should not be discussed with host government officials at this time. Given the sensitivity and completeness of this report posts should also ensure that any comment to Department is sent in Nodis channel.

Muskie

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ The discussion paper, produced by the Department of State in response to a July 22 request from Brzezinski, was forwarded to Brzezinski under an August 21 covering memorandum from Tarnoff. In the covering memorandum, Tarnoff stated that the Department of State believed "the situation in Syria justifies the convening of an IG meeting" which the Department would convene. Copies of the paper and the covering memorandum are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 74, Syria: 7/77–1/81.

400. Memorandum From the President's Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Oil Supply Agreement with Israel (U)

Our negotiations with Israel to define conditions for activating and operating the Oil Supply Agreement will resume Tuesday, October 7.² In addition to our negotiating team, Energy Minister Modai seeks to meet with Secretaries Muskie and Duncan to press them for an immediate, formal agreement. (C)

State and Energy propose a further liberalization of the US negotiating position for next week's talks.³ This and related considerations are presented in the memorandum from Dick Cooper and Les Goldman (DOE) to me at Tab A.⁴ While the memorandum offers the option of standing pat on the position we took in the September 23–24 negotiations, none of your advisers recommends this. (S)

State and Energy propose in the attached memorandum that we amend both of our proposed market tests of Israel's inability to obtain adequate oil:

(1) reduce from 75% to as low as 66% the required proportion of Israeli dependence on short-term, indirect purchases of oil (Israel wants a 50% test; in the tight market of 1979 it reached 53%);

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 5–11/80. Secret. A typewritten notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Last Day for Decision: Monday Oct 6, 80." Below this notation, Carter wrote: "I'll meet if necessary. J." Attached to the memorandum is an October 7 note from Poats to NSC/S, stating that a contingency meeting with Carter has been arranged for the morning of October 8. (Ibid.)

² This latest round of talks on the conditions for activating the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Agreement on Oil began with meetings in Israel September 23–24. However, the meetings ended without resolution. The first day of discussions is summarized in telegram 3032 from Jerusalem, September 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0497) The second day of discussions is summarized in telegram 3051 from Jerusalem, September 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–3051)

³ The U.S. negotiating position was initially laid out in a September 17 memorandum from Cooper to Owen. The memorandum stated that the U.S. intended to hold to the position that the Memorandum of Agreement would not be activated unless at least 75% of Israel's oil was obtained on a short-term, indirect purchase basis and that the average price of Israeli oil imports was higher than the average price of the top 10% of U.S. oil imports. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860132–1018)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

(2) lower the price criterion (on Israel's average oil import payments) from the highest 10% of US oil imports to the highest 20% (Israel proposes the top 30%);

State and DOE propose to make these concessions provided Israel agrees to a substantially longer period of meeting these tests than it has thus far. (We want at least a 90-day measurement period, Israel has moved up from 30 days to 60 days.) (S)

We would, under the State-DOE proposal, continue to insist that both criteria must be met. (Israel wants to be able to call for US supply when either criterion has been met; State and DOE believe Israel could manipulate the spot market test and trigger the agreement almost at will.) (S)

In addition, our present proposal assures Israel that its loss of a major supplier (Mexico or Egypt) would, in and of itself, create a "strong presumption" in favor of activation. (S)

Cooper and Duncan believe this offer would be a forthcoming, reasonable response to Israeli dissatisfaction with our present position. Coupled with the substantial concessions that we made in the September negotiations, it constitutes a fair interpretation of our supply assurance. It continues to protect us from Israeli triggering in other than critical supply situations; thus it incurs a relatively low risk of adversely affecting our current efforts to get increased Arabian oil production to offset the Iraq-Iran curtailment. (S)

This position falls short of what is likely to be required to get agreement. While we cannot be sure of how firmly Modai will cling to his prior demands, he almost certainly will insist that compliance with either market criterion, rather than both tests, should be sufficient, and he probably will demand softer price and spot market tests than the revised offer proposed by State and Energy. (S)

An intermediate position that would not jeopardize our principles or risk unwarranted triggering of the agreement would be to lower the spot market purchase percentage to 60% and, if this did not produce agreement, to indicate that we were prepared to review our position, so as to keep the negotiations going. (S)

State and DOE believe, as do I and others concerned, that key considerations involved in this issue cannot be adequately covered in a memorandum. I strongly recommend that you meet with the Vice President, Stu Eizenstat, Charles Duncan, Dick Cooper, and me before making your decision.⁵ (S)

⁵ See Document 401.

Options:

1. Stand on our previous position. (No agency recommends)
2. Adopt the liberalized position recommended by State and Energy, as outlined above.⁶
3. Adopt the State-Energy proposal except authorize our negotiators to liberalize the spot market purchase criterion to 60% and, in light of Modai's reaction, to indicate that we are prepared to review our position further in the course of continuing negotiations; direct our negotiators to seek your further instructions if it appears that this round of negotiations will end in acrimonious disagreement. (Owen recommends; State and DOE do not object.)
4. Direct our negotiators to begin with the positions outlined above, but then to bargain for the best compromise they can reach with Modai *next week*, consistent with the concept of a supply assurance, including acceptance of the Israeli position that *either* the price test or the spot market test must be met. (No agency recommends)

⁶ Carter approved options 2 and 3, though he crossed out the phrase, "Adopt the State-Energy proposal except authorize our negotiators to liberalize the spot market purchase criterion to 60% and, in light of Modai's reaction, to indicate that we are prepared to review our position further in the course of continuing negotiations," in option 3. Carter did not approve options 1 and 4.

401. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 8, 1980, 9:33–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting on Oil Negotiations with Israel

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Stuart Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 10/1–15/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Alfred Moses, Special Advisor to the President
Richard Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Ambassador Henry Owen, Ambassador-at-Large, Special Representative of the President for International Economic Summits
Deane Hinton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs
Les Goldmann, Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs
Robert Hunter, Staff Member, National Security Council (notetaker)
Rutherford Poats, Staff Member, National Security Council
David Korn, Director of Israel/Arab-Israel Affairs, Department of State

Les Goldmann began by outlining a position on which agreement with Israel could be reached today: 1) that the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) could be activated if Israel were paying for oil more than the average of the top 20% of U.S. imports; 2) we would drop the spot market test; and 3) we would change our position that there would be a “strong presumption” for activation if Israel lost either of its two main suppliers (Egypt and Mexico), to a position in which triggering would be automatic under this circumstance. At the end of negotiations yesterday, our position was that Israel would have to pay a price equivalent to the top 15% of U.S. imports; it would have to buy 66% of its oil on the spot market; and the Mexican/Egyptian case would only lead to a “strong presumption” of activation. Secretaries Muskie and Duncan are seeing Minister Modai at 10:30 this morning.² We have the following options: 1) We could move to the top 20% on price and shift the spot market requirement to 60%. This would not cost us much. If Israel were paying the equivalent of the top 20%, then it would have to be buying heavily in the spot market. And we would keep the strong presumption position. 2) If we want to shift to an automatic trigger, then we could permit triggering for a 90-day period if either Egypt or Mexico were lost, at the end of which Israel would have to meet the price test of 20%.

The President asked whether the Israelis would be likely to accept a U.S. proposal for 20/60 and automatic triggering if it lost one of the two main suppliers?

Les Goldmann said that there was a good chance.

Deane Hinton said that he doubted it.

Ambassador Owen asked whether this would be so if the spot market test were dropped.

² No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. According to an October 8 memorandum from Owen to Carter, Modai “started pressing for further concessions, but he was told by our negotiators that this was the bottom line.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 5–11/80) The resulting Agreement on Contingency Implementing Arrangements for the U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement on Oil Supply was signed October 17. A summary of this agreement is in telegram 276577 to multiple posts, October 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800494–0954)

Deane Hinton said that that would probably do it. But this is hard to judge—this had been a wild and discursive negotiation. Modai sees the “strong presumption” position as very tough, because of the Egyptian connection. Modai sees this as a backward step, whereas in fact it is an advance over the MOA. We could not see what would happen until we tried such a position.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Israel had adjusted its position in the negotiations.

Deane Hinton said they had. They had raised the level on the price criterion, and accepted it in principle, whereas before they had taken the position that *either* price *or* percentage of spot market purchases should be enough to trigger. That is an advance, since our analysis says it would be easier for Israel to satisfy the spot market test than the price criterion.

Les Goldmann said that a logical evolution of our negotiation position would be to go to 20/60 while retaining “strong presumption.”

Al Moses said that if we have the 20/60 figures, then Israel would probably get automatic triggering anyway if it lost Egypt as a supplier.

The President said that wouldn’t be so if it could get cheaper oil elsewhere. He doesn’t want us to be supplying Israel with oil if it could get it from Egypt and other countries. Why should we move in to do so? He had agreed with Begin—and Sadat was involved—that if Israel lost its supplies, then we would guarantee that it would have oil. Subsequently, Israel put in the price element. He agrees that there is legitimacy in this position, if it would mean that Israel were being charged an exorbitant price—say even \$60 a barrel. That would be punitive, and we would supply oil at a reasonable price. But Israel has moved far beyond the original agreement. He favors a reasonable position. With the 20/60 formula, the question of automatic triggering would not be significant, from our perspective.

Ambassador Owen asked what we would lose.

Les Goldmann replied that the problem lies in getting independent criteria. Israel gets 40% now on the spot market. If it lost Egypt, that could raise the figure to 65%. But what price would that be at? No one knows for sure. We could get into the position of subsidizing Israeli imports. Israel is looking for an easier trigger.

The President said that he wants to avoid an Israeli self-imposed triggering, that it might use to get out of having to use the spot market, or relying upon Egypt and Mexico.

Stu Eizenstat said that with the 20/60 formula, and the 90-day automatic triggering provision, then the Israelis could not have a self-inflicted shortage.

Under Secretary Cooper underlined that the automatic triggering would be only for a limited period. (*The President* said he understood).

Deane Hinton said we need a way to deal with Israeli decisions on this: how can that be written down? We aren't talking about political steps: Modai gave the example of adding a single settler leading to a cut-off of oil from Egypt.

Al Moses suggested separating economic from political factors in the triggering here.

Deane Hinton said that the agreement needs a little ambiguity. We need an escape if there is Israeli behavior on oil purchasing that would lead to self-imposed triggering. It shouldn't be automatic.

The President said that a verbal assurance from Secretary Duncan on this point should suffice. The language should stay in. Modai should be told that the case of a settler, or a breakdown in the autonomy negotiations, wouldn't be involved. If Israel were to attack Egypt, or try to take back the Sinai—or something gross—and Egypt stopped supplying oil, then there would be a prohibition. All events can't be spelled out in a document.

Ambassador Owen asked about the impact in the Gulf of a 20/60 formula with a 90-day provision for automatic triggering.

Secretary Duncan said that the subtleties of a formula were not that important. His overriding consideration is that, if there were a triggering in which Israel were getting U.S. oil, then in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries there would be a devastating reaction. It would have an immediate and dramatic impact.

The President noted that Israel would be permitted to trigger the agreement (under certain circumstances), and this was said a year ago.

Secretary Duncan said that this was his judgment.

The President said that the agreement with Israel had been publicized.

Secretary Duncan said that Modai is going on a speaking tour of the United States beginning today. He (Duncan) hopes that Modai will leave Washington with a good feeling. If we go to the 20/60 formula, then we should try to hold with "strong presumption." Goldmann may be right that we should try to get more room on the spot market criterion, and later leave it out. But he (Duncan) would hate to leave the spot-market criterion out of the agreement. This is a supply agreement, though Israel has turned it into a price agreement. This is his intuition.

Ambassador Owen asked about the 90-day provision.

Secretary Duncan said that if the difference lies in whether Modai walks out of the meeting today feeling bad, then it is good. He (Duncan) suggests the following tactics: we should move to 20/60, and hold the line on "strong presumption." If that does not work, then we could have the two staffs work out various options, then discuss it again with Modai when he gets back.

Ambassador Owen asked whether we should introduce the idea of the 90-day period.

Secretary Duncan said we should, as one option, if this would make possible a good meeting today. But he hopes we will not have to do it.

Secretary Muskie asked for an explanation of “strong presumption.”

Secretary Duncan said that if Israel lost either Egypt or Mexico as a supplier, then there would be a “strong presumption” that the MOA would be triggered.

Ambassador Owen said that this is our existing position.

Secretary Duncan said that there is another possibility: that Mexican sales to Israel could be expanded. He has had some success here, stressing collective international efforts. On the 90 days, it means that if either Mexico or Egypt fell out, then there would be automatic triggering. After 90 days, then Israel must show that it meets either the 20% on price or the 60% on the spot market.

Ambassador Owen said that the word should be “and”: Israel would have to meet both tests.

The President said it should be both, since Israel could meet the 60% spot market test by itself.

Secretary Duncan said that if the Saudis get OPEC price unity, then there will be a movement towards price unification. If that is achieved, then there will be few market swings, and Israel could hit the 20% price formula easily.

Stu Eizenstat said he agreed that we should not enter an agreement that would permit triggering now. But there are advantages in getting an agreement now. If the difference is a 90-day automatic provision, with reversion afterwards to 20/60, then we should do it. There is a history to this: OPEC knows of the MOA. Our provisions are not easy ones to meet. There would be a 90-day grace period for Israel in an emergency. It would be good to get an agreement, and put this behind us, not to extend it. Modai is going on a 12-day speaking tour, and he shouldn't go without an agreement.

Ambassador Owen said that we should not just say we will work up alternatives, but try to close a deal.

Stu Eizenstat said that we should do so, even if we can't get total agreement because of other problems.

Secretary Duncan said that there are other issues to be decided, like how long this agreement should last.

Stu Eizenstat said that the other problems could be managed. We should be able to announce major decisions, and that we have a conceptual agreement.

Deane Hinton said that he has prepared two possible press statements. One says that there has been progress on some issues; the other says that there has been substantial agreement, subject to review.

Ambassador Owen said that our decision seems to come down to this: we would go with 20/60, and with “strong presumption.” If that

does not work, we have a choice between a) Duncan's options approach, with the 90-day formula being one such option; or b) as Stu said, trying to nail down the 90-day provision.

The President said that the overriding objective is that Israel should feel that, if it has a serious supply problem, we will step in. This should not just be loss of supply, but also if the price is exorbitant. We must prevent Israel from self-triggering, however—it would rather rely on the U.S. than on the spot market or on Egypt. We will not let that happen. 20/60 is mandatory to prevent that. The 90-day provision, to be followed by the 20/60 test, is all right.

Al Moses said it would help if Modai could get this position today.

Ambassador Owen asked how we should conduct the talks with Modai.

The President said our negotiators need to be tougher.

Secretary Muskie said that there are two ways to go at the 10:30 meeting with Modai—to have the negotiators meet, or to do it at the Cabinet level, then send it to the negotiators, and then back to himself and Duncan if need be.

The President said that they should work out the details. The negotiators should tell Muskie and Duncan what not to do when they see Modai, so that he (Modai) can't slip anything in. This is an old Israeli tactic. If they get something in a side conversation that they like, then it becomes binding—even if it was said by Warren Harding. They say: "Warren said . . ." (laughter)

Secretary Muskie said that he will make Modai feel good, and Duncan can be tough (laughter).

The President said that he has the responsibility to see that Egypt does not turn off the oil for frivolous reasons. Sadat won't do it; but a successor might. We need to guarantee Israel's oil. The position he has outlined is as forthcoming as it can be; we will go no further, even if the Israelis go home.

Secretary Cooper raised the phrase "reasons beyond Israel's control," even under the automatic provision ((note: in Israel's meeting the criteria on Egypt and Mexico)).

The President said he agreed that one settler wouldn't be construed as "Israel's control." Muskie can explain this to Modai.

Les Goldman said that we want to limit this to oil actions on Israel's part.

The President said yes. We don't want Sadat to think that Israel has to agree on points in the autonomy talks for it to get oil. He wishes the team good luck; they should call him if need be. He thinks it will be ok.

(The meeting ended at 10:00 a.m.).

402. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹

Washington, October 13, 1980, 1955Z

273839. Subject: (C) US/EC Consultations on the Middle East. Reference: (A) State 263732,² (B) State 262384.³

1. (C-entire text).

2. The EC–9 are continuing work on their Middle East initiative. Following on the June 13 EC–9 Venice Declaration⁴ and Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn's "Contact Mission"⁵ to the Middle East in Au-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800490–0218. Confidential; Priority. Sent to Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Dublin, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and Copenhagen. Drafted by J.H. Madden (EUR/RPE/EEC); cleared by Robert M. Beaudry (EUR/RPE) and Sterner; approved by Vest. Sent for information to Cairo, Tel Aviv, New York, Amman, Jidda, Jerusalem, and Damascus.

² Telegram 263732 to multiple posts, October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800471–1044)

³ In telegram 262384 to multiple posts, October 1, Christopher conveyed specific steps for Chiefs of Mission in European posts to take to monitor EC–9 political deliberations and to contribute to them substantively "in order to encourage the Nine to adopt positions compatible with our own." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469–0486)

⁴ For the text of the declaration on the state of the Middle East negotiations, agreed by the Heads of State and Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Council at Venice on June 13, see telegram 15533 from Rome, June 13. The Declaration stated that "growing tensions" affecting the Middle East "constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary than other." "The Nine Member States of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800289–0954)

⁵ The "Contact Mission" of Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Gaston Thorn to undertake a series of consultative meetings with Arab, Israeli, and European leaders on the current political situation in the region was done in four "legs." In the first leg, Thorn visited Tunisia and Israel. A summary briefing of this trip was given by an official of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry to Ambassador to Luxembourg James G. Lowenstein on August 2, the details of which are in telegram 1019 from Luxembourg, August 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370–0795) The second leg, in which Thorn visited Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, is summarized in telegrams 1066, 1068, 1069, and 1070, all from Luxembourg, August 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800384–0705, D800384–0788, D800384–0798, D800384–0900 respectively) The third leg, in which Thorn visited Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Vatican, is summarized in telegram 1181 from Luxembourg, September 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800419–0603) The fourth leg, in which Thorn visited Egypt, is summarized in telegram 1182 from Luxembourg, September 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800419–0632) The Contact Mission concluded in September with the September 4–5 EC Political Directors Meeting, summarized in telegram 1212 from Luxembourg, September 6; the September 14 EC Foreign Ministers Political Coordination Meeting, summarized in telegram 1286 from Luxembourg, September 17; and Thorn's meeting with West Bank officials, summarized in telegram 1408 from Luxembourg, October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800424–0340, D800443–0589, D800472–1099 respectively)

gust/September, the nine political directors, working with experts, are now proceeding to develop common positions on issues related to a settlement. These efforts will evidently be revealed by Foreign Ministers shortly before the nine Heads of Government/State decide at the December 1–2 European Council meeting⁶ on a possible EC–9 Middle East initiative.

3. European diplomat who calls upon us frequently told NEA recently the chances now had to be rated good that the EC Summit would result in a European declaration setting forth principles for a Middle East peace going well beyond the Venice Declaration. Source said the declaration would spell out four basic principles for a peace settlement: Israeli security; self-determination for the Palestinians; Israeli withdrawal; and international guarantees. He believed there would also be a “procedural aspect” to the European declaration in the form of an invitation to the parties to come to a European-organized peace conference for negotiations based on these principles. Source said that there was now solid support from Italy, France, Belgium and Ireland for proceeding in this manner. Holland would be opposed; the Germans would drag their feet because they didn’t want to displease the US; and the British were divided among themselves, with Carrington favoring a strong European initiative but Thatcher holding him back.

4. We have repeatedly made clear to the Nine our views on achieving peace in the Middle East through the Camp David process and the need for their support of this process, as well as our concerns about a separate EC–9 initiative. The Secretary discussed these matters with several EC Foreign Ministers at the UNGA, and Ambassador Linowitz presented our views to the EC–9 Ambassadors in Washington on September 15.⁷ Most recently, Deputy Secretary Christopher, at a meeting with several major European Ambassadors on October 9, stressed very strongly that the EC–9, as they consider their Middle East plans for their December 1–2 Summit, should not complicate our Camp David efforts, in particular the President’s upcoming meeting with Sadat and Begin which may be held at about that same time. FYI. Our specific concern is that the EC–9 Summit may produce a European plan for a Middle East settlement that could draw Palestinians and other Arabs away from the Camp David process and undercut agreements or

⁶ The text of the Middle East sections of the European Council’s declaration, released at the end of its December 1–2 meeting, was conveyed to Washington in telegram 1739 from Luxembourg, December 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800575-0321)

⁷ On September 15, Linowitz provided a briefing to EC Ambassadors on his most recent visit to Israel and Egypt and the developments he saw as likely to follow. The briefing is summarized in telegram 248377 to multiple posts, September 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800444-0759)

proposals that might emerge from the President's meeting with Sadat and Begin. End FYI.

5. As indicated reftels, EC-9 political cooperation consultations in recent months have become increasingly significant, with concurrent significant implications for US policy. This development requires that we should intensify our efforts to improve and up-grade the US/EC dialogue, with high-level involvement as needed.⁸ In this regard, no other area is currently more important than EC-9 activities on the Middle East, where we have sometimes experienced difficulty in obtaining details on the development of their policies. It is essential that we not be surprised again about EC intentions. We need timely information if we are to influence the outcome at the EC Summit. In conversations with policy-level officials you should express our concerns, drawing on the position voiced by the Deputy Secretary.

Muskie

⁸ Following indications that the EC-9 would extend invitations for a EC-sponsored Middle East peace conference at the December 1–2 meeting of the European Council, Muskie provided further guidance to European posts on October 21, instructing Chiefs of Mission to seek early meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the EC-9 to share the USG's "great concern that any further steps by the European leaders carefully take into account how those steps would contribute concretely to the negotiations which alone can advance the peace process." Muskie advised that Ambassadors convey the view that the United States wished to "continue a close dialogue" with the EC-9 "on how best to proceed toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict," and to "find a way to address the Middle East problem at the EC-9 Summit in a way which continues to support the current efforts and does not discourage the Palestinians, Jordan and other Arab states." (Telegram 280476 to multiple posts, October 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800501-0935)

403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel and Egypt¹

Washington, October 17, 1980, 0011Z

276563. Subject: October 14–15 Talks With Egypt and Israel.

1. (S-entire text)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 120, 10/15–21/80. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Jerusalem, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Sterner and Jane E. Taylor (S/S-O); approved by Linowitz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140-0373)

2. Discussion during the two days of trilateral talks² focused on procedural questions: How to describe this and coming meetings and how to define next steps in the negotiations. There had been serious, substantive bilaterals with both Israelis and Egyptians in the preceding days,³ concentrating on the draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) but the Ministerial level touched only lightly on these matters.

3. The Egyptians used both our restricted trilateral meetings and our one “plenary” to make strong statements reiterating their known positions on Jerusalem, settlements, and the need to draw in the Palestinians. The Israelis responded quietly but firmly on Jerusalem and settlements and were positive in their approach toward attracting the Palestinians. The most important aspect of these discussions was Egyptian agreement to defer discussion of Jerusalem and the settlements until the summit and proceed in the meantime with the other issues addressed in the MOU. The Egyptians also pressed for Israeli action on two bilateral matters: Egyptians in Israeli jails, and the control of a Coptic church in Jerusalem now in the hands of Ethiopian Copts. Burg promised to look into these questions personally. He seemed to be optimistic that more could be done with the issue of prisoner release and was less sanguine that the religious issue could be solved.

4. The principle debate was whether we were “resuming the autonomy negotiations” or “preparing for the summit” and whether the existing committee structure would be the vehicle for continuing the discussions or whether a general committee should be created to provide follow-up. The Egyptians tried to get priority for characterizing our continued talks as preparing for the summit through a general committee, but we joined the Israelis in insisting that “resumption” and “preparation” are two sides of the same coin and must be given equal weight, as they were in the September 3 statement which Sadat accepted at Alexandria. The Egyptian team left rather dissatisfied, though it is not clear that General Ali shares his subordinates’ strong feelings that Egypt came off second-best. In fact, he was somewhat ironic in his comments about all these “lawyers” who encroach on his “simple military approach” which would be to get on with the business at hand.

² The talks took place in Washington.

³ Lewis met with Burg on October 6 to discuss Israeli plans and understandings for the October 14–15 meetings and fourteen points for confidence building in the hopes of producing a Memorandum of Understanding and improving, as Lewis characterized it, the “political and psychological climate among the Palestinians and thus enhanc[ing] the now rather dreary prospects for Palestinian participation in the autonomy process.” (Telegram 18223 from Tel Aviv, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140–0297) Atheron met with Boutros Ghali on October 9 to discuss Egyptian goals for the meetings. (Telegram 22566 from Cairo, October 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1752)

Nevertheless, Ali was clearly instructed to let himself be guided by his “lawyers.”

5. The Israelis agreed that there was no need (or benefit) to trilateral sessions until after our elections and privately expressed their preference for continuing to work with us outside of the trilateral format provided we do not highlight “bilateral consultations” since this would be seen as a step back in their relations with Egypt. They expressed concern that trilateral consideration of the MOU would be premature and could make progress more difficult. The Egyptians were relieved by this approach and we had no difficulty setting November 17 as the date of the next meeting.⁴ It will be in the area and will probably not be at the Ministerial level. Meanwhile we will send to both parties a revised MOU⁵ and will try to have bilateral discussions of this new text. The latest Egyptian draft⁶ is a bit better than their previous effort and the Israeli draft has promise in that, for the first time, they have given us Cabinet-cleared language on issues, notably land and water, which they have avoided treating in a formal way from the outset and which does not preclude the possibility of compromise. The Egyptians were clearly interested in Ambassador Linowitz’ characterization of the Israeli paper and the areas of agreement between the parties. In this sense the Egyptians may be a bit less negative than they were before the Oct 14–15 sessions. Privately, they asked us to pass them a copy of the Israeli paper which we, of course, refused.

Muskie

⁴ Following Carter’s defeat in the November 4 presidential election, Ali and Boutros Ghali informed Atherton that Egypt did not wish to resume talks on November 17 unless it would lead to a late January 1981 summit and that they received indication from the incoming foreign policy team of President-elect Ronald W. Reagan that it would pursue Camp David “vigorously.” (Memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski, November 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 11–12/80) Ali stated in a November 20 Radio Cairo interview that Egypt “did not expect” a tripartite summit until after Reagan’s inauguration. (Telegram 25585 from Cairo, November 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800555–0714)

⁵ For the text of the revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding, see telegram 294985 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, November 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880140–0430)

⁶ Copies of the Egyptian and Israeli drafts have not been found.

404. Record of Meeting Between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and President Carter¹

Washington, November 13, 1980

President Carter's Notes Regarding his November 13, 1980
Meeting with PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN of Israel
(The White House, Washington, D.C.)

I met with Prime Minister Begin privately. He was ill at ease at first. I told him that I had accepted the result of the election with equanimity. This seemed to have a surprising effect on him for some reason, and he mentioned it several times.

I expressed my appreciation for his participation and contribution to the Camp David Accords and peace treaty, and my gratification that our bilateral relationships had remained strong in spite of many potential reasons for disruption of them. I pointed out our own security advantages from having a strong and free, peaceful, independent Israel. We discussed the political problems that had derived for us from the Camp David Accords.

He expressed agreement that the oil commitment was very satisfactory.

I told him that it would be a serious mistake for Israel to go forward with annexation of the Golan Heights. This would in effect signal to the rest of the world an abandonment by Israel of a commitment to UN Resolution 242, and it would open up floodgates of demands from other nations that the UN Resolution be abandoned or severely modified—something that we had tried to stop. I told him that in my opinion it was also a violation of the commitment made in the Camp David Accords. He didn't respond, but I think he was impressed.

He brought up the subject of military supplies to Iran, saying that they had requested such help from Israel. He didn't acknowledge that they had already made one shipment of tires to Iran. He said that they would like to make these shipments, they thought it would help Iran-Israeli future relationships, and would give them an opening to encourage the hostage release.

I told him immediately that this would be very bad for us, and I strongly urged Israel not to make any sort of further trade with Iran

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin in the Oval Office from 11:05 to 11:40 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

until after the hostages were indeed released. It would be a violation of the embargo that we had tried to establish.

He promised to comply.

We agreed on the need to control proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Mid East. And I told him I would bring this up with the Reagan Administration.

I told him so far as I knew the relationship between our two countries was founded on public opinion in the broadest sense, and that I didn't think there would be any radical change under Governor Reagan.

He asked me to permit the establishment of sensing devices in the West Bank area for the training of air pilots. We believe that they can get an adequate training capability by keeping these devices in the Negev and on the Israeli side of the Green Line. I told him I would look into it, but I made it plain that the Department of Defense would have to determine the necessity for any West Bank placement.

405. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 13, 1980, 11:05 a.m.–12:01 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
Alfred H. Moses, Special Adviser to the President
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(10/80–12/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter's handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin

Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the United States

Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister's Bureau

Yehuda Avner, Adviser to the Prime Minister

Reuven Hecht, Adviser to the Prime Minister

General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister

Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister

Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel

Eitan Bentsur, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

(Between 11:05 a.m. and 11:37 a.m., the President and Prime Minister met alone in the Oval Office.² The following took place in the Cabinet Room beginning at 11:38 a.m.).

The President said that he and the Prime Minister had talked about a number of items when they were alone; some they would relate to their associates in private; many dealt with the Prime Minister's contribution in an historical way to enhance peace on earth. We have strengthened ties between our two great democratic countries. He is grateful to the Prime Minister—and to everyone else at the table. The Prime Minister had taken constructive and courageous actions. He (the President) had spent a large part of his political life on these issues, and there is a new prospect for peace. He is grateful for the opportunity, and it is his strong intention to continue doing so. Israel will find that the new U.S. administration mirrors his (the President's) commitment, on bilateral relations and on peace, between Israel and Egypt and Israel and its other neighbors. This includes continuing to work to achieve full autonomy promised for the West Bank and Gaza; and providing security for Israel. He hopes that the Israeli government will pursue this with the same enthusiasm as has characterized its efforts until now. The Prime Minister and he recalled that the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty represent solemn commitments, which go beyond the identity of whoever is in office in the three countries. They should and will be binding on the peoples and governments; and not cast aside and abandoned. There are no good alternatives: the intrusion of other countries is not beneficial; the going back to a convening of a Geneva conference under UN auspices would not be beneficial; the weakening of Resolution 242 commitments would not be beneficial.

Concerning progress in bilateral U.S.-Israeli relations, it is recognized here that there is real importance to U.S. security in Israeli-U.S. friendship. This is an important development; it may not have begun in the last four years, but it has certainly been strengthened. Public opinion here shows that support for Israel is valued by our people, and is strong. He and the Prime Minister had talked of the need for con-

² See Document 404. A memorandum of conversation for this portion of the meeting has not been found.

tinued sharing of intelligence information between our countries. There is need to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons—to countries like Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The U.S. has taken the lead on this issue, so far. When he sees Governor Reagan next week, he will impress upon him the importance of this issue.

On the question of a possible summit, this has been left in a tentative state. The Prime Minister is willing to proceed if it is advisable. He (the President) wants to see what both Sadat and Reagan think. We should proceed cautiously here. It is important to see the peace process go on. His overall sense is one of gratification and gratitude. The Prime Minister is a courageous leader, who worked with him (the President) in achieving much.

The Prime Minister said thank you very much indeed. He says as a friend, as he did in the Oval Office, that he feels deeply impressed with the spirit of democracy here, and that in such a way the President had accepted the decision of the people. American democracy is an example to others. He has deep appreciation for it—and it has been an example for a long time, for the U.S. and for the world. There is beauty in democracy, and it shows civil courage.

He wants to express the gratitude of Israel, that in President Carter's tenure, Israel's national security has been strengthened; there were the Camp David Accords, and the Egypt-Israel treaty. These are great achievements. The Camp David Accords have two parts—and are in effect an international treaty. The President of the United States witnessed the signing—all three leaders signed them. One part has come to fruition, in the peace treaty reached with the President's help. Now normalization is taking place. There are some difficulties; but in the near future there will be another meeting in Cairo on the autonomy process. Maybe there will be a summit. He and the President have agreed that, as the transition period goes on, he (the Prime Minister) will accept any decision of the President on a summit. If the President wants to have a summit in these ten weeks, and if Sadat agrees, then this is all right, but it is the President's decision. There are voices here that consider the Camp David Accords a document to be discarded, and look elsewhere for ideas. Where are these ideas? This sets a bad example for other nations. What value therefore would there be in a treaty? This would be injurious for all; and he (the Prime Minister) believes that Sadat agrees. Israel stands behind the Camp David Accords, and wants to bring them to fruition. There will be differences—and these will be important sometimes. Each party sees that it is taking the right approach. This is natural. But we can clarify the issues. And we have proved we can reach further agreement. When it appeared we were losing agreement, it was caught in mid-air, we brought it to earth and signed an agreement. Israel stands by the Camp David Accords,

and by free negotiations with the three nations. We should continue with these efforts. He will wait for the President to decide on a summit. If the President will let him know what he decides, he will accept it.

The President said that, in the meantime, we should not discuss it publicly. He does not want it thought that we are taking a unilateral decision. He will talk with Sadat and Reagan. It is likely there will not be a summit, but maybe there could be one, if it is appropriate.

The Prime Minister agreed.

The President said he wants to find out what Reagan thinks of an early meeting with the Prime Minister and Sadat (post-Inauguration). If he (Reagan) reacts positively, this would be the best alternative. He (the President) will explore this quietly.

Secretary Muskie said that he wanted to express his own appreciation for the opportunity to be involved, for a few months, with efforts to keep Camp David going, under difficult circumstances. He appreciates all the cooperation he has received. He compliments both leaders on their historical achievement, and expressed his thanks to both of them—and especially to the Prime Minister—for their understanding.

The Prime Minister said thank you.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he will soon be a private citizen, and hopes to visit Israel, and play a decisive game of chess with the Prime Minister!

The President said he understood that Dr. Brzezinski and the Prime Minister are still tied!

The Prime Minister said that Dr. Brzezinski could come to Israel to play chess with him. But why only one decisive game? (laughter) At Camp David, the score was two-to-two, and was inconclusive. They were interesting games; but he (the Prime Minister) needs more training! (laughter) The games that Dr. Brzezinski and he had played were the first he had played since he was arrested by the Russian Secret Service in 1940. It had been 38 years since he had played chess.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Prime Minister had said this at the beginning of their first chess game at Camp David, and he (Dr. Brzezinski) had been suitably unnerved by the historic significance of it. But at the end, Mrs. Begin had said to him (Dr. Brzezinski) that it was wonderful that they were playing, because Menachem loves to play chess!

The Prime Minister said that that is right, but he hadn't! It had been a hobby when he was a boy. You don't forget how to play. But he needs training—a fact demonstrated because Dr. Brzezinski had beaten him twice! (laughter). Dr. Brzezinski does play very well.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he wanted to join in expressing personal gratitude for the chance to serve the President on these issues.

This was the most difficult, interesting, satisfying and frustrating experience of his life. It included his share of heartburn.

Ambassador Evron said that Ambassador Linowitz sometimes gave heartburn to others, as well! (laughter)

Ambassador Linowitz said that he wished he had! He had played a small part—but was immensely grateful. There is one point, which he raised last night with the Prime Minister. He (Ambassador Linowitz) would be personally unhappy if the process came to a close on Inauguration Day, without a record of what had been done, either a joint summary—such as the Memorandum of Understanding or other document—or a report. He hopes that there can be agreement to do this, for the record for the next administration and for history. It would show we were slowly making progress towards implementing the Camp David agreement.

The President said that this would please him. The optimum would be a joint report they could agree upon. Alternatively, Ambassador Linowitz could give him a unilateral report, with a copy to the others for the record.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we tried this with the Memorandum of Understanding; but predictably there had been problems. He had wanted us to be able to say: here we are.

The President asked why not try to have an assessment made of the progress that has been made, and delineate outstanding items and areas of disagreement. This might be done at the November 17th meeting.³ If not, he will ask Ambassador Linowitz for a report.

The Prime Minister said that if it is a problem of a common assessment by the three countries, and a matter of summing up the negotiations, that could cause some unresolved questions to be brought up. He would favor a document on what we have achieved. Some time was indeed lost, but there are achievements. He will need to consult his colleagues on the idea. He would prefer as much agreement as possible.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he would be happy to try preparing a draft.

The President said that we will try.

The Prime Minister said that it should be positive: what we achieved—for example, that for 32 years there was a state of war and five wars. Officially there were four wars, but non-officially there were

³ A summary of the November 17 trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian meeting was sent in telegram 25364 from Cairo, November 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2004)

five, since there were hundreds of casualties on both sides from the war of attrition.⁴ Then we could see achievement—as recorded in the preamble to the Egypt-Israel treaty, and in normalization—for the first time in 32 years in the Middle East: such a thing doesn't happen! Some of the things could be stated on autonomy, but not all. A tripartite declaration? He would consult his friends.

The President said certainly. Ambassador Linowitz will try a draft on the three countries, and will give it to the Prime Minister to accept or change. He would like to turn over to Reagan what we see as the progress and the problems. (He then invited the Prime Minister to join him outside with the press).

(The meeting concluded at 12:01 p.m.).

⁴ Reference is to the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition that took place along the Suez Canal largely from March 8, 1969, when Nassar renounced the ceasefire ending the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, to August 7, 1970. For documentation on the War of Attrition, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

406. Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Counterterrorism Training for Egypt (S)

As you know, CIA has a trained counterterrorism group for the Ministry of Interior in Egypt. It is composed of about forty men who were originally policemen. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense has come to us with a request [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to train a somewhat larger terrorism group in the Egyptian Army. This request was brought to the attention of the SCC Executive Committee on Terrorism last week. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 11–12/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote "OK. ZB" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

To avoid confusion in our own government, I held a meeting this morning with representatives from the CIA/DDO, DOD/JCS, and State. We determined the following:

—The Egyptians apparently want a second team and do not desire that their own Ministry of Interior specialists train Egyptian Army personnel.

—That Defense and the Army [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would like to meet the Egyptian Ministry of Defense request. (S)

Now that our own government, i.e. [*1 line not declassified*] and that it is the inter-agency consensus that we should, we agreed to take the following actions:

—State, through Atherton, will check with the Egyptian Government to confirm at the Moubarek level that indeed they want a second program.

—Defense will negotiate with the Egyptian military for a small [*less than 1 line not declassified*] training team if the Egyptian request remains valid. (S)

I was the only one who suggested drawbacks such as counterintelligence damage to our own [*less than 1 line not declassified*] capability. Defense assures me this problem is not serious. Everyone else is enthusiastic to go forward. DOD/ISA is enthusiastic to get some credit at the political level for being responsive to the Egyptians. (S)

Unless you object and raise this to your level, no other review will be made. (C)

**407. Letter From the President's Special Representative
for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz) to
President Carter¹**

Washington, January 12, 1981

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to submit to you these two brief reports—one summarizing the progress thus far made in the Autonomy Negotiations and the other the developments in the Egyptian-Israeli normalization process. These reports reflect my experience in the area over the past

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL2, Government Service, Middle East, Reports to the President 1979–1981. No classification marking.

year and take into account my most recent consultations with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.²

As you know, during my December visit both leaders agreed that important progress had been made in the negotiations toward realization of the objectives of the Camp David Accords and they expressed their confidence that they would be able fully to fulfill the promise of Camp David.

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin also affirmed³ their strong conviction that the process which you had developed with them at Camp David is, in their words, “the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East today.” I share that conviction and deeply believe that it is in the highest interest of the United States to press forward in the weeks and months ahead in order to conclude the negotiations at the earliest possible date.

I have been honored to serve as your representative in these negotiations.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz⁴

*Personal Representative of the President
for the Middle East Peace Negotiations*

² Linowitz visited Egypt and Israel December 15–17 for meetings with Sadat and Begin. Meeting with Sadat on December 15, Linowitz conveyed to the Egyptian President a message from President-elect Ronald W. Reagan stating that he would support the Camp David process. Sadat, Linowitz noted, gave the impression that he remained “fully committed” to the process and was “most concerned that the new administration understand it is critical for the United States to remain a full partner in the negotiations.” However, Sadat also gave the impression that he was “suspicious of the Saudis” and “opposed to any role for Hussein until autonomy agreement has been reached,” and that Egypt “will take no initiatives at this juncture.” (Telegram 27630 from Cairo, December 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2029) Linowitz met twice with Begin December 16–17, during which Linowitz briefed him on his conversations with Sadat and conveyed a message from Carter stating that this was a “decisive moment” for the Camp David negotiations as it was necessary to demonstrate to Reagan that the peace process was an “active and viable one.” These meetings are summarized in telegram 22588 from Tel Aviv, December 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880139–2142)

³ On December 18, Sadat and Begin issued a joint statement affirming their continued commitment to the Camp David process. For the full text of this statement, see telegram 3917 from Jerusalem, December 17 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800600–0668)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment**Report Prepared by the President's Special Representative
for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)⁵**

undated

PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

Egypt and Israel have over the past months, by virtue of their commitment and efforts, been able to make considerable progress and have appreciably narrowed their differences on a wide range of critical, substantive matters germane to the concept of "full autonomy" called for by the Camp David Accords.

While significant differences remain on important issues which will require extensive and intensive negotiations during the weeks and months ahead, it can fairly be said that a substantial consensus now exists between the parties on the elements set forth below.

Some of the positions reflected in this report have not yet been revealed by the parties to one another. Moreover, each of the parties has emphasized that its position on many of these matters is expressly conditioned on the completion of a comprehensive autonomy agreement. Accordingly, it is important to emphasize that one or both of the parties might deny aspects of this report were it to be made public. Nevertheless, the existing consensus as reflected below provides a solid foundation for the completion of a comprehensive agreement which will establish the transitional autonomy arrangements contemplated in the Accords.

1. Election of Self-Governing Authority

The parties would agree that a single body should be elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza as the Self-Governing Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "SGA(AC)"). The SGA(AC) would select its own officers from among the elected members and determine its own internal procedures.

Proposals have been made by both parties on the SGA(AC)'s size and structure, and some progress in narrowing the differences has been made. The parties are proceeding on the basis that these issues are more appropriately resolved once the scope and nature of the SGA(AC)'s powers and responsibilities have been more fully defined.

⁵ Secret.

As called for by the Camp David Accords, the SGA(AC) would be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years would begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn, to be replaced by the SGA(AC) as specified in the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces would then take place and there would be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

The parties are agreed that there must be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order. Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities which has now been virtually completed. A system for apportioning representation will be determined in the course of the negotiations once the issue of participation by Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem is resolved.

The election would be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians—individual and institutional—as agreed upon by the negotiators. There will be free access for international media and for such experts as may be agreed upon by the parties.

2. Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

The parties thus far in the negotiating process have agreed upon at least the following areas and functions with respect to which the SGA (AC) would exercise responsibility:

- Administration of Justice
- Agriculture
- Budget
- Civil Service
- Commerce
- Culture
- Ecology
- Education
- Finance
- Health
- Housing and Construction
- Industry
- Internal Communication and Posts
- Internal Transportation
- Labor
- Local Police and Prisons
- Manpower
- Municipal Affairs
- Nature Preserves and Parks
- Public Works

Religious Affairs
Refugee Rehabilitation
Social Welfare
Taxation
Tourism

Other areas and functions in which the SGA (AC) would exercise responsibility are under discussion and negotiation.

The parties anticipate that the SGA (AC) would have the powers necessary and appropriate to the exercise of its responsibilities with respect to the defined areas and functions. These would include the power to formulate policies; to supervise implementation of the laws and regulations relating to them; to decide upon the budget and determine the means of financing it; to employ staff; to sue and be sued; and to enter into contracts.

Considerable attention has been devoted to defining the nature of the legislative power appropriate for the SGA (AC) to fulfill its responsibilities. While some differences remain on this issue, the parties have made significant progress and both agree that the SGA (AC) must be empowered to promulgate such measures as are necessary to the proper fulfillment of its responsibilities. The exercise of power would have to be limited to the defined responsibilities, could not impinge on issues reserved for resolution in the final status negotiations, and must be consistent with the transitional nature of the arrangement and all security provisions and mechanisms called for by the Framework.

In reaching agreement on the above powers and responsibilities, it has been understood that coordination between the SGA (AC) and Israel will be necessary in some specifically defined areas and the parties have agreed that mechanisms to achieve this end will be worked out in the course of the negotiations.

In connection with the issue of land, we can anticipate that lawful private ownership of land in the territories will be protected during the transitional period, based on the principle of equal protection under the law. As to public lands, determination of their ultimate status and uses will be addressed in the final status negotiations. While extensive negotiations will still be required, proposals have recently been made by the parties which may offer a basis for resolving the problem of public land and Israeli settlements during the transitional period.

As to water, final arrangements will be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. For the transitional period, Israel has proposed that new developments and uses of water should be worked out jointly between the SGA (AC) and Israel. For its part, Egypt has believed that the SGA (AC) must control its own water resources but has recognized that development of water resources which underlie both Israel and the territories will require substantial coordination between the two. Both parties appear to favor the establishment of a regional

body representing the various peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources for the benefit of all those peoples.

In connection with security, it is agreed that the inhabitants of both the territories and Israel require assured internal security and public order during the transitional period. Accordingly, it is recognized that the strong local police force, to be constituted by the SGA (AC), must help provide such security. Specific arrangements for liaison between the local police and Israeli security authorities on such security issues, as called for in the Camp David Framework, will be worked out in the course of the negotiations and will be implemented in such a way as to ensure that security is preserved.

To assure external security, and in the absence of Jordanian participation as envisioned in the Camp David Framework, the responsibilities for external security set forth in the Framework must be borne by Israel. The precise arrangements remain to be specified and further discussion will be required on how to enable Israel to fulfill fully its responsibilities while minimizing the impact on the inhabitants.

The parties plan the establishment of a Continuing Committee with Egypt, Israel and the SGA (AC) as members (Jordan has, of course, the option of joining under the provisions of the Framework), and with the United States also invited to participate. The Committee would decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced in 1967, together with measures necessary to prevent disruption and disorder. The Committee would also deal with other matters of common concern, such as economic cooperation. The Committee would operate on the basis of unanimity unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

As you know so well, troublesome problems still remain to be resolved and difficult negotiations still lie ahead. It is significant, however, that on December 18, 1980, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin together issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to the Camp David peace process as “the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East today.”

With the determined efforts of both parties and with continued active participation on the part of the United States, I firmly believe that the negotiations can be successfully concluded.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz⁶

*Personal Representative of the President
for the Middle East Peace Negotiations*

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment**Report Prepared by the President's Special Representative
for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)⁷**

undated

*PROGRESS IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NORMALIZATION
ARRANGEMENTS*

Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the exchange of instruments of ratification on April 25, 1979, Israel has completed on schedule its withdrawal from the Sinai to the interim line specified in the Treaty, including turning over to Egypt the Sinai oil fields. Similarly, Egypt has scrupulously adhered to its commitments under the Treaty.

After the parties established normal and friendly relations on January 25, 1980, they exchanged resident Ambassadors one month later and then began negotiations on the normalization measures called for in the Treaty. In March 1980, they signed three major agreements for cultural relations, civil aviation, and trade and commerce. In addition, the Israelis and Egyptians concluded five memoranda of understanding covering communications and postal services, tourism, agriculture, land and sea transport, and arrangements for the travel of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt.

Flights between Israel and Egypt began immediately and are now being expanded to six times a week. Telephone and postal links have been established between the countries, and the newspapers and periodicals of one appear in the streets of the other.

Tourists are free to travel from one country to the other and the number of official delegations exchanging visits has been increasing. Teams have been exchanged by the respective Ministries of Agriculture, and they are coordinating their activities to prevent the spread of animal diseases such as Rift Valley fever.

Israeli agricultural products including eggs, poultry, seeds and agricultural machinery are beginning to appear in Egyptian markets and an agreement has been reached to exchange agricultural and industrial exhibits to promote trade. President Sadat has recently agreed to the overland transit of goods through El-Arish to supplement the previously agreed access by vessels of each country to the ports of the other.

⁷ No classification marking.

Following President Navon's state visit to Cairo in October, 1980, Egypt and Israel decided to establish a "peace task force" drawn primarily from the private sector to improve mutual understanding. The two countries are now considering proposals to open consulates and cultural centers to support their diplomatic missions.

Both Egypt and Israel have continued to monitor the progress of the normalization of relations, and when problems have developed they have quickly resolved the problems through normal diplomatic channels.

This record of achievement and progress stands out as a dramatic example to all the countries and peoples of the Middle East of the benefits of genuine peace.

Respectfully submitted,

Sol M. Linowitz⁸

*Personal Representative of the President
for the Middle East Peace Negotiations*

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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