

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1977–1980**

**VOLUME XVII**

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**Part 2**

**SUB-SAHARAN  
AFRICA**



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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

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## Volume XVII

### Part 2

# Sub-Saharan Africa

<i>Editor</i>	Louise P. Woodroffe
<i>General Editor</i>	Adam M. Howard

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-

ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional

documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2014 and was completed in 2018, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 4 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 23 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward Africa.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*Acting Historian*

Bureau of Public Affairs  
October 2018

# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This section on Sub-Saharan Africa is one of three parts of Volume XVII on Africa. The other two parts address the administration's policy toward the Horn of Africa and toward North Africa. This compilation on Sub-Saharan Africa traces the administration's handling of events in East, Central, and West Africa. For readers interested in U.S. policy toward southern Africa, the transition toward majority rule, the South African occupation of Namibia, and the role of Cuba in Angola, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Southern Africa, Volume XVI*.

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2*

The focus of this volume is on the Carter administration's approach to events in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. First, the volume addresses the debates within the administration on how to approach the continent as a whole. Memoranda and interagency studies demonstrate that the administration aimed to rethink the U.S. approach toward Africa, but acknowledged its predecessor's fear of Cuban and Soviet influence in the continent. The volume also includes sections on regions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter on West Africa provides documents that concentrate on the role of Nigeria as a powerful player in African economies and politics, the U.S. response to a Liberian coup that overthrew a long-time U.S. ally, and U.S. relations with the smaller countries in West Africa. The chapter on Central Africa largely focuses on U.S. relations with Zaire, in particular the handling of the two Shaba crises and the recovery of the Zairian economy, as well as on aid and investment in Sudan and parts of the Sahel. Finally, the chapter on East Africa traces the U.S. response to the threatening behavior of Idi Amin in Uganda and the subsequent Tanzanian invasion to overthrow him. At the same time, the United States strengthened its relations with Tanzania and Kenya, in order to further U.S. goals in southern Africa.

The Carter administration's most important goal in its Africa policy was the transition to majority rule in southern Africa. Further documentation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa*. Documentation on the Horn of Africa, including the Eritrean insurgency and the issue of Cuban forces in Angola, is printed



in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 1 Documentation on the nations of North Africa and the conflict in the Western Sahara is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3.

*Acknowledgements*

The editor wishes, in particular, to acknowledge the assistance of archivists at the Jimmy Carter Library: Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, and James Yancey. The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Myra Burton, Chief of the Africa and Americas division, and Adam Howard, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Stephen P. Randolph reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth, Thomas Faith, and Heather McDaniel completed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

**Louise P. Woodroffe, Ph.D.**  
*Historian*

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# Sources

## *Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa*

The files at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in the Carter administration's policy toward Africa. In particular, the NSC Institutional Files (also known as the H-Files) provide the minutes and summaries of key meetings among the principals as they debated U.S. policy toward Africa. The editor also had access to the Carter Intelligence Files at the National Security Council and files at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

*Central Foreign Policy Files.* These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

*Lot Files.* These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Bureau of African Affairs Desk Files: Lot 80D85

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 1977–1980 Lot File: Lot 84D241

### National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

RG 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy Files

Entry 9 (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Director), Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981

Entry P-10, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981

### Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Donated Material

Donated Material, Mondale Papers

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Country File

## XII Sources

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- General Odom File
- President's Correspondence With Foreign Leaders File
- Staff Evening Reports
- Subject File
- Trip File
- VIP Visit File
- Staff Material
  - Defense/Security (Ermarth)
  - North/South
  - Office
- National Security Council
  - NSC Institutional Files
- Plains File
  - Subject File
- Presidential Materials
  - President's Daily Diary

### **Central Intelligence Agency**

History Staff Files

### **Library of Congress, Manuscript Division**

Papers of Harold Brown

### **National Security Council**

Carter Administration Intelligence Files

### **Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**

RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense

- OSD Files: FRC 330-80-0017
  - Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1977
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  - Top Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1977
- OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0202
  - Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978
- OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0212
  - Top Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978
- OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0205
  - Secret Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1979 and 1980

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*Congress and the Nation, 1977-1980*. Vol. V. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1981.

Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982.

National Archives and Records Administration.

*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980–81*  
United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: Office of Public Information, 1972–1980.

U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*

Vance, Cyrus. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.



# Abbreviations and Terms

**ACDA**, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**AF**, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State  
**AGIP**, General Italian Oil Company (*Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli*)  
**AID**, U.S. Agency for International Development  
**AN-22**, Soviet military transport designed by the Antonov Design Bureau  
**AP**, Associated Press

**BHN**, basic human needs  
**BP**, British Petroleum

**C-130**, military cargo plane  
**CAE**, Central African Empire  
**CAT**, Conventional Arms Transfer  
**CEAO**, Economic Community of West Africa (*Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*)  
**CH-47C**, Chinook helicopter  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIEC**, Conference on International Economic Cooperation  
**CILSS**, Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (*Comité permanent Inter-États de Lutttes contre la Sécheresse au Sahel*).  
**COMIDEASTFOR**, Commander, Middle East Forces

**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence  
**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission  
**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DOE**, Department of Energy

**ECOWAS**, Economic Community of West African States  
**EEC**, European Economic Community  
**EG**, Equatorial Guinea  
**ELF**, France Gasoline and Lubricants (*Essence et Lubrifiants de France*)  
**ELINT**, electronic intelligence  
**EPA**, Environmental Protection Agency  
**ERA**, Economic Regulatory Administration  
**ESF**, Emergency Support Function  
**EST**, eastern standard time  
**EUCOM**, U.S. European Command  
**EXIM**, Export-Import Bank of the United States

**F5-E**, U.S. supersonic jet fighter designed by the Northrop Corporation  
**FAPLA**, Peoples Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (*Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola*)  
**FAZ**, Zairian armed forces (*Forces Armées Zairoïses*)  
**FERC**, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
**FGN**, Federal Government of Nigeria  
**FMG**, Federal Military Government of Nigeria



**FMS**, Foreign Military Sales  
**FNLC**, National Front for the Liberation of the Congo  
**FonMin**, Foreign Minister  
**FPC**, Federal Power Commission  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

**G-77**, Group of 77, a United Nations intergovernmental group of developing countries  
**GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
**GDR**, German Democratic Republic (East Germany)  
**GNP**, gross national product  
**GOCAE**, Government of the Central African Empire  
**GOCV**, Government of Cape Verde  
**GOF**, Government of France  
**GOG**, Government of Guinea  
**GOK**, Government of Kenya  
**GOL**, Government of Liberia  
**GOU**, Government of Uganda  
**GSP**, Generalized System of Preferences

**HEW**, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, predecessor to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  
**HIRC**, House International Relations Committee

**IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency  
**IAF**, Inter-African Forces  
**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
**ICA**, International Cooperation Administration, predecessor to the U.S. Agency for International Development  
**IDCA**, International Development Corporation Agency  
**IFI**, international financial institutions  
**IG**, Inspector General  
**ILHR**, International League for Human Rights, United Nations  
**ILO**, International Labour Organization  
**IMET**, International Military and Education Training  
**IMF**, International Monetary Fund

**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**JFK**, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy

**LAMCO**, Liberian-American-Swedish Mining Company  
**LANDSAT**, program to acquire satellite imagery of Earth, administered through the U.S. Geological Survey  
**LDC**, less developed country  
**LNG**, liquefied natural gas  
**LPH**, landing platform helicopter  
**LTG**, Lieutenant General

**MAC**, Military Air Command  
**MGen**, Major General  
**MIG-21**, Soviet supersonic jet fighter designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau  
**MOD**, Ministry of Defense  
**MPLA**, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Merimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*)  
**MPR**, Popular Revolutionary Movement (*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*) (Zaire)

**MT**, metric ton

**MTT**, mobile training teams

**NAACP**, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

**NAM**, Non-Aligned Movement

**NAS**, National Academy of Sciences

**NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NCC**, French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (*Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de L'homme*)

**NCO**, Non-commissioned Officer

**NFAC**, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency

**NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate

**NIH**, National Institutes of Health

**NNPC**, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

**NOAA**, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

**NPT**, Non-proliferation Treaty

**NSC**, National Security Council

**NSF**, National Science Foundation

**NUC**, National Universities Commission (Nigeria)

**OAU**, Organization of African Unity

**OGEDP**, National Debt Management Office (Zaire)

**OJCS**, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget

**OPEC**, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

**OPIC**, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**PL**, public law

**PLO**, Palestine Liberation Organization

**POL**, petroleum oil lubricants

**POW**, prisoner of war

**PPP**, Progressive People's Party (Liberia)

**PRA**, People's Republic of Angola

**PRC**, People's Redemption Council (Liberia)

**PriMin**, Prime Minister

**PRM**, Presidential Review Memorandum

**rpt**, repeat

**reftel**, reference telegram

**S&T**, science and technology

**SA-3**, Soviet surface-to-air missile system

**SALT**, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

**SAM**, surface-to-air missiles

**SAWG**, Special Activities Working Group

**SCC**, Special Coordinating Committee

**SDR**, Special Drawing Right, an international reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund

**septel**, separate telegram

**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**STR**, Special Trade Representative

**SWAPO**, South West African People's Organization

## XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

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**T-34**, World War II-era military tank

**TU-95**, Soviet strategic bomber and missile platform

**TOW**, tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided anti-tank missiles

**TPDF**, Tanzania People's Defense Force

**TWA**, Trans World Airlines

**UN**, United Nations

**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly

**UNICEF**, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

**UNITA**, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)

**UNLF**, Uganda National Liberation Front

**UNO**, Ugandan Nationalist Organization

**UNSC**, United Nations Security Council

**UPA**, Ugandan People's Congress

**UPC**, Ugandan People's Congress (*Union pour le Progrès National*)

**UPG**, Ugandan People's Government

**UPI**, United Press International

**UPM**, Ugandan People's Movement

**UPRONA**, Union for National Progress

**USAF**, U.S. Air Force

**USAID**, U.S. Agency for International Development

**USCINCEUR**, Commander in Chief, Europe

**USCINNAVEUR**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe

**USDOC**, U.S. Department of Commerce

**USEUCOM**, U.S. European Command

**USG**, U.S. Government

**USICA**, U.S. International Cooperation Administration

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**VOA**, Voice of America

**VP**, Vice President

**ZANU**, Zimbabwe African National Union

**ZAPU**, Zimbabwe African People's Union

# Persons

**Aaron, David**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**Acheampong, Ignatius Kutu**, President of Ghana until July 5, 1978

**Amin, Idi Dada**, President of Uganda until April 13, 1979

**Bagaza, Jean-Baptiste**, President of Burundi

**Bartholomew, Reginald**, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from July 1, 1979

**Binaisa, Godfrey**, President of Uganda from June 20, 1979, until May 12, 1980

**Bokassa, Jean-Bedel**, President of Central African Republic until September 20, 1979

**Bongo, Omar**, President of Gabon

**Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 23, 1977

**Butcher, Goler T.**, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development

**Byrne, Patricia M.**, U.S. Ambassador to Mali until October 30, 1979

**Carlucci, Frank Charles, III**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 4, 1981

**Carter, James Earl (Jimmy)**, President of the United States from January 20, 1977

**Castro, Fidel**, President of the Council of State and Prime Minister of Cuba

**Christopher, Warren Minor**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1977

**Clift, A. Denis**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

**Cutler, Walter L.**, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) until May 9, 1979

**Deng, Francis M.**, Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

**Dennis, Charles Cecil**, Liberian Minister of Foreign Affairs

**Dennis, Francis**, Liberian Ambassador to the United States until 1979

**Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

**Dodson, Christine**, Deputy Staff Secretary of the National Security Council from January 1977 until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary

**Duncan, Charles W., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977 until July 29, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979

**Easum, Donald B.**, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria until October 15, 1979

**Eilts, Hermann F.**, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt until May 20, 1979

**Eteki Mboumoua, William**, Secretary General of the Organization for African Unity until July 21, 1978

**Eyadema, Gnassingbe**, Colonel President of Togo

**Funk, Gerald**, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan Africa Affairs from December 1978

**Garba, Joseph Nanven**, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs until 1978

**Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry**, President of France

**Habyarimana, Juvenal**, President of Rwanda

**Halsted, David C.**, Chargé d’Affairs ad interim in Kampala in 1979

**Harrop, William C.**, U.S. Ambassador to Guinea until July 15, 1977; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 1977 until May 1980; U.S. Ambassador to Kenya from July 10, 1980

**Heck, L. Douglas**, Director, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of State, until June 6, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Nepal from May 26, 1977

**Henze, Paul**, member, Intelligence Cluster; National Security Council Staff from January 1977 until December 1980

**Hill, Jr., John G.**, Major General, USA; Director of the Joint State-Defense Survey Team dispatched to Kenya in 1977

**Hormats, Robert**, member, National Security Council Staff (International Economics Affairs) from January 1977 until November 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1977

**Houphouet-Boigny, Félix**, President of Côte d’Ivoire

**Huyser, Robert E.**, General, USAF; Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command until 1979

**Jones, David C.**, General, USAF; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 21, 1978

**Keeley, Robert V.**, U.S. Ambassador to Mauritius until September 17, 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1978

**Kountché, Seyni**, President of Niger and President of the Supreme Military Council

**Lake, W. Anthony**, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from January 21, 1977

**Le Melle, Wilbert John**, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya from August 10, 1977, until June 28, 1980

**Lule, Yusuf**, President of Uganda from April 14, 1979, until June 20, 1979

**Magid Hamid Khalil, Abdul**, Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff of the Sudan People’s Armed Forces

**Mark, David Everett**, U.S. Ambassador to Burundi until August 26, 1977

**Martin, Louis**, Special Assistant to the President

**Matthews, Gabriel Bacchus**, Liberian Foreign Minister from 1980

**Mbumba, Nathaniel**, Leader of the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FNLC)

**McGiffert, David E.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs from April 4, 1977

**McHenry, Donald F.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from September 23, 1979

**McNamara, Robert S.**, President of the World Bank

**Mengistu, Haile Mariam**, President of Ethiopia

**Mobutu, Sese Seko**, President of Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

**Mondale, Walter F.**, Vice President of the United States

**Moose, Richard M.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from March 18, 1977, until August 15, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 6, 1977

**Murray, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1978; Under Secretary of the Navy from February 7, 1980

**Muwanga, Paulo**, Chairman of the Military Commission of Uganda from May 12, 1980, until December 10, 1980

**Neto, Antonio Agostinho**, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation on Angola (MPLA); President of Angola until September 10, 1979

**Newsom, David D.**, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until October 6, 1977; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978

**Nguza, Karl-i-Bond**, Foreign Minister of Zaire from 1976 until 1977 and again from 1979 until 1980

**Nimeiry, Gaafar**, President of Sudan

**Nujoma, Samuel D.**, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

**Nyerere, Julius**, President of Tanzania

**Nzambimana, Édouard**, Prime Minister of Burundi until October 13, 1978

**Obasanjo, Olusegun**, General of the Military Government of Nigeria until October 1, 1979

**Obenga, Théophile**, Congolese Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1979

**Obote, Milton**, President of Uganda from December 17, 1980

**Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1977

**Pereira, Aristides**, President of Cape Verde

**Post, Richard**, Director of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until 1978

**Press, Frank**, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, until June 1, 1977; thereafter, Special Advisor to the President for Science and Technology and Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

**Qaddafi, Muammar**, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya until March 1, 1979

**Quainton, Anthony C.E.**, U.S. Ambassador to Central African Empire until June 9, 1978

**Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur**, Prime Minister of Mauritius; Chairman of the Organization of African Unity until July 2, 1977

**Richardson, Henry**, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan Africa Affairs, from February 1977 until November 1978

**Saunders, Harold H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research until April 10, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 11, 1978

**Savimbi, Joseph**, leader of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

**Schaufele, William E., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until July 17, 1977

**Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Seelye, Talcott W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1976 until 1978

**Shulman, Marshall D.**, Soviet specialist; Special Advisor to the Secretary of State

**Siad Barre, Mohammed**, President of Somalia

**Smith, Robert Powell**, U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 1979

**Spain, James W.**, U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania until August 21, 1979

**Tarnoff, Peter**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from April 4, 1977

**Thornton, Thomas**, member, National Security Council Staff for South Asia and United Nations Matters from 1977

**Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia until May 4, 1980

**Tolbert, William R., Jr.**, President of Liberia until April 12, 1980

**Toure, Ahmed Sekou**, President of Guinea

**Tuchman, Jessica**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1977

**Turner, Stansfield**, Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977

**Umba di Lutete, Jean**, Foreign Minister of Zaire from 1977 until 1979

**Vance, Cyrus**, Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 20, 1980

**Vorster, B.J.**, Prime Minister of South Africa until September 28, 1978

**Waldheim, Kurt**, Secretary-General of the United Nations

**Walker, Lannon**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1977

**Warner, Bennie D.**, Vice President of Liberia from 1977

**Young, Andrew**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from January 30, 1977, until August 15, 1979

# Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

## *Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency*

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

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<sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.



covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.<sup>3</sup> In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

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<sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

<sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

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<sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

<sup>6</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate*, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.<sup>9</sup>

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

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<sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.<sup>10</sup>

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.<sup>12</sup>

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,<sup>13</sup> which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40

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<sup>10</sup> For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

<sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

<sup>12</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

<sup>13</sup> For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.

reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive" covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.<sup>14</sup>

*Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group*

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.<sup>15</sup>

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in polit-

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<sup>14</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

<sup>15</sup> Public Law 93-559.

ical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.<sup>16</sup>

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.<sup>17</sup> Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG - namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."<sup>18</sup> In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.

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<sup>16</sup> Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

<sup>17</sup> The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

<sup>18</sup> Executive Order 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing "world-wide" finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification”(MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined<sup>19</sup> in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

<sup>20</sup> PL 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96–450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1–2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280–81.



# Sub-Saharan Africa

## Africa Region

### 1. Editorial Note

The Intelligence Community (IC) produced National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-76 on Soviet Military Policy in the Third World, dated October 21, 1976. See Document 55 in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976. In the estimate, the IC noted that the amount of Soviet aid to Africa in absolute terms was small, but due to the size and equipment of the military forces of Sub-Saharan Africa, even limited amounts of Soviet military aid could have a large impact. Drawing on this assessment, on February 18, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review," which directed an examination of U.S. national strategy and capabilities. The resulting study included an Executive Summary Report on Africa, which argued for ways in which to keep the Soviets off-balance in the continent. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, volume IV, National Security Policy, for documentation on the results of PRM 10.

**2. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 18, 1977, 2032Z

37810. Tosec 20118. Subject: Text of Ambassador Young's Report on His Mission to Africa, Dated February 13, 1977. Ref: Secto 2039.<sup>2</sup> Following is the text of Ambassador Young's report to the President concerning his visit to Africa:<sup>3</sup>

Qte To: President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Mr. Brzezinski.

From: Ambassador Young.

Subject: Recommendations for Discussion Resulting From African Tour.

1. Divisions among the Front Line Presidents, liberation movements require early meeting with British and U.S. observers to develop consensus on process and details of transition period.<sup>4</sup>

—specific composition of Patriotic Front

—timetable for elections

—nature and purpose of Zimbabwe development fund

—plan for civil order during transition

—constitutional safeguards for minority protection

Such a meeting should occur shortly after U.S.–U.K. meeting and Callaghan visit.

2. U.S.–U.K. meeting with Rhodesia and South African representatives.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1488. Confidential; Nodis; Cherokee—For the Secretary only. Drafted by Bunge; cleared in IO and S/S; approved by Christopher. Vance was traveling in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan to review the Middle East peace process.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 2039 from the Secretary's aircraft, February 18, Vance requested the text of Young's report on his Africa visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770058–0489)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 19603 to Dar es Salaam, Lagos, London, and USUN, January 28, the Department reported that Young would "represent the United States at celebrations in Tanzania and Nigeria during the next 10 days." He also "plans to meet with the leaders of Tanzania and Nigeria and other African leaders at the celebrations to discuss African problems and U.S.-African cooperation at the United Nations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770030–0862)

<sup>4</sup> The Presidents of the Front-Line States, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola, worked together to end apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. Documentation on the U.S. response to the aspirations of the liberation movements in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia is in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa.

—to restrain Smith from expanding pre-emptive strikes into Zambia, Botswana, thereby avoiding an escalation which might bring in Cuban-Nigerian or South African participants.

—to define specific guarantees for white settlers.

—to interpret British proposal for majority rule and clarify the African understanding of transition details.

Prior to such a meeting, there should be a U.S.-RSA meeting to develop an understanding of roles and relationships regarding Namibia and S.A. internal situation (possible assistance but no compromise on internationally acceptable majority rule).

Schaufele and I might meet with Botha and Connie Mulder in Washington. Meeting should be lengthy working session. Mulder as a hard liner and Vorster's number two man will be in a better position to give concessions than "moderate" Botha.

Meeting should be held as soon as possible, and should be publicly acknowledged as a continuation of "listening process" of the administration.

Namibia and the U.N. mandate for independence should be a major item on agenda with efforts made to convene a Geneva or New York conference including SWAPO and RSA under U.N. auspices.

3. Critical situation in Horn of Africa requires strengthening U.S. ties with Somalia. Somalia is strongly expansionist in its concept of restoring Somali Kingdom. In their thinking this includes not only FTAI, which they call French Somalia, but also sections of Ethiopia and Kenya as well.

President Siad Barre claims to want an improvement in U.S.-Somali relations. He complained of food shortages which claimed 22,000 deaths by starvation. He can't eat Russian weapons and needs other kinds of development assistance.

A strong, preferably black, U.S. Ambassador would be an excellent counter to the Soviet influence (Bryant George of Ford Foundation is a strong, savvy guy who could handle a development program and would relate well to Siad Barre).

4. Kenya is one country that relates to Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia very well and is economically strong enough to influence trade and market development in the area. They need military assistance in view of the uncertainties to their north. (I opposed arm sales to Kenya while in Congress because I saw their influence being damaged by possible instability following Kenyatta's death. Kenyatta remains strong, and the Kenyan civil servants and top political leadership seem strong enough to carry on without him, though they may have a rather turbulent transition.)

5. Nigeria's inclusion in the Southern African equation is the only way that some discipline can be brought to bear on the liberation

movements. Nigeria provides the “cash” for much of the armed struggle (Soviets supply guns) and also has extended loans to Mozambique and Angola.

Nyerere and Kaunda are philosopher-statesmen. Garba and Head of State Obasanjo (engineer; former Public Works Commissioner) are military men who have a sense of discipline, and they have the clout to bring Nkomo, Mugabe and Nujoma in line. Nigeria is increasingly disturbed about the liberation leaders traveling around the world “playing president” and neglecting their people’s needs.

Nigeria is interested in the leadership being assumed by Africans not Cubans, Soviets or Chinese. They want closer U.S. ties and a joint economic commission similar to those we have with Egypt, Israel and Iran.<sup>5</sup>

6. The British still have a colonial attitude toward Africa which produces constant clashes with African leaders. They resent Nyerere’s intellect and independence; they fear Nigeria’s power and arrogance and they are intimidated by the crude, blunt manner of the liberation leaders.

At the same time, they are liberals who can’t cope with the unprincipled racism of Smith or the political maneuvering of Vorster (a Daley-type politician).

The Labor government is extremely anxious about the outcome of the Rhodesian situation and their economic relations with South Africa. There is a feeling that Kissinger led them into this, promising U.S. support which has not materialized.

In spite of these difficulties the British must be kept in the driver’s seat on Rhodesia, but they need a lot of help. Ivor Richard seems their most able negotiator but Anthony Duff should be brought in to assist. An American team should also be designated to work closely with them.

Obvious U.S. leadership might serve to make the Russians nervous and encourage them toward a disruptive role. Africans also do not want the U.S. to get credit for solving African problems. They do want our support, especially in relation to South Africa.

End quote.

**Hartman**

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<sup>5</sup> For Young’s meeting with Obasanjo, see Document 20.

**3. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Africa in the Soviet-American Balance

*I. Africa in Context*

1. Africa is the latest, the last, and will be, perhaps, the worst area of instability and conflict resulting from the end of the European colonial empires, a process which began immediately after World War II and which has seen the withdrawal of the British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and Portuguese from the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece and Cyprus), the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia.

2. These withdrawals involved conflicts between the colonial power and indigenous nationalist groups, between contending indigenous groups, and between outside powers and forces attempting to fill the vacuum. Although British, French, and Belgian colonial rule in Africa substantially came to an end in the 1960s, the full consequences of that termination are only now being felt, in part, because of the comparatively low level of economic and political development of Africa at the time of independence and in part because of the continued active role of the European powers, particularly France, in many parts of the Continent.

3. The end of the European presence creates vacuums which can be filled in one or more of three ways:

(a) by indigenous nationalist forces (as in India under Nehru or Egypt under Nasser);

(b) by U.S. influence (Greece in 1947, Iran in 1954);

(c) by Soviet influence or communist forces (Indochina; Indonesia in the 1960s).

*II. The Bases of Soviet Influence*

1. Compared to the other ex-colonial regions, Africa presents many more opportunities for Soviet influence because:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 118, Zaire: 3/77-12/78. Secret.

a. Traditional, pre-colonial political and social systems were at comparatively low levels of development and do not provide a heritage and experience which can be effectively drawn in the post-colonial era.

b. The European colonial impact on Africa was, in most cases, relatively short and consequently did not leave a residue of political institutions which could (as in India) provide an initial framework for post-colonial political stability.

c. At the time of independence, most African countries were at very low levels of economic, social, and educational development.

d. As a result of these factors, indigenous political groups have been comparatively weak in leadership organization, cohesion, and effectiveness.

e. The presence of white settler regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa creates a natural target for the Soviets and inhibitions for U.S. policy.

f. Unlike the situation in other ex-colonial regions, the intense era of post-colonial conflict and instability in Africa comes at a time of Soviet-American strategic parity and after the development by the Soviets of their capabilities to project overseas either their own or satellite (Cuban) military forces.

g. This era of conflict and instability in Africa also comes at a time, post-Watergate and post-Vietnam, when the confidence of the U.S. public in governmental leadership and institutions, although rising, is still low and when leaders of public opinion remain gun-shy about anything resembling another Vietnam.

2. As a result of these and other factors, the Soviets have been able to establish positions of influence in a number of countries scattered about Africa, most notably Guinea, Libya, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, Angola. The indications of their desire to extend their influence more broadly are clear.

3. The influence of other outside powers in Africa, including the residual influence of the colonial powers (Britain and France) and the more recent influence of the Chinese, is declining.

4. The United States has not had major interests in Africa and has, at present, few and rather questionable sources of support there: e.g., Kenya, Morocco, Liberia, Zaire, and not much else.

### *III. Consequences of Soviet Influence*

1. All these considerations mean that Africa is probably the worst region in the world for a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union or Soviet-backed forces.

2. In the absence of major changes in African political development or major U.S. economic, political, and military commitments to Africa,

Soviet influence in Africa is thus likely to grow significantly during the next decade.

3. This growth of Soviet influence may well result in a draining away of Soviet resources with little permanent gain, with African governments which have been dependent on the Soviets eventually detaching themselves from the Soviet embrace in the manner of Egypt or Indonesia. On the other hand, some African governments may become (because of their economic, military, and political weakness) so dependent on Soviet support that they are (on the Cuban model) unable or unwilling to break that tie.

4. The growth of Soviet influence in Africa will be perceived in Africa and in other countries as a victory for the Soviets and as a setback for the United States. Depending upon the extent and nature of the growth of that influence, it could produce a backlash in the U.S., particularly among black groups, over the "loss" of Africa (analogous to the 1949–1954 backlash about the "loss" of China).

#### *IV. Possibilities for U.S. Policy*

Given all these factors, the U.S. should not become deeply involved in a major effort to stop head-on the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa. Instead, the U.S. should pursue a damage-limiting strategy designed:

(1) to minimize the opportunities for Soviet influence in the Continent by mediating—in so far as this is possible—peaceful solutions to problems;

(2) to attempt to increase the risks to the Soviets by warning of the seriousness with which we would view any additional direct Soviet military involvement on the Continent and by linking Soviet expansion there to other issues;

(3) to minimize the consequences of Soviet expansion by avoiding identification with probable losers in intra-African confrontations. If any situation should arise where U.S. commitments require U.S. support for one party in an intra-African military conflict, our support should be overwhelming, dramatic, decisive, and brief—leaving no doubt from the start that the U.S. has committed its full power and "face" to the side of its ally. We should not go into an African military conflict incrementally as we did in Vietnam—and we should recognize that bureaucratic and political reasons make it very difficult to cut-off the process of American involvement once it begins. That process of slow involvement usually produces too-little too-late to help our ally and yet also results, at some point, a major commitment of American prestige.

(4) to limit Soviet expansion by attempting to develop and maintain a few key positions of strength in Africa. For the next few years, South

Africa will be one such bastion, but it clearly will not remain that unless it can make progress toward a peaceful resolution of its racial problem. The second most powerful country in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria. Nigeria has the people (in numbers and education), oil, a tradition of reasonably effective political authority, and a lingering British residue, which could make it the Brazil of Africa in the coming decade. The factors that favor the Soviets in Africa are generally weaker in Nigeria than elsewhere in the continent. It should become a principal target of U.S. effort to develop support in Africa.

(5) to counterbalance Soviet involvement in Africa by strengthening our position in other regions surrounding Africa and thereby, in a broad geo-political sense, contain Soviet influence there. U.S. relations with Brazil, for instance, should not be allowed to deteriorate. The U.S. position in the Middle East should be further developed, which would clearly limit what the Soviets could do in Africa. And with Soviet attention on Africa, the U.S. should attempt to improve significantly its relations with India.

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#### 4. Editorial Note

On July 1, 1977, Secretary of State Vance gave a speech before the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in St. Louis, Missouri, in which he defined the Carter administration's Africa policy. On Cold War competition, he emphasized that "a negative reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile." He advocated encouraging African nationalism, using developmental aid to build a "prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace with itself," and ensuring that U.S. Africa policy reflected national values and a respect for human rights. In more specific terms, Vance explained that "this Administration has decided to pursue actively solutions to all three southern African problems—Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situation within South Africa itself." The full text of the speech is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1977, pages 165–170. It is also printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 50.



5. **Memorandum From Henry Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 30, 1977

SUBJECT

USAID Policy and General US African Policy

I recently had lunch with Goler Butcher to talk about a closer coordination of AID policy in Africa with general US policy objectives. We left it that I would get back to her with a memo.<sup>2</sup>

Let me sketch a few thoughts. To the extent that the President has rightly put substantial restraints on using American military forces and providing military assistance to African governments, economic, diplomatic, and ideological strategies rise in importance. Our AID program (with other economic strategies) will emerge as a quite important instrument of American foreign policy. This implies that the NSC must at least have a reasonably clear picture of the objectives of AID programs, the response by host countries to those programs, AID projections of future country needs, and the capacity and desirability of the United States to meet them. This does *not* imply, however, that AID should become a naked instrument of US policy manipulation vis-a-vis any African government.

*General Aid Objectives in Africa*

Our general aid objectives would include the following:

1. Maintain increasing aid levels to participate in meeting the needs of African countries most important to us.
2. Maintain an effective AID program in the Sahel.
3. Maintain sufficient aid flexibility vis-a-vis Congress and congressional appropriations to serve the most important policy functions which we call upon the AID program to perform.
4. Maintain sufficient aid flexibility for our North-South objectives—whether bilateral or multilateral—in Africa.
5. In line with our policy of dialog with African states, formulate AID objectives by even closer consultation with host country governments, but be more open and honest with them about defining US

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 105, 8/12-31/77. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

interests, and operate more forthrightly with respect to AID programs on a benefit-sanctions basis if American interests are not being met.

6. Formulate American objectives and American interests with a greater appreciation of African realities and perceptions than heretofore.

These thoughts refer primarily to our bilateral AID policy vis-a-vis each African government, and not as much to our general North-South strategy, in which, of course, Africa plays a large role.

#### *AID and African Policy*

In making such an inquiry, as we explore the utility of AID programs as an instrument of general US African policy, we must be aware of the *limits* of that concept. These would seem to lie at the point where we might ask AID to take action which is *not* consistent with the *development* of the country or countries concerned. *That notion constitutes a limit because development of African countries in se is a quite important interest of the United States.* I may go further and say that we are rapidly moving beyond definitions of development based on purely economic statistical criteria and incorporating into our policy perceptions and definitions of development—especially in Africa—which have value concepts inherent in them.

In Southern Africa, for example, there is a strong strain of thought which says there is no development without victory of the liberation movement. That is, development cannot exist in the context of racism and white minority rule. Similarly, under our human rights policy, we are beginning to say that there can be no development without a minimum level of human rights in the host country, however we may define it. In any case, it seems clear that “development” in each African state has inherent in it certain value premises which AID must increasingly respond to, and which we at NSC should increasingly be aware of.

*We should not, therefore, call upon AID to take any action or formulate any objective contrary to the development of a particular African country.* But, *within* the notion of development, there is room for dialog between the host government and the US Government about the implementation of *some* shared value-premises. This dialog is subject to the overriding truth that the development of each African country must, in the medium-to-long run, be accomplished by Africans.

#### *Next Steps*

Having proposed the above, it would seem that we need to know certain things. *First*, the general policy objectives of AID for Africa. Until Goler gets a little more settled in her job, and finishes budgetary planning for FY '79, these may be difficult to ascertain in any coherent form.

*Second*, AID individual country objectives in Africa. This dovetails to some extent with a recently expressed wish by the President to have individual country objectives submitted by each Ambassador.<sup>3</sup>

*Third*, areas of policy flexibility within AID programs that could be more responsive to more general US policy needs in Africa. Much of this, I understand, is curtailed by the necessities of budgetary planning, congressional appropriations, and the difficulty of reallocating unspent funds. Nevertheless, the effort would seem worth making because of the importance of AID and related economic strategies through our overall African policy.

*Fourth*, areas of AID policy which are *absolutely unavailable*, for the reasons above, to serve immediate US policy needs.

*Fifth*, proposals to upgrade, improve, and make more meaningful the process of consultation and dialog with each African state and groups of African states relative to formulating AID objectives. Greater input might be possible here for overall US African policy objectives. Simultaneously, we might better understand by participating in such dialog the development imperatives of individual countries.

You might already know most or all of this. Or, most or all of it might be already in process. Some of this might better apply to other US assistance programs. To the extent that it does not, I believe there is an opportunity here for us, touching base with other relevant NSC people, to go back to Goler in a memorandum suggesting ways to better coordinate AID policy with our other African policy objectives.

Let me have your thoughts at your early convenience.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

**6. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, March 8, 1978, 0320Z

815. For the President, Vice President, Brzezinski, Vance. Subject: Africa Policy.

1. There are two and possibly only two principles on which Africa is united. These are: A. Principle of territorial integrity, B. Anti-colonialism and majority rule.

2. There are many other principles and attitudes in which there is considerable African interest even majority concern but only on these two is there unanimity.

3. The Russians have managed to be on the right side of these two issues while we have been hesitant or equivocal in the light of other interests.

4. The result is that we get considerable influence as a result of our policies toward development, health, food and agriculture, investment and technical assistance but jeopardize it all because of our equivocation on the essential African issues.

5. In the Nigeria-Biafra situation<sup>2</sup> as in Ethiopia-Somalia<sup>3</sup> we lost considerable influence by not realizing the unanimity on the territorial integrity issue while the Soviets moved quickly to support the federal governments of Nigeria and Ethiopia.

6. In Southern Africa we have been slow to identify with the majority aspirations of former Portuguese colonies and the liberation movements of Southern Africa.

7. On every other issue we have an outstanding and credible record and the Soviets are miserable.

8. So far, the Carter administration has done very well on the colonialism-majority rule issue. We were slow—myself included—in realizing the importance of the territorial integrity issue. It really strains my values to support a repressive regime as the one in Ethiopia, but Africa has seen repressive regimes come and go. Repression and violence threaten only a few states but every African nation has border

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 8, Southern Africa 1978. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972, for documentation on the U.S. response to the Biafran civil war in Nigeria, which lasted from 1967 until 1970.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, for documentation on the U.S. response to the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977–1978.

problems and none can afford to support border changes without threatening themselves.

9. Our insensitivity to African priorities has created a vacuum in which Russian and Cuban forces gain an advantage. I know we deferred to the OAU,<sup>4</sup> and are innocent of any aggressive act in the Horn, but in the absence of military options (and I think the post Vietnam period has seriously limited all military options unless the US herself is directly threatened), it is imperative that we develop a creative, aggressive and sensitive diplomatic approach to all questions.

10. This we have done very well in the Middle East, Panama, SALT and up to now in Southern Africa.

11. I am afraid that our present situation in Rhodesia has the potential for jeopardizing the progress we have made. A wait and see attitude in Rhodesia now is just like our attitude of ten months ago in the Horn. It creates a vacuum which almost certainly will be filled by Soviet-Cuban forces, and once again they will have the solid support of Africa.

12. Alternatively, action on our part has risks, but we would be entertaining those risks with the support of African leadership and could with a concerted effort win South African support as well.

13. Our enemy in Africa is chaos. We can negotiate with and ultimately influence any educated African leadership. Their power depends on their ability to meet the needs of their people once the fighting stops and the Russians have never assisted much in that direction. Western technology, capital, management and markets are the basis of the kind of peaceful competition the President spelled out in his Notre Dame speech.<sup>5</sup>

14. It will take considerable effort to explain the complexities of this situation to our public and the Congress, but it is important that we try. We must make it clear that the situation cannot be resolved in the simplistic terms of Communist and terrorists versus moderates. I hope you won't mind my taking on this challenge.

15. I know it is difficult with such a crowded agenda to focus on Rhodesia, but I hope that we can keep our policy moving forward. A breakthrough in Africa could also be a very positive contribution to

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<sup>4</sup> For the decision to rely on the OAU to negotiate a settlement of the Ethiopian-Somali war, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 58.

<sup>5</sup> A reference to Carter's May 22 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame. For text of the speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 954-962. It is also printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 40.

our overall foreign policy situation. It is not likely to occur soon, but it can move forward this year in both Rhodesia and Namibia.

Young

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**7. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs (Shulman)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1978

SUBJECT

US Response to Soviet Moves in Africa

The problem to which Sadat referred in his talk with Ambassador Eilts is one which has been on all our minds since the Horn started heating up last year.<sup>2</sup> It seems clear now that the long East-West “truce” in Africa came to an end with the disappearance of the Portuguese empire in 1975 and that the Soviet Union, whether prompted by new opportunities or other motives, is ready to pick up again a policy thread which it dropped after its misadventure in the Congo 15 years ago. It seems clear also that the US has not yet found a coherent approach to this problem. So your request is both provocative and timely.<sup>3</sup>

In my view a paper on this subject would examine relevant Soviet policy but would take as given that the USSR will be ready to send arms, advisers, and Cubans to places where these could help it build up its local influence. Local conflict, as in the Horn, provides one kind of Soviet opportunity. Liberation conflicts in Rhodesia and South Africa offer another sort, perhaps even more promising because even more difficult for the West to deal with. There are also regimes which will want Soviet arms and perhaps Soviet/Cuban forces to help keep themselves in power vis-a-vis domestic or foreign enemies or both. It will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Box 3, 4.1–4.15.78. Secret. Drafted by DePorte and Spiegel and cleared by Kreisberg.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8087 from Cairo, March 13, the Embassy reported on Eilts’ March 11 meeting with Sadat on the subject of African problems and his fear of Soviet-instigated problems on the continent. Sadat asserted that “the Soviet surrogate threat through Libya and Ethiopia to Sub-Saharan Africa is very real.” In particular, he was worried that “we will see trouble in the Sudan from both the East and the West.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112–0455)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

be a long time before the conditions disappear from Africa which provide these opportunities to Soviet policy.

In one way or another, therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States will be competing in Africa. There are several possible policy responses to these various kinds of challenges which we should look at systematically. Each has potential benefits and limits.

1) In our current policy, we try to remove the occasions for Soviet intervention. A basic policy, of course, is to promote political stability by means of economic and social progress. Our diplomatic efforts toward majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and our support for a negotiated resolution of the problems of the Horn are also examples of this approach. In southern Africa, we are committed to a process of change without associating ourselves with particular nationalist groups seeking power in the successor regimes.

2) We support OAU and other efforts to remove the causes of territorial conflicts among African states and to limit their scope if they do occur. Although the Soviets may be cool to the argument that African problems should be left to the Africans, this position is consistent with the African nations' own commitment to mediate disputes and prevent major power intervention wherever possible. Real and consistent US support for this principle should have increasing effect with the African nations.

Unfortunately, the OAU track record to date has not been impressive and it is not clear how effective Western efforts to support and strengthen the OAU in mediating African disputes will be. But the effort should be pursued.

3) In determining future policy, we might explore the possibility, despite obvious inhibitions, of seeking closer economic and political ties with countries where Soviet influence is strong, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, rather than maintaining cool relations and waiting for the Soviets to be thrown out because of their own blunders or inadequacies. This could reduce Soviet influence and at the same time indicate United States support for African non-alignment.

4) We could actively seek international agreements, including with the Soviets, on arms restraint in Africa, or in specific sub-regions of the continent, which would limit sudden buildups of military forces by one country or another. Since both Soviet and United States military assistance is concentrated in a few countries, usually rivals in the same region, such restraint agreements would be necessary to avoid escalating military assistance competition. We should urge the African states to adopt regional and perhaps continent-wide agreements on consumer restraint in arms transfers.

The diversity of African countries, their own suspicion of outside efforts to restrain military sales in the area, and the probable Soviet

reluctance to commit themselves in advance to a policy of military non-supply for some prospective “revolutionary” regime suggest serious practical difficulties in following through on such a course. These difficulties are compounded by the Soviet Union’s relative inability to compete with the West in Africa in any area but arms transfers.

5) We could use a variety of diplomatic tools to seek to reduce Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa or increase the political costs of such intervention. We could seek greater African and Latin American disapproval of their intervention. We could link our economic and diplomatic relations with the Soviets and Cubans to their actions in Africa, and seek agreement by other countries to do the same. By making even minor linkages we could demonstrate in a concrete way that Soviet activities in Africa do have an impact on our relations—and perhaps convince the Soviet Union to exercise sufficient restraint that SALT itself will not be jeopardized. We need to express publicly our disapproval of Soviet intervention in Africa, but not build up the stakes in those cases when we are unable militarily or otherwise to counter their activities.

Thus far, Latin American countries have shown little interest in Cuban and Soviet activities in Africa. African concerns have been muted so far by the Soviets’ choice of the “right” causes: southern African liberation and territorial integrity. Cuba has already made clear that its relations with us are lower priority than its activities in Africa. Our own leverage with the Soviet Union is fundamentally related to the importance we and they attach to detente and SALT and the degree to which we are willing to balance these against US and Soviet interests in Africa, and the impact Soviet/Cuban “success” has on the image of the US elsewhere, including within the US itself, and on our ability to pursue otherwise mutually advantageous relations with the Soviet Union. Our leverage on Soviet/Cuban policy in Africa might grow over the years (e.g., if economic relations become more important). In any case, we must always make clear to the Soviets that what they do in Africa cannot but have a significant impact on the atmosphere within which we conduct our overall relations and on our ability to pursue relations in other spheres, including arms control.

6) We could demonstrate support for African countries by providing (or assisting others to provide) arms to countries threatened by build-ups of Soviet military assistance and foreign troops on their borders—e.g., Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Zaire, etc.

There are, of course, risks and difficulties in this. We would have problems in providing arms to certain repressive regimes or to countries which may have stimulated their neighbors’ involvement with the Soviets by their own territorial claims or intervention in their neighbors’ internal affairs. We should look carefully before providing arms to sure



losers, though there may be occasions on which there will be political benefits in appearing to be responsive even in such difficult cases. We should consider the costs of an open-ended competitive buildup of rival countries and of expectations and commitments we may not want to fulfill later. We also should avoid seeming to dispense arms prodigally, at odds with our overall policy of restraint. At the same time relatively small transfers could have a significant effect in some cases, at least to the extent of reassuring governments that look to us for help or signs of US interest. Such transfers would have only a relatively small impact on our overall transfer figures. Larger transfers, which *would* affect these figures more seriously, might, of course, be justified by a given situation.

7) We should be cautious in committing ourselves to causes and countries which are "wrong" in terms of their ability to command broad African support: countries striving to expand their territory, to stir up unrest in other countries, or groups and minorities seeking to divide or break up African countries. We should not allow ourselves to automatically support one side in an African dispute because the Soviets are supporting the other. We have provided economic assistance to liberation movements and the southern African Front Line States, even though they are receiving military support from the Soviet Union. Should the conflict in the region escalate, we may face more difficult decisions on whether to also provide military assistance to vulnerable African states such as Botswana.

There are, however, real limits to our ability to provide support for a country or movement which is also receiving Soviet aid. It would be particularly difficult to support Marxists, or groups determined to resolve problems militarily and hostile to negotiations.

8) We could encourage the formation of, or provide weapons to, local defensive alliances where the governments concerned are interested and the potential longer-term risks seem manageable. We should, however, carefully avoid building up paper *cordons sanitaires* which would tend to draw us into the difficulties of our protégés beyond a point we might wish and would create illusions of solidarity and strength which could not stand up to serious challenge. Such a policy could aggravate the problem of regional military assistance competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It could also serve to harden divisions on a continent where reconciliation among rivals and shifts in regional "alliances" are frequent.

9) We could more actively encourage other countries, including our European allies, which are concerned about Soviet activities in Africa to respond themselves, rather than relying on United States involvement. This might include outside troops (e.g., Moroccans in Zaire, French in Chad) as well as supply of weapons. This might make

it possible for the defense needs of an African state to be met, while minimizing major power confrontation by avoiding United States involvement. It would, however, require the US to provide more arms to such outside assisting states and to agree to their use in third countries.

10) There is the option of direct United States military action—either against Cuba or in an African country. After Vietnam, this is highly unlikely.

11) We could limit involvement in military conflicts and give major emphasis to our long-term advantages in relations with Africa: trade, aid, and investment to solve the basic economic problems that persist after military disputes have been resolved. The USSR has little else than weapons which, important as they are in certain situations, are a questionable basis for long-term influence, as the Soviets have learned more than once. We could use this more to our advantage in our relations with the African states and in seeking Soviet restraint—pointing out to the Africans the lack of Soviet effort in the economic field and our belief that constructive economic assistance is needed far more in Africa than destructive military assistance, challenging the Soviets to cooperate or compete with us more in the economic sphere.

All of these policies may not keep the Soviets in the near-term from intervening in African affairs or allow us to defeat their interventions promptly in every instance. This consideration leads us to what might be the last topic in the paper: the problem of defining US interests in Africa in such a way that we will be able to obtain Congressional and public support for actions we might want to take but, at the same time, will provide us the option of avoiding being forced into actions which may be futile or dangerous. I believe this problem should be an important part of any general discussion of our policy in Africa. It is clear there will continue to be Soviet actions in Africa which will be hard to deal with, either locally or by use of global leverage. Some of our allies and Middle Eastern friends would wish us to defeat every Soviet “challenge” at once. We will have to give thought to how we can make clear to them that we will carefully adapt our response to the specifics of each Soviet move and that patience is not to be confused with weakness.

If you wish, S/P would be glad to work with you, INR, EUR, PM, and AF on a paper along these lines.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 11 for the Presidential Review Memorandum that tasked the Policy Review Committee with producing such a paper. See Document 16 for the resulting paper.

## 8. Memorandum of Notification<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 14, 1978

TO

Members of the Special Activities Working Group of the Special Coordination Committee

SUBJECT

Planned Covert Action Campaign to Enlighten Cuban Population as to the Price of Cuba's Intervention in Africa<sup>2</sup>

REFERENCE

A. "Perspectives" entitled "The Expanding Cuban/Soviet Presence in Africa"

B. The Presidential Finding on Angola, Dated 8 November 1977<sup>3</sup>

### 1. Background:

The following NFAC analysis (dated 3 March 1978) points to various vulnerabilities of the Cuban government to a better informed domestic public opinion on the issues of Cuba's involvement in Africa.<sup>4</sup> A better informed Cuban public could represent a source of pressure on Castro to modify those involvements.

The political, military, economic, and social costs to Cuba of its expanding role in Africa are still well within manageable limits and are not a significant constraint on Cuban policymakers. Only heavy Cuban casualties would be likely to present the Castro regime with difficult political problems.

Reaction to the country's extensive involvement in Africa is mixed among the Cuban people. Pro-regime activists openly support the African commitments, but many people are convinced that the country's current austerity is caused by the involvement; in fact, it stems largely from low world sugar prices. No organized opposition exists in Cuba, however, and without planning, coordination, and leadership, those who oppose Cuba's role in Africa have little impact on regime leaders.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files: A-E, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978-7 July 1978. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> On March 27, the SCC discussed the idea of a covert action plan to advertise within Cuba the cost of Cuban intervention in Africa. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 76.

<sup>3</sup> Not found but see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 16.

<sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 18.

So far, opposition is limited to grumbling among friends and family of ordinary Cubans sent to do service in Africa.

As is his custom during periods of flagging popular support, President Fidel Castro has spent a good deal of time since mid-1977 traveling through the country trying to bolster morale. Castro is keenly aware of—and exploits—the considerable capacity of the Cuban people to endure hardships. His normal reaction is to manufacture both a reason to suffer and a scapegoat to hate. A master of media manipulation, he has little trouble refocusing public anger and generating renewed revolutionary momentum.

Castro is probably not yet overly concerned about public attitudes. The numerous speeches and heavy media treatment in the last six months are, in effect, pre-emptive moves to head off disaffection. Castro doubtless knows that the current level of discontent is well within tolerable limits and that by careful persuasion he can keep it far short of the point where outright repression might be required.

The political and economic costs of Cuban involvement in Africa will probably remain manageable for Havana, at least for the near term. A deepening popular disaffection, stemming from an exaggerated perception of the financial costs, could pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers, however, should the number of casualties the Cubans suffer increase rapidly.

## 2. *Proposal:*

This paper addresses the means by which Cuban public opinion and the government itself could be influenced through non-attributed and falsely attributed covert action operations. Because these sorts of techniques involve a bit higher risk than routine media placement, we are advising the SCC/SAWG of our intentions.

To complement the ongoing media and radio campaign, CIA proposes to utilize its world-wide network of contacts [7 lines not declassified]. By reaching Cuban officials and military forces outside Cuba, their motivation to work in support of their government's African policies may be adversely affected; they may in turn share their sentiments with friends and family at home. Those at home then may be less quick to support Castro's adventures and might serve as a moderating pressure on his more drastic policies.

### a. *Purpose: Influence Third World Countries Assisting Cuba*

CIA will enhance the doubts and second thoughts about Cuba's activities in Africa which may have occurred to (1) the industrialized countries whose foreign aid and technical assistance programs include Cuba as a beneficiary; (2) the more moderate countries in the Non-Aligned Nations Movement; (3) international organizations concerned with humanitarian relief, some of whose resources are wasted by Cuba's military activities in Africa.

To achieve this, CIA will produce unattributed or falsely attributed studies which demonstrate the Cuban government's direct and indirect exploitation for its own foreign political purposes of the voluntary assistance being provided by certain governments and institutions; that Cuba's military involvements in Africa are draining away humanitarian relief which could better be applied to peoples suffering the effects of poverty and natural disasters.

These studies will consist of both overt and intelligence information and will be circulated to governments, parliaments, international bodies, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

b. *Purpose: Advise Cuban Populace of Realities of Its African Commitment*

*[1 paragraph (24 lines) not declassified]*

c. *Purpose: Alert Selected Groups to Cuba's Duplicity and Betrayals*

CIA will produce and disseminate booklets and circulars which (1) highlight the Cuban government's betrayal of the Eritrean liberation movements (which in the past it supported with propaganda and material assistance); (2) demonstrate that many of Cuba's foreign activities are simply those of a Soviet surrogate, and (3) discuss the long-term adverse effects on the Cuban population of the Cuban government's commitments to current and future African revolutionary developments. These items, given notional or false attribution, will be disseminated to selected foreign audiences in the Third World as well as to the Cuban populace at home.

Through its assets in the media CIA can surface materials specifically designed to support the operations discussed above. Special briefing papers passed to foreign heads of state and decision-makers will also support these operations.

*NOTE:* In addition to efforts now underway to gain access to radio stations in Latin America whose broadcasts reach Cuba, and to radios in Africa and Europe which reach Cuban forces stationed abroad, CIA plans to produce documentary video tapes on Cuba's activities in Africa *[3 lines not declassified]*.

### 3. *Risk-Security Factors:*

*[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]*

### 4. *Policy Authority:*

The following policy authorities permit the covert action initiatives described herein:

a. "Perspectives" entitled "The Expanding Cuban/Soviet Presence in Africa" dated 4 May 1976;

b. “Perspectives” entitled “Drawing African Attention to Soviet Activity in the Horn of Africa: dated 22 September 1977;”<sup>5</sup>

c. Presidential Finding on Angola, dated November 8, 1977.

5. *Subsequent Reporting:*

An interim report on the effectiveness of this campaign will be provided by 30 June 1978.<sup>6</sup>

6. *Deadline:*

Close of business 24 April 1978. Comments should be LDX’ed to Mr. John N. McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with an information copy to Mr. Paul B. Henze, National Security Council Staff, Room 300, extension 3334.

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center,  
Central Intelligence Agency<sup>7</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1976

SUBJECT

PERSPECTIVES—Expanding Cuban/Soviet Presence in Africa

1. Expanding presence of Cubans and Soviets in Africa reflects merging Cuban/Soviet views of third world and complementary roles each can play in it. Cuba’s role promotes Castro’s goals of exporting revolution and building his image as third world leader while acting as surrogate for USSR in military and para-military activities. This serves USSR’s objective and supplements its own efforts to extend its military capabilities and political influence in Africa. Covert action efforts, in support of U.S. foreign policy, should therefore focus on: exposing Cuban/Soviet motives; mobilizing international criticism of Cuban/Soviet actions; and strengthening resolve of those African states opposed to further Cuban/Soviet intervention in Africa.

2. Following provides background on Cuban/Soviet activities and underlying motives and goals:

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<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 52, footnote 6.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 15.

<sup>7</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Approved by the Department of State on April 27, 1976.

a. Cuban involvement in Africa goes back to 1960's when Cuban advisers began training militia forces to support leftist liberation governments/movements in Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Zanzibar, Cameroon Republic and Guinea Bissau. At present Cuban personnel are deployed in about ten countries, either in military capacity or as civilian advisers or technicians. Estimated numbers range from as high as 10,000 or more in Angola to only 20–25 in Guinea Bissau as well as in Sierra Leone. Outside of Angola, Cuban personnel are believed present in largest numbers (i.e., several hundred), in Congo (Brazzaville) which was major staging area and rear base for Cubans fighting in Angola. Cubans are also in Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Guinea, Somalia, Zambia and the Spanish Sahara.

b. Cuban intervention in Africa, paid for and logistically supported by USSR, is ideally suited to Castro's goal of becoming major link between communist and third world countries, thus opening way for him to attain significant international attention. Cuban success in Angola has reinforced his views that communist and third world nations have gained advantage over Western powers in this area. He appears determined to capitalize on this success, which could possibly lead to an effort to obtain Soviet backing for Cuban training of liberation groups opposed to white-minority regimes in Southern Africa.

c. Soviets demonstrated considerable interest in Africa in early 1960's, in wake of several African nations' gaining independence. Although they seemed to lose interest from middle 1960's to 1971, they have since become more active and more selective as to areas in which they operate. In 1971 USSR began gradually to increase arms shipments to Guinea, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda, and has since gained access to facilities for military operations in Guinea and Somalia, including expansion of military base in Berbera, Somalia.

d. In Angola USSR saw opportunity to develop and expand its influence by exploiting crisis situations. Its long-standing assistance to MPLA had remained at moderate levels until date for independence became known, after which assistance escalated sharply and Cuban intervention began in earnest. By arming MPLA and using Cuban troops to intervene in Angolan conflict, USSR has accomplished objectives of attaining influence in Angola and of gaining access to port facilities and airfields on South Atlantic coast of Africa, supplementing facilities it had already acquired on Coasts of Guinea and Somalia. Also, Angola's strategic location, on borders of both black-ruled and white-ruled countries, gives Soviets opportunity to exert political and military influence throughout wide area.

e. By using Cubans to help advance their objectives, Soviets are able to maintain relatively low profile in crisis situations, thereby concealing their intent and eliminating fears of Soviet neo-colonialism on part of



Africans. Using Cubans also gives Soviets one of few benefits they can hope to get in return for their huge investment in Cuba, which is heavily mortgaged to USSR for years to come.

f. Overall Soviet goals in Africa are to identify with and demonstrate continuing commitment to cause of national liberation and to diminish Chinese influence with liberation movements; to reduce or contain western influence; and to obtain access to other strategically located military facilities.

3. In addition to exploiting Cuban/Soviet motives and goals, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] draw on following state-approved guidelines for covert action purposes:

a. Emphasize vital need for settlements providing for majority rule in Rhodesia and an acceptable self-determination process for Namibia. Solution of these problems would remove two of most important pre-texts Soviets and Cubans have used to justify intrusion into Africa.

b. Note inconsistency of those African countries that grant to USSR near-exclusive base rights and free access to airports and harbors and yet profess to be non-aligned.

c. Support territorial integrity of African states in order to strengthen resolve of moderate countries which oppose Cuban/Soviet incursions, or which fear territorial ambitions of their more radical neighbors.

d. Exploit Chinese criticisms of intervention by Cuba and USSR and their responses to this criticism, including Cuba's attack on PRC for its support of "imperialists" and "white racist regimes." Exploit any statements from Maoist/Peking elements that criticize Soviet/Cuban domination of Angolan Government.

e. Question Castro's right to request foreign aid from Western governments and wisdom of these governments in extending aid, when he is spending fortunes (which could well include aid funds) in deploying troops and equipment in distant foreign wars.

f. Encourage consideration about more sober attitudes of governments in Latin America toward Cuban adventures abroad, noting that number of Latin American leaders see that Castro took initiative in Angola. These attitudes of Latin American leaders indicate that Cuba cannot expect to renew its credentials as "revolutionary leader" and at same time retain its recently acquired respectability in Latin America.

g. Emphasize that southern Africa is far removed from Soviet and Cuban homelands and well beyond reasonable limits of their traditional security interests. Suggest that their continued activity in this potentially explosive area could undermine what policy of detente has achieved and could severely damage East/West relationships.



9. **Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Cubans in Africa—Covert Action Proposal

The SCC on 27 March 1978, after a discussion on Cubans in Angola which came to no clear conclusion, did reach consensus . . .

"that there should be *increased covert media activity on Cubans in Africa* with special effort to project information on Cuban casualties and problems into Cuba itself. CIA will prepare plans for implementation, including additional Presidential Findings, if required." (Excerpt from Summary of Conclusions of this meeting.)<sup>2</sup>

In implementation of this decision, CIA prepared a Memorandum of Notification entitled "Covert Action Campaign to Enlighten Cuban Population as to the Price of Cuba's Intervention in Africa" (attached, Tab A), dated 14 April 1978,<sup>3</sup> which according to established procedures we sent to SAWG members on 18 April with a deadline for comment/concurrences of 24 April.

The Attorney-General's office in the person of Ken Bass gave us a wishy-washy comment (Tab B)<sup>4</sup> which concluded that the proposal is "arguably within the scope of the 8 November Finding. The determination of that scope of the Finding is . . . primarily the responsibility of CIA and those NSC personnel involved in its submission to the President."

Walter Slocombe at DOD/ISA came in with a dissent, (Tab C)<sup>5</sup> which repeated the familiar refrain that the program ought to be overt, or at least in large part overt. He ignored the fact—as I have observed repeatedly in passing on other OMB and DOD comments to you—that CIA has no *overt* capability. The SCC specifically charged CIA with preparing a *covert* program, the only kind of program for which it has authority or capability.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files: A-E, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978–7 July 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 76.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached; printed as Document 8.

<sup>4</sup> Dated April 24; attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Slocombe's memorandum to McMahon, undated, is attached but not printed.

State, after delaying three days, sent a mushy memorandum (Tab D)<sup>6</sup> endorsing the concept of spreading information about the Cuban role in Africa but questioning CIA's implementation plans and calling for "a more narrowly focussed clandestine effort" involving only agents of influence not the printed word. State's recommendations add up to scuttling the effort by advocating implementation so minimal that it would constitute no significant action at all. State also questions the "legality" of the action and says its Legal Office should be consulted about it . . .

I reported this problem to you in summary fashion in my Evening Report of 26 April.<sup>7</sup> In response to your strong reaction, I notified CIA by phone this morning that the SCC decision is to be implemented immediately without further ado. I attach a memorandum from you to the DCI advising him officially of this position (Tab E).<sup>8</sup>

We have witnessed here a striking example of how unproductive the "Special Activities Working Group" mechanism has been. The group might better be called the "Special Activities Obstruction Group," since that has been the net effect of this uncooperative body of middle-level bureaucrats since it was instituted last spring.

CIA is not going to be able to respond to the President's desires and to SCC decisions unless we circumvent, streamline or abolish the "Special Activities Working Group." As Chairman of the SCC, you have the authority to define the role of any "Working Groups" which are necessary to support the SCC in its deliberations. *No mention of the SAWG* was made in E. O. 12036<sup>9</sup> so as to preserve your maximum flexibility. Moreover from the beginning we have established the principle that no "Working Group" as such has continual or unlimited status or authority but undertakes only such tasks as the SCC requires done at any given period. The authority for review and approval of covert actions rests only with the SCC, with you as its Chairman and with the President when the sensitivity or scope of the planned action requires his authorization of it. OMB should have advisory authority only in respect to resource availability and the Attorney-General's role should be confined to advise on legalities—President Finding requirements, interpretations, etc.

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<sup>6</sup> Bowdler's memorandum to McMahon, dated April 27, is attached but not printed.

<sup>7</sup> The evening report is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports, Box 11.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 10.

<sup>9</sup> On January 24, 1978, Carter signed Executive Order 12036, which instituted several reforms to the Intelligence Community.

Sam Hoskinson endorses this approach. If you concur in the above-outlined principles, I will prepare a revised set of SCC Chairman's guidelines which reflect it.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski checked the "Agree" option.

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**10. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Implementation of SCC Decision on Increased Covert Media Activity on Cubans in Africa

On 27 March 1978 the SCC agreed

*"that there should be increased covert media activity on Cubans in Africa with special effort to project information on Cuban casualties and problems into Cuba itself. CIA will prepare plans for implementation, including additional Presidential findings, if required."*

Your agency's "Memorandum of Notification" dated 14 April 1978 reflects implementation of this decision. Coordination of this memorandum through the Special Activities Working Group mechanism brought forth a number of recommendations for change or abandonment of your plans. I should like to make very clear that the SCC's decision is not to be altered or its implementation delayed as a result of a sub-SCC review process. Once taken, SCC decisions re covert action [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are to be implemented unless withdrawn by the Chairman.

In this case, since a month has already passed since the SCC decision was taken, implementation should proceed as you have outlined it in your Memorandum of Notification.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files: A-E, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978-7 July 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Vance and Brown.

**11. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–36<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1978

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury  
The United States Representative to the United Nations  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa (S)

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a review of US policy concerning our objectives and interests in limiting Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa and the steps that we might take in support of our objectives. The Presidential Review Memorandum should be completed no later than May 31, 1978.<sup>2</sup>

The review should address the following issues:

1. *US and Others' Interests and Objectives in Limiting Soviet/Cuban Influence in Africa:*

—What kind and level of presence and activity is unacceptable to US interests in the context of our overall priorities in Africa?

—What are the interests and perceptions of our European allies, Saudi Arabia and other Arabs; and African moderates?

2. *Soviet and Cuban Involvement, Present and Potential:*

—What, briefly, is the current status of Cuban and Soviet involvement in areas where they have already established a significant role; how effective have been the efforts of the US and third parties in dealing with it?

—In what areas and issues are the Soviets and Cubans likely to increase their military or political involvement over the next six to twelve months? Discuss the nature of involvement and the indigenous developments that would trigger it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 2, PRM/NSC 25–47 [1] 5. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 16.

### *3. Policy Actions and Instruments in Dealing with Soviet and Cuban Involvement:*

#### *(a) Diplomatic Actions*

—What bilateral diplomatic actions are available to the US in dealing with the Soviets and Cubans and with countries where the Soviets and Cubans become involved?

—What are the possibilities of working together with European, Arab and moderate African countries?

—How can we utilize the UN and OAU?

—What is the potential for a significant Chinese role?

#### *(b) Economic, Military and Political Activities*

—What forms of economic, military and political activities, both inducements and sanctions, will be appropriate in countering Soviet and Cuban involvement?

—Discuss Third Countries' potential as appropriate.

#### *4. Congressional and Public Posture*

—What are the dominant public and Congressional perceptions of Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa?

—What public posture is most effective in terms of dealing with US domestic concerns and with foreign opinion?

—What level of legislative restraint are we likely to encounter in our overall programs of coping with Soviet and Cuban involvement? (Constraints on specific actions should be included in the discussion of these actions.)

#### *5. General Guidance*

—Care should be taken to differentiate between Soviet and Cuban goals, policies, etc. in the course of the discussion.

—Analysis should take place at two levels throughout the study. While due attention should be given to broad strategies (e.g. continent-wide aid programs as a means of offsetting Soviet activities), the prime focus should be on specific situations such as the Horn, Rhodesia and others that turn out to be most acute in the course of analysis. In these specific cases the study should provide a full range of options for furthering US interests.

—This study should be as brief and direct as possible, assuming substantial knowledge of the issue on the part of the Policy Review Committee.

—The implementation of ongoing policy should not be delayed by this study.

—No course of action should be automatically excluded from consideration solely because it will present difficult political problems or

would conflict with existing Administration policies. However, where such constraints would be evident, they should, of course, be noted.

Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Aaron signed for Brzezinski above Brzezinski's typed signature.

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## **12. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 25, 1978, 0042Z

2106. White House pass NSC. Subject: Cuban-US Relations and Cuban Activity in Africa.

1. Summary: Ambassador Young met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to discuss Western initiatives on Namibia.<sup>2</sup> Rodriguez expressed dismay and concern over recent US statements and press articles on Cuba in Africa.<sup>3</sup> He denied Cuban involvement in Shaba,<sup>4</sup> saying the invasion was in neither Cuban nor Angolan interest. He urged that the US base its policy judgements concerning Cuba and Africa on realities and not on rumors and suspicion. He urged that both countries try to improve the climate for US-Cuban relations. End summary.

2. Ambassador Young met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez May 24 to discuss the Western initiatives on Namibia and inform the Cubans the US hoped that they and the Angolans would cooperate in advancing the Namibian negotiations toward a peaceful

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780220–0088. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, the Consulate in Cape Town, and the Interests Section in Havana.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 43–53.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 128394 to Kinshasa, May 21, the Department reported that *the Washington Post* had published an article on Soviet-Cuban activity in Zaire after White House spokesman Powell said on May 19, "We do know that the Cubans did train and equip the Katangans who are engaged in those military operations, and they are fighting with Soviet and Eastern European weapons supplied to them by Cubans in Angola." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780213–0886) See also Document 108.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 99.

settlement. Rodriguez was accompanied by Cuban UN PermRep Raul Roa Kouri and Teofilo Acosta, First Secretary, Cuban Interest Section in Washington. Cooks and Blacken accompanied Young.

3. Rodriguez, after exchanging greetings, remarked that the Cuban Government was confused, upset, and angry over reported statements by United States leaders which had appeared in the press falsely accusing Cuba of certain actions and distorting its intentions in Africa. He then hurriedly added that this was not the purpose of this meeting.

4. Rodriguez mentioned that the Cubans were looking forward to a visit by Ambassador Young to Cuba; however, he recognized that the political environment was not right yet. The Cubans would like to improve the environment in which discussions and relations with the United States are conducted. He said he understood that our two countries have different approaches to problems in Africa but there were a number of things in which we had parallel interests. Recently the issues had become confused and the Cubans thought we should work to clarify them.

5. Ambassador Young commented that the American people's reaction to Cuba and Cuban policies in Africa was complex, and difficult for foreigners to understand. Rodriguez responded that he was concerned over statements made by United States official spokesmen. Ambassador Young explained the adversary relationship existing between the press corps and the Department spokesman tended to result in unbalanced and dramatic press treatment of policy statements. Young added that he thought the State Department's reaction to Cuba and to Cuban activities in Africa had been objective and balanced. Rodriguez nodded agreement.

6. Young said that the events in Zaire had been extremely upsetting. He was convinced that military solutions were not possible in Africa. No country's interest would be served by violence. Any external power with resources could back a dissident group in almost any African country and convert that group into a destabilizing force for the government of that country. He asserted that the United States was not engaged in destabilization in Angola. Rodriguez interrupted saying "but you are preparing to do so". Ambassador Young said this was not the case, but he could see how certain statements could be interpreted in that fashion.

7. Rodriguez commented that it was extremely dangerous for all concerned when a nation engaged in military attacks or destabilizing efforts. During the past year the Cubans had perceived that American policy toward Africa, especially as reflected in statements by Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young, was realistic. Policy had been conducted in a quiet and patient manner. But recently there had been a tendency, reflected through the US press, toward exaggeration, spread-

ing falsehoods, and the “creating of scandals” concerning Cuban policy and developments in Africa. [Omission in the original] had not been reporting the truth about Cuba. There were no Cuban troops in Eritrea. Yet this is the impression that the press was falsely giving. Cuba is not engaged in anything “dangerous” in Africa.

8. In response to Ambassador Young’s comment that it was extremely difficult to tell what was going on in Zaire, Rodriguez agreed, but added that he knew what was not going on. Cuba was not involved in the Shaba invasion or with the invaders. There was a danger in public statements by US officials which, in effect called Fidel a liar.

9. Rodriguez talked at length explaining that Cuba’s policies and actions had a moral basis. Rather than lie, Castro would not discuss an issue, but when he speaks out he speaks the truth. When a situation is extremely sensitive he will refuse to have an interview rather than get placed in a position where he would have to lie.

10. Rodriguez emphatically repeated “we are not involved in Zaire; we have no relations with the Katangans. Two years ago we did provide some training and arms, but there has been no provision of arms or training for the present operation.” He said that the invasion of Shaba created dangers for Angola and for Cuban interests in Africa. The Cubans were convinced that Neto had nothing to do with the situation in Shaba. Rodriguez added that he knows the Soviet Union is also worried. They know there are some Soviet arms in the hands of the rebels. Confusion exists concerning their (the Soviets) motivation. Rodriguez repeated “they (Soviets) are seriously worried”.

11. The conversation turned back to Namibia. Ambassador Young stated that the hope of the US rested in the emergence of an independent and nationalist Namibia. Even if it were not controlled by SWAPO, such a Namibia should give Angola a sense of security.

12. Ambassador Young expressed worry that the conflict in Shaba and its aftermath were creating confusion and instability, not just in Zaire but also in surrounding countries. The economic conditions in Zaire might stimulate a flow of refugees into Zambia and elsewhere. The US hoped that Cuba and Angola would cooperate in advancing the negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. This could pave the way for US discussions on normalizing relations with Angola. All parties interests would be served by peaceful settlement.

13. Rodriguez asserted strongly that Cuba was not in Africa to oppose the United States. Its policy has certain principles such as supporting national liberation and economic development. Cuba saw a constructive role for the United States to play which was not in conflict with Cuban interest.

14. Ambassador Young commented that United States interests would be served by having strong independent and truly non-aligned



states in Africa. We are not able financially to prop-up weak governments and economies all over Africa. We could participate most effectively through private enterprise not the US Government. Private enterprise could be flexible in working out beneficial relationships in the various nations in Africa. Rodriguez nodded assent and said that the Cubans had advised Neto to keep Gulf Oil in Cabinda. He said they made a distinction, however, between "private means and US private investment" (it was not clear what he meant).

15. Returning to the subject of Namibia, Rodriguez said he had talked with Mr. Lane, the USG representative in Havana, some time ago and that Mr. Lane had asked about withdrawal of Angolan and Cuban troops from the Namibian border. Rodriguez said he had told Lane that the Cubans would not tell Neto what to do. However, the Cubans are convinced that Neto would withdraw if he had guarantees that South Africa would not attack Angola.

16. Cuba's position vis-a-vis the Zimbabwean and SWAPO leaders was that they (the Cubans) would support whatever solution the nationalist leaders decided upon. The Cubans were not influencing them to fight rather than negotiate.

17. Ambassador Young explained the Western position on Walvis Bay. Rodriguez responded that separation of Walvis Bay from Namibia posed a problem of principle for the Namibians and the Cubans agreed with their position. Ambassador Young continued with his explanation saying that the Western powers simply could not get South Africa to give up Walvis Bay at this time. He felt, however, this could be done in the future, because South Africa, he believed, wants the kind of relationship with Namibia that it has with Mozambique.

18. Rodriguez said he wanted to shift back to US-Cuba relations which they had touched on at the beginning of the meeting. He then emphasized that the US and Cuba should avoid annoyances in their relationship. He requested that US leaders, in judging Cuban policies and actions, be careful to base its judgements on facts and reality, not on rumors and suspicions. He urged that the US examine carefully what is actually happening in Africa and what the Cubans are doing.

19. Concerning the possibility of Cuba providing armed assistance to a government or to the Zimbabwean nationalists, the US could not expect a blanket commitment in advance that Cuba would not put troops into Zimbabwe, but that does not mean that they intend to send troops. But to make such a commitment publicly would only encourage Smith and Vorster to continue to hold out and refuse any compromise. The reality was, however, that Cuba would not move its troops from Angola to Zimbabwe.

20. Rodriguez emphasized that Cuba did not want to be treated with a double standard by the United States. It was "incomprehensible"

that the US should condone French statements that France would remain permanently in Africa while condemning Cuba's presence.

21. Rodriguez said he feared US leaders were "creating a Frankenstein" in US public opinion which would make impossible for some time normalization of relations between the US and Cuba. He urged that we try to improve the political and emotional climate surrounding US-Cuban relations.

22. The subject of Soviet-Cuban relations came up and Rodriguez said that the US should not believe that any US-Cuba agreements would break Cuba's close relationship with the Soviet Union. The meeting ended on that note as Ambassador Young excused himself to attend a meeting with Vice President Mondale.

Young

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**13. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, June 14, 1978, 2009Z

2446. For the President and Secretary of State from Andrew Young. Subject: US Africa Policy: Shaba Soviet/Cuban Involvement.

1. It is important that we not allow the Africans to escape the lesson of the Shaba.<sup>2</sup> It is the Africans who have by commission or omission permitted the Soviets and Cubans to play an increasingly active military role in Africa, enough to influence some very important African political developments. It is important that the Africans understand that tolerance of a Soviet/Cuban role inevitably will lead to Africa's becoming an East-West cockpit in which outside powers will contend. It is important that these countries—so vulnerable to outside intervention—understand precisely that Cuban intervention does legitimize intervention by others and Africa's long run interest lies in strengthening the political and institutional obstacles to outside intervention.

2. I believe it essential therefore that we go on to challenge the Africans and to show them how to meet that challenge. By that I mean we should press the Africans to go beyond slogans and to act as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2657. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 99–111.

Africans to solve African problems, and to develop the kinds of African approaches required for this purpose. This is a tall order, and at least initially will require a more realistic assessment by Africans of the OAU, which has failed miserably to meet African needs—witness Chad, Ethiopia/Somalia and the Shaba.<sup>3</sup> We should offer to assist Africans in finding ways, without direct U.S. involvement, to deal more effectively with African problems. For example, we could encourage the Africans to develop institutions and codes of conduct to deal with the problem of ethnic minorities—the most explosive political problem in the continent because of the irrationality of colonial borders. There are some foundation stones on which to build. At the last General Assembly the Nigerians proposed the creation of regional human rights commissions in regions that now did not have them.<sup>4</sup> We could push this idea along with the thought that the first task of the African commission should be to deal with the rights and responsibilities of ethnic minorities in African states.

3. In the area of peacekeeping we should urge the Africans to have recourse to the Security Council where their influence can command the resources needed for effective peacekeeping in Africa. In the Council, the Africans can most effectively control the rivalries of outside powers. The UN has the experience and status to do the job.

4. We might also challenge other involved outside powers to agree to establish certain limits on their actions. Thus, we could declare our intention never to introduce nuclear weapons or new more dangerous forms of conventional weapons into Africa and work to exact similar pledges from others: We could offer never to support intervention in an African state without seeking Security Council endorsement provided the Soviet Union made the same commitment.

5. Specifically we might offer to work to stop all intervention in the Zaire-Angola conflict and attempt to secure borders against all overt and covert attack.

6. I recognize that there are complexities in such proposals. But I urge that you commission an urgent study aimed at developing specific ideas, such as the ones I suggested, on how Africans can more effectively act to deal with their own problems. The study should consider political, economic and military options. Ideally, we should develop

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Libyan intervention in Chad and the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia and the Cuban and Soviet intervention on behalf of Ethiopia. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, and vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa.

<sup>4</sup> On March 8, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 24 (XXXIV) which requested that the Secretary-General consider arranging regional seminars to discuss “the advisability of establishing regional commissions on human rights where none existed.” (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978*, p. 720)

our conclusions in consultation with Nyerere, Obasanjo, Sadat and other principal African leaders in advance of the Khartoum meeting of OAU heads of government and thus offer our efforts towards assuring that the focus of that meeting will be a serious effort at African problem-solving.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 155074 to OAU Collective, June 19, the Department reported that the OAU Council of Ministers would meet at Khartoum July 7–15, followed by the OAU Summit July 18–21, and suggested several issues to watch, including: views on Soviet-Cuban military involvement in Ethiopia and Angola, reaction to Shaba II, debate on Western efforts in Namibia and Rhodesia, attitudes toward political versus military settlement in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, Western Sahara, and Chad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255–0354)

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#### **14. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1978

##### **SUBJECT**

Reaction to Andy Young's Suggestions for African Solutions to African Problems

Cy recently tasked our African posts to respond to the ideas for solutions to African problems, without direct U.S. involvement, contained in Andy Young's June 14 cable to you and Cy.<sup>2</sup> You will remember that Andy suggested State initiate a study aimed at developing specific ideas, considering political, economic and military options, on how the Africans can more effectively deal with their own problems. He recommended that the study be developed, in consultation with principal African leaders, in advance of the Khartoum meeting of the OAU heads of government, and that our efforts be directed toward assuring that the focus of that meeting will be a serious effort at African

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 124, Africa 2–6/78. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 13. In telegram 153145, to all African posts, June 16, Vance requested that Ambassadors respond to Young's cable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255–0554)

problem-solving. Andy's specific proposals included realistic reassessment of the role of the OAU, encouraging recourse to the Security Council for peacekeeping support, challenging outside powers to voluntarily limit their actions in Africa, and emphasizing that tolerance of Cuban intervention legitimizes intervention by others.

Most posts enthusiastically supported Andy's initiative in general. They are in agreement that the OAU is incapable of solving Africa's problems, but doubt the acceptability and/or advisability of an increased UNSC role. Most wholeheartedly endorse expanded consultations with African leaders, but many add that the U.S. must retain a capability to respond rapidly to challenges such as the Shaba crisis. Following are summaries of the more significant available responses.

*Frontline States:*<sup>3</sup> *Zambia:* Clingerman feels that challenging Africans to meet what we consider to be their problem-solving responsibilities is to run the risk of alienating the very people whose support we seek. *Tanzania:* Spain thinks Nyerere is unlikely to be receptive to suggestions that Soviet/Cuban involvement is not in Africa's interest, but that he might be interested in consultations directed toward ending cross-border violence and dealing with the difficulties of major tribal groups divided by international borders. *Botswana:* Norland sees the starting point in efforts to uproot and eventually roll back Soviet presence and influence as adoption of policies, such as our current ones on southern African issues, which will enable African opinion to associate itself with us.

*The Horn:*<sup>4</sup> *Somalia:* Vought sees bleak prospects for immediate improvement in the OAU, and, while reluctant to see a U.S. big-brother relationship across the board, believes strongly that Africa will look to the U.S. for "deeds as well as rhetoric" during the next few years. *Sudan:* Bergus agrees that the OAU has failed woefully and sees much to commend the suggestion for an expanded UNSC role, but feels it will face stiff resistance. In order to contribute to stability on the continent, the ambassador sees a definite need for a U.S. capability to move quickly with economic aid, supporting assistance, and a modest supply of arms. *Kenya:* LeMelle thinks we should impress on our African friends the urgent and critical need to strengthen their own regional machinery in order to avoid exacerbating East-West rivalry in Africa.

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<sup>3</sup> The Ambassadors to the Front-Line States responded to Vance's tasking in telegrams 2202 from Lusaka, June 20; 2593 from Dar es Salaam, June 16; and 1872 from Gabarone, June 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256-1058, D780252-0688, and D780255-0353, respectively)

<sup>4</sup> The responses from the Embassies in the Horn of Africa are in telegrams 1383 from Mogadiscio, June 20; 2711 from Khartoum, June 17; and 9104 from Nairobi, June 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256-0987, D780253-1085, and D780253-1191, respectively)

*West Africa:*<sup>5</sup> *Nigeria:* Wyman sees problems and difficulties with Andy's approaches, but is confident that their relative advantages and disadvantages can be "carefully weighted" in the State study. *Liberia:* Horan is concerned that we not mislead the Africans, through any new consultative process, into thinking we are losing the resolve we showed in both Shaba I and Shaba II to send the Soviets the message that "enough is enough." *Sierra Leone:* Linehan said we should carefully examine our own rhetoric to determine whether we are in a position to cast the first stone, and at whom.

*Francophone Countries:*<sup>6</sup> *Senegal:* Cohen says the U.S. must inevitably become involved in some way with material support. *Guinea:* Crosby feels the U.S. initiative might be welcomed as an expression of willingness to keep "hands off" Africa and as the basis for serious discussion at Khartoum. *Chad:* Bradford thinks that the suggested approach, if devoid of the promise of security assistance or financing, would be "laughed out of nearly every office in which we make our case." *Togo:* Palmer feels the U.S. should encourage and support self-assertive efforts by moderate African states to deal with the instabilities of the African political system. *Gabon:* Tienken sees our greatest contribution as being pressure on the Cubans and Soviets in various fora that need not be African. *Mauritius:* Keeley says it is difficult to generalize an "African policy," and expresses the need to examine each African problem as an individual case. *Guinea-Bissau:* Marks thinks we must avoid the inadvertent impression that our interest in a particular leader or group of leaders results from unenlightened self-interest. *Cameroon:* Smythe says we should identify African leaders who have some ambivalence toward Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa and open a dialogue with them on the rationale for control of outside influences in Africa. *Mali:* Byrne suggests we consider establishment of a formal U.S. mission to the OAU, separate and distinct from our embassy in Addis Ababa.

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<sup>5</sup> The West African posts' responses are in telegrams 7552 from Lagos, June 19; 4411 from Monrovia, June 16; and 1977 from Freetown, June 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255–0557, D780252–0463, and D780258–1127, respectively)

<sup>6</sup> The Embassies in the Francophone countries responded in telegrams 4616 from Dakar, June 16; 1170 from Conakry, June 17; 2408 from N'Djamena, June 20; 1967 from Lome, June 19; 1669 from Libreville, June 19; 692 from Port Louis, June 19; 778 from Bissau, June 22; 3053 from Yaounde, June 22; and 2925 from Bamako, June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780252–0476, D780253–1197, D780256–0476, D780255–0770, D780255–0217, D780255–0339, D780260–0649, D780260–0583, and D780260–1176, respectively)

**15. Memorandum of Notification**

Washington, July 7, 1978

[Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files: A-E, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978–7 July 1978. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

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**16. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 18, 1978

Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa and U.S. Interests

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

*EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**Part I—US and Others' Interests and Objectives in Limiting Soviet/Cuban Influence in Africa*

It is in the interest of the U.S. (and of other Western nations): to have a peaceful and stable Africa of independent nations where Soviet/Cuban influence is not predominant and where the level of Soviet presence and involvement does not alter the overall global balance between the U.S. and the USSR; to achieve the modernization and material improvement which Africans desire by helping them to help themselves; to help the Africans achieve their goals of human dignity, social justice and majority rule; to preserve reasonable and non-discriminatory access to Africa's mineral, agricultural, and marine resources; and to focus the inevitable US-Soviet competition into peaceful economic, trade, cultural, informational, and diplomatic channels.

Most African nations lack the expertise and resources to resolve their problems and are compelled to seek external assistance. Africans would therefore strongly resist any Western effort to brand all Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa as "unacceptable". Indeed, Soviet and Cuban efforts in economic development, health care, technical educa-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files: A-E, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 10 August 1978–19 August 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by the NSC's Policy Review Committee under the chairmanship of the Department of State. For the text of PRM/NSC-36, see Document 11.



tion and food production are “acceptable” to us as well as to the Africans. It is the use of large-scale military efforts coupled with Soviet/Cuban political spoiling tactics which are “unacceptable” to the U.S., particularly when they encourage African leaders to seek military solutions to problems which cannot be resolved militarily and make more difficult the negotiated resolution of disputes.

The long-term impact of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa is the subject of vigorous debate. At one end of the range of opinion is the view that the Soviets and Cubans cannot be dislodged once they have acquired a position of dominance. As a consequence, the division of position and influence in Africa between East and West could be changed to our disadvantage, and the global balance shifted in favor of the Soviets, depending on the strategic importance of the African nation taken over. Other observers, however, believe that the Soviets have demonstrated they can maintain a position of dominance only where they are able to station substantial military forces and have shown repeatedly that they are unable to maintain a close relationship with an African nation, in part because of their heavy-handed behavior, but more fundamentally because as they attempt to utilize a position of influence to pursue their own objectives, they erode and ultimately lose their position of dominance. Most observers believe that the history of Africa since 1945 clearly demonstrates the strength of African nationalism, and the skill and will of African leaders to prevent the Soviets from achieving a dominant position.

While the experience of the past two decades suggests that African nationalism has been strong enough to keep the Soviets in the role of just another foreign power, there are several significant differences between the present situation and the earlier period. First, the Soviets have shown a willingness to involve themselves militarily in problem situations in Africa. Second, Cuban combat forces represent a new element which could enable the Soviets to acquire and maintain effective control in Africa in a pattern paralleling Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Third, by providing nearly all the manpower needed, the less heavy-handed Cubans enable the Soviets to keep in the background. In view of these differences, the balance between Soviet pressures and African nationalism which prevailed during the past two decades may have been altered, and as a consequence, the pattern evolved between 1955 and 1978 may not hold for the next two decades.<sup>2</sup>

This Review Memorandum assesses the problems posed by Soviet/Cuban involvement for the present and the immediate future. A follow-

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<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the left margin.



on assessment<sup>3</sup> should be prepared in 12 to 14 months to permit the identification of any significant changes and the need for additional or different counter-measures.

European attitudes toward Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa are ambivalent and the implications for policy uncertain. Europeans see a challenge to their own and Western interests; would like something to be done about it; and fear the consequences for global balance of an inadequate Western response. However, with the exception of France, the Europeans feel there is little they can do themselves, and see at least as much risk as benefit in deepening Western or US support for regimes like that of Zaire. Many European governments have strong reservations about an African intervention force. Others think that a Western-backed African bloc would be of doubtful effectiveness and might drive African states unwilling to line up with the West into the arms of the Soviets. On the other hand, European governments agree that every effort should be made to find peaceful solutions to the increasingly more critical problems of southern Africa.

The moderate and conservative Arab governments and Iran would like to see Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa countered by the U.S. Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have shown the greatest concern and have been the most vocal in urging us to action.

Most Latin American states are mildly concerned over and disapproving of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa. But they regard it as a distant problem not directly affecting them, and are by and large unwilling to do anything about it or able to agree even on publicly condemning it.

The Chinese can be expected to continue their sharp propaganda attacks on Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa and to intensify their challenge of Cuba's Non-Aligned credentials. But Peking will attempt to avoid over-identification with western moves.

While Africans universally agree the Soviets are seeking influence in Africa, some see this as a normal "big power" effort to serve its interests while others believe the Soviets seek political and ideological hegemony. Governments which rely heavily on the Soviets see them as supportive and reliable. Governments which face opposition from groups which are recipients of Soviet aid ascribe a conspiratorial design to Soviet/Cuban behavior. Those in the middle find Soviet and Cuban activities peripheral to the development needs of Africa but essential to the successful resolution of southern African problems. Almost none are willing to condemn or forswear all outside military intervention. At the July OAU Summit, the Chiefs of State, while reaffirming OAU

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

opposition to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African states, reiterated traditional OAU approval of appeals by sovereign states for outside help. Still, Nigerian President Obasanjo, apparently articulating the evolving OAU consensus, cautioned the Soviets and Cubans not to overstay their welcome in Africa. Africans are divided on whether the Cubans are playing an independent role or are surrogates for the Soviets. A number of countries see the Cubans as a useful catalyst to frighten the West into exerting greater pressure on the white regimes of southern Africa. Few Africans see any alternative to having the Cubans and the Soviets help equip and train the fighting forces of the Namibian and Zimbabwean nationalists. Nearly all are prepared to accept Soviet support to achieve black majority rule in southern Africa, a goal which Africans of all political persuasions are determined to achieve.

African moderate states are divided on whether Soviet/Cuban involvement constitutes a threat to their freedom. Many Africans do not think that there is a Cuban problem or a Soviet problem; they note that the Soviets left Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan when requested to do so, and seem confident that the Cubans will depart when asked. Still others believe that if Western countries object to a Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa, they must prevent the rise of situations in which the African participants believe that Soviet or Cuban help is necessary.

*Part II—Soviet and Cuban Involvement, Present and Potential*

The Soviets and the Cubans have nearly 60,000 civilian and military personnel scattered across the African Continent; they have mounted massive military aid programs; they have planned, launched, and sustained extensive combat operations in support of African governments which have requested their help. Although the Soviets have personnel in some 35 African countries and the Cubans in 13, the recent expansion of Soviet and Cuban activity has been focused principally in three areas: Angola, Ethiopia, and the nations neighboring Rhodesia. (The Soviet presence in Algeria and Libya dates back to an earlier period.) Cuba is the principal supplier of manpower. There are now some 42 to 47 thousand Cubans in Africa, including the 20,000 combat troops in Angola, the 17,000 in Ethiopia, and the 500 military advisors in Mozambique. In addition, there are 5,000 Cuban civilian advisors in Angola, with another 5,000 expected to arrive before the end of 1978. (See Annex I for a more detailed inventory of Soviet and Cuban activity.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the left margin. The annexes are not printed.

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious but not necessarily synonymous. The Soviets and the Cubans have developed a symbiotic relationship in their African adventure which furthers both their particular and mutual interests.

Soviet motivations, objectives, and intentions represent a mixture of geopolitical, strategic, and ideological/political elements which differ area by area on the Continent.

In the Horn the Soviets appear to calculate that if they can establish a strong, permanent presence in Ethiopia, they will be in a position to strengthen their strategic impact on Middle Eastern events and affect the flow of oil, to project their military power east into the Indian Ocean, and extend their influence west and south into Africa. At the same time, active involvement in Ethiopia permits the Soviets to displace the West and specifically the U.S. from a long-held position of influence, to enhance their status as a great power and expand their world role, and to support the ideologically compatible Mengistu regime.<sup>5</sup>

Angola's location on the South Atlantic is strategically important and its proximity to foci of weakness (Zaire, Namibia) is attractive, but support for an ideologically compatible liberation movement-cum-government to the detriment of Western interests is equally attractive and important.

Soviet involvement in Algeria and Libya reflects a similar "mix" of motivation: a strategic presence on NATO's southern flank and the support of ideologically compatible regimes plus the attraction of hard currency earnings from massive arms sales.

Soviet involvement in the Rhodesian conflict in the short term is heavily ideological/political. Support of the black nationalist guerrillas enables the Soviets simultaneously to associate themselves with a "progressive" political grouping, to support a liberation struggle, to help the member states of the Organization of African Unity achieve one of their primary goals, and to undermine the position, influence, and interests of the West. In the longer term, their interests may be more focused on strategic influence on the events in South Africa and ultimately on the geopolitical importance and resources of southern Africa.

While the connecting thread of Soviet involvement in Africa is opportunism, there were different circumstances and different attractions in each of the areas/situations the Soviets have entered. More importantly, there are differing degrees of Soviet interest, involvement and commitment.

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In the near term, the Soviets will not abandon their present role in African affairs, and are likely to seek to consolidate, if not to extend it. Nevertheless, the costs to the Soviets in terms of Soviet-US and Soviet-European relations could reach proportions which could be meaningful in Soviet decision-making, and give rise to some second thoughts about the pace and scope of Soviet involvement in Africa, if not about the long-run objective of displacing Western presence, position, and influence from Africa. (See also NIE 11/4/78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT).)<sup>6</sup>

Cuba is not involved in Africa solely or even primarily because of its relationship with the USSR. It is deeply committed to the pursuit of its own ideological and pragmatic political goals there: the advancement of “The Revolution” and the support of “progressive” regimes, the expansion of its own political influence in the Third World at the expense of the West (read U.S.), and the establishment for itself of a major leadership role among developing nations.

Cuba is not likely to abandon its objectives in Africa easily or soon. There are probably only three sets of circumstances which would cause the Cubans to consider a drastic reduction in their presence or early withdrawal:

—An explicit request from the African governments directly involved for the Cubans to depart and/or an unmistakable change of mind by other African governments which to date have found Cuba’s presence and activities acceptable;

—A Soviet threat to withdraw or severely reduce its economic assistance to Cuba unless Havana withdraws from Africa. The termination or the reduction of Soviet logistical support would force the Cubans to reduce their African presence, but they would not withdraw even if they had to go it alone in Africa;

—Direct US military measures or the threat of US military action.

Judging from the response of Soviet officials and spokesmen to our diplomatic and public “warnings”, the Soviets may have initially discounted the significance and strength of our disapproval of their African adventurism. Publicly, the Soviets have insisted that they are active in Africa only in response to the explicit invitation of the African government involved, and countered Western criticism of the Soviet/Cuban role in Shaba II with accusations of Western intervention and Western responsibility. Our concerns, however, have clearly registered

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<sup>6</sup> Dated May 9; scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security Policy. A redacted version of the NIE is in the National Archives, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, NN #263–96–001 31.

with the Soviet leadership. On June 22, the Soviets issued an official statement justifying at length Soviet African policy and criticizing US and Western policies and actions there.<sup>7</sup> Although the Soviet public responses have been along predictable lines, there are some indications that behind the scenes the Soviets are beginning to take seriously the opposition of the U.S., the Europeans, and some Third Worlders to their military involvement in Africa.<sup>8</sup>

US efforts to deal with Cuban adventurism in Africa have not produced substantial results so far. Our diplomatic warnings that continued Cuban military presence there will make progress toward normalization impossible do not appear to have had any appreciable effect. However, Western action in Zaire, including the commitment of US military forces and our strong public statements,<sup>9</sup> may have caused Castro to review one of the "givens" of his African policy—that the U.S. would not become militarily involved in Africa. It is not yet clear what, if any, shifts might occur in Cuban policy as a result. It is unlikely that Cuba will draw back from areas where it is already heavily committed, but recent Western action might result in somewhat greater caution on the part of Cuba with respect to future involvements.

Cuban losses, both killed and wounded in both Angola and Ethiopia are probably not in excess of 3 to 4 thousand. The highest estimate of the total number killed in action is 1,200. (In comparison, 606 Cubans were killed and 8,708 were injured in traffic accidents last year.) The psychological impact in Cuba has been minimal. Casualties would have to be much higher to be sharply felt among a population of nine million. Even if the numbers were larger, the effect would still be modest because of the careful management of all news. There are no casualty reports; the few references to losses are couched in terms of "fallen heroes" and are accompanied by patriotic appeals which have an undoubted effect.

Within the next six months to one year, we believe that the Soviets and Cubans will remain occupied primarily with their existing commitments to Angola, Ethiopia, and the Rhodesian nationalists, although it is possible that the scale of these commitments will be increased. In Angola, the continuing civil war will likely require the Soviets and the Cubans to make even greater commitments to protect their current position. In Ethiopia, the Cubans and the Soviets continue to resist

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<sup>7</sup> The official statement, which set forth the Soviet Union's policy goals in Africa, maintained that détente did not rule out Soviet military intervention in Africa to support national liberation movements. (Kevin Klose, "Moscow Defends Its Military Intervention in Africa," *Washington Post*, June 23, 1978, p. A20)

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this and the next three paragraphs in the left margin.

<sup>9</sup> See Documents 103 and 108.

participation in a costly and perhaps unwinnable battle for Eritrea. But should the Ethiopian military campaign continue, it is likely that the Soviets and the Cubans will eventually be drawn into a costly involvement in that conflict. Alternatively, if the Soviets promote a negotiated settlement with the Eritrean rebels against Mengistu's wishes, they will receive little Ethiopian gratitude. If the renewed pressure of Somali liberation forces continues and expands, the Soviets and the Cubans may find it necessary to resume an active role in the Ogaden fighting. In any event, the Soviets will have to continue to deal with an unstable Ethiopian regime facing major economic and social difficulties. Should the political stalemate continue in Rhodesia, the Soviets and Cubans are expected to increase their military assistance to the Rhodesian guerrillas. Cuban military personnel may begin accompanying guerrilla units into Rhodesia, but we doubt that Cuba is presently contemplating a major offensive in Rhodesia using Cuban military units.

Over the longer term, southern Africa has the greatest potential for Soviet/Cuban involvement. Zaire probably presents the best opportunity for exploiting indigenous opposition to a corrupt and chronically unstable regime. A post-independence Namibia is another area of potential opportunity for the Soviets and the Cubans should internal stability, external pressures from South Africa, or spill-over from the UNITA-Angolan Government conflict lead Namibian leaders to seek outside military help. The Cubans and the Soviets can be expected to take advantage of opportunities which arise as the result of unpredictable events, for example, the departure from the scene or the death of or overthrow of current leaders, and of structural weaknesses endemic to post-colonial Africa. Uganda after Amin will be vulnerable to subversion. Ghana and Nigeria are both in a period of political unease as military leaders embark on reversion to civilian rule. There are obvious uncertainties in the post-Kenyatta scene in Kenya.

### *Part III—Policy Actions and Instruments*

#### *A. Instruments:*

US actions to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa should be keyed to the following long-term goals: a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa; the orderly social and economic development of the nations of Africa; and a strengthened Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its member states to resolve the underlying causes of inter-African conflict. Flowing from these goals are shorter-term objectives: the removal of the immediate occasions for outside intervention in African affairs; the removal of Cuban combat troops from the Continent; and an increase in the costs to the Soviets and the Cubans of involvement in African trouble spots.

There are seven policy/action instruments available for use:

1. *Diplomatic*—Direct diplomatic approaches to the Soviets and the Cubans can be continued, but exhortation and warnings are unlikely to bring about changes in either government's opportunistic approach to Africa. Careful diplomatic work in the Organization of American States might result in a weak resolution *indirectly* condemning Cuban activities in Africa. There is virtually no chance of achieving even that result in either the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity, although we may be able to work through the UN and the OAU to encourage negotiated settlements of African disputes. Our Western European allies (particularly France) might be persuasive with certain countries, such as the radical Arab states who would discount or dismiss US approaches. If pressed by us, 3 or 4 Latin American states might raise US concern over Cuba's military involvement in Africa with Havana, but we cannot expect much in the way of direct results. We could continue our efforts directly and through our European, Arab, and African friends to convince selected members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to oppose Cuban cooperation with Soviet military activities in Africa as inconsistent with Cuba's status in and its desire for leadership of the NAM. It is possible that too direct or frontal an effort could backfire and strengthen support within the NAM for Cuba.

US efforts to resolve disputes and to bring about peaceful change in Africa by working bilaterally with African governments and multilaterally with African, Arab, and European states can be continued. The recent agreement among the parties for the peaceful decolonization of South West Africa/Namibia after 15 months of careful, patient, and persistent diplomacy demonstrates the significant progress which can be made toward the resolution of African conflicts by working in an African context.<sup>10</sup>

By maintaining a continuing dialogue with Africans of all persuasions, we can strengthen our credibility and influence in Africa. This influence can help us in turn to frustrate Soviet/Cuban aspirations by enabling us to contribute effectively to arranging negotiated settlements. Opening or expanding existing relations with some countries which have been close to the Soviets and the Cubans also provides those states with an "option" to the West; it increases their flexibility of policy and behavior, and encourages them to utilize it. While there is potentially a risk that the aid we might provide could enable the recipient government to utilize its own resources for military purposes and continue its military relationship with the Soviets and the Cubans, we should be able to avoid the types or amounts of assistance which

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<sup>10</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 88 and 89.



would free resources for military equipment or operations. On the other hand, a decision to limit US interaction with African states which permit or encourage Soviet/Cuban involvement could increase the economic cost to the Soviets of their activities, sharpen African awareness of the inadequacy of Soviet assistance, and deter other governments from support of Soviet/Cuban actions. But such a US cut-off would heighten the East-West confrontation in Africa and be sharply criticized by most African states.

Ongoing arms control negotiations which have direct substantive linkages to Soviet activities in Africa, e.g. the Indian Ocean talks, and the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) restraint talks might be utilized—to call the Soviets to task for their military activities in Africa and to show them that an alternative cooperative course for protecting their interests is open to them. There is no evidence thus far, however, that the Soviets are prepared to limit their political options in Africa by forswearing their only effective resource tool: arms; or that the pace or content of the Indian Ocean talks will influence Soviet African policy measurably. On those arms control negotiations which do not have direct substantive linkage to Africa, e.g. SALT, we can continue to make clear to the Soviets that progress is made difficult when Soviet activities are raising tensions and adversely affecting public and Congressional attitudes.

2. *Economic Assistance*—Development assistance is one of the strong cards that we and our Western partners hold in the competition with Soviet/Cuban military aid diplomacy in Africa. A vigorous development assistance effort permits us both to identify the US and the West with the long-term aspirations of the peoples and leaders of Africa and to counter Soviet ambitions in the short-term by strengthening our presence on the ground. If our economic aid program in Africa were substantially increased in size and scope—perhaps from \$467 million proposed in FY 79 to some \$950 million in FY 80 and to include infrastructure for river basin development and relieving transportation and communications bottlenecks, and to expand training, health and energy programs—it could be more effective. At the same time, the very substantial US and Western commitments to African development, together with clear assurances of major increases to address problems which the Africans consider critical, need to be made more visible. Africa's most basic problems are long term and require long term solutions. (See Annex VIII, in particular VIII-B, for a more complete and detailed exposition of the contribution development assistance can make to the achievement of US objectives in Africa.)

The West also offers African nations the most lucrative markets for their exports, access to capital, the highest quality goods and the most advanced technology available in nearly every field.



But the impact of these Western economic assets is generally long-term. We cannot counter Soviet/Cuban military assistance directly with long term contributions to African development. We need flexibility to devise, in coordination with other Western governments, an array of short-term and long-term economic tools which will permit the fashioning of integrated economic packages that are responsive to urgent needs. Such packages should include not only development assistance, which addresses both immediate and longer term requirements, plus incentives for foreign investment and access to Western markets and technology, but also short-term assistance, balance of payments and budget support, and export financing. In this way, economic instruments could be used more effectively, with other policy tools to help offset Soviet and Cuban initiatives by demonstrating the economic advantages which association with the West affords Africa.

3. *Military Related Measures*—Military measures will not be successful in and of themselves in achieving US objectives in Africa. But combined with diplomatic and economic initiatives, security assistance—arms transfers, military training, military construction activity—could reduce the incentive of countries to seek Soviet assistance and could contribute to improved US–African relations. US policy restraints together with practical limitations (e.g. a country's ability to absorb materiel or training) will continue to keep US security assistance to Africa at a modest level. The U.S. might support African peacekeeping efforts. The U.S. can encourage other countries to shoulder some of the burden of checking the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa by providing funds, equipment and forces. While it is not US policy at this time to send US combat forces to Africa, we can demonstrate our capability to project our power in Africa by providing logistics support to African, European or international organization forces operating in Africa and by scheduling Navy port visits or organizing joint training exercises with the military forces of selected African nations. There are numerous military actions which could be taken against Cuba or the Soviet Union and their military forces—increasing the surveillance of Soviet ELINT ships, aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba, increased air and sea surveillance of Cuban aircraft and ships, etc. The U.S. could also encourage nations whose airspace is being used by Soviet/Cuban aircraft on route to Africa to deny them overflight clearance and to challenge the overflying aircraft. However, such actions would not stop Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa, and the wisdom of turning to such measures to communicate our concern over Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa is subject to vigorous debate.

4. *Enlisting the Support of Allies and Friends*—The political pressures which our allies and other friends can bring to bear on the Soviets and the Cubans closely parallel our own at a lower level of potential

effectiveness. They could provide economic support and development assistance to vulnerable African nations who wish to resist. France, Morocco and a small number of other nations have already provided military support in the form of equipment, training, logistics help, and combat troops.

5. *Economic and Financial Incentives and Disincentives*—Neither US bilateral nor multilateral economic or financial measures directed at Cuba appear to offer a sufficient negative cost or positive inducement to produce a change in Cuban African policy. Bilateral US sanctions already preclude most economic contact, and the Cubans have made it clear that a normalization of US-Cuban relations does not provide sufficient incentive to change. The imposition of multilaterally agreed upon economic/financial sanctions (particularly the curtailment of official credits and export guarantees and private credits) could impose significant economic penalties on Havana, and on Moscow if it felt compelled to pick up the slack on behalf of Cuba. But the extensive international cooperation required to make such sanctions effective would be extremely difficult to achieve. A mandatory multilateral trade embargo of Cuba would require UN Security Council action which would be subject to Soviet veto. Our allies are most unlikely to agree to an informal embargo of Cuba. Such sanctions would involve serious political and important economic costs to us and to our allies. As a result, Cuba's European and Asian trading partners are not likely to cut back their trade with Cuba or curtail the flow of credit to Havana.

The U.S. could exert limited economic pressure on the USSR (through tightening technology transfer and trade, including a reduction in grain shipments). But experience suggests that economic pressures and trade incentives do not have significant impact on Soviet behavior. In addition, there are severe domestic constraints on such pressures, not only on grain exports, but increasingly on other exports as well. A US effort to obtain multilateral agreement to limit trade with the Soviets or to restrict credit flows is unlikely to succeed in the face of Western and Japanese unwillingness to terminate government-supported credits or extend trade restrictions to non-strategic items. Allied reluctance is occasioned not only by the prospective impact on their own economies of such measures, but also by their judgment (which we share) that such measures would be largely ineffective in furthering our common political objectives.

A range of positive and negative measures which could be used to influence the policies of African governments also exists. Expanded OPIC and EXIMBANK financing, international bank lending, commodity agreements, etc. are essentially long term. The negative measures (trade embargos, the blockage of assets, the slow-down of lending and assistance programs) would require not only Western but Arab oil

producer cooperation to be effective. They run the risk of domestic and Third World backlash, and run counter to other US economic policies.

6. *Public Diplomacy*—The tools of public diplomacy—the Voice of America, films, television, books and documents, exchange of persons programs, etc.—can be utilized to develop an international perception of the problems posed by continued Soviet/Cuban military involvement in Africa; gain support for constructive, i.e. economic and ideological rather than military, competition between East and West; and stress the need for long-term African growth and stability and for fostering development, peaceful change, and racial and social justice. A detailed public diplomacy program can be devised to support whichever policy option is selected.

B. Specific Issues and Situations—Issues for Decision or Discussion:

1. In the Diplomatic sphere:

—Whether to work toward normal relations with all the governments and groupings in Africa regardless of their support or acquiescence in Soviet/Cuban military involvement.

—Should we (a) undertake a major diplomatic effort in the coming months with the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to persuade them to raise objections to Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa, to challenge Cuba's credentials as an NAM state, and voice objection to continued Cuban efforts to lead the NAM, and (b) urge Latin American and other moderate states which are not NAM members to join and work against radical influence in the NAM?

2. In the Economic Assistance sphere:

—Should we attempt despite the active opposition of some Members of Congress and the public and the lack of enthusiasm of many others for foreign aid to increase substantially the size and broaden the scope of our economic development assistance program in Africa in order to obtain the resources required for the success of our African strategy?

3. In the Military sphere:

—Should we increase our military assistance programs in Africa substantially in dollar amounts, scope, and number of recipients?

—Should we increase our peacetime military visibility in Africa by increasing the number of Navy port calls, USAF overflights and visits, and joint military training exercises?

—Should we consider direct actions against the USSR and Cuba and against their military forces (e.g. increased surveillance of Soviet ELINT ships and of Cuban aircraft and ships, overflights of Cuba)?

4. In the Economic/Financial sphere:

—Should we consider additional unilateral or multilateral restraints on trade, credit flows, and the transfer of technology with

Cuba and the Soviet Union in the event their military role in Africa increases?

C. Specific Issues and Situations—OPTIONS:

The options below are designed to draw together for conceptual purposes varying sets of hypothetical choices, which appear to have an internal consistency of approach, from among the issues for decision described above in III, B. It would of course be possible to construct differing options by choosing somewhat differently from among the decision issues. The following options are, in addition, designed for the coming year. Their success or failure, judged in terms of results in Africa during that period, would determine any need for further review. In Part I, it was suggested that an assessment of the situation be made after a year.

All of the policy options we have identified have a common set of assumptions:

- that the U.S. will continue to pursue its efforts to secure a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa;

- that we will continue to emphasize economic and social development in our assistance strategy for Africa;

- that our military assistance to African nations will continue to be selective and measured;

- that direct US military involvement in Africa will be limited to logistics support for the combat forces of others;

- that the U.S. will continue to stress the need for Africans to develop their own efforts to resolve local disputes and to develop their own peacekeeping capabilities;

- that the US Government in concert with other like-minded governments, will continue to stress to the Soviets and the Cubans the destabilizing effects of their unrestrained arms transfers and their pursuit of military adventurism in Africa.

It is also assumed that there will be no major shift in Soviet/Cuban policies in the next 6 to 12 months.

OPTION 1:

To continue to pursue present policies aimed at peaceful resolution of disputes, focus military assistance programs on a limited number of key, friendly African states to strengthen their defense capabilities, but with close attention to our arms transfer restraint objectives, provide limited logistics support on a case by case basis for third country military forces requested by an African state under attack from outside its borders, increase economic assistance and other resource flows, and emphasize the need for African resolution of local disputes. Within this framework, the U.S. would encourage key African leaders to revitalize the OAU, urge OAU members to call for restraint by all African

countries in seeking the assistance of foreign troops, continue to work with the UN, the OAU and sub-regional groups of African countries to promote the peaceful resolution of specific conflicts, work towards an arms transfer restraint regime in the next CAT negotiating session, and persist in our efforts to exert international pressure on the Soviets and Cubans (through the NAM and other channels) to limit their military activities in Africa and to withdraw their combat forces from the Continent. (See pp 47–48 for a detailed presentation of the specific actions to be taken in West and Central Africa, in the Horn, and in southern Africa.)

PRO: This course is essentially an indirect, African-focused approach to the Soviets and the Cubans. It leaves us free to concentrate our attention on our longer-term goals in Africa, places the U.S. in the role of peacemaker while casting the Soviets and the Cubans as “meddlers”, provides a measure of reassurance to moderate African leaders, avoids polarization of African forces, emphasizes US advantages in the economic and technical assistance fields, and minimizes East-West confrontational aspects of our strategy.

CON: This course does not meet directly the challenge of the ongoing Soviet/Cuban activities or lead to short-term reduction in Soviet/Cuban presence or involvement in Africa. It may leave some moderate African and Arab states with a sense of uncertainty as to whether the U.S. is willing to counter Soviet/Cuban military activity in Africa and about their own security.

#### OPTION 2:

In addition to the steps in Option 1, to intensify efforts to support friendly governments which are concerned about Soviet/Cuban activities with substantially increased military and economic assistance, encourage efforts by the OAU to buttress African peacekeeping capabilities, and use diplomatic means to mobilize European and Non-Aligned sentiment against Soviet/Cuban actions. Within this framework, the U.S. would engage in a vigorous diplomatic campaign to seek condemnation of Cuba in the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, focus NATO and other non-African government attention on the dangers posed by Soviet/Cuban actions in Africa, and move immediately, with Congressional approval, to increase significantly not only our economic development aid but also our security supporting assistance and FMS credits for African countries. If an OAU peacekeeping force were established, we would offer logistics support.

PRO: This course of action provides greater reassurance to France, Belgium and moderate African and Arab states of US willingness and determination to support efforts to stabilize the situation in Africa and to counter in tangible ways Soviet/Cuban involvement. It reserves the US position in the event that even more drastic action might have to

be taken should Soviet/Cuban actions be markedly stepped-up. It stresses continuing US support for peacekeeping by the Africans themselves.

CON: The increases projected in economic and military aid impose difficult budget choices. Congressional reaction to increased US military supply to Africa is likely to be negative. Reaction to greater development assistance transfers may be less sharp but is still likely to be adverse. Some African “progressive” states may regard this track as provocative and likely to lead to polarization unless it is balanced by intensified US diplomatic and other actions aimed at South Africa and Rhodesia. It is doubtful that the NAM will respond conclusively or effectively against Cuban military involvement. Certain elements of this course, if mishandled, could risk diplomatic rupture with Ethiopia, a failure in efforts to improve relations with Angola, and greater polarization of Africa along East-West lines.

OPTION 3:

To adopt a policy of direct and clear cut opposition to Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa, using bilateral US-Soviet and US-Cuban relations as a means of increasing pressures. Within this framework, the U.S. would, in addition to the measures described in Options 1 and 2, intensify its public denunciation of the Soviets and the Cubans particularly if there is any increase in Soviet/Cuban military activity, call explicitly for OAU or individual African government opposition to Soviet/Cuban involvement, and seek to create a consortium of European-African-Arab states to support regional or individual African state efforts to strengthen their security and resist Soviet/Cuban incursions. The U.S. would make clear through specific actions that US-Soviet and US-Cuban bilateral economic, exchange, technological, and other relationships would suffer as a result of Soviet and Cuban African policies. The U.S. would launch efforts to persuade our allies to join us in applying economic and financial sanctions against Cuba. The U.S. would also announce its intention to increase markedly its military assistance programs in Africa, including the provision of more sophisticated military equipment to countries threatened by the Soviet/Cuban presence. We would consult on an urgent basis with our European allies, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Morocco on establishing a coordinated strategy for resource transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.

PRO: This course of action establishes clearly US will and determination to deal with Soviet/Cuban “meddling” in Africa. It reinforces our general strategy for southern Africa, leaves the USSR and Cuba enmeshed in a no-win situation in Eritrea, and meets rising moderate African-Arab concerns.

CON: This course of action puts the problems of Africa into a sharply defined East-West context, and would as a consequence draw

fire from Nigeria, Tanzania, and other influential African governments. It would further polarize African opinion, antagonize the Front Line states, and severely hamper our ability to work with them on southern African issues. More significantly, it risks the escalation of African conflicts, and raises the very real possibility of greater US military involvement in Africa. This course of action will convince South Africa that it has nothing to gain from further collaboration on Rhodesia and Namibia. Finally, this track would be difficult to sustain in terms of Congressional and public opinion, of allied cooperation, or of our other foreign policy objectives.

*Part IV—Congressional and Public Posture*

Most Americans think about Africa only when events or issues place it in an East-West framework and seem to involve the United States. In this context, two long-term opinion trends are relevant: the American public's deep distrust of the Soviet Union and its deep-seated unwillingness to commit American soldiers or large amounts of other resources or prestige to distant fronts so long as there is no clear perception that American security is directly and unquestionably endangered.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the Secretary of State's recent appearance before the House International Relations Committee<sup>12</sup> and his Atlantic City speech on Africa,<sup>13</sup> many Members of Congress remain uneasy and uncertain about what US policy in Africa is. Members perceive the U.S. as reacting to events in Africa on a piece-meal basis rather than within a coherent policy framework, are unsure over the direction of US policy toward the Soviet Union, and are apprehensive that US involvement in Africa to counter Soviet/Cuban expansionism could ensnare us in another Viet Nam.

An effective public posture—at home and abroad—would build on the major policy statements about US-USSR and US-African relations recently made by the President and the Secretary of State in which they set forth our view of Africa, defined our long-term purpose in positive terms, and outlined the type of relationship we desire and expect to have with the Soviets and the Cubans in the African context. Abroad, our public diplomacy strategy would: reinforce our positive,

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<sup>11</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the left margin.

<sup>12</sup> Vance appeared before the House International Relations Committee to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations and Africa on June 19. For the text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, pp. 14–16.

<sup>13</sup> Vance gave the speech to the Annual Meeting of the U.S. Jaycees in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on June 20. For the text of the speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, pp. 10–13. Excerpts of the speech are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 89.



forward-looking policy toward Africa; work to remove the “mantle of legitimacy” from Soviet/Cuban involvement; communicate American support for long-term development, for social justice, independence and stability in Africa; stimulate an international consensus against continued Soviet and Cuban military involvement; and encourage African efforts to develop ground rules to contain and reduce Soviet/Cuban military activities and to evolve African institutional capabilities for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

At home, an effective public posture would reiterate that our relationship with the Soviet Union is at once competitive and cooperative, that our African strategy is long-range and is directed at helping African peoples and their leaders solve the fundamental problems confronting them, and that the U.S. need have no fears about the long-range outcome of a vigorous competition with the Soviets in Africa. It would emphasize that Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa is still limited, that the West enjoys decided advantages there, and that the U.S. has greatly enhanced its position and significantly increased its influence in Africa in the last two years. It would, finally, note that our long-range strategy requires a long-term commitment of support, and appeal to the people and the Congress to have the patience and determination to stay the course.

We believe that sufficient public and Congressional support can be mustered to approve and implement a range of countermeasures—short of committing US troops. However, any approach to the Congress for support and for additional resources, and in particular any effort by the Executive Branch to secure the lifting of the constraints which have been imposed by Congress over the past few years, will result in a full scale debate of the entire range of questions involved.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper, including several annexes.]



**17. Editorial Note**

In January 1980, the Carter administration chose to send boxer Mohammed Ali to visit several African countries in order to build support for an international boycott of the Moscow Olympics, initiated after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Documentation on these visits is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues.

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**18. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 7, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Report on My Recent Trip Through Four African Countries [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. I recently paid visits to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. My principal observations are:

a. Leaders of all countries expressed concern over external threats to their security.

b. All of the countries face formidable long-term internal security problems, though none faces imminent threats. Considerable concern was expressed at the internal threat posed by the example of Sergeant Doe's successful coup in Liberia.<sup>2</sup>

c. Uniformly there were strong complaints at the unwillingness of the United States to supply arms to these countries. [*less than 1 line not declassified*], for instance, claimed that all of his friends are coming to look on the Soviets as the only people on whom they can rely. While this is an exaggeration, I did sense that the Soviets have created a belief of Soviet momentum throughout Africa as a result of the number and wide variety of their activities.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 3, Central Intelligence Agency, 5–12/80. Secret. Carter wrote "C" in the upper-right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 55 and 56.

d. The general quest for more arms in part relates to the expressed concerns about external threats, but also in large part to the importance for these leaders of being able to placate their own military. The concern over the Liberian example is typical of this. It did not appear to me that any of these countries was in real need of military aid. In the first instance, the external threats are not that great. In the second, they are not equipped to handle advanced weaponry. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified*]

—In short, what the military forces of countries like these really need is to have a sense of discipline, organization and mission instilled in them. [*2 lines not declassified*] It occurs to me that the most genuine assistance which the U.S. could offer to the leaders of these countries is training advisers. Fifty or sixty U.S. Army or Marine Corps personnel, ranging from Sergeant to Major, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], could whip those battalions into shape over a period of a year or so. [*3 lines not declassified*] Even two crack battalions, however, [*2 lines not declassified*]. The provision of training assistants would not be expensive. It need not involve FMS or IMET since no equipment would be involved nor would there be mobile training teams (MTTs). Those teach specific functions for a limited period of time, whereas what the military forces of these countries need is to have our people living and working with them in order to establish performance standards for them. Their continued presence would ensure performance towards those standards. Politically, the presence of U.S. training advisers may not be acceptable in many African countries. Still, the offer to support a genuine need would, I believe, stand us in good stead over the long run. In contrast, the Soviet provision of unnecessary equipment such as SA-3s and MIG-21s may well have a deleterious impact in the long run.<sup>3</sup>

e. The economic outlook [*less than 1 line not declassified*] can only be described as bleak, and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] it is not good.

f. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are virulent with regard to U.S. policy toward South Africa. Their economy is becoming so increasingly dependent upon South Africa that they cannot afford to take a strong stand themselves.

g. [*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Africa.]

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand drew a line down the left margin adjacent to this paragraph.

**19. Memorandum From the Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press) to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Results of S&T Delegation to Black Africa (U)

I want to report to you on the results of my just-completed visit to Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Zimbabwe. I took to these countries a delegation of our senior appointees in science and technology (e.g. heads of NASA, NSF, NIH, NOAA) and the Presidents of NAS, Ohio State and University of Rochester. At each stop we were received enthusiastically and we achieved our goals of initiating or enhancing cooperation in major areas of development. In particular, in Nigeria and Senegal we followed up on your recent visits. (U)

I met with Prime Minister Mugabe, Presidents Moi and Senghor and the Nigerian Vice President. All hold our country in the highest esteem. All are flattered and grateful for the President's sending the delegation, both for the political message it implies and the technological cooperation it portends. Each—including President Shagari—is writing the President to express his appreciation. (U)

At each of the four stops I signed an agreement for cooperation in science and technology. These are to some extent symbolic but do provide a very useful framework for cooperation. We also signed specific agreements for carrying out major projects with the host countries. These are in areas of priority identified by those countries, typically agriculture and fisheries, energy, health, remote sensing, management and manpower training. For all except Nigeria—which will pay for the assistance it gets—these projects will be funded by AID or the technical agencies, using money which is already programmed. (U)

Mugabe said he was sorry he couldn't come back to help in the campaign! He expressed his strong support for US-Zimbabwean cooperation in S&T. Zimbabwe has been most fortunate in inheriting valuable mineral and agricultural resources, an industrial base, and a (white) managerial class, albeit a nervous and resentful one. They will need a growing competence in their black technocrats to succeed in reconstructing the country, reshaping its society, and providing a better life for the poor, rural blacks. (U)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 63, Foreign Countries—Nigeria [1980]. Confidential.

Shagari will be briefed on the results of our stop in Lagos prior to his visit next week. Our mission there accomplished all its objectives, including the signing of an S&T agreement and reimbursable agreements in several areas of agriculture (soil surveys, training, technical assistance), the environment (oil spills, environmental impact statements), fisheries and oceanography. (U)

President Senghor told me of his eagerness to obtain technical assistance and training opportunities from the U.S. Why, he asked, should Senegal get technology from France and the other Europeans when they themselves obtained it from the U.S.? He was very pleased by the opportunities presented as a result of our visit. Senghor said he is most supportive of our efforts regarding Afghanistan, and critical in this regard of Giscard and Schmidt. (C)

These high-level S&T visits have many benefits. In addition to agreements realized, they result in personal contacts made by senior counterparts of the two sides. These should serve to develop and facilitate further opportunities for cooperation. Also, my meetings with heads of state serve to elevate the status of S&T leaders of those states, leaders who could contribute significantly to development if they have status and clout. (U)

Above all, these visits serve to bring into play in our foreign policy a major but under-utilized asset of our country: our leadership of the world's science and technology. Each of these four countries is eager for our technological help. With each, increasing technological bonds will undoubtedly lead to stronger political ties. As a result of the visits, I believe that each of the four countries will reorder its priorities on what it seeks from the U.S. They will capitalize on our particular strength and seek relatively more technological assistance from us. (U)

As a result of this trip I believe more than ever that U.S. bilateral aid should emphasize technological assistance and PL 480 food; concessional aid should be shifted to the World Bank and other international lending agencies. This approach need cost us no more than what we spend now. At the present time major opportunities are available to us for little additional funds. By reprogramming some \$10 million (less than 10% of our assistance to these countries), we can develop a technological assistance program that would serve to solve many problems of Zimbabwe, Kenya and Senegal and bring us many political benefits. I will be pursuing this through the budgetary process. (U)

## West Africa

### 20. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Lagos, February 18, 1977, 1622Z

1973. Subject: Discussion of US-Nigerian Bilateral Relations With Obasanjo.

1. Near the close of Ambassador Young's long discussion February 10 with Lt. General Obasanjo at Dodan Barracks, Obasanjo raised the question of US-Nigerian bilateral relations.<sup>2</sup> Noting "the strain" that he said the Angolan confrontation and Nigerian lack of trust in the Nixon-Ford administration had produced in our bilateral dialogue,<sup>3</sup> Obasanjo stated he saw important possibilities now for improved collaboration between our two countries. He then told me he could not understand why "major American companies, for example in construction, were not taking a greater interest in the Nigerian market."

2. As Obasanjo seemed unaware of the increase in number of active US firms in past year, I told him he would be seeing early evidence of greater US activity in the Nigerian market. At the same time, I could not deny there were problems. I cited the kinds of factors that American businessmen examine when deciding where to expend scarce financial and manpower resources. I noted such items as costs of rental or purchase of office space and residential buildings, access to communications facilities (telephone, telex, etc.), ability to move around the city and the countryside, clarity and extent of indigenization requirements, general climate for expatriates, availability of strong local partners, and efficiency of host government bureaucracy. I said that on some of the cited points Nigerian scored high, on others less so. I said that the Embassy had an active program of assisting and counseling American companies interested in the Nigerian market regarding how best to approach and evaluate these various factors, and I assured the Head of State that FMG offices and other Nigerians were engaged in similar and collaborative efforts with US. In particular we often found that we had to urge patience on American companies who sometimes

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770059-0052. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to USUN and London.

<sup>2</sup> Young visited Nigeria February 7-11 during his mission to Africa. For his report on his mission, see Document 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 212-216 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976.

thought they could strike “the quick deal.” These various efforts were achieving a stronger US business presence in Nigeria.

3. I also cited the importance of the business and commercial grapevine in the US which I said could sometimes exaggerate the complications of doing business in Lagos. If a major company thought it had suffered a bad experience it might reverberate around the corporate boardrooms and business luncheon circuits in ways that would discourage other American companies from taking a careful and serious look at Nigerian market possibilities. As an example, I cited C–E Tec and its experience with the military barracks construction project.

4. Obasanjo said he understood the effects of the sorts of problems I had mentioned and hoped we could work together to alleviate them. As for C–E Tec, he said “they presented us with an impossibly expensive deal—besides, they are getting a good project in the east.” I said I was not privy to the details of the military barracks negotiation and its breakdown but I thought that better communication and more patience on both sides might have produced better understanding and avoided the possibility that C–E Tec’s experience might discourage others. (As for the C–E Tec project in Anambra and Imo states, we understand it was terminated in its early stages.)

5. I asked about the long-awaited program of incentives for foreign oil producers. Obasanjo said it would be announced soon.

6. Ambassador Young mentioned his long-time interest in a Nigerian-American joint consultative commission and asked whether something along such lines might be timely. Obasanjo said he thought yes and asked Garba whether the FMG had not already studied the matter. Garba referred to the several conversations he and I had had on this subject over the past eighteen months and said his office had received materials from us for review and discussion with other departments of the government. Garba told Obasanjo that the FMG would pick up this matter again with the USG. I cautioned that the experience we had had with other such commissions indicated that they were most useful when tailored to specific needs and interests of each side. Even then, the demands that the commission infrastructure puts on high-level officials of both governments are heavy. I suggested that careful exploration of such a proposal would be necessary prior to raising the possible merits of the proposal to decision-making levels in each government. Obasanjo agreed, and instructed Garba to undertake such explorations with me.<sup>4</sup>

**Easum**

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<sup>4</sup> Bilateral discussions took place in November 1977 and April 1978. See Document 36.

## 21. Telegram From the Embassy in Mali to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Bamako, March 25, 1977, 1034Z

1138. Subject: Soviet Military Activity in Mali—a French View.

1. DCM and Embassy's Defense Attache (resident in Dakar) called March 21 on French Military Attache in Bamako, Lt. Col. Claude Maquin, to discuss Soviet military activity in Mali. Maquin said Malians placed priority on developing their Air Force. There are about 80 Malians now training in Soviet Union,<sup>2</sup> including pilots, radar technicians, maintenance specialists, and runway repair technicians. In short, said Maquin, Malians were developing needed infrastructure to support an Air Force, or, he added, a Soviet Air Force presence.

2. Maquin had heard rumors of Soviet activity in Adrar des Iforas section in remote Sixth Region near Algerian border. There were natural air strips in that area that could be used, although the logistic problems would be enormous. Area is barren rock and desert populated sparsely by nomadic tribesmen.

3. Soviets were also providing equipment and training in armor and artillery, but the tanks were World War II relics—about 30 T-34's. Maquin said he had not heard of any T-62 model tanks in Mali. Maquin had counted six additional T-34's delivered to Mali via Guinea in late 1976.

4. Maquin noted that Malians had, by Sahelian standards, a respectable military force. Even the old tanks represented impressive fire-power against other African countries. Yet, said Maquin, the Malians lacked the logistic facilities to go much beyond their own borders. Senegal and Ivory Coast would only have to cut the railroad and the roads leading to Mali and Malian Armed Forces would be cut off. Perhaps in the far distant future Soviet logistic support—from the north—might be enough to carry Mali against its coastal neighbors, but that was farfetched. Maquin doubted that the Malians had any territorial designs on their neighbors.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Box 18, Africa. Confidential. Sent for information to Abidjan, Conakry, Dakar for the Defense Attaché, Moscow, Ouagadougou, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this sentence and the previous one in the right margin and underlined "80 Malians now training in Soviet Union."

**22. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Sale of Boeing Chinook Helicopters to Nigeria

The Boeing Vertol Company has informed us that the Nigerian Air Force wishes to purchase seven Chinook helicopters (CH-47C's). Since this prospective sale could change the nature of our military supply relationship with Nigeria, I am informing you about it at this early stage to obtain your views.

The total sale could amount to about \$40 million. If approved, it would represent the first sale on a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) basis of U.S. military equipment to Nigeria since the Nigerian civil war. (The Nigerians already have six C-130 transport planes, but these were purchased commercially, not through FMS.) Boeing representatives have informed us that the Nigerian Federal Military Government (FMG) would like to send a 5–7 man team to the United States the week of April 17 to visit the Boeing production facility and U.S. Army installations to inspect and see CH-47 helicopters demonstrated. State Department permission would be required for a visit to the Boeing factory because it is a defense plant. Defense Department clearance is required to visit U.S. Army installations.

Our Ambassador to Nigeria strongly favors the sale of Chinooks, but he and Boeing are concerned that the Nigerians not be allowed to proceed too far if there is any chance the USG would turn down a subsequent request for a FMS Letter of Offer and Acceptance. Boeing has requested an advisory opinion on whether we would issue an export license.

Although your election and Ambassador Young's trip to Nigeria have already strengthened our bilateral relations,<sup>2</sup> we have an interest in further links to the FMG. The USG's decision not to sell spare parts and ammunition during the Nigerian civil war was a basic reason for the decline in our relations. A Nigerian decision to proceed with the Chinook purchase could contribute to the further improvement of US-Nigerian relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nigeria 1–2/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 20.



With respect to arms transfer policy concerns, the Chinook is a heavy-lift helicopter which would improve the mobility of the Nigerian armed forces and would also be available for non-military roles such as civic action and infrastructure projects. It is unarmed, and we have sold non-lethal equipment to Nigeria in the past. For these reasons, Ambassador Young supports this sale. It cannot be air transported (except by the very largest cargo aircraft) and has limited range, so that it is unlikely to be used outside the immediate environs of Nigeria. Nigeria is already militarily much stronger than its neighbors, but this has not raised concerns among them. However, a Chinook sale could lead to further sales inquiries from the Nigerians. They have already expressed interest in possible purchases of C-130 and F-5E aircraft, artillery, air defense radar, and other military equipment.

While the visit of the Nigerian team does not require Congressional notification, it may eventually lead to a sale which would require submission to Congress. Under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, any Letter of Offer to sell major defense equipment valued at \$7 million or more must be submitted to Congress for review and possible rejection by concurrent resolution.

*Recommendation:*

In light of our desire to improve our bilateral relationship with Nigeria and notwithstanding our general policy to restrict arms transfers to developing countries, I recommend that you:

A. Authorize me to approve the prospective Nigerian visit to Boeing facilities and to request the Department of Defense to approve visits to appropriate U.S. Army installations.

B. Approve in principle a positive USG response to any subsequent Nigerian request to purchase CH-47 Chinook helicopters.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option under both recommendations.

**23. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

*SOVIET ACTIVITY IN MALI*

The Soviets are engaged in airport modernization in Mali. They have already lengthened the strip at Mopti to 3000 meters and are doing the same at Bamako. Another airstrip is also being worked on.

This program is logical enough from the Malian point of view; they have received a few MIGs from the Soviets and the lengthened runways will accommodate these. The related early warning radars and navigation aids are also logical.

More disturbing from our point of view is the capability of these strips to handle large Soviet transports of the type (AN-22) that would be used to support possible military operations in Southern Africa. The Soviets made some limited use of Mali's fields during the Angolan operation; the improved fields would be much more attractive to the Soviets and they would probably feel that they had good grounds for demanding their use, either as an alternative to Conakry or in addition to it. (The route from Algeria to Central Africa is much shorter via Mopti than via Conakry—see map.)<sup>2</sup>

We do not know of any agreement providing for Soviet use of these fields but should find out if any exists. We probably do not have much legal ground for arguing against Soviet use but we might consider exploring ways of averting a problem before it arises:

—Our own influence in Mali is limited. Before anything else is done, however, State and Embassy Bamako should explore the possible usefulness of a direct approach. Ambassador Byrne is anxious to have subjects to raise with her host government; she could be briefed on our view of the Soviet role in Africa or some similar topic and lead the conversation to our concern over Soviet military involvement in the continent.<sup>3</sup>

—The French have residual influence in Mali; they could be asked to convey their concern that Mali not become a staging area for Soviet activities in Central and Southern Africa.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 105, 6–7/77. Secret. Richardson and Thornton sent the paper to Brzezinski under a June 3 covering memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 27.

—Most useful might be approaches by other Africans (Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire) along the same lines. We could inspire these.

Whoever makes the approaches they would obviously have to be cast in general terms—e.g., on the undesirability of great power military involvement in Africa. Mali is not guilty of anything and perhaps has no intention of obliging the Soviets in this regard. Still, it might be useful to remind them gently.

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**24. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1977

Dear Zbig:

Attached is a memorandum<sup>2</sup> in response to your query about Soviet activity in Mali and how it might be countered.<sup>3</sup>

The paper in general concludes that the Soviet airfield construction program will enhance the USSR's capability to provide air logistical support for military operations in Angola or southern Africa. The significant increase in Soviet military assistance to Mali over the past year, particularly in aircraft sales and airfield construction, would tend to ensure some type of Soviet access to Mali's airfields.

In view of Mali's current reliance on Soviet military aid, and the mutual interest of these two governments in supporting liberation movements in southern Africa, it appears doubtful that Mali would be responsive to a Western suggestion to deny the Soviets access to these facilities without a very positive Western offer of military assistance.

If you have additional questions on this subject, please let us know.

Yours sincerely,

**Stansfield Turner<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Mali 1/77-1/81. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Turner signed "Stan" above his typed signature.

**25. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1977

SUBJECT

Soviet Activity in Mali

Your memorandum of June 6, 1977, raised several questions concerning the Soviet airfield improvement program in Mali.<sup>2</sup> When the program is completed, a number of these strips will be able to accommodate large Soviet transports such as the AN-22. Whether a formal agreement exists for Soviet use of these fields is of minor significance, as Mali is solidly committed to support "wars of liberation" against white-controlled regimes in southern Africa. Were the Soviets to request permission to use these fields to support possible military operations in southern Africa, it immediately would be granted by the Malians.

Because of Mali's landlocked position, the improved airfields do not offer the same advantages as enjoyed by the Soviets in Guinea or Somalia. For example, if they wished to stage TU-95 reconnaissance flights from Mali, the Soviets would need to obtain overflight clearances from the neighboring African countries. Additionally, it would be much more expensive to fuel and support aircraft in Mali, than at airfields like Conakry and Cotonou along the coast.

The airfield improvement program is of direct benefit to Mali and has non-military significance as well. It will strengthen considerably Mali's internal air transport capability and will make possible direct flights from the country's major agricultural areas to Europe by civilian freighters. The Malians eventually hope to export by air, major quantities of fruits, vegetables, and chilled meat to the European market.

The strength of Mali's commitment to the liberation of southern Africa is such that neither a direct approach by the U.S., nor influence through the French or Mali's African neighbors would cause her to deny the Soviets use of the improved airfields in the support of operations in southern Africa. Indeed, Soviet flights in support of the liberation of southern Africa probably would be welcome in certain other West

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Mali 1/77–1/81. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. An undated and unsigned memorandum to the Secretary of State, attached to Richardson and Thornton's June 3 covering memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 1, Document 23) raises these questions.

African states (e.g., Chad). We shall, however, raise the matter with the Embassy in Bamako and request its advice regarding possible ways to bring our concern to the Malian Government's attention.<sup>3</sup>

Peter Tarnoff<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 27.

<sup>4</sup> Wisner signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

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**26. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 29, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Meeting with Guinean Prime Minister Beavogui

On June 29, 1977, I met for 45 minutes with Prime Minister Beavogui of Guinea and his delegation of three Guinean Cabinet members. The meeting was extremely positive in tone. The Prime Minister, speaking for President Sekou Toure, emphasized:

- the friendship Guinea feels for the U.S.;
- Guinea's desire to move ahead with economic, cultural, educational and industrial development programs between our two countries that will deepen our relationship and strengthen our friendship;
- Guinea's full appreciation for your Administration's Africa policy. The Prime Minister said with satisfaction that the Guineans see your policy as a certainty and they are impressed with the far-seeing nature of your views.
- He said we would see Guinea's appreciation reflected in the positions it takes during the current OAU meeting in Libreville.

The Prime Minister confirmed that Guinea has put an end to the presence of Soviet long-range reconnaissance Bear aircraft which have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 42, Countries, Africa 7-12/77 [1]. Confidential. Copies were sent to Vance and Brzezinski.

operated out of Conakry, a decision which he had earlier conveyed to Warren Christopher.<sup>2</sup>

The Prime Minister said that President Sekou Toure and Guinea share fully your views on human rights—views which they see as the moral and social foundation for your policy in Africa. The Prime Minister confirmed, as he had said to Warren, that Guinea would be pleased to have a U.S. delegation visit his country to look into the human rights situation there.

Emphasizing his desire to be candid, the Prime Minister said that Guinea would be most appreciative if we could make available six coast guard cutters to help his nation protect its coast (however, he did not link this to the termination of the Bear flights). Of significance, he said that while weapons are important, Guinea attaches great importance to its economic, industrial, agricultural and educational cooperation with the U.S.

On these requests for assistance, I told the Prime Minister that I knew the State Department was giving consideration to his government's request for the cutters. I said that we were pleased to consider Guinea's request for cooperation in the fields he had identified, and I noted that our Ambassador—who was present at the meeting—had taken careful note of the specific points made by the Prime Minister.

In concluding, the Prime Minister emphasized again that Guinea views the U.S. as a friend. He said that it is his country's greatest wish to receive a visit at the highest level from your Administration. He said President Sekou Toure hoped that you would accept his invitation to come to Guinea, but if you preferred, Sekou Toure would come to the U.S.; that if you could not make the visit they would be delighted to have me come; and if I could not, they would be delighted to have Secretary Vance come.

I told the Prime Minister I would convey his message and his invitation to you, and I said we looked forward to exploring ways to increase our cooperation.

Prime Minister Beavogui's message could not have been more positive. Given the problems we have had with Guinea in the past, Sekou Toure's decision to end the Bear flights is both positive and significant. I believe it would be very helpful if the State Department and the NSC were to forward a detailed analysis of this message

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 148788 to Conakry, June 25, the Department reported on the June 23 discussion between Christopher and Beavogui. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228-0407)

delivered by the Prime Minister, together with recommendations on how the U.S. might effectively follow up.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 28.

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## 27. Telegram From the Embassy in Mali to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Bamako, July 26, 1977, 1801Z

3057. For AF/W. Subj: Soviet Activity in Mali. Ref: State 170070.<sup>2</sup>

1. Not having received the relevant background papers mentioned in reftel, I feel somewhat hampered in responding. In any event, before answering the Department's three questions, I shall briefly recapitulate some general comments on the Soviet-Malian relationship as reported from this Embassy. The Department may wish also to look at such messages as 76 Bamako 3030,<sup>3</sup> Bamako 0154,<sup>4</sup> the Mali PARM (Bamako 1568),<sup>5</sup> and Bamako 2930.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770266-0896. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 170070 to Bamako, July 21, the Department asked Byrne for her comments on three questions: Is there an agreement between Mali and the Soviet Union on use of airfields? How would the Malians react to an expression of concern by the U.S. Government regarding Soviet use of airfields? Would France or another African country be a better vehicle for conveying such concern? (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770259-0666)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3030 from Bamako, August 27, 1976, the Embassy reported on conversations with diplomats from the French and West German Embassies on Soviet intentions in Mali and their general conclusion that while the Soviets would like to improve their tactical capability in the region, Mali would maintain its independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760328-0629)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 154 from Bamako, January 11, the Embassy proposed using other African countries to pressure Mali to reduce its Soviet ties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770011-0740)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1568 from Bamako, April 19, in the Embassy's annual Policy Analysis and Resource Management report, Byrne assessed U.S. interests in Mali as encouraging Mali to remain non-aligned and assisting in development. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770135-0900)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 2930 from Bamako, July 18, the Embassy noted Malian self-interest behind Mali's acceptance of Soviet military assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770256-0295)

2. Mali perceives itself as independent and non-aligned, acting in its own interests and no one else's. It seeks economic development aid from the West and military assistance from the Soviets. The military government considers an effective armed force essential to its image and to Mali's security, and the USSR is the only source willing to provide the required equipment. Mali believes itself free of outside influence and is confident of its ability to handle any unwanted pressures.

3. With respect to airfields, the Soviets have been undertaking significant improvements of the runways at Sikasso, San, Mopti, and Gao, ostensibly for Mali's MIG-21's but actually also for Soviet aircraft, just in case. Mali is strategically important to the Soviets because in the vast belt above the 11th parallel, only Mali would offer landing facilities to them on their way south. Gao is much closer to Algiers than is Guinea, and so for certain aircraft it could be a better staging area. These airfields are probably not intended as anything more than back-up or emergency landing places.

4. Whereas the Soviet intent in improving Mali's runways would seem clearly to be to prepare for contingencies in connection with any designs in Southern Africa, Mali's purposes are different. For Mali such Soviet activity is seen as upgrading its basic infrastructure in a way no other power is willing to do. Equally important, if an airlift were needed to bring majority rule to Southern Africa, Mali could offer its airfields as refueling or staging areas as its contribution to the common effort.

5. Mali does not want a violent solution in Southern Africa because of the attendant suffering and the diversion of energies from the goal of economic development. But it remains skeptical of negotiations, and if nothing comes of them and armed struggle were viewed as the only way to "liberate" Southern Africa, Mali would do its part through its airfields. At the time of Soviet use of Bamako-Senou for the airlift to Angola in late 1975, Director General of Foreign Affairs Halidou Toure told the French Ambassador that Mali "would ally itself with the devil" if it would help the Southern Africa cause. Actually, the Malians, who unequivocally backed the MPLA, were convinced that the Soviets and the Cubans were "pure" in their motivation and had no designs in Angola of their own. That consideration was important to the Malian perception, for Toure also said at the time (and to me later) that Mali would not want to do anything to further an outside power's ambitions on the continent.

6. To turn to the Department's questions, we know of no specific agreement giving the Soviets use of the airfields improved by them, and the French are quite certain there is none. There may, however, be verbal promises or even an informal letter. General arrangements



concerning Soviet assistance concluded under the Modibo Keita regime apparently still exist but are highly secret, and it is said that virtually no one, even among Malian officials, knows what is in them. In any case, the form of any agreement or lack thereof would not be important if the situation met the Military Committee's criteria for assistance to Southern Africa.

7. A demarche to express concern over possible future Soviet use of Mali's airfields to support operations elsewhere in Africa would be, in a word, unacceptable to the Malians. The Department will recall the Foreign Ministry's reaction of controlled anger when Chargé Dawkins delivered a diplomatic note expressing the USG's concern over the Angola airlift on December 24, 1975 (75 Bamako 4730).<sup>7</sup> It will also remember Ambassador McGuire's message some two months later reporting that the Government of Mali came close to refusing to receive the December demarche and that our bilateral relations had suffered from it (76 Bamako 0591).<sup>8</sup> A similar demarche now would have no chance of success.

8. The French Ambassador considers that an approach to Mali by France, still the single most influential power here, would be as badly received as one by us and would perhaps be even less acceptable.

9. The West African defense arrangement under the CEAO framework offers the possibility of important moderating influences on Mali, and we are pleased that Mali has been folded in. The Africans, however, are themselves enough concerned about Soviet activity in Africa to undertake the requisite steps with Mali without Western prodding. I would therefore recommend that we let the Africans pursue their own courses with Mali in their own effective way.

10. Fundamentally, Mali's reaction to any future Soviet request to use its airfields and air space for operations elsewhere in Africa will depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time and on how the request is presented. If it is cleverly couched in terms of "liberating" Southern Africa, Mali would respond affirmatively. If the situation were not clear, however, and Mali perceived an element of Soviet self-serving or power politics, its reply might not be so easily predicted. The Western effort at negotiated solutions is critical, both in the hope

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 4730 from Bamako, December 24, 1975, the Embassy reported the Government of Mali's angry reaction when the Ambassador delivered a diplomatic note protesting Malian support for the MPLA in Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850081-1639)

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 591 from Bamako, February 17, 1976, the Embassy reported that the U.S. demarche to Mali on the use of Bamako airport by Soviet aircraft returning from Angola was badly received. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850107-1962)

of achieving those solutions and to deny the Soviets any justification for intervention on the ground that only they can help.

Byrne

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**28. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-Up Analysis of the Guinean Prime Minister's Visit

The following is in response to your suggestion that the Department of State and NSC analyze the Guinean Prime Minister's message and suggest ways we might follow up.<sup>2</sup>

*Significance*

Prime Minister Beavogui's visit was a Guinean initiative to improve strained relations with the United States. We should respond in a positive but discreet manner, to each of the major points Guinea raised, while paying due regard to the sensibilities of Guinea's moderate neighbors and to USG policy considerations, including human rights and arms transfer restraint.

*Background:*

Sekou Toure decided to send Beavogui to the United States for several reasons:

—Guinean relations with the U.S. had been strained by Guinea's decision to allow Soviet reconnaissance flights from Conakry to resume on September 23, the day after we signed an agreement to provide 10,000 tons of PL-480 rice. Guinea earlier offered to stop the flights, but had requested a U.S. security guarantee. We replied that we would study the guarantee request while agreeing to the request for rice. The sequence of events clearly indicated Guinean duplicity and we suspended implementation of the PL-480 agreement until last May.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Countries, Box 42, Africa 7-12/77 [2]. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 26.

—The continued success of foreign investment in Guinean bauxite, in which two U.S. firms play a leading role, and the interest of U.S. Steel in Guinean iron ore, have raised the Guinean government's hopes for more private U.S. investment.

—Sekou Toure recognizes that the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights raises additional problems in bilateral relations with the U.S.

—Sekou Toure wished to lessen Guinean dependence on the Soviets.

*Results:*

The Prime Minister gave two major undertakings in his meetings with the two of us: he announced that the deployment of Soviet intelligence aircraft from Conakry had been stopped, and that Guinea was prepared to accept a delegation in Conakry to examine the human rights situation. The only specific request he made was to obtain six "coast guard cutters," although in his meeting with you he also alluded to "economic, cultural, educational and industrial development programs."

The request for "coast guard cutters" was not expressly stated as a *quid pro quo* for termination of the intelligence flights. Guinea, however, has contended that the Soviet flights were tolerated because they provided occasional defensive surveillance of the Guinean coast. The implication was that the "cutters" could serve this purpose among others.

Sekou Toure is aware of the inconsistencies between Guinea's professions of support for the rights of man and the practices of his government. Available evidence suggests that the Guinean government does not hesitate to take harsh repressive measures against real or imagined opponents. These measures include prolonged detention without charge, and torture to extract confessions. Resort to these measures reached its height following the abortive Portuguese invasion of 1970. Since then the pattern has been uneven but marked by occasional purges. Toure is conscious of the adverse effects that well documented international criticism, such as the report of the International League for Human Rights (ILHR) to the UN, can have on his relations with western governments.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On June 7, the International League for Human Rights released a report on alleged violations of human rights in Guinea and called for a UN inquiry. In telegram 990 from Conakry, June 9, the Embassy described the Ambassador's discussion of the report with the Guinean Acting Foreign Minister on June 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770206-0424)

Guinea's first line of defense against criticism has been a determined attempt to justify Guinea's repressive actions on internal security grounds while emphasizing Guinea's underlying respect for human rights. Sekou Toure bitterly and publicly attacked the ILHR report by denouncing its authors as agents of western intelligence services. This has been his standard reaction to criticism of his country's human rights record. However, it is possible that Guinea is prepared to improve its human rights situation for tangible benefits, particularly aid and investment.

*U.S. Response*

We propose a prompt and constructive response as follows:

*Termination of the Soviet Flights:* We shall continue to note that this has removed a major obstacle to improvement of our bilateral relations. The Soviets are still deploying intelligence flights to Africa and may pressure the Guineans to allow them to refuel and transit Conakry in route to Angola. We shall avoid linking the termination to any specific *quid pro quo* on our part, but will attempt to strengthen Guinean resolve by responding promptly and constructively to the latest request for PL-480 commodities, implying that our response stems from their willingness to continue to deny the Soviet flights.

*Offer to Receive Human Rights Delegation:* It is not clear how Guinea would respond to a proposal to send a delegation—whether it would be allowed to interview specific prisoners and visit detention sites for example. To test Guinea's intentions we shall seek to inspire a proposal from an international body with a recognized interest in human rights, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, (which is widely known for its impartiality and great discretion) and urge Guinea to accept. This would be far preferable to sending a delegation identified solely with the U.S. Government or a U.S. private organization. We should be alert to any Guinean efforts to influence the composition of the delegation. If the ILHR complaint is forwarded to the U.N. Human Rights Commission we would be prepared, consistent with our announced policy on such complaints, to support a thorough study or investigation.

*Request for "Coast Guard Cutters":* While we do not know why Guinea requested cutters, or precisely what they have in mind, all but the smallest U.S. made patrol or rescue craft are on the munitions list. Thus the Guinean request raises problems under the arms transfer policy.

The President's arms transfer policy describes arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy tool. The Foreign Assistance Act contemplates that arms sales and financing for such sales will not be made to countries with poor records of human rights observance unless the

Secretary of State concludes that such assistance is in our national interest. Our security assistance presentations to Congress have never given any indication of possible military sales to Guinea, let alone U.S. funds to finance such sales. There is considerable unease in Congress about U.S. military sales to Africa and reprogramming of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds. We believe an FMS sale to Guinea might be justified if it could be shown that it occurred in a context of improved Guinea performance on human rights and would provide an incentive for further human rights improvements by easing Guinea's fears—whether justified or not—regarding its security. The sale, by removing the only justification Guinea has ever advanced for the Soviet intelligence flights, could also remove Guinea as an important link in the Soviet ocean surveillance system.

Under the circumstances we shall postpone a final decision on the provision of "cutters" to Guinea until a) we can assess their willingness to receive a human rights delegation, b) we have had an opportunity to consult the Congress and c) we have a clear idea of their requirements.

*Conclusion:*

In sum we propose to:

- Explore urgently with the ICRC the possibility of their proposing a delegation to Guinea to examine the human rights situation and urge the Guineans to accept.

- Stand ready at the next U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting to support a thorough study and investigation of the human rights situation in Guinea.

- Express appreciation on suitable occasions for the termination of the Soviet intelligence flights.

- Explore in greater detail the Guinean request for "coast guard cutters" while making clear to the Guineans that progress on human rights and continued denial of Soviet flights will weigh heavily in our final decision.

- Seek to reply promptly and positively to further Guinean requests for PL-480 commodities and agree to consider other requests for assistance.

- Brief informally key Congressional leaders on a possible change in our relationship with Guinea.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>In a handwritten note at the bottom of the page, Christopher wrote: "8-5-77. Fritz—We are keeping a close watch to see if the Guineans allow the flights to be resumed. I remain somewhat skeptical. Warren."

## 29. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 29, 1977

### SUBJECT

US-Liberia Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### LIBERIA

Bishop Bennie D. Warner, Vice Presidential Candidate

C. Cecil Dennis, Foreign Minister

Emmett Harmon, Ambassador-at-Large

Francis A. Dennis, Ambassador to US

#### US

The Secretary

Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary, AF

Thomas W.M. Smith, Director, AF/W (notetaker)

The Secretary began by welcoming the Liberians.

Minister Dennis replied by saying that he was grateful for the opportunity to meet the Secretary on short notice and in advance of the scheduled appointment. He said *Bishop Warner* was “not yet in the saddle” but would be elected Vice President of Liberia on the 4th of October, and thus had to return to Liberia September 30.

The Secretary offered his congratulations in advance to Bishop Warner.

Dennis said that he had particularly wished the Bishop to meet the Secretary, and to see that great school of learning, the UN General Assembly, before his election.

The Secretary replied that after his exposure to the UN, the Bishop might teach the US a thing or two.

Dennis complimented the Secretary on his first few months in office, to which the Secretary replied that he was getting used to it after eight months.

Bishop Warner said that he had watched the Secretary on television during the *Panama Canal Treaty* hearings, and that he had rooted for the Secretary like a football fan.

The Secretary replied that he had been before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for four hours, and in the end had been obliged

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons 1977. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved by Wisner on October 11. The meeting took place at One UN Plaza.

to excuse himself because he had an appointment with UN Secretary General Waldheim in New York.

Dennis said he wished to underscore President Tolbert's cable to President Carter congratulating the latter on the achievement of the Panama Canal Treaties.<sup>2</sup> Dennis said Liberia would sign the Declaration of Washington.<sup>3</sup> Dennis continued that he wished to say how much Liberia appreciated the Carter Administration. President Tolbert, he said, never lost an opportunity to congratulate President Carter on *US African policy*. The Liberian Government thought that an eloquent way of manifesting US interest in Africa was to visit the continent. President Tolbert was overjoyed by the prospect of President Carter's visit to Africa.<sup>4</sup> Dennis continued by saying that the US is closely identified with Liberia. Liberia has tried hard to encourage the US to take an intelligent interest in Africa. Now Liberia can only congratulate the US on the success of its ventures in Rhodesia and elsewhere. Dennis said the US has the wholehearted support of Liberia.

The Secretary said the US Government appreciates the wholehearted support of Liberia and, in particular, the President appreciates the support which came from President Tolbert even before his Administration began.

Dennis said that they regretted President Tolbert could not come to the General Assembly. They had received a message through the Embassy in Monrovia to the effect that President Carter was prepared to receive President Tolbert in New York if the latter could be there around October 4. Unfortunately, Bishop Warner's election prevented President Tolbert from leaving Liberia.

Dennis continued by saying that he would be honest. Liberia appreciated the assistance the US has given, but all Liberians wished to know the answer to the question "Where does the US stand with regard to Liberia, given the *special relationship*?". Senegal and Ivory Coast, to name two of Liberia's neighbors, have a special relationship to France. Liberia was a beacon, a torch, lit in Africa by the United States. Until recently, Liberia was the only independent republic on the continent. Now, the OAU has 49 members. They have followed the example of Liberia. Liberia has paid a price for this. It has been regarded as a tool of the US. Liberia has tolerated this implied criticism, indeed on occa-

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6223 from Monrovia, September 7, the Embassy transmitted a message from Tolbert to Carter congratulating him on the success of the Panama Canal Treaties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323-0976)

<sup>3</sup> The Declaration was signed by the representatives of 26 American Republics at the same time the Panama Canal Treaties were signed.

<sup>4</sup> President Carter visited Monrovia on April 3, 1978, and met with President Tolbert. See Document 34.

sion has been more Catholic than the Pope, and supported US interests as strongly as any American. Given this close relationship, the friends of the US in Liberia wished to know where the US stood.

Dennis emphasized that he was not talking about the possibility of a visit by President Carter to Liberia, although Liberia knows where President Giscard of France would go if he made a visit to Africa.

The Secretary said he would speak simply. It was true that there is a special relationship with Liberia based on history, shared aspirations, and shared views. Among the important values we share are a belief in human rights. What must be done now is to work closely together to make sure that our hopes and aspirations can be realized. We must stay next to each other in the UN. We must be aware of the economic aspects of the special relationship. The Secretary commented that he understood that US economic assistance to Liberia had been greater than US assistance to any other country but one in the African area. The question arose, should it be larger? The Secretary said we would be willing to talk about it, in order to respond to Liberia's requirements.

The Secretary said he regretted it was not possible for the President to stop in Monrovia during his trip. There simply was not enough time. In the interest of the special relationship there should be increased discussion of issues, particularly African issues, with Liberia. The US needs to understand better Liberia's point of view.

Dennis thanked the Secretary for his explanation. He noted that the system Liberia advocated had been inherited from the United States, and that Liberia believed in it. But, he said, to sustain the system we shall require more of the things we are talking about. Dennis said he was heartened by the way the Secretary felt about it, and commented that, among other things, a new yardstick was needed to measure US assistance, a yardstick more effective than *per capita* aid. Liberia knows that a friend in need is a friend indeed.

Bishop Warner said he wished to express his appreciation for taking the Secretary's time. He had benefitted from the broad perspective of the Secretary's views of the world. He understood that the Secretary kept a Bible in his office and had been heartened by that news.

The Secretary congratulated the Bishop and said that he looked forward to working with him.

Dennis, who had just received a note from Ambassador Harmon, said that in 1979 Monrovia would be the venue for the meeting of the OAU. He said that as Liberia prepares for this meeting it would share some of its problems with the US.

The Secretary concluded by saying that in the meantime the US would be grateful for the support of Liberia, particularly with regard



to southern Africa. The problems were important. The repercussions of success or failure would be worldwide.

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**30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 11, 1977

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to West Africa.]

2. *My Meeting with Obasanjo*: Following your meeting with Lt. General Obasanjo this morning,<sup>2</sup> Andy and I met with him for two hours this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> Our discussion centered on the forthcoming negotiations by Lord Carver and General Chand to determine arrangements for the transition period of Rhodesia. In addition, I summarized the present state of negotiations for a Middle East settlement, progress toward a SALT agreement, and the US position on the principal North/South economic issues.

The most significant aspect of our conversation was a remarkably frank exchange of views regarding the difficulties which we anticipate in dealing with Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. We pointed out that Nkomo in particular may, possibly with Soviet backing, hold out for arrangements which would make peacekeeping unworkable or cast doubt on the integrity of the election procedure. Obasanjo urged us to see that the negotiations are conducted in Africa—not elsewhere as David Owen and Nkomo have suggested—and said that we must stay in close contact with the Front Line and Nigeria. He promised, in so many words, that if Carver and Prem Chand come up with a workable arrangement which Nkomo or Mugabe reject, the Front Line and Nigeria would “take care of them” as well as, by implication, any objections which the Russians or Chinese might raise in the UN.

I emphasized our desire for an early report to the Security Council and a recommendation regarding a UN peacekeeping force. General Obasanjo underlined the importance of defining the responsibilities of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State) 10/77. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy, J” in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 171.

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum of conversation, dated October 11, is in the Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons 1977.

the Resident Commissioner, and the eventual UN Commander, for administering Rhodesia during the transition, for maintaining law and order and for training a new professional Zimbabwe army. In response to our question, Obasanjo said he would not object if a Nigerian were appointed UN force commander or deputy commander. He urged, in great confidence, that we use our influence to see that Nigeria is entrusted with responsibility for training the new army which, in his words he said “must be loyal to Zimbabwe and not to any political figure.” This army, he said, would be the key to what is his greatest concern, i.e., post-independence stability.

Overall, on Rhodesia, we agreed (a) to work to get the Resident Commissioner and Prem Chand in motion as quickly as possible; (b) to urge that the negotiations take place in Africa with a wide variety of parties; (c) to seek a report to the Security Council on security arrangements as soon as possible; and (d) that in themselves these accomplishments would hasten the departure of Smith.<sup>4</sup>

General Obasanjo had no substantive questions following my summary of the Middle East and SALT. During our discussion of international economic issues, he expressed a desire for an experts’ meeting in Washington or Lagos to deal with outstanding bilateral and multilateral economic issues. He noted that this meeting could lead to the establishment of some form of a US/Nigerian economic commission and said that he expects to discuss this subject tomorrow. Dick Cooper summarized our opposition on oil prices but the General did not comment.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to West Africa.]

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<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote and underlined “good” in the left margin.

### 31. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 12, 1977, 10:30 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Talks Between President Carter and the US Delegation, and Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Delegation: Second Session

#### PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US

The President  
 Vice President Mondale  
 The Secretary of State  
 Dr. Brzezinski  
 Ambassador Andrew Young  
 Ambassador Donald Easum  
 Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard Cooper  
 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose  
 Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (notetaker)

#### PARTICIPANTS FOR NIGERIA

Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo  
 Commissioner Joseph Nanven Garba  
 General Martin Adamu  
 Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso  
 Mr. J.A. Oladel Akadiri  
 Mr. Haruna Bin Musa  
 Mr. M. Arzika

#### (Press Opportunity)

*The President:* I appreciate the tusk (gift). I wish to present to you this book of satellite photos. Should we be able to assist you with respect to geological or geodetic surveys, please let me know or transmit your request through Ambassador Easum. Do you have national satellite transmission facilities?

*Easum:* You (Nigeria) have facilities for transmitting internationally, but not internally. The latter is being worked on.

*The President:* We would be glad to work with you on this. I wish for you to set the agenda for our discussion this morning, as it relates to the talks you have already had with Secretary Vance.<sup>2</sup>

*Obasanjo:* We have covered most of the points, I believe: North/South, SALT, Middle East. We also touched on bilateral issues slightly.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 114, Nigeria: Obasanjo Visit 10/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 12:05 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 30.

Perhaps we could also discuss other issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation.

*The President:* On non-proliferation, we with a few other countries are suppliers of enriched uranium. Do you have uranium in Nigeria?

*Obasanjo:* There are some indications of it, but they have not yet proved out.

*The President:* It is costly to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel; the United States has been able to do it for thirty years. We are eager to see constraints placed on nuclear fuel after its use to prevent its reprocessing for use in explosives. We have been pushing to get agreement on this point among the relevant countries. We are concerned, and we have been monitoring South Africa from our satellites, to try to prevent further cooperation between South Africa and other potential nuclear powers. We hope to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear nations while moving towards the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power.

*Obasanjo:* Nigeria will need to develop peaceful atomic power.

*The President:* We are glad that Nigeria will participate in the nuclear suppliers conference. France and Germany who are reluctant to impose restraints will probably also participate, as will the Japanese. We want a strong IAEA and for all nations to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The point is to make fuel available for peaceful purposes while preventing its use for explosives. I feel strongly on this issue, and I have put maximum pressure on France and Germany on these questions.

*Obasanjo:* How much success have you had with France and Germany?

*The President:* We have had some success. Early in my Administration, I made the mistake of pursuing this question too much in public. We have some progress with Brazil. The French have doubts about Pakistan commitments in that deal. The French have publicly agreed not to sell reprocessing plants to any *other* countries. If they can back out without being seen to capitulate to the United States, I believe they would do so. A year ago there was a feeling that nothing can be done on non-proliferation. Now, that feeling is reversed. I will be urging Brazil to reconsider on this matter; they are angry with me for entering into “an internal matter”; they were on the verge of being competitive in this area.

In the upcoming (nuclear suppliers) meeting, I will meet with the delegates. This will probably be a meeting of technicians, designed to educate the world on this subject. For example, what is uranium, what are the processes by which it is enriched, the nuclear waste problem, peaceful nuclear power, some analysis of the fuel cycle. The Soviets and others need to know the necessity for restraint. There is a growing

common commitment on this point. Demonstrations have occurred against nuclear power plants in the United States and in Germany. I think that if properly built, the plants can be safe, but there is strong public feeling on this question. Increasingly this is a world problem: it relates to national energy supplies, and it relates to OPEC.

*Obasanjo:* You mentioned carrying along the USSR on this question.

*The President:* They have been critical of France. We, Australia and the USSR are in quiet harmony on this question.

*Obasanjo:* What about China?

*The President:* They feel that nuclear power is their own business. But they are not a major supplier, and they probably don't wish to be. They are facing the Soviet atomic threat. China wants an international conference, and wants that to lead to the elimination of nuclear explosives worldwide. But while they're facing the USSR, they do not wish limitations to be placed on their capacity in this regard.

*Vance:* They have also said that they will not assist other nations to acquire their own explosive devices.

*The President:* Cy Vance has already touched on SALT. We are negotiating SALT II, and this will hopefully result in the first *actual reduction* (*sic*) of strategic weapons. Both the US and the Soviet Union realize that present arms levels are excessive, that money is being wasted, and that there is already adequate and general parity between the two countries. We probably have an advantage in miniaturization, solid propellants, and in numbers of warheads. The Soviets generally have liquid-fueled missiles and larger warheads.

If SALT II is successfully negotiated, for the first time there would be an equivalency which ends the arms race and looks towards a cutback. The present agreement mandates the Soviet Union to get rid of 300 weapons. We made good progress when Gromyko was here, and the Soviet Union seems to be acting responsibly. I have invited Brezhnev to visit; they have been waiting on progress on SALT to be made, but I hope for a visit this year. The tension between the United States and the USSR has been reduced dramatically.

*Obasanjo:* Yes, this reduced tension can be felt in Africa.

*The President:* I believe that my Charleston speech,<sup>3</sup> the UN speech,<sup>4</sup> and also progress on the Indian Ocean negotiations all helped. I feel

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<sup>3</sup> Carter gave a speech to the 31st annual meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference on July 21, in which he spelled out his foreign policy goals. (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1309–1315; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 52*)

<sup>4</sup> Carter addressed the United Nations General Assembly on March 17. He emphasized a foreign policy focus on arms control and human rights, among other goals. (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 444–451; Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29*)

good about all of those. The Soviets are now willing to discuss a range of matters responsibly: they are no longer taking a strong anti-Israeli position, and we have cooperated on the joint Middle East statement. Progress is beginning in all areas of our relationship.

*Obasanjo:* Commissioner Garba just asked me how does Egypt affect the Soviet stand in the Middle East?

*The President:* Three years ago the Soviet Union and Egypt were aligned. That relationship was broken by Egypt. There are currently good relations between the US and Egypt. Of all the parties in the Middle East, Egypt is probably the most cooperative, both publicly and in private; Sadat has frequently extended offers to help. Relative to military power, Egypt offers Israel the most problems. Sadat is having serious economic problems. A breakdown in negotiations would be attributed to his lack as a political leader, and his offer of friendship towards Israel would be perceived as spurned. The Syrians are more difficult; they are afraid of a unilateral Egyptian move. I personally like Assad and Assam, however.

Israel has been the most difficult, but lately more cooperative. They have agreed to move towards Geneva and towards PLO representation there. They are now being more forthcoming in private. Egypt is the most cooperative, and feels a great need for peace in the area. The easiest negotiations might be between Egypt and Israel. We are putting enormous economic and arms aid into Egypt and Israel.

*Obasanjo:* Do you see an economic cooperative arrangement arising between Egypt and Israel?

*The President:* I do, after a peace treaty is signed. We and the Saudis are willing to give aid. Joint mineral projects, irrigation schemes, etc., would be a great boost, and a reduction of weapons would assist the economies of both countries. Israel especially has a high rate of inflation.

*Vance:* In the draft peace treaties so far presented, all have arms limitations clauses.

*The President:* Even if only Israel and Egypt reach agreement, this would lead to a reduction in arms. However, this would cause difficulty in Syria and Iraq. I believe they do trust us somewhat more, and I will not betray that trust. I am interested in a Golan Heights settlement, and willing to pressure Israel to this end, but it is difficult. We will just have to listen and work these problems through. Cy and I have spent an enormous amount of time doing so. All parties have now agreed that Lebanon should be a party to the Geneva Convention. On Geneva, the US/Soviet co-chairmanship is still in force. That a new party must have unanimous consent to join the Conference, presents problems. Lebanon's joining is a good step; the PLO could be part of the Lebanese delegation or spread among the Iraqi and Jordanian

delegations. Israel has agreed that the Palestinians themselves can be represented. The Palestinians can also be represented on the *refugees* (*sic*) question. The process is somewhat like chewing on rocks. There is much pressure on Israel on the West Bank settlement issue. Israeli acts on the West Bank may be in accord with the Geneva Covenant. We are making progress and we must, because everyone knows that the alternative is war.

*Obasanjo*: Thank you for your exposition.

*The President*: In the future, if you have any questions, we would welcome your inquiry by personal letter, or through the Embassy. We have nothing to conceal from you.

*Obasanjo*: We appreciate that. Perhaps we could cover two points before getting to bilateral issues.

*Garba*: On Belize, the UN group met on Belize, and decided that Nigeria should approach the United States to persuade Guatemala to respect the territorial integrity of Belize in order that it may become independent.

*Vance*: We have been in touch with the British on this in London. The US position is generally that if a territorial compromise was possible, it should be explored. The British wish for Belize to retain territory down to the Mohoh River and west from there to Guatemala. They are also exploring initial compensation along with a settlement. We are now awaiting word from the British, and we have urged the Guatemalans not to take any precipitate actions.

I have also talked to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister in New York. Historically, Guatemala thinks that Belize is part of Guatemala, but think that some small territorial cession might be necessary. We would like to minimize this. The area in the South is basically unpopulated, and some compensation for pipeline rights might be possible. The United States has been publicly quiet on this issue. There is a general international feeling that Belize should be independent. We have been urging fairness throughout the whole process.

*Garba*: There would seem to be an analogy to the Ogaden here. And there is some fear in the Commonwealth of violating the principle of territorial integrity.

*Vance*: We have come down hard on Guatemala on this point.

*Garba*: We wish also to raise the issue of Mayotte. We want to persuade France to get out of Mayotte and to leave it as part of the Comoros Islands.

*Moose*: I met with the Comoros Foreign Minister in New York. Their position is that all the islands in the Comoros should have been given independence at the same time, and that there was no rationale for the French continuing to retain Mayotte. I promised that the United

States would study the issue. I understand that the French Foreign Office might think that their own case on this question is weak.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Wasn't there a plebiscite on the question?

*Moose:* There was a plebiscite on a constitution but not on island-by-island independence. The Mayotte plebiscite came out two to one against the constitution. There are also economic reasons supposedly involved. We don't have a position, but I promised that we would study it.

(There was some joking about the possibility of the French Foreign Minister not having hotel space in Lagos because of the arrival of President Carter's entourage.)

*The President:* My only bilateral concern is investment arrangements. I hope we can establish an exchange on this matter between ourselves. I cannot force US business to do what they do not want to do, and I wish you to understand that. I also wish to report their concerns about the stability of the climate in which they are going to invest; for example, with respect to non-retroactive laws. I believe that substantial US investment in Nigeria is to our mutual advantage. Perhaps we could establish a joint trade commission or a seminar for US businessmen in Lagos to "have it out" on these issues. I would hate for this to create a problem between us. There is no imminent difficulty, but US businessmen need to understand your laws and your customs, for example, your labor situation and your regulations on indigenization.

*Obasanjo:* We briefly touched on this yesterday. Perhaps a seminar and a joint commission would be possible.

*Garba:* I told Ambassador Easum I will recommend something similar to General Obasanjo when we return to Lagos and get back to him on the details.

*Obasanjo:* That probably will satisfy the situation. We are fashioning economic progress and allowing investment and government participation. I believe that Nigeria's atmosphere allows for a satisfactory return on investment. Relative to indigenization, there are three areas or sectors for Nigerian investment relative to the percentage which should be reserved for Nigerian participation: for example, trading, and distribution. In the distribution area we allow foreign participation up to 40 percent. In other areas we allow foreign participation of up to 60 percent. In some cases, there has been a deliberate misinterpretation of our policy. When we said Nigerians must participate up to 60 percent in banks and insurance companies, American banks and insurance companies decided to stay. Ambassador Easum tells me that they are happy. One, I believe, did decide to go, but I predict they will return.

*Easum:* The First National City Bank decided that they must honor their worldwide policy against foreign participation and reluctantly left, but they left on good terms.



*Obasanjo:* Our policies are moderate. We seek to fulfill our national aspirations without losing sight of the need for investment. I speak only for the present government, obviously, but I don't see expropriation by a future Nigerian government. Nigerians are too sensible and realistic to pursue such a policy. Our proposed discussion and seminar will serve an educational function in this respect. When we promulgated our indigenization program, we spoke with the ambassadors from the industrialized countries. This dissipated some initial misunderstanding. There is always the possibility of distortion unless one is actually on-the-spot to see how these policies work. Perhaps a seminar in the United States to serve a similar educational function might be possible.

*The President:* The business community might be overly concerned about these issues. For some of them their calculations must figure on investments of fifteen years, and therefore their concern is understandable. Might it be possible to include an anti-expropriation provision in the new constitution which you are now drafting?

*Obasanjo:* I do not think that would be possible. We do not intend to write the constitution; that will be done by other organs. The government wishes to exercise no "subterranean influence" on the writing of the constitution.

*The President:* When could we have the first exploratory meeting—before Lagos, I hope?

*Easum:* We could put a list together in a few days which would cover technical subjects: repatriation of profits, expatriate quotas, limitation on dividends.

*Obasanjo:* We can resolve this on an official level.

*Cooper:* On the concern that US business has, there is an area short of a constitutional provision where these concerns might be met. These concerns must be seen in light of various Third World resolutions in several international fora on investment, e.g., the Manila Declaration.<sup>5</sup> This creates an atmosphere against private investment. In this context, Nigerian policy understandably seems difficult to separate from general Third World policies.

*Obasanjo:* What specific international conferences do you speak of?

*Cooper:* The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties,<sup>6</sup> and the Manila Conference. Similar restrictions were tried at CIEAC,<sup>7</sup> but they just

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<sup>5</sup> The Manila Declaration was promulgated at meetings of the G-77 in January and February 1976. It laid out a strategy for relations between the developed world and the developing world. The Group of 77 (G-77) is an intergovernmental group of developing countries.

<sup>6</sup> The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted in 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to CIEC (Conference on International Economic Cooperation), which concluded in June 1977.

missed. The atmospherics suggest caution to business investors. What we must do is to change those atmospherics, and this will take some work.

*Obasanjo*: Thank you for this caution. We do belong to G-77. You are probably more effective than us in your international groups. We have always tried to moderate policies in the groups to which we belonged, e.g., on debt questions. We have a problem in Africa, similar to yours in America. Everyone wants to benefit from us and take a bite out of us. When at times we tend to go along with this trend, you understand how this works.

*Garba*: We are realistic. Our economic planning must necessarily take into account global considerations, for example, ECOWAS.

*Obasanjo*: On the debt issue, we must search for some accommodation. We have become a modest *creditor* (*sic*) but must also think of the poor countries who cannot even *service* (*sic*) their foreign debts. What do we do? This produces problems.

*The President*: If you would help hold down the price of oil, this would help your problem.

*Obasanjo*: We in return want your assurance that the price of machinery which we import from the United States will be stabilized.

*The President*: We urge you to assess the adverse impact of an oil price increase at this time. The United States may be able to accommodate itself to a price rise, but the global impact would be much more severe. On the Peace Corps, I realize that in Nigeria it has had somewhat of a bad reputation in the past. Now, we have volunteers who are technically trained and would be ready to begin a program in Nigeria at your pleasure. They are young and energetic. I wish to emphasize that there is no political motivation here and no political involvement. I would want to know about it, and I would not permit any political involvement on their part.

*Obasanjo*: As I might have mentioned before, in the early days the Peace Corps had a bad press in Nigeria. We will look at this question politically and consider if the time is now ripe. If so, we will pass it on to Easum. If we need time to prepare the minds of the people, we will let that be known also.

*The President*: We are not trying to intrude, and we will certainly abide by your wishes in this matter.

I wish to say that I am proud of the friendship that you and I have developed on this visit. We value your advice and counsel and the opportunity to learn about your perspectives.

*Obasanjo*: On behalf of the Nigerian people and myself and my delegation, I wish to extend our sincere appreciation to you for this opportunity to examine issues of concern and importance to both Africa

and the world. We are *most (sic)* impressed by the frank and cordial discussions which we have had. This is a new chapter in US–Nigerian relations. We will do all possible to continue to build on this firm foundation. We hope that skeptics and cynics will not be given the opportunity to say that they were right. We do still have a long way to go to concretize certain of these issues to our mutual advantage, and to the advantage of Africa and the world. I particularly appreciate the confidence that you repose in us and in me. We solemnly say that we will not betray that confidence—you have opened yourself to us. We will take advantage of this exposure in the best spirit.

*The President:* Those are indeed my feelings. We feel that we can depend absolutely on your integrity, and this is a mirror of the faith that Africa has reposed in you to act fairly. If there is any situation in the future that demands it, I hope that we would directly communicate with each other to escape any major difficulties. I hope that the small differences that we are bound to have can coexist within our friendship. I am honored to have all of you and look forward to visiting you again in Lagos.

[The discussion ended.]<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Brackets are in the original.

**32. Memorandum From Henry Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1977

SUBJECT

1977 Goals: Nigeria<sup>2</sup>

1. *Assure Nigeria that it will receive at least if not more than parity treatment with South Africa in receiving nuclear technology and fuels (short of getting its own fuel cycle) (1977).*

—Nigeria is organizing its own nuclear regulatory commission and we are awaiting its emergence. We did indicate in mid-summer our interest in discussing the possible purchase of a reactor, but they expressed little interest. Recent discussions on the official level indicate Nigerian interest in research reactors.

2. *Assuming general limits are established on overall arms transfers, assure Nigeria that the US will approve for transfer to Nigeria any weapons that were transferred to other African states (i.e., Most Favored Nation status on arms transfers) (1977).*

—This part of our larger study on arms transfers is moving through State.<sup>3</sup> We have sold everything requested by the Nigerians, including much non-lethal equipment. They appear inclined towards the United States for subsequent arms purchases. The Nigerian Chief of Staff will soon visit his American counterpart.

3. *Explore with the Nigerians their needs for transport aircraft in order to play a broader role as a stabilizing force in Africa (1977).*

—We have been willing to do this for at least a year. Two years ago we sold them C-130's which they have used to aid Zimbabwe guerrilla forces. We stand ready to seriously consider any request that they make, though we have not expressly explored this issue with them. They would probably first approach individual US companies.

4. *Advise the Nigerians on any communications equipment which they will need, and approve the sale of such equipment to them. (1977–78).*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 106, 12/1–10/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In a November 30 memorandum to Tuchman and Richardson, Brzezinski asked for a progress report on goals for Nigeria. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 280.

—Discussions on the official level have been held; the Nigerians have long been actively interested in buying such equipment, and are following up with individual firms.

5. *Consult with Nigeria on human rights problems in Africa, recognizing the United States will have to speak out on deportations and political prisoners in South Africa before it can get Nigerian cooperation in dealing with Amin, and other black African violations of human rights (1977–).*

—We have spoken out on political prisoners in South Africa. We have spoken out against Amin and human rights violations in Ethiopia and the Central African Empire. We have acted internally on human rights violations in other African states. We have not yet formally consulted on these questions.

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### 33. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Lagos, Nigeria, April 2, 1978, 10:40 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Talks Between President Carter and the US Delegation, and Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Delegation: Second Session

#### PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US

The President  
 Dr. Brzezinski  
 The Secretary of State  
 Ambassador Andrew Young  
 Ambassador Donald Easum  
 Ambassador Donald McHenry  
 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose  
 Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State  
 Henry Richardson, NSC Staff  
 Robert Hormats, State Department  
 Parker Wyman, Embassy Lagos  
 Harry Cahill, Embassy Lagos

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons President 4/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the State House Marina. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the conference room and ended at 12:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) Carter visited Lagos March 31–April 3, the first U.S. President to make a State visit to Sub-Saharan Africa.

PARTICIPANTS FOR NIGERIA

Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo  
 S.M. Yar'Adua  
 Brig J.N. Garba  
 B.O.W. Mafini  
 D.O. Adewaye  
 Mr. A. Alhaji  
 Mr. S.O. Falalu  
 Mr. M. Bello  
 Mr. G.P.O. Chikelu  
 Mr. Y. Abubakar  
 Ambassador O. Jalaoso  
 Ambassador P.A. Afolaki  
 Mr. A.O. Oluwunim

The session opened at 10:40 a.m. with a press opportunity.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Since our last session,<sup>2</sup> we have had a meeting with Front Line foreign ministers and Secretary Vance can brief you on this.

*VANCE:* On Namibia, we agreed to put the Five Power proposals before the Security Council on April 10. The United States is prepared to publicly state to SWAPO that the issue of Walvis Bay can be negotiated subsequent to a settlement, and to further state our view that the results of these negotiations should be that Walvis Bay will wind up as a part of Namibia. The Front Line undertook to get in touch with Sam Nujoma and discuss his concurrence with the proposal.

Relative to Zimbabwe, we agree on a meeting with the Patriotic Front called by the United States and Britain. This would be followed by an all-parties conference. We are working on the final details today. Our preference is for the site of such a conference to be somewhere in Africa. The United States will be in touch with all the parties.

*GARBA:* We made the point that the circle of contact on Zimbabwe should be widened.

*VANCE:* We will touch base with Rhodesia and South Africa beforehand on our plans.

*THE PRESIDENT:* General Obasanjo will find Sam Nujoma.

*VANCE:* Front Line ministers would be invited to attend both of these meetings.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Who was at the meetings today?

*VANCE:* Foreign Minister Mogwe of Botswana, Foreign Minister Mwale of Zambia, and Ambassador Salim of Tanzania.

*OBASANJO:* Were the British represented?

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 200.

VANCE: British High Commissioner Sir Sam Falle sat in on those meetings.

VANCE: We asked specifically whether the Patriotic Front had agreed to attend an all-parties meeting. We were assured without doubt that they did agree on this.

GARBA: It is reported that Mugabe is coming in tonight; we can then get the Patriotic Front position from the horse's mouth.

OBASANJO: I am not sure about the position that we have agreed on Walvis Bay.

VANCE: (Repeated the above position.)

OBASANJO: What will be the South African reaction?

VANCE: I believe that they will understand, but Ambassador McHenry can better speak to that.

MCHEHRY: They will probably understand but will not like it. They have agreed that all Walvis Bay questions can be negotiated. The language that we have proposed meets their minimum conditions: it respects their legal position and it calls for negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT: This may result in an agreement by an independent Namibia to let the South Africans use their port facilities. If we raised this question in any other way, we would get bogged down.

OBASANJO: We must move quickly on Zimbabwe and Namibia.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree; this could be a headache for us and we would not want it to drag on.

VANCE: I have informed David Owen in response to a message which he sent last night that I will participate in a meeting with the Patriotic Front, probably in Dar-es-Salaam.

OBASANJO: On South Africa, we would like to know what other "arm twisting measures" the United States will bring to bear towards changing apartheid.

THE PRESIDENT: South Africa desires several things. They desire to be respected and accepted as part of the international community and not to be a pariah. We have joined in the arms embargo against them. Our own business firms have initiated standards for their activities in South Africa related to bettering conditions of their South African employees. The United States has less capital investment in South Africa than other countries like Britain and France who have a large South African trade. Many African nations have massive trade with South Africa, such as Mozambique. Over time, the United Nations will probably act further; we will be acting independently as well.

It is impossible for us to totally sever our relationship with South Africa and withdraw our investment from that country. It would be futile and would violate United States law. I would not mislead you

on this. The most effective pressure on South Africa must come by concerted action with other nations.

*VANCE:* We have been considering other economic actions against South Africa such as cutting off EXIM credits. I talked recently with a member of the South African business community who told me of the serious effects such a step would have. We are also exploring other measures.

*ANDY YOUNG:* There is much happening on this point apart from any action the United States Government may take. My worry is that South Africa has a self-sufficient economy. Unless sanctions are orchestrated carefully and are in response to a crisis, we risk being overruled by Congress.

*THE PRESIDENT:* We would also be violating U.S. law.

*VANCE:* (In response to a question.) EXIM credits to South Africa are declining and consist only of guarantees of financing and insurance.

*THE PRESIDENT:* We have had bad experience on embargoes in the Middle East. The South African economy may be self-sufficient. Vorster has indicated he wants to see me; I have said that I will when he is ready to settle Namibia and move seriously on Zimbabwe. If we act in concert we will be more effective. South Africa is the key economic nation in southern Africa. As South Africa changes to majority rule, it can continue to be a central economic force in the region.

*OBASANJO:* We can talk about further measures when the crisis comes.

*THE PRESIDENT:* If South Africa were not feeling the pressure they would not have been responsive on Namibia. And, though I do not want to give them too much credit, they have been helpful from time to time.

*OBASANJO:* I believe we have finished Africa.

*THE PRESIDENT:* I will be glad to brief you on other issues. In the Middle East we are heavily involved, perhaps too much so, transmitting messages between Israel and Egypt and other states. We are committed to support Israel's right to exist, and we have generally good relations with other nations in the area. Sadat's visit was a major step towards peace, but the Israeli response was not equal to it. The Israeli's have taken certain measures, but Begin is stuck on three points and these are an obstacle to peace:

1. He is unwilling to accept that Resolution 242<sup>3</sup> applies to the West Bank.

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<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted on November 22, 1967, in the aftermath of the war between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. The resolution addressed the issues of boundaries and refugees in the region and aimed to end the state of belligerency between Israel on one hand, and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt on the other.



2. He is unwilling to give Palestinian Arabs a voice on their own future—either to affiliate with Jordan or some international affiliation.

3. He has refused to stop creating new settlements or to halt the expansion of old settlements.

I think he is wrong on all three points. We have gone as far as possible by ourselves. Begin is in a strong position in Israel, but there is strong dissension in the Israeli Government. Begin will not change unless his advisors and other government leaders change their minds on these issues. He is a stubborn man.

Sadat can hold out against pressure for a limited time only. We have convinced him to give it a few weeks longer to let world opinion work to put pressure on Israel. We feel it is in Israel's best interests to have friendly relations with its Arab neighbors. The situation in the Middle East is a dangerous one and could lead to a serious war, and I do not know quite what will happen. With the Soviet Union, we are making good progress on the SALT talks. Notwithstanding news reports, there has been no interruption in these talks. We are also talking with them on holding down weapons sales, peace in the Indian Ocean, and preventing attacks on each other's satellites.

*OBASANJO*: Possibly Africa figures in your discussions with the Soviet Union?

*THE PRESIDENT*: Yes. Their intrusion in Africa is a serious problem. We have encouraged them to reduce their arms supply and not to use the Cubans. The Soviets claim that they are acting to uphold self-determination of African countries, but we understand that the Cubans will soon make a major push in Eritrea. Our belief, and we hope Africa will see this too, is that once the Soviets get into a country they are reluctant to leave, as with both Ethiopia and Angola. They claim they have no influence over Cuba, which is only a peaceful country helping black people in Africa.

*OBASANJO*: Let me introduce my team. (Introductions.)

*OBASANJO*: You previously asked me how we operated. We have Ministries headed by Commissioners. The administrative boss in the Ministry is the Permanent Secretary, who is not as permanent as is implied. (Laughter.)

He is a career man and starts from the middle of the ladder and works his way up to the top. If he has been correctly trained in the army he is ready after coming up the ladder to offer good advice to government. We have other committees and so forth, and we have 22 Ministries. (Names the Ministries.)

*DR. BRZEZINSKI*: What is the Ministry of Establishment?

*OBASANJO*: It looks after overall government administration and personnel matters. We also have a Public Services Commission.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Which ministry is building the new capital?

*OBASANJO:* We have a separate one for that.

There is a cabinet office through which everything comes from the ministries through to the government. There is a body there which coordinates the economic ministries. There is also a Permanent Secretary for Services Affairs, for Political Activities, and for External Affairs. Petroleum used to be a ministry but now it is a corporation in order to more easily operate in the commercial market. We have a Committee for Economic Development responsible for initiating and carrying out our development plans.

I would like to now start on bilateral issues. When I was in Washington, we agreed that we would set up meetings on the official level to discuss outstanding problems in the context of the encouragement of, and the need for, closer cooperation between our two countries.<sup>4</sup> A meeting was held which decided to set up working groups on agriculture, trade, and education. However, since then there has not been another meeting, and I do not believe we have moved fast enough on these matters.

*EASUM:* After the meeting between officials of the two governments in the fall,<sup>5</sup> we have worked to follow up the results of that meeting, and I believe we have made good progress. We are currently well underway in scheduling the working groups to meet with us in the United States in the spring.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Would there be a subsequent meeting in May?

*EASUM:* That would perhaps be the case.

*THE PRESIDENT:* If there is a lack of progress here, I wish that you will communicate with me directly and I will attempt to resolve it. I will do what I can in this respect not only relative to our government but also on approaches to private industry.

Ours is a free enterprise system, and the government has very little to do with where investors choose to invest. Unintentionally, small obstacles may have arisen in your country that are preventing US investors from coming in. I believe it would be possible for Ford Motor Company, makers of blue jeans and other goods to all invest here. We have no quarrel with the laws and rules for investment which you establish. The difficulty which worries investors is the uncertainty and

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 13085 from Lagos, November 10, 1977, the Embassy reported on the November 7–8 bilateral economic talks between a U.S. economic delegation led by Hormats and Nigerian officials during which they discussed investment climate, OPIC, trade, the South African boycott, petroleum investment, finance, development assistance, aid, and a proposed technical and economic development conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770416–1177)

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 30 and 31.

unpredictability of these rules. If investors could count on such rules, for example, with respect to indigenization, not changing over the next five years, their willingness to invest would increase. Your country has been blessed by oil, but that will not last forever and will have to be replaced by manufacturing and development. We are eager to expand our cooperation and trade with you. If difficulties arise in this process please get in touch with me directly and I will see what I can do to resolve them. Since we do have different systems we may not be able to resolve all of them completely, but we will try.

*OBASANJO*: I will take that. I understood that in Washington D.C. the officials of our two governments were not clear about some of the conditions "on the ground," (i.e., in Nigeria). On that basis we would perhaps prefer that the next meeting of the working groups would be here.

*EASUM*: There are both advantages and disadvantages in Lagos and Washington. Perhaps Robert Hormats who chaired our team at the last meeting could comment further.

*HORMATS*: Our idea in inviting the working groups to Washington was to give them some direct exposure to the U.S. Government agencies relevant to meeting Nigeria's needs and to the private firms which might be involved. We had hoped that a small group could have come over earlier in the year, but that unfortunately had to be cancelled. Now we hope that they can come at the end of April. Much work has been done to make their visit a success.

*THE PRESIDENT*: While the working groups are meeting in Washington, could we invite representatives of banks and major corporations to meet with them?

*HORMATS*: Yes, it could be arranged, or we could set up meetings in New York.

*THE PRESIDENT*: It would be helpful to identify the kinds of investment that would be useful to Nigeria; for example, (agriculture company) has a useful program of experiments and equipment in agriculture, and perhaps the working group could meet with them or similar firms. We are not trying to make American business richer, but only to facilitate investments which are good for you.

*HORMATS*: We will attempt to focus talks on the types of technical assistance we could provide in the areas of agriculture and education, and to examine opportunities for investment in areas of particular interest to Nigeria.

*EASUM*: Your government has indicated the need in conjunction with its development plan for a data base. Exposure to such procedures could be one of the objectives of the working group meeting in Washington.

*THE PRESIDENT:* When (to Easum) could you give General Obasanjo and me an interim report which would identify problems and the progress being made in this area?

*OBASANJO:* The team could meet in April or May for their second meeting.<sup>6</sup>

*THE PRESIDENT:* General Obasanjo and I do not seem to be fully informed about the problems and needs in this area. Could you (to Easum) by the end of May give us both an interim report on the status of these talks and the progress being made?

*EASUM:* Such a report could be prepared within one week after the next meetings are held, and could be ready by the end of May.

*THE PRESIDENT:* This report should be something that I can read in one hour, which should be frank and honest in respect to both governments, include criticisms of either government where warranted, and made jointly to General Obasanjo and myself.

*OBASANJO:* I agree. I understand that the US economic system is in private hands. Your government can encourage it to move but not move it directly.

*THE PRESIDENT:* The American business community pointed out two or three problems which tend to inhibit investment in your country. One is an uncertainty about the future, especially relative to successive changes in laws such as your indigenization decree.

*OBASANJO:* I can assure you that I will not change them in the future because I will not be here in the future (laughter).

We have taken all of these measures with a serious sense of responsibility, because we do not choose to isolate ourselves from the world and therefore know that cooperation must continue. We have divided our enterprises into three groups: (1) those where little expertise or capital is required; (2) those where medium expertise and capital is required. (In these Nigerians are required to own 60 percent and foreigners 40 percent); (3) those where very heavy expertise and capital, for instance relative to transfer of technology, are required. For these foreigners may own 60 percent and Nigerians are required to own 40 percent.

In all seriousness we do not intend to change this. On the question of whether a future administration may change these provisions, we believe there is no cause for fear. We have been acting responsibly and we have no intention of expropriating anyone's business. Even if "radicals" took over the government tomorrow, we are taking measures

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<sup>6</sup> The second round of the bilateral economic talks took place in Washington April 24–28. See Document 36 for the joint report.

to prevent expropriations from occurring. If I can illustrate on the level of dividends, we are fighting both externally imposed inflation and internally generated inflation. It is not an easy fight. We have recently allowed a little more for dividends to give us flexibility in fighting inflation. We have also moved large firms into group number three. This goes well with President Carter's and my joint plans for retirement on the farm (laughter).

*THE PRESIDENT:* I am going to form a joint venture with him on my farm in Plains, and he and I will have a farm in partnership in Nigeria (laughter).

*OBASANJO:* When I was in the United States, I talked with Rockefeller (relative to Chase Manhattan's decision to leave Nigeria), who said that he had not regretted his bank's stay here. Our policies are deliberate, but they should not hurt investments. On this basis I would ask, can the United States do something to generate or to underpin private sector confidence relative to investment in Nigeria?

*THE PRESIDENT:* I believe that my visit will help in this respect. When we return, I can report to my Cabinet on your stability and progress as well as the study which we discussed which is now underway. Cy and Bob (Hormats), could you prepare a report on this so that I can explain the importance of the visit of the Nigerian team and our economic relationship?

OPIC is also very important here. I understand that there have been delays on both the business side and in your government in processing the papers for application for such guarantees. Some businessmen who are dynamic are sometimes impulsive; they are often frustrated at the slow process of OPIC applications, etc. All of these measures plus my public statements will help the situation.

*VANCE:* The EXIM problem is now cleared up, so EXIM financing is now available, and I will make a note of that.

*EASUM:* We must be clear on the difference between EXIM and OPIC. There has been some difficulty on the acceptance of OPIC proposals submitted to your government three months ago.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Our businessmen consider OPIC to be an important form of insurance for investors.

*OBASANJO:* (To Musa) Is there a problem here?

*MUSA:* These projects under our system must be referred to government relative to enterprise classification, and there have been delays in that process.

*HORMATS:* In November we made a proposal to you which simplified the present approach by reducing the number of times that we

had to go to the Nigerian Government for approval.<sup>7</sup> Such a proposal would avoid complications. We hope you will reexamine it in this light.

*OBASANJO*: I believe that we should be able to streamline this system.

*THE PRESIDENT*: I understand that 31 companies are waiting for approval of their OPIC applications.

*EASUM*: There are 31 pending applications which have been submitted.

*OBASANJO*: Don, send these directly to me through External Affairs. Other points or problems can be taken up by the study group.

Let me raise another question. We are being discriminated against as an OPEC country.

*THE PRESIDENT*: Unfortunately, it is probably not possible to change this situation now. GSP is designed to help poor countries. At the time of the oil embargo, Congress passed a law removing GSP applicability to OPEC countries. Congress will not now reconsider this law. President Perez of Venezuela made it a point to bring the same matter to my attention in Caracas. I wish that the law was not there. However, I believe that the adverse impact on Nigeria is slight.

*OBASANJO*: That may be the case, but this is a symbolic thing; however, I understand.

Also, we used to have a block grant agreement. Concessional aid for participant training of Nigerians in the US and salary supplementation of US experts in Nigeria. Can this be updated?

*EASUM*: There is about \$1 million left under this agreement which we were planning to use to top up experts' salaries for work in Nigeria.

*OBASANJO*: I am aware of the \$1 million; I was asking whether additional monies would be possible.

*EASUM*: My understanding is that there are no specific gross national product criteria under the relevant AID legislation. But we need to know the specifics of how you would propose that concessional aid be used. On that basis we can go to Congress. This matter can be developed further in the working groups.

*THE PRESIDENT*: Most of these agreements go to low-income countries. In this connection there is another possibility for assistance, but we do not insist on it. Peace Corps is an avenue of aid for high

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 12965 from Lagos, November 8, the Embassy reported that, on November 7, an OPIC team presented to the Nigerian Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Industries proposals for streamlining foreign investment procedures. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770413–0917)

income countries. I know it has a bad history here. Perhaps a few volunteers could be sent on a trial basis, but we are not insisting on this.

*OBASANJO:* We need older, mature people. They could perhaps be sent over under a technical assistance program but not as Peace Corps, because we still have political problems here. But it could be done as technical assistance, and this may work, especially in agriculture.

*THE PRESIDENT:* If you could list the specialties which you need that Peace Corps volunteers might be able to fill, we could work on it in the way that you suggest. I have a somewhat different view of Peace Corps than you do; my mother went to India in the Peace Corps when she was 68. I don't know about problems in the past, but I do know about the future. Sending the Peace Corps here is not an issue for us and I only propose it as another way to help you. If you don't want it, forget it. Possibly retired people with expertise could be worked into this program.

*OBASANJO:* We can see about this.

On another question, I do not have absolute confirmation, but relative to the 1,000 students which we sent to the United States in the middle level manpower training program, we may not be getting what we want.<sup>8</sup> We anticipated that these students would be distributed to and incorporated into the programs of existing institutions. Instead we understand that they may be getting special treatment.

*EASUM:* Our Economic Counselor can better speak on this as he has been following this problem closely.

*CAHILL:* Five hundred students were sent in December to 63 institutions that were chosen for their relevance to the students' needs; as far as I am aware they were fitted into the curriculum in each of these institutions.

*JOLAOSO:* In certain areas, where there were no courses, special programs have been designed for these students, such as Clark College in Atlanta where students went to be trained in pharmacy; Clark does not normally offer courses in pharmacy and these were laid on especially. This problem just came to my attention before I left the States.

*VANCE:* These problems can be reported directly to State.

*THE PRESIDENT:* On even the small problems in this process, please let the Secretary of State know directly.

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<sup>8</sup> Details of the middle level manpower training program are described in telegram 154136 to Lagos, July 1, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770236-0153)



*OBASANJO*: Earlier this year, the Nigerian government went to the European money market for a \$1 billion loan. We find that we need more to maintain a good position relative to development projects and current expenditures. We would welcome anything that we could get along these lines in either money markets or direct government loans in the United States.<sup>9</sup>

*THE PRESIDENT*: What are your relations with the International Monetary Fund?

*OBASANJO*: They are pretty good.

*THE PRESIDENT*: The United States is preparing to contribute further to the International Monetary Fund. You should know that those officials, members of the business communities and officers of the banks all communicate with each other about these kinds of questions. Your stability and willingness to accommodate to investors will help. With respect to the possibility of direct government loans, I will do all I can to help.

*OBASANJO*: You and I had spoken briefly before about the problem of liquified natural gas. The Commissioner for Petroleum could expand on this.

*COMMISSIONER*: Our concern is to find a market for projected supplies of LNG. I understand that a primary question relates to the rules of the U.S. Department of Energy and the energy legislation which has not yet been approved. Our concern to find a market especially becomes acute after 1983, because we estimate thereafter that market will decline by 10 percent each year.

*THE PRESIDENT*: Have you talked to Secretary Schlesinger at our Department of Energy? You might wish to come over to do so or we might send someone over here to explore these questions. We do have a need in the future for oil and gas. Congressional action on the Energy Bill is imminent. Detailed discussion by you would possibly be useful with Schlesinger and also the oil and gas companies involved.<sup>10</sup>

*COMMISSIONER*: I am familiar with the LNG programs of Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iran. I think we have some advantage over them relative to the United States market because of our proximity. According to all projections, Nigeria is more a gas country than an oil country.

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<sup>9</sup> In a May 31 memorandum to Brzezinski, Blumenthal provided an analysis of Nigeria's economic potential and noted his decision that direct government lending to Nigeria was feasible. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 113, Nigeria 6/77–12/78)

<sup>10</sup> See Documents 39, 45, and 89.



*THE PRESIDENT:* The Energy Bill would raise the price of natural gas by increments, but by 1985 the price will be unregulated. This is expected to cost the American consumers a great deal of money.

*OBASANJO:* May I thank you sincerely for the additional contribution, which you announced in your speech to the African Development Fund.<sup>11</sup> It will go a long way to help development in several African countries.

I have read carefully your Venezuelan speech and the economic proposals which you made.<sup>12</sup> I am convinced that the political will to carry out such proposals as the Common Fund and debt, where progress is important to Africa but has been too slow, is all that is needed on both sides, and that we must go forward to establish it. Relative to the U.S. foundation for technology which you announced in that speech, I hope that Nigeria can participate.

*THE PRESIDENT:* Yes, this should be possible.

I want to raise another point. It has been difficult for industrialized countries to find a suitable forum to discuss international economic questions. The Group of 77 gets together to discuss these issues and their radical members take positions which scare our Congress. We have much to offer through the World Bank, AID programs, the IMF and other institutions, but we cannot negotiate with 95 nations. I believe, however, that we are making progress on this.

*OBASANJO:* I think that something is in the offing; I recently got a letter from Manley of Jamaica.

*THE PRESIDENT:* But still, this remains a problem. I want to break away from a situation where when our proposals do not fully meet G-77 demands we are considered an enemy.

*OBASANJO:* I believe that this is improving.

*THE PRESIDENT:* I hope that by the time the Economic Summit meets in July in Bonn, there can be a framework under which improvement can be made. Also, all of the NATO leaders will be in Washington in May and we will have informal discussions about this problem.

*OBASANJO:* Manley suggested a meeting in June, but I believe that I will have problems with this.

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<sup>11</sup> In remarks at the National Arts Theatre in Lagos on April 1, Carter announced his intention to recommend a U.S. contribution of \$125 million to the second replenishment of the African Development Fund. (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, Book I*, pp. 645-651)

<sup>12</sup> Carter gave a speech before the Venezuelan Congress on March 29, in which he set forth his plans to promote international economic growth. (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, Book I*, pp. 619-623)

*THE PRESIDENT:* It would be helpful if that meeting could take place before the Economic Summit convenes in July.

END OF SECOND SESSION

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#### 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Liberia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Monrovia, April 7, 1978, 1655Z

2598. Dept please pass NSC for Brzezinski and Richardson. Subject: President Carter's Visit to Liberia. Ref: Monrovia 2506.<sup>2</sup>

1. As participants will recall, a number of sidebar conversations ensued during course of Monday, 3 April working luncheon but bilateral discussions in which most of US participated could be broken down into three categories: agriculture, health and security.

2. Under agriculture, President Tolbert and Minister Phillips discussed Liberia's interest in support for treecrop development designed to increase production of palm oil, coffee and cocoa. There was general discussion on this subject in which President Carter also participated, utilizing his specialized knowledge of ground nuts, but no decisions or recommendations were taken. It was noted that U.S. is already somewhat involved in the palm oil industry in Liberia and questions from the USG side stressed Liberia's plans for small farmer inclusion.

3. Under discussion on health the exchanges concentrated on river blindness, a disease described by President Tolbert as affecting at least half the population in certain rural subdivisions of the country. Tolbert and Minister of Justice (formerly Health Minister) Oliver Bright asked that U.S. consider support for a regional research center on onchocerciasis. Secretary Vance pointed out that USAID is already doing some work on the subject, that we would undertake to determine whether Liberia could be included in the regional program already established.

4. The discussion under security flowed from President Carter's observation that the GOL wished to obtain additional patrol vessels

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780151-0024. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Carter visited Monrovia April 3. In telegram 2506 from Monrovia, April 5, the Embassy transmitted the highlights of a Liberian government memorandum analyzing U.S.-Liberian relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780147-0349)

under the FMS program in FY-1980. Tolbert lamented the small allocation in the FY-79 budget and said yes, that the GOL did anticipate "an additional ship or two" by 1981 to help in policing its waters. Tolbert and Minister of Defense Burleigh Holder claimed that the Soviets were raping Liberia's waters of valuable fish. President Carter related USG's experience with the Soviets and acknowledged that the situation was not improved until several vessels and their captains were brought to stateside ports and courts. President Carter expressed interest in GOL's request for patrol equipment and asked that the situation be reviewed by (and here I am uncertain) Secretary Vance or NSC Director Brzezinski.<sup>3</sup>

5. Embassy rapporteur suffers somewhat in fulfilling his assignment because he could not join the various sub-groupings around the table. This problem is additionally compounded by the fact that substantive exchanges occurred between USG and GOL principals riding to and from the airport. FonMin Dennis has promised to provide Ambassador with a debriefing on his exchanges with Secretary Vance but we may find it difficult to resurrect fragments of conversations between other principals.

6. Minister Townsend told Ambassador that Presidents Carter and Tolbert discussed the inroads being made by Communism in Africa in their private discussions while traveling in from the airport. Townsend said Tolbert revealed that he had called in the Soviet Ambassador at the time the GOL was throwing out the TASS correspondent for interference in internal Liberian affairs and warned the Ambassador that any similar involvements would result in the Ambassador's being asked to leave. Tolbert is reported to have spoken to President Carter of increasing Marxist activities in Liberia, citing the University of Liberia and the radical organization Susukuu as being danger spots.

7. All of the above, according to Townsend, occurred while the two Presidents were discussing the general subject of security. (Townsend said the security discussion developed when President Tolbert sought additional financial support from USG for the Armed Forces of Liberia.) According to Townsend, Tolbert reported President Carter's attitude as sympathetic and receptive.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 90967 to multiple posts, April 8, the Department asked for local assessments of the ability of West African coastal states to patrol their offshore fisheries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780152-0749) In telegram 3071 from Monrovia, April 27, the Embassy reported on some of the difficulties that the Liberian Coast Guard faced in protecting their fisheries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780180-0011)

8. This message should be read with the caveat that it is an uncleared draft and the hope is expressed that Washington participants will flesh out the categories as required.

Carter

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### 35. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 8, 1978, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Carter and President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
Herman Cohen, United States Ambassador to Senegal  
Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council  
  
President Leopold Sedar Senghor  
Ambassador Andre Jean Coulbary, Senegal Ambassador to the United States  
Medoune Fall, Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
Djibo Ka, Director of the Cabinet  
Shiekh Leye, Chief of Protocol  
Samba Ba, Press Attache

The meeting began at 11:00 a.m. with an exchange of books between the two Presidents.

*President Carter* welcomed Senghor and said he sought his advice, particularly an assessment of the situation in the Western Sahara region and what we could do to secure peace in Africa especially working through the OAU.

*President Senghor* replied that the Annapolis speech was very comforting.<sup>2</sup> He then turned to Angola as a starting point of his analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 114, Senegal 6/78–4/80. Confidential; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Carter's June 7 commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1052–1057. It is also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 87.

The Soviets are prudent and flexible but quickly move into a vacuum. Angola was such a case because of American hesitation following Vietnam. France and other countries needed to trade with Angola and pressed Senegal to recognize it. They even spoke of personal danger to Senghor. Senghor told them that this was a dangerous tactic and that Zambia or Zaire could be next. The Soviets are attempting to carry out the legacy of both Lenin and Peter the Great. They want to conquer Africa first and then Europe. By that time it might be too late for the United States to react. They rely on non-African helpers such as Cuba and the GDR but have also recruited Africans such as Algeria, Libya, Benin, Congo Brazzaville, Madagascar, Ethiopia and Guinea although in Guinea American actions have improved the situation.<sup>3</sup> Egypt, Tunisia and Senegal on the other hand are going to establish a social democratic union at the end of June.

*President Senghor* pointed to one split in Africa between Arabs and Negroes. Algeria and Libya are playing on this. Senegal is on the dividing line and has removed both tribalism and religious wars. A more important split is the cultural one between Francophones and Anglophones. Senegal is combatting this by developing bi-lingualism.

*President Senghor* said that the worst split in Africa is between "progressives" and moderates. The progressives, supported by the USSR and Eastern Europeans, seek to destabilize areas that they do not control. The OAU refuses to accept an East-West split in Africa and condemns intervention. Algeria however opposes Morocco and Mauritania and has intervened in Mali and Niger. They and the Libyans are interfering in the Western Sahara, and want to split all of these states to gain control of the Arab populations. Hardly five percent of the people in the Sahara however are pure Arabs.

*President Senghor* said the first thing we should do is to ensure compliance with Article III which prohibits intervention.<sup>4</sup> Last year at the OAU, Senegal sponsored a Resolution condemning intervention, with Angola in mind. Algeria opposed it but it was adopted 42 to 6 showing that there is no progressive majority in the OAU.<sup>5</sup> A second step should be an agreement among the Euro-Americans, within the Helsinki framework,<sup>6</sup> prohibiting all military intervention. This should

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 26 and 28.

<sup>4</sup> Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity affirms the sovereignty and independence of member states and advocates the peaceful settlement of disputes and a non-aligned policy for members.

<sup>5</sup> The 14th OAU summit took place in Libreville July 2-5, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Accords, aimed to improve relations between the Eastern bloc and the West.

be supplemented by a UN Resolution that would cover the Cubans and Asians.

*President Senghor* pointed to the need for a defensive capability for the moderate states. He had asked for a defense arrangement at the last ECOWAS meeting<sup>7</sup> but this depended on Nigeria and he solicited US backing with Nigeria on this.

*President Senghor* opposes an OAU force and prefers regional arrangements because the OAU is too diverse.

Even though Senegal is sending a Battalion to Zaire<sup>8</sup> it feels very remote from Zaire. Senegal does not want the US to send troops, but to train and transport the forces of the regional pacts as they did in the Kolwezi operation.

*President Senghor* said that since only 10 of the 49 African countries are “progressives” we need not worry. The Cuban role, as in Angola, shows that this is not the case. Senegal could have refused to help in Zaire but then Chad and Mauritania would follow. There would be a Soviet-Cuban thrust into central Africa, isolating the moderates on the periphery.

*President Senghor* said we are in a state of confrontation of two ideologies. He and President Carter are both democrats and believe in human rights. President Carter’s religion and stand on human rights, and defense of democracy is important for Africa. America should help defend human rights and freedom in Africa and help resist communism.

*President Carter* thanked Senghor for his thorough and enlightening presentation which helped to shape his thoughts. He said that the American government is developing a willingness to play an active role in Africa. We want strong independent states in Africa with regional burden-sharing, no foreign intrusion, and efforts concentrated on peaceful development. We cannot send military forces but look to regional groupings or perhaps the OAU to deter intervention.

*President Carter* said it is correct to emphasize that countries such as Libya and Algeria who disrupt existing borders are setting a dangerous precedent. America needs guidance from Senghor on how to better handle African matters such as Zaire. We have had no success in getting the Cubans out of Africa or keeping them from sending more troops. We are therefore closely in tune with your advice and plans.

*President Carter* referred to Africa’s several economic problems and said that his Mother may visit the Sahel. This would dramatize his

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<sup>7</sup> The ECOWAS summit took place April 21–22 in Lagos.

<sup>8</sup> Senegal contributed troops to the inter-African peacekeeping force in southern Zaire after the Shaba II conflict. See Document 116.

own personal interest in these problems. America wants to help alleviate hunger and disease and seeks Senegal's guidance.

*President Carter* said that Senghor's analysis of the Angola situation is correct. The Soviets came in while we were traumatized by Vietnam. We will not make a similar mistake. We have not recognized Neto but by law we cannot get involved in Angola. Neto would be unable to stay in power without Cuban support. We need to cooperate with you and other great African leaders. There has been a substantial change in Congressional and public opinion about opposing Soviets and Cubans and providing aid to those who help themselves.

*President Senghor* said he would be glad to welcome Miss Lillian.<sup>9</sup> Turning to Angola he said that he frequently sees Savimbi who is fighting courageously. The French help him as does Senegal within its limited means. Cuba cannot remain indefinitely in Angola.

*President Senghor* said he was pleasantly surprised at the understanding and openness of the Congressmen with whom he had met, especially in the HIRC. He had met with the Black Caucus this morning. They are romantics and he told them that the Algerians are racists who want a white empire. The Polisario is slaughtering blacks.

*President Carter* asked how we could get SWAPO to be more cooperative. Nujoma is elusive and there is a danger of unilateral South African action.

*President Senghor* replied that the South African incursion had spoiled everything. He has long-standing ties with SWAPO and has urged them in the direction of the Western Five proposals. His Ambassador at the UN will talk to Nujoma again. Senegal supports the Anglo-American plan at Five Power proposals. Nujoma will not accept South African troops; the forces should come from the UN and Senegal will contribute if necessary. Senghor supports democracy in Namibia and Rhodesia and has told Nkomo and Mugabe that there should not be an imposed regime like the MPLA. Elections should be held as is done in Senegal.

*President Senghor* then raised the Arab-Israeli question. He said he is part Jewish and can speak frankly to both sides. At the time of the mandate both Jews and Palestinians lived together and both deserve a homeland. There will be no durable peace until Jews live among Arabs in a confederation. Begin is a fanatic but Senghor has confidence in Sadat. He is trying to establish relations between the PLO and Israeli Labor Party. He has always found the PLO open and easy to talk with, although the Christian Palestinians are more difficult. Senghor said he

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to President Carter's mother, Lillian Carter.

is at President Carter's disposal if he can help. His financial advisor in Washington is David Morse with whom he is in close contact.

*President Carter* said that Secretary Vance would give Senghor a fuller report on the Middle East situation. We are not optimistic; Israel has delayed answering questions that we [omission in the original—gave?] to them.

*President Carter* noted that President Senghor had a luncheon scheduled and thanked him for this exciting chance to meet with him. He also expressed appreciation for Senghor's servicing of our aircraft enroute to Shaba.

Thereupon at 12:15 the meeting closed as *President Senghor* presented some personal gifts for Mrs. Carter.

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### **36. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 10, 1978

#### **SUBJECT**

Joint Report of the US/Nigerian Bilateral Economic Talks, April 24–28

During your visit to Lagos you and General Obasanjo agreed that the second round of US/Nigerian bilateral economic talks should be held in Washington.<sup>2</sup> You asked that we work with our Nigerian counterparts on a report for you and General Obasanjo to be ready by the end of May. You suggested that these talks should focus on opportunities for further progress in US/Nigeria economic relations and on outstanding differences in the economic area. The meetings took place on April 24–28. I attach the report agreed to by both delegations.<sup>3</sup>

Nigeria was represented by a high-level delegation consisting of three permanent secretaries and a number of senior officials representing virtually all major ministries in Lagos. The size, level and breadth of agency coverage represented on the delegation evidenced the importance attached by the Nigerian Government to US/Nigerian relations. The US delegation comprised representatives from all agencies with a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nigeria 1–12/78. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 33.

<sup>3</sup> Attachment not found.



role in US/Nigerian economic relations. Chaired by Bob Hormats, it included Don Easum and senior officials from AID, Commerce, EXIM, OPIC, Agriculture and ICA.

As you and General Obasanjo said they should, the conferees carefully examined the numerous possibilities for closer US/Nigerian economic ties and frankly assessed current impediments to such ties, e.g. the Nigerian investment climate. In accordance with your wishes, we sought to establish contacts between the Nigerian delegation and the US private sector. Three of the five days were spent by the group visiting other parts of the US in order to meet with various elements of the US private sector, especially potential investors and research institutions with an interest in Nigeria.

### *SIGNIFICANCE*

This second round of US-Nigerian bilateral economic talks was significant for several reasons:

—They continued the discussion of bilateral economic problems, and the possibilities for further cooperation, which had been begun in the first round in Lagos last November.<sup>4</sup> There is now an established framework in which we can continue to expand economic contacts as well as raise pressing economic matters affecting our bilateral relationship.

—We succeeded in putting on the record our views of virtually all of the major issues between us.

These issues are chiefly in the trade and investment field. The most important are the percentage of management personnel that may be recruited outside Nigeria ("expatriate quotas"), the percentage of an enterprise that must be Nigerian owned ("indigenization"), and the amount of profit from investment that may be remitted.

The only significant issue that is not covered in the final report is the denial of consular access to American citizens detained by the Nigerian authorities. The Nigerian delegation contended that this is not purely an economic issue and that we had not given them prior notice of our intention to raise it in this context. They pointed out, correctly, that no American businessman in the course of extensive discussions with the private sector had raised the point. However, they agreed to inform General Obasanjo of our views and I understand this has been done.

—The possibilities for further cooperation to develop the Nigerian economy have been greatly enhanced. Two results are particularly significant.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 33.

First, we agreed to fund several missions to examine key aspects of the Nigerian economy in the clear expectation that these missions will result in substantial reimbursable development programs. These programs are facilitated by Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Under this section, the Nigerian Government may buy services from or through the US Government, as it is now doing to provide training in the US for roughly a thousand Nigerian technicians.

Second, the Nigerians made clear, for the first time, their desires for “cost sharing” arrangements, i.e. concessional aid in the form of a reduction in the price of the services they might purchase from us.

#### *THE WORKING GROUPS*

The four working groups focused on their special areas of interest:

—The Investment and Trade Group met with the Export Import Bank (EXIM) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and spent two days in New York with investors, traders, shippers, and financiers, discussing their interests and problems in doing business in Nigeria.

—The Transfer of Technology Group met with a wide range of USG agencies interested in providing services to the Federal Military Government, and traveled to Boston (Harvard, Arthur D. Little) and North Carolina (The Research Triangle).

—The Agriculture and Rural Development Group met with the Departments of Agriculture and Interior and NASA and with private firms interested in joint ventures in Nigeria.

—The Education Group met with HEW, ICA, AID and a wide range of educational associations and institutions.

#### *NEXT STEPS*

—We shall continue to work with the Federal Military Government to reduce impediments to US trade and investment, particularly in those specific areas identified by the working group on trade and investment.

—OPIC will inform prospective US investors that Nigeria qualifies for investment insurance and will assist the FMG in promoting US investment in Nigeria. A number of proposals suggested to the Nigerian delegation are under consideration.

—EXIM is now in a position to consider requests for finance on a case by case basis. As a result of the bilateral economic talks in November, the FMG prepaid in full a particularly troublesome loan that had impeded EXIM’s ability to finance Nigerian projects.

—We will continue to discuss with the FMG means of enhancing communication between the US and Nigerian public and private sectors, including future meetings of the individual working groups and

the proposed Nigerian-US Conference on Technology and Economic Development.

—AID will fund an agricultural team, coordinated by the Department of Agriculture, to travel to Nigeria in October to identify specific reimbursable projects.

—AID will fund survey missions to Nigeria by representatives of several US agencies to identify projects to increase the transfer of US technology to Nigeria.

—AID and ICA will work closely with Nigerian educational institutions to develop links between US and Nigerian institutions, continue the technical manpower training program, develop teacher training and vocational/technical institutions, expand health care capabilities, and develop counseling and guidance facilities.

—AID will review existing or potential avenues for cost sharing under the Foreign Assistance Act and submit a proposal for Executive Branch consideration prior to consultations with Congress.

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### **37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1978, 2008Z

157812. Subject: Letter From President Carter to President Tolbert.

1. Please pass the following letter dated June 20, 1978, from President Carter to President Tolbert. Signed original follows.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President: When I visited Monrovia on April 3 you presented me with a document entitled, "Briefing Notes and Proposals."<sup>2</sup> I read it with interest and have directed that your suggestions be studied carefully. The various departments have now made their reports and Ambassador Carter will be in touch with your ministers to review your plans and the help which we can provide. We look forward to cooperating with your government in the fields of development and low-cost shelters in Monrovia. I also believe that we will be able to help in the health area. I therefore propose sending

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780259-0508. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Svendsen (AF/W); cleared in AID, PM, S/P, P, and S/S; approved by Moose.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 34 and footnote 2 thereto.

a team to Liberia to determine how we can help you combat river blindness.<sup>3</sup>

3. Although the subject was not raised in your memorandum, I have asked our aeronautics and space administration to see whether our space capability could be of benefit to Liberia. They have recommended to me that we undertake a technical assessment of potential use of satellite imagery in resource management and weather prediction. Ambassador Carter is prepared to work with appropriate ministries in arranging such a survey, if you are interested.

4. Most importantly, I would like to be responsive to the desires you expressed to bring more of the benefits of development to all Liberians. It seems to me that one of the best ways to do this is to provide a greater opportunity for Liberians in all walks of life to acquire the skills and knowledge that would permit them to improve their own circumstances and, at the same time, participate more fully in the development process.

5. Such an approach might be national in scope, and extend over several years. It might aim at the improvement of the formal education system as well as the establishment of training in specialized skills relevant to the needs of Liberia's people. It could include primary, secondary and vocational and on-the-job training in the public and private sector.

6. National programs of this type have large monetary and political costs, and require the sacrifice of certain other activities. But the returns can be immense. We are interested in assisting in this area if it is your wish, and if you are prepared to commit substantial resources to the program.<sup>4</sup>

7. Rosalynn and I will always cherish the memory of our visit to Liberia and the warmth of our reception. Thank you very much for the inscribed photographs; please also express my thanks to the Liberian Senate for the kind letter that they sent to me. These will be continual reminders of our meeting with you and the Liberian people, and of the depth and character of the special relationship between our two countries.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1471 from Monrovia, February 23, 1980, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Patricia Harris and Tolbert, in which she assured the Liberian President that assistance on combating river blindness was forthcoming once her office received the team's final report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800094-0737)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5129 from Monrovia, July 17, the Embassy transmitted the text of Tolbert's response. Tolbert accepted Carter's offer to send a research team to study the issue of river blindness, the satellite survey to aid in resource management, and assistance to improve Liberia's education system. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780259-0508)

8. With every good wish and warm regards. Sincerely, (signed) Jimmy Carter. Unquote.

Vance

### 38. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Lagos, June 30, 1978, 1435Z

8092. Subject: Nigerian Advice to the Cubans. Ref: (A) Lagos 8033; (B) Lagos 6853.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Ambassador of Togo told me today that Obasanjo had informed the Togolese Ministerial Mission (reftel A) earlier this week that the FMG recently sent the Cubans a written communication regarding the presence of their troops in Africa. According to Ambassador Apedo-Amah, the gist of the message had been that Nigeria appreciated the assistance which Cuban troops in Africa had provided in the past but that enough was enough and the FMG now hopes that Cuban troops in Africa will be withdrawn. Obasanjo indicated that the FMG will take additional steps in the future designed to encourage the withdrawal of Cuban troops.<sup>3</sup>

2. This information indicates that there was a great deal of significance behind the statement in the FMG's press release (reftel A) that Nigeria's opposition to the presence "of any foreign troops on African soil . . . had been brought to the notice of all the countries concerned."

3. We reported earlier (reftel B) that the sending of peacekeeping forces to Shaba Province had significantly increased existing Nigerian

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nigeria 1-12/78. Confidential; Immediate, Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lome. Sent for information to Moscow, the Interests Section in Havana, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8033 from Lagos, June 29, the Embassy reported that Obasanjo had "reaffirmed that Nigeria was against foreign intervention in the continent either directly or indirectly through military force." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780271-0952) In telegram 6853 from Lagos, June 3, the Embassy reported: "The Cuban role in the Shaba affair has apparently set off a reevaluation of Cuban involvement in Africa generally within Nigerian government circles which could ultimately redound to our favor." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780232-0951)

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph, drew an arrow next to it, and wrote at the top of the page, "This certainly would have never happened (if it has!) if we had not kept raising the issue. ZB." Beneath this Carter wrote "Good, J."

uneasiness about the continued presence of African troops in Cuba. The present information shows that Nigerian rethinking in this respect has gone considerably farther than seemed likely at that time. We feel sure that there are many within the government who do not agree with the advice which the FMG has now given the Cubans.

4. We will discreetly endeavor to obtain corroboration of this report as circumstances permit.

Wyman

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### 39. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 30, 1978, 3 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting Between Secretary Schlesinger and Nigerian Commissioner for Petroleum, Muhammed Buhari, 3:00 p.m., June 30, 1978

#### PARTICIPANTS

See Attachment

#### LNG

Commissioner Buhari described Nigeria's planned LNG project. It will produce 1.6 to 1.7 billion cubic feet (about 0.6 tcf per year) from six trains, all of which the Nigerians hope to dedicate to the US. This 20 year project will require 13 tcf of Nigeria's 45 tcf of reserves. The Federal Government will own 85 percent of the gas gathering facilities and 50 percent of the transportation facilities; the companies involved in the project—Shell, BP, Phillips, ELF and AGIP—will own the remainder.

Buhari said the LNG project could come on-stream 36 months after all regulatory approvals had been obtained. He expressed concern about regulatory delays.

Secretary Schlesinger said we expect to have an LNG policy statement by September. Once the policy has been established, he hoped evaluation of individual projects would not take more than three or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 113, Nigeria 6/77–12/78. Confidential. Drafted by Creekmore on July 10. The meeting took place at the Department of Energy.

four months (following submission of a complete application). Nigeria could hopefully get an answer in that time frame, though he could not say what the answer would be. The Secretary advised the Nigerians not to equate the timing of reviews on new applications with that required for earlier projects. The applications for the El Paso II and the Tenneco projects were filed before the FPC; its stringent *ex parte* procedures will hopefully not apply to applications with DOE.

(FYI—Final procedures for processing LNG import applications are still being negotiated between the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). At this juncture, it appears that most major policy aspects of specific LNG projects will be reviewed by ERA with FERC conducting a separate review on siting and domestic marketing arrangements. While ERA is generally subject to DOE policy guidance, FERC is not bound by such guidance. End FYI)

Secretary Schlesinger said price will be an extremely important consideration in the final decision on LNG contracts. He noted that the average price of US natural gas is about \$1.25 mcf; new gas is now selling for about \$2.00 mcf; Canadian gas for \$2.16 mcf; and Mexico has offered the US gas at \$2.60 mcf. Consequently LNG is a relatively high cost gas, and we are uncertain about future demand for it. We believe the natural gas legislation will stimulate development of new domestic gas.

The Secretary suggested that Nigeria had two key factors in its favor. First, a large portion of LNG cost is the transportation charge and Nigeria is closer to the East coast market than some other potential LNG exporters. Second, the US wanted to diversify sources of supply, and most LNG applications, either approved or pending, involve Algerian LNG (1.6 tcf/yr)—which causes supply security concerns.

In response to Mr. Marinho's questions on incremental vs. rolled-in pricing and price indexing, the Secretary said that:

—The natural gas legislation requires limited incremental pricing for new natural gas. We do not yet know how much of the burden of incremental pricing would fall on LNG, but would tend to look askance at fully rolled-in pricing for LNG.

—We have already allowed some price indexing but only if the delivered price is acceptable. We would likely not permit landed price of LNG to reflect solely the OPEC price but we might find it acceptable if the landed cost of LNG was tied to the total cost of energy. The underlying objective of our energy policy is to bring the full cost of energy to the consumers.

The Nigerians asked whether plans to use existing landing sites on the East coast and the Gulf coast would adversely affect the decision

on the Nigerian LNG proposal. The Secretary assured them that this factor would not be decisive.

Buhari told the Secretary that his discussion the day before at Treasury had been useful. He explained Phillips' concern that its 7.5 percent equity in the LNG project would not permit it to qualify for tax credits under IRS guidelines. Buhari thought an acceptable solution would be to let Phillips have 10 percent of voting control but receive only 7½ percent of the profits. He also noted that Phillips is discussing buying additional equity from other companies in the project.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Competitiveness of US Equipment Manufacturers*

Buhari and Marinho said that the cost of the LNG project to the FMG would be about \$4 billion, 60 percent for equipment and 40 percent for construction. While preferring US equipment and contractors, they said European and Japanese offers were more competitive. For instance, they said US Steel refused to bid on the pipelines for the project after learning of Japanese competition. One US firm—Williams International—got a small portion of the \$4 billion contract and had exceeded Nigerian expectations. Since this firm had used sub-contractors, the Nigerians wondered why it had not been willing to take on a large share of the total project. Marinho asked what might be done to make US companies more competitive. He speculated that they entered a larger risk element in their calculation than was justified. He also raised the question of EXIM financing.

Secretary Schlesinger said the US Government does not dictate commercial policy to US companies and noted that the US market itself is invaded by imported steel. He said unfortunately US firms tend not to be export-oriented, but they must reassess earlier attitudes in view of the US's \$30 billion trade deficit in 1977. The Secretary said we would look into how companies calculate risks in dealing with Nigeria.

Regarding EXIM, the Secretary said the Bank's objective was to encourage US exports; its loans were normally tied to the purchase of US equipment. He noted that the Nigerians might want to approach the World Bank, whose loans were not tied to purchases of equipment from any particular country.

#### *Oil*

Commissioner Buhari explained the importance of US companies to the Nigerian energy situation. The companies produced 700,000 b/d of oil. With a total investment of \$1.3 billion, they had invested \$200 million in Nigerian oil production in 1977. He expressed concern

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<sup>2</sup> For follow-up on the LNG discussions, see Document 45.



that the companies would reduce their investments if they were subject to the IRS ruling that taxes based on posted prices cannot be counted as tax credits. Noting that Treasury would have to decide that matter, Secretary Schlesinger speculated that the companies would probably figure out some way to meet the IRS concerns and still protect their interests in Nigeria.

Buhari said the Nigerians needed help to accelerate the development of new reserves. The cost of equipment, particularly for deep offshore drilling, is escalating. Marinho interjected that US and other industrialized countries' firms appear to charge a surtax on equipment sold to OPEC countries. He said Nigeria had documented that equipment sold to Ghana was priced lower than the same equipment sold to Nigeria.

Secretary Schlesinger emphasized that there was no government policy to charge OPEC countries more than other countries. He said we would investigate these charges if the Nigerians would furnish us the data. It was agreed that the Nigerian Ambassador would provide the information to Assistant Secretary Bergold.

#### *US Energy Legislation*

In response to Commissioner Buhari's query, Secretary Schlesinger said new US energy legislation would not affect Nigerian exports disproportionately. The effect of the new legislation on imports will be slow. He expected US demand for imports to grow after the Alaskan oil had been fully absorbed into the economy.

Marinho suggested that non-commercial factors were responsible for the current slack in Nigerian oil sales. He claimed that even though Nigeria had taken the necessary action to make its prices competitive on a net-back basis with comparable crudes from other countries, its sales were not recovering as rapidly as they should. Nigerian crude exports to the US had declined from 58% to 50% of total exports. He said that Iran seemed to be benefiting most from the Saudi decision to reduce exports of light crudes.

Secretary Schlesinger stated that the US Government did not try to influence companies as to their sources of supply. We have no allocation system. However, he indicated that we would investigate if non-commercial factors were causing aberrations in the market.

#### *US Strategic Reserves*

In response to Marinho's query, the Secretary made the following points:

—We have ambitious plans for the creation of a 1 billion barrel strategic storage reserve, which we will reach by 1983–84.

—We had hoped to have 250 million barrels a day in storage by the end of the year. But the figure will be more like 125 million barrels. The larger figure will not be achieved until June 1979.

—We are experiencing some difficulties (e.g., in citing permits from states, disposing of obstacles from salt caverns), but we think all can be overcome.

—By the end of October, we will have pipelines to the storage facilities, permitting accelerated filling. Currently oil is moved to storage by barges.

#### *Future Direct Contacts*

The Nigerians expressed a desire for direct line of contact with DOE. Secretary Schlesinger assigned that responsibility to Assistant Secretary Bergold. The Embassy in Washington will be the Nigerian point of contact.

### **Attachment<sup>3</sup>**

#### *List of Participants*

##### *Nigeria*

Muhammed Buhari, Commissioner for Petroleum

Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso

F.R.A. Marinho, Managing Director, Nigerian National  
Petroleum Company (NNPC)

S.M. Akpe, Head of Gas and Petrochemical Division of NNPC

D.A. Okanla, Manager of the Petroleum Inspectorate of NNPC

E.O. Idowu, Manager of the Legal Division of NNPC

J.J. Akpieyi, Head of the Product Marketing Division of NNPC

##### *US*

Secretary James Schlesinger

Harry E. Bergold, Jr., Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

Marion Creekmore, Director, Special Regions Policy

Peter Chaveas, Desk Officer, Dept. of State

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

**40. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Accra, July 5, 1978, 1511Z

5349. Subj: General Acheampong Resigns.

1. At 2:30 p.m. today, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs R.J.A. Felli announced to heads of all diplomatic missions, who had been summoned to his office one hour before, that Chief of State and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council General I.K. Acheampong had resigned from office as of this morning. Colonel Felli stated Acheampong, who was "safe and well" had also asked to be retired from the armed forces. The Supreme Military Council and National Redemption Council were now in emergency session and further announcements would be expected. He went on to say that there would be no fundamental changes or major departures in Ghana's foreign policy and asked that this word be sent to the home governments of those present.

2. Comment: Announcement came as complete surprise to assembled chiefs of diplomatic missions as no prior notice or even rumors of such a move had circulated, city is calm. Announcement made on 3 p.m. Radio Ghana news broadcast. Additional information will be forwarded as received.<sup>2</sup>

**Holmes**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780275-1183. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Abidjan, Lagos, Lome, London for Seitz, Ouagadougou, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Acheampong was tried and executed in June 1979.

**41. Telegram From the Embassy in Guinea to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Conakry, August 7, 1978, 1115Z

1477. AF for Assistant Secretary Moose. Subject: Moose Meeting With Sekou Toure.

1. Summary: In intense, five-hour exchange August 3, President Toure made clear his interest in cooperation with the US, set forth his dedication to independence, dignity and self-respect, recounted Guinea's struggle for independence and survival despite attempts to overthrow his regime, described the trauma of the 1970 invasion,<sup>2</sup> defended incarceration of traitors and affirmed his respect for human rights.

Secretary Moose emphasized fundamental importance USG attaches to human rights, spoke of practical problems rights violations create with Congress, and asked whether prisoner releases would continue. Sensitive on this issue, Toure spoke of the strong popular revulsion against traitors and asserted the question of their release is a matter for GOG alone to decide. Toure's half-brother Ismael pointed out that the President had not said the prisoner releases would not continue and that we might draw our own conclusions from that fact. Sekou Toure agreed with that interpretation. The exchange was an extremely useful one, enabling both sides to lay their principles and concerns on the table, and clearing the way for greater understanding, closer communications and perhaps cooperation on some African problems. End summary.

2. Afternoon August 3 Assistant Secretary Moose had intense five-hour exchange with President Toure, at the end of which they repaired to informal luncheon (7:15 p.m.) in a nearby room of the Presidential Palace. Present during the exchange were: Prime Minister Beavogui; Minister of Domain for Economics and Finance Ismael Toure; Minister of Information and Ideology Senainon Behanzin; Politbureau Perma-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0153. Confidential; Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> In November 1970, Portuguese soldiers and Guinean insurgents attacked Conakry, intending to capture Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the independence movement in Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) who was living in Guinea, and overthrow Sékou Touré. The invaders freed some prisoners and destroyed some infrastructure, but they retreated after they could not find Cabral or Sékou Touré. Portugal denied involvement, but a UN mission determined that Portugal had backed the invasion. The National Assembly of Guinea sentenced 92 people to death on charges of treason for alleged assistance to the invaders. ("Guinea Dooms 92 in Treason Trial," *New York Times*, January 25, 1971, p. 1)

nent Secretary and Party Inspector General Damantang Camara; Minister of Public Works, Urban Affairs and Housing Mohamed Lamine Toure; Minister of Plan and Economic Cooperation N'Faly Sangare; PermSec of Ministry of External Affairs Morou Balde (later joined by MinExtAff Fily Cissoko, just returned from Belgrade NAM meeting); T.W. Smith (AF/W); Will Petty (USICA); Bryant Salter (AF); Ambassador and DCM.

3. Atmosphere of meeting was friendly, frank but serious from the outset. Toure said he attached great importance to the meeting, which he pointed out was the first with a high-level USG visitor to Guinea in five or six years. Assembled group of some of his most important ministers attested to significance he attached to meeting and at same time put him on his mettle and may have robbed him of some flexibility. Toure spoke in measured tones, referring occasionally to notes, but increasing in conviction and vehemence as he expanded on the essential spirit and goals of his regime and the dangers that had threatened it over the past 20 years.

A. Toure assured Moose his wish for cooperation with the US is total and sincere; he did not expect full agreement with everything GOG does but he wants us to understand the spirit and principles that guide his government. He asked that we judge Guinea by its acts, not what people say about it. He said Guinea is not Communist nor a Communist puppet. He has had as much trouble with the Soviets and socialist states as he has with the West. Communism is alien to him. As he is deeply religious, lives by the principles of the Koran and would deservedly lose support of his people if he departed from those principles.

B. Central theme of GOG is dedication to independence, liberty, and the dignity, self-respect and equal rights of the individual. He said Guinean independence had developed and been strengthened through obstacles overcome, plots foiled and victories won. Toure described at some length the economic destitution of Guinea following its excommunication by France and withdrawal of 12,000 Frenchmen within a month after he opted for independence. Out of these trials has grown a deep mutual trust between Guinean people and Toure's leadership. He asserted it is trust born of the principles of honesty, genuine interest in the welfare of the people and concern for human rights. He cited equality accorded women in Guinea (in contrast to many other African countries), lack of large differences in pay scale and retirement provisions (the same for government ministers as for lowest civil servant), pointed to fact that justice is free and appeal to the law and judicial authorities at all levels involves no monetary outlay. Nor does education, which has been vastly expanded and is free to qualifying students through university level. He described the principles underlying "pop-

ular democracy" in Guinea and underscored extensive role played by people's organizations and local government authorities, asserting that his efforts to inform them, guide them and solicit their active participation in direction of the affairs of the country represent a more democratic approach to government than can be found anywhere else on continent. He added that he had criticized the Communist Party in Soviet Union for representing such a small percentage of the population.

C. Toure then spoke with strong emotion about his long struggle to maintain, first, Guinea's independence and thereafter the integrity and stability of his regime. He described the vast propaganda campaign of distortion and vilification directed against him and the attempts to assassinate him and overthrow his regime. The 1970 Portuguese invasion was a major, traumatic event which shook Toure and the memory of which is still fresh and acutely painful and leads him to give unhesitating priority to defense of his regime. He accused the West Germans of complicity in the affair and repeatedly underscored his abhorrence of treachery and betrayal and spoke of the revulsion of the people against the traitors. He emphasized the active participation of the people in arrest, conviction and sentencing of traitors, many of whom were personal friends of his and whose defection was particularly painful. He cited Kassory Bangour, Karim Bangoura (former Ambassador to the US) and Catholic Archbishop Tchidimbo, whom Toure had personally recommended for the post against the candidate proposed by the Vatican. He asserted Tchidimbo had then been recruited by Focart and turned against GOG. Then however, in [garble] as a gesture of friendship and cooperation, Toure had acceded to President Tolbert's appeal for release of Tchidimbo and had informed the Pope he would do everything possible to prepare the people to accept his release. Unfortunately, premature announcement of this by foreign news media put him in an awkward position, threatening to make it look to his people as though Tchidimbo's release had been imposed on him as a condition for reconciliation with Senegal and Ivory Coast. He had therefore suspended Tchidimbo's release until this unfortunate interpretation is forgotten. Pointing to verification and documentation by UN Security Council, OAU, etc., of the facts of the 1970 invasion, Toure said the question of release of prisoners is a sensitive one touching the feelings of widows and relatives of victims, and he maintained there would be hue and cry at release of those responsible for atrocities. He cited Koranic teaching that the leader cannot pardon traitors against the state; only the people can. In case of 1970 invasion, Toure pointed out that the people had condemned the traitors to death and it was he who had commuted this to prison sentences. He said that appeared somehow to be held against him, but he was prepared to accept the

consequences. He cited cases of France, Morocco, Zaire, Senegal and others who had unhesitatingly executed traitors and assassins and had not incurred foreign criticism. He pointed out that all foreigners involved in the 1970 event had been released: Those remaining are all former GOG officials convicted of treason. Toure's historical review stopped after the invasion and trials, omitting mention of the later arrests in connection with the 1976 "Foulah Plot".<sup>3</sup>

D. Toure then went on to discussion of bilateral US-GOG matters and general African problems (see septels).<sup>4</sup>

4. Moose thanked Toure for eloquent and detailed account of history and conditions under which underlying GOG principles had been formed, especially the fight for independence. He said he was struck by fact that despite all charges and suspicions on the part of those who continue to oppose the GOG, our outlook is so similar on most African questions. He said if there was one problem that could divide us, it is the question of human rights: He sincerely hoped it would not. Moose emphasized great importance attached to human rights by Carter administration and said he welcomed Toure's raising the subject, as he would like to discuss it further. Toure responded that human rights is one of the themes to be discussed at the 11th Party Congress in September, which he said would reaffirm GOG's dedication to these rights. Citing the fact that one can walk in safety through any part of Guinea and referring to his invitation to Guineans abroad to return, he drew the picture of a country internally at peace with itself. He quoted from his own writings praising Presidents Kennedy and Carter for the deep moral courage of their stand on human rights and asserted that human rights considerations are central to his philosophy of government: The GOG supports all those who fight for human rights. Moose said it was not his intention to criticize or attack the GOG, it was simply that there were serious possibilities of misunderstandings on this important issue, and there were practical problems involved;

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1561 from Conakry, August 5, 1976, the Embassy reported that a "wave of arrests for alleged conspiracy against Guinean government continues." "During a long emotional speech Sekou Toure said arrested fifth columnists had disclosed that conspiracy was supported by 'French Republic, West Germany and South Africa, with financial help from Senegal and Ivory Coast and assistance from Governments of Gabon and Zaire.' Sekou Toure vehemently denied popular rumors that arrests were a vendetta against Foulah tribe." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760302-0146)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1478 from Conakry, August 7, the Embassy reported Moose's exchange with Sékou Touré on general African issues including: Guinean support for ECOWAS, the offer of Guinean peacekeeping troops in Namibia, Rhodesian negotiations, apartheid in South Africa, and the problem of coups in Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329-0154) In telegram 1479 from Conakry, August 7, the Embassy reported on Sékou Touré's interest in U.S. aid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332-0113)

he wanted to do all he could to foster understanding and cooperation. He asked whether the release of prisoners we had noted and welcomed during past months would continue. Toure replied that the prisoners had been condemned to death and it was hard to release them because of bitter feelings of the population. Moose asked whether prisoners could not be rehabilitated. Toure said that would follow their release. Moose said in light of government's present confidence and stability, release of the prisoners now would be desirable as an act of humanity, but Toure again referred to 300 widows who would vociferously oppose. Moose asked how many prisoners there were, and Toure answered with some asperity that that is a matter of "public record"; Guinea is the only country that publishes such information. Moose explained that it was necessary to discuss the matter frankly, as we have difficulties with the Congress on the subject and we want to avoid misunderstandings. Toure retorted that there was already misunderstanding; the facts of the invasion had all been established by UN Security Council; he found it painful if, in pressing for release of prisoners, we were showing more concern for a few traitors than we did for the interests of the entire population and state of Guinea. These traitors had been condemned to death, and he had said "give them life". By now thoroughly worked up, Toure asserted that this was a matter for Guinea alone to decide; he would not be pressured into releasing one prisoner by considerations of foreign aid; if aid donors want to withhold assistance, they can do so. President's half-brother, Ismael Toure, intervened at that point and asked the President's permission to summarize and interpret his views. He then said that while Guinea would never give in to pressure or submit to blackmail, we should recall Guinea's releases of prisoners over the past year and more; nothing the President had said indicated that this would not continue. We would simply have to draw our own conclusion and trust the Chief of State on this. Sekou Toure agreed with this interpretation, and Moose said he would be glad to report that to Washington and would do what he could to explain the situation in the interest of continued strengthening of our mutual relations.

5. With that, the meeting ended and Toure invited the US representatives and several ministers to the lunch that had been waiting for some hours. The tense, charged atmosphere of the formal discussions fell away at once, and Toure, having made his defense of his 20 years in power, was relaxed and cheerful, providing an incisive, realistic analysis of various current African problems (septel). After the meal, he accompanied his guests down the stairs to the front entrance, said a warm goodbye and expressed thanks and appreciation for the Moose visit to Guinea.

6. Comment: Toure came through as a strong, determined man, dedicated to underlying principles of independence, self-respect and



development of Guinea to the benefit of all the people. His interest in the understanding of and closer economic association with the US appeared completely genuine, but his pride and resentment at being pushed hard on the human rights issue caused him to take a more uncompromising stance than appears to be the case in practice. Ismael Toure's helpful intervention pointed to this, and a later conversation that prisoner releases will indeed continue, as we had been led to expect (ref B). In sum, the extended exchange between Moose and Toure was extremely useful, offering both parties opportunity to set forth their principles, views and concerns, and clearing the way for greater mutual understanding and closer communication and perhaps cooperation on various African problems. End comment.

**Crosby**

**42. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

RPM 79–10007

Washington, January 5, 1979

Nigeria: Electoral Lineup for 1979 and Civilian Rule Prospects  
[classification marking not declassified]

*Key Judgments*

*Nigeria faces a potentially stormy political year as it attempts a difficult transition to civilian rule scheduled for completion next October. More likely than not, the changeover will not occur. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—New political parties, headed by old guard politicians, are operating along traditional lines of regional and tribal conflict which brought down the first republic. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—Shehu Shagari, presidential candidate of the northern Muslim-oriented National Party, has the largest bloc of regional support as Nigeria heads toward a series of elections beginning this spring. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—Elections are unlikely to be placid, and a brokered solution will be required in the likely event that there is no clear-cut presidential victor under constitutional rules. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—The process could be aborted at any point by various elements in the armed forces or, more likely, by the regime as a result of divisive campaigning and communal disorders. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—Even if a civilian government is established, it probably would not survive for much more than two years because of ethnic conflict and rising social demands. [classification marking not declassified]*

*—Events are likely to demonstrate that only the more nationalistic military is capable of governing and holding Nigeria together. [classification marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here are a map of Nigeria, a list of Nigerian political parties, and the body of the paper.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nigeria 1/79–3/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted by [name not declassified]. The memorandum was prepared in the Africa Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the Offices of Central Reference and Economic Research.

**43. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Liberian Problems (U)

Over the Easter weekend what started out as a peaceful demonstration over the price of rice turned into a civil disturbance when ill-disciplined police fired into the crowds. Ultimately, about 40 people were killed and 400 were injured. (C)

This type of thing is simply not in the Liberian tradition, and President Tolbert and his government were, and are, badly rattled by the experience. Tolbert was genuinely shocked by the killings. (C)

At the urging of Houphouet-Boigny, Tolbert called upon Sekou Toure for help, and approximately 300 Guinean troops were quickly airlifted to Monrovia.<sup>2</sup> And although this force was never really deployed, the maneuver is of some significance in terms of Guinea's new alignment in West Africa. Liberia is now a bit nervous about the Guinean presence, and indications are that there will be an early withdrawal,—if for no other reason than the fact that Toure can reasonably expect some rice riots of his own at home. (S)

At any rate, Tolbert is busy looking for CP-backed outside agitators, but will find the pickings pretty slim. The problem really results from the Tolbert government's neglect of the growing urban workers' dilemma of a slow-growth economy and wildly inflationary food prices,—and a very badly trained police and military. Tolbert has left labor problems to the devices of his son, who in addition to being a labor leader, is a minister of the gospel, an author, a rock singer, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a man about town. He has not been noticeably successful in any of these pursuits. (S)

Although there are some formally registered opposition parties in Liberia, and there is a high degree of political freedom, the African tradition of rule by consensus of an elite has been in effect for many decades, and all members of the legislative body are members of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia 1/77–11/78. Secret. Sent for information. "ZB has seen" is stamped in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2936 from Monrovia, April 16, the Embassy reported on the Liberian request for Guinean troops. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790179–0033)

True Whig Party. Aside from the growing problems of an urbanizing population and slow growth, the major stress in that society is that the ruling elite has traditionally been an Americo-Liberian society (returned former slaves) which has systematically dominated the indigenous population. Tolbert has been addressing this problem by opening up the “elite” ranks in many ways, thus preventing the formation of any really cohesive opposition. (S)

In view of Liberia’s traditionally close relationship to the U.S., and given his reasonably good record on human rights, we have been responsive to Tolbert’s need for reassurance. We have flown in medical supplies on humanitarian grounds, and the President has sent a message of condolence for the loss of life.<sup>3</sup> And we have agreed to speed up some regular FMS sales, just to reassure. (S)

*Finally*, Foreign Minister Dennis is coming this weekend, as a special emissary of Tolbert, with a message for the President. Apparently Secretary Vance will handle the formalities,<sup>4</sup> but he will see others in State, and wend his way around the Hill. I will try to meet him on as informal a basis as possible, since I used to discuss the urban problem with him when he was Minister of Labor. I will restrain myself from saying, “I told you so.” (S)

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 105157 to Monrovia, April 26, transmitted the message for Tolbert, in which Carter expressed that he was “troubled and saddened by the tragic loss of life, personal injuries and destruction in Monrovia earlier this month.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790191–0711)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 44.

#### 44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 1, 1979, 2239Z

110297. Subj: Liberian Foreign Minister Dennis Calls on Secretary Vance. Ref: Monrovia 3329, Kuwait 1941.<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: Liberian Foreign Minister Dennis called on the Secretary for an hour and a half April 30. Most of the meeting was taken up by Dennis's explanation of the background of the Easter weekend riot in Monrovia.<sup>3</sup> Dennis said the principal causes were the radicalization of Liberian university students in recent years, and their disaffection with the government. The situation was exacerbated by the presence in Monrovia of large numbers of half educated unemployed. Although Dennis was certain that there had been some indirect Soviet encouragement of the demonstration, he admitted the authorities could not document a specific connection. He appealed for assistance in the form of a grant to help reconstruct Monrovia, and a development loan to finance projects that would put the unemployed to work. He made no specific suggestions. End summary.

2. Request to call on President Carter: Dennis acknowledged the Secretary's welcome, conveyed President Tolbert's greetings to the Secretary, and emphasized that at Tolbert's direction he had taken special pains to keep the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia informed of Liberian Government views of the background and the events of the riot in Monrovia during Easter weekend. Dennis said Tolbert had entrusted him with a message to President Carter and that he hoped to deliver it in person. Dennis said that, "At this time of national crisis," the fact that President Carter had received Tolbert's special emissary would in itself have a favorable psychological effect by underlining U.S. support for Liberia. The Secretary replied that the President was extremely busy, that he could make no promises, but that he would see what he could do.

3. Background of riot: Dennis explained the background of the riot as follows. In 1974 Bacchus Matthews, a recent graduate, was Vice

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790219-0140. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Abidjan, Conakry, Free-town, Accra, Kuwait, and Cairo. Drafted by Smith and approved by Harrop and Tarnoff.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3329 from Monrovia, April 27, the Embassy reported on Tolbert's reasons for the visit of Dennis to the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790193-0800) In telegram 1941 from Kuwait, April 23, the Embassy reported on Tolbert's visit to Kuwait and his request for aid for Liberia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790187-0295)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 43.

Consul in New York. He was dismissed for misappropriation of funds. He subsequently claimed that he was fired for political reasons, and became anti-government. The Progressive Alliance of Liberia was founded in New York in 1974. From its published statements there can be no doubt of its “alien indoctrination.” It was joined by disaffected students, including some who had lost their scholarships. Dennis described at some length President Tolbert’s interest in the welfare of the people as a whole, and his efforts to enlist the support and participation of Liberian youth, particularly recent graduates. Despite these efforts, the PAL established an office in Monrovia and succeeded in infiltrating the university. There its views were condoned and supported by some professors, many trained in the U.S., who “taught that the free enterprise system was no good.” The PAL and similar groups were critical of the West in general and the U.S. in particular.

4. In response to the Secretary’s question, Dennis said the centers of student disaffection were Monrovia and Cuttington College, but that similar views were being expressed in the interior, because there is no restriction of travel in Liberia. Dennis added that although the spread of education in Liberia had been impressive in recent years, it had also resulted in a substantial increase in the number of “half educated” unemployed in the cities, who were an easy prey to ideologues. Although Tolbert had emphasized education, often at the expense of strengthening the security forces, more attention must now be paid to improving the effectiveness of these forces.

5. External involvement: In response to the Secretary’s question, Dennis said that there “had to have been” external support for the dissidents. Their leaders had no jobs, but lived reasonably well, traveled both in Liberia and abroad, and published a paper. However, the Liberian authorities could not identify a specific link between the alleged instigators of the demonstration and a foreign government. In retrospect, the Liberian Government thought there might be more than coincidence in the facts that a Russian student told a student meeting in Lome that he had to be in Monrovia by the 14th, that North Korean and Cuban delegations were in Monrovia at the same time, that some alleged leaders of the demonstration had been seen in the Soviet Embassy the night before, and that three officers of the Soviet Embassy had visited PAL headquarters on the eve of the demonstration.

6. Proposal to increase rice prices: Dennis explained in detail the background of the Minister of Agriculture’s proposal to increase the price of rice, and the lengthy discussion of this proposal in the Cabinet and with concerned groups in Liberia including the PAL. He said that despite the denial of a permit to demonstrate against the proposal, Matthews and the PAL went ahead anyway.

7. Organization of demonstration: Dennis said the demonstration had caught the Liberian Government by surprise. Although spear-

headed by unemployed toughs “made brave by dope and liquor” it had clearly required considerable planning, as shown by the skill with which roadblocks were thrown up and by the success with which the leaders later eluded arrest. Dennis thanked the Secretary because the Embassy had denied Matthews asylum. In response to the Secretary’s question Dennis said the purpose of the demonstration was to create a “state of anarchy” in Monrovia. In reply to Harrop, Dennis said the demonstrators were not armed with firearms.

8. Support from other governments: Dennis described the support Liberia had received from other states. Guinea had sent a delegation on the 15th and the next day had sent a second delegation accompanied by 50 troops. The total Guinean strength in Monrovia was just under 300. Dennis did not make clear whether Tolbert had requested Guinean troops or not, but said that when the first group arrived Tolbert “did not turn them away” and implied that the second group of 220 came to complement the first. President Houphouet-Boigny sent a message of support, food and medical supplies. At this point Dennis checked himself and assured the Secretary that Liberia was most grateful for U.S. medical supplies, and for military assistance. The Secretary noted that U.S. military equipment would arrive very shortly.

9. Request for aid: Dennis recalled President Carter’s forthcoming comments to Tolbert during and following his visit to Monrovia in April 1978 on the subject of assistance.<sup>4</sup> He said Liberia needs a “reconstruction program.” There was a good possibility that insurance could cover some claims arising from the riots, but “the little man needs help.” Liberia had an obligation to hold the OAU summit on schedule. Liberia had two specific needs: A grant to provide immediate assistance, and help to repair some or all of the \$50 million in damage caused by the riot; and a long term development loan to finance projects that would take the unemployed off the streets. The Secretary asked if the Liberian Government had appealed to any other donor, and mentioned the African Development Bank. Dennis said that thus far an appeal had been made only to the U.S., Liberia’s greatest friend. He was sure the U.S. would not want to turn down its closest ally in Africa, especially just before the OAU summit. Dennis asked if the U.S. could reexamine the possibilities of encouraging long term investment.

10. The Secretary replied that he thought it important to distinguish between short and long term needs. Encouraging investment took considerable time. He could give no assurances, but the Department and AID would examine the possibilities carefully. The United States valued the special relationship. He asked precisely what the Liberians thought

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 34.

they required. Dennis replied that it was difficult to be specific. He had come, “as a patient comes to a doctor, to be told what he needs.”

11. Middle East: Picking up a complimentary comment Dennis had made regarding U.S. contribution to peace in the Middle East, the Secretary said we are now in the second stage of the peace making process, and must deal with the enormously complex Palestinian question. He said he was somewhat troubled by statements made after President Tolbert’s visit to Kuwait which appeared to indicate little understanding of the situation. The Camp David summit had established the first and only realistic framework for dealing with this extremely difficult problem, and we would appreciate support from our friends. Dennis replied that the Liberians had not expected a communique to be proposed in Kuwait, and said that he had greatly watered down the original draft proposed to him by the Kuwaitis.

12. NAM: The Secretary said he thought it would be disastrous and unfair if Egypt were expelled from the Non-Aligned Movement. To say that Egypt does not have a right to make peace to recover lost territory is shocking. Dennis said Liberia wished to support the U.S. view, and suggested that assisting Liberia to hold the OAU summit might be the best means to this end.

Christopher

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**45. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 4, 1979

SUBJECT

Obasanjo’s Letter on LNG<sup>2</sup>

Attached is State’s analysis of the issues raised by Nigeria regarding U.S. policy on the purchase of liquified natural gas (LNG), as coordi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 14, Nigeria 1–10/79. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 24. (Ibid.)



nated with CIA and DOE.<sup>3</sup> A State draft reply for the President will be provided in the next few days.<sup>4</sup> (C)

*A summary* of the State analysis follows: (Rud Poats will add appropriate comments.) (U)

Nigeria is irritated with our failure to respond to their urgent offer to sell us LNG. They produce 2.4 billion c/ft./day, and flare 95% of it. They now sell us over 1 billion b/d of crude oil,—50% of their production, 15% of our imports. There have been rumors of threats to cut this supply to some degree or other, in response to a positive Case-Javits determination.<sup>5</sup> But in spite of the obvious importance Nigeria attached to Rhodesia, it seems likely that a market for LNG is of more importance to them, and will ultimately determine where and how they will offer to sell crude. (C)

*LNG Project Background.* In 1978, the Nigerian national company, plus Phillips, Shell, BP, ELF and AGIP formed the Bonny LNG Company to market 2/3 of Nigeria's gas, mainly to the U.S., in about 4/5 years, at prices estimated from \$3.25–\$5.00/mm BTU. (C)

*Contract Talks.* Bonny talks with U.S. pipeline companies have not gone well, and most issues remain unresolved. When the companies expressed doubts about winning U.S. regulatory approval, the Nigerians took this as evidence of USG opposition to the whole project. (C)

*Government Discussions.* The Nigerians have been pressing for a preliminary USG approval, prior to formal application. They received a non-committal reply from Schlesinger in June 1978,<sup>6</sup> and tried to see the President last March. DOE has stressed that while we may buy some Nigerian LNG, U.S.-Alaskan, Mexican and Canadian gas has priority. (C)

*Regulatory Procedures and Status.* In addition to state and local approval, Bonny must get by DOE, FERC, and ERA, and the process can only begin after a contract is signed. It will be a lengthy process. (C)

*U.S. Policy.* Nigerian LNG would not come on stream until about 1985, and the U.S. policy of import pricing competitive with alternatives will probably be unchanged. Pricing should be on the basis of real cost, not rolled-in or average cost. On this basis, Nigerian LNG may

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<sup>3</sup> The undated paper is attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 46.

<sup>5</sup> The Case-Javits amendment (approved July 26, 1978) required President Carter to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if he determined the Salisbury elections were free and fair and that the Government of Rhodesia demonstrated willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 39.

well not be very attractive for the 1985–90 period. But then, it may be. (C)

*Credibility of Nigerian "Threats" on Rhodesia.* Nigeria could divert a substantial portion of its crude from the U.S. within 90 days, and the cost of low sulphur crudes would go up in the U.S. Nigeria is deeply committed on the Rhodesian issue, and would have to retaliate in some measure against a positive Case-Javits determination. However, the sale of LNG is of great importance to Nigeria, and so long as the FMG feels the U.S. LNG market is possible, they will be cautious. (C)

*U.S. Response.* We can't give the kind of assurances which Obasanjo wants, but we should be "forthcoming" and prompt in our response. (C)

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**46. Letter From President Carter to Nigerian Head of State Obasanjo<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 13, 1979

Dear General Obasanjo:

Your letter of May 24<sup>2</sup> was, as always, true to the forthright spirit which has characterized our exchanges since we first met in Washington. Because we have been able to communicate in this open and direct manner, I have personally found much value in our regular correspondence.

The international energy situation is a matter of paramount concern to both of us. I appreciate that Nigeria has expanded its oil exports over the last six months, helping to relieve the shortfall in world supply. I know that your decisions on oil production have been and will be based on a profound concern for Nigeria's long-term interest in a stable world economy.

I understand your impatience with the slow pace of action to end the waste of Nigeria's gas resources. I share your concern and hope a feasible solution can be found. The discussions between the Bonny LNG Company and a group of American firms on the sale of liquefied natural gas to the United States seemed to offer promise of such a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 14, Nigeria 1–10/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 45.

solution, provided a formula reconciling energy, legal and market considerations could be devised.

It is important that your government's discussions with potential United States buyers proceed with the fullest possible understanding of relevant United States laws, policies, and energy markets. I propose, therefore, to send to Lagos a small delegation of economic and energy specialists to discuss with your government the factors likely to be critical to a decision by United States regulatory agencies in this instance.<sup>3</sup>

I am advised that no application for importation of Nigerian LNG has yet been filed with our regulatory agencies.

If convenient to your government, the delegation could be in Lagos in mid-July. That timing also would enable the delegation to provide background on the decisions of the Economic Summit in Tokyo.

It is a matter of great importance that Nigeria and the United States maintain relations of full understanding and cooperation. I share your determination to try to achieve solutions of differences through full and frank discussion.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 48.

47. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 8, 1979, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.–Guinea Bilateral Relations; African Issues; the NAM

PARTICIPANTS

*Americans*

The President

Secretary Vance

Dr. Brzezinski

Gerald Funk, National Security Council

Oliver S. Crosby, Ambassador to Guinea

William C. Harrop, Acting Assistant Secretary of State

*Guineans*

President Sekou Toure

Moussa Diakite, Minister of Housing and Urban Development

Ismael Toure, Minister of Mines and Geology

Damantang Camara, President of the National Assembly

Mamady Conde, Ambassador to the U.S.

*Summary:*

During a 70-minute exchange, Sekou Toure said he agreed that the NAM should not be dominated by the Soviets. He was working with Tito to seek a collegial leadership for the NAM rather than a single president (Castro). He expected their proposal to be accepted. The President and Sekou Toure agreed on the urgent need for resolution of Southern Africa issues. Toure acknowledged that Muzorewa was a bona fide political leader and felt that a negotiated reconciliation with the Patriotic Front should be possible. In response to the President's request that Guinea support Sadat, Sekou Toure replied indirectly by emphasizing his close personal relationship with Sadat. The President underlined American concern about human rights questions, and congratulated Sekou Toure on the release from prison of Archbishop Tchidimbo.<sup>2</sup> The President said the U.S. looked forward to expanding its aid to Guinea. The President reminded Toure of the importance we attach

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President 7–9/79. Confidential. Drafted by Harrop on August 11 and cleared by Funk. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 11:42 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> Archbishop Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo was imprisoned after his alleged involvement in the 1970 invasion of Guinea. He was released and exiled on August 7. See Document 41.

to continued cessation of Soviet reconnaissance flights from Conakry.<sup>3</sup> The atmosphere was cordial, with Toure projecting a moderate image. End Summary.

*President Carter* welcomed the Guinean delegation, noting pleasure at our new friendship and the fine record of American investment in Guinea. He congratulated President Toure on his leadership role in Africa, his mediation of conflicts, and his forthcoming presidency of the OAU. The President commented on our mutual concern for the enhancement of human rights. He knew that Sekou Toure appreciated the importance of this issue to the American people. The President congratulated Sekou Toure on the release the previous day of Archbishop Tchidimbo.

*Sekou Toure* said he was happy to be in Washington and was determined to improve cooperation between Guinea and the United States. He then presented an historical sketch of Guinea since the 13th century, emphasizing the country's resistance to colonial domination. He described how he, starting from the labor movement, had led Guinea toward freedom and toward the historic vote of 1958 when Guinea was the only one of 13 French colonies in Africa to chose independence. Since that time Guinea had been wrongly accused of communism and extremism. Guinea had a very bad press and wished to be judged on its actions not upon what people said of it. The Guinean people and their leaders were deeply religious, poor in material terms but not poor spiritually; they had a refined sense of human dignity.

Turning to contemporary African problems, *Toure* urged the U.S. to lend its effective support to self-determination, so that blacks and whites could have equal rights in South Africa, and the people of Zimbabwe could live together in true self-determination, so that Namibia could reach independence under international and UN auspices.

*President Carter* said he had listened with attention to Sekou Toure's explanation of Guinea and the courage of its people, who insisted upon independence and freedom. All Western nations were gratified by the improving relationship between themselves and Guinea. He had discussed this among leaders of the West who all felt this evolution is of mutual benefit to the industrialized nations and to Guinea. The President said he admired the way Guinea had been able to utilize American aid and looked forward to some expansion of both this assistance and of trade between our countries.

*The President* said he hoped that Sekou Toure, as a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and an African leader, would use his influence to prevent the NAM from coming under Soviet domination.

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 27 and 28.

In the American view, Cuba and Castro are subject to Soviet influence and we are concerned by the draft communique distributed by Castro.<sup>4</sup> The President wished to ask two questions: First, he understood Toure had just met with Tito and wondered how he assessed the balance among members for the Havana Conference. Second, he wanted Sekou Toure to know the United States agreed fully with the Guinea view on Zimbabwe and Namibia. He would appreciate Toure's assessment of the Lusaka Commonwealth meeting.<sup>5</sup>

*Sekou Toure* returned to his presentation, noting that after self-determination were effected in Namibia and Zimbabwe we would be faced with the core problem of apartheid. If apartheid could be abolished then there would be an excellent prospect for cooperation between the countries of black Africa and South Africa, by far the most industrialized nation on the continent.

On Rhodesia, Toure felt the Lusaka conference had exposed certain contradictions between the UK and the Front Line. He believed there was a possibility of compromise between Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front on condition that the reality of radical change be accepted both by Ian Smith and the more conservative elements in the British government. Toure had supported the recent OAU resolution recognizing the Patriotic Front as sole representative of the Zimbabwe people,<sup>6</sup> but he knew that this was no solution. Muzorewa was a political leader regardless of how one evaluated the election. The Patriotic Front and the leaders of the Salisbury regime must come together and initiate a reconciliation in good faith. There must also be good faith shown toward the armed cadres of the Patriotic Front who had fought and suffered for their independence. They were really the ones whose interests were recognized by the OAU resolution.

*President Carter* said the United States would support the British effort as developed by the Commonwealth at Lusaka and which has the support of certain Front Line leaders. He asked Toure's views of the NAM meeting in Havana.

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 193073 to multiple posts, July 25, the Department described the initial U.S. reaction to the Cuban draft communique for the Havana NAM summit as "totally unhelpful in both its overall orientation and specific positions. If adopted at the summit in anything like its present form, the Cuban draft could take us back to the confrontations of three years ago, which embittered the relationship between the United States and the Third World." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790341–0712)

<sup>5</sup> The 22nd Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting took place in Lusaka August 1–7. A summary can be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Volume XXV, 1979, pp. 29901–29908.

<sup>6</sup> The OAU summit was held in Monrovia July 17–21. A summary of the resolution can be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Volume XXV, 1979, pp. 29841–29842.

Toure said he had hoped also to discuss the Western Sahara, Uganda, his recent talks in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Libya, the questions of Chad and Vietnam, and other issues.

The *President* suggested these other matters be saved for the later meeting Toure would have with Secretary Vance.<sup>7</sup>

Turning to the NAM, *Toure* said that he and Tito had recently published in Belgrade a long communique on non-alignment. Their intention was to create a collegial leadership of the NAM in place of a single president who could be the instrument of a major outside power, for example Fidel Castro and the USSR. It was not reasonable for an organization composed of many varied governments to have a single spokesman for the four-year period between non-aligned conferences. *Sekou Toure* agreed completely with the President that the non-aligned should be in fact non-aligned, not a tool of the Soviet Union. He believed that the membership would approve of the collegial leadership proposal.

*President Carter* thanked Toure for this explanation. The President said we were very concerned about the isolation of President Sadat and asked Toure for his views on this matter. He asked that Guinea provide maximum support to Sadat.

*Toure* emphasized his long and close personal friendship for Anwar Sadat and his admiration for him. Toure had had a long and useful exchange with Sadat at the Monrovia conference in July about the Middle East peace process. Sadat was a fine and courageous leader.

*President Carter* concluded the meeting by noting that Sadat's courage was like the courage of the Guinean people. He thanked Sekou Toure for his visit and wished him a good trip in the U.S. He hoped for continually improved understanding between the U.S. and Guinea. The President recalled that when the Guinean Ambassador had presented his credentials two years ago the President had expressed his concern over the deployment of Soviet TU 95 BEAR reconnaissance aircraft from Conakry. Sekou Toure had shown his friendship for the U.S. and his interest in true non-alignment by cooperating with us on this matter of importance to our security, and had ceased the flights. This had opened a period of warmer relations between us which we hoped would continue and prosper. President Toure thanked the President for the useful exchange.

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 207979 to Conakry, August 10, the Department reported on Vance's meeting with Touré in which they discussed Namibia, Western Sahara, Chad, Uganda, and Southeast Asia. Both expressed hope for strengthened U.S.-Guinean relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790362-0610)

**48. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 22, 1979

## SUBJECT

U.S. LNG Mission to Nigeria

In your letter of May 24 to General Obasanjo,<sup>2</sup> you offered to send a delegation to Nigeria to discuss LNG export possibilities and the results of the Tokyo Summit. Officials of State and DOE visited Nigeria on August 1 and 2 (the dates suggested by the Nigerians) for the promised consultations. The consultations were helpful in giving the Nigerians a better understanding of the key commercial and regulatory considerations in determining whether or not they can export LNG to the U.S. Without raising expectations too high, the U.S. delegation indicated that we were interested in working closely with Nigeria as it formulates its proposals for submission to U.S. regulatory authorities.

A more detailed report is attached.

**Attachment****Report of the U.S. Delegation<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, August 13, 1979

*Results of LNG Discussions in Nigeria*

In response to General Obasanjo's letter of May 24, 1979 President Carter offered to send a delegation to Nigeria to discuss critical factors in U.S. regulatory decisions on LNG imports, and to provide background on the Tokyo Summit. These discussions were held in Lagos on August 1 and 2. The U.S. delegation consisted of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy Peter Borre, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hormats and Robert deSugny, a DOE lawyer. The Nigerian delegation was headed by the Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), F. Marinho.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 113, Nigeria 1–12/79. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The reference should be to Carter's June 13 letter to Obasanjo. See Document 46. Carter's letter was in reply to Obasanjo's May 24 letter. See Document 45.

<sup>3</sup> Secret.



### *Consultations on LNG Imports*

The U.S. team described the complex U.S. gas import review procedures, and the U.S. gas market outlook. The major points were:

—The U.S. attaches great importance to its relationship with Nigeria, and bilateral energy trade; these consultations represent a special effort on our part to address Nigerian concerns.

—There is a high degree of autonomy in U.S. regulatory procedures, hence the executive branch cannot commit itself, or prejudice the results of quasi-judicial proceedings.

—Imported LNG will need to find customers in the industrial sector. Because residual fuel oil is the major alternative for the industrial sector, LNG will need to be price competitive with residual oil; U.S. gas companies will thus need a landed LNG price competitive with "resid." (Currently Nigeria is proposing a price too high to be attractive to U.S. industry).

In response, the Nigerians asked about specifics such as price escalator formula components, *force majeure* clauses and allowability of prepayments.

The discussions were substantive, low key and friendly; the Nigerians seem to have concluded that the USG is genuinely interested in pursuing the possibility of LNG imports, but that much work remained to be done, with commercial and regulatory criteria being the determinative factors.

Marinho at the conclusion asked that future consultations be formalized through a joint energy working group (which could join the four working groups already established by President Carter and General Obasanjo). We have already conveyed our agreement to this proposal.

### *Tokyo Summit Results*

Hormats stressed the commitment of the Tokyo Summit participants to limit future oil imports.<sup>4</sup> This was in part a response to urgings from OPEC countries that industrialized countries contribute to stability in the oil market through greater conservation. We underlined our hope that OPEC, in turn, would also contribute to a more stable oil market by responsible price and production policies.

The U.S. team pointed out that the Summit countries had committed themselves to help LDCs increase energy production, and noted that the U.S. has a program to help them assess their future energy needs and sources of production. The U.S. side said that, while Nigeria

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<sup>4</sup> For the portion of the minutes of the June 28–29 G-7 Tokyo Economic Summit on energy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 221.

differs from most LDCs which are energy importers we understand its desire to develop energy other than oil. We have done energy assessments in Egypt and Peru and are exploring the possibilities with Venezuela on a reimbursable basis. We would be pleased, should Nigeria be interested to discuss possibilities in greater detail.

*Nigerian Oil Production*

In a private conversation Marinho told Borre that the Federal Military Government might soon review Nigeria's oil exports in light of:

—The July 31 nationalization of BP, which gave NNPC “almost 300,000 b/pd” of BP equity oil, “most of which has been going to the United States.”<sup>5</sup>

—Pending applications from U.S. refiner/importers, also for “almost 300,000 b/pd.”

—New “flexibility” for NNPC, due to the August 1 production cutback of 240,000 b/pd.

By flexibility, Marinho was hinting at restoring some of the cutback, notwithstanding the technical rationale (which our Embassy is inclined to believe notwithstanding some skepticism expressed by the oil companies) used by Nigeria to justify the cutback.

Borre responded that:

—Geographic and oil quality factors have made the U.S. a natural outlet for Nigerian exports.

—Given market tightness, cutbacks in oil flows to the U.S. are a matter of concern in Washington; the need to rebuild distillate inventories makes the United States especially sensitive to Nigerian actions, because of the suitability of Nigerian oil for light products.

—With the possibility of a quota mechanism to back up U.S. oil import ceilings, both countries have a strong interest in steady, reliable energy trade.

Marinho seemed receptive to these points and indicated he would draw upon them in preparing materials for the FMG.

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 10280 from Lagos, August 1, the Embassy reported on the nationalization and transmitted a Nigerian aide mémoire announcing it. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0976)

## 49. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 2, 1979, 11 a.m.–noon

### SUBJECT

President's Meeting With President William R. Tolbert, Jr., of Liberia (C)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

President Jimmy Carter  
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State  
Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State  
Robert P. Smith, Ambassador to Liberia  
Jerry Funk, National Security Council  
Parker Borg, Director of West African Affairs, Department of State

#### *Liberia*

President William R. Tolbert, Jr.  
Cecil Dennis, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Francis Dennis, Ambassador to the U.S.  
J. Bernard Blamo, Minister of Education  
D. Franklin Neal, Minister of Planning and Economic Development  
William Bull, Counselor, Embassy of Liberia

### SUMMARY

President Carter and President Tolbert exchanged views on major multilateral as well as bilateral issues. President Tolbert discussed the work of the OAU as viewed from his position of Chairman. He made a strong plea for U.S. recognition of Angola, asked that the U.S. not lift sanctions against Zimbabwe, and called for greater U.S. assistance to Africa in its struggle for economic independence. Speaking to bilateral issues, President Tolbert made several specific requests for U.S. assistance. President Carter proposed sending a delegation to Liberia to explore ways of strengthening the special relationship between the two nations. (C)

#### *Multilateral Issues*

*OAU Conference.* President Carter opened the discussion of multilateral issues by congratulating President Tolbert on his successful hosting of the OAU Conference and praising his statesmanship as OAU Chairman.<sup>2</sup> (U)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 113, Memcons, 4/78–10/80. Confidential. Drafted on October 16. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 47.

*Human Rights.* President Tolbert noted that he felt the most important achievement of the Conference was the resolution on human rights. Africans should have the same standards for human rights as they expect from the rest of the world. He noted that the human rights seminar held in Monrovia after the OAU Conference had reached a number of important decisions. (C)

*Economic Liberation.* Tolbert said he felt a second important outcome was the resolution on economic liberation. Africans had struggled in the past to achieve political liberation, and while some problems remain, such as apartheid, the present struggle will center around economic liberation. If economic dependency and underdevelopment continue, Africans will still not be free. He noted that the OAU Conference had drawn up a strategy for Africa's economic development aimed at the continent's future self-sufficiency. Tolbert urged that the U.S. move decisively to help the Africans with economic development. Eastern countries had seized opportunities to help with political liberation, but Africans, he said, realized that those countries could not resolve the continent's problems. U.S. help as a common friend and ally would be much appreciated at this time. (C)

*Egypt.* President Carter commended Tolbert for his handling of the Egyptian issue at the OAU. Tolbert responded that it had not been easy to work out a resolution on Egypt.<sup>3</sup> They had had to juggle what the extremists wanted with what they perceived as the U.S. position. He noted that it was the resolution adopted at Monrovia that had saved Sadat in Havana, pointedly remarking, "we did this as a friend of yours". (C)

*Angola.* (a) As he had with Secretary Vance,<sup>4</sup> Tolbert made a strong pitch to President Carter for U.S. recognition of Angola. He noted that Neto had told him he would welcome diplomatic ties with the U.S. although he had to rely on the Cubans because his existence depended on them. Tolbert stressed that Neto above all was a man of his own mind. He noted that dos Santos, at Neto's funeral, had assured him that he would follow the same policies. (C)

(b) Carter remarked that he had been surprised and favorably impressed with Neto during the last few months, and said that the U.S. would follow the situation closely and not let Neto's death interrupt

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<sup>3</sup> The OAU resolution on the Middle East omitted any reference to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and affirmed support for the struggle of the Palestinian people.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 256182 to Monrovia, September 28, the Department reported on the meeting between Vance and Tolbert in which they discussed U.S. assistance for economic development in Africa, the Southern Africa situation, Rhodesian sanctions, and Egyptian-Israeli negotiations; and reiterated U.S.-Liberian friendship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445-0874)

the progress made previously.<sup>5</sup> He cautioned, however, that the 18,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola colored U.S. attitudes on the matter, and that we needed to see what kind of new leaders emerged there. (C)

(c) The Deputy Secretary added that it will be important to see how the new Angolan leadership acts on Namibia. Tolbert agreed, adding that SWAPO's presence on the Angolan border makes them very involved in Namibian events. Carter noted that in conversations with Angolan leaders the U.S. had encouraged the withdrawal of SWAPO forces from the border and of South African troops from the whole area. The Angolans have stated that they need only a token force to use against UNITA. Carter noted that the U.S. had cooperated with Angola in helping to defuse the Shaba situation and to demilitarize the Angola/Zaire border. Both the U.S. and Angola seek a non-apartheid government in Namibia, and the U.S. awaits the eventual Cuban withdrawal the Angolans have discussed. (C)

(d) Tolbert urged that the evolution of the situation is more important than the changes in leadership, and that the two sides should not waste time assessing each other's leaders at this point. President Carter agreed that this was a very good point and asked the Deputy Secretary to pursue it through Ambassador McHenry. Carter continued that the U.S. would like to see Angola move out of the Soviet/Cuban orbit to become more truly non-aligned. Tolbert volunteered to do all that he could on this issue as OAU Chairman, and noted that it would be very useful if the Contact Group of Western Foreign Ministers could work more closely with a representative group of OAU Ministers on this issue. Carter agreed that this was a very useful idea. (C)

*Western Sahara.* Tolbert raised the Western Sahara issue, noting that the report of the OAU Committee of Wise Men had called for the self-determination of the people of the Sahara. Mauritania had pulled out of its section in the Sahara and Morocco had moved in. He said that he had called a meeting of the Wise Men and representatives of neighboring countries for October 16 in Monrovia, but that participation posed a problem. The Polisario wants to be there, but the Moroccans fear the Polisario would adversely influence the meeting. Further, Tolbert questioned whether Chadli of Algeria would attend if the Polisario were absent. Carter said it reminded him of the Middle East problems. (C)

*Benin-Gabon Relations.* Tolbert said he was also trying to bring Benin and Gabon together, after having successfully kept their dispute off the OAU agenda. Foreign Minister Dennis noted that a meeting at the Foreign Minister level is scheduled for October 12. (C)

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<sup>5</sup> Agostinho Neto died in Moscow on September 10.

*Arab-Israeli Dispute.* Carter urged Tolbert to help with the Middle East situation, noting that if only Arafat would accept Resolution 242 and recognize Israel's right to exist, it would be much easier to have serious negotiations. Carter noted that Arafat's reluctance to recognize Israel until the final stage of negotiations appeared to play into the Israelis' hands. Tolbert agreed that the Palestinians should recognize Israel's right to exist as a state. (C)

*Zimbabwe.* Tolbert raised the Zimbabwe issue, noting that they hoped the London talks would go well but were concerned about the transitional arrangements involving the three armies. He expressed appreciation of the U.S. role in the matter. Tolbert urged that the U.S. not lift sanctions until there was real freedom and elections in Zimbabwe. He noted that African leaders at the OAU Conference had agreed that lifting of sanctions was tantamount to recognition, and such an action would reflect very badly on the U.S. Carter spoke of the difficulties with the sanctions issue, noting that the future U.S. position would depend on the London negotiations and the moves of ZAPU and ZANU. Carter warned that if the Patriotic Front broke off negotiations, leaving the British and Muzorewa as the only seemingly reasonable parties, it would be difficult to adhere to his present position. He noted that the U.S. would work closely with the British, who had the proper legal status to resolve the issue. As for the question of armies, he noted that the British agree that this should be resolved afterwards. (C)

#### *Bilateral Issues*

*President Carter opened* the meeting by expressing Secretary Vance's regrets that he could not be present, commending President Tolbert for his good judgment at the OAU Conference, and noting his regret at the departure of Ambassador Dennis with whom he noted he had the closest relationship of all the African Ambassadors in Washington. President Tolbert noted that this was the third time he had been received warmly in the White House and commended President Carter on his speech about Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere the previous evening.<sup>6</sup> (C)

*The Liberian Political Situation.* In response to President Carter's inquiry about the aftermath of the April 14 riots,<sup>7</sup> President Tolbert thanked Carter for the American support at the time and noted that

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<sup>6</sup> Tolbert met Ford at the White House on November 5, 1974, while in Washington on a private visit. He returned for an official State visit September 21–24, 1976. Carter addressed the nation on the evening of October 2 about the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba (*Public Papers of the Presidents Jimmy Carter*, 1979, Book II, pp. 1802–1806; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 129)

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 43 and 44.

certain elements had wanted to bring Communism to Liberia. He said that at the time of the riots there was a larger number of Cubans in the country than ever before. As a result he had asked the Russians to reduce the size of their mission in Monrovia. He noted that Liberia faced certain social problems and that he was moving to solve these problems, but that resources were limited. (C)

*A Special Delegation.* President Carter responded by recalling the special relationship and suggested sending a delegation to explore ways to strengthen the friendship and alleviate tension that sometimes had developed between the two countries.<sup>8</sup> He stressed that the purpose of the group would not be to recommend an increase in assistance but to look at the overall relationship. Tolbert said he would welcome such a visit as he had welcomed Andy Young's recent business delegation.<sup>9</sup> He suggested that one of the first things the delegation might explore was the relocation of the University. President Carter said the delegation would have a broader mandate and composition than Young's business group and might also include educators who had been associated with one of the large American university systems. President Carter asked Acting Secretary Christopher to look into the proposal and give him a recommendation. Carter noted that normally such commissions are created when there are difficult problems but happily this group would not look at any such large problems. (C)

*Follow-Up From The President's 1978 Visit.* President Carter asked about the status of the projects which were discussed during his 1978 visit to Monrovia.<sup>10</sup> (a) Tolbert said he had not yet received the report on the study of the river blindness, stressing that the problem was serious in many parts of the country, particularly near the Firestone Plantation.<sup>11</sup> (C)

(b) Regarding the patrol boats, Tolbert said the new boats had not been received yet, noting that some of the original patrol boats had defective sections when they arrived. President Tolbert said they had wanted new boats but the Americans had stressed spare parts for the original boats. President Carter asked the Acting Secretary to look into the status of the river blindness and patrol boats project. (C)

(c) After Mr. Christopher noted that he had just signed the \$10 million housing guarantee and \$5 million ESF for low income housing,

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 50.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 7149 from Monrovia, September 11, the Embassy reported on the trade mission led by Young that visited Liberia September 5-8 in order to increase U.S. trade and investment in Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790419-0326)

<sup>10</sup> See Document 34.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 3, Document 37.

the Liberian President expressed his appreciation and continued that the housing needs in Liberia were very great. Noting the deplorable condition of the military housing and the consequent social problems, Tolbert asked that the U.S. Government consider a military housing project. President Carter responded by noting Liberia's highest in Africa per capita assistance and Congressional strictness in allocating large sums for aid programs. (C)

*P.L. 480.* Tolbert noted that Liberia had once hoped to become self-sufficient in rice production, but that now it would be useful to have a P.L. 480 program again. The Acting Secretary responded that a program was not planned for next year; Assistant Secretary Moose explained that the Liberia program had been established in response to a certain need at a certain time, and as other countries' requirements gradually surpassed Liberia's, the program was stopped. Carter proposed that the delegation might include some agricultural experts. Noting that Liberians would know more about their own agricultural situation than outsiders, he added that the experts might be useful in discussing their tree crop technology. (C)

*In conclusion,* Tolbert again noted that the delegation would be very welcome. He stressed that the two most important projects for the Liberians would be the military housing program and the relocation of the University. (C)



**50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1979

SUBJECT

Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations (C)

In keeping with your initiative during your meeting with President Tolbert on October 2,<sup>2</sup> and based upon recommendations from State, we propose the appointment of a nine-person Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian relations. (C)

The objectives of the Commission would be to assess our overall relationship with Liberia, to identify problems and constraints, and to develop new approaches to strengthening the ties between us, with proper note of your caveat against simply recommending increased aid. (C)

The Commission should be appointed by early November, should meet in Washington to initiate preliminary work by mid-November, and should spend about 10 days in Liberia in early January, and report to you in February.<sup>3</sup> (C)

The appointees should include the following: an agricultural economist, a University President, an African political specialist, a developmental economist, a labor specialist, a businessman, a banker, a Congressman, and a representative of the American Black Community. (C)

The Commission should travel to Liberia in a special Air Force plane in order to emphasize the importance you attach to it. (C)

Should you concur with this general approach, we will give to you a list of recommended individuals covering each category later this week, together with appropriate documents to bring the Commission into existence. (C)

*RECOMMENDATION:* That you approve the establishment of the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian relations as outlined above. (C) Arnie Miller concurs.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia 12/79-1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 49.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 115972 to Monrovia, May 2, 1980, the Department explained that the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations would not visit Monrovia due to the change in government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800218-0544)

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option and wrote "Include Editor James Wall Christian Century. J."

**51. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

PA 79–10517

Washington, November 1979

Nigeria: Oil and Politics [*classification marking not declassified*]*Key Judgments*

Following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran last winter, the Nigerian military government adopted an aggressive oil policy that for the first time involved the use of Nigerian oil as a political weapon. The Nigerians were able to take advantage of the tight world oil market and record prices that allowed production cuts without a significant loss in vital petroleum revenues. [*classification marking not declassified*]

The new government of President Shagari—Nigeria's first civilian administration in 13 years—has been too busy setting up house to do much on the oil front. Shagari, however, has announced he too will be quick to use the oil weapon if necessary in pursuit of majority rule in southern Africa. He has given no indication that he plans to revise aggressive oil-related decisions by the military government. [*classification marking not declassified*]

The Nigerians will be watching the United States closely in the coming months for any sign that it is softening its opposition to minority rule in southern Africa. In addition, Washington has been on notice since last May that it will risk the US status as a "preferred" customer if it fails to approve the importation of Nigerian liquefied natural gas—seen by Lagos as an important potential source of foreign exchange to offset an expected decline in oil exports after the mid-1980s.<sup>2</sup> [*classification marking not declassified*]

We doubt that the new government will impose an oil embargo against the United States, because it would be difficult to enforce. Lagos has other effective and more easily executed options, including imposing a selective cutback on oil production by US companies, a ban on company purchases of government-owned crude, or nationalization of the companies' remaining equity in Nigerian oil. [*classification marking not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 35, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background, Stan Turner's Background Reading. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by [*name not declassified*], Africa Division, Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 45.

Potential technical and labor problems and increasing domestic demand also could affect Nigeria's role as a major supplier. We doubt that Nigeria will experience labor unrest on the Iranian scale. But a number of potential flashpoints—including tribal conflicts and resentment over privileges held by expatriate personnel—eventually may provoke trouble that would severely test the new civilian government's ability to handle disruptions as effectively as previous military regimes. *[classification marking not declassified]*

[Omitted here are a map of petroleum locations in Nigeria and the body of the paper.]

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**52. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S.-Liberian Relations (U)

We do have a serious problem in Liberia. It is growing worse. And the problem won't cease growing until we are perceived by *all* groups in Liberia, as no longer "taking Liberia for granted." (S)

Unfortunately, such a change in perception is going to cost some money. Not much. But more than we have to work with right now. (U)

*Tolbert's basic problem* is one of rising expectations by the urbanizing workers and the non-Americo-Liberians, who, ironically, began to get a piece of the action only after Tolbert came to power. At a time of inflation-fueled economic crises, he is caught between these snowballing expectations and an American-Liberian, right-wing backlash. And the only way he can survive is to blame his trouble on CP outside agitations, and demonstrate to everyone, left and right, that he can draw upon the "special relationship" to help out. (S)

*He is over-reacting*, to some degree, but he is being pressed hard, —by the right to restore traditional elitism; by Foreign Minister Dennis (and many other young Americo-Liberians of the center) to *demand*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia 12/79-1/81. Secret. Sent for information. "ZB has seen" is stamped in the upper right corner and "3/21/80" is written beneath it by an unknown hand.

that the U.S. quit using Liberia as one-way street; and by the specter of growing urban frustration on the left.<sup>2</sup> (S)

His over-reaction is exacerbated by his lack of a clear perception of what kind of help Liberia needs, and how to put it to use. All he knows is that he needs help. Now. And he sees a moral obligation on our part to be somewhat responsive. (S)

*Liberia is very important to us. And even if you are offended by Dennis' bad manners at times, you have to empathize with his case. We are getting a pretty good deal. For virtually no rent (and with \$7/8 million or so in aid) we get: (1) an Omega station, (2) a VOA station, (3) a regional commo facility, (4) virtually total access to Roberts Field airport, and (5) use of the port of Monrovia. We would be hard pressed to arrange alternate facilities.* (S)

*Ambassador Smith is also over-reacting a little. Tolbert will cool off a bit during the next several weeks, as he realizes that the extreme left has not become strongly based in the urban workers—yet. And the Presidential Commission is now scheduled to arrive the last week of April.<sup>3</sup> We should not carry off an I.G. study before the Commission does its thing. But we should, and we will, brief the Commission fully and carefully on Liberia's problems, its importance to us, and our budgetary constraints. We should promote the idea of private sector action with the Commission. But we can nevertheless be certain that the Commission will recommend more USG aid. But we should bite that bullet after we have a report, not before.* (S)

To move to an IG study now would be seen as preempting the Commission. And should we decide we do need to do more to protect our investment, we will need the Commission's study as a basis for action. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2158 from Monrovia, March 18, the Embassy reported on Ambassador Smith's meetings with Dennis and Tolbert and the Liberians' complaints that "they thought the United States took Liberia for granted, they did not feel the United States was doing enough for Liberia and we could do a lot more if we really wanted to." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800138-1016)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

**53. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

PA M 80-10143

Washington, March 25, 1980

US-SENEGALESE RELATIONS [*classification marking not declassified*]

*The US has traditionally maintained warm relations with Senegal under the moderate, pro-Western leadership of President Leopold Senghor, who has governed since independence in 1960. Dakar's moderate foreign policies, which frequently support US interests, stem mainly from Senghor's fear of Soviet intervention in Africa and elsewhere. Senghor, who supports the Camp David accords and US human rights policies, would like to develop closer economic and military ties with the US, but not at the expense of jeopardizing relations with France, Senegal's principal benefactor. [portion marking not declassified]*

*Senegal's most pressing problems are a burgeoning population, a stagnant economy, and weathering Senghor's planned retirement prior to the next election in 1983. Although the succession to Senghor may be marked by some political conflict, on balance Senegal's institutional stability should prevail. Senghor's successor almost certainly will not be as forceful a proponent of Western views on the international scene, but probably will continue to follow moderate, democratic principles. [portion marking not declassified]*

*Senegal's Policies Under Senghor*

Senghor's stature as an elder statesman and as a renowned poet-philosopher, his vigorous personal diplomacy, and his long-established relationship with world political and intellectual leaders give Senegal influence far out of proportion to the country's limited economic and military resources. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Senghor earnestly opposes Soviet influence in Africa and elsewhere in the nonaligned world, and his suspicion of Soviet intentions colors many aspects of Senegalese foreign policy. His diplomatic and moral support for Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute, for example, is motivated in part by his fear that the Algerians—by backing the Polisario—are acting as the Soviet surrogate to destabilize West Africa. Senegal is one of the few OAU members that still refuse to recognize the Soviet-backed government in Angola, and Senghor continues to support Angolan opposition leader Jonas Savimbi. Senghor views

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 114, Senegal 6/78-4/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Drafted by [*name not declassified*], Africa Division, Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate for Operations, the Office of Economic Research, and the NIO.

events in the Horn as further evidence of Soviet intentions to establish a predominant position in Africa. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Senghor has been mildly critical of what he sees as US reluctance to help friendly countries resist Soviet-Cuban intervention. The US decision to sell arms to Morocco and Washington's strong reaction to the Afghanistan invasion however, have reassured him. Senegal took a leading role in the United Nations debate on Afghanistan with a searing attack on the Soviet intervention. Last summer, Senegal agreed to US urgings to attend the Nonaligned Summit in Havana and openly criticized Cuban manipulation of the meeting's procedures and voting. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Senegal is one of a handful of African countries with a commendable human rights record. Senghor is using his influence to pressure the OAU into agreeing that human rights guarantees are as applicable to black Africa as they are to white-ruled South Africa. [*portion marking not declassified*]

In another reflection of his pro-Western orientation, Senghor has granted the US informal access to facilities at Dakar. American military aircraft have been allowed to use Dakar airport, for example during the airlift of men and material to Zaire's Shaba province in 1978. More recently, the Senegalese Government has permitted US naval reconnaissance aircraft to use the airport as a staging base for following Soviet ship movements. [*portion marking not declassified*]

A few of Senghor's policies conflict with US interests. Although he promotes dialogue between Israel and Arab states and probably would like to restore Senegal's relations with Israel, Senghor believes the Israelis should be more generous in negotiations with the Arabs and that the Palestinians must be given a greater voice in any negotiated settlement. In the North-South dialogue, Senegal is a vigorous proponent of more assistance from developed countries to the Third World. [*portion marking not declassified*]

#### *Economic and Political Issues Affecting US Interests*

Senegal's economy, plagued by unfavorable climatic conditions, depressed markets for its major exports—peanuts and phosphates—and a rapidly growing population, registered little overall growth in the last decade. Burdened with continual budgetary deficits, the country is dependent for survival on the largesse of France—the former colonial power—and international organizations. An ambitious economic plan launched last December aims to restructure the existing economic system by shrinking the government sector, opening Senegal to foreign investment, granting farmers more benefits, and removing price subsidies for urban consumers. Some of its more austere measures could lead to unrest, especially among the urban population. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Government officials are preoccupied with the succession issue. Senghor, who has dominated the country since independence in 1960, reportedly plans to step down before his term ends in 1983. He believes that this will enable his chosen successor, Prime Minister Diouf, to establish himself before the next presidential election. Diouf, who reflects Senghor's moderate, pro-Western views, has assumed the major share of day-to-day government responsibilities over the last few years. A reform-minded technocrat, the Prime Minister has not gained the complete confidence of leaders in the ruling party and the military and lacks a strong grass-roots base. He could face a serious challenge for the office from the more conservative old guard of Senghor's dominant Socialist Party or from the leader of the principal opposition party. Neither of these elements, however, would be likely to impose policies inimical to US interests. Moreover, the country's institutional stability and the general respect for constitutional procedures should help reduce chances for major disruptions. Senegal without Senghor probably will play a diminished role on the African and international scene, as any new leader will be preoccupied with domestic economic and social problems. As a result, the US may have to work harder to obtain Senegal's support on controversial international issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

#### *US Goals and Objectives*

The bulk of the modest level of US assistance to Senegal—almost \$20 million in fiscal year 1979—is designed to promote economic development. Long- and short-term assistance is geared to increase food production, promote Senegalese efforts to reform the sagging agricultural sector, and upgrade the quality of rural life. The US also participates in multilateral projects such as the Senegal River Development Organization and the Sahel Development Program and trains a small number of Senegalese military officers. [*marking not declassified*]

The US is Senegal's second largest trading partner, exporting about \$40 million in goods per year to Dakar. US investment in Senegal also is modest—about \$25 million, with fixed asset investment mainly limited to petroleum marketing and phosphate mining. France remains Senegal's largest financial and military donor, foreign investor, and trading partner, although President Senghor has expressed a desire to expand economic and military relations with the US. [*portion marking not declassified*]

**54. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1980, 9–9:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting With President Senghor of Senegal

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Ambassador Herman Cohen  
Mr. Louis Martin, Special Assistant to the President  
President Leopold Senghor  
Ambassador Andre Coulbary  
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan

*BACKGROUND:* President Senghor was in the U.S. on a private visit, and was hosted in Washington D.C. by Mayor Marion Barry. (U)

The President opened by noting the compatibility of ideas between the U.S. and Senegal on the Soviet/Cuban threat to Africa, and the necessity for maintaining the political and economic strength to meet that threat. (S)

President Senghor responded that he is concerned by the Soviet menace both in Asia and Africa, and disappointed about the level of support for the U.S. on Iran and Afghanistan, particularly by the French and the Germans. (S)

The President replied that while the allies had not been as firm and united on these issues as they might have been, he remains optimistic that in the long run they will be more supportive of efforts to oppose Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the use of Soviet surrogates to destabilize Africa. (S)

President Senghor said that he would raise the issues in upcoming talks with Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing. He noted that while the Europeans had taught Africans to think rationally about the world, these Europeans sometimes fail to think rationally themselves about Africa and Asia. (S)

He said that Senegal approved of U.S. measures on Iran and Afghanistan, and supported the U.S. position both at the U.N. and at

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 113, Memcons, 4/78–10/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House.



the Islamabad meeting.<sup>2</sup> He also said that Senegal would be closing its Embassy in Tehran, as a way of helping in the hostage situation. (S)

Senghor repeated his position that Senegal would not be able to support the Olympic boycott, because this would be inconsistent with the refusal to boycott the Montreal games in 1976, but Senegal would not influence others to go to Moscow. He said that he advocated a change of venue—to give the games a permanent home in Greece. (S)

The President responded that there was an honest disagreement over the Olympics, and that he felt the Soviet people will interpret attendance as an endorsement of aggression in Afghanistan. He asked Senghor to keep an open mind on the issue. (S)

Senghor responded that he would do everything possible to support the President short of an actual boycott. (S)

Senghor expressed his concern about Soviet and Cuban efforts to subvert African nations. He said that U.S. assistance for Morocco and Tunisia was helpful, and he hoped that the U.S. would give military aid to African nations willing to stand up to Soviet aggression. He noted that while it was desirable for all foreign military forces to leave Africa,—the 60,000 Communist troops and the 15,000 Western military alike,—this was impossible because the pro-Communist African governments need foreign Communist troops to stay in power. (S)

The President expressed the hope that Senghor would continue his efforts in the OAU to rid the Continent of foreign troops. (S)

Senghor turned to the problem of Western Sahara, and noted that he is working hard for a compromise. He said he was hopeful that Algeria would listen to suggestions for a settlement. (S)

Finally, Senghor noted that he had met World Bank President McNamara the previous day, and that he hoped the U.S. Congress would be supportive of the work of the Bank. (S)

The President endorsed Senghor's hope, but noted that it is not always a simple matter to persuade the Congress to be entirely cooperative. (S)

The President thanked President Senghor for calling on him, and they exchanged farewells. (U)

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<sup>2</sup> At the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, January 27–29, the participants adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Volume XXVI, 1980, pp. 30241–30242)

**55. Telegram From the Embassy in Liberia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Monrovia, April 12, 1980, 1300Z

8697. Dept. pass to UPI Bureau WashDC. Subject: Coup Attempt.

1. Urgent news message for relay to UPI Bureau in Wash. First lead earlier. Begin text:

A. Monrovia, Liberia (UPI)—Liberian President William Tolbert was assassinated in a pre-dawn coup by army enlisted men who seized control of the capital before dawn Saturday, citing “rampant corruption by the government.”

B. An announcement over Monrovia radio station said the coup had been led by Master Sgt. Samuel K. Doe, 28, who said, “the army will conduct the affairs of the country until a decision has been reached” about future administration.

C. Doe disclosed to the Liberian news agency that Tolbert, 66, current Chairman of the OAU had been killed. There were reports of other fatalities, but no figures were available.

D. The army sergeant said his “Army Redemption Council” seized power in the West African nation of 1.7 million people “because of rampant corruption and continuous failure by the government to effectively handle the affairs of the people.”

E. Crowds of Liberians thronged streets of the capital despite orders for a 24-hour curfew. Green-uniformed soldiers fired their weapons into the air in celebration and commandeered vehicles to ride through the streets.

F. Communications with the outside world were cut and flights in and out of the country suspended.

G. Automatic weapons fire broke out at Tolbert’s five-story official mansion housing his offices and residence about two hours after midnight. There was sporadic firing around military installations in the city until shortly after dawn and Doe announced his takeover at 6:30 a.m.

H. Doe ordered a number of senior government and military officials to report to the mansion and also requested an immediate meeting with American and Soviet diplomatic representatives at Tolbert’s former offices.

I. A broadcast asked citizens and foreign residents to remain calm. It said Tolbert’s wife had been arrested, but gave no further details.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800183–0789. Unclassified; Niact Immediate.

J. Tolbert, who has been President since 1971 and was elected to an 8 year term in 1975, is a member of a family that has wide-spread business interests. There have been periodic allegations of conflict of interest and corruption involving government officials.

K. Sources said there were reports that opposition political figures who were jailed early in March had been freed by the army but there was no immediate confirmation. End text.

2. Please advise UPI Bureau in Washington to pick up previous and inform NY cables desk that although Kaylor cannot call out, incoming calls have gotten through. Kaylor's number is 223916 ext. 353.

Walker

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**56. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Liberia Situation (U)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Liberia as of this morning is worth skimming. I requested it last night,<sup>2</sup> [*2 lines not declassified*].

—No functional government, but signs that things may stabilize in next 48 hours.

—No army command structure remaining.

—Police hold the key: they have been inactive, but may begin to function soon to restore order.

—New government says it will be fair and just with old regime, but likely to be less than discriminate.

—Some order in evidence at the Mansion, with Sgt. Doe and Foreign Minister Matthews (PPP) showing leadership.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia 12/79-1/81. Secret. Sent for information. "ZB has seen" is stamped in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

—Cabinet will be popular but ineffective government of national unity.

—Government covers ideological spectrum which will lead to dissension.

—PPP (“resemble European social democrats”) appear to have policy upper-hand.

—Doe wants close ties with U.S., Mathews (PPP, Min. F.A.) will steer to non-aligned status, with leaning toward “a special relationship” with U.S. (S)

State sent guidance for the Charge’s use this morning, expressing our desire to work with the new government, and urging restraint as they bring the former government to trial.<sup>3</sup> (S)

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 98174 to Monrovia, April 14, the Department transmitted talking points to the Chargé for use with the new Foreign Minister. The démarche expressed concern about possible show trials and the desire of the United States to work with the new government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800186–0780)

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## 57. Paper Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

PA 80–10171

Washington, April 1980

### West Africa: The Second Generation *[portion marking not declassified]*

#### *Overview*

This paper examines the likely characteristics of the future government leaders of seven West African countries—Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. It assumes most political change will be evolutionary, building on past experience and drawing new leadership from within existing systems. That assumption is necessary for analytic purposes, but evolutionary change

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 35, Vice President’s Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background, Stan Turner’s Background Reading. Secret. Drafted by *[name not declassified]*; coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the National Intelligence Officer for Africa, and the Offices of Strategic Research and Central Reference.

is not a foregone conclusion, as the coup in Liberia on 12 April illustrates.<sup>2</sup> In any case, we believe that the generational differences investigated in this study will play an important role in shaping future governments in West Africa. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Most of the incumbent presidents have been in power since these countries became independent, and turnover at the top will affect the timing and manner of changes at other levels. Although there may be interim arrangements in some cases, it appears likely that West Africa will skip a generation when it makes its transition to new leadership. There would seem to be little future for the middle-aged group that has been overshadowed by the generation that led the way to independence. Within a few years we expect to see younger people, now in their thirties and forties, whose ideas have been formed since independence move into positions of authority throughout the area. *[portion marking not declassified]*

These young leaders are nominal members of the ruling party, as this is generally expected of officeholders, but few are really active in party affairs and even fewer have indicated that they entertain presidential ambitions. Although in most West African societies it is considered bad form to discuss the possibility of change at the top, the reluctance of the young leaders to do so probably indicates a genuine lack of interest in political competition. When they do express views, they deplore the uncertainty and risk that comes with playing politics. In most instances, their aim is to do well in their careers and to ensure a comfortable standard of living for themselves and their families. *[portion marking not declassified]*

As these West African countries have matured, their elites have grown more similar. There has been an influx into key positions of young people from outlying areas where colonial influences are weaker and where tribal affiliations cross national boundaries. Open borders and frequent multinational meetings strengthen regional ties—a trend recently reinforced by the return of Guinea to an active role in Africa.<sup>3</sup> *[portion marking not declassified]*

Coming administrations probably will be directed by highly educated Africans. They will have well-developed technical and managerial skills and yet be deeply rooted in African life. These potential leaders are professionally oriented people who show relatively little interest in ideology or in political careers per se. *[portion marking not declassified]*

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 55 and 56.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 47.

Under this second generation leadership, policy is likely to be increasingly shaped by a permanent civil service dedicated to solving the practical problems of nation-building, economic development, and regional cooperation. Although a strong presidential figure and a party apparatus will continue to mobilize the population in support of political goals, the dominance of party and president seems likely to diminish. [*portion marking not declassified*]

These countries are branching out from residual dependence on their former colonial rulers and turning more frequently to international organizations to meet development needs that are looming larger in their policy planning. They also are moving toward more formal inter-African cooperation with a variety of regional organizations that cross the old English- and French-speaking lines. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Collectively these seven countries occupy the part of Sub-Saharan Africa that is geographically closest to the United States and Western Europe. They are generally pro-Western and have relatively open political systems. Although all of them are classified as less developed countries, their economies function relatively well, and several have considerable undeveloped resources. Although a severe economic setback could upset their stability, their political systems seem securely enough rooted to survive in normal conditions. Because they have been relatively friendly and trouble free, these countries have only infrequently come to the attention of US policymakers. For that reason, the new generation coming to prominence is not well known in the United States, and there is some risk that this unfamiliarity could cause problems in future US dealings with them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here are a map and the body of the paper.]

## 58. Minutes of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 24, 1980, 10:30–11:45 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Liberia (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

William Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs  
Parker Borg, Director, Office of West African Affairs

#### *OSD*

James Woods, Director, African Region/ISA  
Lt Colonel William Isom, Assistant for Central and West Africa/ISA

#### *JCS*

Brig General James I. Granger, Assistant Deputy for International Negotiations,  
J-5  
Lt Colonel Val Johnson, J-3

#### *DCI*

Gray Cowan, NIO for Africa  
[*name not declassified*]

#### *White House*

Colonel William Odom

#### *NSC*

Jerry Funk  
Nicholas Spiliotes

### MINUTES

*Colonel Odom.* The two objectives that we want to achieve this morning are: (1) to clarify the situation and make recommendations on how far contingency planning should proceed. (2) To evaluate available information in preparation for the upcoming PRC meeting on the overall U.S.-Liberian relationship.<sup>2</sup> (S)

*DAS Harrop.* What we would like to do is go over the urgent, immediate questions to consider evacuation on an *ad referendum* basis to the Secretary of State. The Secretary has serious reservations on the military approach and wants to explore the options further. We have formulated three options for potential action. (S)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 122, SCM 127 Mini SCC 4/24/80 Liberia. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A Summary of Conclusions, on which Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner, is attached but not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 59.

*Colonel Odom.* I think we should proceed with the agenda and then discuss your options. (U)

*Harrop.* As you know, we had a confidential teleconference with Ambassador Smith last night.<sup>3</sup> The Ambassador saw Sgt. Doe only four hours before the execution of the 13 former Cabinet members. After the executions there was a sense of total glee in the streets of Monrovia, a sort of Roman festival. Yesterday, Ambassador Smith saw Foreign Minister Matthews who had been receptive to our concerns up to this point. On this occasion, it appeared that Matthews had no authority in the deliberations over executions. He seemed unable to influence the decision of the Peoples' Redemption Council (PRC). The PRC members are inexperienced and basically illiterate, non-commissioned officers. The civilians are not in control and it is unclear exactly what control Sgt. Doe exercises himself. The Embassy expects more executions sometime this weekend. Our Ambassador has been attempting to see Sgt. Doe since yesterday, but as of yet has been unsuccessful. (S)

I must stress that at no time have Americans or foreigners been the explicit objects of violence. Hostility and violence has been directed, for the most part, toward members of the former ruling elite. Currently, there are 80 people in confinement. The Embassy is concerned that we not give the PRC any impression that the U.S. opposes this revolution, or is in any way hostile to the new rulers. Most importantly, we must avoid giving any impression that we are involved in any counter-coup planning. The PRC is in an intensely paranoid state and our Ambassador is furthermore reluctant to evacuate Americans because it may imply our opposition to the regime and spark a reaction. (S)

Ambassador Smith views any presentation to the GOL on the asylum/deportation idea as imprudent. But he would like to begin moving on military contingency planning and would hope that a cover story for any military movement could be devised. Any public knowledge that American military planning was ongoing would have deleterious effects on the situation in Monrovia. (S)

*Colonel Odom.* Can I not draw the conclusion, however, from the available information, that the Ambassador has not made a choice as to whether contingency planning should go forward?

*Harrop.* I don't think so. If I can read the relevant section of the transcript of our discussion with Ambassador Smith yesterday, it may

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3581 from Monrovia, April 24, the Embassy responded to the Department's questions about the safety of Americans in Liberia and elaborated on the previous night's teleconference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800203–0172)



shed some light on this. In response to a general question about evacuation preparation, Ambassador Smith said:

"We share concern at lengthy military lead time and recommend that forces be placed on alert. Even if alert status leaked, given other areas of crisis in the world, unless ground is carefully prepared here, news of alert could put us in jeopardy.

"We concur in despatch of LPH helicopter ships as well as placing airborne force on alert. Ship should have ability to communicate with Embassy in secure channel. We would not want to explain this action to Doe now and hope cover story could be arranged for its destination.

"We would like to come back to this important question later, but tend now to believe that the dangers of formally entering the warning phase of E and E plan outweigh the advantages. However, we plan to take many of the actions called for in the warning phase quietly. We can also take additional steps to reduce numbers of Americans slowly." (S)

*Colonel Odom.* It still seems somewhat ambiguous. (U)

*Harrop.* In today's communication, he tilts toward moving ahead with alert and prepositioning. (S)

*Colonel Odom.* Let us turn to CIA for anything additional you may want to add. (S)

*Mr. Cowan.* [less than 1 line not declassified] that more executions are expected on Saturday.<sup>4</sup> [less than 1 line not declassified] We are concerned that once executions begin again, they will be most difficult to stop. There are two factors to keep in mind. First, the group in control does not understand diplomatic niceties. Diplomacy, in fact, is almost irrelevant. Second, the government is totally unpredictable and may act in ways which we would normally not expect. [classification marking not declassified]

*Odom.* A more explicit question is what are the immediate causes of these events? (S)

*Cowan.* There are two explanations: One is that it was a spontaneous act of a group of people sitting around and drinking beer. The other, which is unconfirmed and more unlikely, is that this had been in the works for almost a year. (S)

*Odom.* It seems to me that the spontaneous explanation is less than compelling because sustained executions require some degree of planning. (S)

*Cowan.* Basically, it comes down to upcountry Liberians out to get their oppressors of 133 years. (S)

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<sup>4</sup> April 26.

*Odom.* There is no other evidence of foreign involvement? Is there no credence to reports that the Soviet Embassy was involved? (S)

*Cowan.* No, there is not, but there is potential for Soviet advantage. We are also concerned about possible demonstration effects in Sierra Leone and elsewhere on the Continent. (S)

*Odom.* Are other countries in a similar crisis meeting phase? What about the Germans, the British and the French? (S)

*Harrop.* In London the British told us they would be willing to participate in any joint diplomatic efforts.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, it is an American problem. (S)

*Parker Borg.* No one has the same interests as we do in Liberia. (S)

*Odom.* How many troops do the Liberians have? (S)

*Lt. Col. Val Johnson.* 5,000 men, 5 of 100mm artillery pieces, some mortars, light machinery. We estimate it would take as little as 200 American troops to take over. (S)

*Odom.* But how organized are they? How large are the opposing forces? (S)

*Col. William Isom.* What we have here is a total breakdown in command and control. There are bands of armed privates, corporals and sergeants roaming around. What we are trying to do now is just maintain liaison with the military authorities. (S)

*Cowan.* It is even difficult to tell who the soldiers are because approximately 1500 uniforms were stolen. (S)

*Odom.* I would like to task DOD and CIA to get a better fix on what exactly is out there in the way of military organization and equipment. What will we be faced with? We need to tighten up our data base. Now, what about Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast? To what extent would these countries be good for exfiltration? Is it worthwhile investigating this route? Will Americans attempting to escape across the border be prevented from leaving? (S)

*Borg.* People who are upcountry could get across the border because it is quite permeable. (S)

*Harrop.* Any border sealing by Sierra Leone or Ivory Coast is unlikely. (S)

*Cowan.* The roads are bad and evacuation across the border is somewhat impracticable. (S)

*Harrop.* Evacuation by air or sea really are the only viable alternatives. (S)

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 8677 from London, April 23, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office "would wish to coordinate any action with regard to welfare of its citizens with us." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201-0769)

*Odom.* Jerry Funk wants to mention something briefly about the asylum questions. (S)

*Funk.* In light of Ambassador Smith's conversations, it appears that the idea mentioned at the IG yesterday is undesirable.<sup>6</sup> What was floated was an approach to the GOL indicating our willingness to accept those they considered undesirable American-Liberians as refugees, subsequent to their deportation by Liberia. I would like to table this idea now and ask for comments. (S)

*Cowan.* How about domestic U.S. reaction? (S)

*Funk.* Congressman Solarz and his committee have been expressing great concern over the plight of Foreign Minister Dennis, and have asked why we did not give him asylum. (S)

*Harrop.* If the Americo-Liberians believe that a pogrom against them as a class is underway, then we will have serious asylum problems. I have talked to Congressman Solarz about the situation and am keeping him informed. (S)

*Odom.* For the record, I would like to bring out a discussion of the long-term political implications. I think the PRC would want to discuss this further. (S)

*Borg.* It depends on how we do it. If we do it by commercial aviation or military, there would be different effects. The reaction in Africa depends on how it is done. (S)

*Odom.* What about the Western press and Congress? Would they feel that the U.S. is picking up its tent and leaving? (S)

*Harrop.* I would not pose a question that way. This is not a case of our abandoning any of our facilities, private investment or relationship with Liberia. What we are considering is the evacuation of American citizens who may be in danger. (S)

*Odom.* O.K. I just wanted to bring it out and discover whether anyone thinks that this type of consideration should have any bearing on decision-making on evacuation. (S)

*Cowan.* [2 lines not declassified]

*Odom.* Mr. Harrop, can you present the three options which you brought along? (U)

*Harrop.* Option 1 calls for quiet departure by commercial carriers of non-essential American personnel, both private and official, and dependents. Option 2 is to place on alert U.S. aircraft, personnel and equipment required to land one battalion of men in Monrovia, as well as instructing an LPH to proceed to the area. Option 3 is to approach Sgt. Doe and inform him that we would like to gradually and temporar-

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<sup>6</sup> No record of a meeting has been found.

ily reduce the number of Americans in the country and ask for Liberian support, making it clear that this in no way implies disapproval of the Liberian government. (S)

The Ambassador is proceeding in a limited way with Option 1. Because of his concern about raising suspicions in the GOL, he is not in a position to issue travel orders for American personnel. (S)

*Odom.* I take it that State does not support Option 3. (S)

*Harrop.* State does not have a firm position at this point. The Secretary wants to have a consideration of all the available options. (S)

*Johnson.* The options do not appear to be mutually incompatible. (S)

*Odom.* The essential choice is whether or not to announce to Doe our intention to draw down. (S)

*Harrop.* That is the crucial question. (U)

*Odom.* Then how far should we go with military preparation? (S)

*Harrop.* If we ask for Doe's support, then we should tell him about the military preparation. The only way a draw down using commercial air or shipping is feasible, is with the cooperation of the government. (S)

*Odom.* Then we have an implicit choice as to whether we move more rapidly or slowly. There appears then to be two dimensions to the problem. (S)

*Harrop.* Yes, if we do not go to the government, then we must go slow. (S)

*James Woods.* A question on the facts. Yesterday at the IG we heard a figure of 4800 Americans in Liberia. The Mission has come back with a figure of about 3800. There are a lot of missionaries in Liberia. Do these figures include them or not? (S)

*Harrop.* We have to clarify the numbers and will do so. (U)

*Borg.* There is also a large category of Americans who are married to Liberians, but who are still legally American citizens. We would have to deal with them as well. (S)

*Woods.* It seems that we would not want to go with option 3. It could trigger a scenario we are trying to avoid. (S)

*Harrop.* That is quite true. (U)

*Cowan.* And what happens if he says no? (U)

*Harrop.* Before we finish this discussion we should consider the problem of leaks. In the 1980's we cannot operate without this factor. If leaks are inevitable and Sgt. Doe and the PRC learn of our military preparations, we could indeed bring on the scenario we are trying to avoid. (S)

*General Granger.* I think that the preferred way is the commercial evacuation option. (U)

*Harrop.* It is the Ambassador's judgment that evacuation must be done carefully, if at all, and it would be most imprudent to do anything to alienate the GOL at this time. There are considerable problems with harassment by unruly soldiers at the airport, a difficult hour-long drive to the airport, and the fact that the first battalion camp of Liberian troops is along the way. And, we don't have much play in option 1. (U)

*Borg.* There are only two flights a week by PanAm and we have got to know how many other scheduled flights are flying. (S)

*Odom.* What are the JCS reactions to these options? (U)

*General Granger.* There appear to be a large number of scheduled flights in and out of Monrovia on different commercial carriers. (S)

*Harrop.* Aggregating people in the first phase of evacuation would be difficult and may cause some panic. (S)

*Johnson.* Right now we are in the planning phase. The next stage is issuance of a warning order for detailed planning. We have not done the detailed plans as of yet. (S)

*Harrop.* What kind of mobility would troops have when there? (S)

*Johnson.* They would be mobile with five days of supplies. It would take 14 C-141's to bring the battalion in. We have an LPH in the Mediterranean which has just left Turkey and is heading toward France. Once it is in position off the coast of Spain, it will be six days time to Monrovia. (S)

*Harrop.* How long would it be to Monrovia as of today? (S)

*Johnson.* Twelve days and each day it gets closer. The LPH could handle the situation. It has 1100 Marines on board and could handle evacuees for a very short time, perhaps 24 hours. Since it takes two days to Dakar, there would have to be some other way of dealing with the evacuees. (S)

*Isom.* Basically, a reinforced company could take the airport without any problem. A battalion could probably secure the road from Monrovia to the airport. (S)

*Odom.* Can we send anything else along with it to receive the evacuees? (S)

*Johnson.* We will look into that. (U)

*Odom.* It would be useful to raise a question internally at DOD to see whether for some other reason this LPH could remain on course and not put into port. We also need to know what types of internal resistance that would be encountered and the feasibility of ground movement. We have to take a look at the country in detail and JCS should have a firm grasp on difficulties to be encountered. We need tighter intelligence about what we might run into. Before taking any of this to the President, we need a much clearer idea of what we face. (S)

*Harrop.* The Secretary of State would prefer that nothing go to the President at this point. (S)

*Odom.* Of course. (U)

*Harrop.* Before we close, can we consider the problem of a cover story? Could one be successfully implemented or maintained? (S)

*Funk.* We have got to go with the real story. (S)

*Borg.* Liberians would not believe that a military ship could be just for evacuation. (S)

Odom adjourned the meeting after saying that we would meet again shortly. (U)

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## 59. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 7, 1980, 10–10:45 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Relationship with the New Government of Liberia

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *STATE*

Acting Secretary Warren Christopher

Under Secretary David Newsom

Deputy Assistant Secretary William Harrop

#### *OSD*

Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor

Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr. (African Affairs)

#### *JCS*

Lieutenant General John Pustay

#### *DCI*

Mr. Gray Cowan

Mr. Clair George

#### *ICA*

Director John Reinhardt

Ms. Mary Betterman

#### *NSC*

Mr. Jerry Funk

Colonel William Odom

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 80, PRC 139 Liberia 5/7/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

## SUMMARY

The meeting focused on our relations with the new government. It was noted that while the new regime had, in response to our strong demarches, moderated its original harsh policy on executions and had begun to establish some internal stability, its inexperience had made its viability far from certain.<sup>2</sup> We remain concerned about our political, economic and strategic interests in Liberia, including important communication facilities, considerable economic investment, access to air and port facilities, and some 4,000 American citizens. It was recognized that while we have not received requests for large-scale assistance as yet, the likelihood is that the Liberian economy will deteriorate badly rather quickly, and such appeals for economic aid can be expected in the coming months. (S)

## CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—We should augment our present relationship with the new government (while maintaining enough distance to allow for criticism of any further excesses), by taking a range of actions including:

- Sending Chairman Gray and perhaps one or two others of the Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations to examine the new situation,—as a “special mission” while holding the Commission itself in abeyance.<sup>3</sup>
- Recommencing a small temporarily suspended military training team activity.
- Considering ways of being responsive to requests for military re-supply and for non-lethal equipment, (principally trucks), within the present \$1.2 million FMS program.<sup>4</sup>
- Indicating a willingness to explore the possibility of modest economic assistance, perhaps including a PL-480 program,—all contingent upon our ability to reprogram funds.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 56. In telegram 106677 to Monrovia, April 23, the Department instructed Smith to make another *démarche* to the Government of Liberia conveying the concern of the U.S. Government that the accused members of the former government be “assured due process,” that “executions have shocked the American public,” and that “such acts will certainly have serious repercussions” on how the world views the new Liberian government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201–0234) In telegram 3702 from Monrovia, April 25, the Embassy reported on Smith’s meeting with Doe to deliver the *démarche*. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800205–0886)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 62. The Commission was established after Tolbert’s visit. See Document 50.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 3784 from Monrovia, April 28, the Embassy reported that the Liberian Ministry of Defense had requested military training teams, vehicles for military transport, and assorted items of ammunition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800213–0307)

- Taking steps to encourage sound economic advice on a technical basis, perhaps through the IMF or World Bank, and to encourage commercial banks to assist in maintaining an orderly economy insofar as they are able to do so.

—We should maintain a public policy of muted public criticism of the new regime, while continuing to express privately in direct terms the necessity for a policy of respect for human rights and a maintenance of a rule of law.

—We should continue our present low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents and non-essential people, and maintain this posture until the situation is entirely normal. At the same time, JCS and OSD should continue quiet contingency planning for military evacuation in the event of a serious deterioration.

—We should reaffirm our present policy of not granting asylum requests within a foreign jurisdiction, but granting temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances, where the welfare of American citizens is not put at risk. (S)

*RECOMMENDATION:* That you approve the general course of action suggested by the PRC including:

(1) Augmenting our present relations with the Liberian Government by offering modest assistance and good faith advice, along the lines set forth above. (S)

(2) Maintaining our present policy of muted public criticism coupled with strong private admonitions. (S)

(3) Continuing our present low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents. (S)

(4) Reaffirming our present policy on asylum.<sup>5</sup> (S)

*Minutes of the Meeting*

*Christopher* opened the meeting with a brief statement concerning our obvious political, economic and strategic interests in Liberia, noting the extensive communication facilities, the military access, the substantial commercial investment, and the presence of some 4,000 U.S. citizens. He said that it was his personal judgment that the position of the Doe Government remains somewhat precarious and tenuous. He asked CIA for its evaluation. (S)

*Cowan* said that he agreed with Secretary Christopher's general assessment, and had little to add to the information set forth in the

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<sup>5</sup> There is no indication of Carter's approval or disapproval of the general course of action. However, in a May 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk forwarded the Summary of Conclusions, on which Brzezinski wrote, "P. approved ZB," dated May 8. (Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 80, PRC 139 Liberia 5/7/80)



short brief which had been distributed to the participants,<sup>6</sup> except to note that there was recent evidence to suggest a growing interest in Liberia on the part of both Ethiopia and Libya. He judged that Doe would respond to this interest in a manner dependent upon our ability to be responsive to his requests to us for assistance. (S)

*Christopher* said that the principal issue to be dealt with was that of our relationship with the new regime, and he briefly outlined the three basic options,—to distance ourselves from the Doe Government, to maintain the present relationship, or to augment the present relationship. He noted a preference for option three,—augmentation, but pointed out that this was easier to state than to fund, given our scarce resources. (S)

*Claytor* stated OSD's preference for option three, and made particular reference to the desirability of responding to requests for some \$600,000 in transport equipment, under the \$1.2 million FMS program. (S)

*Pustay* stated—JCS preference for option three. (U)

*Funk* said that NSC supported option three, within the limits of our ability to reprogram funds at the present time. (U)

*Reinhardt* said that ICA would prefer option three. He went on to point out that we were faced with a terribly weak leadership in the new government, but that it was all we had to work with. (S)

*Newsom* spoke of the severe limitation of resources in trying to implement option three. (U)

*Pustay* noted that an imaginative use of presently funded programs, such as the military training team, will do much to put things on track. (S)

*Christopher* asked for opinions on the desirability of continuing with the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations. (U)

*Harrop* said that the Commission had been "put on hold" for now, but that Chairman Gray had expressed an interest in going to Liberia with one or two others,—perhaps Assistant Secretary Moose and NSC staffer Jerry Funk. (S)

*Newsom* supported the Chairman's idea, but pointed out that this would require much groundwork with the Doe people so as to avoid raising false expectations. (U)

*Funk* agreed with Gray's suggestions, as well as Newsom's caveat, but also pointed out that in his discussions with Chairman Gray, Gray had expressed a desire to have at least one other Commission member go along,—perhaps Andrew Brimmer. (U)

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.

*Christopher* said that there being no disagreement, Gray and a few select people should travel to Liberia, but as a “special delegation” rather than as a Commission. (S)

*Christopher* then turned to the question of the military training team and other temporarily suspended military programs. (S)

*Pustay* reported that an advance party of the present team group was in transit. (S)

*Claytor* said that should the presently moderating policy of the Doe Government remain in effect, it would seem appropriate to lift the present ban on lethal items, but that while the Liberian army was requesting resupply of ammunition, this request should be answered only after a thorough research of actual needs. (S)

*Pelletreau* noted the urgent request for \$500,000 in transport equipment, especially trucks, and said that the need was apparent. (S)

*Harrop* said that it was possible to fund these truck purchases through the present FMS program. (S)

*Christopher* noted that it was the consensus that we proceed with this major truck purchase program, subject to availability of funding. (S)

*Christopher* then took up a suggestion that we might now reprogram \$670,000 from Nicaraguan FMS, but stated his strong reservations. (S)

*Newsom* noted that we should not rush to do so, as we could expect to have increasing claims put upon these dwindling resources in the months ahead. (U)

*Claytor* said that it was inevitable that the Doe Government would slip into severe economic difficulty, and would be back for much more. (S)

*Christopher* then said that the Nicaraguan FMS reprogramming idea should not be pursued. He then asked for general ideas about the prospects for finding available funds for developmental and ESF programs within the 1981 budget. (S)

*Harrop* spoke of the possibility of finding some funds for a PL-480 program for 1981, and suggested that we should explore the idea. (S)

*Funk* noted the desirability of such a program for Liberia, given the continuing basic “rice crisis” facing the country, but said that such a program would have to be weighed carefully on other African claimants to a dwindling PL-480 reserve. (S)

*Christopher* then noted that we seemed in general agreement on the desirability of trying to be responsive to what can be expected to be increasing requests for aid, subject to the availability of reprogramming which would not do serious harm to other vital programs. (S)

*Newsom* suggested that it would be useful to encourage the availability of sound economic advice, on a technical rather than a political basis,—perhaps through the World Bank or the IMF. (S)

*Harrop* said that such advice and guidance would be helpful in sending reassuring signals to the business community, and that we should encourage the commercial banks to be helpful in this regard. (S)

*Christopher* directed *Harrop* to follow through on these ideas. (U)

*Christopher* then raised the question of our strategy with Congress, suggesting that we should continue to keep Congressman Gray and Congressman Solarz and other key members of the House and Senate fully informed. All agreed. (U)

*Christopher* asked for ideas on evacuation, stating a preference for continued low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents and non-essential people. (S)

*Claytor* supported this continuation of this present policy, and noted that OSD and JCS were, of course, continuing contingency planning for any possible military evacuation. (S)

*Pustay* said that JCS had a special group updating contingency planning on a continuing basis, and noted that a helicopter ship would remain in the Western Mediterranean, within 6–8 days of Monrovia. (S)

*Newsom* asked that the possibility of direct sea evacuation, in cooperation with commercial lines, not be overlooked. (S)

*Pustay* said that JCS would review such an option. (U)

*Christopher* next raised the question of what our public stance should be. He said that since public condemnation was clearly not useful in this case, we should stay with our present policy of muted public criticism, coupled with direct and forceful admonitions to the Doe regime to initiate and maintain a policy of respect for human rights and rule of law. There was complete agreement on this point. (S)

*Christopher* moved to the question of asylum policy. (U)

*Harrop* outlined the concerns which had been raised on the Hill, particularly by Congressman Solarz, with respect to the late Foreign Minister Dennis,—in which case Solarz had been misinformed, as Dennis had *not* requested asylum, probably because he was well aware of our long-standing policy. (S)

*Funk* stated a preference for maintaining our present policy of not granting asylum in a foreign jurisdiction except for temporary refuge in extreme circumstances. There was a consensus on this position. (S)

*Newsom* then noted that so far there was a general coolness to the Doe Government on the part of other African governments, and asked if there might be some impact on our relations with these other Africans, should we aid Doe. (S)

*Harrop* said that he felt there would be no serious problem unless we went very far in support of a government which was obviously bringing more chaos to the nation. (S)

*Funk* said that as long as our aid and guidance was perceived by other Africans as being directed toward the promotion of stability,—internally and in the region,—our intervention would be welcomed, and more, expected. (S)

*Cowan* noted that there seemed to be an excellent opportunity to give good advice in the creation of a new constitution. (S)

*Christopher* asked that Harrop and Funk coordinate the preparation of the minutes and conclusions to be presented to the President, and adjourned the meeting. (U)

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## 60. Minutes of a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 23, 1980, 2:15–2:50 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Covert Action Proposal for Liberia (S)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

#### *State Department*

Mr. David Newsom (Under Secretary for Political Affairs)

Mr. Ronald Spiers (Dep. Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research)

#### *OSD*

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

Admiral Daniel Murphy (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Review)

#### *JCS*

Lt. General John Pustay

#### *DCI*

Mr. Frank Carlucci

Mr. Clair George (Chief of Africa Division)

#### *NSC*

Jerry Funk

#### *OMB*

John White (Deputy Director)

Randy Jayne (Associate Director, National Security & International Affairs)

#### *JUSTICE*

Ken Bass

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes 4/16/80–8/6/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

## MINUTES OF THE MEETING

The Chairman, *Dr. Brzezinski*, opened the meeting by noting that there was a three-part covert action proposal on Liberia to be considered, and it was his understanding that there would be little discussion on parts two and three, with somewhat more discussion on item one. He therefore suggested we work backwards, taking the first item last. He then summarized the three-part proposal:

—To provide advisors to the GOL in managing its economic, political and public administration affairs.

—To provide [*less than 1 line not declassified*] assistance to the Liberian intelligence/security services, to train, equip and advise.

—To engage in propaganda activities to encourage the GOL to pursue an acceptable human rights policy. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* said that State had no objections to items two and three,—security liaison and propaganda. (S)

*Admiral Murphy* asked what safeguards there were to the security liaison proposal, noting that the creation of a very efficient security service can be politically dangerous. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* said that the proposal was to train, to provide some measure of personal protection for the executive, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]*—not to set up a police operation. He said that we all knew there could be no absolute guarantees, but that the best guarantee was our presence. [classification marking not declassified]*

*Admiral Murphy* said that he agreed and had no further question. (U)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that there being no further comment or question, the meeting approved items two and three;—security liaison and propaganda,—and asked for discussion on item one, providing advisors. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* asked for some elaboration on the proposal, and said that it was not clear if it was offered in response to GOL requests, or on our initiative. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* said that CIA had been inundated with requests,—[*2 lines not declassified*]. He said that GOL was in deep trouble, and often had little or no idea of what to do next. He said that what was being proposed was not a unilateral CIA effort to respond but a unified USG effort to find an advisor or advisors qualified with experience in less developed nations who could give intelligent and timely advice to the GOL at the highest levels. [*classification marking not declassified*]

*Dr. Brzezinski* then asked what was to prevent the Embassy from rendering such a service. (C)

*Mr. Carlucci* said he felt the GOL leadership would prefer to have such high-level advice come from a private source not openly identified directly with the U.S. government. [*portion marking not declassified*]

*Dr. Brzezinski* then asked for clarification on how the action would be covert, in what respect. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* responded that we could work [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to engage a consultant qualified to give economic and political policy advice, as a consultant to and employee of the GOL. He said that CIA had no particular candidate and would leave the selection to State if that were desired.

*Mr. Claytor* noted that State and CIA could coordinate closely in such a project. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* said that the idea was to have the consultant report regularly to the Ambassador.

*Dr. Brzezinski* noted that he was left with the impression from last week's foreign policy breakfast<sup>2</sup> that the President was generally favorably disposed to the idea of providing close advice to the GOL. He then asked for State's specific concerns about the proposal. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* said that

—State can provide the required advice overtly.

—Much advice can be provided effectively by international organizations such as IMF and World Bank.

—Covert advice would tend to tie us too closely to a Doe regime which may fall.

—AID can provide much useful advice overtly.

—GOL can hire consultants on their own.

*Mr. White*, in response to the Chairman's request for other views, said that in general advice of the kind contemplated should be overt insofar as possible, but there should be no objection to covert advice per se.

*Dr. Brzezinski* then suggested that covert advice should be seen as supplemental to overt advice, and should not necessarily exclude it. (S)

*Admiral Murphy* noted that covert action had the advantage of providing for quick action, as was called for in this case. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* said that there was an impression that the GOL had not really asked us for covert assistance of this kind.

*Mr. Carlucci* responded that this was not the case, but rather that such requests had been made repeatedly. He said the requests had not been made in detail, because it was impossible to get into a detailed discussion until a Finding was put forward to allow such discussions. [*classification marking not declassified*]

*Mr. Newsom* asked what advantage was to be had by providing advice covertly as opposed to overtly in this case. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably the President's foreign policy breakfast on May 16 with Brzezinski, Christopher, Harold Brown, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, and Presidential Adviser Hedley Donovan. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.

*Mr. Carlucci [less than 1 line not declassified]*

—would keep U.S. Government officials from direct identification with the GOL leadership.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked if it was stating State's position clearly to say that there was no objection to covert action per se, but that it was not necessary in this case. (S)

*Mr. Spiers* responded that

—on the question of economic advice, there was objection, since such advice was bound to be hard and we would prefer to see non-USG people deliver the bad news.

—on the question of political advice, it is more appropriate that U.S. citizens render such advice.

—therefore, GOL should be encouraged to follow the lead of the IMF in looking for economic advice. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* noted that the record of less developed countries in searching out sound advice on their own is not good, and that we must realize that the GOL needs help in knowing how to approach and cope with the IMF in eliciting and acting on its advice. [portion marking not declassified]

*Mr. Newsom* noted that there were some sophisticated people in the field of economics presently in the GOL. But that in any case, any advice should be given government to government, and not to Sargent Doe. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* said that the proposal was to advise at the highest levels of the GOL, and not individual persons.

*Dr. Brzezinski* [2 lines not declassified]

*Mr. Newsom* [2 lines not declassified] He went on to note that the Ambassador was on record as opposing the proposal. [classification marking not declassified]

*Dr. Brzezinski* then suggested that since we appeared to have two views,—first, that covert action is dangerous and unnecessary, and second, that we should have the option to act covertly in specific instances in a supplementary way,—we might wish to draw up a brief description of each view to put before the President. (S)

In response to an inquiry from Admiral Murphy, *Mr. Newsom* read a message from the Ambassador stating his position on the need for economic and political advice, and on the question of how to provide it.<sup>3</sup> (S)

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4471 from Monrovia, May 15, the Ambassador outlined the economic and political difficulties that Liberia faced in the near term, along with several suggestions for actions that the United States could take to alleviate the problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240-0790)



*Dr. Brzezinski* said that he found the Ambassador's position to be sensible, and that perhaps there was no real difference in perceived objectives and little difference in approach. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* suggested that he still felt that overt advice such as could be provided by AID, was the best approach, [1 line not declassified].

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that there seemed to be three options: disapprove, approve, or find some middle ground. (S)

*Mr. Newsom* said there was a fourth option: to await the result of discussions to be held by Assistant Secretary Moose and Congressman Gray in Liberia the first week of June.<sup>4</sup> (S)

*Mr. Claytor* commented that it was dangerous to wait; *Dr. Brzezinski* concurred, and then suggested that the Committee could agree that advice should be overt wherever possible, to be supplemented by covert advice where necessary, and in the case of economic advice, should be provided by non-U.S. sources. (S)

*Mr. Claytor* suggested that if we relied too heavily on overt advice we might tend to lose some control. Both *Dr. Brzezinski* and *Mr. Newsom* said this was not necessarily the case. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said he felt that [2 lines not declassified].

*Mr. Newsom* agreed, [2 lines not declassified].

*Mr. Jayne* noted that the proposal called for only two man-years, and that much more would be required. (S)

*Mr. Bass* noted that a Finding was not necessary unless it was decided to take up the option for rendering advice on a covert basis. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked *Mr. Funk* to read the operative language that the meeting had agreed to amend the proposal, as it would be described in the Finding. *Mr. Carlucci* offered alternative wording which was agreed upon unanimously, as follows:

"Wherever possible provide advice and assistance overtly, either by U.S. advisers or through international organizations, such advice to be supplemented, particularly in the public administration and political areas, by covert advice [1 line not declassified]. In economic areas, advisers should be non-American insofar as possible." [classification marking not declassified]

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked *Mr. Carlucci* and *Mr. Funk* to agree on precise wording for final clearance with State.<sup>5</sup> (S)

The meeting adjourned at 2:50 p.m. (U)

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 62.

<sup>5</sup> In a May 23 memorandum to Carter, *Brzezinski* forwarded a Summary of Conclusions and recommended: "That you approve the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A), and sign the Finding (Tab B). Carter checked the "yes" box and initialed "J." (Carter Library, Plains File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes 4/16/80–8/6/80)



## 61. Presidential Finding<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

*Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations in Foreign Countries Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection*

I hereby find the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary. (S)

### SCOPE

### DESCRIPTION

Liberia

Provide directly to the Government of Liberia, or unilaterally as appropriate, advice, guidance and assistance in managing Liberia's governmental affairs in the political, economic, public administration, intelligence, security and related fields, and assist in equipping and training the Liberian intelligence/security services, for the purpose of maintaining U.S. interests in Liberia, keeping Liberia moderate and pro West, and encouraging respect for human rights. (S)

Wherever possible provide advice and assistance overtly, either by U.S. advisers or through international organizations, such advice to be supplemented, particularly in the public administration and political areas. [2 lines not declassified] In economic areas, advisers should be non-American insofar as possible. (S) Disseminate all forms of covert propaganda worldwide and in Liberia in support of these objectives. (S)

**Jimmy Carter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 30, NSC/SCC Minutes 4/16/80–8/6/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

SCOPE OF CIA ACTIVITIES UNDER THE LIBERIA FINDING

Following approval by the President of the attached Presidential Finding on Liberia, CIA will undertake the following specific activities:

(a) As a supplement to overt advice and assistance provided by U.S. advisers or through international organizations, furnish covert advice and guidance to the new Liberian Government as agreed upon [*1 line not declassified*] in the political, economic, and public administration fields in order to: promote internal stability and a moderate, pro-West stance by the new Government; preserve and further U.S. interests in Liberia; pre-empt, reduce or neutralize the influence of hostile intelligence services; and influence the Government to adopt policies which respect and preserve human rights. (S)

(b) Provide advice and guidance on intelligence and security matters, and appropriate training, equipment and other support to the Liberian Government's [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in furtherance of the above objectives. (S)

(c) Utilize all forms of covert propaganda techniques worldwide [*1 line not declassified*] in order to indirectly and favorably influence the Liberian Government and to otherwise promote and facilitate the accomplishment of these objectives. (S)

**62. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Liberian Trip Summary (U)

*General Situation*

The leadership of the Government of Liberia is frightened and confused by the problems it is facing, and it is operating on two distinct levels—the Military Peoples Redemption Council seeing one set of problems, and the Cabinet (and civil servants), another. But all agree that they need help, desperately, and that they want this help to come from the US—their “first and best friend.”

We (Congressman Gray, Asst. Sec. Moose and I) talked to virtually the entire Cabinet and top civil servants several times over 3 days, met with Doe twice, and with the entire PRC! In all that time there was no threat to move toward the Libyans, Ethiopians, Cubans and Soviets, but it is painfully clear that if they don't get the help they need to survive from us, they will take that help from any source.

*The PRC's View*

The PRC has been expanded from the original 17 to include an additional 11 “associate members”—thus allowing for marginally better tribal balance, and a mechanism for denoting some of the more hopeless incompetents from the all-powerful 17 who act as executive and legislature. Doe and his top 3/4 people are intelligent and highly motivated to bring honest reform, but they have the equivalent of perhaps a 5th grade education. They are clearly popular, for now, but they seem to realize this will change rapidly if they can't deliver.

They are focused on two problems—the desperate need for military housing (as requested by Tolbert when he saw the President last year),<sup>2</sup> and the hostility of their neighbors, which they blow all out of proportion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia: 12/78–1/81. Confidential. Outside the System. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bloomfield, Owen, Poats, and Thornton. An unidentified person with initials DR indicated in the upper right margin that he saw the memorandum on June 10.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 49.

Thus, Doe and his immediate circle are asking for housing aid, and modest military help—trucks, radios, some small arms. We are answering the military needs. But the housing will require a program of \$10 million a year for four years.

#### *The Cabinet's View*

The Cabinet, which is dominated by Foreign Minister Matthews, Planning Minister Tipoth, Justice Minister Cheapoo and Financial Advisor Tarr—is focused on the real and crucial immediate problem: how to maintain financial liquidity. They were left with \$5 million in the bank and a shortfall of \$25 million at the end of the fiscal year, June 30. (The Tolbert government would have faced the same problem, but with a line of commercial credit to carry them over the year end.)

Once through this credit crunch, the Cabinet sees a need to get on with the military housing—as they feel that will ensure the PRC's early return to the barracks.

#### *Policy Statements*

The Cabinet has issued political and policy statements which we can live with—"true non-alignment," honoring all existing agreements, maintaining free enterprise system, etc. The human rights situation is not great, but steadily and clearly improving.

#### *What Do We Need to Do?*

We have already shown our good will and won a large measure of confidence from both the PRC and the Cabinet by being responsive to the immediate needs of the military (\$2.5 in FMS, trucks, radios, small arms, plus training teams in country)—and by PL-480 rice help for October.<sup>3</sup>

But we have to help them find a way to maintain liquidity, or the whole economy and quite probably the political system will cave in. We can be certain the Soviets and friends will scavenge the remains.

It has been suggested that OPIC could give 50 percent guarantees on loans from Chase and Citibank to LAMCO and perhaps Firestone for legitimate and long proposed projects, and these funds, put on deposit in Liberia, would get the country through its present credit crunch. First indications from OPIC were negative, but everyone else appears ready to play ball. We will be working on this early in the

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<sup>3</sup> In a June 12 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk provided the details of the Liberian assistance package. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia: 12/78-1/81)

week, trying to find one variation or alternative that will keep it glued together.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand drew a line in the left margin beside this paragraph.

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### 63. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Dakar, July 18, 1980

#### SUBJECT

African Issues

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *United States*

Vice President Mondale

Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Herman J. Cohen, U.S. Ambassador to Senegal

##### *Senegal*

President Leopold Senghor

Moustapha Niasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs

#### *Namibia and South Africa*

Senghor said that Sam Nujoma can be influenced in favor of moderation. "We will make him a social democrat and keep him out of the Soviets arms." Senghor said the African moderates are insisting on a free election in Namibia along the lines of Zimbabwe. SWAPO should not take power automatically.

The Vice President asked Senghor for his views of the current negotiations with South Africa. Senghor replied that he supports the efforts of the Western contact group, but that South Africa will not go along unless pressure is applied. Senghor said that an immediate oil

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background—Memcons and Speeches [2]. Confidential. Drafted by Cohen on August 5. According to a telegram 6189 from Dakar, July 18, the meeting took place on July 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800394–1239) Mondale visited Senegal July 17–19, Niger July 19–20, Nigeria July 20–23, and Cape Verde July 23.

blockade must be started. Only then will South Africa understand the West means business.

Vice President Mondale reviewed U.S.-South African relations since the beginning of the Carter Administration, starting with his Vienna meeting with Vorster.<sup>2</sup> He said we hope to make progress through peaceful change, and we want to hold the economic sanctions weapon in reserve, to be used only when it is clear that other methods of persuasion have failed.

#### *Angola*

Senghor said that since the death of Neto, pro-Soviet elements in the MPLA have been in the ascendancy. Neto had been leaning toward reconciliation with Savimbi, but the Soviets stopped that development by killing Neto on the operating table. Senghor said he supports Savimbi because he represents 40 percent of the Angolan people. The MPLA was imposed by the Cubans. The MPLA represent the Luanda Mulatto intellectuals. Senghor urged the US to support Savimbi.

Mr. Moose said that Savimbi expressed an interest in reconciliation with the MPLA during his visit to Washington.<sup>3</sup> He talked of making a deal, such as allowing the Benguela railroad to be opened in return for a role in government. Moose asked if Senghor had any news of this. Senghor said that he hoped the US would support Savimbi as the only hope of driving the Cubans out. The Vice President said the US is not going to be involved in Angola's internal affairs. The US wants to do everything possible to bring about a reconciliation.

#### *Western Sahara*

Covered in Dakar 5486<sup>4</sup>

#### *Chad*

Covered in Dakar 5519/6189<sup>5</sup>

#### *Middle East*

Senghor prefaced his remarks by saying he does not want to appear anti-semitic. He said that his two children by his first marriage have

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 158.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 40.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5486 from Dakar, July 18, the Embassy reported on Senghor's discussion with Mondale on the dispute in the Western Sahara. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0260)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 215864 to Dakar, August 15, the Department notified the Embassy that telegram 5519 from Dakar never arrived in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800389–0658) In telegram 6189 from Dakar, August 18, the Embassy retransmitted telegram 5519, which reported on Mondale's discussion with Senghor on Chad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800394–1239)

Jewish blood through their mother. One of his sons is engaged to a Dutch woman of the Jewish faith. Senghor said he gets along well with Simon Peres of the Labor Party. But Begin is an extremist; there will be no hope for Palestinian autonomy as long as Begin is Prime Minister. The Israelis have to decide they are a Middle Eastern people, and not a European people. Senghor said he supports the Camp David Agreement. Senegal has never failed to oppose efforts to condemn Sadat in international conferences.

The Vice President said the U.S. is grateful for Senegal's support, and we hope it will continue. The Vice President said one of the problems in reaching an agreement on Palestinian autonomy is Israel's sense of isolation. The Africans broke relations with Israel because of Egypt's requests in 1967 and 1973. Now that Egypt has resumed relations with Israel, isn't it time for the Africans to do the same. President Senghor implied that the question was premature, and began a discussion of Libya. He said that Senegal broke relations with Libya because Senegalese citizens had been enticed to go there for military training.

#### *East-West Relations*

Senghor said he was upset with Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt because of their weak solidarity with the U.S. on Afghanistan and Iran. He said that Africa cannot be expected to resist communist penetration if the West is reacting so weakly to the Soviet threat. Senghor said he mentioned this to both Giscard and Schmidt.

The Vice President replied that the U.S. was disappointed in its European allies, and said he was pleased that Senghor had made his displeasure known to them.

#### *North-South Dialogue*

Senghor said that the Sahel countries can solve the problem of desertification only through the construction of dams. The dams needed to save Senegal alone will cost one trillion dollars by the year 2020. It will be impossible to achieve these objectives if the industrialized countries do not follow the World Bank recommendation to donate 0.7 percent of their GNP's to economic assistance. He cited figures to show that Europe is donating only 0.30 percent of GNP, and the U.S. only 0.25 percent. He pleaded for greater understanding.

The Vice President pointed out that President Carter has consistently asked Congress to increase foreign aid. But Congress has found it difficult to do so in view of the needs of the poor in the U.S.

**64. Telegram From the Embassy in Niger to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Niamey, July 25, 1980, 1704Z

3384. White House (Vice President's office) for Denis Clift. Subject: Vice President's First Meeting With President Kountche. Following Niamey 3384 sent action SecState 7/25/80 repeated with White House caption. Begin quote.

Ref: Niamey 3378.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S)–Entire text

2. Following is an uncleared report of the Vice President's first meeting with President Kountche,<sup>3</sup> which took place at the Presidential Palace on July 19. The Vice President was accompanied by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Richard Moose, Ambassador James Bishop, and interpreter Sophia Porson. President Kountche was accompanied by Foreign Minister Daouda Diallo.

3. Summary: In their first meeting, President Kountche acknowledged American concern about Niger's sales of uranium to Libya but defended these as preferable to an embargo which might prompt Libya to seize Niger's uranium mines. He predicted a 60 million dls shortfall due to lower uranium prices in the 300 million dls revenue foreseen in Niger's current budget, and he asked for American assistance. Pessimistic about the Chadian situation, he endorsed the concept of a UN peacekeeping force. He said Niger has not recognized the Polisario's claims because their acknowledgement would encourage other groups within the Sahara to contest the legitimacy of recognized international borders. The Vice President outlined Western concerns provoked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and described some of the defensive measures being undertaken by the United States and its allies. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background—Memcons and Speeches [2]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3378 from Niamey, July 25, the Embassy reported that it had tried to send the cables on Mondale's visit to Niger to Lagos for clearance, but they did not arrive on time. The Department was informed that the cables would be sent there and the Bureau of African Affairs could work with Mondale's office on clearance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870108–1086)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3385 from Niamey, July 25, the Embassy reported on the second meeting between Mondale and Kountche. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice-President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background—Memcons and Speeches [2])



[Omitted here is a detailed description of Mondale's discussion with Kountche.]

Bishop

**65. Telegram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Lagos, July 23, 1980, 0005Z

7873. Pass White House. Subject: Vice President Mondale's Meeting With President Shagari.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Vice President Mondale met with President Shagari for about a half an hour on Tuesday morning, July 22. The initial welcome by President Shagari and response by the Vice President were attended by the press and the Vice President's party. Following this the press and non-official members of the party withdrew.

3. The Vice President passed on to President Shagari President Carter's warm regards and delivered the personal letter from him.<sup>2</sup> He told President Shagari that President Carter would be delighted to meet with him in early October when President Shagari was visiting the UNGA. Because of President Carter's busy campaign schedule it was difficult to tie down an exact time but this could be worked out by the ambassadors.

4. President Shagari again welcomed the Vice President noting this obvious further demonstration of U.S. interest in Nigeria following President Carter's visit in 1978.<sup>3</sup> He said he understood and appreciated American support for Nigeria's democratic constitutional development and was pleased with the evident seriousness with which we were approaching the economic talks.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background—Memcons and Speeches [2]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In the July 12 letter to Shagari, Carter emphasized the importance of bilateral talks and Mondale's visit. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 37, Vice-President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Nigeria, President's Letter [to President Shagari])

<sup>3</sup> See Document 33.

5. The President said that the Nigerian people needed some clear-cut identification of America with its development progress. The British and Europeans and Japanese were associated with the country's industrial development. The Soviets had undertaken to assist with its steel industry. Nigeria is determined to do something about agriculture and the President said he believed the U.S. should devote its efforts to that sector. The second area of involvement should be energy development. He would like to see the U.S. make an impact in the oil and petrochemical industry so that Americans could be clearly identified with this sector.

6. The President said that he would also like to see Americans associated with Nigerian constitutional development. The country is still experimenting with its structure. If it succeeds it will set an example towards which the rest of Africa will look.

7. The Vice President responded that America was thrilled by the restoration of democracy in Nigeria, and particularly impressed that it had chosen a constitutional structure similar in many ways to our own. He assured the President of our immediate response if there was any way in which we could be helpful in this regard.

8. As to the bilateral talks the Vice President said he had brought a high-level delegation of men and women who were capable of making decisions on the spot and wanted to see concrete results. The Vice President said we fully support the priority which Nigeria gives to agriculture. If oil is its biggest asset, its dependence on foreign agriculture is its greatest liability. Farmers are the most stable element of society. The Vice President noted that he had brought Undersecretary Hathaway with him for discussions on agriculture and that we are prepared to sign a memorandum of understanding which covered detailed areas of cooperation. He described some of the areas. On energy, Undersecretary Sawhill was prepared to contribute to the success of the meeting. We had no disagreement on any of this. The President agreed that there were no disagreements; we just needed accomplishments.

9. The Vice President then reviewed his written list of projects we are preparing. He mentioned soil conservation, trade and development and our interest in science and technology. Here he noted that President Carter wanted to send his science advisor, Frank Press, and a group of our leading scientists to Nigeria in September to discuss cooperation in that area. He noted student exchanges in education and pledged that we would try to do a better job in getting rid of unnecessary obstacles. We are hoping for instance to be able to permit Nigerian students to obtain multiple entry visas.

10. The President said he was impressed with this very concrete list of proposals and acknowledged that the ball was in the Nigerians

court to respond to them; a challenge which Foreign Minister Audu said would be met.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For the Joint Communiqué signed in Lagos by Mondale and Nigerian Vice President Ekwueme on July 23, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1980, pp. 13–14.

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## 66. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Praia, July 23, 1980, 1:45–2:20 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting in Cape Verde during Vice President Mondale's Trip to West Africa

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	<i>Cape Verde</i>
Vice President Mondale	Prime Minister Pires
Sophia Porson (interpreter)	

Prime Minister Pires welcomed the Vice President, saying that he was most honored and gratified to receive him in Cape Verde, particularly in view of the special relationship that exists between our two countries owing to the many Cape Verdeans living in the U.S.

Pires regretted that the Vice President could stay so little time. He would have wished him to visit the other islands, especially inasmuch as Sal was not representative of the rest of the archipelago. He described the topographic and climatic conditions of Cape Verde, referring in the main to the drought. The Vice President was aware of the problem and sympathetic about it, pointing to our own arid lands and the recent drought that has ravaged our Southwest and Midwest.

Referring to the large Cape Verdean population in the U.S., the Vice President asked if many returned to the islands to visit. Pires said a fair number had traditionally come back to live once they were eligible

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Background—Memcons and Speeches [2]. Confidential. The meeting took place at the Sal Island Airport. Drafted by Porson.

for pensions, and that since independence interest in the country had grown among the emigrants more and more were returning as visitors.

The Vice President then told Pires that he had had good visits to Senegal, Niger, and Nigeria,<sup>2</sup> where he had had comprehensive exchanges of views with their leaders. During his talk with Pires, he especially wanted to hear the Government of Cape Verde's concerns, to know how our assistance was working and what more we could do to help, since that was our desire. He then hoped to hear Pires' views on Angola, a country with which we would like to have better relations. Since Cape Verde and Angola shared a common history in their relationship to Portugal, he knew that the Cape Verdeans understood the Angolans and he was interested in what they thought we should do in relation to Angola.

Pires' response to the first question was that their most pressing, immediate worry was that the rains were very late in coming, as the Vice President had no doubt already heard in Senegal.

On cooperation with the United States in general, he described it as "quite good." Extensive talks had been held with AID representatives in which the Cape Verdeans had been able to describe their problems. A series of projects were planned or under way, which Pires outlined briefly:

Two desalinization projects, one on Sao Vicente to expand and improve an existing plant, and a new one on Sal, which had been delayed but thanks to Goler Butcher's visit would now be going forward.<sup>3</sup> Pires emphasized this project's value to the Sal population, the airport, and the present and future hotel facilities. He used the Sal project to make the general point of how essential all water-related projects were to Cape Verde's future, equalled in importance only by finding means to meet the country's energy needs.

A brief general discussion followed on the economics of desalinization and on non-conventional sources of energy.

Pires then resumed his description of the AID program, mentioning the Tarrafal and Sao Tiago agricultural and soil conservation projects, school construction, and research on non-conventional energy sources. This prompted the Vice President to ask an aide to invite Dr. John Sawhill of DOE to join the conversation. While we waited for him to

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 63–65.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1102 from Praia, July 8, the Embassy reported on some of the details of Butcher's June trip to Cape Verde. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800328–1103)

arrive, the VP gave the PM President Carter's letter to President Pereira.<sup>4</sup>

Pires continued with his outline of the AID program, saying how important the food assistance was to his country. He described the operation of the National Development Fund, stressing its value in creating employment and his government's philosophy in administering it, i.e. selling the food rather than giving it away, so as not to create a "beggar mentality" among the people, and then investing the proceeds in labor-intensive projects, particularly in agriculture.

The Vice President informed Pires that the U.S. would be providing 5,000 tons of corn above the 10,000 already agreed upon, as soon as adequate storage became available. Pires acknowledged that, adding that discussions were in progress on the receipt of food assistance under Title III. The VP responded that we were pleased to work with the Cape Verdeans on this, indicating how complicated our legislation is.

At this point Dr. Sawhill arrived, and the conversation turned back to energy. Pires described his country's dependence on diesel-fueled generators, their inability to effect economies of scale because the islands were so small, and even to have an integrated power system on each island. CV places great hope in eventually being able to use solar, wind, and sea energy (the latter taking advantage of the differences in temperature between the various layers of water). He described the newly created Technical Research Institute which will be concentrating on such forms of energy. The GOCV has been in touch with various European governments about the institute, and have found the Swedes to be especially interested in helping. Also, the Institute's director was recently in the U.S. making contacts there.

Dr. Sawhill said the DOE would be happy to receive the Director and to show him the various technologies we are working on. Pires replied that the Institute was still being organized, existing largely on paper and with few staff members. In any case, Dr. Sawhill undertook to provide whatever documentation the Institute might wish and to cooperate in other ways. Prime Minister Pires promised to follow up on the offer.

Pires added that there was already a wind energy project with AID on Sao Tiago, and that Cape Verde was also involved via CILSS in some regional energy activities that received U.S. assistance. In fact, it was possible that the future CILSS center for research on non-conventional energy sources would be located in Cape Verde.

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<sup>4</sup> In the July 12 letter to Pereira, Carter praised Cape Verde's non-alignment stance and program of economic development. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 37, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80-7/23/80], President's Letter [to President Pereira])

The Vice President said that he had been very impressed with his visit to the CILSS Agrhymet center in Niamey, and told the Prime Minister about the Cape Verdean trainees he had met there. The VP was pleased that Cape Verde was involved in the CILSS regional program, since essentially the Sahel countries faced the same problems. That was true, responded Pires, but Cape Verde's situation was more complicated because of its being made up of islands.

In connection with training, Pires informed the Vice President that there were Cape Verdeans in the U.S. now being trained, mainly to work with the AID agriculture and irrigation projects.

In summary, Pires said, there was broad cooperation between the U.S. and Cape Verde, with which his government was pleased.

The Vice President then informed the Prime Minister that we would be doubling our scholarship program, raising it from \$100,000 to \$200,000.

At this point, the Vice President was notified that it was time to make his departure statement, and the private meeting broke up. Before leaving the VIP lounge, however, a quick conversation on Angola was held, in which the other people in the room were included (some GOCV officials including Foreign Minister Duarte, and, on our side, Denis Clift, Jerry Funk, Tony Lake, and Ed Torre).

Pires told the Vice President that prior to his arrival in Cape Verde the Angolans had been in touch with the GOCV. The Angolans were very concerned about finding a solution to the whole Namibia-South Africa problem and with the latest activity in the U.S. Congress on the Clark Amendment.<sup>5</sup>

The Vice President said that he did not think the Senate modification of the Clark Amendment had any chance of coming out of the House-Senate conference. Even if it were approved, however, we had no intention of changing our present policy and no intention of intervening in Angola. What we wanted, simply, was that the parties there resolve their differences peacefully.

Pires responded that the Angolans feel the problem of South Africa has to be resolved; with that, the Namibian and other problems can be worked out. The VP asked if he did not mean that the Namibian problem had to be resolved first. Pires acknowledged that that was right, but that it was the South Africans who were invading Angola.

The Vice President then stated that we hoped to be able to force South Africa to agree to the holding of UN-supervised elections, which would allow for the creation of a democratically elected government

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<sup>5</sup> The Clark amendment to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 forbade aid to groups involved in military operations in Angola.

as was the case in Zimbabwe. This in turn would provide justification for President dos Santos to have the Cubans leave Angola. Pires answered that that was the Angolans' position exactly.

The Vice President remarked that we have been working exceedingly hard on the Namibian question. If Pires had any ideas on how we should be dealing with the South Africans, we would welcome his advice. We are doing what we can to pressure them to let go.

Tony Lake added that we had been working closely with Angola on the Namibia question. The first step had to be an agreement on Namibia. With that settled, the big benefit would be that it would reduce the reasons given for the Cuban presence in Angola. Pires responded that the Angolans were very open to cooperation on settling the Namibia problem. That, said Vice President Mondale, was all the more reason for us not to let up on our efforts there.

The meeting ended at this point, the Vice President delivered his departure statement to the press in the public lounge, and then we went out to the plane. There, Pires again expressed his great pleasure in having met with the Vice President and asked him to come back and spend more time in Cape Verde. The Vice President said he would be delighted to do so.

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**67. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Follow-Up on Your Visit to West Africa

In keeping with the practice you have established, upon your return from Africa I asked State and the NSC to bring together a comprehensive report on the actions being taken to implement the initiatives resulting from your trip. I have worked closely with Moose and Funk on this.

State has now sent to the White House (Tab A) its report—which is concurred in by the NSC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 36, Vice President's Visit to West Africa [7/17/80–7/23/80] Memcons and Speeches [2]. Secret.

In almost every instance, the report indicates that satisfactory follow-up action is underway. On pages 1 and 2 of the report the Department of State and NSC recommend, and I concur, that you take the following actions to build on the African trip:

—A letter to Orville Freeman (Tab 1)<sup>2</sup> asking him to serve as Chairman of the U.S.-Nigerian Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee;

—A letter to IDCA Director Ehrlich (Tab 2)<sup>3</sup> asking IDCA to fund the initial visit of the Consultative Committee;

—A recommendation to the President that he confirm an appointment for President Shagari of Nigeria on the October 7 White House calendar.<sup>4</sup> (I would note that this is a fast-moving item. The office call has been confirmed. Anne Wexler and Louis Martin will be pressing the President to agree to give a dinner for Shagari, bearing in mind the highly successful impact of Mugabe's White House visit.<sup>5</sup> Anne notes that Gretchen Posten is enthusiastic provided the President gives the go-ahead, and she notes that we will be in the new budget cycle. I told her that I would recommend to you that you support a White House dinner for Shagari and that if you agreed I would include it in your talking points for your September 8 luncheon with the President.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the political benefit which Anne and Louis see, there are important foreign policy reasons for the President to extend such hospitality to Shagari. Shagari sees his first visit to the United States as President, a visit in which he will present Nigeria's 20th Anniversary of Independence address to the UN, as very important. His visit builds on the success of your meetings just concluded in Lagos, and has the potential for a further increase in the constructive development of U.S.-Nigerian relations.);

—And, a recommendation that you advise Ambassador Evron of the results of your conversations in Africa on possible African moves toward the establishment of relations with Israel.<sup>7</sup> I will include talking points on this subject for your meeting with Eppli on Tuesday, September 2.

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<sup>2</sup> The letter, dated September 2, is attached but not printed. Mondale wrote "OK" beside this paragraph in the left margin.

<sup>3</sup> Tab 2 is attached but not printed. Mondale wrote "OK" beside this paragraph in the left margin.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 69.

<sup>5</sup> Mugabe met with Carter on August 27. See Document 258 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI Southern Africa.

<sup>6</sup> Mondale wrote "OK" beside this sentence in the left margin.

<sup>7</sup> Mondale wrote "Done" beside this paragraph in the left margin.



*RECOMMENDATION*

That you sign the letter to Orville Freeman at Tab 1 and the letter to Tom Ehrlich of IDCA at Tab 2.<sup>8</sup>

**Tab A****Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>9</sup>**

Washington, August 26, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Follow-Up On the Vice President's Trip to West Africa

This memorandum lists the initiatives which resulted from the Vice President's visit to West Africa July 16–23. There are four actions which might require direct follow-up by the Vice President. Two of these related to the establishment of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, which was one of the key areas of concentration at the bilateral meetings in Lagos. We recommend that the Vice President consider the following:

1. Sign a letter to Orville Freeman asking him to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee. The Department has already discussed the Committee with Mr. Freeman but nobody has yet asked him to be Chairman. A self-explanatory draft letter which has been cleared by Agriculture Under Secretary Hathaway is attached to this memorandum (Tab 1).

2. Sign a letter to IDCA Director Thomas Ehrlich requesting that IDCA consider funding the initial visit to Nigeria of the members of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (scheduled for late this year or early next year) to identify projects. IDCA was originally very forthcoming on this idea, but has recently shown signs of diminished interest. A draft letter is also attached (Tab 2).

3. Secure a time on the President's schedule for a meeting with President Shagari of Nigeria. In response to the Vice President's invitation, President Shagari will arrive in Washington on the morning of October 7 and depart that same evening for Nigeria. The White House has been unable to provide a time for this meeting because of the

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<sup>8</sup> Mondale signed both letters.

<sup>9</sup> Secret.

uncertainties for the President's schedule so far in advance. Although recognizing that this is an election year, the Nigerians are very sensitive about sufficient advance notification. In 1973 President Nixon kept Head of State Yakubu Gowon waiting for an appointment that never materialized. This non-meeting contributed substantially to a deterioration in relations with Nigeria. Both the Ambassador in Washington and at the UN have indicated that they would very much appreciate early confirmation of an appointment time.

4. Debrief Israeli Ambassador Evron on the results of the visit. The Israelis are very interested in the results of any conversations of the Vice President regarding possible African moves toward the reestablishment of relations with Israel. The Israeli Embassy understood before the visit that the Vice President would urge African leaders to consider these ties.

Following is the list of initiatives from the Vice President's visit with notes on the current status of each.

#### *I. Regional*

Ambassador Hormats agreed to send a letter to ECOWAS regarding US assistance to that organization. The letter has been sent. STR is now following up on a proposed symposium on US–ECOWAS trade and investment, scheduled tentatively for October 28–29.

#### *II. Senegal*

A. Assistance to police the territorial seas off Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania. The President of the Senegalese Economic and Social Council requested assistance in protecting offshore fishing areas. In response to this request the Vice President raised the issue with Goler T. Butcher, AID Assistant Administrator for Africa. AID is pursuing the issue with the preparation of a document for design of a project on the protection of fisheries. Discussion of the issue with Senegalese officials is anticipated in the context of a visit to Senegal September 29 to October 1 by the President's Science Advisor Frank Press.

B. Request for a stepped-up youth exchange program between the U.S. and Senegal. In response to a request from the Minister of Youth and Sports, the Vice President said that we would place the Minister in contact with appropriate American organizations when he visited the U.S. in September 1980. USICA is arranging these contacts at the present time.

#### *III. Niger*

A. C-130 Pilot Training. The Vice President told President Kountche that we would train C-130 pilots and ground crew members under our IMET program in FY 81. The allocation of funds must await Con-

gressional action on FY 81 aid appropriations. Agreement has already been reached within the Department to reprogram funds in FY 81.

B. USAID level increase. The Vice President told President Kountche that we would increase our FY 81 AID program level. After receiving clearance from AID, delegation informed Nigerians that US assistance would increase by \$3 million in FY 81—an amount equivalent to the FY 81 request of Congress. AID is pursuing this.

C. Support for Niger with the IBRD and other international financial institutions. The Vice President pledged that the U.S. would support Niger in its international efforts to offset the revenue shortfall caused by the slump in uranium prices. At about the same time, the IMF approved a \$7.1 million SDR Trust Fund Loan. The State Department will remain in close contact with Treasury on these questions.

D. Talks with Kountche. President Kountche suggested the Vice President speak with the Nigerian President about the situation in Chad and Liberia. Only Liberia was discussed with Foreign Minister Audu during the visit to Lagos. The Department has forwarded a brief summary of this conversation and that of Mr. Moose during his subsequent visit to Monrovia for the Ambassador to use in his discussions with President Kountche.

E. Uranium issues. Since the Vice President's visit, we have been notified that the Libyan Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement entered into force July 8, 1980. As a result the pressure is diminished on Niger to cease its exports to Libya. Uranium shipped to Libya by Niger will now be under safeguards pursuant to the safeguards agreement. To facilitate the flow of information in this area Niger will continue to record its exports in the *Official Journal* and will begin to report directly to the IAEA.

F. Arms sales. President Kountche indicated that the Nigeriens would be interested in purchasing military equipment from the United States. There has been no subsequent discussion of this topic between the Nigeriens and our Embassy.

G. Closer cooperation in the area of intelligence exchange. In response to President Kountche's request for cooperation in this area, the Vice President agreed to send a senior intelligence officer to Niamey to meet with President Kountche. A message about this visit, now scheduled for late September or early October, was sent August 11, [2 lines not declassified].

#### IV. Nigeria

##### A. General

1. Meeting between President Carter and President Shagari. As noted on the first page, preparations are underway for President Shagari's visit to Washington.

2. The US agreed to consider issuance of multiple entry visas for students. We are waiting for a response from the Nigerians regarding reciprocity. The Embassy will follow up.

B. Agriculture.

1. Implementation of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation. Under Secretary Hathaway will chair the U.S. side of the working group set up to implement the agreement. We are waiting for the Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture to identify priority projects. The FGN ministry has promised us this information by September 1. Quentin West or Dale Hathaway will be on the Frank Press trip, and the Working Group will meet at that time to discuss specific project proposals based on these priorities.

2. Establishment of Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee. State is in the process of compiling a list of potential members. We are aiming for the American side to meet with President Shagari during his October visit to Washington, and for the team to travel to Nigeria late this year or early next year.

C. Energy

1. The Department of Energy is developing specific proposals, including estimates of budget requirements, for the implementation of each of the energy cooperation areas mentioned in the Joint Communiqué.<sup>10</sup> These proposals should be ready in about two weeks.

2. The DOE proposals will include programs of information and training involving exchange of scientific and technical information in each area. They will also include in some areas short-term visits by scientific and technical persons from the two countries. They may also include temporary assignments of a few Nigerians at DOE and private facilities for training and observation. The proposals will be discussed with a Nigerian team (yet to be named) when they visit Washington this fall.

3. In solar energy, DOE is working to identify one or more solar demonstration projects which could be jointly funded, in addition to preparing an information and training program directed at the development of a solar research capability in Nigeria. This will also be discussed during the fall visit of the Nigerian experts.

4. In the area of "facilitation of joint ventures and other appropriate vehicles for manufacturing equipment and material to support the oil industry in Nigeria," DOE will be working with the office of the Special Trade Representative to develop proposals for cooperation. State is participating in the preparation of the proposals.

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<sup>10</sup> See footnote 4, Document 65.

#### D. Science and Technology

1. A draft S&T agreement and projects were tabled during the bilaterals. The advance team for Frank Press visited Lagos August 4–5 and discussed both matters with the Nigerians. The Nigerians are reviewing our agreement and we expect a response from them shortly. Specific follow-up actions on priority project areas were also agreed upon. The Department is coordinating these actions within the USG. Several of the more promising proposals that emerged include cooperation in fisheries development, industrial management and maintenance technology, and remote sensing via LANDSAT.

2. In connection with areas of priority concern identified by the Nigerians, the USG sent a team of experts from EPA to Nigeria August 21 to develop specific project proposals for cooperation in environment. A NOAA team arrives in Lagos on August 29 to discuss a fisheries-marine science agreement.

3. AID's regional housing officer in Abidjan will visit Nigeria in September at the time of the Press visit to discuss Nigerian interests in obtaining training assistance for government and mortgage banking personnel.

#### E. Trade and Investment

1. Ambassador Hormats agreed that upon his return to the U.S. he would speak with Export-Import Bank Chairman, John Moore, to determine why Ex-Im had not financed more projects in Nigeria and report back to the Nigerians. Hormats spoke to Moore, who has promised to send him a full report on EXIM activity in Nigeria. When he receives the report (which will show that EXIM is moving very rapidly but the Nigerian bureaucracy is not acting on projects), he will send a copy to the Nigerians.

2. The US side agreed to consider promptly the contents of the proposed "Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation" tabled during the talks and respond to this initiative in September. Most of the substance of this will be included in the agreement to be signed during the Press visit. We are working with the Press staff to make sure this deadline is met.

3. The US side agreed to inquire at the Justice Department when they would provide a clarification of the legal status of negotiations between the American West African Freight Conference and the US. We have provided a tentative response, and will respond further when Justice reaches a final decision which is expected in about three months.

4. Commerce agreed to assist in the establishment of trade and investment centers in the U.S. Commerce is gathering information on existing centers here and abroad to determine representative costs, staffing requirements, methods of operations etc., to send the Embassy for the Nigerians by the end of this month.

5. Assist FGN to identify ways in which Nigeria can take greater advantage of USDOC's services. Commerce has prepared packages of information pamphlets on their services to be given to ministries and other FGN officials. These packages were sent August 15.

6. Assist Nigeria to derive maximum benefit from OPIC. FGN has promised to send OPIC a list of specific projects they are interested in. Once that list is received, OPIC will review it and begin recruiting appropriate companies for an investment mission to Nigeria.

7. Each government agreed to designate a senior official to be in frequent contact on trade and investment problems. The USG has proposed designating Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Gould as our senior official. When approved by the Secretary of Commerce (by the end of August), we will formally notify the FGN and request that they name a counterpart official.

8. The USG and the FGN agreed to conduct joint seminars in major U.S. cities to expose American business people to opportunities in the Nigerian market. Commerce plans to wait until the FGN names its senior official (see above) before organizing seminars.

9. The US and the Nigerians agreed to exchange drafts for a Bilateral Trade Agreement. We received a draft agreement from the Nigerians on August 9, which was a form agreement more suitable for use with a non-GATT country; thus it is not applicable to our purposes. The Trade Policy Committee is drafting a new agreement incorporating some of the language from the Nigerian draft. We expect to cable a draft to Lagos early in the first week of September. The Nigerians have been informed of the reasons for the delay.

10. The US agreed to support legislation for Congressional authorization for GSP eligibility for Nigeria. This must await outcome of negotiation of bilateral trade agreement.

11. The US and the Nigerians agreed to resume negotiations on the Bilateral Tax Treaty. The US proposed March 2 to resume negotiations. The Nigerians have tentatively accepted this date.

12. The Nigerians agreed to notify GATT of their trade restrictions each year. The Office of the Special Trade Representative will monitor this decision.

13. The Nigerians agreed to review their policy regarding issuance of Multiple Entry Visas to businessmen and others. State and Commerce are compiling information to provide the Nigerians with an update on recent experiences of businessmen. The Nigerians agreed then to review their policy. The Embassy will monitor this situation.

14. The Nigerians agreed to explore the possibility of centralizing and simplifying the approvals process for foreign investors. The Embassy will follow up by continuing to encourage such action.

15. The Nigerians agreed to advise the US regarding the status of Corps of Engineers Niger River Project. There has been no contact as yet.

16. Establishment of a Nigeria-US Business Council. The US Chamber of Commerce has been informed. State has discussed next steps with them. Follow up rests with U.S. Chamber, as this is to be a strictly private sector organization.

#### F. Education

1. Both sides agreed to act on the final agreement and signing of the teacher training program. We are waiting for a response from the Nigerians. IDCA is pursuing this.

2. Status report on use of funds from National Universities Commission (NUC) block grant. ICA is looking into this. They will then submit a proposal for integrating NUC program with Fulbright program by early September.

3. Explore linkages in higher education including availability of Title XII assistance for higher education. State and ICA are exploring these possibilities and will advise the Embassy by early September.

4. The US agreed to advise the Nigerians on criteria for issuance of J-I visas for students. The Embassy and ICA are providing information on requirements to the Nigerians.

5. The Nigerians agreed to post education attaches at their Embassy and consulates. The Ministry of Education proposal is being circulated within the Nigerian Government. Our Embassy will be checking on the status.

#### V. Cape Verde

A. Affirmation of commitment to deliver 5000 MT of corn in PL 480 Title II program when adequate storage is available. The PL 480 office has already begun arrangements to ship the corn, scheduled for September when it is anticipated that storage will be available and the corn needed. This process is still underway but no problems are foreseen.

B. Statement that the US is pleased to work with Cape Verde on a possible Title III program (without a commitment). No action will be taken until after the start of FY 81. No further action required at the moment; the Department will follow-up with AID when planning begins on the next budget cycle.

C. John Sawhill of the Department of Energy offered to assist the Director of the Technical Research Institute, should he visit the US again, in obtaining any information on US programs for alternate energy. The Department of Energy agreed in any case to provide whatever documentation the Institute might request, and to "cooperate in other ways." The ball is in the GOCV court on the DOE offer. If nothing

is forthcoming, State might recommend that DOE send a letter confirming our interest in providing this information.

D. Statement that the US was doubling its Portuguese language scholarship program (\$100,000 to \$200,000). This was stated in the context of a discussion about AID training in the US for agricultural/irrigation projects. AID has already doubled the technical training program allocation, for FY 80, as the Vice-President stated. Nominees are to be selected by the GOCV.

E. The Vice President suggested that our Charge inform Defense Minister Da Luz of our offer to provide medical treatment for his daughter. Charge Torre has discussed this with the Defense Minister and the details of his daughter's visit to Washington are being arranged for early September.

**Peter Tarnoff<sup>11</sup>**

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<sup>11</sup> Seitz signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

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## **68. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1980, 11:30 a.m.–noon

### **SUBJECT**

President's Meeting with Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone

### **PARTICIPANTS**

President Jimmy Carter  
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
David Aaron, National Security Council  
Harold Horan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
Theresa Healy, U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone  
Louis Martin, The White House  
Thomas Thornton, National Security Council  
Parker W. Borg, Country Director for West Africa, Department of State

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 114, Sierra Leone 9–10/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.



Siaka Stevens, President  
 Abdulai Conteh, Foreign Minister  
 Mohamed Turay, Ambassador

*Carter:* Welcome to the United States. You shoulder the burden both of President of your country and Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. I understand you made a good speech at the United Nations yesterday. I value your friendship. I want you to know that you honor me by coming to the White House to call on me. I would be interested in hearing your views during this brief meeting of some of the issues which concern the OAU. Congratulations also on your 75th birthday, your diamond birthday, which is particularly appropriate because of the diamonds your country produces. Your vigor reminds me of my mother who is in her 80's and still extremely active. (C)

*Stevens:* It is an honor for us to be here. I know that the strain of electioneering takes a lot of your time, which makes this visit even more greatly appreciated. The first necessary quality for a national leader is stamina because of the amount of energy needed for all of the travel. I come as a friend of the United States and am happy to be here. (C)

*Carter:* I hope that you will also be able to join with me this afternoon for my meeting with the Black Caucus. It would be a great help to me politically if you were present.<sup>2</sup> (C)

*Stevens:* I would be happy to be present.

*Carter:* I understand that the OAU meeting which you hosted in Freetown was remarkably successful.<sup>3</sup> The OAU positions on the Western Sahara, Chad and the Ogaden are complementary to our own. The OAU mediation effort in these disputes plays a helpful role in solving these problems. I am also interested in your efforts to normalize relations with Liberia. As a neighbor, you should be able to explain the situation there better than almost anyone. (C)

*Stevens:* On Chad and the Western Sahara, there was not much progress at the OAU summit. The mandates of the various committees were renewed. We have every hope that these Committees will play a useful role in the future. Sekou Toure has influence with the Moroccans and they have confidence in him. He is quite experienced in dealing with the Moroccans. Likewise, President Eyadema of Togo had been helpful in trying to find a solution to the problem in Chad. (C)

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<sup>2</sup> Stevens attended the White House reception for the members of the Congressional Black Caucus on the afternoon of September 25. For Carter's remarks at the reception, in which he praised Steven's role as Chairman of the OAU, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81*, Book II, pp. 1927-1930.

<sup>3</sup> Sierra Leone hosted the OAU summit July 1-4. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Volume XXVI, 1980, pp. 30557-30559)

*Carter:* What can you tell me about the OAU peacekeeping efforts? (C)

*Stevens:* We are negotiating with the Secretary General on these issues now. It is not an easy problem because of the issue of colonial boundaries cutting across tribal boundaries. I am planning to visit Chad myself. I have every hope for progress. With regard to the Western Sahara, the Moroccans showed up for the first time at an OAU Wisemen's meeting. This was a sign of progress, but they brought with them ten groups. The Wisemen opposed listening to all of the Moroccan sponsored groups, but I prevailed and insisted that they all be heard. The Moroccans said they did not want a referendum, but I hope the Wisemen's Committee members can help. (C)

*Carter:* What about the problems between Liberia and her neighbors? (C)

*Stevens:* In Liberia the colonial boundaries also cut across tribal boundaries. Some of the Liberian tribes are the same as those in Sierra Leone and Guinea. My mother is a Vai, a group which lives on both sides of the border between the two countries. We have a great interest in peace with Liberia. The Mano River Union is important to us.<sup>4</sup> We have found that outside powers pay greater attention to countries which are associated with this sort of union. Later this month, we hope that Sekou Toure will join us. At first I was very skeptical about the new Liberian government, but I believe they are now trying to set things straight. I had told the Tolbert Government to try to get as many people as possible involved in the government in order to create a sense of belonging. He had responded that it was very difficult because of some of the other people in his clique of important supporters. I told him to go into the bush to seek support, but he did not. (C)

Master Sergeant Doe has written to Sekou Toure to invite him to Monrovia in connection with Guinea joining the Mano River Union. I am of course a little prejudiced because of his past, but peace is most important. I recognize that this invitation is part politics on the part of the Liberians but I will try to convince Sekou Toure to participate to promote stability in the region. These meetings are difficult because of the problems of different languages. Shortly after the coup I saw Matthews and told him to watch the soldiers because when soldiers rule problems can develop. They were unable to watch the soldiers and so good people got killed. We are now in the process of normalizing relations. We are trying to prevail on the Liberians to urge the military and civilians to work together. If there is no cooperation, the civilian

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<sup>4</sup> The Mano River Union was an agreement reached in 1973 between Sierra Leone and Liberia to foster economic ties between the two countries.

ministers are powerless. After elections I have told them that they should all continue to try to work together. (C)

*Carter:* Is Doe strong enough to run Liberia? (C)

*Stevens:* If you are asking me to speak diplomatically, that is the business of other people. In Yamasoukro two months ago, we found it hard to understand his English. At the airport Senghor (sic) said that Master Sergeant Doe seemed to be a hostage himself, judging from the soldiers around him. After the coup Doe made foolish promises about quadrupling salaries of military. We realize, however, that we must work with him. Matthews and Fanbullah in the cabinet make things easier. As an example of the recent changes, when one soldier PRC member wanted to see a patient at the JFK Hospital, he beat up the doctors who refused him immediate entrance. That soldier was removed from the PRC and locked up. That is some progress. (C)

*Carter:* Southern Africa is also a serious problem. We are very interested in progress on Namibia. I want you to know we are doing the best we can with you and others to solve this problem. (C)

*Stevens:* That is one of the points I want to thank you and your government on. Your interest in South Africa is welcome. Some people say that the principle of non-intervention should be maintained, but what does this mean? In some cases, non-intervention is a factor which I question. We welcome your policies. As you know nature abhors a vacuum. (C)

*Carter:* Through Ambassadors Turay and Healy we hope to get your continuing advice. Please let us know if something does come up on which we can help. (C)

*Christopher:* I have some new information on southern Africa I would like to share with you. We have heard that there are possible South African-SWAPO talks on the island of Sal scheduled for early October and a proposed visit by a UN team to South Africa on October 20 to explore next steps on Namibia. (C)

*Carter:* We appreciate all of the help you have provided us on the hostages, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, PLO observer status at the IMF/IBRD meetings and the Puerto Rican issue at the United Nations. We value your statesmanship. You have good relations with Britain, West Germany, to a lesser degree with the French, and others. We admire your leadership and care about your prosperity. (C)

*Stevens:* There is a point I would like to make. With regard to the north-south dialogue, we in the third world have serious problems. We hope that you will show a particular interest in this issue. We have problems with our balance of payments. This is one of the main subjects of discussion with the World Bank and the IMF. Whatever the U.S. can do will be highly beneficial. Current economic problems could lead

to the disintegration of some countries. They might reach the point of no return. How can we be expected to balance our books on Wednesday, when because of price changes, like the recent \$2 OPEC oil increase, everything changes on Thursday. The IMF told us two years ago that we had to devalue. But it is very difficult to tell your countrymen that their money is only worth half what it used to be worth. They can't understand and think you are cheating them. A woman once approached me asking for some money. When I told her I had none she would not believe me and insisted that I must have some because after all my picture was on the money. It is very hard to explain devaluation. We are a small country. Modest help can take us a long way. There is much outside states can do to help. The oil producing states say they will help, but they have done nothing. I hope you will look into this matter before it is too late. (C)

*Carter:* I will. Secretary Muskie and Deputy Secretary Christopher have alerted me to the problems of your country. I also recognize the oil problem. Something we would like to see is additional U.S. investment in Sierra Leone. Our interest in Africa has only developed very recently. We are learning and hope that our political and economic influence is beneficial. Our primary interests are in peace and prosperity in Africa. Your leadership is valuable to us. Let me again thank you for your visit. It has been exciting to see you and I look forward to seeing you again later this afternoon. In closing I would like to give you two books: one which I wrote and the other which shows some photographs of the earth taken from satellites. (C)

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## 69. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1980, 11:10 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

### SUBJECT

President Carter's Meeting With Nigerian President Shagari

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 114, Nigeria: Shagari Visit 10/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
 Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary, African Affairs  
 Dr. Frank Press, Special Assistant to the President  
 Louis Martin, Special Assistant to the President  
 Henry Owen, Ambassador-at-Large  
 Ambassador Stephen Low  
 Jerry Funk, National Security Council Staff  
 Parker W. Borg, Director, Office of West African Affairs

President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria  
 Minister of External Affairs Ishaya S. Audu  
 Minister of Transportation Alhaji Umaru Dikko  
 Secretary to the Government Alhaji Shehu Musa  
 Minister of Agriculture Alhaji Ibrahim Gussau  
 Mr. Bukar Shaib, Special Advisor to the President  
 Professor E.C. Edozien, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs  
 Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso  
 Ambassador L.S.M. Osobase, Director of the Africa Department, Ministry of  
 External Affairs

*President Carter:* I want to tell you again, and privately, how delighted I am that you can be with us and that you brought such a distinguished delegation with you. We have read of their distinguished backgrounds. Their presence will add to the depth of understanding on the issues which we discuss. I am also grateful that you were such a generous host to Vice President Mondale and his wife during their recent visit.<sup>2</sup> I'll always remember myself the hospitality of General Obasanjo.<sup>3</sup> The exchanges which began with that visit and have continued for the last few years have been of great benefit to our country. We have seen an exchange in the fields of trade, science and technology, the sale of many products, and especially the exchange of students. All this has been very beneficial. (S)

Dr. Press was very pleased to have signed several agreements on technology.<sup>4</sup> Again, let me say that I am very grateful that you could come and hope that you will share with me your views on issues of common interest, including those of a bilateral, Africa-wide and international nature. Once again, welcome. I am delighted that you can be here. (S)

*President Shagari:* I want to offer my sincere thanks for your kind invitation. It is especially thoughtful for you to see me now because of all of your other business, the election and the campaign. It will be

<sup>2</sup> See Document 65.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 33.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 10356 from Lagos, September 23, the Embassy reported on Press's visit and transmitted a September 22 joint communiqué issued by the Governments of Nigeria and the United States. "The two sides signed an agreement for scientific and technological cooperation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800454-0763) For Press's report on his trip to Africa, see Document 19.

definitely a privilege to share part of your time. I am happy that you have invited me and members of my staff for these talks to discuss matters of mutual interest between our two countries. We appreciated very much the visit of your Vice President and others. We had fruitful discussions with them. As in your case, I have four years to accomplish many tasks. One year of that term has already passed. In the next three we will want results. As I told Vice President Mondale, Nigeria cannot afford a lot of bureaucracy and red tape. We do not want talk but action. We want to produce results. We are happy that you have responded positively to our science interest by sending Frank Press, and by making arrangements for the various committees to discuss the various issues between our two countries. I want to thank you for what you have done. Our officials are here and in other places today to meet with you and others to finalize many things. We really want to get moving. We know how busy you are. Our officials should work together and get results. (S)

I know that we have recently formed a joint agricultural committee. I have with me Professor Edozien who will be our chairman; also my Minister of Agriculture and my special advisor who will meet with some of the eminent agriculturists here in the U.S. Our number one priority is agriculture. Nigeria has a lot of potential. Before we exported a lot of food; now we import it. We have every potential to export again. We know how much the U.S. can contribute. The President himself is a farmer and knows what we are talking about. (S)

We recognize that agricultural development is a long-term activity and one cannot expect quick results. During my talks with American businessmen in Nigeria and New York all have talked of the trade imbalance between Nigeria and the U.S. As far as I am concerned the way to reduce this imbalance is for Americans to invest in Nigeria in a big way. This will provide much scope for more imports, especially industrial. For our development programs we need increasingly to import machinery, particularly agricultural machinery. We are presently preparing a four-year development plan which we have been working on since January. We have had to import a lot of machinery in the past and hope that your cooperation in the future will be forthcoming. (S)

American businessmen also complain about the lack of markets in Africa. Not many know about our potential. We are 80 million people and with ECOWAS, we see a possibility of expanding this market to the rest of West Africa with a total market of 150 million people. This is a market which we would like to show your businessmen. (S)

Another interest is our desire for technology transfer. We need assistance in this regard. We are really going for improved technology in a big way. We are trying to open technical universities and technical

schools. We believe that this technical experience will be required for running both our old and new industries. (S)

On the question of education, we owe a great deal to the U.S. Most people who hold high positions in my government were trained in the U.S. We still need teachers from the U.S. These, Mr. President, are some of the points which have been discussed before with the Vice President and Mr. Press. (S)

Other questions of importance in Africa are: Chad—we are very worried about the situation there; Western Sahara—Nigeria is a member of the OAU “Wisemen”; Namibia—which I discussed with Secretary-General Waldheim; South Africa—which concerns us very much; and the Horn of Africa—Nigeria is chairman of the committee set up by the OAU for reconciliation between Ethiopia and Somalia. We held a meeting in Lagos to try to bring together the two countries. There were, of course, certain difficulties. I would be pleased to discuss these and other issues. (S)

Outside Africa, Nigeria is concerned about the Middle East, and the war between Iran and Iraq. We are among those who share your concern about the unfortunate situation in Afghanistan. We are very concerned about the hostages in Iran and have made appeals to the Ayatollah. All these things, Mr. President, are matters that concern us. I will be quite happy to do whatever small part I can to contribute toward world peace. (S)

*President Carter:* Thank you very much. It is important to have heard your explanation of the bilateral issues. I am especially interested in the exchange between colleges because I believe our land grant universities have much to offer. The soils in many parts of the U.S. are similar to those in Nigeria. If you should have any needs for fertilizers, transportation, methods to harvest crops or means to control insects or rodents, I hope you will make a request. We will try to be resourceful and send experts to Nigeria, or bring people here. We also can be helpful with the problem of transportation, particularly with regard to the transportation of seed. (S)

We are anxious to help on rice. There are certain segments in the American economy who are upset about the difficulties of exporting rice to Nigeria. I would like to see a change in your sales policy authorized by you. Our farmers would like to see this very much. We also have an eager business community which follows this issue. Following my visit I know that you have modified your laws in part to the benefit of both countries. (S)

We are pleased by the number of Nigerian students studying in the U.S., especially in vocational and technical schools. Dr. Press would like a list of your needs in this area and we will try to accommodate



you. We have a high trade deficit with Nigeria, primarily because of your oil exports. (S)

We will consult closely with you on the question of Namibia. As you know, the US is one of the five members of the contact group. You may know also that the Secretary-General is going to southern Africa to explore next steps on October 20. (S)

*President Shagari:* Yes, he told me.

*President Carter:* My opinion is that South Africa has delayed settling the Namibia question month after month. I must not build up expectations too much because in the past when we thought we were close to a settlement, the South Africans have always created problems. I should admit though also that there have been some problems on the other side as well. (S)

I share your view on the war between Iran and Iraq. I hope that you will join with others in seeking a peaceful solution to this problem. Twelve million barrels of oil per day flow through the Persian Gulf. A few countries which are dependent upon supplies from Iran and Iraq are now deprived of this fuel. I would hope that during this interim period you could increase Nigerian production and sell to some of them. The spot market is a very difficult and expensive place to purchase fuel. (S)

We will follow up on the science and technology exchange. Your specialists know better your needs than we do. If these specialists need to come here, we would be happy to receive them. (S)

I appreciate your efforts to get the hostages in Iran released. Iran has become very isolated in the world community as a result of the hostage issue. We want to see the hostages released, but we would also like to see Iran at peace with its neighbors. This is not possible as long as Iran is guilty of holding hostages. Your assistance is very beneficial. (S)

As you know, we follow closely what the OAU does on Chad and the Western Sahara. Please, if you have further ideas on this subject, let me know either through Ambassador Low in Lagos or Ambassador Jolaoso here. We believe that the problems of Africa can best be solved by Africans. We are strongly opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Africa. We would like to see the Cuban troops leave Angola after the problem of Namibia is resolved. The Angolans know our views on this and our desire for normal relations. We appreciate personal consultations. I would be happy if you would send me letters with your thoughts on these issues and I would like also the privilege to write to you from time to time. (S)

*President Shagari:* Some areas are very difficult, but we know the influence you can exert on African issues; for example, in Chad. I have



encouraged the people who supply arms to stop these activities. They seem to supply arms to both sides. The French in particular do this sort of thing. Also Egypt does it, perhaps claiming that this is necessary to control the Libyan influence. (S)

*President Carter:* Do you believe that Libya is also guilty of providing arms to all sides? (S)

*President Shagari:* Yes, they are guilty also. (S)

*President Carter:* What are your relations with Libya? (S)

*President Shagari:* They are normal for relations between African states. (Laughter from Nigerian side). (S)

*Secretary Muskie:* Normal in the sense that you have normal relations with all of the African states. (S)

*President Carter:* Qadhafi is a fellow Muslim, isn't he? (U)

*President Shagari:* Yes.

*President Carter:* Any calming influence which you might have on Qadhafi would be very much appreciated. (S)

*President Shagari:* He is somewhat crazy. You know how difficult he can be. We will do our best to talk to them. They support one side one day and another the next. In the case of the Western Sahara, we have managed to get all sides together to talk. We were able to get the Moroccans to attend the most recent session. I believe that this Moroccan willingness was due largely to the pressure which Nigeria applied. The Moroccans have just recently refused to accept our solution from that conference that is a referendum, one which seemed very reasonable to us. The OAU has accepted our solution and the Polisario has accepted it as well. With great difficulty we got the Polisario to agree on a cease-fire and a referendum. (S)

The Moroccans have refused the referendum part and parcel. They state that the traditional way of conducting a referendum has already been exercised; that is, the tribal chiefs have already paid homage to the King which they interpret to mean the people have accepted the Moroccan solution. We tried to show that this sort of traditional self-determination is no longer acceptable. There should be a free and fair referendum. Our fear is that they will refuse and that more and more African states will recognize the Polisario. In that case the Polisario will definitely be encouraged to continue fighting. If Morocco goes on fighting that will be too bad for them. They must agree to a referendum supervised by the OAU and the UN. Everybody will accept that outcome. We as friends and the US also must exert pressure upon the Moroccans to make them see reason and stop war. (S)

Much the same is true in the Horn of Africa. There the OAU passed a resolution which said that the Ogaden is a part of Ethiopia. This is based on the OAU charter which says that all colonial boundaries must

be accepted. Unless this principle is accepted all Africa will be at war with each other. The colonial boundaries must be observed. Somalia must realize this. This problem has brought in powers outside Africa. That is one of our problems—foreign troops—they come in when African countries fail to solve problems. Issues should be resolved between neighboring countries themselves. We think the Somalis should accept the resolutions of the OAU instead of fighting. We know these questions are not of your direct concern. We members of the OAU are trying to bring peace and independence to the region. We hope you can help and greatly appreciate your efforts toward peace. (S)

*President Carter:* We take the same position on the Ogaden. We have limited influence on Siad. We asked him to take his troops out of the Ogaden and he has reduced them substantially. We want to stabilize the situation. We are monitoring the situation closely and agree that the situation is a threat to peace. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski (to Assistant Secretary Moose):* Dick, have we endorsed the OAU decision on the Western Sahara? (U)

*Mr. Moose:* We have not specifically endorsed a referendum or taken a formal position on the OAU recommendation. We have said that we do not consider an act of self-determination to have taken place. (S)

*President Carter:* Yes, that is right. We have taken no position on the OAU recommendations. I would like to go back to another issue. How difficult would it be for you to increase your rice purchases given your needs for rice imports?<sup>5</sup> (S)

*President Shagari:* We cannot lift the restrictions on foreign rice purchases. We must look at this in the context of our own production. Whatever we cannot produce we purchase abroad. (S)

*President Carter:* Let me pursue this another way. We would like to know what you can do over the longer term to purchase U.S. rice if you have a need? (S)

*Bukar Shaib:* American rice is not competitive in price. Our businessmen have been going to Thailand to purchase rice. (S)

*Henry Owen:* What we are interested in is open and general licensing. We want to compete openly with other exporters. (S)

*President Carter:* We will meet the rice producing competition on quality and price. (S)

*President Shagari:* We cannot afford to lift the import restrictions. The place would be flooded to the detriment of our farmers. We cannot

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 70.

allow an open policy. We have restrictions also on the Thai rice imports. (S)

*Bukar Shaib:* Let me try to explain. If a license is given to a businessman he can go where he wants to purchase the rice. For example, if he has a license to purchase 50,000 tons he may find that the Thai rice is most competitive. (S)

*President Carter* (to the U.S. side): Will you get me an accurate analysis so that I can explain this issue to the American farmers because they believe that Nigeria has important specific restrictions against American rice. This seems to be the only problem between our two countries. Do you have any other problems you would like to raise before lunch? (S)

*Mr. Moose:* There will be a meeting between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Nigerians this afternoon. We will report back to you before dinner. (U)

*President Carter:* Then I will see you at the banquet this evening. I look forward to seeing you again. Mr. President, I would like to present you a couple of books. One which I wrote myself and the other with some photos of the earth taken from satellites. These are typical satellite photos which, if you are interested, we could help you obtain. (U)

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## 70. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1980

[Omitted here are items unrelated to West Africa.]

3. *Shagari Meetings*—As follow-up to the question you raised during your meeting with President Shagari, the Nigerians have agreed to explore ways to substantially increase their purchases of American rice.<sup>2</sup> One possibility, which they are agreeable to, is to enter into an agreement to purchase a specific quantity of rice, provided that the price is competitive and the seller helps Nigeria in its efforts to increase domestic rice production. Shagari also asked Fritz Mondale whether the price of U.S. rice might be lowered. We will follow up on this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State) 10/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 69.

issue in discussions with the Nigerians during our October 24–28 trade agreement negotiations.<sup>3</sup>

Meeting with the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, Shagari and his senior advisors were very forthcoming on their interest in U.S. agribusiness investment and outlined several changes in their regulations, which have either already been implemented or are in the works, to encourage foreign investment in the agricultural sector. At a follow-up meeting, the members of the Committee seemed to agree that the opportunities were great, but so were the problems. Success depends on Shagari's continued strong commitment. (LOU)

[Omitted here are items unrelated to West Africa.]

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 296721 to Lagos, November 6, the Department reported on the U.S.-Nigeria trade negotiations that were eventually held November 3–4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800532–0254)

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## 71. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

NI IIM 80–10019

Washington, December 1980

### Postcoup Prospects in Liberia

#### KEY JUDGMENTS

The United States enjoys valuable access rights and facilities in Liberia which probably cannot be duplicated elsewhere on the continent. In the eyes of the world, Liberia is inextricably linked to the United States, and its failures will be interpreted as American failures. As a result, the symbolic importance of Liberia to US interest may even transcend material considerations. If Liberia is disappointed with US assistance, it will turn elsewhere. This could allow nations unfriendly toward the United States to make significant inroads.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note at the end of the Key Judgments section reads: "This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the working level." Research for the memorandum was completed December 22.

The coup last April left Liberia with a fragile political system and profound weaknesses in its institutions, leadership, and social structure.<sup>2</sup> Realization of these conditions, and fear that the most likely alternative to the Doe regime is unpredictable chaos, is probably the major cement holding the system together today. The regime depends on the support of the military, and therefore must satisfy the personal and professional demands of the ethnically disparate rank and file. Continued relative stability in Liberia depends on solving the near-term fiscal crisis to permit continued importation of petroleum products and foodstuffs. In the longer term, basic economic stability will depend on a return of foreign investor confidence. Foreign assistance will be crucial both in the short and in the long run.

Despite the grudging acceptance of the new regime by other African governments, Liberian leaders remain frightened of subversion supported from the outside. Efforts by Communist and radical African regimes to exploit the situation have so far generally been unsuccessful because of the Liberian Government's continued attachment to America and its suspicion of Communist motivation.

Civilian rule will not return to Liberia until the economic situation improves to a point where civilians and military alike can count on some benefits from the system. This in turn depends upon the ability of a fragile administration to sustain progress and to resolve day-to-day crises in the fiscal and public security areas. Liberia is bound to the United States and its progress, or lack of it, will depend upon cooperation with the United States or replacement of the United States with some other outside benefactor.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 55 and 56.

## Central Africa

### 72. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kinshasa, March 7, 1977, 1000Z

1914. Subj: Deputy Assistant Secretary Seelye Call on President Mobutu.

1. Summary: During breakfast meeting with Pres Mobutu, Mar 5, Seelye discussed range of bilateral issues including economic and security assistance, human rights, and PanAm contract. Seelye also reviewed current US efforts in Southern Africa and delivered message of appreciation from Pres Carter for Mobutu's intervention with Amin.<sup>2</sup> Mobutu asked that Seelye carry back two messages to new US administration: Mobutu was determined to implement tough measures to stabilize Zaire's economy and, in doing so, will need continued US help; he remains ready to advise and support us in dealing with African problems. End summary.

2. Seelye and I flew to Mbandaka today, Mar 5, to meet with Pres Mobutu for a breakfast session on board his river boat. Meeting lasted one and one quarter hours. Acting FonMin Lombo was also present. Mobutu was in good form and seemed relaxed.

3. In seating us at the breakfast table on deck, Mobutu jokingly said he would keep us away from the hot sun in order to "protect human rights". He then started off the conversation by asking Seelye what good news he had brought from Washington.

4. Seelye expressed appreciation for being received by the President, particularly at time when President was busy with consultations with members of his Political Bureau. He reviewed his trip in Africa thus far, observing that USG is watching developments in the Horn of Africa closely in view of Ethiopian-Somalian rivalries in anticipation of Djibouti's independence. Seelye said his next stop would be Cameroon, a country with which the US enjoys excellent relations.

5. Seelye said he considered his visit to Zaire the high point of his trip and remarked that it would be stating the obvious to reiterate the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077-0796. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Brussels, Cape Town, Lagos, Lusaka, Paris, and Pretoria.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 47709 to Kinshasa, March 3, the Department transmitted a message from Carter thanking Mobutu for assistance to U.S. citizens in Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-0264)

particular importance the US attaches to its relations with Zaire. In this connection, if the President were interested, he would propose to discuss various aspects of our relationship. The President nodded support. Seelye started by delivering to Mobutu Pres Carter's message of appreciation for Mobutu's intervention with Idi Amin in our behalf. Mobutu read the message carefully and expressed his appreciation.

6. Seelye said that the new administration in Washington intends to continue its assistance programs to Zaire and noted that we had just submitted to Congress proposals for economic assistance to Zaire for fiscal year 1978. Referring to useful meetings held the day before with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Minister of Finance,<sup>3</sup> he said he was impressed with the program the Zairian Govt has proposed to further stabilize its economy. This program, he observed, is an essential precondition to eliciting substantial international economic and financial assistance to Zaire in the years ahead.

7. Mobutu broke in at this point to ask that Seelye convey to Pres Carter and Secty Vance the following message: Zaire still has serious economic problems and Mobutu is determined to take all necessary steps, however tough they may be, to implement new stabilization measures and thereby effect the country's economic recovery. In doing so, Zaire will need all the help it can get and must therefore look to the US for continued assistance.

8. With regard to military assistance, Seelye noted that I had already informed the President of the administration's intention to provide Zaire with \$30 million in credits for fiscal year 1978, an undertaking which had been submitted for congressional approval.<sup>4</sup> Seelye remarked that Congress' increasing role in foreign policy requires much closer consultation between the executive and legislative branches on foreign policy matters, and it will therefore be necessary to work more closely than ever with Congress in underlining the importance of our continuing our military assistance program to Zaire. He said that, as part of this effort, I had been asked to return to Washington in a couple of days for consultations. Mobutu stressed the continuing need for military aid, referring to the hundreds of tanks in neighboring Angola and in Congo as well. Seelye noted that, as the President was aware, we had included some tanks in our assistance package for this fiscal year.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1922 from Kinshasa, March 7, the Embassy reported on Seelye's March 4 meeting with Zaire's Acting Foreign Minister, the Governor of the Central Bank, and the Minister of Finance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077-0874)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 41170 to multiple posts, February 24, the Department transmitted the proposed FMS funding levels for individual countries for FY 1978, including \$30 million for Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770063-0639)

9. With regard to military assistance, I recalled that Secretary Kissinger had promised to encourage our European allies to explore ways of providing more help to Zaire and that subsequently, last January, US defense experts had held consultations with the Belgians<sup>5</sup> and the French.<sup>6</sup> I said that these discussions had proved very useful in the sense of promoting better coordination of our respective efforts and that we were generally encouraged by the attitudes of our European allies. Mobutu said that during his recent visit to Brussels the Belgian Defense Minister had mentioned these consultations to him. Mobutu added that he was concerned by political developments in Belgium and the possibility the current government might be changed.

10. On the political level, Seelye continued, Washington continues to have high regard for President Mobutu and Ambassador Young's meeting with the President in Lagos was an excellent first step in establishing close contacts between the new administration and the GOZ.<sup>7</sup> Seelye said that Ambassador Young had much appreciated the opportunity of meeting with Mobutu. Not only does the US esteem the role that President Mobutu can play in our bilateral relationship, but we value the moderate and constructive role that he has played and can continue to play in Africa.

11. Seelye said there were two other matters involving our bilateral relations that he wanted to mention. First, he said that the new administration attaches a great deal of importance to human rights considerations in its relations with countries around the world. Accordingly, programs of bilateral assistance would depend to a certain extent on how recipient governments protect human rights. I interjected to say that Congress also is deeply interested in this issue and has asked the administration to submit to it public reports on the status of human rights in many individual countries, including Zaire, where we of course have important assistance programs. Seelye went on to say that President Mobutu should be fully aware of this factor in our foreign policy, although he did not think that this should pose a problem in our relations with Zaire.

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 167 from Brussels, January 7, the Embassy reported on exploratory talks with the Belgians on military assistance to Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770007–0570)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 845 from Paris, January 11, the Embassy reported on consultations with the French on military assistance to Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770010–0515)

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 1462 from Lagos, February 8, the Embassy reported on Young's conversation with Mobutu, during which they focused their discussion on the situation in Rhodesia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770075–0679) For Young's report on his mission to Africa, see Document 2.



12. Addressing the issue of human rights, Mobutu expressed confidence in Zaire's situation. He said the Zairian people were attached to their leader because they knew he was doing his best to lead and develop the country and to improve their lot. So long as there was this attachment by the people there should be no problem regarding human rights.

13. As his final point in discussing our bilateral relationship, Seelye alluded to the news which had come out during his stay in Kinshasa regarding the Zairian Government's decision to discontinue its contract with PanAm to manage and operate Air Zaire. He said he was "surprised" at this decision since it seemed to be in our mutual interest to expand all possible areas of American-Zairian relations.

14. Mobutu responded with lengthy explanation of why he found it impossible to renew the PanAm contract, making essentially same points he had previously made to me: i.e., after six years PanAm's efforts had accomplished next to nothing; contract was tilted in favor of PanAm's interests vis-a-vis those of Air Zaire; contract was too expensive in light of Zaire's budgetary and [garble—fiscal?] crunch, with too much evidence of high-living by expatriate employees; those foreigners still needed should be hired individually by Air Zaire, but not under contract with another airline. Mobutu said he had nothing against the USG; but he had concluded it was in Zaire's sovereign interest to terminate the contract with PanAm. Seelye acknowledged that it was of course a decision for Zaire to make. I said I understood PanAm would start immediately to remove its personnel and in doing so would make every effort to minimize any possible damage or disruption to Air Zaire's operations. Mobutu indicated he appreciated PanAm's intention to terminate its services "correctly".

15. Turning to area issues, Seelye brought the President up to date concerning our approach to resolution of the Southern African problems. Inter alia, he made the following points:

(A) The new administration has publicly indicated its determination that the US continue to play an active role in facilitating negotiated settlements;

(B) The British "formula" for assuming an active role in the transition government still seems to provide a basis for bringing the parties together;

(C) Secretary Vance last month issued an unequivocal statement signaling the Ian Smith government that the US under no circumstances would come to Rhodesia's assistance if Rhodesia did not cooperate in efforts to move rapidly to independence and majority rule;<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is presumably to Vance's February 10 statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1977, pp. 170-172.

(D) This administration has also announced its intention to marshal its resources in an effort to repeal the Byrd amendment;<sup>9</sup>

(E) Consultations with the British last week were designed to regenerate the negotiating momentum and our approach to the problem is still based on the assumption that the alternative of protracted bloody warfare is totally unacceptable.<sup>10</sup>

16. With regard to Namibia, Seelye said that there has been no movement in the last few months but the US continues to believe South Africa is prepared to make some basic concessions which, if met by some flexibility on the part of SWAPO, could produce results. Seelye stressed that the fact we are working with South Africa in resolving problems of Rhodesia and Namibia should in no way be misinterpreted as US support for apartheid. On the contrary, our policy continues to be based on strong opposition to apartheid and the new administration has already expressed strong views in this regard. At the same time, US policy is based on the premise that top priority should be given to resolving the pressing issues of Rhodesia and Namibia.

17. Mobutu interjected that he fully agreed with this set of priorities and noted basic differences between problems of Rhodesia and South Africa. The whites in Rhodesia were clearly a colonialist minority and there is no question that the country should move quickly to rule by the black majority. In South Africa, on the other hand, the whites had just as much of a claim to staying there as the blacks. The institution of apartheid was the problem, and efforts should therefore be directed toward changing it. On Rhodesia, Mobutu noted that Zaire opposed exclusion of any of major Zimbabwe nationalist groups and had been instrumental in convincing the OAU not to endorse solely the Patriotic Front.

18. On Angola, Seelye recalled that Secretary Vance announced some weeks ago that the US is prepared to consider normalizing relations with that country, but, frankly, we do not expect this to be an easy process. We are approaching this matter with great care. In response to Seelye's query as to Mobutu's views on the internal situation in Angola, Mobutu said it is evident the MPLA regime is split essentially between those favoring the Soviets and Cubans and those opposing them. In any case, the Angolans themselves are not in control of their own affairs. He thought Lara is the man to watch as being potentially one of the most influential members of the regime.

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<sup>9</sup> The Byrd amendment to the Military Procurement Act (1971), allowed the importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions.

<sup>10</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 138.

19. I raised the question of Zaire's relations with Angola, noting that Luanda seems finally to have acknowledged Zaire's formal recognition of the PRA. Mobutu attributed this acknowledgement to his own rebuttal of Luanda's charges that forces from Zaire had attacked across the border, noting also that in his rebuttal he had called Neto's bluff by endorsing Neto's appeal for an OAU investigation. Mobutu expressed doubt, however, that Angola's acknowledgement of Zaire's recognition meant that Angola would soon be willing to move seriously toward improving relations.

20. Mobutu said that during his recent visit to Nigeria President Obasanjo had offered to help in normalizing Zairian-Angolan relations by talking to Neto. Mobutu had agreed and the Nigerians did in fact elicit assurances that the PRA wished to improve relations. However, Obasanjo had not been aware of all the charges Neto was at the same time making publicly against Zaire, and Nigeria's efforts had not accomplished much. Seelye said he was interested in the President's allusion to better relations between Zaire and Nigeria and wondered if it would be correct to say that these relations are now good. Mobutu replied in the affirmative.

21. Mobutu closed the conversation by asking Seelye to convey another message to President Carter: while Zaire may not be the predominant leader in Africa, it has the capability of exerting strong influence and—just as he helped the previous administration to avoid or resolve certain problems in its relations with Africa—so Mobutu remains ready to continue to advise and support the USG as it pursues its African policies. Seelye thanked the President and said he would convey this assurance of continued cooperation to the new administration.

2. Comment: Mobutu was obviously pleased to have this chance to talk to Seelye, the second high-ranking official to come out from Washington since the new administration took office. Without resorting to the hard sell, Mobutu nevertheless made his message clear: he needs and wants our continued economic and military assistance, and is at the same time ready to continue cooperating with us on a spectrum of issues where US interests are involved. Certainly such is the case in Southern Africa, where—although his capacity to influence events is clearly limited—Mobutu's views and objectives remain generally in line with ours and where he is willing to work at least privately with other Africans in support of moderate solutions.

**Cutler**

**73. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 10, 1977

1. *Invasion of Zaire:*—We are still unable to determine with certainty the intentions of the forces that entered Zaire from Angola the day before yesterday.<sup>2</sup> The invaders hold a number of towns in the Shaba (Katangan) region along the Angolan border in a triangle approximately 100 miles long and 40 miles deep. They also apparently hold 7 American missionaries. At this point we tend to the view that this is a limited incursion in retaliation for alleged Zairian support of Angolan insurgents. It is possible, however, that Angola President Neto wants to promote secession in the Shaba which could well lead to Zairian President Mobutu's overthrow. Zaire's military forces are of poor quality and most of them are located far from the threatened area. In addition, a severe fuel shortage, particularly in the Shaba, has put a halt to any sustained military reaction by the Zairians.<sup>3</sup>

Mobutu is currently trying some quiet diplomacy with the Soviets, Cubans and selected African countries (such as Nigeria and Tanzania), rather than engaging at this stage in a public confrontation with Moscow and Havana. He has also transmitted an oral request to you for military aid which would probably involve our helping to supply munitions and parachutes as well as spare parts for his C-130s, and overhaul of his jet trainers.<sup>4</sup>

We are in the process of trying to identify Zaire's priority military needs and I will of course consult you in advance of any proposal to increase our supply of military equipment to Zaire as a result of this invasion. We still have \$10 million in unspent but obligated funds that were scheduled to help Mobutu build a mobile deterrent force in the Shaba to counter precisely the present sort of incursion.

If the Angola advance persists, we will then approach certain African states and the Soviets to encourage OAU investigation and media-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Evening Reports (State) 3/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1992 from Kinshasa, March 8, the Embassy reported news of an Angolan attack on the Shaba Province of Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770082-0151)

<sup>3</sup> Carter initialed "C" in the left margin.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2075 from Kinshasa, March 10, the Embassy reported Mobutu's oral request for military equipment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770082-0668)

tion, as well as use their good offices to secure the release of American missionaries. We are also in contact with our European allies.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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**74. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Zaire—Cautionary Thoughts

We have no very good idea of who is doing what to whom and why in Zaire. We *may* be facing a major Cuban-Soviet-inspired test of wills designed to overthrow Mobutu and discredit us. More likely, Neto is stoking the Katangan insurgency to discourage further Zairean support to Angolan insurgents and is playing by ear to see if even this small push might cause Mobutu's downfall.

I cannot see that it is in our interest to prop Mobutu up beyond routine military re-supply if he is confronting a prolonged Katangan insurgency with limited outside support. If he cannot handle it himself, he probably is not worth saving.

If there is a large Angolan/Cuban involvement, we are in for a difficult time and will have to rethink much of our African policy. It seems unlikely, though, that Angola would get heavily involved, given their own insurgency problems. They know that we (not to mention the South Africans) could turn that pressure up considerably.

Even if there turns out to be a modest Cuban involvement, we are dealing here with an African problem that should be handled through African channels—the OAU if possible. Our principal interest is to see that the Soviets—and we—play as minor a role as possible. Most Africans share this perspective.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1-12/77. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right corner with a "C."

We have a long-term interest in the stability of Zaire and perhaps a short-term interest in supporting Mobutu. Our credibility is not at stake, however. We bear no responsibility for whatever trouble Mobutu has gotten himself into. Short of major Cuban/Soviet involvement, there is no issue of principle involved for us.

Our policy approach should therefore be along these lines:

—Actions and statements should be very low key, playing down the idea of Soviet/Cuban involvement unless it becomes clear that they are deeply involved *and* present a serious threat.<sup>2</sup>

—In talking to the Soviets and Cubans we should not throw down any gauntlets. We are on spongy ground with Mobutu and may not have the capability to win an all-out shoving match.<sup>3</sup>

—We should encourage African mediation, recognizing that such an effort may not come out wholly to the liking of Mobutu. That is his problem, not ours.

—We should get these points across to Mobutu and support at the present level of threat should be limited to modest resupply.

The actions we have taken thus far seem to be moving in the right direction. They should be strengthened, however, with a more explicit rationale, and monitored closely to ensure that they do not gain an independent momentum.

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote “agree” in the right margin next to this point.

<sup>3</sup> Carter placed a checkmark next to this and the remaining three points.

**75. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

Military Aid to Zaire

The issue is whether and how we respond to President Mobutu's request for ammunition for U.S. weapons previously supplied Zaire.<sup>2</sup> It is estimated that some of the Zairian forces could run out of ammunition if supplies are not in the pipeline in the next few days.

We wish to give President Mobutu a chance to mount a credible defense as the pursuit of a diplomatic solution centered around the OAU goes forward. We must decide how far we wish to go to assist him militarily at this time.

A refusal by the U.S. to provide ammunition would obviously hurt Mobutu's hope for survival and encourage the invaders to step up the pressure. We could mitigate these adverse effects by providing Zaire with the means to purchase the ammunition. Assuming that we would supply the ammunition directly, Ambassador Cutler has recommended that we respond only at this time to the request for 2 million rounds of M-16 ammunition.

Zaire has asked us for ammunition for M-16 rifles, 4.2 inch mortars, 50 caliber machine guns and LAWs with a total estimated value of \$1.5 million. Zaire also has U.S. 75 mm recoilless rifles and 60 mm and 81 mm mortars. Ammunition for all these weapons is produced and can be purchased in Europe. There are no legal impediments to prevent us from authorizing Zaire to draw down on the \$28 million in approved FY 1977 FMS funds for military POL imports. In an average month, Zaire spends about \$12 million on POL imports.

To arrange this: the oil company from which Zaire purchases its POL or the aircraft manufacturer sends its bill to the Government of Zaire, which then sends the bill to the Defense Department with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Box 78, To/From President: 3-4/77. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2184 from Kinshasa, March 12, the Embassy transmitted Zaire's final request for military assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770085-0351) In telegram 2320 from Kinshasa, March 15, the Embassy provided justification for Mobutu's request for ammunition for U.S.-made weapons previously supplied by the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770089-0387)

normal certificate testifying to the fact that the goods were received and that the Zairian Government wishes to use its credit for this purpose.

If you approve, we would approach the Belgian Government to be sure it has no objection to the purchase of the ammunition, and will facilitate the delivery. There are other countries where the ammunition could also be purchased.

This indirect route of providing Mobutu with ammunition would obviously be more acceptable to Congress than supplying it directly from the U.S. There is no legal impediment to allowing Mobutu to use FMS funds from FY 76 Transitional Quarter and from FY 1977 for the purchase of ammunition in the U.S.

I advise that at this time we arrange to provide Mobutu with the 2 million rounds of M-16 ammunition recommended by Ambassador Cutler, by the indirect route of using Transitional Quarter FMS funds for POL. If you agree, we will promptly start our consultations with the Congress.

*Recommendation:*

1. That you agree to fund 2 million rounds of M-16 ammunition at an estimated cost of \$225,000, by the indirect route of using Transitional Quarter FMS funds for POL.<sup>3</sup>

*OR, ALTERNATIVELY*

2. That you approve the use of Transitional Quarter and FY 1977 FMS credits to provide ammunition to Zaire from U.S. suppliers directly.

3. With respect to further ammunition transfers, we should defer a decision for further consideration.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option.

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option and circled the word "defer."



## 76. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 15, 1977

1. *Zaire*—The military situation in western Shaba appears to be deteriorating. Latest reports indicate that hostile forces are moving east towards the last Zairian military position before Kolwezi.<sup>2</sup> The Belgians have begun air shipments of small arms and munitions (22 tons).<sup>3</sup>

As we expected, international and African reaction is very cautious, with most feeling that the affair is internal. President Nyerere has sent us a strong exposition of his viewpoint combined with an urgent request that we provide no “new or specific US involvement.”<sup>4</sup>

I raised the question of the invasion into Zaire from Angola with Dobrynin this afternoon. He told me that the Soviets had been in touch with Neto who claimed that there were no Cubans or Angolan forces in Zaire. Neto further said to the Soviets that he would not put Angolan or Cuban troops in Zaire. I told Dobrynin that we were very concerned with this incursion and that I expected that they would continue to caution restraint. I informed Dobrynin that we had already sent limited supplies and gave him the nature of the supplies.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 3/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2283 from Kinshasa, March 15, the Embassy transmitted the latest situation report on the position of hostile forces in Shaba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770148–1220)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2490 from Brussels, March 15, the Embassy reported that the Belgians had sent two C–130s loaded with 22 metric tons of guns, ammunition, and grenades. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770088–1099)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1082 from Dar es Salaam, March 15, the Embassy reported on Nyerere’s views on the situation in Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770088–0874)

<sup>5</sup> Carter underscored “limited supplies” and initialed “C” in the left margin. See Document 75.

**77. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kinshasa, March 25, 1977, 1615Z

2742. Subject: Shaba Invasion: Consultations With Mobutu, March 25. Ref: (A) Kinshasa 2670<sup>2</sup> (B) State 65136<sup>3</sup> (C) State 64366<sup>4</sup> (D) State 65371<sup>5</sup> (E) Kinshasa 2683.<sup>6</sup>

Summary: During March 25 meeting I briefed Mobutu on the status of our consultations with Nigerians on mediation, our undertaking direct contacts with Cubans, and discussed both the political and military dimensions of the Shaba problem. I stressed the importance of Zaire's continued cooperation in seeking a political solution and need to avoid actions which might impede achievement of that goal. Mobutu indicated his agreement on most points and understanding of reasons why we placed priority on political settlement. He reiterated his concern, however, re our reluctance to extend more military aid and the dangerous signal this could give to those attacking Zaire. End summary.

1. I spent an hour with Mobutu this morning, March 25. I began by referring to our phone conversation yesterday (Ref A) and said I thought it would be useful to discuss further the reasons why we remained intent on pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Shaba problem as a first priority. I noted that both President Carter and Secretary Vance had underlined the importance we attach to mediation efforts in recent public statements.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0188. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2670 from Kinshasa, March 24, the Embassy reported on Cutler's telephone conversation with Mobutu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0194)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 65136 to Kinshasa, Brussels, and Paris, March 24, the Department commented on Vance's March 21 meeting with Garba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770101–0199)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 64366 to Lagos, March 23, the Department reported on Vance's March 21 discussion with Garba of the Shaba invasion and Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770100–1009)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 65371 to Kinshasa, March 24, the Department reported that U.S. representatives were meeting with Cuban representatives to discuss fisheries problems, and they would use this opportunity to raise the issue of Cuban intervention in Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–1918)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 2683 from Kinshasa, March 24, the Embassy reported on a meeting of military mission chiefs from the U.S., U.K., French, and Belgian Embassies and Zaire to discuss the current military situation in Shaba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770102–0091)

2. Mobutu broke in, as I expected he would, to say that not all of those statements were very favorable for Zaire. He mentioned particularly the President's press conference remark yesterday to the effect that the US had no military obligation to Zaire,<sup>7</sup> expressing concern that this might only encourage the Angolans and their Cuban and Soviet supporters to pursue their aggression against Zaire. I said that, while I had no official elaboration, from reading the text of the President's comments I had the impression he was speaking more in the context of whether we were actually committed to make further arms shipments in response to the Shaba attack, and not so much in terms of our ongoing, longer-range FMS program. As Mobutu was well aware, the question of the degree of our response had aroused considerable interest both in the US media and the Congress, and the administration had made clear that it intends to weigh all factors carefully. Mobutu then expressed surprise that Secretary Vance had told the press that, in view of mediation efforts, no additional shipments will be made to Zaire. I corrected this, noting that the Secretary had said such shipments may rpt may be unnecessary.<sup>8</sup>

3. I then returned to the question of mediation and gave Mobutu a run-down of the Secretary's consultations with Nigerian FonMin Garba (Refs B, C) which, I noted, seemed to have gone very well. Mobutu listened with interest and seemed pleased with the results. When I mentioned Garba's concern that any attempt to pursue the Katangans across the border into Angola might provoke an escalation of the conflict, Mobutu said Garba had expressed the same concern to Nguza and he, Mobutu, understood well why this would indeed cause problems. I also noted that Secretary Vance had confirmed we were talking to the Soviets about the Shaba problem. I then went on to convey the Secretary's message concerning US-Cuban discussions (Ref D), noting our hope to broaden the talks to cover Cuba's intervention in Angola and its policies in Africa.

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<sup>7</sup> At a March 24 press conference, in response to a question on U.S. commitments to Zaire, Carter said, "We look on them as a friendly nation, and we have no obligations to them as far as military aid goes. But we have been cooperating in exchanging information with the Belgian Government, the French Government, and others, just to try to stabilize the situation and to lessen the chance of expanding the conflict." (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 502*)

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 64724 to Kinshasa, March 23, the Department transmitted a portion of the transcript of Vance's March 23 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Afterward, Vance responded to questions from reporters. In response to a question about the U.S. response to Zaire's request for ammunition, he said, "We have nothing at this point. At the moment, we're looking to see what we can do on the question of a political solution there." The reporter followed up by asking, "It may be unnecessary, is that what you seem to be saying?" Vance responded, "It may be unnecessary." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770100-0358)

4. I said all of these activities—including instructions just sent to our posts in a number of African countries which Mobutu had suggested to us—clearly showed our continuing desire to be helpful in Africa.<sup>9</sup> As for the Shaba, our stress on an African solution does not mean we intend to wash our hands of the whole affair. On the contrary, we are playing an active although discreet role with many parties in support of successful mediation. I expressed the personal view that a political solution was by far the best and perhaps the only feasible way to resolve the Shaba problem.

5. I said I had been impressed by the positive steps Mobutu himself had taken in the diplomatic area, and expressed hope we could count on his continued close cooperation. I thought it was particularly important to avoid any actions that might harm the chances for mediation or provide Luanda with excuses—such as claims of Zairian border provocations—for abandoning the political track. On the other hand, I could see an advantage in finding ways to demonstrate positive support for mediation, which would strengthen Zaire's international position and certainly be well received in the US. In this regard, I favorably noted a report this morning that the GOZ had stated it had no objection to Nigerian mediation.

6. Mobutu agreed on the need to avoid charges of not wanting a political settlement and, in this regard, said he had no intention of stirring up trouble elsewhere along the border. He then went on to review some of the GOZ's successful efforts to gain diplomatic support, noting Amin's decision to send food to Zaire (which he found amusing) and the support for Zaire published by the Libyan press (which he found mystifying). He said the GOZ would continue its diplomatic efforts and would seek additional ways to indicate a positive approach to mediation. Then, he said, if Angola backs away the onus for failure will be on them.

7. Turning to military matters, I said I did not yet have a definitive reaction to Mobutu's suggestion that we might find a way to help finance Belgian arms and ammunition shipments to Zaire. However, I did not discount the possibility that something along these lines might be feasible. As for mercenaries, I referred to General Babia's comments to our ZAMISH chief on this matter (Ref E). I said that, while I had no official guidance, my personal view was that news of introduction of foreign mercenaries in Shaba, particularly Americans, [would] elicit a decidedly negative reaction in the US. The whole mercenary question had proved highly controversial in the US during the Angolan war,

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<sup>9</sup> Telegram 64155 to all African diplomatic posts, March 23, transmitted information and talking points for consultations with host governments about the attack on Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770158–0374)

and I anticipated a similar reaction should they now turn up in Shaba. As for Babia's suggestion that we might help in recruiting anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries, I thought this was clearly out of the question. Mobutu said he understood and agreed with my assessment, and said the GOZ did not have in mind seeking USG assistance in recruitment. He did not explicitly confirm or deny that he intended to move ahead with putting mercenaries in place. However, he went on to stress the urgent need to improve the lamentable performance of his forces in Shaba. In this connection, he said he would make major changes in command personnel in the next few days. Mobutu gave no detailed response to my query as to how he intended to proceed militarily in Shaba, other than to confirm that defense of Kolwezi had first priority and that he also intended to counter-attack at an early date.

8. Mobutu made a final reference to the serious threat which the Shaba invasion posed to Zaire's hard-pressed economy, both in terms of domestic finances and the negative impact it might have on foreign donors and investors. He hoped he could count on our continuing assistance. I said we were proceeding with our economic assistance programs and were alert to new needs which might arise. This very serious aspect of the current situation underlined the importance of resolving the Shaba problem just as quickly as possible.

9. Comment: Mobutu was in one of his rare listening moods today and seemed to take in most of what I said. While I suspect he harbors reservations about the Nigerian role and tends to view of the whole mediation track more in terms of political competition than a serious way out of his problems, he still seems inclined to cooperate. In this regard, I believe the fact that we ourselves are playing an active role is a source of reassurance and encouragement to him. Certainly by now he understands the problems we have in moving ahead with further military aid at this time and the real importance we place on a political solution.

10. Dept please pass other posts as desired.

**Cutler**

**78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Military Aid to Zaire

President Mobutu has requested our help in funding the importation of petroleum products to meet emergency military needs arising from the invasion of the Shaba. In an average month, Zaire spends roughly \$12 million on POL imports. I believe that we should be responsive in a measured way to this request, authorizing the Zairian government to utilize up to \$1 million of the remaining \$6 million FY 76 Transitional Quarter FMS monies. Of course, we will want to consult with the Congress before any action is taken.

*Recommendation:*

1. That you agree that Zaire can draw down up to \$1 million for POL military purposes from its remaining FY 76 Transitional Quarter FMS monies.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1–12/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski checked the “Approve” option and wrote underneath it, “by ZB for the President (as authorized).”

## 79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 8, 1977, 0401Z

78877. Subject: Secretary's Conversation on Zaire With French President Giscard.

1. Following is summary of Secretary's April 2 conversation in Paris with Giscard on Zaire.

2. Secretary summarized U.S. actions concerning situation thus far, noted speed with which we had responded to Mobutu's request for non-lethal aid,<sup>2</sup> and described congressional criticism that aid generated.<sup>3</sup> He expressed vigorous disappointment with inaccuracy of intelligence received from Zaire and bluntly condemned military competence of FAZ. He noted this reluctance to fight created great problems for USG with Congress and even inside executive branch. How is it possible to help a country that cannot help itself? In responding to this question, he said, administration is pointing to regional and broader effects in Africa of Shaba situation.

3. Secretary cited Nigerian mediation effort, discounted reports other African states (Morocco, Egypt) might send troops to Zaire, acknowledged Belgian and French assistance, and expressed view Zaire could not hold out without support. Secretary reported he had twice warned Soviets of adverse consequences of Zaire developments. When he raised issue in Moscow, Soviet response was totally inadequate, consisting of repeating Angolan assurances of non-involvement and stating Katangans were not using Soviet equipment.<sup>4</sup>

4. Giscard commented at length on Zaire in context of overall African situation, seeing Zaire as test for both U.S. and France. He claimed U.S. had been rather indifferent to Africa in past 12 years, which saw nearly half of African regimes move toward pro-Soviet affiliation. Rest could follow by 1980 unless we meet challenge. Moderate leaders know that Soviets would provide ample arms, lots of aid and, if necessary, Cuban military assistance, thus assuring their personal safety. West on other hand provides little or no military aid,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081-1973. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Lagos. Drafted by Arenales; cleared by Buchanan and Moose and in S/S; approved by Seelye.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 81.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 71571 to the Secretary's delegation in Bonn, March 31, the Department reported on congressional consultations on assistance to Zaire that "the reaction is mixed and some of it quite negative." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072-1509) See also Document 84.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 75. Vance visited Moscow March 27-30 for meetings with Gromyko and Brezhnev, but there is no record of a discussion of Zaire.

some economic aid, but no technicians or advisers. Africans have never shown martial prowess.

5. Giscard said Mobutu is Zaire's only possible leader; without him country will rapidly fall into anarchy. He should not be dropped unless it becomes absolutely certain he cannot survive. Some of the business interests which control Belgian policy are tempted to flirt with Katanga solution. This would be gross mistake. It important to stabilize military situation, if only for few weeks. France is trying to do so "ourselves". Morocco will probably soon send few "volunteers" and Egypt perhaps some air transport. King Hassan said he will decide soon after one of his ablest advisers now in Zaire returns. Giscard expressed belief even 200 good fighting men could bring overnight change to military situation, which not regular war but rather home-ward migration of Katangans. Once they leave forests and try capture defended towns, they may be less successful. We must do our best.

6. Secretary agreed we should try to avoid giving any impression we are considering abandoning Mobutu but warned some Congressmen might so speculate and the press might use such comments to misstate our policy. We would have problem there. Secretary added we would move ahead with support for Mobutu and that he would focus on this as soon as he returned to Washington. We will consider requests for more petroleum, rations or other non-lethal supplies. We must by law inform Congress of any sizeable amounts of assistance but within certain limits we can give Mobutu more. Willing fighters on ground are vital to provide time for political solution.

8. To Secretary's question as to how he assessed Nigerian mediation effort,<sup>5</sup> Giscard noted that Angola also has problems and held that if other Africans, bigger Europeans and U.S. took a stand Angola might pull back fearing harm to its own interests. At that point, Giscard said, he believed Nigerian role could be genuinely helpful. Giscard concluded that what is needed now is time.

9. Secretary said that Nigerian FonMin Garba had confirmed Angolan logistic support of Katangans and had noted that in long term Angola wants relations with U.S. Secretary ended by stating we had

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 2501 from Kinshasa, March 19, the Embassy reported that Obasanjo had agreed to Zairian requests to mediate between Zaire and Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770095–0959) See also footnote 2, Document 80.



informed Angolans that we would be willing to discuss relations without preconditions if there is progress on Zaire problem.<sup>6</sup>

Vance

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 64155 to Lisbon, March 23, the Department agreed to support Nigerian mediation of the Zaire-Angola dispute and authorized the Nigerians to tell Neto that the United States "would be prepared to open discussions on normalization without preconditions provided progress is made with respect to current problem regarding Zaire." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0624)

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**80. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Schaufele) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 3, 1977

*Zaire—Current Information*

Our intelligence on the invasion is limited and confirmed information is particularly scarce. [*1 line not declassified*] We have moved additional personnel and equipment to Lubumbashi (approximately 400 kilometers from the fighting) and hope to obtain air photography within the next week.

*Tactical Situation*

The invaders entered Zaire March 8 and occupied three towns along the western and southern borders of Shaba Region with Angola: Kapanga (in the north), the border and railhead town of Dilolo, and the manganese mining town of Kisenge (in the south).

Moving slowly along the Dilolo-Kolwezi, the invaders are now somewhere east of Mutshatsa, probably in the area of Kayembe, approximately 80 kilometers west of Kolwezi. There are unconfirmed intelligence reports that the invaders have also moved north from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Africa: 1-12/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Marks and Thorne. Sent through Habib. Carter, Brzezinski, and Aaron initialed the memorandum. Tab 1, a map of Zaire, was not attached.

Kapanga towards the Kasai Region, and south of Kolwezi towards the key junction of Tenke (the rail link to the north). Finally, there are unconfirmed reports that as many as 250 invaders have infiltrated into Kolwezi itself.

There have been no significant battles; the only confirmed fire-fight was the ambushing (with upwards of 200 casualties) of a Zairian unit near Kisenge in the first few days.

### *The Invaders*

In one of their rare announcements, the invaders have identified themselves as ex-Katanga Gendarmes. The Zairian Government claims they number 5,000 and are accompanied by Cubans and/or mercenaries—which we doubt. We estimate their numbers at approximately 2,000. There are unconfirmed reports that up to 4,000 more Katangan Gendarmes are in reserve in Angola.

In local terms, the invaders are experienced and disciplined troops. Although the Zairians claim they are equipped with armor, rockets, and heavy artillery, we have no independent confirmation. We assume they have mostly small arms and crew served weapons (probably from former Portuguese and/or perhaps Cuban and Soviet stocks) as well as vehicles.

### *Angolan, Cuban and Soviet Backing*

We assume that at a minimum the Soviet and the Cubans (who helped train the Katangans during the past two years) acquiesced in the Zaire invasion. The Angolans are presumably providing at least logistical support from their side of the border. Angolan President Neto has admitted to Nigerian Foreign Affairs Commissioner Garba that the Gendarmes were under his “tutelage.”<sup>2</sup>

### *The Invader's Objectives*

A dissident exile movement called the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) claims responsibility for the invasion. Apart from press statements by the FNLC and the Gendarmes' own announcement that their aim was to liberate Zaire from Mobutu, the leaders have remained silent. There are no prominent political figures positively identified with the invasion.

To date the invaders occupy Lunda tribal territory; and so are “at home.” Their military objectives remain unclear: they could remain in Lunda country and challenge Mobutu at long distance; they could be

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3698 from Lagos, April 1, the Embassy reported on Garba's mission to Zaire and Angola and Neto's admission that Katangese gendarmes were “under his tutelage.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770113-0865)

preparing to take the copperbelt towns and announce an alternative government.

### *Opposition Figures and Movements*

Opposition to Mobutu consists of a number of small, fragmented movements led by various exiled political figures. There is also a minor insurgent opposition in the far east of the country which Mobutu has not been able to eliminate, but which has not yet tried to exploit the invasion.

A number of the opposition figures recently formed a coalition and presented a letter to our Embassy in Paris asking the USG to withdraw support from Mobutu. They are meeting with the old-line radical Gizenga on April 6 to work out a common negotiating platform with Mobutu.

### *Political Atmosphere in Zaire*

More important than organized exile dissidence is the emergence of vocal opposition to Mobutu within the Zairian establishment. From a position of popularity as the man who restored order, Mobutu has in the past three years lost most of his credibility with Zairians (both elite and the mass). This results primarily from a series of disastrous political and economic policies rather than from ideological differences. The invasion appears to have brought criticism to a point where highly placed members of the elite no longer support his continuation in office.

### *The Zairian Armed Forces*

The air force transport wing (C-130s) appears to be performing well but the attack component equipped with Mirage jets and Macchi fighters has been useless.

The Zairian army numbers under 30,000, plus 30,000 Gendarmes (police). It has little heavy equipment. Morale, training and competent leadership are lacking. There are mixed reports as to how well Zairian units performed in the Angolan war, but in the end all of them were demoralized by the beating they took from the Cuban backed Angolans.

Their officer corps is, broadly speaking, divided into two groups: the blatantly political elements and a number of trained professionals. Mobutu has constantly balanced off these groups. The units and officers sent to Shaba so far have been drawn from the poorest elements of the army.

There were no Zairian forces west of Kolwezi when the attack began, and no more than three battalions in the whole region. They have since transported upwards of five battalions (possibly 3,000 men) to Shaba. Zaire's best units, the para-commandos, remain in the Kinshasa area.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

*USG Military Assistance*

Up to recently, U.S. military assistance has been fairly modest and largely concentrated in transport, communications and training. We have shipped to date \$1.4 million in non-lethal military equipment and are pending approval of approximately \$1.8 million worth of radios, batteries, spare parts, etc., plus authorization to use \$1 million in FMS credits for POL products. \$33.4 million in FMS funds remain unused from the Transitional Quarter and FY 1977 credits of \$38 million.

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**81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1977

**SUBJECT**

U.S. Assistance to Zaire

I have examined the various options available to us in connection with the continuing invasion of Zaire, and their respective implications. Our options range from maximum support to total non-involvement and encouragement of internal reform.

We face a situation where the military prognosis is very poor, and tends to undermine our diplomatic and political actions. The Zairian forces have shown little will to fight, and are only now beginning to get organized in the defense of Zaire's main copper center. There is no certainty that foreign mercenaries or military cadres can stiffen the Zairians sufficiently to develop some military equilibrium, supportive of diplomatic efforts. Or, that the other side may not try to trump foreign combat aid to Zaire by escalating in its turn.

The military situation is, also, further weakening political support for President Mobutu. But Mobutu is a fighter not inclined to make concessions to his opposition under pressure. And no one can identify an obvious alternative leader capable of preventing a return to the regionalism and factionalism which threatened to disintegrate Zaire after independence. We see little alternative, therefore, to continued support of the legitimate government. Now is not the moment to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 233, [Aaron, David] Vice President Africa, 3/1–4/77. Secret. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote "To Cy, J" in the upper right corner. Dodson noted that a copy was sent to Thornton on April 8.

address the longer-term question of reform in Zaire, or to try dealing with Mobutu's opposition.

Our influence in this situation is unfortunately limited, and yet our prestige as well as our interests are involved. Given the unfavorable outlook, we should avoid making Zaire appear a test of American interest or will, indeed a major East-West confrontation. At the same time, our failure to support Zaire against an attack widely perceived in Africa as having been engineered by Angola and its communist supporters would also have wider repercussions on our future influence on that continent.<sup>2</sup>

### *Congress*

We will need, of course, to consult first with key members of Congress, explain the rationale and scope of our policy, and hopefully obtain their concurrence, if not enthusiastic support. Because of Congressional concerns, we should consult regularly with Congress, at least once a month, making very clear to key Congressional leaders exactly what we have sent Zaire, what we propose to do further and why. I recommend a supportive but limited policy involving the following courses of action:

*Military.* We will, in consultation with Congress, make further shipments of non-lethal equipment, including POL. Funds available from the Transitional Quarter and FY 1977 are estimated at \$30 million. We would provide the pending Zairian request for non-lethal equipment, valued at \$13 million (Tab 1); of that \$13 million, over \$9 million is for a C-130 on order for delivery in May.<sup>3</sup> We would plan to expend the balance of the \$30 million, if necessary, with great care.

*Mercenaries.* We will neither encourage nor discourage our allies from providing mercenaries requested by President Mobutu. However, if pressed, we will have to express our general disapproval of mercenaries, the use of which can be expected to be widely criticized.

*Foreign Troops.* Reports of whether—and how many—foreign troops, especially Moroccans and Egyptians, might go to Zaire are confusing and will probably not be clarified before tomorrow, April 8, at the earliest. We will be addressing messages to the Moroccans and Egyptians telling them in general what we propose to do, asking what they plan to provide. While the appearance of foreign African officers in Zaire is more acceptable publicly than mercenaries, this course is also not without its complications—particularly if the other side should escalate its involvement. We may also expect requests for

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "I agree" in the left margin.

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "OK" in the left margin.

assistance in funding or facilitating military aid from moderate African states which we will have to turn down.<sup>4</sup>

*Economic.* We can be quickly supportive by authorizing the expenditure of the FY 1977 \$16.6 million Security Supporting Assistance commodity import program and the \$14.9 million PL-480 program. Both programs could probably be ready for signature within a week but it would take several months for any commodities to reach Zaire, unless items destined for delivery elsewhere were diverted there. If necessary, we will seek to make such diversions and as expeditiously as possible.<sup>5</sup>

We also plan to encourage the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, international banking community (via Citibank) and other governments to be understanding of Zaire's present financial difficulties. Specifically, we would propose postponement of the Paris Club debt rescheduling<sup>6</sup> and IBRD Consultative Group meetings (scheduled to take place before June) until we have a better appreciation of the economic consequences of the present war. We should try as much as possible to keep these economic actions out of a political context.

*Diplomatic.* We will support the Nigerian mediation effort as long as possible, publicly and privately. We will also urge states enjoying good relations with Zaire to use their influence to contribute to the success of the Nigerian initiative and the preservation of Zaire's territorial integrity. If this effort fails, and the conflict continues, we will examine the possibility of getting Nigeria alone or with several other states to ask OAU President Ramgoolam of Mauritius to convene an extraordinary session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Or we might favor convening the OAU Mediation Commission, chaired by Zambia. Meanwhile, we should stay in close touch with Nigeria and Tanzania—key states in any effort to pressure Angola—but avoid putting the US label on African mediation efforts.<sup>7</sup>

A complementary strategy we might consider after the OAU met would urge key Africans to request a Security Council meeting to ask for a suspension of hostilities and support of Zaire's territorial integrity and request the OAU urgently to send an observer team to the area.<sup>8</sup>

*Political Bilateral.* Mobutu's suspicion that we might plan to abandon him has clouded our relations. Our instructions to Ambassador

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<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "which we will have to turn down" and wrote "Why?" in the left margin.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote "OK" in the left margin.

<sup>6</sup> The Paris Club, first convened in 1956, is an informal and voluntary group of officials of the major creditor countries that develops coordinated policies to help countries having trouble repaying their debts.

<sup>7</sup> Carter wrote "OK" in the left margin.

<sup>8</sup> Carter underlined "after the OAU met" and wrote "OK" in the left margin.

Cutler conveying the essentials of our support should dispel this problem. At the same time, we will encourage Mobutu to withhold any suggestion of support for the Angolan insurgents and to send his best troops to the front to repel the Katangans.<sup>9</sup>

We will also inform our allies of what we propose to do for Zaire, thereby encouraging them to continue their own efforts.

*Declarative Posture*

Our policy to support Mobutu will not be popular. In general, we should eschew "cold war" language and avoid making our limited support appear a test of will with Moscow or Cuba. We would propose to emphasize the following points:

—The United States is responding to the request of a friendly nation for continuation of our aid at a time when its border has been crossed by a hostile military force. We believe that such a response is in keeping with our principles and our interests.<sup>10</sup>

—Our response is carefully limited and appropriate to the situation.

—The shipments of *non-lethal* military supplies we are sending to Zaire are under terms of an agreement we have with that country to provide it with credits for the sale of military items. These funds have been approved by the Congress. We have no plans to allow lethal items.

—We continue to uphold the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference, both for Africa as a whole and in the specific case of Zaire.

—Many African leaders are concerned by the implications of this attack for their own future security and territorial integrity.

—Whatever their objectives, the Katangan insurgents risk re-igniting the civil war which devastated the old Congo.

—We believe that the current problem in Zaire is one which should be solved by Africans and we fully support diplomatic efforts to this end.

—We will continue to keep the Congress fully informed of our actions.

<sup>9</sup> Carter underlined "to withhold any suggestion of support for the Angolan insurgents" and wrote "meaning?" in the right margin.

<sup>10</sup> Carter wrote "OK" in the left margin next to this and the next three points.

**Tab 1**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>11</sup>**

Washington, undated

*Materiel On Order Under FMS Credits*

The following non-lethal military support items are presently on order for delivery under Foreign Military Sales credits. The cost column should generally be treated as including estimates rather than firm figures. The items have been purchased either directly or commercially with FMS credits in some cases dating back to FY 1975. It is estimated that Zaire has used up about \$8 million of its \$10 million in Transitional Quarter credits, (including, to avoid default, FMS materiel delivered on credit for which Zaire has not paid). The following items will therefore be funded out of the remaining \$30 million in TQ and, if necessary, FY 1977 FMS monies.

*A. TQ and FY 1977 FMS Funds*

<i>Item</i>	<i>Credit (Estimate)</i>	<i>Authorization Year</i>
1. 30 Auxiliary power units for AN/PRC-77 radios	12,000	FY 7T
2. 150 AN/PRC-77 radios <sup>12</sup>	1,059,000	FY 7T
3. 30 Racal 931 radio systems	320,000	FY 7T
4. 15 100 Amp Ignition Kits (jeep)	13,000	FY 7T
5. C-130 spare parts	500,000	FY 7T
6. Petrol	1,000,000	FY 7T
7. Communication spares	33,000	FY 7T
8. Signal Panels (70 sets)	1,000	FY 7T
9. Spares for trucks and jeeps	30,000	FY 7T
10. 2 Collins HF SSB radios	250,000	FY 7T
11. C-130 Nose-gear repair (parts and Lockheed technicians)	210,000	FY 7T

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<sup>11</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>12</sup> Zaire owes Associated Industries \$409,000 for previously delivered AN/PRC-77 radios, as part of a 600-radio contract order. Kinshasa can obtain the balance of 200 AN/PRC-77 radios on order, if it pays their value, \$650,000 plus the \$409,000 on what it owes under contract, i.e., a total of \$1,059,000. [Footnote is in the original.]



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12. Cessna spares	65,000	FY 7T
13. 326 C-130 spare parts repair	<u>350,000</u>	FY 7T
Total	3,843,000	

*B. Other Fiscal Years*

1. Remaining M 1131 spares (APC)	60,000	FY 75
2. One C-130 <sup>13</sup>	<u>9,100,000</u>	FY 76
Total	9,160,000	

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<sup>13</sup> The last of several C-130s ordered by Zaire is due for delivery in May. It is included among the items on the Munitions Control Export List being held for Presidential review. The C-130s are the back bone of Zaire's military transport system to the Shaba. Thus far, we can take some pride in the fact that this US-organized branch of the Zairian forces is operating relatively efficiently. It would be good to be able to authorize release of this plane for delivery as soon as possible. [Footnote is in the original.] Carter wrote "OK" in the left margin.

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## 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kinshasa, April 7, 1977, 1525Z

3265. Subject: Shaba Invasion: Intervention of Moroccan and Egyptian Forces. Ref: Kinshasa 3192.<sup>2</sup>

1. Foreign Minister Nguza called me in at noon today, April 7, to inform me that 1500 Moroccan troops will start arriving in Zaire April 8. Troops will be transported by Air Zaire DC-10 aircraft in series of six flights beginning this evening. Troops will be flown directly from Morocco to Lubumbashi or, alternatively via Libreville which Nguza said will be used by Moroccans as their "operational base". From Lubumbashi they will be transported directly to Kolwezi in FAZ C-130's. Morocco will also send approximately 125 "military vehicles" and six tons of materiel.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0257. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3192 from Kinshasa, April 6, the Embassy reported that a battalion of Moroccan troops with French advisers would arrive in Zaire on April 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0260)

2. An Egyptian military delegation headed by general officer will arrive Kinshasa tonight to make arrangements for provision of Egyptian troops. Nguza said Egyptian force would not number more than 1500 and probably would include paras.

3. President Mobutu makes following request for US Government support of the Moroccan/Egyptian operation:

A. Tents for 3,000 personnel (this is now rainy season in Shaba).

B. Organizational tentage for 2 infantry brigade configuration (CP tents, GP mediums, kitchen tents, etc.).

C. Medical supplies for 3,000 personnel.

D. C-rations for 5,000 men for 30 days.

E. Assistance in air transport of 200,000 cans of Coke to be purchased commercially in US by GOZ. (Coke is staple in Zairian diet and presumably is for FAZ as well.)<sup>3</sup>

F. Use of 2 USAF C-130 aircraft, including crews, for a period of 30 days for interior transport.

4. Nguza prefaced all of above with following message from Mobutu: Mobutu values assurances, as most recently conveyed in Secretary Vance's letter of March 11, that US will continue its traditional support of Zairian unity.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, Mobutu understands problems which Shaba invasion has caused the administration and Congress. Mobutu shares our concern that the Shaba problem be handled to the extent possible within African context. It is with that in mind that Zaire readily accepted Nigeria's offer to seek mediation. By the same token, request for military assistance from fellow African states such as Morocco and Egypt complies with principle of Africans trying to solve their own problems. Mobutu hopes the US will bear these points in mind when deciding whether it can lend the limited logistical support requested above.

5. Nguza also provided following background to current operation: Idea of sending troops was first discussed during Nguza's visit to Cairo and Marrakesh. Morocco then sent Air Force delegation to Kinshasa last week for consultations. After this delegation reported back to King Hassan, latter consulted with Sadat and Giscard. Giscard indicated his

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 87356 to Kinshasa, April 19, the Department transmitted its decisions on aid to Zaire including \$21,000 worth of C-rations, \$80,000 worth of medicine, \$140,000 worth of tents, along with other non-lethal items. The Department also agreed to "ship Coca Cola on space available basis provided it is clear that the GOZ has paid for it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770134-1024)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 56010 to Kinshasa, March 12, the Department transmitted the text of Vance's letter to Mobutu, in which he wrote, "The United States has for 17 years been an unwavering supporter of Zairian unity and we have no intention of changing now." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086-0492)

support, as did Sadat following his consultations with Giscard in Paris last weekend. At that time Sadat also told Hassan that Egypt would favorably consider taking similar action but he first wanted to talk further with Giscard and President Carter. Nguza anticipates that Sadat will make definitive decision next week to send similar force. He said Saudis have agreed to provide discreet financial assistance to both Moroccans and Egyptians.

6. General Babia conveyed much of the same information to Chief ZAMISH, including request for US logistical support, at the same time I was seeing Nguza. In his presentation Babia specified that Moroccan force would be paratroop unit. Nguza said whole matter was being very tightly held for the time being in the hope that the entire Moroccan force could be in place in Shaba prior to Moroccan/Zairian announcement of action being taken.

7. In response to my query, Nguza said he did not believe Moroccan/Egyptian intervention would interfere with Nigerian mediation effort. He said Obasanjo had emphasized necessity of holding the line militarily if negotiations were to succeed. Nguza acknowledged, however, that GOZ had not yet informed Nigerians and did not intend to do so until operation well underway.

8. GOZ is apparently making separate requests to French and Belgians for military assistance/support, and we will report on this separately. Our initial impression is that GOZ is asking them mainly to support FAZ while making its requests to US in the context of supporting other African troops being sent to help.

**Cutler**

**83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

3. *Congressional Consultations on Zaire*: We have begun to call members of the Leadership and others who should be consulted on your decision to provide assistance to Zaire. We expect to complete the calls late today or early tomorrow. We are emphasizing the following points:

—The outlook in Zaire is uncertain at best, and we must avoid making Zaire appear as a test of American interest or will, or a major East-West confrontation. At the same time, our failure to support Zaire against an attack on its territorial integrity would have wider repercussions on our future influence in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

—We will send non-lethal equipment and only in amounts already approved by Congress for Zaire.

—We do not plan to expand the number of American personnel in Zaire.

—We will accelerate already programmed economic assistance in the form of PL 480 food and commodity imports.

—Belgium and France are providing logistic support; France is also supplying military advisors. We were not consulted by Morocco on its decision to send troops to Zaire or by France on its decision to lend support. But we are hopeful that their effort can stabilize the military situation so that the Nigerian diplomatic effort will have a chance to work.<sup>3</sup>

I will report to you tomorrow on the Congressional reaction to our consultation after all the calls are completed.

4. *US Assistance to Zaire*: You had two questions on the memorandum that I sent to you last week on US assistance to Zaire:<sup>4</sup>

—First, you asked why I said we should turn down requests for US assistance in funds or military aid from moderate African states interested in helping Zaire. The reasons for opposing such aid are essentially political. We have the authority to let a foreign government use US supplied defense articles for purposes other than internal secu-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 4/77. Secret. Carter wrote "To Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Carter initialed "C" in the left margin.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 82.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 81.

rity or self-defense if the use is compatible with “collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”<sup>5</sup> Whether this use fits under that rubric is questionable. In addition, our sounding in Congress indicates a strong negative reaction if we should permit African nations to use US supplied military equipment in Zaire.

—Second, you asked what it meant for me to say that Mobutu should “withhold any suggestion of support for the Angolan insurgents.” As you know, Angolan President Neto has charged that Mobutu is aiding the active guerilla movements that continue to fight against the Angolan government. We have no hard evidence that Zaire is giving significant support to these anti-Neto forces, but we have mentioned to Mobutu that we would oppose any such aid.<sup>6</sup> Zairian help for the anti-Neto forces, while of minimal military value, could serve as a pretext for the Cubans to become militarily active in Zaire.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

We have cabled Charlie Diggs in Mali, John Brademas and Dick Schweiker in China, and John Sparkman in Australia.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote “We should keep this option open” in the left margin.

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote “I agree—Couldn’t understand the language” in the left margin.

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#### 84. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 12, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

3. *Congressional Reactions on Zaire Assistance*—The following is a summary of Congressional reactions to the Zaire assistance plan:

—*Senator Robert Byrd.* Byrd said he “views any involvement with concern and skepticism, which is not to say I would not support it if I knew more about it.” We will spend more time with him to answer any questions he may have.

—*Tip O’Neill.* He goes along reluctantly.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

—*John Rhodes*. Rhodes said nothing when informed but thanked us for calling.

—*Jim Wright*. Wright appreciated being notified. His chief concern was whether this assistance would really make a difference and whether we shouldn't do more. He believes we should firmly defend the notion of territorial integrity.

—*Alan Cranston*. He was appreciative of the call, accepted our explanation and moved on to another subject.

—*Dick Clark*. He is opposed but will moderate his criticism.

—*Dan Inouye*. Supports our plan.

—*John Anderson*. Anderson is concerned over the possibility of an arms race. He appreciated our contacting him but did not offer support.

—*John Buchanan*. Andy Young contacted Buchanan and reports that Buchanan has no problem with this limited package.

—*Clifford Case*. We were not able to reach Case but discussed the situation with his staff. They report that Case will be on board.

—*Clem Zablocki*. Zablocki continues to be concerned about the use that our aid will be put to. He hopes that we will not be drawn more deeply into the conflict. Zablocki will support the decision.

—*Congresswoman Cardiss R. Collins*. Mrs. Collins strongly supports the Administration's decision. She will appear on local television this weekend and will be supportive.

—*Congresswoman Yvonne B. Burke*. Mrs. Burke was pleased that we called her but is highly skeptical. However, she conceded that a decision not to spend money already authorized would be read as backing out of our commitment to Zaire. She will appear on a television talk show tonight (in Los Angeles, we believe) and can be expected to raise questions but will be moderate in her criticism.

We have not been able to contact Howard Baker, Jim Pearson, Bill Broomfield, Hubert Humphrey and Don Bonker (Andy Young is trying to reach Bonker, who because of his criticism of the initial shipments to Zaire could be important). We expect to reach these people by tomorrow.

# 85. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

3. *Congo Brazzaville Proposes Talks*: The Congolese proposal to open talks on normalization of relations on May 9 in Bonn is a response to your message to late President Ngouabi<sup>2</sup> which was delivered after his assassination.<sup>3</sup> Congo's UN Ambassador will be delivering this proposal to us formally tomorrow.<sup>4</sup>

In our reply, we will offer to meet in Bonn on May 30 since other commitments of our key people make it difficult to meet sooner.

Our willingness to move ahead in normalizing relations with the Congo may assist us indirectly in pursuing our negotiations with Angola. The two regimes are close.

4. *Zaire*: We are now in the process of formulating our positions on military assistance to Zaire for FY 78. As you know, the Congressional mark-ups for Security Supporting Assistance are taking place this week, and we can expect considerable opposition to a continuation of our previous military aid relationship with Zaire. We are attempting to devise a strategy that will allow us some flexibility in making future decisions with respect to both lethal and non-lethal equipment.<sup>5</sup>

After an extensive study of Zaire's military capabilities and needs, it was decided in November of last year to offer Zaire a military "upgrade package" designed to equip and train a Zairian military force over a period of four years which would be capable of deterring external aggression, especially in the Shaba region. The recent events in Shaba have underscored the continuing importance of assisting Zaire in the development of such a force. The upgrade package consisted of 56

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 5/77. Secret. Carter wrote "To Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 58089 to Bonn, March 16, the Department requested that the Federal Republic of Germany transmit the text of a letter from Carter to Ngouabi, in which Carter proposed a move toward normalization of relations between the United States and Congo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770089-0708)

<sup>3</sup> Ngouabi was assassinated on March 18. In telegram 2498 from Kinshasa, March 18, the Embassy reported that Radio Brazzaville had announced his death. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770094-1154)

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "ok" in the right margin.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote "Minimize Congressional restraints" in the right margin.

heavy armored cars, mobile artillery and a program to train and equip infantry for integrated mobile operations.<sup>6</sup>

Subsequently, the previous administration decided for political and psychological reasons to add 10 M–60 tanks to the upgrade package.<sup>7</sup> Given the absence of a security justification for the tanks and the strong Congressional opposition we would encounter to providing them, we are eliminating them from the package. I nevertheless believe that we should attempt to retain some flexibility to provide Zaire with the other types of equipment in the original package and also to respond to any future requests we receive from the Zairians for emergency supplies. To do this, I intend to have Administration witnesses try to retain as much as possible of the \$30 million in security supporting assistance requested in our FY 78 budget proposal for possible use in the development of such a mobile force. If this package were authorized, we could still, of course, continue our present policy of limiting sales to non-lethal items if circumstances in FY 78 so dictate.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>6</sup> Carter underlined “heavy armored cars,” “mobile artillery,” and “train and equip infantry,” and wrote “ok” in the right margin.

<sup>7</sup> Carter underlined “10 M–60” and wrote “no” in the right margin.



## 86. Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1977

### COUNTRY

Zaire

### SUBJECT

Comments by Ex-Katangan Gendarme soldiers on the planning and execution of the invasion of Zaire

### ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

### SOURCE

[3 lines not declassified]

Summary: The invasion of Zaire was planned and carried out in close coordination with Angolan Army and Cuban military personnel in Angola.<sup>2</sup> The invaders were promised full Angolan support. They assumed that many African countries would support the invasion, that Mobutu would be quickly overthrown and that no outside military assistance would be available to Zaire. Zaire Air Force operations greatly demoralized the Katangan troops as did the failure of their SAM-7 anti-aircraft weapons. The arrival of the Moroccans caused panic among the invaders and caused Angola to suspend its promised support. No contingency plans were made for insurgent operations in Zaire and it is estimated that one-half of the invading soldiers have fled and no longer want to fight.

1. The invasion of Zaire by ex-Katangan gendarmes from Angola was planned and prepared in close coordination with the Angolan Army (FAPLA) personnel and Cuban military advisors assigned to FAPLA in Angola.<sup>3</sup> The invasion plan was built around three basic assumptions: (A) that the Zaire Army (FAZ) would not fight and that most of its soldiers would defect to the invaders, (B) that Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko was sufficiently unpopular in Africa that he would receive no support from other African states and that many African states would publically support the invasion whose goal was to over-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 42, Countries—Africa 1-6/77 [1]. Secret; Priority; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Sent to State/INR, JCS/MC (DIA), CIA/NMCC, SWS, NSA, Treasury, NSC/S, WH/SITRM, SDO, NIO, OCR.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

throw Mobutu, and (C) that Mobutu would not be able to obtain effective outside military assistance to fight the invasion.

2. The invasion was carried out by a force of about 1,000 men who were armed primarily with light weapons including rifles, AK-47 automatic weapons, light machine guns, grenade launchers, 61 mm mortars, grenades and mines. The invaders were trained in Angola by FAPLA and Cuban personnel and the weapons were provided from FAPLA stocks.<sup>4</sup> The invaders were promised that as the invasion progressed and showed signs of succeeding, heavier weapons would be provided, including 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless artillery, SAM-7 anti-aircraft weapons, and “Stalin organ” 122-mm rocket launchers. As the invasion expanded, and if heavy fighting developed to capture Kolwezi or Lubumbashi, Angola promised that armored vehicles, tanks and heavy artillery would be sent to support them. Large numbers of such equipment were stockpiled at Henrique da Carvalho by FAPLA and the Cubans and these were shown to most of the Katangan invaders before the invasion to boost their morale. The tanks and armored vehicles were to be crewed by FAPLA personnel since none of the Katangans were trained in their use.

3. The initial objectives of the invasion were the capture of Mutshasa and Kolwezi. Mutshasa was to be made the prime military base because it is located in terrain which is easily defensible, and Kolwezi was to be made the administrative center. By the time Mutshasa and Kolwezi had fallen it was assumed that Mobutu’s position would be shaky, that the population of Shaba and the FAZ would be rallying to the invaders, and that the push onward to Lubumbashi would be relatively easy.

4. When the invasion began, the Katangans found that the majority of the population welcomed their arrival and that most FAZ units were giving up without a fight. The invaders were also helped by several high-level “traitors” (unidentified) in the FAZ command structure who were secretly providing information on FAZ plans and order of battle. The move to Mutshasa was done with relative ease and against no significant FAZ opposition. However, many of the Katangans had become nervous by the time of their arrival at Mutshasha because some FAZ units were resisting their advance, and because there was no widespread defection by FAZ troops from other parts of Shaba.

5. During the first two weeks of the invasion a number of FAPLA and Cuban advisors visited Dilolo and areas east of Dilolo but they took no part in the fighting. The Cubans were mostly light-skinned Cubans dressed in unmarked uniforms.<sup>5</sup> There were rumors among the

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand underlined this and the previous sentence.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined this and the previous sentence.

Katangans fighting towards Mutshasa that some Cubans and FAPLA troops were participating in the fighting in the north near Sandoa and Kapanga, but these rumors could not be confirmed.<sup>6</sup>

6. The appearance of Zaire Air Force planes in the battle caused the first serious signs of demoralization among the Katangan troops. Hurried calls for SAM-7 anti-aircraft weapons were sent to Angola and SAM-7 weapons were sent to forward units. However, the Katangan troops quickly found that the SAM-7's misfired, jammed, or went wild, and were generally ineffective. Heavy machine guns were then sent from Angola, and these also proved to be ineffective against the aircraft. Though the Zaire aircraft did little damage and caused few casualties, their operations and the failure of the SAM-7's caused serious demoralization among the Katangans and caused the troops to refuse to proceed beyond Mutshasa without heavier weapons.

7. Another reason the troops refused to advance from Mutshasa was that it was also becoming apparent to the Katangans that expected African support for the invasion had not materialized and that Mobutu was still entrenched in power. Furthermore Angola's support for the invasion was beginning to waver and those few FAPLA officers who had been with the Katangans were ordered to return to Angola in mid-April. There was a general feeling among the troops in mid-April that they were being abandoned because they had not won a quick victory.

8. When the Moroccan intervention was announced, the Katangan leadership was caught by surprise and many of the troops wanted to flee. They refused to press forward against the Moroccans without the armored vehicles, tanks and the Angolan intervention which had been promised. Katangan leader General Nathaniel Mbumba went to Luanda to plead for support from Angolan President Agostinho Neto but was told that the Moroccan intervention had created a new set of circumstances and that Angola could no longer provide the promised support. When this became known at the front, plans were formulated to prepare for insurgent operations, but large numbers of Katangan troops began fleeing to Zambia or Angola. Those who fled said that they had fought against the colonialists, in the Angola civil war, and against Mobutu, and had no real hope of success against the Moroccans. They were afraid and tired of more fighting. Those who stayed were ordered to resist the Moroccans where possible, to make plans for insurgent operations, and to retreat as necessary back to Angola to

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<sup>6</sup> At a news conference on April 22, President Carter was asked if Cubans were present in Zaire supporting Katangan separatists. Carter responded, "Our best information is that the Katangans have been trained within Angola by the Cubans. We have no direct evidence at all that there are Cubans within Zaire." (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 703*)

reorganize. It is estimated that about half of the Katangan invaders followed these orders and that the others fled or disappeared into the bush.

9. Those Katangan gendarmes now in refugee camps in Zambia are tired of fighting and are considering means to go back to Zaire, make their peace with the Mobutu government, and live a normal life.

10. [6 lines not declassified]

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**87. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

*Republic of the Congo.* As a result of your letter to Congolese President Yhombi-Opango and his enthusiastic response,<sup>2</sup> Assistant Secretary Schaufele will meet in Bonn on June 6 with Congolese Foreign Minister Obenga to discuss normalization of our diplomatic relations.<sup>3</sup> We will seek assurances from the Congolese on treatment of U.S. diplomats (we suspended relations with the Congo in 1965 because of their imprisonment of several American officials) and arrangements for compensation for nationalized American oil companies. If the negotiations go well, and we think they will, one more possible sore point in our relations with Africa will be eliminated.<sup>4</sup>

*Zaire.* President Mobutu has charged our Consul in Lubumbashi with improper and subversive activities and requested that we withdraw him to avoid formal expulsion. We think Mobutu may be trying to retaliate for what he sees as our lack of support during the Shaba invasion. Our Embassy in Kinshasa has looked into the charges and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 6/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Warren, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Yhombi-Opango wrote an April 13 letter to Carter expressing his wish to normalize diplomatic relations between Congo and the United States. Carter wrote back on May 24 and proposed a meeting of their respective representatives in Bonn in June. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Congo Yhombi-Opango)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 88. The United States suspended diplomatic relations with the Republic of Congo in August 1965.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "Good" in the left margin.

finds them without merit. We will so inform Foreign Minister Nguza when he returns from Paris.<sup>5</sup> In a recent cordial chat with our Charge, Mobutu did not allude to this matter so that it is at least possible that the incident will pass away.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 125616 to Kinshasa, June 1, the Department instructed the Chargé to explain to Nguza that the U.S. Government would not withdraw the Consul and to assure him that no U.S. Government representative "is or will be engaged in subversive activities against the Zairian government." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770194-0163)

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## **88. Telegram From the Embassy in The Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bonn, June 6, 1977, 1715Z

9536. Subject: Meeting With Congolese Delegation on Normalization of Relations.

1. US and Congolese delegations met this morning at FRG Foreign Ministry and agreed to issue simultaneously in Brazzaville and Washington June 15 joint communique ending suspension of relations.

2. In discussions, which lasted one and a half hours, Ambassador Schaufele informed Congolese that there no preconditions to negotiations but raised following points: (1) protection of diplomats and mutual respect of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (2) compensation for US firms nationalized by Congolese Government; and (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Congolese agreed to all points and raised no substantive issue of their own. They agreed to draft communique presented by US side with only minor modifications.

3. Text of communique to be released simultaneously in both capitals June 15 follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770201-0198. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Kinshasa, Libreville, Brussels, and Paris.

## Begin text

An American delegation led by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William E. Schauffele, Jr., and a Congolese delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Theophile Obenga, met in Bonn, the Federal Republic of Germany, on June 6, 1977. As a result of this meeting, the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of the Congo have agreed to put an end to the suspension of their diplomatic relations as of June 7, 1977, and to reopen their embassies in Brazzaville and Washington.

The two governments express their hope that this step will strengthen relations between their countries and contribute substantially to bettering their mutual understanding and cooperation based on the principles of reciprocal respect, sovereign equality, and non-interference in internal affairs. In this connection, the two governments reaffirm their adherence to the principles of international law, and, in particular, to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

## End text

4. In addition, two sides agreed to give statement to press which FRG Foreign Ministry will release today. Text follows.

## Begin text

An American delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William E. Schauffele, Jr., and a Congolese delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the People's Republic of the Congo met June 6, 1977, in Bonn. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding.

The two delegations thank the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for its kind hospitality.

## End text

5. Comment: Although they had no substantive points to raise Congolese evidently not willing to authorize release of joint communique ending suspension of diplomatic relations for two reasons:

1) They prefer it to emanate from Brazzaville and Washington rather than third capital;

2) The need for Obenga, although he did not say so directly, to associate his government and party leadership with text when he returns to Brazzaville.

6. Although in his remarks Obenga several times alluded to "economic, scientific and technological cooperation," no direct statement about US assistance was made.

7. Later Germans told us that Congolese indicated they wanted first contacts with us to be political. Economic questions would be taken up later.

8. Further contacts, if necessary, can be made through Congolese Mission to UN, German Embassy in Brazzaville or American Embassy Kinshasa.<sup>2</sup>

Cash

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<sup>2</sup> The United States and the People's Republic of the Congo resumed diplomatic relations on October 31. In telegram 5 from Brazzaville, November 8, the Embassy transmitted the Congolese government's official announcement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770412-0569)

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**89. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

3. *Zaire's Foreign Minister*: In my meeting last night, Zairian Foreign Affairs Commissioner Nguza described President Mobutu's proposed political, economic and military reforms. They are clearly designed, as Nguza frankly stated, to meet external criticism of Mobutu's government, particularly with respect to lack of democratic practice and human rights abuses. If implemented, the reforms could go a long way to meet the criticisms. On the economic side, Nguza acknowledged Zaire's past mistakes and corruption and reiterated several times that the reforms are intended to obtain donor confidence and therefore greater external economic assistance.<sup>2</sup>

Nguza described the internal Angolan situation as "very bad." He said Neto's relations with the Soviets and the Cubans have become strained; Neto's party is split on racial and political grounds; the former guerrillas are pitted against the ideologues; and Neto's opponents within the ruling MPLA were disposed to compromise with Savimbi.

I asked Nguza for his views on the situation in Chad. Nguza called Mobutu this morning and at lunch today told Dick Moose that Mobutu

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State) 7/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "He may be biased in views" in the left margin.

opposes the Libyan activity in Chad which he considers to be a violation of Organization of African Unity principles. Zaire will strongly support publicly and diplomatically actions to assist Chad but would prefer not to provide direct assistance.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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**90. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kinshasa, August 13, 1977, 1720Z

7651. Subject: Radio Announces Arrest of Foreign Minister Nguza.

1. Zairian radio announced at noon today the arrest of Foreign Minister Nguza, recalled from Europe yesterday, on charges of treason. Nguza is accused of having learned from Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC) official Kibwe, during Mobutu's January-February visit to Europe, of FLNC plans to invade Shaba in March, and of having concealed that information from the President. The radio also reports that Mobutu became aware of Nguza's "treachery" during early July (i.e., before Nguza left for Washington), but chose to watch him closely before ordering his arrest.

2. In addition, radio announced arrest of Lunda Paramount Chief Mwant Yav, seized with documents in his possession indicating ties with FLNC leader Mbumba.

3. Comment: Nguza's arrest comes as total surprise to foreign observers here and, apparently, to most Zairians as well. While in announcing Sambwa's dismissal earlier this week Mobutu made clear other heads would soon roll,<sup>2</sup> there was no indication that Nguza's name was high on the list. We expect others will follow in what looks like major purge of all those suspected of having wavered in their fidelity to Mobutu when he appeared to be on the way out. Fact that Nguza had just returned from U.S. as President's emissary may stimulate speculation that Nguza's downfall is in some way related to U.S.-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770292–1174. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Brussels, Paris, and London.

<sup>2</sup> The Embassy reported the decree dismissing Sambwa, Governor of the Bank of Zaire, and Mobutu's press interview explaining the dismissal in telegram 7576 from Kinshasa, August 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770289–0700)



Zairian relations, and in fact could be interpreted as a slap in our direction. So far, however, there is no indication Mobutu intends to pursue this line. Further comment septel.<sup>3</sup>

Cutler

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<sup>3</sup> The Embassy considered the impact on U.S.-Zairian relations of the arrests of Nguza and Sambwa in telegram 8589 from Kinshasa, September 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770325-0553)

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# 91. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 21, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

7. *Central African Empire* We have undertaken a government-wide review of our relations with the Central African Empire following the July detentions of two journalists and a Peace Corps Volunteer in Bangui. Emperor Bokassa's mistreatment of the detainees and his repeated allegations of American plotting have led us to reappraise our relations with them. Our intention is to register our serious concern over his mistreatment of Americans and others in a manner that least risks provoking retaliation against our citizens.

We have instructed our Ambassador to tell Bokassa that the detentions have had an adverse effect on bilateral relations and our ability to provide economic support.<sup>2</sup> We are eliminating new AID programs worth \$6 million in addition to cancelling certain other bilateral activities, although ongoing aid projects will be completed. This should make clear our dissatisfaction with Bokassa's behavior and could stand some chance of influencing him to improve the overall human rights situation in his country.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State) 9/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2132 from Bangui, October 4, the Embassy reported on Quainton's October 3 session with Emperor Bokassa, in which Quainton explained that additional aid would not be available to the Central African Empire due to human rights incidents. "Bokassa accepted these realities." Bokassa also agreed to "suppress incriminating documents taken from the journalists" and "return the motorcycle confiscated from PCV Maher." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770363-0066)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "ok" in the left margin.

**92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 15, 1977, 1905Z

247577. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Umba: 32nd UNGA.

1. Following is memorandum of conversation of subject meeting which took place Oct. 3 in the Secretary's suite, UN Plaza Hotel.

2. Participants:

Zaire: Foreign Minister Umba-di-Lutete, Ambassador (to US) Kasongo Mutuale, Cit. Ngwanza, Counselor to Foreign Minister.

U.S.: Secretary Vance, Lannon Walker, Director, AF/C, Alec Toumayan, Interpreter.

3. Text as follows:

Secretary Vance opened the conversation by asking Umba to convey his best wishes to President Mobutu. Umba reciprocated the courtesy points, emphasizing how important it was for him to be able to meet the Secretary.

—Then Umba said that he had an oral message from President Mobutu for the Secretary, the President, indeed for the entire Carter administration:

—First of all, a message of thanks for all that the US has done in the past for Zaire; a reaffirmation of the true friendship which exists between Zaire and the United States. For over 17 years that friendship has been constant. Please reassure President Carter that, from the Zairian side, this friendship will never lag.

—Secondly, President Mobutu wants the Secretary to know how much he appreciated the way in which General Babia was recently received at various levels of the USG.<sup>2</sup>

—Then Umba launched into the Nguza affair.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, Mobutu wants to make the point that our relations are based on institutions and not on individuals, like Nguza—and the point that he, Mobutu, hopes that the Nguza affair will not negatively impact upon those relations. Umba related Mobutu's points and concerns as follows:

—Thank you for the welcome you offered to my predecessor, Nguza.<sup>4</sup> That welcome, we know was to a man who was a special envoy of President Mobutu.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770379–1108. Confidential. Drafted by Kates; cleared by Wisner and Harrop; approved by Walker.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 90.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 89.

—President Mobutu asked me to dispel any ambiguity which might surround the fact that Nguza was accused of treason just after his visit to the U.S.

—Mobutu was not aware of Nguza's treason when he sent him to the U.S. and it was only after he left that the full facts were known. Mobutu did not feel he could recall him and thus allowed him to terminate his mission to America; indeed he allowed him then to go on to Holland for medical treatment. And only after Nguza was feeling better did the President instruct him to return to Zaire.

—Thus, the USG should in no way believe that the Nguza affair has anything to do with the United States. Our relations are based upon institutions, not personalities. In example, it is not now I who speak to you, but rather President Mobutu who has asked me to relay this message.

—President Mobutu has also asked me to relay his profound thanks for the ways in which you made known the American concern for Nguza's fate. Certain other countries (he refers to Belgium) overstated their case and did so in a public and unhelpful manner. The U.S. interventions on behalf of Nguza, on the other hand, were handled through normal diplomatic channels.<sup>5</sup>

—Then Umba went to the question of Nguza's guilt, pointing out that whatever we might believe on this subject—Nguza confessed his treason in the letter he wrote to President Mobutu asking for clemency.

—Umba also showed the Secretary a regular Zairian passport delivered to Nguza by the Zairian Embassy in The Hague on 3 July 1977, whereas Nguza carried and had the right to carry a diplomatic passport. Umba speculated that Nguza knew he was guilty and wanted to anticipate trouble.

—Without missing a beat, Umba then turned to "bilateral relations." He allowed that the Secretary almost certainly knew what he was going to say concerning certain problems in the Zairian economy, but Mobutu thought it important to reiterate the points through his Foreign Minister.

—In spite of the very considerable efforts Zaire has made to live up to the economic stabilization program—and the IMF can attest to our success in this regard—this austerity has been imposed at enormous sacrifice and to little evident economic effect.

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 194775 to Kinshasa, August 16, the Department summarized Moose's August 15 meeting with the departing Zairian Ambassador. Moose pointed out that a "speedy and fair trial of Nguza would be best indication that Mobutu intends to fully implement reforms, especially in the area of human rights." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770296-0060)

—The economic situation remains extremely difficult; copper prices are down, inflation up. There are strikes. The balance of payments gap means a further reduction of imports and then the prospect of more inflation and labor troubles.

—Zaire is talking with a number of friendly countries, asking them for additional assistance. But US influence is such that these governments will not move unless they see a real American interest in Zairian economic recovery.

—However, if the economic picture is bad, the political scene is in very good shape. During the Shaba war many commentators said that it was an “internal” matter. Umba asked rhetorically if, since the invaders were repulsed, one now heard of continued conflict in Shaba.

—But beyond the basic political stability is the important fact that the political reforms announced by President Mobutu are being applied. The electoral campaign, for example, is in full swing.

Secretary Vance interjected to say that he was very pleased to hear of the program of political reform, and interested to see that it goes forward and becomes a reality as soon as possible.

—Umba said that the electoral campaigns were under way now, but emphasized President Mobutu’s prediction that the ex-Katangan Gendarmes would probably try to cause trouble in order to sabotage political reforms. Umba said that the Katangans’ commando training continued and that they continue to infiltrate anti-regime groups.

—The Secretary asked if the GOZ expected such attacks only in the Shaba, or in other parts of Zaire as well? Umba believes that the initial attacks will come in the Shaba, but that they may be followed by forays into neighboring provinces.

—Umba went on to say that the leading Zairian oppositionists are now in Algiers and that their plans included infiltration through Zambia. The Secretary asked if Neto was aware and approved of the Katangan plans? Umba said that given the numbers of Katangans on Angolan soil, we must assume that Neto is aware of this and their plans. Then Umba offered a personal opinion to the effect the Katangans had begun to bother Neto—they were stealing his diamonds—and thus he simply wanted them out of Angola. Umba finished off this part of the conversation by saying that he and Ambassador Kasango had just seen the Zambian Foreign Minister who assured them that Zambian territory would never be used to allow Katangan infiltration into the Shaba.

—Umba finally terminated his near monologue by complaining that in spite of the 17 year old friendship between the US and Zaire—in spite of the fact that Zaire would not be independent today, within its present borders if the US had not intervened in the early sixties—

in spite of all this “we have the impression that you are ashamed of being Zaire’s friends.”

—Your enemies are better treated than your friends, like Zaire, Umba continued. You continue to make clear your commitments to Israel and to South Korea. “Are we not friends on the same plane as they?”, the Foreign Minister asked.

—Secretary Vance then responded to Umba’s points:

—We share President Mobutu’s desire to strengthen and to improve our relations. Indeed, we have worked closely together for the last 17 years and we hope and expect that this close cooperation will continue in the future.

—We appreciate President Mobutu’s message. Please convey to him our thanks for his prompt support for the US-UK initiative on Zimbabwe.<sup>6</sup>

—I would also like to express our appreciation for President Mobutu’s various interventions with Idi Amin on humanitarian issues.<sup>7</sup> We realize that these interventions on our behalf cause President Mobutu problems.

—I do believe it important that the political reforms you mentioned be undertaken. They are necessary, desirable and will strengthen Zaire’s image in the eyes of the world community.

—I am also convinced of the necessity of economic reforms under IMF leadership. These are very important and we want to continue to work with you in implementing these reforms.

—On the military side, we have recently approved the use of FY 1977 FMS funds for the purchase of a stock of M-16 ammunition as well as for tents, medicines, C-rations and other basic supplies.<sup>8</sup> In FY 1978, as you know we are working together to come up with the right equipment to fit into your military reform plans. And in this regard we have discussed further military needs with the Belgians and the French. We seem to be in agreement on your needs and on the question of the relative supply role of each of us. We have eliminated, as you

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 8574 from Kinshasa, September 8, the Embassy reported that Mobutu and Obasanjo had signed a joint communiqué that endorsed the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770325-0324)

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 1745 from Kinshasa, March 1, the Embassy reported on Cutler’s telephone conversation with Mobutu, which described Zaire’s démarche to Amin on behalf of Americans in Uganda, and Amin’s response to Mobutu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770069-1149)

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 223964 to Kinshasa, September 17, the Department transmitted a message from Vance to Mobutu informing Mobutu of approval of the Zairian request to use FY 1977 FMS credits to purchase M-16 ammunition and other supplies, “recognizing your special needs at this time.” (National Archives, RG 29, Central Foreign Policy File, D770338-1240)

know, certain items such as tanks, but these do not seem to us to be the kind of equipment you need in a Shaba-type situation. Other elements of our initial package will be continued, however and our two governments are working out the details.

—We are certainly not embarrassed over the good relations our two countries have enjoyed over the years.

—Our relations have been forged from mutual respect and mutual confidence—and these are the bases from which our relations will proceed in the future.

—Umba thanked the Secretary and in his closing minutes tried to point out that while Zaire's critics always emphasized corruption, it was fair to say that no country was free from corruption. So too for the criticism aimed at Zaire's inefficient administration. Zaire is a young and developing country. President Mobutu is determined to push through his political and economic reforms—but "we need encouragement."

—The Secretary did not respond directly to this last point and the meeting which had run well over the allotted time terminated amid expression of courtesy from both participants.

Vance

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### 93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 18, 1977, 1548Z

249678. Subject: Moose's Meeting With Umba: Pierre Hotel.

1. Following is memcon of October 5 meeting in New York between Assistant Secretary Moose and AF/C Director Walker and Umba.

2. Mr. Moose had been unable to attend Foreign Minister Umba's meeting with Secretary Vance on October 3<sup>2</sup> and had therefore arranged to follow up on certain points with Umba. After initial courtesies, Mr. Moose led off the discussion by making the following points:

—You and other Zairian representatives have told us recently that President Mobutu was pleased that we had directed our interventions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770383–1025. Confidential. Drafted by Kates; cleared by Walker; approved by Moose.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 92.

on Nguza's behalf through normal diplomatic channels,<sup>3</sup> as opposed to other governments who had gone public, and that the President's decision to commute Nguza's sentence reflected our intervention.<sup>4</sup>

—We will always try to handle problems quietly, but at times issues such as the Nguza affair can get out of control. For example, Belgian human rights lawyer Wolf came to Washington last week with the intention of making the Nguza affair a public issue.

—This, in our view, would have been unfortunate, and we were able to persuade Wolf that such an action would be unhelpful. But we also told him that we too were concerned over Nguza's ultimate fate, especially in the light of reports that his health was bad.<sup>5</sup>

—I recount all of this to show you how we are trying to keep the Nguza affair from becoming a public issue between our two countries.

—But I also want to emphasize that there is considerable concern over the Nguza affair in the Congress, the American press and among human rights advocates in general. And thus, the Nguza affair remains an important element in our relations.

—We have confidence in President Mobutu's political acumen and in his humanitarian virtues. We believe that the decisions he will ultimately take in this case—sovereign decisions—will take into account the various factors at play.

—Umba took all this in and clearly got the message that while we were pleased with Mobutu's decision to commute Nguza's death sentence, we expected that President Mobutu would make additional, humane decisions in the ex-Foreign Minister's regard. Umba went back over the accusations against Nguza, pointed out that Mobutu was the one who had been most personally touched by the treason of a close collaborator and tried to pin Moose down as to just what more the U.S. expected Mobutu to do.

—Moose did not bite, but rather reiterated our confidence in Mobutu's judgment—sovereign judgment.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 92.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 8881 from Kinshasa, September 15, the Embassy reported the September 15 news broadcast that gave an account of Mobutu's commutation of Nguza's death sentence to life imprisonment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335-0492)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 244207 to Kinshasa, October 12, the Department reported on the meeting between Walker and Wolf, in which Walker assured Wolf that the U.S. Government was "deeply concerned about the well-being of Nguza" but stressed "the need to avoid public pressure on Mobutu" that "risks making matters worse for Nguza." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770371-0372)

On the nature of US-Zairian friendship

—Mr. Moose then addressed a major preoccupation of Zaire, that concerning the changing nature of the relationship.

—You said to the Secretary that it seemed the US was ashamed of its friendship with Zaire. The Secretary responded that such was not the case and the next day President Carter told you that we were proud of our relationship with Zaire, and I want to reiterate these sentiments.<sup>6</sup>

—At the same time, you should understand that our friendship can be put in an embarrassing situation. For example, during the Shaba war when congressional and US opinion feared too deep an American involvement certain very real constraints were placed upon our ability to respond to the requests of an old friend.<sup>7</sup>

—These are political facts with which we both have to deal and as long as we are both aware of the constraints, we can indeed work together.

—In this regard, and as the Secretary pointed out, progress on political, economic and military reforms in Zaire is the surest base from which the USG can continue to marshal support for your country. I cannot overemphasize this point.

—Umba thanked Moose for his frankness and said that it was this kind of open discussion which cleared the air and allowed both sides to proceed with a better understanding of the factors at play. Umba was especially appreciative of Moose's analysis of both congressional and executive concerns over Zaire, the image problem from which Zaire suffered and the very real need to improve that image through concrete reforms.

On the military side

—Moose also made following points relative to our recent positive decisions on FMS:

—As the Secretary pointed out, we consider our recent decisions on military supply to be a gauge of our desire for good relations.

But there is one point I have made to Ambassador Kasongo and which I would like to reiterate with you: There is profound congressional concern that US military equipment supplied to Zaire might be transferred to UNITA or other Angolan opposition groups.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 247715 to the OAU Collective, October 15, the Department reported on Carter's luncheon with representatives of the Africa Group at the UN, including Umba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770380–0410)

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 79.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 243083 to Kinshasa, October 9, the Department reported that Congress was concerned that Mobutu might transfer arms to UNITA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770369–0464)



—We do not believe this to be Zaire's intention, but given congressional attitudes, we must make the point concerning third country transfers.

—I might also point out that we consider the approval of M-16 ammunition to be a one-time transaction. In other words, the 10 million rounds should last you indefinitely or through any foreseeable contingency. We do not expect to receive future requests for M-16 ammo.

—Umba said he understood perfectly and pointed out that Ambassador Kasongo had already transmitted Moose's previous demarche on this subject to President Mobutu. He reassured us that we need have no fear concerning unauthorized third country transfers.

—Mr. Walker said that during his briefings of Congress concerning our M-16 ammo decisions, he had found great concern over reports that Zaire was on the verge of reinstituting its assistance to UNITA. These congressional contacts had pointed out that if such were to prove to be the case, all bilateral programs with Zaire could be in jeopardy. Umba said he got the point and would relay it to Mobutu.

#### Zairian demarche on ILO

—At the end of the conversation, Umba said that President Mobutu had instructed him to intervene with the USG to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the ILO.<sup>9</sup> Umba implied that Belgium and African states had asked Mobutu to undertake this demarche since they all believed it important that the US remain within the organization and "not allow the Communists to take over." Umba offered to call on George Meany while he was in the US—if that would be helpful.

—Mr. Moose said he greatly appreciated Zaire's intervention in this matter. He also emphasized the history leading up to the US position and pointed out that America's friends needed to effect changes within the ILO if they wished us to remain. Moose said he would pass on the gist of Umba's intervention.

Vance

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<sup>9</sup> In telegram 264665 to the UN Mission in Geneva, November 4, the Department transmitted the text of the formal notification letter on U.S. withdrawal from the ILO, effective November 6. The letter noted that "the US does not want to leave the ILO and would not do so if conditions had changed to make our effective participation possible." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770407-0908)

**94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1977

1. *The Situation in Zaire.* I have been concerned over reports pointing toward a possible resurgence of the Shaba conflict. My talk with Leo Tindemans heightened my worries over the state of the Zairian economy and the possible political repercussions if it continues to deteriorate.<sup>2</sup>

Five weeks ago we approved a Zairian request for 10 million rounds of M-16 ammunition (1,000 rounds per weapon) on the grounds, among others, that if the Shaba conflict were to erupt again it would be better to have already shipped the only lethal items we are likely to be asked for. The Zairians understand that this is a one-time transaction. We are now asking Defense to move the ammunition by regular MAC shipments promptly.<sup>3</sup>

On the economic and related issues of reform in Zaire, I have asked for a study which will address:

—what additional contribution, if any, we might be prepared to make to Belgium's effort to fill Zaire's urgent balance of payments gap.

—the prospect of military, economic and political reforms now underway in Zaire and the degree to which we want to support these efforts.

I will be in touch with you when I have reviewed my staff's recommendations.

Last, I have asked our Ambassador in Kinshasa to remind Mobutu that his renewing assistance to Savimbi will complicate the already difficult situation on the Shaba frontier.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State) 10/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 256442 to Brussels, October 26, the Department reported on Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans' October 19–20 visit to the United States, during which he met with Carter, Vance, and other U.S. officials. In his meeting with Vance, he insisted that Belgium would not give Zaire any money, and "economic changes must be done within the framework of multilateral institutions." Tindemans and Vance "agreed that there was no alternative to Mobutu and we would have to deal with him." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770393–1071)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "ok" in the left margin.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "The only concern about helping UNITA is that it might precipitate an attack on Zaire by Katangans" in the left margin.

**95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 1, 1977

SUBJECT

Sudanese Desire to Purchase F-5 Aircraft and Air Defense Radar

The Joint State/Defense Survey Team which went to Sudan in August at my direction to formulate recommendations for appropriate U.S. contributions to that country's defense needs<sup>2</sup> has concluded that Sudan's most pressing defense need is for an improved air defense capability, including early warning radar and interceptor aircraft. This conclusion is consistent with the December 1976 Sudanese request for F-5's and associated radar. Although the report does not specifically recommend the acquisition of U.S. equipment, its presentation to the Sudanese later this month is expected to trigger an early reiteration of Sudan's past request for F-5s and associated equipment. We therefore must consider our response to the anticipated Sudanese request.

I recommend that you approve the sale of one squadron of F-5's and associated air defense radar. These together with a training program would be the most significant U.S. contributions to an initial 2-3 year phase of a multi-year military improvement program. U.S. participation if any in subsequent phases will be subject to later review. The cost of the aircraft would be about \$78 million and the radar \$31 million. Sudan has assured us that it will have Saudi financial support without which the sale can not proceed.

I believe we should agree to this sale because:

—it will add new momentum to improving U.S.-Sudanese relations;

—it will be welcomed by the Saudis and others as a sign of U.S. support for moderate Arab and African regimes;

—it responds in a modest way to a projected imbalance in aircraft inventories between Sudan and Ethiopia without trying to match the magnitude of Soviet deliveries to Ethiopia.

The sale would be consistent with our arms transfer guidelines.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Sudan: 1/77-5/80. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 172111 to Khartoum, July 22, the Department reported that Vance had requested that the Department of Defense complete a military survey of Sudan before Ramadan, which started on August 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770262-1160)

—it will not introduce into the region a higher level of combat capability. F-5's are already in the inventories of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia is awaiting and Libya already has the longer-range MIG-23.

—the number of U.S. military personnel required to support the sale would be only about 10 for two years, with another 6 contract or DOD civilians.

ACDA concurs in this view.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize me (1) to inform the government of Sudan that we are prepared to respond favorably to their request of December 1976 to purchase one squadron of F-5 aircraft and associated air defense radar; (2) to request the Department of Defense to begin discussions with Sudanese officials to develop the necessary Letters of Offer and Acceptance and to provide the Congress with the related section 36(b) certification.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option and signed "J. Carter."

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## **96. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 27, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

3. *Zaire*: Several weeks ago I mentioned my concern growing out of Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans' visit, at the perilous state of the Zairian economy.<sup>2</sup> We now have the revised Belgian proposal for a new multilateral assistance effort, which Mobutu revealed late last month and christened as his own "Mobutu Plan."<sup>3</sup> We have considered

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State) 12/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 94.

<sup>3</sup> In a November 25 speech, Mobutu announced the Mobutu Plan, which called for "improvements in a number of sectors, among them transportation, agriculture, mining and general management, especially of the financial institutions." The Embassy reported the speech in telegram 11236 from Kinshasa, November 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770439-0277)

Tindemans' request for an indication of how we might participate in the effort and we plan to tell him we are prepared to process a \$20 million loan and guarantee for Zaire's copper economy, subject to Ex-Im's evaluation and concurrence. We will hold in abeyance, pending further indications of Mobutu's seriousness in implementing promised economic reforms,<sup>4</sup> a decision on whether to provide a possible \$8 million in additional PL-480 assistance on top of \$18 million of food aid already programmed for Zaire. Meanwhile, we will reaffirm to Tindemans our commitment in principle to participate in the Mobutu Plan and tell him that we look forward to attending a coordinating meeting of potential donors in the new year.

We have also considered diplomatic steps which we might take to stabilize the Angola-Zaire border situation. Our concern is that military assistance from French, Belgian and Moroccan sources being funneled through Zaire to UNITA may prompt Neto to encourage a resumption of Katangan gendarme attacks aimed at Zaire. My conclusion is that we cannot dissuade the French and Belgians from their view that their long-term interests are served by an ultimate Savimbi victory.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to again warning Mobutu against diversions of US-supplied equipment. We will also share with him our concerns that his continued interference in Angola, even as an intermediary for others, could jeopardize Congressional support for our present economic and military programs and provoke the Angolans and Katangans into stepping up their activities in Shaba.

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<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "implementing promised economic reforms" and wrote "We should be strict on this" in the left margin.

<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined "long-term interests are served by an ultimate Savimbi victory" and wrote "ours also?" in the left margin.

**97. Letter From President Carter to Zairian President Mobutu<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 16, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of February 20<sup>2</sup> and for sending your personal emissaries to Washington. I regret that my schedule did not permit me to receive Foreign Minister Umba-di-Lutete and Planning Minister Mulumba Lukoji.<sup>3</sup> However, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski have given me a full account of their discussions on the Mobutu Plan for recovery and reform in Zaire, as well as on Angola and other issues of mutual concern. The discussions were most useful, and I have gained a much clearer impression of Zaire's problems and its determination to overcome them.

We remain committed in principle to support the multilateral effort to help meet the economic and financial crisis facing your country. We look forward to exploring the details further in the weeks ahead. As you know we are convinced that the success of the Mobutu Plan will depend on implementing a stabilization program and an agreement with the IMF. I was therefore pleased to learn that your government has also formally requested the IMF's help in recruiting outside specialists to exercise authority in the central bank and the Ministry of Finance, so that you can assure foreign exchange repatriation and budgetary control.

We welcome the role the Belgian Government has played in coordinating the multilateral effort and we look forward to cooperating fully with it, other countries, and international institutions in helping Zaire meet its problems.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Zaire: Mobutu. No classification marking. The Department transmitted the letter to the Embassy in Zaire in telegram 72015 to Kinshasa, March 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780123–1123)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 58521 to Kinshasa, March 7, the Department transmitted a translation of Mobutu's letter to Carter asking for U.S. support for the Mobutu Plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780103–0527)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 55150 to Kinshasa, March 3, the Department reported on the meeting between Umba and Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780098–0958)

98. **Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kinshasa, May 8, 1978, 1344Z

4549. Subject: Mobutu Plan: Background. Ref: Brussels 07720.<sup>2</sup>

1. In view of the Belgian invitation to a prospective donors' conference (reftel), the Embassy believes addressees might find useful some background to Zaire's economic problems, some definitions of terminology, and a report on the status of implementation of economic reforms.

2. Causes for the current economic problems: Taking advantage of high commodity prices of the early 1970's, Zaire embarked on an overly ambitious development program, accompanied by numerous prestige projects and with little management control. During the same period it also undertook an extensive nationalization program which resulted in a drastic decline in industrial and agricultural production as well as disruption of normal commercial supply channels. As long as commodity prices remained high, Zaire had no problem borrowing to meet its foreign exchange deficit. However, in late 1974 there was a general decline in commodity prices and a particularly steep fall in the price of copper, Zaire's primary export. At the same time, prices for imported petroleum products more than tripled. In 1975, the Benguela Railroad, the principal supply and evacuation route through Angola for Zaire's minerals, was closed, adversely affecting production levels and increasing costs. Prospects for the railroad's reopening are still poor. As a result of all these factors, Zaire's foreign exchange reserves were effectively exhausted in 1975.

3. Stabilization program: The USG and other traditional donor countries informed Zaire that any additional economic assistance would be dependent upon Zaire's undertaking self-help measures. In August 1975 Zaire requested the assistance of the IMF in preparing a stabilization program and began to implement a number of measures designed to bring about economic recovery. These measures, together with an IMF standby signed in March 1976 and another IMF standby

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194-1128. Confidential. Sent for information to Bonn, Brussels (also for USEEC), Bukavu, Jidda, London, Lubumbashi, Lusaka, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Tehran, The Hague, Tokyo, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7720 from Brussels, April 20, the Embassy transmitted Belgian Foreign Minister Simonet's invitation to Vance to participate in an international conference on implementation of economic reforms in Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780169-0624)

signed in March 1977, have been the essence of the stabilization program.

4. Self-help measures: The most important of the self-help measures which Zaire has undertaken are the following:

A. Devaluation: In February 1976 Zaire devalued its currency by approximately 42 per cent. However, continuing inflation coupled with import shortages and economic stagnation have brought about a situation where the zaire is once again seriously over-valued on the official market.

B. Retrocession: In late 1976 Zaire began a process, now virtually completed, whereby up to 60 per cent of the equity ownership in major nationalized industrial, agricultural and commercial enterprises would be returned to the original owners.

C. OGEDEP: In 1976 Zaire created an Office of Debt Management (OGEDEP), which inventories and monitors all GOZ debt. This office has only recently begun to function fully.

5. IMF agreements: Zaire did not comply with the provisions of the 1976 standby, in that the budgetary deficit considerably exceeded the agreed-upon target—primarily because of greater than-anticipated GOZ expenditures. Partly as a result, inflation in 1976 was approximately 80 percent. Following a review in October 1977, the IMF again found Zaire not to be in compliance with the provisions of the standby signed in March 1977. Although the IMF found extenuating circumstances in that the price of copper was less than had been assumed and no proceeds had been received from the anticipated private bank loan, the budget deficit was again considerably beyond the agreed-upon target, again because of greater-than-anticipated GOZ expenditures. The GOZ and the IMF have had several consultations and are expected to negotiate the terms of a new standby agreement in May.

6. Official debt rescheduling: In 1976 the USG and Zaire's other major Western creditors, under the auspices of the Paris Club, agreed to reschedule a substantial portion of 1975 official arrearages and a major portion of interest and principal payments coming due in 1976. In 1977 the USG and other major Western creditors agreed to another generous rescheduling concerning most official payments coming due that year. They also agreed that they would consider the same generous terms for 1978, provided that Zaire concluded a comparable agreement with its private creditors, concluded a new IMF standby, and made its best efforts to abide by the terms of the previous rescheduling agreements. Although Zaire has made an effort to comply with the terms of the two previous rescheduling agreements, it has not yet reached an agreement with its private creditors, nor has it signed a new standby. However, it is expected that these two conditions will



be satisfied in the near future and a Paris Club meeting to consider 1978 obligations is expected to follow soon thereafter.

7. London bank agreement: In November 1976 Zaire reached an agreement in principle with the private banks which were the managers of its syndicated loans. Under the terms of the agreement, if Zaire became current in interest and principal payments due these banks under the syndicated loans, then the banks would make their best efforts to raise up to \$250 million in medium-term credits. In July 1977, Zaire essentially complied with its obligations under the London agreement. But, because of the Shaba invasion and other factors, including a change in the Governor of the Central Bank, the private banks by that time had not been able to raise a significant new loan for Zaire. However, it is expected that in the near future these private banks and the GOZ will conclude a five-year credit for approximately \$220 million. Disbursement will be contingent upon the GOZ being current in all payments due to banks under syndicated loans and on the conclusion of an IMF standby.

8. Mobutu Plan: Following the 1977 Shaba war President Mobutu spoke of a "Marshall Plan" to assist in the economic recovery of Zaire.<sup>3</sup> Following discussions with a number of European governments, particularly with the Belgians, President Mobutu announced the Mobutu Plan, designed to restore the economy through a combination of self-help measures and foreign assistance.<sup>4</sup> He asked the Belgians to help in the preparation of the plan and to serve as coordinators in soliciting assistance from other donors. Funds from foreign donors are to be channeled and coordinated through the IBRD. Although not yet completed, the plan is essentially a three-year program designed to ensure better fiscal and monetary management and development of priority projects in key sectors of the economy such as agriculture, transportation, mining and energy. The main aspect of the Mobutu Plan yet to be completed is the financial section which will reflect key elements of the contemplated IMF standby. The major self-help measures contemplated by Zaire will be better fiscal and monetary control. In this connection, the GOZ has requested the IMF to provide experts for the Central Bank, and the GOZ and IMF reportedly have agreed upon the powers of a team at the Central Bank which will essentially control foreign exchange allocation. Likewise, it is contemplated that foreign experts will be placed in the Ministry of Finance, particularly in the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 96.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 17472 from Paris, June 14, 1977, the Embassy reported on the Zaire Consultative Group meeting, held June 8–10, 1977, in which Zaire's Minister of State for Finance Bofassa first called for a "Marshall Plan" for Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212–0498)

customs division where fiscal irregularities are notorious. The GOZ already has put foreign experts in control of its essential rail and river transportation systems and, as a result, productivity of the transportation sector has increased significantly. It is hoped that similar effectiveness will result from placing expatriates in the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance.

Cutler

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**99. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kinshasa, May 13, 1978, 1145Z

4740. Subject: Reported Military Action in Kolwezi. Ref: Lubumbashi 454 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. American sources at CIS construction camp in Kolwezi report (via radio to CIS Kinshasa) that starting 0500 hours May 13 firing broke out and continued for several hours into morning. Firing believed to include small arms and mortars with airport apparently one of major targets. CIS sources have not rpt not confirmed info reftel re air attack. As of mid-morning, some sporadic firing still reported but apparently farther away from Kolwezi town.

2. Of total 75 Americans (including dependents) at CIS base Kolwezi all but one accounted for. One American dependent child slightly injured, apparently by small arms fire which struck pick-up truck. CIS is moving its two helicopters and two DC-3 aircraft to Kamina for possible evacuation. However, no rpt no evacuation orders have yet been issued and CIS Kolwezi reports Americans there are reasonably calm while taking steps to improve their local security situation.

3. FAZ sources report President Mobutu is expected to arrive in Kinshasa today. Late May 12 I was informed to be ready to go to Gbadolite next day to see Mobutu along with French, British, and Chinese Ambassadors. Upon arrival at Kinshasa airport this morning,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780211–0814. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Brussels, Lubumbashi, Lusaka, USUN, and Paris. Sent for information to Brazzaville.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 454 from Lubumbashi, May 13, the Consulate informed the Embassy in Kinshasa that missionaries reported a combined land/air attack on Kolwezi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780203–0559)

May 13, for the flight to Gbadolite we were all informed, without explanation, that flight cancelled because Mobutu returning Kinshasa. Fact that we represented permanent members of Security Council, and that Soviet Chargé had been summoned by Mobutu May 12, may indicate GOZ intention to lodge complaint with SC.

4. At this point facts of Kolwezi situation are unclear. FAZ has told us that "enemy attack" has taken place but has confirmed nothing more. We cannot rule out possibility that military action involves FAZ forces only.

5. Will report further as info becomes available.

Cutler

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## 100. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1978

### SUBJECT

SCC Working Group Meeting on Zaire—May 16, 1978—11:00 a.m.

Principal points and assignments made were as follows:

In the Intelligence area the radio blackout was noted and State is to check with the GOZ concerning the situation at the Base Camp. CIA is to produce maps and photographs of the Kolwezi area. [3 lines not declassified]

With regard to the evacuation of American citizens, the situation is unclear. State is to look into the possibility of sending cars in from Lubumbashi. DOD said that an air drop into the Kolwezi to seize the airport and rescue Americans could take place in 66½ hours from the time it was ordered. If troops were on alert this would be reduced by 18 hours. The advisability of putting troops on alert will be decided later. DOD will also look at a smaller military option, putting a company-size force in to defend the Americans in place. It will also check on aircraft availability to effect an unopposed evacuation. State is to press French and Belgians on their evacuation plans.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 10, SCC Meeting #80 Held 5/26/78, 5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Aaron, Richardson, and Odom. No minutes of the meeting have been found.

In the area of military supply, Defense said it would have a good fix on availabilities and requirements by Wednesday morning. They will see what they can do to expedite flow of critical items both in terms of rapid movement and reprogramming within the FY 1978 orders.

We will keep Congress informed and if we decide to go to military alert will brief them. We will be developing public statements later this afternoon.

In addition to close consultation with the French and Belgians, diplomatic activities will include keeping selected African states briefed on the situation and contacting the Angolans and Portuguese.

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**101. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1978, 12:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

Kolwezi Relief Operation

The planning is going forward for the possible rescue operation by the Belgian Government with U.S. support in providing petroleum at a staging base outside the combat area. In addition, the Belgians have asked us through EUCOM to lift the equivalent of three C-141 loads of equipment to Zaire. This equipment would include ammunition. The Defense Department is trying to find out what the equipment involves, the destination of the lift and how essential it is that the U.S. provide this lift. Charles Duncan recommends we take no action on the request until we have the answers to these questions and I agree.

The State Department has a report from the French Ambassador in Kinshasa that the French together with Gabonese forces plan an operation into Kolwezi no later than the morning of the 19th (Friday).<sup>2</sup> The French Ambassador reports that the Belgians may participate in that operation or mount a separate one of their own. We are concerned

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1–5/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4936 from Kinshasa, May 18, the Embassy reported that the French Ambassador had informed Mobutu that French, Gabonese, and perhaps other African troops would mount an airborne rescue mission in Kolwezi beginning the morning of May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1878)

over the degree of coordination, if any, which exists between these efforts and its impact on our support activity and are seeking clarification in Paris and Brussels.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 15761 from Paris, May 18, the Embassy reported that as of 10 a.m. Paris time, Giscard was reaching a final decision on French action. The French and Belgians had one fundamental disagreement in that France was inclined toward a French military operation to stabilize the region, while Belgium wanted a more limited rescue operation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209-0341) In telegram 9516 from Brussels, May 18, the Embassy reported that the Belgian Foreign Minister's Chef du Cabinet had described the disagreement in a similar fashion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209-0589)

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**102. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Charles Duncan's Revised Information on Combined Operations in Zaire

Charles Duncan called me at 11:00 a.m. today to update his last word to Dr. Brzezinski a short time ago<sup>2</sup> and to make some other points:

—First, the refueling personnel on the ground in Kamina will remain tomorrow night due to Belgian requirements that Duncan was not aware of an hour ago. He wants to amend his report to specify that 11 American personnel will remain through tomorrow night. We were speaking on an open line, and I am not aware of the details of the Brzezinski/Duncan conversation; therefore, precisely what 11 additional Americans on the ground means is not clear to me.

—Second, General Huyser reports that:

(1) The French and Belgians are endeavoring to set up a combined command;

(2) The French intend to stay in Kolwezi longer than required simply to rescue Europeans;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 61, Zaire: 5-8/78. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

(3) The first group of aircraft lifting French forces are reportedly off the ground.

—Third, the French have only five DC–8s which are not configured for cargo transport. They also have 50 C–160s which are short range and unsatisfactory for the present operation.

—Fourth, if you still have questions, Duncan expects you to call him.

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**103. Presidential Determination No. 78–11<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT

Assistance to Zaire

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 25 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, I hereby determine that:

(a) The furnishing to Zaire of not to exceed \$2,500,000 in international military education and training for the fiscal year 1978 under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the extension to and utilization by Zaire of not to exceed \$17,500,000 for the fiscal year 1978 in credit under the Arms Export Control Act, and the utilization by Zaire of the uncommitted balance of credit extended to Zaire under the Arms Export Control Act in any prior fiscal year, are important to the national security interests of the United States; and

(b) Such assistance should be furnished to Zaire in the national security interests of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Congress, as required by law. You are also requested to keep the Congress fully and currently informed on the specific details of how the assistance to Zaire is utilized.

This determination shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 72, Zaire—1978. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Brown. “22 May 1978” and “SecDef has seen” are stamped in the upper right corner. Brown initialed the memorandum and wrote “5/22.”

**104. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1978

SUBJECT

SCC Working Group Meeting on Zaire—Friday, May 19, 1978

The following points summarize the meeting you chaired this morning.<sup>2</sup>

CIA briefly reviewed the situation in Shaba. It is unclear.

During the course of the meeting the details of U.S. support were elucidated:

- Ten C-141s to assist the French air lift to Zaire;
- Eight C-141s to haul ammunition from Brussels to Zaire;
- POL from Kinshasa to Kamina where 11 Americans will remain overnight to secure satellite terminals and POL equipment.

David Aaron emphasized the difference between the Belgian extraction mission and the French protection mission, i.e., the French intend to stay, whereas the Belgian forces intend to pull out European citizens.

Dick Moose reported the Congressional reactions thus far as supportive. State interprets the War Powers Resolution to have no applicability in this case.

Issues that came up in press guidance strategy included:

- Nature of Cuban and Soviet support or involvement.
- Rationale for U.S. aid to Belgians and French, particularly the dilemma posed in supporting a Belgian extraction effort as opposed to a French occupation mission.

The meeting ended in an effort to list the chronology of U.S. decision making in response to requests from Zaire, Belgium, and France.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 61, Zaire: 5-8/78. Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> No minutes of this meeting have been found.

**105. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 20, 1978

1. *Shaba Operations*: By early afternoon our time, 10 Americans have been reported by our Consulate in Lubumbashi as having been rescued from Kolwezi (one of them wounded, the other nine in good condition).<sup>2</sup> We have unconfirmed reports that two Americans have been killed. The other American out of the total of 13 who were in Kolwezi is still unaccounted for.<sup>3</sup>

Belgian forces were airdropped into Kolwezi early this morning. The French report that friendly forces have control of all parts of town, that they had found almost all houses looted, and that about 60 European bodies have now been discovered. French military casualties are one killed and 15 missing with around 200 enemy killed.<sup>4</sup>

The Katangans are reportedly retreating toward Zambia en route to Angola in a truck convoy with an unknown number of expatriate hostages. We instructed our Embassy in Brussels to contact Angolan Ambassador Almeida there with a request that the Angolan Government take urgent measures to assure the hostages' safety should they arrive in Angola. Almeida said he would relay the message to Luanda.<sup>5</sup> (The Angolans had told us earlier this week that they would permit transit of evacuees from Shaba.)

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State) 5/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 521 from Lubumbashi, May 20, the Consulate reported on the status of the U.S. citizens in Kolwezi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780213–0256)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5140 from Kinshasa, May 22, the Embassy reported that one U.S. citizen had been killed and the others were all safe. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780215–0085)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5086 from Kinshasa, May 20, the Embassy reported on the military situation in Kolwezi at 1000Z on May 20, including the discovery of European bodies and an update on French military casualties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780213–0144)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 9784 from Brussels, the Embassy reported that the Political Officer had met with Almeida, who promised to relay the message to Neto. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780215–0863)



**106. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1978

SUBJECT

SCC Working Group Meeting on Zaire—May 22, 1978.

The following major points were developed in a meeting this afternoon on Zaire:<sup>2</sup>

1. CIA gave the judgment that the Katangans can repeat incursions into Shaba in the future, and the FAZ probably cannot prevent them.

2. State reviewed the French efforts as indicating movement toward a French-African peace-keeping force, but this is merely an inference. The rundown on the Belgians intentions was taken largely from the recent Belgian cable asking for a swift reply on the U.S. attitude toward an international peace-keeping force in Shaba.<sup>3</sup> The most useful force, it was observed, would be one along the border which can detect Katangese incursions early.

3. The Zaire economy can be expected to spiral downward with the exodus of Europeans which will continue from all parts of Zaire unless the security situation can be changed. In a word, the outlook for the economy is disastrous.

4. Tony Lake suggested we review the long term policy implications, but for the shorter run we must work up a package of economic and military support for Zaire, demanding reforms so that Mobutu cannot waste the time gained as he has the past year since the first Katangese incursion.

5. A number of ramifications of U.S., NATO, French, Belgian, and African involvement in Zaire were discussed against the previous statements of the situation and proposals for U.S. action.

6. David Aaron summed up the meeting with the following points:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 10, SCC Meeting #80 Held 5/26/78, 5/78. Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> No minutes of this meeting have been found.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 9852 from Brussels, May 22, the Embassy reported that Simonet had asked "if the United States would support or participate in the formation of an international force to provide security for Shaba." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780215-0740)

a. We can render political support for an international peace-keeping effort but at present we cannot make a commitment of material support.

b. We face no request for aid now with the possible exception of Babia's mention of a joint French/Zaire query. That must be clarified as to whether it is in fact a formal Zairian request.

c. We need to produce a policy paper reviewing the longer term implications for the U.S. and its allies in Zaire.

d. We should draw the French and the Belgians out on their longer term intentions.

7. Two outputs to be accomplished are:

a. A cable to Belgium answering the questions on peace-keeping to the effect we offer political support to an international peace-keeping effort.

b. State's policy paper on the longer term.

8. The meeting also discussed briefly State's desire not to deliver a bill for the costs of the U.S. forces to the French and Belgians at present. David Aaron asked, on another matter, that DIA/[*less than 1 line not declassified*] get someone on the ground in Kolwezi and other relevant places so that we may have a regular American report on what is going on.

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**107. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Murray) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Towards Zaire

At the NSC Working Group meeting this morning, chaired by Dave Aaron, there was considerable discussion of the U.S. intermediate and longer term policy with respect to Zaire.<sup>2</sup> The two alternatives posed were: (a) the U.S. should be greatly concerned about the future of Zaire

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 72, Zaire—1978. Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right corner indicates that Duncan saw the memorandum on May 23. Duncan initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, ASD/ISA, and Africa Reg/ISA.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to the SCC Working Group meeting. See Document 106.

and the political, economic, security, and diplomatic steps we might take to ensure Zaire's solvency; and (b) Zaire is essentially a European-African problem, and our role should be minimal. State is preparing a paper now for interagency review on this subject.<sup>3</sup> The paper is to be ready by Wednesday, and another Working Group meeting is scheduled for Thursday. An SCC meeting may be scheduled on Friday.<sup>4</sup>

The second major topic of discussion was Zaire's security situation. It is felt that the Zairean armed forces are not able to provide the essential security environment for the return of the expatriate community to Kolwezi. (It may be that expatriates working elsewhere in the country will take the Shaba conflict as a sign that they ought to leave.) This means great difficulty for Zaire's economy. It was decided that U.S. support for an international peacekeeping force was a desirable thing; however, we could not decide on the character of our support for an international force until we had a clearer idea of our longer run objectives in Zaire. (We will work with DIA to develop our own DOD<sup>5</sup> ideas on possible peacekeeping forces.)

**Robert J. Murray<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> No paper has been found.

<sup>4</sup> The dates for Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday are May 24, 25, and 26.

<sup>5</sup> Murray wrote "DOD" in the sentence.

<sup>6</sup> Murray initialed "RJM" above his typed signature and wrote "I will keep you informed" at the bottom of the page.

**108. Editorial Note**

In a news conference on May 25, 1978, President Jimmy Carter accused Cuba of playing an active role in the Katangan invasion of Zaire. “We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plans to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them from crossing the border. We also know that the Cubans have played a key role in training and equipping the Katangans who attacked.” (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 972) On May 23, Carter had signed PRM/NSC–30 directing a Policy Review Committee review of U.S. policy toward limiting the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa. See Document 11.

The Cubans categorically denied any role in the invasion to the press and U.S. officials. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in his memoirs, described his May 25 conversation with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in which Rodriguez insisted that the Cubans “had had no connection with the Katangans for more than two years.” Vance “told him our information indicated that the Cubans had supported the Katangan incursion. Indeed, we did have some ambiguous and, as it turned out, not very good intelligence to this effect.” (*Hard Choices*, p. 90) See also Document 12.

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**109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Next Steps in Zaire

The SCC met this morning<sup>2</sup> to discuss our overall approach to the Zairian problem and, in particular, what you should say to Giscard this evening.<sup>3</sup> Talking points for the latter are at the end of this memorandum.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1–5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> No minutes of this meeting have been found.

<sup>3</sup> A record of this conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

The decisions that we make now are going to have important long-term consequences. To some extent, our support of the rescue operation has identified us with European attempts to preserve the situation in Zaire. If we now decide to proceed with support of French and Belgian ideas for a much more ambitious political and economic rescue plan, backed up by an international military force, we will have committed ourselves to an undertaking that will be costly with only a 50–50 chance of success. Most important, even the fact of consultations starts us on the road to this commitment.

You should be aware that the State Department is inclined to consult first and only incrementally develop issues for your decision. Instead, we have insisted on establishing a framework setting forth the limits of our prospective involvement as guidelines for any such consultations. The SCC recommendations on this are set forth below.

The key issues are:

- (1) Are we willing to get involved in some measure in an increased long-term development/reconstruction effort?
- (2) Are we willing to support an international “peacekeeping” effort in Shaba?

#### *The Long-Term Effort*

Despite the poor prospects for significant reform, there was a general SCC consensus led by State that Zaire is too important and the global stakes too high for the United States to continue its past posture of marginal support for the Zaire economic effort. It is important to recognize that before the invasion, the United States had given indications that it was prepared to support the Mobutu plan—a fairly ambitious multinational development effort with a price tag of about \$300 million annually, with financing coming from governments and international banks. The disruption in Shaba will add another \$150 million in short-term costs to that price tag. A multinational planning meeting of donor nations for Zaire has been planned for some time to convene June 14–15 in Brussels.<sup>5</sup>

The SCC recommends that any U.S. contribution to such a program would depend on significant reforms—many of which Mobutu has already pledged he would undertake.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 7, Document 112. In telegram 11758 from Brussels, June 14, the Embassy summed up the U.S. position in the meeting: “In sum we refused to commit our \$18 million PL-480 package until the Zairians give us some indication of what foreign exchange revenues they foresee over the next three months and how they propose to use them to address essential import priorities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780248–1056)

The alternative of not participating in this effort would probably lead to a rapid economic collapse in Zaire and political fragmentation of the country. At the same time, you should be aware that deeper U.S. economic involvement will mean that Zaire will become politically more important to us and, success or failure, strategically more significant. In this connection, everyone agrees that, to the maximum extent possible, we should be junior partners to the Europeans and others in this development program.

#### *Security Situation*

The SCC agreed that any long-term economic recovery could not take place unless there was an improvement in the security situation. There was agreement that you should be prepared to indicate to Giscard our willingness to provide airlift for elements of an international force. It is also recommended that we assume the costs (in the neighborhood of \$20 million for approximately 175 C-141 sorties).

The SCC also believes that we should respond positively to requests for equipment to replace US-origin items transferred into Zaire for the international force. It was recommended that we be prepared to participate in the financing of such replacement equipment but not assume the entire burden.

It was also agreed that while the United States should be prepared to provide some specific, very short-term training or familiarization with certain equipment (i.e., commo gear), we should not station any people in Zaire for maintenance or any other purpose.

#### *Allied Consultations*

There was consensus that the next step should be to begin consultation with the Belgians and the French on both the security situation and economic reconstruction plans. If you agree with the above principles, that would serve as guidance for such consultations.

Your meeting with Giscard would be the first of our consultations. At that meeting, you should try to get him to spell out the extent to which France plans to be involved. If the French are prepared to support the Mobutu plan and an international peacekeeping force as has been reported, you could indicate in general terms our willingness to do so within the above constraints.<sup>6</sup> This would be followed up by a meeting between Cy Vance and the Belgian and French Foreign Ministers in

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<sup>6</sup> A White House statement issued at the end of the meeting noted that Giscard and Carter “expressed their common concern about recent developments in Africa and agreed that concerted action with the African countries is necessary to promote security and development in that continent.” (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 1008)

the next few days<sup>7</sup> and, subsequently, a lower level planning session in Europe.<sup>8</sup> However, we also would wish to broaden the base of planning and consult as rapidly as possible with the Africans.

*Talking Points*

Talking points along the above lines are attached.

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 13686 to Brussels, May 30, the Department reported on the meeting between Vance and Simonet on May 29, in which they agreed on the root causes and issues of the Shaba situation and Vance promised to send Newsom to Brussels for a meeting on the Mobutu Plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780226-0553) In telegram 137873 to Paris, May 31, the Department reported on Vance's meeting with French Foreign Minister de Guiringaud, in which they agreed that France would host a June 5 meeting in Paris to discuss Zaire's security and economy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780228-0151)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 111.

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**110. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Mini-SCC Meeting on Zaire.

A Mini-SCC met this morning<sup>2</sup> prior to David Newsom's weekend mission to Paris on the Zaire operation.<sup>3</sup> Newsom will meet with the French on Sunday to discuss our backstopping of the Shaba operation. The Monday meeting, to include other allies, is less well defined.<sup>4</sup> The French want to discuss the idea of a Pan-African force for general purpose duty. We will avoid commitments in this area, not the least because we do not want to offend English-speaking friends such as Nigeria and Tanzania who will probably be opposed. Newsom will try to get the Monday meeting to focus more on the Shaba operation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 6-12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> No meeting minutes have been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 111.

<sup>4</sup> Sunday and Monday were June 4 and 5.

and the preparation for the economic meeting to be held on Zaire later this month.

Newsom is going with guidance reflecting your desire to keep the Europeans in the lead, rely on African troops, and keep us in a backstopping role not including troops. He will emphasize the limits on our involvement in the current operation (30 sorties) and make no commitments at this point with regard to US supply of equipment. However, with your approval, he would indicate that we are prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis some limited replacement of US items used in Shaba (as previously recommended by the SCC).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, we will be pointing out to the French our concern that their evacuation not proceed so rapidly that it creates panic among the Europeans in Shaba.

On the economic front, Newsom will be equally cautious and make no commitments about future US aid levels. He will encourage maximum contribution by the Europeans, coordination among the donors to effect reform in Zaire,<sup>6</sup> and indicate that we will use our influence with the IFI's and the private lenders to be helpful to Zaire. However, he will make clear we shall remain "junior partners" in this effort. This issue will be discussed more extensively at the Brussels meeting June 13–14.<sup>7</sup>

Does the above approach meet with your approval?<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 109.

<sup>6</sup> Carter underlined "effect reform in Zaire" and wrote "Very important" in the left margin.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5, Document 109.

<sup>8</sup> Carter checked the "Yes" option.



# 111. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 6, 1978

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to Central Africa.]

2. *Paris Meeting on Zaire*—Under Secretary Newsom has returned from the Paris meeting on Zaire and reports that throughout, the key problem was the French desire to expand the results of the conference—through presentations during the meeting and the press statement to include their goals of a Pan-African Intervention Force and the Giscard Fund.<sup>2</sup> After extended negotiations the press statement reflected the views we share with the British, the Germans, and the Belgians. French concerns were partially satisfied by a general reference to wider African problems. In addition, a working group produced a report which calculated Zaire's requirement for urgent imports over the next three months at some \$55 million for food, petroleum, and medicines alone. The group was unable to calculate the requirement for spare parts but it is probably in the neighborhood of \$5–15 million. There was a firm consensus on the need to press Mobutu for reforms which would be necessary if foreign assistance is to be forthcoming and effective.

The French made an appeal to all present to assist with the ongoing support of the African Force in Shaba. No commitments were made in Paris, but this issue of medium-term support for the African Force will bedevil us in the weeks ahead.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State) 6/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 17965 from Paris, June 6, the Embassy reported on the details of the June 5 Paris meeting and the debate on the press statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780236–0553) Giscard proposed a Special Fund for African Development, which became known as the Giscard Fund, at a Franco-African summit held in May 1976. For the Ford administration position on Giscard's proposal, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–6, Documents of Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 46, 49, 52, and 54.

**112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1978, 0304Z

148155. Subject: Follow-up to Five Power Demarche:<sup>2</sup> Letter From President Carter to President Mobutu. Reference: State 148132.<sup>3</sup>

1. Following the joint five power demarche to Mobutu on reforms, you should deliver the following message from President Carter to President Mobutu: Quote:

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of June 4 in which you noted the appreciation of the Republic of Zaire for the assistance my government has extended over the years and particularly during the current crisis.<sup>4</sup>

You raise the problem of Soviet-Cuban activities and intentions in Africa, which greatly concern the United States and other Western governments. I have initiated a review of this question and will be undertaking further appropriate actions when that review is completed.<sup>5</sup>

But in the meantime, I wanted to share with you my conviction that the problems of stability in Central Africa go beyond the issues posed by Soviet-Cuban activities. And on the basis of the discussions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243–1142. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Brussels, Bonn, and London. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Brzezinski, and Moose and in S/S; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 18434 from Paris, June 9, the Embassy reported that the five powers (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Belgium) agreed to deliver a demarche to Mobutu on reforms agreed to at the June 5 meeting in Paris. The recommendations concerned national reconciliation, “full participation of all the regional entities of Zaire in the national life of the country,” the improvement of Zaire’s institutions, enhancing Zaire’s diplomatic position, and economic recovery and stabilization. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780241–1029) Regarding the June 5 meeting, see Documents 110 and 111.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 148132, to Paris, Brussels, London, and Bonn, June 10, the Department instructed the Embassies to urge their host governments to move quickly to deliver the five-power demarche. The telegram, also sent for information to Kinshasa, instructed that Embassies emphasize the need for Zaire to streamline and discipline its armed forces and to inform Mobutu that his comments that indicated Zaire might arm and train anti-Neto forces in Angola were “counter-productive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243–0670)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5777 from Kinshasa, June 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of Mobutu’s June 4 letter to Carter, in which he reaffirmed U.S.-Zairian friendship and expressed thanks from Zaire for the “assistance that the Government of the United States of America has never ceased to give it from its accession to independence in 1960 until today.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234–1061)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 11.

held in Paris on June 5, I believe that my analysis is shared by the other governments represented there. Indeed, the Ambassadors of the five powers have already shared with you the main conclusions of the meeting in Paris. Let me be more specific.

Between friends, we can speak frankly and address the need for reforms in Zaire. Your own public declarations on this subject have come to form the framework of needed reforms in the political as well as the economic fields. Both you and your foreign friends are in agreement that these reforms are urgent.

To summarize my understanding of what we have agreed thus far: on the economic front, a new stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund must be signed just as soon as possible and it is understood that continued bilateral assistance will be related to performance under the terms of the agreement. We have also agreed on the reforms you set forth in the "Mobutu Plan,"<sup>6</sup> notably relating to the placement of foreign experts in key positions at the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and in customs, as well as a clear shift in development priorities toward agriculture. Our representatives will be pursuing these in Brussels June 13–14.<sup>7</sup>

As I review the elements of the economic reform package, I am struck by the common concern, not only in the IMF-led stabilization effort, but also in the Mobutu Plan, over control and repatriation of foreign exchange.

As you know, both the stabilization plan and the recovery plan cannot be put in place overnight, yet the urgency of economic reform is such that something must be done quickly to give the signal that the process is being implemented. This is particularly important from the American viewpoint where our Congress will want to see evidence of reform before we can envisage further assistance. In this regard, you might wish to consider putting into place an interim system for assuring that foreign exchange receipts are repatriated to Zaire's essential import requirements. You may have other ideas which would get across the

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 98.

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 11763 from Brussels, June 14, reported on the conclusions of the meeting, which was attended by delegations from Germany, Belgium, Canada, the United States, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Zaire, the IBRD, the EEC, and the IMF. The telegram also transmitted the French text of the document agreed on by the participants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780249–0162) In telegram 153099 to Brussels, June 15, the Department transmitted a translation of the French text. Entitled "Conclusions of the International Conference on the Mobutu Plan Held in Brussels on the 13 and 14 June 1978," it listed the measures necessary to assist Zaire to implement its plan for economic and financial recovery: "management reorganization, economic and financial stabilization, revitalized production, particularly in the areas of agriculture, mines, transport, and manufacturing." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780252–0036) See also footnote 5, Document 109.

key message that Zaire's own resources are being used to address essential needs.

Beyond the economic reforms you have laid out, I see particular significance in the political reforms you announced in your July 1 speech.<sup>8</sup> As I understand it you envisaged the use of the office of the Prime Minister more fully to handle the day-to-day business of the government and to revitalize the functions of the legislative assembly. I consider this concept of decentralization critical not only to the functioning of your constitutional institutions, but also to the effort of national reconciliation which I know you are undertaking.

When the five met in Paris we reviewed the short term requirements of security in Shaba and, as you know, discussed the needs of the African force which is being put in place there. But we all agreed that the African force is only a temporary solution and that the fundamental problems of stability in that region had to be addressed:

—The reintegration of Shaba into the body politic of Zaire;

—An improvement in relations between Zaire and Angola, which would lead Angola to cooperate in preventing the further incursions of Katangans into Zaire;

—Restructuring the FAZ into a leaner, more disciplined force which would have the trust and support of the population.

Again, I know that you have ideas on how these critical problems can be approached and I would greatly appreciate hearing from you in this regard. In Paris, our analysis pointed to some specific actions, but we were all agreed that only you could undertake the dramatic gestures and detailed diplomacy that will be necessary.

Lastly, Mr. President, I must raise the most delicate of issues. As you know, the furtherance of human rights has become an integral part of American foreign policy.

There is no intention on our part of imposing our view on others, but it is also clear that a pattern of human rights violations in a given country inevitably has its repercussions on the overall relationship in general and on assistance programs in particular.

I realize full well the enormous challenge that bringing unity to the nation of Zaire presents and I know that American norms cannot be transplanted. At the same time, you must know that I cannot continue significant assistance if corrupt elements continue to be associated in the public mind with your government. Our Ambassador will be pre-

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<sup>8</sup> In telegram 6192 from Kinshasa, July 1, 1977, the Embassy summarized the main points of Mobutu's July 1, 1977, speech, in which he proclaimed that Zaire's "political structure and economy had to be democratized and decentralized." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770235–0981)

pared to discuss specific allegations with you if you desire. Also, support will be most difficult if the pattern of arrests and executions we have witnessed continues.

This letter is being sent in a spirit of friendship and frankness. We wish to see Zaire develop into a strong and unified nation. We feel that this can be done only if the hard facts of the current situation are faced courageously and those decisions made which will insure the success of our common effort. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End quote.

2. This letter should be delivered only after joint demarche of five Ambassadors.

3. Info addressees should see to it that copies of President Carter's letter to Mobutu are delivered in strictest confidence to the Chiefs of State of the respective governments with a note encouraging them to follow up with an equally firm line, making clear that we will deliver letter after joint demarche.

4. French text follows by septel.<sup>9</sup>

**Vance**

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<sup>9</sup> Telegram 148156 to Kinshasa, June 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243-1145)

**113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Responses to your Memorandum of June 16 regarding the Reinforcement of our Collection Capabilities [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; and to your Memorandum of June 19 regarding provision of Intelligence Support to the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

I have reviewed your memorandum of June 16,<sup>2</sup> and I support and approve your initiative to reinforce our intelligence capabilities [*less than 1 line not declassified*], as outlined in your memorandum.

I have reviewed your memorandum of June 19 regarding provision of intelligence support to [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and I approve the provision of intelligence and other support, as outlined in your memorandum.

Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>3</sup>

**Attachment**

**Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, June 19, 1978

[Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files S–Z, Box 27, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files S–Z, Box 27, Zaire. No classification marking;

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

**114. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1978

*Zaire.* The western ambassadors have begun meetings with Mobutu to urge that he undertake serious reform in Zaire. Giscard called Mobutu to stress the importance of the five-power demarche, and Mobutu received the French Ambassador yesterday. We understand that Mobutu told the French that he agreed with the points made in the five-power memorandum.<sup>2</sup> In response to the French Ambassador's suggestion that relations with Angola be improved, Mobutu said that he was willing to try to reach an understanding with Neto but was skeptical about what could be achieved. Kaunda, he said, has offered to mediate.

Our Ambassador made his demarche today and delivered your letter.<sup>3</sup> Mobutu read the letter carefully and bristled momentarily at references to corruption, arrests, and executions. His comments were defensive, but he asked that we be assured that he is aware of the need to expedite reform.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State) 6/78. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 7, Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 112. Cutler reported on his meeting with Mobutu in telegram 6429 from Kinshasa, June 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256-1242)

## 115. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 21, 1978, 9:30–10:45 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with President Nimeiry of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan

### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
\*Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U.N.  
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
David A. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Donald C. Bergus, U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan  
\*\*Parren J. Mitchell, Congressman from Maryland  
Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff Member for Relations with the Press  
Paul B. Henze, (Notetaker), National Security Council Staff Member  
Gaafar Muhammed Nimeiry, President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan  
Rashid Al-Tahir Bakr, Vice President and Foreign Minister  
Dr. Francis Deng, Permanent Secretary, MFA  
Abu Bakr Mohammed Osman Salih, Minister of State, Council of Ministers  
Omer Salih Eissa, Sudanese Ambassador to the United States

\* Present for the first part of the meeting.

\*\* Present during the last part of the meeting.

*The President*, who had welcomed President Nimeiry and his party on the portico, opened the formal meeting by stating that we were pleased at the close relations we have developed with Sudan during President Nimeiry's tenure and that we were happy to welcome him also as a representative of the entire continent of Africa as Chairman of the OAU.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Africa.]

*President Carter* then suggested that the discussion turn to African problems and OAU efforts to settle them. *President Nimeiry* replied that African problems, too, were complex, and Sudan considered them just as important as Middle Eastern ones. He said he would like to comment

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 8–9/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.



briefly on four crisis situations: the Horn, South Africa, Chad and the Western Sahara.<sup>2</sup>

The basic problem in the Horn is backwardness, *President Nimeiry* declared. This is why the Ethiopian people reacted the way they did. He recalled that shortly after changes came in Ethiopia he had visited President Ford and had urged continuation of American military and economic assistance for Ethiopia.<sup>3</sup> He was puzzled about what happened after that, he said, for the United States did not give help and left the Ethiopians no alternative but to accept Soviet help. The Soviets rushed in and things have gone from bad to worse, with the Soviets now moving into the area of political organization. Errors on the part of Somalia also contributed to this situation, he said. Ethnic problems in Ethiopia took most serious form in Eritrea because Eritrea had had a separate colonial existence. For Sudan Eritrea is a very important problem, President Nimeiry said, because it affects Sudan directly, with half a million Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees there. The OAU Summit meeting in Khartoum recognized this problem, he said, and tried to find a way of trying to settle it, with Sierra Leone taking the lead in mediation efforts.<sup>4</sup>

As long as the Soviet Union and Cuba are involved in Ethiopia, *President Nimeiry* said, he feared the Eritrean problem could not be settled, for he was convinced the Soviets wished to exploit it to consolidate their position in Ethiopia. The Somalis were continuing to support the guerrilla movement in the Ogaden and Sudan fears that this may bring about another outbreak of war. This would also help Soviet and Cuban interests. "What exactly are Soviet and Cuban intentions?" he asked—"I cannot be sure about them but I believe that their objective is still to expand their influence and to bring Marxist ideology to all of Africa. The Soviet Union, using Cuba as an instrument, is very active in Africa and claims to be opposing imperialism or reactionary systems. A central factor is the speed with which the Soviet Union responds to the needs of Africans so that some of the smaller and weaker countries find it very attractive to turn to the Soviet Union for help, knowing that they will get it quickly—the Soviets pour in weaponry. They take advantage of the poverty of people in these countries and their lack

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<sup>2</sup> The discussion of the Horn took up all available time and there was no discussion of the other three situations. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>3</sup> See Document 235 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, for the June 10, 1976, meeting between Ford and Nimeiry.

<sup>4</sup> The OAU summit took place in Khartoum July 18–21. The Embassy reported on the Ethiopia/Sudan Mediation Commission, chaired by Sierra Leone, in telegram 3335 from Khartoum, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303–0679)

of knowledge of the real intention of the Soviets. We have tried to find alternative solutions for some of these countries.”

Returning specifically to Ethiopia, *President Nimeiry* said Sudan had tried to find a basis for settlement in Eritrea and also a basis for settlement between Ethiopia and Somalia. He was convinced that these efforts would have had some success had it not been for the fact that the Soviet Union moved with such speed to undermine them. *President Carter* said we had evidence of strain between the Soviets and Mengistu and reports that Mengistu had asked the Cubans to reduce their forces; he added that we knew Mengistu had made overtures to the Egyptians for better relations. “What are the chances for better relations between you and Ethiopia?” *President Carter* asked.

“We believe we could move very fast in improving our relations with Ethiopia but only on condition that the parties commit themselves to a non-violent means for settling problems,” *President Nimeiry* replied. “It may be that next month I will have a meeting with Mengistu in Dar es Salaam. I intend to confront him very frankly with some of the problems that we see confronting Ethiopia and to suggest what could be done to bring Ethiopia back to a better position. But I am afraid that Ethiopia under the leadership of Mengistu seems to resort too rapidly to extreme Marxist approaches—this may well indicate that Ethiopia is going to be a second Cuba and merely an instrument of the Soviet Union.” He commented on the recent celebrations of the fourth anniversary of the revolution in Addis Ababa, saying that these had been a demonstration of extremist Marxism and “no country which stands in the way of Marxism in Africa was left uninsulted.” “China, too, was insulted by Mengistu simply because it has a quarrel with the Soviet Union,” *President Nimeiry* declared.

*President Carter*, noting that time was pressing, asked *President Nimeiry* to be sure to discuss Rhodesia, Namibia and other African issues with Deputy Secretary Christopher and other Administration officials and to give them the full benefit of his ideas.<sup>5</sup> He then asked *President Nimeiry* for comments on the bilateral relationship. He observed that what *President Nimeiry* has done to bring peace to the Sudan and to recognize basic human rights is a tribute to his statesmanship and leadership. He noted that the United States is helping Sudan with F-5’s and C-130’s and said he wanted to see the military relationship continue. He asked *President Nimeiry* to comment on

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 243435 to Khartoum, September 25, the Department reported on discussions between Nimeiri and officials from the Department of State. Nimeiri and Deng delivered Sudanese assessments on the subjects of peacekeeping in Africa, Namibia, sanctions on South Africa, Rhodesia, and the economic development of Sudan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392-0337)

what might be done in the future to strengthen U.S.-Sudanese ties of friendship and mutual support.

*President Nimeiry* said Sudan needed rapid response to its needs because it is in an area where many challenges must be faced from elements who tend to get responses very rapidly from other sources. Sudan needs military support to confront threats from outside because it is a large country located in a crossroads position and it is affected both by what happens in Africa and in the Middle East. Sudan's only source of strength, he said, was its internal strength. Changes which have been brought about have made the country stronger, he maintained.

*President Carter* replied that the United States is eager to continue to increase assistance because we recognize the benefits that come from stability and peace. "You have a leading role to play in Africa and in the Arab World. This is in itself a great protection for your people, as are your relationships with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya. We would like very much, before you leave Washington, to have your frank ideas on how we may be of greater assistance to you. My own inclination is to support you in your needs. Our aid program is limited but we recognize the value of your friendship and your strength," the President concluded.

*President Carter* then introduced Congressman Parren Mitchell, Chairman of the Black Caucus, who had joined the meeting somewhat earlier, and stressed the importance of Congress in supporting the Administration's efforts. The Congressman indicated that he would be going to Sudan in a few weeks for a first visit and President Nimeiry assured him of a warm welcome.<sup>6</sup> With expressions of appreciation for a good meeting from both Presidents, the talks came to an end. President Carter escorted President Nimeiry and his party to their car.

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 5773 from Khartoum, November 30, the Embassy reported on the November 29 meetings between Nimeiri and attendees, including Mitchell, at the ninth annual conference sponsored by the African-American Institute, which took place November 27-30 in Khartoum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496-1029)

**116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 28, 1978

SUBJECT

African Peacekeeping Force in Zaire's Shaba Province—INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

*I. Summary.*

You asked what is happening on the prospective withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Zaire's Shaba province. In sum, we agree with our European colleagues that the African peacekeeping force should remain in Zaire, but we maintain that our allies should now assume full responsibility for it given their greater direct interest and the extent of our commitments elsewhere. French President Giscard is likely to appeal this stance when he meets with President Carter at Guadeloupe January 5–6.<sup>2</sup>

*II. No Immediate Withdrawal.*

King Hassan has not started removing his forces nor has he requested assistance to do so. He has apparently been receiving some outside help. The Quai informed us December 13 that France had earlier received \$25 million from Saudi Arabia for French equipment for Morocco's Shaba troops.<sup>3</sup> Belgium and France are also currently discussing with Senegal arrangements for about \$5 million each in assistance for Dakar's contingent.

We agree with our European colleagues (Belgium, France, Germany, the UK) that the African peacekeeping force is badly needed to maintain order in the Shaba province. We are also inclined toward the more pessimistic estimates that it will be next September or later before

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 72, Zaire—1978. Confidential. A stamp in the upper right corner of the memorandum indicates that the Deputy Secretary of Defense saw it on December 29. Duncan initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to Brown and Resor.

<sup>2</sup> The Guadeloupe Summit took place January 5–7, 1979, with Carter, Giscard, British Prime Minister Callaghan, and German Chancellor Schmidt in attendance. In telegram 5365 to all NATO capitals, January 9, 1979, the Department reported on the summit, but did not mention an appeal from Giscard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790010–0571)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 41016 from Paris, December 14, the Embassy reported on the December 13 meeting in Paris on Zairian security, during which the French discussed the Saudi \$25 million purchase of equipment to support Morocco's troops. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780516–1008)

Zairian replacements can be trained. But we feel that we have made our contribution and that those with greater direct interests in Zaire should now carry the remaining costs. This position was set out in State Department instructions on December 7<sup>4</sup> and restated in a Paris meeting with our European colleagues on December 13.

### III. *Airlift.*

Embassy Paris has reported that Giscard is likely to appeal the US position when he meets with President Carter January 5–6 at Guadeloupe and may well argue for the US at least assuming responsibility for the ultimate removal of the peacekeeping forces.

It can be argued that, having airlifted the peacekeeping force into Shaba, the US has some responsibility for its removal. But the US has never assumed such a commitment. When President Carter consented on May 26 to the second Zaire airlift, he and Giscard also agreed in principle that the European states should take the lead and carry the main burden in dealing with the Zairian problem.<sup>5</sup> The US airlift was provided in the context of lifting the Europeans out and bringing African replacements in—not as a contribution to an indefinite maintaining of order in Zaire.

In response to a State request, JCS is now costing out both the airlift rotation of Moroccan/Senegalese forces and their ultimate removal (with equipment). The withdrawal cost is likely to be as much or more than for the original lift. While a US airlift with C-141s would be more efficient than our allies' use of Moroccan or Zairian C-130s, there is no outsize equipment requiring US planes. Costs could be reduced if troops were flown out by commercial carriers and materiel were airlifted to Kinshasa and then shipped to Dakar and Casbalanca.

David E. McGiffert

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 308828 to multiple posts, December 7, the Department transmitted background and instructions concerning U.S. support for the inter-African peacekeeping force in Shaba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780504–1035)

<sup>5</sup> Carter hosted a working dinner for Giscard on the evening of May 26. See Document 109 for the SCC recommendations to Carter for the meeting.

## 117. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 10, 1979, 2:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

US-Zairian Bilateral Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *US*

Secretary Cyrus S. Vance

Mr. Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Mr. Lewis D. Junior, Director, AF/C

#### *Zaire*

Commissioner for Foreign Affairs NGUZA Karl-I-Bond

Ambassador KASONGO Mutuale

Ambassador NGOY Kapenga Kamakanga, Deputy Director of Cabinet

Nguza opened by thanking the Secretary and other American authorities for their interest and support for him personally during his recent “bad days”.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary responded that he was overjoyed to see Commissioner Nguza restored to his present position.

Nguza said that he had already spent three days in Washington, most of it on Capitol Hill, where the subject matter had been only about one-third Zaire and two-thirds Rhodesia. Concerning Zaire, however, he had found a good deal of sympathy, even among those most critical of Zaire and President Mobutu, e.g., Mr. Solarz.

In response to the Secretary’s question as to the situation on the Senate side, Nguza said that he had met with Senators Church, Javits and McGovern, all of whom had taken a positive view. Javits had told Nguza that, although he was a Republican, he would support the administration view on Zaire. Senator McGovern had been very helpful and Senator Church, accompanied by several staff members, had posed many questions and promised to be helpful vis-a-vis the House. The Secretary said that he would personally speak with Congressman Solarz on the issue of aid to Zaire.

The Secretary asked Commissioner Nguza for a report on the Zairian action program for internal and economic reforms.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 118, Zaire: 1–10/79. Secret. Drafted by Junior on May 17; cleared by Moose; approved by Wisner on June 6. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 90 and 93. In telegram 7367 from Kinshasa, July 15, 1978, the Embassy reported that Nguza had been released from prison on July 14, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780290–1108)

Nguza responded that President Mobutu has done a great deal in meeting the requirements of Zaire's international partners. He ticked off, among other accomplishments, the successful amnesty decree which had resulted in the return of 150,000 Zairians from Angola, the reconciliation with Angola, and progress on the internal problems of Zaire. Mobutu had asked Nguza to explain to all Zairian dissidents located outside Zaire that they should and could return to Zaire to work for the good of the country without fear of the central regime. Referring to the decentralization of power, the President had created the office of Prime Minister and was giving the incumbent, Bo-Boliko, a good deal of authority and discretion in the use of his power. Bo-Boliko has been given sufficient independence to make important decisions, in consultation with his cabinet colleagues. The National Assembly has been freely elected, granting that it was within the context of a one party system. Even so the Zairian people had in many instances their choice of up to ten candidates for each post to represent them in Kinshasa. Another hopeful development was the new process of interpellation of department heads in the legislature.

The Secretary asked to what extent the Shabans are being reintegrated in the political life of the country.

Nguza, in response, pointed out the thousands of returnees to Shaba from Angola. Moreover, Shaba is represented in the Political Bureau by a number of members, including himself. Nguza is a member of the National Security Council. Counting himself, there are a total of three Shabans having ministerial portfolios and there is one regional commissioner (Governor) from Shaba.

In response to the Secretary's question as to the progress on reorganization of the army, Nguza said that criticism against the army had been at two levels. The first had pertained to the regrettable acts committed by the soldiers, acts which, however, were more understandable when one recognizes that they frequently had not been paid for periods running to three or four months. The solution to this problem had been to create an independent office within the Ministry of Finance which would be responsible for regular pay to the soldiers.

The second and larger problem was the creation of a "new army" with more training and more discipline. The FAZ needs officers and non-commissioned officers who care about their profession and who will not confuse their own private interests with those of the country. It was in this context that the government of Zaire had requested and received assistance from Belgium and France in the training of 3,000 new soldiers each. Additionally, Zaire has asked the Chinese to train up to 3,000 commandos.

The Secretary asked how long it would take to complete the training process. Nguza felt that by the end of September sufficient troops



would be trained to complete replacement of the Inter-African Forces. The Belgians would move their training operations to Kamina Base in Shaba and the French would be physically present in Kolwezi and elsewhere in Shaba. The replacement of the IAF would begin about the end of June, continuing through the end of September. At about mid-point, perhaps at the end of August, the French would join the Zairians in joint maneuvers in Shaba for psychological reasons, to reassure the expatriate community that it was safe to remain or return.

The Secretary noted that we had carefully followed the repatriation of Shabans from Angola and were encouraged. This had led to greater stability along the border with Angola and reinforced the congratulations which had been given to President Mobutu on his reconciliation with that country.

Nguza noted that Zaire had been talking to King Hassan about the withdrawal of the Moroccans and other components of the IAF, hopefully with United States assistance.

The Secretary responded that we will help. We are still considering problems of finance and legal constraints but we are working out the necessary ways to resolve these problems.

Mr. Moose noted that we are consulting with the French and Belgians about some kind of joint effort in the replacement process.

Commissioner Nguza referred to the economic situation in Zaire which he characterized as being "terrible and dangerous". He said that without substantial assistance from Zaire's friends Zaire will never reach "take off". The Mobutu Plan had as a fundamental objective the fight against corruption in Zaire. It looked to reinforce the management of the financial institutions in Zaire such as the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. In public enterprises it looked to the reduction of managerial abuses. A fundamental component of the Mobutu Plan is the presence in Zaire of outside experts such as those provided by the International Monetary Fund.

The Secretary asked what plans were being made to retain the services of the IMF's Erwin Blumenthal. Nguza responded that Zaire has asked the IMF to keep Blumenthal as long as he might be needed.

The Secretary said it was clear that a key problem for Zaire is regaining the confidence of lenders and donors. To this end it was extremely important to conclude the agreement with the IMF and then to work out the problem of the debt renegotiations.

Nguza said that the government of Zaire was in full agreement. The problem with the IMF had become more difficult, however, since the government of Zaire had found it necessary to increase salaries in the public sector following on the steep prices resulting from three currency devaluations. The skyrocketing prices had created severe social and political problems for the government of Zaire.



The Secretary responded that he was familiar with the problem having seen it in other countries. He added that he wished to be helpful in getting the (IBRD) Consultative Group mechanism working.

The Secretary said he was following with considerable interest the problem of barter deals in Zaire. Mr. Moose commented that he and the Commissioner had covered the barter deal problem in great detail in the morning meeting. It was possible to sympathize with the occasional, one-time, barter deal to cope with a specific difficult situation. However, it is necessary whenever possible to avoid them since they tend to syphon off foreign exchange which would otherwise be available to meet priority needs in the developmental and social needs of the country.

The Secretary told Commissioner Nguza that the United States government was appreciative of Zairian support for the Egypt/Israel treaty and added that he was worried about the possible outcome of the Islamic conference. It looked as though Egypt might be suspended from the conference.<sup>3</sup> He felt that it was totally unfair to punish a country such as Egypt for entering into an agreement which would enable it to get back its own lands and which would for the first time deal with the Palestinian problem.

The meeting ended at 3:30 p.m.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3164 from Rabat, May 9, the Embassy reported that the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference had voted to suspend Egypt's membership in the Islamic Conference and associated bodies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790170-0117)

**118. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1979, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Meeting Between Dr. Brzezinski and Commissioner Nguza (U)

PARTICIPANTS

*Zaire*

Commissioner (Minister of Foreign Affairs) Nguza Karl-I-Bond  
Ambassador Kasonga Mutuale, Embassy of Zaire in Washington  
Ambassador Ngoy Kapenga Komakcanga, Nguza's Deputy Director of Cabinet

*United States*

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Mr. Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa  
Mr. Jerry Funk, Staff Member, National Security Council

Dr. Brzezinski opened the 15-minute meeting with an apology for having to meet so briefly, but said that he wanted to receive the Commissioner personally to extend the personal greetings of the President. (U)

Nguza thanked Dr. Brzezinski for making room on his busy schedule, and expressed his gratitude to the American Government and to the President personally for the interventions on his behalf when he had been under the death sentence which was later removed, with full pardon, by President Mobutu.<sup>2</sup> (C)

Nguza then presented some personal mementos to Dr. Brzezinski, and delivered a personal letter from President Mobutu to the President.<sup>3</sup> (C)

He then briefly noted the purpose of his visit, to gain rapport and understanding for Zaire, and recounted his experience on the Hill. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stated that the U.S. views Zaire as important, both from the bilateral relations point of view and from the strategic point of view. He noted that it was in a strategic position and wielded important power and influence in African affairs. He went on to speak

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Zaire: Mobutu. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 117.

<sup>3</sup> Mobutu's April 28 letter to Carter expressed his desire to reaffirm Zairian-American friendship and to present Nguza as Foreign Minister. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Zaire: Mobutu)

encouragingly of the reforms which Zaire had instituted, and expressed the hope that this would be a continuing process. (S)

Nguza responded affirmatively and said that he had been questioned extensively and intensively about reforms, and that at one point he had been asked for "proof" of Mobutu's commitment to reform. Nguza said he simply replied, "the proof is me." (S)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out our concerns about obtaining a just and viable settlement in Southern Africa, particularly Rhodesia, which would forestall further outside intervention, prevent complete polarization of the races, and promote stability in the area. He noted that Zaire had an important role to play in this process. (S)

Nguza agreed, and said that President Mobutu would be taking further initiatives in order to help bring about a political settlement. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski noted this with satisfaction, and said that he felt the OAU should take a stronger position to assure a larger role in settling this issue on a regional basis. (C)

Finally, Dr. Brzezinski, responding to an earlier question, noted that he hoped that the President and President Mobutu would one day be able to get together to talk personally at some mutually convenient time.<sup>4</sup> (S)

There followed a warm exchange of thank yous and good-byes, and Dr. Brzezinski escorted Nguza to his limousine. (U)

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand underlined "Brzezinski" and "he hoped that the President and President Mobutu would one day be able to get together to talk personally at some mutually convenient time."

**119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Central African Empire<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1979, 2306Z

122925. Subject: Student Deaths.

1. Amnesty International has issued following release which is being carried by wire services.

2. Quote: Children Slain Lead

Paris (AP)—The imperial guard of Emperor Bokassa I bayoneted, clubbed and stoned to death as many as 100 school children last month in the Central African Empire because they protested wearing uniforms to class, Amnesty International said today.

The Paris section of the London-based human rights organization said the children, aged 8 to 16, were rounded up in the capital city of Bangui on April 18 and taken to the central Ngarangba prison to be punished. The Amnesty report said the children had thrown stones at official cars, including Bokassa's. Amnesty International, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for its work on the plight of political prisoners, cited "numerous, varied and reliable sources, both African and European" for its report on the slayings. Amnesty said Bokassa's guards swept through the Bangui neighborhoods of Malimaka, Boy-Rabe, Zande and Nzakara and arrested several hundred children. "Some of the children were stoned by the imperial guards to punish them for having thrown stones at the imperial car," Amnesty said. "Others were stabbed with bayonets, others died from blows by clubs containing nails. Probably nearly 100 children were killed and buried in a common grave during the night by the guards," the report said. The organization said the students were locked in small cells sealed so tightly that about 20 of the children suffocated. Amnesty said one witness alone counted 62 bodies. The next day, the 58-year-old Bokassa, who describes himself as "the father and protector of the children who are the future of the country," announced he was going to free those still in custody. "It appears that in fact some were released," Amnesty said. End quote.

3. Department has developed following press guidance.

4. Q. AP reports from Paris that Amnesty International has released information pertaining to student deaths at government hands in Bangui, Central African Empire. What information can you provide on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790223-1110. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Junior; cleared by Walker; approved by Junior. Sent for information to Yaounde and Paris.

this subject, what is the Department's reaction to the report, and what is the Department's general view on the human rights situation in the CAE.

A. We have received reports from Bangui that a number of young persons were rounded up and imprisoned in mid-April. The reports included allegations that, while the bulk of the students and other young persons had been released, some of them might have been killed while in custody. The rumors in Bangui ranged from roughly seven dead to about forty. However, we have had no independent confirmation of these stories, or indeed whether any deaths actually occurred. However, if true, we would greatly regret the reoccurrence of government violence directed at the student population along the lines of comparable events reported in Bangui in January.<sup>2</sup> Following that occasion we expressed our views with considerable clarity to the Government of the CAE. Last, it might be noted that the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have deleted from the current foreign assistance bill some \$685,000 requested by the administration for a rural health project in the northern part of the country. The deletion was on grounds of human rights violations.

5. Decontrol upon receipt.

**Vance**

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 132 from Bangui, January 18, the Embassy reported that several thousand high school students demonstrated in the streets of Bangui, smashing cars and throwing stones at the police. The issue was the sharp rise of the price of uniforms and a new attempt to enforce wearing them. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790025-0679)

## 120. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 23, 1979

### SUBJECT

Meeting with Sudanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Francis M. Deng

### Sudanese Participants

Dr. Francis M. Deng, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Eissa, Ambassador to the United States

### United States Participants

Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Murray  
Director, DSAA, LTG Graves  
Mr. Lloyd Cutler, Consultant  
Assistant for East Africa, ISA, Mrs. Charles  
Col. Coyle, Military Assistant to DepSecDef

Mr. Duncan informed Dr. Deng of yesterday's Senate action increasing Sudan's proposed FY 1980 appropriations to \$25M in FMS credits and \$50M in security supporting assistance. Dr. Deng responded that he was aware of the Senate's good news and amazed to see how quickly the word had spread throughout Washington. Dr. Deng then launched into a lengthy discussion on Sudan's position in the region vis-a-vis its neighbors, explaining that the principles which Sudan supports and which had won it friends in the past are now endangering Sudan's achievements. This was evidenced by the hostile actions of Iraq which cut Sudan's oil supply without warning at a very critical time. Because of the instability in Sudan created by the radical Arabs, a debate within the country has ensued as to whether or not the government's continued support of President Sadat and the Peace Treaty is wise. The radical Arabs have undertaken subversive actions to discredit President Nimeiri's position with his countrymen, and to further arouse public discontent. Rejectionist Arabs are providing both money and arms for this purpose.

Dr. Deng continued that the situation with Ethiopia and Mengistu's refusal to resolve the Eritrean dispute during the Freetown talks is also destabilizing to Sudan's security. At the end of the talks, which Dr. Deng attended as President Nimeiri's interpreter, Mengistu threatened

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0205, Box 22, Sudan—1979. Secret. Drafted by Charles; cleared by Graves; approved by Murray for Duncan. The meeting took place in Duncan's office.

to turn Sudan into another Lebanon (by the supply of arms to southern dissidents Dr. Deng surmised).

Dr. Deng said that deepening concern about Sudan's security prompted President Nimeiri to write a letter to President Carter, which Dr. Deng was asked to deliver.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Deng said he was appreciative for the opportunity to meet with Secretary Duncan since he understood Secretary Duncan's meeting with LTG Magid had been a good one. The reported success of Magid's visit had been revitalizing to the Sudanese.

Secretary Duncan stated that he was pleased with the marked improvement in the level of US assistance for Sudan. He believed that through their visits Sudanese officials such as Dr. Deng had presented Washington officials with a clearer picture of Sudan's needs, thus enabling us to be more responsive to Sudan's requests for aid. Secretary Duncan then mentioned the proposal for a National Communications Network for Sudan which both President Nimeiri and LTG Magid had raised during previous meetings with him. (Dr. Deng said he also intended to raise the subject.) Secretary Duncan explained that Collins Division of Rockwell International was now actively pursuing the project. Collins expects the project would cost between \$5M-\$7M, and that the Collins representative in Cairo would be visiting Khartoum within the next week to discuss the proposal with Sudanese government officials. Secretary Duncan asked Dr. Deng to tell President Nimeiri that we understood the importance of this project, and that Sudan could use FY 1980 SSA funds for this purpose if it chooses to do so.

Dr. Deng was pleased with the news on the Communications System. He then mentioned that one important issue he was asked to discuss was Sudan's need for general military planning over the next five years based on the survey report which we provided in December 1977.<sup>3</sup> President Nimeiri is seeking closer US/Sudanese defense cooperation for the next five years to help bridge the gap between Sudan's military deficiencies and requirements.

Secretary Duncan said that we want to be helpful and supportive in meeting Sudan's military requirements. Current trends in this direction are positive. Secretary Duncan pointed out that in his letter President Nimeiri acknowledged the constraints on President Carter in being responsive to Sudan's military requests. Secretary Duncan continued that we would like Sudan to remain a moderating influence. He was pleased that the dialogue between our two governments was construc-

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<sup>2</sup> Nimeiri's May 7 letter to Carter included a plea for economic and military support to meet Sudan's defense needs. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 18, Sudan)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 95.

tive, stating that good communications between us lead to a better understanding in our government of Sudan's needs. For example, at a time when Congress is enforcing reductions in general, the Senate instead has added to Sudan's FY 1980 allocations. He was pleased that things are moving in the right direction.

Dr. Deng then confidentially mentioned that he wished to explain President Nimeiri's efforts in southern Africa. He believes that if African leadership approaches Rhodesia realistically, they would see that the new government has potential. The new leaders in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe have also struggled to get where they are. It is too simplistic to expect each party to be happy with the outcome of the elections. President Nimeiri believes in the broader concept of representation and for this reason he is continuing to negotiate with Patriotic Front leaders. Nkomo in fact has asked to meet with Nimeiri.

On Uganda, Dr. Deng explained that the Sudan is apprehensive about the way Amin met his downfall since it was a violation of territorial boundaries. As head of the OAU, and because some Sudanese were involved in Uganda, Sudan has withheld recognition of the new government. They do intend to be supportive of the new government, however, in order to help bring stability to the country.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Deng briefly mentioned the Foreign Minister's recent visit to Libya and the embarrassment it had created for his government. He explained that they were trying to correct some of the erroneous statements made on Sudanese policy during the visit.

Dr. Deng said he would be returning to Sudan from his visit reassured of US support. Secretary Duncan suggested to Dr. Deng that if the Sudanese felt an increase in US presence through ship visits or deployments such as the earlier F-15 visit, would help to deter Sudan's adversaries, then we would be willing to provide such a signal. Dr. Deng thanked Mr. Duncan for the offer. He went on to say that two other ways which he believed we might demonstrate close US/Sudanese defense cooperation and thus deter aggression would be by airlifting some military items which we plan to expedite to Sudan, and by sending a team to Sudan to discuss Sudanese defense planning. Secretary Duncan said he would look into these possibilities.

**Sandra L. Charles**  
*Assistant for East Africa*

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<sup>4</sup> After Amin fled Uganda into exile in Libya on April 11, a provisional Ugandan government was formed. See Documents 162–166.



**121. Letter From President Carter to Zairian President Mobutu<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I want to take the opportunity provided by your kind letter of April 28<sup>2</sup> and the recent visit of Foreign Minister Nguza<sup>3</sup> to review with you key elements of the relations between our two countries. I last wrote you on June 11, 1978.<sup>4</sup> Since then, much has occurred and important tasks have begun.

The sustained momentum of the economic and other reforms you have set in motion continues to be an important factor in our relations. As we explained to Foreign Minister Nguza, the conclusion of the pending stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund will mark a major milestone in your efforts to revitalize the Zairian economy. Once this agreement is in place, we should be able to proceed rapidly with implementation of a new agricultural commodity program and with disbursements on the Inga-Shaba transmission line cost over-run loan.

Equally important is continued progress on the full range of other reforms which you have set in motion, including those expanding political and civil liberties. In this regard, I welcome your recent decision to reshape your cabinet as a commitment on your part to place increasing responsibility in the First Commissioner and his colleagues for carrying out reform programs in all sectors of national life.

We both recognize, however, that there is still far to go in achieving all that you have established as Zaire's primary objectives. In particular, we are convinced that the Zairian armed forces must earn the trust and support of the people in all regions of Zaire if they are to carry out their mission of preserving national security. The pace of military reform will assume larger importance as Zairian troops begin to replace the African forces in Shaba. We want to help in this process and, as we informed your Foreign Minister, we are prepared to participate in a combined effort to withdraw the African forces from Shaba according to the timetable you have established.

We want to continue to support you as you pursue the rigorous program you have articulated as the sound basis for reform and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 22, Zaire: Mobutu. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 118.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 117 and 118.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 112.

national renewal. As a means of cooperating on this important program you have undertaken, our staffs should remain in close and frank dialogue on all aspects of the program implementation, and perhaps at some appropriate point it could be useful and productive for us to get together for a talk under circumstances mutually convenient.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Central African Empire<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 11, 1979, 2345Z

150230. Subject: Revised Policy Toward the Central African Empire.

1. Department has completed a review of relations with the Central African Empire taking into account the recent reports of killings of young people and congressional action to prohibit bilateral assistance.<sup>2</sup> We have reached consensus on an approach which makes clear our condemnation of the reported killings, both to the CAE and to American public opinion, but which does not unduly risk the safety of Americans in that country.

2. Ambassador Cooke will return to Bangui at least until the aid phase out is completed in October,<sup>3</sup> at which time the situation will be again reviewed. As soon as possible after his return, the Ambassador will convey our displeasure and congressional attitudes to Prime Minister Maidou.<sup>4</sup> A Washington announcement will be made following that demarche. We will approach other African governments and the French and other Europeans to state our views and seek their opinions.

Depending on the French reaction, consideration might later be given to urging France to cut its budgetary assistance. The recently

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790265–0460. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Paris, Yaounde, Ndjamena, Brazzaville, Dakar, Libreville, Kinshasa, Abidjan, Monrovia, Kigali, and Cotonou. Drafted by Gribben (AF/C); cleared in HA, H, S/P, AF, EUR/WE, AF/C, and AF/W; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 119.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 136468 to Bangui, May 27, the Department announced the recall of Cooke to Washington for consultations on U.S.–CAE relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–1109)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 124.

named African investigating committee will be urged to expedite its activities. CAE applications to the IFI's will be screened with particular care. We plan to vote against loans which appear to support Bokassa's regime.

3. Ambassador Cooke will use the following talking points with GOCAE Prime Minister Maidou:

—We have warned the Emperor repeatedly that lack of real improvement in human rights would result in an aid cutoff. Congress has now taken these steps. We regret losing BHN projects, because we wanted to continue to help the people of the CAE. But decision is taken and we will be phasing out our assistance and our people.

—The USG attaches great importance to the visit of the five-nation fact-finding mission to Bangui. The CAE should do everything possible to facilitate and expedite this visit.

—USG will be looking very hard at all IFI loans for CAE in coming months, and will perhaps abstain or oppose projects on human rights grounds.

—As for the overall relationship, Cooke will, over the next months, be recommending final U.S. position—again dependent upon real progress in human rights.

4. Following the Ambassador's demarche: The press spokesman in Washington will announce the elements of the above.

5. For Paris: Following talking points are for your use with GOF. Request that you arrange appointment with George at Political Counselor level for June 18, 19 or 20. Ambassador Cooke will be transiting Paris and will accompany.

—We are concerned about the human rights situation in the CAE.

—Bokassa is an embarrassment to moderate African and Western governments.

—Our leverage is limited, but France has the wherewithal to effect change.

—We are interested in knowing what policies France plans to adopt concerning the CAE.

6. For Dakar, Abidjan, Monrovia, Kigali: We note President Houphouet's assertion that the five power fact-finding team is scheduled to go to Bangui this week. Upon suitable occasion, you should make following points: (Cotonou is not being asked to approach Govt. of Benin).

—The USG is concerned about the human rights situation in the CAE.

—We note President Houphouet-Boigny's statement that the five power team is going to Bangui this week.

—We urge that the team conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into Amnesty International charges and spread its report widely.<sup>5</sup>

—Note that USG is in the process of taking a number of steps concerning its relations with the GOCAE. We had recalled our Ambassador to Washington, but are now sending him back to Bangui to convey the results of our consultations to the GOCAE.

—Following his talks with the GOCAE and the return of your fact-finding team, we will be back in touch to discuss in greater depth our concerns about the CAE.

7. Other addressees: We anticipate providing CAE-related talking points for your use following Ambassador Cooke's demarche to GOCAE.

8. Ambassador Cooke and daughter Jennifer will depart New York June 17 via TWA flight 800 for Paris arriving June 18, 0830. Please reserve two singles at convenient moderate price hotel. They will continue to Bangui on June 21 via UT 777 arriving at 7:40 p.m.

**Vance**

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<sup>5</sup> The fact-finding mission included jurists from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Rwanda, and Togo. Their report, issued on August 16 in Dakar, found that Bokassa had ordered and probably took part in the massacre of school children in April. ("Africa Commission Says Bokassa Had Role in Massacre of Children," *New York Times*, August 17, 1979, p. A8)

123. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 14, 1979, 9:30 a.m.

## SUBJECT

Middle East Negotiations; the Nonaligned Movement; Rhodesia; U.S.-Gabon Relations and Military Assistance

## PARTICIPANTS

*US*

Vice President Mondale  
William C. Harrop, Bureau of  
African Affairs, State  
Department  
Denis Clift, Office of the Vice  
President  
Gerald Funk, National Security  
Council  
Sophia Porson, Interpreter  
Maurice Tempelman  
USUN—Amb. Young

*Gabon*

President Omar Bongo  
Foreign Minister Martin Bongo  
Ambassador Jose-Joseph Amiar

After Salutations, *Vice President Mondale* said that President Carter had wanted him to raise four points:

1) We were grateful and pleased by Gabon's support for the Middle East peace process, and especially for President Sadat.

2) We appreciated in this regard the constructive role played by Gabon at the Islamic Summit,<sup>2</sup> and we hoped that Gabon would continue to support Egypt at the Monrovia OAU Summit in July.

3) We were further gratified by Gabon's efforts to keep the non-aligned movement actually nonaligned in opposition to Cuba's obvious efforts to swing it toward Moscow.

4) President Carter hoped that President Bongo, while in the United States, would help the American people to understand the importance of holding to principle on Rhodesia. Some Americans saw a black bishop with the title of prime minister and wanted to lift sanctions precipitously. The President felt we must persevere to seek a government in Zimbabwe truly reflecting majority rule. President Bongo could help us domestically by explaining this complex issue.

*President Bongo* said he would comment on these points. On the Middle East, he was pleased to see that the Camp David process was evolving as President Carter had outlined to him in March of 1978

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Mondale Papers, Box 43, Foreign Countries—Africa, 1977–1980 [1]. No classification marking. Drafted June 19 by Harrop; cleared by Clift. The meeting took place in Mondale's office.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 117. Gabon had abstained from the vote to expel Egypt.

[1977].<sup>3</sup> A comprehensive peace was desirable, but we had to start somewhere. Egypt and Sadat were now seriously isolated. Gabon and other friendly African governments were trying to rally African support for him. Africans had broken with Israel at Egypt's request, and it now appeared logical for Africa to renew contact with Israel. President Bongo had that morning met with the Israeli Ambassador to Washington to outline his intention, now that Israel and Egypt were resolving their problems, to get off dead center and work toward normalization. He would make the same points to the Egyptian Ambassador in Libreville on his return and seek Egyptian views also. He was prepared to do all he could to restore peace both in the Middle East and between Israel and African governments, and he was prepared to raise this issue at the OAU Summit.<sup>4</sup>

However, Gabon was surrounded by radical states, some under strong Soviet and Cuban influence. He could not cope with a military challenge and needed military credits to buy defensive equipment; he also wished training in the United States for his officers. He would like to discuss these requirements with the Department of Defense if Vice President Mondale could arrange an appointment.

(*The Vice President* undertook to arrange an appointment for Bongo with Deputy Secretary Duncan for later in the day, and did so.)<sup>5</sup>

Turning to Rhodesia, *President Bongo* said he shared the U.S. position and had so informed members of the Senate and House of Representatives the day before. It would be wrong to lift sanctions.

*The Vice President* interjected to assure President Bongo that the United States had no intention of lifting sanctions. The recent vote in the Senate would sustain a veto and there was a fair chance of winning outright in the House of Representatives.

*Bongo* went on to say that Rhodesia was still a British responsibility and it was up to the U.K. to make the first move. At such time as Britain declared Rhodesia independent, others could consider their own position. Action now would be untimely and wrong. The citizens

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<sup>3</sup> Bongo met with Carter on March 3, 1977, during a private visit to the United States. In telegram 50528 to Libreville, March 8, 1977, the Department summarized Bongo's visit and his meeting with Carter: "Discussion lasted for over an hour, focusing primarily on broad African issues and on President Bongo's forthcoming tenure as OAU Chairman." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770078–0710)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5698 from Monrovia, July 21, the Embassy reported on the OAU summit that took place in Monrovia July 17–20. The OAU adopted a resolution on the Middle East that strongly condemned Israel, but refrained from attacking Egypt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790333–0463)

<sup>5</sup> Bongo met with Duncan on June 14. The memorandum of conversation, dated June 29, recorded their discussion of military aid to Gabon. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Box 9, G–1979)

of Zimbabwe must choose their own leadership. However, the Patriotic Front had refused to cooperate in an early election and Ian Smith had gone ahead without them. Others must view the resulting situation with caution. The OAU would not offer any support or recognition to the Muzorewa government. Smith was still the brains and the power behind Muzorewa. Thus, Gabon approved of President Carter's position.

On the nonaligned movement, *President Bongo* continued, he agreed with the Vice President. In order to oppose Cuban influence, the United States must support moderate Africans and should encourage investment in countries such as Angola where the Soviets and Cubans were not truly popular. In response to the Vice President's question, Bongo enlarged on this to say that the communists were not popular in Congo-Brazzaville either. Africans were like people everywhere and wanted to eat and to live more comfortably. You could not eat ideology. Furthermore, maintenance of Cuban armies and technicians was a very expensive matter for African governments; this was another source of unpopularity.

*President Bongo* expressed his high regard for Maurice Tempelsman,<sup>6</sup> whom he was quite aware had obtained the appointment for him with Vice President Mondale after the American Ambassador and the State Department had stressed how very busy the President and Vice President were.

The *Vice President* thanked President Bongo for coming to see him and wished him a good visit and trip home.

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<sup>6</sup> Maurice Tempelsman, a U.S. diamond merchant, maintained contacts with government leaders in Africa and political connections with members of the Democratic Party.

**124. Telegram From the Embassy in the Central African Empire to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bangui, June 23, 1979, 0740Z

1546. Subj: Bokassa Ponders His Future. Ref: State 150230.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text.)

2. Summary. I spoke with Bokassa at his initiative this morning, June 22, in Berengo. In a rambling and vague fashion, Emperor reviewed the events of the past several months in CAE, blamed his problems on the Russians, and speculated about what the future would hold for him, including the possibilities of resignation or leaving the CAE. He said he wished cordial relations with the US and that events here had been exaggerated by the press. I told Bokassa that Washington authorities and US public had been shocked by Amnesty International allegations.<sup>3</sup> US was awaiting report of five-nation commission with great interest,<sup>4</sup> but atmosphere in Washington was such that further bilateral assistance programs appeared impossible at this time. Bokassa took this calmly, said he had facilitated commission's inquiries and urged me to work for improved US–CAE relations. End summary.

3. This was an odd visit. Charge Fairchild had been convoked before GOCAE learned of my return, and the invitation was then changed. Bokassa, accompanied by PriMin Maidou and Deputy Fon-Min Lavodrama, received me cordially, but appeared somewhat muddled and had probably been drinking. He started by saying that the Russians were at the bottom of CAE's problems. Russian teachers had subverted CAE youth, and France had been unwilling to supply adequate assistance to replace the Soviets. He was strongly anti-Communist and wanted to remain close to the US and Western Europe. He regretted the defections of CAE Ambassador to France Sylvestre Bangui, who was a fellow M'Baka tribesman, and former PriMin Patasse, who had arranged his coronation. He welcomed democratic opposition (sic) but could not accept violence. Bokassa said he had the people with him. If not he would leave the country. At this point he reversed himself and said "no, I will not leave the country. I was born here and I will die here." Further, he said he had no money whatsoever abroad (a patent falsehood which I did not contradict), and lived on the income

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790287–1172. Confidential. Sent for information to Libreville for Walker and to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 122.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 119.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 122.



from his Berengo farm. He said he might resign, and compared his plight to that of President Nixon after Watergate. "But Nixon lives quietly. Africa is barbaric. If the Chief of State resigns they kill him". Bokassa mentioned Ghana's Acheampong as an example.<sup>5</sup> He then reiterated his fears of a Russian takeover, and said he wanted good relations with the US.

4. I said the US had endeavored to maintain close relations with CAE. But the AI allegations of events in April, following the suppression of the January riots, had caused a sensation in the US. Congress had voted against further bilateral aid, and though the decision was not final I saw no likelihood of reversing it. Bokassa simply nodded. I noted that the report of the five-nation commission would be read with great interest in Washington. Bokassa said he hoped the report would clear the air. There were too many lies—he mentioned the press reports of an assassination attempt in April, and added, almost as an afterthought "I didn't kill the children". Finally, he urged me to work to improve relations, and appeared gratified at my assurances.

5. Comment: Bokassa's mood was melancholic, and his attempts to appear cheerful unsuccessful. He is a consummate actor with real powers of dissimulation, but he left the impression of being distraught and uncertain, unable to find a way out of an increasingly untenable position. His motivation for initiating this discussion was perhaps an attempt to shore up relations with the US by stressing his anti-Communist sentiments, but he was singularly unconvincing. I plan to proceed with demarche to PriMin Maidou as instructed reftel.<sup>6</sup> Bokassa's calm reaction, however artificial, to news of aid termination, suggests GOCAE will also react more in sorrow than anger.

Cooke

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 5886 from Accra, June 16, the Embassy reported that Acheampong had been executed by firing squad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272-0519)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 1570 from Bangui, June 27, the Embassy reported that Cooke delivered the demarche to Maidou, as instructed in telegram 150230 (see Document 122), and explained the congressional cuts on all U.S. assistance to the Central African Empire due to human rights problems. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790290-0723)

**125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 28, 1979

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to Central Africa.]

2. *Equatorial Guinea*: Following the August fourth coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea,<sup>2</sup> the Spanish encouraged us to move quickly to diplomatic recognition of the new regime and to provide humanitarian assistance.

We are sending a mid-level survey team to Equatorial Guinea for a few days starting Thursday, August 30. Its mission will be to assess the composition and political outlook of the new regime, and the nature and size of humanitarian needs.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 8/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4778 from Yaounde, August 6, transmitted a translation of the communiqué issued by the new Revolutionary Military Council in Malabo on the night of August 3 announcing the seizure of power by Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Nguema Mbazogo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790356–0526)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5430 from Yaounde, September 4, transmitted the survey team's preliminary report. "The new military regime in Malabo has made an admirable start toward the return of orderly and responsible government by creating the psychological climate necessary to begin the rebuilding process." The team recommended that "we should work with the Spanish and other donors to provide medical and other assistance to help meet emergency human needs, particularly in the public health and education sectors." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790403–0495)

## 126. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1979, 1:45–2:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting with President Mobutu of Zaire (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State  
 David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
 Thomas P. Thornton, National Security Council (Notetaker)  
 Alec G. Toumayan, Department of State (Interpreter)

President Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire  
 Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Foreign Minister, Zaire  
 Mutuale Kasongo, Ambassador of Zaire

The two Presidents spent a few moments in the Rose Garden before the photographers and then, with the two parties, entered the Cabinet Room. (U)

*The President* welcomed Mobutu and expressed his gratitude for the close ties between our countries resulting from Mobutu's leadership and our shared purposes and goals. The US recognizes that the maintenance of well-being and independence of Zaire under Mobutu's leadership is an important aspect of our own well-being and security. (C)

*The President* recalled that the US has sought to cooperate with Zaire, the French and Belgians in recent months, and expressed his pleasure that the outcome has been as successful as it has. (C)

*The President* noted that he had written to Mobutu in June, outlining our hope that Zaire would be successful in negotiating an agreement with the IMF.<sup>2</sup> He expressed pleasure that this has been achieved and wished Mobutu success in carrying it out. We trust that this agreement is satisfactory to you and that good prices for your primary export products will bring you prosperity and peace.<sup>3</sup> (C)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President 7–9/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 121.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 8024 from Kinshasa, July 30, the Embassy reported on the details of a letter of intent to the IMF that Mobutu had signed on about July 20. The IMF had required a series of promises from Zaire to reform its banking sector, monetary policy, and budget, in exchange for funds to stabilize the Zairian economy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346–1028)

The *President* again welcomed and congratulated Mobutu, thanking him for the close ties that are of benefit to Mobutu, himself and both peoples. (C)

*President Mobutu* expressed his deep appreciation for the President's greeting as well as for all that the US has done for Zaire. Zaire is pleased to know that the United States stands by it. (C)

*Mobutu* said that he had come to talk not of the past but of the future but did want to devote some comments to past events. He noted that Zaire is a young nation that reached independence under difficult circumstances and his main task had been to create a nation and conditions of peace, at times in the face of aggression. (C)

*Mobutu* then addressed himself to a series of criticisms that had been laid to Zaire, explaining in some detail how Zaire was making important progress in the fields of democratization under the new constitution including rights of women and said that the support that he had gotten in his reelection, without even having to campaign, showed the strength of the peoples approval.<sup>4</sup> He went on to point out that there are no political prisoners in Zaire and that the prison conditions are the best that can be achieved under a system inherited from the Belgians. Further, Mobutu emphasized the severity of military justice against any military who mistreated the civilian population. Mobutu also noted progress against corruption and described the role that the IMF and donors are now playing in the Zairian economy. (C)

*Mobutu* stressed the importance to Zaire of having US support, even more than that of Belgium and France. He expressed great optimism about the economic future of Zaire under changed conditions and believed that matters are going forward well despite inevitable problems. Zaire appeals to its friends for continued support. (C)

*Mobutu* noted very briefly that Zaire's neighbors cause problems and referred to the Cuban presence in Africa, offering to discuss these matters with President Carter if the latter desired. (C)

*The President* said that Mobutu's historical resume had been very interesting and that the US has observed with admiration Mobutu's ability to form a single nation. He said that Mobutu's reelection must have been very gratifying as a demonstration of the support of the Zairian people. The President said he was convinced that the US interest

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<sup>4</sup> The Presidential election took place on December 2, 1977. In telegram 11646 from Kinshasa, December 9, 1977, the Embassy reported that "the feasibility of voting against the only candidate, Mobutu, was in most cases only theoretical: in Kinshasa only a few polling places offered negative ballot forms." "The government announced that almost 97 percent of the electorate turned out and that 98.16 percent of those cast their ballots in favor of a new 7-year term." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770459-1071)

is best served by a stable government in Zaire led by Mobutu. He assured Mobutu that he could rely on American support. (C)

*The President* noted that Mobutu had addressed some of the concerns that the US has about Zaire. He pointed out that Zaire's commitment to carry out the IMF agreement will be important and will provide an answer to critics of Zaire's ability to carry out programs. Fulfilling the IMF program will be a demonstration of Mobutu's leadership and the strength of his government. (C)

*The President* expressed the hope that with the withdrawal of Belgian and French forces,<sup>5</sup> everything would be done to prevent abuse of civilians by the military. The President had found Mobutu's description of the discipline demanded of the military as an encouraging refutation of Zaire's critics. (C)

*The President* expressed appreciation for Mobutu's report on political prisoners and the conditions in the jails that Zaire had inherited from the Belgians. The President welcomed Mobutu's commitment to democracy and believed that further dissemination of political power is an inevitable part of the democratization process. The United States observes this process with great interest and sees it as a great credit to Mobutu. (C)

*The President* concluded by noting that Mobutu had anticipated well his interests and concerns. (C)

*President Mobutu* noted that, as regards decentralization, Zaire now has a Prime Minister with full powers and other officials such as mayors of cities also have greatly enhanced authority. Mobutu said that security remained a vast and serious problem. He noted that Zaire is receiving various kinds of assistance from the US, France, Belgium and China. The Department of Defense was aware of Zaire's requests for further US equipment. (C)

*The President* expressed his appreciation for this opportunity to meet and reaffirm mutual friendship, and for the fact that Mobutu would spend some time with Secretary Vance, discussing not only bilateral, but also African matters. The President looked forward to learning from Secretary Vance of the advice and counsel that Mobutu would provide to us. (C)

*The President* once again expressed his thanks for the opportunity to reaffirm the friendship between the two governments and peoples. (C)

Thereupon the meeting ended at 2:22 p.m. The President accompanied Mobutu to his car. (U)

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<sup>5</sup> The French and Belgian forces left Zaire in May and June 1978. The Inter-African Force arrived in July 1978.

## 127. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1979, 2:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

US-Zaire Relations.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Zaire*

President Mobutu Sese Seko

Nguza Karl-I-Bond, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Maitre Nimy, Director, Office of the President

Ambassador Kasongo Mutuale, Zairian Ambassador to US

Seti Yale, Special Counselor to President Mobutu

#### *US*

Secretary Vance

Under Secretary Newsom

William C. Harrop, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Lewis D. Junior, Director, AF/C (notetaker)

(Note: President Mobutu and the Secretary had just, prior to this meeting, met with President Carter in the White House.)

The Secretary said he wished to pick up the thread from the preceding conversation. He wondered what the security situation was on the Zairian border with Angola and what effect the succession in Luanda would have on that situation.<sup>2</sup> Were there currently any problems concerning resurgency of the Katangan Gendarmes?

President Mobutu said that all depends upon who will be Neto's successor. On the one hand there is Pascoal Luvualu who is well and favorably known to Zaire and who would be an acceptable successor from the GOZ viewpoint. The second candidate, however, is Lucio Lara whom President Mobutu considers to be dangerous, a man of the left, and in tight relationship with the Cubans and the Soviets. In regard to the gendarmes, Neto had kept his promises; the gendarmes remaining in Angola are no problem. However, "most" of the gendarmes have fled to Zambia, posing a small problem there. President Kaunda presumably would not voluntarily let them act against Zaire but, given the difficulty of Zambia in controlling that part of its territory,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 118, Zaire: Mobutu Visit 8–9/79. Secret. Drafted on September 17 by Junior; cleared by Walker and in P; approved on October 9 by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> Angolan President Neto died on September 10.

something could happen. Zaire, however, is not greatly concerned because the conditions for such aggression are not favorable; things have evolved for the better in Shaba in the recent past.

Moreover, said Mobutu, he had received agreement that the French, the Belgians and the Chinese military trainers will stay on for two more years in a training capacity to assure that the new Zairian armed forces would be well trained and well officered. The French and Belgians are now integrated in command roles with the newly deployed forces in Shaba. They are working closely with their Zairian counterparts, who should be well-trained at the end of the period.

The Secretary said he wished to make a few general comments concerning Zaire. We all recognize that much remains to be done in Zaire but we have also noted the points of progress in the recent past. These include the new agreement with the IMF,<sup>3</sup> the presence of controller-experts in the Banks and the French and the Belgian training effort. The next three months will be very difficult for Zaire. It will take real determination for President Mobutu and his colleagues to stay within the IMF guidelines and to persist with the important question of military reform. The Secretary congratulated President Mobutu on the relationship which he had worked out with President Neto of Angola. He hoped President Mobutu would be able to work with Neto's successor in a constructive fashion to help maintain peace in the area. The Secretary added that he was impressed by the evolving roles of the Prime Minister and the Parliament in Zaire, a point which President Carter himself had mentioned in the earlier meeting. The Secretary felt it was important that the Prime Minister and his Parliament be permitted to fulfill the promise inherent in those offices. He then asked how President Mobutu saw the development of the economic and financial situation in Zaire in the months ahead.

President Mobutu said that the success of the IMF plan would depend, not only on Zairian determination, but also in large part on assistance from Zaire's partners. This had been a point discussed at the meeting in Brussels in November of last year when it had been agreed that, following emplacement of a satisfactory stabilization plan in Zaire, the various partners would proceed with their assistance programs.<sup>4</sup> The USG at that time had indicated a program of help in the range of \$35 million or \$40 million. Without such external help Zaire will not be able to pursue its plan of recovery and development.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 126.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 21469 from Brussels, November 10, 1978, the Embassy reported on the results of the November 9-10 Brussels meeting of donor nations to Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780465-1135)

Secretary Vance replied that we will be monitoring carefully the implementation of the IMF agreement. He was well aware of its contents. President McNamara of the IBRD had discussed the matter with him and had noted that not only the IMF but also the IBRD would also be watching the program closely.

The Secretary said that we look forward to working with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. With particular respect to Foreign Minister Nguza, we have found that any problems between us have been settled rapidly and satisfactory with his good help.

President Mobutu said that it was important for him and his colleagues to know that the Americans are supportive of Zaire.

The Secretary responded that, given the long ties between our two countries, President Mobutu could count on the US to help the execution of his reform programs.

The Secretary informed President Mobutu that in the very near future we will be asking agrément for a very good American Ambassador to Kinshasa, a distinguished foreign service officer, a man whom the Secretary knows well having worked with him for the past three years.<sup>5</sup> The delay in asking agrément was, in fact, due to the difficulty of detaching him from his present responsibilities.

Turning to the broader issues of southern Africa, Secretary Vance asked President Mobutu's views on the current conference in London on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, and on the Namibian question.

Concerning Zimbabwe/Rhodesia President Mobutu said that the major important fact is that all of the parties have come together in London. He, Mobutu, had personally always held the view that a settlement could come only by such a conference. He had pressed this on his African friends and at the recent OAU Summit Meeting. He, Mobutu, felt that there is no escaping the fact that this is their problem which can be worked out only together. The important thing is that they should continue to talk to each other.

On Namibia, Mobutu said neither SWAPO nor the SAG are playing by the rules. South Africa would likely accept an independent Namibia only reluctantly. The South Africans were concerned that a Namibian independence would result in a communist government installed on their border. On the other side, Neto had told Mobutu of his tough problems with SWAPO since, according to Neto, SWAPO President Nujoma was afraid to participate in elections he thought he might lose.

Returning to Rhodesia the Secretary said that we are fully supportive of Great Britain in arriving at a peaceful settlement. There was a

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<sup>5</sup> Robert Oakley was appointed Ambassador on November 6 and presented his credentials on November 28.



good chance of drafting a satisfactory new constitution. New elections under such constitution would, of course, be desirable but they would be more difficult, perhaps, to arrive at than the first step of agreeing on constitution.

President Mobutu noted that he had been active in working with leaders such as Kaunda, Nyerere and Obansanjo to encourage an all-parties conference. Everyone seemed more or less agreed with his viewpoint. He added that, while he would not wish to criticise his Nigerian colleagues, he felt that their attitudes "did not make the task any easier." However, Nyerere has changed for the better and encouraged President Mobutu in his efforts.

Secretary Vance said that Neto's death might have an unfortunate influence on moving the Namibia problem to a successful conclusion. Were Neto's successor not of the same view as Neto, the chances of a solution might well disappear.

Mobutu commented that Neto's death was indeed unfortunate. Turning to another subject Mobutu said that it was not to him to offer advice to the United States Government but he did wish to suggest that the Secretary should follow the Western Sahara question carefully. Developments there could be dangerous. The Secretary agreed, noting that the situation in the Western Sahara had been both dangerous and fragile during the last two months.

Mobutu commented that Algeria alone was no particular problem for Morocco but with other players involved, such as Libyans and the Russians, there was a potential for the question to become very big one.

The Secretary said he wished to return to the subject of US assistance to Zaire, which had been raised only briefly in the cabinet room. He said that the continued progress on reform in Zaire was the key to our ability to maintain current levels of economic and military assistance. We are following closely the progress of the new army units in Shaba; we are pleased that they seem to be making a real effort to enlist the support of the population in Shaba.

Mobutu commented that the units were under strict orders. Mr. Walker had seen them in Zaire during his recent visit and could testify to the state of their discipline.

The Secretary said he wished to raise another problem area, i.e., the lack of agreement so far on rescheduling of the Zairian private and public debt. This was significant because the issue was linked to the question of our ability to provide aid. President Mobutu immediately intervened to say that we should not raise new conditions to US assistance beyond those agreed to at Brussels.

Mr. Walker explained that the linkage lies in our inability to disburse assistance when Zaire is in arrears on its debts. The purpose of

rescheduling of the debt was to eliminate the problem of arrearages. He also mentioned to the Secretary that Lazard Freres is now advising the government of Zaire on the question of rescheduling of the debt in the London and Paris Clubs.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Harrop said that President Mobutu was undoubtedly aware of the very strong criticism to which Zaire had been subjected in the Congress. President Mobutu would be seeing important Congressional personalities tomorrow and would be able to get a first hand appreciation of their attitudes. This was important because it is to the Congress that we must turn for the resources necessary to continue support of Zaire. Secretary Vance agreed, saying that this presented a golden opportunity for President Mobutu to meet directly with and hear the ideas of important Congressmen.

The Secretary then asked President Mobutu's views on recent events in the Central African Empire and Equatorial Guinea. President Mobutu responded that he did not know Equatorial Guinea well. He had often been invited to visit by the now ex-President but had kept putting the invitation off.<sup>7</sup> He also noted wryly that he had been charged some seven years ago by the OAU to try to help improve relations between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

Mobutu's view of the situation in the CAE was somber. He expressed his concern for the families of the dead students and of the "bad situation" in the interior of the country.<sup>8</sup> Without referring directly to the Emperor he mentioned "diabolic" forces at work in the country. He had discussed the problem with Giscard d'Estaing and personally saw no out for the Emperor. Giscard had tried to persuade Bokassa to step down in favor of a regency council but, in the end, Bokassa had refused.

President Mobutu said that unfortunately at the time of Ambassador Cutler's departure from Kinshasa, he, Mobutu had been away from Kinshasa. Ambassador Cutler had therefore unfortunately left Zaire without the proper honors due him. President Mobutu wished the Secretary to know that Ambassador Cutler had done a great deal for Zairian-US relations. He had therefore ordered that Ambassador Cutler be decorated with the national order of Zaire, the Order of the Leopard, at a ceremony in the Zairian Embassy the following morning. He wished the Secretary to know that Charge Davis in Kinshasa is doing a excellent job and was much appreciated in Kinshasa.

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<sup>6</sup> The London Club is a group of private creditors, while the Paris Club comprises public lenders. See footnote 6, Document 81. The London Club first met in June 1976 to reschedule Zaire's debt.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 125.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 119.

The Secretary responded that he was pleased to hear these kind words and to be informed of Ambassador Cutler's impending honor. Ambassador Cutler was one of the fine officers of the Foreign Service corps and the Secretary was delighted to see such officers recognized.

At this point President Mobutu laughingly pointed out that, in looking around the room, it might well have been a meeting of his own council of ministers in Kinshasa, with the understandable exception of the Secretary, all present on the American side were familiar with and for the most part had served in Zaire. He had been informed that there was a "Zairian Mafia" in the State Department and he now saw most of the members present. He would have Nguza invite the Secretary to visit Zaire and, thus, close the circuit.

The Secretary expressed his regrets at not being able to attend the dinner given that evening by Governor Harriman for President Mobutu but that he had not enough time. The problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba was demanding. The Soviets had stated that the brigade was only a training unit which had been in Cuba for many years. The US had only begun discussions with the Soviets on the issue yesterday and the Secretary assumed that the discussions could continue for days or even weeks. President Mobutu asked if the eventual outcome would be withdrawal of the brigade. The Secretary said that the first problem was to determine the facts. We had put a number of questions to the Soviets but as yet had received no answers. After having the facts we would determine what the optimal outcome of the problem should be.

President Mobutu concluded the meeting by saying that he hoped to have the continuing support of the US in his programs. It was the US which was the key to garnering support of other partners.

On the way out, Mobutu showed the Secretary a letter from Senghor in which the Senegalese President stated that he had talked with the head of the Jurists' Commission which had investigated the atrocities in the CAE and was convinced there was no truth to the rumor that Zairian troops had been involved.

## 128. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 4, 1979, noon

### SUBJECT

US/Zairian Relations, Reform in Zaire, Angola

### PARTICIPANTS

*US*

Secretary Vance

Assistant Secretary Richard M. Moose

Lewis D. Junior, Director, AF/C (Notetaker)

*Zaire*

Foreign Minister Nguza

Ambassador Kasongo

The Foreign Minister opened by presenting a letter from President Mobutu to President Carter,<sup>2</sup> characterizing it as thanks for Mobutu's recent successful visit to Washington, for conversations with the President and the Secretary,<sup>3</sup> and for the opportunity to meet with key Congressmen such as Mr. Solarz.

In response to the Secretary's question, Nguza replied that the visit with Solarz had gone well. Personally he had liked the session, which had been handled in a frank democratic way. Mobutu had acknowledged that there is much wrong in Zaire but that it was important to assess current efforts to rectify Zaire's problems. Mobutu had urged Solarz to come and see for himself; Solarz has accepted and is scheduled to arrive at the end of November.<sup>4</sup>

Nguza said the Washington visit had been a success in more ways than one. In Paris, on the return trip, Giscard told Mobutu that it was "wonderful" that he (Mobutu) had been able to meet with the "leader of the western world". Giscard took this as a "green light" for further French aid to Zaire but had said that Zaire "must" implement the terms of the IMF agreement. Giscard had opined that the USG too would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 118, Zaire: 1–10/79. Confidential. The meeting took place at USUN. Drafted on October 9 by Junior; cleared by Moose; approved on October 15 by Seitz.

<sup>2</sup> The letter has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 126 and 127.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 241899 to Kinshasa, September 14, the Department reported on Mobutu's meetings with Members of Congress and a private meeting with Solarz. "Solarz was not impressed with Mobutu's answers to the charges implicit in his (Solarz) presentation. Solarz was initially enthusiastic in accepting Mobutu's invitation to visit Zaire, but is now backing off to take another look at his up-coming schedule." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790420–0454)

help if Zaire respected that accord. The Secretary immediately responded "Yes, if", vocally underlining the "if".

The Secretary went on to say that he wanted to underscore the importance of not letting the debt rescheduling process slip. He was a little worried because slippage could have adverse effects on Brussels III.<sup>5</sup>

Nguza responded that Mobutu not only was well aware of the importance of rescheduling but also had the political will to follow through. He had instructed that all necessary preparatory work be completed before the end of October to permit getting it to Simonet for dissemination to interested parties.

Moreover, said Nguza, Mobutu is stopping "all" GOZ expenditures not in accord with the IMF agreement. He, Nguza, had received "rumors" in New York of unauthorized expenditures, e.g., for Air Zaire, and in Lubumbashi and Gbadolite. Nguza had immediately sent a cable to Kinshasa saying that he didn't know if the rumors were true. If so, however, the expenditures were to stop; if not he wanted a cable report. This action was consistent with Mobutu's action on return to Kinshasa when he had ordered that all unnecessary expenditures be stopped, at least through the end of this year. This, illustratively, included a prohibition on all official foreign travel except for Nguza himself, and even so Mobutu had to review and approve each Nguza trip.

The Secretary asked about Mobutu's trip to Angola.<sup>6</sup>

The trip had gone well, said Nguza. The preferred of two black candidates to succeed Neto had been chosen, Dos Santos rather than Lucio Lara who is a "hardline Leninist". Dos Santos may be in for some internal problems even though he is believed to be the "political son" of, and "pre-selected" by, Neto. However on foreign policy he

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<sup>5</sup> The third Brussels meeting on Zaire took place November 28–29. In telegram 21050 from Brussels, November 30, Walker, who headed the U.S. delegation, gave a positive assessment of the Brussels conference. "Everyone recognized the strides that Zaire has taken in the areas of political, military, economic and administrative reform." Still, while the donor countries volunteered more debt relief for Zaire, they did not fill the entire resource gap. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790551–0283) The first Brussels conference took place June 13–14, 1978; see footnote 7, Document 112. Harrop's assessment of the second conference, held November 9–10, 1978, is in telegram 21465 from Brussels, November 10, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy, D780465–0999)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 10792 from Kinshasa, October 9, the Embassy reported that "President Mobutu, Foreign Minister Nguza, and an entourage visited Luanda for six hours on September 27. During that time Mobutu paid homage to the late Agostinho Neto, conferred with President Dos Santos, and participated in a joint press conference which affirmed the continuation of Zairian-Angolan détente." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463–0262)

had said he would cleave to the Neto line. On relations with Zaire, Dos Santos had said “Exactly like Neto”. On Namibia, “Exactly like Neto”. On the opening to the West, “Exactly like Neto”. Per Nguza, Dos Santos had added “On the body of my brother Neto”, I will follow his line.”

The meeting terminated with the Secretary’s response, re Dos Santos’ attitude, “Good, that’s important for policy purposes.”

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**129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 11, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

5. *Equatorial Guinea*—You asked what representation we have in Equatorial Guinea.<sup>2</sup> At present, we have no Embassy and no diplomats accredited there following suspension of relations with the Macias regime in 1976. On September 10, we offered to normalize relations, but as yet we have no formal response. We do, however, have agreement from the Guinean Foreign Minister to send our Deputy Chief of Mission in Yaounde, Cameroon, Peter Lord, to Malabo to maintain contact in the interim.<sup>3</sup> We expect Lord to be in Malabo early next week. At that time, he could deliver to President Nguema your response to Nguema’s letter of August 29.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 10/79. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy, J” in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> On an October 6 memorandum from Vance, in which Equatorial Guinea was mentioned, Carter wrote, “What presence do we have there?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 10/79)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote in the left margin, “I would like to move them toward us.”

<sup>4</sup> See Document 130.

**130. Letter From President Carter to Equatorial Guinean  
President Nguema<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 12, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of August 29, 1979,<sup>2</sup> offers encouraging words that you and your government are determined to rebuild Equatorial Guinea and overcome the human rights abuses inflicted by former President Macias. Because the plight of the people of Equatorial Guinea has been a matter for deep concern in this country, we will be watching with sympathy and interest your efforts to improve the lives of your people.

We are agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with your government and are prepared to offer emergency assistance, initially in the area of public health.<sup>3</sup> Initially, we would envisage relations as being conducted through frequent visits to Malabo by officials accredited from our Embassy in Yaounde. Once relations are formally reestablished, our two governments can consider more permanent arrangements and other forms of cooperation.

We look forward to renewed cooperation with the government and people of Equatorial Guinea as you undertake the heavy tasks of reconstruction in an atmosphere of renewed respect for internationally recognized human values and rights.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 5, Equatorial Guinea: Mbsongo. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Nguema's August 29 letter is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 125.

**131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

*Equatorial Guinea*—DCM Peter Lord from Yaounde concluded discussions yesterday with the new government of Equatorial Guinea and reports that authorities there are eager to normalize diplomatic relations and are enthusiastic about our proposed US Navy ship visit in mid-November.<sup>2</sup> We will proceed to plan the visit. Lord reached agreement on the text of a joint communique, announcing the normalization of diplomatic relations, which could be signed November 1 when Lord returns to Malabo to deliver medical supplies. Equatorial Guinea indicated it would nominate its UN Ambassador as Ambassador to the US. On the basis of this positive response, we intend to move quickly to accredit Ambassador Mabel Smythe in Yaounde as our non-resident Ambassador. We have also begun developing programs for development assistance drawing on regional AID funds.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 10/79. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy, J” in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6679 from Yaounde, October 27, the Embassy reported on the results of Lord’s discussions in Malabo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790492–0059)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote “ok” in the left margin. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Equatorial Guinea officially resumed on December 19.



### 132. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

NI IIM 80-10005

Washington, March 7, 1980

#### Sudan: The Nimeiri Regime Under Pressure

[Omitted here are the table of contents, foreword, and a map.]

#### KEY JUDGMENTS

The greater US role in the northwestern Indian Ocean area has made it increasingly important from Washington's point of view to have a friendly and moderate government in Khartoum. Sudanese President Nimeiri's support for the Middle East peace process, in the face of pressure from other Arab states, has also given his country a new significance.

The most serious challenge to Nimeiri's regime is economic. Despite international financial action, the economic outlook is bleak. Serious shortages of consumer goods and a declining standard of living could cause outbreaks of popular unrest and dissatisfaction within the security forces—Nimeiri's main base of support—that could threaten his government. The possibility of a commercial-size oil find, his political skill, and the disunity of the opposition will improve his prospects somewhat.

If Nimeiri were deposed, the military presumably would remain in control, although it is possible that a successor regime would be nominally civilian led. In either case, the successor regime would probably identify less with US interests in the area and move some distance toward the Arab consensus, especially with regard to policy toward Egypt and the peace process.<sup>2</sup> A less likely alternative would be a successor regime controlled by military officers who favored a closer alignment with the hardline Arab states.

US ability to influence Sudanese policy depends primarily on how the Sudanese perceive US resolve and strength. Sudan wants a strong friend and military patron to counter threats it sees presented by the USSR, Ethiopia, and Libya.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from various components of the National Foreign Assessment Center, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

<sup>2</sup> For the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency on this sentence, see footnote 7 at paragraph 75 of the Discussion section. [Footnote is in the original.]

As Nimeiri's hope for political survival over the short term depends in part on his ability to have bread and flour on store shelves when the traditional lean summer season arrives, probably the most important thing that the United States could do to aid him in the near term would be to increase food aid.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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### 133. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

NI IIM 80–10013

Washington, June 1, 1980

Zaire: Is It Reformable?

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

#### PREFACE

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is limited in scope and addresses four basic questions: is Mobutu's Zaire "reformable"; why has no revolt against the Mobutu regime taken place; what would be the impact if the United States distanced itself from Mobutu; and what would be the impact of Mobutu's fall from power?

Included is an annex on the importance of Zaire's cobalt to the West.

This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. It has been coordinated at the working level.

#### KEY JUDGMENTS

Although President Mobutu of Zaire has taken steps in the political and economic spheres he would not have taken without external pressure, he has done nothing he could not reverse if he became convinced that the costs outweighed the benefits. Mobutu is likely to continue to oppose or circumvent efforts to alter significantly his style of rule. He has moved ahead just enough on reforms, however, to make premature the conclusion that additional progress under his leadership is not possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

Far-reaching reform in the Western sense would invite upheaval by stimulating popular expectations and undermining the system centered on Mobutu that has provided stability so far.

There are limited economic, political, and military reforms, however, that would not threaten his regime, and might well strengthen it. Even these Mobutu would not be likely to make in the absence of foreign pressure; he realizes he must be responsive to his external supporters.

By allowing foreign powers to assume key roles in addressing some of Zaire's major problems, Mobutu gains room for maneuver and links Belgium, France, and the United States to his own survival.

The impact of placing some distance between the United States and Mobutu would be minor in the absence of concurrent action by France and Belgium, which are likely to continue to support him regardless of his response to pressures for change.

Pent-up pressures in Kinshasa could explode at any time and topple Mobutu, and he could be challenged from unexpected quarters. Revolt has been averted thus far because of disarray within the opposition, Mobutu's skillful manipulation of potential challengers, repression by the security forces, and apprehension among many Zairians that the country without him would return to the chaos of the early 1960s. Zaire's size and diversity reduce the chance that a revolt, once started, could spread. Moreover, African social institutions provide safety valves that relieve somewhat the intense pressures of urban poverty.

If Mobutu were to depart the scene, it is possible that he would be quickly replaced by a military junta which could hold the country together. It is more likely, however, that a prolonged and bloody struggle for power would ensue. The turmoil could well spread from Kinshasa to other parts of the country, reviving secessionist tendencies. Turbulence or disintegration in Zaire could hardly fail to have an impact on Zaire's neighbors in a variety of ways, not the least of which is the possibility that Zaire would again become a theater for rivalries among external powers.

A major impact of Mobutu's replacement by an anti-Western regime would be on the African, European, and Arab perceptions of the United States. Conservative African leaders might see it as a further shift in the balance of forces against them; Europeans and Arabs would see it as further evidence of the United States' inability or unwillingness to protect its friends.

## DISCUSSION

1. Zaire's problems loom larger to the United States and other Western countries than those of most other African nations, even though similar difficulties can also be found elsewhere on the continent.

First, Zaire's size, economic potential, and mineral resources make its international alignment important to the West. Second, its regime is closely associated by much of the world with the West in general and with the United States in particular. Third, the plight of its people, in the face of inefficient government and economic regression, and the association of President Mobutu's government with corruption and arbitrary treatment of his people have led many in the West to question the morality of Western support for his regime.

2. The military incursion into the mineral-rich Shaba region in March 1977 by Zairian exiles based in Angola revealed the extent to which the Mobutu regime had been weakened by a combination of world market factors and poor management since its zenith in 1972–73. In response to growing domestic and international pressures, the latter principally from the United States, Mobutu announced in July 1977 that major political, military, and economic reforms would be implemented. The most significant political reforms proved to be the holding of competitive elections to fill seats in the legislature, the members of which had previously been appointed, and the creation of the office of prime minister. Responsibility for upgrading Zaire's armed forces was placed primarily on the Belgian and French military missions. The resultant Belgian-trained 21st Infantry Brigade and the French-trained 31st Paratroop Brigade represent a significant strengthening of Zaire's military capability. The central elements of economic reform in Zaire have been adherence to an International Monetary Fund standby agreement and reliance on expatriates to staff key positions at the Bank of Zaire, the Ministry of Finance, and Customs.

3. In general, there now are two contending schools of thought concerning reform. Some believe that the present regime can be brought to a point of significant reform, that some of the changes that Mobutu has already made are irreversible and will alter the nature of the regime. Others contend that no real change has occurred and that Mobutu must go if the current "*mal Zairois*" is to be cured.

*The Belgian Legacy: The Early Years in the Congo*

4. Although the difficulties that President Mobutu and his predecessors have faced in trying to establish Zaire as a viable and cohesive state are hardly unique in Africa, the legacy of Belgium's colonial paternalism and its hasty retreat from its principal African territory virtually assured an inauspicious beginning. In contrast to the relatively orderly preparations for independence that were instituted by the French and British—in which political parties took root and aspiring politicians were gradually brought into the administrative and political systems—the Congolese were grossly ill prepared to take over the administration of the new state.


5. By the time Mobutu seized power in 1965, Zaire had experienced practically everything that could go wrong in a newly independent African country. Independence was followed by an Army mutiny, debilitating political infighting, fragmentation of the country along ethnic lines, three regional secessions, and a series of peasant uprisings. Many of these developments were exacerbated by outside interests, including those of some West European and Communist nations. Five years of independence had left the political, economic, and social life of the country in ruins.

6. The pre-Mobutu regimes depended heavily on external economic and technical assistance, including the continued service of large numbers of foreign civilian and military specialists. Indeed, the foreign rescue operations that were mobilized to maintain the country's viability during the tumultuous early 1960s—ranging from economic inputs from aid contributors and private investors to UN peacekeeping forces—have remained permanent features of Zaire's history. They were manifested more recently by the French, Belgian, and Moroccan involvement in the Shaba crises of 1977 and 1978 and by international efforts to maintain the government's solvency. Unlike many other African countries where foreign involvement is rebuffed as neocolonialism, or at least is less visible to the outside world, Zaire under Mobutu welcomes it—albeit selectively. Foreign involvement has become an essential part of the way Mobutu manipulates the country's political dynamics.

#### *The "Pax Mobutu"*

7. Even Mobutu's harshest critics grudgingly acknowledge his success in maintaining a reasonable degree of domestic peace and order in Zaire. Except for opponents within the Zairian elite, many observers until recently found few faults with Mobutu's efforts at maintaining stability. They viewed the political system he began to construct after he came to power as being not markedly unlike regimes that were emerging in other parts of the continent as African leaders replaced the political frameworks left behind by the former metropolises. Such moves as the establishment of the MPR (Popular Revolutionary Movement) as the sole political party and the gradual extension of Mobutu's control over the armed forces were seen as logical steps to strengthen the central government and prevent a return to chaos.

8. Neighboring states were relieved that "the Congo problem" no longer threatened their own stability and shared the general African satisfaction that a blemish had been removed from Africa's record. During the "Pax Mobutu" period that lasted through the early 1970s and was marked by relatively substantial revenues from copper and other mineral resources, few private investors or others in the interna-



tional community seemed to worry about how Zaire was governed, but instead were more concerned with the investment climate.

9. Although the innermost workings of Mobutu's circle of cronies and advisers remain obscure, the basic details of how his system works are generally known and have not changed significantly since he took power. He rules more as a paramount tribal chief than as a head of state in the Western sense. He is secretive, ruthless (although less so in recent years), and politically astute, and has a talent for catching potential challengers and foreign leaders off balance and for exploiting tribal jealousies. He adroitly handles the military, judiciously dispenses largesse and punishment, funds pet projects, and indulges in luxuries without being directly accountable to any authority. He also rules by employing a crisis management approach to problems, marshaling seemingly nonexistent domestic and external resources to resolve or defer what appear to others as insoluble economic and political problems.



10. Mobutu distrusts Western-style democratic institutions because he believes they would give free reign to the divided loyalties and opportunism that have disrupted Zaire in the past. In the early 1970s, when Zaire had emerged from a decade of internal rebellions, Mobutu embarked on a series of political changes that were intended to create the framework of a one-party state, to introduce into Zaire something of the aura of an African "radical" state, and to give himself the legitimacy that came from identification with the African political mainstream. Perhaps the best known of these enterprises was his unsuccessful attempt to carry out his campaign for "authenticity"—a kind of cultural revolution which had precedents in other African countries and which emphasized political solidarity by stressing the introduction of "authentic" indigenous practices to replace "colonial" ways (for example, changes in personal names from Europeanized to vernacular forms). This was also an attempt to create a sense of national unity, no doubt inspired by Mobutu's confidence that he was in full control and by the vague philosophies of other African leaders who have sought to construct a framework for their own particular style of rule. In the event, neither authenticity in its various ramifications nor any of the other innovations that Mobutu attempted to introduce in the early 1970s took deep root and Zaire's political system has remained a highly personalized one.

*The Current Malaise and Mobutu's Response*

11. After 15 years, "Pax Mobutu" is still little more than a truce enforced through Mobutu's domination of the instruments of power. Tribal and regional tensions persist, and social and economic problems—including inflation, unemployment, labor and student unrest, periodic shortages of necessities, and deteriorating infrastructure—are now acute.

12. Many factors contribute to Zaire's current difficulties—including a severe deterioration of the terms of trade, the invasions of Shaba, costly economic blunders, the burgeoning foreign debt, and the pilfering of scarce foreign exchange. The resulting deterioration of the economy and public services has stimulated public discontent, while international concern over human rights has rallied some of Mobutu's detractors around the central theme of reform. Mobutu's domestic problems have been compounded by his tendency—for a variety of reasons, including maintenance of his regime—to deal with their symptoms rather than their causes.

13. In gauging his response to the pressures on his regime, Mobutu has accurately perceived that there are divergent views among those who advocate change. Longtime Zairian opponents both inside and outside the country seem to believe that any change must be accompa-

nied by Mobutu's departure. The United States and, to a lesser extent, France and Belgium recognize the need for stringent fiscal and monetary measures to halt the economic decline, but only the United States also places emphasis on the necessity of internal political changes. For the Belgians and French, economic recovery programs that result in nondisruptive political changes are acceptable, and Paris and Brussels seem content to let the United States take the lead and act as the lightning rod for any adverse reactions from Mobutu.

14. Mobutu believes he has the support of the Europeans regardless of his response to reform pressures. He also probably reasons that his critics are limited in dealing with him by the fear of severe unrest and an even less palatable outcome if he should leave the scene. Mobutu has responded skillfully to these various pressures, dragging out his response while he seeks to play off the outside players against each other, and at the same time weighing the impact of his actions on his control of the internal situation.

15. Mobutu has apparently concluded that the United States and his domestic opponents have similar notions about the changes that should be implemented. Although he realizes that no reforms will satisfy the Zairian intellectual elite, both this group and the United States tend to advocate structural changes in the government that accord with Western conceptions of how reform is induced. Consequently, Mobutu has only tinkered with the country's thinly rooted institutions. Among other things, he has appointed a Prime Minister and given him some responsibilities in the day-to-day operations of the government. The legislature has been allowed to voice some criticism of the regime. A number of corrupt officials have been replaced by competent technocrats, and a cabinet shakeup earlier this year appears to have improved the overall competence of the government's ministers. Against this backdrop, some judicial reforms have been enacted and amnesties for criminals and political dissidents have been announced in order to placate those who point out the repressive nature of his rule. Nevertheless, each move has usually been followed at some point by other actions that are intended to signal to domestic critics that Mobutu is not prepared to go too far. In essence, he continues to rely primarily on his keen understanding of the system he has created to maintain himself in power.

16. Mobutu has shrewdly delegated major responsibility for solving the economic crisis to Western advisers and governments that are deeply involved in Zaire. By depending on them to come up with stopgap financial aid, to reassure and work with overseas financial institutions and investors, and to oversee Zaire's banking and customs operations, he has linked the United States, France, and Belgium to his own survival—a move which enables him in part to deflect domestic criticism of the economic situation to outsiders.



17. Mobutu has pursued a similar strategy in the military sphere. Because the armed forces are both the base of Mobutu's support and a potential threat to his rule, he probably has ruled out extensive changes in the military that would threaten his control of the officer corps. Economic constraints weigh against any substantial arms expenditures, and a need for continuous security has ruled out replacement of existing forces by totally new ones. Instead, prompted partly by Western pressure and partly by his own recognition of the need for improvement, Mobutu has put in train a series of important, though less sweeping, measures—reduction in the number of troops, creation of three new brigades, improvements in messing and pay, streamlining the chain of command, retraining a poorly disciplined infantry division, and establishment of a logistics corps. With the exception of the last two of these, measurable albeit halting progress has been made, although this has depended on about 200 Belgian and French advisers, some of whom accompany and command the units they have trained. Mobutu and key armed forces officers hope the reforms already made will become sufficiently institutionalized to last beyond the tenure of these advisers. One of the most significant of the reforms—the infusion of discipline in the armed forces—has proved less effective. Thus far, with the exception of the Belgian- and French-advised units, there does not seem to have been a significant crackdown designed to impress on the troops the importance of discipline.

*Prospects for Reform*

18. In allowing certain foreign powers to assume key roles in trying to solve Zaire's current problems, Mobutu has provided room for maneuver to continue his balancing act of maintaining himself in power while others tackle the intricacies of economic recovery and keep the regime afloat with financial aid and economic assistance. While this allows the United States, and to a lesser extent France and Belgium, to maintain some pressure on Mobutu to reduce the flagrantly corrupt practices that are part of his regime, Mobutu's response thus far strongly suggests that fundamental political reform—in Western terms—is neither his intention nor in his perception a possibility. Most of the basic decisions affecting the country's economic life will continue to be made in his office. Mobutu doubtless would allow further limited changes in the government and bureaucracy in order to appear responsive, calculating that the high officials and civil servants who are affected by such changes will be content to seek ways around them to survive economically.

19. Mobutu is no doubt aware of the pressure on his principal foreign supporters to distance themselves from his regime, although he probably has fewer doubts about France's resolve than he does about that of the United States or Belgium. He may reason, however,

that his critics in the international community have been unable to offer a candidate for succession and that active opponents of serious stature either in Zaire or among the Zairian exiles abroad do not exist. He also perceives that most of the international community attaches as much—if not more—importance to access to Zaire's mineral resources and to the country's potential for affecting regional stability as to internal reform. Even those nearby African leaders who dislike Mobutu and are highly sensitive to foreign military rescue operations in support of African regimes would probably argue against disengagement on the grounds that Africa's and the West's interests would not be served if Mobutu's departure brought a return to the situation that existed in Zaire before he came to power. Mobutu views his trip to Europe and the United States late last year, his private contacts with French President Giscard, and French willingness to conclude occasional bilateral economic deals that circumvent the IMF program as commitments to his survival.

20. While Mobutu may perceive that the downward trend of US economic and military assistance represents a gradual disengagement, he could conclude that his ties to the French and the Belgians, and to conservative Arab governments that provide financial handouts, are sufficiently firm to enable him to lash out at the United States, as he has done in the past when tensions have arisen in US-Zairian relations. If he judges that US pressures for reform are excessive, he might calculate that the US commitment to Zaire is so deep that a US response to any action he might take would be limited and would not endanger US-Zairian relations. Mobutu might gauge the success of any anti-US move on the lack of a negative US response to his stage-managed ouster of the US Ambassador in mid-1975.

21. On the other hand, Mobutu has seen his margin of maneuver reduced by Zaire's growing dependence on external financial assistance. Moreover, his exaggerated perception of US influence on the IMF (and the World Bank) has contributed to his acceptance, however reluctant, of far more US infringement on what he considers Zairian sovereignty than would have been conceivable in 1975.

#### *The Impact of Reform on Stability*

22. Fundamental political changes designed to liberalize the regime would substantially increase chances for instability by stimulating expectations and undermining the system Mobutu has assembled for maintaining control. If implemented now, these measures—such as creation of impersonal institutions and independent sources of power, introduction of a multi-party system, or devolution of significant law-making authority to parliament or regional bodies—would likely unleash the divisive tendencies in Zaire that Mobutu so far has managed to contain and use to his own advantage.

23. More limited changes, however, unless adopted simultaneously, would probably not threaten Mobutu's regime and might well strengthen it by allowing dissidents to vent their dissatisfaction in a controlled environment. Permitting the legislature to elect its officers without presidential interference would be one such measure, as would making regional assemblies centers of discussion about local problems. He could also grant his appointed prime minister authority to select and dismiss cabinet members.

24. The security forces likely offer somewhat more room for non-threatening improvement than does the strictly political sphere. Further efforts to bolster the morale and effectiveness of troops—better training, more efficient pay and quartermaster systems, some new barracks and medical facilities, tighter discipline—would probably improve Mobutu's position by raising security force capabilities marginally. But dramatic improvement of military effectiveness would require stressing competence over ethnic background and personal loyalty to Mobutu within the officer corps. The President would have to relinquish control over officer assignments and perquisites—which would greatly improve chances of an eventual move by a military unit against him.

25. There is also a margin for additional reform in the economic arena. Although Mobutu will continue to need both ample funds for direct payoffs to key supporters and opportunities for them to exploit public positions for private gain, there appears to be considerable room for retrenchment in these areas. Progress on managing Zaire's foreign exchange earnings and reducing payroll skimming, for example, might cramp Mobutu's style somewhat but at no real political cost.

#### *Reasons for Absence of Revolt*

26. Many observers wonder why major disturbances have not already occurred in view of the deteriorating quality of life in Zaire. They have argued that the chief danger to the Mobutu government would come in the form of spontaneous uprisings in such locales as Kinshasa and other urban centers. Aside from the Mobutu system that has been described, there are other factors that we believe have contributed to stability. Some are specific to Mobutu's Zaire: his manipulation of potential rivals, the relative efficacy of his security forces, the Zairian population's belief that the United States, France, and Belgium would intervene to prop him up, and the widespread desire to avoid a repetition of the violence of the early 1960s. Others, including ethnicity and income redistribution within the extended family, are features general to Africa.

27. During his 15-year tenure, Mobutu has been extraordinarily successful in controlling military plotting and political intrigue. Through a variety of methods—arrests, intimidation, bribery, rewards,

and the shuffling of portfolios—he has been able to keep potential rivals off balance. His practice of filling government positions with individuals from minor ethnic groups means that there are few persons in positions of power who could command broad support. In the military, he has encouraged factionalism and promoted ethnic and regional tensions. He has periodically manipulated the chain of command to help keep the Army from becoming a unified, cohesive force. He has, moreover, staffed key military positions with presumably trusted officers from his own tribe or region.

28. Nevertheless, the military has the potential for a successful move against Mobutu, so he pays careful attention to it. No senior officers known to us present immediate threats to Mobutu's control. Any officer, regardless of his competence, who appears to be attracting a following of his own is shifted promptly to another job. Senior officers still need Mobutu—as do most members of his entourage—more than he needs them. This situation is likely to persist at least as long as the effective leaders of elite troops are the foreign training officers, now Belgian and French.

29. There is no obvious leader to galvanize discontent and exploit the regime's shortcomings. With the exception of a vague feeling of "anti-Mobutuism," there is no one ideology that appeals to a majority of Zairians. Most of Mobutu's opposition is based outside the country, either in Europe or in neighboring countries. With the exception of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC: ex-Katangan gendarmes), which has some contacts inside the Shaba region, external opponents have few links within Zaire. They are unable to organize effectively, and none has an effective propaganda machine. Although France and Belgium host numerous anti-Mobutu groups and individuals, these governments have not and probably would not allow such groups to engage in serious action to destabilize the regime even if they possessed the potential to do so.

30. Another factor is the effectiveness of the security services—the Army and security police. Although ragtag and unprofessional by Western standards, they can contain limited local uprisings and are able to monitor antigovernment activities both at home and abroad. Moreover, their reputation for brutality also acts as a deterrent.

31. The implications of perceived US support for Zaire are more valuable to Mobutu than the actual assistance he receives. Although many educated Zairians believe that the French and the Belgians also would be likely to intervene on Mobutu's behalf, they have the notion that Paris and Brussels—despite significantly larger interests to protect in Zaire—take their cue from Washington. Mobutu's detractors believe that this foreign support bolsters the incumbent and preserves the status quo, and this belief, which Mobutu reinforces, is also a major inhibitor of meaningful opposition.

32. An additional important factor that probably limits the potential for revolt is the population's fear of a repetition of the internal violence that characterized Zaire in the early 1960s. Mobutu's demise could touch off domestic instability that no single Zairian figure would be able to calm. Although disgruntled, many Zairians simply are apolitical; others believe that things could get worse without Mobutu.

33. While a less tangible explanation for the absence of revolt, it appears that most Zairians do not expect much from the regime. This probably works in the President's favor by lessening demands that might otherwise be placed on the government. The inclination of Zairians to accept situations they perceive as being beyond their control also works to Mobutu's advantage.

34. The country's size, diversity, and lack of social cohesion helps prevent the coalescence of a viable opposition. The central government's presence in Zaire's diverse regions, tenuous at best since independence, has deteriorated still further in recent years. Several of Zaire's regions are so physically and psychologically separated from Kinshasa that they are part of the country in name only. Deteriorating roads, shortages of fuel, and limited contact between the capital and the outlying regions contribute to their relative isolation and lessen the likelihood that a revolt would spread.

35. Ethnic and regional cleavages that migrants bring with them to the cities remain deeply rooted. This insularity helps to prevent the coalescence of a broadly based dissidence in Kinshasa or in other urban areas.

36. "Safety valves" to ameliorate economic hardships in the urban areas to some degree belie the statistical indicators pointing to ever declining living standards. Principal among these safety valves is the village origin of many urban dwellers. In times of shortages or hardship, family members go to their home villages to be fed and cared for; when they return they bring food mostly for family consumption but for sale as well. Some observers point out that 80 percent of all urban women are engaged in some sort of market activity; this contributes in small degree to alleviating the distress of urban workers.

37. Because of the responsibilities inherent in the extended family system, those members with jobs or other resources must help less fortunate relatives. This is in effect an informal but effective income redistribution and welfare system that relieves an otherwise bleak economic situation.

38. These arguments for the absence of revolt do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Mobutu will be in power indefinitely. They do suggest, however, that the individual or group working to replace him will not be visible until very shortly before the action, if then, and may come from unexpected quarters. For example, noncommissioned

and junior officers, who were clearly a major factor in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Liberia, could strike similarly in Zaire.

### *The US Connection*

39. The threat to sever or reduce the close US relationship to the regime is Washington's main source of influencing Mobutu to adopt reform measures he would otherwise shun. This is not, however, a very powerful source of leverage, and is diminishing as other supporters have adopted comparatively stronger roles in the wake of the two Shaba invasions. Mobutu's prospects for political survival would not be seriously diminished by a withdrawal of US support, although it would likely encourage some opponents of the regime. A clear signal that the United States would not intervene to rescue Mobutu from a Shaba III or an uprising in Kinshasa would not have a significant impact on the stability of the regime in the absence of concurrent action by France and Belgium. A drastic reduction of US aid would probably not trigger similar reactions by France and Belgium, and might even stimulate greater support by them. The impact on regional stability of a unilateral US withdrawal would likely be minimal, but would be of concern to other African nations and might tempt the Soviet Union to exploit Zairian weaknesses.

40. If, on the other hand, France and Belgium were to follow the US lead and withdraw their military personnel and their general support for Mobutu, the threat to his survival would increase markedly. The effectiveness and political reliability of key military units would rapidly decline. Mobutu's opponents, both internal and external, would have far more opportunities to hasten his downfall than is currently the case and consequently Mobutu's style of rule would probably become progressively more harsh and repressive. Mobutu would likely be desperate for foreign support and would accept it from any quarter, including the USSR.

41. But Paris and Brussels seem firmly committed to Mobutu regardless of his response to pressure for political reform. Neither appears to have any illusions about Mobutu's ability or willingness to alter the way he rules Zaire. As long as they can continue to get what they want from Zaire with Mobutu's cooperation they will continue to do what they can to maintain him in power.

### *Impact of Mobutu's Departure*

42. There is no question that Zaire's size, its location in Africa, and its mineral wealth make it an important country. The impact on US interests of Mobutu's disappearance or overthrow would depend on the ability of a successor regime to maintain order. While there is a possibility that a military junta could manage this, we think it more likely that a prolonged and bloody struggle for power would ensue.

The turmoil could well spread from Kinshasa to other parts of the country, reviving secessionist tendencies. Turbulence or disintegration in Zaire could hardly fail to impact on Zaire's neighbors in a variety of ways, not the least of which is the possibility that Zaire would again become a theater for rivalries among external powers.

43. In these circumstances Moscow would be tempted to intervene. Already present in considerable numbers in some neighboring countries, the Soviets and their Cuban allies might be convinced that they eventually could win out in Zaire. Although most of Mobutu's known opponents are not favorably disposed to the Soviets, backing from Moscow or Havana could be the crucial difference enabling new leaders to seize and maintain power. The degree to which the Soviets and Cubans would seek to become actively involved in shaping a post-Mobutu Zaire would depend on a multitude of factors, including Soviet commitments and activities elsewhere.

44. Assuming that Zaire's cobalt production facilities are not destroyed, we are not greatly alarmed by the potential for denial of Zaire's mineral resources to the West. Zaire's own need for foreign exchange would make it very difficult for any government in Kinshasa to use its strength in cobalt supplies to exert leverage on Western countries. An unexpected and protracted cutoff of Zaire's cobalt, however, would seriously affect Western industry. (See the annex.)

45. This probably understates the noise in the world that would arise from Mobutu's overthrow and replacement by an anti-Western regime. A major impact might well be in the perceptions of African, West European, and Arab political strategists. Few now find Mobutu attractive as a national leader, but he continues, because of his past history of association with the United States and the West, to represent what was, at least at one time, a significant Western victory over hostile tendencies. Conservative African leaders might see Mobutu's departure as a further shift from a balance of forces with which they were comfortable. West Europeans would tend to blame the United States for another blunder unless Mobutu's successor were clearly in the pro-Western camp. The Arab nations might, again depending on circumstances, read Mobutu's fall as evidence of another failure of American nerve.

## ANNEX

### ZAIRE'S MINERAL IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST: THE COBALT CONNECTION

1. US strategic interests in Zaire, along with those of most other industrial powers outside the Communist world, are influenced by their almost total reliance on imported cobalt and by Zaire's prominent role in supply of this critical metal. Prized for its unique qualities, cobalt is regarded as essential and virtually irreplaceable in some 60



percent of its uses by volume in the United States. These include, for example: high temperature, stress-resistant superalloys for jet engines; abrasive-resistant surfaces for tools, dies, and drill bits; and catalysts for petroleum hydrogenation.

2. In terms of non-Communist world needs for cobalt, Zaire has been and will remain crucially important. Specifically, it accounts for well over half of the new cobalt entering the market each year. Last year, Zaire's output of 14,000 metric tons represented 57 percent of the non-Communist world's cobalt production, overshadowing that by any other producer. We do not believe that recent output gains and plans of other cobalt producers portend any significant diminution of Zaire's share in world cobalt production over the near future. In terms of land-based reserves, no other country has Zaire's capability for expanding output.

3. This heavy reliance on Zaire takes on special significance because of existing and potential threats to output. Zaire's cobalt industry has been increasingly strained by shortages of spare parts, inadequate maintenance, need for new equipment, and more recently by shortages of badly needed foreign technical and supervisory personnel. A major breakdown or accident that would defy on-site capabilities for repair could result in a major loss of output for a considerable time. Along with the possibilities of accidental damage, Zaire's cobalt industry, with its weak plant security, is highly vulnerable to sabotage. Action by just a few individuals against key units, [1 line not declassified] could, in the view of experts, shut down operations for a considerable period.

4. Stoppage in the supply of Zairian cobalt for a few months or so probably would not cause serious hardship to any consuming country, particularly in the light of current market conditions. If the cutoff were protracted, we think that within a year, serious strains and dislocations would be felt by cobalt-consuming industries in a number of countries—particularly those with heavy traditional ties to Zairian supplies. Included in this list are the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. If the US situation should warrant Presidential declaration of a "national emergency," strategic reserves could be allocated to keep defense and other essential producers operating for some time; the other countries would face serious operating problems.

5. The United Kingdom and West Germany would feel the impact sooner and to a greater extent than the United States, since neither country has meaningful national stockpiles of cobalt or much flexibility to employ substitutes in cobalt consuming industries. France, on the other hand, could stave off serious hardships for a considerably longer period, because it not only receives the bulk of its cobalt from Morocco but has some national stockpiles to fall back on. Japan probably also would feel the impact later than most, since it processes most of its



cobalt from non-Zairian materials and can employ substitutes to a greater extent than most industrial users. Although the effects might be deferred longer in some countries than others, it seems clear that loss of some half of non-Communist world cobalt supply would take its toll directly or indirectly on all consumers.

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**134. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 2, 1980

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Central Africa.]

5. *Representation in Equatorial Guinea*—You asked what diplomatic representation we will have in Equatorial Guinea (EG).<sup>2</sup> We had proposed appointing a consular agent there pending a decision whether we would have an aid program of sufficient size to justify a resident diplomatic mission. The Government of EG, encouraged by Spain, wants a resident mission established in light of EG's political reorientation toward the West and as a psychological shield against Soviet maneuverings: it disapproved our request to appoint a consular agent. In view of our recent decision on aid levels for EG, we must decide whether US interests currently justify the expenditure of personnel and money required to open a resident mission.<sup>3</sup> Our new Ambassador to Cameroon, Hume Horan, who will also be accredited to EG, will recommend how best to proceed after his arrival at post in mid-July.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State) 7/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Ed, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> On a July 1 memorandum from Muskie, in which Equatorial Guinea was mentioned, Carter wrote, "What diplomatic representation will we have here?" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State) 10/80)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "Minimal is ok—but an American" in the left margin.

**135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1980, 1507Z

213253. Subject: Reply to Mobutu Letter From President Carter.

1. Please deliver following message to President Mobutu from President Carter:

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of July 14<sup>2</sup> and for sharing with me the thoughts on Zaire's future and its potential role in Southern Africa. I was pleased to note your continued dedication to working with the International Monetary Fund, as well as with Zaire's bilateral assistance partners, to reinvigorate the Zairian economy.

This is an important step in building on the progress Zaire and its advisors have made in restarting the development process in Zaire.

An "extended fund facility" has worked to the benefit of other countries with financial problems similar to those now faced by Zaire, and I understand that the International Monetary Fund has responded positively to your request for an extended arrangement.<sup>3</sup> Although the conditions attached to this type of program are stringent, the potential long term benefits are great. You can be assured of our interest in your negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and of our strong support for longer and more generous fund arrangements with those members prepared to undertake equally far-reaching commitments.

I sincerely hope that Zaire will be able to reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund quickly and in a manner that will reinforce the economic progress Zaire has already made. Further strengthening of the Zairian economy will also give you more latitude to advance the important initiatives for regional economic and political cooperation that you have recently put forward.

I will continue to follow with great interest your government's efforts to improve the lot of the Zairian people. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800384–0457. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Garrison; cleared in EB, HA, S/P, AF, the Treasury Department, the NSC, and S/S; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8889 from Kinshasa, July 17, the Embassy transmitted a letter from Mobutu to Carter explaining why Zaire needed additional assistance, particularly extended credit from the IMF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800352–0814)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 203268 to Kinshasa, July 31, the Department reported that the IMF would consider Zaire's need for an "extended fund facility" after assessing its performance under the current agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800368–0027)

2. No signed original will be forthcoming. White House does not plan to release text of message but has no objection to its release by recipient.

**Christopher**

## East Africa

### 136. Editorial Note

Although the United States never broke diplomatic relations with Uganda, the Department of State closed the U.S. Embassy in Kampala on November 10, 1973, due to security concerns and threats to U.S. citizens by high-ranking Ugandan officials. *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 240–249 describe the decision. The West German Embassy in Kampala represented U.S. interests in Uganda.

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### 137. Telegram From the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Nairobi, February 17, 1977, 1400Z

2168. Subject: Death of Ugandan Ministers and Archbishop.

1. Dept. will have noted Kampala radio report that three prominent Ugandans accused of coup-plotting were killed in auto accident on Feb. 16, allegedly while trying to escape from custody as they were being transported away from public meeting attended by Amin to condemn coup plot. The three are Most Rev. Janan Luwum, Anglican Archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Zaire; Minister of Lands and Water Resources Lt. Col. Erenayo Oryema, and Minister of Internal Affairs Charles Oboth-Ofumbi.<sup>2</sup>

2. According to Western diplomats who have been in Uganda recently, Protestant and Catholic Church leaders had been worried in recent weeks about Amin move against the Church. Despite this apprehension, Anglican clergy reacted sharply to security forces' efforts to intimidate Archbishop Luwum by searching his house at gunpoint on Feb. 5 and accusing him of involvement in coup plot allegedly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–0372. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Bonn, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Kigali, Kinshasa, London, and USCINCEUR for POLAD.

<sup>2</sup> Carter noted the deaths in a press conference on February 23 in response to a question on human rights. "In Uganda, the actions there have disgusted the entire civilized world." (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 220)

masterminded by former President Obote. According Nairobi Standard (confirmed by British diplomat here), eighteen Bishops signed forceful letter dated Feb. 10 deploring atrocities committed by Amin's security forces, asserting that guns in hands of these elements are in effect "pointed at every Christian . . . and have been increasingly used against the Ugandan to take away his life and property."

3. Comment: Majority of Ugandans are Christian and have long resented Amin's use of Muslim minority tribesmen from the north to maintain control of populace. Killing of Archbishop and two Ministers who are said to be strong Christians may arouse more unified opposition to Amin than has been seen for several years.

Marshall

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**138. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Ugandan Crisis Management

David Aaron chaired this morning a working level meeting of the Special Coordination Committee to consider the situation.<sup>2</sup> I enclose his full report on the meeting.

In essence,

—on the diplomatic front, we can act through intermediaries (Egyptians, Saudis, perhaps the Germans) to try to defuse the situation;<sup>3</sup>

—on the humanitarian side, we can charter an aircraft to evacuate those Americans who wish to leave, provided Amin is willing to let them go;

—on the public front, we should say very little;

—on the military end, we can exert some pressure by naval presence, but effective application of force would take 2½ days to develop.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Institutional Files, Box 85, SCC 006 Uganda Crisis Developments 2/26/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> On February 25, Amin forbade U.S. citizens living in Uganda to leave the country and ordered them to meet with him on Monday, February 28. ("Amin Orders U.S. Residents To Meet Him," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1977, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> Here Carter added "also UN."

Finally, it should be noted that if a genuine crisis develops and action has to be taken, Kenya and Tanzania would be willing to assist us, and Tanzania has already even indicated an interest in toppling Amin personally.

### Attachment

#### **Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1977

At Dr. Brzezinski's request, I chaired a working level meeting of the SCC to consider the situation in Uganda and possible U.S. responses.

#### *The Situation*

There are no new developments that we are aware of in Uganda except the letter which President Amin has directed to you, Secretary General Waldheim and a number of others.<sup>5</sup> That letter essentially responds to charges of human rights violations in Uganda and makes some counter charges concerning the U.S. It makes no threats against the U.S. nor does it mention his order to have all Americans assemble in Kampala on Monday. It does contain the ominous note that the United States was involved in a recent plan to invade Uganda, "based on information from 16 people involved in the plot" who were arrested yesterday.<sup>6</sup>

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

#### *Diplomatic Actions*

The State Department is in the process of sending out cables to African leaders who might be influential with Amin. These messages express our deep concern over what might happen to our people. The

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<sup>4</sup> Secret; Contains Codeword. Sent for action.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 3533 from Borin, February 25, the Embassy transmitted the text of Amin's letter to Carter, in which Amin rebuffed Carter's criticism of human rights in Uganda, provided his own list of American human rights violations, and claimed U.S. involvement in a plan to invade Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770066–1233) The *New York Times* published the transcript of Amin's February 25 message (*New York Times*, February 26, 1977, p.6)

<sup>6</sup> On February 24, the *New York Times* reported that Amin had acknowledged to British reporters that dissident soldiers had attempted to mutiny on February 19 and 22. Ugandan refugees arriving in Dar es Salaam reported widespread killings of Christian tribesmen. (Michael T. Kaufman, "Amin Acknowledges Mutiny in His Army," *New York Times*, February 24, 1977, p. 7)

State Department estimates that this diplomatic activity is not likely to show clear results for 36–48 hours. It may have to be supplemented by further diplomatic activity.

It was the consensus of the Working Group that our strategy at this stage should be to put heavy pressure insofar as we can on Uganda but not to do so publicly. It is the State Department's judgment that *public* pressure will only provoke greater counter-action by Amin and may well make him less flexible. If we can keep Amin faithful to what he has said thus far—that he is merely calling people in to Kampala to choose whether they wish to go or stay—we might get through this without too much trouble.

*You will not, however, be able to avoid public comment. You are currently meeting with Secretary General Waldheim and some statement on this subject will be necessary. We will also be pressed for our answer to Amin's letter. On both, we would propose to say the minimum. (Press guidance on both is attached.)*<sup>7</sup>

#### *Military Actions*

Everyone agrees that military actions should only be undertaken in extremis and that we should avoid preparations now which would become public and create a crisis atmosphere.

However, the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* and some other supporting cruisers are in the general area. They have been directed to proceed to a position 100 miles off the coast of Kenya. At the current rate of advance (20 knots), the *Enterprise* will arrive at noon tomorrow. Secretary Duncan is concerned that if the fact of the *Enterprise's* movements become public knowledge, this could be seized by Amin as a pretext for further action. You should be aware that the *Enterprise* is being shadowed by Soviet ships and planes, and the Soviets could well inform Amin.

Everyone believes it is only prudent to move the *Enterprise* into the area although it would have no value in helping us evacuate Americans. It is capable only of offensive operations. It is probably desirable therefore to slow the carrier down or alter course slightly so that its mission is not so evident in the next 24 hours.

#### *Other Actions*

It was agreed that it might be desirable to offer to send an airplane to Entebbe to take out those Americans who wish to leave. This would be consistent with Amin's offer. The State Department is arranging to be able to put a charter—probably foreign flag aircraft—into Entebbe

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<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed.

by late Sunday. Your approval of this step would be required before any action.<sup>8</sup>

It may prove necessary or desirable to send someone to speak on our behalf with Amin and observe his meeting with the Americans on Monday. One suggestion is that we ask a foreigner such as the Egyptian Foreign Minister or a Saudi to do this for us. It may be necessary given Amin's psychology, to send an American. The State Department will provide us with a list of possible "emissaries" this afternoon.<sup>9</sup>

It was also suggested that we might wish to hold a Security Council meeting. It was generally agreed that this should come only if we switch to the strategy of applying public pressure. The threat of holding such a meeting may prove useful to the Africans in encouraging them to work with Amin.<sup>10</sup>

Military options are not attractive for reasons that are fairly obvious. To move in force we would employ elements of the 82d Airborne which would take 2½ days for the lead elements to arrive, Major readiness steps could not be taken without public notice although there are some smaller steps that could be undertaken with minimum risks if you should so order.

*To summarize, we are*

- refraining from public comment insofar as possible
- preparing to send a foreign flag aircraft to pick up the Americans if necessary
- developing a list of possible emissaries
- moving the Enterprise into position
- developing our military planning so that we can act in extremis
- Putting on diplomatic pressure<sup>11</sup>

If you agree with these steps, the only further decision you need to take at this point is whether to slow down the Enterprise.

Yes, Slow it down

No, keep it on course for now<sup>12</sup>

By late this afternoon or early tomorrow morning, you will wish to decide whether to offer an airplane to pick up the Americans and whether to offer to arrange to send an emissary.<sup>13</sup>

We do not have a realistic military option of moving in force before Monday. After we see what happens then, we will reassess the situation.

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<sup>8</sup> Underneath this paragraph, Carter wrote "With Amin's prior public agreement."

<sup>9</sup> In the right margin, Carter wrote "ok."

<sup>10</sup> In the right margin, Carter wrote "no."

<sup>11</sup> Carter placed a checkmark at the end of each summation.

<sup>12</sup> Carter checked this option.

<sup>13</sup> At the end of this paragraph, Carter wrote "Call me."



### 139. Situation Report Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 25, 1977, 6:30 p.m.

#### *US CITIZENS IN UGANDA INFORMAL WORKING GROUP*

#### Situation Report No. 1

*Situation in Uganda as of 1830 hours (EST) February 25, 1977*

1. At approximately 0600 hours (EST) 25 February 1977 the Operations Center learned via press reports that President Amin of Uganda had summoned all Americans living in Uganda to meet with him in Kampala at 1100 hours (local time) on Monday 28 February 1977. Meanwhile Ugandan border officials were to allow no Americans to depart the country. A GOU spokesman has portrayed the meeting as an opportunity for Amin to thank the Americans for their work in Uganda and that the meeting should cause no alarm.

2. An informal working group under the direction of Assistant Secretary Schaufele and Ambassador Heck was established shortly after being notified of President Amin's statement.

3. The Ugandan Charge in Washington was called to the State Department at 0915 (EST) today in order to receive the official protest of the USG against Amin's order restricting the right of Americans to leave Uganda. (The Charge had been called in to see AF/E Office Director Post Thursday morning at 1100 (EST) and was told: of the US concern about the human rights situation in Uganda as reflected in the President's statement and the SFRC resolution;<sup>2</sup> that Amin's unfounded allegations of US complicity in attempts to overthrow him might produce inflamed local opinion against Americans living in Uganda; and that we held the GOU responsible for the safety and well being of the American citizens.)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country Files, Box 76, Uganda: 1-12/77. Secret. Drafted by the Uganda informal working group; [text not declassified]. Aaron wrote "ZB—Note no mention of SCC Meeting. DA" in the upper right corner. Brzezinski wrote "This is a joke!" in the right margin. For a summary of the SCC meeting, see Document 138.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 137. On February 22, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a resolution condemning Uganda's recent actions and urging other nations to cease supplying arms to Uganda. ("Senate Unit Condemns Uganda," *New York Times*, February 23, 1977, p. 2)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 42220 to USUN, February 25, the Department described the meeting between Post and Chepkwurui on Thursday, February 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770065-0121)

4. The Department is seeking to enlist the good offices and advice of OAU Chairman Ramgoolam<sup>4</sup> and Secretary General Eteki,<sup>5</sup> as well as Presidents of Zaire, Central African Empire, Somalia, and Ruanda to intervene with President Amin to assure the safety and well being of Americans resident in Uganda. A request for a joint approach to Amin is being made to the Presidents of Sudan, Egypt and Syria who are holding a summit meeting in Khartoum.

5. UN Secretary General Waldheim has told the President he will contact President Amin.

6. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which has taken care of US interests in Uganda since 1973, has directed the FRG Embassy in Kampala to take all action possible to protect the approximately 240 Americans still residing in Uganda. A list of names of Americans in Uganda is being prepared.<sup>6</sup>

7. US naval vessels in the Indian Ocean (Carrier Task Group USS *Enterprise*, USS *Truxton*, USS *Tautog*) have been instructed to proceed to the Western Indian Ocean but to remain at least 100 miles off the Kenyan Coast.

8. Our diplomatic and consular posts in Africa, Europe and the Middle East have been instructed to advise Americans in a non-public manner not to travel to Uganda.

9. Amin's letter to President Carter (transmitted on Uganda radio and through the FRG Embassy) has been received and the Department has recommended that it not be answered at this time.<sup>7</sup>

10. There is a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] report that Amin may shelve his original plan to bring the Americans to Kampala but will instead keep the Americans dispersed in the western area of Uganda where most live.

11. The German Ambassador has reported that while Amin reportedly is angry by what his Washington Chargé was told Thursday, the Ambassador had been told by the GOU Agriculture Minister that

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 42852 to Port Louis, February 25, the Department transmitted a letter from Carter to Ramgoolam. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770066–1205)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 42666 to Lome, February 25, transmitted a message from Vance to Eteki, urging the Secretary General of the OAU to "undertake any action you deem suitable to ensure that the Government of Uganda carries out its responsibility to protect the safety and well-being of Americans and other foreign nationals in Uganda, and to permit all of those to leave who express a desire to do so." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770066–1187)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 3532 from Bonn, February 25, the Embassy reported that the German Ambassador in Kampala, Ellerkmann, had compiled a list of U.S. citizens in Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770066–1107)

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5, Document 138.

Monday's scheduled meeting with the Americans would be a friendly affair. The FRG Ambassador has the impression that no drastic actions will be taken against the Americans.

12. At this point Department plans to portray US reaction to Amin's order on a "low key" basis to avoid giving Amin any basis to misinterpret our actions or provide him with any pretext to retaliate against Americans.

13. USG is presently considering chartering a civilian aircraft to be available, possibly in Kinshasa on a stand-by basis. This aircraft would be available to evacuate any Americans who wish to leave after the Monday meeting.

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**140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 25, 1977

[Omitted here is an item unrelated to East Africa.]

2. *What is Driving Amin?* You are of course aware of every operational step that we are taking following Amin's action with regard to American citizens in Uganda.<sup>2</sup> For me to better understand what caused Amin to make this move, and to give me insights into how best to respond, I asked my research staff to analyze Amin's motives. Here is what they came up with:

Although it is hard to know why Amin acts as he does in any given situation, in the present case he probably is reacting to foreign criticism of the latest wave of killings in Uganda. He also professes to fear a foreign attack although, again, it is hard to untangle when Amin really fears something and when, for some tendentious purpose, he says he does. [*8 lines not declassified*]<sup>3</sup>

Amin's current behavior follows patterns well established over the past six years and is motivated by the following:

—He is seeking foreign scapegoats to divert popular attention from internal troubles and to keep his military opponents off balance. (There

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject Files, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 2/11–28/77. Secret; Eyes Only. This memorandum was forwarded to Carter under a covering memorandum from Brzezinski, dated February 26.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 139.

<sup>3</sup> Carter initialed "C" in the left margin.

are at least half a dozen active plots against Amin, some involving the military and some the Ugandan political exiles headed by former President Milton Obote.)

—His cultural background causes Amin to blame other people rather than himself for his troubles. Over the years, the Israelis, Asians, British, foreign missionaries, and CIA have been identified as mischievous outsiders who try to sow dissension among Ugandans.

—He is immensely insecure and sees foreign missionaries (most of the 240 U.S. citizens are missionaries) as a source of opposition. Although he has expelled some missionaries, including Americans, and has curtailed church power, he still worries about the influence of the clergy and religious teachers over the Christian community—roughly half of the Ugandan population. This concern, rather than anti-Christian or anti-white sentiments as such, has been the key to his approach toward missionaries.

—He has a love-hate relationship with the West. His original takeover of the government in January 1971 met with Western approbation, but within the year the regime's excesses, especially military bloodletting, and the expulsion of the Asian community, had tarnished its image and impaired relations with the UK and US in particular. Amin acts like a spurned suitor. He apparently still has a deep affection for the British and Israeli military who trained him, yet he regards these countries as his betrayers.

The continued absence of a U.S. Embassy in Kampala—closed in 1973, primarily because of the security situation—is interpreted by Amin as a rebuff to his periodic overtures for better relations. He regards U.S. military aid to Kenya as still additional evidence that we have lined up with his enemies.

The summoning of U.S. citizens in Uganda to a meeting on Monday is undoubtedly the prelude to a period of humiliation, harassment, and perhaps the expulsion of some or all of them. We doubt that Amin intends to harm them physically, *unless he is convinced the U.S. really is involved in a military operation against him*. But there is a great and ever-present danger of ill-treatment or murder by Amin's barely-disciplined soldiers, either while the Americans are en route to Kampala or once they have arrived. (Another possibility is that Americans who do not hear of Amin's summons in time may be summarily punished by Amin's soldiers.)

Amin has bullied and humiliated Westerners on previous occasions, and in the 1975 case of a British citizen—Denis Hills—imprisoned and threatened to execute them, but he has stopped short of killing Westerners (in marked contrast to his killing of Ugandans). There is one exception: Amin probably ordered the killing of a British citizen—Mrs. Dora Bloch—in the aftermath of the Israeli raid on Entebbe. (Two

Americans, a journalist and a graduate student who were investigating military purges, were killed in 1972 by Ugandan soldiers, but probably without Amin's knowledge.)

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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**141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

3. *Uganda Update*: We called in the Ugandan Charge at 5:30 p.m. today to ask him about the further postponement of the meeting with Americans scheduled for March 2.<sup>2</sup>

The Charge answered that he assumed it was due to the tremendous amount of unfavorable publicity and that his government had perhaps decided to postpone the meeting to reduce tension. The Charge also said he had been instructed to pass on assurances that there was no cause for alarm and that the Americans in Uganda were completely safe.

We noted that the Americans were still prohibited from leaving Uganda until the meeting with Amin, now postponed. The Charge said that they were free to leave.

We asked him if he knew it to be the case. He answered that his government was not prohibiting the Americans from leaving. We then suggested that the Government of Uganda itself might help defuse the situation by announcing publicly that the Americans could leave whenever they wished. The Charge agreed this might calm tensions and he said he would telephone Kampala and pass along our suggestion.<sup>3</sup> In light of the foregoing, we have delayed making any announcement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 2/11–28/77. Secret. Carter wrote "To Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 44683 to Bonn, March 1, the Department of State reported on Schaufele's meeting with Chepkwurui. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770069–0287)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3638 from Bonn, March 1, the Embassy reported that Ellerkmann confirmed the cancellation of Amin's meeting with the U.S. citizens and that Radio Kampala reported that U.S. citizens were free to leave Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770069–0999)

about sending an emissary to Amin until we hear back from the Charge.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Carter initialed “C” in the left margin.

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**142. Memorandum From Thomas P. Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1977

SUBJECT

Uganda Aftermath

Bill Odom said this morning that you wanted a draft letter to Mobutu. I am attaching one, but do not have much confidence in it.<sup>2</sup> State should be doing this.<sup>3</sup> Also, Mobutu was not the only one who gave a hand (Nimeiry actually sent an emissary).<sup>4</sup> They should get a pat on the head also.<sup>5</sup>

The more I think about it, the more I like the idea of evacuation by train if the question should arise again. Let’s keep it in mind.

Ex-Ambassador Melady urges us to urge all Americans to get out of Uganda finally, realizing that many won’t. One way of getting them

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, Uganda: 1–12/77. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Odom.

<sup>2</sup> Undated; attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 47709 to Kinshasa, March 3, transmitted a message from Carter to Mobutu, thanking him for his assistance with the situation in Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074–0264)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 92. Telegram 47710 to Khartoum, March 3, transmitted a message from Carter to Nimieri thanking him for his assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074–0245) Similar messages were sent to Habyarimana, Siad, Bokassa, and others.

<sup>5</sup> Thornton placed an asterisk at the end of this sentence and wrote at the bottom of the page “Also, probably, Ellerkmann should get a note from the President!” An unknown hand drew an arrow to this comment and wrote “Draft one.” Telegram 46809 to Bonn, March 3, transmitted a message from Vance to Ellerkmann, thanking him for his assistance to U.S. citizens living in Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770072–0594)

out is to get in touch with their religious superiors here in the States. (Melady did this in 1973 and got the total down from over 1,000 to 200.) We could also tell Ellerkmann to let them know we think they should leave while the going is good.

Pretty soon, the President is going to have to return to the theme of human rights in Uganda generally. This will be a touchy problem, but we can't give the impression of (a) caring only about Americans or (b) having been silenced by Amin's blackmail.

I hope that we are going to let the Enterprise hang around for a few more days until we are reasonably sure that there are no more tricks up Amin's sleeve.

Who let word of the Seelye mission out?<sup>6</sup> That was dumb, especially now that the question is moot.

Melady strongly urges that we make a major effort in the UN on human rights, even though it will be contentious. He reports, incidentally, that there is going to be a big anti-Amin rally in New York on Sunday.

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 45376 to Mogadiscio, March 1, the Department informed Seelye, who was visiting several African countries, that the United States no longer intended to accept Amin's invitation to send an emissary to see that U.S. citizens were safe in Uganda, since the meeting between Amin and U.S. citizens was cancelled. Therefore, Seelye should follow his original itinerary. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070-1058)

**143. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

RP M 77–10156

Washington, June 16, 1977

**Uganda: The Immediate Consequences of a Successful Effort to Topple President Amin**

The assassination or overthrow of President Amin is likely to touch off a long period of unrest in Uganda, especially in the military, the major prop of the Amin regime. The Ugandan army, traditionally an ill-disciplined force, has become even more unruly during Amin's six years of maladministration. Military excesses have been a product of:

—the privileged position of the armed forces and its virtually unlimited police powers.

—the army's fragmented, chaotic, or nonexistent lines of authority resulting in part from Amin's frequent tribally-inspired purges of the officer corps.

—aggravation of serious tribal, ethnic and religious frictions in the army stemming from Amin's heavy recruitment and favored treatment of his fellow Muslims and Sudanic tribesmen.

Military indiscipline and turmoil is likely to intensify when what little control Amin exercises by loyalty, obeisance, or terror is removed with his departure from the scene.

Fighting in the immediate post Amin era is likely to erupt along tribal and ethnic lines and among individual units as new loyalties are sorted out. Those who have suffered at the hands of Amin and his Muslim troops are likely to take the opportunity to settle old scores. Recognizing their precarious position without Amin, some of the president's followers may take advantage of the confusion immediately following his downfall to take pre-emptive action against their opponents. Others fearing for their lives, will probably melt away to remote tribal areas such as the region straddling the Uganda-Sudan border. In any event, without a cohesive military, whatever individual or group succeeds Amin will have considerable difficulty gaining control of the situation.

In addition to military turmoil, Amin's successors may have to contend with unrest among segments of the civilian population seeking to preserve or reassert the interests of the country's disparate tribal groups. Members of Uganda's traditional kingdoms, such as Buganda,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North-South, Box 116, Uganda 4/77–3/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in coordination with the Directorate of Operations.



never fully resigned to the kingdom's dissolution under Amin's predecessor, could try to revive their once privileged position.

Uganda's neighbors, especially Kenya and Tanzania, which have been supporting anti-Amin groups, are also likely to try to influence events in the immediate post-Amin period. Long concerned about Amin and his threats to their security, Kenya and Tanzania may see the confusion following Amin's death as an opportunity to ensure the rise of a more compatible government in Kampala by insinuating into Uganda elements they have supported.

Despite any efforts by Kenya and Tanzania, it is unlikely that a civilian government would emerge on top in Kampala in the immediate post-Amin period. There are a number of civilian groups plotting against Amin, some with extensive contacts in the military. The latter groups probably have a good chance of toppling Amin and playing a role in a successor government, but little chance of dominating such a government.

As a result of Amin's purges, there appears to be a dearth of widely respected Ugandan civilians capable of bridging Uganda's ethnic and tribal divisions and wielding sufficient authority to control the situation without relying heavily on the army. Most civilian leaders, either in Uganda or in exile, are not well known or—like former President Obote—command little respect in Uganda. One possible exception is Paul Etiang, an outstanding and widely respected member of Amin's cabinet. Although opposed to Amin and not trusted by the president, Etiang has managed to survive and maintain a position in the government.

It's always possible that some unknown junior officer or group of lower level officers could come out on top after a period of instability. This scenario would be more likely if a large part of Amin's hierarchy were wiped out in his downfall. Such a government would be marked by considerable maneuvering for loyalties and positions of leadership and might find it necessary to call on a senior exiled or currently out of favor military figure to assume leadership.

It appears, however, that senior military officers—possibly those in Amin's hierarchy who survive his downfall—would have the best chance of bringing some stability to the situation, but again only after a period of bloodshed. The cast of characters in the upper level of the military has changed frequently since Amin came to power. Many senior officers have been killed, disappeared, or lost favor with Amin. Little is known of the current military leadership except that most are Muslims from Sudanic related tribes in northern Uganda and are members of the shadowy Defense Council that is purported to advise Amin.

Most of these military figures presumably have some following in the army, but none appears to have any significant advantage over the

others in this area. Among those mentioned as possible successors to Amin are:

—Brigadier Moses Ali who is said to be close to Amin. He reportedly warned Amin of a coup plot in 1973.

—Colonel Juma Sabuni, Minister of Industry and Power and another adviser to the president. Sabuni is in his mid-thirties and has represented Amin abroad.

—Colonel Juma Oris, Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Muslim and a member of Amin's Kakwa tribe. He is about 40 and poorly educated. He is loyal to Amin and enjoys his trust.

—Major General Mustafa Adirsi, Vice President and Defense Minister. Apparently loyal to Amin, Adirsi was named vice president early this year. He belongs to Amin's Kakwa tribe.

—Colonel Issac Maliyamungu, a powerful member of the Defense Council. Reported at one time to be Amin's personal hatchetman, he may now be plotting against the president.

—Major General Francis Nyangweso, Army Chief of Staff. He is the most senior Christian on active duty. It is rumored that opposition to Amin in the army is coalescing around Lumago. He is reported to be Western oriented and to have a popular following in the army.

—Major General Francis Nyangweso, a former Army commander and one of the few Christians in the upper ranks. He was once close to Amin, but has since fallen out of favor and has been rusticated to an ambassadorial post in the Central African Empire. He still appears to have a following in the army.

We cannot gauge with certainty the foreign policy to be followed by Amin successors. It seems likely, however, that a successor government will be inclined to follow a moderate nonaligned course with some traditional African socialist trappings. Amin's successors will probably reason that the country will need help from all quarters in order to revitalize the economy and domestic institutions devastated by Amin's misrule. As a result, they may seek closer ties to the West.

A military government will probably maintain ties to the Soviet Union, Uganda's principal arms supplier, at least over the short run. None of the prominent leaders, however, seems closely aligned with the Soviets. In fact the apparently heavy-handed Soviet advisory and supply role in the military has probably created considerable suspicion and mistrust of Moscow in the army hierarchy. In any event, the policies of a successor government will almost certainly be more consistent than those of the erratic Amin.

#### 144. Telegram From the Embassy in Burundi to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Bujumbura, June 27, 1977, 0550Z

722. Subject: Tour d'Horizon With President Bagaza.

1. Summary. During 105 minutes entirely alone with President Bagaza, I ranged over almost all questions of interest to US and to West about Burundi's foreign orientation, its internal stability, political rivalries, developmental aspirations, Hutu-Tutsi relations,<sup>2</sup> human rights, attitudes toward Zaire and Rwanda, and the Korean question. The last three items will be covered in septels,<sup>3</sup> while this general cable seeks to convey the current state of play regarding the Bagaza regime. In brief, it is a heterogeneous administration, with many conflicting strains pulling at a very sober, intellectual, philosophical, idealistic and relatively moderate young President. He is quite aware of his political enemies, who tend to be radicals in domestic and foreign policy preferences, while simultaneously less concerned about reconciliation with the Hutus and a new deal for the masses. Bagaza is quietly building up his power base, and his watchword to me was prudence and, above all, patience in tactics. End summary.

2. I started the conversation with a general statement about American policy in Africa under the Carter administration, with our increased pressures for peaceful but drastic change in Southern Africa, with our greater flexibility on North-South issues, and with our determination to increase our contributions to development in the neediest African nations, including Burundi. Bagaza reiterated his satisfaction with Washington's course and added that he had found similar reactions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7700228-0703. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Brussels, Dar es Salaam, Kigali, and Kinshasa.

<sup>2</sup> In 1972, members of the Hutu population rebelled against the ruling Tutsi population. In response, the Tutsis killed all prominent Hutus. For the U.S. reaction, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol E-5, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Documents 220, 221, 222, and 223.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 741 from Bujumbura, June 28, the Embassy reported on the condition of human rights in Burundi, arguing that there was no tradition in the Western sense of respect for the individual and that corruption and ethnic tensions were rampant, but that the country was still attempting to stabilize after the 1972 genocide. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770230-1140) In telegram 723 from Bujumbura, June 27, the Embassy reported that Burundi's relations with Zaire were "frozen" and with Rwanda beset by "malaise." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228-0713) In telegram 727 from Bujumbura, June 27, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Mark had encouraged President Bagaza to open lines of communication with South Korea, instead of maintaining exclusive ties with North Korea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228-0824)

among other chiefs of state whom he had met in recent months (mentioning Nyerere specifically). He reiterated his statement to me of a few months ago that he fervently hoped that the transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia could be peaceful, because, otherwise, the destruction would be enormous and would set back the quest for a decent life in the area for 20 years or more. He indicated approval for the results of the initiatives of the Western Five<sup>4</sup> with South Africa on Namibia (after I offered a summary rundown of the negotiations), but he said frankly that these were matters in which Burundi could play little role. He would not rpt not personally go to the OAU summit in Libreville.<sup>5</sup>

3. I told Bagaza that with our growing interest in Africa and our hopes in the next years to become substantially more active in furnishing bilateral assistance to Burundi, we were also more concerned to know where his government would be leading the country. In regard to foreign policy orientation, we saw a tendency to displace foreign experts, Western businessmen, and even some missionaries. I had evidence that the Surete (secret police) checked up on U.S. Embassy contacts with Burundian friends and worried about the supposed preferences of American missionaries for Hutus. The media talked more about divisions among Burundians between revolutionaries and reactionaries, and the latter were linked to “imperialism”, which had anti-Western connotations. It was a fact not only for the U.S. Embassy, but for all Western Embassies, that the requirement that all social contacts with Burundians be arranged through the Protocol Office had severely chilled such contacts and led almost to their disappearance. In regard to domestic policy, we noticed ever tighter controls over private businesses (Burundian and foreign) and an increasing resort to state intervention and regulation as a cure for all ills. I commented that statism posed enough problems even in developed countries, but in nations such as Burundi, with an inadequate number of well trained officials, with weak bureaucratic traditions, and with strong habits of corruption, unbridled statism could become a real burden on development. I referred to the planned top level UPRONA party<sup>6</sup> “seminar” in late July and asked whether it would be proclaiming a new leftist shift in Burundi’s policies.

4. The President said that no Marxist program would be set forth for Burundi, and the country would not become a socialist state. It would remain non-aligned, but its primary orientation for development

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<sup>4</sup> The Western Five refers to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and West Germany, and their diplomatic efforts to bring independence to Namibia.

<sup>5</sup> The OAU summit was held July 2–5 in Libreville.

<sup>6</sup> UPRONA (*Union pour le Progrès National* or the Union for National Progress) was the ruling party in Burundi since independence.

would be on the West. There were more non-governmental Europeans in Burundi now than before independence. He reiterated that his regime was reformist; it was trying to create a new national spirit of unity and morality. Since the masses of peasants, both Hutus and Tutsis, had suffered most from Micombero's misrule,<sup>7</sup> his government's priority would be on rejuvenating the countryside and modernizing it. However, mentalities had to change equally in the cities. In the past, a small elitist clique in government and business had worked hand in glove to appropriate for themselves a lopsided share of the nation's wealth, and this had occurred through every manner of corruption and illegality. Of course, these privileged people were now screaming for sympathy as they were forced to change their ways. They knew how to approach foreigners to try to gain their support. This is why the regime had quite deliberately sought to cut off contacts with diplomats in November. But it was not rpt not true that there was any particular suspicion of Americans or missionaries. I suggested that diplomats really did not rpt not want to deal with political has-beens, but with the ministers and officials now on the top. Hence, the curtailment of social contacts for diplomats was self-defeating for the regime. Bagaza said that matters had now evolved far enough so that a relaxation on contacts could start.

5. I also commented that a policy of moderate and controlled reform needed leadership. The President had showed this during his two month tour of the provinces at the beginning of the year, but now he was out of the limelight and some observers said that there was a leadership vacuum. If this was the case, other elements would try to fill it, and I mentioned (UN Ambassador) Simbananiye's attempts to return to a job in Burundi where he could intrigue more successfully for his leftist and anti-Western policies. I could not rpt not understand how he and others in his group had escaped arrest when 80 or so others had been jailed pending trial about five months ago for past corruption. I cited what I had personally heard about the embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds of Simbananiye, Prime Minister Nzambimana (when he was Public Works Minister in the old regime), and several current ambassadors.

6. Bagaza said I seemed to be well informed even without social contacts. He knew of these charges against people who held high posts in the new government. However, one could not rpt not arrest such people for trial without documentary or other very strong proof. On the other hand, their continued presence in high posts would not rpt not prevent their dismissal and arrest if proof were found. I asked

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<sup>7</sup> Former President Michel Micombero was deposed by a military coup in November 1976.

whether he was saying that, since most of these people had helped him to make the coup d'état on November first, he was more or less in debt to them politically and thus had to accommodate his principles somewhat to political realities. Bagaza said that I must know of the inherent instabilities in Burundi, which had created divisions between ethnic groups, regions, and clans. It was essential to put all this behind them if a modern society was ever to emerge. Hence, he could not rpt not act in such a way as to give the appearance of favoring one region over another, or one clan over another. This made it essential that he bide his time. I should know that investigations were continuing quietly all the time against the people I had named, and others. If enough evidence appeared, he would act, but meantime, the watchword was prudence and, above all, patience.

7. Comment. Though, in parting, Bagaza said that he had enjoyed our conversation because I had made my points strongly and was one of the "rare" ambassadors who told him the truth, he still did not rpt not answer all of my questions directly. He did not rpt not disavow the statist tendencies in the regime, whatever the distinction he drew between that and both Marxism and socialism. I feel that he has rather negative feelings about local free enterprise and that he will try to regulate it severely without taking formal measures to halt it. This attitude has already sapped the confidence of local businessmen, and their holding back on new capital investment and inventory buildup will further prejudice the regime against them. On the other hand, Bagaza would welcome foreign investment in Burundi by larger scale, more modern enterprises, and this means that if U.S. and other investors ever decide that Burundi nickel is an attractive prospect, Bagaza will most probably accept them eagerly.

8. Bagaza also did not respond directly to my queries about the party line that will emerge from the July seminar. However, by his remarks about Simbananiye and the latter's cohort, Prime Minister Nzambimana, it is clear that he recognizes the efforts of these men to gain a predominant position both personally and politically to his (Bagaza's) disadvantage. I sense that the President is feeling his way to a confrontation, but, at all costs, wishes to avoid a premature show-down. Thus, he really does not rpt not know just what political line will emerge a month hence, though he personally favors more moderation.

9. About a month ago, rumors spread everywhere in town that Bagaza was about to dismiss Nzambimana and other ministers, but this was later denied and ascribed to an effort by the adherents of the old regime to sow confusion. Father Barakana, the ex-university rector, has told us that the rumors were in fact correct, but that Bagaza backed away from his action because it would have been unseemly to act amidst such public speculation. This version rings true, and, if so, it

means that Nzambimana is well aware of the critical challenge that he and others of his (Matana) group face from Bagaza. Perhaps this is why Nzambimana is trying to build up his own more radical constituency. For instance, in a speech at the construction site for the Chinese textile plant on June 22, Nzambimana decried "imperialist" economic aid to Burundi which, unlike Chinese, allegedly tries to block Burundi's development and to saddle the country with foreign experts indefinitely instead of training native cadres. If Nzambimana is thus, through his demogogy, trying to make himself into a folk hero and less vulnerable to dismissal by Bagaza, we may indeed well be facing a month of fairly critical internal realignment for the future orientation of Burundi's second republic.

Mark

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**145. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1977

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

3. *Uganda*—You may have seen Jack Anderson's column this morning reporting that a group of Uganda police helicopter pilots are being trained by Bell in Texas.<sup>2</sup> The column is accurate and highlights a growing problem which we face concerning our relations with Uganda.<sup>3</sup>

Visas for the Bell trainees were routinely issued by our Embassy in Nairobi. Although issuance of such visas is not illegal, we have now initiated a special screening procedure for official Uganda visa applications which would prevent this from happening again.

The Anderson Column and recent events related to South Africa will focus Congressional attention once again on Uganda as the Black African State with the most notorious human rights record.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 11/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Ugandans Get Pilot Training in U.S.," *Washington Post*, November 7, 1977, p. C27.

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "Unbelievable!" in the left margin.



I have recently recommended to Commerce that applications to export three Bell helicopters and a used Boeing 707 to Uganda be denied on human rights grounds, and we are exploring the question of restricting “grey area” exports to Uganda as we now do to South Africa. We must expect growing Congressional pressure for stronger measures against Uganda. Three bills recently introduced by Congressman Pease of Ohio and co-sponsored by a broad group of House liberals and conservatives would effectively embargo all US trade with Uganda.<sup>4</sup>

I will soon forward to you a memorandum outlining my suggestions for steps which could be taken against Uganda.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>4</sup> These measures introduced by Congressman Pease on September 20 became part of Public Law 95–435, signed by Carter on October 10, 1978. See Document 154.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote “ok” in the left margin.

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**146. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the  
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Relations with Uganda

The Secretary agreed to provide the President with a report on the state of our relations with Uganda.<sup>2</sup> The attached report addresses the steps we have taken with respect to Ugandan helicopter trainees and the provision of aircraft to Uganda. In addition, the report describes

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, Uganda: 1/78–1/81. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 145.



the state of Ugandan-American relations, reviews the climate of opinion in Congress and sets out further actions which we are contemplating.

**Peter Tarnoff<sup>3</sup>**

*Executive Secretary*

## **Attachment**

### **Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Uganda

#### *1. The Immediate Problem: Helicopter Trainees*

The following steps we have taken should help to mitigate the embarrassment caused us by the discovery that a number of Ugandan police officers are attending helicopter training courses in Forth Worth, Texas, under the auspices of the Bell Helicopter Textron company, which sold 9 civilian model helicopters to the Ugandan police before we closed our Embassy in 1973:

—Prior to the furor over the training, the Secretary recommended to the Department of Commerce that it deny applications for export licenses for three new helicopters and one used Boeing 707 destined for Uganda, since these items would be likely to be used in support of the regime's violations of human rights. Commerce has accepted this recommendation and Bell has indicated it will not fight the decision.

—We have instructed all diplomatic and consular posts to refer to the Department for advisory opinions all visa applications by Ugandan officials and anyone else traveling on Ugandan Government business.<sup>5</sup> This enables us to prevent future travel by Ugandans to the US which we would deem to be incompatible with our human rights policy (e.g., police helicopter pilots).

—We have denied entry into the US of two additional Ugandan helicopter trainees who were issued visas with the rest of the group

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<sup>3</sup> Wisner signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> Confidential.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 263166 to all diplomatic and consular posts, November 3, the Department transmitted instructions on visas for Ugandan officials and those traveling on behalf of the Ugandan government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770405-0904)

but had not yet arrived in this country when we learned of the program. We have also revoked the visas of two other trainees who have not yet arrived.

—We are actively considering asking Bell Helicopter and/or the Ugandans to terminate the training before its scheduled end (which for most of the trainees will be December 16, although for some the training may continue until toward the end of January).

Official action to terminate the training is an option open to us: we could revoke the visas as “prejudicial to the public interest” under Section 212 (a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and request the trainees to leave the country. However, if they refused to leave, our legal grounds for expelling them would be shaky: that section of the law has never been used to revoke a visa and expel an alien after his admission to this country.

## *2. What Amin Can Do to Us*

A factor we must keep constantly in mind, as we move in other ways against Uganda, is our desire to avoid so direct and open a confrontation between the US Government and Idi Amin that he is impelled to retaliate against us. Despite our efforts to persuade Americans living in Uganda to leave, and to secure the support of parent organizations in the US in this effort, there remain some 240 Americans in Uganda whom Amin can treat as hostages in the manner he did last February.<sup>6</sup> The most vulnerable members of the American community in Uganda are the Christian missionaries who make up about one-third of the total: while most of the Americans apparently feel secure because they are performing essential jobs, the missionaries’ security is particularly questionable as Moslem Amin’s wrath takes on an increasingly anti-Christian tone.

## *3. Congressional Attitudes*

Congressman Pease (D., Ohio) has taken the lead in urging Congressional action against Uganda. He has introduced three basic bills which would, respectively, ban imports of Ugandan coffee, ban all Ugandan imports and ban all US exports to Uganda. He is also considering introducing a resolution calling for the closure of the Ugandan Embassy in Washington. He has succeeded in obtaining significant liberal and conservative co-sponsorship. Observers of the Congressional scene report that anti-Uganda sentiment on the Hill is so widespread that the Pease measures would pass overwhelmingly if they were put to a vote at this moment.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 139.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 145.

In our discussions on the Hill, we have pointed out that the use of trade sanctions against Uganda could increase pressure for their use elsewhere, notably South Africa; that, indeed, our relations with black African leaders, even such an outspoken critic of Amin as Nyerere, would suffer serious damage if we were to impose trade sanctions on Uganda after having vetoed an African Security Council resolution to impose similar sanctions on South Africa.<sup>8</sup> We have also noted that such measures are of dubious effectiveness, given the likelihood that Uganda can find other trading partners to replace us, and that in any case such actions of ours are unlikely to rectify the human rights situation in Uganda.

Congressman Pease acknowledges these arguments. He nonetheless sees value in disassociating the US completely from the Amin regime and feels that its human rights record is so unrelievedly egregious as to minimize the possibility that actions against Uganda will be precedent-setting. He also feels that if trade measures could be instituted to slow or halt the flow of goods which buys the loyalty of Amin's soldiers, this could lead to Amin's overthrow (though he admits that Amin's immediate successor may be no improvement). In his opinion, the US should take the lead on this and seek cooperation from Uganda's other trade partners. Pease accepts our view that the existence of the Uganda Embassy in Washington was extremely useful to us for direct access to Amin during the February crisis and could fill this role again. However, he is concerned that allowing the Embassy to operate confers some degree of respectability on the Amin regime and he wonders if the need for direct access could not be achieved through the Uganda Mission to the UN.

#### *4. The Current US-Uganda Official Relationship*

Aside from the specific steps we have taken in the context of the helicopter trainees, our official treatment of Uganda has been decidedly cool since we closed our Embassy there in 1973:

—Our interests in Uganda are protected by the FRG Embassy but we have no official American personnel there.

—The Uganda Embassy in Washington is kept at the Charge d'Affaires level.

—We send no congratulatory messages to Amin nor do we respond to messages from him.

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<sup>8</sup> The Security Council met October 10–November 4 to consider the situation in South Africa. One of four draft resolutions called on governments to refrain from making loans to or investments in South Africa. The resolution was not adopted due to negative votes by permanent members of the Security Council, including the United States. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1977, pp. 144–145)

—We discourage all Americans from traveling to or residing in Uganda.

—We terminated our AID program and withdrew the Peace Corps contingent in 1973.

—US representatives to international development banks are under instructions to oppose and vote against loans to Uganda.

—We have for the past several years maintained an informal arms embargo against Uganda. Though unannounced, we have not approved any applications for export licenses for items on the munitions list.

—When approached by American business representatives interested in doing business with Uganda, we have described the situation in Uganda factually and have suggested that firms might wish to consider the effect on their reputation of having an association with Amin's Uganda.

—Both you and Andy Young have openly criticized Uganda's record of human rights violations.<sup>9</sup>

#### 5. Further US Actions

We have, in short, maintained an officially unfriendly relationship with Uganda. In the context of criticisms of us for leaning heavily on South Africa for its human rights violations while ignoring Uganda, the fact is that we have been officially much harsher toward Uganda than toward South Africa.

Additional steps we could realistically take to underscore our abhorrence of the Amin regime and respond to Congressional concerns include the extension of our *de facto* arms embargo to include all items for use by the Uganda military and police (parallel to our action with respect to South Africa) and a lobbying effort to secure greater support from the Africans and others at the UN (and the UN Human Rights Commission) for international condemnation of the Amin regime. We hope that the cumulative effect of all the measures we have instituted against Uganda will by January, when hearings on the Pease bills are planned, have put further distance between us and Amin. Hopefully, this will enable us to persuade Congress that the contemplated legislative action would have so negligible an incremental effect on Amin as not to justify the risk of establishing a precedent for using trade policy as a political weapon and, in the process, forcing a confrontation with Amin which could jeopardize the Americans who perversely insist on remaining in Uganda.

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 137.

**147. Memorandum From Henry Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Our Current Lack of Tactical Options in a Uganda Crisis

This afternoon I attended an interagency meeting at State to review contingency plans for a possible Ugandan crisis. The meeting reviewed the situation, and set up a Task Force to produce a contingency plan on an accelerated basis, but this will take at least a week.<sup>2</sup> Such a plan is to be distinguished from the paper on general policy options which State will send over tomorrow or Friday.<sup>3</sup>

The point of this memo is that the general consensus of the meeting was that the United States at the moment has no contingency plan for dealing with the situation where Idi Amin decides to, for whatever reason, hold some or all of the 240 American citizens in Uganda hostage in response to one of several kinds of events, including US action. Such a crisis does not at the moment exist, but it could arise very fast.

The meeting reviewed various factors:

- the widely dispersed nature of the Americans throughout Uganda and the difficulty in communicating with them;

- the apparent lassitude of the West Germans in ascertaining their exact circumstances;

- a review of the February Ugandan crisis, concluding that we resolved that crisis as much through luck as skill and that the same tactics may not work the second time around;<sup>4</sup>

- decided to set up an interagency task force on a priority basis, coordinated by State, to develop a set of tactical crisis options incor-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 56, Uganda: 2/77–2/78. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Tuchman, Thornton, Odom, and Schecter. An unknown hand wrote "Col. Odom" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In a December 23 memorandum to Aaron, Richardson described the Task Force's contingency plan in case Amin took U.S. citizens as hostages. The plan included radio communication over Voice of America and the British Broadcasting System (BBC), getting help from the West German Embassy, requesting assistance from other African countries, sending a high-ranking U.S. official to Kampala, and military options. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, Uganda 1–12/77)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 148.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 138 and 139.

porating diplomatic, military, and psychological strategies for the President;

—the probability that any military option would be a very messy one.

I felt very keenly as the meeting wore on, the lack of basis for intelligent choices that could at this moment be put before the President, and therefore stressed the need to move both quickly and confidentially. (It was remembered that in February Amin offered to come over and join our task force!)

There was general sentiment that a number of factors could trigger a crisis, and until the most intelligent tactical options possible were presented to the President, we should avoid situations and words which might trigger Amin's anger. I concur strongly in this recommendation.

I, in conjunction with Dick Moose, will push State and the Task Force to produce these options for the President as soon as possible. In the meantime, State will take actions to upgrade our information, and will specifically approach the Germans at a high level with precise requests for their assistance through their embassy in Kampala towards more precisely ascertaining the whereabouts and exact circumstances of all the American citizens in Uganda.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

—That State's general policy options paper be taken to the President at the same time and not before a tactical options paper.

—That you orally advise the President of the desirability of he, Andy Young, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and you not making inflammatory statements or denunciations of Amin during this particular period of a week or ten days until tactical options are developed.

—That you discuss the general situation with Christopher.

—That if necessary to support State's efforts, you, the Vice President, or the President be willing to certify the importance to key Congressmen during this interim period of not taking overtly antagonistic public acts while our Uganda crisis policy is in an embryonic stage. This task will be made somewhat easier by the upcoming Congressional recess, at the end of which we will presumably have both a tactical and a general policy. The sentiment at today's meeting was that somewhat higher than working level approaches to Congress might be necessary.

**148. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the  
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Uganda Policy

We have now completed our overall review of the elements of our relationship with Uganda and the policy options available to us.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary has concluded that our policy should be one of consciously distancing the U.S. from Ugandan human rights violations and encouraging international action on Uganda, while not going so far as to sever all U.S. contact with Uganda.

The major specific elements of our policy are as follows:

—We will not grant visas to Ugandans who appear to have been involved in human rights violations, and we will not grant visas for security-related training or for other training which would directly benefit the regime's repressive apparatus.

—We will continue to prohibit munitions-list exports, and in cooperation with the Commerce Department will deny licenses for "gray area" items (such as shot guns and crime control equipment, and including helicopters and other light aircraft).

—We will also review all other major exports to Uganda from the human rights perspective. We plan to continue to deny commercial aircraft sales, since Uganda's commercial aviation fleet is at present primarily used for the direct supply and support of the regime and its security apparatus. Other items will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

—We will continue to remind American firms of Uganda's egregious human rights record and will signal the public relations problems of doing business with Uganda, but (except in cases requiring licensing) we will make clear to American firms considering doing business with Uganda that they must make their own decisions on this subject in light of all the considerations involved.

—We will continue strongly to discourage Americans from traveling to Uganda for any purpose (including business), and will continue to advise the remaining 200-plus American residents to leave.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, Uganda: 1/78-1/81. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 147.

—We will play an active role in international discussions of Uganda's human rights situation and will support resolutions and investigations by the UN Human Rights Commission and other bodies; our focus will be on building an international consensus, and we will closely coordinate our efforts with those of other concerned governments in the interest of maximum effectiveness.

—We will reinforce our present policy of providing humanitarian assistance to Ugandan refugees, both through contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and through special assistance (such as in the education field) where particular needs are identified.

However, at the same time we will not take certain steps advocated by some critics of Uganda, including a number of members of Congress:

—We will not break relations with Uganda, close the Ugandan Embassy in Washington, or restrict the movement of Ugandan diplomats at the United Nations. We will, however, monitor closely and investigate any information received on improper activities by Ugandan personnel in this country (including harassment of exiles) and will take up with the Ugandans any cases where there is substantial evidence of such improper activities.

—We will not support the legislation proposed by Congressman Pease for embargoes of U.S. imports from and exports to Uganda, legislation which would establish difficult precedents for our international trade policy and would stimulate pressure for similar sanctions against other countries with human rights problems. Instead, we will respond to the strong pressures in Congress for action on Uganda in the coming session by working with interested members and committees to develop an acceptable vehicle for Congressional action based on the elements of our policy previously described. A likely approach would be through a resolution similar to the Collins resolution on South Africa.<sup>3</sup> We are cautiously optimistic that such an approach can succeed, but success is by no means guaranteed, particularly since there is substantial Congressional support for the Pease boycott bills.

We cannot discount the possibility of retaliation against the Americans resident in Uganda. Accordingly, we are continuing to work on contingency planning for the protection and/or evacuation of those Americans should such retaliation occur or should the situation otherwise deteriorate. A team representing the Departments of State and

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<sup>3</sup> The Collins amendment to House Concurrent Resolution 388, introduced on October 26, denounced South Africa for the September 12 death of Steve Biko while under detention in South Africa and for the October 19 banning of anti-apartheid individuals and groups. It also urged the President to take measures against South Africa to register the deep concern of the U.S. public about the continued violation of human rights in South Africa.



Defense, led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, leaves this weekend for consultations with the West Germans (our protecting power in Kampala) in Bonn and Nairobi aimed at producing agreed plans and courses of action.<sup>4</sup>

However, in taking these necessary precautions, we fully recognize that our practical ability to protect the Americans in most situations is limited. We are again this week, through the German Government, advising all Americans in Uganda to depart the country. We have also encouraged several interested Congressmen and their staffs to discuss with the headquarters of the various missionary groups the implications of the continued presence of their personnel in Uganda.

**Peter Tarnoff**

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<sup>4</sup> Reports on the January 17–18 meetings in Bonn are in telegrams 982 from Bonn, January 18, and 1077 from Bonn, January 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780027–0408 and D780029–0369, respectively) In telegram 1061 from Nairobi, January 23, the Embassy reported on the January 23 meetings with the German Ambassador in Nairobi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780033–0718)

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## 149. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 2, 1978

### SUBJECT

Kenya's Security Concerns

### PARTICIPANTS

#### KENYA

Daniel T. arap Moi, Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs

Mwai Kibaki, Minister for Finance and Planning

Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs

C. Njonjo, Attorney General

G. K. Kariithi, Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Cabinet, Office of the President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 2–3/78. Confidential. Drafted by Post. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

J. G. Kiereini, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense  
N. Nganga, Permanent Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
John P. Mbogua, Kenya Ambassador

UNITED STATES

The President

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor

David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor

Paul Henze, NSC Staff

Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, AF

Richard Post, Director, AF/E

Before the President entered the Cabinet Room, Dr. Brzezinski started the discussion off by noting that the US is very preoccupied with the maintenance of the principle of territorial integrity, not only in the Horn of Africa but elsewhere. The US is very conscious of the closeness of its relationship with Kenya, and in consequence of its closeness to Kenya, the US is very concerned for Kenya's security.

Vice President Moi said that Kenya felt the same concern as the United States does over the Horn of Africa. The situation requires urgent attention. The conflict must be removed. Kenya feels that major powers should not be involved there, and Kenya therefore appreciates the US position of staying out of the conflict. Territorial integrity is a priority concern. If that principle comes apart, it could cause chaos in Africa. Kenya has concentrated on economic development up to now. But the world is unpredictable. Kenya sent this delegation to make the US Government understand Kenya's problems. People may misunderstand Kenya from hearsay or from reading newspaper accounts. But the fact is that Kenya's concern is real and that is why President Kenyatta has asked the delegation to come to the US.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the US needed to consult with Kenya on these problems and needs Kenya's guidance. He noted that Kenya is much closer to the problem and we are of course close friends who share the same values about growth, development, political organization, etc. He hoped that Kenya has noted a change in US policies toward Africa under this Administration. We are against the involvement of outside powers in African problems. We have made clear our support in southern Africa for majority rule. We have also made clear our support for the principle of territorial integrity. This is the thrust of US policy.

In that context, Dr. Brzezinski said the US is concerned about the Horn and wished to fashion a response that will improve the prospects for a peaceful settlement. In that context, he wished to make three points:

1. The US does not approve the Somali aggression. Somalia should withdraw from the Ogaden and should not pose a threat to any of its

neighbors. We will not provide the means for them to make or carry out such threats.

2. There must be some African arrangement to ensure that the Somalis have confidence that there will not be any retribution against the Ogaden population if they withdraw. Such an arrangement would also ensure that Somalia's territorial integrity would not be violated.

3. There must be an arrangement for the removal of foreign troops. The Soviets and Cubans went there to protect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Once that threat is gone, they should go also. We fear that their presence there could be the beginning of military and political involvement in the area and in African problems which should be a cause of concern to Africans themselves. He stressed that foreign incursion in the Horn breeds foreign counter-incursion.

Mr. Kibaki said that Kenya agrees with Dr. Brzezinski entirely. Those objectives are also Kenya's objectives. It is most important to realize that the reason why there has been foreign incursion is the pursuit by Somalia of something fundamental to Somali life which they have been undertaking with Soviet help: Greater Somalia. That is the fundamental issue. If the Somalis do not abandon the goal of a Greater Somalia, withdrawal will mean nothing. It will simply represent a pause before they start to pursue Greater Somalia again. For that abandonment by them they may have some need for foreign assistance. But the US and the West must think of the demand side: Why did the Soviets get invited in?

At this point in the conversation the President entered the room and shook hands with all the Kenyan guests. He then said that he was honored to have the delegation here from Kenya which is a great country and a great friend of the United States. He asked Vice President Moi to express his pleasure and his admiration to President Kenyatta and also to pass along his hopes that President Kenyatta would have a long and fruitful life.

The President then said that he would like to say that the US shares Kenya's deep concern about the deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa. The US shares Kenyan concern about violations of territorial integrity. While it may well be that boundaries in Africa were drawn without very good reason, nonetheless we must now stick with them.

The President said that the US is concerned at the fact that the Soviets first overarmed the Somalis, which precipitated the invasion of Ethiopia, and now they are pouring arms into Ethiopia. We have talked to President Siad and have impressed upon him the importance of withdrawing from the Ogaden. On the other hand, we have a commitment from Mengistu and from the Soviets not to cross the border into Somalia. We are concerned about Kenya's security. Evidence of that is the fact that the first F-5's are about to arrive. We are working

to improve Kenya's security with other Western powers who share our view of Kenya's importance.

The US feels that Kenya has taken the right course in not investing in weapons, but instead putting its resources into meeting the needs of the people.

The President hoped that in the coming months there might be a lessening of tension between Kenya and Somalia. It would be much easier for us to use our influence if there were a drop in the level of harsh language used between the two countries. He hoped that in conveying his words to President Kenyatta that Vice President Moi would also express his admiration for Kenya's great leader. (At this point Vice President Moi handed over a letter from Kenyatta to President Carter.)<sup>2</sup> The President remarked that President Kenyatta had certainly sent a superb delegation. We are honored by the quality of the delegation and by the fact that it represents such a considerable portion of the leadership of Kenya.

Vice President Moi said that President Kenyatta had sent him with a very important message. Having concentrated its efforts on economic development, Kenya now finds that the time has come for it to safeguard its security. There are three areas of importance to Kenya: political, military, and economic. On the political side, Kenya knows that the interests of the United States and Kenya are identical: containment of communism in the Horn of Africa and protection of the sea lanes and safeguarding the sources of petroleum. These matters are vital to East Africa and especially to Kenya. When goods had to go around the Cape, Kenya had to pay much more. Kenya wants the United States to understand Kenya. Kenya does not wish to get arms. The possession of arms does not contribute to a better standard of living for the people. For a long time President Kenyatta held that view, but now he feels the time has come to seek help from Kenya's friends and that means the United States, our close friend. When Kenya needs help, we come to you.

As for the political aspect, Kenya itself does not dispute any borders. But Somalia has enshrined a Greater Somalia in its constitution and now they are embarked on achieving it. Kenya has put a great deal of development effort into the Northeast Province, such things as schools and hospitals. Kenya shares nothing in the way of ideology with Ethiopia. The only thing that Kenya shares with Ethiopia is a devotion to the principle of territorial integrity. That question is vital

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<sup>2</sup> The January 27 letter from Kenyatta to Carter expressed hope for a new security understanding between Kenya and the United States. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 11, Kenya: President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta 1/77–3/78)

to Kenya. Kenya loathes the presence of Soviets in Ethiopia. Kenya feels that withdrawal of the Somali forces from the Ogaden would leave the Soviets with no excuse for staying, but as long as the fighting continues the Soviets do have an excuse to stay: protection of Ethiopia's territorial integrity. If the Somalis withdraw, then Kenya feels that all of us can call for Soviet and Cuban forces to withdraw as well. He said that Kenya felt that the United States had made the right move in sending a special emissary to Ethiopia.

Vice President Moi said that the delegation has come to request the US to help on a number of items. They are asking the minimum to defend Kenya's borders. Kenya has no desire to become a military power. However, they face the threat from Somalia and they also face a future threat from the Marxist regime in Ethiopia. It makes no sense to wait until the end and then ask for help. This has led many African countries to panic and seek help anywhere it was available.

Moi said that President Kenyatta places high hopes on the success of this mission. He has already been telephoning Vice President Moi to find out what progress has been made. Vice President Moi hoped that the President would consider very sympathetically Kenya's request. Kenya has threats from Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia. The only peaceful neighbor it has is Sudan. He stressed the strategic importance of Kenya.

President Carter said that he had to go to make an appearance on television. He said that he had already had a very good briefing from Secretary Vance on his meeting with the delegation the previous day<sup>3</sup> and has also discussed matters extensively with Dr. Brzezinski and he will be talking to both men this afternoon. He expressed his appreciation for the delegation's coming to Washington. He noted that the US shares a number of principles with Kenya and the US is indeed concerned over Kenya's security situation. We share Kenya's feeling that you must be able to defend yourself. He said he would be awaiting a recommendation from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on which to base a decision, but he assured the delegation that he would give their request very sympathetic consideration.<sup>4</sup> He said that an attack on Kenya would be very dangerous for the United States as well. He agreed to study their request and their military needs as

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 56370 to Nairobi, March 5, the Department reported on the March 1 meeting between Vance and the Kenyan delegation led by Vice President Moi in which they discussed the Horn of Africa and Kenyan defense needs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780099-1288)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 150.

well as the assessment of their situation that our defense officials will make. The President then left the Cabinet Room.

[Omitted here is a long discussion on the situation in the Horn of Africa.]

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**150. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint State/Defense Survey Team to Kenya (Hill) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Preliminary Findings Joint State/Defense Survey Team to Kenya (U)

1. (U) Undersigned was the Director of the Joint State-Defense Survey Team dispatched to Kenya to assess the threats confronting that nation and the capacity and needs of its Armed Forces to meet these threats. The Team, representing all military departments, OJCS, OSD, European Command, The State Department, and US Embassy (Nairobi), conducted the survey of Kenyan Armed Forces, during the period 18 March–5 April.

2. (C) Our preliminary findings are as follows:

a. Intelligence.

(1) Somalia presents the principal threat to Kenya; tentatively, Somalia has the capability to launch several brigades, with the total strength of a division sized force with limited air and naval support, against Kenya's Armed Forces. In addition, there is present in Uganda a force sufficient to launch attacks against Kenya in brigade strength. Our best estimate is that Somalia and Uganda will be in a position to launch such attacks within 0 to two years. Over the longer-term of three to five years, a combination of Soviet-Armed Ethiopian or Tanzanian Forces, assisted by Cuban Surrogates, would be in a position to launch attacks of corps-level strength against Kenya. During the next five

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 58, Kenya 091.3—1978. Secret. The date is handwritten. In an April 11 handwritten note forwarding the memorandum to Duncan, Lieutenant General W.Y. Smith wrote, "Mr. Duncan, General Jones asked that I provide the attached to you. The complete report on the Kenya trip will be available in about 3 weeks I'm told. I have given a copy of this to Thor Hanson to pass to the NSC Staff. Bill. Cc: Thor Hanson." The handwritten note is stamped "April 13, 1978 Dep Sec has seen." (Ibid.)

years, in conjunction with a Somali-Ugandan or Ethiopian-Tanzanian attack, insurgency by the Somali population of Northeast Kenya is probable.

(2) Analysis of terrain discloses the following key points:

(a) There is sufficient space between the borders and key areas to trade space for time except opposite Uganda and Tanzania in the Mombassa port area.

(b) The terrain opposite Somalia favors the attacker, with unobstructed mobility and poor defensive fields of fire due to brush, which will make ground-fired wire guided missiles ineffective and limit tank main gun effectiveness.

b. The Kenyan Armed Forces presently have negligible capabilities to counter the above hostile capabilities. The ground forces are essentially infantry with no antitank defense or air defense means. Some tanks and artillery, on order from Great Britain, will not significantly affect the deficiency in the antitank means, since the equipment on order could not be effectively operated in the terrain facing Somalia. The Air Force is based on obsolete combat and training aircraft with extremely low operational readiness rates. Air support and airlift aircraft, although more advanced, are limited and small.

The incoming squadron of F-5E's represent a considerable improvement as a general purpose fighter, however the lack of an adequate ground environment (radar, commo, etc.), reduces the capability. The Navy consists of seven patrol boats, three of which are obsolete and in questionable material condition. All vessels are lightly armed, short-ranged, weather limited coastal craft. Plans to improve weapons capability by installing GABRIEL surface-to-surface missile systems have been approved for two craft commencing in March 1979. The other two ships of this class are expected to receive the SSM conversion at a later date. The Armed Forces major asset is a well educated and disciplined enlisted man who compares favorably with US enlisted personnel. The officer corps, on the other hand, particularly at the higher level, is not well-grounded professionally.

3. (S) The Survey Team is developing alternative equipment-training-logistics packages which will augment existing third country programs. The Team approach will involve low, middle, and high cost force improvement packages that are balanced, integrated and time-phased. These will be based on a one-year (quick fix), a two-to four-year period, and an out-year period. The alternative packages will include capital investment costs and increased operating costs associated with force improvement, together with an assessment of the likely impact of these increased costs on the Kenyan economy.

All three alternatives, (force packages) will consider the present equipment on hand and equipment on order from third country



nations. Primary emphasis will be placed on avoiding the mixing of similar typed equipment from two or more nations. As an example, the Kenyans are programmed to receive the British Vickers tank (105mm main gun) commencing March 1979. This weapon system provides an adequate armor capability and US tanks will not be recommended as they would complicate the equipment mix. Also, the Kenyans are procuring the United Kingdom's new 105mm light gun (total of 18) with a maximum range of 17,000 meters. This gun adequately fulfills the immediate field artillery requirement, negating the purchasing of US Howitzers. Similarly, equipment alternatives will be considered to provide the required capability, such as using either TOW or HOT missiles to counter the armor threats.

In addition, the report will identify actions which the Government of Kenya can initiate to improve the capabilities of its Armed Forces, regardless of the type or quantity of new equipment it decides to procure. These include providing dispersal facilities for fighters, constructing taxi ways to enhance the efficiency of fighter bases, bolstering logistic systems, and correcting deficiencies in the officer training program.

No overall cost estimates are presently calculated, however, it is estimated that the initial costs will be low, with emphasis on reform of support systems and integration of equipment on order.

4. (S) Additional factors that bear on US policy are:

a. The Kenyans are experiencing serious difficulties with the British military supply system due to the obsolescence of equipment provided and inadequate logistics backup for available equipment. The Kenyans are developing a close tie with Israel, who is training Kenyan technicians and supplying some key items.

b. The Kenyan political and senior military leadership has provided only partial policy direction, inspiration, and management control. This deficiency adversely affects the professionalism and ability of the Armed Forces to develop the organization and human resources necessary to effectively transition to modern equipment.

c. The physical infirmities of President Kenyatta make the question of political succession a key issue at this time. There is significant dissatisfaction among junior officers which could be an important factor in the post-Kenyatta period should a struggle for power among various contenders prove destabilizing.

d. However, the overall potential of the country is promising. Kenya possesses a capable, educated population, a soundly developing economy, and a significant young leadership with strong nationalistic motivation.

5. (U) An overview of preliminary findings, to include those items that the Kenyans must do for themselves, were presented to members



of the US Embassy, the Kenyan Armed Services, and to the Deputy Commander in Chief, USEUCOM. A written report is being prepared with an availability date of three weeks.

**John G. Hill, Jr.**  
*Major General, USA*

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## **151. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 5, 1978, 4–5:30 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Arms Transfer Policy for Iran and Security Assistance for Kenya

### **PARTICIPANTS**

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Ms. Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology

Mr. Leslie Gelb, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

#### *Defense*

Deputy Secretary Charles W. Duncan

Mr. Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

#### *JCS*

Lt. General William Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

#### *CIA*

Dr. Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

Mr. John Helgerson, Assistant NIO Near Eastern Affairs and South Asian Affairs

#### *ACDA*

Deputy Director Spurgeon M. Keeny

Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

#### *OMB*

Director James McIntyre

Mr. Edward G. Sanders, Deputy Associate Director, International Affairs Division

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 69, PRC 064 Arms Transfer Policy 7/5/78 [1]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

NSC

Dr. Jessica Tuchman Mathews

Gary Sick

Leslie G. Denend

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to East Africa.]

#### KENYA

Secretary Vance keyed the discussion on Kenya to the three questions posed in the agenda.<sup>2</sup> On the question of whether the helicopter/TOW system would require an exception to PD-13,<sup>3</sup> Vance said that State has said that it would. Sayre Stevens said that Ethiopia has the TOW. Dr. Brzezinski said that we should grant the exception but point out that others in the area may have a similar capability. General Smith asked whether PD-13 implied that we could not supply a country to respond to an increased threat. Secretary Vance said grant the exception but footnote it as stated by Dr. Brzezinski.

On the second question, of whether FMS credit might be reprogrammed, Secretary Vance pointed out that the Kenyans will have \$6.0 million in FY 1979. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the President had said we would help and asked if there were other countries we might look at. He suggested Jordan. Vance said he thought Jordan would not be appropriate since we may need Jordan's help in the near future, and suggested we provide the credit in FY 1980. Charles Duncan said that we really need to help Kenya now, and was it not possible to find \$10 million? Jim McIntyre said that he was concerned about our promising assistance in future budget years and suggested we look at FY 1978 and 1979. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the working group review the situation in time to consider the question at the Monday SCC meeting. He also stressed the importance of providing the assistance teams and that they should also be part of the discussion on Monday. Duncan said that if we just present the report to the Kenyans without additional commitments, our response will be viewed as insufficient. Secretary Vance said that we would delay presenting the report until we have had a chance to review the credit question.

The meeting adjourned at 5:30 p.m.

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Carter signed Presidential Directive/NSC-13, "U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," on May 13, 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.

## 152. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 13, 1978, 5 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Security Assistance for Kenya

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology  
William Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa

#### *Defense*

David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs  
Major General John G. Hill, Survey Team Chief, Kenya

#### *CIA*

William Parmenter, NIO, Africa

#### *JCS*

Lt. General William Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

#### *ACDA*

Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

#### *OMB*

Edward Sanders, Deputy Associate Director, International Affairs Division

#### *White House*

David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Leslie G. Denend

### *Summary of Conclusions*

The SCC focused first on the gap between the survey team report<sup>2</sup> which sets out an ambitious \$1 billion ten year program requiring up to 50% of Kenya's foreign exchange earnings during the period and the proposed US response which would assist in providing less than five percent of the program during the first three years. Defense maintained that the report is a credible assessment of the threat to Kenya and that since it calls for a phased response to Kenya's needs and the participation of other suppliers, the Kenyans would not view our initial

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 33, INT documents: 4300s-4400s, 7-8/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 150 for the preliminary report. The survey team produced a full report on April 28. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0202, Box 58, Kenya 091.3-1978)

modest response as inadequate. The CIA felt that the report would not make the Kenyans psychologically dependent on the US. The Kenyans view the report as a professional analysis of their military needs. ACDA added that the Kenyans could be counted on to make a realistic evaluation of the threat. State viewed the report as a realistic assessment of Kenyan needs and that it was worthwhile for the US to offer them the limited package dictated by available resources. There was agreement that the survey team chief would return to Kenya and present the report.<sup>3</sup> He would indicate US willingness to provide assistance teams and bring back any Kenyan request for equipment.

Next, the SCC turned to financing. The most urgent priority contained in the report is the 32 helicopters equipped with TOW anti-tank missiles costing \$44 million. The only immediate source of funds is the reprogramming of FY '78 and '79 FMS credit. Because it is not possible to find the full \$44 million in FY '78 and '79, US approval of the sale would necessarily imply that Kenya must finance a part of the total cost. Defense and State maintained that it would be militarily unsound to offer fewer helicopters. Also, because of the uncertainties associated with the FY '79 FMS credit request, reprogramming should focus only on FY '78. State offered the \$10 million previously identified for Somalia (Taiwan \$5, Indonesia \$2, Thailand \$1, Morocco \$1, and Jordan \$1) plus \$2 million additional from Jordan. Aaron pointed out that the donor countries involved have not yet been notified of that previous decision. He questioned the wisdom of taking funds which were identified in response to one set of circumstances and applying them to a different situation. He registered the VP's concern over the possible impact of cuts to Indonesia and Thailand. Defense added that the cuts to Jordan would send an appropriate message. State felt that Morocco should not receive further cuts. There was agreement that it was not necessary to make the final decision at this meeting on where the cuts would take place. The exact donors would be identified closer to the end of the fiscal year when it became clearer as to which FMS credit agreements might not be signed in FY '78. For FY '79, the Kenyans are programmed to receive \$6 million in credit which is not yet committed. Because of possible cuts in the FY '79 appropriation, it might not be possible to find more. There was also agreement to view Kenya sympathetically during the FY '80 budget cycle. The survey team chief was directed not to disappoint the Kenyans by calling attention to the FMS credit problem, but to indicate that \$12 million would be reprogrammed in FY '78.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 153.

**153. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Murray) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Status of the Kenya Survey Report (U)—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

On July 13, 1978, I attended a mini-SCC meeting chaired by David Aaron on the Kenya survey report.<sup>2</sup> MGen Hill, the survey team chief, accompanied me. The discussion focused mainly on the question of US responsiveness to Kenya—were we considering enough assistance and financial help for Kenya in view of the survey report's recommendations and Kenyan expectations?

There was general agreement that MGen Hill should be allowed to return to Kenya to present the survey report immediately and offer the following to the Kenyan government:

- USG participation in the first phase of Kenya's defense modernization program.
- the helicopter/TOW system, subject to Presidential and Congressional approval.
- the logistics, training and personnel teams.
- the reallocation of \$12M in FY 78 FMS financing to enable the GOK to initiate the helicopter program, and indications that we will consider additional FMS credits in FY 79 and 80 (without making a commitment).
- our expectation that the Kenyans would share the financial burden since there are limitations upon FMS credit which we can make available.

Subsequently, on July 18, 1978 MGen Hill presented the survey report to the Kenyan Ministry of Defense (MOD). Overall, the Kenyans were pleased with the professionalism of the report and intend to use it as a comprehensive strategic objectives plan. Conversely, they expressed some concern about the following:

- the lack of immediate US support—both equipment and money—and the lack of firm, multi-year funding.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330-81-0202, Box 58, Kenya 091.3—1978. Secret. "Jul 28, 1978, Dep Sec has seen" and "25 Jul 1978 10:40, Office of the Secretary of Defense" are stamped in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 152.

- the limited amount of assistance the USG is prepared to provide in comparison with the magnitude of the overall military modernization program outlined in the survey report.

*CONCLUSION.* The Kenyans decided to defer a decision on procurement of those items mentioned in the report until the report has been reviewed by the Kenyan MOD and Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile, they intend to proceed with high level military visits to the UK, FRG, France, Israel and Canada to seek additional military assistance.

*OUTLOOK.* According to MGen Hill, the Kenyans are likely to agree to the modernization program, and will probably request US assistance in those areas where we have shown an interest, i.e., air superiority, logistics, personnel, training and air cavalry. We can expect to receive a request for the 32 Hughes helicopters/TOW package in the near future. Additionally, the Kenyans are acutely aware of their immediate logistics, personnel and training problems and may seek US help in correcting them.

Whether or not we increase our security assistance to Kenya, our Ambassador in Nairobi has asked that we establish an Office of Defense Cooperation within the Embassy sometime in FY 79. We are taking steps to implement his request.

**Robert J. Murray**

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#### **154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 7, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights in Uganda

Despite low-key Administration efforts to warn about the dangers of imposing a trade embargo against Uganda because of human rights violations, the Senate voted 73 to 1 in favor of doing so last week. The amendment, which is on the IMF authorization bill, allows you to lift the embargo when you can certify that there is no longer a pattern of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North-South, Funk Subject File, Box 116, Uganda: 4/77–3/80. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

gross violations of human rights. The amendment amounts to a coffee embargo since more than 99 percent of U.S. imports from Uganda are coffee. The amendment exempts our agricultural exports, and we export little else to Uganda. Earlier, the House approved 377 to 0 a similar, though non-binding, resolution. We expect the bill to go to Conference this week. The Conference will take no more than a few days, and the bill should be on your desk in 2 to 3 weeks.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible (some would say probable) that Amin will react violently to the imposition of the embargo. He may threaten to, or actually, retaliate against the 200-odd Americans in Uganda. If he does, our ability to rescue Americans, who are scattered throughout the country, is quite limited.

Our choices are limited. They are:

1. Not to oppose the amendment openly in Conference, but privately warn the conferees that you think the amendment is ill-advised because it jeopardizes American lives. We cannot win, and action opposing it would cast doubt about your dedication to a human rights policy. (State and White House Congressional Liaison are in agreement on this.)

2. Couple private warnings with public statements expressing the hope that the situation in Uganda will improve and that the embargo is ill-advised. (Treasury would favor this approach because they are generally opposed to economic embargoes for political reasons.)

Making a protest for the record would lay the ground work for a signing statement which would point out that this is an example of the problems posed by Congressional interference in the day-to-day operation of foreign policy.

3. Of course, you could veto the bill. I would, however, strongly recommend against it because it might be misinterpreted as a defense of Amin and would certainly be overridden. In addition, a veto would be detrimental from the point of view of the IMF. If you are inclined to veto it, we should know now so that we can begin to establish a record which would clearly explain your reasons for doing so.

#### *RECOMMENDATIONS:*

1. That the Administration not actively oppose the Uganda amendment but warn Members privately that the action is ill-advised.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 145.

<sup>3</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option. Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the page, "You might raise this at the Congressional breakfast." Carter wrote "Will do."

2. That we prepare a signing statement pointing out that this is an example of the problems posed by Congressional interference in the day-to-day operation of foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Carter placed a question mark in the right margin.

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### 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Nairobi, September 2, 1978, 0937Z

13070. H pass Congressman Diggs. Subject: US Delegation to Kenyatta Funeral Received by President Moi.<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: Personal rep of President Carter, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and senior members USDel, received by President Moi and ranking members GOK afternoon September 1. Moi stressed long and close ties to US and promised to continue Kenyatta's domestic and foreign policies. After ordering press to depart, Moi spoke of Kenya's desire to live in peace with neighbors, mentioned continuing, camouflaged Somali military activities in Ogaden and requested us to put pressure on Siad Barre to respect Kenya's boundaries. Assistant Secretary Moose briefed Moi on our dialogue with Siad, assuring we are proceeding slowly but deliberately and have Kenyan interests in mind.<sup>3</sup> Moose then stated our desire to improve relations with Ethiopia and asked GOK to get this message to Mengistu given closeness of Kenya-Ethiopian ties. Moi agreed, saying he had already mentioned this to Ethiopian delegation day before as sequel to discussions he had had in Washington during visit this past winter.<sup>4</sup> Near end, Moi thanked

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780359–0670. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, Djibouti, London for Seitz, USCINNAVEUR, USCINCEUR for POLAD, and COMID-EASTFOR.

<sup>2</sup> President Jomo Kenyatta died on Tuesday, August 22. Telegram 213296 to Nairobi, August 22, transmitted a message from Carter to Moi sending condolences on behalf of the Government and people of the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780343–0949)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 76 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 149.



US for economic development assistance and said he would see Ambassador to discuss aid program in coming days.<sup>5</sup> After appeal for military assistance "in case of trouble here" by MinState Koinange, Assistant Secretary Moose reiterated necessity for speedy request for \$12 million FMS credit now available. Meeting was extremely cordial and provided excellent means for first substantive discussion with President Moi and close associates. Particularly useful was Justice Marshall's praise for Kenya's Constitution and democratic institutions and expression of US wish to see these continue. End summary.

2. President Moi received USDel to Kenyatta funeral at 4:30 p.m. September 1 in Harambee House (Office of President) in response to request for such meeting. Delegation headed by Justice Marshall who was accompanied by Ambassador Young, Ambassador Le Melle, Congressman Diggs and Assistant Secretary Moose (several members of delegation, including Mr. and Mrs. Jeff Carter, were on trip to Masai Mara game reserve). President Moi was flanked by MinState Koinange, Attorney General Njonjo (Marshall had specifically requested to see these two earlier in day), MinFinance Kibaki, FonMin Waiyaki and MinCooperative Development Paul Ngei (long-time associate President Kenyatta and leading Kamba politician), and Geoffrey Kariithi, head of the civil service.

3. Moi stressed long and close friendship with US predating independence (Justice Marshall was evidence of this having helped Kenyan delegation to Lancaster House conference in 1961) and his commitment to continue Kenyatta's domestic and foreign policies. Moi stressed his respect for Kenyan Constitution, an independent judiciary and his firm commitment to uphold individual freedoms of Kenyans. Justice Marshall picked up on this theme, saying Kenya and late President Kenyatta merited particular respect for constitutional democracy as Kenya "had not bent its constitution" as had so many other governments. Marshall added that democracy was cumbersome, but best system he knew despite its many shortcomings, commenting it was better to plod ahead with reason than "to kill someone and then be sorry."

4. President Moi requested press to leave room, after which he explained Kenya's desire to live in peace with neighbors and have border respected. President claimed there were some 10,000 Somali military in civilian clothes fighting in Ogaden and requested our assistance in putting pressure on Siad to desist and respect the territorial

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 13393 from Nairobi, September 8, the Embassy reported on Ambassador Le Melle's meeting with Foreign Minister Waiyaki to discuss bilateral issues following Moi's assumption of the Presidency. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780368-0680)

integrity of all its neighbors. He said the situation in Djibouti seemed all right at present, as French presence there has deterred Siad from any aggressive action. He added that Mengistu was very much afraid of Arab support for Somalia. At this point, Assistant Secretary Moose informed Moi that our dialogue with Siad was premised on condition that Somalia live in peace with her neighbors and that we will continue to push this objective and keep Kenyan interests in mind as we proceed. Ambassador Young added that it was preferable that we have some relationship with Siad so that he has an alternative to the Soviets. Moi responded that Kenya has no problem with a US-Somali relationship, as GOK sees us as moderating influence on Siad.

5. At this juncture, Assistant Secretary Moose spoke of our desire to better relations with Ethiopia which he characterized as currently marked by suspicion and misunderstanding. He said that while we certainly do not agree with everything the Mengistu regime is doing and are particularly distressed over the human rights situation in Ethiopia, we recognize the need for basic reforms and are willing to approach our relationship with Ethiopia with an open mind. Moose then explained particular problem with US law on expropriation without compensation issue and lack of understanding of USG constraints by PMAC re this issue. Moi responded that he had already mentioned US desire for improvement of relations “to Ethiopian number two” (Capt. Fikre-Selassie Wodgeress, who headed Ethiopian delegation to Kenyatta funeral), on previous day as follow-up to talks he had had in Washington during visit this past winter, although he did not elaborate on precisely what he told Ethiopian delegation. FonMin Waiyaki then proposed we make pitch to Ethiopian Foreign Minister, whom he said was “reasonable man,” at upcoming UNGA.

6. Moi then thanked USG for economic assistance, adding he expected to see Ambassador in coming days on this issue. At this point MinState Koinange said it was most important to get message to US so that Kenya would be able to cope “with problems here.” While Koinange did not mention military assistance as such, it was assumed this is what he had in mind. Justice Marshall replied that the USG would do all it could to help Kenya, implying USG did not have a free hand given congressional role which Congressman Diggs had earlier described in some detail. As meeting broke up, Assistant Secretary Moose emphasized need for GOK to act quickly lest \$12 million in FMS credit now available be lost as USG nears end its fiscal year.

7. Comment: Meeting, originally set for 20 minutes but stretched to 35 minutes, was marked by extreme warmth, mainly due to Justice Marshall’s long association with Kenya and its leaders. Moi seemed genuinely thankful for presence of USDel, particularly President Carter’s son. I believe meeting was extremely useful opportunity to make

known importance we attach to continuation of constitutionality in Kenya. Point could not have been made by better person than Justice Marshall who had important role in drafting Kenyan Constitution.

8. While discussion of Horn did not break new ground, it was useful exchange in as much as it re-emphasized our mutual interest in influencing other interested parties (Somalis and Arabs by US; Ethiopians by Kenyans) toward moderation and fact that stability in Horn is in everybody's interest. I believe it would be useful to follow-up Kenya's Ethiopian link with FonMin Waiyaki at upcoming UNGA.

9. In any future meeting re our economic development assistance to Kenya, I would expect to give assurances of continued US support within budgetary limitations. I shall follow up quickly on \$12 million FMS credit as MOD has already indicated to Embassy it wishes to accept this credit. Naturally, Kenyatta's death and funeral have delayed all government business.

10. I might add here that Kenyatta funeral was an enormous feat which GOK carried out with impressive organizational skill and dignity (to be reported in septel). Entire USDel made a splendid showing and I appreciate efforts of all those who had hand in assembling it and arranging for its getting out here.

11. This tel not cleared with delegation which departed shortly after meeting.

Le Melle

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## 156. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1978

### SUBJECT

Exception to PD-13 for Sale of Helicopter-Mounted TOW Missile Capability to Kenya

Last February the Kenyans gave us an extensive list of weapons they wished to obtain. The list included helicopters armed with wire-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 43, Kenya: 1/77-1/81. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "ok" in the upper right corner.

guided anti-tank (TOW) missiles. The Joint State/Defense Survey Team which went to Kenya in April concluded that one of Kenya's most pressing defense needs is for an air cavalry brigade composed of helicopters armed with such weapons. The team found that this capability would provide the speed and mobility required to respond to attack along Kenya's lengthy frontiers.<sup>2</sup> On July 5 the Policy Review Committee (PRC) endorsed the survey team's recommendation.<sup>3</sup> The Kenyans have now confirmed their desire to proceed with this purchase, valued at \$44 million.

For reasons set forth below, we believe approval of this request would require making an exception to one of the prohibitions in PD-13,<sup>4</sup> your arms transfer restraint directive. The PRC has recommended that such an exception be made, and I am now seeking your approval of that recommendation.

The relevant provision of PD-13 states:

"The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region an advanced weapons system which creates a new or significantly higher combat capability."

We have previously informed Congress that the determination of what is "advanced" will vary from region to region. We believe a helicopter-mounted TOW missile capability is an advanced system with respect to sub-Saharan Africa, for the following reasons:

—the U.S. has not previously provided a *helicopter borne* anti-tank missile system to any African country. (The TOW itself has been provided to Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco.)

—we have no evidence that the Soviets have yet provided such a system in sub-Saharan Africa, although they are providing this capability to Libya and Algeria. (They have provided a ground-based system to Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, and Uganda.)

—the Europeans have not provided this capability in sub-Saharan Africa, though the Kenyans are exploring French sources.

One of the grounds for an exception under PD-13 is that a friendly country needs the weaponry in question to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance. We believe the transfer to Kenya of helicopters armed with TOW missiles satisfies this criterion. Kenya is more supportive of American and moderate international political objectives than any other East African country. At the same time, Kenya's neighbors, especially Ethiopia, have formidable tank forces which create an imbalance in the region. A helicopter-

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 149 and 150.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 151.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 151.

mounted TOW capability would help Kenya defend against this external threat and thus reduce the imbalance. The nature of the terrain along Kenya's borders and the large distances that must be covered to defend the lengthy borders make this weapons system the most cost-effective deterrent.

Approval of this transfer would be welcomed by Kenya as a clear sign of U.S. support for its territorial integrity. It would particularly appreciate the gesture at this time in view of President Kenyatta's recent death.

We would assist in the financing of this sale and have taken account of it in the FY 79 arms transfer ceiling plan.

There may be some Congressional criticism of the sale, on grounds that it is contrary to the Administration's arms restraint policy.

In order to minimize the effect of granting this exception, we would suggest that there be a caveat making it explicit that the exception results from the unique circumstances in which Kenya finds itself and shall not have precedential value in deciding whether exceptions to PD-13 ought to be made with respect to other arms transfers to countries in the region.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That, subject to the caveat just noted, you authorize an exception to PD-13 for the sale to Kenya of helicopters armed with TOW missiles. If you approve, the Defense Department will begin discussions with Kenyan officials to develop the necessary Letters of Offer and Acceptance and will subsequently provide Congress with the necessary certification under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Carter checked the "Approve" option.

**157. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 31, 1978

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

5. *Uganda-Tanzania*: We have confirmed the fighting along Uganda's border with Tanzania.<sup>2</sup> It now appears that Amin, using the excuse of an invasion from Tanzania, has launched an operation against dissident elements within his own army, stationed in the Ugandan-Tanzanian border area. A dissident unit fled toward the border pursued by Amin's forces. Ugandan incursions into Tanzania, although apparently pressed forward in some force, were designed primarily to crush Ugandan dissidents and to stop Tanzania from resupplying the dissidents. Tanzanian forces have engaged the Ugandan units in an effort to contain the fighting and push Amin's forces back. Nyerere has asked for British military equipment and the matter is under consideration in London. He has only asked us what economic measures we could take to restrain Amin.<sup>3</sup> With the recently voted embargo against Uganda, there is little else we can do in this regard.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject Files, Box 20, Evening Reports (State) 10/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4716 from Dar es Salaam, October 31, the Embassy reported that Nyerere had called U.K. High Commissioner Moon and Ambassador Spain to his residence to update them on the fighting at the Uganda-Tanzania border. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780454-0871)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4718 from Dar es Salaam, October 31, the Embassy reported on Nyerere's requests to the United Kingdom and the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780448-0724)

**158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanzania<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1979, 0137Z

24513. Subject: Ugandan/Tanzanian Situation.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. We received today text of a message from Idi Amin to Secretary General Waldheim dated January 26, 1979, in which Amin called attention to alleged attacks by Tanzanian forces and asked Waldheim and the Security Council to “prevail on Tanzania to withdraw from Uganda peacefully.”<sup>2</sup> In accordance with standard procedures, Waldheim sent Amin’s message to the Security Council President for January (Mills of Jamaica) and to the other Council members.

3. The next step, if any, in the UN’s handling of the Ugandan complaint depends very much on the actions of the other members of the Council, in which the positions of the three African members (Nigeria, Gabon and Zambia) will be decisive. Without African support, we doubt that there will be any inclination within the Council to respond in one way or another to Amin’s message. It is possible that Kuwaiti PermRep Bishara, who assumes the Council’s Presidency on February 1, will be more inclined to be responsive to Amin than the current Council President, but we doubt that Ishara will take any step, even toward informal consultations, without African support. We are confident that the Soviets will also adjust their moves to the African position.

4. The Ugandan move to the UN places the United States in a potentially embarrassing position. On the one hand, it is very difficult, as was the case with Cambodia and the Vietnamese invasion,<sup>3</sup> to be seen supporting someone whose record is as awful as Idi Amin’s. On the other hand, an important principle of international law and the UN Charter is at stake if the international community turns a blind eye toward Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, despite the mitigating circumstances of Uganda’s prior invasion of Tanzania. There are two points which we need to consider:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790044–0976. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bridges (IO/UNP); cleared in AF and S/S; approved by Maynes (IO). Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 373 from USUN, January 29, the Mission transmitted the text of Amin’s letter to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790044–0411)

<sup>3</sup> In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Kampuchea) to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime. The United States condemned the invasion as a violation of international law.

A. How should we react if a formal request for inscription of a Security Council agenda item on Uganda's complaint is made? IO and AF believe we should follow our traditional policy in favor of inscription. We could tell the press that in line with our well-known policy, we support the Council's hearing any complaint a member state chooses to bring, and this includes a complaint by Uganda. At the same time, we would totally disassociate ourselves from the Ugandan regime, as we did in the case of Pol Pot and Cambodia.

B. What should we say to the Tanzanians, and when? We believe that we should, if only for the record, attempt to dissuade Nyerere from deeper military involvement in Uganda.

5. Would appreciate your urgent reaction to above, and reporting on any discussions you have had with Tanzanian officials in last several days as well as your best estimate of Tanzanian intentions.

Vance

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**159. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanzania to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dar es Salaam, January 30, 1979, 1135Z

478. Subject: (C) Tanzania/Uganda Conflict at the UN. Ref: State 24513.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Embassy appreciates dilemma described reftel regarding our bilateral Tanzania interests on one hand and our interest in upholding principles of international law and UN Charter on the other. Our general preference is to duck on this issue as much as we can. Since Embassy is not clear about process of inscribing an item on UNSC agenda, we do not know what is involved in trying to take such evasive action. We would think, however, that it would be as procedurally possible as it is substantively desirable to take our cue from Africans on this matter and let them take the lead. If they go along with inscription, so can we. If they oppose inscription, presumably they will pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790045–0378. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 158.



pose another way of dealing with the issue—e.g., via OAU—to which we can respectfully defer.

3. If Africans oppose without leaving us a way out, our first choice is to abstain. If other considerations of international organization principle are overriding, we can support inscription without unacceptable damage, as long as we are not out in front of others. We should cast our vote but lie low in any debate. In our public remarks, we should follow guidelines suggested para 4A reftel, but we would hope for a more effective dissociation from Amin's regime than we were able to achieve (here at least) from Pol Pot.

4. In any UN consideration of this matter and consequent USG position, caution is required in dealing with notion of invasion in context of Uganda-Tanzania conflict. Facts are hard to come by in that distant battlezone, but we are not at all certain that TPDF action thus far on Uganda side of border can be characterized as invasion in normal sense of the term that means large scale attack to gain territory (as was case of Amin's October invasion)<sup>3</sup> or to defeat and occupy a country. TanGov officials to whom we have talked within past week claim their military action on the border is either in reaction to Uganda military probes or getting TPDF in better tactical position to defend against Amin's promised "phase 2" attack on Tanzania. TPDF action doubtless is designed as well to help bring Amin down, and Tanzanian units have crossed the border, but it is not a very clean model of an invasion. We think that this peculiar aspect of fighting, rather than mitigating circumstances of prior Uganda invasion (para 4 reftel), should govern consideration of how international law and organization principles are applied.

5. On Tanzania intentions, we think it premature to go beyond saying that Nyerere intends to keep military pressure on Amin in the hope of bringing him down. Depending on events in Uganda, this could include either pushing Tanzanian military elements further into Uganda or promptly recalling them to their own territory. We still think the odds are against a full-blown march on Kampala but are reevaluating that judgment daily.

6. As for what and when we discuss matter with Tanzanians, we should do nothing unless and until the question of inscription at UNSC actually comes up. We will then be in a position to question, consult, and perhaps influence the TanGov. To go in now will not produce anything useful.

**Spain**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 157.

**160. Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**THE PRECARIOUS SITUATION IN UGANDA***The Military Situation*

Amin's military situation is deteriorating steadily. The Tanzanians took Masaka—some 80 miles from Kampala—on February 23, according to Reuters. [1 line not declassified]

The Libyans apparently have been airlifting supplies and a small number of personnel to protect and advise Amin, but it is questionable whether late-arriving, small-scale Libyan military aid can save him.

The outcome will depend on whether the Tanzanians continue to press the war and whether the Ugandan exiles are strong enough to wreck Amin's rule from within.

—The Tanzanians may soon face serious logistical problems as their supply lines lengthen and heavy rains make transportation difficult.

—The exiles are still untested in battle and divided among themselves.

The Ugandans' resistance has been weak, [less than 1 line not declassified]. In the few instances where they stood and fought, they were quickly routed by Tanzanian BM-21 rockets. Ugandan losses in men and equipment have been significant. The Ugandans are suffering serious shortages of equipment, ammunition, and other supplies. [2 lines not declassified]

OAU and Libyan efforts to mediate the conflict appear to have little chance of success. Nyerere's foreign minister is in Nairobi for the OAU ministers' meeting and to "monitor" a meeting of the OAU mediation committee. His deputy foreign minister has gone to Tripoli to discuss a Libyan peace initiative. But Nyerere has no desire for mediation at this point. Government sources denied a Tripoli broadcast's claim that Nyerere had agreed to negotiate with Amin. Publicly and privately, the Tanzanians continue to press their demands that the OAU condemn Uganda's "invasion of Tanzania" and that Amin renounce claims to Tanzanian territory and pay reparations.

Nyerere apparently is pressing on with the war. He instructed his troops to take Masaka by February 21, before the OAU committee was

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, Uganda: 1/78–1/81. Secret; Noform; Orcon. Sent to Brzezinski under a February 24 covering memorandum from Tarnoff who noted that the paper was prepared on February 23.

to meet, and has been moving forward in talks to improve Tanzanian-Kenyan relations. Kenyan Foreign Minister Waiyaki told the press on February 20 that the talks were going well, and the "border will soon be open." A border re-opening would have immediate short-term advantages for Nairobi. It could be Nyerere's *quid pro quo* for Kenyan cooperation—or at least acquiescence—in his effort to topple Amin.

Amin may also face threats from his own colleagues. [7 lines not declassified]

#### *Who Would Succeed Amin?*

If Amin leaves the scene, we believe that the army will fragment, and that disorder and near-anarchy will ensue. Eventually, a military junta is likely to emerge. Its makeup is hard to predict, but may include anti-Amin junior and middle-ranking officers, plus some Ugandan military exiles.

—The Ugandan Army, despite its current disarray, is the only indigenous force that counts. Nyerere and the exiles will have to come to terms with what remains of it.

—The only alternative is an indefinite Tanzanian military occupation, which we think would be unfeasible.

—[1 line not declassified] the Ugandan Army consisted of some 17,000 men, perhaps 6 to 7,000 of whom are southern Sudanese. These Sudanese are regarded as "Amin's mercenaries," are disliked by the other troops, and, [less than 1 line not declassified], are nervous about their future and wish to return home.

—If the Sudanese depart, a large core of the remaining army would be Kakwa and Lugbara, tribes which live in northwestern Uganda. These groups have been predominant in the Ugandan military for the last five years, and cannot easily be disregarded. They are traditional rivals: the Kakwa are largely Muslim, and the Lugbara largely Christian. A minority of the Muslims are believed to be loyal to Amin. Senior officers such as Major General Isaac Lumago and Brigadier Isaac Maliyamungu are closely identified with Amin, whereas younger officers are involved in anti-Amin plotting. Major General Mustafa Adrisi, the disaffected former vice president, is from yet another northern Ugandan tribe.

We know little about the other troops. Some are southerners and easterners—tribes which were predominant during the British colonial period and which are antagonistic to the northerners. The southerners originally formed the military elite; they were well-educated and trained in British military academies. But after Amin took power in 1971, he began to promote ex-NCO's with less than a sixth-grade education to field grade status over these career officers.

—Obote and the other Ugandan exiles are divided over who shall rule and whether the government shall be civilian or military. Obote

and his Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) are uneasily allied with the largest group of Ugandan military exiles, led by Colonel Tito Okello and Lt. Colonel Oyite Ojok, and with the Ugandan People's Alliance (UPA), a loose confederation of small, leftist-oriented civilian groups. Okello originally favored a military government, but is now backing Obote. Obote is opposed by the Ugandan Nationalist Organization (UNO).

These groups and others have been armed and trained by the Tanzanian intelligence service. They are now fighting within Uganda without any agreed-upon programs. Obote himself does not seem to have a significant following within Uganda. The killings (in 1971, 1972 and 1977) under Amin's direction, of Obote's Lango tribesmen, and Acholi supporters within the Ugandan army, make support from that quarter doubtful. Therefore, if Nyerere were to attempt to install Obote in power, it would cause more trouble.

The foregoing should be read in light of our serious lack of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] information about conditions inside Uganda. Our Embassy in Kampala was closed in 1973, and reporting from the FRG Embassy, which looks after our interests there, is sketchy.

*Possible U.S. Response to Fall of Idi Amin*

The U.S. has led the world in denouncing the egregious human rights practices of Idi Amin, but we should be wary of appearing to take any credit for his demise.

Amin might well be overthrown soon by Africans. If they succeed, it will be without any assistance from either East or West, and in the past few months we have encouraged African countries in both the UN and the OAU to take the lead in handling the Uganda/Tanzania border dispute. We should, therefore, continue using the same policy line by following the African lead on recognition of and relations with any new Ugandan government. Although we would wish to be among the first to express our good wishes, it would probably be best to wait until some move has been made by such key countries as Kenya, Nigeria and Sudan.

We currently envision three possible scenarios for Amin's overthrow:

(a) Amin is removed (deposed, killed, exiled, etc.) by opposition elements in his own government. If the new regime appears to have support throughout the country and can maintain law and order, we should not hesitate to make an appropriate statement to the press and have representatives from Embassy Nairobi visit Kampala as soon as possible.

(b) If, on the other hand, the overthrow of Amin results in chaos with various factions competing to succeed him, it might be weeks or

months before a new government could establish control. We would have time to work out when and how we might like to re-establish relations.

(c) Ugandan exile forces might overthrow Amin in cooperation with Tanzanian military forces. The Tanzanian connections to any exile group taking power will be examined meticulously, and we would want to prevent any appearance of having instigated or encouraged Tanzanian actions. President Nyerere would deeply resent any indication that he might have been a U.S. client in these operations, and we should try to maintain our current posture of interested observer. The Kenyans will certainly be suspicious of any Tanzanian-dominated government, and we should probably await some sign from them as well as Great Britain before sending in a representative.

[Omitted here is a map of selected Ugandan ethnic groups.]

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**161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanzania<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 11, 1979, 2143Z

60705. Subject: Uganda Situation. Refs: A) Dar 1124; B) Nairobi 4400.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Entire text.

1. Before instructing Ambassador Le Melle to meet with President Moi, we believe we should make clear to President Nyerere the nature of the message we are prepared to deliver from him to Moi. In that regard, we are not rpt not prepared to raise specific issues which Nyerere identified for discussion or to ascertain whether Moi will cooperate in the manner Nyerere desires. We are willing to tell Moi that Nyerere wants to discuss the Ugandan situation, but we will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-1776. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Beyer (AF) and Berry (AF); cleared by Harrop; approved by Newsom. Sent for information Immediate to Nairobi and the White House.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1124 from Dar es Salaam, March 10, the Embassy reported that Nyerere had asked for U.S. assistance to convince Kenya to help him with the Uganda situation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-1779) In telegram 4400 from Nairobi, March 11, the Embassy reported on Kenyan attitudes toward the Tanzania-Uganda conflict and the unlikelihood that Moi would want to intervene; however, the Embassy noted that Moi would likely be open to a conversation with Nyerere on the subject. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2141)

specifically note that the USG has no rpt no relationship to or involvement in anything that Nyerere may propose in this discussion.

2. Request that you see Nyerere to make the following points:

—We have queried our Embassy in Nairobi concerning your request and our Ambassador believes he can make an approach on your behalf but we believe the approach should be limited as follows: Quote

—Pres. Nyerere told Amb. Spain in Dar es Salaam that he believes it would be useful to have a discreet discussion with you on ways in which your two governments might cooperate to resolve the Uganda situation.

—Nyerere asked Spain if U.S. would be willing to relay this message in the interest of bringing an early end to the Tanzania-Uganda conflict.

—We agreed to do so for that reason, but as you are aware we have tried not to become involved in this dispute and have hoped that an African solution could be reached.

—Further, we are merely seeking in this matter to assist communication between two of our friends; we do not have, nor do we seek, any relationship to or involvement in the topics to be discussed.

—If you desire to talk to Nyerere about Uganda, we assume you will wish to arrange that through your own channels. If you desire, we will also advise Ambassador Spain to tell President Nyerere that you are interested in talking with Nyerere about Uganda and will welcome a direct communication from him. Unquote.<sup>3</sup>

—We feel strongly that events going on in East Africa and communication between African leaders is an African matter in which we do not believe we can appropriately be involved.

—If this limited approach is satisfactory to you, we will proceed with it promptly.

3. We are willing of course to accept minor modifications by Nyerere to our proposed representation to Moi, but we could not accept amendments which would tend to involve us any more directly in this matter.

**Christopher**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1142 from Dar es Salaam, March 13, the Embassy reported on Spain's meeting with Nyerere. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-1774)

**162. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 26, 1979

1. *Uganda*: Amin's fall may be imminent.<sup>2</sup> Combined Tanzanian and Ugandan exile forces have captured a key town 18 miles from Kampala and shelled the airport at Entebbe. Amin's troops have withdrawn in disarray towards Kampala. There are reports that the Libyans have withdrawn their troops, and rumors that Amin's military may attempt a coup against him. A group of prominent Ugandan exiles convened by Nyerere in Tanzania on March 23 reportedly selected a former Uganda university vice-chancellor, Y.K. Lule, as administrator for the "liberated" areas. Looking to the possible collapse of the Amin regime, I have set up a Uganda working group in the Department.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 3/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "What a shame!" in the left margin.

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**163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

4. *Uganda*: Nyerere has told us that over the weekend Quadafi sent him an ultimatum giving Tanzania 24 hours to withdraw from Uganda. Nyerere ignored this threat and is continuing to pursue his military campaign against Amin, but he has expressed his concern to us and other Western representatives and has asked us for our assessment of Libyan involvement in Uganda. We will give him our intelligence on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 3/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right corner.

Libya's military capability.<sup>2</sup> Our initial estimate is that the Libyan threat contains a large element of bluff.<sup>3</sup>

Ugandan exile leaders meeting in Tanzania have elected an 11-member council as a provisional government. The council, which is representative of the regional and ethnic groups of Uganda, plans to establish itself in southern Uganda.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 76729 to Dar es Salaam, the Department instructed the Ambassador to pass along U.S. intelligence on Libyan involvement in Uganda; the United States estimated that there were fewer than 500 Libyan troops there and that Libyan air support was limited to a single plane. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–1920)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "I agree" in the left margin.

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#### 164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 4, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

5. *Uganda*—Intelligence and press sources indicate the Libyans are withdrawing from Uganda and the end of the conflict is near. Exile leaders told us today that they will set up a transitional government in Kampala as soon as it is secure. Yesterday we delivered your message to Moi requesting that Libyan war materials not be allowed to transit Kenya.<sup>2</sup> Moi asked that you be told he would "do what he could". Nyerere told our Chargé in Dar es Salaam this morning that he credited your message to Moi for the increased cooperation Moi pledged. He

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 4/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 82339 to Nairobi, April 3, the Department instructed Le Melle to relay an oral message from President Carter to President Moi, expressing that the U.S. Government was pleased by Moi's decision to prohibit the airlift of petroleum to Uganda and the re-fueling of Libyan aircraft to and from Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2128) In telegram 6040 from Nairobi, April 3, the Embassy reported that Le Melle had delivered Carter's message to Moi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2100)



said he was deeply grateful and would find an occasion soon to thank you properly.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1532 from Dar es Salaam, April 4, the Embassy reported that Nyerere was grateful to Carter for sending the message to Moi. Moi had telephoned Nyerere on April 3. Nyerere believed that it had been a productive conversation and said he would try to alleviate some Kenyan concerns about "Obote imposing his will on Ugandans." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-2019)

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## **165. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1979

*Uganda.* We told the Executive Committee of the Uganda National Liberation Front, in response to their inquiry, that once a new government is in place, we would look forward to restoring relations and reopening our Embassy. We said we would want to work closely with a new government which had the support of the Ugandan people and was able to gain wider African acceptance, in the expectation that it would move soon to reestablish democratic institutions. Looking ahead, we said we would entertain requests from such a government for humanitarian assistance and longer-term development aid, and also work with the Congress to remove restrictions on trade with Uganda.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 4/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1502 from USUN, April 6, the Mission reported on the April 3 meeting with UNLF representatives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790158-0240)

**166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 19, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

6. *Uganda*—In view of the moderate approach announced by the new Ugandan Government,<sup>2</sup> I believe that we should normalize relations as soon as possible. As a first step I plan to send a team from our Embassy in Kenya to Kampala tomorrow or Saturday.<sup>3</sup> The team will establish contact with the new leaders, assess the emergency relief situation, and determine the administrative requirements for reopening our Embassy.<sup>4</sup> If this visit is successful, I would plan to send a Department official for further discussions next week. Full relations could be reestablished soon. Meanwhile we are exploring possibilities for economic aid within current legislative limits, and looking into prospects for new legislation to enable us to respond to Uganda's needs.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 4/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1710 from Dar es Salaam, April 12, the Embassy reported on the April 11 capture of Kampala by the UNLF and the formation of a provisional Ugandan government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790168–0644) Amin fled into exile in Libya on April 11. In telegram 1731 from Dar es Salaam, April 15, the Embassy reported that Lule, after being sworn in as President, gave a speech promising respect for the rule of law and equality and individual rights for all Ugandans. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790174–0850)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote “move expeditiously” in the left margin.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 167.

**167. Telegram From the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State and the Embassies in the Federal Republic of Germany, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Nairobi, April 25, 1979, 1605Z

7350. From Blane. Subject: Report of Blane Mission.<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: Mission was entirely successful in achieving all its objectives. We had substantive conversations with President Lule and with the Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning (Sam Sabagareka), Health, (Dr. Arnold Bisasi), Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (Andrew Adimola), as well as with Presidential Adviser Semei Nyanzi and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nathan Barungi. Upon our arrival in Kampala, we met with Foreign Minister, who was on his way to Nairobi for talks with the Kenyan Government. We conveyed the points set forth in State 097405 that the US accepts the UPG as the Government of Uganda, is encouraged by UPG stands on reconciliation and human rights, are working to lift aid restrictions and will open our Embassy as soon as possible. The Ugandans received this word with evident pleasure.

2. Kampala is calm and completely under the control of the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force. There are many control points throughout the city, at which identity documents of pedestrians and motorists are checked by the TPDF. There is, however, no harassment of the civilian population, and all of the soldiers we saw were invariably polite and well disciplined in carrying out their duties.

3. Uganda is an economic disaster area. This disaster came about not from the single episode of the war, but is rather the result of eight years of plundering and maladministration by the Amin government. There is almost no foreign exchange. Industry is at an almost total standstill. Sugar refining is down to ten percent of pre-Amin levels. Cement production has ceased altogether, as has the manufacture of glass, agricultural implements, etc. Uganda's once prosperous agricul-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790189-0465. Confidential; Niact Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 97405 to Bonn, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, April 18, the Department announced that the U.S. Government would like to normalize relations with Uganda and, as a first step, would send a team to Kampala from the Embassy in Nairobi to establish contact with the Ugandan Provisional Government (UPG). The team was instructed to convey to the UPG that the United States was working to lift congressional restrictions on aid and assess Ugandan relief requirements, meet with officials of the FRG Embassy to thank them for handling U.S. interests, and assess the administrative possibilities for reopening the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178-0094) The team was headed by John Blane, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Nairobi.

tural sector has sunk to the subsistence level, with cotton, coffee and tea down to only a small fraction of earlier production. The looting which took place April 11–14 throughout Kampala, as the Ugandans released the pent-up rage at Amin and his cronies (who owned most of the retail establishments), has completely destroyed the commercial life of the city. Every shop in Kampala has been stripped bare of all of its goods and furniture, display windows exist no longer, and office machinery and files have been destroyed. The POL situation is desperate, with all public service stations closed. Some small quantities of black market gasoline exist at very high prices.

4. On the bright side, subsistence agriculture and the informal, traditional market mechanisms are functioning well. There is plenty of food in the liberated areas. Markets we saw, both in Kampala and on the road between Kampala and Entebbe, were well stocked and busy. There were, of course, no imported items or manufactured goods, but there were plenty of plantains, sweet potatoes, onions, green beans, tomatoes, and other staple items of diet. Thus, there is no famine and no necessity for emergency food imports. (This may not be true in the country at large. Many of the unliberated areas are in the more arid, less fertile north, and there may be food shortages there.)

5. The new government is starting out under an immense handicap. All of the government offices were looted, furniture and files destroyed. Consequently, the new government is largely operating out of the ministers' hotel rooms or the conference rooms in the Nile Mansions Hotel. Nevertheless, the new cabinet has started off at a fast pace. Although the government had only been in place ten days when we arrived in Kampala, it has already done an amazing amount of research and organizational planning. The UPG has adopted very strong human rights policy (not surprising for a successor government to Amin) and is pledged to fair and public trials for all accused Amin officials. All of the new government whom we met impressed us immensely with their energy, commitment to the difficult task facing them, and their remarkable realism. They are beginning their work from an indescribably low point. Their resources are few, but their determination is great. They are counting on the help of the rest of the world in this endeavor, and it is the unanimous consensus of my delegation that they deserve it. An initial UPG statement of its aid needs is being sent by separate message.<sup>3</sup> End summary.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7337 from Nairobi, April 25, the Embassy reported that the *Nairobi Daily Nation* published an interview with the Ugandan Finance Minister who suggested that Uganda would need \$2 billion over the next year to aid recovery. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790192–0617)

6. The setting: The Entebbe airport runway is virtually undamaged. The control tower is now in operation (although all of the navigational systems are not). Any sort or size aircraft can be accommodated at Entebbe. The airport buildings are damaged, but not as extensively as we had been led to believe. The airport is still closed to all traffic except small chartered aircraft from Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The airport is controlled by the TPDF (which as far as we could observe provides all the security throughout the liberated areas. The liberation (UNLF) forces are all at the front.)

7. The road between Entebbe and Kampala is in relatively good shape. There is an occasional shell crater in the road or along the shoulder, and one sees a few burned out APCs and other vehicles along the road. But there is remarkably little war damage to the houses along the way, and the population seems to be going about its business as usual. The scene of the worst fighting was a pass between two low hills, where a Libyan force coming south from Kampala in an attempt to retake Entebbe airport was ambushed. According to reliable sources, including the British representative now in Kampala, some 400 Libyans died at this spot. Among the derelict items still on the scene is a GM-21 "Stalin organ" rocket launcher.

8. Kampala itself suffered relatively little damage from the fighting. A few buildings, where Amin's soldiers holed up, are extensively damaged, but the destruction from the war is quite localized and limited. The destruction from the looting, on the other hand, is everywhere and extensive. It would be impossible to estimate how many thousands of square feet of store windows have been shattered in Kampala. As far as one could tell, not a single business establishment was missed. The looters took everything that would be of value to them and destroyed the rest. The same pattern was repeated at government offices. The streets of Kampala were littered with an incredible amount of paper from pillaged filing cabinets. Broken glass was everywhere. Most of the shop owners had not yet troubled to board up their establishments, so the face of the town as one drives down the streets is one of empty, gaping shop windows and store fronts.

9. As far as we were able to determine, the TPDF did nothing to restrain the looting for the first three days the city was occupied. By that time everything was gone or destroyed. After listening to stories from all sides in Kampala, it is actually not difficult to imagine the spirit that must have seized the looters. For years consumer goods have been of increasingly short supply in Uganda. Luxury articles were reserved for the army, the security apparatus, and other privileged groups of Amin's supporters. The common man could buy nothing; his money was virtually worthless. Further, most of the retail commerce had been expropriated from its original owners and taken over by

Amin cronies. Thus, commerce in the modern sector was seen simply another manifestation of a regime that was hated as much as it was feared. When the controls were off, it is understandable that the peoples' frustration and rage burst forth.

10. The economy: The economy of Uganda has been devastated—not only from the war and the looting, but, principally, from Amin's maladministration and the plundering of all economic assets by Amin and his crowd. The story is truly dismal. During the early years of his reign, Amin systematically expropriated almost all of the industry in the country, and then he allowed it to fall into such disrepair that by now almost none of it is functional. The flight of both expatriate experts and qualified Ugandans from Amin's brutality contributed greatly to the process. At present, Uganda has practically no operational industry other than the breweries at Jinja. (Jinja fell the day we arrived, and the first beer Kampala had seen for weeks arrived the following evening to the unrestrained jubilation of the Kampala populace).

11. As with industry, cash crop agriculture stagnated under Amin. Prices paid the farmers were held artificially low, and insufficient foreign exchange was devoted to agricultural implements and fertilizers, with the result that most of the country's farmers went back to growing subsistence crops rather than producing commodities for export.

The looting has taken care of what was left of the retail commerce in the country. Shops have no stocks; warehouses have been stripped, and there are simply no goods to be bought or sold.

12. With the road from Kenya still blocked by Amin forces, no POL trucks have been able to come through and there is very little POL and hence little civilian motor transport. There is something of a black market, but supplies are soon almost exhausted even here and prices very high.

13. The government: We met President Lule; one of his two most senior advisers, Semei Nyanzi; plus the three most important ministers concerned with the reconstruction of the country, together with a host of lesser officialdom and some of the remaining civil servants. The new government impressed us all by their obvious commitment to the task at hand. They recognize fully the immensity of the job to be done, but they are determined rather than cowed by the bleak prospects facing them. One of the things that struck us most was the realism of the people with whom we talked. They recognized that there will be no easy answers. They know that the undertaking will be a long one, and they recognize how desperately they will need the help of the rest of the world to get their country going again. Obviously, mere determination will not be sufficient to ensure success. Just how able these people will be to cope with the problems facing Uganda is at this point impossi-

ble to predict. We know they will give it a good try; we hope they will have the capacity to pull it off. On the negative side, many of the new people have had little or no previous government experience. They are bright and well educated (there are a large number of university professors and medical practitioners amongst them), but they have never had to cope with administering a state. On the positive side, we can say with assurance that they will be able to do a much better job than Amin and his government did. The new government is still disorganized. They have no offices in which to work; they are only beginning to fill out their staffs; the files of many ministries and offices have been destroyed; and the government has no money. It would be difficult to imagine a more difficult point at which to start attempting to govern a country.

14. Policy and ideology: We could detect no ideological bias in any of the people with whom we spoke. They all appeared to be pragmatists, and almost all of them (perhaps it was only because of their auditors) spoke of the need of getting free enterprise going again in Uganda. The tone of our interlocutors was for the most part anti-Obote. Adimola (protect) was vehement in his denunciation of the former President, and called Amin "only an extension of Obote." President Lule and Minister of Health Bisasi referred to the United States and the United Kingdom as Uganda's "very special friends," on whom Uganda would have to count more than on any other sources of help.

15. As might have been expected, the new Ugandan Government has adopted a very strong human rights stance. The President and each of the ministers with whom we spoke stressed to us that the greatest tragedy that has befallen Uganda, more than the deaths, more than the economic deterioration, has been the "dehumanization" of the whole population under the terror of the Amin regime. Minister Adimola perhaps best expressed the situation. We have found, he said, that so many of our people "are no longer real human beings." They have, he said, little respect for human life. They fear and distrust everyone. As urgently as Uganda needs economic reconstruction, even more it needs, he said, "moral and spiritual rehabilitation." He said that if Uganda rebuilt its economy and neglected its moral regeneration, "we will find ourselves in another eight years destroying our country again."

16. In line with this policy, we have seen no evidence that the new government has sanctioned any retaliations on Amin's people. They told us that anyone accused of crimes under the former regime would be given fair and public trials. (From what we and Western journalists have seen of the files of the State Research Bureau and the Kampala prison, it won't be difficult to get convictions).

17. Aid requirements: We have transmitted UPG's initial aid requirements statement by separate message. There is no immediate



necessity for food. We think there will be a need for medicines and hospital supplies. This will be the subject of subsequent messages. The quantities or dollar amounts are impossible to estimate now.

18. The UPG needs foreign exchange desperately. It may have claims on monies in foreign banks, but it doesn't know yet how much or where. It has some coffee to sell, but again, no details have yet been established. In the interim it must start buying things—most importantly POL. Few, if any suppliers will give Uganda credit. Certainly (according to Nairobi industry sources) the oil companies will be most reluctant.

19. The UPG today received a cash grant of one million pounds from the British. They asked us to provide some cash grant aid as well. We pointed to congressional problems and suggested going to the IMF. They probably hadn't thought of that yet but took up the suggestion quickly and said they would send a delegation to Washington within two weeks. We will inform Department further when we have details.

20. US Embassy: We think that it will be necessary to get a permanent party into Kampala as soon as possible, by which we would mean as soon as the road from Nairobi to Kampala is open. The inchoate state of the new Ugandan Government, the chaotic condition of the economy, plus the extreme difficulty in communications combine to make it all but impossible to deal effectively with the UGP or plan US policy rationally without a presence in Kampala. I would suggest an initial team of political officer (whether or not with charge title), admin officer and aid officer. As soon as feasible I would add an American secretary and a communicator (OTP).

21. U.S. real estate: Our chancery is presently sublet to the French Embassy, which has six months according to the lease to vacate. The French Ambassador has promised to seek new quarters at once and move out earlier if possible. The offices are in good shape and have USG furniture.

22. The residence has been used as an international primary school. We can probably get it back and put it in shape in three months. Two of our other houses can be occupied in about the same time. We are recommending that the remaining two houses be sold. They are very run down and are in poor locations. We will send a separate message with more details on the properties.

23. Temporary office space: The FRG Embassy has no space. The British High Commission does and has offered us suitable and sufficiently spacious offices. Separate message follows.

24. Vehicles. We will need at least two vehicles (sedan and minibus) as soon as we have people in Kampala. Suggest getting authority now to buy foreign made vehicles in Nairobi.



25. Administrative problems: The administrative situation in Kampala is obviously chaotic, but the British are coping with getting started under these circumstances, and so can we. We will have to support the operation extensively from Nairobi. Nothing is available in Kampala, including foodstuffs acceptable to American tastes, beverages, paper products, etc. All official supplies must come from here. Communications at first will be slow and arduous. It won't be easy, but it will be manageable.

26. Local employees: Several of our former local employees made contact with us and are ready to go back to work if we want them.

27. I reiterate, we should become reestablished in Kampala soonest. We led the world in condemning Amin. We must not be the last in moving to cooperate with and assist the new government. The psychological boost of our presence will be as important initially as our advice and material assistance.<sup>4</sup>

**Le Melle**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 7421 from Nairobi, April 26, Blane continued his report, providing additional information and comments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790194-1001)

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**168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and the United Kingdom, and to the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 22, 1979, 0056Z

129719. Subject: Uganda—Secretary Receives Lule's Representative, May 18.

1. Secretary welcomed Semei Nyanzi, special envoy of Uganda's Provisional President Lule May 18 and asked for his views on the current situation in Uganda. Nyanzi said he appreciated being received promptly. His first duty was to deliver to the Secretary Lule's letter to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790232-0392. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Beyer; approved by Wisner and Keeley.

President Carter<sup>2</sup> and a letter from Lule identifying Nyanzi.<sup>3</sup> Attending the meeting were AF DAS Keeley and AF/E Director Beyer.

2. Nyanzi said President Lule asked that he express the deep gratitude of the Ugandan people for US political and economic support in recent months. Though Amin has now been overthrown, Ugandans hope US support will continue. We seek close relations with US, Nyanzi said, and we are trying to create a government which will not repeat past history. We seek a stable society, a democratic system for our people and good relations with all countries. Since arriving in Washington, everyone has been most sympathetic to our situation. We have to help our people psychologically and morally, especially the young people who have not known in the past eight years a moral or rational environment.

3. Nyanzi said he wanted to make two points particularly. First, Tanzania has no rpt no intention of trying to impose any policy or program on us. There are differences between us and the Tanzanians and Nyerere has told Lule the Tanzanian system can't work in Uganda. We need economic relations with all surrounding countries. We have urged, therefore, normalization of relations between Kenya and Tanzania and open borders. We understand why Kenya took position it did towards Amin regime. We now have established good relations with Kenya. Secondly, we do need help from US. We recognize legal prohibitions against aid to Uganda must be rescinded and that these actions take time. We have appreciated two delegations sent to Kampala and Bob Keeley here is well aware of our needs.<sup>4</sup>

4. Nyanzi then outlined current organization and plans of Ugandan Provisional Government. One immediate problem is the numerous arms in the hands of the people. In eastern Uganda there have already been incidents which the presence of arms in the area have made more serious. Another problem was brewing in western Uganda. We hope when our troops and the Tanzanians finish overcoming the last remnants of Amin's forces that they will assume a policing role. We would like to license the possession of all weapons. The first elections will be to the district councils hopefully this month. The district councils will

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<sup>2</sup> The letter, dated May 9, included an attachment with a summary of emergency relief needs for the Ugandan people. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, Uganda: President Yusuf K. Lule)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> For the report of the Blane Mission, see Document 167. In telegram 7824 from Nairobi, May 3, the Embassy reported on Keeley's May 2–3 visit to Kampala and his meetings with foreign dignitaries as well as the new Ugandan officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790202–0459)

then elect a constituent assembly. We intend to ask the UN to do a census before national elections are held.

5. Secretary said it is good to hear of the progress the new government has already made. We welcomed the end of the Amin regime and wish to have good and close relations with the new Ugandan Government. We recognize there are problems of rehabilitation as well as economic needs. President Carter has lifted the embargo on Uganda which means private charitable institutions can begin to be of assistance to Uganda again.<sup>5</sup> Also subsidiaries of US oil companies in Kenya will be able to get back into business of supplying petroleum products to Uganda. Congress is in the process of repealing the restrictions on aid to Uganda. We expect this to move along rapidly.<sup>6</sup> We will be giving priority consideration to your humanitarian and other needs. We wish you and your people well in establishing a free and democratic society and in re-establishing relations with other nations. What about the Libyans, what kind of relations will you establish with them?

6. Nyanzi replied that his government distinguishes between the leader of Libya and the Libyan people. The former is a problem, but we are not antagonistic to the Libyan people. Indeed many young Libyan soldiers who were sent to fight in Uganda did not know why they were there. It was a tragic situation because many were killed. We have no animosity towards Muslims and we see the possibility for cooperation with Sudan and Egypt.

7. Secretary said Lule's letter would be sent this evening to the President<sup>7</sup> who would study it over the weekend, and we will be back in touch to your President promptly.<sup>8</sup> (Lule's letter to the President requested immediate emergency assistance and, on a longer term, requested economic aid in various fields outlined in an enclosure totaling dollars 1.3 billion.) We are delighted to hear the Uganda-Kenya-Tanzania relationship is developing in a constructive fashion. This is important for the region as well as for the individual countries. Secretary said he has a high regard for Nyerere, he is a good man. Neverthe-

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<sup>5</sup> On May 15, President Carter issued a determination that the Government of Uganda was no longer committing gross violations of human rights, and he requested that the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce take appropriate steps to permit the immediate resumption of trade with Uganda. (*Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 867)

<sup>6</sup> Congress repealed the ban on economic aid to Uganda on September 11 (P.L. 96-67). Immediately after Carter signed the measure into law on September 21, the Department of State approved \$6.2 million in emergency food and development aid for Uganda. (*Congress and the Nation*, Volume 5, 1977-1980, p. 78)

<sup>7</sup> In a memorandum to Carter, May 18, Vance described his meeting with Nyanzi and included the letter to Carter from Lule. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 5/79)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 169.

less each state should have its own system. That is better than trying to import someone else's system or have someone dictate a system for you.

8. Secretary then asked about situation of the army and police forces. Nyanzi said the present forces would be demobilized and new, smaller forces constituted. UK has been asked to help with police because their system has been used in the past.

9. Nyanzi said we are cautiously establishing relations with China, not unlike US approach. PRC is offering practical help without reference to ideology. Secretary said he is delighted to hear that. US-PRC relations were for many years difficult, but now we are beginning to build up a good relationship. Just in the past week we have moved forward by agreeing to work together in the fields of technology and cultural exchanges. We are pleased Chinese are now prepared to help you. They built a good railway in Tanzania. We welcome their help to you.

10. Keeley asked about Uganda's relations with others, e.g. USSR and Sudan. Relations with Sudan are coming along well, Nyanzi replied, but USSR has not been very forthcoming. Ugandan people know Amin regime spent a good deal of money for arms bought from the Soviets. These arms were used against other Ugandans. It is now difficult to convince the people of the utility of having relations with USSR. It is also difficult to deal with Soviet state organizations. Secretary concurred state enterprises are always difficult to deal with and Soviets seem to be more willing to supply military rather than economic assistance. US view is that we help where we can economically, encourage countries to develop their own institutions in accordance with their own culture and values and stress that each country must decide these matters for itself. Nyanzi said he and the Ugandan people recognize this is US position and appreciate it. Keeley commented our new Chargé, David Halsted, would arrive in Kampala by the end of the month so we will be in daily communication. Nyanzi said his government will welcome Halsted's arrival.

**Christopher**

**169. Letter From President Carter to Ugandan President Lule<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 9, 1979, which Secretary Vance received from your special envoy, Semei Nyanzi.<sup>2</sup>

I am heartened to know that after eight years of cruelty and terror the Ugandan people will now be governed by leaders who, as you wrote in your letter, are totally committed to basic human rights and to the restoration of unity, freedom and democracy.

You face an extraordinarily difficult task in reconstructing and rehabilitating your country. Please be assured that we will do all that we can to assist you within the limits of our resources. We have already removed the trade embargo on Uganda and have initiated legislative action to permit economic assistance.<sup>3</sup> We are now considering those areas in which such assistance can be most effectively used.

I am particularly pleased that the United States Embassy in Kampala is being reopened immediately.<sup>4</sup> I have asked our newly-named Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr. David C. Halsted, to personally carry this letter to you. Please give him any assistance which may be needed in reestablishing the U.S. Mission in Uganda.

The American people join me in wishing every success to you and the people of Uganda. In previous eras there have been close ties between our two countries, and I am sure they will be renewed and strengthened in the future.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, Uganda: President Yusuf K. Lule. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 168.

<sup>3</sup> See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 168.

<sup>4</sup> The Embassy in Kampala reopened on June 18.

**170. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

5. *Uganda*—The resignation of Lule has sparked a reaction by his tribal supporters. Lule now claims that his resignation was forced upon him and that he remains President.<sup>2</sup> Godfrey Binaisa's successor government declared the demonstrations by Lule's supporters illegal, and Ugandan and Tanzanian troops dispersed them with small arms fire.

The balance of power in Uganda rests with the 30,000 Tanzanian troops. Tanzania, which has accepted Binaisa's new government, is anxious to restore political stability and to withdraw the bulk of its forces.

Our people in Kampala are safe. We plan to make no statements about the new government in this volatile situation.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 6/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to Carter, June 20, Vance wrote, "Yusufe Lule resigned yesterday and Godfrey Binaisa was appointed Acting Head of Government. Lule was not in good health and apparently stepped aside in response to pressures from his National Council, which objected to Lule's making Cabinet appointments without consultation." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State) 6/79)

# 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kampala, July 9, 1979, 1100Z

109. Subject: Meeting With President Binaisa.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. Most of July 6 conversation with Binaisa was devoted to areas where he wants US help. Binaisa gives impression of man in charge. He is conscious of need to project image of stability and believes he needs first to deliver on consumer goods to obtain domestic support for his government. End summary.

3. I met for an hour July 6 with President Binaisa. Office of Protocol notetaker was only other person present. Most of conversation centered on aid, for which Binaisa has high hopes from the US. I stuck to a few central themes throughout—stability, aid coordination, and protection of Americans—and generally listened to what President had to say on a wide variety of subjects. Aid matters reported septel.<sup>2</sup> Other points and impressions follow.

4. Binaisa. Binaisa acts like the man in charge. He is clearly in a big hurry to get on with reconstruction. He is forceful and articulate in presenting his views, yet is receptive to the thoughts of others and acts on new ideas that he likes. He said his ideology is unity and that he considers himself to left of center. This, he said, was an essential for the leader of a Third World country.

5. Relations with the US. Binaisa said he was seeking agreement for Dr. Luyimbazi Zake as his Ambassador to Washington. (Zake was Obote's Education Minister and now teaches at a US university. As a fellow Muganda who shares the odium among Baganda of having served Obote, Zake may be fairly close to Binaisa.) Binaisa said he expected soon to have a personal message for President Carter. He hoped to hear soon about an American Ambassador to Uganda.

6. Security. Binaisa was well informed about security problems in Kampala. He said remnants of Amin's army were still being picked up. They had caused some trouble, as have a large number of "thugs" who had been released from prison when Kampala was liberated. Even more serious, he thought, were the black market operators who were

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790311-1158. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 115 from Kampala, July 9, the Embassy listed the areas in which Binaisa requested assistance: agriculture, mining, medical equipment, security support, imports, and construction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790311-1056)

constantly looking for stolen goods to sell. He said black marketeers had stolen or bought arms and uniforms to pose as soldiers. Still worse, he said, soldiers were sometimes still being used to “liberate” houses pointed out to them by black marketeers as homes of Amin supporters.

7. Stability. I pointed out that Uganda’s image as a country bent on reconstruction had probably suffered from political turmoil that surrounded June 20 change of government. Donors had backed away, waiting for stable conditions to emerge. Binaisa said he understood this. He hoped Washington would understand Uganda’s situation. The people had been suppressed for eight years and some turmoil was inevitable. Binaisa said he had ordered the greatest restraint in dealing with Baganda who demonstrated about the change of government. He wanted to let people speak out and to preserve human and political rights as far as possible. I assured him that this had not gone unnoticed, particularly the welcome restraint in dealing with Baganda demonstrators.

8. Elections. Binaisa brought up elections. I did not comment. He was critical of those now calling for elections (Kampala 78).<sup>3</sup> Citing practical problems, he said Uganda could not have elections in less than two years. There had been no voter registration since 1961. More than half of those now eligible to vote had never been registered. The old constituencies were inadequate and would have to be withdrawn.

9. Political requirements. Binaisa said his most pressing political requirement is to get consumer goods on the market.

10. Relations with Kenya. Binaisa said he wants and needs Kenya’s help. He said he expected very good cooperation from Kenya and pointed to the extended stay in Nairobi of the Ejalu mission as a sign that things were going well.

11. Peace Corps. Binaisa said he wants the Peace Corps to provide teachers. I said that I was pleased to learn of his interest in the Peace Corps. Pointed out that the Peace Corps could help in areas other than teaching, and suggested we wait a year or so to see where the Peace Corps might best be able to assist.

12. State 174889 Notal not received here until July 7.<sup>4</sup>

**Halsted**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 78 from Kampala, July 3, the Embassy reported that a former Minister of Internal Affairs had called for a Presidential election. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790303–1240)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 174889 to Kampala, July 6, the Department authorized Halsted to accept an invitation to meet with Binaisa, but recommended that he “avoid implication of any special relationship between Binaisa regime and U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307–0043)



**172. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 6, 1979

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

5. *Uganda*—We met with President Binaisa on Sept. 2 in New York and discussed the deteriorating security situation in Uganda.<sup>2</sup> Binaisa asked us to help strengthen the Ugandan police forces by supplying police vehicles. We raised the matter with Steve Solarz yesterday and Steve agreed to seek quick action in conference to lift restrictions on aid in a joint bill. If Steve is successful, we will work with AID to apply \$3 million in FY 79 ESF funds for maximum and immediate political impact. We will also be consulting with interested governments to coordinate assistance, bearing in mind that the security problem is an impediment to any such efforts.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 9/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 232656 to Kampala, September 5, the Department reported on the September 2 meeting between Keeley and Binaisa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790404-0599)

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**173. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 20, 1980, 10:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

President's Meeting with President Moi of Kenya

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Jimmy Carter  
Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Wilbert J. Le Melle, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 38, Memcons: President 2/80. Secret. Drafted on March 16 by Beyer; cleared by Harrop and Funk. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
Jerry Funk, National Security Council Staff  
Gordon R. Beyer, Director, East African Affairs  
Jerry Schecter, White House Staff

His Excellency Daniel T. arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya  
The Honorable Charles Njonjo, Attorney General  
The Honorable Robert J. Ouko, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
The Honorable Godfrey G. Kariuki, Minister of State, Office of the President  
The Honorable Nicholas K. Biwott, Minister of State, Office of the President  
The Honorable Zacharia T. Onyonka, Minister for Economic Planning and Development  
Mr. Jeremiah G. Kiereini, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President  
His Excellency the Ambassador of Kenya and Mrs. Mbogua  
Mr. Philip Ndegwa, Economic Adviser, Office of the President.  
Mr. Simon Nyachae, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President

SUMMARY: See State 47717<sup>2</sup>

*The President* opened the meeting by welcoming President Moi and the opportunity his visit presented to consult and to share ideas. He recognized that Moi would be meeting with State and Defense officials and key members of Congress. Moi should call, the President said, if he needed his personal help on any matter.

This was a time of trial, the President continued, for the democracies of the world. Again he wanted to note his admiration for political developments in Kenya in recent months. The successful holding of elections recently was an encouragement to countries throughout the world.<sup>3</sup> We had also watched with great interest Kenyan efforts to improve relations with neighboring Tanzania and Uganda. We had followed closely the economic development of Kenya.

*The President* noted the comment of President Moi to him during the arrival ceremony that a few years ago one fifth of the receipts for the export of coffee were adequate to pay for the import of Kenya's petroleum needs.<sup>4</sup> Today the cost of petroleum imports was more than the total receipts for coffee exports. Moi had told him of the temporary shortage of grain resulting from adverse weather conditions, and the United States wished to be of assistance with this problem. The President reiterated his appreciation for Kenya's staunch support of US positions on the hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We valued our good relations with Kenya very highly.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 47717 to Nairobi, February 22, the Department summarized the meeting between Moi and Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0399)

<sup>3</sup> Kenyan elections took place on November 8, 1979.

<sup>4</sup> For the welcoming remarks of both Presidents Carter and Moi, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 352–354.

*The President* urged Moi to take up with American Cabinet officers he would be seeing any items not completed at this session. Further, there would be time tonight before dinner and the entertainment for a private talk if there were any additional matters which had not been covered during today.

*President Moi* expressed his sincere appreciation for the very warm reception that he and his delegation had in the United States. He brought greetings to President Carter from all the Kenyan people. If it were agreeable to the President, he would first discuss East African and related issues and then US-Kenya bilateral relations.

*Tanzania*—The situation in East Africa is very fluid, *President Moi* said. He had hoped that the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda would result in greater stability in that country but in fact things had worsened there. There was enormous hostility developing between the Ugandan people and the Tanzanian occupying troops. Kenya had hoped that Julius Nyerere and Binaisa would ask the UK for police training, and perhaps for training of a new army as well. Regretfully, this had not taken place. Uganda had many Marxists in the present government. There was no reconstruction going on in Uganda because, for example, the revenue from the sale of Uganda's coffee and tea, which was now being sold through Tanzania, was going into Tanzanian coffers. The Tanzanians argued that the Ugandans must pay for the war and for the occupying Tanzanian soldiers. The Tanzanians had between 25,000 and 30,000 troops in Uganda which cost 6 million pounds monthly. Incidents were increasing and in some villages Tanzanian soldiers had been killed.

*President Carter* asked if any Tanzanian troops were withdrawing from Uganda. Moi said it was not likely that Julius would withdraw his troops soon.

*The President* asked if Binaisa was independent of Nyerere. Moi said it is impossible for Binaisa to be independent of Nyerere because his security depended on Tanzania. The last time he met with Binaisa, Moi continued, he said he hoped Binaisa wouldn't repeat everything he told him to Dar-es-Salaam. Kenya was doing what it could to encourage Binaisa to be more independent.

Kenyans sought peace, Moi continued, but were surrounded by potentially hostile countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Tanzania. There had been a meeting in Arusha in January,<sup>5</sup> but little

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 32 from Dar es Salaam, January 3, the Embassy reported on an East African summit of Moi, Binaisa, and Nyerere in Arusha on January 2 to "discuss common problems." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007-0534) In telegram 141 from Dar es Salaam, January 8, the Embassy reported more details on the meeting, in which "little concrete resulted." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800015-0650)

was discussed. A second meeting in Mombasa had been planned, but Moi had had to defer it because of his state visit to West Germany. Moi said he hoped to convene the meeting when he returned from his visit to the United States.

*President Carter* asked if Moi favored an open border with Tanzania. Moi replied that he had no problem with an open border; it was Tanzania that had closed the border. Recently he ordered the Kenyan border closed too, however, and he believed this had brought home to Tanzania the problem of closed borders. President Carter asked if the border might be opened soon. Moi said he didn't see that as a likely possibility. Further, even when it is open it won't be as useful as it was before.

*President Moi* then expressed his concern for the expansion of Tanzanian influence in Africa, e.g. with Mugabe in Zimbabwe, in the Comoros, and with Mengistu in Ethiopia. Moi said many countries in Africa were obtaining arms rather than funds for the economic betterment of their people. He suggested that the US should consider providing economic assistance to only those countries that don't invest a disproportionate amount of funds in arms. Tanzanian soldiers were currently in Uganda, Seychelles and Mozambique. Further, Zanzibar wants to be separate from the mainland.

*Somalia*—The situation with Somalia, *Moi* said, was currently quiet. Moi said he hoped we would tell the Somalis to keep things quiet or the US won't help them.

*President Carter* said we recognize the sensitivity of Kenyan-Somali relations and the threat that Somalia has posed in the past to Kenya and may pose in the future. We believe we can be of assistance in protecting Kenya from that potential threat in the future. President Carter said that Moi knew we had opened talks with President Siad. In those talks Siad had asked us to use our good offices to facilitate better relations between Somalia and Kenya.<sup>6</sup> We were prepared to do so and the President asked that Moi pursue this matter with Acting Secretary Christopher if he desired us to be of assistance in improving understanding between Kenya and Somalia. The President assured Moi that we would be cautious in our dealings with the Somalis and would assure that they posed no threat to Kenya.

*Moi* expressed his sincere thanks for these comments.

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 3839 from Mogadishu, October 22, 1979, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Moose and Siad, in which Siad had requested that the United States help Kenya and Somalia improve their relationship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–1061)

*Ethiopia*—Moi said the Kenyans did not agree with the current ideological bent of Ethiopia. Tanzania had the same sort of ideological bent. Kenya stayed in touch with the Ethiopians to have some idea of the intentions of the Russians.

*Mr. Christopher* said that some viewed Mengistu as a nationalist leader while others said he is a puppet of the Soviets. What was the Kenyan view? Moi said that when he visited Ethiopia a year ago Mengistu told him and other members of his delegation that he wanted to preserve the identity of Ethiopia. Moi said he also believed Ethiopians would continue to be Ethiopians and would not change. It would take time, however, for Ethiopian nationalism to return as the dominant force in Ethiopia. Moi said he had recently begun to wonder whether he was right in this judgment about the strength of Ethiopian nationalism. The communists were getting a tight grip on certain sectors of Ethiopian society and might soon take over. It was a difficult situation to judge.

*Sudan*—Kenya-Sudan relations were very good, *Moi* continued. The situation in Sudan was stable at the moment but the Sudanese did have serious economic problems and Libya continued to cause trouble. The Saudis were very helpful but were not quick to act. The US played a key role in the Persian Gulf area and if the Saudis were to fall to the Soviets, all the Persian Gulf area and much of Africa would be in danger.

*President Carter* asked whether Kenya had good communications with Saudi Arabia. President Moi replied that Kenya did not have any formal agreements but it did maintain good diplomatic relations and a good dialogue with both countries.

*Zambia*—Moi said he told Prime Minister Thatcher that Kaunda should not be left out on a limb. When the Soviets got into a country it was difficult to get them out. Zambia was in a strategically key position. If Zambia bought Russian arms, the East Germans and Cubans would use Zambia as a base to penetrate Zaire and Namibia. The situation in Zimbabwe was still uncertain and Kaunda was still not strong enough to stand alone. Julius was trying to get Kaunda removed. If the UK or the US could give arms to Zambia that would help; and it was not too late to draw Kaunda back from the Soviets. When he told this to Prime Minister Thatcher she said she would send Peter Carrington to Zambia after the elections in Zimbabwe to see what needed to be done. Kaunda was helping Nkomo. Kenya was helping Nkomo too, morally, because Kenya believed that what happened in Zimbabwe would determine what would happen in Namibia. Moi had told Nkomo to form a government of National Unity.

*President Carter* asked if Moi would like to predict how things would turn out in Zimbabwe. Moi said he hoped things would go

well. It would be a choice between Mugabe and Nkomo. Moi reiterated his view that if the Soviets supplied arms and the US supplied economic assistance to a particular country, the US was strengthening its enemy. Western countries should learn this basic fact.

The basic principles of Kenya were unity, peace and love. It was necessary to have all three of these. Israel, for example, must not only be well-armed but must learn to love the Palestinians.

*Iraq*—Iraq was a country in between, Moi said. The President asked if Moi had visited Iraq. Moi replied he had been invited but he had not been able to go there yet. The President said we would like to have more normal relations with Iraq but they were reluctant.

*Kenyan Facilities*—In principle it was agreeable for the US to use Kenyan facilities, Moi said. The Kenyan Government would appreciate, Moi said, that the word “facilities” is used and not “bases”. The President assured Moi that we would try to be careful and refer only to use of facilities. Moi said that Kenya already shared many things with the US, and in Mombasa, for example, US naval personnel often assisted in the repair of Kenyan naval equipment or vessels. The President asked how relations were between US military forces and Kenya’s during US naval ship visits to Mombasa. Were they friendly? Moi replied that personal relations were excellent and the personnel of our respective military forces were very friendly with one another. They considered themselves comrades in arms.

*Kenya’s Problems*—Like other countries in the world, Moi continued, Kenya had a problem today resulting from the rise in oil prices, worldwide inflation, the increase in prices of most imports and the decline in prices of Kenya’s major exports (coffee and tea). The past year had also been difficult for Kenya because of poor weather conditions. As a result there was not enough food this year to feed the people. Kenya usually grew enough maize and wheat to export. Maize was a staple food in Kenya. The decline in agricultural production affected revenues, yet at the same time the government was buying F–5Es which increased Defense expenditures. The result of these several factors was a large increase in the balance of payments gap. He had instructed government departments to cut expenditures wherever possible, even cutting out some services.

They were working to increase food production so that next year Kenya would once again be self-sufficient. He had also created a Ministry of Energy, Moi said, to study these problems.

Some European countries (UK and Switzerland) had offered to help by writing off some of Kenya’s debts. He had talked to the Germans about these things and they were seeing how they could help. He estimated the balance of payments gap at \$150 million during 1980/81. He needed to cover this gap in order to sustain economic

development in the country and to ensure continuing stability. He was requesting, therefore, an additional \$100 million in balance of payments help, rather than the \$18 million originally requested. Secondly, he needed help with the existing military FMS debt of \$93 million. He hoped this debt would be waived or rescheduled. If that were difficult, then perhaps some form of other assistance from UNICEF or other UN agencies could be obtained. Those were his problems, Moi said. The people of Kenya were stable and he had their confidence. Without assistance, however, it would be difficult for Kenya in 1980 and therefore he was asking help from his friends.

*President Carter* said that it would be very helpful to us if President Moi could discuss his problems and Kenya's needs in detail with the Secretary of Defense<sup>7</sup> and the Acting Secretary of State<sup>8</sup> during his meetings with them. They should discuss whether or how payments might be delayed and whether there were other means to manage these problems. It might be possible, for example, for the US to increase its shipments of PL-480 food to Kenya. He hoped, however, that there can be a permanent improvement in Kenyan production of corn and wheat. The US was prepared to share with Kenya the knowledge it had gained of how to improve our agricultural production. The harvests recently had been good.

The overall levels of US aid to Kenya, the President said, could not be raised much more than the delegation which recently visited Kenya had indicated.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, President Moi and his advisors should discuss these matters with other members of his administration during the visit.

*Olympic Steering Committee—The President* said he hoped it would be possible for Kenya to be represented on the Committee that was seeking to make arrangements for a new place to hold the Olympic games. The President asked President Moi to designate one of the members of his delegation to this task. After a brief consultation with other members of his delegation, Moi designated Ambassador Mbogua.

*President Carter* commented that alternate games were now supported by about 50 nations which had made firm or at least tentative

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 54823 to Nairobi, transmitted the memorandum of conversation between Moi and Brown, in which they discussed security concerns along the border with Somalia, Kenya's balance of payments problem, and Kenyan desire to modernize its armed forces. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800105-0704)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 174.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 456 from Mogadishu, February 6, the Embassy reported on a February 4 meeting of a U.S. team led by Bartholomew and Moi, in which Moi agreed to U.S. use and development of Kenyan bases, welcomed U.S. military and economic assistance, and agreed to increased U.S. flight and ship visits. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1903)



statements on this issue. Some countries were not as firm as Kenya on this matter and were waiting to see if the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviets were having difficulty in Afghanistan, the President commented, in that freedom fighters throughout the country were effective. As a result, the Soviets had continued to send in troops and the US now estimated they had 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. Today Afghanistan loyalists controlled several regional towns and the Soviets only controlled the central sector of Afghanistan. We did not believe the Soviets would withdraw their forces. We intended to stand firm and would not send our athletes to Moscow. We hoped that others would also stand firm. We intended to keep in close touch with Kenya as circumstances changed.

*The President* said he hoped Moi would take the initiative to improve relations with Somalia and Sudan, as well as with Uganda and Tanzania. The recent meeting in Arusha, for example, was helpful. The US would be prepared to assist him in improving his relations with Sadat and the Saudis. He could help us, in return, in improving our relations with Iraq which are difficult because of our involvement in the Israeli-Egypt peace process. The President said he was prepared to encourage greater trade and investment by US firms in Kenya. Such additional investment would provide more jobs. Should Moi desire a special trade mission to facilitate increased investment, the President said Moi should let him know through either his Ambassador or the US Ambassador in Nairobi.

Should Moi desire a briefing on intelligence matters or on the President's relations with other leaders in the Middle East, Pakistan or India, he should send the President a message. The President added that he intended to take Moi's advice and to look into keeping Kaunda from depending solely on the Soviets for weapons. He would further explore this matter both directly and with the UK. We were optimistic that in another week or ten days there would be a successful election in Zimbabwe. We believe such an event would help break the impasse in Namibia as well as contribute to improvements in the situation in Angola. We planned to share with President Moi whatever information we had on these subjects and would be seeking his advice.

*Population Problems*—*The President* asked Mr. Christopher if there were any other matters that should be taken up. Mr. Christopher said that the rate of population growth in Kenya may well be one of Kenya's most serious problems. The President chided Moi that it would be difficult for Moi as the father of seven children to take the lead in such a campaign. Moi responded that in fact he had publicly urged Kenyans not to produce children that couldn't be taken care of. The President asked Moi if he had discussed this issue with any other governments. Moi said he had looked at what had been done to control population



in Singapore. The President said Prime Minister Lee had done a good job but he had a small country.

*Mr. Christopher* suggested that it might be a good idea to convene a conference on population matters in Kenya. This might stimulate interest in the problem in Kenya. The US would be willing to help to sponsor such a conference. Moi and other members of his delegation indicated an interest in this proposal.

*The President* noted that even Catholic countries such as Mexico were becoming concerned by the problem. Moi said Catholics in Kenya were willing to cooperate in population programs. The President commented that Lee in Singapore used penalties and rewards to cut down population growth but that such a system would be difficult for Kenya because Kenya is so large. There might be other ways to tackle the problem.

*Ambassador Le Melle* commented that what Kenya has needed is policy leadership in this field. Kenya was one of the first countries to establish in 1966 a population council. Now that President Moi was giving this problem his personal leadership it was being taken up at the working levels. Moi said it was difficult to start a new program like this because of the current financial difficulties. He had also found that people won't listen to parents of large families but will listen to young couples who after having one or two children stopped having more. They are the most effective spokesmen for population control. The President commented that he had been governor of a southern state with a high birth rate. He found the most effective slogan was the phrase "we want every child to be a wanted child". If this problem is handled sensitively an effective program can be operated. Mrs. Gandhi in India had initiated a very rigid program, perhaps too rigid. China was also working on the problem. There was financial assistance available from international organizations for support of a population program.

*The President* closed the meeting by noting that some of the points covered could be discussed in greater length at Acting Secretary Christopher's lunch for the Kenyan party at the Department of State. The President said he would be looking forward to seeing Moi this evening as his guest at the White House. There would be time for a private meeting, he reminded, before the dinner if Moi had any points he wished to raise as a result of his day of talks.

**174. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 21, 1980

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

7. *President Moi's Visit.* At my lunch for President Moi yesterday, he reiterated the themes he had discussed with you about Nyerere's misguided socialism and Tanzania's designs on Uganda, Seychelles, Comoros and Zambia. The Kenyan Attorney General suggested we use our influence with Binaisa to ease out the Tanzanian presence in Uganda.<sup>2</sup> Moi also repeated his concern about Soviet arms supply to Zambia and his hope that the West could provide more support to Zambia so Kaunda would not have to turn to the Soviets. He said he relied upon us to restrain Siad Barre.

Moi gave Harold Brown a shopping list (APCs, artillery, air defense missiles, C-130's, additional F-5 airplanes and navigational aides). Harold told Moi we were aware of Kenya's economic problems and would therefore want to consult closely on military priorities. He noted that debt forgiveness presents problems for us but said he hoped we could find a way to help. He proposed more lenient terms for FMS credits in FY-1980 and FY-1981 and said he hoped that \$20 million ESF we had offered would help with Kenya's balance of payments problem. Moi said that the morale of Kenya's armed forces has been raised by the prospect of our joint use of their facilities and that Kenya is proud to be our partner.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State) 2/80. Secret. Carter initialed and wrote "Cy" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "We should do this" in the left margin.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 173.

## 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kampala, March 18, 1980

711. Subject: Meeting With President Binaisa. Ref: State 68614 Notal.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I went through points reftel with Binaisa at State House, Entebbe, late afternoon March 17. I emphasized that I had instructions to point out concerns in Washington about Binaisa's apparent efforts to create an independent force loyal to him. I said the US is concerned about the possibilities of unilateral Kenyan involvement in some form as this issue more than anything else has stirred some National Consultative Council members to think of acting against him. Roger Channel message<sup>3</sup> cited reftel did not arrive but I mentioned some specifics of alleged Kenyan involvement and Binaisa's own security force that I have read or heard about. In fact, I pretty well explored the limits of possible security activities Binaisa might be undertaking on his own behalf. This drew no reaction at all.

2. The other point I emphasized was the necessity of Binaisa's working with the NCC. I said that it had been demonstrated that a majority of the NCC has so far not favored dismissing him. In the interests of Uganda's stability and his own position he should consider how this sentiment can be turned to constructive advantage.

3. Binaisa heard me out on these points, then launched into a jumble of details. He wondered why Obote had chosen this time to announce his candidacy. He wanted to know why Tanzania had suddenly decided to dump 700 Ugandan POWs on him with only four days notice (the POWs are at Mwanza). To my suggestion that his unannounced trip to Nairobi had created serious tensions, Banaisa asked, "Am I not a free agent?" I said that was the essential point; in the context of the interim arrangements he was definitely not a free agent. He said his ministers come and go as they please, so why shouldn't he? Banaisa

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800140-0571. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The transmission time was garbled.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 68614 to Kampala, March 15, the Department instructed Halsted to raise four points with Binaisa. The United States supported the idea of an international peacekeeping force, thought an East African summit would be useful, believed that Binaisa needed to work with the National Consultative Council, and was concerned that his effort to create an independent force loyal only to him would likely backfire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132-0200)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

said he followed the point on working with the NCC. He acknowledged that he receives help from the Democratic Party. He said he has been requested to attend a “secret” NCC meeting on March 18 at which a no-confidence motion may arise.

4. Binaisa said he could do nothing now about a Commonwealth or other international force. The Cabinet, he said, is firmly against it since his March 10–11 meeting with Moi.<sup>4</sup> He said there can now be an international force only if the word comes from Nyerere as no one will send in troops unless Nyerere invites them. Binaisa asked for help from the US in persuading Nyerere to move in this direction.

5. Absent an international force, Binaisa seemed to think Uganda could squeak by. He expects all Tanzanian soldiers to be gone by September, by which time, he said, Uganda’s army and police should be able to maintain security. Binaisa sees a role for an elections-monitoring force (I will comment on this aspect of reftel separately)<sup>5</sup> and dwelled at length on political and constitutional aspects of advancing the date of elections.

6. Binaisa indicated that his relationship with Nyerere is at an end. He said he will not go to Tanzania again because Nyerere might lock him up as he did Lule. Binaisa does not expect that there will be another East African summit and said he would not want to attend one while Nyerere is treating him “like a little schoolboy.” He is tired of Nyerere’s dictates and wants to get out of the way entirely. He was visibly irked that Tanzanian Minister of State Shekilango had just arrived, probably with another message from Nyerere. He was pleased to be able to keep Shekilango waiting for about an hour while we talked. He said the underlying problem with Tanzania is ideological. Tanzanian envy of Uganda’s relatively greater wealth is an additional complication.

7. Binaisa had a good deal to say about plots against him by Obote and his followers. He said that if he is attacked he will not “turn the other cheek.” He will stay and fight. He said he has no plans to leave the country. “I will be killed here. I will do no such thing as Lule did.”

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 68015 to Nairobi, March 14, the Department voiced concern over reports that during May 10–11 meetings, Moi may have offered to supply Binaisa with weapons to arm a militia that would be loyal to him. The Department, instead, advocated urging Binaisa to work with the NCC and rely upon an international peacekeeping force in the event of a TPDF withdrawal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800131–0180)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 724 from Kampala, March 19, the Embassy advocated an election-monitoring force as an alternative to an international peacekeeping force. Such a force “would be tied to a specific objective, rather than involved in an open-ended ‘peace-keeping’ operation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800140–1018)

8. Comment. There was little in today's presentation I have not said to Binaisa before. Fact of instructions, which I emphasized, added helpful weight but I am not optimistic that Binaisa will be much influenced. Others have tried to get across more or less the same message without apparent effect.

9. Binaisa's stated determination to fight back if attacked and his refusal to rise to the bait and comment on his own security arrangements lead me to suspect that he has put something together to defend himself. He knows what the US thinks about his plans and may be suspicious that the US will interfere if we find out for certain what he is up to.

10. The March 17 meeting may have provided some new insights into how Binaisa sees things. I think it is probable that he sees things in the following way: Obote's supporters, who now include Nyerere, are determined that Obote should return and run the country without elections. Obote is the one who matters. Politicians in the NCC are largely irrelevant. Binaisa believes that he has limited time to set the country irreversibly on a course towards elections. Obote will revive a socialist dictatorship. Binaisa is the only hope for free enterprise and democracy. The NCC cannot be trusted to uphold democratic principles. The NCC will not be around to help when Obote's forces move against him. Binaisa therefore has to be prepared to stand on his own. He believes he represents the will of the great majority of Ugandans and that he has their interests at heart.

11. If this is indeed how Binaisa sees things, adjurations to him about avoiding confrontation will fall on deaf ears. Probably the best we can hope for is that he will reduce his isolation by cooperating more with those whom he thinks are not after his hide, but he is likely to see confrontation with the rest of the NCC as inevitable and even necessary.

**Halsted**

**176. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 5, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #135

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

*Kenya Agreement Initialed*

On 3 April, US and Kenyan negotiators initialed, ad referendum on governments, the 10-year agreement that gives us the access to Kenyan facilities we have sought.<sup>2</sup> It calls for the creation of a US liaison office to manage aspects of access, and allows us to make needed improvements to Kenyan facilities. The “cost” to us for this liberal access is \$10 million in ESF for the next two years and \$6 million in FMS credits in FY81, in addition to modest support now programmed for Kenya. The final agreement is very close to our initial draft, except that it provides for a “status of forces” arrangement rather than exclusive US legal jurisdiction over US personnel we initially proposed. So as not to embarrass the Kenyans, we should not publicize this achievement until after it has been formally accepted by both governments, and even then we should keep publicity at a low key. Secretary Vance will cable our acceptance after a final internal review.<sup>3</sup> (C)

2. *National Security Affairs Calendar* (attached).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 29, State Department Evening Reports, 1–5/80. Secret. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6423 from Nairobi, April 3, the Embassy transmitted the text of the initialed ad referendum agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800167–0082)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 118752 to Nairobi, May 6, Christopher cabled U.S. approval of the agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800224–0190)

<sup>4</sup> Not attached.

# 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 13, 1980, 0133Z

125648. Subject: Possible Military Coup in Uganda. Ref: Kampala 1211 and Previous.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

2. We are concerned by recent developments in Uganda, believing the country needs to put political turmoil behind it and concentrate on its increasingly serious economic problems. Binaisa's move to oust Ojok now was clearly ill advised and obviously poorly executed. Judging by Radio Kampala and foreign press reports, it seems to have cost him his job. We hold no brief for Binaisa or any other Ugandan leader. We want the people of Uganda to have an opportunity, after eight years, to decide who will govern them and we want that process to be fair and acceptable to the international community. Our principal concern then is that the reported assumption of power by the "military commission" and Binaisa's seeming dismissal not interrupt progress towards national elections.

3. While the situation in Uganda is still confused, it is clear the Tanzanians hold one of the keys to future developments there. We agree with Kampala's suggestion and approach to Nyerere would be useful and suggest Embassy Dar es Salaam make the following points to Nyerere as soon as possible:<sup>3</sup>

—We are concerned by recent developments in Uganda, as we believe all of Uganda's friends are.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236-0492. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Brill; cleared in AF/E; approved by Moose. Sent for information Immediate to Kampala and London.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1211 from Kampala, May 12, the Embassy reported that a confrontation between Binaisa and the Ugandan military had left senior army officers in effective control of Uganda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800235-0360) In telegram 1191 from Kampala, May 10, the Embassy reported that President Binaisa attempted to remove Brigadier Oyite-Ojok as Uganda Army Chief of Staff. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800231-0546) In telegram 1197 from Kampala, May 11, the Embassy reported that Binaisa lacked the support to sustain his decision to dismiss Ojok and a "military commission" met on May 10 to reject Ojok's dismissal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800233-0380)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2734 from Dar es Salaam, May 13, the Embassy responded to this suggestion by saying that any efforts toward Nyerere had been overtaken by events and Embassy staff believed that Nyerere was "caught completely off-guard not only by Binaisa's move against Ojok, but more importantly, by Ojok's quick marshalling of support." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236-0912)

—Uganda needs to put its political disputes behind it and concentrate on its very serious economic problems.

—We supported the announcement of early elections believing they would help in this process and produce a government which would have the support of the people and the international community.

—We are concerned that the reported military take over of the Ugandan Government may lead to increased instability and interrupt the progress towards early elections.

—We hope that those friends of Uganda who have some influence will do what they can to facilitate implementation of the political process agreed at Mombasa without further delay or bloodshed.<sup>4</sup>

4. For Nairobi and Khartoum: We believe the Mombasa summit meeting gives both Presidents Moi and Nimeiri a role to play in this situation. Embassies should approach host governments at an appropriately high level to register our concern about recent developments in Uganda and our hope that all the Mombasa summit participants will continue to make known their support of early elections in Uganda.<sup>5</sup>

5. For Viets from Dick Moose: What is unstated but obvious in this situation is Nyerere's peculiar responsibility and vulnerability with regard to the Ojok-Obote connection. I thought Nyerere had recognized how costly, politically and economically, his Ugandan adventure had become. Mombasa looked like the beginning of his withdrawal from this exposure and the possible opening of a new East African era. Nyerere scarcely needs the onus of being the *mettre en scene* of Obote. He must realize there is a presumption of [garble—guilt already]. We give you license to play this piece of music as you will but as I read the foregoing it seemed a bit pale. Nyerere may not be able to do anything about this but if anyone can, he can.

**Muskie**

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<sup>4</sup> Presidents Moi, Nyerere, Binaisa, and Nimeiry met in Mombasa April 14–15.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 3309 from Khartoum, May 13, the Embassy reported that President Nimeiry "reacted immediately and spontaneously to developments in Uganda along the lines we were instructed to urge." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800236–1034) In telegram 9088 from Nairobi, May 15, the Embassy reported on Moi's response to a meeting with Ugandan Foreign Minister Mkapa, in which Moi expressed his opinion that "the maintenance of law, order and legitimacy in Uganda was, ultimately, the responsibility of Tanzania." He also proposed a conference "at which an interim coalition government would be chosen to administer the country until the elections next December." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0463)



# 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kampala, October 9, 1980, 1055Z

2605. Subject: Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker's Uganda Visit.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. Top Ugandan officials discussed elections and security problems with DAS Walker October 8. Cross-border attacks by suspected ex-Amin soldiers were much on the Ugandans' minds. Ugandans see attacks as confirming their suspicions about hostile activities in neighboring countries. Military Commission Chairman Muwanga warned that unrelenting hostility by Kenya could alter the political character of Uganda and perhaps even East Africa. Outside influences will not be allowed to interfere with elections which will go ahead on schedule as closely as possible. End summary.

3. Deputy Assistant Secretary Lannon Walker met separately on October 8 with Military Commission Chairman Muwanga, Vice-Chairman Museveni and Foreign Minister Allimadi. Ambassador and DCM were also present.

4. Attacks in last few days on border posts, allegedly by ex-Amin soldiers, was the principal topic raised by Ugandans. Attacks were cited as evidence of support by Sudan and Kenya for efforts of dissident Ugandan exiles, including Amin elements, to disrupt elections. To news of attacks in the northwest Muwanga added reports of attacks in the east near the Kenya border. In one incident fifteen on the Ugandan side had been killed. He believes all the attacks were coordinated. The Military Commission's information is sparse but the threat can probably be contained. A diplomatic initiative includes expressing concern to Ambassadors of Zaire and Sudan. An envoy from Zaire is expected and Muwanga thinks Mobutu will be cooperative.

5. While Allimadi was hopeful that some form of regional cooperation can be salvaged (he discussed contacts with Sudan and Kenya in a business as usual fashion) Muwanga was pessimistic, warning that relations with Kenya are in very bad shape. "Kenya is driving this country to a precipice that might cause Uganda to have a different political face. We are being driven into a corner. Because of Kenya we have to spend more on guns and security." (We understood Muwanga to be saying that Uganda might have to abandon its basically Western

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800483-0933. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Khartoum, Kinshasa, London, and Nairobi.

model for development. He also seemed to be thinking of major changes throughout East Africa). Smuggling by Kenyans and the training in arms of Ugandan dissidents are the principal problems. Kenya won't cooperate because it is obsessed with Obote and Nyerere. "Kenya believes every lie because it has no one here to learn the truth." Muwanga has refrained from talking publicly because he does not want to make a difficult situation impossible. Uganda could hurt Kenya, if necessary, by closing the border. Uganda could also take care of itself in a fight with Kenya but Muwanga is not planning any action.

6. Walker wondered how the US could help since Sudan and Kenya, along with Uganda, are friends. In response to an earlier Ugandan request the US had received assurances from Sudan and Kenya that they are not helping Ugandan dissidents.<sup>2</sup> Muwanga was skeptical, "these assurances are ones to which we attach little importance." Uganda's information, he said is too good to believe otherwise. He had prior knowledge of the attacks on the border posts. "We have known for certain that Kenya has our fellow countrymen under training."

7. The Ugandans expressed determination to carry on with elections despite outside threats. All were positive about Commonwealth observers. Muwanga is disappointed that only the US has pledged election assistance.

8. Muwanga claimed strict impartiality in managing the elections. He has good relations with the Democratic Party but nothing good to say about the Uganda Patriotic Movement (he did not mention the name) which he described as a radical "youth movement." He said all the parties, including UPC, are dissatisfied with the work of the electoral commission.

9. Walker stressed that the US is fully in agreement on the importance of elections and the sooner the better under free and fair conditions. Uganda's friends in the US are particularly interested because free and fair elections will put them in a better position to help with economic reconstruction.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6478 from Khartoum, September 5, the Embassy reported that Embassy officials discussed the Ugandan situation with Sudanese officials, who denied involvement with Ugandan dissidents residing in southern Sudan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800423–0078) However, in telegram 5097 from Dar es Salaam, September 9, the Embassy reported that the Sudanese Ambassador to Tanzania had "described in considerable detail Sudanese and Kenyan support for Ugandan exiles." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800429–0445)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 160323 to Dar es Salaam, June 18, the Department transmitted the text of the Pease amendment to the FY 81 Foreign Aid bill: "The President shall encourage the holding of free and open elections in Uganda and shall, in considering assistance for Uganda and Tanzania with funds authorized to be appropriated by this act, take into account whether such elections were held as planned." The Department believed that "the Pease amendment provides a useful opportunity to remind Tanzanians and Ugandans of our concerns." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800296–0759)

10. Museveni had relatively little to say about politics but did comment that he thinks a political solution can be found to the impasse in the National Consultative Council. Museveni stuck largely to UPM economic policies. (He may have been put off by the presence of Foreign Ministry notetaker or he may have been deflated because UPM lost its suit to have voter registration stopped. Justice Allen decided on October 8 that there are illegalities in the election arrangements but expediency and economy are more persuasive. UPM has joined the other three parties in urging its followers to register).

11. Both Muwanga and Allimadi raised internal security problems. Both spoke of some improvement and expressed hope for still more as the police force is developed. Muwanga stated that much remains to be done but this is really a problem for the next government to handle. Walker stressed importance of substantial improvement in internal security if the US is going to be able to be of much help in Uganda's development.

12. Walker mentioned to Muwanga that the good treatment extended to Binaisa has contributed favorably to Uganda's image. Muwanga indicated he understood and said Binaisa's case will be left for the next government to resolve.

**Beyer**

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#### **179. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1980

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

4. *Uganda*. Last week's elections in Uganda have ended amid charges of wide-scale fraud by the government to ensure Milton Obote's return to power.<sup>2</sup> The opposition party has said it will appeal the results and boycott the government. We have some evidence from the opposition party to support the charges, but are awaiting a more detailed analysis from Embassy Kampala and the Commonwealth

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State) 12/80. Secret. Carter initialed "J" in the upper right corner.

<sup>2</sup> Former President Milton Obote was declared the victor in the December 10 election.

Observers before making a judgment. The election controversy raises the prospect of continuing instability in Uganda.

Regardless of our views on the election, Uganda has a new government—Obote was inaugurated today—and we will have to deal with it. We plan a correct, but cool, approach initially.<sup>3</sup> Our Ambassador attended Obote's inauguration and we have prepared a low-key congratulatory message from you which we plan to hold for at least another 24 hours. We will also seek opportunities to remind Obote and his opposition that Uganda needs political stability and unity if it is to get the international support needed to resolve its difficult economic and food supply problems. (C)

[Omitted here are items unrelated to East Africa.]

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<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined the phrase "correct, but cool, approach" and wrote "ok" in the left margin.

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## **180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 18, 1980, 1427Z

333831. Subject: Presidential Message to Obote.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Para 3 contains the text of a Presidential message to President Obote. You should inform your British colleagues that you have this message, but not rpt not deliver it until they have delivered theirs, which we understand they may do Thursday or Friday.<sup>2</sup>

3. Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my best wishes as you begin your term as President of Uganda. You face an enormous task in rebuilding your country's economy, institutions and society after the debacle of the Amin years. I trust that under your leadership all the people of Uganda will work together to realize your country's tremendous potential. Your govern-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800601–0826. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to London. Sent for information Routine to Nairobi, Khartoum, and Dar es Salaam. Drafted by Brill; cleared in AF/E, NSC, P, and S/S; approved by Walker.

<sup>2</sup> December 18 and 19.

ment and the people of Uganda can expect the United States to cooperate with your efforts to bring peace, justice and prosperity to Uganda. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

4. White House has no plans to release this message but has no objection to GOU's doing so.

**Muskie**

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**181. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kampala, December 23, 1980, 0650Z

3155. Subject: Relations With New Government. Ref: State 336011.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C)–Entire text.

2. Requested appointment with President Obote morning December 22 and was received by him in the President's office at noon for 20 minute talk. Obote was attended by Minister of State Chris Rwakasisi and Ephraom Kamuntu (former Minister of Tourism and Wildlife).

3. Said I wished to reiterate points made in President Carter's message to President Obote and then read points listed in last portion para 3 reftel.<sup>3</sup> Reminded Obote that we had tried to stay neutral during elections between the several parties; Obote said yes you did and you were successful. Continued that I would be less than frank, however, if I did not now tell him that many of those most knowledgeable about African affairs in the U.S. believed that an Obote government would be the strongest government in Uganda and, therefore, have the best chance of leading Ugandans to a better life.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800608–0580. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Khartoum, London, Bonn, Paris, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 336011 to Kampala, December 20, the Department instructed the Ambassador to seek an early appointment with Obote. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800605–0636)

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 3 of telegram 336011 reads: "We wish new administration well as it takes up its responsibilities, we trust the new government will seek to unite all Ugandans in task of overcoming Amin's legacy of economic, political and social devastation, and we hope to cooperate, within the constraints of our very limited resources, with the new government's efforts to revitalize the economy and return Uganda to the rule of law." For Carter's message, see Document 180.

4. Obote said he was very grateful for President Carter's letter and for my comments. He wanted me to know, however, that he was somewhat appalled by the problems facing Uganda. He had spent a full day at the Ministry of Finance and things are in terrible shape. He was also distressed by the civil service. There are many in the civil service, Obote continued, who are corrupt, but whom he will have to retain in government for a while. It will take time to train men to staff a reformed civil service. I interrupted to offer U.S. assistance in training civil servants in various areas, either in Uganda or in the U.S. Offered to have AID Director Buck sit down with Obote's Minister of Planning Sam Odaka to see how we might be of help. Obote was very grateful for this offer and concurred in my arranging such a meeting.

5. Commented that Uganda had received quite good final report from the Commonwealth observers. Obote said he wanted me know that he felt some of the allegations against Military Commission Chairman Paulo Muwanga in the foreign press were unfair. When Muwanga found incompetence in the staging of the elections in Kampala that bordered on subversion, he over-reacted by issuing his edict taking from the Electoral Commission the authority to report vote tallies. Obote said he told Muwanga he had made an error and although that edict was not rescinded, it was not enforced and the next day Muwanga publicly turned back to the Electoral Commission the authority to collate and report the returns. Secondly, Electoral Commission had erred in announcing on its own the extension of the period of voting to December 11. Electoral Commission did not have the legal authority to do so and, therefore, Muwanga's edict, although ill advised, did legalize the Commission's extension. Thirdly, Ssekono's order to polling stations to not begin counting the votes until after the polls were closed on December 11 was apparently not received by all election officials. Therefore, some early counting did begin and some polls apparently did not open or were late in opening on December 11. This led to partial returns beginning to come to Kampala while the election was still in progress in some constituencies. Obote could not explain how DP could have announced the number of seats it claimed to have won around noon on December 11 before the polls had even closed officially. There were also several other discrepancies he could not explain but which he was looking into. For example, in the Masaka area there were 80,000 more ballots delivered by Ssekono to the constituencies there than there were people officially registered. UPC intended to look into cases where it felt its candidates had been badly treated and it would accept the decision of the courts whether it went for UPC or against UPC. He hoped the other parties would do the same. Obote concluded his remarks on the election by saying when he had been at the Embassy November 5 and viewed our schematic dia-

gram of how the various parties had fared, he thought of such a diagram for Uganda today. UPC had done well in the north, the east, and some part of the west, but not well at all in the south. This was a problem that would have to be faced by UPC if there was to be a unified Uganda, and he intended to work on it.

6. Told Obote that DP and UPM officials had sought US out to complain of election malpractices. Stressed to Obote that we urged these officials, as Obote himself had outlined in his inaugural speech, to follow legal procedures to seek redress where they felt their candidates had a case. We emphasized that if a party seeks judicial review on a constituency by constituency basis that it was not then consistent to refuse to accept the election in toto. We had urged, therefore, that DP and UPM candidates who had won take their seats in the National Assembly and we were pleased to see that they were apparently going to do so.

7. Obote ended the meeting by saying he would be looking to friends to help Uganda in the months ahead. He was grateful for the rapid pledges of support from the EEC, Commonwealth nations, and others. He said he wanted me to know that he and his government would do the best job that they could.

8. Addendum. Have made a request for appointment with Muwanga but have not yet had it confirmed. Did not discuss, therefore, with Obote Muwanga's request for assistance for an expanded militia.

9. Comment. As the foregoing suggests, this meeting with Obote was very cordial. Ephraim Kamuntu is a friend and neighbor and it was encouraging to me that he was sitting at Obote's right hand. (Kamuntu had telephoned the house last night to discuss a social get together and inter alia expressed the hope that I would continue on as Ambassador under our new President. Said I hoped I would too.) The rapidity with which Obote received me was also encouraging. Believed the election brouhaha is now behind us and we are well embarked on a good relationship with the new regime.

**Beyer**