

**FOREIGN
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OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1977–1980
VOLUME XVII**

PART 3

**NORTH
AFRICA**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

Volume XVII

Part 3

North Africa

Editor

Myra F. Burton

General Editor

Adam M. Howard

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate

with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign*

Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

Editorial Methodology

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-

ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 8 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 18 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward North Africa.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
The Historian

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This volume documents the evolution of the administration's policy toward North Africa. Readers interested in the administration's policies throughout the African continent should consult *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa; and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XVI, Southern Africa. Readers interested in the administration's efforts to find a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East should consult *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3

This volume documents the Carter administration's efforts to promote stability in the Maghreb through a multi-faceted approach that addressed the many challenges in the region: "normalizing" relations with Algeria and Libya; reassuring Morocco and Tunisia of the administration's continued support and consulting them on the Middle East peace initiative; and serving as an "honest broker" in the regional dispute over the Western Sahara.

The volume chronicles the Department of State's efforts to normalize relations with Algeria, largely through an increase in U.S. investment in the country and a commitment to increased educational and cultural exchange. The greatest tangible evidence of the normalization of relations is documented in multiple discussions with Algerian officials on regional issues. Normalizing relations with Libya remained elusive, despite the professed desire of both Carter and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi to do so. Qadhafi's support for international terrorists, belligerent behavior toward Tunisia, Egypt, and Chad, and aggression toward the United States and its representatives prompted multiple interagency policy reviews and discussions, as well as numerous *démarches*, none of which proved effective in dealing with the unpredictable Qadhafi. Carter abandoned the effort and suspended relations with Libya in May 1980 in the aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in December 1979.

Morocco and Tunisia received significant attention from Carter, the National Security Council, and the Departments of State and Defense. Both countries were concerned about real and perceived threats from their neighbors in the Maghreb and sought reassurance that the United States would continue to provide security assistance. Congressional concerns over Morocco's use of U.S. arms in the Western Sahara created tensions with the long-term ally, resulting in several inter-agency reviews. Despite this tension, Morocco, like Tunisia, remained actively engaged in the dialogue over regional problems and supported the administration's policy toward peace in the Middle East.

Administration concerns that the conflict in Western Sahara would destabilize the region led the Department of State to hold numerous high-level meetings with Moroccan, Algerian, and Mauritanian officials in an attempt to help resolve the conflict. A lower level meeting was also held with a representative of the Polisario. Several members of Congress expressed concern over the conflict and traveled to the region to assess the situation. Despite these efforts, the administration was unable to resolve the differences among the parties and Carter left office without a settlement.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Betty Egwenike, Ceri McCarron, and Brittany Paris. Thanks are due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency were accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland for their assistance with Department of State material.

The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Adam M. Howard reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Myra F. Burton
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

The Carter Presidential Library is the best source of high-level decisionmaking documentation on U.S. policy toward North Africa during the Carter administration. The National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File is a particularly rich source of documentation on the individual countries in the Maghreb and the administration's policy toward North Africa in general. The Staff Material, Middle East Trips/Visits File provides documentation on congressional involvement in the region. Comprehensive documentation of bilateral and regional issues is also in the National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, especially the Country File, Country Chron File, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, and the Subject File, which contains memoranda of conversation and the State Department Evening Reports. The National Security Council, Institutional Files contain documents crucial to understanding the policy and decisionmaking process with regard to Libya, Western Sahara and Morocco.

The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland (Archives II), houses a variety of Department of State records. The Central Foreign Policy File is an invaluable resource for cables, providing a comprehensive record of day-to-day diplomatic activities and exchanges between the Department of State and diplomatic posts. Additionally, summaries of visits by congressional delegations, officials of other agencies and departments, as well as private citizens can be found here. Department of State Lot Files, particularly the records of Cyrus R. Vance, are another rich source of documentation on the development and implementation of Department policy.

The volume includes several Central Intelligence Agency documents. Files in the Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Jobs 80T00071A, 82T00267R, 85T00287, and 82T00466R were useful.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Office of the Secretariat Staff

Lot 84D241, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Central Foreign Policy File

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Country File

Country Chron File

President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File

Subject File

Staff Material

Middle East File

Office, Unfiled File

National Security Council

Institutional File

Central Intelligence Agency

History Staff Files

Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence

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Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files

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Abbreviations and Terms

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AI, Amnesty International

AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AFR/SW, Office of Sahel and Francophone West Africa Affairs, Agency for International Development

AFN, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

AID, Agency for International Development

APC, armored personnel carrier

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command

CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe

CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe

COMSIXTHFLT, Commander, U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet

DATT, Defense Attaché

DI, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency

DOC, Department of Commerce

DOD, Department of Defense

EUCOM, United States European Command

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution

EXIM, Export-Import Bank

FLN, National Liberation Front, Algeria

FMS, Foreign Military Sales

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FY, fiscal year

GIRM, Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

GNP, gross national product

GOA, Government of Algeria

GOE, Government of Egypt

GOI, Government of Italy

GOM, Government of Morocco

GOT, Government of Tunisia

GSP, Generalized System of Preferences

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee

ICA, International Communication Agency

XIV Abbreviations and Terms

ICJ, International Court of Justice

ILO, International Labor Organization

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

LARG, Libyan Arab Republic Government

Limdis, Limited Distribution

LNG, liquefied natural gas

LOU, Limited Official Use

MAC, Military Airlift Command

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/AFN, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Niact, Night Action

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

Nodis, No Distribution

OAS, Organization of American States

OAU, Organization of African Unity

OBE, overtaken by events

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PL, Public Law

PL 480, Food for Peace (formally Public Law 83–480, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954)

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

POLAD, political adviser

reftel, reference telegram

RMAF, Royal Moroccan Air Force

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SC, Security Council (United Nations)

SecDef, Secretary of Defense

SecGen, Secretary General

septel, separate telegram

SPLAJ, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

SWAPO, Southwest Africa People's Organization

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

US, United States

USAF, United States Air Force

USDA, United States Department of Agriculture

USDOCOSOUTH, United States Document Officer, Allied Forces South Europe

USG, United States Government

USINT, United States Interests Section

USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military Representative to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Albright, Madeleine, Press and Congressional Relations Officer, National Security Council Staff, from March 1978 until January 1981

Anderson, Jack, syndicated columnist and investigative reporter

Anderson, Robert, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from April 12, 1976 until October 6, 1978

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr. (Roy), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 13, 1978; Ambassador at Large from April 11, 1978, until May 22, 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979

Bagley, David H., Admiral, USN; Commander, U.S. Naval Operations in Europe from May 1975 until August 1977

Bendjedid, Chadli, President of Algeria from February 9, 1979

Bengelloun, Ali, Moroccan Ambassador to the United States

Bergland, Robert S., Secretary of Agriculture

Bergstrom, Alan H., Economic and Commercial Chargé, U.S. Embassy in Tripoli

Bishop, James K., Director, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1979

Bosworth, Stephen W., U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from March 27, 1979, until June 22, 1981

Boucetta, M'hamed, Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1977

Boumediene, Houari, President of Algeria until December 1978

Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisia

Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, Algerian Foreign Minister until December 1978

Boutros Ghali, Boutros, Egyptian Foreign Minister from November until December 1977; Acting Foreign Minister from September 1978 until February 1979

Bowie, Robert R., Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for Intelligence from April 4, 1977, until August 17, 1979 and Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, from October 11, 1977, until August 17, 1979

Bradford, William G., U.S. Ambassador to Chad from October 15, 1976, until June 19, 1979

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States

Carter, William A. (Billy), brother of Jimmy Carter

Chatty, Habib, Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1974 until December 1977

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977 until January 1981

Collums, Haley D., Staff Assistant, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Coon, Carleton S., Deputy Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, until 1978; thereafter Director, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Cooper, Richard N., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 8, 1977, until January 19, 1981

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary

Draper, Morris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1978

Duncan, Charles W., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Duke, Angier Biddle, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from December 20, 1979, until February 28, 1981

Eagleton, William L., Jr., Chargé d'Affaires to the U.S. Embassy in Libya from August 1978 until February 8, 1980

Eilts, Hermann F., U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from April 20, 1974, until May 20, 1979

Fahmy, Ismail, Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1973 until November 1977

Farhat, Abdallah, Tunisian Defense Minister until 1980

Fish, Howard M., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance from August 1974 until 1978; Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force from March 1, 1978

Franco, Francisco, General, Spanish Head of State until November 20, 1975

Fraser, Donald M., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Minnesota) until January 3, 1979

Friendly, Alfred, Associate White House Press Secretary from 1980

Funk, Gerald (Jerry), member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan African Affairs from December 1978 until January 1981

al-Gamasy, Mohammed Abdel Ghani, General, Egyptian Chief of Staff from 1973; Deputy Prime Minister from April 1975

Gashut, Shaban F., Counselor, Chargé d'Affaires of the Libyan Embassy in the United States from September 25, 1975, until May 1978

Guedira, Ahmed R., Counselor to Moroccan King Hassan II

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 1976 until April 1978; thereafter Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State on Caribbean issues

Hamilton, Lee H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana); Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Harman, Sidney, Under Secretary of Commerce until December 1978

Hassan II, King of Morocco

Haynes, Ulric St. Clair, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from May 11, 1977, until December 13, 1980

Hedda, Ali, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States

el-Houderi, Ali, Head of the Libyan People's Bureau in the United States

Kikhya, Mansour, Libyan Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Kreps, Juanita M., Secretary of Commerce until October 1979

Laghdaif, Cheikhna Ould Mohamed, Mauritanian Foreign Minister from 1978 until 1979

Lance, Thomas Bertram (Bert), Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 24, 1977, until September 24, 1977

Laraki, Ahmed, Moroccan Foreign Minister until 1977

al-Madfai, Ahmad, Chargé d'Affaires of the Libyan Embassy in the United States

Malloum, Felix, Chadian Head of State from May 12, 1975, until August 29, 1978; thereafter President until March 23, 1979

Marcuss, Stanley J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Trade
McGiffert, David E., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Assistance
Mondale, Walter S., Vice President of the United States

Moose, Richard M., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Mulcahy, Edward W., U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia from May 31, 1976, until January 5, 1979

Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D-Maine) until May 7, 1980; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981

Newsom, David D., U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines from November 1977 until March 1978; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978

Nouira, Hedi, Tunisian Prime Minister until April 1980

Odom, William E., Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

Parker, Richard B., U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from December 18, 1974, until February 12, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from October 31, 1978, until June 22, 1979

Perry, Jack R., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1979

Poats, Rutherford, staff member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics from 1978 until 1981

Press, Frank, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology; Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, from June 1, 1977

Pustay, John S., Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1979

Qadhafi, Mu'ammar, Colonel, Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council; Secretary of Defense

Quainton, Anthony C.E., Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism, Department of State, from August 16, 1978, until August 1, 1981

Quandt, William B., member, National Security Council Staff for Middle East and North African Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979

Rentschler, James, member, National Security Council Staff for West European Affairs

Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D-Connecticut)

Roy, Wayne A., Country Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

al-Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt

Saunders, Harold H., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Sick, Gary, member, National Security Council Staff for Middle East and North African Affairs

Sikes, Robert L.F., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida) until January 3, 1979

Sober, Sidney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Solarz, Stephen J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York); Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa

Stoddard, Philip H., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1979

Tarnoff, Peter, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981

Todman, Terence A., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from April 1, 1977, until June 27, 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Spain from July 20, 1978, until August 8, 1983

Toumayan, Alec G., staff member, Language Services Division, Bureau of Administration, Department of State

al-Turayki, Ali Abd al-Salam, Libyan Foreign Minister

Turner, Stansfield, Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Twaddell, William H., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance from 1977 until 1979

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Veliotis, Nicholas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations

Weislogel, Winifred S., Director, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter, Staff Officer, Secretariat Staff, Department of State

Wilkinson, Theodore S., Director, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

North Africa

North Africa Region

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, January 12, 1977, 1043Z

252. Dept pls pass DOD. Subject: Alleged Qadhafi Decision To "Unite" Libya and Tunisia.

1. Admiral Bagley, CINCUSNAVEUR, was received by Tunisian Minister of Defense Farhat on January 11, shortly after his arrival in Tunisia on official visit. Atmosphere was cordial and meeting served useful purposes.

2. It was obvious throughout meeting that Libya still uppermost in minds of Tunisian defense officials (Deputy Defense Minister Bennour, Secretary General Alouini and Navy Chief of Staff Jedidi also present). Farhat stated during meeting that new source of concern was intelligence report received by GOT concerning secret meeting held by Qadhafi on approximately January 1 in which he allegedly outlined his plans for "uniting" with Tunisia. Qadhafi supposedly told meeting that while in Moscow he had obtained assurances that if he decided to "take over" Tunisia, Moscow would maintain hands off policy (i.e. would not object to Libyan use of Soviet arms for this purpose). Qadhafi went on to say that he had made definite decision to unify Libya and Tunisia by any means, including force, and that he believed he could count on Algerian support or neutrality in the event he attacked Tunisia.

3. Farhat said he took reported Qadhafi remarks seriously. He believed that Qadhafi had decided that Egypt was more than he could chew and that he would now turn his attention to Tunisia. Farhat said he believed Qadhafi counting on Egyptian, Iraqi and Palestinian mercenaries, whom he now recruiting, to make up for lack of trained

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770011-0832. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Moscow, and Tripoli.

Libyans. Farhat added that in event of hostilities he expected Egypt and Algeria would both remain neutral.

4. Questioned further at dinner that evening about seriousness of reported Qadhafi threat, Bennour said it “very disturbing” fresh intelligence acquired only “three or four days ago”.

King

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, January 20, 1977, 0837Z

74. Subject: Egyptian Ambassador’s Comments on Egyptian/Libyan Relations.

1. Summary. Egyptian Amb in Tripoli views future of relations with Libya pessimistically and with some foreboding. Egypt plans to continue and even step up pressure on Qadhafi regime.

2. During meeting January 19 Egyptian Ambassador Tuhmai commented extensively on what he described as bad and deteriorating relations between his country and Libya. Ambassador reiterated that Egyptian complaints against Libya included Libyan sponsorship of the anti-Sadat/Nasserite organization in Libya and Egypt, Libyan sponsored sabotage activities in Egypt and the frozen Egyptian accounts in Libyan banks amounting to some 17 million [garble—dinars?]. The Ambassador observed that the Libyans are reorganizing the Nasserite organization among Egyptians in Libya and seeking to recruit young Egyptian students to expand it. Nasserites were responsible for sabotage in Egypt and might be behind current rioting.

3. Ambassador said he felt somewhat insecure in Tripoli though active surveillance had decreased. He added, however, that the possibility of Egyptian and/or Sudanese military intervention in Libya was still possible provided there was a suitable internal situation to warrant it. He felt that in such a case Egyptian Embassy would be subject to open attack. Even under current circumstances the possibility of a LARG inspired demonstration could not be ruled out. Ambassador claimed his cypher communications system now insecure because of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770021–0691. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Khartoum, and Tunis.

possible Libyan penetration with Soviet aid. Accordingly, he was under instructions from Cairo to use only couriers.

4. Tuhmai saw little possibility for mediation noting that Guinea's Sekou Toure's attempt had failed because Libyans had refused to agree to discussion of outstanding problems. Tito, currently in Tripoli, was unlikely to try again this area having already failed once.

5. Ambassador views Qadhafi as feeling increasingly insecure. He tells visiting dignitaries that Sadat intends to kill him. He has growing concern over what he sees as encirclement by Egypt, Sudan, Chad and possibly Tunisia. Policy of the Egyptian Government, according to Tuhami, will be to do whatever possible to increase this nervousness. Accordingly, former RCC member Muyhayshi is to be unleashed again in the near future over Egyptian radio which now reaches every home in Tripoli. Also Sadat himself will make further public statements regarding Qadhafi's evil and irrational activities.

6. Though charitably suggesting Qadhafi perhaps unaware of everything bad that happened in Libya, Tuhmai doubted possibility of ever reaching a viable understanding with him. He suggested US "should get rid of him." I replied that US found Qadhafi very difficult indeed but certainly would not rpt not interfere in internal Libyan affairs.

7. In response to a query as to with whom among present Libyan leaders Egypt might possibly work, Ambassador responded that his Embassy had recently had vague and indirect approaches from Prime Minister Jallud whom they regarded as tough and crude but reasonably open. At the same time if separation between eastern and western Libya developed, Egyptians thought that RCC member Kharoubi might well become the leader of the eastern portion and was someone with whom they might also work.

8. Tuhami spoke more than he listened but was interested in extent of US support for C-130 maintenance. I explained status of Lockheed technical group and basics of US/Libyan policy. We agreed to keep in touch. He claimed to have discussed Libyan policy at length with President Sadat and FonMin Fahmy during recent consultations in Cairo. I leave it to my colleagues in Cairo to assess the authority of his somewhat fearsome predictions for the future.

Carle

3. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 18, 1977, 1700Z

1194. Amman for Ambassador Mulcahy. Subject: Tunisian/Libyan Dispute Over Offshore Drilling Operation: State of Play February 18. Ref: Tunis 1168.² (Notal)

1. Summary: Tunisians state that Italian Ambassador has told them that GOI has informed LARG that Italy withdrawing drilling rig from waters claimed by Tunisia and that Libyans have threatened to “open fire” if Tunisians do not cease “occupying” drilling platform. Coordinates of drilling rig that Tunisians say given them by Libyans and verified by GOT would seem to place drilling point on Tunisian side of shelf boundary, on basis of “island base point” calculation made by Geographer’s office. End summary.

2. Tunisian Foreign Ministry Director for European and American Affairs Ahmed Ghezal gave Charge detailed exposition this morning of events leading to alleged Italian Government decision to withdraw drilling rig which working at point on continental shelf claimed by Tunisia. Tunisian version of sequence of events as follows:

3. GOT believes that around Jan 13 drilling ship, Scarabeo Four belonging to subsidiary (AGIP/SAIPEM) of Italian State Oil Company (ENI) positioned off Tunisian/Libyan coast. On Jan 18 Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent circular note to all diplomatic missions in Tripoli—excluding Tunisia—informing them of drilling operation but giving erroneous coordinates. On Feb 1 Libyan MOFA sent second note to diplomatic missions Tripoli, including Tunisia, “correcting” coordinates. Note received by Tunisian High Representative Tripoli on Feb 4 and was first knowledge GOT had of this operation. Coordinates were given as 34 degrees one minute five point 54 seconds north and 12 degrees 34 minutes 13 point thirty-four seconds east.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770058–1222. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Amman, Tripoli, and Rome. Sent for information to Rabat, Paris, London, Algiers, Cairo, Valetta, USCOMSIXTHFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR.

² In telegram 1168 from Tunis, February 17, King summarized a telephone conversation with Ghezal, who summarized Tunisia’s position on the drilling by the Italian firm AGIP of an offshore well for Libya that was “clearly” in Tunisian waters. “GOT informed LARG of this fact by diplomatic note and at the same time requested Italian Government to withdraw AGIP operation. Italians agreed.” Ghezal also noted the Libyan response: “Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud has now called in Tunisian High Representative in Tripoli and told him to inform GOT that if there any further GOT ‘interference’ with drilling operation, Libya will open fire on Tunisian patrol boats.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–0649)

3. On Feb 8 Tunisian MOFA presented Libyan Charge Tunis with diplomatic note (text given Embassy)³ confirming receipt of Libyan note and stating that position of Scarabeo Four indisputably on Tunisia continental shelf; that dispatch of ship by Libyan Government to this point constituted flagrant violation of sovereign rights of Tunisia; that GOT strongly protested this act and categorically rejected Libyan note as null and void. Libyan Government asked to withdraw ship and not to undertake any activity that would infringe on Tunisian continental shelf. According to Ghezal, Libyan Charge “returned” Tunisian note Feb 14.

4. On Feb 9 Tunisian MOFA called in Italian Ambassador and “warned him of consequences of Italian action”, pointing out that location of drilling vessel within area of Tunisian concession to SEPEG in which AGIP has interest (according to Embassy’s information 20 percent). Therefore Italians drilling in Tunisian concession which included them as well as French, but on basis overlapping concession granted AGIP by Libya.

5. On Feb 11 Director of Energy for Tunisian Ministry of National Economy requested Tunisian Coast Guard to verify coordinates. Coast Guard patrol boat did so and reported approximately same coordinates as Libyan note (34 degrees one point one minute north and 12 degrees 34 point two minutes east). Director of Energy prepared summons on Feb 17 (text given Embassy)⁴ informing Captain Scarabeo Four that he had violated Tunisian continental shelf and that he must cease operations and immediately leave the area or be subject to penalties of Tunisian law. Summons delivered to Scarabeo Four Feb 17 by Tunisian Coast Guard boat.

6. Also on Feb 17 Italian Ambassador in Tunis informed Tunisian MOFA that Scarabeo would leave area within four days, time required to cap drill hole. MOFA asked for written confirmation of this from GOI as well as written confirmation from ENI that operation being abandoned. Later in day, Feb 17, Libyan Prime Minister Jallud called in Tunisian High Representative Tripoli and informed him that if “Tunisian occupation” of drilling rig did not cease, Libyan forces would “open fire”. Tunisia, of course, in no way “occupying” rig.

7. Morning of Feb 18 Italian Ambassador informed Tunisian MOFA that GOI had told Libyans that they were withdrawing Scarabeo and that he would confirm Italian decision to GOT by note either today or tomorrow, Feb 19. (We know that Italian Ambassador did call on Ghezal this morning, as did later on in morning, French Charge.) In

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

response to question, Ghezal said he did not know whether any Tunisian Navy vessels now in immediate area of drilling operation but he did believe Tunisian “warship” had been in area at time summons delivered (thus distinguishing Tunisian Coast Guard from Tunisian Navy proper).

8. Aside from information supplied by Ghezal, Embassy Officer informed by GOT Ministry of Interior official that Libyan Minister of Interior arriving Tunis tonight (Feb 18) from Madrid with two other senior Libyan officials. Purpose of visit unknown.

9. Comment: Ghezal asked nothing from USG, although he hinted broadly that GOT would be interested in any information USG gained on GOI intentions. He made it clear that GOT not entirely convinced Italians would keep strictly to their word on withdrawal of drilling vessel. Following meeting with Ghezal, we have reviewed INR study of Libya/Tunisia continental shelf boundary (RGES–7 of 21 Dec 72)⁵ and attached map as modified by State 212136 of 26 Aug 76,⁶ and it would appear that coordinates given us by Tunisians fall on Tunisian side of line according to Geographer’s calculation that uses islands as base points.

King

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Telegram 212136 to Tunis, August 26, 1976, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760326–0480.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, March 29, 1977, 0935Z

2107. CINCUSNAVEUR, EUCOM pass POLADs. USDOCO-SOUTH pass CINCSOUTH for POLAD. Subject: Prime Minister Views Tunisian-Libyan Confrontation. Ref: Tunis 2049 and Tunis 2050.²

1. Summary: Prime Minister Nouira reviewed with me at length today Tunisian version of its dispute with Libya over delimitation of continental shelf. He charged Italians with bad faith and recounted complete impasse encountered by Foreign Minister Chatti in talk last week with Colonel Qadhafi. He sought U.S. opinion as to wisdom of referral of present dispute to Security Council. End summary.

2. Prime Minister Hedi Nouira took most of one hundred minute meeting afternoon March 28 to review history of Tunisian-Libyan confrontation over continental shelf and exposition of Tunisian policy thereon. He explained that GOT has been trying since 1968 to obtain delimitation of continental shelf precisely in order to avoid potential armed clash now likely to arise due to Qadhafi's intransigence.

3. GOT's basic position, Nouira explained, has never changed. It seeks pro forma delimitation of continental shelf according to accepted principles of international law. Once defined GOT's original and standing offer to exploit oil resources on the continental shelf jointly with Libya still stands. Tunisia today takes the position that dispute should be referred to ICJ which should state principles upon which demarcation should be based. Once delimited, disputed area should be exploited by Tunisia in common with Libya. This only just and equitable, Prime Minister insists. Libyan position has constantly shifted to point where Libya now even refused to apply the universally accepted principles of Geneva Convention with regard to "median lines"

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770107-0094. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Rome, Tripoli, and USUN. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Oslo, Paris, Rabat, the Secretary of Defense, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH Naples.

² In telegram 2049 from Tunis, March 25, Mulcahy wrote: "I learned today that Tunisia plans to have Norwegian drilling contractor operate at site just north of disputed drilling location on Tunisian-Libyan continental shelf. It was made clear to me by Minister of Defense that Tunisian Navy will guard drilling operations and be prepared to fire upon any parties interfering with it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770103-0317) In telegram 2050 from Tunis, March 25, the Embassy provided an unofficial translation of the Tunisian note presented to the Italian Embassy on March 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770103-0321)

between shore points.³ GOT cannot wait until Law of Sea conference obtains general agreement on principles.

4. Prime Minister reviewed history of current confrontation arising from drilling by *Scarabeo IV* as outlined in note submitted March 19 to Italians (Tunis 2049 and 2050) and emphasized Italians' bad faith in this incident. At this juncture I told Prime Minister of brief talk I had had with Italian Ambassador Giuffrida March 25 who insisted that Italian Foreign Ministry had been unaware of intentions of SAIPEM (AGIP–ENI subsidiary) to drill on disputed site. Prime Minister replied "that may or may not be true". Involvement of Italians in this incident, he said, was especially sad since Tunisia had "maintained only friendliest of relations with Italy since last Punic War".

5. Foreign Minister Chatty had visited Tripoli last week carrying moderately worded note for Qadhafi, protesting GOT's desire to settle current dispute in peaceful, non-violent manner, suggesting that matter could be referred for arbitration to group of mutually agreed Arab League members if Libya disliked going to ICJ. He told me Chatty had had two hours alone with Qadhafi and used every possible fraternal and moderate means to persuade Qadhafi to negotiate the dispute peacefully. When Qadhafi remained adamant that he would not negotiate away a single meter of Libyan territory, Chatty stated that Tunisia only wished to have Libya agree to execute the accord reached last year to submit dispute to ICJ.⁴ Qadhafi replied that Libya would apply that accord when Tunisia agreed to apply the Djerba Accord of 1974 (merging the two countries). Chatty then made it clear that Libya leaves Tunisia no alternative but to defend its rights by all means at its disposal. Qadhafi stated strongly (with Nouira then reading from Chatty's cable) that if Tunisia resorts to military methods it would find Libya "stronger than you". Qadhafi also said that *Scarabeo IV* would soon resume drilling and he hoped GOT would not be foolish enough to try to prevent it. He repeated that "the military balance is not in favor of Tunisia". Chatty replied with regret that Tunisia could only rely upon Qadhafi's goodwill or resort to means of self-defense to protect its territory, since Libya refused all offers of arbitration. Qadhafi reiterated his refusal to accept any arbitration. Interview was terminated on this unhappy note.

6. Prime Minister said he had taken pains to ensure that Tunisia's friends were aware of each new development in this unhappy story. He has appreciated understanding attitude U.S. has displayed and

³ The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the limits of territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries.

⁴ In August 1976, Tunisia and Libya agreed to submit the matter of the continental shelf boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice.

generous contribution of time and expertise given by officers of Department to Tunisian representatives who have visited Washington recently. He thought it was now important to note that if Scarabeo IV resumes drilling GOT may well be obliged to resort to force to prevent it. He said he had begun to wonder whether the UN Security Council could be invoked with a view to settling a possible clash. I told him that, while I was far from expert in Security Council procedures, the UN Charter created the Security Council to have jurisdiction in threats to international peace and security and it seemed to me that this would encompass potential threats as well as actual clashes. He asked me if I would obtain the Department's opinion regarding the likelihood of Security Council acceptance of a Tunisian appeal to it for mediation of this dispute. I promised to do so.

7. Nouria stated that Qadhafi's current attitude completely denies GOT the resources of an appeal to the ICJ and obliges it to appeal to international opinion possibly through Security Council. He stated that if Tunisia is proved wrong on subject of boundary it will accept this fact. Tunisia would give up its claims; however, it feels that it should have the right as a peaceful state to have its rights examined peacefully.

8. Prime Minister soliloquized at considerable length over plight peaceful, hard-working Tunisia finds itself in today at [garble] troublesome neighbor, Libya. Tunisia has devoted all its efforts to raising the standard of living of its people and promoting their social development. No Arab nation is more Westernized nor more pro-West than Tunisia. If Qadhafi chose to roll across the border with his hundred [garble] Soviet tanks and scores of MiGs, Tunisia would be defenseless, having nothing but Korean War vintage military equipment and a small army to defend itself. Currently, the Prime Minister said, his government is deeply concerned with the inexplicable Libyan prohibition of movements into and out of Libya by all Arabs. "Why is he doing this?" asked Nouria. I told him I had only seen a report of this move in past few hours and was unable to offer any valid explanation. I could only express the hope that reason would prevail and that Tunisia's persistence in seeking a peaceful solution would prove successful.

9. Comment: While Nouria from time to time referred to a map showing Tunisia's boundary claim and of oil concessions within it, he volunteered no reference to Tunisian intention to commence drilling at site due north of present position of Scarabeo IV. When I asked whether Tunisia planned any early drilling operations in vicinity of Scarabeo IV (not citing my March 25 talk with Defense Minister Farhat) he indicated that the Chatty-Qadhafi conversation had changed nature

of entire confrontation, leaving me with impression such drilling would not soon take place.⁵

10. Action requested: I would appreciate a statement of Department's views on wisdom of GOT's request for Security Council meeting on current dispute suitable for passing to Prime Minister at an early date.⁶

Mulcahy

⁵ In telegram 71629 to Tunis, April 1, Atherton wrote: "Qadhafi's refusal to negotiate and his veiled threat to resort to military force against Tunisia clearly places the onus of fault for deterioration of the situation on Libya, regardless of the merits of the respective boundary lines. I believe Qadhafi's threat should be taken seriously and I want you to know that we are focusing on the problem with a view to determining how the U.S. might be most helpful to Tunisia." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770111–0557)

⁶ In telegram 72492 to Tunis, April 2, the Department wrote: "Since Qadhafi has for the moment rejected ICJ adjudication and has threatened to use force, we believe Tunisians have a legitimate basis to seek Security Council action. U.S. policy is to support right of any UN member to bring to attention of SC any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or endanger the maintenance of international peace, as provided for in Chapter VI of UN Charter. In this case, our initial judgment is that SC debate would help Tunisia by broadening international support for what appears to be a reasonable and restrained attitude and perhaps bring international pressure on Qadhafi to adopt a more conciliatory posture." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114–0385)

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France, Italy, and Tunisia¹

Washington, April 2, 1977, 2237Z

73662. Subject: Tunisian-Libyan Shelf Dispute: Atherton-Hedda Meeting on April 1. CINCUSNAVEUR, EUCOM pass POLADs. USDOC-OSOUTH pass CINCSOUTH for POLAD. Ref: State 71629.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770116–0033. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Oslo, Rabat, Tripoli, USUN, the Secretary of Defense, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH. Drafted by Wilkinson; cleared in draft in EUR and IO; approved by Atherton.

² See footnote 5, Document 4.

1. Summary: After reviewing background on Libyan-Tunisian shelf dispute, Tunisian Ambassador Hedda and Assistant Secretary Atherton discussed ways in which U.S. might help Tunisians in their effort to resolve dispute by peaceful means. Atherton drew on points in guidance sent septel³ and added that we would discuss issue with France and Italy. End summary.

2. Hedda's report on situation paralleled full reports from Embassy Tunis, including Qadhafi's threat to Tunisian FonMin Chatty in Tripoli last week. Hedda added that Chatty had spent this week travelling to capitals to see Fahmi and Fahd and Iraqi Representative, probably Hammadi, returning to Tunis on March 31. Tunisians had repeatedly asked Italians to comply with their earlier promises about withdrawal of drilling rig, and had sought French support as well. Hedda suggested that U.S. might also intercede with France and Italy.

3. Atherton reassured Hedda that we would help in Security Council, if necessary, and suggested that Tunisian UN Mission talk to SYG Waldheim. Hedda took occasion to ask for increased U.S. military assistance, including Redeye. Atherton replied that no assurances on increased military assistance were possible at the moment. In any event, Tunisia appeared more in need of diplomatic support from friends. In this regard, he said we would exchange views with France and Italy.

4. Hedda said this would be helpful particularly in Rome, where Tunis by itself could scarcely compete with Libya, given important Libyan-Italian economic links. Speaking without instructions, he asked the U.S. to give consideration to what further steps could be taken in the event that Qadhafi should continue to push Tunisians toward the wall. He specifically recalled U.S. political/military support in August 1976 (extended Sixth Fleet ship visit, birthday message from President Ford, exchange of intelligence, etc.), and linked support from U.S. and others to Qadhafi's agreement only a few weeks later to submit issue to ICJ.

5. Comment: Neither Hedda nor Atherton was aware at time of meeting of information in report being repeated septel that Italian rig Scarabeo has apparently moved to east out of disputed area. Although this will help to defuse situation, we do not yet know whether Tunisians will wish to continue to press for SC consideration of issue. Mere removal of rig does not resolve Qadhafi's backtracking on August 1976 agreement to submit matter to Hague, nor his threatening demand that operations in Isis field to the north be suspended.

³ See footnote 6, Document 4.

6. For Rome and Paris: We will forward instructions and talking points septel for discussions with FonMins on shelf issue.⁴

Vance

⁴ In telegram 80407 to Rome, Paris, and London, April 10, the Department transmitted the following instructions: "You should inform FonOff that U.S. is concerned about possible threat to the peace as a result of recent Libyan statements re disputed shelf area between Libya and Tunisia. You should state that we are following standard policy of not taking a position on legal merits of a dispute to which we are not parties and advising American drillers to stay out of disputed waters, but we are willing to associate ourselves with Tunisia's efforts to prevent the matter from being settled by force. You should note that Tunisians have been eager to drill an exploratory well in disputed zone for over a year, but are continuing to exercise restraint and avoid provoking Libyans. Libyans, in contrast, have exercised no such restraint." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770124–1218)

6. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 16, 1977, 1245Z

6378. Subj: Fahmy on Libya. Ref: Cairo 6369.²

1. When meeting with Fahmy today, I alluded to current Egyptian-Libyan strains and asked for his latest assessment of Libyan situation.

2. Fahmy claimed Egyptian burning of Libyan Relations Office in Alexandria was in direct retaliation for Libyan action against Egyptian Public Relations Office in Benghazi. He also acknowledged that Libyan diplomatic officials had been forbidden to leave Egypt until Egyptian officials in Libya were allowed to leave. Judging from latest information available to MFA, Libyans are now allowing Egyptian officials to leave. However, relations between Egypt and Libya are tense and likely to remain so. Border, while not formally closed, is tightly controlled.

2. GOE, Fahmy emphasized, has no intention of involving the United States in the Egyptian-Libyan dispute. GOE will take care of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0249. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tripoli.

² Telegram 6369 from Cairo, April 16, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0257.

Qadhafi by itself. It is determined to get rid of Qadhafi and is moving to achieve this. Decision has been made to topple him "in best interests of everyone." GOE will try to get rid of him in any way it can. Whether it is able to do so or not, Fahmy observed, remains to be seen.

3. Noting Cairo press reports that GOE is submitting a letter to the Arab League about Qadhafi, Fahmy stated that he had included in that letter a statement charging Qadhafi with plotting terrorist activities against "certain Embassies in some Arab countries" and that Egypt will at the appropriate time provide details. In this connection, Fahmy stated that he may at some time leak the Libyan threat against me.³

4. I noted that there continues to be sensitivity in Washington about disclosure and urged that he not do so without first consulting US. Fahmy responded that Egyptian security officials have now obtained the whole story from the original source. He reiterated his frequently expressed concern that USG is "soft" on Qadhafi and seems to be trying to protect him. I told him that, as he should know from talks in Washington, the USG is fully alive to the danger Qadhafi represents and is in no way seeking to protect him. As he also knew, we have been skeptical of Qadhafi's overtures and have thus far refused Libya's suggestions to exchange Ambassadors, release C-130's and take various other measures which Libya wants. Our Egyptian friends must recognize, however, that we must handle our relations with Libya in a manner which we consider will best serve US interests.

5. Comment: I fear some of our recent actions vis-a-vis Libya, including the demarche I was instructed to make just before Sadat's departure for the US,⁴ our unwillingness publicly to disclose the Libyan threat against me, has persuaded senior GOE officials to believe that, regardless of what we say, we are in fact seeking to protect Qadhafi. Our protestations to the contrary are greeted with skepticism and even Sadat's talks in Washington have not allayed that concern.⁵ We should not be surprised at this, since Egyptians are by nature suspicious and prone to read into things implications which are in no way intended. So long as this impression persists, however, we may find the Egyptians

³ See Document 86.

⁴ In telegram 5161 from Cairo, March 27, Eilts reported on his meeting with Sadat, during which Sadat declared his intention to discuss with Carter Libya's "subversive" activities in the Middle East and Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052-2156, N770002-0201)

⁵ Sadat was in Washington April 3-6. For the memoranda for conversation of his meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Documents 25-27.

somewhat more closemouthed in telling us about their plans vis-a-vis Qadhafi and Libya.

Eilts

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, April 16, 1977, 2323Z

86313. Subject: Libyan Demarche on Sadat's Intentions.

1. Libyan Charge Gashut delivered following undated, untitled "piece of paper" to NEA/AFN April 14:

2. Begin text:

Quote: The information available to us confirms that Sadat during his visit to Washington² requested permission and arms to make war against the people of the Libyan Jamahiriah.

This became certain after Sadat's return to Egypt and immediately ordered his armed forces and land-to-land missiles to be moved to the Libyan border. He also issued his orders to detain Libyan diplomats and preventing all Libyan nationals from leaving Egypt.

It is certain that when Sadat came to you he did not come for peace but he came for war and this was confirmed to us by our sources.

We want confirmation or denial before we start an international move in this concern. End quote. End text.

3. We are considering how best to reply to Libyan note.

Christopher

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Cairo. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by M.C. King (NEA/AFN); cleared in S/S, NEA/EGY, and NEA/AFN; approved by Veliotis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0533)

² See footnote 5, Document 6.

8. **Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, May 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Ambassador Toura Gaba's Letter Concerning Food Aid Air Transport and Chadian Relations with Libya

Chadian Ambassador Toura Gaba's letter to you of May 16² emphasized two major concerns of his government. He requested one or two aircraft and crew to distribute donated foodstuffs to the drought areas of Chad before the rainy season. He requested some form of security assistance to help Chad cope with Libyan "expansionist designs."

The Chadian Drought

International donors have agreed to contribute 32,400 tons of food to Chad because of this year's recurrence of a severe drought in that nation, over half of which comes from US sources. Of the total aid, less than 5,000 tons have arrived in Chad. A small German airlift is already underway as an interim measure to supply eastern Chad until food arrives by truck. The French are prepared to mount a limited airlift to the northern area of Chad.

The Government of Chad has made several requests over the past six months to us for a food relief airlift. Given the inordinately high cost of previous food airlifts in 1973 and 1974, we have resisted the Chadian approaches. We have told the Chadians that we would only consider an airlift as a way to move food aid after all methods of moving food by conventional transport had been exhausted, or were ineffective. Poor planning by the Government of Chad and the fast approaching rainy season may, however, force us to give serious consideration next month to an airlift or to funding expanded airlifts by other donor nations. Chadian President Malloum recently told our Ambassador he could not understand why "a great country like the U.S." could not meet his request for planes to distribute food relief. Malloum recalls that the politics of famine played a role in the downfall of his predecessor, Tombalbaye.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. Confidential.

² Not found.

Chadian Relations with Libya

In a May 21 meeting with our Ambassador, President Malloum made a strong plea for U.S. military assistance.³ President Malloum is deeply concerned by rebel activity in northern and eastern Chad. In the east, the Chadian army has tried to confront the rebel forces led by Hissene Habre. The most recent operation, in which the Chadians used for the first time Soviet equipment acquired in the wake of our refusal to supply Chad with heavy equipment in 1975 proved a dismal failure. Malloum is also very upset by the fact that Libya has occupied a sizeable strip of territory in northern Chad, and has long supported rebel forces against the Chadian Government. Our Ambassador replied to President Malloum by outlining the Administration's new arms policy, and suggesting that further discussion be deferred until after you had an opportunity to consider Ambassador Toura Gaba's letter.

Recommendation:

That you send the attached letter to Ambassador Toura Gaba.⁴

Peter Tarnoff

Executive Secretary

³ In telegram 1697 from Ndjamena, May 21, Bradford summarized his meeting with Malloum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770181–1319)

⁴ Not attached.

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, May 30, 1977, 1325Z

704. Subj: Continental Shelf Dispute: Libyan Demarche.

1. Libyan Under Sec. FonAffairs Atrash summoned me morning May 30 for presentation Libyan position on continental shelf dispute and to charge that presence U.S. naval unit in area dangerously complicates matter and threatens great power confrontation.

2. Atrash opened by stating that Tunisians were creating a problem over Libyan offshore exploration. The Tunisian media allegations were totally untrue, said Atrash, since exploration had been underway for some time in an area of the continental shelf which comes under Libyan sovereignty according to accepted principles of international law. Tunisian decision to make an issue of Libyan exploration in this area was probably due to encouragement from "other sources".

3. Libyan Government was very surprised to learn of presence U.S. naval unit in Gabes. Presence this ship, Atrash charged, has encouraged Tunisians to act aggressively towards Libya. U.S. involvement in this way will further aggravate dispute. He asked that I inform USG that Libyan Government takes U.S. naval presence in disputed area very seriously and requests that U.S. ship be withdrawn for "safety all parties concerned". Atrash said that if situation deteriorates further, and if Tunisians attack, Libya will be forced to "fight back in self defense." Should U.S. naval unit take any action on behalf Tunisia, "it might be subject to our attack as well."

4. Atrash said dispute is between two neighboring Arab countries and presence foreign naval units in disputed area dangerously complicates situation. Libya for its part might be forced to invite naval unit from a "friendly country" which would surely escalate the situation into a "direct encounter in the disputed area." (Comment: Atrash clearly means that the Soviets might be invited, leading to a US-Soviet confrontation).

5. Atrash said Libya wants to solve problem peacefully, and is willing to hold discussions with Tunisia. Secretary Fon Affairs Turayki had hoped to go to Tunis Saturday,² but "Tunisians had made it impos-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770192-0874. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Algiers, London, Moscow, Paris, and Rome. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Valletta, USUN, CINCUSNAV-EUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM, the Secretary of Defense, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² June 4.

sible for him to leave Tripoli.” Libya hopes wisdom will prevail, but Tunisian propaganda and “unfriendly attitude” makes negotiated solution difficult.

6. I told Atrash that his presentation would be forwarded immediately. I also said that U.S. policy is to avoid taking a position on legal merits of shelf or other boundary disputes to which we not a party and to advise U.S. drilling companies to stay out of disputed waters. This is longstanding policy and is applied generally in other disputed areas as well. Our hope is for peaceful settlement, and we are concerned over safety and welfare U.S. citizens on drilling rig which contracted by Libyan NOC and Reading & Bates contrary USG advice to U.S. company. We hoped Libya would take no precipitate action which would imperil our citizens or make peaceful resolution more difficult. As for naval unit, U.S. 6th Fleet ships call routinely at Tunisian and other ports in Med., and these visits are usually scheduled several months in advance.

7. When I asked for clarification of his remarks that U.S. ship might be subject to Libyan attack, Atrash said that he did not mean to imply a Libyan threat to U.S. naval units. He meant only that Libya would have to respond if attacked, and that Libya is concerned that U.S. naval units might take “some action” on behalf Tunisia. In response my query whether Libya would agree outside arbitration of dispute Atrash evasively said that Tunisians had turned down several Libyan suggestions for solution.

8. Request info on U.S. naval activity Tunisia/disputed area, and Dept guidance for our further discussions with Libyans.³

Bergstrom

³ In telegram 125155 to Tripoli and Tunis, May 31, the Department wrote: “Your initial answer to Atrash was right on target. You should reiterate points in para 6 reftel on instructed basis. You should add that the USG is in process of trying to persuade U.S. firm to withdraw its drilling ship, so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement of dispute.” Regarding U.S. Navy activity in the area: “You should also advise FonMin that there have been no U.S. ships in vicinity of J.W. Bates since its deployment to Gulf of Gabes. As for calls by Sixth Fleet units in Tunisian ports, these are scheduled frequently on a routine basis, as you stated, and have no connection with the Tunisian-Libyan shelf dispute.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770193–1042)

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Tunisia and the United Kingdom¹

Washington, June 9, 1977, 2005Z

133570. London for Kinsolving. Subject: Tunisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Dispute. Ref: Tunis 4052, London 9435.²

1. Now that we have official confirmation that GOT has changed its position and entered into real negotiations with the Libyans despite presence of American-owned rig in disputed zone, we believe it important to give Reading and Bates President Thornton a new official communication from the USG which reflects the changed situation.

2. For London: Please deliver following message from Deputy Assistant Secretary Veliotis to Charles Thornton ASAP. You should type message in letter form on official stationery—should Thornton desire signed original, this can be sent to his Tulsa office.

3. "Mr. Charles E. Thornton, President, Reading and Bates, c/o London Hilton. Dear Mr. Thornton: I refer to the letter, dated June 3, you received from Under Secretary Habib³ and our several subsequent telephone conversations. The Department of State has now received official confirmation that the Government of Tunisia has changed its

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77-6/78. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Tripoli. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Veliotis; cleared in L/NEA; approved by Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770206-0559)

² In telegram 4052 from Tunis, June 8, Mulcahy reported on Chatty's assessment of the Tunisian-Libyan negotiations mediated by Arab League Secretary General Mahmoud Riad: "He stated that they had already achieved almost complete agreement on the text of a 'compromis' for submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In this text only one point remained to be worked out to Tunisia's satisfaction: While agreement had been achieved between the two parties that no exploitation rpt exploitation would proceed during arbitration process, GOT had not yet won its point that there should also be no exploration rpt exploration during arbitration. He was hopeful that in resumed session with Riadh and Turayki this evening this point could also be agreed upon." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77-6/78) In telegram 9435 from London, June 9, the Embassy reported that Charles Thornton "told EmbOff Muntasser had just phoned him from the Office of the Counselor of the Libyan Embassy to say that latter had received a telegram from Tripoli reporting that Libyan-Tunisian meeting is still in progress with favorable outlook and reiterating that Tunisians have agreed to drilling operations proceeding." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205-1067)

³ Telegram 128987 to London, June 3, transmitted the text of the letter to Thornton, in which Habib wrote: "The Tunisian Government will not repeat not agree to discuss any kind of compromise with the Libyan Government as long as your rig is present in the disputed zone," and recommended Thornton completely remove the rig. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77-6/78)

position with respect to its previous policy of insisting that your rig depart the disputed zone before the Tunisian Government would enter into negotiations with the Libyan Government looking to a negotiated settlement of this matter. The Tunisian Government has also officially confirmed that it has extended the “deadline” as concerns the presence and continued drilling of your rig from 10 to 15 days. Given the fact that official negotiations are actually underway and that both governments are reportedly working to find an acceptable compromise, it is clear that the situation has been, to a large extent, defused. Therefore, the circumstances described in Mr. Habib’s letter do not obtain at the present time and, in our judgment, there is at least no immediate danger to the ship and the American citizens on board.

4. “We cannot, of course, predict the course the present negotiations may follow nor the final outcome of these negotiations. It might be prudent for you and your colleagues, along with the Libyan officials, to plan to stay in London until the weekend. We understand, in this respect, that the current round of negotiations are reasonably expected to be concluded by then.

5. “Should circumstances require that we communicate with you after this weekend, we will be in touch through your Tulsa office. With best wishes, Sincerely, Nicholas A. Veliotis, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs”

6. For Kinsolving: In conveying letter, you should tell Thornton orally that the letter does not constitute a USG “endorsement” of the presence of his ship in the disputed area. Since there is as yet no agreement between the parties, we must abide by the policy in Veliotis’ letter of April to Mr. Kent—i.e. our official position is still one of discouraging American rigs from entering into disputed zones.⁴ We are not, however, pressing him for an immediate withdrawal because of the changed circumstances, and the possibility that their continued drilling may be agreed by the parties. You should also tell Thornton that we have kept Senator Bartlett’s office up-to-date.

7. Tunis for Ambassador: You should see Chatty as soon as possible and tell him of action we are taking with Thornton. You should express our hope that current negotiations will result in agreement. You should note that we expect Libyans and Americans to depart London by the weekend at the latest.

8. You should also raise with Chatty question of extension to “15” days re presence of American-owned rig. Tunisians should bear in mind that, should current negotiations fail and GOT again presses for

⁴ The text of Veliotis’s April 29 letter was transmitted in telegram 98421 to Tunis, April 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770152–0722)

withdrawal of rig, it highly unlikely USG will be able to play previous role. FYI You should know that GOT failure to inform us until June 8—and at our explicit request—of decision made on June 4 to change Tunisian position re presence of rig and negotiations, with full knowledge Habib letter, has not enhanced our confidence that GOT has always been candid with us on this whole matter. We do not want to make an issue out of this, but you might find an appropriate occasion to get this point across.⁵ End FYI.

Vance

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph in the right-hand margin.

11. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, June 10, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the continental shelf dispute.]

5. *Tunisia/Libya*: Tunisian Ambassador Hedda has just informed the Department that the Tunisian and Libyan governments today have signed an agreement to submit the continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice.² Ambassador Hedda also conveyed the gratitude of his government for the sympathetic support of the USG which was, in his words, indispensable in bringing about this first but essential step towards a negotiated and peaceful solution of this matter. Ambassador Hedda alluded to a secret agreement between the two governments which would allow the American-owned drilling rig to continue working for an unspecified period of time. According to Charles Thornton, the President of the American company involved, the Libyan authorities have told him that his drilling rig would be able to finish its current work. We are hopeful that the agreement will

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Carter wrote "C" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

stick. In any event, the immediate crisis has ended with all concerned apparently satisfied.

12. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

[*cable number not declassified*]

Washington, June 17, 1977

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77–6/78. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. 5 pages not declassified.]

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, June 21, 1977, 1320Z

4343. Dept please pass to CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM & SecDef. Subject: Repercussions of Continental Shelf Crisis on Tunisian Government.

1. Now that the dust has settled from crisis with Libya over continental shelf, it is becoming clear extent to which political establishment here has been shaken by these events. Reasons for GOT's sudden shift from position of no compromise on issue of American drilling rig to one of accommodation with Qadhafi also now clearer. Tunisia may have been quite close to use of force against rig and incursion into Libya. President Bourguiba's abrupt reversal of this plan may have saved the day but may also have so damaged Prime Minister Nour's prestige that his survival in that position may be in jeopardy.

2. We now have what appear to be two reliable [*less than 1 line not declassified*]² on what went on behind the scenes in GOT when crisis was at its most acute. [*10 lines not declassified*] morale within Tunisian

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77–6/78. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tripoli, and Valletta. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Not found.

armed forces has been shaken by these events as well as confidence in military leadership here.

3. In addition to these reports, we have also had conversations in last several days in which well-placed Tunisians have described same events as extremely damaging to Nourira. One of Tunisia's most influential and cleverest lawyers told Ambassador that Prime Minister Nourira is as good as finished as result of continental shelf crisis (lawyer is, however, confidant of Wassila Bourguiba).³ He made open attack on Prime Minister whom he accused of financial mismanagement and corruption. He said that Nourira's tax measures had led to taxpayers revolt (and alleged basis for current liquidity problem), and that if he persisted GOT revenues may dry up. He also said, interestingly, that Bourguiba had not only been prepared to allow human rights meeting to proceed (Tunis 4113)⁴ but had prepared message of greeting for meeting. He was convinced by Nourira and Mohamed Sayah not to allow meeting only a few hours before it was to take place. Lawyer made strong pitch for now bringing "liberals" in government.

4. In separate conversation senior Foreign Ministry official told DCM that serious consequences [garble] continental shelf crisis were avoided only by Bourguiba's wise decision to avoid confrontation with Qadhafi. However, events had revealed a serious failure of political leadership on part of Prime Minister Nourira and other senior party officials. Describing June 6 Political Bureau meeting at which it was confirmed that negotiations would be resumed with Libya (Tunis 3988),⁵ he said Bourguiba opened meeting by waving before members of Bureau telegram from disgraced former Foreign Minister Masmoudi counseling compromise. Bourguiba said it was a sorry state of affairs when best advice available to him came from a man he had been obliged to dismiss. Bourguiba then turned angrily on Prime Minister Nourira and said "as for you, you know neither how to make war nor how to make peace." President announced he was taking matter into his own hands and that there would be no confrontation. Following meeting, Nourira offered to resign but his offer was rather contemptuously brushed aside by President. Foreign Ministry official said best solution now was for GOT to readmit disaffected political figures like Ahmed Nestiri to positions of power in government, and this is what King Hassan of Morocco had advised Bourguiba to do.

³ President Bourguiba's wife.

⁴ Telegram 4113 from Tunis, June 10, reporting on the government's blocking of the Conference on Public Liberties, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207-1198.

⁵ Telegram 3988 from Tunis, June 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770202-0806.

5. Comment: It is quite unusual for anyone in an official position or in the public eye here to speak in such a manner about government leadership. It would seem probable that they dare to do so now only because they believe Nouri is indeed seriously if not fatally weakened. If above reports are accurate, they go a long way to explain sudden change of course by GOT at height of crisis. They also give us sobering idea of the degree to which Qadhafi can cause disruption in Tunisia at little cost to himself. Consequences of chain of events beginning with positioning of Italian drilling rig Scarabeo IV in waters claimed by Tunisia are apparently far from over. Among most disquieting results is not only damage to political leadership but effect on morale in Tunisian armed forces. Happily, Bourguiba is still in good enough shape to make decision that avoided unpredictable confrontation with Libya; but as Foreign Ministry official noted to us, it is disquieting for Tunisia that in a moment of crisis an old sick man must take over policy personally.

Mulcahy

14. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, July 1, 1977, 1331Z

11017. Subject: President Sadat Oral Message to President Carter re Chad and Niger.

Summary: Sadat wants President Carter to know of urgent message received from Chadian President Malloum re Qadhafi-supported rebel threat. Rebels apparently moving on Fort Lamy. Joint Egyptian/Sudanese military mission sent to Chad to assess situation and make recommendations on military assistance. Chadian rebels had also attacked Genayna, an important religious town in Western Sudan, which suggests to Sadat that they hold at least half of Chad. Sadat impatient with Numayri who seems to be “sleeping on his ear.” Niger President also advised Sadat of Qadhafi threat and asked for military assistance. Sadat intends to provide both Chad and Niger with military aid, including perhaps some “commandos” to Chad. He sees these activities as

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2088. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

part of Soviet threat to moderate regimes in Africa, ultimately aimed at getting rid of Numayri and him. He asks President Carter for:

(A) Small arms and vehicular equipment (amounts unspecified) for use in helping Chad and Niger;

(B) USG assistance in preventing Israelis from exploiting his current pre-occupation with Africa by mounting some kind of military action against Arab state. End summary.

1. Sadat asked me to meet with him last evening. He had just arrived from Alexandria and was preparing for his departure today for OAU Summit in Libreville. He wished following to be conveyed to President Carter in furtherance of his dialogue with US on Africa.

2. Five days earlier he had received an urgent message from B/G Felix Malloum, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Chad. Malloum had at same time sent a message to Numayri. Malloum's two messages noted that Chadian "guerrillas," supported by Qadhafi, had occupied the northern part of Chad during the regime of former President Tombalbaye. (According to Sadat, Qadhafi had earlier told him that the northern Chad region had been bought from Tombalbaye for two million dollars, which the former Chadian President had put into a Swiss bank.) The armed guerrillas, according to Malloum, are pressing southward toward Fort Lamy (Sadat at no time used "N'djamena"). Malloum had asked for Egyptian assistance to meet the threat. Sadat said he views this development as part of the Soviet game plan in Africa. They are using Qadhafi against Chad and the Sudan, just as they are using Ethiopia against the Sudan. He has been on the verge of asking Gamasy to go to the Sudan and recommend to Numayri that Egypt and Sudan take some joint initiative to assist Chad. However, "my friends in the Sudan—they are lazy."

3. He had then read of a raid on the Sudanese town of Genayna, just west of the Sudanese/Chad border. This had taken place five days earlier. Genayna, Sadat explained, is an important religious center in central and east Africa. It was from this town that Islam entered Africa through the Senusi movement. Numayri, the "idiot," had sent him nothing about the attack on Genayna, although four Sudanese soldiers had been killed. The attack had been made, not by Malloum's forces, but by Chadian rebels armed by Qadhafi. Qadhafi's purpose, Sadat noted, is identical to the Soviet objective: to get Numayri and then Sadat.

4. Before sending Gamasy, he had finally gotten a message from Numayri referring to Malloum's message and asking what Sadat thought ought to be done. Sadat had replied that GOE is sending a military delegation, first to the Sudan and then to Chad, and that it should be a joint Sudanese/Egyptian military delegation. Purpose would be to assess the situation and to assure Malloum that Egypt and Sudan are with him whatever the consequences. Sadat is still

awaiting report from his mission, but he expressed annoyance that it had taken the Sudanese two days before they were ready to join the Egyptian component. He understood that the Chadian rebels are apparently approaching Fort Lamy.

5. Sadat then produced a map in order to point out Genayna's position just inside the Sudanese border. The Chadian rebels had had to cross virtually all of Chad to get to the Western Sudan. This suggested to him that more than half of Chad might be under rebel control. All this was happening while the Sudanese are "sleeping on their ears." The situation was "fantastic," especially since he understood that the Chadian rebel movement has no more than 3,000 guerrillas. Some action is necessary to help President Malloum against the rebels. He was still awaiting joint military delegation's report before deciding what to do.

6. Sadat then pointed on map to Niger, whose President had two days earlier instructed Niger Ambassador to inform Sadat of his concern about Qadhafi. The President of Niger had asked Sadat to assist him with arms. Sadat said he had promised to provide arms (but no soldiers) and that both Chad and Niger could depend on Egypt and the Sudan. He would use his Antonovs to send arms. Here Sadat noted that Algeria has also taken a threatening position towards Niger.

7. Sadat continued that GOE now has responsibilities in both Chad and Niger. He had given his word and, whatever the cost, he would fight his battle. Chad and Niger leaders relying on his word. He wished President Carter "to be in the picture" and recalled that he had previously asked for arms for African "brushfires" which he might have to extinguish.

8. Sadat said he wanted two things from President Carter:

(A) Some small arms and efficient cars for use in these African areas (numbers not specified). Semi-track would be best, but jeeps would be all right. If we are not willing to send American arms, he understood that CIA has large quantities of Soviet arms. Perhaps these could be sent.

(B) In view of his pre-occupation with Africa, he was concerned that Begin—and especially, Weizman, as Minister of Defense—might undertake some pre-emptive strike against the Arabs. He asked President Carter to keep the Israelis from seeking to exploit the situation, through any kind of military action while he is busy in Africa.

9. Although this was the gist of his message, Sadat repeated his points several times, stressing his conviction that the Soviets are behind Qadhafi. He recalled Golda Meir's description of Qadhafi as a "monkey with a checkbook." Whatever the situation in Chad requires, he would assist. While he could not send troops, he might send some commandos

if necessary. It will depend upon what his military mission recommends. The Sudan, Sadat noted, might be able to send troops.

10. Sadat also noted Malloum is bringing his case against Qadhafi before OAU meeting.

Eilts

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Chad to the Department of State¹

Ndjamena, July 6, 1977, 2000Z

2261. Subj: President Malloum Suggests Travel to US to Present Chadian Case for Armaments Directly to President Carter.

1. Vice President Djime called me to his office this evening, and requested my advice on how to go about making arrangements for President Malloum to go to Washington immediately and present Chad's request for assistance personally to President Carter. He stressed that arms were pouring into northern Chad from Libya and situation is becoming desperate. For first time he stated categorically that he believed Soviets were behind present Libyan push. I assured Vice President that President Carter was already aware of the situation in Chad. I explained the many problems concerned with such a visit, but said that I wanted to sleep on the problem and I would call him in the morning.

2. Realize the short notice and complicated subject matter of such a visit make it extremely difficult. However, if we are going to grant Chad any assistance believe we could profit from the visit as a visible sign of our interest in helping moderate African states defend their territorial integrity against outside aggression. If we are not going to grant any assistance it is better for me to say "no" here rather than have it said in Washington.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084-2289. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

3. Please advise as to what line I should take with Vice President in morning.²

Bradford

² In telegram 157286 to Ndjamena, July 7, the Department replied that the short notice made a meeting with Carter or any other specific official unlikely: "We fully recognize the urgency of Chadian needs. Our ability to respond is limited by the following constraints. First, providing equipment as a grant is impossible without a prior Presidential Determination that it is important to the security interests of the US and the prior appropriation of funds by the Congress. Given the prevailing attitude in the administration and the Congress towards the provision of military equipment particularly under new programs, neither is likely even if speed were not important. Second, government to government sale of military items requires a finding of eligibility (i.e. that it is important to the security interests of the US), Presidential Determination, and notification to the Congress." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2617)

16. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

IN 332817

Washington, July 7, 1977

COUNTRY

Egypt/Libya

DOI

[1 line not declassified]

SUBJECT

Updated Egyptian Planning Against Libyan Leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[2 lines not declassified]

To State: No distribution except to Mr. Harold Saunders

To NSA: Exclusive for Vice Admiral Inman

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals—[handling restriction not declassified].

To DIA: Exclusive for Lt. General Wilson

1. In about January 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat gave orders that Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi was to be removed, by covert political action if possible, but if political action was impossible, by overt military operation. No time limit was set, but it was clear Sadat wanted action sooner rather than later. Since the initial effort was to be political action via an indigenous coup d'état Egyptian General Intelligence (GI) was assigned primary responsibility. About April 1977, in the absence of a coup d'état, Sadat ordered that plans be made for a military incursion in which an armored brigade would drive across northeastern Libya to Benghazi. On the basis of intelligence information given him by GI, Sadat was persuaded that the Egyptian incursion would be welcomed enthusiastically by the Libyan masses, provoking them to rise against Qadhafi and bringing about a change of regime. In the meantime, GI was to continue its search for a coup group and Egyptian Military Intelligence (MI) was to alert sabotage nets already in place in Libya.

2. In early June 1977, Sadat began pressuring Minister of War General Muhammad 'abd al-Ghani al-Jamasi to hasten the planning and preparation for the brigade incursion, because of Sadat's growing conviction that the military option was the only recourse for bringing down Qadhafi. Jamasi and senior MI officers were reluctant to mount such an incursion, however, because intelligence collected by MI did not support GI's assessment of widespread Libyan popular dissatisfaction or readiness to rise against Qadhafi. To the contrary, MI's assessment was that the Egyptian brigade would not be able to reach Benghazi in force, although commando units would, and thus could not take the city. MI believed that the Libyan masses would rally behind Qadhafi to repel or halt the Egyptian invader. Thus, the Egyptians would be left with two options: to withdraw in humiliation back to Egypt; or to occupy what territory they could control in northeast Libya. In the latter case, Egypt would only succeed in uniting the Libyan population behind Qadhafi as never before, and would probably also end Qadhafi's isolation from his Arab colleagues. MI intelligence indicated that while opposition to Qadhafi did in fact exist in Libya, it was passive and unorganized, and practically certain to stand with Qadhafi against any "liberating" force from Egypt. Through Jamasi, MI recommended that Sadat again shelve the military option and that MI be given permission to launch widespread and continuing sabotage throughout Libya. This course, according to MI, would destabilize Qadhafi and open the way for an indigenous move against him which the Egyptians could actively support.

3. By late June 1977, Sadat was ninety per cent convinced of the military option and gave orders that preparations for a military incur-

sion were to proceed. Coincidentally, MI was receiving confirmed intelligence that Libya was reinforcing its eastern defenses and that Soviet and Cuban military advisors were assisting this effort. Moreover, MI believed that while the USSR would not commit Soviet forces to defend Libya against Egypt, Soviet signal ships anchored in the Gulf of Sallum would be used to jam and distort Egyptian military communications.

4. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Jamasi was scheduled to meet with the heads of MI and GI for an objective review of Egyptian capabilities for bringing down Qadhafi. If this review does not develop a viable political action alternative, it is possible that the brigade size military incursion will be launched before the beginning of the month of Ramadan, about 15 August.²

5. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Dissem: *[2 lines not declassified]*.

² An unknown hand underlined this sentence. In an August 16 memorandum to Aaron, Quandt noted that Sadat had asked for three things: "Any intelligence we might have on the presence of the 700 km range ground-to-ground Scaleboard missile in Libya; general intelligence coordination on Libya; and, 'watch the Soviets.'" Quandt recommended that Brzezinski act on the Scaleboard request. Aaron wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Find out from CIA—have them lay on extra photography if necessary." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78)

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 14, 1977, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Chad Military Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

CHAD

Vice President Mamari DJIME N'Gakinar

Pierre TOURA GABA, Ambassador of Chad

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Smith on July 15; cleared by Moose. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

U.S.

The Secretary

Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary, AF

William G. Bradford, Ambassador to Chad

Thomas W.M. Smith, Director, AF/W

Alec G. Toumayan, Interpreter

The Secretary began with a brief welcome.

The Vice President replied by acknowledging the Secretary's welcome. He said he had come to Washington on very short notice, and greatly appreciated the opportunity to call on the Secretary and later the Vice President, despite their busy schedules. He said he had come because the security of the Chadian state and Chad's territorial integrity were threatened. He said the US plays an important role in the world and that the US is virtually Chad's only hope for assistance. "However", he said, "Chad knows it can count on the US".

The Secretary replied that he had been following events in Chad closely, and that President Sadat had drawn our attention to the urgency of Chad's needs. The Secretary asked the Vice President to outline the situation in Chad so that he could evaluate the situation in light of the Vice President's statement.

The Vice President said that Chad was the object of imperialist aggression designed to destroy the country. Under the previous Chadian administration, Libya had occupied Aouzou. For the past ten years there had been a rebellion in the area. The Vice President said the objective of President Malloum's administration was to achieve reconciliation with the rebels. The policy has had some success, but many rebels have reacted by waiting to see what the results of the policy would be before laying down their arms.

The Vice President continued that some of the Toubou rebels do not wish to be reconciled to the Chadian Government because they are under the influence of Libyan President Quadhafi. Quadhafi controls Goukouni, the present leader of the rebels in the Tibesti. The Vice President said that Quadhafi is under Soviet control, and is also inspired by the old Senussi idea of expansion, but chiefly, said the Vice President, it is the Soviet Union that is pushing Quadhafi and supplying arms for the rebels. Because Chad is pro-west, the Soviets are attempting to penetrate Chad, a move which would be followed by the penetration of other countries.

The Vice President said Quadhafi's first step had been to send food to the border area and to create employment. The tactic had been successful and many Toubou had joined FROLINAT, the rebel party, in order to get work. Quadhafi is now exploiting his influence in the area, and is defeating the Chadian Government's efforts to achieve reconciliation.

Turning to the military situation, the Vice President said that on June 20 Ounianga Kebir had been attacked. The attackers had artillery, bazookas, and mortars. Although the Chadian garrison was surrounded, a relief column from the south managed to break through. Some rebels were killed and Soviet arms with Libyan markings were captured.

The Vice President said that on June 22–23 Bardai and Zouar were attacked. Zouar beat off the attackers, but Bardai was surrounded and, because the rebels held the heights around the town, was eventually forced to surrender. The Chadian Army lost 350 men with their equipment, a serious loss. Chad was obliged to evacuate Zouar and to regroup at Largeau and Ounianga Kebir. Now, said the Vice President, with your help we may hope to regain the offensive.

The Secretary asked how many men the Chadian Government had in the area. The Vice President replied by describing the strengths of some of the garrisons and concluded that the total Chadian force in the area was between 1100 to 1500 men.

The Secretary asked what the Chadian Army required. The Vice President replied that aircraft and armor were essential.

Mr. Moose asked if the Libyans had used armor or air in the attack on Chadian forces. The Vice President replied that Libyan planes landed at central airports to deliver supplies. He said Libyan ground troops are heavily armed and the Chadian support aircraft have been fired upon. However, the Chadians have not been attacked from the air. The Vice President said the rebels have armor. Quadhafi is said to have given them six tanks, although these have not been seen.

The Vice President said that if Chad had sufficient aircraft Bardai would not have fallen. He again made a plea for assistance and then gave the Secretary a paper outlining Chadian requirements. (A translation of the paper is attached.) The Secretary asked for and received an explanation of some of the details of the Chadian request.

The Secretary asked if it were true that the government controlled the south and the rebels controlled the Tibesti. The Vice President replied that the government controlled certain centers in the north, but that the rebels were active outside these settlements.

The Secretary asked what commitments had been made by other countries. The Vice President replied that Egypt and Sudan had offered political support by seeking to encourage a reconciliation between the Chadian Government and Habre, a rebel leader formerly closely allied with Goukouni, now active in eastern Chad. Neither country had provided much material yet, although Egypt had offered small arms. In response to the Secretary's question, the Vice President said Egypt had declined to provide aircraft because the Egyptians have their own

problems. The Vice President said that France has provided AD-4s, but these are old planes and are nearly worn out. France provided pilots for these planes. France has sent several Transalls, which were used to evacuate Zouar. Gabon has loaned Chad two AD-4's.

In response to the Secretary's question, the Vice President said Chad does not have pilots and the AD-4's have civilian French pilots. The Vice President requested armament for spotter planes bought in Switzerland and for armor to protect convoys on the road.

The Secretary noted that the Vice President would see Vice President Mondale the following day.² He continued that he wished to study the Chadian request carefully and that we would be in touch with the Chadian Government. The Secretary said he could not make promises, but that he would examine the request sympathetically.

The Vice President said that Morocco had sent three experts to N'Djamena but the results of their trip are not yet known.

The Secretary asked Mr. Moose if there were any other countries to which we have provided equipment which might be transferred to Chad. Mr. Moose agreed to look into it.

The Vice President said that he had a personal letter from President Molloum for President Carter but that in view of the fact that the President was too busy to see him, he wished to give it to the Secretary for delivery to the President. The Secretary replied that he would see the President at breakfast the following day and would deliver the letter to him at that time. The Secretary said the President would reply at a later date.³

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chadian Government⁴

N'Djamena, July 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Needs Expressed by Chad to the United States

Owing to the generalized rebel offensive at Bet, flagrantly abetted by Libya, the Supreme Military Council transmits the following request for assistance:

² See footnote 2, Document 18.

³ See Document 21.

⁴ Confidential. Printed from an official translation.

10,000 individual combat rations.

18. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Urgent Military Assistance to Chad

Chadian Vice President Djime is in Washington on very short notice to make a personal request for military assistance. He saw the Secretary of State today at 3:00 p.m., who conveyed our sympathy and promised to carefully consider his request. No commitment was made. He is scheduled to see Vice President Mondale tomorrow, July 15, at 2:00 p.m.

Chad is fighting two insurgencies which are supported by Libya, who most probably hopes to establish permanent control over northern Chad. Libya has occupied a disputed strip in northwest Chad since 1973. Thanks to Libyan support, the situation in northern Chad has now seriously deteriorated.

Chad has requested combat and transport aircraft, with crews, equipment to outfit 1500 reserve infantrymen, combat rations and fuel. They have been informed that the USG will not provide personnel.

France is providing technical assistance and spare parts; Egypt and the Sudan have sent military missions to study Chad's needs; Morocco has expressed sympathy but made no commitments. President Sadat sees the situation as Libyan/Soviet expansionism which may well be aimed at him and the Sudan. He requested urgently that you receive Djime. We have informed him that the Vice President will do so.

The rebellion does not yet directly affect the survival of the government; if insurgent successes continue unchecked it will soon do so.

I believe it is in our interest to provide at least some military assistance to Chad in this situation. State has divided on the issue and effectively expressed no opinion.

Arguments against doing so include the fact that Chad's northern territory is probably already lost, other governments are assisting, and it would perhaps be undesirable to inaugurate a new US military supply commitment.

But the stronger arguments, in my opinion, lie on the side of giving minor assistance. Chad has been a friend of the USG; it has a good human rights record; there is here a direct threat to its territorial integ-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Pres approved in discussion."

rity; our assistance would be consistent with our emerging policy of aiding moderate African states. Further, to give limited military aid would preserve some USG influence and credibility on an evolving range of problems in the Western Sahara, and preserve our influence in the Chadian government. It would help contain Libyan expansionism in the area and in that light be viewed favorably by Egypt and probably Morocco and the Sudan. As in Zaire, indigenous rebels backed by a neighboring country have attempted to acquire effective control over territory. This situation is more blatant in that Libya not only openly supports the rebels but has militarily occupied Chadian territory. Other than the Soviet Union being Libya's largest arms supplier, we have no evidence of Soviet involvement in this situation.

It would enhance the above interests if Vice President Mondale could send Djime back to Chad with at least a conditional commitment by the USG conveyed in his meeting tomorrow.²

If you agree it is desirable to give limited military assistance to Chad, the following are possible:³

1. *We could immediately note to the Chadians our readiness to license the export of equipment purchased from commercial sources.* However, Chad almost certainly cannot afford such equipment at commercial prices, and therefore this action would probably be regarded by them as an empty gesture.

2. *We could provide them with military equipment of US origin by a third country transfer, perhaps from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or possibly Morocco.* This requires a determination by the Secretary of State that it will strengthen the United States and promote world peace, and 30 days prior notification to Congress. It is a public determination. Egypt and Senator Javits have expressed interest in such an arrangement.

3. *Chad could be made eligible for Foreign Military Sales.* This is perhaps the quickest way to provide assistance. You must publicly determine that such sales would contribute to the national security of the United States. For sales exceeding \$7 million, Congress must be consulted 30 days in advance. State is inclined against making Chad eligible, arguing that this would be the first determination of FMS eligibility of the present Administration and would strain the credibility of our arms

² In telegram 166506 to Ndjamen, July 16, the Department summarized Mondale's July 15 meeting with Djime. "Vice President Mondale said matter had been discussed at President's weekly breakfast meeting this morning. President had stated we believed in the territorial integrity of Chad and of every other nation, and we will help in restoring Chad's. Vice President Mondale said we were studying ways to proceed toward this end and hoped to give Chadians a fuller response soon through Ambassador Bradford." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770254-0187) See Document 19.

³ There is no indication or approval or disapproval of any of the options, but see footnote 1 above.

transfer policy. In favor of such a determination is the fact that it would enable us to transfer both lethal and nonlethal equipment on credit terms. Also, over seventy countries, including Mauritania, are now on the FMS list. One difference between the Zaire and the Chadian situations is that we already had a substantial FMS program underway in Zaire and were able to reprogram available funds to meet the Zairian request.

4. We could expand existing economic aid to Chad if it could be made relevant.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, July 15, 1977

SUBJECT

Military Assistance to Chad

As per the discussion with the President at breakfast today, the President desires that:

1. A multilateral meeting be held, at the level determined by you, between France, Morocco, Egypt, and the United States regarding assistance to Chad;²

2. Non-lethal assistance (such as C rations, tents, and other items) be provided to Chad;³

3. Small arms transfer from third countries to Chad be authorized (for example, from Morocco or Egypt).

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. Secret.

² See Document 22.

³ At the end of this item, Brzezinski wrote: "perhaps also some vehicles."

20. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 19, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Egypt and Libya.]

2. *Egypt-Libya Border Fighting*: A series of sharp, though limited, Libyan attacks launched over the past 24 hours against several Egyptian border outposts mark a significant escalation of the continuing low-level dispute between the two countries. The Libyans apparently surprised the Egyptian forces and the latter, who have responded with tactical air strikes, appear to be having difficulty in organizing the defense of their outposts. The outcome of the fighting is so far unclear, however.

We believe Qadhafi ordered the Libyan attacks as a show of force to prove Libyan strength and preparedness and to force the Egyptians off balance.

Egypt will at a minimum counter the Libyan provocation with similar raids against Libyan border positions. We do not believe Sadat will immediately implement his long-considered military incursion into Eastern Libya, mainly because Egyptian preparations are apparently not yet complete.

Recent reports indicated that Sadat has become increasingly persuaded that the military option (an incursion into Eastern Libya by one or more brigades, or perhaps a land and airborne raid against Tobruk) is the only one which has a chance for success. Therefore, we cannot rule out a major Egyptian-initiated escalation of the border fighting in the near future (one to four weeks), particularly if the intensity of the military incidents does not abate. In the next day or so we should be able to judge whether either side will try to escalate the fighting.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Egypt and Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² In a July 20 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "The Egyptian military command apparently favors coordinated air and armor attacks against Libyan units and outposts along the border in retaliation for Libya's July 19 attacks. President Sadat, however, wishes to deal Qadhafi a major psychological blow and he has ordered rapid preparations for a more daring airborne commando raid against the Libyan port of Tobruk. Which course will be decided upon is not yet clear, but some form of Egyptian military action is virtually certain." (Ibid.)

21. Letter From President Carter to Chadian President Malloum¹

Washington, August 1, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

The Secretary of State has given me your letter, which Vice President Mamari Djime Ngakinar delivered during his visit to the United States.² I am grateful for your good wishes.

Vice President Djime's explanations of the situation in Chad were most valuable and helped us better understand the problems you face. Secretary of State Vance and Vice President Mondale have briefed me fully on their conversations with Vice President Djime. At my request, they are now investigating various methods by which we can help Chad. As soon as we complete our review, Ambassador Bradford will tell you my decision about the nature of our assistance.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. No classification marking.

² See Document 17. Malloum's letter was not found. In telegram 165862 to multiple posts, July 15, the Department summarized the meeting between Vance and Djime and described the letter as "a brief personal non-substantive letter from President Malloum to President Carter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770253-0217)

22. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Egypt¹

Washington, August 2, 1977, 0241Z

Tosec 80036/180597. From Moose to Habib. Subject: Aid to Chad. Ref: Secto 8006.²

1. Realistically, we can do very little for Chad in either military or economic aid in the near future.

2. The principal constraints in military aid are the provisions in our own legislation and the fact that Chad has no money. Grant assistance would require specific congressional authorization, and for practical purposes is out of the question. Chad is not eligible for Foreign Military Sales (FMS), but we are preparing a draft Presidential Determination that sales of defense articles and services to Chad under FMS will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace.³ Such a determination is a condition of FMS eligibility. Under present circumstances, the only way Chad can obtain military equipment from the US is to buy it from commercial sources. Chad's Foreign Minister is about to leave for Jidda, and presumably will request financing to purchase military equipment. If the President were to determine that Chad is eligible for FMS, Chad could purchase through DOD but would still require financing. Chad is not interested in credit, except on the most favorable terms. If Chad were FMS eligible, and we were able to reprogram FY 77 funds, it might be possible to arrange FMS credits for Chad. We are asking PM to look into this possibility. I understand there is already quite a list of claimants, including Lebanon and Tunisia.

3. Chad could obtain US origin equipment through transfers from third countries. Chad has approached Zaire, Gabon, Morocco, Egypt and Sudan and will raise third country transfers with Saudi Arabia and perhaps Jordan. (FYI: Gabon has declined to provide further assistance to Chad because President Bongo is now President of OAU. Egypt has no US origin lethal equipment and little if anything else from

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770275–1146. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Smith and Lewis; cleared in PM, AFR/SFWA, NEA, NEA/EGY, and P; approved by Moose. Vance was in Alexandria to meet with Sadat to discuss the Middle East peace process.

² In telegram Secto 8006 from the Secretary's aircraft, August 1, Habib wrote: "In anticipation of Egyptian interest could you let me have by immediate return cable a summary of what we can realistically do for Chad in military and economic aid in the immediate future. The Secretary would like to move ahead on this without delay. Also, sum up the results of our discussions with other countries and what they are doing or are willing to do." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274–0830)

³ See Document 24.

US which would help Chadians.) Transfers of US origin equipment/services to a country that is not FMS eligible, such as Chad, require a determination by the Secretary that the US would be willing to transfer the equipment in question directly to Chad, and that the proposed transfers will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace. Furthermore, before transfers of FMS origin items are approved, Congress must be notified 30 working days in advance.

4. Increasing our economic aid to Chad in the short-run will be extremely difficult. We have a PL-480 Title II program designed to make up shortfalls in last year's harvest. This program is valued at 7 million dols, about half of which is the value of the commodities and about half the cost of transporting it to Chad. Chad has requested, as part of its military assistance package, 50 tons of rice but we cannot provide this under PL-480 because PL-480 cannot be used for military purposes. The principal problem in the present PL-480 program has been a bottleneck at the railhead in Cameroon (N'Gaoundere) which has now been broken. Chad had requested an airlift to distribute food within Chad, which we turned down because it was not, and is not now, necessary. An airlift at this point would be a dramatic demonstration of our support for Chad, but would also be expensive and unnecessary, and would not directly assist Chad in maintaining its territorial integrity.

5. Our economic assistance to Chad in FY 77 amounts to about 4 million dols, chiefly devoted to increasing food production over the long-run. It would be very difficult to accelerate any plans now in preparation to increase this assistance.

6. In sum, subject to our readiness to take necessary policy decisions, for the time being the best advice we can give Chad is to solicit financing from countries such as Saudi Arabia in order to be able to buy military equipment from the US or elsewhere through commercial channels. A somewhat more lengthy and complex procedure would be to solicit such transfers of US origin equipment from other countries as US would agree to.

7. Sadat may raise with you the possibility of replacing military equipment including small arms, which are not of US origin, to Chad. Presidential Determination on arms for Egypt has now been signed.⁴ We could consider providing Egypt with replacements for such equipment. However, this would require consultations with the Congress and could impact adversely on our "non-lethal" package on the Hill.

⁴ In telegram Secto 8025 from Alexandria, August 2, Vance summarized his meeting on Africa and bilateral issues with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072-2615)

8. In our discussions with other countries on assistance to Chad, we have found very little support for a meeting of potential donors. The French have suggested a concertation of assistance through a series of bilateral contacts. Belgium and the FRG may be possible sources of economic assistance, but are unlikely to provide Chad with any military assistance. Also, it appears that Morocco and the Sudan, though sympathetic to Chad, may only be able to provide at the most very little military assistance such as small arms and ammunition. Embassy Jidda believes Saudi Arabia would be willing to participate financially in a multilateral effort. Embassy Tehran believes Iran would not finance Chadian arms purchases, but might contribute to common pool intended to assist Chad economically. Saudi Arabia, Iran and possibly Jordan could be sources of third country transfers. At the moment France is providing Chad with logistical equipment support and technical assistance. Egypt is giving small arms, ammunition, and spare parts. Gabon has provided an aircraft but, as noted, Gabon has declined to provide more assistance.

9. As to possible Saudi financial assistance, Secretary may wish to raise topic during his meetings in Jidda.⁵

10. In sum, as soon as Chad can find a source of financing some non-lethal equipment (e.g., uniforms, rations) be made available from commercial sources in a matter of three to four weeks. Delivery would probably also require financing.

Christopher

⁵ Vance was in Taif August 7–9 to discuss the Middle East peace process with Saudi leaders. There is no indication that he discussed Saudi assistance to Chad. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 74, 75, and 77.

23. Presidential Determination No. 77-19¹

Washington, August 12, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT

Waiver of the Limitation on the Aggregate of Military Assistance Granted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and of Credits Extended and Loans Guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act for African Countries in Fiscal Year 1977

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 33(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, I hereby determine that the waiver of the limitations of Section 33(a) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, for fiscal year 1977 is important to the security of the United States.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as required by law.

This determination shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

Jimmy Carter

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER
SECTION 33 OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, WAIVING
THE \$40 MILLION CEILING ON TOTAL FY 1977 MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, CREDITS AND GUARANTEED LOANS TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Problem

Section 33 of the Arms Export Control Act limits to \$40,000,000 in any fiscal year the total of grant military assistance and of financing for foreign military sales for African countries, exclusive of training. This section also authorizes the President to waive the \$40,000,000 limitation if he determines that to do so is important to the security of the United States. Inflationary trends and changes in regional security needs in Africa since Congress enacted the ceiling have required program modifications and waivers of this limitation in recent years. For fiscal year (FY) 1977, Congress enacted security assistance legislation based on an Executive Branch presentation which showed a total of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. No classification marking.

approximately \$100,000,000 in military assistance and in foreign military sales (FMS) financing for African countries.

The Executive Branch intends to provide in FY 1977 a total of \$108,500,000 in FMS financing for seven African countries—Zaire, Senegal, Liberia, Gabon, Kenya, Morocco and Tunisia. The only grant military assistance program in Africa for FY 1977 was a \$6,000,000 program for Ethiopia, which was terminated as a result of events in April 1977.

Justification

The recent Angola-supported invasion of the Shaba region of Zaire, the continued Soviet/Cuban presence in Angola, and the continuing flow of Soviet arms into the Congo (Brazzaville) represent a threat to the security and stability of Central Africa. These developments have heightened insecurity in Gabon and in West Africa, where Senegal and Liberia also share borders with Soviet-supported Guinea.

The preservation of Zaire's territorial integrity and the maintenance of security and stability in Central and West Africa are important to the security interests of the United States. To further these interests, the Executive Branch is planning to furnish FY 1977 FMS financing totaling:

- \$28,000,000 to Zaire for the purchase of nonlethal military equipment and supplies required to repel the Shaba invasion and military equipment to improve Zaire's defensive capability upon the completion of the Shaba operations.

- \$2,000,000 to assist Gabon's purchase of one C-130 aircraft and the financing of armored cars.

- \$8,000,000 to Senegal for the purchase of engineering equipment for its armed forces.

- \$500,000 to Liberia to improve its modest military capability and support the civic action program conducted by its armed forces.

During the past six months, there have also been destabilizing developments in East Africa. Ethiopia's continued internal instability, its declining relations with Sudan and the United States, its growing ties with the Soviet Union, and the coming independence of Djibouti have fostered an atmosphere of political uncertainty in the region. Kenya remains directly threatened by the forces of Somalia and Uganda, which have superior Soviet equipment. Kenya is also one of the few countries on the east coast of Africa which allows U.S. naval vessels to make port calls. Kenya's continued pro-Western democratic orientation and continued U.S. naval access to Kenyan ports are important to the protection of U.S. security interests in the Indian Ocean region. To support these security interests, the Executive Branch plans to provide Kenya \$15,000,000 in FY 1977 FMS financing to facilitate its 1976 purchase of F-5E aircraft.

In North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia respectively occupy strategic positions at the entrance to and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. They have neighbors whose largely Soviet-supplied military power greatly exceeds their own. Morocco provides U.S. naval vessels access to its ports and has supported recent U.S. efforts to secure peace in the Middle East. Tunisia is a moderate voice in Arab councils, particularly in contrast with its neighbor Libya, which continues to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors. Tunisia also provides units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet with their only regular access to ports on the central southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea.

To advance U.S. security interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, the Executive Branch expects to furnish FMS financing totaling \$30,000,000 to Morocco for payments on transport and training aircraft and other defense equipment and \$25,000,000 to Tunisia for payments toward the purchase of an air defense system.

24. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, August 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Eligibility of Chad to Purchase Defense Articles and Defense Services under the Arms Export Control Act

Problem

You are asked to find that the sale of defense articles and defense services under the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) to Chad will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. Your finding will assist the United States Government in responding positively to a Chadian request for approval to purchase military equipment and training on a government-to-government basis under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures. This would be the first new country made FMS eligible by your Administration.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. Confidential. Sent to Carter under an August 30 covering memorandum from Brzezinski, who recommended the President sign the Determination.

Background

Chad's request for defense articles and services from the United States results from its unsuccessful efforts to quell an insurgency in northern Chad that has been receiving increased military support from Libya. On July 15, Vice President Mondale told the Chadian Vice President that we would assist in restoring Chad's territorial integrity.² The Government of Chad has requested assistance from other governments as well as the United States to stabilize the situation.

I believe it is in our security interest to work with France and other interested governments to ensure that the internal security of Chad does not further deteriorate, and to ensure that Chad can assert control over its territory to the maximum extent possible.

If you approve this Determination, we would plan, subject to your agreement, to establish the military supply relationship with Chad on the understanding that it would be designed essentially to meet the current problem and would not be enduring. The principal purpose of your Determination would be to gain the authority to permit third country transfers. However, we would also wish to be in a position to authorize government-to-government sales of equipment which we have indicated to Chad we are prepared to provide. While our strong preference would be for third countries to finance such purchases, we plan to include a small amount of FMS credit for Chad in our preparations for the FY 1979 budget submissions in the event other countries prove unwilling to finance Chad's military needs.

Legal Considerations

Chad is not at present eligible to purchase defense articles and services on a government-to-government basis. Section 3(a)(1) of the Act provides as one of the conditions of eligibility for any foreign country to purchase defense articles or defense services from the United States Government that the President find that such sales will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." Authority to make this finding is reserved to the President by Section 1(a) of Executive Order 11958 of January 18, 1977. Section 3(a) of the Act also provides that consent may not be given to the proposed transfer from a third party of FMS-origin defense articles or services unless the United States would itself transfer the articles and services in question to the proposed recipient.

Other considerations

Because the equipment which we would consider for transfer to Chad would be limited in quantity, variety and sophistication, your

² See footnote 2, Document 18.

determination of eligibility would not be inconsistent with your general arms transfer policy.

Chad's human rights record has improved considerably under the military regime that came to power following the April 1975 coup d'état. Though arbitrary arrests of suspect guerrillas have occurred, most detainees are quickly either brought to trial or released.

Preliminary soundings indicate that we must expect some Congressional opposition to expanding the list of countries eligible for FMS sales in light of your avowed determination to reduce arms sales worldwide. We doubt, however, given the limited nature of any likely sales to Chad, that there will be a major opposition to declaring Chad eligible to purchase defense articles and services from the United States. Although not required by law, we believe notification to Congress and publication of the Determination in the *Federal Register* will be helpful in its implementation.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve and sign the attached Determination, thereby also approving the attached justification therefor. The Department of Defense concurs. In accordance with established procedures, your Determination and the attached justification therefor will be furnished to the Congress. The Determination alone will be published in the *Federal Register*.³

³ Not attached. Presidential Determination No. 77-20, signed by Carter on September 1, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad.

25. Letter From President Carter to Chadian President Malloum¹

Washington, September 9, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your gracious letter of August 17,² I am pleased to inform you that I signed on September 1, 1977, a determination making Chad eligible to purchase defense articles and services from the United States under its foreign military sales program.

I have asked Ambassador Bradford to work closely with your government in exploring ways in which we can help meet some of your urgent needs. He will explain the legal and procedural requirements involved.

The United States respects the OAU principle of the territorial integrity of all African states, and supports the OAU's efforts to assist Chad in arriving at a negotiated solution to your immediate problems.

Your commitment to cooperate with the OAU in its mission is a reassuring demonstration of the Government of Chad's resolve to attain a peaceful resolution of the challenges to your territorial integrity. It is my hope that this action will help you in the attainment of this goal, so that your country can devote its undivided attention to the priority task of developing its human and physical resources.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chad. No classification marking.

² In telegram 2819 from Ndjamena, August 19, the Embassy transmitted the text of Malloum's letter to Carter which reads in part: "I have taken note of your government's willingness to come to the aid of Chad. Since the situation is becoming more and more worrisome because of Libya's efforts to reinforce its positions with a view to launching new offensives, we would greatly appreciate Your Excellency's expediting the assistance which will be put at our disposal." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770301-0781)

26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad¹

Washington, September 10, 1977, 1603Z

217502. Subject: Chadian Ambassador's Meeting With Assistant Secretary Moose, September 9. Refs: (A) State 212134 (B) State 212135 (Notal)² (C) State 166506 (Notal).³

1. Summary: Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chadian Ambassador to inform him of Presidential Determination making Chad eligible for FMS program (ref A). Chadian Ambassador forcibly stated his disappointment that he could not see President Carter, asked when U.S. assistance would arrive, and concluded by saying he thought Chadian Vice President had been offered trucks and fuel on grant basis. End summary.

2. Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chadian Ambassador Pierre Toura Gaba on September 9. AF/W Director and Chadian Desk Officer attended. Purpose of meeting was to present original of letter from President Carter to President Malloum (ref B).

3. Mr. Moose opened meeting by saying that the President was very occupied with the Panama Canal Treaty and regretted that he could not personally meet the Ambassador as the Ambassador had requested. Noting that Chad, and in a limited sense Egypt, were the only countries made eligible for FMS by the Carter administration, Moose emphasized that this favorable determination was a significant step for the United States. While the Carter administration placed great emphasis on restraining military assistance programs, he said this decision reflected U.S. support for the territorial integrity of African states within their colonial boundaries—a policy which has been reaffirmed in a number of instances, and was in the spirit of earlier assurances to Chadian Vice President Djime. Moose said efforts were being made to assure congressional support for the decision.

4. Moose noted that under the FMS program we could (A) allow the sale of U.S. military goods and services, and (B) permit the transfer

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770329–0077. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Eaton; cleared in AF/I; approved by Moose.

² In telegram 212134 to multiple posts, September 3, the Department informed posts that Carter signed the Determination making Chad eligible for foreign military sales. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320–0963) See Document 24. Telegram 212135 to Ndjamena, September 3, transmitted the text of Carter's letter to Malloum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323–1094) See Document 25.

³ See footnote 2, Document 18.

of US-origin goods from other countries. Moose noted that both the U.S. and Chad had made preliminary soundings in friendly countries about possible third country transfers. He said Chad should now contact these capitals with specific requests for equipment transfers or financing to purchase equipment under FMS. (Later in the conversation, Moose pointed out that, as a matter of policy, the U.S. would not approve of sales or transfer of attack aircraft, helicopters or light tanks.)

5. Ambassador Toura Gaba thanked Mr. Moose for receiving him, but quickly expressed his disappointment that a meeting with President Carter could not be arranged. The Ambassador admitted that he still had a good deal to learn about U.S. bureaucracy, but noted that he had been waiting several weeks to pass on a message to President Carter from President Malloum. He said that this message was short: Chad needed to know when it could expect the U.S. assistance it had been promised.

6. The Ambassador said that Libya, supported by “other great powers,” was massing troops and military materiel in the area, and that time was against Chad. He alluded to Chad as a dying patient and said that a good doctor would not expect the proper medicine to be located elsewhere. He noted that FonMin Kamougue had visited African capitals to explain the situation and request aid. Yet, for the time being, he said Chad was in urgent need of trucks and gasoline and needed some idea when it could expect them from the United States.

7. Moose said he sympathized with the Ambassador’s difficulty in securing an appointment with President Carter. However, he was meeting with the Ambassador to make the President’s decision, and our intentions, clear to Chad at the earliest possible date. AF/W Director pointed out that the recent Presidential Determination is in the spirit of Vice President’s commitment to aid Chad. Referring to Toura Gaba’s use of the word “grant”, he emphasized that grant military assistance was reserved for a small group of traditional U.S. allies. He recommended that Chad begin to search for sources of financing for the purchase of U.S. equipment, said we were prepared to support Chad, and would agree to reasonable requests for sales and approvals of transfers.

8. Ambassador Toura Gaba reiterated his disappointment with the limited nature of our assistance. He said that Chad had been expecting at least some grant assistance on trucks and gasoline on the basis of Vice President Djime’s meeting with Vice President Mondale last July. He said: quote: Djime had insisted on seeing the President (Carter), but the President had no time. But he (Djime) was promised—and that promise was repeated by Vice President Mondale—that the trucks and gasoline would be forthcoming. Unquote. The Ambassador said Djime and the Chadian Government had since been expecting the trucks and gasoline ASAP.

9. Moose explained that if Chad has expected trucks and gasoline on a grant basis, there had been a serious misunderstanding. Such grant assistance, he said, was not possible. Moose reminded the Ambassador that a special briefing had been arranged for Djime and the Ambassador last July with PM Deputy Director (Ericson) to avoid any possible misunderstanding of the law. He regretted that there appears to have been a major misunderstanding and repeated that Chad could not rpt not expect any assistance on a grant basis. At the same time, the U.S. would try to assist Chad as much as possible in arranging expeditious purchases or transfers of US-origin military equipment.

10. At this point the Ambassador arose and somewhat regretfully noted that further discussion would achieve little more at this time. He thanked Moose for the extensive talk.

11. Comment: In his meeting (ref C) with Djime July 15, Vice President Mondale made no specific promises (e.g., trucks or gasoline) in reply to Chadian request for military assistance. Department believes that Ambassador Toura Gaba was mistaken in his memory of the meeting. Ambassador Bradford may wish to make certain this misunderstanding is not widespread in Chadian circles, and assure GOC understands that such direct assistance is not possible. End comment.

Vance

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Chad to the Department of State and Other Recipients¹

Ndjamena, September 13, 1977, 0829Z

3176. Subject: Military Assistance to Chad. Ref: Ndjamena 3169.²

1. Summary: During our conversation at the time of the delivery of the letter to President Carter (see reftel), President Malloum made the following points:

A) Libyan aggression in northern Chad was being carried out at Soviet instructions; B) while Chad greatly appreciated the assistance we have offered to date, he hoped we would reconsider the matter of helicopters and bombers; and C) he offered to conclude some sort of formal military agreement with the U.S. for training and equipment similar to that in existence with French. I did not comment on Soviet involvement with Libya. I cautioned him that I thought bombers were out of the question, but did agree to re-raise the possibility of helicopters, and I told him in cases like Chad, we seldom enter into a full scale military agreement arrangement but that we would need close cooperation, particularly in training.

2. In delivering his letter to President Carter, President Malloum again stressed the urgency of the present case, stating that enemy forces were continuing to mass in northern Chad. He went on to explain that in the present circumstance, Libya was merely acting on behalf of the Soviets and the purpose of seizing Tibesti was to outflank Egypt and eventually isolate it. He said that once this was done and these Soviet gains were consolidated with those in the Horn of Africa, Soviet efforts would be turned to a similar isolation of Morocco. He went on to point out that it was strongly in the U.S. interests as well as those of Western Europe and other African states, to halt the Soviet thrust in northern Chad before it gathered momentum. I made no comment on the scenario, but it is clear that President Malloum has talked himself into believing it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335–0122. Confidential. Also sent to Cairo, DIA, Khartoum, Paris, Rabat, and Tripoli.

² In telegram 3169 from Ndjamena, September 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of Malloum's September 12 letter to Carter which reads in part: "We wish that you could, because of your role as a great power responsible for peace and international security, use all necessary means to make Libya listen to reason, because we have reasons to fear that what is happening in Tibesti could degenerate into a situation similar to that of the Ogaden. It is because of this situation that we have judged indispensable and necessary to appeal to certain friendly countries such as the United States to help us assure the security and defense of our territorial integrity." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335–0552)

3. I took occasion of our interview to re-explain in detail the nature of our proposed assistance to Chad as well as the unusual nature of our entering into a new relationship. President Malloum was appreciative of what we were prepared to do and was under no illusion about the nature of our commitment. I particularly pointed out that the nature of our procedures made it impossible for us to undertake any direct grant of military assistance. Despite his appreciation for our proposed program, Malloum reiterated the Soviet threat to the north and made a strong plea for reconsideration of the inclusion of bombers and helicopters in our program. I told him that I honestly thought bombers were completely out of the question, but that I would re-raise the question of unarmed helicopters with Washington. However, before doing so I wanted to be sure that the French were not prepared to augment their present force [garble—in?] helicopters as it seemed redundant introducing a new type of aircraft into the limited Chadian maintenance scene. Malloum seemed satisfied with this suggestion but did, however, want to raise both points so that Washington could be giving them further consideration.

4. The President then went on to say that in view of the nature of our new relationship, he wondered if we should not have a military accord similar to that between Chad and France. I told him that normally, in programs such as those on which we were about to embark in Chad, we did not go into a full scale military agreement arrangement. However, I added that close cooperation would be necessary in determining the types of equipment covered and arranging for appropriate training.

5. Our meeting was most cordial and President was obviously most appreciative of President Carter's letter and his recent determination on the eligibility of Chad to purchase American equipment.

Bradford

28. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 21, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Chad and Libya.]

6. *Ceasefire Agreement in Chad*: Chad and Libya have agreed to resume talks aimed at resolving the conflict in northern Chad, largely as a result of Sudanese mediation. In a joint announcement February 18, both countries agreed to a ceasefire, the resumption of diplomatic relations, a withdrawal of the Chadian complaint before the UN Security Council, and promised to arrange meetings between Libyan and Chadian leaders in the near future.²

Prospects for a durable settlement are uncertain. Although the Chadian rebels rely heavily on Libya for support, they retain some independence and could decide to ignore Libya's call for a ceasefire. Libya's intentions are also unclear. The Libyans may only be trying to present an image of reasonableness to the OAU ministerial conference now convening in Tripoli.

Chad has little choice but to negotiate. The ceasefire announcement followed shortly after the fall of the government's last major northern garrison, Faya-Largeau. Over the past three weeks, 40 percent of Chad's 5,000 man army has been killed or captured in the northern fighting.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Chad and Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² On February 6, Chad suspended diplomatic relations with Libya over suspicions of Libyan support for rebel insurgents. In a February 13 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "Chad has decided to take its case against Libyan aggression to the UN Security Council. It claims that Libya has, first of all, occupied Chadian territory which is disputed by the two countries, and secondly, that Libya is supporting and encouraging Chadian rebels currently waging the offensive in northern Chad. The African members of the Security Council have asked to postpone a formal meeting on the Chadian complaint until all possibilities of an 'African' solution through the OAU have been exhausted." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 2/78) The joint Libya-Chad-Sudan communiqué issued on February 18 in Tripoli announced that Qadhafi and Malloum would meet on February 23. (Telegram 272 from Tripoli, February 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780180-0838, D780082-0298. For a summary of the February meetings between representatives of Chad and Libya, with Sudanese mediation, see *Keesing's Contemporary, Archives*, 1978, pp. 28976–28977.

29. **Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, February 23, 1978

SUBJECT

North African Developments

One effect of our intense concentration on Arab-Israeli issues has been to ignore North Africa. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but I am concerned that the bureaucracy is operating on a day-to-day basis without any sense of what our broad policy objectives in this region are—apart from the omnipresent goal of “improving relations.” As third-world countries go, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are of considerable interest to us, and we have reasonably good ties with all three. Pressures are mounting, however, to make decisions that could tend to polarize the region unnecessarily, or at least to erode our ability to pursue our interest effectively. Finally, we have invitations pending to Hassan, Noura and Boumediene, and of necessity we will have to spend more time thinking about North Africa as their visits approach.

The issues as I see them, are as follows:

We need to decide on OV-10s and Cobras for Hassan.² There is a lukewarm, and even negative, Congressional attitude. There are problems of timing. There is a question of whether we would try to urge Hassan to be any more flexible on the Sahara issue. If Hassan invites himself to visit in April, would we want him to come then, or should we try to have all of the Maghreb leaders in late 1978/early 1979?

Algeria. The French and Moroccans would like to draw us into a policy of confrontation with Algeria. Boumediene seems determined to keep lines open to us, and we have quite a substantial economic relationship at stake. The question of LNG imports is being held up because of Schlesinger's objections. With all the problems of dealing with Algeria, we have no interest in writing Boumediene off or leaving the field to the Soviets. Algeria is something of a test case for us in demonstrating that we can deal maturely with a self-styled radical country.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 73, North Africa: PRM 34: 2-7/78. Secret. Sent for action. Dodson wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “See RI [Inderfuth] & [illegible—DA (Aaron)?] notes p. 2.”

² Laraki requested the arms in a September 13, 1977, meeting with Vance. See footnote 2, Document 152 and Document 222.

Tunisia. The fabric of Tunisian political life is coming under severe strain as a result of Bourguiba's imminent demise and the emergence of socio-economic grievances. Libyan intervention cannot be excluded. The aftermath of the January 26 riots will make a smooth transition difficult. Tunisia constantly asks for more visible signs of support. I feel that there is enough here to justify a PRM on North Africa. There is no particular rush, but I would think that it might be worth requesting a study as a way of getting better coordination within the bureaucracy. If you agree, I will draft a request for a PRM for your signature.³

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate whether you feel a PRC on North Africa would be justified.⁴

Yes. Prepare a draft request for a PRM.⁵

Not now. Wait until closer to visit.

³ Brzezinski drew an arrow from this paragraph and wrote: "Have a working group meet first under your chairmanship."

⁴ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Dodson added a typewritten note beneath the options: "Checked with Bill; under the second option, he intends to wait until next fall or even later if all visits get postponed to 1979. Christine."

⁵ Inderfurth drew a line from this sentence to the bottom of the page and wrote: "I think we should go ahead with a PRM. First, it will give those in the bureaucracy working on the Maghreb direction. They apparently need it. Second, it has been some time since a regional PRM has been issued and it is important to have these periodically. If you agree to go the PRM route now, remember we can state a longer time—3–6 months—for completion. Rick." Beneath this, an unknown hand, presumably Aaron, wrote: "I agree, though my experience is that [illegible] work on projects with long deadlines tend to be deferred until the last minute. Hence I would be [illegible] to go ahead, get [illegible]."

30. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-34¹

Washington, April 14, 1978

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, analyze our policies toward Morocco and Algeria in the context of our broad interests in North Africa. (C)

The background paper should briefly discuss:

—U.S. interests in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and in North Africa as a region.

—The Soviet role in North Africa.

—Issues requiring early decision, e.g., Moroccan arms requests, strategy for the visit of King Hassan, Exim credits for Algeria, timing of Nouira visit, rescheduling of Boumediene visit.

—Longer term issues, e.g., recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, a possible US role in promoting a settlement of the Sahara dispute, prospects for preventing a deterioration in US-Algerian economic and political relations, US policy on terrorism and its effects in North Africa. (S)

The paper should identify strategies which the United States might follow over the next several years, analyzing in each case the probable effects on US interests, Soviet prospects, and the key issues which we face in the near and longer term. (S)

These strategies should include, but not necessarily be limited to, a continuation of our present approach; a closer alignment with Morocco; and an effort to promote a peaceful resolution of the Sahara conflict. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 69, PRC 062, 6/13/78, North Africa. Secret.

The review should be no longer than 20 pages in length. It should be submitted to the Policy Review Committee by April 28,² 1978.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

² An unknown hand crossed out “April 28” and wrote “May 5.”

31. Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee¹

Washington, undated

Introduction

Our reluctance to allow the Moroccan Government to use our military equipment in the Sahara and Mauritania in the course of its conflict with the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas has resulted in growing estrangement in our historically close relations with Morocco. Meanwhile the Algerian-American rapprochement has lost its momentum due to the resurgence of serious political differences and indications the U.S. will not approve further liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts. In Algeria, the Soviet efforts to secure additional naval facilities on NATO’s southern flank could have some success if there is a sharp deterioration in Algerian-American relations. Morocco and Algeria are engaged in an expensive arms race, and there is the possibility of a direct military confrontation.

As U.S. policy toward the Sahara conflict is central to our present relations with Morocco and Algeria, this paper identifies the core elements of American policy on that dispute and describes two alternative strategies, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These are aligning ourselves more closely with Morocco and more active U.S. promotion of a peaceful settlement. The paper does not assume that our current policy is inadequate, but it does emphasize the strain which has resulted in relations with Morocco as we pursued our present

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 48, PRM/NSC–34 Secret. Prepared in response to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–34 Sent to Brzezinski on May 12 under a covering memorandum from Tarnoff. Dodson forwarded the paper to Mondale, Vance, Blumenthal, Brown, Schlesinger, Warnke, Brown, and Turner under a May 18 covering memorandum. Attached but not printed is an undated Checklist of Major Decisions.

strategy. It also describes the current impasse with the Moroccans provoked by their use of American arms in the western Sahara and Mauritania and steps underway within the framework of our current policy to overcome this impasse. The paper concludes that regardless of our policy choices it would be desirable to have a high-level U.S. emissary speak with leaders in Rabat and Algiers in the near future.

Morocco Questions U.S. Objectives and Friendship

King Hassan appears to be questioning the value of his close relationship with the U.S. During the previous Administration, Secretary Kissinger expressed to Hassan his "personal view" that Moroccan dominance in northwest Africa would be preferable to that of Algeria;² and at the United Nations in 1975 the U.S. voted in favor of the pro-Moroccan resolution on the Sahara while abstaining on its pro-Algerian rival. In December 1977 President Carter expressed to the Moroccan Prime Minister his sympathy with Moroccan concern about Soviet intrusions in Africa.³ This sentiment has been echoed by other Administration officials, including one Cabinet member, in meetings with the King. Hassan is aware that the President assured Giscard d'Estaing that the U.S. understood the reasons for French military intervention against the Polisario guerrillas in Mauritania. The President has stated publicly U.S. appreciation for Moroccan military assistance to Zaire during the Shaba incursion.

Against this background, the Moroccans professed to be astonished by the Administration's statements to Congressional committees that the Administration recognized Moroccan administrative control but not sovereignty over the western Sahara,⁴ although they are well aware this has been our policy since early 1976 (and the policy of Morocco's other friends in the West). They are bitterly disappointed by the U.S. refusal to sell them arms to be used in the Sahara, and they contrast our position with that of the Soviets who impose no similar restrictions on weapons they furnish the Algerians. They may refuse to withdraw the F-5 aircraft presently in the Sahara and Mauritania in violation of our assistance agreement or refuse to give formal assurances that U.S. weapons will not be used in these areas, thereby perhaps provoking a U.S. arms embargo (affecting both our \$45 million FMS credit program and the more than \$100 million in planned Moroccan commercial arms purchases) and a major crisis in bilateral relations.

² Kissinger met with King Hassan during his visit to Rabat October 15, 1974. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-9. Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 90.

³ See Document 151.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 154.

The Moroccans are also quite concerned by the Administration's perceived failure to counter effectively Soviet/Cuban intrusions in Africa. While there is self-serving exaggeration in his characterization of the Polisario's challenge to Moroccan/Mauritanian control of the Sahara as Soviet inspired or manipulated, the King is genuinely alarmed by the propensity of the Soviets generously to support militarily left wing forces in African disputes.

Belatedly, the King decided he should take his case directly to the President. Having aborted on three days notice a state visit scheduled to begin December 7 (the fifth such "postponement" in seven years), he unsuccessfully sought a meeting with President Carter at a time when the President's schedule was exceptionally busy.

Impending Discord with Algeria

Perhaps to improve its access to the U.S. energy market, and to American technology and finance for the development of Algeria's hydrocarbon industry, the Boumediene Government made a number of gestures, e.g., assignment of an Ambassador, intended to normalize relations with the new Carter Administration. Repeated efforts were undertaken to exploit the new Administration's interest in human rights to win sympathy for the Polisario's self-determination demands. As relations with France worsened in late 1977 following French military intervention against the Polisario, the Algerians, anxious not to be estranged simultaneously from both Paris and Washington, muted their growing disagreements with the United States on the Middle East.

The Algerians also downplayed their frustration at the Department of Energy's continuing delay in reaching decisions overdue since December 31, 1977 on two pending major LNG import contracts. Although the Algerians probably perceive a political motive, the delay is due to national energy policy considerations. Major factors in DOE's review of the two cases are their consistency with the LNG import policy being developed by an Interagency Task Force and the draft energy bill, with respect to security of supply, pricing, environment, and other factors. Public oral arguments have been heard in one case, and probably will be heard in the second. No date has been set for final decisions in these cases.

Algerian pleasure at U.S. refusal to sell Morocco weapons for use in the Sahara and Mauritania will be overshadowed by resentment, should Algeria's support for Palestinian and other guerrilla groups expose the Boumediene Government to the economic sanctions of recent or anticipated American legislation on international terrorism. This is a very real possibility given Algeria's relations with such organizations and strong Congressional support for legislation which would penalize governments associated with terrorist groups. Earlier this year

the State Department suspended action for two months on Export-Import Bank operations regarding Algeria while examining Algeria's links to guerrilla groups within the context of current legislation on Exim and terrorism.

Algeria maintains extensive contacts with a number of leftist dissident groups and with Palestinians of all persuasion, including Palestinian terrorist groups. Algiers provides some direct support—regular and diplomatic passports, monetary aid, and reportedly some military training—to Spanish and Canary Islands dissidents, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and members of Fatah as well as the Polisario. Some known international terrorists, including Carlos, have used Algeria as a transit or stopover point; Carlos is reported to use Algerian passports in some of his travels. Although Algeria has in the past granted airline hijackers safehaven and transit out of the country, it announced earlier this year that it would no longer accept a hijacked airliner unless Algerians were involved or unless asked to do so by a recognized international authority.

Finally, U.S. indefinite postponement for administrative reasons of the state visit that Boumediene had been invited to make in mid-1978 can be expected to irritate him.

Mauritania: Caught in the Middle

U.S. interests are fundamentally humanitarian, and are distinctly secondary to those in Algeria and Morocco. As the weakest link, Mauritania is bearing the brunt of the war and is dependent on conservative Arab money, Moroccan troops, and French aircraft for its survival. The Mauritaniens would like to find a negotiated way out of the conflict that preserves their territory and political integrity, but are too reliant on Morocco to pursue an independent peace settlement policy.

U.S. Interests in the Maghreb

Security and Strategic

American regional security interests include maintenance of sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean, support for the Sixth Fleet, protection of NATO's southern flank, and denial to the Soviets of bases and naval repair facilities in an area where they are now logistically disadvantaged.

Morocco's control of the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar and its Atlantic Ocean littoral therefore have important strategic significance for the U.S., especially as Morocco has a long history of cooperation with the U.S. in military matters. There were SAC airfields in the country's early years, and more recently naval communications installations which just now are being phased out at U.S. initiative. The Moroccans continue to welcome U.S. naval visits, including those

by nuclear powered warships, and have agreed to permit the Navy to continue to use Moroccan registered radio frequencies very important for Sixth Fleet operations. The King has agreed in principle to construction of a deep space optical tracking facility to be operated by the U.S. Air Force which will permit observations of Soviet satellites orbiting beyond the range of present U.S. sensors. He is interested in expanding his military relationship with the U.S.; and at a time of less troubled relations he would be sympathetic to U.S. requests for additional basing privileges should the U.S. decide these were desirable.

The Moroccans demonstrated in Shaba their willingness to react militarily to threats against moderate regimes in Africa. Less successful was a Moroccan effort to overthrow the avowedly Marxist-Leninist regime in Benin. The Moroccans currently are providing covert military assistance to the guerrillas contesting the Marxist MPLA's control of Angola. Were they not preoccupied by the Sahara struggle, the Moroccans might be aiding the embattled Chadian Government defend itself against Libyan-backed insurgents.

Economic

There is a curious dichotomy in our national interests along the southern Mediterranean littoral. Not surprisingly, our political interests are high in moderate Morocco. But we have greater economic interests in "socialist" Algeria. U.S. petroleum imports from Algeria comprise 8 percent of our total imports of crude oil, and Algeria is becoming America's principal source of LNG, which is an important energy source in some U.S. regional markets. American firms have won contracts valued at \$6 billion, chiefly for construction of oil and LNG facilities. They hope to be awarded many more contracts as Algeria spends an additional estimated \$17.4 billion developing its hydrocarbon sector through 1985. Outstanding loans to Algeria from Exim and private U.S. institutions approach \$2 billion. U.S. exports to Algeria in 1977 amounted to \$525 million.

The Moroccan economy is just beginning to become really accessible to American firms. U.S. exports were only \$200 million in 1977. However, Westinghouse recently won a \$215 million contract and is a strong contender for leadership in development plans both for Morocco's promising uranium resources and for nuclear power. With as much as 60 percent of the world's phosphate reserves, Morocco will have an important role in pricing this commodity, which is important for agricultural production. Extensive shale oil deposits will be exploited if economically viable technology can be developed.

Political

U.S. political interests of both regional and global dimensions generally have been furthered by Morocco's pro-Western orientation.

Though careful to protect its Third World and Arab credentials, Morocco usually has promoted cooperative relations between the Third World and the Western democracies. Morocco has been very supportive of U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. Hassan was one of the first and the most vocal supporter of Sadat's peace initiative and has tried to extend the influence of the moderates within the Palestinian camp. Morocco's activities in Africa have been beneficial to American and Western interests. Near Tangier, the Rabat Government permits the U.S. to operate an important VOA station broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Despite Algiers' initiatives to improve relations with Washington, the Boumediene Government's positions on most regional and global issues are in sharp conflict with those of the U.S. Algeria had been helpful to earlier U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East by protecting Syria's flank against more radical Arabs. But Boumediene's outspoken opposition to Sadat's peace initiative is a reminder of the strength of Algeria's commitment to the Palestinians. An additional factor is the Algerian support to certain Palestinians and others engaging in international terrorism.

Soviet Interests in the Maghreb

Security and Strategic

With only limited use of major port facilities, and lagging in the development of a full range of mobile support capabilities, the Soviets have been seeking port and repair facilities throughout the western Mediterranean. Their objectives have been to ease the overcrowded Soviet Northern Fleet bases and to allow their diesel submarines to linger longer in the Mediterranean. They also have sought permission to base military aircraft in western Algeria, presumably to improve their surveillance of NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic.

Both Algeria and Morocco allow the Soviets to make port calls. These are frequent in Algeria and occasional in Morocco. Vessels of the USSR's Mediterranean Squadron undertake routine repair and maintenance in and off the Algerian port of Annaba, and Algerian permission was recently requested for similar privileges elsewhere in Algeria. To date, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade the Algerians to grant them base rights in western Algeria.

Approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians are stationed in Algeria, which has signed agreements for the purchase of a wide variety of sophisticated Soviet weaponry worth \$1.3 billion. Although the Soviets do not provide direct military support to the Polisario guerrillas, they have not tried to block Algerian deliveries of Soviet arms to the Polisario.

To preclude an exclusive Moroccan arms relationship with the West, the USSR maintains modest military sales and training programs in Morocco.

Economic

Soviet arms sales to Algeria are understood to be paid for in hard currency, which makes them a significant entry in each country's commercial accounts. The Soviet Union also exports civilian goods to Algeria and provides economic assistance. However, a recently concluded \$2 billion, 20-year agreement, which provides Soviet technical assistance, financing, and chemicals in return for deliveries of Moroccan phosphates, and an even more recent fishing agreement, probably will make Morocco the USSR's largest trading partner in Africa.

Political

Within the Maghreb, Moscow places priority on its relations with "progressive" Algeria but clearly does not want to push the Moroccans closer to the West and therefore tries to maintain normal relations with King Hassan. The Soviets have avoided publicly choosing sides on the Sahara conflict. Like ourselves, the Soviets are believed to see little advantage in a war between Algeria and Morocco, although the persistence of tension facilitates Soviet arms sales and creates a degree of Algerian dependency they hope eventually will be of strategic benefit.

U.S. and Soviet Larger Interests in Africa and the Middle East

Soviet relations with the Maghreb are more clearly divided when the issues are regional or global. Although the stridently Third World Algerians sometimes criticize Soviet policies, Algiers and Moscow frequently share views. The Algerians assisted the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola by permitting Soviet transport aircraft to refuel and overfly their territory. They have tended to side with the elements backed by the Soviets in the Ogaden and southern Africa. (At the same time, Algeria has apparently strongly cautioned Cuba against becoming involved militarily in Eritrea against Muslim Eritrean liberation elements which have in the past been supported by Algeria, Iraq and Cuba itself. To at least some extent these representations, and those by Iraq, appear to have played a role in inducing the present Cuban restraint.) The Moroccans consistently decry Soviet intervention on the African continent.

Again, there is less ambiguity when Soviet relations with the Maghreb are set within the context of Soviet interests in the Arab world. Algeria's pro-Palestinian militancy and participation in the "steadfastness front" against Sadat coincide with Soviet objectives, while Morocco's advocacy of a peaceful settlement is frequently at odds with Soviet tactics.

American behavior in the dispute between Morocco and Algeria will influence attitudes toward the U.S. of other friendly Middle Eastern, European, and African nations. U.S. policies will have a negative impact on many of these countries to the extent they are perceived as part of a U.S. "failure" to oppose effectively the growth of Soviet/Cuban military influence in Africa. Morocco has close ties with France and with the other moderate regimes in these regions, e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Zaire. All of these countries share Hassan's alarm about Soviet intrusions in Africa and favor a negotiated settlement to the Arab/Israeli dispute. Some of Algeria's close associates in Africa and the Middle East, e.g., Libya, Iraq, PDRY, Angola, Benin, Madagascar, advocate Middle East policies generally supported by the Soviets; and the Africans among them have welcomed Soviet military intervention on their continent.

Moroccan Objectives in the Western Sahara Dispute

The Moroccan claims to the Sahara, supported by the large majority of Morocco's population, have a deep historical and religious basis. The annexation of the territory in February 1976 was the expression of a powerful current of irredentism. In geopolitical terms, the Moroccan leadership viewed the annexation as a means of preventing the creation of a radical Algerian puppet state which would isolate Morocco from the rest of Africa; and the Sahara's phosphate reserves were seen as important to the country's economic future.

Hassan's dominant personal interests are his continued reign and the perpetuation of the 300-year old Alaouite dynasty. His "recovery" of the Sahara has unified the nation behind him, and he could not surrender the territory without grave risk of a military coup or popular uprising. For the moment the military situation in the Sahara and Mauritania is manageable. But he would be sorely tempted to strike more aggressively at Polisario sanctuaries in Algeria, if the tide of battle turned against his forces. On the other hand, he realizes the danger to his position of a full-scale conflict with the much better armed Algerians, and he is painfully conscious of the growing financial burden of the ongoing guerrilla war. He is ready for a negotiated settlement, but only if it does not call into question the annexation of that portion of the Sahara he now controls.

Over the longer term Hassan will continue to regard the Soviets as sponsors of an ideology obviously alien to his regime and rule. This recognition will not preclude economic cooperation, but in the political sphere his preference will be the West, as long as he believes the West can resist Soviet ambitions. Should he become persuaded the West was going to abandon Africa to these ambitions, he probably would seek a temporizing accommodation with Moscow, hoping the West would rally before he was overthrown.

Algerian Objectives

Much more than in the neighboring Kingdom, Algeria's Sahara policy reflects the personal views of the leader, for Algerians generally do not actively support their Government's stance. Because the motivation is to this extent personal, it is less clearly defined. Elements are believed to include Boumediene's desire for Algerian geopolitical pre-eminence in northwest Africa as well as his pique at Hassan's attempt to confront him with a *fait accompli*. There also is anger with Ould Daddah for his betrayal of their earlier partnership. Boumediene regards the Moroccan monarchy as an offensive anachronism and would be pleased to precipitate the King's overthrow. Although he denies any Algerian territorial ambition, establishment of a client state would facilitate the export via the Atlantic of southwest Algeria's mineral resources when and if commercial exploitation proves viable. There is also, however, some truth to Boumediene's professions of concern for Saharan self-determination which probably evokes a sympathetic response from the more ideological elements of the ruling elite—as opposed to more pragmatic figures including Foreign Minister Bouteflika.

Although the Algerians have supported OAU consideration of the Sahara dispute, in contrast with the Moroccans, who have quietly sabotaged successive attempts to have it examined under OAU aegis, this presumably was for tactical advantage. Most potential intermediaries who visited both Rabat and Algiers reported the Algerians equally opposed to negotiations. As the costs of the conflict increase, and French support makes a Moroccan/Mauritanian defeat unlikely, the Algerians are perhaps becoming more willing to seek a negotiated settlement.

Over the longer term, the Algerians will remain highly nationalistic and reluctant to compromise their non-aligned status by giving the Soviets base rights. But they will cooperate with the Soviets in support of "progressive" Arab and African elements and might eventually grant some additional port privileges if their dependency on Soviet arms increases. The elaboration of their economic ties with the U.S. could modify their propensity to such behavior over the long run.

The Western Europeans

France and Spain remain deeply involved in the Maghreb. The former's support for Morocco and Mauritania provoked a crisis in Franco-Algerian relations when the Polisario seized French hostages and the French Air Force subsequently destroyed Polisario military formations. But neither the French nor the Algerians can afford the permanent alienation of the other, and a limited reconciliation once again appears underway. The French probably would support any peace initiative they regarded as viable and are particularly well placed

to put pressure on Rabat and Nouakchott to negotiate, but they are reluctant to promote a peace settlement unilaterally.

The French share their African protégés' concern about the Soviet role in Africa. They have intervened militarily to support friendly African regimes not only from Soviet-backed elements but from those sponsored by the Libyans in Chad. Given the domestic political sensibilities and limited French resources it is unclear how long France will be able and willing to sustain the present level of its commitments to Lebanon, Djibouti, Chad, Mauritania/Morocco, or where it will cut back if it chooses to do so.

Squeezed between their economic dependence on Algerian energy and the vulnerability of their Moroccan enclaves to military pressure by Hassan's troops, the Spaniards have made it clear they will not take any risky initiative to resolve the Sahara conflict.

Current U.S. Strategy

Basic U.S. objectives in relations with Morocco have been the preservation of close security and political ties and the expansion of American trade and investment. In relations with Algeria the fundamental objectives have been the protection and promotion of our economic interests and the normalization of the bilateral political relationship.

As the Sahara conflict unfolded in 1975, the Administration believed U.S. interests would be better served by the absorption of the Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania than by the possible creation of an unstable, Arab radical microstate, under Algerian suzerainty, which could be subject to Soviet influence. But the U.S. was reluctant to become very involved and recognized there were previous public U.S. affirmations in the United Nations of the applicability of the principle of self-determination. The U.S. consequently adopted a public posture of neutrality. However, in recognizing the Madrid Accord providing for the transfer of control of the Sahara from Spain to Morocco and Mauritania, and in voting for the pro-Moroccan resolution while abstaining on its pro-Algerian rival at the 1975 General Assembly, the U.S. revealed its pro-Moroccan bias.⁵

The pro-Moroccan resolution called for "free consultations" with "all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory" that would be "organized with the assistance of a representative of the United

⁵ The Madrid Accord, signed by Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania on November 14, 1975, ended Spanish presence in the Spanish Sahara, ceding the northern two-thirds of the territory to Morocco and the southern third to Mauritania. UN General Assembly Resolutions 3458A and 3458B were adopted on December 10, 1975. The United States abstained on the first and voted in favor of the second, which endorsed the Madrid Accord. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, pp. 188-190.

Nations appointed by the Secretary General". However, a UN mission in January–February 1976 concluded that conditions in the territory were too unsettled for meaningful "consultations" with the population.

The Spanish actually completed withdrawal on February 26, 1976, turning over administration to Morocco and Mauritania, who immediately proclaimed sovereignty over their respective portions of the western Sahara on the basis of a unanimous vote by those members of the old Spanish territorial assembly (a slim majority) who had chosen to remain rather than to join the Polisario independence movement in exile. UN Secretary General Waldheim declined the Moroccan invitation extended 36 hours before this vote to send a UN observer and subsequently refused to acknowledge that the terms of either the pro-Algerian or the pro-Moroccan UN resolution had been fulfilled. Although Morocco and Mauritania have pointed to Saharan participation in subsequent national elections as further evidence that self-determination has taken place, the only member of the international community to fully endorse their claim has been the Ivory Coast. The U.S. has said that it would not take a public position on the self-determination question, on the grounds that the UN has asked the OAU to deal with the entire issue. The Moroccans have correctly pointed out that U.S. statements characterizing them as an administering authority strongly imply that we are not satisfied that self-determination has yet occurred.

There has been little international interest in the dispute. With Moroccan encouragement, the OAU avoided action on the issue for two years. The U.S. position did not become a domestic issue until the question of continuing Moroccan use in the Sahara and Mauritania of F-5 aircraft obtained within the framework of the 1960 Moroccan-American military assistance agreement was brought to the attention of Congress. (To prevent use of U.S.-supplied equipment against Israel, that agreement specifies that weapons obtained from the U.S. Government can be used solely for the internal security and protection of the Kingdom of Morocco.)

The problem crystallized in autumn of 1977 when the Moroccan Government, after several military reverses by the Polisario, whose Soviet arms inventories had been greatly improved in previous months by the Algerians, requested U.S. authorization to purchase armed reconnaissance aircraft (OV-10) and Cobra helicopters to use in the Sahara and Mauritania.⁶ After considerable internal debate, the Department of State informed key Members of Congress in January and February of the Administration's desire to authorize the sale. It was explained the U.S. first would amend the bilateral assistance agreement

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 152 and Document 222.

to permit use of U.S.-furnished equipment, not only for the defense of the Kingdom of Morocco, but to protect territory subject to Moroccan administrative control, i.e., the Sahara, and the territory of nations in the region with which Morocco had defense arrangements, i.e., Mauritania. At the same time, we noted that we would make clear to the Moroccans that we would continue our policy of "reserving" on the issue of sovereignty.

There was considerable Congressional opposition to this proposal, led by HIRC Subcommittee Chairmen Diggs and Fraser, and SFRC Subcommittee Chairman Clark, and its further advocacy appeared unwise as the controversy with Congress deepened over aircraft proposals for the Middle East. The Moroccans and Congress subsequently were informed in March that the Department had decided not to proceed "at this time" with the amendment to the bilateral or the sales.⁷ Subcommittee staffers subsequently abandoned plans to try to write legislative restrictions on our traditional FMS programs with Morocco when the Moroccan Ambassador pledged that his Government would respect end use restrictions on future FMS equipment.⁸

Currently, the U.S. is seeking redeployment to bases in Morocco of the F-5 aircraft stationed outside the country. The Moroccans also have been asked to give formal assurances that other military equipment purchased in the U.S. will not be used in the Sahara and Mauritania. In addition to legal obligations, the Department of State seeks to preclude a Congressionally imposed arms embargo. Unless or until we change our policy, the F-5s are a key issue, and their use is a major problem for those vocal and influential Congressmen who oppose the use of U.S. arms in the Sahara.

The Moroccan response is uncertain. Until they can replace the F-5s with French-supplied F-1 aircraft just now coming off the production line, the F-5s will remain the only high performance aircraft in their inventory. With over a third of their army committed to the conflict with the Polisario, the Moroccans want to protect their forces with air power.

Pending a response from the Moroccans to these requests, and to offer some protection from Congressional criticism in the interim, the Department of State has deferred action on new requests for major equipment items. Already one million dollars has been diverted from the \$45 million FY 1978 FMS program earmarked for Morocco. As the fiscal year wears on, there may be further raids on this sum, should it remain uncommitted. Should the Moroccans refuse to withdraw the

⁷ See Document 153.

⁸ See Document 157.

F-5s and/or to give satisfactory assurances on use of U.S. equipment, we would have to decide if we are obligated to inform the Congress officially that Morocco has violated our agreement. Should this happen, it would further strain Moroccan-American relations.

Another element in U.S. policy toward the Sahara dispute has been refusal to play the role of intermediary. This has been suggested by the Algerians, but it is not clear how serious they have been. Informal discussion of their proposal has indicated their actual aspiration may have been to persuade the U.S. to reduce arms deliveries to the Moroccans. An additional motive may have been to sow further doubt in Moroccan minds about the reliability of their ties with the U.S. The formal response to these Algerian suggestions has been that the U.S. wishes to avoid major power involvement and believes African or Arab Governments could more appropriately play this role.

To summarize, the key elements of current U.S. strategy are:

- No U.S. weapons for Moroccan use in the Sahara or Mauritania.
- Suspension of approval for new arms transfers to Morocco pending clarification of Morocco's position on use of U.S.-furnished weapons in the Sahara and Mauritania.
- No recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara.
- Formal U.S. neutrality on the merits of the Sahara dispute.
- No U.S. role in mediation.
- Admonishing the Moroccans and the Algerians not to escalate the level of hostilities in the Sahara.
- Refusal to be critical of French military intervention against the Polisario.
- Reminding the Algerians of their responsibility to restrain the Polisario from attacking civilian targets in Mauritania and thus provoking French retaliation.
- Seeking to expand our energy-related commercial relations with Algeria.
- Building on the above, by being responsive to Algerian desires to expand official relations in the cultural, educational, and agricultural fields.

Effect on U.S. Interests

The risk of maintaining present U.S. policy is that an impasse on Moroccan use of American equipment involving continuing inaction on new arms transfer proposals could seriously erode bilateral relations and adversely impact on our relations with other moderate regimes in Africa and the Middle East. It is difficult to quantify this, but certainly we wish to avoid introducing still new complications in the atmosphere and substance of our relations with these countries. As concerns partic-

ulars on a bilateral basis, this would be a poor climate in which to press for formal authorization for the USAF deep space tracking facility. Obtaining permission for Sixth Fleet visits might become more difficult. Moroccan positions on Middle Eastern and African issues will remain generally consistent with those of the U.S. But there probably would be a less cooperative response to specific requests for assistance in pursuit of U.S. strategic and diplomatic objectives, particularly when the Moroccans perceive a significant cost involved in their cooperation with us.

Of course, a continuing impasse on Moroccan use of American arms is not inevitable. The Moroccans may respond affirmatively to recent urging that they withdraw the F-5s from the Sahara and Mauritania and that they provide suitable assurances regarding the use of FMS and Munitions Control list equipment they want to obtain in the U.S. A variant solution to the F-5 problem would be a Moroccan assurance that by sometime this fall (when the F-1s may be ready to be deployed), they would withdraw the F-5s. To some extent, such a deal could build on our latest Congressional testimony, in which we made the point that our policy on the F-5s previously had not been made clear to the Moroccans.⁹ Current American policy would be more viable, should this occur.

Alternative Strategies

1. Closer Alignment with Morocco

The Strategy

On the assumption that U.S. interests in the Maghreb, as well as in Africa and the Middle East, will be best served by strengthening our relations with Morocco, some of the following initiatives could be undertaken:

—Amendment or reinterpretation of our bilateral military assistance agreement to permit use of American weapons in the Sahara and Mauritania.

—Subsequent sale of the OV-10, Cobra, and other U.S. weapons without limitation on their use in the Sahara and Mauritania.

—Recognition of Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty in the Sahara, either unilaterally or perhaps in concert with the French and moderate Africans and Middle Easterners.

—Accept Moroccan acknowledgment that our F-5s must be withdrawn from Sahara and Mauritania as soon as they can be replaced by operational Mirage F-1s sold by France.

⁹ Presumably Veliotis's March statement. See footnote 3, Document 154.

To minimize the adverse impact of such a strategy on our relations with Algeria, some of the following initiatives would be appropriate:

- In return for U.S. support, urge the Moroccans to make concessions which would facilitate a negotiated settlement.

- Reschedule the Boumediene state visit.

- Offer U.S. training to Algerian military officers.

- Approve sales of selected non-lethal equipment to the Algerian military, e.g., computers and civilian model training aircraft.

(Should DOE subsequently approve pending LNG contracts, these decisions could have a salutary effect on our relations with Algeria.)

Constraints

Any change in our policies on arms sales and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty would arouse vocal Congressional opposition, probably including introduction of a motion of disapproval, and provoke accusations of bad faith and of violations of the Arms Export Control Act. There also would be some public criticism of the Administration for alleged inconsistency with its human rights and arms restraint policies, as well as claims that recognition of Moroccan sovereignty conflicted with UN charter obligations.

Effects on U.S. Interests

On the positive side, such a strategy would restore Moroccan and Mauritanian confidence in the reliability of American cooperation, encouraging continued Moroccan support in the realization of U.S. strategic and diplomatic objectives in the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East. One likely immediate benefit would be definitive Moroccan agreement for construction of the USAF deep space optical tracking station. If and when the Moroccans resolved the Polisario problem, they might be prepared to use their military forces in situations similar to Shaba or Chad, where a moderate regime faced an externally assisted threat. This strategy also would be welcomed by important Middle Eastern, Western European, and African governments friendly to the U.S. There would be voices in the Congress who would be supportive. On the other hand, continuing Moroccan concern about their Algerian frontiers, the limited size of the Moroccan army, and internal political constraints make it unlikely the Moroccans would be able or willing to commit forces in conflicts where they would be likely to suffer substantial casualties, where their involvement might be prolonged, or where they might be defeated. Their availability to deal with possible Cuban forces elsewhere in Africa, therefore, is probably extremely limited.

The negative consequences of this strategy would include some deterioration in relations with Algeria, and the possibility of some

Algerian purchases of additional arms to offset acquisitions by Morocco. The Algerians conceivably could retaliate by suspending energy deliveries to U.S. customers, but this would be much more damaging to Algerian interests than to American, as alternative sources are readily available. It certainly would be more difficult to persuade the Algerians to abandon their support for terrorists. U.S. firms probably would be awarded fewer Algerian contracts; few indeed, if Exim financing were unavailable. The Boumediene Government could again become openly confrontational and obstructive in international fora. Its dependence on the Soviets might increase, and the Soviets consequently could perhaps obtain greater Algerian assistance provisioning and maintaining their Mediterranean Squadron.

Stepped up American support could make the Moroccans less willing to negotiate. There is no guarantee it would enable the Moroccans to defeat the Polisario. It would accentuate the East/West element in the dispute since more significant amounts of U.S. arms would be employed against an adversary armed with Soviet weapons. There would also be some adverse African reaction.

2. More Active Promotion of a Negotiated Settlement

The Strategy

The Moroccans and Algerians are reported by reliable intelligence sources to have met twice this spring in unsuccessful efforts to resolve the Sahara dispute through negotiation.¹⁰ If it is determined that it is desirable for the U.S. to become actively engaged in efforts to promote a peaceful settlement, the following are possible scenarios:

A. Recalling several statements in the past two years in which King Hassan guardedly expressed willingness to consider further measures of self-determination for the Saharans, we could take the initiative to explore with him or with his counselors the steps the Moroccans would need to take to gain recognition of their "recovery" of the Sahara from favorably disposed countries (Spain, France, and the influential Arabs, as well as the U.S.).

B. The U.S. could encourage Arab or African states, singly or in concert, to urge Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria to meet again to discuss their differences. These states might be encouraged to offer their good offices in arranging meetings.

C. The U.S. could try to enlist France's cooperation in encouraging Arab or African offers of good offices. France itself could be asked to use its influence in Rabat, Nouakchott, and Algiers to promote

¹⁰ See Document 229.

negotiations. (We are aware the French have examined settlement options but have been waiting for an improvement in their relations with Algeria before consulting with us or other governments.)

D. The U.S. could encourage UN Secretary General Waldheim to try to bring together the Moroccans, Mauritians, and Algerians, perhaps during the Special Session on Disarmament, when senior diplomats from the three nations will be in New York.

The parties themselves will have to determine their objectives and what tradeoffs and other compromises might be acceptable. The following is an illustrative list describing possible elements of a peace settlement which might be suggested to potential intermediaries or to the parties themselves:

Basic Plan

—Establishment of a Polisario state in the portion of the Sahara now controlled by Mauritania (when first suggested by the Algerians in secret negotiations, this proposal was rejected by the Moroccans).

—Creation of a special region within Mauritania or special regions in both Mauritania and Morocco in which the Saharans would have some degree of political autonomy and/or guaranteed economic benefits.

—Establishment of a Mauritanian/Moroccan condominium in the Sahara which would permit internal self-government by the Saharans but leave the Moroccans and Mauritians responsible for defense and foreign relations.

—Creation of a federal state in which Morocco and the Sahara, or Morocco, the Sahara, and Mauritania would be constituent parts.

Inducements/Tradeoffs

—Moroccan ratification of its border agreement with Algeria recognizing Algerian sovereignty in the Tindouf region.

—Guaranteed Algerian access to an Atlantic port.

—Saudi assistance to a Saharan state or autonomous region(s).

—Increased Saudi assistance to Mauritania.

—An agreement on regional economic development with sharing of tasks and benefits.

—A Saharan referendum conducted in accordance with procedures acceptable to Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania.

Constraints

The U.S. alone does not have sufficient leverage with any of the governments concerned to pressure them to take steps they are not ready for. The main drawback to the strategy of indirect pressure

described is that every previous attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement has failed because the positions of the Algerians and Moroccans proved irreconcilable. The Algerians demanded the Saharans be permitted an unfettered exercise in self-determination; and the Moroccans would not allow any self-determination process which would call into question their retention of that portion of the Sahara they have annexed. There also are very difficult practical problems, e.g., authenticating the nationality claims of the area's nomadic population, the modalities of a plebescite when a large portion of the Saharans are living in Algerian-controlled refugee camps, etc.

A more active American role would be inconsistent with our previous reticence about providing good offices. We have a consistent public record of opposing great power involvement of any kind. Some potential intermediaries might be irritated by a U.S. approach to help solve a problem remote to their interests while the U.S. is perceived as responding inadequately to problems of more direct concern to them, e.g., the Saudis and their worries about the Horn and Aden.

Effects on U.S. Interests

A durable peace settlement almost certainly would further U.S. interests not only in the Maghreb but elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. However, a Saharan microstate could become a troublesome radical Arab entity susceptible to Soviet influence.

Unsuccessful mediation initiatives in which the U.S. hand were visible could sow further seeds of doubt in Moroccan minds about their relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, if an American initiative had failed due to Algerian intransigence, the Administration might face less Congressional opposition if it subsequently adopted the strategy of a closer alignment with Morocco.

Conclusion

Whatever strategy or strategies are adopted, the strain in current relations with Morocco, the need to persuade the Algerians that their relations with groups employing terrorism could endanger Algerian-American economic relations, and the postponement of the Hassan and Boumediene state visits are strong arguments for the dispatch of a special American envoy who could discuss these issues with leaders in Rabat and Algiers. His position, area experience, and the enthusiasm with which his appointment has been welcomed in Algeria and Morocco uniquely qualify Under Secretary Newsom for this task. Should it be decided that U.S. policy should go beyond the *status quo*, Newsom could undertake the demarches and/or negotiations associated with alternative strategies.

32. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 5, 1978

SUBJECT

PRM/NSC-34: North Africa

At Tab A is the inter-agency study on North Africa that we requested. It focuses on Morocco, Algeria, the Sahara conflict and our policy choices regarding arms for Morocco, recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara, and the prospects for encouraging political settlement of the Sahara conflict. Present U.S. policy is well-summarized on pages 15 and 16 of the attached study.² *The options are a bit artificial, and I recommend below a somewhat different course of action combining elements of both.* (C)

Why Consider Changes in Policy?

It can be argued that our present low profile in North Africa is appropriate in light of our limited influence and limited interests. There is no impending crisis in either US-Moroccan or US-Algerian relations, although there are some problems in each case. Nor is the Sahara conflict likely to lead to another Horn of Africa situation. (C)

The argument for seriously considering some adjustments in our policy is based on the belief that preventive diplomacy now may keep minor problems from becoming significantly larger. There are signs of impending difficulty if we do not revise some of our policies, as well as hints of opportunities to encourage a peaceful settlement of the Sahara dispute. (U)

The Key Choices

*Virtually everyone agrees that we should at some point respond positively to the Moroccan request for 24 Cobra helicopters worth approximately \$100 million.*³ The questions revolve around timing, conditions and context:

—King Hassan is looking for visible evidence that we value our relationship with Morocco. This is a long-standing concern of his, but it is presently intensified because of Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 69, PRC 062, 6/13/78, North Africa. Secret. Sent for information.

² Attached; printed as Document 31. An update to the paper is also attached and printed below.

³ Inderfurth highlighted this sentence in the left-hand margin.

—While King Hassan states that he does not need the Cobras in the Sahara, we must anticipate that they will be used there if the armed conflict persists.⁴

—Our reading of the US-Moroccan 1960 Defense Agreement has precluded use of US-supplied arms in the Sahara.⁵ There is also some Congressional opposition (Clark, Fraser, Diggs) to selling arms to Morocco which would be used in the Sahara.⁶

—We have indicated a willingness to allow the Moroccans to use US-supplied arms in Mauritania, provided the Mauriticians make such a request. (This would follow the French pattern of helping Morocco and Mauritania, but not using French aircraft in the Sahara itself.)

—Hassan has been very stubborn on the Sahara issue, as has Boumediene. There are, however, some faint indications that a dialogue may have begun. We might try to use the supply of Cobras in order to encourage a political settlement of the Sahara dispute. There is a risk, however, that Hassan will not show more flexibility and that Boumediene will also react negatively, thereby complicating the situation.

—The Algerians may react to the sale of Cobras to Morocco by stepping up their support of Polisario and buying more arms from the Soviets. (S)

A Strategy

We are primarily confronted with decisions which have symbolic political importance, but which are not driven by military necessity. The Saharan situation is essentially a military stalemate. (S)

If we move abruptly and decisively toward a more pro-Moroccan stance, this will be seen as consistent with a firm anti-Soviet stance in Africa. It will be appreciated, but will raise expectations and requests for assistance, on the part of other pro-Western Africans. If we move more cautiously, we risk disappointing King Hassan, but may succeed in maintaining some useful ties to the Algerians⁷ which will help to reduce Algerian proclivities for trouble-making. Our professed interest in a North-South dialogue and in dealing constructively with regimes of various persuasions would also be enhanced by a somewhat more cautious approach. (S)

Our long-term interests in North Africa are best protected if we can remain on relatively good terms with both Morocco and Algeria. Only the

⁴ Inderfurth wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: "Why not seek *assurances* on their use?"

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 223.

⁶ See Documents 153, 219, and 220.

⁷ Inderfurth highlighted this part of the sentence in the left-hand margin.

Sahara conflict, and policy choices related to it, calls into question the kind of balanced posture that has served us well in the past ten years. We should not fall into the simplistic trap of labeling Algeria a “radical” Arab state and thereby placing it in the same category as Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen. Algeria is closer to Syria, in the sense that we have some common interests, the makings of a modest political dialogue, as well as serious disagreements on numerous issues. Boumediene, like Assad, is capable of being quite pragmatic and rational and is wary of excessive Soviet influence in his country. (S)

My conclusion is that we should try to encourage a political settlement of the Sahara conflict through some quiet diplomacy, including frank talks with both Hassan and Boumediene. Meanwhile, we should begin the process of responding positively to Hassan’s request for the Cobras by consulting with Congress. The Cobras have a normal delivery lead-time of about two years. We do not have to come to grips with where the helicopters will be used until nearer the delivery date. This gives us a little bit of leverage with both sides. With the Moroccans, we could say that we cannot permit use of US arms in the Sahara unless Morocco can go some distance in meeting the UN provision for consultations with the population of the Sahara to determine their political preferences.⁸ We will, however, continue normal military supplies for use in Morocco and Mauritania. At the same time, the Algerians might conclude from our decision on the Cobras that a military approach to the Sahara problem is not going to pay off and they might show greater interest in negotiations. Our basic interest is to avoid a full-scale Moroccan-Algerian confrontation, which would draw the Soviets more deeply into Algeria. We have legitimate concerns on both sides of this dispute, and thus we have reason to try to promote a settlement, not to exacerbate existing tensions. (S)

Recommended Course of Action

The PRC should be encouraged to recommend the following steps:

—Plan to proceed with the sale of 24 Cobras to Morocco. Congressional leaders would be consulted, especially potential opponents such as Clark and Fraser.⁹

—Establish basic policy guidance that we should strengthen relations with Morocco, but with due attention to the effect on US-Algerian relations. We have an interest in keeping the Soviets from becoming more deeply involved in Algeria.

—Leave in abeyance for the moment the question of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara. Take position that this is an issue for the

⁸ See footnote 5, Document 31.

⁹ Inderfurth underlined “Clark and Fraser.”

OAU and UN to resolve. For the moment, allow use of US-supplied arms in Morocco and Mauritania, but not in the Sahara.

—Authorize Newsom mission to Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, and Paris, either in July or September, for political discussions.¹⁰ Quietly seek to determine interest in political settlement in Sahara. (Newsom is well-known in North Africa and is highly regarded).

—Prior to Newsom's departure, we should have tentative dates to suggest for Hassan,¹¹ Boumediene and Nouria visits to Washington in late 1978 or early 1979. (S)

Apart from an early decision on Cobras, we do not have to proceed rapidly in our North Africa policy. What is required is a general sense of purpose to guide the actions of the bureaucracy as it makes its day-to-day recommendations. A simplistic pro-Morocco, anti-Algeria framework is inadequate. We need a greater appreciation for nuance. This should be reflected in the PRC discussion. It can then be used to direct our actions over the next several months. Your contribution can be to provide the philosophical underpinnings for a balanced policy in North Africa which will protect our interests both in Morocco and Algeria. Vance will be more inclined to focus on specific decisions such as the stationing of F-5s in Mauritania and the sale of Cobras to Morocco. These are important decisions, which you can support, but they need to be put in a somewhat broader context of our Africa, Middle East, and US-Soviet strategies. (S)

Attachment

Interagency Paper¹²

Washington, undated

Update to PRM-34 Background Paper

The second Shaba crisis has focused attention on Morocco's willingness to respond militarily to threats to at least one African moderate regime. King Hassan has sent 1,000 combat-experienced soldiers to Zaire where they will form the core of the Africa peace-keeping force.

Morocco's delight that the U.S. is responding more positively to the second Shaba incursion is tempered by disappointment that the

¹⁰ Inderfurth circled this sentence. Newsom visited Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat. See Documents 101, 102, and 203.

¹¹ Inderfurth underlined "Hassan" and wrote in the right-hand margin: "most important. Rick."

¹² Secret.

U.S. still is unwilling to sell Morocco weapons for use in the Sahara and Mauritania against the Polisario. While Saudi financing may eliminate any need for U.S. replacements, the situation may become even more awkward if we were to replace equipment taken by Moroccan units to Shaba but insisted that such equipment could not be used in the Sahara and Mauritania.

Recent efforts to break the Moroccan/American deadlock on use of F-5 aircraft in the western Sahara and Mauritania have not been successful.¹³ In a demarche to the Moroccan Ambassador, Under Secretary Newsom said the Administration will have to report to the Congress a violation of our bilateral military assistance agreement and wants to be able to state that the F-5s are being withdrawn.¹⁴ King Hassan replied through the Ambassador that he considers his use of the F-5s in the Sahara and Mauritania within the scope of the bilateral agreement, as the purpose of their employment in these areas is to defend the Kingdom of Morocco.¹⁵ We have told the French we might authorize use of the F-5s to defend Mauritania (excluding that portion of the Sahara annexed by Nouakchott),¹⁶ provided we have official requests from the Moroccans and Mauritaniens. The French have said they can arrange for the Mauritanian request whenever we wish.

The nature of the Moroccan arms request changed with the King's decision that he is not interested for the moment in the OV-10 aircraft but would like only Cobra helicopters.¹⁷ Secretary Vance, to whom the King's preference was communicated by Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta May 25, promised a thorough examination and prompt response.¹⁸ The Moroccans are keenly aware that the Middle East arms package has survived Congressional challenge and now expect Administration action on their arms requests.

¹³ An unknown hand underlined "Moroccan/American deadlock on use of F-5 aircraft in the western Sahara and Mauritania have not been successful."

¹⁴ In telegram 117714 to Rabat, May 9, the Department reported on the May 3 meeting between Newsom and Bengelloun. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196-0742)

¹⁵ An unknown hand underlined "King Hassan replied through the Ambassador that he considers his use of the F-5s in the Sahara and Mauritania within the scope of the bilateral agreement." In telegram 126109 to Rabat, May 18, the Department reported on Bengelloun's May 16 meeting with Veliotis in which the Ambassador presented Hassan's views. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209-0972)

¹⁶ An unknown hand underlined "We have told the French we might authorize use of the F-5s to defend Mauritania (excluding that portion of the Sahara annexed by Nouakchott)."

¹⁷ See Document 156. Inderfurth underlined this sentence.

¹⁸ An unknown hand underlined "prompt response." Telegram 136040 to Rabat, May 29, reported on Vance's meeting in New York with Boucetta. The two were attending the UN Special Session on Disarmament. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0376)

In a newspaper interview King Hassan showed some flexibility on the status of the western Sahara, when he allegedly said he could foresee some limited United Nations role.¹⁹ We currently are seeking clarification of his thinking on this important point. In a May 25 conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Saunders, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika would not say if there have been direct Algerian/Moroccan negotiations but hinted that a compromise involving something less than self-determination might be possible.²⁰ While maintaining that Algeria would be open to American mediation, he did not make any such request or show great interest in the possibility. He did express appreciation for U.S. neutrality in the conflict, while seeking half-heartedly U.S. restraint on French military intervention.

¹⁹ An unknown hand underlined "King Hassan" and "he could foresee some limited United Nations role."

²⁰ An unknown hand underlined "Bouteflika" and "hinted that a compromise involving something less than self-determination might be possible." In telegram 135959 to Algiers, May 27, the Department reported on Saunders's May 25 meeting with Bouteflika. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0036)

33. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 13, 1978, 5:30-6:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

North Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs (Chairman)
Harold Saunders, Asst Secy, NEA

Treasury

Ernie Chase, Intl Energy Policy

JCS

LGEM William Smith

CIA

Robert Bowie, Director,
NFIA Center
David Blee, NIO/NEA

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 36, North Africa: 1977-1978. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found.

Defense

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
Robert Murray, Dep Asst Scy, NEA

Energy

Harry Bergold, Asst Scy, Intl Affairs

ACDA

Barry Blechman, Asst Dir, Weapons
Evaluation and Control Bureau

White House

David Aaron

NSC

William B. Quandt

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Policy Review Committee discussed our broad interests in maintaining close relations with Morocco, while at the same time strengthening ties with Algeria. To pursue this course, decisions are required on a number of issues involving our military relationship with Morocco, the dispute in the Sahara, and possible visits by Hassan and Boumedienne to Washington. (C)

1. *F-5s in Mauritania and Sahara.* Morocco undertook in its 1960 military agreement with us not to use U.S.-supplied military equipment outside its own borders. Since we do not recognize Morocco's annexation of the Western Sahara, the deployment of F-5s to that region is technically in violation of our agreement. We have asked the Moroccans to remove the aircraft and have informed them of our requirement to report to Congress any violations of end-use of U.S.-supplied military equipment. They have not responded. State proposed, and all other agencies concurred, that we should agree to Moroccan use of F-5s in defense of Mauritania, but that we could not permit their use in the Western Sahara. F-5s in the Sahara should be withdrawn as soon as possible. (S)

2. *Sale of Cobras.* Morocco has formally requested 24 Cobra helicopters. All agencies recommend that we agree to the sale, subject to the condition that no Cobras would be delivered until the F-5s were withdrawn from the Sahara or the Sahara dispute had been peacefully resolved. Defense suggested that Morocco might be well advised to consider the OV-10 aircraft instead of additional Cobras. (Congress will have the normal period of time to consider these cases.) (S)

3. *Notification of Congress.* We intend to notify appropriate Congressional committees orally that a technical violation of our bilateral military agreement with Morocco may have taken place. We will explain the steps underway to remove the F-5s from the Sahara and will explain the broader context of trying to promote a peaceful resolution of the Sahara dispute. After further talks with the Moroccans, and a trip by Under Secretary Newsom to North Africa, we would formally notify Congress of the Moroccan violation. We want to avoid a sharp negative reaction. (C)

4. *Sovereignty over Sahara.* It was generally agreed that we should encourage Morocco and Algeria to negotiate a peaceful resolution of this dispute, and that we should urge King Hassan to adopt a more forthcoming attitude toward carrying out the UN resolutions calling for consultations with the local population as part of the process of self-determination. It was not felt that we should actively try to mediate the dispute or unilaterally change our position of neutrality on the question of sovereignty over the Sahara. (S)

5. *US-Algerian Relations.* Our economic interests are substantial, although these may not continue to develop as rapidly as in the past if two large Algerian LNG projects are disapproved, as is anticipated by the Department of Energy. Exim Bank lending remains a significant aspect of our economic relations. Prospective legislation concerning international terrorism could possibly jeopardize those relations if Algeria is considered among those countries supporting terrorism. We have periodically discussed this issue with the Algerians, and a frank talk with Boumediene would be useful. In addition, we should consider more Presidential correspondence with Boumediene on substantive issues. (C)

6. *Hassan-Boumediene Visits.* We have little tangible to offer in our political relations with Algeria beyond an invitation to Boumediene to visit Washington. Consequently, the group felt that we should begin to consider appropriate dates for an early visit by Boumediene, which was previously postponed. King Hassan of Morocco has expressed an interest in visiting Washington this fall. Since these visits are directly related, Under Secretary Newsom should be in a position to extend invitations when he visits North Africa. (S)

34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 20, 1978

SUBJECT

PRC on North Africa

The Policy Review Committee met on June 13 to consider our relations with Morocco and Algeria. The summary of the discussion is at Tab A for your approval.² (C)

David Newsom, or another senior State Department official, is planning a trip to North Africa in the near future. If you approve, he would discuss the course of action recommended by the PRC with King Hassan and President Boumediene. He would also want to carry substantive letters from you to each of the leaders he will be meeting. The letters are being drafted now. The key passage in each will be an indication about when they could expect to visit Washington. The PRC recommendation is at point 6 of the summary. (S)

We will also want to respond soon to the Moroccan request for 24 Cobra helicopters. The PRC's examination of this issue was an attempt to balance two conflicting aspects of our North Africa policy. First, we wish to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the area, which means preserving our ties to Algeria to keep it from drifting toward the Soviet camp. At the same time, we want to maintain the very close bilateral relations we have with Morocco. So long as the warfare continues in the Western Sahara, our attempt to maintain a balanced posture is going to be less than satisfactory to both Algeria and Morocco. The recommendation in the second point of the summary is designed to use the sale of the Cobras as a modest incentive for Morocco to pull its F-5s out of the Western Sahara, where they are in violation of our bilateral military cooperation agreement, and to work toward a peaceful settlement of the dispute. If you approve, we would raise this issue with the parties in the next few weeks, possibly during Under Secretary Newsom's trip. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 36, North Africa: 1977–1978. Secret. Sent for action.

² Tab A is attached but not printed. The meeting's summary of conclusions is printed as Document 33.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the summary of the PRC meeting as the policy framework for North Africa.³

³ Carter checked the Approve option and initialed beneath the recommendation. In a June 21 memorandum to Vance, Harold Brown, Blumenthal, Schlesinger, Warnke, General Brown, and Turner, Brzezinski wrote: "The President has approved this summary as the USG policy framework for North Africa." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 36, North Africa: 1977–1978)

35. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 3, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Egypt and Libya.]

2. *Egypt-Libya:* Dave Newsom met today with Egyptian Director of Military Intelligence, General Shawkat, to caution Egypt against moving militarily against Libya.² Shawkat acknowledged that there has been some augmentation of Egyptian forces in the Western Desert facing Libya, but explained that the recent transfer of two brigades from Suez westward reflected a decision to redeploy some troops facing Israel in the context of peace negotiations. Shawkat categorically said Egypt could not afford to go to war against Libya.

I have cautioned General Ali on action against Libya, and we are instructing Ambassador Eilts to raise this matter with Sadat.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Egypt and Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 11/78. Secret.

² In telegram 282694 to Cairo and the White House, November 7, the Department reported on Newsom's November 3 meeting with Shawkat: "Newsom made point that, while we would understand any GOE deployment of forces to meet defensive needs vis-a-vis conceivable Libyan attack, we do not see any benefit should the GOE initiate action against Qadhafi government." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2423)

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 4, 1978, 1016Z

24272. Exdis distribute as Nodis. Subject: USG Attitude re Possible Egyptian Move Against Libya. Ref: State 280929.²

1. I will speak to Sadat soonest to raise Libyan matter with him. Next few days are not likely be propitious, however, since Boutros Ghali will be here urging what is likely to be a reluctant Sadat to agree to accept our treaty language on various disputed points. Injecting Libyan issue while this internal debate is going on will only make Boutros' job here more difficult.

2. Sadat will unquestionably resent our intercession on Libyan matter, especially if sole purpose of my call is to hector him on this point. It might ease the blow a bit if I had some other important issue to discuss with him on which my request for a meeting could be pegged. Libyan matter could then be tacked on to general discussion. If Dept has any more positive elements that it wants raised with Sadat in near future, please let me know in next few days. If not, I will make the demarche solely in terms of the Libyan affair.

3. I note UnderSec Newsom raised subject with Shawkat. There is nothing wrong with having raised it with Shawkat, but doing so is lecturing to the converted. Shawkat has long told us that he is opposed to Libyan venture and his advice to his immediate superiors has been on the impractical nature of such a caper in terms of logistic and other problems. But Shawkat has no direct input to Sadat.

4. Apart from Sadat, the man who will have the most input into question of whether such an Egyptian military operation should take place is now in Washington. I refer to MinDefense LTG Kamal Hassan Ali. It is Hassan Ali who in his previous position of Director of General Intelligence regularly sent Sadat, via Mubarak, reports suggesting an operation into Libya would be no problem. Gamasy's opposition to such a move, supported by Shawkat's estimates, was one reason for the former MinWar's dismissal. It might be assumed that Shawkat will report Newsom's demarche to Kamal Hassan Ali, but we should not

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2758. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Tripoli. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

² Telegram 280929 to Cairo, November 4, instructed Eilts to meet with Sadat to discuss Libya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

rely on this. Shawkat and Hassan Ali have for past several years been competitors in the intelligence purveying business and Shawkat now finds himself in the uncertain position of being subordinate to the man whose estimates he consistently denigrated. In the circumstances, Shawkat is not likely to beard Hassan Ali too strongly. Since Hassan Ali is in Washington, it would seem to me that the simplest thing to do would be for the Secretary or Secretary Brown to have a heart-to-heart talk with Hassan Ali on the subject. Doing so would also facilitate any demarche that I make here, since Sadat will never understand why I am raising the issue with him when no one in Washington has raised it with his Minister of Defense and principal planner.³

Eilts

³ Telegram 281969 to Cairo, November 4, instructed Eilts to defer the meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-2392)

**37. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, March 24, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting, March 27

Attached is an agenda² for the PRC meeting scheduled for March 27 on aspects of U.S. relations with Algeria and Morocco. Also attached is a discussion paper for the meeting. The Department would appreciate

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 098, 3/27/79, North Africa. Secret.

² The agenda is attached but not printed.

distribution of these documents to representatives of other agencies expected to participate in the PRC meeting.³

Peter Tarnoff⁴
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting
Tuesday, March 27, 3:00 p.m.

Morocco's Value to the U.S.

Morocco is of value to us because of its strategic location, its key role as a backer of President Sadat within the Arab camp, and its support for African moderates.

Location: Morocco's geographic position is of strategic importance because Morocco is a gateway to Africa and the Mediterranean for ships and aircraft coming from North America. We want continued access to Morocco's ports and airfields for U.S. ships, including nuclear-powered vessels, and our military aircraft. One of VOA's two African transmitters is located outside Tangier. The King has agreed in principle but is delaying further action on construction of an Air Force deep space surveillance station. The station must be placed in Morocco, Spain or Portugal to complete a worldwide network.

Middle East: Hassan continues to back Sadat even though there is domestic opposition to this policy and in spite of the costs in terms of loss of radical Arab support for Morocco's position in the western Sahara. Hassan supports Sadat because he believes this is the best way to stem Soviet inroads in Africa and the Middle East. This support may be crucial as we and Sadat seek to dampen adverse Arab reaction to the Egypt/Israel agreement.

³ Under a March 26 covering memorandum to Mondale, Vance, Blumenthal, Harold Brown, Kreps, Warnke, General Brown, and Turner, Dodson forwarded the agenda and discussion paper. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 098, 3/27/79, North Africa)

⁴ Hughes signed for Tarnoff.

⁵ Secret.

Africa: Moroccan troops were vital in reestablishing Zairian government control in Shaba in 1977 and 1978. Morocco provides logistical support for both its troops and for the other African contingents. The King has expressed willingness to deploy his troops elsewhere in Africa to protect western interests.

Morocco in Difficulty

Serious economic problems have begun to undermine the national consensus which Hassan created by the Green March⁶ and his vigorous Saharan policies. Paradoxically Moroccans remain united in support of their government's claim to sovereignty in the Sahara, but they blame the Sahara conflict for the economic problems they are encountering. The Government also is criticized by a populace which ignores Algeria's superiority in military equipment for not striking at Polisario bases in Tindouf after the February attack on Tan Tan (50 miles within Morocco's 1975 borders).⁷ Political opponents who benefited from liberalization measures the King implemented in the past three years have begun to criticize the monarch. Strikes and student protests are becoming more frequent.

Since the Tan Tan attack the Government has been forced to stop pretending that it has the military situation in the Sahara under control. Actually there has been no recent sharp deterioration in the situation on the ground. But the Polisario has fought the Moroccans to a stalemate. The guerrillas have established staging bases within the Sahara, and Moroccan control does not extend beyond urban centers. A critical lack of spare parts and hesitant leadership preclude vigorous counterinsurgency measures. A pro-Moroccan coup in Mauritania would make it more difficult for the Polisario to continue to use staging bases in the Mauritanian Sahara to mount attacks against Moroccan forces to the north. But the breakdown of the ceasefire between Mauritania and the Polisario would force the Moroccans to engage again in the active defense of Mauritania. Poor military morale reflects war weariness and frustration at not being able to strike at the Polisario's sanctuaries in Algeria. Although Hassan has taken elaborate precautions to protect himself against a military coup, the possibility of one cannot be excluded.

⁶ In November 1975, the Moroccan Government organized a demonstration involving several hundred thousand Moroccans, who "marched" several miles into disputed territory in the Western Sahara, accompanied by thousands of Moroccan troops. For the U.S. reaction, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Documents 100-109.

⁷ In telegram 694 from Rabat, January 31, the Embassy reported on the January 28 Polisario attack on Tan Tan in southern Morocco. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790048-1209)

Unless the Saudis resume payment of the \$500 million annual subsidy provided Morocco during the first two years of the Sahara conflict, the King will have to continue his unpopular austerity measures in the economic sphere and he will be unable to purchase new weapons for his army. It probably will be at least two years before retrenchment restores Morocco's economic health.

The King feels beleaguered. With characteristic political skill he has turned the Tan Tan attack to his political advantage, forming a National Defense Committee and nominating to it the leader of the principal opposition group. But he recognizes this tactic offers only partial and momentary protection from the rising groundswell of domestic discontent. The King has a propensity for the dramatic which could lead him to decisions as dangerous as an attack on Tindouf, which could make his position ever more insecure.

The King feels let down by several of his more important foreign friends. Termination of the Saudi subsidy was a heavy blow. Payment problems have interrupted the flow of French weapons and spare parts. Hassan feels the U.S. has been particularly unhelpful. From his perspective our public rejection of his claims to sovereignty in the Sahara (which occurred in response to Congressional inquiries) undermined his diplomatic position. Moroccans feel that our refusal to sell them new weapons to use in the Sahara, while Soviet arms deliveries to the Algerians continue without interruption, has put them at an unfair disadvantage in Morocco's struggle with the Polisario. As we look to Hassan for support on our Middle East policy, we find him full of resentment for our apparent insensitivity to his needs.

Stated below are several options which the U.S. could implement to take some of the current strain out of our relations with Morocco.

A. Sell the Moroccans Weapons to Defend the Sahara

The U.S. recognizes that Morocco shares responsibility for administrative control of the Sahara with Mauritania by virtue of the Madrid Accords. The U.S. does not recognize the claims of Morocco and Mauritania to sovereignty in the Sahara, and neither does any other nation. Apart from the British, who are not significant arms suppliers, the U.S. is Morocco's only arms supplier to insist that the weapons it furnishes not be used to defend the Sahara. This U.S. position has been based on the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act which authorize U.S. sales only for legitimate self-defense and internal security. The U.S.-Moroccan Military Assistance Agreement of 1960, which implements the Act, limits uses of American-furnished weapons to the defense and internal security of the Kingdom of Morocco.

We have given our permission for the Moroccans to use U.S. weapons elsewhere, e.g., collective defense measures in Shaba, thus effec-

tively amending the bilateral. However, we have not been willing to amend the bilateral to authorize use of American weapons for the defense of the Sahara because Morocco is not only defending the territory but seeking to consolidate its claim to sovereignty in the territory.⁸ An interpretation of the relevant U.S. legislation that would allow use of American weapons to defend the Sahara would be subject to Congressional challenge. Some Members of Congress would oppose Moroccan use of American weapons to defend the Sahara on the grounds that (1) it would be inconsistent with U.S. support for Saharan self-determination; (2) that it would violate U.S. law; (3) it would involve the U.S. in an African conflict; and (4) it would damage U.S. relations with Algeria.⁹

The Moroccans probably are most interested in the OV-10 aircraft, six of which might be available on short notice. They also have said they want to purchase anti-tank helicopters. Supplying U.S. military equipment to Morocco would not be likely to end the military stalemate in the Sahara. Its principal benefit would be improved U.S.-Moroccan relations at this time. There is an outside chance that such a demonstration of U.S. support for Morocco might persuade the Algerians to negotiate a settlement.

B. Further Demarches

The U.S. has consistently counseled the Moroccans and Algerians to seek a negotiated settlement. We called the Algerians' attention to the conciliatory tone of Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta's February 1 letter suggesting bilateral negotiation.¹⁰ We also told the Algerians we thought Polisario attacks on Moroccan cities, e.g., Tan Tan, did not improve peace prospects. The Algerians' discouraging response to Boucetta has been cited by Hassan as the reason he must search for other means, presumably military, to end the struggle in the Sahara.

We could repeat our demarches, perhaps escalating them to the Algerians by having the Secretary call in the Algerian Ambassador to urge reconsideration of Boucetta's suggestion for negotiation. We could urge Hassan to be more patient and to tell him of our further approach

⁸ Despite repeated American demarches, King Hassan has refused to withdraw U.S.-supplied F-5s from the Sahara. While we consider this use inconsistent with our bilateral arms agreement, the Moroccans say there is no inconsistency because they consider the Sahara Moroccan territory. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ ACDA believes some in Congress also would object that furnishing arms for this purpose could cause other countries to doubt the significance the U.S. attaches to end use agreements. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Boucetta's letter to Bouteflika was not found. In telegram 479 from Algiers, February 18, the Embassy commented on Bouteflika's reply. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790078-0726)

to the Algerians. There is no reason not to try such demarches. But there is little reason to believe they would be effective, and Hassan would regard them as an inadequate U.S. response to his problems.

C. Economic Aid to Support a Settlement

More concrete U.S. support for a peaceful solution would be an American offer to provide economic assistance as part of a settlement formula. U.S. aid either could be extended to a Polisario state in the Mauritanian Sahara, or perhaps to a supranational entity created to provide assistance on a regional basis to all parties involved in the conflict. Congressional attitudes probably would be sympathetic but it is unlikely that a pledge of U.S. aid in itself would give much impetus to a peace process. Any such U.S. offer would have to be coordinated closely with the Moroccans to avoid misunderstanding.

D. U.S. Mediation

At one time or another, both Morocco and Algeria have asked us to mediate the Sahara dispute. However, what each state actually had in mind was U.S. pressure on its opponent, and neither appeared ready to make the concessions required for a compromise. We declined to mediate because the basis for agreement seemed absent, and because we thought it preferable to avoid superpower involvement. We also believed various Arab and African governments, as well as the French and the Spanish, were better qualified to serve as mediators.

We have given consistent support to the mediation efforts of others. Most recently, we encouraged President Nimeri to exercise the mandate given him by the OAU, and we voted for a UNGA resolution last fall supporting his efforts. We have told both the French and the Spanish we would collaborate diplomatically in any peace process they might be able to initiate. (The French have not been interested in our cooperation in their abortive efforts, and the Spanish never had been able to get an initiative underway.)

Mauritania's new leaders obviously want an end to the war. They and the Polisario have participated in a *de facto* ceasefire since July 1978. However, the Mauritania's so far have been unwilling to negotiate a separate peace with the Polisario, realizing this would invite retaliation by their Moroccan allies. Boucetta's February 1 letter to his Algerian counterpart suggested rescheduling of the summit meeting which Hassan and Boumediene were to have held at Brussels in September 1978 but had to be cancelled due to Boumediene's illness. Bouteflika replied that there could be no discussion of a solution to the Sahara conflict without the Polisario, knowing the Moroccans would not agree to sit down with a movement they insist is an Algerian creation.

Hassan cannot abandon Morocco's portion of the Sahara without grave risk to his throne. The Algerians say they will settle for any

arrangement satisfactory to the Polisario. The latter, whose degree of independence from the Algerians is not clear, insist that they must have the entire western Sahara. Clearly the chances for successful mediation are slim. Any offer of mediation would give rise immediately to the question of the Polisario's participation in the mediation process. Pressure on the Moroccans to deal with the Polisario would be strongly resented in Rabat.

Algerian Reaction

The Algerians would react negatively only to the option of permitting the Moroccans to use U.S. military equipment to defend the Sahara. No matter how qualified this permission, the Algerians would criticize our "abandonment of neutrality" and publicly claim that our action was motivated by our desire to guarantee Hassan's support for our Mideast peace process efforts. If we gave Hassan unqualified permission to acquire American arms, the Algerians probably would discriminate against U.S. firms in the award of new construction and import contracts. The injury to our economic and commercial interests might be less if we permitted the Moroccans to acquire only new systems of a primarily defensive or transport nature, e.g., sensors or additional C-130s. Any change in U.S. policy on arms would put strain on our political relations with Algeria, which though never intimate, have been improving in recent months. A decision of this nature also could have an unwelcome influence on the foreign policy orientation of Algeria's new government.

38. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1979, 3:30–4:35p.m.

SUBJECT

North Africa (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs

Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, Science &
Technology

Harold Saunders, Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs

Treasury

John Lange, Director, Office of
Trade Finance

Defense

David McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary for International
Security Affairs

Owen Roberts, Director, Africa
Region

Commerce

Juanita Kreps
Abe Katz, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International
Economic Policies and
Resources

ACDA

Barry Blechman, Assistant
Director, Weapons Evaluation
and Control Bureau

JCS

LTG William Y. Smith, Assistant
to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff

CIA

Robert Bowie, Director National
Foreign Assessment Center
Robert Ames, NIO Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

White House

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National
Security Affairs

NSC

William Quandt, Staff Member
Jerry Funk, Staff Member

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. CIA's assessment is that Morocco is facing serious problems, largely because of the stagnating economic situation, the continuing Sahara conflict, and the ineffective leadership. These trends may get worse, with serious consequences for U.S.-Moroccan relations. It was agreed that the U.S. has a serious interest in Morocco and in cooperation with King Hassan. Morocco's generally moderate stand on Middle East and African issues is a particularly valuable asset. While taking steps

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 098, 3/27/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the summary of conclusions. The minutes of the meeting were not found.

to strengthen U.S.-Moroccan relations, however, we should be mindful of our important economic interests in Algeria and of the fluid leadership situation there.

2. The Moroccans have requested \$6 million worth of spare parts for the F-5 aircraft. Until now, this package has been held up because of disagreement on the use of the F-5 in the Sahara. All agencies, with the exception of ACDA, now believe we should go forward with this request. ACDA's dissent is based on the belief that the spare parts will not significantly affect the military situation confronting Morocco and will constitute a technical violation of the U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement. Defense and State have determined that the spare parts would not constitute such a violation. Congressional consultations on this case have indicated general support, with the exception of Senator McGovern.

3. Defense and JCS will quietly examine other military items which might be of a particular help to the Moroccans in the present circumstances. Defense believes that inadequate communications equipment and surveillance may be the major problems currently confronting the Moroccan forces. Recommendations should be available within several weeks.

4. All participants felt that the Sahara conflict could not be resolved militarily. At some point, a political settlement will be essential. It is not clear that the time is right for a settlement, nor is there consensus on what possible role the U.S. might play. Consequently, a small study group will be formed to examine diplomatic strategies for beginning the process of accommodation between Morocco and Algeria concerning the Sahara.² This group will also explore means for channeling more economic assistance to Morocco, and in particular a resumption of assistance from Saudi Arabia.

² See Document 239.

39. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 28, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC on North Africa (U)

The Policy Review Committee met today² to consider our relations with Morocco. The immediate case in point is a Moroccan request for spare parts for the F-5 aircraft which they are using in the Sahara. All agencies, with the exception of ACDA, recommended approval of this \$6 million package. (S)

Other issues in our relations with Morocco and Algeria will be reviewed on an on-going basis with the objective of strengthening our relations with both countries. I will report to you later on the results of these further studies. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the summary of conclusions and particularly the recommendation on spare parts for the F-5s.³ (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 098, 3/27/79, North Africa. Secret. Sent for action.

² The meeting took place on March 27. See Document 38.

³ Carter checked the Approved option and wrote "done last week. J" in the right-hand margin next to it. Beneath the options, Brzezinski wrote: "This might also help to keep Morocco in line on the Eg.-Isr. Peace Treaty. ZB."

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, April 20, 1979, 1543Z

5416. Subject: (S) North Africa: Todman-Haynes-Parker Meeting in Madrid.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: Three Ambassadors have had very useful exchange of views both inhouse and with Spaniards. Situation in North Africa growing out of Saharan struggle poses serious risks for Spain as well as US. Saharan conflict, if it continues, risks bringing down Moroccan regime and/or sparking Algerian-Moroccan war.² Possibilities for solution depend to large degree on factors beyond our control or influence: (a) Algerian intentions vis-a-vis Morocco, (b) Moroccan internal stresses, (c) Polisario willingness to accept compromise and (d) Mauritanian intentions.

3. There was agreement among Americans that parties know each other better than we do, and that there is no need for a moderator to establish direct contact.³ There may be useful role for someone like Spanish or French, however, to help parties understand dangers more fully and rise above polemics in search for realistic, lasting peaceful solution. Spanish appear interested⁴ in such a role but say they would not do it alone. We should support them, but not try to do it ourselves. End summary.

4. Ambassadors Todman, Haynes and Parker met in Madrid April 18–20 and held series of discussions on North Africa, including luncheon with Foreign Minister Oreja Aguirre and Foreign Ministry Director General for Africa and Asia Lopez Aguirrebengoa, and tea with Javier Ruperez, UCD International Secretary. Discussions particularly useful for Parker and Haynes, and each found the other's perspective very educational. Following are some of more pertinent conclusions and observations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Moscow, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Tripolic, Tunis, USUN, USDOCSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.

² An unknown hand underlined and highlighted this sentence.

³ An unknown hand underlined "no need for a moderator to establish direct contact."

⁴ An unknown hand underlined "Spanish appear interested," and highlighted this sentence.

5. Algeria:⁵ Ambassador Haynes described developments internally and in our bilateral relations since demise of Boumediene.⁶ He described Sahara as outstanding international issue in minds Algerians, who regarded it as vital question. He foresaw little possibility Algerians would change their position and noted that while there may have been degrees of personal pique in Boumediene's position, Sahara and Polisario now had dynamic of their own and could not simply be turned off. More importantly, he believes Algerians see Sahara as means to bring about downfall of monarchy in Morocco and hope this will further their goal of asserting hegemony over Maghreb.⁷

6. Morocco: Ambassador Parker described current difficulties being encountered by Hassan's experiment in democracy. Austerity measures necessitated by expenditures of Sahara campaign, expense of massive military modernization program, drop in phosphate prices and withdrawal of Saudi subsidy, together with demographic factors, have complicated already pressing economic and social problems.⁸ He noted that unity created by Green March was showing cracks and speculated that serious military reverses in the Sahara, or abandonment of the Moroccan claim there, could lead to overthrow of Hassan and installation of military regime which would be more obstinate than Hassan on questions affecting Algeria. He asked if Algerians did not recognize dangers this would pose to their interests, and said that, given Benjedid's record of pragmatism, he was convinced latter would change Algerian policies on Sahara. If he did not, sooner or later there would be war between Morocco and Algeria, because Hassan would fight rather than quit.⁹

7. Ambassador Haynes said we must not expect Algerians always to react logically, and we should bear in mind that Boumediene had had to restrain Benjedid, then commander of the western military region, from undertaking rash military action against Morocco in 1975 at the time of the Green March.

8. Various solutions were discussed, and it was agreed there was little give in the position of the parties.¹⁰ Ambassador Parker suggested that only solution which seemed to have remote chance of acceptance was creation of Polisario state in Tiris al-Gharbia, perhaps in federation

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "Algeria."

⁶ Boumediene died on December 27, 1978. See Document 67.

⁷ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence and wrote "not so sure" in the right-hand margin next to it.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "Austerity measures necessitated by expenditures of Sahara campaign," and highlighted this sentence.

⁹ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined "little give in the position of the parties."

with Mauritania.¹¹ Ambassador Haynes did not believe this would settle issue, since Polisario would continue attack against Saguia al Hamra from this base. Ambassador Parker noted that this would be much more difficult for sovereign state, than for a provisional government, and pointed out that no Polisario state could function as such in Western Sahara against armed opposition of Morocco. Ambassador Todman remarked that we should not confuse functioning with existence. Provisional government could operate, and be given recognition, even if it did not carry out all the functions of a sovereign state in its own sovereign territory. Coming into being of independent Polisario state might not be inevitable, but it was likely. He was impressed with dynamic qualities Polisario leadership. Ambassador Haynes agreed.

9. Mediation: Ambassador Haynes noted that there were already clandestine contacts between Moroccans and Algerians, who knew each other far better than we ever would.¹² He did not think there was any need for a mediator to establish contact or to convey the views of the opposing parties. If the two wanted to meet, they would do so and had no need of outsiders. Ambassador Parker agreed. Ambassador Todman, however, felt a mediator could play a useful role and might provide a framework to help the parties rise above invective and polemics.¹³ He believed the Spanish might like to play such a role. Ambassador Parker noted that his staff doubted Spanish suitability for that role, but agreed they might be wrong.

10. The question was raised with Lopez Aguirrebengoa after lunch. He said Spanish would not be able to do it alone.¹⁴ Similar answer was given by Ruperez. At same time, it seems evident Spaniards would like to try the role. Ruperez said, in fact, that Prime Minister's trip to Algeria and FonMin's to Nouakchott had been timed to precede Juan Carlos' trip to Morocco first week in June in hopes they would produce something for latter to say to Hassan about problem.

11. Spanish reiterated their impression Algerians wanted to avoid war but unable to explain why they not showing more interest in peace if that was the case. Lopez Aguirrebengoa claimed Libyans provided 85[%] of financial support received by Polisario and speculated at length on possibility playing on Mauritanian or Saharan elements in Polisario as way to find compromise. Ruperez claimed Polisario position not as hard as it seemed and expressed concern at Cuban connec-

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined "Parker" and "only solution which seemed to have remote chance of acceptance was creation of Polisario state in Tiris al-Gharbia, perhaps in federation with Mauritania."

¹² An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹³ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹⁴ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

tions of Bokhari, Polisario representative in Madrid. He advised us to establish direct contact with organization, but he and others denied Spanish had any, other than those maintained by UCD and other parties. Ruperez said Polisario not seeking to bring down Hassan, whom they regarded as foil to Algerians and whose presence necessary to keep them from being dominated by latter.

12. Ambassador Todman thought that King Juan Carlos and the Spanish Government would be watching closely the degree to which we support King Hassan, who they consider to have been a staunch American friend over the years. Any Spanish perception that we fail to support him in a time of need—as they believe we failed the Shah—would be certain to affect the Spanish view of whether they can count fully on the U.S.¹⁵

13. Without in any way tilting toward Algeria, our Spanish informants displayed a considerable measure of irritation with Hassan for creating this mess by taking advantage of Spanish preoccupation with the demise of Franco in the fall of 1975. There was a strong hint in their analysis that the only key to a possible solution involved Mauritania. The Spanish felt that, notwithstanding some assessments to the contrary, the new Mauritanian Government is continuing its behind-the-scenes talks with the Polisario with the probable aim of ceding Tiris al-Gharbia to them as their independent state. In this connection, they feel that the Polisario is acting independently of Algeria.¹⁶

14. Oreja said he had just spoken with the Mauritanian Ambassador to Madrid, who is closely related through personal and family ties to the new Mauritanian leadership. The Ambassador had said that the recent change of government in no way represented a change in Mauritania's policy of seeking peace with the Polisario. The Mauritanian Foreign Minister was to go to Libya at the end of this week and would discuss possible peace moves with Qadhafi. Ambassador Haynes speculated that he might also have in mind meeting with Polisario representatives in Libya.

15. Soviet arms: Ambassador Parker briefed Ambassador Haynes on current intelligence regarding Morocco's possibly turning to the Soviets for arms. He noted that Moroccans already had more conventional arms than they presently able maintain, and it would not make much sense to turn to the Soviets for more of those, nor would more

¹⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

¹⁶ An unknown hand underlined "Spanish," placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to the second sentence, and underlined "the new Mauritanian Government is continuing its behind-the-scenes talks with the Polisario with the probable aim of ceding Tiris al-Gharbia to them as their independent state" and "Polisario is acting independently of Algeria."

of them make much difference in the Sahara. He did not know whether Soviets might be able to supply aircraft which would significantly improve Moroccan capabilities. Ambassador Haynes felt that there was validity in the view expressed to him at the Quai that, given their failure to date to bring Algeria into their orbit, or to get navy facilities there, the Soviets might very well turn to a more vulnerable Morocco as a riper field for exerting its influence in the Maghreb.

16. Conclusions: It seems clear that there is little hope of a mediated solution to the Sahara problem if the parties themselves are not ready for it. If it is true that the Algerians are determined to get Hassan, and are not interested in compromise, and if it looks as though they may succeed, Hassan will eventually strike at Algeria and the Algerians will respond in kind. Similarly, if the Moroccans are not prepared to make concessions, which they have so far resisted, there seems little possibility of interesting the Polisario. All agreed, however, that we should bear in mind the Arab ability for quick turn-arounds, and that a settlement was not out of the question.

17. Meanwhile, unhealthy Moroccan internal situation is likely create pressure on Hassan for radical policies in one direction or another, i.e. either to suppress dissent or distract it with international preoccupations. While internal pressures in a sense militate for political settlement of the Sahara problem, they also impose severe limits on the nature of that settlement. The King cannot give up the territory and survive.¹⁷

18. Soviet intentions are not clear, but we believe they could very well decide to supply arms to Morocco on liberal terms (a) to embarrass U.S., (b) to impress the Algerians and (c) to gain a strategic foothold in the region. While this would not mean the death of our republic, it could have serious implications for our military relationship with Morocco and for our broader national security interests in the Mediterranean.

19. Policy: For the time being we should maintain our present posture and watch the players go through their respective acts until such time as we see a well-defined limited-risk role for the USG to play that would lead them all to a negotiated settlement. That time has not yet come.

20. After considerable discussion, the three Ambassadors agreed that there was an obvious lack of clear policy for North Africa. We feel we are drifting. Some hard decisions must be taken and if they are not taken the consequences for our national interest will be serious. We should decide once and for all what we are going to do about arms

¹⁷ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

for Morocco. We should decide whether we believe the collapse of the Moroccan position in the Sahara is inevitable. If so we should start making arrangements to establish relations with those who are coming after. Alternatively, if we believe the collapse is avoidable, we should decide how we can support more fully the Moroccan position. In the same vein we should decide how important Algerian oil and natural gas are to us in the face of a worsening American energy crisis and what effect more support for a Moroccan position may have on our access to them. Likewise we should make an urgent determination of whether any one of the countries in North Africa is likely to occupy a position of dominance in the region for the foreseeable future and how we protect our interests in that event.

Todman

41. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT

The Western Sahara and U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Morocco

THE ISSUE

To decide whether and how to revise our peace strategy and our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our regional objectives.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

1. *U.S. Objectives*

—Enough *attention to Hassan's political and security concerns* to restore a damaged bilateral relation with a traditionally friendly country, enabling us to discuss with him, among other things, the problems he faces in the western Sahara.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 124, 9/21/79, North Africa. Secret. Drafted by Coon on September 20. Cleared by Saunders. Sent to Brzezinski under an undated covering memorandum from Tarnoff. Prepared for the September 21 PRC meeting; see Document 42.

—A *negotiated settlement* of the western Sahara dispute that will endure and be reasonably congenial to U.S. interests. (We do *not* want to act toward Morocco in ways that might encourage Moroccan inflexibility on the peace issue.)

—*Avoid incurring serious setbacks* in our bilateral relations with Algeria.

2. *Recent Developments*

—Following an upsurge in Polisario attacks within Morocco's internationally recognized boundaries, I initiated consultations with the Senate and House in late July.²

—In early August Morocco reacted to Mauritania's decision to make a separate peace with the Polisario and withdraw from the western Sahara by unilaterally annexing the territory's former Mauritanian sector.³

—Meanwhile the Polisario has the military advantage, even though it cannot oust Morocco from the cities in the western Sahara; internal pressures are increasing on Hassan to find a way out of the impasse (but not one under which Morocco would give up territory); and Morocco finds itself increasingly isolated diplomatically.

3. *A Strategy for Peace*

We believe we should continue, as in the past, to take no explicit position on the ultimate nature of the settlement; we would go along with any outcome that was agreed to by all principally concerned parties. Also, while we shall probably want to initiate direct talks with the Polisario at some point, we should not try to reach any conclusion on this until we have thought through our peace strategy in more detail (see below).

We should in addition continue to eschew a mediatory role ourselves—on grounds that we are not particularly well-positioned for the role and we already have more than enough U.S. mediating efforts in operation—but we would encourage and support efforts by other interested third parties to bring the principals to the negotiating table. We shall seek to develop a conceptual framework that will strengthen our direct diplomacy, both with the principals and with well-placed third parties, such as Saudi Arabia, France, Spain, and key OAU members.

Finally, any change in our arms transfer policy toward Morocco should be designed among other things to mesh with our peace strategy

² See Document 176.

³ See Document 240.

and strengthen our diplomatic efforts in Rabat, Algiers and third countries to bring the contestants to the negotiating table.

4. *U.S. Arms Transfers to Morocco*

(a) *First Option: Stand Pat*

Under this option there would be no change in our present policy of limiting arms transfers to weapons systems that clearly are not suitable for use in the western Sahara. The principal *advantages* of this course are that (i) the U.S. would be widely seen domestically and internationally as keeping in step with the majority that does not support Moroccan occupation of the western Sahara and has recently been disturbed by Morocco's move into the Mauritanian sector; (ii) there would be no possible disagreement about the consistency of our policy with our 1960 bilateral agreement and U.S. law; (iii) we would avoid giving Hassan any grounds for hoping—however erroneously—that with our new weapons systems he might achieve a military victory; and (iv) our relations with the new Algerian Government would be at least unjeopardized and possibly improved. In addition, we would avoid a bruising debate in the Congress.

It can be argued, however, that the present policy has ill-served our purposes: (i) although we have tried in recent months to be responsive short of supplying Hassan with weapons systems suitable for use in the Sahara, this limitation has cost us much of our credibility or influence with Hassan, and we have gained no perceptible balancing increment of influence with the Algerians; (ii) even more serious, we have contributed to a growing Moroccan sense of international isolation that, added to other frustrations, could in time either force Hassan to move rashly against Algeria, or lead to his replacement by a possibly less prudent, as well as less pro-Western regime; (iii) significant forces, both domestic (e.g., Senators Javits and Stone) and foreign (particularly Saudi Arabia and France) are urging us to support Morocco more forthrightly.

(b) *Second Option: Partial Relaxation*

This would involve some relaxation in our policy strictures but stopping short of the OV-10 (third option), at least for the presently foreseeable future. The guiding principle would be that we would be prepared to be forthcoming, on a case-by-case basis, on weapons systems the Moroccans might request which were not primarily intended (as the OV-10 necessarily would be) for anti-Polisario warfare.⁴ Under

⁴ Systems we might consider include the OV-1 reconnaissance plane and either the Hughes 500 or the Cobra helicopter equipped with TOW. If this option is selected, we would plan to send a team to Morocco to discuss possible requirements in detail, prior to policy determinations in Washington. [Footnote is in the original. An unknown hand highlighted and drew an arrow to this footnote.]

this policy we would no longer construe Morocco as violating our bilateral if and when it employed such U.S. arms as we were willing to sell it in the western Sahara. Our rationale for this would be based on the need to demonstrate some reaction to recent Polisario attacks within Morocco's internationally recognized boundaries from Algerian sanctuaries through the western Sahara. We would still not actively help Morocco with its war in the western Sahara, but would indicate to Morocco that, should a negotiated peace settlement be reached, we would then be prepared to cooperate in further strengthening their defense capability in order to ensure their security in a new political environment in the region.

It should be noted that if this option is to be effective as an adjunct to our peace strategy we shall have to maintain a degree of flexibility as to which weapons systems we consider admissible under it. For example, Polisario cessation of attacks within Morocco proper would undercut the rationale on which the option is based and suggest a more restrictive approach; while Moroccan reasonableness matched by Algerian/Polisario intransigence could necessitate moving toward greater flexibility.

The *principal advantage* to this option is that we would retain credible arguments to support our diplomacy in both Rabat and Algiers, as well as with interested third parties. We would of course stress the positive aspects of our policy shift with Hassan while reaffirming our conviction that in the long run Morocco's Saharan dilemma could be resolved only through negotiations. We would try to make Algiers see that we cannot remain indifferent to a situation in which Algeria almost without restriction supports, arms, and provides sanctuary to Polisario forces while the U.S. follows a highly restrictive policy damaging to U.S.-Moroccan relations. However, we also would tell the Algerians that despite our historic ties with Morocco we had come down, after intense deliberation, in favor of what was essentially still a policy of considerable restraint. We would ask the Algerians in return to restrain the Polisario and take meaningful steps toward bringing about negotiations; we could also imply that if Algeria failed to take such steps while Morocco did make good faith efforts to negotiate a solution, we might be forced to review our policy again. Similarly, we would indicate to the Moroccans that it was difficult to urge restraint on Algeria unless the Moroccans were displaying convincing signs of flexibility. We would also indicate our support for any reasonable mediation efforts that happened to be underway at the time, consistent of course with our peace strategy as described above.

The *principal drawbacks* of this option are: (i) It fully satisfies neither of the interested parties, nor those who advocate U.S. actions along the lines of either Option 1 above or Option 3 below. Thus to some

extent it could adversely affect U.S. relations with OAU countries, inhibit development of better relations with Algeria, and even, if mis-handled, encourage Moroccan intransigence. On the other hand it could be perceived by the Moroccans as an inadequate response and contribute to a further erosion of our position there; (ii) Any liberalization in our policy at this time is complicated by Morocco's recent takeover of the former Mauritanian sector. It should be noted, however, that this latter issue is more political than legal. L believes that the legal picture has not changed much (Tab 3).⁵ (We did not recognize the legality of the Moroccan-Mauritanian partition and annexation of the territory in the first place.)

(c) *Third Option: The OV-10*

For better or worse, this armed reconnaissance aircraft has become the litmus test of our policy review in the eyes of Moroccans and Algerians, and to some extent in the international press and even within the Administration. It is seen as a weapons system well designed for anti-Polisario operations in western Sahara, which is only available from U.S. sources.

There is considerable support in certain quarters within the Administration and on the Hill for selling Morocco the OV-10. Internationally, Saudi Arabia, France, and Senegal have strongly urged us to follow this general course. A central concept determining this group's view is that it is time for the U.S. to demonstrate by actions as well as words that it is willing to help its friends when its help is needed. It has also been argued that the OV-10 could affect the anti-Polisario military effort significantly (though all agree not decisively), thus raising the cost of the war for both the Polisario and Algeria and thereby encouraging them to think in terms of alternatives to total victory.

The *principal disadvantages* of this option would be: (i) a major battle on the Hill and considerable domestic and international⁶ criticism, augmented by Morocco's recent takeover of the Mauritanian sector; (ii) Algeria's leaders would probably take this step as a challenge and our limited ability to reason with them could be further reduced; (iii) Morocco's position on negotiations might harden because of raised hopes of a military victory; in any case Morocco might stall for the period of months it will take for the first OV-10s to be delivered and deployed, in order to see whether its use might give Morocco a new and significant edge on the battlefield; (iv) the situation on the ground does not indicate that even with the OV-10, military victory would in

⁵ Tab 3 is not attached.

⁶ Most Subsaharan African countries, Spain, and to a lesser extent the non-aligned states in general support the Algeria/Polisario position. [Footnote is in the original.]

fact be close for Morocco; and (v) intensification of U.S. military support for Morocco might produce greater Algerian support for the Polisario, an invitation for support from the Cubans (already hinted at by the Polisario), and a broadening of the conflict.

42. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1979, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

PRC on North Africa (C)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Ms. Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance

Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

OSD

Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor

Mr. Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay

DCI

Mr. Bruce Clarke, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

Mr. Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

ACDA

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

Dr. Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

White House

Mr. David Aaron

NSC

Mr. James M. Rentschler (Notetaker)

Major Robert Kimmitt

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 124, 9/21/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A summary of conclusions is attached but not printed.

MINUTES

At *Chairman Newsom's* request, *Mr. Saunders* briefly reviewed the context in which the PRC discussion was taking place, emphasizing the two-year deterioration in our bilateral relationship with Morocco and the centrality of the military supply issue. He noted in addition the changed situation produced by Polisario attacks inside Morocco proper which helped precipitate mid-summer consultations with Congress on whether and to what extent we should change our present arms supply policy. Five options—later refined to three—had been discussed at that time, and Congress had warmly welcomed the consultative spirit with which the Department had presented them. At present we face a fourfold problem:

1. King Hassan, a friend, has staked his future on the Sahara situation.
2. We do not wish to jeopardize our interests in Algeria.
3. We face a stalemate so far as progress toward a negotiated solution is concerned.
4. The issue of self-determination for the Sahraoui people is gaining prominence. (C)

Mr. Saunders also reviewed the status of Congressional sentiment on North Africa, noting that on the House side there appeared to be support primarily for "Option 1 (standpat) with maybe a little bit more"; the House favored maintenance of an essentially restrictive policy on arms sales. On the Senate side, the SFRC voted 7–3 on September 20 in favor of three points:²

1. The U.S. should undertake a concerted diplomatic effort toward a negotiated solution.
2. We should move rapidly to send a new Ambassador to Rabat who can maintain an effective dialogue with the King.
3. We should provide increased military assistance for Morocco but avoid selling weapons designed primarily for counterinsurgency warfare in the desert. (C)

In response to *Mr. Newsom's* request, *Mr. Ames* provided a CIA assessment of Hassan's position: a) he generally supported Mr. Saunders' presentation; b) the Agency had reviewed pertinent earlier judgments and found them unchanged; c) although there had been serious deterioration in Hassan's position since the first of the year, he was not yet on a slippery slope (his difficulties derived largely from his unwillingness to address possible solutions); d) the Western Sahara does not mean much to 65 percent of Hassan's people. (C)

² See Document 177.

Mr. Aaron questioned this analysis and stated that it runs counter to historical experience. He wanted to know if the CIA had a reading from the Moroccan military on our arms policy. (C)

Mr. Ames replied that he had no reading. (C)

Mr. Aaron then asked if there was any evidence that the Moroccan military favored a negotiated solution or a Polisario takeover of the Western Sahara. (C)

Mr. Ames replied [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the military wanted either to “get in or get out”. (C)

Mr. Newsom requested information concerning two other factors: 1) what do we know about the magnitude of the Egyptian supply effort? (C)

Mr. Ames: Two paneloads of small arms. (C)

Mr. Newsom: And 2) what do we know about Saudi attitudes, both financial and toward the Sahara situation in general? (C)

Mr. Ames: The Saudis have decided that more money won’t help; they prefer more active mediation. Khalid, coming from Geneva, will stop in both Rabat and Algiers for this purpose. (C)

Additional questioning then ensued along the following lines:

Mr. Newsom: What is the impact of all this on Hassan’s ability to purchase more equipment? (C)

Mr. Ames: Little. (C)

Mr. Newsom: Could use of OV-10s decide the war in Hassan’s favor? (C)

Mr. Ames: No. Hassan’s main problem lies in command-and-control. (C)

Mr. Murray interjected that while the OV-10s would not *win* the war, militarily they *can* make a difference. (C)

Mr. Newsom: Do the Polisario have any validity as a Saharan movement without Algeria? (C)

Mr. Ames: Yes; if Algerian sanctuaries did not exist, the Polisario could come from Mauritania. (C)

Mr. Newsom: On Polisario, is it the CIA judgment that any other valid claimants speak for the Sahraoui people? (C)

Mr. Ames: Polisario remains the most important tribal element in the Western Sahara. (C)

Mr. Newsom then asked participants to comment on the three arms supply policy options before the PRC: (U)

—*Option 1*. (Defended by Mr. Keeny.) ACDA feels that additional equipment won’t win the war for Hassan, would merely involve us more intimately with Morocco’s sagging leadership. Weakening our

ability to maintain relations with a successor regime is a central concern. ACDA has no problem with the present level of arms transfers but wants to make sure that whatever we do does not have greater negative symbolic value vis-à-vis the other side. *Mr. Blechman* added that ACDA is concerned over the possibility that more equipment might encourage Hassan to be intransigent, thereby protracting the conflict. (C)

—*Option 2.* (Defended by *Mrs. Benson.*) State feels that Option 1, standing pat on our present policy, does not serve our interests. State favors a more forthright response to Morocco's requests while maintaining some restraint. We should seek a balance between Algeria and Morocco, though we would not ourselves want to play a mediatory role. We *are* interested in Moroccan defense and would consider supplying additional systems. This means that: we would furnish more spare parts and maintenance for the F-5s; we would view the presence of F-5s in the Sahara as only a technical violation of our bilateral; we would inform Algeria that we are not indifferent to Morocco's need and would urge Algerian restraint on the Polisario; we would urge Saudi Arabia to play a more active role; we would institute no contacts with the Polisario; we would tell the Moroccans that we do not see a military solution in the Sahara (we would consult with France, Spain, and others). (C)

—*Option 3.* (Defended by *Mr. Claytor.*) DOD's view is that Option 2 does not do enough to strengthen Hassan for negotiations. *Mr. Murray* stated that Option 3 would help turn around the military deterioration. He added that Options 1 and 2 contain good points, and the issue involves a very close judgment call. On balance, however, DOD sees danger in our winding up with the worst of both worlds: linked in symbolic support for Hassan while he goes down the drain. *General Pustay* noted that the JCS also supports Option 3 because of the added leverage it would give us with Hassan. He described the technical advantages of the OV-10 aircraft, including recce and night-flying capabilities. The OV-10 would not be a decisive factor militarily, but at the same time it is important not to diminish its potential. (C)

Mr. Aaron stated his view that with no prospect of a negotiated solution and with little likelihood of military assistance changing the outcome, we really have only two options: either we stick with our present policy, or even less—taking the heat while hoping that this high-risk course might convince Hassan to negotiate—or we move to Option 3. (C)

Following some discussion of OV-10 delivery time (a question of months, not years) and possible restrictions which might accompany a decision to make the OV-10 available, *Mr. Saunders* stated that restrictions are not enforceable. We have a situation where a loyal ally is under attack. How are we going to retain a decent relationship with that

country under these circumstances? At some point in this ambiguous situation we have to ask ourselves if we are going to support our friends. (C)

In light of the Secretary's imminent meetings in New York with both the Moroccan and Algerian Foreign Ministers,³ and given the communication problem with the King, *Mr. Aaron* agreed it would make sense to conduct a round of consultations, including with the Saudis, the French, and the Spanish.⁴ *Mr. Aaron* said he would be willing to try that out but we should have a plan ready to implement as soon as the round is over. (C)

Summarizing general points of agreement, *Mr. Newsom* noted 1) continued support to Morocco with the F-5 is both desirable and Congressionally sustainable; 2) we should not at this point seek to meet with the Polisario in any overt, significant way [1 line not declassified]; 3) we will immediately undertake consultations in New York and capitals with the Moroccans, Algerians, Saudis, French, and Spanish; 4) the U.S. should not seek to be a primary actor in the mediating process. (S)

There was also general agreement that the issue boiled down to the symbolic importance of the sale of OV-10 aircraft, i.e., for or against support to the King. (C)

The participants then exchanged views on whether there were any other significant items of equipment which we could offer which might be less conspicuously identified with the Sahara conflict. (General answer: no.) (C)

Concluding the PRC, *Mr. Newsom* stated that we would defer a decision on a desired U.S. arms supply policy pending results of the diplomatic consultations to be undertaken in New York and capitals. We would prepare talking points for use with the Moroccans, Algerians, Saudis, French, and Spanish which would stress the following:

- Our concern for Morocco's security.
- We are reexamining our present arms supply policy.
- We feel that a peaceful settlement is in everyone's interest.
- We cannot be expected to exercise restraint indefinitely when the future of a friend is at stake.

³ See Documents 43 and 45.

⁴ In telegram 4183 from USUN, October 6, the Mission reported on Vance's discussion with Crown Prince Fahd. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790458-0198) In telegram 258424 to Paris, October 2, the Department reported on Vance's meeting with Foreign Minister François-Poncet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790451-0743) In telegram 254089 to Madrid, September 27, the Department reported on Vance's meeting with Foreign Minister Oreja. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790441-0767)

—We want to know what possible paths the parties see to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (C)

Mr. Newsom directed that the consultations be completed within two weeks, at which time the PRC will consider the responses and decide what specific recommendations to make to the President. (C)

43. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, September 28, 1979, 2247Z

256045. Subject: Secretary's Bilateral With Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In September 26 discussion with the Secretary, Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta asked for U.S. support, asserting that threat to Morocco was broadening. International Communism, he said, is now actively seeking to penetrate region, exploiting Western Sahara dispute to destabilize Morocco. The Secretary informed Boucetta that he was consulting with countries interested in Western Sahara dispute. During October we hoped to conclude our military supply policy review, and would let the Moroccans know the results. He noted that we had received congressional views, with the House of Representatives coming down less positively than the Senate. Under Secretary Newsom added that our policy review is not exclusively concerned with arms supply policy but also with issue of how U.S. and others can contribute to long term stability in region. End summary.

3. Moroccan Foreign Minister called on Secretary Vance in New York September 26 for annual bilateral consultation. Ambassador to the U.S. Ali Bengelloun attended from Moroccan side; Under Secretary Newsom, AFN Director Coon and interpreter, from U.S. side. After initial courtesies, Boucetta said he wanted to talk about the serious problem Morocco faces. Morocco regards U.S. as a friend and ally it can rely on. There must continue to be a special relationship between the two countries. Morocco is being tested in the Sahara and the scope

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445–0586. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda, Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, Cairo, Paris, Madrid, USUN, and Dakar. Sent for information Priority to Bamako, Niamey, Ndjamena, Baghdad, and Rome.

of the danger has increased. It is no longer Algeria versus Morocco, but more a matter of a policy designed elsewhere and being carried out in the region through Communist penetration. Morocco is defending the same values as its ally and neighbor America. Morocco wants the Secretary and President Carter to know how serious the situation has recently become. Morocco must know that it can count on U.S. support. Our relations are good but "we sense a hesitation or reticence and we would like to dispel your hesitation". Morocco has made some proposals for purchase of certain equipment and hopes that all differences will be set aside.

4. Secretary Vance replied that the U.S. has been and remains Morocco's staunch friend and ally. We have been following events with care, especially Morocco's relations with Algeria and the situation in the Western Sahara. The U.S. has noted action by Mauritania and the Moroccan action that followed. We would like the Foreign Minister's assessment: How do you view the current situation? What are Algeria's current objectives? What is the situation on the ground in the Sahara? And how do you see the situation developing in the period immediately ahead?

5. Boucetta, in reply, said that situation at present is that the Algerian factor is being overtaken. A couple of days ago Boucetta sent a letter to the Secretary² noting that Secretaries General of the Communist Parties of France, Spain, and Italy are meeting in Madrid. The other side gets Soviet arms "to the limit". Meanwhile, Algeria still maintains publicly that the problem only concerns the Sahara people, not Algeria. This is not true. The question is whether Morocco will resist, or become "destabilized", as Mauritania was. The Moroccan people stand firmly around the King and will resist Communist efforts to destabilize the region to the end.

6. Secretary Vance asked how the Foreign Minister saw this tendency manifesting itself on the ground. Boucetta replied that beginning in June there was a significant escalation of sneak attacks within Morocco's former boundaries. Morocco was adapting to the new situation. The arms that it had were not suited for this kind of task. However, the Moroccan Army was becoming more "operational". It was also getting more "weight" now that 10,000 soldiers formerly positioned in Mauritania, and the troops it had had in Zaire, had returned to Morocco. However, there remains the question of supply. The question of military equipment was vital.

7. In Mauritania, Boucetta continued, there are a number of pro-Polisario and pro-Communist activists supported by Algeria, Libya

² Not found.

and the Iraqi Baathists. They are trying to influence the Mauritians who see their country's interests as requiring constructive relations with Morocco. The Mauritanian Foreign Minister will tell you about this privately, and about the need to help Morocco in order to help Mauritania—even though he can't say this publicly.

8. The Secretary asked whether Boucetta believed the Algerians were trying to destabilize or overthrow the Government of Morocco or was that perhaps overtaken too. Boucetta replied that as an issue that was overtaken, the Communist attempt through destabilization of Morocco to extend their influence over the whole region was now the issue. Boucetta then mentioned the Tunisian invitation to Hassan and Bendjedid to get together in Tunisia. The Secretary said that the Tunisian Foreign Minister had just told him about the negative Algerian reply.³

9. The Secretary then said he wanted to tell Boucetta where the U.S. stood at present regarding its policy review, which included the subjects of the OV-10 and armed helicopters. The USG had done a great deal of work in connection with its policy review. At present the Secretary was consulting with various interested third parties as well as with the Moroccans and Algerians in talks such as these. After next week there would be another interagency meeting at which all the evidence would be reviewed. Some time in October, therefore, the USG would come to a conclusion. Meanwhile, the House and the Senate have also looked into the situation and provided their views. Boucetta said he hoped that the congressional views were positive. The Secretary said that one House was more positive than the other: the House of Representatives was less positive, though split.

10. Boucetta said Morocco must count on U.S. for physical and moral support. We saw what happened at Monrovia and Havana, where a Communist bloc animated the majority and carried with it many others of different persuasions. In view of these developments, King Hassan has worked out a diplomatic plan which he has embodied in a letter he has sent to the Chairman of the OAU. His proposal would involve all the states bordering on the Sahara, North and South, including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The basic objective would be to convert this Sahara region from zone of conflict to a zone of development and peace—and thereby to oppose the Communist effort to penetrate and occupy it.

³ No record of Vance's meeting with Tunisian Foreign Minister Chatty was found. The Algerian reply was reported in telegram 7304 from Tunis, September 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790424-1010)

11. Newsom noted that our current policy review is not exclusively concerned with arms supply but also with the issue of how the U.S. and others can contribute to long-term stability in the region. The U.S. wants to discuss how the international community can contribute to a peaceful settlement. Boucetta agreed that this aspect was very important and briefly mentioned Spain. Spain, he said, is going through a difficult period. Boucetta saw the Spanish Foreign Minister earlier that day and asked him three questions: (a) Knowing Moroccans as you do, and knowing that all Moroccans support the King's policy on the Sahara, do you really think that Morocco can be expected to give up the region? (b) Strictly in terms of Spain's own interests, is a Moroccan presence there better or worse than some other presence? (c) When the development of the region gets into full gear, should it be with the participation of Spain, or of others? Boucetta then told the Secretary he believed firmly that if the Spaniards would cooperate, and also the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the four together in partnership could do great things with the Western Sahara.

12. The Secretary said he had also talked to the Spanish as well as the French about the Western Sahara.⁴ He then recapitulated, stating that when our review was completed we would let the Moroccans know.

13. As meeting was ending, Boucetta noted that Morocco wanted to improve its relations with certain Sub-Saharan states, particularly Nigeria and Liberia. He hoped the U.S. could put in a good word to help this process along, especially with Liberia. He noted that Tolbert had made a moderate and conciliatory speech in the General Assembly shortly before.

Vance

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 42.

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, September 29, 1979, 0034Z

256242. Subject: Negotiating Western Sahara Conflict.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. After careful consideration of Western Sahara situation as reflected in your and other analyses,² we have decided that you should seek appointment with highest available MFA official to make ASAP points below in para 3 on Western Sahara. It is important that conversation be held before Secretary sees Foreign Minister in New York on October 5.³ The underlying thrust of your meeting should be that the U.S. is considering its various policy options, not simply on arms but on all facets of the Saharan issue, and needs to understand the Algerian position fully. We want you to describe our evolving thinking and to probe the Algerians as to how far they would go to get the process started that could eventually lead to a negotiated settlement.

3. Following are talking points for use with Algerian Government:

A. As you know, the United States is reviewing its policies with respect to northwest Africa. In this connection we wish the views of the nations of the region. We attach particular importance to the views of Algeria.

B. Ever since Algeria became independent we have sought to maintain a balanced relationship between Morocco and Algeria, despite frequent tensions between the two countries. We consider our evolving relationship with Algeria important. At the same time, we have had a very good relationship with Morocco over the years.

C. The general peace and stability of the area is threatened by the Saharan conflict. The U.S. shares the view of many that an early solution

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D790445–0521. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Rabat. Drafted by Hester, Coon and Draper; cleared in S/P, NEA, T, and PM/SAS; approved by Newsom.

² In telegram 2527 from Algiers, September 17, Haynes submitted a lengthy review of U.S. policy in the Western Sahara. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790424–1087)

³ In telegram 2722 from Algiers, October 4, Haynes expressed concern that he might not have an opportunity to meet with Bendjedid prior to Vance's October 5 meeting with Benyahia (see Document 45). He reported that he had raised the talking points with several people in the Foreign Affairs Ministry on October 1: "At that time, I gave them the English text of the talking points as an aide memoire." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790455–0460) In telegram 2771 from Algiers, October 9, Haynes reported on his meeting with Bendjedid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790499–0331)

is desirable. We do not wish to be centrally involved in these efforts, but attitudes toward a settlement are important to us as we consider our own policies toward the individual countries of the area.

D. While we remain openminded as regards the determination of the final status of the Saharan territories, we believe that no time should be lost in moving towards a negotiated resolution of the Saharan issue. Virtually everyone is in agreement that the continuing conflict is in no one's long-term interest.

E. This bloody conflict could continue for a lengthy period, and the risks of wider conflict would continue to grow. Increasingly, we have come to the conclusion that the conflict will not repeat not be solved by military action alone. No side, including the Polisario, has the capacity to win a military victory.

F. Algeria has provided arms, sanctuary, and political support to the Polisario. In a real sense, therefore, Algeria is a party to the dispute and, in any case, has the means to influence the outcome of a negotiated solution through its relationship with the Polisario.

G. The U.S. has a deep interest in Morocco's stability, its security, and its economic and social development. We intend to maintain a military supply relationship. In this connection we have sought to carry out a balanced policy of restraint.

H. This year's heavy attacks by Polisario forces on Moroccan forces deep inside the sovereign borders of Morocco have changed the situation significantly. This has increased Moroccan concern that Algeria intends to use the Saharan conflict to topple the Hassan regime. While we have made no final decisions, we must take into account the fact that Morocco has every legitimate right to defend itself within its territories which are not repeat not in dispute.

I. We have not repeat not undertaken a mediatory role in this dispute, but we believe that third parties with an interest in resolving the conflict in a fair and equitable way should receive a sympathetic and cooperative response. To some degree France, Spain, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, the OAU and certain African states have displayed interest in accelerating movements towards a negotiated settlement of the issue. We support these efforts in principle.

J. Virtually all such efforts started with a common premise: That Algeria and Morocco should meet at a high level. The Algerian response generally has been that Morocco should deal directly with the Polisario. For the purpose of determining our policy in the period ahead, we would like to know whether Algeria could consider a meeting with Morocco devoted exclusively to the issue of improved relationships between these two countries, but without excluding the possibility that representatives of the Polisario could be brought into the dialogue as it progresses.

K. It would also be extremely helpful to us if we could understand precisely the Algerian position towards the regime of King Hassan. We have heard several descriptions of Algerian policy in this regard. One is that Algeria would prefer that Hassan continue to lead his country. Another variation, however, of this position is that Algeria believes that King Hassan is sure to leave the scene at some future point in any event and that Algeria is confident it will be able to deal effectively with any successor government.

L. We are posing these very serious questions to Algeria because we are concerned at the evolving pattern of developments which, if unchecked, could lead to instability and further tension in the region. This would be in the interest of no repeat no one who views responsibly the important position of this region in the world.

Vance

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

Washington, October 6, 1979, 2157Z

262979. Madrid please pass Ambassador Haynes. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Algerian Foreign Minister.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In first discussion new Bendjedid government has had with U.S. at this level, Algerian FonMin Benyahia confined himself largely to a restatement of established GOA position on Western Sahara dispute. He did, however, concur strongly with Secretary's assessment of the urgent need for a peaceful settlement and indicate GOA willing to participate in effort to work one out. He stressed that GOA saw preservation of Hassan's regime as very much in Algeria's interest. End summary.

3. Algerian FonMin Benyahia arrived unaccompanied for Bendjedid government's first bilateral discussion with U.S. at FonMin level. U.S. participants, in addition to Secretary and an interpreter, were Ambassador McHenry, Assistant Secretary Saunders, NSC Rep Hunter,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790459–0466. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tripoli, and Tunis. Drafted by Coon; cleared in S/S; approved by Saunders.

and Country Director Coon. Opening courtesies included statement by Benyahia that GOA had been tied up in months since Boumediene's death by internal reorganization, and by such external events as Colombo, NAM, and Arab League conferences. GOA felt lack of direct contact at senior USG levels during this period had not been normal; present meeting could permit preliminary review of matters of mutual interest, and GOA hoped for further meetings in coming months to permit discussions in greater depth. Secretary agreed and suggested present meeting begin with the region and Western Saharan problem. He noted Ambassador Haynes had recently conveyed our views to GOA.² What was GOA's current view of West Sahara issue? What were its thoughts regarding possible solutions?

4. Benyahia replied at length: The OAU operated on the "golden rule" that all states recognized the boundaries established in the colonial era; to do otherwise would destabilize the entire continent. By now all the ex-colonies had achieved political independence except the Spanish Sahara—why not it? One could overlook the "golden rule" if the inhabitants had chosen to be attached to Morocco or Mauritania but this had not happened and subsequent events showed the inhabitants did not want to be joined to Morocco. Morocco raises historical arguments, conceives of itself as an imperial nation with territorial claims that include a third of Algeria, parts of Mali extending to Timbuktu, and all of Mauritania as well as Western Sahara. Impossible to tell where this will lead, if this logic is accepted. Things being what they are, Morocco has signed a border agreement with Algeria, recognized Mauritania, and is laying no claims on Mali. In 1975 when Morocco incorrectly claimed the Spanish had transferred sovereignty to it under the Madrid Agreement it also declared that it had achieved its legitimate borders, but later it expanded its territorial claims when it took over the Mauritanian portion of the territory. Morocco is one of those rare countries where one doesn't know where its borders end or begin. The problems this poses are rendered particularly serious since Morocco asserts its claims by force not through a process of self-determination. Algeria sees the Western Sahara problem as an issue of decolonization that has not been resolved and can only be resolved through a process of self-determination. Algeria has no claims of its own to any part of the territory. In his press conference Hassan offered to open ports to Algeria and generally implied a willingness to share the territory with Algeria, but Algeria will stick to its established borders; there is no question of its negotiating with Morocco on any such "sharing" basis. Furthermore, Algeria cannot construe the problem as

² See footnote 3, Document 44.

a bilateral one between it and Morocco, as it basically is between Morocco and the inhabitants of the territory, and a settlement has to be between those two. Nevertheless, Algeria recognizes that it has certain interests in the conflict: first, it is taking place on Algeria's border and could lead to a regional war; and second, Morocco charges Algeria, correctly, with providing material support—as to other African countries. But the Polisario is an independent movement, not a creature of the GOA; it was created during the Spanish occupation, well before 1975, and not in Algiers. The Polisario has proclaimed the SDAR which has been recognized by 32 governments.³ How could Algeria exclude the Polisario in negotiating the fate of the territory with Morocco? How could it explain such action to the 32 governments that have recognized the SDAR?

5. Secretary said USG was not taking sides in dispute. We value our relations with both Algeria and Morocco highly and want those relations strengthened. Western Sahara dispute is a danger to entire region. Continuation of conflict is in no one's interest. As a practical matter, and notwithstanding Algerian position that issue is mainly between Morocco and Western Saharan inhabitants, USG does not see how a negotiated solution is possible unless Algeria helps. As friend of both Algeria and Morocco, we would like to urge Algeria to discuss issue with Morocco—and to extent it proves necessary, desirable, and helpful, other parties might be brought into the discussion. Otherwise, if Algeria insists on standing apart while advising Moroccans and Saharouis to discuss problem directly, the situation will just get more dangerous.

6. Benyahia said his government's assessment of the situation was very similar. Conflict does affect stability of region as a whole. No military solution was possible, so question was what approach, what mechanism should interested parties have recourse to. He thought his government would be ready to participate in helping find a political solution, drawing on "creative imagination" of concerned parties to ensure that final settlement took account of interests of both sides. In his opinion, Benyahia continued, OAU approach responded fairly well to all these concerns. The Monrovia resolution, which created the ad hoc Committee of Wisemen, was something GOA approved of and

³ The Polisario proclaimed the Saharan (Sahrawi) Democratic Arab Republic in February 1976. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 113.

agreed to work with.⁴ This demonstrated Algerian willingness to assume its responsibilities in working for a peaceful settlement.

7. Benyahia said he wanted to clarify Algerian policy on another point: GOA has no interest in further deterioration of situation, but sees it in its interest to get a peaceful solution. Problem is not at all a matter of ideological conflict between Moroccan and Algerian political and social systems. As GOA sees it, issue is purely a national liberation struggle by a small country that wants its independence. This has nothing to do with character of Moroccan regime. Algeria was on very good terms with that regime until 1975. It is true that in Ben Bella's time there were attempts to destabilize Morocco—training personnel in Algeria to go back to Morocco to stir up trouble—but since June 1965, GOA has pursued constant policy toward Morocco of friendship and non-intervention. Boumediene was first to congratulate Hassan when he survived Skhirat coup attempt in 1971⁵ and made his congratulation public while Libyans were waging propaganda war against him. There was never any proof Algerians had anything to do with either that attempt or the one a year later. Indeed, GOA feels that from its point of view Hassan is “the only pragmatic interlocutor for Morocco”. Algeria continues to believe this but fears current situation could lead to destabilization in Morocco. Secretary interjected that he agreed. Benyahia continued: Chances of such destabilization occurring are growing over time. Algeria does not want destabilization of Morocco for two fundamental reasons. First, any government that might succeed Hassan will use demagoguery and play on Sahara theme to gain popularity. Second, destabilizing Hassan could lead to string of coups and chronic instability; Algeria did not want to have adventurous regime like Qadhafi's on its western border. Algeria prefers to have a wise man in charge with whom it can talk pragmatically.

8. Secretary apologized that time had run out and meeting would have to adjourn. He regretted not having had opportunity to discuss bilateral issues but looked forward to talking to Algeria's new Ambassador in Washington, Redha Malek, who had just arrived.

Vance

⁴ The OAU ad hoc Wisemen's Committee was established by a resolution at the 15th OAU Summit, held in Khartoum July 18–22, 1978, to consider the issue of the Western Sahara. The text of the resolution is in telegram 3330 from Khartoum, July 24, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303–0100) The Committee's report, considered at the 16th OAU Summit held in Monrovia July 17–21, “said that Morocco did not have sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but only administrative control.” On July 20, the OAU adopted two resolutions calling for a ceasefire and a referendum in the Western Sahara. Hassan did not attend the Summit, and the Moroccan delegation, led by Boucetta, left the Summit after the vote. A report on the Summit and the resolutions is in telegram 5652 from Monrovia, July 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790330–0315)

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 76.

46. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT

The Western Sahara and U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Morocco

THE ISSUE

Building on the discussion at the PRC meeting held on September 21, we need to decide whether and how to revise our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our western Saharan peace strategy, our regional objectives, and the latest Saudi request that we supply arms to Morocco on an emergency basis.²

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The basic choices we face are the same as those presented in the discussion paper for the September 21 PRC meeting. (Tab A is a record of that meeting plus its discussion paper, without annexes.)³ However, since that meeting we have obtained more precise statements of policy from Algeria and Morocco and from certain interested third parties.

1. U.S. Strategy for Peace

The Secretary's bilateral talks with the Foreign Ministers of various concerned governments, summarized at Tab B,⁴ suggested widespread agreement that a military solution of the western Sahara conflict is not in the cards, the present situation is becoming increasingly dangerous,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Secret. Prepared for the October 16 PRC meeting; see Document 47.

² See Document 42. An unknown hand underlined "we need to decide whether and how to revise our arms policy toward Morocco in the context of our western Saharan peace strategy, our regional objectives, and the latest Saudi request that we supply arms to Morocco on an emergency basis." Telegram 7052 from Jidda, October 8, reported: "Naif stated that in view of the serious situation facing Morocco, Saudi Arabia was prepared on an urgent basis to fund the military assistance Morocco needs to defend itself and to reestablish a military balance in the region. Crown Prince believes this will not be possible without full U.S. assistance. What the Crown Prince wants to know as soon as possible is whether the U.S. is willing in principle to furnish military equipment to Morocco in an expeditious manner (i.e. including from U.S. stocks)." (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa)

³ Not attached; the discussion paper is printed as Document 41.

⁴ Tab B, an undated paper entitled "Positions on Western Saharan Conflict Expressed by Concerned Parties During and Since Meeting with Secretary at UNGA," is attached but not printed.

and a need for a peaceful resolution of the dispute is becoming correspondingly more urgent. Some of the most concerned parties (France, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia) insisted that the first priority was to strengthen Morocco's military position vis-a-vis the Polisario; only after that would meaningful negotiations become possible.⁵ Spain and the Ivory Coast favored a negotiated solution or referendum as a means of addressing the problem. While Mali and Liberia have a neutral policy, they have asked us to influence Hassan to be more flexible, and they would both oppose any liberalization of our military supply policy.

Neither Morocco nor Algeria has signaled to us that they are willing to change their negotiating postures significantly enough to open the way to meaningful negotiations.⁶ And Algeria has warned that increased U.S. arms supply to Morocco will further complicate efforts aimed at finding a negotiated solution, and also hurt U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations. Algerian President Bendjedid has told us (and says he has told the Saudis and Tunisians as well) that he is willing to discuss peace personally with Hassan only if the Polisario is involved, and that he will meet with Hassan on bilateral issues only if some agreed agenda or working paper has been developed in advance to serve as a basis for the discussions.⁷ Given his previous position on these issues, the Algerian proposal is not deemed likely to be accepted by Hassan.

The principal recent development on the military front was that Morocco turned back a major Polisario attack on Smara, the second largest town in the western Sahara, October 6–7. Both sides took casualties, but the battle was probably a psychological victory for the Polisario.⁸

Nothing has happened to alter our earlier view that the U.S. should continue to stay out of any direct mediatory role,⁹ and should not take any explicit position on the ultimate nature of a settlement, at least at this time. We are, however, increasingly disposed to ease our policy on direct substantive contact with Polisario leaders and to further relax restrictions on official travel to the western Sahara.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined this sentence. See footnote 4, Document 42.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined this sentence. See Documents 43 and 45.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 44.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "The principal recent development on the military front was that Morocco turned back a major Polisario attack on Smara" and "the battle was probably a psychological victory for the Polisario."

⁹ An unknown hand underlined "Nothing has happened to alter our earlier view that that U.S. should continue to stay out of any direct mediatory role."

2. *U.S. Arms Transfers to Morocco*

The most significant development in the past several weeks on this front has been the extent to which the Saudis have made clear to us that the degree of our support for Hassan is a matter of intense concern to them.¹⁰ In two demarches they made several days ago (Tab C)¹¹ they stressed the urgent Moroccan need for arms and ammunition and took the unusual step of offering to bankroll our arms transfers to Morocco on the condition that they have an early impact on Morocco's military capabilities against the Polisario. The Saudi proposal demands an early substantive response. That response need not be confined to the military supply issue but can presumably also be designed to encourage economic cooperation and in particular further Saudi initiatives with both Algeria and Morocco to bring about negotiations.¹² We would also wish to convey our decision on military supply policy to Algeria, Morocco, and third parties in ways which would encourage negotiations.

DOD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Murray leaves October 16 for Jidda, where he can discuss seriously with the Saudis our assessment of the military situation in Morocco and the Sahara. The Saudis will expect him to discuss also what we are prepared to do for Morocco. The outcome of the present PRC meeting could constitute the basis for this brief,¹³ which we shall cable him as soon as possible after the meeting.

The Congressional situation has changed slightly. The SFRC still favors by a close margin a partial relaxation of our policy, perhaps up to but clearly not including sale of OV-10 aircraft.¹⁴ However, Senator Muskie, who voted for relaxation, now appears to be between options one and two. HFAC Africa Subcommittee Chairman Solarz maintains he will fight any relaxation, and will, if necessary, introduce legislation to this effect.¹⁵ HFAC Mid-East Subcommittee Chairman Hamilton will agree to only a very slight shift, one his staff characterizes as option 1½. Thus a move to the OV-10 or to explicit support of Morocco in

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹¹ Tab C, copies of telegrams 7052 and 7118 from Jidda, is not printed. See footnote 2 above. Telegram 7118 from Jidda, October 10, is in the (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa)

¹² An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹³ An unknown hand underlined "DOD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Murray leaves October 16 for Jidda" and "The outcome of the present PRC meeting could constitute the basis for this brief."

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹⁵ An unknown hand underlined "Solarz maintains he will fight any relaxation, and will, if necessary, introduce legislation to this effect."

the Sahara war would generate resolutions of disapproval in both responsible committees and a major floor fight.¹⁶

OPTIONS BEFORE THE PRC

The immediate questions are whether we should do something in concert with the Saudis to show support for Hassan, and whether we should openly support Hassan in the Sahara.

1. *First Option: Continuation of Existing Policy*

While we have not supported Hassan's objectives in the Sahara, we have over the past year acted positively on several Moroccan requests for equipment not precluded under the existing, restrictive policy. There are other items we could sell, such as additional tanks, which would enhance Morocco's ability to defend itself against a conventional attack from Algeria, but these are not high on Morocco's list of priorities when it is so heavily engaged against the Polisario. Moreover, Saudi financing could be necessary for some purchases, and the Saudis would probably not be interested if Hassan was not. In short, there is more we could do under this option to show support for Morocco, but we might have to finance it ourselves, and neither Morocco nor the Saudis would consider it particularly helpful.¹⁷ Other arguments for and against this option remain as described in Tab A.

2. *Second Option: Partial Relaxation*

This would involve an attempt to send political and military signals of support for Hassan and Morocco that would go far enough beyond the present policy to be seen both by the Moroccans and the Saudis as responsive to their most important needs and requirements¹⁸ without associating us openly with Hassan's objectives in the Sahara. We would still pursue the actions described under option one to strengthen Morocco's defense against a conventional Algerian attack, mindful that the Saudis do not share our distinction between military supply for use to defend Morocco versus supply for prosecution of the war against the Polisario in the western Sahara. We would exchange with the Saudis assessments of the domestic political and the military situations facing

¹⁶ An unknown underlined this sentence and wrote beneath it: "unsubstantiated!" The September 21 letter to Carter from Javits and Church, the September 19 letter to Carter from Solarz, and the September 19 letter to Vance from Hamilton are all attached at Tab E. Solarz's and Hamilton's letters are printed as Documents 245 and 246.

¹⁷ An unknown hand underlined "neither Morocco nor the Saudis would consider it particularly helpful."

¹⁸ An unknown hand underlined this sentence up to this point, placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin, and wrote at the bottom of the page: "* Problem: nothing we have seen or heard suggests that the Moroccans would be happy with anything *but* the OV-10!"

Hassan. We would want to be sure that they understand our concern that the war is not winnable militarily and that additional equipment will have at best only a marginal effect on the fighting. We could emphasize the difference between support for Hassan and support for his Saharan objectives, and we could raise the possibility of increased Saudi economic aid to Morocco. With this assessment as a background we would press for further Saudi efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution, making clear to the Saudis that we believe such a solution will require significant Moroccan as well as Algerian/Polisario concessions. Assuming the Saudis are willing to undertake such an effort, we would consider on a case by case basis proposals that go beyond those in option one but not going as far as to associate ourselves explicitly with Moroccan objectives in the Sahara. We would explain to the Moroccans that our position on the sovereignty issue remained unchanged, that no military solution was possible, and that it was incumbent on all concerned to work for a negotiated settlement. We would also intensify our consultations with Algeria, France, Spain, the OAU and other parties. In this regard we might consider a fresh OAU effort as suggested by Liberian Foreign Minister Dennis.

We would have to discuss with the Saudis and with the Moroccans specific actions to be considered under the case by case approach. These might include supply of items as indicated on pages 4 and 5 of the discussion paper at Tab A. However, both the Moroccans and Saudis would presumably want to give more priority to equipment and training that would have an effect in the Sahara in the short term, i.e. in about six months. Some examples are contained in the upper two thirds of the list at Tab D.¹⁹

Principal arguments for and against this option remain as stated in Tab A, with the added point that we now have an important Saudi interest in a shift in U.S. military supply policy but also recognizing that this option may not go far enough to satisfy the Saudis.

3. Third Option: Explicit Association with Morocco in the Sahara

Under this option we would still not try to assist Hassan achieve a military victory since we all agree this is not possible. We would remain committed to our present position on the sovereignty issue and on the need for a negotiated solution. However, by providing equipment and training primarily suited for the kind of war Morocco is waging against the Polisario, we would associate ourselves more explicitly with Hassan's objectives in the Sahara in the hope that this a) would strengthen Hassan's military position and that b) this would

¹⁹ Tab D is attached but not printed.

lead him to negotiate rather than continuing to seek a military victory. The Saudis would clearly prefer this option.²⁰

Here again, the basic arguments are as stated in the discussion paper at Tab A. For more immediate impact than items such as the OV-10 aircraft would have, we might provide some training and equipment listed at the bottom of the table at Tab D. (While any increase in U.S. presence would be sensitive, counterinsurgency training would be particularly touchy.)

²⁰ An unknown hand underlined this sentence and wrote "Also the French" in the margin next to it.

47. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, October 16, 1979, 4-5 p.m.

SUBJECT

North Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
David Newsom, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
Harold Saunders, Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs

OSD

W. Graham Claytor, Deputy
Secretary
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near East, Africa
and South Asian Affairs

JCS

Admiral Thomas Hayward,
Acting Chairman
Vice Admiral Thor Hanson,
Director, Joint Staff

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
Barry Blechman, Assistant
Director, Weapons Evaluation
and Control Bureau

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
[*name not declassified*], Assistant
NIO for Near East and South
Asia

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

James M. Rentschler (Notetaker)
Robert M. Kimmitt

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A summary of conclusions is attached but not printed.

Secretary Vance opened the meeting by noting that the participants were essentially down to three choices, continuance of our present policy, *or* going all the way to help Morocco, including the sale of OV-10 aircraft and Cobra helicopters, *or* some step in between. He briefly reviewed his UNGA consultations in New York and noted the Saudi demarche calling for bilateral cooperation with us on assisting Morocco militarily, a recent and significant development. Whatever we did, we would have to tell King Hassan that we saw no prospect of a military solution and that he should get on with a negotiated settlement. The Secretary then solicited views around the table and asked Dr. Brzezinski to lead off. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said he leaned to the view that continued deterioration in Morocco's military situation will not improve conditions for a negotiated settlement. Our experience with the Egyptians and the Israelis had demonstrated that we were more likely to move disputants to a negotiating process if both sides felt confident in their strength and stability. This was not now the case for Morocco. Moreover, our record in supporting our friends, or the *perception* of that record—which is what counts in foreign affairs—is ambiguous. All things considered, he favored cutting the Gordian knot and supplying Morocco with what it needed to bolster its military position, which would in turn enable Morocco to negotiate from strength. As far as Algeria is concerned, we should not be shy in telling them that we do not believe a weak, unstable Morocco is in our interest. At the same time, we can honestly tell them that we favor a negotiated settlement and are putting pressure on Hassan for that purpose. We should, in sum, act like a big and strong country should act. (S)

Speaking for the DOD, *Deputy Secretary Claytor* said that he had discussed the situation with Secretary Brown and both believed that we had to strengthen Hassan's position. Defense was in essential agreement with Dr. Brzezinski's view and felt that any other course would risk destabilization in a strategic part of North Africa. Defense also agreed with the need to tell Hassan that he had to negotiate. One way to ensure that he did might be to give him part of an arms supply package now and withhold the rest until we had evidence that he was actively pursuing a negotiated settlement. (S)

Admiral Hayward noted that the JCS fully shared the views expressed by Deputy Secretary Claytor and Dr. Brzezinski. (C)

Following some discussion about the merits of the OV-1 as a possible substitute for the OV-10 (which Admiral Hayward believed would be a substantial letdown psychologically to the Moroccans), *Director Turner* expressed pessimism about inducing Hassan to negotiate, a) because the King thinks he has to have military success, and b) because there is a "wave of enthusiasm" among loyalist officers for improving

command-and-control and in general achieving greater fighting effectiveness. Director Turner added that we ought not to overlook the Polisario; in other words, we may want to try to play both sides of the street. (S)

Summarizing ACDA's preference for sticking to our present policy, Mr. Keeny said that liberalization risked protracting and perhaps escalating the conflict. It would send a wrong signal to Morocco and complicate our life with both Algeria and Congress. In response to Dr. Brzezinski's query concerning the source of Congressional opposition to a changed policy, Mr. Keeny noted that Steve Solarz was out in front. Losing a confrontation with him and other members of Congress would not help us with our friends.² (C)

Under Secretary Newsom then recapitulated State's point of view which favored a partial relaxation of our present policy to include items which would not incur Congressional opposition (replacements, for example, for all eight F-5s lost by Morocco). Supporting Secretary Vance's contention that Congressional sentiment was a key factor which had to be put on the table, Mr. Newsom said that we faced a real fight in the House and no strong endorsement in the Senate. The OV-10 had become a symbol and as such could give us trouble not only with Congress but with Algeria. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that it would be nice if we could please everybody; yet in the real world we cannot. We must choose, and if it is a question between pleasing Algeria and pleasing Saudi Arabia, there was no doubt in his mind where the US national interest lay. Moreover, we have to ask ourselves how we will look in that part of the world if Hassan falls. Hassan may not be our favorite person, as a human being or otherwise. Yet he has been our friend. And our track record in support of our friends is not reassuring. (S)

Secretary Vance then summed up his own position, emphasizing that we have to support Hassan but that we would have great trouble getting the OV-10 through Congress. In those circumstances he recommended seeing if we can put together a decent package with items that would not be as Congressionally sensitive as the OV-10. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asserted that we have an overriding national interest which is worth the effort of arguing. The problem with the option favored by State is that it is a typical halfway measure which gets everybody mad. When the stakes are high, as they are in North Africa, the US has an obligation to support its friends. He reiterated his belief that we should fight Solarz on this; he had seen the latter on television

² An unknown hand placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

knocking the President over Cambodia. Solarz is not the Secretary of State. We had done him a lot of favors and we can play hardball politics, too. He agreed that we should certainly flag the possibility of Congressional opposition for the President, but in response to Assistant Secretary Saunders' emphasis on the "rare occurrence" of detailed State-Hill consultations on North Africa, expressed concern that such consultations could become abdication. (C)

In concluding the substantive deliberations, *Secretary Vance* said there was now a need to submit three differing options for Presidential decision, defined as follows:

- Option 1: maintenance of our present policy, with no liberalized supply relationship, i.e., the status quo; (C)
- Option 2: a liberalized arms supply "package" which would include F-5s, Hughes helicopters, and OV-1s (if the JCS determined that the latter would be something more than mere "make-weight"); (C)
- Option 3: a liberalized arms supply "package" which would include F-5s *plus* OV-10s and Cobra TOWs. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stipulated that to ensure the greatest possible fairness and accuracy in the presentation of these options, respective "sponsors" should submit their own language, not to exceed a half-page in length and to reach the White House by noon on October 17.³ He added that should the President favor Option 3, *Dr. Brzezinski* would recommend this contingent upon a more thorough canvassing of Congress. *Dr. Brzezinski* then cautioned the participants to keep the PRC proceedings leak-free; an unfortunate piece had already appeared in the *New York Times* on this subject,⁴ and it was in no one's interest to divulge any of this sensitive material before the President had had a chance to make his decision. (C)

Secretary Vance seconded *Dr. Brzezinski* and emphasized the difficulty such leaks could cause. (C)

In response to *Dr. Brzezinski's* question concerning what we might be able to do with the Algerians, *Secretary Vance* agreed with Under Secretary Newsom that it would in principle be a good idea to field a high-level US delegation for the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution scheduled for November 1. (C)

³ See Document 48.

⁴ Presumably Bernard Gwertzman's October 12 article, "U.S., in Shift, May Sell Arms to Morocco for Sahara War," *New York Times*, October 12, 1979, p. A6.

After agreeing to cable appropriate follow-up instructions to OSD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Murray (who was leaving for Saudi Arabia that evening), the PRC adjourned. (C)

48. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 17, 1979

SUBJECT

Decision on our North African Policy (U)

The issue we face is whether and to what extent our present arms supply relationship with Morocco should be changed, as a means both 1) of helping King Hassan cope with an increasingly difficult military and political situation deriving from the Western Sahara conflict; and 2) of encouraging him (and other parties directly concerned) to seek a negotiated settlement. (C)

Our policy has been under review since the summer, a move precipitated by Polisario strikes within the internationally recognized frontiers of Morocco proper. Since then other key developments have occurred, including:

—Moroccan annexation of the portion of the Western Sahara relinquished by Mauritania; (U)

—Detailed consultations between State and relevant subcommittees of Congress on the direction our North Africa policy should take; (U)

—Growing evidence that Hassan may not be survivable in the absence of some military or political success within the near future; (C)

—Cy's consultations with concerned parties at the UNGA, including the French, Saudis, and Egyptians (who forcefully reaffirmed the view that we urgently need to do more to help Morocco); (C)

—An explicit Saudi appeal for bilateral cooperation to assist Morocco militarily (they would finance Moroccan arms purchases from us). (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum.

Against this background Cy chaired yesterday's PRC, which developed three sharply differentiated policy options. To ensure the fairest and most accurate presentation of these options, I asked each "sponsoring" agency to provide its own language, included at Tabs 1, 2, and 3 respectively.² (C)

Despite differing viewpoints, there is general agreement on four major concerns: 1) we want to help Hassan; 2) we see no prospect of a military solution by either of the contending parties; 3) we wish to promote a negotiated settlement; and 4) whatever policy we formulate should be accompanied by word to Hassan that we expect him to move actively toward negotiations. (C)

The question thus becomes one of which US policy option stands the best chance of contributing to a negotiating process. In that connection, I am impressed by French, Saudi, and Egyptian assertions that unless Hassan receives help which he himself, as well as his adversaries, considers significant, there will be little incentive for Algeria and the Polisario to negotiate (our experience with the Egyptians and Israelis suggests that both sides feel confident and stable—which is not Morocco's case at present). I also believe that continued deterioration of Morocco's politico-military position will merely promote conditions of increasing instability in a strategic corner of Africa which will be inimical to our interests. (C)

Accordingly, I believe that option 1 is totally inadequate, and option 2 is a typical slicing of the pie in the middle, which satisfies no one and is not effective. We simply have to choose whether we are prepared to support Morocco and with it Saudi Arabia and Egypt, or whether we are prepared to watch the situation deteriorate further and perhaps even see Hassan fall from power. If we help Hassan, we are in a better position to create a stalemate, and on that basis to press him to negotiate with the Polisario and the Algerians. If Hassan does not obtain help, neither the Polisario nor the Algerians have much incentive to compromise. If the argument is that Steve Solarz won't like it, we should be prepared to take him on, and not have our foreign policy made for us by individual congressmen. You have done him a lot of favors, but if he doesn't help us then we can stop doing him favors. The Senate is likely to support us—for example, Birch Bayh would be prepared to go to the mat for us. Frankly, I think State is using congressional opposition to justify a recommendation that is timid and unresponsive. In brief, I think the time has come for us to fish or cut bait insofar as

² Tabs 1, 2, and 3 are not attached, but the policy options are printed in the attachment to Document 49.

the moderate Arabs are concerned, and I strongly support Harold Brown and the JCS in option 3.

Your Decision³

³ Carter checked "Option 3" and initialed beneath the decision.

49. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Seignious)¹

Washington, October 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Decision on North African Policy/Morocco (U)

The President, having reviewed the recommendations of the PRC on our arms supply relationship with Morocco (as per the three attached options), has approved option 3. (S)

Morocco is to be provided six OV-10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and other material useful in the Sahara. The full package is conditional on the King's willingness to negotiate and the OV-10s should not be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations. (S)

With regard to implementation:

1. The Moroccans should be informed that this decision reflects U.S. firmness in supporting its friends; it is also meant, however, to stabilize the situation and to encourage both sides to come to the negotiating table. We thus expect the King to exploit the additional support this decision conveys to express a willingness to negotiate with the Algerians and the Polisario.²

2. The Saudis should be informed that the positive decision was made in part because of Saudi representations and as an expression

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 36, North Africa: 1979-1980. Secret. A copy was sent to Turner.

² See Document 247.

of U.S. sensitivity to Saudi concerns. The Saudis should now follow through in regard to financing.³

3. The Algerians should be informed that the U.S. is interested in stabilizing the situation and in bringing both parties to the negotiating table. It is not the U.S. intention to promote a military solution either by Morocco or by its opponents. The U.S. accordingly is not giving King Hassan a blank check but is using this leverage in order to promote a negotiated settlement.⁴ (S)

4. The Congressional effort associated with this decision should be closely coordinated by the Departments of State and Defense, and a special effort should be made to have the Secretary of Defense personally speak to key Congressional figures about this package. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Options Papers⁵

Washington, undated

Option 1. The present policy of selling to Morocco whatever arms are necessary for the defense of its own territory, but not transferring weapons that clearly would be used in the Western Sahara.

ACDA believes the present policy is the best way to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Western Sahara and thus to ensure that King Hassan remains in power. Intelligence assessments make clear that the course of the war will not be altered by the availability of new types of weapons. In March 1979, we liberalized our policy by supplying Morocco with F-5 spare parts and other equipment, but this has provided no leverage in our efforts to persuade Hassan to negotiate and he has prosecuted the war with greater vigor, but less success. Regardless of what we tell Hassan, further liberalization would probably encourage him to believe that if he continues to pursue a military solution, the United States ultimately will directly support him in the Western Sahara. Thus, a change in policy would probably prolong the conflict and risk escalation to direct Algerian-Moroccan clashes.

³ Talking points for Murray's meeting with Saudi officials to discuss military supply to Morocco were sent in telegram 275499 to Jidda, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790484-0626)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 247.

⁵ Secret. Vance requested the agencies to submit their preferred options at the October 16 PRC meeting (see Document 47).

Sending new types of arms to Morocco would move us closer to direct involvement in a no-win situation. Additionally, deeper U.S. involvement in the Western Sahara conflict would jeopardize now-improving relations with Algeria, and antagonize most OAU nations. Finally, liberalizing our policy would provoke a bruising battle in the Congress where the responsible committees in both Houses can be expected to hold public hearings on resolutions of disapproval, raising questions about the Administration's commitment to arms transfer restraint.⁶

OPTION 2

This option would backstop an active diplomacy with all concerned parties to achieve a negotiated settlement by a partial relaxation of our arms transfer policy to Morocco. We would still not supply sensitive new weapons systems that would be particularly suited to the Sahara war, such as the OV-10 or the Cobra attack helicopter. We might sell the Hughes 500 MD anti-tank helicopter and non-lethal items such as aerial surveillance equipment and night vision devices. We would continue to support previously supplied equipment and replace end items, including F-5 aircraft, APC's, jeeps, trucks and so forth.

With careful managing we think this policy will enable us to:

—Help Hassan enough, politically as well as militarily, to establish conditions making it possible for him ultimately to negotiate peace terms that he and Morocco can live with, while giving us the influence we need to move him in this direction. At the same time our help would not be such as to encourage him to believe he could win a military victory.

—Show concerned countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia that we are willing to help our friends, but without going so far as to alienate Algeria, the OAU, and third parties who are convinced Morocco should give up its claim to the western Sahara.

—Avoid the bruising battle we would face in Congress under Option 3. Systematic and detailed consultations with the committees of both Houses since July indicate that both would oppose Option 3. The Senate would support Option 2 while House opposition to Option 2 would be markedly less than for Option 3. Congressmen Solarz and Hamilton and members of the Black Caucus have expressed their strong opposition to OV-10s and Cobras. Senators Church and Javits have stated in a joint letter that “. . . the United States should not provide weapons that would be suitable only for counterinsurgency operations in the western Sahara.” Any effort to get approval under such circum-

⁶ An unknown hand wrote “ACDA” beneath this paragraph.

stances, even if we won, would be at a heavy cost in terms of Congressional support of other important issues (e.g., Salt II).⁷

OPTION THREE

All agencies agree that a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the Western Sahara conflict is required. However, before negotiations are possible, the military situation must stabilize. The King must feel confident enough to negotiate, and the POLISARIO and their supporters must realize that they cannot win a military victory. Given the POLISARIO's recent escalation, including increasingly frequent attacks into Morocco proper, the US Government should now liberalize its arms sales policy to include sale of OV-10 aircraft and other equipment and training useful to Morocco not only in the Western Sahara but in maintaining the balance vis-a-vis Algeria.

Some assistance can and should be rendered immediately, but the full package must be conditional on the King's willingness to negotiate. We favor a commitment to provide Morocco at least 6 OV-10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters, and other material useful to his defense in the Sahara, but the OV-10's will not in fact be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations.⁸ This package, as well as associated training and technical assistance will not win the war for Rabat. But it will help stabilize the situation in the near term and encourage both sides to come to the negotiating table. While this option runs the risk of tempting King Hassan toward greater intransigence and will meet some resistance in Congress, it more nearly serves US objectives in North Africa and provides greater possibilities for starting negotiations.⁹

⁷ An unknown hand wrote "STATE" beneath this paragraph.

⁸ Carter underlined and drew an arrow in the margin to the phrase "the full package must be conditional on the King's willingness." He also underlined "OV-10s will not in fact be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations." At the bottom of the memorandum, he wrote: "This is best. Move on it with Hassan & with Congress. J."

⁹ "DOD, JCS, and NSC" is typed beneath this paragraph.

50. **Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, December 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Status of President's Morocco Arms Sales Decision²

The President's October 19 decision contained two conditions: first that the whole arms package is contingent on King Hassan's agreement to negotiate, and second that OV-10 deliveries should not occur until negotiations have actually begun.

We believe that, while we must continue to press hard for a firmer, and more explicit commitment than we have received so far from Hassan, it will not be practical to withhold action on this initial package pending such a commitment.³ The basic intent of the Presidential decision would be preserved by constant review of the arms supply relationship with Morocco in the context of progress by Morocco on the negotiating front. The initial package will be of limited military value, and we should consider future sales in light of progress toward a negotiated solution. Furthermore, we will still retain the option of holding up deliveries of items in the initial package.⁴

Congressional Notification

The informal notification was sent to Congress on November 16. The formal notification might have been sent on December 6. However, technical details had not been completed by DOD and explicit funding commitments had not been received from Saudi Arabia.⁵ We, nevertheless, held open the possibility of an extraordinary breach of normal notification procedures to permit the 30 day formal notification to run

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79-1/81. Secret. Sent to Brzezinski under a December 26 covering memorandum from Rentschler.

² Rentschler underlined the subject line. In a December 18 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson expressed concern over the delay in implementing the October 19 decision regarding arms sales to Morocco. The Department was instructed to prepare a detailed status report that addressed formal congressional notification, the composition of an arms package, and Saudi financing. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79-1/81)

³ Rentschler underlined "it will not be practical to withhold action on this initial package pending such a commitment," and wrote "that's right!" in the right-hand margin.

⁴ Rentschler highlighted the last three sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin "o.k."

⁵ Rentschler underlined this and the previous sentence.

substantially into the Christmas recess. If Hassan had gone to the Monrovia OAU meeting⁶—which could have been regarded as at least an opening move toward real negotiations—we could have sent the formal notification to Congress this month. His abrupt decision not to attend, however, removed the excuse we would have used with Congress to justify pushing a notification during this period. The Moroccans were aware that this was possible and probably interpret the fact that we did not move forward as a signal of how serious we are about the need to negotiate.⁷

Congressional Views

We explained the situation to Senator Stone. Stone reportedly told Ambassador Duke in a meeting on December 3 that the Moroccan failure to go to Monrovia made it seem unwise to expedite the procedure. Stone was apparently embarrassed, however, when this judgment was reported back to the Moroccan Ambassador.⁸ Senator Stone subsequently repeated his concern for prompt movement, both orally to the Moroccan Ambassador and in writing to the Secretary on December 11.⁹ Stone was aware of the technical and funding questions and told the Saudi Ambassador that it was partly the Saudis' fault that the case had not been moved in December. In his latest conversation with us, Senator Stone said that he hoped the case would move as soon as possible, January if necessary, and that his letter of December 11 was not meant to force our hand beyond that. This seems to conflict with conversations he and his staff have had with others in the Administration, and we are unable to explain the apparent difference.¹⁰

In its letter of September 21 the SFRC indicated support for military sales to Morocco in the context of Moroccan willingness to seek a peaceful settlement.¹¹ Ambassador Duke will be talking to King Hassan and other Moroccan leaders in the weeks ahead; and we expect that as a result of these exchanges we will be able to confirm to the Committee Moroccan willingness to move to a negotiated settlement. With that confirmation, we believe the Committee would support the sales.¹²

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 45.

⁷ Rentschler underlined "The Moroccans" and "probably interpret the fact that we did not move forward as a signal of how serious we are about the need to negotiate," and wrote "maybe" in the right-hand margin.

⁸ Rentschler underlined this and the previous sentence.

⁹ Not found.

¹⁰ Rentschler underlined "we are unable to explain the apparent difference," and placed an exclamation point in the left-hand margin.

¹¹ See Document 177.

¹² Rentschler underlined "we expect that as a result of these exchanges we will be able to confirm to the Committee Moroccan willingness to move to a negotiated settlement. With that confirmation, we believe the Committee would support the sales."

In the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the equation is different. At the present time, Steve Solarz probably has the support of Lee Hamilton for a resolution of disapproval of the proposed sales. Another nod toward peace by the Moroccans will change that equation, and Solarz is beginning to waver because of some constituent concern that he is being overly hard on Morocco. In the final analysis, even if the House Foreign Affairs Committee should pass a resolution of disapproval, a defeat of a resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would permit us to go forward with the sale.¹³

Composition of Package

Clarification of the composition of the initial package has been complicated by problems in releasing equipment from U.S. inventory and by somewhat conflicting Saudi and Moroccan objectives, with the Saudis more concerned about when equipment will be available and the Moroccans focusing more on the type of equipment.¹⁴ The attached chronology summarizes communications on this project. DOD is now determining what items we can release from our inventories, and DOD/ISA and STATE/NEA have prepared a telegram instructing Rabat and Jidda to approach the Moroccans and Saudis for a firm decision on what they want in the package. Although desirable to have such a decision before formal notification to Congress, we could if necessary transmit the formal notification in the same form as the informal notification, i.e., providing for six OV-10s, eight F-5E/F aircraft and *either* 12 Cobras or 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters.¹⁵

Saudi Financing

The Saudis have told us that they will in principle finance a package of the type covered in the informal notification. Because of problems with Saudi financing of purchases for other countries, both we and DOD have considered it important to get a Saudi commitment in writing on the Moroccan package.¹⁶ First, however, we need agreement on the composition of the package. The telegram to Jidda and Rabat now being prepared (see above) will contain language for a letter of commitment from the Saudis, which would precede the actual LOAs.

¹³ Rentschler underlined this sentence.

¹⁴ Rentschler underlined this sentence.

¹⁵ Rentschler underlined "we could if necessary transmit the formal notification in the same form as the informal notification, i.e., providing for six OV-10s, eight F-5E/F aircraft and either 12 Cobras or 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters," and wrote below the paragraph: "State instructed to use this option if necessary."

¹⁶ Rentschler underlined this sentence.

This memorandum has not been cleared with DOD.¹⁷

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁸

Washington, undated

Actions Taken on Composition/Financing of Moroccan Arms Package

October 19—Presidential decision.

October 22—Instructions to Rabat and to Jidda to inform Morocco and Saudi Arabia of substance of decision.

October 30—Deputy Secretary Christopher tells the King specifically what items we are willing to provide, and later same day Moroccans request 24 OV-10s, 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters, and 20 F-5E/F aircraft.

November 10—State 294014 instructs Jidda to discuss with Saudis a package of six OV-10s, 20 F-5E/F aircraft and either 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters or 6–12 Cobras. Because of earlier Saudi interest in only items which are available immediately, emphasis is put on delivery times, which appeared long for both F-5E/F aircraft and Hughes 500 MD helicopters.

November 15—Saudis agree in principle to package as described. They do not react against the aggregate cost but do ask questions showing a concern that the package provide an appreciable and early military capability at the estimated prices.

November 16—Informal notification to Congress on six OV-10s, eight F-5E/F aircraft (replacements for F-5A/B aircraft Morocco has lost), and either 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters or 12 Cobras.

November 16 to Present—While contingency instructions have been prepared to pin down composition of package with Rabat and Jidda, the complicated process of determining whether Cobras can be released from active U.S. inventories and whether delivery times for Hughes 500's could be accelerated had to run its course.

¹⁷ Rentschler underlined this sentence and placed an exclamation point in the right-hand margin.

¹⁸ Secret.

December 7—MUSLO (MAAG) Chief Rabat reports that Moroccan Air Force Chief says he is not clear on helicopter choices available to him and requests dispatch of a U.S. Army team to assist him in making a decision. Moroccan Air Force Chief also reiterates desire for 20 instead of only eight F-5E/F aircraft. (U.S. agrees in principle that a team could be sent.)

December 21—DOD decision on availability of Cobras and TOW sights for Hughes 500 MD is about to be made. Implementing instructions will be sent immediately to Jidda and Rabat and would include readiness to send a U.S. team to Rabat.

51. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 18, 1980

SUBJECT

Egypt and Libya

Because of the recent exchange of rhetoric,² I called a working level meeting this afternoon (DIA, OSD, CIA—State declined) to review the situation on the border and to get a better feel for the kind of contingencies we might face. The session was informative. The following are the major points of interest:

—There has been no major buildup by either Egypt or Libya over the past year. Egypt has a two division equivalent force in place in the Western Military District which could move on very little notice. The Egyptians outnumber the Libyans by three to one.

—Both sides have concentrated on improving their defenses over the past year, with Egypt putting much more money and attention into manning and maintaining a credible force than the Libyans.

—Egypt has forces in place which could take eastern Libya within a week. The major impediments to an Egyptian attack are: (1) the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1-8/80. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "DA has seen."

² Not further identified.

difficulties of sustaining a military operation over very long lines of communication and supply; and (2) concern that Libya will be able to find expatriate pilots to man their sophisticated aircraft and air defenses.

—The Egyptians took advantage of the Qadhafi speech to rectify an oversight.³ When Sadat lifted martial law, he should have left the military in charge of the border region since civil authority is not up to the massive job of patrolling. In fact, the military had probably continued to perform this task in the interim since May, and the Qadhafi speech provided the excuse to formalize the arrangement.

—There is no eagerness on the part of the Egyptian military to clash with a neighboring Arab state unless there is a clear and persuasive case of provocation, where Egypt is seen as the aggrieved party and where an operation is seen as defending Egyptian honor and security.

—There have been no tangible acts by either side to date which would put substance behind the heated exchange of words.

General Conclusion. Although Egypt is technically capable of launching an attack on Libya with virtually no warning, such an attack will almost certainly not be launched without a prior escalation of provocations considerably beyond the present rhetorical posturing. The movement of ground attack aircraft (Mirages/F-4s) to the Egyptian border would be an indication that they were preparing to act, but that is not strictly essential. The intelligence community is aware of our interest and will be watching closely for any signs of hostile intentions.

³ In telegram 13419 from Cairo, June 16, the Embassy reported on Qadhafi's speech marking the tenth anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. bases in Libya: "While focus of address is on US-Egyptian military cooperation, with Qaddafi alleging establishment of U.S. bases on Egyptian-Libyan border, there is significant escalation of Libyan rhetoric in Qaddafi's call for Egyptian Army to mutiny and overthrow Sadat government." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800294-0091)

52. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Qadhafi

Re the reading item you sent (attached).² The Libya watchers are now generally in agreement that some kind of assassination attempt on Qadhafi occurred in April.³ The best guess is that he was wounded in the arm. The attempt on his life does *not* explain the assassination squads, however. In fact, it may be the reverse. The killings of Libyans overseas began in March with a murder in Rome, and it may have been this policy which led someone to make the attempt on Qadhafi.

The part of the report about the seriousness of the wound is probably exaggerated. Qadhafi has been seen by many people since that time. He appeared on *Issues and Answers*⁴ in the first half of May, and he looked healthy and whole to me at that time. He is a terrible hypochondriac, however, and a quick visit to Yugoslavia for medical treatment—perhaps for a wound that was not healing properly—is entirely possible.

Qadhafi is currently not a good actuarial risk. His unleashing of assassination squads, his quixotic mismanagement of the economy, the devastation of morale and organization in the military, and such minor items as increasingly routine torture in Libyan prisons have given an increasing number of people grievances against his rule.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–8/80. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum, dated July 9, reads: "DA has seen."

² Not attached.

³ In telegram 213 from Tripoli, April 14, the Embassy reported on rumors circulating in Libya and Tunis that an attempt on Qadhafi's life took place in Benghazi during the second week in April: "The report alleged that Qadhafi was shot in the arm during the attempt." Regarding the veracity of the rumors, the Embassy wrote: "Libyan source added that this is not the first time such a reported assassination attempt against Qadhafi has been circulated. It seems Qadhafi relishes the opportunity to let such rumors build then to make a grand public appearance to show people how naive they are to believe in such rumors. Nevertheless, Qadhafi has been out of the public limelight for almost a week and a half. Just how long he will play his game of hide and seek is unknown, but given his unabashed modesty, his return is long overdue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800187–0448)

⁴ *Issues and Answers* was a U.S. television news program featuring interviews with foreign and domestic government officials.

I am struck by the recent report out of Cairo that the level of new troops going into the Western Desert is far greater than Sadat and his military aides are leading us to believe. Maybe this is just a “driver training exercise” as someone suggested, but it may also be that we are being carefully soothed in advance of a new Sadat “surprise.” You will recall that our advance warning time of the 1973 war and Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem were brief to non-existent. My guess is that something of the magnitude of an attack on Libya would not be shared with us—for reasons of security if nothing else—until just before he struck. He has promised us advance notice—but he did not say how much!!!

I can’t prove this, but I have a nagging feeling that something is going on.

Item: Ramadan begins July 16. That was when he launched in 1973.

Item: This July marks the third anniversary of the last major dustup between Egypt and Libya.

Item: Qadhafi is in the worst military shape today he has ever been.

Keep watching this space. . .⁵

⁵ Aaron wrote beneath this sentence: “I will. DA, 7/9/80.”

53. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moose) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, November 20, 1980

SUBJECT

Libyan Intervention in Chad—Information

During the past six weeks there has been a sharp escalation of Libyan military intervention in Chad, reportedly in response to requests for assistance from Chad’s Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT). The build-up includes the introduction of Soviet-built

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 11/80. Secret. Drafted by Horan. Walker concurred. Horan initialed for Moose. Muskie forwarded the memorandum to Carter on November 21, as part of his Evening Report on Libyan intervention in Chad. (Ibid.) A note on the memorandum by Carter reads: “Ed—Why not go to UN & build up public concern? J.”

medium bombers, helicopter gunships and light strike aircraft as well as Soviet tanks, howitzers and armored personnel carriers. An estimated 3,000 Libyan combat and technical personnel have arrived in Chad with this equipment.

Concern grows that Libya's intervention goes beyond aiding the GUNT against the forces of ex-Defense Minister Hissein Habre and is aimed at a permanent presence in northern Chad in keeping with Libyan expansionist policies.

While our interests in Chad are extremely limited, this increased Libyan intervention is cause for concern. Our immediate goal in Chad is to gain access to our Chancery to complete destruction of classified material. If Goukouni forces occupy all of N'Djamena, and if Libya does not play a spoiling role, the U.S. re-entry team standing by in Kousseri (Cameroon) should be able to complete its task within three hours.

Of longer term interest is prevention of Libyan domination of its southern neighbor. To pursue this goal we have concentrated efforts on an information campaign, including the sharing of satellite imagery showing Libyan equipment, that seeks to (a) increase awareness among Chad's neighbors of the Libyan threat; (b) encourage Chad's neighbors to condemn Libya's actions and (c) strengthen the will of Chadian nationalists to resist any effort by Libya to occupy or dominate Chad. Meanwhile, we will continue our dialogue with the GUNT concentrating our focus on humanitarian assistance which was the topic of a recent exchange of letters between Presidents Goukouni and Carter.²

² In telegram 290532 to multiple posts, October 31, the Department transmitted the text of Carter's reply to Goukouni. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800519-0866) Goukouni's September 13 letter to Carter was not found.

54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, November 25, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Chad and Libya.]

5. *Libyan Adventurism in Chad*: In response to a briefing item we recently sent you on this subject, you suggested we go to the UN and build a public case.² While we do not rule this out in the future, we should proceed with some caution since the African states, and in particular Nigeria, are sensitive to non-African initiatives in the Chadian conflict.³ Furthermore, discussions at the UN could include Egypt's support for the anti-Libyan rebel elements opposed to the currently recognized Chadian Government. We are continuing, by a variety of means, our efforts to heighten awareness of the concerned African states and to generate public discussion in the OAU context. This would precede any consideration by the UN. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the conflict between Chad and Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 11/80. Secret.

² See footnote 1, Document 53.

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "Continue to push every feasible avenue—through African states may be best—to publicize Libya's adventurism."

Algeria

55. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, February 12, 1977, 1600Z

376. CINCEUR for POLAD. Subject: Valedictory Message—Political.

1. Summary. There has been significant improvement in our relations with Algeria over past two years, due largely to Algerian interest in our technology and market. Algeria will continue to be a force in international politics and to cause trouble, but it has dropped back to the second rank and as its economy grows may become more responsible. The country looks stable under the direction of Boumedienne, and the regime seems remarkably relaxed about opposition. For better or worse, Algeria will be dominant power in North Africa. Our posture towards it should take into account our need for its energy resources. End summary.

2. This is a retrospective and impressionistic look at the development of US-Algerian relations over past two years and at local political prospects. It represents my own views, and not necessarily those of my colleagues.

3. Two changes:

A. US-Algerian relations—During the period under consideration there has been a significant improvement in US-Algerian relations, in spite of Algerian unhappiness with our position on the Sahara. This change has reflected the growing interdependence between US (discussed in my economic valedictory)² and the limited choices open to Algerians. While there are other sources of technology and other markets, and while our companies are not as efficient as Germans or Italians when it comes to construction in Algeria, our positive approach and the size of our market make us their most interesting available partner.

4. Nature and extent of improvement should not be exaggerated. We do, however, have improved access to senior Algerian officials and are now able to carry on something of a dialogue with them on subjects

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2-12/77. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tripoli, London, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, CINCEUR, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 373 from Algiers, February 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051-0395)

of mutual interest. There has furthermore been a quantum jump in expressions of official interest in technical and education cooperation with US. A quick count, for instance, shows that the Ministries of Higher Education, Agriculture, National Defense, Health, and the Gendarmerie have all shown interest in the past two years in opening up one or more avenues of cooperation. While Industry and Energy and Finance have had close relations with us for some time, the other Ministries mentioned above have not. As I have said before, we have become respectable and a latent interest in things American is now being allowed to surface. Thus, President Boumediene told me during my farewell call that he hoped the teaching of English would be emphasized and expanded in the local education system in order to give the Algerians an alternative to reliance on French culture.³ He noted that the 1600 Algerian students now in the United States are a manifestation of increased Algerian interest in our technology and said that interest would increase as their economy developed.

5. The United States will nevertheless continue to be fair game in local media. We are unlikely ever to qualify as a brotherly socialist state and we can expect that our positions on most Third World issues will be criticized locally, unless we undergo a substantial change in our own outlook. The press does not reflect the attitudes of the average Algerian, or necessarily always those of the government, but it is an expression of the image we have for many Algerians. We are going to find this irritating, but should not rise to the bait. It is well to protest the more egregious offenses, but we should ignore the daily pinpricks, and hope that eventually, as their economy expands and they become more interested in stability and less in revolution, the Algerians will become more responsible.

6. In the multilateral area the Algerians have pulled in their horns somewhat over the past 18 months, apparently because they were tired of getting all the opprobrium for their forward position on Third World issues. They are still a force to be reckoned with, however, and we will continue to find them a thorn in our side on many issues. We should not be afraid to make our position known to them clearly and forcefully, and we may hope that one day our representations will have some effect.

7. Malcolm Kerr in an article some ten years ago said that doing business with Nasser was like trying to change a tire on a moving automobile. Doing business with Algeria is not like that. The car is not

³ Telegram 366 from Algiers, February 12, summarized the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051-0315)

moving. It is just that the lug nuts won't screw on properly, but with enough care and attention the tire will eventually get mounted.

8. B. Building institutions—One reason our relations have improved has been the Algerian concentration on institution-building over the past year. Boumediene, who has been fond of saying that Algeria was “solid” because if he went the people would remain and would know what to do, has nevertheless been well aware of the lack of institutions to take over should he disappear. He has no apparent intention to share any real power with them, but he is nevertheless going through a carefully worked-out process of setting up institutions, a constitution, a Parliament, and a reorganized government—to give the regime legitimacy and to make a power transition possible at some point. Energies which might otherwise have been expended on causing trouble internationally have been dedicated to this task, and the points of irritation between us have diminished accordingly. In particular, the Sahara has been put on the back burner—Boumediene did not even mention the word (although he referred to it indirectly) in our last conversation.⁴

9. The building of these institutions has not been greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm locally and there is a vocal, if modest, opposition to Boumediene and all his policies. The significance of this opposition is hard to gauge, and its future role will be determined to a large extent by the role the institutions are allowed to play. If the Parliament in fact is allowed to express the opinions of its members and enjoys some authority, the positions of regime opponents may be pre-empted.

10. Two questions:

A. Will the GOA get it all together?: The Algerians are embarked not only on building institutions but on a forced draft industrialization program which has occasioned much waste and a good deal of inefficient use of resources. The biggest single problem is that of the lack of competent people to run things. Middle management is a waste land, and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of delays have been caused by governmental inefficiency. Given the population growth rate (3.2 percent) and the massive unemployment (upwards of 25 percent) it is hard to be optimistic. Yet there are positive factors. For one thing, there seems to be general agreement on goals and there is a very competent elite which makes decisions on the basis of logical (if flawed) reasoning rather than family interest. For another, Algeria's resources are impressive, and a certain amount of waste can be absorbed without fatal consequences.

11. It seems to me necessary to strike a balance somewhere between Pangloss and Cassandra. The Algerians are going to fall short of their

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted the last sentence of this paragraph.

goals. How short is the question. My own guess is that they will get about 80 per cent of what they are trying to do done.⁵ That is a passing grade, but whether they will be left with an unmanageable industrial establishment which is producing all the wrong things at the wrong time, and doing so poorly, as many of my colleagues argue, or whether they will eventually arrive at a second-rate but nevertheless functional equilibrium is the question. It is easy to make comparisons with Mohamed Ali's experiment in 19th century Egypt, but the Algerians are considerably more sophisticated, and have much more to work with, than the Egyptians were and did then. As a perennial optimist, I will bet the Algerians reach a satisfactory equilibrium some time within the next twenty years, but I won't bet much.⁶

12. B. How stable is Algeria? This is a question very much on the minds of American businessmen contemplating this place. It is of course impossible to predict what will happen here. Change is inevitable sooner or later. I am impressed, however, by the relatively relaxed attitude of the regime.⁷ Although there is opposition to it, as far as we can tell there are no political prisoners except some five people, including Ben Bella, who are under house arrest. The Army is as far as we know loyal to Boumediene and it holds the keys to power. There is always the risk that he will be assassinated. It would be easy to do. He often rides unescorted in the front seat of a BMW and follows an itinerary that frequently takes him through heavy traffic. I suspect, however, that, barring accidents, he will be with us for some time and that he will continue to rule Algeria with a firm hand. As long as he is in power there will be stability. When he passes, someone else will fill his shoes peacefully.⁸ The Algerians have had their revolution.

13. Conclusion: I close with the observation that, for better or worse, Algeria is going to be the dominant power in North Africa. We may feel warm about Tunisia and Morocco, but our economic interests are here. This is one of the four or five most important states on the African continent and in deciding what our posture towards it should be, we should keep in mind the need to heat our homes in a winter like that we are now passing through.⁹

Parker

⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph.

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "relatively relaxed attitude of the regime."

⁸ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁹ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

56. **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State¹**

Washington, April 5, 1977

INR AFTERNOON ANALYSIS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

ALGERIA SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US

The Boumediene regime has important economic and political reasons for its current efforts to improve relations with the US. Better relations would be economically beneficial for both sides and would possibly encourage a less confrontational Algerian attitude on North-South and Middle Eastern issues, though we would not expect major modifications in Algeria's anti-imperialist ideology.²

The Algerian leadership feels that substantial benefits can be gained by closer relations with the US:

—Economic: The paramount goal of the Boumediene regime is the implementation of its ambitious development plans. It is urgently seeking decisions from the Federal Power Commission³ on long-term LNG sales, which are needed to finance these plans. Algeria also wants additional Exim Bank loans and access to US technology.

—Regional: Boumediene hopes to dissuade us from our alleged "tilt" toward Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. At a minimum, Algeria wants continued US neutrality and encouragement of Moroccan restraint. Algerian requests to purchase limited amounts of military equipment (jeeps, radios, radar) in the US are intended to test our even-handedness and to send signals to Morocco that we would not stand behind it if it attacked Algeria.

—Global: Closer relations would demonstrate Algeria's nonalignment and provide proof of US respect for Algeria's international status. Algerians also seem to think that the Carter Administration will be flexible on North-South issues and that a dialogue with the US on this subject would be productive.

Algeria's proven reserves of natural gas are the world's fourth largest. It needs long-term cooperation with major gas consumers.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77-11/80. Confidential. Carter initialed the paper and wrote "good" in the upper right-hand corner.

² An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

³ The U.S. Federal Power Commission, established in 1930, regulated interstate electric utilities and the natural gas industry.

Better relations with the US would be likely to lead to a stable economic relationship, resulting in sizable commercial contracts for US firms (sales average about \$500 million annually, with prospects for significant increase).

The specific indications of changing Algerian attitudes toward the US include:

- unusually warm congratulatory messages to President Carter and Secretary Vance in January;⁴

- the appointment of an Algerian Ambassador to Washington (a confidant of Boumedienne) after a two-year delay following the reestablishment of Algerian-US relations;⁵ and

- the diversion of several tankers of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the US this past winter.⁶

⁴ In telegram 32758 to Algiers, February 13, the Department transmitted the text of Boumedienne's message to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0589) In telegram 205 from Algiers, January 24, the Embassy transmitted the congratulatory message from Bouteflika to Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770025–0102)

⁵ Abdelaziz Maoui presented his credentials on June 24. Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967 in response to U.S. assistance to Israel during the Arab-Israeli War. The Embassy in Algiers was re-opened in November 1974.

⁶ In telegram 337 from Algiers, February 7, the Embassy reported on a press announcement regarding "two special sales contracts of Algerian LNG for immediate delivery to US." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770043–0307)

57. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 13, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

3. *Improving Relations with Algeria*: You asked what steps we could take to improve relations with Algeria.² Diplomatic ties were restored in November 1974 and our economic relations have greatly expanded

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum and wrote "To Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Not further identified.

since then. Seventy American firms operate in Algeria with contracts worth over six billion dollars. The Algerians have 1600 students in the US and are regularly seeking educational, agricultural and specific technical expertise—which they pay for.

The state of our political relations is less satisfactory. The Algerians criticize our support of Morocco, our stand on the Palestinian question and third world economic issues. Recently, though, we have made some headway. The Algerians have just named an Ambassador here and have been careful not to criticize our Middle East peace-making effort. On our part, we will give special priority to Exim Bank financing of Algerian projects and try to have the Federal Power Commission speed up consideration of gas imports from Algeria. David Rockefeller tells us Boumediene may wish to see you this fall if he visits the UN, an opening we will pursue.³ Phil Habib visited Algiers this week,⁴ and I am considering sending Dick Cooper to Algeria soon to discuss North-South economic issues. I will also stress to our new Ambassador to Algeria, Rick Haynes, the importance we attach to finding further opportunities for improving ties and will review with Phil Habib the results of his consultations to see what additional steps can be taken now.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

³ Carter wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ In telegram 943 from Algiers, April 13, the Embassy reported on Habib’s visit and his April 11 meeting with Boumediene. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770128–0196)

**58. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State¹**

Report No. 782

Washington, April 25, 1977

**US RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA IN A NORTH AFRICAN
CONTEXT**

US relations with the states of North Africa have remained in a relatively fixed pattern since the mid-1960's. Ties with Morocco and Tunisia are close, but ideological hostility and political confrontation have characterized those with Algeria, despite a growing economic relationship.

There have been indications over the past year that Algeria, primarily for economic reasons, may be seeking a better relationship with the US. The present situation offers possibilities for more stable US-Algerian relations without affecting the ties the US has with its historical allies in North Africa. Nevertheless, while an extensive US-Algerian relationship in the economic field could lead to less confrontational Algerian tactics on issues of concern to the US (particularly on North-South issues and the Middle East peace process), it would be unlikely to lead to major modifications in Algerian foreign policy, at least in the short run.

Indications of Algerian Moderation

During Under Secretary Habib's visit to Algiers, April 10–12, President Boumedienne expressed the view that US-Algerian differences were in the past and emphasized that Algeria's "battle" now is for economic development.² These remarks do not mean, however, that the Algerian leadership has modified its radical, "anti-imperialist" ideology, which is the product of a deeply engrained sense of national identity forged during the bitter eight-year war of independence. Nor were they meant to imply that Algeria will abandon its "progressive" stances on North-South issues which it genuinely believes to be justified.

In recent months, however, there has been evidence that Algeria has pulled back somewhat from its point position as leader of Third World radicals. Algerian leaders have given the impression that they are weary of being "out front" in international meetings and perhaps feel that it is now time for others to bear a larger share of the burden.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77. Confidential; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Drafted by Flora; approved by Stoddard.

² See footnote 4, Document 57.

This was symbolized by the passing of non-aligned leadership to Sri Lanka at the Non-Aligned Summit Conference at Colombo in August 1976.³ Other, more specific factors also account for the lower Algerian visibility in Third World affairs:

—*Economic Dependence on the West*: The major source of Algeria's moderation appears to be a growing realization among its leaders that Algeria is economically dependent on Western technology and financing. As a result, while Algerian positions on specific issues involving concrete interests remain unchanged, the confrontational tactics of past years seem to be waning.

—*Internal Problems*: The Algerian leadership over the past year has been preoccupied by its efforts to legitimize itself through a long, cumbersome process of institution-building that has included four major elections. In addition, the country's ambitious development programs have slowed. Inflation, sluggish performance, bureaucratic inefficiency, shortages of consumer items, and other problems have resulted in growing popular disillusionment.

—*The Western Sahara Dispute*: The continuing dispute with Morocco over the Western Sahara and related diplomatic problems with the Arab world have diverted Algerian attention from other Third World issues.

With respect to the US, there have been several Algerian overtures which have complemented expressions of interest by Foreign Ministry officials in higher level exchanges and long-term cooperation. These have included:

—unusually warm congratulatory messages to President Carter and Secretary Vance in January;

—the appointment of an Algerian Ambassador to Washington (a Cabinet Minister) after a two-year delay following the reestablishment of Algerian-US relations; and

—the diversion of several tankers of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the US during the US gas crisis this past winter.

Algerian Objectives

Though the Algerian leadership continues to view the "imperialist" posture of the US with suspicion, it apparently perceives significant benefits to be gained by closer relations:

—*Economic*: The paramount goal of the Boumediene regime is the implementation of Algeria's plans for economic development and industrialization. The regime is urgently seeking decisions from the

³ For a summary of the proceedings of the August 16–19, 1976, conference, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1976, pp. 27977–27980. Algeria had led the Non-Aligned Movement since the previous Summit in September 1973.

Federal Power Commission on long-term LNG sales, which Algeria needs to finance its development plans. Additionally, in view of its difficulties in obtaining credit, Algeria desires a liberalization of the Export-Import Bank's loan policies. Algerian economists may also be seeking US technology and know-how in various fields, including the agricultural sector, where productivity has continued to decline despite the government's agrarian reform program.

—*Regional*: Boumediene hopes to dissuade the US from what he perceives as the US "tilt" toward Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. At a minimum, Algeria wants continued US neutrality and encouragement of Moroccan restraint. Algerian requests to purchase limited amounts of military equipment (jeeps, radios, radar) in the US are intended in part to test our evenhandedness, as well as to send signals to Morocco that the US would not stand behind it in the event of Moroccan-initiated hostilities against Algeria.⁴

—*Global*: Closer relations with the US would also demonstrate Algeria's genuine non-alignment and show proof of US respect for Algeria's international status. Algerians also seem to think that the Carter administration will be flexible on North-South issues and that a dialogue with the US in this area would be productive.

Potential Opportunities for the US

While no quick modifications of Algerian ideology are expected, the US could derive significant economic benefits and some long-term political advantages from a favorable response to Algerian overtures for a stable, more comprehensive relationship:

—*Economic*: Algeria is a major source of natural gas (its proven reserves of over 125 trillion cubic feet are fourth largest in the world). Its need for assured markets for its gas is likely to lead to a stable economic relationship, resulting in sizable commercial contracts for US firms.⁵ (Sales already average about \$500 million annually, with prospects for a significant increase.)

—*Short-Run Algerian Moderation*: Promotion of solid economic relations should encourage a continuation of Algeria's lower international profile and a further reduction of the extreme, often gratuitous, confrontational tactics that characterized its past positions on many international issues.

—*Long-Run Political Cooperation*: Algeria, genuinely non-aligned and with a proven capacity for Third World leadership, appears to be

⁴ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

the most important state in Northwest Africa. Extensive, comprehensive relations in functional areas would likely work, over the longer run, toward greater Algerian willingness to compromise on political and diplomatic issues.

The long-term evolution of US-Algerian cooperation is, of course, the least predictable of the potential benefits that would accrue to the US. Any significant modification of Algerian foreign policy will be slow and will result from the internal dynamics involved in a mutually beneficial economic relationship. Since Algeria does not consider economic and political relations to be linked, efforts by the US to use economic relations to bring about such changes probably would be counterproductive.

Effects of a Rapprochement on US Relations With Tunisia and Morocco

A US decision to seek closer and more comprehensive relations with Algeria could have adverse consequences for US relations with traditional friends in the region. To mitigate these consequences, it would be necessary to continue to pay high-level attention to Morocco and Tunisia and to reassure them that better relations with Algeria did not indicate a decrease of US interest in them. Assuming such reassurances, the following reactions could be expected:

—*Tunisian* leaders, because of Tunisia's basic policy of accommodation with Algeria, would not likely be overly concerned. They feel secure in their own close ties with the US and would probably view closer US relations with Algeria as having a moderating and restraining effect on that country.

—The *Moroccan* leadership, in contrast, would be disturbed by a US-Algerian rapprochement because of the continuing Algerian-Moroccan confrontation and the delicate situation in the Western Sahara. Especially if the US were to sell military-related items to Algeria, Morocco would probably view a rapprochement as a weakening of US support for its position on the Western Sahara. While this might discourage Morocco from escalating its military activities against Polisario guerrilla targets in Algeria—if such moves were seriously contemplated—too close a link between the US and Algeria could lead to a cooling of US-Moroccan relations. Though major shifts in Moroccan foreign policy would be unlikely, the Moroccans might express their displeasure by, for example, permitting fewer visits of US naval vessels to Moroccan ports or by reversing their current policy of accepting visits of US nuclear-powered vessels.

59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, May 27, 1977, 0529Z

122874. Subject: Message to President Boumediene From President Carter.

1. Please deliver the following message from President Carter to President Boumediene.

2. Quote. Dear Mr. President:

I want to take this opportunity to establish a direct personal dialogue with you on matters of mutual interest to Algeria and the United States. The views and positions of your government are of major importance on many world issues and the development of a close relationship between Algeria and the United States is a matter of great interest to me.

3. Since coming to office in January, I have been extremely pleased to see the growing cooperation between our two countries in a variety of fields. I am most appreciative for the opportunity which you accorded Under Secretary of State Habib to meet with you for such a thorough exchange of views when he visited Algiers in April.² We are looking forward to the arrival of Ambassador Maoui, whose presence in Washington will greatly facilitate communication, as will the presence in Algiers of Ambassador Haynes, whom I have named to replace Ambassador Parker.

4. Under Secretary Habib discussed the Middle East situation with you in detail when he was in Algiers. I wish to underscore the commitment of the United States to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We will continue to work toward a reconvening of the Geneva Conference this year. As I have stated publicly, our policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. We expect Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by UN Resolutions 242 and 338 which they have previously accepted.³ To let the present propitious opportunity for a settlement pass could mean disaster for the Middle East and perhaps for interna-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770189–0893. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Atherton.

² See footnote 4, Document 57.

³ UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967, and UN Security Council Resolution 338, adopted unanimously on October 22, 1973, established principles and a framework for negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1967, pp. 257–258 and *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1973, p. 213.

tional political and economic order as well. You can be sure that I will personally devote my time and energy to the achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.

5. I would also like to share with you some thoughts on North-South relations, a subject of great importance to us both. I feel that it is especially important that the Conference on International Economic Cooperation show constructive results during the Ministerial meeting in Paris at the end of this month.⁴ In my view, the Ministerial meeting presents an opportunity to make progress on a number of important economic issues and also to establish a framework within which to continue our discussions on questions of mutual concern. Several questions require special attention. These include the transfer of resources, where it will hopefully be possible to reach agreement on the need for increased and more effective flows of foreign assistance, particularly to the low income countries; commodities, where we will be prepared to give new political momentum to the work in Geneva on individual commodities and a Common Fund;⁵ and energy, where we must decide how best to continue the dialogue on global energy trends.

6. It is vitally important for the entire world community that there be a continuing dialogue on North-South matters. We will make every effort to assure that such a dialogue continues in a constructive and productive manner. Secretary of State Vance hopes to meet with Foreign Minister Bouteflika in Paris and this will afford an opportunity for an exchange of views. The members of our delegation in Paris also have been instructed to maintain close contact with their Algerian counterparts as the Ministerial meeting unfolds. I hope to hear from you directly on these and other matters of common concern.

7. For my part, I would be very gratified to have the opportunity to meet with you personally at an early date. I hope that you will be able to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time in the future so that I may have the opportunity of welcoming you to the White House. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter (signed Jimmy Carter, Best wishes J.C.) End quote.

Vance

⁴ The final Ministerial session of the CIEC was held in Paris May 30–June 3. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 265.

⁵ The UN Negotiating Conference on the Common Fund held its first session in Geneva March 7–April 3.

60. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, May 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting at the Raphael Hotel between the Secretary and Foreign Minister
Bouteflika: Part I, Algerian-U.S. Relations, Algerian Position on the Western
Sahara

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Atherton
Mr. Cooper
Senator Ribicoff
Mr. Toumayan (notetaker and interpreter)

Foreign Minister Bouteflika
Mr. Djézairi plus one

The Secretary: I am very happy to have an opportunity to meet with you today having heard and read a great deal about you over the years. It is a pleasure and an honor to meet you.

Bouteflika: It is a pleasure and an honor which I share very largely. I believe this is a very valuable opportunity which we have today. The fact that we are meeting allows us to set aside what we have read and heard about each other. I thank you for this opportunity to share ideas with you in matters of common interest. We look forward to having the pleasure of receiving you in Algeria.²

The Secretary: I would welcome the opportunity and I hope to come in the near future. I want to thank you for your kindness when you received Undersecretary Habib.

Bouteflika: Mr. Habib has many friends in Algeria and is considered as a real friend by us. Bilaterally our relations have reached such a degree that it would be a pity to leave aside political contacts. Our economic and cultural relations have advanced very well.

The Secretary: I share that view.

Bouteflika: We should have a cultural agreement between our two countries.³ We already have 2,000 students in your country and a number of Americans are teaching in Algeria. The cultural agreement

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan; approved by Twaddell on June 20. Vance was in Paris to attend the Ministerial session of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The meeting took place at the Raphael Hotel. This is part I of II. The second memorandum of conversation deals with CIEC. (Ibid.)

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “cultural agreement.”

would act as a framework and would complement what we have in the commercial and economic area. Our relations are all the more important in that they touch upon sensitive areas such as energy and the petrochemical industry. We are sending as our new Ambassador to Washington Ambassador Maoui who has 12 years of experience in our government, is well aware of our problems, and as a former Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry is very interested in having his mission be successful. Let me tell you something which I have not mentioned before and which I am saying here for the first time. We have a number of American citizens in jail in Algeria for drug related offenses. We had already reduced some of their sentences but on the occasion of Ambassador Maoui's assignment to Washington we are releasing five of these individuals.⁴ There are actually six, although the sixth one is in jail for sabotage. He had been sentenced to death but then the sentence had been commuted to imprisonment. I appreciate very much your letter concerning the Paris Conference.⁵ President Carter's letter to President Boumediene touched upon a number of subjects and confirmed a number of points. I do not want to discuss the Paris Conference before being assured that there is a genuine political will to take steps toward improving Algerian-U.S. relations.⁶ As you know, Mr. Clifford came to Algiers after Mr. Habib and it is our feeling that there is a real will to have with Algeria an open, sincere and forthcoming dialogue.⁷

The Secretary: Let me state that there is a very genuine will and desire on our part to have an open and forthcoming dialogue with Algeria. This is important for our country and I look forward to opening and pursuing that dialogue.

Bouteflika: There is no outstanding issue between our two countries.⁸ The only problems we had were related to foreign policy and have now been settled. I refer to Southeast Asia and to Southern Africa.⁹ Vietnam has been settled, Cambodia in its own way also. These issues

⁴ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ Vance's letter, transmitted in telegram 120307 to multiple posts, including Algiers, May 25, was addressed to the Ministers in the host governments who would be attending the CIEC. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770185-1212)

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. For Carter's message, see Document 59.

⁷ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Clifford, on a private visit to Algeria, met with Bouteflika on May 11 and Boumediene on May 12 at their request. Telegram 1195 from Algiers, May 15, summarized the discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172-0534)

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "no outstanding issue between our two countries."

⁹ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

do not have the same topicality. We follow closely your efforts to find a solution in Southern Africa. We are interested in the modest approach you follow towards Africa. We sense a new American approach vis-a-vis the third world and it is extremely important for us to have the feeling that you are now prepared to listen to new viewpoints before formulating a position. In the past, we had the feeling that your position was pre-determined and, therefore, there was no sense in having a dialogue. But now we feel that you are prepared to listen to other voices.

The Secretary: We do wish to listen and learn from those who are involved in Africa before determining what our attitude can be in dealing with the problem. Concerning African problems, we feel that the solution should be found by the Africans themselves but we are willing to play our part in assisting to find a solution in conjunction with the people of the area, not imposing views from outside.

Bouteflika: This approach is fair and attractive, and I ask as an interested party because there is a huge ambiguity in my part of the world concerning the Western Sahara.¹⁰ It is not like me to insult my friends or turn my back upon them and I have had excellent relations with your predecessor. Nevertheless, I had the feeling that a bad solution was favored in the Western Sahara, as if in weighing the problem more weight was placed on one part of the scale to the detriment of the other. Decolonialization of that area is a time bomb for the entire region. We have no problem with Morocco or Mauritania. We have treaties of cooperation with them. The people of these countries share the same interests and aspirations. Their leaders were together in the fight against French colonialism. Nothing separates us. We see a small people, very few in numbers, being deprived of the right to speak, of the right of self-expression. Our position is very flexible. If the people are consulted and say they want to be Moroccans or Mauritania or both, we shall give our support and our blessing to that decision.¹¹ But if the people of the Sahara do not want to belong to either of them, then a solution must be found. The international community has not abandoned self-determination and Spain as the sponsoring nation cannot dispose of the sovereignty of the people. We all remember the circumstances. Franco was dying. Spain does not know how to decolonialize. It has left problems before departing from Equatorial Guinea and it is now leaving problems in the Western Sahara. Let me add that we follow with sympathy the democratization process now going on in Spain. We have a situation here where Morocco, Mauritania,

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined "Western Sahara," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined and highlighted this sentence and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

Algeria and Spain are all involved. The real problem is very much like the problem of the Middle East where there is no solution without the Palestinians. Here there can be no solution without the Sahraouis.

Algeria does not seek a corridor to the Atlantic or a port on the Atlantic. We do not seek a share in the Bu Craa phosphates.¹² Algeria has quite enough for its own people and people of the region. We have arranged to transport our iron ore through the Mediterranean. So there is no problem for us. It is only a matter of justice and principle.

The Secretary: Let me ask you a question. As you know we have stayed apart from the controversy. I have talked to the UN SecGen a number of times and more recently in Geneva after he had been to Algeria and talked to your leaders.¹³ How do you see a solution coming about?

Bouteflika: I have already outlined the solution when I say that we have no territorial claim over the region.¹⁴ I do not want our situation to be misinterpreted. We are not like Morocco or Mauritania with the additional justification that we would not have succeeded. But yesterday's remedy is not possible today and what is possible today would not be possible tomorrow. Years ago, mock elections could have taken place. This is not possible today because the Saharouis have developed a genuine national awareness.¹⁵ Mock consultations could have been held in the past because Algeria did not particularly seek a role. I believe that Ambassador Young recently met with Saharan delegates in Maputo. I think you should delegate someone to meet with them and get an idea of the total situation. Public opinion in Algeria is very sensitized to the problem.

Today you would find more Algerians to make sacrifices for the Saharouis than to make sacrifices for the Palestinians.¹⁶ This phenomenon has occurred because they are our neighbors and there is considerable mass media and TV impact. Algeria is interested in a just solution, and our feeling concerning Morocco and Mauritania is one of sorrow because they were our friends. They were our companions in arms. We have no revolution to export.¹⁷ Our country is very young. The solution is not one of exporting subversion to Morocco and trying to

¹² An unknown hand underlined and highlighted this and the previous sentence. Bou Craa in the Western Sahara is the site of Moroccan-controlled phosphate mines.

¹³ See Document 212.

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "no territorial claim over the region."

¹⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹⁷ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

have a different regime there. We signed a treaty of cooperation with King Hassan and with President Ould Daddah. We have had a long honeymoon. In fact, for a time it was almost Mauritania against Morocco, and Algeria against Morocco and it was as a result of our efforts that Morocco recognized Mauritania. Mauritania does not have a land problem. We would understand this from the Chinese people, but Mauritania is underpopulated and does not want to extend its territory. That would be my first reflection.

The second point would be a consultation with the people. They can become Mauritaniens or Moroccans and say so freely in a consultation.¹⁸ But if they reject either one, then must these people be destroyed in a genocide? That is immoral. There are quite a number of minor states with fewer people. Given the national wealth of the region and how well organized the people are, it could become a small Qatar or a new Emirate. It has lots of resources and a very dynamic people.

Now people immediately begin to raise the speculation of the ideology of being communist or becoming communist. Algeria fought for eight years for its decolonialization and we are not communists. Surely you can say that Algeria is very keen on its independence, very nationalistic, very touchy on the subject but we are not communists.¹⁹ Your Ambassador was in Algeria during the discussion on our new national charter and he witnessed the whole procedure and knows this well. Islam is the strongest obstacle to communism. I am not pronouncing any judgment against communism. We have relations with all countries and ask only that our sovereignty be respected. The third question is that since you talk about a homeland for the Palestinians, why can you not find a homeland for the Saharouis, who do not want to live in Mauritania and cannot go on being refugees in Algeria. Algeria knows war. Algeria has experienced war at firsthand, in World War II, in which our people were involved, and in the war against French colonialization. Our people yearn for peace, a peace which cannot be disturbed for a grain of sand. We seek political justice in the region. I believe it would strengthen the cause of peace and it is a noble and important objective for the US to undertake. Having first avoided the confrontation, international legality would then come into play. On the other side, there are some rigid precepts. "We have annexed it and we shall keep it." It should be an easy question to resolve what the people want and for them to say so freely.

¹⁸ An unknown hand highlighted this and the previous sentence.

¹⁹ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

I can say this very frankly because we are here in Paris. I was in New York at the time and your position at the UN and at the Security Council was neutral. You were for self-determination.²⁰ We have our suspicions concerning the policies of the French government and we are convinced that part of the Spanish regime benefited from some corruption. There was a very rocky situation there. There was a rather specific reversal. Why would the King of Spain go to al Aïoun and two weeks later announce partition, claiming that it was part of the legacy of General Franco. We all know that General Franco was intractable on the subject. If the US's position was then clearly in support of self-determination, we wonder if there was at that time some secret diplomacy on your part and that the arrangement was blessed by the US. I may be wrong but I want to say what I think. So we must now make an effort to consolidate the effort for peace, avoid a confrontation that would be costly for the whole region. The region is ailing already. We have Libya versus Egypt, problems in the Sudan, Chad and Tunisia. I am sure you can make a contribution to having Morocco find a new solution for the Sahara.

The Secretary: Your description of the problem as perceived by Algeria has been very helpful. I want to reflect on what you have told me.²¹

Bouteflika: (Upon taking his leave from the Secretary). "Please reflect upon what I have told you. We would very much appreciate a reaction from you."²²

²⁰ An unknown hand underlined "was neutral. You were for self-determination," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin. Reference is presumably to the UN Security Council deliberations on the Western Sahara in October and November 1975 and UNSC Resolutions 377, adopted on October 22; 379, adopted on November 2; and 380, adopted on November 6. The General Assembly met on the Western Sahara in November and December 1975 and adopted UNGA Resolutions 3458A and 3458B on December 10. The United States abstained on the first and voted in favor of the second. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975*, pp. 175–190.

²¹ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

²² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, July 2, 1977, 1515Z

1653. Subject: Multilateral Diplomacy and Algeria. Ref: State 148782.²

1. Algeria's philosophy of revolutionary socialism, its economic self-interest, and its political commitments as Arab/African state bring Algerians to oppose us on most multilateral issues.

2. Question becomes not how can we convert Algerians but how best we can reduce their impact, either by stifling their activism or by undercutting their influence.

3. Past year has seen decline in both Algerian activism and influence because of GOA focus on Sahara and on internal institution-building and economic development.

4. This focus provides opportunity we can attempt exploit to further the decline. Algerians hope that new US administration will be more forthcoming on such Algerian concerns as Sahara and New International Economic Order.³ In addition Algerians have had to recognize increasing difficulty of obtaining financing for their development projects. These factors have produced distinct improvement in atmosphere of US-Algerian bilateral relations and have had spillover on Algerian behavior in international fora, for example at CIEC meeting in Paris.

5. In this context, organizing for multilateral diplomacy vis-a-vis Algeria involves:

A. Continued effort to maintain and expand cordial bilateral atmosphere by such actions as:

I. Continued briefings on President's, Vice President's, and Secretary's meetings on Middle East and Southern African issues;

II. Boumediene visit to US in 1978;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2-12/77. Confidential.

² In telegram 148782 to all diplomatic posts, June 25, the Department wrote: "Given the importance of multilateral diplomacy to our foreign policy objectives, the Department would welcome your comments on the objectives outlined in this message, i.e. which steps we might take to achieve them, and the particular circumstances you and your staff believe should be taken into account with respect to your own host government as the Department begins preparation of background and instruction cables." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228-0399)

³ The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted on May 1, 1974, at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, aimed to redress the balance between developed and developing countries in trade, commodities, and development.

III. Continued public neutrality on Sahara and show of flexibility in North-South dialogue.

B. Continued effort to ensure Algerians aware of our views on key multilateral issues and of importance we attach to them by such actions as:

I. Use of Presidential and Secretarial messages on key issues;

II. Repeated mention of key issues not only by Embassy on specific instructions but also by high-ranking visitors;

III. Provision of French translations to post.

6. We cannot expect to change many Algerian positions. We can expect to contribute to muffling their influence. On many issues, such as Middle East and Southern Africa, Algerians have abdicated responsibility for articulating own positions and have indicated willingness to go along with whatever parties directly concerned accept. On other issues, such as illicit payments and ILO, Algerians have been increasingly satisfied to remain "in the middle of the pack", as one Foreign Ministry official expressed it, rather than to lead pack as they have in past.

7. For time being we should concentrate on encouraging these trends. Further on down line, as our economic/commercial and cultural ties grow and as past suspicions diminish, we may be able to do more. Algerians have already demonstrated willingness to assist us on certain restricted issues, for example diplomatic relations with Iraq. It will be a while before we can expect such cooperation on broader multilateral issues. In meantime, we should work to preserve and further their silence and inactivity.

Haynes

62. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 8, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

2. *Algerian Foreign Minister*: I met this morning with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika.² We discussed several subjects: the problems of Western Sahara; the release of French hostages held by the Polisario; the need to freeze oil prices in the upcoming OPEC meeting; Algeria's participation in the International Fuel Cycle Study; the Middle East; and East/West relations, including progress in negotiations on the comprehensive test ban and SALT. I came down very hard on the need to freeze oil prices and asked Algeria's cooperation. He listened attentively, asked questions about our discussions with other members of OPEC, and said that he would take our concerns and requests under consideration.³

I also urged Algerian support at the upcoming Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting for the early convening of the Geneva Conference. He told me that the Algerians supported completely our joint statement with the Soviet Union concerning the Middle East⁴ and would act accordingly at the Foreign Ministers meeting. He said they were pleased with the position we had taken on the Middle East problem. He specifically said that they would use their best efforts with the Syrians.

On the regional problems, I urged restraint and a peaceful solution of the differences between Algeria and Morocco. He said that we could rest assured that they would take no aggressive action and wanted a peaceful political solution. He asked that we help in the solution of the problem and pointed out that we would be receiving heads of both states within the next six months in Washington. I responded that, as he knew, we believed that the problem should be solved if possible by the OAU but that I took note of his suggestion that both heads of government would be meeting with you in the next six months.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 11/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² See Document 217.

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "Haven for hijackers."

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 120.

63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, June 18, 1978, 1605Z

155012. Subj: Secretary's June 10 Meeting With Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika. Ref: State 135959.²

1. Summary: During a lengthy conversation Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika gave Secretary a letter from President Boumedienne to President Carter protesting France's military intervention in the Western Saharan conflict.³ Bouteflika elaborated on this theme in discussion, criticizing the French also for their military role in Zaire and Chad. When he sought assurance there had been no change in administration's African policy, Secretary reminded him that U.S. has sought peaceful resolution of African disputes, while Soviets have fueled the fires of conflict with massive arms shipments. FonMin said he had told Castro, Kosygin, and Mengistu the Eritrean conflict will have to be settled politically, and that Castro had told him Cuban troops would not become involved. On Namibia, Bouteflika said Algeria will support a solution acceptable to the Front Line states. Bouteflika admitted there have been secret peace talks between Rabat and Algiers on the Western Sahara war. However, he indicated these have not been productive.

Secretary pledged continuing U.S. neutrality. Bouteflika outlined terms of a possible settlement. On the Middle East, Bouteflika was highly critical of Sadat and argued that the Soviets be given a larger role in the peace process. Secretary took the occasion to give him a briefing on our current Middle East policy. End summary.

2. Bouteflika called on Secretary June 10 following request for appointment from Algerian Embassy, which said Bouteflika had been instructed to seek meeting by Algerian President Boumedienne. Talks which lasted two and half hours covered following topics:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 1-12/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Rabat, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, USUN, Havana, Kinshasa, Mogadiscio, and Addis Ababa. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Houghton and in AF/I and P; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0757)

² In telegram 135959 to Algiers, May 27, the Department reported on Saunders's May 25 meeting with Bouteflika. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0036)

³ A copy of Boumedienne's May 20 letter to Carter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 1, Algeria: President Houari Boumedienne, 5/77-6/78. See also Document 229.

3. U.S. African policy and the French: As discussion began, Bouteflika handed Secretary letter from Boumediene to President Carter (text, which being cabled septel, protests French military intervention in Africa). Bouteflika quickly took up same theme, claiming African Anglophones and those other African nations maintaining “policy of national independence” join Algeria in opposition to French action. Commenting that French appear to be acting on behalf of the West, Bouteflika asked rhetorically why the West intervened to support defective, incompetent and corrupt leaders against their own peoples. Accusing French of engaging in colonial conquest, he said Paris is seeking encircle Algeria by extending its influence in surrounding states. He suggested that if Algeria forced to choose between suffering French attacks and permitting Soviets to establish bases, Algeria would do latter. Noting that U.S. is associated with France and Morocco in Shaba operation, FonMin asked if this represented a long term change in U.S. policy. He called on U.S. to urge France to act with greater restraint in Africa. He then attacked African intervention force proposed by France.

4. Replying, Secretary assured Bouteflika there has been no change in African policies of Carter administration, reminding him that new administration had substantially increased economic assistance to Africa, had given clear support for African majority rule in Southern Africa and had sought peaceful resolution of problems, while Soviets and Cubans poured in arms which escalated conflict. With regard to Zaire, U.S. respected OAU principle of territorial integrity. Danger to civilians arose from violation of international frontier. U.S. response to requests for assistance from Zaire, France and Belgium was motivated by humanitarian factors. He added parenthetically that U.S. action was a specific response to situation in Shaba and not within the context of proposals for an African peacekeeping force. U.S. realizes fundamental reforms are necessary in Zaire and will seek these for the benefit of the country’s people. Secretary again invited Bouteflika to look at record of U.S. African policy over previous 18 months and assured FonMin that U.S. wants Algeria to continue to pursue its policy of national independence.

5. Bouteflika said he was reassured by Secretary’s reaffirmation of administration’s African policy. He said Algeria also supported principle of territorial integrity and had demonstrated it in Congo, Biafra and Ethiopian contexts. Mobutu’s accusations of Algerian complicity in renewed Shaba incursion were prompted by French and Moroccans, he claimed. He blamed South Africans for Shaba problem, indicating he thought they brought it on via their support for Savimbi in an effort to distract attention from their designs in Namibia and Rhodesia.

6. Namibia and Rhodesia: As examples of U.S. efforts to promote peaceful settlements, Secretary outlined for Bouteflika current efforts

to reach agreement on future of Zambia and Rhodesia. He expressed hope Algerians would use their good offices to get SWAPO to accept the principles formulated by the Group of Five⁴ which are supported by the Front Line states. He said U.S. also would appreciate any help Algerians could give to promote Rhodesian settlement.

7. Algeria fully supports Front Line states, FonMin said. Discussing Walvis Bay, Bouteflika expressed belief this issue is principal obstacle to SWAPO's adhesion to Group of Five's proposals. Secretary then outlined elements of public statement Group of Five prepared to make concerning Walvis Bay if SWAPO would agree to defer resolution of its status until after elections. He also clarified other aspects of Group of Five proposal and reactions of individual Front Line Presidents. Responding, Bouteflika described himself as personally reassured.

8. Western Sahara: Responding to the Secretary's inquiry regarding press reports of talks between Rabat and Algiers, Bouteflika admitted these have occurred, asking Secretary to treat this information confidentially. He accused Moroccans of press leaks designed to forestall efforts by third parties to mediate dispute. If this behavior continued, he said, Algeria will reveal that no progress has been made and that the two parties remain in total disagreement. His personal belief, Bouteflika claimed, is that Moroccans think French intervened in Mauritania partially to prevent Morocco from extending its borders to Nouakchott or even St. Louis. In brief discussion of possible solutions, Bouteflika said that realizing Hassan had put his throne at risk Algeria appreciates some concession must be made to his ambitions. He suggested Morocco might keep portion of Sahara including phosphate mines and part of seacoast, while Saharans received remainder of territory now occupied by Morocco and Mauritania. Although the Moroccan political parties are very bellicose, there are factions in Morocco which favor peace, even within the royal entourage. He suggested that if U.S. helped Algeria by getting the French to pull back rather than fueling fires, Algeria would work for a relaxation of tension in the area. He cautioned that, as with Namibia, it would be difficult to achieve progress. Without making any comment on this proposal, Secretary said U.S. policy toward Sahara dispute would remain one of neutrality.

9. During exchange on the Horn, Secretary said U.S. could see no possible justification for Cuban military involvement in Eritrea, as the dispute is purely internal. Such involvement moreover would be inconsistent with Cuban pretensions of non-alignment. In fact, U.S. already has told Cubans there is no justification for them to remain in Ethiopia.

⁴ The Group of Five, comprised of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, worked to resolve the conflict between the South-West Africa People's Organization (Namibia) and the South African Government.

Focusing initially on Soviets, Bouteflika said they already had been ejected from two Nilotic countries and that no superpower should want to see the other superpower feeling humiliated. Superpowers should regard each other within the context of global issues, and the U.S. should not force the Soviets' backs to the wall if U.S. wants a SALT agreement. Both U.S. and USSR should "close eyes to some things" in the search for equilibrium. He said that during his recent meetings in Havana Castro had assured him Cuba would not become militarily engaged in Eritrea. The problem demanded a political solution, and Bouteflika said he had pressed this view on Kosygin and Mengistu, as well as on Castro. Asked by the Secretary why 17,000 Cuban troops remain in Ethiopia, Bouteflika said the Ethiopians fear new trouble in the Ogaden, and that the Somalis clearly do not regard that chapter as closed.

10. Middle East: During discussion on this topic, Bouteflika was highly critical of Sadat in exchange which repeated main themes of Bouteflika/Saunders conversation described reftel, with Secretary identifying questions regarding future of West Bank currently under consideration by Israeli Cabinet at U.S. request. Bouteflika urged that Soviets be given more prominent role in peace process.

Vance

64. Letter From President Carter to Algerian President Boumedienne¹

Washington, June 29, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of May 20.² I attach great importance to our relations with Algeria and am glad for this opportunity to renew our dialogue. I was pleased too that Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Bouteflika were able to have such a useful discussion, when the Minister delivered your letter.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 1, Algeria: President Houari Boumedienne, 5/77–6/78. No classification marking.

² See footnote 3, Document 63.

I completely understand your concern about events in the Sahara. The United States is in the fortunate position of enjoying good relations with all three governments involved in this question. While maintaining a position of neutrality ourselves, we will continue to urge our friends in each country to seek a peaceful settlement. I was encouraged to learn that there have been some discussions, and I earnestly hope these eventually will prove successful, for we would like to see peace restored in North Africa.

Beyond the Western Sahara conflict, I am deeply concerned about other areas of tension and conflict in Africa. Under my Administration, the United States has followed an African policy which has emphasized support for majority rule, substantially increased economic assistance, and the active pursuit of peaceful solutions to African disputes. Recent United States actions in Zaire were a specific and humanitarian response to the danger to civilians in Shaba Province resulting from the violation of Zaire's border, and did not reflect any change in our African policy.

During their discussion, Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Bouteflika had an opportunity to clarify our two Governments' views on other African issues, as well as those problems which impede the search for a durable peace in the Middle East. Such exchanges are very helpful in our continuing efforts to expand communications between Algeria and the United States.

The United States and Algeria have many interests and perspectives in common. Foremost among these is the mutual recognition that conflict is in the interests of no nation in the long term, that peace is the foundation upon which the true prosperity and well-being of every nation is based, and that respect for the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of others is essential to preserve stability and harmony in relations among nations. Those are the principles upon which the United States has relied in dealing with you and your neighbors in the Maghreb in the past, and they will form the basis of our policy in the future. I hope to be in touch with you soon to propose specific dates for your visit to Washington.³

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ In a March 15 letter, Carter informed Boumediene that scheduling demands precluded a meeting in 1978. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 1-12/78) In telegram 82839 to Algiers, March 31, the Department authorized the Embassy to "make following oral points in presenting letter to Algerian Government. Number of other such visits are also being postponed. This postponement is not rpt not reflection on bilateral U.S.-Algerian relations, but is based on pressure of demands made on President's time. We hope to reschedule the visit for some time after the end of this year." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780140-1067) Boumediene died before a visit could be scheduled.

65. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

IN 1461052

Washington, October 24, 1978

COUNTRY

Algeria/USSR

SUBJECT

(1) Medical Evacuation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene to Moscow in Comatose State in Early October 1978.

(2) Minister of Interior Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani Designated Acting Chief of State by Boumediene Prior Boumediene's Evacuation to Moscow [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*4 lines not declassified*]

1. [*1 line not declassified*] President Houari Boumediene was medically evacuated from Algiers Maillot Military Hospital to Moscow in early October 1978 in a comatose state and on "the verge of death". Several days previously, Boumediene, realizing he was seriously ill, convened the Council of the Revolution and designated Minister of Interior Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani to act as head of state in his absence. Abdelghani has been acting in this capacity since the President's departure.

2. Boumediene, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], had returned to Algiers from Damascus in a state of extreme fatigue, nervousness, and depression. On or about 27 September, the President became seriously ill and was taken to Algiers Maillot Military Hospital for diagnosis and treatment. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*] Comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] did not specify the nature or symptoms of the President's illness).

3. Probably realizing that his physical condition was continuing to deteriorate, Boumediene convoked a meeting of the Council of the Revolution. The meeting, in late September or very early October, was attended by Abdelghani; Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ahmed Draia, Minister of Transport; Tayebi Larbi, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform; Ahmed Ben Cherif, Minister of Hydraulics; Mohamed Salah Yahaoui, Chief of the National Liberation Front (FLN); Colonel Benjedid Chadli, Commander of the Second (Oran) Military Region; and Colonel Abdallah Belhouchet, Commander

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 1–12/78. Secret; Immediate; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

of the First (Blida) Military Region. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Boumediene as telling the assembled Council members, "I am very sick. I am leaving and I leave it to you to take care of the governing of Algeria". The President then specifically designated Abdelghani to act as head of state during his absence.

4. Boumediene was medically evacuated to Moscow by air in a comatose state in early October 1978. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Boumediene was gravely ill and "on the verge of death". Since Boumediene's departure, Abdelghani has shown no hesitation in acting like a head of state or giving orders to other high-ranking government leaders. Ahmed Ben Cherif and Mohamed Salah Yahaoui are acting as Abdelghani's principal advisors and supporters.

5. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Comment: *[less than 1 line not declassified]* all members of the Council of the Revolution are believed to be in Algeria, with the exception of Bouteflika. Colonel Slimane Hoffman, Presidential Advisor and Chief of the FLN Commission for International Relations, is also out of the country.)

6. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Comment: *[5 lines not declassified]* criticized the government's failure to inform the Algerian people about the President's illness, describing news releases about Boumediene's alleged talks in Moscow as "ridiculous").

7. *[1 line not declassified]*

8. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Dissem: *[3 lines not declassified]*

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, November 20, 1978

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Algeria

Our policy toward Algeria in recent years has consisted of building on the strength of our mutual economic interests, which are quite extensive, in order to engage in an increasingly serious political dialogue on issues such as the Middle East, third-world economic

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77-11/80. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information.

demands, and the Sahara conflict. We have tried to keep our political differences from affecting our economic relations, and we have wanted Boumediene to feel that he has an alternative to exclusive and heavy reliance on the Soviets. On the whole, this policy has served us fairly well, although the political dialogue that we have sought has never really gotten off the ground.

As you know, Boumediene is now gravely ill. A U.S. medical team arrived in Algiers on Sunday to offer emergency assistance,² but the prognosis is not good. If Boumediene is replaced, there is likely to be a period of confusion in Algeria since there is no obvious successor. The Foreign Minister and the Interior Minister are both possible candidates and we have established a reasonably good working relationship with the former.

During any succession struggle, we will want to use our influence to strengthen the hand of the moderates. This means sticking with our policy of formal neutrality on the Sahara conflict for the moment, cooperating normally in economic and technical spheres, and continuing to express interest in an ongoing political dialogue. Until we see what the new leadership looks like, it will be difficult to develop a more finely-tuned policy. If Boumediene dies, a high-level U.S. representative might head the delegation to the funeral and could carry a Presidential message to the new leadership.

² Sunday, November 19. In telegram 3339 from Algiers, November 24, the Embassy reported on Boumediene's status: "Although Boumediene is still in a coma, 'his situation is better than ever' and good enough that the doctors have decided that the risks of surgery outweigh the possible benefits at least for now." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780485–0133)

67. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Algeria After Boumediene (U)

Boumediene's death will bring to an end an era in Algerian politics marked by surprising stability, militancy on Third World and Palestinian issues, entanglement in an unpopular war over the Sahara, and a heavily statist, but nonetheless impressive, social and economic policy. Based on what I know of the likely successors, *I would predict*: (S)

—a period of preoccupation with internal problems. Great care will be taken to maintain law and order. Vivid memories exist of the near-civil war after independence. (U)

—some relaxation of the socialistic economic system, which has not been popular or particularly effective. (U)

—continued commitment to rapid social-economic development and a hawkish stand on oil prices. (C)

—a non-aligned foreign policy. I do not anticipate closer ties with the Soviets. We may be able to develop fairly good relations with the new leadership. (S)

—a gradual disengagement from the Sahara conflict through a negotiated solution. (C)

The risks in the period ahead are that the hard-won stability and unity of the country, which was Boumediene's greatest achievement, may be lost. Weak leadership or a crisis of authority could open the way for a more pro-Soviet group, or for reliance on an aggressive foreign policy to foster domestic unity. This is clearly not in our interest. (S)

Assuming that real power rests in the hands of Colonels Yahyaoui (head of the Party), Ben Ahmed (Interior Minister), Ben Djedid (head of the western military district), and to some extent Bouteflika (Foreign Minister), we should be able to develop relatively good relations. But we do not at present know anyone except Bouteflika among these leaders, and he is the least influential. Nor do we have a particularly aggressive Ambassador in Algiers. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1977–1978. Secret. Sent for information.

We may want to think of a series of visits simply as a way of getting to know the new leadership. For example, Newsom, Kreps, Blumenthal, Schlesinger, Frank Press, Saunders, and I could all find reasons to go over the next year or so. At a time when we are not doing very well keeping old friends in the Middle East, we should not pass up the chance to get off to a good start with the new Algerian leadership. We do not have much to offer them concretely—although our private sector does—but we nonetheless have interests in the area that will be served by better U.S.-Algerian communications.² (S)

² Quandt wrote at the bottom of the page: "P.S. State will provide its analysis by c.o.b. Monday." See Document 68.

68. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Post-Boumediene Algeria

Summary

Boumediene is expected to be succeeded by a collegial leadership drawn from the country's current political establishment. The process probably will be peaceful, and no immediate major changes are anticipated in Algerian domestic or foreign policies.

Collegial Leadership Expected

President Boumediene has been in a coma since November 18. Death could occur at any moment. A recovery sufficient to permit him to function as Chief of State is believed impossible by the American physicians who have attended him.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1977–1978. Secret. Sent to Brzezinski on December 11 under a covering memorandum from Tarnoff.

² See footnote 2, Document 66. In telegram 3438 from Algiers, December 3, the Embassy reported: "The collective decision of international medical specialists (including now a team from Communist China) is that President Boumediene should not have surgery for the two cerebellar hematomas that showed up on the German CAT scanner (Algiers 3423). His medical treatment will continue to be conservative. Meanwhile, Boumediene remains in critical condition." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0649) Telegram 3423 from Algiers, November 30, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780494–0315.

When he seized power in 1965 from Ahmed Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first ruler, Boumediene created a 26-man Council of the Revolution. Composed primarily of military officers who had supported his takeover, the Council was a collective leadership group in which Boumediene's status was that of first among equals. In the intervening years the Council has lost members and influence as Boumediene outmaneuvered his rivals and asserted his political dominance. Since Boumediene became ill, the eight active surviving members of the Council have taken the reins of government in hand. They are of the Algerian political establishment and probably will designate, and to a major extent serve as Boumediene's successors, providing considerable continuity in state policy.

Algeria's leaders are extraordinarily secretive, a characteristic not unrelated to their clandestine experiences during Algeria's independence struggle. We have had almost no access to most members of the Revolutionary Council and have little meaningful secondhand intelligence about them. Our imperfect understanding is that there currently are at least two major factions within the Council. One, headed by Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is considered more interested in good relations with the West than the other, which is headed by Party Chief Mohamed Yahiaoui. The two other key members of the Council seem to be Oran Military District Commander Chadly Bendjedid, who has the support of some other senior military officers, and Interior Minister Mohamed Abdelghani. The loyalties, if any, of Bendjedid and Abdelghani are uncertain. Unclear also are the preferences of less influential Council members.

Recognizing there are wide gaps in our intelligence, we have concluded nevertheless that to preserve their status the Council members will patch over their differences and reestablish collegial leadership. This is consistent with the risk minimizing and turf protective propensities in Algerian political life. It also is what appears to be occurring at present and it is the pattern which first followed independence and was adopted by Boumediene at the beginning of his own reign.

Over time however we would expect the evolution which then occurred under Boumediene to be repeated—one member of the collegium eventually will become dominant. Although it is difficult to predict, the final struggle may well be among a leading military figure such as Bendjedid, who would have significant Army support; Bouteflika, with the backing of moderates and technocrats; and Yahiaoui, with student and Party support. The successful contender would not be able to rely exclusively on his initial power base but would have to expand it at the expense of his competitors. An essential element would be his acceptability to senior military officers.

Algerians outside the Council could make a bid for power. Only two of the six regional military commanders are Council members. No

unit commanders, most of whom we cannot even identify, are on the Council. The presence of powerful Islamic currents within Algerian society, including the apparent organization of conservative Muslims in the civilian sector, makes it possible there is some cohesion among fundamentalist officers and NCO's. However, the Council appears to have the country in hand. It has instructed the Army and the Party to maintain order, and it has the security services watching each other and the Army. The 4,000 Americans in Algeria therefore are believed to be in little danger at present.

The Algerian Constitution would make National Assembly President Rabah Bitat interim Chief of State during the 45 days following Boumediene's death. He is an ideal figurehead: one of the founders of the Algerian revolution and a man of modest ambition. The Council probably will follow constitutional provisions to the extent of allowing Bitat to assume the Presidency for the interim period. It is less clear what will happen thereafter. The Constitution says the Party is to meet and nominate a successor, whose mandate would be affirmed in a general election. Although a Party Congress is tentatively scheduled for 1979, there has been no Party Congress since the sixties, and the Council might not feel confident it could control one now.

Whatever the Council decides, it clearly must bring into senior leadership positions representatives of the technocrats needed to administer the Government. Boumediene included them in his cabinet, and this could be the procedure followed again. However, the relationship between the Council, which has no constitutional standing, and a cabinet would be awkward. One possible solution would be for the Council members to take for themselves the principal state and army offices either held by Boumediene or vacant at the time of his death. In addition to the Presidency, these include the positions of Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Chief of Staff.

Policies Likely to be Unchanged

It is unclear who, if anyone, would dominate an "interim" collective leadership. Bouteflika's health is uncertain and his acceptability to the Army doubtful. Yahiaoui is almost totally unknown to us, and Bendjedid's ambitions are believed limited to retaining control of his Oran fiefdom. The international orientations of the Council's leading figures also are obscure. Although he defends articulately Soviet positions in exchanges with American officials, Bouteflika is said to value Algeria's connections with the West, and to be distrusted by the Soviets. The Soviets and radical Arabs are said to favor Yahiaoui, but this is the only evidence we have that he may be any more sympathetic to their ideologies than Boumediene.

No major reorientation of Algeria's domestic and international policies is likely, although the new leadership, at least initially, might

be less active internationally. Whoever governs Algeria is expected to recognize that Western technology, finance and marketing are essential to the development of Algeria's hydrocarbon sector, and that the earnings from this sector are the *sine qua non* for Algerian growth. We therefore would expect a continuation of Algeria's extensive economic ties with the United States (i.e., \$1.4 billion in Exim credits) and other Western Governments without any letup in criticism of Western economic "imperialism". Algerian petroleum exports (8 percent of our oil imports) also will continue. There is little basis to hope that the Algerians will turn away from their military assistance relationship with the Soviets, but good reason to believe that as ardent nationalists they will guard their independence zealously. On the Middle East, any change probably would be marginal, which means they will remain in the steadfastness camp and are unlikely to give our peacemaking efforts any support.

Mismanagement, corruption and shortages of consumer goods have eroded much of the public support Boumediene's regime won by bringing order to a nation still divided after independence. New leaders might seek public favor by allowing the private sector a larger role at the margins of what will remain a socialized economy. Given public apathy about Algeria's role in the Sahara conflict, and the popular impression this is responsible for some of the country's economic problems, new leaders might be more willing to compromise than Boumediene. For him the war by proxy against Hassan was personal. However, any such change, if it were to come, would not be immediate.

69. **Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, January 2, 1979

SUBJECT

My Trip to Algiers, December 28–30, 1978² (U)

The strongest conclusion I would draw from my brief visit to Algiers is that *we have an opportunity in the next several months to influence positively the course of U.S.-Algerian relations*. While this is not a top-priority foreign policy issue, it is worth doing, particularly at a time when our position in the Middle East is undergoing a number of changes. (S)

Boumediene's Funeral. The Algerians made the funeral a very dignified occasion. Our delegation was treated extremely well—greeted by three cabinet ministers on arrival and given the best accommodations. We had no significant opportunities for official contacts, but there were no signs of hostility. (S)

Bouteflika delivered a very moving eulogy, with relatively little overt political content. The honored guests at the funeral were Asad, Qadhafi, and Arafat. The PLO fielded the strongest delegation of all. The Soviets were not particularly well represented. (S)

Succession Maneuvering. I managed to pick up a few fragments of information from my Algerian friends about likely successors. No one knows for sure how things will work out, but it is widely believed that the leadership is divided into at least *two major factions*. (S)

One group favors a measure of liberalization and would be less militant on foreign policy issues. The outspoken head of this faction is Colonel *Ben Cherif*, former head of the Gendarmerie. He is not particularly bright, but he is ambitious and has a following. He could probably count on the support of Colonels Bendjedid and Belhouchet, regional military commanders; of Bouteflika; and possibly of Minister of Interior Abdelghani. There is no doubt in my mind that this is the group that we will find it easiest to work with. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77–11/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: "WQ, good. Need memos to Vance, Brown with actions. ZB."

² Quandt was part of the official delegation, which was headed by Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, to Boumediene's funeral. Boumediene died on December 27.

The other faction is headed by Colonel Yahyaoui, head of the party, former head of the military academy, and an officer trained in the Soviet Union at Frunze. The Soviets are clearly betting on him, despite his reputation as something of a Muslim puritan. He has a reputation for honesty, but is no great intellect, and may be easily manipulated by others in his faction seeking to recoup some of their former powers, such as Ministers Draia (former head of security and intelligence, now Minister of Transport), and Larbi, the ineffective head of the Agricultural ministry. (S)

I am not sure that we can do much in the next month or so to affect the succession struggle, but *we should be prepared to step up contacts with the new leadership at an early date. At a minimum, we need to get to know the new cast of characters. We should consider some of the following steps:*³ (S)

—Presidential message of congratulations to new President when he is chosen in February.⁴ (We might want to reextend the invitation to visit Washington later in the year.) (C)

—Visit by a science and technology team headed by Frank Press. (Our technology is avidly sought). (C)

—Visit by Secretary Bergland to discuss agricultural development. (The Algerians know we are good in the agricultural area; their socialist experiments have been a disaster; at the right moment, this might be very much welcomed). (C)

—Invite head of Algerian Air Academy to visit USAF Academy at Colorado Springs. (He has expressed an interest, is friendly to the U.S., and has hinted that Algeria would like to replace AN-12s with C-130s and to acquire some T-34 trainers). (S)

—Vance meeting with Bouteflika sometime in spring in Europe or in Algeria. (S)

—Visit by Saunders and/or myself to Algeria in the spring. (C)

—Maintain our present posture on the western Sahara and on Moroccan arms requests for the time being. (S)

Jordan/Iraq. While in Algiers, I also had a useful talk with Jordanian Royal Court Chief Sharaf.⁵ We reviewed the negotiations and I was fairly blunt in telling him that we saw little merit in the Baghdad

³ Inderfurth wrote in the left-hand margin: "ZB, I think you should send these recommendations to Vance under your signature. Rick." See Document 70.

⁴ See Document 71.

⁵ In telegram 14 to Amman, January 1, the Department summarized Quandt's meeting with Sharaf. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790001-0208)

Summit⁶ or in the Jordanian ideas about going to the Security Council or Geneva. I strongly urged that Jordan not tie its hands and that it get ready to join the next phase of negotiations. He was unconvinced, but I think he took seriously what I said. A fuller report is at Tab A.⁷ (S)

Since the Iraqi delegation was headed by the token Kurdish Vice-President and did not contain the Foreign Minister, I made no attempt to talk directly to the Iraqis. In the course of my conversation with Sharaf, who was very impressed by the new Iraqi line, I said that we were interested in normalizing relations with Iraq. He said that Saddam Hussein was planning to visit Jordan in the near future and that he would suggest that the King urge the Iraqis to reestablish diplomatic relations with us. (S)

⁶ The Arab League Summit was held in Baghdad November 2–5, 1978.

⁷ Not attached.

70. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Initiatives Toward Algeria (C)

In light of the new situation in Algeria, we should consider taking initiatives which would help lay the groundwork for a strengthening of U.S.-Algerian relations. The following are illustrative of steps that could be taken: (C)

—Presidential message of congratulations to new President of Algeria. We might want to reaffirm the invitation issued in 1977 for an official visit to Washington at some time in the future. (S)

—Visit by a science and technology team, perhaps headed by Frank Press. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1979–1980. Secret. A copy was sent to Harold Brown.

—Visit by Secretary Bergland to discuss agricultural development. (This could be combined with visits to Tunisia and Morocco as well.) (S)

—Consultations/briefings with Foreign Minister on Middle East and African issues. (C)

—Invite the head of the Algerian Air Academy to visit the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. (He has apparently expressed an interest in such a trip).² (C)

Please coordinate initiatives along these lines with my office. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski³

² In telegram 749 from Rabat, February 1, Parker expressed his support for the first four initiatives. Regarding the invitation, he wrote: "We would argue strenuously against any invitation to the commander of the Algerian Air Force as proposed by Ambassador Haynes in Algiers 0274. There is just so much we can put into the military basket before triggering unnecessary alarm here." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790049–0676) Telegram 274 from Algiers, January 31 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790047–0373. In telegram 235953 to Algiers, September 7, the Department informed the Embassy that the Department of Defense was preparing to invite the Algerian commander and requested biographic information: "Current plan would involve invitation to Academy commander and one aide to visit U.S. Air Force Academy with one other stop either to or from Colorado Springs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790409–0532)

³ Aaron signed for Brzezinski.

71. Letter From President Carter to Algerian President Bendjedid¹

Washington, February 9, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to extend to you my best wishes upon your inauguration as President of Algeria. The United States attaches great importance to its relations with Algeria, which plays a significant role in world affairs. I look forward to continuing growth in the relations between our two countries.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1979–1980. No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the letter indicates it was hand-carried to the Department of State on February 8.

In recent years there has been a mutually beneficial expansion of economic relations between our two nations in energy and other fields. American technology, financing, and commercial ties can continue to offer positive benefits for Algeria's development. We are particularly pleased to have so many young Algerians in our universities. Their presence enriches the educational experiences of our own students, and the knowledge and skills they acquire here will help enable them to contribute to the development and progress of their own country.

As you know, Mr. President, we have enjoyed a useful exchange of views with senior officials of the Algerian Government, including your predecessor. I regret that President Boumediene was unable to make a state visit to the United States in response to my invitation to him.² I would like to extend the same invitation to you and hope it will prove possible for you to visit Washington at a mutually convenient time.³

We look forward to the continuation of our dialogue with your Government, confident that your Government's policies, as ours, seek to promote peace with justice in a world which is becoming increasingly interdependent.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

² See Document 64.

³ In telegram 56849 to Algiers, March 8, the Department transmitted the text of Bendjedid's February 15 reply, in which he expressed a desire to meet with Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790106–0965) Due to scheduling conflicts, no meeting between Bendjedid and Carter took place.

72. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Initiatives Toward Algeria

REF

Brzezinski to Secretary Memorandum of January 9²

Attached is a list of phased initiatives which the Department and other interested agencies are considering with a view toward strengthening U.S. relations with post-Boumediene Algeria, where a new President was elected on February 7 and inaugurated on February 9.

Implementation of many of these initiatives will be contingent on the new regime's attitude toward the U.S. We also will take into account their effect on our relations with other states in the region. We will coordinate closely with the National Security Council as we proceed.

Peter Tarnoff³
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

Initiatives to Strengthen U.S.-Algerian Relations

PROSPECTIVE ACTIONS DURING NEXT 3 MONTHS:

—Send a high-level delegation, including Congressional representation, to Algeria early in the administration of Algerian President Bendjedid, perhaps when his new government is selected and con-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77-11/80. Secret.

² See Document 70.

³ Perry signed for Tarnoff.

⁴ Secret.

firmed by the Popular National Assembly. The Department has suggested a list of names from which an eventual delegation can be drawn.

—Send a letter from President Carter to President Bendjedid encouraging continued close economic relations and political dialogue and inviting him to visit the U.S. at a mutually acceptable future date. The Department has dispatched this letter to Algeria.

—Respond to Algeria's desire to increase the price of gas under the El Paso I contract in a fashion which protects the interests of U.S. consumers and minimizes disturbance to U.S.-Algerian relations. The Department of Energy is considering available options in consultation with State.

—Offer ICA travel grants enabling lecturers from New York University to instruct at the Algerian National School of Administration (ENA). ICA will be able to meet this request.

—Encourage the new Algerian Government to sign a pending cultural agreement.

—Identify funding available to carry out cultural exchange activities under the prospective cultural agreement. These would include facilitating cooperative relationships between American and Algerian universities. There is a possibility of using funds under Section 661 of the Foreign Assistance Act for these purposes.

—Arrange consultations/briefings with the Algerian Foreign Minister on Middle East and African issues.

PROSPECTIVE ACTIONS WITHIN 3 TO 9 MONTHS:

—A visit to Algeria by a science and technology team, perhaps headed by White House Science Advisor Frank Press, to encourage wider cooperation in these areas. The National Science Foundation is prepared to send a team to Algeria to consider specific forms of cooperation.

—A visit to Algeria by Secretary Bergland to discuss Algerian agricultural development and cooperation in sectors identified in a USDA/AID study where U.S. reimbursable technical assistance might be relevant to Algerian efforts. Preliminary reactions from USDA are that the Secretary would be interested in such a visit, possibly in the summer.

—Offer to consider modest amounts of Eximbank financing for equipment to be used in well-planned pilot agricultural projects as a further indication of U.S. interest in Algerian agricultural development. Several of the agricultural projects in the USDA/AID study are suitable for such supplier credit financing.

—Invite the commander of the Algerian Air Academy to visit the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. He has expressed interest

in such a trip. The Air Force has indicated agreement in principle to such a visit.⁵ If it is successful, invitations could be extended to other Algerian service school chiefs.

—Offer to assign a defense attache to Algiers. Defense agrees in principle.

—Explore possibility of negotiating an Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement with Algeria to facilitate American business in Algeria. Embassy Algiers has been asked to comment on this initiative.

—Exchange visits of military students. Algeria received students from our National War College in 1977, and we could invite a comparable group to visit the U.S.

—Subject to the state of our relations with both Algeria and Morocco, we would consider early in the summer of 1979 approaching the Algerians to ask if they would be interested in sending some of their military to the United States for training beginning in FY 1981. Defense agrees in principle.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 70.

73. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 18, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S. Delegation to 25th Anniversary of Algerian Revolution (November 1) (C)

You asked for my views on the question of your heading a U.S. delegation (or being the American representative) to the 25th Anniversary observance of the Algerian revolution on November 1. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77-11/80. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for action. A notation at the top of the page reads: "cy to Rentschler, 10/19."

On reflection—and influenced to some extent by the frustrating press leakage on matters re North Africa²—I feel it *would be useful for you to undertake such a trip*. Positive factors:

—evidence of WH interest in Algeria and in continuing improvement of our bilateral relationship;

—renewal of President's invitation to Chadli for a visit next summer;

—authoritative statement of our North African policy (whatever it may then be), coupled with some frank assertions of our interest in a stable Morocco along the lines you expressed during the last PRC.³ (C)

The stop in Algeria would obviously have to be balanced by a stop in Morocco, preferably *after* Algeria. The factors here are more ambiguous and would be conditioned by whether the President came down on Option 2 or Option 3⁴ (if the former, you could expect a reception that would be correct, verging on cool; if the latter, you'd find a much more hospitable monarch, and one readier to hear you out). In either case it would be a useful stop, and for essentially the same reasons as for Algeria (authoritative statement of our policy). At the same time, you could well be the one to *communicate* with the King, in the sense of getting him to tell us where he thinks he is going and what he sees down the road. The fact is, *no one in our Government has really talked turkey with him on the implications of the present conflict*. The chance of doing that is alone worth the trip . . . (C)

NB. As I indicated last evening, Newsom wants to sound out Duncan on going to Algeria November 1 and may have informally and noncommittally sounded him out. Do you want me to put a freeze on that?⁵ (C)

² Presumably the press accounts of the October 16 PRC meeting on U.S. arms sales to Morocco. See footnote 4, Document 47.

³ See Document 47.

⁴ See Document 49.

⁵ Brzezinski wrote "yes" below this paragraph.

**74. Letter From President Carter to Algerian President
Bendjedid¹**

Washington, October 29, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to inform you personally that Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, is leading the American delegation to your celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution. The happiness of this occasion is in strong contrast to the sorrow which we shared with the Algerian nation less than a year ago at the funeral of the late President Boumedienne.²

This year's national day celebrations will also provide a special opportunity for a high-level discussion of our common concerns. Dr. Brzezinski has my full confidence and looks forward to such a discussion with you. I hope that you will receive him and talk with him as freely and frankly as you would with me about the matters that so concern us both in this critical period. He will report personally to me upon his return to Washington.

I am confident that our mutual interest in encouraging the development of international understanding and cooperation will continue to guide our relations. In particular, my country desires to build on the constructive bilateral ties which our two nations already enjoy. I view our mutual relations as important to the development and progress which I know both of us desire to see in the North African region.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Algeria: 1979–1980. No classification marking.

² See Document 69.

75. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, November 1, 1979, 4:15–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia (U)

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ulric Haynes, US Ambassador to Algeria
Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
James Rentschler, NSC Staff Member
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Mohamed Benyahia, Algerian Foreign Minister
Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry
Interpreter

In a discussion confined largely to the Middle East and the Western Saharan conflict *Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, met for 1¾ hours with *Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia*. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski led off the discussion by noting that the President, by sending him to Algeria, wanted to outline the importance of our relations with Algeria; he had asked Dr. Brzezinski to explain to the Foreign Minister and President Bendjedid the basic points of United States foreign policy in the Middle East; and more specifically to outline the reasons underlying the President's arms supply decision on Morocco. (C)

In developing these views, *Dr. Brzezinski* added that he wished to summarize very briefly a number of key ideas: First, the President and the United States Government accept the reality of fundamental change in the world. We live in a period marked by a major redistribution of political power, reflecting changes which in a sense started with the shots fired in 1945 at Setif.² We have seen the end of the Eurocentric era, and while we accept this change, we insist that it be stable, constructive, and lead to conditions which are both peaceful and equitable. We are not interested in defending the status quo, but at the same time we will not permit other powers to exploit changes for their own ends. We view the non-aligned movement as a constructive element in world

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Hotel Aurassi.

² On May 8, 1945, French police fired on Algerians protesting colonial rule in the town of Sétif.

affairs and we especially appreciate the important role which Algeria plays in that context. (U)

Turning specifically to the Middle East, *Dr. Brzezinski* told the Foreign Minister that we expect neither Algerian approval nor support for our Middle East policy; we would, however, like Algeria to understand that policy. The President's Administration, he noted, is the first Democratic Administration to work for peace in the Middle East on a basis other than maximalist Israeli positions. We are not supporting a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement; rather we want to use the Israeli-Egyptian agreements as a catalyst leading to a larger settlement. We will try, in the next phase of negotiations, to move toward Palestinian autonomy. We hope to draw some moderate Palestinians directly into this process. We hope transitional arrangements will emerge which will, in time, modify both Israeli and Palestinian expectations, out of which will come eventual recognition of Israel's right to exist. Our policy is based on the premise that Palestinians have the right to participate in the shaping of their own future. We expect this process to move forward, with the result that there will be both restoration of territories and self-government—for Arabs in general and for the Palestinians in particular. We recognize and respect the Arab renaissance and consider it in the United States interest to have friendly relations with as many Arab countries as possible. In this connection we want better relations with Iraq and Libya. (U)

Concerning Morocco, *Dr. Brzezinski* stressed that the arms decision we took was based on three things: first, the solution to the Western Saharan conflict should be political not military; second, we are not supporting Morocco in order to enable it to seek a military solution; rather we want to encourage Morocco, on the basis of stability and confidence, to seek a political settlement; third, we think it important that our friends know they can count on the United States and that the United States will not let military solutions be imposed upon them. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski added that we are not seeking to mediate this conflict—none of the parties have asked us to be a mediator and we are not volunteering—but we will be using whatever influence we have to urge others to join us in encouraging the parties to look for a political solution. The North African region has enormous potential; its resources are such that it could easily become a new Ruhr. We are confident that neither Algeria nor Morocco wants a war, and we are thus doing what we can to help promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to note that we consider Algeria an important actor, both regionally and internationally. Algeria has high standing in the non-aligned movement and in the international community. Algeria's struggle for independence confers prestige upon it, as does

the role played by religion in Algerian national life and the fact that in international affairs Algeria speaks for itself. We are encouraged by our growing economic relations and believe that the time has come for more frequent contacts between our two countries in political affairs. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski concluded his presentation by noting that, while he didn't expect our two governments to agree on everything, he didn't think we have any fundamental conflicts. We both agree on the need to keep foreign military presence and ideological pressures out of Africa. We respect religious principles and the natural desire of people to participate in organizing their futures. We are both conscious of the gradual redistribution of political power taking place which will affect events until the end of this century and beyond. On all of these issues there is enough common ground to enable us to speak seriously to one another. (U)

In response, and before delivering his own presentation, *Foreign Minister Benyahia* asked why *Dr. Brzezinski* had not mentioned the words "PLO" or "Palestinian State" in his remarks concerning the Middle East. *Dr. Brzezinski* replied that he had wished to stress the basic tenets of our policy rather than specify solutions. (C)

Foreign Minister Benyahia went on to note that Algeria is very appreciative of the President's gesture in sending *Dr. Brzezinski* to Algeria for the 25th Anniversary observance of the Algerian Revolution. Contacts between our two countries have not been frequent, which Algeria does not consider a good thing. So far as developing a dialogue is concerned, we are in agreement and we want this dialogue to be open and permanent. So far as international affairs are concerned, *Foreign Minister Benyahia* stressed that Algeria had acquired its independence through suffering and struggle. Accordingly, a fundamental basis of Algerian policy is its support for national independence. Algeria is excessively sensitive to the struggle of others for self-determination, and sometimes has gone against its own interest in asserting this principle (when *Dr. Brzezinski* asked for specific examples, *Benyahia* cited Algeria's severance of relations with the US, UK, and the FRG over the Middle East—moves which hurt a developing country like Algeria from an economic point of view). (C)

Concerning the Palestinian question in the Middle East, *Foreign Minister Benyahia* said that Algeria saw this in the same way that it saw Rhodesia, Namibia and the former Portuguese African colonies. People must have the right to independence; the Palestinian people's existence in negotiations can only be undertaken with those who represent and carry on alone the struggle of the people. History without exception shows that those are the only ones who validly express the people's interest, a point which also applies to the Saharan conflict.

The Foreign Minister said he did not want to employ adjectives that are too extreme, but the least he could say about our policy in the Middle East was that it was "unrealistic." Any process which implicitly or explicitly aimed at eliminating the PLO will inevitably lead to a large-scale confrontation in the Middle East. (C)

Speaking at much greater length on the Western Saharan conflict, *Foreign Minister Benyahia* said he did not wish to get into a discussion which would question the friendship of one people against another people. However, if he were to rephrase Dr. Brzezinski's position it would seem that the US is against the self-determination of people who are opposed by friends of the US. The basic facts of the Western Saharan situation are that Morocco, by force of arms, now occupies a territory previously held by the Spanish and that the people living there want their independence. These facts have led to a decolonization struggle. Either one is for self-determination, against it or neutral in this struggle. Each of these positions dictates certain actions. However, one thing is clear, you cannot claim neutrality while supplying one of the parties to the conflict the means of military repression. (C)

Developing further his points, the *Foreign Minister* wondered where Morocco really thought its borders were located and then alluded to the claims Morocco made as far as Timbuktu. Benyahia said he did not want to make a comparison with Israel, adding Morocco was one of the rare states in the world that wanted to have "elastic frontiers." The Sahara conflict is one involving the right of a colonial people to self-determination, something that is not "negotiable." The situation is not similar to that of the Algerian liberation struggle where the Algerians had something to negotiate over with the French; i.e., rights of French citizens remaining in Algeria and the commercial interests of French companies in Algeria. The difficulties that Morocco is having in the Sahara are not due to a lack of military equipment. They are due to a lack of moral justification. Additional arms to Morocco will not change the situation at all. In sum, said Benyahia, Algeria did not find American rationale for its supply policy convincing. Reinforcing Morocco to negotiate would mean negotiations at the expense of the Saharan people's right of self-determination, a point which led Benyahia to comment on the question of bilateral relations. He stressed that Algeria was ready to discuss peace, but it continues to refuse two things: (1) the idea that the Western Saharan conflict could be considered a bilateral affair between Morocco and Algeria; (2) that Algeria can be the agent to discuss the future of the Saharan people with third parties. Since the existence of the first liberation movements, the USG has tended to attribute communist motives to them. Such an interpretation is worthy of "cartoons." Our Charge in Washington reports that one of your staff told him that the USG knew of the existence of an accord

between Libya and Algeria to use the Tuareg Tribesmen of Mali and Niger to destabilize their respective governments. This allegation prompted us to call on the governments of those two countries to see whether they believed such an allegation. Before making up its mind, the Foreign Minister urged the USG to contact the allegedly threatened governments. Algeria's policy, he said, is not to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors; the only problem Algeria has with Morocco is based on that country's policy of expansionism. (C)

On the subject of US-Algerian relations, *Benyahia* agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that since Algeria's independence there have been no direct issues of disagreement between us. Economic ties have grown to such a state that the US is now Algeria's number one economic partner, with France in third place. Algeria would like to expand those ties even more. At the same time, however, Algeria does not want the US to become a factor of destabilization in the region. *Benyahia* emphasized in this context that the American arms supply initiative causes Algeria enormous disquiet and concern. He likened US policy to the plight of a businessman who invests in a bankrupted business, since Algeria is convinced that arms to Morocco, no matter in what quantity, cannot bring stability, especially for Morocco itself. *The Foreign Minister* said that for US-Algerian relations to remain excellent, the USG must not contribute to destabilization in the region. The USG is investing in a "rotten regime" in Morocco and, therefore, US arms will neither stabilize the region nor defeat the Polisario. Referring to the experience of recent history, the Foreign Minister pointed out that each time a power attempted to stop the process of self-determination, that power itself became destabilized. He cited, as examples, the cases of France with respect to Algeria and Portugal with respect to the decolonization of its African possessions. (C)

Benyahia stressed that the fall of King Hassan was not in Algeria's interest; Algeria knows the King, but doesn't know what might follow him. It could be even more expansionist. (C)

In conclusion, *Foreign Minister Benyahia* said he was in agreement with a need to develop our relations. He agreed too with Dr. Brzezinski's points concerning a new economic order and the redistribution of political power. The more we discuss these problems, he said the better we will understand each other. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski thanked the Foreign Minister for a very enlightening and very impressive expose and expressed appreciation for the frankness with which it was delivered. He said that he felt it was fair to conclude that there were two issues which, while not central to our relations, were nevertheless important and on which we do not agree: the Palestinian question and Morocco. He wished to make a brief observation on each of these two issues. (C)

On Palestine, *Dr. Brzezinski* questioned the Foreign Minister's analogy between the PLO and Algeria's own revolutionary experience. He agreed on the importance of recognizing the principal combatants; adding while it was true that the FLN was the principal combatant during Algeria's independence struggle, the fact is that the principal combatants in the Middle East have not been the PLO but rather Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Dr. Brzezinski stressed that he did not ignore the importance of the PLO but he did not feel that its experience was comparable to that of the FLN. Indeed, Dr. Brzezinski noted, he has often said that if the PLO ever fought like the FLN, Israel would be in serious difficulty. (C)

A second important difference between the PLO and the FLN, *Dr. Brzezinski* continued, is that in all the latter's documents there was a readiness to sign a treaty with France provided France recognized Algerian rights. The PLO on the other hand does not accept an internationally acceptable platform for a Middle East framework of peace, embodied in UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Dr. Brzezinski added that he made this observation not for polemical reasons but because unless certain distinctions were made clear, historic analogies can be seriously misleading. We do not exclude the role of the PLO—there is a process of change, and in this process there will be greater recognition of Palestinian rights. The resignation of Dayan and Abba Eban's speech are indicators of that recognition within Israel itself.³ In response to the Foreign Minister's contentions that we are pursuing an erroneous policy, Dr. Brzezinski said he felt obliged to point out that Arab policy in all the years past did not recover a single inch of Arab territory held by Israel. US policy is bringing that restoration about, and once the Sinai is restored, along with autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank, the stage will be set for further progress—and that is the reason why extremist elements in Israel oppose this because they see where it is leading. (C)

On Morocco, *Dr. Brzezinski* reemphasized that we are not assisting Morocco to impose its maximalist position. We are, however, worried by potential disruption in Morocco's political life and the possible collapse of the King. The problem is that Morocco's perception of the Western Sahara is completely different from Algeria's. Morocco, and even Tunisia, say Algeria is the dynamic and expansionist power in the area. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to stress the need for dealing with subjective perceptions because they motivate people no matter how ridiculous

³ Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan resigned on October 21 over differences with Menachem Begin regarding Palestinian autonomy and the West Bank. Abba Eban's speech is not further identified.

the perceptions might seem to others. For our part, we will be using our leverage to promote a political solution. Some of our common friends will do the same. What we cannot permit is a situation to develop where one side gets massive outside assistance while the other becomes progressively isolated and forced to accept an imposed solution. It is this consideration which has led us to undertake talks with Morocco and others. We have no hidden motives. We are not trying by subterfuge to help Morocco prevail in a military sense. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski concluded, we don't feel we have to choose between our friendship with Morocco and our growing relations and friendship with Algeria. Many of the things he has said, he added, the Foreign Minister will disagree with or reject. But so will the Moroccans. The important thing is to seek a political accommodation. (C)

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the Moroccan King speaks of the "right of hot pursuit" into Algeria. He felt it necessary to point out that if Morocco ever resorts to hot pursuit, then there will be a broader conflict. He continued by asking Dr. Brzezinski what the USG thinks of the Sahara resolution adopted at the OAU summit last July calling for a referendum in the Western Sahara to allow its inhabitants to express their desire to either be free or to be a part of Morocco.⁴ Algeria, he added, rigidly adheres to those principles of the OAU Charter calling for the respect of the rights of the people of the continent and for national borders. He chucklingly told Dr. Brzezinski that the latter was "insulting" Morocco when he said that the Polisario has enormous military might while Morocco has inadequate means. The Foreign Minister suggested that the USG send a State Department mission to visit the Polisario on the spot to see the amount of US arms seized intact from fleeing Moroccans. With time running out before Dr. Brzezinski's next appointment with the Iranian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister indicated that allegations of Tunisian fears of Algerian domination seemed to him incredible. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski took his leave in reemphasizing his belief that no fundamental conflicts divide the US and Algeria. He warmly thanked the Foreign Minister for his helpful views; the latter responded in kind and said he was making arrangements to insure that Dr. Brzezinski would meet with President Bendjedid the following day. (U)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 45.

76. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, November 2, 1979, 6–7 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid
(U)

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ulric Haynes, US Ambassador to Algeria
Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
James M. Rentschler, NSC Staff Member
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Chadli Bendjedid, President of Algeria
Mohamed Benyahia, Foreign Minister
Interpreter

Dr. Brzezinski began by giving President Bendjedid a personal letter from President Carter.² He expressed pleasure at the opportunity he had had to visit Kabyle battlefields earlier in the day and his admiration for the many evidences of peaceful progress and development he had witnessed in the same region. He went on to state that because of the lengthy exchange he had had the day before with President Bendjedid's very frank, very able, and very eloquent Foreign Minister he would not repeat all the points discussed on that occasion. Rather, *Dr. Brzezinski* said that he wished to underline a fundamental belief: while we may disagree on this issue or that, on the basics we do not disagree at all. We believe that the world is in the midst of fundamental change. We believe that Algeria is a very important regional and international force in that process. Algeria speaks for itself in international fora and for no one else. We respect Algerian independence, we understand its sources, and we understand Algeria's influence on others. For all of these reasons, *Dr. Brzezinski* continued, we believe the time is ripe for more frequent contacts. We are prepared to engage in a serious dialogue with Algeria on all the major issues of concern to us both. We feel strongly that Algeria has a very major role to play, and we want to collaborate with Algeria as closely as possible. (U)

President Bendjedid replied that he wished to express his thanks both for what *Dr. Brzezinski* had said and for President Carter's gesture

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Hotel Aurassi.

² See Document 74.

in sending him to Algeria for the 25th anniversary observance of the Algerian Revolution. That gesture testifies to the fact that US-Algerian relations are going well, despite disagreement on some international affairs. Bilaterally things are going very well. Algeria and the US may have some divergencies, but these do not interfere with our bilateral relations. President Bendjedid went on to say that he knew Dr. Brzezinski liked to speak frankly, and the President himself wished to speak in the same way about an affair which concerns Algeria closely. Algeria has appreciated the attitude of the US in the North African region. President Bendjedid is not expecting support for the Algerian position and recognizes that the US has interests in Morocco as well as in Algeria and other countries; however, the Algerian people do not understand why the US gives armaments to one of Algeria's neighbors and thereby contributes to danger in the region. (C)

President Bendjedid noted that the day Algeria got its independence, the Algerian position was clear: his country never tries to create problems for its neighbors or interfere in their affairs. On the other hand, during the difficult days which followed the death of Boumediene, Algeria's neighbors tried to interfere in Algerian internal matters. Asked by Dr. Brzezinski to clarify that part of his remarks, President Bendjedid cited the parachuting of small arms into Algeria from a C-130 which came from Morocco.³ (C)

President Bendjedid stated that Algeria had had several opportunities to exploit a difficult internal situation in Morocco but did not do so. For example, following the attempted coup at Skirrat, the first head of state to call Hassan on the telephone and offer moral support was the Algerian President.⁴ Algeria also refused categorically to receive anyone who had participated in the attempted coup. Algeria believed in the principle of good relations with its neighbors; it never tried to export its revolutionary experience to Morocco, nor create problems there. King Hassan knows this. President Bendjedid invited the US to ask the King if he had evidence to the contrary. (C)

We have now a problem in the area, *President Bendjedid* continued. It is the Western Sahara, and our perceptions there were different. Algeria's is based on the principle of self-determination for all people, a principle which it has believed in since the organization of its revolution. It is also a principle shared by the UN and the OAU. Algeria believes that the Saharan people must have the opportunity to decide its own future and organize its own life. Unless this principle is applied,

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Reference is to the June 10, 1971, coup attempt at Hassan's seaside palace in Skhirat. For details on the attack, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Documents 116 and 117.

there is the risk of creating a serious precedent in Africa, in effect a return to jungle law where smaller countries will be at the mercy of larger countries. This would lead to instability in the continent. (C)

President Bendjedid reiterated that Algeria has no claim in the Western Sahara. The problem there is between the Saharan people, who want self-determination, and another power which is using force against them. Algeria supports any and all liberation forces. President Bendjedid had said before to the American Ambassador that before the Western Sahara problem had arisen Algeria had very good relations with Morocco. The President wanted Dr. Brzezinski to know that Algeria's principles are the same regardless of the monarchical system in Morocco. That system concerns only the Moroccan people. Algeria has no right to concern itself with Morocco's internal affairs, but if it did have to pronounce a view, it would say that Moroccan stability is in Algeria's interest. The President wishes King Hassan himself would recognize that Algeria does not want to make any problem. The most important thing for Algeria is to work for the improvement in the lives of its own people, to help the nation achieve development. Having fought for 7½ years, Algeria knows all the dangers of conflict, perhaps better than anybody else in the region. (C)

Returning to the question of arms supply to Morocco, *President Bendjedid* expressed the view that this could lead Morocco to try to oppress its neighbors. To understand the importance of the Polisario fighting in the south, it is necessary to come back to the origins of the conflict: it is Morocco which oppressed the Sahara people, not the contrary. The role that Algeria played between the Polisario and Mauritania demonstrates its peaceful intentions so far as that conflict is concerned. (C)

At this point *Dr. Brzezinski* expressed the hope that President Bendjedid would permit him to use Mr. Toumayan as his interpreter. Sometimes, he said, he speaks in a way that is deliberately enigmatic, and Mr. Toumayan is accustomed to this. He went on to say that he had found the President's views, as well as the Foreign Minister's, extremely beneficial. These will enable him to return to Washington and to report to President Carter with a clearer understanding of Algerian foreign policy and a better understanding of Algerian concerns. He will also go back with the feeling that in terms of fundamental conceptions of world affairs, there is no real conflict between Algeria and the United States. (C)

Concerning the differences which have surfaced, *Dr. Brzezinski* continued, these strike him as essentially practical in nature; he can detect no fundamental strategic difference. He was very reassured by the President's emphasis and that of the Foreign Minister on the need for political contacts. We share that view. On the question of US arms

for Morocco, Dr. Brzezinski indicated that he would comment briefly. He was enormously impressed by the military parade which he had the privilege of seeing the day before. He noted that while he was not a military technician, he did have the impression that not all of the arms shown in the parade were of local manufacture. Moreover, some of the weapons *not* produced in Algeria impressed him as being very modern. Dr. Brzezinski thought that President Bendjedid would have far greater cause for concern if the US had already given the same level of arms to Morocco. What we are giving the King does not match what Dr. Brzezinski had seen the day before. In any event, the purpose of our arms is to ensure that the King, who is a source of stability in Morocco, does not feel cornered in a difficult situation. (S)

President Bendjedid replied that he would like to underline a point: if Algeria seeks modern armaments, it is not to oppress a neighbor. It has never used arms against its neighbors. President Bendjedid asserted that he had personally attended meetings in international fora where the King recognized that there was no border problem with Algeria. Algeria has neither expansionist policy, nor soldiers outside its frontiers. On the other hand, Morocco does have an expansionist policy—indirectly against Algeria and Mauritania, directly against the Western Sahara people. Having this point of view, Morocco could create a real danger in the region. President Bendjedid believes that all the big powers, especially the US, should prevent any country in the region from having such a policy. The US' own interests in the region would thereby be served. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski thanked President Bendjedid for his views and said they were very helpful. The US fully believes Algeria is peaceful in its motivations and has no aggressive designs. Anyone familiar with Algeria's courageous struggle, which forms one of the most remarkable chapters of contemporary history, understands Algeria's craving for peace and development. (C)

President Bendjedid asserted that that was in fact an essential underpinning of Algerian national life; Algeria had suffered too much to desire anything different. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that besides wanting peace, Algeria was the strongest power in the region. It could feel secure about its peace. The US certainly has no intention of supporting anyone against Algeria. We intend to use the political leverage we have to encourage Morocco, and others who are our friends, to seek a peaceful solution. We do not underestimate the potential destructiveness of the Western Sahara conflict. It threatens not only Morocco, our traditional friend, but everyone else in the area. One cannot predict the consequences of an awakened political consciousness of the Saharan people as a whole. It might not be possible to circumscribe a conflict in its present area.

One cannot exclude the possibility of a spillover which would invite an East-West ideological confrontation. (S)

President Bendjedid interjected that there is no ideological problem in the Western Sahara. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski countered that there could be in time should the conflict expand. One cannot predict the implications of such a conflict, one could make no firm assumptions. In any case, he wished to underline the US desire for the most rapid end of the conflict. The question is how and what will be the solution. We have no prescription. We will encourage our friends to seek a political accommodation; we will *not* encourage our friends to seek a military solution. We respect the principle of self-determination. That in turn raises the question of how to move in the direction of a solution based on principles shared by *all* the parties. At present, there is a division between the sides which excludes shared principles. But with patience and encouragement from friends, that division can be narrowed, and things which seem difficult or impossible to one or the other parties now can become acceptable. The important thing is to avoid creating a situation where one of the two parties feels compelled toward acts of desperation or provocation. (S)

President Bendjedid asked for clarification; which were the two sides *Dr. Brzezinski* had in mind? (C)

Morocco and those who oppose Morocco, *Dr. Brzezinski* replied. He added that he didn't really know who was opposing Morocco, but he assumed that everyone in the room knew. He went on to assure the President that the US is engaging in discussions with our friends, which aren't easy, to encourage them to look at the realities in a peaceful and practical fashion. At this stage, we do not think it is possible to envisage the details of a peaceful solution, but that can be possible once a process has been started which can lead to a serious dialogue. (C)

President Bendjedid said he agreed with *Dr. Brzezinski* but wished to make the point that Algeria is a member of the OAU, an organization which has designated a committee to deal with the problem. The US and its friends should work with the committee to lead Morocco to adopt a different policy vis-à-vis the Western Sahara. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that we are prepared to explore every avenue that might lead to peace. We ourselves are not prepared to become a mediator—we have the impression that neither Algeria nor Morocco desires us to play this role. (C)

President Bendjedid rejoined that this was not what he had meant to say. There is an existing framework for peace, which has not as yet been used. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that he would be seeing President Tolbert⁵ after his meeting with President Bendjedid, and he expected that this issue would be discussed further. All he is saying at present is that we will be exploring all ways to peace. Morocco and Algeria are Arab countries; there are many different ways to encourage the parties toward peace in that context. (C)

President Bendjedid assured *Dr. Brzezinski* that Algeria will welcome any initiatives leading to peace and stability in the conflict. It will be in Algeria's interest to do so. Though Algeria is not directly involved in the conflict, it is in Algeria's interest to see it resolved. He then asked *Dr. Brzezinski* if the US believes in self-determination as a principle. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski answered yes. However, he added, self-determination is only one principle; non-use of force is another; national security is a third. He was sure that we both shared these. (C)

President Bendjedid reasserted that Algeria has certain principles; he wished to underline that aspect. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that he did not believe that any fundamental conflict divided us on the question of principles or the application of these, either on this continent or anywhere else. We feel that the Non-Aligned Movement is a positive force in world affairs. This is a change in US policy from past Administrations. We feel that countries such as Algeria and Yugoslavia are providing leadership in a constructive way. This is an historically important development, because it implies a waning in previously intense ideological divisions. During many years in the West, for example, the concept of socialism was associated with atheism. Algeria is demonstrating that socialism and religion were compatible. (C)

President Bendjedid said he would like to stress the fact that Algeria continues to follow the same line as it builds its society. No one could make Algeria communist. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stated that he has never suspected the Algerian people or its leadership of sympathy for Communism; still, before his visit, he had underestimated the extent to which the Algerian people were attracted to religion. As a young student and academician he had thought of the Algerian struggle as more of a political and national phenomenon rather than religious. The resurgence of religion in national life is something which *Dr. Brzezinski* finds especially fascinating. In America we neither fear this nor object to it. We welcome it,

⁵ Brzezinski met with Tolbert, who was the current Chairman of the OAU, from 7 to 7:45 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. A brief summary of the meeting is in telegram 289347 to Algiers, Monrovia, and Rabat, November 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790509–1095)

for it comports with the philosophical and systemic mosaic we see as the ideal for a world of pluralism and diversity. If he were a Soviet leader, he added, he would be greatly concerned by this trend. He would have to ask himself, everytime greetings appeared in Pravda from the Socialist and Democratic Republic of Algeria, what the 65 million Moslems living in the Soviet Union were likely to think. He could imagine people from Tashkent saying "Why can't I have my own mosque, my own flag, my own country?" (C)

President Bendjedid concluded the meeting by stressing how fruitful he felt his talk with Dr. Brzezinski had been. Algeria and the US both favored a cooperative relationship. As regards the Western Sahara, he believes that the US will act toward a political solution and is confident about US intentions there. He asked Dr. Brzezinski to relay his best wishes to President Carter, whom he looked forward to meeting. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski expressed warm thanks for his meeting with President Bendjedid, assured him that President Carter hopes to welcome him to the White House, and presented him a modest gift from the President. (U)

77. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 3, 1979

SUBJECT

A Summary Report on My Trip to Algiers

I. US-Algerian Relations

A. The Algerian leadership is realistic, hardheaded and very religious. This religious aspect was stronger than I had expected and is very explicitly stressed in their pronouncements and activities.

B. The Algerians resent the Cuban role in the NAM and there is growing dislike for the Soviet Union because of the Soviet mistreatment of its Muslims.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Algeria, 10/31/79–11/3/79: Report. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no indication Carter saw the memorandum.

C. The Algerians are critical of our Moroccan decision but listened to my explanations and by their words and deeds seemed to imply that it should not affect the bilateral US-Algerian relationship.

D. I believe that my visit, and especially the conversation with the President and Foreign Minister, in addition to my deliberate public display of respect for the martyrs of the Algerian revolution, made an impact on the Algerians. I believe that the time is ripe for closer political and military contacts, and both DOD and State should be instructed to pursue all opportunities. The Algerian leadership was especially receptive to my statement to the effect that President Carter approves of the non-aligned movement and especially of Algeria's role in it ("We respect Algeria because we know that when Algeria speaks, it speaks for itself and no one else.").

E. Finally, I think the VOA should be instructed to step up its broadcasts to Arab countries on the subject of the Soviet mistreatment of its Muslims, especially with regard to denial of religious opportunities.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

I come back convinced that Algeria is going to become the dominant force on the North African Continent. I believe we can work with it if we are firm in stating clearly what our objectives are, and if at the same time we indicate our positive appraisal of their role and respect for their independence. The judgment both of my Algerian hosts and U.S. Ambassador was that the visit was timely and constructive; the Algerians gave every impression of being delighted by it and went out of their way through a variety of small symbolic gestures to highlight my presence and to display warm feelings towards you as well as myself.

I also gave a TV interview, and visited the revolutionary sites outside of Algiers.

78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, January 17, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

2. *Algeria*—I met Ambassador Redha Malek of Algeria this afternoon. Malek stressed Algeria's determination to broaden relationships with the US and thought that the Iran and Afghanistan situations offered grounds for closer cooperation.² He personally thought the non-aligned movement should take a position against the Soviet invasion. I pressed him to urge that the Algerian Ambassador in Tehran try hard again to gain access to our hostages. He agreed.

On the Sahara, he agreed on the need for an early, peaceful solution based on a compromise settlement. I suggested that Algeria discuss the Sahara bilaterally with the Moroccans in the first instance, rather than insisting that the Moroccans talk first to the Polisario. (Angie Duke reports these discussions may already have started.) Malek expressed uneasiness over the forthcoming testimony to Congress on the Moroccan arms package, and hoped it would not have a negative impact on our relationship. I assured him that we would make clear our arms are designed to promote a negotiated settlement, not to win a war.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Algeria.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Carter underlined "closer cooperation" and wrote "good" in the left-hand margin. In telegram 17458 to Algiers, January 21, the Department provided a detailed account of the meeting between Vance and Malek. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800036-0466)

Libya

79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 28, 1977, 2216Z

20279. Subject: Protest to Libya Over Navy Aircraft Incident.

1. Morning of January 28, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Day called in Libyan Charge to deliver protest note concerning incident January 27 when U.S. Navy plane was harassed in mid-air over international waters by two Libyan Mirages. Charge asked if we expected LARG response and was told that USG would be interested in any explanation LARG prepared to give. Details of incident are included in note, text of which follows.

2. Begin quote. The Department of State wishes to inform the Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic that on the morning of January 27, 1977, two Libyan Mirage aircraft engaged in irresponsible and extremely dangerous maneuvers over international waters which threatened the safety of a United States Government airplane at latitude 34-09 north, longitude 13-08 east beginning at 10:32 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time.

The two Libyan aircraft approached an unarmed United States military aircraft from the southeast, coming to within 200 feet of the United States aircraft which was flying at an altitude of 13,500 feet. One of the Libyan fighters then maneuvered directly over the American aircraft by rolling from a position on the American aircraft's left to its right, and accelerated so as to pass directly ahead of the American aircraft at a distance of 200 feet. The two Libyan aircraft then took up a position approximately two miles behind the American aircraft, one Libyan aircraft performed a maneuver similar to a gunnery approach, and the United States aircraft was illuminated with Libyan fire control radar until approximately 10:43 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time. Throughout its flight, the United States aircraft never proceeded closer than 53 nautical miles from Libyan territory, and the dangerous maneuvers described took place approximately 75 nautical miles north of Tripoli.

The United States Government hereby protests in the strongest terms that the actions of the Libyan aircraft constituted an extreme hazard to the safe navigation of the American aircraft over the high

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770031-1104. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted by King; cleared in PM/ISO and DOD/OSD/ISA; approved by Day.

seas, and were in violation of international standards of aviation safety. The United States Government would consider it a dangerous and unfriendly act should such an incident recur and would hold the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic fully accountable for any future incidents in which United States aircraft transiting international air space were threatened. End quote.

3. Action requested: Embassy should deliver copy of above text to MFA, indicating that original note was handed to Libyan Charge Gas-hut on January 28 and report to Department by immediate cable when note delivered. Embassy should also report promptly any LARG comments/explanation.²

Vance

² In telegram 182 from Tripoli, February 8, the Embassy transmitted a translation of the Libyan response, which disputed the U.S. account: "An American military aircraft entered the training area of Libyan Air Force which is internationally recognized as prohibited and subsequently penetrated Libyan air space threatening the safety of Libyan Air Force aircraft. Libyan Air Force aircraft did not intercept the American aircraft, but only reconnoitered and followed it because the unidentified aircraft was approaching vital Libyan installations." (National Archives, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy File, D770044-0812) In telegram 194 from Tripoli, February 9, Bergstrom reported on his meeting with Sahad, Acting Director of the Foreign Ministry Americas Department: "Beyond Libyan failure to acknowledge hazardous maneuvers Libyan aircraft, most troublesome element of LARG response is in unclear Libyan definition of prohibited, training, or restricted areas within the Libyan Flight Information Region (FIR)." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770046-0370)

80. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, February 10, 1977

U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq

Pursuant to your discussions with the President of the status of United States relations with Libya and Iraq,² you requested us to prepare a memorandum to the President on that subject. The requested memorandum is attached.³

*Recommendation:*⁴

That you sign the attached memorandum.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Secret. Sent through Habib. Drafted by Weislogel on February 1 and cleared by Saunders.

² Not further identified.

³ Not attached. See Document 82.

⁴ An unknown hand wrote beneath the recommendation: "signed 2/13."

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, February 13, 1977, 0237Z

32744. Subject: Protest to Libya Over Navy Aircraft Incident.² Ref: Tripoli 196.³

1. Department not repeat not prepared to allow Libyan assertion of prohibited zone over international waters to go unchallenged. Accordingly, Embassy is instructed to deliver following note to MFA.

2. Begin text: The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Ministry's note of February 7, 1977, concerning the encounter between a United States military aircraft and Libyan Air Force planes on January 27.⁴

3. The U.S. aircraft at no time approached closer than 53 nautical miles from the Libyan coast and at the time it was intercepted by the Libyan planes was 75 nautical miles off Libyan shores. The U.S. considers that the American aircraft in question was exercising the freedom to fly over the high seas in accordance with international law. The United States does not consider that any nation may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas, or the airspace over the high seas, to its sovereignty, nor to establish prohibited areas of the kind referred to in the Ministry's note. Moreover, the US considers that the aircraft of the Libyan Air Force that flew dangerously close to the American aircraft failed to pay reasonable regard to the interests of all states in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas, in accordance with international law.⁵

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77-12/78. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton and in EB/AVP, L/PM, PM/ISO, INR/DDC, and L/EB; approved by Habib.

² An unknown hand underlined the subject line.

³ In telegram 196 from Tripoli, February 9, the Embassy wrote: "Our most recent information from Libyan civilian aviation (pouched NEA/AFN) indicates that LARG has established two danger areas and two restricted areas within the sea area of the Tripoli FIR. Incident occurred outside these areas. We not aware that LARG claims control over any other areas off Tripoli. Please advise whether we should pursue matter of restricted air space off Tripoli." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770046-0510)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 79.

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted the first three sentences of this paragraph.

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 14, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq

You inquired about the status of our relations with Libya and Iraq.² With the exception of South Yemen, where the U.S. has neither diplomatic relations nor resident officials under the flag of a protecting power, Libya and Iraq are the two Arab States whose interests and policies radically diverge from our own. Iraq is the only Arab country which has not resumed diplomatic relations broken off during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Libya was one of the few Arab countries which did not sever relations with us then; after Qadhafi's takeover in September 1969, however, U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated and since November 1972, our respective Embassies have been headed by Chargés.

Iraq and Libya refuse to accept the existence of the State of Israel and share support of the Palestinian elements that reject a negotiated settlement. Although Iraq and Libya share much of the ideological paraphernalia of the radical end of the Third World spectrum, Iraq's orientation is secular and modernizing while Libya's is conservative Islamic. Apparent similarities between Iraq and Libya probably are outweighed by actual differences in ideology, political style and social custom. The Soviet Union is the major supplier of military equipment to Iraq and Libya but the single-party governments in both countries remain deeply suspicious of the USSR. In Libya the Communist Party is outlawed; in Iraq it is severely circumscribed.

Libya

Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya adopted foreign and domestic policies characterized by extreme nationalism, militant Islam, and advocacy of radical Third World ideology. Between 1969 and 1974 the Libyans ejected us from Wheelus Air Base, attacked an unarmed American C-130 plane in international airspace, partially or totally nationalized U.S. oil interests in Libya, expelled American missionaries

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. Secret. Sent to Carter on February 17 under a covering memorandum from Brzezinski. Carter wrote at the bottom of the covering memorandum: "Why should we not initiate proposals for normalizing relations—& see what prospects are? J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77-1/81)

² See Document 80 and footnote 2 thereto.

and confiscated their properties without compensation, and, during the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict, applied an embargo on the sale of petroleum to the U.S. which lasted until 1975.

But the most important issue dividing us has been Qadhafi's commitment to the destruction of Israel, his willingness to use Libyan resources to undermine a negotiated Middle East settlement and subvert those Arab Governments which favor such a solution, and his support for international terrorism.

Despite our political problems with Libya, we maintain active commercial relations; nearly 10 percent of our crude oil is imported from Libya, representing about 30 percent of Libya's production. Approximately 2,000 Americans live in Libya, working for oil companies and in other occupations. About 2,000 Libyans are studying at U.S. institutions of higher learning under Libyan Government sponsorship.

Since late 1974 the Libyans have professed a desire for improved relations. Libya appears uneasy over its estrangement from fellow Arabs and its growing reliance upon the Soviets for arms and technology. By improving relations with the U.S. Libya may hope to lessen its dependence on the USSR, to obtain access to U.S. military goods and technology and to regain status and respectability in the Arab world. Qadhafi appears to believe that the advent of a new U.S. Administration offers the possibility of a change for the better.

In our discussions with Libyan representatives we have indicated that a major change in U.S. policy toward Libya would not be possible as long as Libya persists in obstructing our Middle East peace efforts and supports international terrorism.³ We also have given considerable weight to Sadat's opposition to any U.S. rapprochement with Libya in light of his own problems with Qadhafi. We have maintained restrictions on the sale of military-related items to Libya, including denial of export licenses for eight C-130 aircraft which Libya bought in 1972 from Lockheed, despite our making clear at the time that we could not give assurances that licenses would be issued if the sale were consummated.⁴

[Omitted here is material on Iraq.]

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In 1974, the United States refused to issue export licenses for eight C-130 aircraft that Libya had purchased from Lockheed. For an exchange of diplomatic notes on the aircraft, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Documents 49 and 50.

83. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 24, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq

In response to a recent memorandum from the Secretary of State,² you asked why we should not initiate proposals for normalizing relations with Iraq and Libya.³

We maintain active commercial relations with both nations, and Libya has recently indicated its interest in establishing normal diplomatic relations.⁴ Iraq is rapidly assuming a more important role in the economic and political activities of the Persian Gulf area and has resolved, at least for the moment, the border dispute and the Kurdish issue which had been a major source of irritation in its relations with Iran.

In both cases, I believe that we should be alert for opportunities to develop more normal relations. The timing, however, of any U.S. unilateral move in this direction will be extremely important since it will be interpreted by other Middle Eastern states as a signal of our intentions and could have major implications for the success of our efforts to promote an Arab-Israel settlement. Both Libya and Iraq are viewed as pariahs by their neighbors. Thus, I would recommend that any move on our part toward closer ties be carefully prepared in advance through consultations with our friends in the area, particularly the Egyptians and the Saudis, and I believe we should avoid any new moves in that direction while our Middle East negotiations are in their present delicate state.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Secret. Sent for information.

² See Document 82.

³ See footnote 1, Document 82.

⁴ In telegram 230 from Tripoli, February 15, Bergstrom reported that in a February 14 meeting, Sahad reiterated Libya's desire for improved relations with the United States, and presented Libya's positions on the two barriers to improvement: the Middle East and terrorism. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78)

⁵ Carter wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "OK, but *moves* to normalize relations may keep Iraq & Libya from trying to disrupt Mid E efforts. How can/could we move?"

84. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP-M-77-10035

Washington, February 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Changes in Libyan Government

Libya's President Qadhafi apparently intends to carry out plans first announced in November to reshape the Libyan government into what he calls a "people's democracy."² Although Qadhafi has been talking about such a move for years, he had no reason to worry about the structure of his regime until events of the past two years began seriously to erode his support in the military and key civilian groups.

The plan—which may go into effect within the next several weeks—calls for the introduction of a civilian governing structure that will allow Qadhafi to transform his popularity among Libya's largely rural, tribal population into a more effective political instrument. It will also provide him with a pretext for sidelining and perhaps abolishing completely the military's Revolutionary Command Council, which has theoretically ruled Libya since 1969.

We have no evidence that any of Qadhafi's colleagues on the Council is planning to try to block him; the four remaining active members reportedly have grudgingly resigned themselves to the move. We know little, however, about the attitudes of the rest of the officer corps, which views the reorientation of the government as further evidence of Qadhafi's distrust of the military. Although Qadhafi's efforts to marshal his grassroots support may ultimately reduce his reliance on the armed forces, he is over the short term running a high risk of further demoralizing the primary prop of his regime.

Qadhafi's Motives

Qadhafi has been on the defensive since 1975, when a coup attempt engineered by council member Umar Muhyashi and a small clique of

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A: Production Case Files (1976-1979), Box 7, Folder 73: Changes in Libyan Government. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Clandestine Service."

² In telegram 1491 from Tripoli, November 24, 1976, the Embassy wrote: "Qadhafi proposes basic reorganization of LARG, change of its name. Islamization of laws, popular rule with ultimate authority resting in General People's Congress may be step towards democracy in Libya. More immediate effect would be to strengthen RCC Chairman's run of country." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760438-0768)

army officers brought to the surface wide-ranging dissatisfaction with Qadhafi's one-man rule. The defection of other Council members in the wake of Muhayshi's betrayal and the resentment stirred up by an investigation of the conspiracy compounded tensions between Qadhafi and the military and ended all pretense of collegiality within the Council.

Since 1975, the incidence of insubordination and violence within the armed forces—including at least several attempts on Qadhafi's life—has increased markedly. Qadhafi has responded by repositioning key units and major ammunition stores, by upgrading the police and paramilitary forces at the expense of the army, and by systematically replacing all those suspected of disloyalty with his kinsmen and members of tribes from his home region.

He has been hesitant to reduce the power of his subordinates on the Council, however, without first regaining control over the military. He apparently now feels confident that he can remove the glaring evidence of divided leadership that the Council has come to represent. None of the four active members, including Prime Minister Jallud, has a powerbase sufficiently strong to challenge Qadhafi, and dissension among them probably precludes their acting in concert.

In his campaign to sell the new government structure, Qadhafi has carefully skirted the question of what will become of his colleagues. He has said only that their "protective role" is over and that the people can seek their help as they see fit. The Council could theoretically remain as part of the military command or any of its members could relinquish his rank and serve in the new all-civilian government. Qadhafi may favor such an arrangement as a way of mitigating the ill-will he has already engendered in his colleagues.

The New Government

Qadhafi's plan for the new government is designed to maximize his support among tribal and rural communities. Over the past year, the Libyan leader has spent much time in the countryside explaining his ideas, cultivating his supporters, and encouraging them to greater political activism. His orchestration of numerous popular demonstrations has served both to generate enthusiasm for the new order and to warn his detractors that he has the support to carry off the change.

Stripped of its socialist jargon, Qadhafi's blueprint, in theory, resembles that of a parliamentary system. The electorate, however, is to be organized in small neighborhood "congresses," trade unions, and "people's committees" to give Qadhafi's tribal supporters maximum representation. A national people's congress, a secretary general, and a cabinet are to serve as parliament, premier, and government. The people's congress is also supposed to elect a president—presumably Qadhafi—who has vaguely defined but no doubt sweeping powers.

Much of what Qadhafi has said about the new government and the way he has orchestrated its promotion are reminiscent of old-fashioned tribal politics. Meetings over the past several months to discuss the plan have consisted of debate over local interests, with Qadhafi both receiving and issuing criticism and advice but always acting as final arbiter. Most of his audience seem to enjoy the exchange, and are prepared to do his bidding.

The Cynical View

Qadhafi's decision to inaugurate the new government in Sabhah—his small desert hometown where the Qadhafa tribe is still centered—and to invite such notables as Fidel Castro was calculated not only to attract international attention but to forestall any effort to disrupt the proceedings. He is probably especially worried about disgruntled officers who resent the termination of their special role in the Libyan government.

According to several sources, Qadhafi's move is regarded by much of the military as a simple power play which will lead to further changes in the officer corps and a general diminution of the importance of the armed forces. Most officers concede that Qadhafi already completely controls what will become the apparatus of the new government, and believe he will have little trouble sidelining officers who are close to Prime Minister Jallud, Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kharubi, and the other two remaining Council members.

It is not clear that this cynicism extends to the rank and file. Most enlisted men come from Bedouin families whose lot has improved markedly under Qadhafi's rule. Moreover, as Qadhafi has moved against officers, he has been careful to cultivate their subordinates. In addition to keeping the salaries of the enlisted men relatively high, Qadhafi has repeatedly admonished officers to follow the example of the "loyal" rank and file.

Libya's small educated middle class probably views with alarm the changeover in government. The traditional commercial establishment and the new class of professionals and businessmen have never been sympathetic to Qadhafi's military dictatorship. Now they are even more fearful of his turn toward tribal politics.

Qadhafi has coupled his elevation of tribal groups with repeated verbal attacks on the urban "bourgeoisie" and a number of policy moves against the private sector of the economy. So far, the business community has been able to fight a successful rear-guard action by simply delaying, ignoring, or evading his decrees. This may become increasingly difficult, however, as tribal and rural leaders—who have a strong bias against the urban establishment—become more politicized.

85. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

IN 208431

Washington, March 8, 1977

COUNTRY

Libya

DOI:

[1 line not declassified]

SUBJECT

Libyan Delegation Aims in Discussing Bilateral Relations With the United States

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[3 lines not declassified]

1. Libyan Chief of State Mu'ammār Qadhafi has assigned his Ambassador to the United Nations Mansur Kikhya the responsibility for conducting bilateral relations with the United States. Kikhya has been instructed to act as personal emissary of Qadhafi to President Jimmy Carter.

2. Libya's primary objectives are an early exchange of Ambassadors and delivery of transport aircraft to Libya. Qadhafi views the aircraft as a matter of principle and will make no concessions to the United States without the aircraft.

3. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Comment: *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Khalifah al-Mismari, currently Ambassador to London, will probably be sent to Washington if an exchange of Ambassadors is agreed upon. Al-Mismari will then have the primary job of improving short-term relations with the United States. In the event that al-Mismari is successful, Kikhya could be expected to replace him within 18 months. Qadhafi, however, while viewing the assignment as very important, cannot spare Kikhya from his present job unless he is absolutely certain that relations will improve.)

4. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Dissem: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; *[handling restriction not declassified]*.

86. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, March 18, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

3. *Libyan Assassination Attempt*: As you know, Phil Habib called in the Libyan Ambassador to the UN Kikha on Wednesday to strongly protest the fact that elements of the Libyan intelligence service in collaboration with "Carlos" were plotting to assassinate our Ambassador to Cairo, Herman Eilts.² Late this afternoon, the Libyan Chargé in Washington came in to deliver his government's denial of any knowledge of the alleged operation against Eilts. I am enclosing a copy of the Libyan note. You can see that the Libyan reply is unsatisfactory. [2 lines not declassified] I may authorize supplying the Libyans with more specific details of the assassination operation. I will be back in touch with you on this case.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

Enclosure

Note From the Libyan Government⁴

Washington, March 17, 1977

Note by the Libyan Government in response to our demarche concerning the Threat to Ambassador Eilts. (In English and Arabic)

We are completely unaware of, we have no intention, and it is not from our behaviour nor of our (Islamic) characters to do this and we have no information. If you have information, we request you to provide us with it. Maybe, there are those who want to do something and they want to ascribe it to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Jamahiriya is not responsible for the imaginations and unbiased fallacies directed to her. We have a rule in Islamic religion that says

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 3/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: "Copy sent to Vance 3/19."

² See Document 87.

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: [text not declassified].

⁴ No classification marking. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "Delivered by Libyan Charge Gashut to Under Secretary Habib March 17, 1977."

“a plaintiff must support his case with evidence, and a denying defendant is obligated to clear himself by an oath.”

87. Editorial Note

In late summer 1981, multiple intelligence reports from a variety of sources revealed Libyan Chairman Mu‘ammar Qadhafi’s intentions to assassinate U.S. citizens, including President Ronald Reagan. In telegram 79388 to multiple recipients, November 21, 1981, the Central Intelligence Agency provided an analysis of the attempt against Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts to provide background for Qadhafi’s current threats. According to this analysis, the plot to assassinate Eilts was formed in 1976, in reaction to the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel. Qadhafi viewed these agreements as a form of treason and blamed the effort on the United States. According to the Agency: “Ambassador Eilts had been picked as the target of the operation because he was considered to be the major U.S. representative of the ‘imperialist-reactionary’ policy of U.S.-Egyptian collusion.”

The plan, developed by Venezuelan terrorist Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez (“Carlos the Jackal”) and the Libyan intelligence service, involved the use of two hit men documented as Egyptians. The first plan involved planting an incendiary device “somewhere within the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.” That plan was subsequently abandoned in favor of “a small, well-trained team to carry out a direct personal attack on the Ambassador.”

“Execution of the operation involved two separate but related actions. First, a sniper, probably using a Soviet M–54 sniper rifle, would fire at the Ambassador as he exited the front door of the Embassy. The second member of the team would then throw grenades to anyone attempting to come to the Ambassador’s assistance. Should a sniper attack be impossible because of trees or other obstacles in the line of fire, then the main attack would be made on the Ambassador’s car as it exited the Embassy grounds. In this case, since ‘Carlos’ believed that the car would be armor-plated and would have bullet-proof glass, one attacker would throw Soviet-made high-explosive grenades underneath the car in order to force the occupants to leave the vehicle. The Ambassador would then be shot with a handgun. The other team member, with his sniper rifle, would be stationed in a building across the street from the Embassy where he could fire on anyone attempting to aid the Ambassador and also try to cover his partner’s retreat.”

The plan was cancelled when surveillance revealed that security around both the Ambassador and the Embassy had been strengthened. Additionally, before the “action agents” departed for Cairo, Libya received a *démarche* from the United States, informing Qadhafi of U.S. knowledge of the plot, and demanding that it be aborted. No attempt was made against Eilts. (Telegram 79388 from the CIA, November 21, 1981; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, Box 3, Libya—Admiral Poindexter file (1)–(13))

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, April 14, 1977, 1034Z

475. For Asst Secretary Atherton, NEA. Cairo for Ambassador/Charge. Subject: Libyan Response to Presidential Message.

1. Below is an informal translation (by Embassy Arabic-trained officers) of note handed me at noon April 14 by FonOff Americas Dept official Ibrahim Bahad under direct instructions from ForSec Turayki. Arabic text will be pouched.

2. Bahad said delay in response was due to need for investigation into matter by Libyan Government. Investigation, he added, was continuing. After hearing his sketchy account of contents, I asked why Col. Qadhafi had not taken opportunity for direct communication with President Carter. Sahad said he unable account for Colonel's methods but note constituted considered views of Libyan Government and hinted that Colonel had hand in drafting.

3. In response to my query, Sahad said he had not seen text President's letter and didn't know if Turayki had.² He believed he and Turayki only two officials in Tripoli FonOff aware of subject; added that matter very sensitive for Libyan Government which appreciated thus far discreet handling by U.S. He reiterated continuing Libyan desire improve political relations with new administration and regretted ongoing unfriendly U.S. attitude more in sorrow than anger. He

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Sent for information to Cairo.

² An unknown hand underlined “seen text of President's letter,” and wrote: “Let's see if we can get this from Rick (see p. 3).” Carter's letter was not found.

noted even Libyan motives in Philippine mediation were being impugned in Departmental letters to Congressmen.³ Had improvement in political climate Libya sought actually occurred, present misunderstanding might not have arisen. He concluded brief presentation by reiterating statement made to me early March in Sebha by FonSec Turayki that U.S. would be best advised not to take sides in disputes between Arab countries.⁴ (At time, Turayki was referring to Tunisia; Bahad clearly had Egypt in mind.)

4. Unsurprisingly Libyans sticking to Qashut's initial denial but in more detail and seeking pin blame on Egypt. Content of note appears to be one long prevarication while tone is conciliatory.

5. There are probably a variety of reasons for indirect response through Embassy rather than direct answer from Colonel. High on list is Libyan pride and pique that Charge Qashut's initial retort was not accepted.⁵ Another factor is desire to downgrade whole affair and characterize it as a "misunderstanding." Even though powerfully preoccupied of late, Qadhafi certainly involved in composition of note. Nevertheless, he probably chose to toss it back to FonOff as gesture of unconcern which I doubt he really feels.

6. Text of note follows:

"Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamaheriyah, No. 30/3, April 14, 1977. Diplomatic Note.

The Foreign Secretariat presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and refers to the Embassy's note of March 20, 1977, from President Jimmy Carter to Brother Leader Muammar Qadhafi.⁶

The Secretariat wishes to clarify two points contained in the above-mentioned note. In the first instance, the names of the persons (men) are non-Libyan, as the numbers of their passports and dates of their births in that note (of that date) exchanged on this subject. Despite our conviction that the subject in its entirety does not warrant the sending of messages, nevertheless we respond in order not to destroy a dialogue even on this subject.

³ Libya was hosting peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front.

⁴ Carle reported on his meeting with Turayki in telegram 281 from Tripoli, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070–0188)

⁵ See Document 86.

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted and underlined "Embassy's note of March 20, 1977, from President Jimmy Carter to Brother Leader Muammar Qadhafi." The Embassy's note with Carter's letter was not found.

Secondly, the aforementioned note names some officers and the American Ambassador to Egypt who was the subject of the note. It is very clear that this information is false Egyptian information.

Before responding to this note, we gathered the facts about the first point and began an investigation of the aspects of the note as soon as it was brought to our attention.

The two officers mentioned were referred to in a message broadcast by the Egyptian Middle East Radio (MENA) for reasons of their own. This information that appears in the note is the work of Egyptian Middle East News Broadcast (MENA). We wish to make it clear that the officers do not work in Libyan intelligence but work in the field of agriculture since the beginning of the revolution and everyone knows them and knows the agricultural projects which they are known for. No doubt the American companies working in the area know that as well.

We undertook a careful investigation of the two persons mentioned in the message and it appears that the first is Azzat Mahmud Abdel Rahman of Egyptian nationality who entered the country more than four years ago as a construction worker (carpenter for reinforced cement) and the investigation continues to learn more information about him. As for the second person, he is Nasir Iddiin Jaffar. He is of Sudanese nationality and entered the country for work with a contractor. He is now working (as a houseboy) in the Brazilian Embassy in Libya. We are absolutely convinced that no Libyan party previously contacted or commissioned him with any act, but we do not know if this Sudanese is an agent of foreign intelligence and we do not know if he is involved in spreading rumors. We invite you to meet with him; the meeting can be attended by an American and a Libyan party, and we have no objection to a third, neutral party in order to assure you that your information is false and has no foundation in fact.

The very choice of the American Ambassador in Cairo shows that the entire subject is an Egyptian plot against Libya. Otherwise, why not an American diplomat working in Libya or in any other country. We return to the theme that Egyptian intelligence aims at involving the United States of America in a local dispute.

The Carlos mentioned in the message has only been mentioned by Sadat. We again must clarify that Carlos has not entered Libya except on the occasion of the Oil Minister's kidnapping when he transitted Tripoli International Airport after the plane had stopped at other international airports. Since that time we don't know anything about Carlos. We inform you that Carlos is wanted by us for trial because he killed one of the members of the official Libyan delegation at the OPEC Ministers' Conference in Vienna.

We inform the United States of America that we are not killers nor bandits and we are principled.

If we decided on a belligerent course, we would announce this and it would be because the world would be convinced of the justification for it, or we ourselves would be convinced, and if we do not decide on war openly, there is no other way for us.

We took the first steps to encourage President Carter and we announced our faith in the new American administration because President Carter is a man of religious principle and morality. It is not reasonable that we would encourage the new administration by undertaking acts which would ruin relations with it.

Finally, it is not possible that we could be responsible for the brutality which is attributed to us. We know that we are a neutral, progressive revolution with friends and enemies. The enemies will plot our downfall if we are not prepared to counter whatever the enemy may conspire against us. Because of this, we work for ourselves and carry the burden with courage.

Complimentary close. End.”

Carle

89. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Current Activities of Major Hasan Ashkal

1. *Background.* The United States demarche of 20 March 1977² on the Libyan-sponsored plot to assassinate Ambassador Eilts identified Major Hasan Ashkal as one of the three Libyan intelligence officials involved in the plot. The Libyan reply claimed that two of the individuals named in the demarche work in the “agricultural sector.”³

2. [3 lines not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive.

² See footnote 6, Document 88.

³ See Document 88.

3. Moreover, [1 line not declassified] Major Hasan Ashkal accompanied Qadhafi from Tripoli to Benghazi on 5 April aboard a Libyan VIP aircraft. The only passengers on the flight were Qadhafi and Ashkal, who was dressed in military uniform and carried a machine gun.

4. A copy of this memorandum is also being provided to the Secretary of State.

Stansfield Turner⁴
Admiral, U.S. Navy

⁴ Turner signed "Stan" above this typed signature.

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, July 8, 1977, 1755Z

158889. Subject: Conversation With Libyan Charge Gashut.

1. At his request, Libyan Charge Gashut called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Veliotos on June 29 prior to returning to Libya for consultation and leave. He said he would be discussing U.S. relations with his Foreign Minister. Gashut initiated conversation by stating that he wished to discuss Department Spokesman's comments of June 10 to effect USG was waiting for some moves on part of Libyans to improve relations. Gashut asked rhetorical question, "What can we do," then proceeded to answer it by stating Libya was prepared to send Ambassador; he added that U.S. should release C-130's.

2. Veliotos noted in reply that it would be best to discuss major substantive policies at issue between us, than to focus on possible misinterpretation of Department's Press Spokesman's remarks. He then reviewed in detail administration's Middle East policy, with its purpose the establishment of a permanent, just peace for all in the area, including

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77-12/78. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Tunis, USUN, Rabat, and Algiers. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Veliotos; approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770243-0970)

the Palestinians. He noted that the logic of Libya's rejectionist posture was the frustration of this major policy initiative of President Carter and the condemnation of the area to future wars.

3. Veliotis continued that Libya's support for rejectionist organizations as a part of its Middle East policy resulted in Libyan support for terrorist actions. We did not want to get into a sterile argument of definitions, i.e., terrorist vs. freedom fighters. No matter what one called the persons involved, the massacre of innocent people, such as the Rome airport tragedy, was an abominable act which had to be condemned by all.² It was important to recognize that we were not dealing in semantics, but outrageous and unacceptable actions.

4. Gashut, with force and some emotion, replied by defending his government's Middle East policy. He argued that Qadhafi was not trying to stop the convening of a Geneva Conference but he did not believe that this conference could result in justice for the Palestinians. The thrust of his presentation was that Libya could not do other than support the rejectionist cause if it were to remain true to its own revolutionary traditions. He explained that Libya's solution to the problem was the creation of a secular democratic state in Palestine. As concerns the Israelis, he explained that his government believed that all Jews who were in Palestine prior to 1947 should be allowed to remain and coexist peacefully with the Arabs in this secular democratic state. All of the others would have to leave. He subsumed the "terrorist issue" in his presentation.

5. Veliotis noted that successive American administrations had expressed the commitment of this country to the security and existence of the state of Israel. This was a given in American policy which has been accepted by the Arab confrontation states, who were cooperating with us in our search for peace in the Middle East. Gashut responded by describing the Libyan view of the "Arab nation" which, to the extent we could understand his point, seemed to imply that those particular Arab states we referred to were really irrelevant to the current situation and to the great sweep of history.

6. Gashut returned to the need for both countries to engage in actions to improve relations. He backed into an endorsement of a "high level dialogue" by explaining the necessity for senior officials to sit and reason together, putting aside the issues which may divide us and concentrating on the areas of agreement. To support his contention of wide areas of agreement between us, he cited the fact that Libya and

² Reference is presumably to the December 17, 1973, attack on a Pan American World Airways plane at Leonardo da Vinci airport in Fiumicino, Italy, in which 32 people were killed. For a summary of the incident and Nixon's statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1973*, p. 1016.

the United States had voted together on “great numbers” of UN resolutions.

7. Conversation then turned to subject of Libya’s relations with other Arab states. Veliotes noted that, as far as U.S. was concerned, basically this was something for Libya and the other Arab states concerned to sort out. Gashut brightened up at this point and said, “thank you, that’s good to hear.” Veliotes then noted that we had, however, legitimate concerns about certain aspects of Libya’s relations with other Arab states, particularly when Libyan policies and actions were aimed at certain Arab governments and leaders who were very friendly to us and were cooperating with us in our search for peace in the Middle East. We could only conclude that a principal purpose—if not the principal purpose—of such Libyan policies was the disruption of our Middle East peace policy. Although these were intra-Arab problems to be solved by the Arab parties concerned, Libya should be aware of our interpretation of its purposes as they affect us.

8. Veliotes then noted that, looked at in light of foregoing discussion, questions of exchange of Ambassadors and release of C-130’s were symptoms of a problem, not the cause. He added that President Carter’s Middle East policy, the success of which was very important for global as well as regional considerations, was offering peace with justice to all concerned. In striking contrast, based on Gashut’s description, the logic of Libyan policy was to offer to Palestinians and others the “peace of the grave.” Gashut protested this conclusion and repeated his earlier comments about the need for Libya to be true to its revolutionary traditions.

9. Comment: Our conversation lasted for about an hour and was always cordial, if frank and vigorous. Upon leaving, Gashut said he would look forward to another discussion after his return from Libya in August. Based on this experience, we conclude that no useful purpose can be served by initiating a “higher level dialogue” in near future.

Vance

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, February 17, 1978, 1927Z

42713. Subject: Sale of U.S. Aircraft and Services to Libya.

1. Dept made following decisions February 16:

A. To inform Lockheed the Dept will not authorize the overhaul of Libya's C-130s in the U.S.

B. To turn down future munitions control license applications for the overhaul of Libya's C-130s abroad.

C. To turn down continued supply spare parts and continued onsite maintenance of the aircraft.

D. To inform Lockheed the Dept will recommend to Commerce approval for the export of Jet Star to Libya.

E. To inform Commerce that Dept is not in favor of approving issuance of a license permitting sale of two Boeing 727s to Libyan Arab Airlines.

2. Department understands Senator Case's office has learned of Department's decision and plans make public announcement at 1500 hours Washington time. Lockheed concerned about safety its personnel in Libya and unable to contact Team Chief West. Please inform West of impending announcement, as well as heads of other American companies, if you believe Libyan reaction might be violent and Americans should be cautioned. In meanwhile, Department attempting to persuade Case's office to delay press announcement.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to London and Rome. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bergstrom; cleared in NEA/RA, D, NEA/AFN, and H; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780074–0628)

92. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 20, 1978

SUBJECT

Tank Transporters to Libya

The Oshkosh Truck Company has a contract to sell \$60 million worth of large trucks to Libya. These trucks are purely commercial items and are not controlled by any policy prohibitions. However, they are extremely large and are intended for the Libyan Army as end user. It is evident to everyone that the Libyans intend to use them as tank transporters. State originally took a very firm position with Commerce, insisting that this sale be placed under a controlled list where it could be affected by policy considerations. Commerce has stalled. Yesterday, the Oshkosh Company, which faces severe financial hardship if the sale is killed, managed to convince Cooper at State that the sale should go through. Cooper has reportedly convinced Christopher to reverse the previous State position. We are informed that the first trucks are due to be shipped at the end of this week. (C)

If this sale is approved, we face three policy repercussions:

—We must be prepared to answer queries on the Hill during a time when terrorist legislation is under active consideration;

—We must reexamine our own policy since we recently turned down the sale of 727s to Libya on the grounds they could be used for military purposes, and this is in direct contradiction.

—We must consider how to inform Sadat that we let this one pass. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you call Warren Christopher today and express concern that this sale not be allowed to go through.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77-1/81. Confidential. Sent for action.

² There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation; however, beneath the options Dodson wrote: "Taken care of DA."

93. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Tank Transporters to Libya

David's earlier call to State was successful in preventing a total collapse of their position opposing the sale of heavy trucks to Libya for use as tank transporters. However, it was not successful—at least thus far—in getting State officially back to its previous position of lobbying with Commerce to get the trucks placed on a validated list rather than the general license it is now on. A validated listing permits us to exercise policy control over sales. A general license is only for notification purposes. (C)

The issue will go to Under Secretary Harmon at Commerce within 24 hours. Once he has made a decision, it will be extremely difficult to reverse it. As far as I can tell, State does not plan to weigh in on this, although they are still trying to develop a collective position. I believe it is essential that Commerce be aware of the foreign policy implications of this case and that they be informed in advance of our concern. I have previously talked to Stan Marcuss, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and I intend to make these points with him again today. But Harmon will make the final decision. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you or David call Dr. Sidney Harmon, Under Secretary of Commerce, and make the talking points at Tab A.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. Aaron initialed the memorandum, drew an arrow pointing to Sick's name, and wrote: "Return with it!"

² Tab A, an undated paper entitled "Talking Points on Heavy Trucks to Libya," is attached but not printed. Brzezinski drew an arrow to the Approve option and wrote: "DA to call."

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, September 21, 1978, 1903Z

240302. Subject: Libyan-American Relations. Refs: A. Tripoli 1186 B. Tripoli 1139 C. Tripoli 1138.²

1. Department is following closely reports of your initial meetings with Libyan officials and is pleased to learn of Qadhafi's alleged interest in better relations with U.S. However, Department recalls that in recent past similar professions by Qadhafi have been accompanied by actions and public accusations incompatible with any improvement in bilateral relations. There does not appear to be any novel element in the current situation, e.g. persuasive evidence of serious strain in Libyan-Soviet relations, which might be prompting Qadhafi to consider the changes in Libyan policy which his emissaries have been informed would be necessary for more normal relations with U.S. There also are other foreign and domestic policy reasons which argue against modification of our current policy of indicating our displeasure with Libyan behavior by refusing to discourse with them at a senior level.

2. Department does appreciate and share your desire to work, where possible, for an improvement in bilateral relations. Department has informed Madfa'i it is prepared to resume the discussions initiated before his departure on consultations. Department is pleased action is

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77-12/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Dodson wrote: "(DA approved) (paragraph 3)" in the upper right-hand corner. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Sick and Tarnoff and in M/CT and NEA; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

² In telegram 1186 from Tripoli, August 28, Eagleton reported on August 24 and 25 meetings which included Congressman Sikes, Turayki, and Shahati, in which the Libyans expressed frustration with their inability to meet with Carter or Vance. Eagleton reported: "In support of our effort to initiate a dialogue here, it would be most useful if the Secretary could have a brief meeting with Turayki during the upcoming UNGA session." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780350-1244) In telegram 1139 from Tripoli, August 17, regarding the sale of Boeing 727 airplanes to Libya, Eagleton wrote: "I therefore recommend that some time during the month of September we be in a position to tell the Libyans that we have heard their message, and in order to encourage the dialogue and cooperation in the field of terrorism, we are permitting the sale of Boeings to go forward." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780338-0107) In telegram 1138 from Tripoli, August 17, Eagleton reported on an August 16 meeting with Ahmed Madfai, Libyan Chargé in Washington, currently in Tripoli for consultation, who discussed his private conversation with Qadhafi on August 11: "Qadhafi wished not only to maintain relations but to improve them because it was in Libya's interest to have a balanced position in the world and avoid dependence on the Soviet Union." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780336-0466)

underway which will give you a channel to Qadhafi. Department will continue to monitor closely Libya's behavior regarding terrorism, its neighbors, and Middle East peace process, while indicating to Libyan officials that these are areas where more responsible action on their government's part offers the possibility for more normal bilateral relations.

3. You should inform the GOL immediately, and we will inform Madfa'i, that the Department has decided to consult with Congress on its attitude toward the sale of two 727s. Sale would be subject to obtaining guarantee that aircraft would not be used other than for normal commercial purposes and would only be made with clear understanding that supply of spare parts for all LAA's 727s could be cut off if any of these aircraft were used for other than commercial purposes.³ In your discussions with GOL, you should seek GOL reaction to sale under these conditions.⁴ (FYI: We hope to have congressional reaction by end of September and to reach definitive position soon thereafter on the sale of the two 727s.) You should mention in this context that Department expects congressional attitudes to be influenced by Libyan reaction to Camp David Agreements; that while we realize Libya disapproves of these agreements, ad hominen attacks on President Carter and/or any physical injury to U.S. persons or property would be resented by Congress.

Christopher

³ Aaron placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ In telegram 1407 from Tripoli, October 3, Eagleton wrote: "During conversation Oct 3 with Under Secretary for Political Affairs at Foreign Ministry, Sha'aban, I referred to our proposed consultation with Congress on sale of two 727 Boeings. Sha'aban said he was aware of our proposal but that he was troubled by 'conditions.' He said it was obvious that Boeings were for civilian use, but he did not like idea of setting a precedent by making a 'guarantee' in this regard." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2402) In telegram 1508 from Tripoli, October 26, Eagleton transmitted the text of a letter from the Chairman of the Libyan Arab Airlines to the Chairman of Boeing, providing assurances regarding the use of the 727s: "The aircraft in question will be used solely in civil aviation and will not be state aircraft." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78)

95. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Embassy in Libya and the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1978, 2328Z

3953. Subject: UNGA: Newsom Bilateral With Libya PermRep. Ref: Tripoli 1384.²

1. Under Secretary Newsom called on Libyan PermRep Kikhia at Newsom request for one hour Oct 2. After short discussion of Camp David Accords, during which Kikhia made standard plea for US to recognize PLO, Newsom switched conversation to bilateral relations. He said he was prepared to see if some improvement is possible. Private links continue to prosper through companies, unofficial trips, and the US-Arab Dialogue scheduled for Tripoli later this week.³ Newsom reported that administration going to Congress to try to get consensus on proceeding with the sale of commercial aircraft to Libya. Agreement has been given for the export of the 400 Oshkosh trucks. Dept has noted with pleasure that Libya has ratified The Hague Convention.⁴ With regard to C-130s, because of Libya's active support for "terrorist" activities, we are not able to move on military items.

2. Kikhia expressed his great personal interest in improving relations. On positive side, he cited existence of diplomatic relations, fact that US imports approx. 40 percent of Libyan oil at annual cost of 4 billion dollars, 4,000 US citizens working in Libya, and 3,000 Libyan students in the US. What bothers him is that every American official gives him a different reason for the lack of high level official relations. Some have said because of support for PLO and Pentagon has put Libya in category of nations "dangerous to U.S." which makes no sense. Libyan policies were almost identical to those of Algeria and Iraq and there is no such campaign against them. Stories such as threat to US Amb in Cairo and its connection with Moro revolt have been incorrect

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77-12/78. Confidential; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 1384 from Tripoli, October 1, Eagleton wrote: "I hope it will be possible for Newsom to see Kikhia sometime soon. We have been going around in circles for many months on who should see whom when. A meeting between Newsom and Kikhia should clear the air and permit future contacts at levels we consider most appropriate and useful." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780401-0634)

³ The Arab-American Dialogue, sponsored by the Libyan Foreign Liaison Bureau, opened on October 10 in Tripoli. Telegram 1443 from Tripoli, October 11, reported on the proceedings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780415-1233)

⁴ Libya officially ratified the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft on October 4.

or exaggerated.⁵ Finally, he alleged US had put out statements suggesting Libya is seeking to improve relations, under pressure from U.S. This puts Libya in a “humiliating” position. Kikhia concluding that US needs a scapegoat in the region for domestic political reasons and Libya serves the purpose.

3. Newsom said we are dealing with public impressions and it is not useful to argue about allegations of Libyan involvement in acts against US interests—that is what is believed in the public and in the Congress. His call was “informal” to find out Libyan desires. He understood they include exchange of Ambassadors, beginning of high-level dialogue, and more normal diplomatic exchanges. Newsom said he will examine these ideas. He could then meet again with Kikhia or FM Turayki to try to clear away some of the misunderstandings. Department sees desirability of better relations, but we must justify each step we take in view of prevailing impressions of Libyan policies.

4. In closing, Kikhia raised possibility of following such future meeting with a joint communique in which each side would state its position. This would be preferable to unilateral US statement which suggests Libya responding to US pressure.

5. Department has been taking look at Libyan-US relations and will give further attention in light this conversation. Newsom will plan contact Kikhia again when Under Secretary returns from Europe Oct 10.⁶

Young

⁵ An unknown hand underlined “incorrect or exaggerated,” circled “exaggerated,” and placed an exclamation point in the right-hand margin. See Documents 86–88.

⁶ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, October 21, 1978, 1329Z

267504. Subject: Acting Secretary Newsom's Meeting With Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki.

1. Summary. Luncheon meeting focused primarily on bilateral relations. Issue of a joint statement on terrorism, which earlier had been discussed informally as a possible precondition for movement toward normalization of relations, did not arise, as each side restated familiar positions on terrorism. Newsom told Turayki frankly that Libya's image with Congress and public as supporter of terrorists and meddler in affairs of other nations would have to improve before political relations could become more normal. Turayki reiterated desire for better relations without holding out any promise that Libya would change its policies to facilitate this process. Exchanges on Middle East and Africa broke little new ground. Despite sharp disagreements, meeting was cordial. Discussion on Western Sahara reported septel.² End summary.

2. Meeting was held as a result of an earlier discussion between Newsom and Libyan PermRep Kikhya.³ At the request of the Libyans, who were fearful that press would describe them as coming cap in hand to Washington to seek an improvement in relations, no public announcement was made of the meeting. In response to Libyans' request for an informal exchange, meeting was conducted over lunch, and Newsom spent almost two hours with Turayki, who was accompanied by Charge Madfa'i and a notetaker from the Embassy. Although there had been previous discussion with the Libyans about the possibility that a joint statement on terrorism might be published as a step toward more normal bilateral political relations, it quickly became apparent this was not in the cards, and the subject was not raised.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432-0438. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tunis, Cairo, London, Khartoum, Algiers, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Ndjamena, and USUN. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in M/CT, H, and NEA; approved by Newsom.

² Telegram 267505 to Tripoli, October 21, summarized the discussion on the Western Sahara: "Turayki said Libya feels Morocco and Mauritania must comply with the resolutions of the UNGA and OAU and that the consultation conducted with the Jemaa did not do this. Libya had tried to facilitate negotiations between the Moroccans and Algerians but without success." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432-1070)

³ See Document 95.

3. Discussion opened rather slowly with an exchange on Southern Africa focused largely on press accounts. When Newsom asked about Libya's relations with Chad, Turayki said problems remain but his government is in touch with the Sudanese and Nigerians. After more rather general remarks about South Asia and the state of King Khalid's health, Newsom engaged Turayki on bilateral relations by commenting that recent Arab-American Dialogue in Tripoli served a particularly useful function, given the limits on what could be accomplished on a government to government basis. Elaborating, he explained that Libya's image with the Congress as a supporter of terrorist groups inevitably puts restrictions on what the US Government will do vis a vis Libya.

4. Turayki responded that his government wanted "at least" normal relations with the US and felt the US emphasis on terrorism was an attempt to make Libya a scapegoat for its Middle East policies. When he suggested distinction between terrorists and liberation fighters, Newsom said that impression exists in US that Libya supplies funds and arms to groups which engage for whatever motive in acts which result in loss of innocent lives. Moreover, Libyans, or individuals trained in Libya, had been involved in incidents such as those at Orly and Istanbul airports, and in the assassination of US diplomats, which had no direct relation with the attainment of national liberation. Turayki responded that some liberation fighters trained in Libya might misuse their training, but Americans trained by US Army sometimes use their military skills to commit crimes. Libya is not responsible for everything done by those trained in Libya and agrees that some of these activities are not related to liberation and deserve condemnation. Newsom replied that while US realizes and has informed interested members of the Congress that Libya has acceded to the international conventions on hijacking, he did not remember Libya ever having condemned a terrorist attack at an airport.

5. Shifting ground, Turayki said that while his government is interested in dialogue with the US, it would not respond to pressure. He characterized US decisions on trucks and planes as pressure, stating these decisions had been made by the administration, not the Congress. Newsom pointed out that decisions made by the administration must recognize attitudes within the Congress, or the Congress will impose its will by legislation. He said he understood acceptable guarantees had been provided regarding the Oshkosh trucks and that the Department should be able to recommend the sale of the 727s, if the assurances we had in mind could be provided. He cautioned Turayki that US would have to look at question of spares and support for 727s if the aircraft

were used for conditions other than those in the assurances.⁴ When Turayki protested that US would find some reason to cut off spares, Newsom replied that US would respect its agreements with Libya. Turayki then repeated argument that real basis for US trade restrictions against Libya is disagreement on Middle East policy and threatened that Libya would buy admittedly inferior aircraft from alternate sources. Without using term Soviets, he suggested Libya would move closer to them "if backed into a corner" by US. Newsom insisted US decision regarding 727s unrelated to Middle East policy differences and based entirely on planes' use. If US is satisfied how planes will be used, they will be sold, he said.

6. Returning to terrorism, Newsom said hand of Libya seen in many acts of violence which do not seem related to the Arab cause, mentioning the Philippines, and talk of Libyan involvement in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in Europe. The impression that Libya is prepared to support acts of violence against governments all over the world makes it difficult to improve bilateral relations. US realizes Libya can purchase aircraft elsewhere, he concluded, but discussion was based on Libya's desire for American planes.

7. When Newsom asked for clarification of Libya's general policy regarding the supply of arms to dissident groups, Turayki replied he had come to discuss bilateral relations not Libyan policy. He accused US of supporting terrorism by furnishing Israel with weapons. At this point Newsom commented that he had read Turayki's General Assembly address, and, returning to this subject a few minutes later, said Turayki's characterization of American policy represented rhetoric ten years out of date.⁵

8. When discussion again focused on bilateral relations, Newsom said he hoped Charge Eagleton, a senior US diplomat, would have access to Turayki and other Libyan officials. Administration recognizes there have been positive developments, such as accession to hijacking conventions and settlement of nationalization cases. Congress is kept informed of these matters, and the administration would keep in mind

⁴ Regarding Libyan assurances, see footnote 4, Document 94. In a November 2 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "Libya has provided the assurances we requested that two Boeing 727's it wishes to buy for its commercial airline will not be used for military purposes. The Department of Commerce will now license the sale, subject to a written condition that spare parts will be denied if these assurances are violated. We have had no strong Congressional opposition to the sale except from Javits." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 11/78)

⁵ Turayki addressed the General Assembly on October 10. Telegram 4268 from USUN, October 10, characterized his statement as a "vitriolic attack on 'imperialists' and 'colonialists', naming the United States several times." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780420-0424)

the possibility of normalizing relations. When Turayki objected that trade restrictions would be an impediment to this process, Newsom reminded him that Libya's image in the US also is an obstacle.

9. Raising the Camp David Accords, Newsom stressed importance US attaches to implementation of both agreements, emphasizing benefits for Palestinians. Turayki responded that all Arabs except Sadat oppose the Accords and Sadat had signed them when his position was weak. Sadat is within his rights signing a Sinai agreement, Turayki said, but he has no right to be discussing Palestinian problems. If US wants a real and permanent peace it should reconsider its position regarding PLO.

10. Rejecting Turayki's description of Arab reaction to the Camp David Accords, Newsom said he saw no realistic alternative which would allow Palestinians to regain homeland. When Turayki suggested US put more pressure on Israel, Newsom commented that as proud and independent state Libya could understand how Israelis would resent pressure. He pointed out that President Carter had put unprecedented pressure on Israel already. Any contact with PLO would provoke a congressional prohibition on such meetings. By accepting responsibility for violent acts not directly related to the Palestinian struggle, PLO and Fatah have earned a poor image in US. Turayki countered that US has a bad image among people of Arab world. While America might have good relations with leaders of weak reactionary regimes, the Arab people do not accept American professions of neutrality.

11. Despite evident differences, meeting ended cordially, with Turayki suggesting that Newsom or Secretary visit Tripoli. It was agreed that should there be any press inquiries about the meeting each side would state that it had been arranged to take advantage of Turayki's presence in the US for the UNGA and was one in a series of exchanges with foreign diplomats conducted by State Department during UNGA.

Newsom

97. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Libya and Billy Carter

You should be aware that Clinton Murchison—among other things owner of the Dallas Cowboys—is soon on his way to Libya to discuss an air defense system. (State opposed sale of this system to Libya, but Murchison evidently formed a company in the Bahamas and designed the system with European parts to avoid the restrictions.)

Billy Carter was Murchison's guest at the Super Bowl, and another guest was Irving Davidson who is Murchison's advance and PR man. Davidson is a Vice President of one of Murchison's businesses and, among other things, is a registered agent for Israel.

During the game, Libya was much discussed. Davidson described the process of registering as a foreign agent as a painless one that is merely a formality. He suggested that Billy Carter register as a foreign agent for Libya. According to Davidson, Billy Carter said that is exactly what he intended to do.

This information comes from the State desk officer for Libya who got it directly from Davidson.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1-12/79. No classification marking.

98. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, March 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Plane Sales to Libya

Commerce opened the issue of selling Boeing 727s to Libya in May 1978. In August 1978 Vance agreed that serious consideration go forward. The NEA Bureau sent Stanley Marcuss, Commerce, a memorandum on November 2 which approved the sale because Libya had provided assurances that the 727s would only be used for civil aviation.² In the event of a violation of this restriction, Libya was warned, all spare parts for 727s would be cut off. Although I cannot get to complete State files this morning, all the information available indicates that Vance approved this final action. (C)

The considerations behind the approval were twofold. On the one hand, Boeing and Commerce made a strong case that the effect on our foreign trade deficit would be significant, not small change. On the other hand, State came to the view that we might turn Libya around on its terrorism policy. Recently, after Libya agreed to support certain international anti-hijacking agreements, Ambassador Quainton visited Tripoli for discussions with the Libyan Foreign Minister.³ The discussions were not as productive as expected, but Libya did not draw back in its softer rhetoric. (S)

During all this diplomatic effort, of course, Libya has been quite busy in training terrorists and acting as a supply and transit depot for covert activities throughout the region. (S)

If you desire a fuller rundown, I will follow up on Monday. At present I suggest that we leave the ball in State's court.⁴ (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Secret. Sent for information. Aaron initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

² Not found. See footnote 4, Document 96.

³ In telegram 33222 to Tunis, February 8, the Department reported on the January 31 meeting between Quainton and Turayki to discuss terrorism. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy, D790062–0021)

⁴ An unknown hand wrote "OBE" and "3/14/79" beneath this sentence. Aaron wrote: "Bill—get on top of reports that the Libyans are using 727s to ferry troops to Uganda. DA."

99. Letter From the Director of the Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Chargé d'Affaires in Libya (Eagleton)¹

Washington, March 9, 1979

Dear Bill:

Morrie was jumped by Senator Stone on the 747 issue last Friday.² The White House was in a panic Saturday,³ afraid the decision to sell the aircraft would be misinterpreted as the product of Billy's influence. For several days it appeared the White House would force cancellation of the export license. The return of sanity, or perhaps the departure for Cairo of the demented, has lifted this threat, hopefully permanently.

Qadhafi's support for Amin is having the obvious consequences for Libya's public image here. It has prompted numerous press and Congressional inquiries. The state of our current knowledge is sufficiently imperfect that we can honestly reply that we have few details. But the Libyans have done themselves substantial damage, creating further opposition to their normalization campaign. When we are in the bubble at Tripoli remind me to tell you an interesting story about their lost TU-22.

Newsom was astonished to learn we continue to deliver Chinooks to Libya (the Moroccans have been calling attention to these deliveries when complaining about our initial refusal to permit the Italians to ship Chinooks to Rabat). He called personally and was quite concerned. I told him our lawyers say we could not withdraw our permission (we looked into this when we learned the Libyans are training Palestinian pilots on the choppers). On further reflection, Newsom appeared ready to accept my conclusion that it is a complex world and mentioned in bemused fashion that he probably approved the sale when he had my job. We are asking the Historical Office to refresh our memory on the details of deliberations at the time.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 9-10/80. Secret; Official/Informal.

² March 2. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Draper informed the committee that the Department of State had approved the sale to Libya of three Boeing 747 aircraft, in addition to the two 727s. ("State Department Approves Sale of Three 747's to Libya," *New York Times*, March 3, 1979, p. 5)

³ March 3

⁴ The undated paper entitled "Considerations Concerning U.S. Approval of the Sale to Libya of Helicopters Manufactured Under U.S. License by the Italian Firm Agusta-Bell, 1972-1973," is in the Department of State, Office of the Historian, Research Projects File, Lot 16D82, 1206—Helicopter Sale to Libya.

I continue to scout the bushes for a Blucker replacement. Sean Donnelly, who was an outstanding economic officer when I knew him at Dakar, nibbled for a while. But I doubt he will bite.

Kawan at the Embassy here told me a few nights ago that Muntasir's family has returned to Tripoli with the exception of a brother. The latter is living with Muntasir, who is receiving out-patient treatment but reportedly far from well.

See you in Tripoli if the Middle East does not blow apart again.

Warm regards,

James K. Bishop⁵

Director

Office of North African Affairs

⁵ Bishop signed "Jim" above his typed signature.

100. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PAM 79–10251

Washington, June 1, 1979

LIBYA'S CHANGING ROLE AS A PATRON STATE

Libya's Colonel Qadhafi continues to operate as a major patron of terrorist organizations. Since late 1977, however, there have been some noteworthy changes in Libyan activities, which at least temporarily redound to the benefit of Western industrial states. Qadhafi still seeks the destruction of Israel, the undermining of certain "enemy" Arab governments, and the strengthening of militant Islamic causes worldwide—and he is still willing to provide considerable material support to terrorist groups pursuing like ends. But he seems to have recently realized that his wholesale support of terrorist movements has significantly hurt his international image—particularly in the West—

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 15: Libya's Changing Role as a Patron State. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

and could even be weakening his political position at home. [classification marking not declassified]

In any event, he evidently has decided to risk fewer resources and to involve less of his prestige in sponsoring terrorist operations, at least those directed against the industrial democracies. He has even expressed to Western officials a willingness to cooperate in curbing the activities of groups based in such countries. This stance has been in response to considerable Western pressure and, in good measure, has been handled as a public relations gambit. But it probably also reflects his political insecurity and a degree of personal disillusion with some anti-Western terrorist groups. [classification marking not declassified]

Qadhafi's somewhat more discriminating support of terrorism is more a change of tactics than a change of heart, and even now he is not consistent in his activities. Because of his mercurial political style, he could quickly reverse his course, especially if he reassessed the significance of the pressures raised against his patronage of terrorists. [classification marking not declassified]

1. Under Colonel Qadhafi, Libya has gained a reputation as a principal, perhaps *the* principal, patron of terrorist groups. For most of the decade of Qadhafi's rule, this reputation was deserved, even if sometimes exaggerated by international media.² Over the last 18 months or so there have been some noteworthy, and potentially significant, tactical changes. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

Reducing Support to Terrorism in Europe

2. Qadhafi has taken a number of steps to improve his image in the West in general and Europe in particular. No Palestinian or other Arab terrorist activities carried out in Europe during 1978 can be attributed directly to the Libyans. Tripoli, for example, had only a tangential connection with the May 1978 incident at Orly Airport in which members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired on passengers of an El Al airliner with weapons purchased by Libya in 1975; there is no evidence that the Libyans had prior knowledge of or gave approval to the operation. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

3. The West Germans have particularly good reasons to welcome the change in Libyan attitude. Before 1978, Libya maintained at least indirect ties with German terrorists: groups such as the Baader-Meinhof

² Libya's role as a patron state through late 1977 is described in Annex B of an NFAC Intelligence Assessment on *International Terrorism: The Problem of Patron State Support* (RP 77-10330 December 1977). Annex B is Secret/[*handling restriction not declassified*]. [Footnote is in the original.]

Gang (BMG) and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) were involved in several joint terrorist attacks with the PFLP, which has received substantial Libyan aid. In one past incident, for example, the PFLP group that hijacked an Air France jet in June 1976 included RZ members. On its way to Entebbe, Uganda, the plane received permission to refuel at Benghazi, a move that the Libyans later called a “humanitarian gesture”. *[classification marking not declassified]*

4. In September 1977, however, the Libyans agreed to West German requests not to grant asylum to members of the BMG whose release had been demanded by the kidnappers of Dr. Schleyer. The next month they refused landing permission to a hijacked Lufthansa jetliner; the PFLP hijackers in this instance had been aided by the BMG. A year later Libyan officials said they were ready to cooperate with West German officials in locating four German terrorists who had been expelled by Yugoslavia. The Libyans described the terrorists as “disturbed persons” and promised that Libya would not only deny them sanctuary but would try to persuade other countries to act likewise. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

5. Italy also received some reassurances from Libya in 1978. Italian security officials long suspected that the two major leftist terrorist organizations, the Red Brigades (RB) and the Front Line, were benefiting from external support, possibly including Libya. In what was probably a public relations gesture, however, Qadhafi called in the Italian Ambassador a few weeks after Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the RB in March 1978, to express his condolences to Moro’s family, his condemnation of RB, and his willingness to help in securing Moro’s release. However, Libya recently purchased US diving equipment (\$700,000 in June 1978 with a commitment to buy more in the future), and an Italian claimed that he accidentally witnessed the under water training of RB members at a facility outside Tripoli. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

6. Libya has significantly reduced its material assistance to Irish terrorist groups. As of 1978 the Libyans were no longer providing weapons, support facilities, or training for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). They were continuing to provide unspecified cash payments to the IRA, despite new objections by some ranking Libyan officials that aid to Irish terrorists furthers no Libyan or Arab goals. The PLO now seems to be the main Middle Eastern donor of training and arms to the IRA. In 1978 Iraq decided for the first time to extend military aid as well. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

7. Libyan support for and training of Spanish and Basque terrorists appears to have diminished. As late as 1976–77 a few persons affiliated with Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA–V) and First of October Revolutionary Group were reportedly trained in Algeria with some

funding provided by Libya. Moreover ETA-V may have received some weapons and ammunition through Libyan [*less than 1 line not declassified*] channels [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during this period. At present, however, nearly all material support for terrorism in Spain apparently comes from either indigenous sources or ethnic Basques [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

8. Libyan meddling in Greek and Turkish issues has remained limited and to some degree works at cross-purposes. [*3 lines not declassified*] Libya's verbal endorsement of Kurdish separatism—including the Turkish Kurds—is somewhat at odds with recent Libyan-Turkish negotiations for military cooperation. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

Dialogue with US

9. In an unprecedented gesture, the Libyan Government last November invited the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism of the US Department of State to visit Tripoli for discussions on international terrorism. When the visit took place in January 1979 the Libyan Foreign Secretary put his government on record concerning terrorism by noting that there were different interpretations concerning the "legitimacy" of "liberation movements," with some having political claims that Libya supported.³ He added, however, that Libya opposed such acts as hijacking and terrorism and advised its friends not to use means that worked against their interests. He emphasized that the Palestinians do not feel the same responsibility to the international community as do the United States and Libya. He said Libya did not believe that hijacking planes and individual crimes were helpful to the Palestinian cause. Denying that Libya controlled such organizations, he added that his country was ready to cooperate with the international community to put an end to terrorist acts, and would advise "liberation movements" on the "correct way to fight." [*classification marking not declassified*]

10. Such Libyan statements are to some degree self-serving. This was highlighted by the Foreign Secretary's comment that the US policy on embargoing certain items to Libya was "not useful." Moreover, while the Foreign Secretary can make such policy statements, Qadhafi still makes the decisions, usually on an *ad hoc* basis and without much regard for consistency. [*classification marking not declassified*]

11. Libya's moves in recent years with regard to hijacking still reflect some of this inconsistency, although its overall record is clearly

³ See footnote 3, Document 98.

improving from the US point of view. Libya has now adhered to three international anti-hijacking conventions: in 1972 it joined the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft;⁴ two years later it adhered to the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;⁵ and last October it adhered to the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.⁶ In November 1977, Libya joined in a UN General Assembly consensus that condemned hijacking.⁷ Libya's noncooperation with the hijackers associated with West German terrorists has been mentioned. In addition, Libya in February 1978, refused landing permission to a Cypriot airliner that had been commandeered by members of the Iraqi-supported Black June Organization involved in the assassination of an Egyptian newspaper editor. That refusal is consistent with the Libyan Foreign Secretary's statement to the visiting US official last January that Libya would not support every act of violence carried out in the name of the Palestinian "cause". *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

12. On the negative side of the ledger, the Libyans have thus far refused to support the antihijacking agreement reached at the July 1978 Economic Summit in Bonn,⁸ because the agreement makes no exception for hijackings committed in the name of "national liberation." Qadhafi presumably believes that at least some hijackings of this kind would be justified. In January 1979 the Libyans gave a hijacked Tunis Air jetliner permission to land. The Libyans released the passengers but ignored a Tunisian extradition request for the three hijackers and have taken no action against them except to refuse to allow them to leave Libya for France. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

13. With regard to two other international terrorism issues of concern to the United States raised in January 1979 by the Libyan Foreign Secretary—the New York Convention on Internationally Protected Persons and the draft convention against the taking of hostages⁹—Libya's position in recent months has been to object in principle but cooperate

⁴ Libya's ratification of the 1963 Tokyo Convention was effective on September 19, 1972.

⁵ Libya's ratification of the 1971 Montreal Convention was effective on February 19, 1974.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 95.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 32/8, adopted on November 3, 1977. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1977, pp. 373–375.

⁸ See *Public Papers: Carter*, 1978, Book II, pp. 1308–1309.

⁹ See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 1139–1146.

in practice. Libya has indicated its unwillingness to sign any agreement that might be used to the “disadvantage of people who are struggling for independence and self-determination”—as the Libyans put it during debate on the Hostages Convention which Tripoli ultimately supported. Nonetheless, in recent months the Libyans have helped free: an American missionary who had been kidnapped by the Philippine Muslim insurgents; the crew of a Spanish fishing boat seized by the Polisario Front; several European hostages seized by revolutionaries in Chad; and the Egyptian ambassador to Bangladesh. *[classification marking not declassified]*

14. On the other hand, the Libyans have shown no concession to the US policy objective of gaining Arab assent to that part of UN resolution 242 recognizing the State of Israel. In the January 1979 discussions referred to above, the Libyan Foreign Secretary did not promise to ask the Palestinians to support 242 though he was given a clear opportunity to do so. There may be Libyan officials who differ with Qadhafi on this important question, but there is no doubt that he himself remains adamantly opposed to the existence of the State of Israel, as the following press questioning in April 1978 makes clear:

Reporter: Are you prepared to recognize any form of Israel?

Qadhafi: The body called Israel is a racist, colonial and political phenomenon that emerged from the Second World War, exactly like Rhodesia, and the racist and colonial aspects of it make it impossible for us to recognize it.

Reporter: Is it not unrealistic to expect that after 30 years Israel will simply disappear?

Qadhafi: That depends on the capability of the Palestinian people to score victories over the racists who occupied the Palestinian land.

Reporter: But are you not making a second people who are dispossessed, the second people who will be homeless?

Qadhafi: No, they have come from their countries and they will have to return to their countries. Jews who constitute what is now called Israel have come from and are citizens of other countries and have the nationalities of those countries and should return to them. But the oriental Jews, who were originally in Palestine, ought to stay and live with the Palestinians. *[classification marking not declassified]*

Continuing Support for Palestinians and Other Third World Clients

15. Despite the apparent reduction in its direct support for international terrorist activities, Libya remains a major supporter of Palestinian and other “national liberation” groups. While most of these groups engage in terrorist activities, Qadhafi now distinguishes between primarily terrorist organizations and those that seek to “liberate” territory. The latter, even when their tactics call for terrorist activity in Europe,

“deserve” Libyan aid and support. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

16. The Palestinians remain the principal beneficiary of Libyan aid. Since late 1977, monthly sums *[less than 1 line not declassified]* are known to have been funneled to Fatah, the PFLP, Arab Liberation Front, Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and PFLP-General Command. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Palestine Liberation Organization as a whole has been receiving an annual subsidy *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, of which about three-quarters is earmarked for Fatah. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

17. As a paymaster for the Palestinians, the Libyans buy their weapons, almost entirely of Soviet manufacture, ranging from small arms to 130 mm artillery; help them meet salaries and publish propaganda; and enable them to carry out “special projects.” As examples of “special projects” the Libyans put up \$10 million for the December 1975 PFLP attack on the OPEC meeting in Vienna; and, according to a 1978 Kuwait newspaper report, Qadhafi offered the Palestinians (Fatah, PFLP and the PFLP-General Command) \$40 million to undertake raids in the West Bank. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

18. In another area of support for the Palestinians—training—Libya’s profile is lower, although the type and perhaps the extent of the aid probably remains unchanged. There are fewer Libyan facilities now training Palestinians than before; of the 12 terrorist training camps in Libya, at least four are used by Palestinian groups, compared to 20 camps operating in 1970. The overall level of Palestinian training has not diminished, however, since the discontinued Libyan training camps have been replaced by new ones in Lebanon. Whether these new camps employ Libyan instructors is not known. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

19. Another indicator of change in Libya’s aid to terrorists is Tripoli’s probable decision to end its close relationship with “Carlos,” a Venezuelan-born PFLP operative who led several sensational terrorist attacks in the past. Housed at “The Institute,” a terrorist training camp near Tripoli, Carlos and the Libyan Intelligence Service planned such operations as the aborted attack on the US ambassador to Egypt in 1977. Since 1977, Carlos’ whereabouts have become a matter for intense speculation on the part of several governments. Some reporting suggests that he is still in Libya, other reports have placed him at various times in Iraq, Czechoslovakia, and Aden. *[1 line not declassified]* “Carlos” has dropped out of sight. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

20. In terms of extending other forms of material assistance to the Palestinians, the evidence, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, suggests that

the Libyans are playing second fiddle to the Iraqis. The Libyans seem to be parsimonious in doling out military equipment (as opposed to paying for it), whereas the Iraqis are not. A single Iraqi transaction with the PFLP in January 1978 involved the physical transfer of 18 tons of weapons and equipment. [6 lines not declassified] [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

21. In any case, one aspect of the Libyan-Palestinian relationship is that Qadhafi expects some *quid* for his *quo*, and not merely in terms of fighting the Israelis. On at least two occasions since mid-1977 he is known to have asked Palestinian groups to aid Libya militarily in the event of an Egyptian attack. Qadhafi also has used Palestinians to train non-Palestinians in Libyan camps and to serve as elite security guards for important Libyan allies such as Idi Amin in Uganda. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

Support to Non-Arab Organizations

22. In keeping with Qadhafi's self-appointed role as champion of "national liberation" movements, Libyan training camps, money and supplies continue to be available to several non-Palestinian Arab, black African, and Asian Muslim groups. Qadhafi seeks first to topple those moderate Arab states that do not share his pan-Arab visions; Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, the Yemen Arab Republic, and Oman seem to be his foremost targets. He recently told Moroccan officials that Libya was no longer providing military support to the Polisario Front; the Moroccans do not take him at his word, however, and it is likely that Polisario guerrillas are still training in Libya. Last October the Yemen Arab Republic Government accused the Libyans of involvement in an unsuccessful coup attempt. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

23. Next, Qadhafi has tried to assist Muslim insurgent groups or Muslim rulers who are threatened. Chad and Uganda are the best examples. Libyan and Soviet instructors train Chadian Muslim insurgents at the camp [less than 1 line not declassified] in Libya, and three other camps nearby may also be used for the same purpose. During the last months of Idi Amin's rule in Uganda, Qadhafi not only dispatched Libyan troops to fight the invading forces, but sent Palestinian training cadre to serve as Amin's personal security guards. [classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]

24. Members of African "liberation" movements are probably trained at the Seven April Camp south of Tripoli. In recent months trainees there have included nationals of Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe (the factions were not identified but probably include

both ZAPU and ZANU) and Namibia (almost certainly SWAPO).¹⁰ Libya initially supported Eritrean insurgents—because they are Muslim—against Ethiopia, but cancelled this assistance sometime in 1977, presumably because the Soviets objected. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

25. Until the fall of the Bahktiar Government in Iran in February 1979, Libya had supported various anti-Shah terrorist organizations. There were also unconfirmed reports that Libya was training Iran's Baluchi tribesmen and supplying them with propaganda. With the fall of the monarchy, and the recent trip of former Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to Tehran, this activity may have ceased. Qadhafi has publicly described the Iranian revolution as modeled on his own and, as long as he believes this, he is unlikely to support groups seeking either to overthrow the regime or to dismember the country, for example, the Baluchi or Kurdish separatists. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

26. Apparently, Libya has not supplied financing or equipment to Kurdish separatists anywhere. Palestinian groups have provided training and equipment for Turkish Kurds, but in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, not Libya. However, the Libyan Foreign Secretary did say in January 1979 that the Kurdish question was one which needed a "political" solution. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

27. Libya continues to send arms and money to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim organization seeking independence for part of the southern Philippines. Until recently, Libya openly boasted that it was aiding the MNLF militarily and financially. In October 1977, the Libyan ambassador to the Philippines announced that Libyan relief funds for the Muslims would, in the future, be channeled through the government of the Philippines. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reporting suggests that in fact not all military aid has stopped, and that the Libyans are supplying small arms. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

28. Since 1977, Libya has increased aid to another Asian Muslim group, the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in Thailand, [*4 lines not declassified*]. Finally, the government of Sri Lanka suspects that Libya is training some Tamil separatists for terrorist actions in Sri Lanka. There has been considerable friction lately between the Muslim Tamil and the Hindu Singhalese on the island and this may be another case where Libya is aiding a Muslim minority group against a

¹⁰ ZAPU—Zimbabwe African Peoples Union; ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union; SWAPO—South-West African Peoples Organization. [Footnote is in the original.]

non-Muslim government. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

29. Libya's relationship with Bangladesh is ambiguous. In November of 1977, Libya was strongly suspected of abetting a coup attempt with some Soviet help. *[5 lines not declassified]* *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

30. Although Qadhafi enjoys the attention he receives from the Third World, he is apparently having second thoughts about supporting revolutionary movements only distantly related to Arab or Muslim goals. During a recent conference of Latin American guerrilla groups in Tripoli, Qadhafi benefitted from being portrayed as a staunch supporter of revolutions in Latin America. But when representatives of Nicaragua's Sandinista guerrillas later approached him for SA-7 rockets, he turned down their request, saying Libya would "consider" sending only small arms shipments. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

Qadhafi's Motivations

31. Libya's present attempts to improve its image in the West as well as its generally more cautious approach in supporting extremist groups are motivated by a variety of external and internal concerns. As mentioned above, Foreign Secretary Turayki last January pointed to possible Western economic embargoes. Moreover, a realignment of power in the Middle East has followed the opening of the Egyptian-Israeli dialogue. Cairo no longer need worry about a military threat from Israel, and may deal more forcefully with a neighbor which has periodically supported terrorist raids inside Egypt. Qadhafi has recently expressed concern regarding an Egyptian military buildup on Libya's borders. In addition, Qadhafi feels politically insecure at home, suggested by his constant shuffling of key personnel, especially of his security and intelligence officers. *[classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]*

32. Given Qadhafi's personality, his newly cautious approach to terrorism could easily be short-lived. His need to be in the limelight is likely eventually to impel him toward resuming more active support for various revolutionary groups. Nonetheless, for at least the short run, he has attempted to repair some of the damage his earlier policies as a patron for international terrorism has wrought, in an effort to be accepted as an influential world leader rather than an outlaw chieftain. *[classification marking not declassified]*

101. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tripoli, June 17, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

Major Abd al-Salam Jallud, No. 2 to Colonel Qadhafi
Ali Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Taj al-Din Jarbi, Director of American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Zaghar, Chef de Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Under Secretary David B. Newsom
Charge William Eagleton
Richard L. Jackson

SUBJECT

1. Libyan-U.S. Relations
2. Middle East

Jallud welcomed Under Secretary Newsom's mission because of his knowledge of Libya and the opportunity this presents for relations between the two countries.

Newsom noted evidence of progress and change in the decade since his departure,² particularly in the airport, port, and new roads. *Newsom* commented on his travels within Libya as Ambassador and congratulated Qadhafi and Jallud on the progress made.

Jallud expressed thanks to President Carter for the creative initiative of the *Newsom* visit. As a result, Libya immediately welcomed the request for a mission. Libya believes in dialogue and contacts in a small and interdependent world. If we do not face the problems of the world as one united family, we cannot overcome them. Although we may laugh at propaganda against Libya in the United States media, *Newsom* can see for himself the progress that has been made. As he can see, the U.S. media does not reflect the true picture. Although he is satisfied that *Newsom* as a former U.S. Ambassador to Libya will help the mission, he would also welcome other converts to the Libyan side. In the Arab tradition, he welcomed his guests and asked to hear *Newsom's* views.

Newsom acknowledged Jallud's welcome to him personally and to the mission. As explained earlier to Turayki, the Jamahiriyah has conveyed in various ways its desire for better relations with the U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–12/79. Secret; Nodis. Approved by Jackson on June 21. The meeting took place in Major Jallud's office.

² *Newsom* served as Ambassador to Libya from 1965 until 1969.

via Turayki's visit, the Shahati trip, and other visits.³ Most recently, Marshall Tito, after his visit to Tripoli, conveyed to the President Qadhafi's comments about lack of sufficient contact with the U.S.⁴ The President, therefore, thought it would be useful to have this visit and explore Libya's views. We are very appreciative of such a quick response through Charge d'Affaires Madfai and hope that it will be possible to see Colonel Qadhafi. Looking at the recent history of our relations, it has been nearly nine years since a senior U.S. official had the opportunity to speak with Qadhafi and hear his views on Libyan policy. That is too long a time.

We have many important bilateral interests. Our people have worked closely with Libyans for many years in the development of Libya. We have appreciated its continuing hospitality to our citizens in Libya. We have important trade relations and support the development of Libya. We also genuinely support the continued independence of Arab nations. We have differences, however, and I am here to discuss these candidly. As Major Jallud said, the impression of Libya conveyed by the media may not be fully accurate, such as the impression of its support for movements around the world which some regard as linked to terrorism. There is certainly some exaggeration in this, and many do not understand Libya's commitment to the Palestinian and liberation movements. It would help to know how Major Jallud sees Libya's role in this part of the world and relations with Egypt and the Palestinians in the context of its active policies in both the Middle East and Africa.

Jallud interjected that, as far as he knew from a prior briefing by Secretary-General Turayki and what he had heard, he concluded that Newsom wanted only to hear his views and discuss possibilities of dialogue. Newsom carried no concrete proposal.

Newsom replied that his mission was to continue the dialogue and to explore problems on the basis of his knowledge of Libya. *Jallud's*

³ For Turayki's October 21, 1978, meeting with Newsom in New York, see Document 96. In telegram 43325 to Tripoli, February 21, the Department provided a detailed account of Saunders's February 10 meeting with Shahati. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790081-0037)

⁴ Telegram 4413 from Belgrade, June 14, transmitted the text of Tito's letter to Carter in which he summarized his visits to Algeria and Libya: "On the occasion of (my) recent visit to Libya, Col. Qadhafi acquainted me about the state of American-Libyan relations. On that occasion Col. Qadhafi expressed desire and readiness for improvement of relations with the United States of America and he told me that his previous efforts in this direction have not met with a corresponding response." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790268-0977) Vance transmitted Carter's response in telegram Secto 5019 to Belgrade, June 18. Carter wrote: "I would like better relations with Libya although there are many constraints on our ability to improve our relationship with President Qadhafi because of the policies he has adopted in Africa and the Middle East." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790279-0730)

comments would be helpful, and he would report to the President the Major's expression of current Libyan policies and concerns. They would be most helpful in reaching decisions to be made in our bilateral and broader relations. Foreign Secretary Turayki has visited us in Washington, Charge Eagleton is in touch with Foreign Ministry officials, and we have read many declarations by Libya's leadership. He could also convey from his experience here the deep emotions of Libya's people on Palestine and their deep sensitivities on questions of sovereignty and liberty, but there is no substitute for direct expression by Libya's leaders to someone in touch with the President and Secretary. The whole question of efforts to bring peace in the Middle East rests on the rights of the Palestinians and the role of countries of the area in this process. It is of utmost importance to President Carter. While we can keep bilateral and other issues separate, a clear understanding of Libya's policies is necessary in order to deal with a variety of attitudes, some hostile toward Libya, in Washington.

Jallud commented that, although dialogue is desirable, he would like to express regret, since he had expected to hear concrete proposals from President Carter. Libya should have been in the position of a listener. Since the mission is to have a dialogue and exchange ideas, he would, however, express his views. In spite of big differences between us, since 1969 Libya has never said no to a dialogue. While we cannot separate bilateral from general relations involving the destiny of Arab nations and Libya, we believe that improvement in bilateral relations would be a desirable step.

He clarified that recent discussions with Tito in Tripoli focused on non-alignment in general, rather than relations with the U.S. Libyans believe, however, that opposition by the U.S. does not help their position of non-alignment. Since Tito's visit preceded the Havana Summit,⁵ they discussed non-alignment and the NAM in general. They informed Tito that present U.S. policies do not help Libya to continue its non-aligned position. In fact, to the extent that the U.S. has bilateral relations with smaller non-aligned countries, it will affect their overall position of non-alignment. Libyans believe that third-world countries all desire to be non-aligned. In the final analysis, when you have a strong enemy pushing you to the wall and cannot withstand the pressure, it will force you to be aligned in order to fight for your own survival. This is not particular to Libya, but is a general principle. The question Libyans ask is what the U.S. wants vis-a-vis bilateral relations. Libyans are not the kind of people to be affected by pressure.

⁵ The Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Havana September 3–9.

During the last ten years of the revolution, Libya was the underdog in relations with the U.S. while the latter continued a favorable commercial exchange. Libya was subjected to a situation which was not to its advantage. Now, it must take a stand and start to think. It must review the situation and state that it cannot continue as the underdog with U.S. interests safeguarded and Libya's interests victimized. It is essential that relations be on a reciprocal basis. Libya does not care about profit and loss. It is a matter of principle and dignity. After the revolution, when Libya nationalized some oil, it ran the risk of a boycott and loss of markets for what it believed was the correct position.

The Libyans feel that the U.S. people, the President, Cy Vance, Newsom, and all assistants will understand that the Libyan people will not allow this situation to continue and will pressure the government to change its attitude to the U.S. when they see the simple fact that transport aircraft, already paid for and with Libyan markings, have been undelivered since 1972 and commercial Boeing aircraft have been embargoed.⁶ On one hand, Libyans see constant provocation by the U.S. and, on the other, a lenient stand by Libya which denigrates its national revolutionary stand. Libyans are not traders and bargainers. As politicians, they assign their treatment by the U.S. its moral, not material, value. It seems as if Libyans always offer smiles to the U.S.

We would like to seize this opportunity to convey to President Carter and responsible people in the U.S. that the time has come for the U.S. to end its boycott and respect commitments and signed agreements. If the U.S. had rejected the sale before signature of a contract it would be different. We cannot stand by while you put an embargo on the Boeings.

In approaching this question, we look to the U.S. government, not Congress. It is obvious that when Americans and Congress were against Vietnam, the number of troops there reached one million and aircraft 1,000. Tomorrow Carter will sign the SALT treaty. The President has already acted on Rhodesia. Nixon acted on Vietnam. We think after Newsom's visit the U.S. should release the C-130s and Boeings. Then we can think of improving relations. It cannot be one sided.

Newsom explained that, even though Congress is deeply involved and the American public has definite opinions, he represented the President's own special concerns and would be very frank. There are

⁶ The Department instructed the Embassy in telegram 133068 to Tripoli, May 24, to inform the Libyan Government that Vance had decided to ask the Commerce Department not to approve the export of the 747s. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880110-1195, D790237-0275) Eagleton reported the Libyan response in telegram 840 from Tripoli, May 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790241-0213)

very few things today of such overriding importance to the President as peace in the Middle East with recognition and restoration of Palestinian rights in the West Bank and Gaza. The President has decided on pursuing this and means it. There are two routes to a solution. The Rejectionist States see a solution only through armed struggle. We find serious dangers in this approach and cannot foresee success by any of the parties involved. It would be a grave risk to peace. The only other route is through negotiations, and Camp David is based on two phases. The first was the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the second is self-determination for the Palestinians. We are now involved in the second stage. We do not link this to the question of aircraft but from the President's standpoint the attitude of states toward the peace process is an important element in his considerations. As we told Turayki, we have had messages from other states participating at Baghdad.⁷ While they oppose Camp David, they have acknowledged that they would take another look and not actively oppose American methods if through the negotiations we can achieve benefits for the Palestinians.

The impression of the President and of Congress about Libya is that it actively opposes the efforts of Camp David and is seeking to undermine Sadat. In so doing, Libya is actively opposing something of great importance to President Carter. If Major Jallud or Colonel Qadhafi were in a position to provide an expression of understanding for what President Carter is attempting to do, even if they do not agree with it, this would be helpful in our overall relations with Libya.

Jallud responded that U.S. policy would make a big mistake if it believed that Libya would link small bilateral problems with general policy in the Arab world. If Libya engaged in a dialogue, linking bilateral relations with its general position regarding the Middle East, it would be lost in a sea of sand. It is impossible for Libya to change its attitude or policies in regard to the U.S. stand on the Palestinian issue and non-friendly attitude toward the Arab nation. The Newsom mission immediately follows a Palestinian meeting in Tripoli concerning the Palestinian revolution.⁸ During that conference, the Palestinians and Arab countries rejected any idea of others having a mandate to

⁷ Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states and PLO representatives, meeting in Baghdad March 27–31 after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, resolved to suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt, impose an extensive diplomatic and economic boycott on Egypt, suspend Egyptian membership in the Arab League, and move the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. The text of the Baghdad resolutions is printed in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 29952–29953. For more information on the meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document 236.

⁸ In telegram 154537 to multiple posts, June 15, the Department summarized the June 14 meeting in Tripoli. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272–0467)

act for them. The Palestinian issue cannot be considered in the absence of the Palestinians themselves.

Newsom asked if the conference communique represented Palestinian policy or was also the Libyan view. If it represented Libya's policy, it would be very difficult to explain paragraph 23 of the communique calling for liquidation of all American economic and political interests in the Arab world. Such a statement comes at a time when President Carter has risked his political position and made greater efforts than any previous U.S. president to help the Palestinians.

Jallud responded that the communique was both Palestinian and Libyan policy. What did the U.S. expect from people victimized in both bilateral and multilateral issues? Did we expect that when one party drops a bomb the other offers sweets to eat?

Newsom pointed out that the President is presently being attacked for statements he has made on behalf of the Palestinians and for efforts he is making to restrict Jewish resettlement and bombing attacks in southern Lebanon.

We have considered the sale of C-130 and 747 aircraft with cargo configurations to a country which has already used two American commercial aircraft to support military operations in Uganda and has now subscribed to a declaration on liquidation of American interests in the Arab and Islamic world. The President must consider if it is in our interest to provide additional capacity to a country which seems dedicated to erasing American interests in this part of the world.

Jallud responded that, after ten years of attempting not to change its policy, Libya might be forced to do so in response to the U.S. position. Did the U.S. expect to be saluted after placing an embargo on civilian aircraft? Interest in improving relations should come from both sides. We are, however, far apart on this issue. We did not expect the U.S. to change its position.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

102. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, June 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Newsom Mission to Libya

Summary

At your request, David Newsom visited Libya on June 16–18 to discuss relations with the U.S. and Libyan reaction to the Boeing turn-down. Newsom met with the number two official, Major Jallud, and with the Foreign Minister.² Qadhafi was unavailable, apparently because of his mother's death. Newsom found the Libyans willing to talk, but firmly opposed to our efforts in the Middle East, unwilling to accept any linkage between what we do bilaterally and their wider policies, and angered by our decision not to supply 747 and C130 aircraft. You will recall that we stopped the 747s after the Libyans used 727s in their operations in Uganda. Following is a summary of Newsom's conclusions on possible retaliation against us by Libya and next steps in our relations.

Setting

Action against U.S. interests in Libya is clearly possible but is not a foregone conclusion. Newsom's reception in Tripoli indicates that Libya wants to maintain ties with the U.S., probably to avoid an appearance of dependence on the Soviets and a consequent loss of credibility with non-aligned countries. For this reason, Qadhafi is also courting the Europeans. He received Foreign Minister Genscher June 18–20 and hopes to visit Bonn, Rome, Paris and London during July. Fear of attack by Egypt is another restraining factor, and Jallud specifically raised the issue of U.S. arms supply to Sadat. Newsom said it was only prudent for Egypt to look to its defenses. He told Jallud we were not encouraging any Egyptian moves against Libya and similarly cautioned against any Libyan moves against Egypt. On the other hand, the Libyans have noted that our policy on commercial exports is tougher on them than on Iraq and other rejectionist states. The others, however, are not known to have used commercial aircraft for military operations

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Secret; Nodis. Sent to Carter under a July 2 covering memorandum from Brzezinski, who recommended that Carter approve the recommendations.

² See Document 101.

as in Uganda. Finally, Libyan reaction to the 747 decision will be affected by a sense of inferiority which Newsom noted in repeated references by Jallud and others to being the underdog and “punished” by U.S. policy.

Possible Libyan Actions

Direct U.S. interests in Libya consist of 2,500 Americans (principally oil field personnel), oil imports of 700,000 bpd (10% of our imported oil), and investments with a current replacement value of \$2.5 billion. If Libya decides to retaliate, a total embargo on oil is probably not feasible unless they cut back production which Qadhafi has thus far been reluctant to do. (Tunisian Prime Minister Nouira confirmed this assessment to Newsom).³ More likely, Libya would interrupt present marketing arrangements with the U.S., placing more oil on the spot market and seeking new contracts with Europe. We know that Qadhafi broached the possibility of expanded oil markets in Germany with Genscher this week. Other gestures, not to be excluded, given the emotional element in Libyan policy, include severing diplomatic relations, offering naval facilities to the Soviets, or nationalizing less productive U.S. petroleum-related investments. We will in the next month be sending an analyst to Libya to develop further what Libya's options and general policies may be.

Next Steps

Newsom promised the Libyans he would report to you on his conversations and provide a further response to them after the Asian Summit meetings. The Libyans may also defer possible action until after the Muslim month of Ramadan beginning July 25. Qadhafi has no major speeches scheduled until the Tenth Anniversary of the Libyan Revolution on September 1. On my return from Asia, I will propose to Foreign Minister Turayki that we meet for further discussion while he is at the General Assembly in September.⁴ We do, of course, still have the option of releasing the 747s, but do not recommend it in the present circumstances. We are informing Boeing that we will let the licenses expire and do not intend to reconsider. We have asked Commerce to review all four-wheel drive vehicles on a case-by-case basis and will carefully review pending orders for jeeps without taking immediate decisions. We hope by these actions to buy some time before Libya takes a decision.

³ See Document 203.

⁴ See Document 106.

Recommendation

That you approve the next steps proposed above.⁵

⁵ Carter checked the Approve option and initialed beneath the options.

103. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, July 17, 1979

SUBJECT

Billy Carter Travel to Libya

I understand that Billy Carter yesterday announced on a television program² that he would be making another trip to Libya. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you that such a trip would be entirely a private one, with no official purpose or connection whatsoever. Accordingly, the Department of State and our Embassies abroad should be instructed to treat Mr. Carter's trip, should it take place, strictly as a personal visit by a private citizen and provide only that assistance consistent with such a trip.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 9–10/80. No classification marking.

² Not further identified.

104. Note From the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency (Bowie) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 7, 1979

Zbig:

In response to your request of 26 July² for a thorough evaluation of CIA [*report number not declassified*]³—the report that Qadhafi is planning to announce on 1 September the nationalization of US oil company assets in Libya—the attached memorandum has been prepared. Although we tend to believe that Qadhafi is still hoping that the Boeing 747 decision might be reversed again, we cannot rule out nationalization and view it as a credible threat.³

Robert R. Bowie⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the first page: "RP, RH, look into this; what do we need to do? ZB. 8/10/79." The salutation is handwritten.

² In a July 26 memorandum to Tarnoff and Evans, Dodson requested additional information from the Department and the Central Intelligence Agency: "Please provide additional intelligence information bearing on this matter, relevant background on US oil company assets, and current information on Libyan interest in the aircraft." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 81, Carter (Billy)/Libya/Hearings: 7-8/80). For the Department of State response, see the Attachment to Document 105.

³ Gregg wrote at the bottom of the note: "ZB—This tells you more than you may want to know. Paras 1, 7, 8, 9 & 12 are key. DG. State assessment also attached."

⁴ Bowie signed "Bob" above this typed signature.

Attachment**Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵**

Washington, August 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Libyan Expropriation of US Oil Company Interests

1. Relations between the United States and Libya regarding the sale of C-130s, 727s, and 747s have over the years taken heavily symbolic overtones, which in large part account for Libya's consideration of drastic measures in retaliation for the US denial of these planes. The possible nationalization of the remaining US oil company assets in Libya in retaliation for the US Government refusal to permit the sale of transport aircraft to Libya [*less than 1 line not declassified*] should be viewed as a credible threat. [*classification marking and handling restriction not declassified*]

2. The contract for the original contingent of eight C-130s dates back to mid-1969, before the revolution in Libya that brought Qadhafi to power. Those planes were delivered without incident, but by the time the new Libyan regime sought to exercise its right under the contract to purchase another eight planes, it had established a record for supporting terrorism that induced the United States to hold up the export license. (Strictly speaking, the license has not been denied; it is still "under consideration.") Lockheed had been warned in advance of potential problems with the license but accepted full payment (\$4.5 million per plane) from the Libyans, who are still paying monthly storage and service charges for their maintenance in Georgia. The Libyans have chosen to make the issue a matter of principle, not finances; they have refused to re-sell the planes, although with the rise in prices—the C-130, substantially unaltered, now goes for \$10.5 million—they would stand to recapture their money and probably make a tidy profit. The C-130 question has remained an irritant in Libyan-US relations for years. (U)

3. In March 1978, Boeing applied for a license to export two 727s and was turned down. That fall, however, the decision was reversed—apparently the result of Congressional pressure to help out Boeing,

⁵ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in National Foreign Assessment Center. A note on the first page reads: "This memorandum, requested by the National Security Council on 26 July, was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia by analysts in NFAC's Office of Economic Research and Office of Political Analysis and was coordinated at the working level in State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research."

although the reversal also came at a time when the Libyan government was seeking improved relations with the United States to balance its growing ties with the Soviet Union. The license was granted under condition that the aircraft not be put to military use or altered to enhance their military capabilities, and that they not be used for military training. The 727s were delivered in November. (C)

4. In March 1979, the United States received evidence that the Libyans had used 727s to transport troops and military equipment to Uganda—though, as it later developed, the 727s used were not those sold under the US conditions. The United States nevertheless decided that the spirit if not the letter of the agreement had been violated, and decided to block the export of the three 747s. (U)

5. The Libyans already had reason for irritation at the United States. They have been attempting for some time to persuade the United States to upgrade its representation in Libya to the ambassadorial level, without success. Libya looks with considerable suspicion at the US alliance with Egypt, particularly the US willingness to help Egypt out with arms, in view of the fact that President Sadat continues to make preparations for an attack on Libya; Qadhafi is also convinced that the US-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty represents a sell-out of the Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanians. Qadhafi resents US opposition to the Libyan involvement in Uganda and the fact that Libyan oil—10% of US oil imports—seems to be given no weight in the US attitude toward Libya. (S)

6. Since the US decision on the 747s was announced, Qadhafi has made clear his intense annoyance and the fact that he would seriously consider retaliation—specifically by withholding US oil supplies—if the decision were not reversed. During West German Foreign Minister Genscher's visit in mid-June, Qadhafi talked angrily about "anti-Libyan actions" by the United States and indicated that Libya was interested in expanding oil exports to West Germany by shifting oil from US contracts. In a magazine interview given on 25 June, Qadhafi said that Libya was "seriously thinking" of reducing or even stopping oil production for two or three years in response to "pressure and threats of invasion." (The article was originally mistranslated to sound as if the decision to stop production had already been taken, and caused a minor panic on Wall Street.) During the course of his three-week tour of various Arab countries beginning at the end of June, Qadhafi apparently attempted to persuade the oil-producing countries that they ought to freeze production to defend Arab rights. He made no converts, but may still be thinking about a unilateral use of the oil weapon. (C)

7. Qadhafi has made no public statements implying that he is considering nationalizing the remaining US oil interests in Libya as an alternative form of retaliation, but the step could hold considerable

appeal for him. The move would probably cost him very little, particularly if the US companies could be induced to remain in place—a strong possibility in light of the current tight oil market. With the tenth anniversary of the Libyan revolution approaching on 1 September, moreover, Qadhafi may be tempted to announce the nationalization as a dramatic gesture suitable to the occasion. (C)

8. Nevertheless, we believe that Qadhafi will *not* make a final decision until he has given up hope of persuading the United States to approve the aircraft sales. Moreover, Libya is currently negotiating revenue-sharing agreements with US and West European firms now operating in the country in an effort to encourage exploration and development commitments; nationalization would presumably upset the appercart.

9. Finally, Libya—probably as a result of its own intelligence assets in Egypt—expects an attack from Egypt, possibly as early as this month. It realizes that the United States is the only country that might successfully dissuade Sadat from the attack, and would not wish to alienate the United States—or provoke the United States to support the Egyptians—at this critical juncture. If, however, Qadhafi held the United States partly responsible for an Egyptian attack, he might take any one of the following retaliatory moves: nationalization, embargo of oil deliveries to the United States, or possibly even cut off of total production for a time. (S NF)

10. After a decision to nationalize, two main issues would remain: terms of compensation and the future role of the US companies in Libya. (U)

11. Although companies frequently argue that compensation should be based on replacement cost, net book value or some portion of net book value is more frequently settled on as the basis for a compensation agreement. A comprehensive audit would be required to determine the exact value of these assets and disputes between Tripoli and the companies over the results could be expected. (C)

12. One American oil executive has estimated that the net book value of the remaining producing assets of American firms in Libya is around \$100 million. This compares with an original cost on the order of \$1 billion. American equity in Libyan producing assets currently represents about 30 percent of the total. (C)

13. The same American executive estimated that replacement costs for facilities to produce an equivalent amount of production—about 600,000 b/d—would amount to between \$1.6 billion and \$1.9 billion. He put the finding costs necessary to establish a reserve base to support this level of production at an additional \$1.8–2.6 billion, bringing the grand total for replacement to an estimated \$3.4–4.5 billion. The compa-

nies clearly would not expect the Libyans to agree to such compensation. (C)

14. The above estimates do not include an LNG plant owned by ESSO with an estimated book value of around \$35 million and a replacement value of about \$800 million. They also do not include an estimated \$100 million worth of equipment in Libya belonging to American oil service companies. (C)

15. Compensation could take forms other than cash. For example, Libya might offer the companies better long-term purchase agreements "guaranteeing" future access to Libyan crude or a slight discount on crude purchases. The former concessionaries in Kuwait, for example, purchase crude at a 15 cent-per-barrel discount. Current Libyan financial arrangements allow the companies operating there to maintain a 50–55 cent per barrel profit margin on their equity oil. (C)

16. While the Libyans need technical assistance, they do not necessarily need US technical assistance. Although US oil technology and services are in general superior to those of other nations, Tripoli probably would be willing to arrange technical service contracts with non-US firms to replace US operators. Qadhafi could probably obtain good terms in the current market by providing access to Libyan crude denied to the nationalized US companies. Similarly, while the Libyans clearly want US investment in exploration and production, they could find European investors. (C)

17. If US companies are to be excluded from Libya and denied access to Libyan crude, their attempts to find new supplies would put further pressures on the world market. (C)

105. Memorandum From Rutherford Poats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Assessment of Reports of Libyan Expropriation Plans (U)

I asked CIA and State for assessments of a CIA report that Qadhafi was thinking of nationalizing the remaining ownership interests of US oil companies in Libya on September 1 as an anniversary present to himself. You may not have seen State's reply (attached), which discounted the reliability of CIA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and doubted that Qadhafi would behave irrationally in oil matters; he knows that he needs the US companies' willing cooperation, State says. You saw the reply from Bob Bowie,² on which you wrote to Bob Hunter and me: "What do we need to do?" (S)

The first thing to do is to judge whether the aircraft embargo issue and other sources of Libyan hostility are likely to precipitate a rash Libyan action or proxy action (sabotage of tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, for example) seriously damaging to US interests. While the chances of Qadhafi's recklessly jeopardizing Libyan oil revenues are low, he could devise a nationalization that keeps the oil flowing. (S)

The next thing to do is to consider whether the risk is sufficiently real and great to warrant appeasement of Qadhafi on a non-vital but burning issue, i.e., the C-130s or the 747s. I have asked Bob Hormats to get some technical and legal specialists in State to look into the feasibility of a restricted lease of transport aircraft with crews by a US company, perhaps with assurance of immediate recall by the lessor if the aircraft are sent on missions outside Libya. This probably is not practicable. Hormats will explore other ideas and report back shortly.³ (S)

Bob Hunter doubts that our possible gains from releasing the C-130s unconditionally would be worth the certain cost to our relations with Israel. He notes that he has State and Defense working on the Strait of Hormuz problem. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen" and is dated August 15.

² See Document 104.

³ Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph and wrote in the left margin: "Worth looking into."

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State⁴

Washington, July 27, 1979

Colonel Qadhafi's Purported Intention to Nationalize American Oil Company Holdings in Libya

Colonel Qadhafi has for years expressed his intention to nationalize foreign oil holdings in Libya. These expressions have ordinarily taken the form of interviews with the press.

Form of nationalizations. There are two forms of nationalization: One is expulsion, the other is participation. Expulsion means that all equity is assumed and corporate expatriate personnel leave the country. Participation, such as in the case of the Kuwait Oil Company (BP and Gulf), means the same people who explore, produce, transport, ship and most importantly market the oil continue their activities, only the price and country take go up. It is not clear from the TD which form of nationalization is meant.

Expulsion. If the Colonel intends this, he would lose the production expertise of the expatriates and their ability to take care of his marketing. Right now a company, such as Exxon, would rather lift (the figures are illustrative, not definitive) Libyan oil at \$23 a barrel rather than Algerian oil of similar quality at \$22 a barrel. This is because Libyan oil, which Exxon produces provides them with U.S. income tax foreign tax credits while Algerian oil which they acquire on a straight purchase arrangement gives them no such tax credit. Therefore, Libyan oil even at a higher price is more competitive than Algerian oil in such companies. Guaranteed access to markets is another advantage that the companies provide the producing country; it is not certain whether Colonel Qadhafi understands this but his Oil Minister, Ezzedin Mabrouk certainly does. He knows that, while marketing oil in mid-summer 1979 may not present a difficulty, selling it in a slack market such as most observers see coming within six months will be much more of a problem.

Production expertise will be impossible to replace without increased cost and lower output. It can be done, but only with lowered revenues.

Participation. Colonel Qadhafi could increase government "ownership" of the companies to 100 percent and continue to let the same

⁴ Confidential. Drafted by Edward Springer (INR/REC).

operators do what they have been doing all along, *a la* Kuwait. This, however, would lower the amount of risk capital put into the country at a time when all indications are that the GOL wants the companies to increase capacity. The companies could continue to benefit from foreign tax credits through a “service fee” arrangement, as they have done in Kuwait, and they would continue their marketing function.

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

The Oil Minister and other cooler heads will continue to advise the Colonel against rash action against the companies. While the Colonel has been cited for acting in an irrational manner on some issues, he has never done so regarding oil. He did nationalize (expel) BP and Shell but those companies were not beneficiaries of foreign tax credits and the American multinationals were forced to take over some of their marketing duties. He did nationalize (expel) Amoseas (Caltex) and Atlantic Richfield but they were new in Libya and their high depreciation allowances made foreign tax credits negligible.

106. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

New York, October 4, 1979, 2125Z

Secto 9008. Subject: Secretary’s Discussion With Libyan Foreign Minister.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. Summary: Basic elements of US-Libyan bilateral relationship rather than specific current problems were central features of Secretary’s forty-five minute discussion with Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki on Oct. 3. General Tone was frank and direct but cordial and constructive on both sides. Secretary stated USG had no desire to undermine Libyan Government and would neither encourage nor condone such efforts by others. Main causes of US-Libyan differences were Libyan support for movements espousing violence and terrorism, and hostile Libyan attitude toward those involved in efforts to achieve

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Tripoli. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Tunis. Vance was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

Middle East peace. Turayki stated his government opposed terrorism but reaffirmed Libyan support for PLO and certain unspecified African movements. On Middle East he said Sadat could not speak for Palestinians but conceded that Libya would not oppose an eventual settlement if the Palestinians themselves agreed. On bilateral US-Libyan relations generally, Turayki said Libyans wanted to improve relations and implied that an exchange of Ambassadors would be helpful but he was not in a hurry. Libyans, he continued, did not understand why U.S. holding up aircraft sales or what good USG thought it would do. Secretary said exchange of Ambassadors not possible at this time. He noted, however, that other steps were feasible and desirable, e.g., more access at highest levels for existing reps, high level visits and stepped-up efforts to promote cultural exchange. Turayki suggested that some joint group, perhaps in Tripoli, be charged with working out specific proposals to implement such measures. End summary.

3. Secretary's Oct. 3 bilateral with Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki was attended by Libya's UN PermRep Kikhia and a notetaker on Libyan side, and by Deputy Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretary Saunders and Country Director Coon. Secretary opened discussion by saying he was pleased with the opportunity to start a discussion with Libyan Government at this level. Turayki reciprocated these sentiments. The Secretary said he wanted to make two points at outset: First, USG had no desire in any way to undermine Government of Libya, it would give no encouragement to any other government seeking to do this, nor indeed would it condone such an effort. Second, U.S. and Libya did, however, have significant differences which should be fully discussed with the objective of reducing them over time. Turayki agreed, noting U.S. and Libya had enjoyed excellent economic and cultural relations for a long time and that Libya has continued to be interested in further improving relations with the U.S.

4. Secretary stated one of the major causes of differences was widespread U.S. perception that Libya supported movements which had as guiding principle the use of violence and terrorism. A second major area of difference was the apparently hostile attitude Libya took to U.S. effort to achieve Middle East peace. At present U.S. agrees to disagree with many Arab countries regarding best course to follow in order to achieve universally shared goal of a peaceful settlement. But Libya goes beyond that in terms its hostility to the whole process and its punitive attitude to the other parties principally engaged in the peace negotiations.

5. Turayki said that as far as terrorism is concerned, his government was against it, although of course it supported PLO and certain movements in Africa. He did not think his government should be held accountable for individual terrorist acts committed by such groups any

more than USG should be for acts of mercenary soldiers who might previously have had training in U.S. Army. As for Middle East, he acknowledged difficulties administration faces in its present effort but questioned correctness of US approach. Libya particularly objects to Sadat putting himself in position of speaking for Palestinians. Despite all this, if a settlement could ultimately be achieved which the Palestinians themselves would be willing to accept, "Libya would not be more royal than the King."

6. Secretary acknowledged that Libya had taken positive steps such as subscribing to anti-hijacking convention,² but reiterated US concern at continued Libyan support for organizations engaged in terrorist acts, some of which have been directed against our own personnel. On the Middle East, Secretary stressed importance of understanding the nature of our step-by-step approach, which is not at all inconsistent with the conviction we share with others that any lasting solution will have to deal effectively with the Palestinian issue. He wanted to be sure that while we might differ on tactics, Libya did not misunderstand us on this point.

7. Turayki said Libyans were disturbed by use of the word "autonomy" in describing plans for political evolution of West Bank, since term usually referred to a particular condition within a sovereign country, in this case, presumably, Israel. Secretary explained that language in CDA was "full autonomy", meaning Israel would hold its claims in abeyance while West Bank leaders participated in discussions of longer term future of area with other interested parties; thus use of term did not imply US repudiation of principle of opposing occupation of territory by force. Turayki did not dispute this explanation but suggested a need for a specific timetable for Israeli withdrawal, and a need for USG to bring PLO into the peace process. Secretary said USG foresaw Palestinian participation in peace process and welcomed this prospect—once necessary formulation (PLO recognition for Israel's right to exist) had been agreed on. This had almost been achieved in 1977 but PLO was not quite able to agree within itself at that time. USG was still trying. Turayki said it was necessary not only for PLO to recognize Israeli's right to exist, but also for the reverse to happen. Turayki, responding to a question, said he believed that there were still differing points of view within PLO but that a decision on this issue taken by the top level would be upheld.

8. Turayki said we should not link multilateral and bilateral issues. On bilateral issues, speaking frankly, he thought US-Libyan relations as a whole were far more important than the question of a couple of

² See footnote 4, Document 95.

Boeings or C-130s. Libya could if it needed get them or their equivalent elsewhere, but could not understand why US was creating the problem. Was Libya serving as a scapegoat in the region? Secretary replied that US had problems with two Arab countries on the terrorism question, Libya and Iraq, and was following the policy of not selling them equipment that could significantly add to military capabilities. This position might change later on but there was no prospect of a change in the immediate future. Turayki reiterated Libya's desire for better relations with US and noted that Libya was a genuinely non-aligned state. He asked how US felt the sanctions against Libya helped, whether a couple of Boeings would change the regional balance. Libya has a small population but needs to defend itself, and fortunately has the money to pay for it. USSR knows Libya is not Communist and still supplies arms. Why then the US policy? Secretary replied that to answer the question one had to go back to basics and referred to his earlier remarks regarding Libyan support for terrorist groups, and hostility to the peace process. He added that recent Libyan use of Boeing 727's in Uganda had not helped either, though USG recognized that these were not the specific aircraft legally constrained from such use. Turayki said he still thought Libya was being discriminated against. Secretary noted that USG does not sell arms to many countries, and does sell other type of equipment to Libya. Turayki questioned practicality of constraints US places on arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, saying that if war broke out in region they would certainly use the arms as they chose. Secretary pointed out that if these arms were used offensively rather than for defensive purposes for which they were sold, we would be legally required to cut off spares.

9. Turayki suggested Libya would like to upgrade diplomatic relations with US, i.e., exchange Ambassadors. Secretary said this was not possible now though we agreed in principle it might be desirable later on. Meanwhile, each side could increase access at high levels of its government to the other's diplomatic representatives. This should be started at once. There followed a brief discussion of the new People's Committee which has taken over the Libyan Embassy in Washington. Secretary said this should not create problems as long as all agreed that it continued to act as a diplomatic mission. He asked whether the chairman of the Peoples Bureau would be the head of the Mission. Turayki said his government would let us know about that in a formal note.

10. Secretary proposed certain additional steps to improve relations: First, an exchange of visits by high level officials. He hoped that Mr. Saunders or Mr. Newsom or someone of similar rank could visit Tripoli in the near future. Second, he thought the two countries could work more effectively to develop specific areas of cooperation,

in particular by stimulating broadly-based cultural and educational exchanges.

11. Turayki, seconded by Libyan PermRep Kikhia, reacted favorably to the foregoing suggestions. Turayki felt that there was a need for more discussion between the two governments on the terrorism issue. Kikhia felt the US media were heavily biased against Libya and welcomed advice on what Libya could do about it. Turayki noted that Charge Eagleton was doing a very good job to strengthen US/Libya relations in Tripoli. He suggested the formation of something like a committee, perhaps involving Eagleton and based in Tripoli, to review bilateral relations and work systematically on what needed to be done. The Secretary expressed interest in this idea as the meeting closed.³

12. Comment: While it is difficult to predict what Qaddhafi's reaction to meeting will be, we had impression meeting effectively carried forward dialogue. Differences remain profound, but if Turayki attitude is any judge they may be sufficiently manageable to avoid major break.

Vance

³ In telegram 294915 to Tripoli, November 11, the Department reported on a November 8 meeting between Newsom and Kikhia in New York to discuss topics for the proposed U.S.-Libyan dialogue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790520–1127)

107. Diplomatic Note From the United States to the Government of Libya¹

Washington, October 10, 1979

The United States Government acknowledges receipt of the Libyan Foreign Secretariat Note (Reference 9/41/79) of September 19² and wishes to inform the Government of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya that as from the date of that note the Libyan diplomatic office in Washington will be designated and regarded by the United States Government as the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

This action is taken in accordance with the Vienna Convention's definition of a diplomatic mission and takes account of the Secretariat's reference to the People's Bureau being specifically "at the Diplomatic Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Further, the Government of the United States notes that "The People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission will exercise its responsibilities in the customary manner in the relations between the two countries" and wish to emphasize that the "customary manner" of such relations is codified in the Vienna Convention.³

The Government of the United States still awaits clarification of the status to be accorded the members of the People's Committee of that People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission. In order to deal formally with members of the People's Committee it is necessary that they be accorded official status and the United States Government would welcome a request from the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for diplomatic status for those Committee members. It would also be necessary that one member of the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission be formally designated the official spokesman for the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission and be recognized as its Chairman, Coordinator, or other appropriate title. In this regard

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. No classification marking.

² In telegram 1484 from Tripoli, September 19, the Embassy transmitted a translation of the "substantive part" of the note: "The Secretariat has the pleasure to inform the Embassy that a People's Bureau (or office) has been formed at the diplomatic mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the United States. This action has been taken in accordance with the application of People's Democracy in the SPLA and the implementation of decisions of the People's Congresses." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790428-0745)

³ The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed on April 18, 1961, and entered into force on April 24, 1964, provides a framework for the establishment, maintenance, and termination of diplomatic relations between sovereign states. (23 UST 3227; 500 UNTS 95)

diplomatic titles per se present no particular problem and title and position of such an individual within the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission itself is purely a matter to be left to the discretion of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

In addition, while in no way affecting the name or designation of the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission, for protocol purposes it would be helpful to know at what level the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission should be regarded, i.e., at the level of an Embassy, Legation, etc. Upon the clarification of these points the United States Government will be in a better position to determine the wishes of the Government of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in this regard and how best to respond to those wishes.

108. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts and Other Recipients¹

Washington, December 2, 1979, 1954Z

310900. Inform Consuls. Subject: Libya SitRep No 1 as of 1200 EST, December 2, 1979.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Embassy Tripoli was attacked about 10:00 a.m. (3 a.m. EST) on Sunday, December 2, 1979 by a mob of about several hundred (18–25 year-old men) shouting anti-American slogans. By 10:30 the mob was breaking windows and trying to batter down the front door, which did not give. The assault turned to removing the ground floor window grills, and breached the Embassy about 11:10 a.m. (4:10 a.m. EST) through a second floor balcony. The remaining staff retreated to the third floor vault and then left the building about 11:15 a.m. (4:15 a.m. EST) via a trap door and walked to the British Embassy, about 15 minutes away. All employees, American and local departed safely without injury. Fires were subsequently set in the Chancery and extinguished by the local fire department.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790556–0065. Secret; Immediate. Sent to all diplomatic and consular posts, JCS, USCINCEUR, CINC-USAFA, CINCUSNAVEUR, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, CINC-USEUR, U.S. Secret Service, and USNMR SHAPE. Drafted by Hester and approved by Smith.

The mob had arrived with placards at the time of an anti-American pro-Iranian revolution rally of several thousand people at Tripoli's Green Square about a mile from the Embassy. Most members were in military fatigues which recently have become standard clothing for students and others in Tripoli.

After noon local time (7:00 a.m. EST) and following difficulty in contacting responsible Libyan officials, Charge Eagleton made a demarche to Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki about the damage to the Embassy and the lack of adequate protection. He insisted on strengthened protection for the Embassy and residence of official Americans. Turayki assured Eagleton that the security of the Embassy and the American community will be taken care of. He stated that Libya continues to hold the positive positions taken in recent high-level bilateral correspondence.

At 4:00 p.m. (10:00 a.m. EST) local time Libyan police were placed in front and at the rear of the Charge's residence. At 4:15 p.m. (10:15 a.m. EST) Charge Eagleton was invited to Libyan Foreign Liaison Office to arrange access to the Chancery. He subsequently gained access and confirmed that security has not been violated although the first floor consular and economic/commercial areas have suffered extensive fire and water damage. We reoccupied the Embassy about 7:00 p.m. (noon EST).

Guidance has been prepared for the American business community advising it to thin down its staffs and to reduce its presence by sending out dependents to other countries until present tensions cease.

Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) head Ali el-Houderi was called in at 10:00 a.m. EST to receive the Department's protest from Deputy Assistant Secretary Draper about the irresponsible conduct of the Libyan Government in handling the attack. The Embassy met with local American business leaders at 6:30 p.m. (11:30 a.m. EST) to advise them on the situation.²

We have advised other North African and nearby posts to reduce classified files to a minimum, to be kept only in secure areas, and again to review with host governments specific arrangements for adequate protection, including designation of specific units. Rabat, Algiers, and Tunis and constituent posts are being considered urgently for a voluntary thinning out of staff and reduction in the number of dependents.

Vance

² No record of Draper's meeting was found. For the protest note, see Document 109. No record of a meeting with U.S. business leaders in Tripoli was found.

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the British Embassy in Washington¹

Washington, December 2, 1979, 1716Z

310814. Subject: Message for American Charge William L. Eagleton. Please pass British Embassy Tripoli.

1. This is message no. 1.

2. Please convey following personal message to Foreign Secretary Turayki from the Secretary:

Begin message: I am deeply shocked at the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.² All information we have suggests that protection at our diplomatic premises was clearly inadequate and that the authorities did not respond during the attack. I expect your government to undertake immediately exceptional measures to protect the official American community in Tripoli and also the unofficial American community in Libya. The situation calls for the designation of special units explicitly assigned to this task, with which the Embassy and other resident Americans can communicate directly as assistance is required and in order to assure an immediate response.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 10–12/79. Confidential; Immediate. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Coon; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790555–0907)

² See Document 108.

110. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 3, 1979, 9–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Warren Christopher

Harold Saunders

Richard Cooper**

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown

W. Graham Clayton

JCS

General David Jones

General John Pustay

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Frank Carlucci

Energy

John Sawhill**

Treasury

Secretary William Miller**

Richard Solomon**

Robert Mundheim**

Justice

John Harmon**

White House

Hamilton Jordan

Stuart Eizenstat**

Lloyd Cutler**

Jody Powell**

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

NSC

Colonel William Odom

Gary Sick

**Present for discussion of domestic issues only

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Libya.]

4. *Libya*. The SCC agreed that we should suspend relations with Libya. The American diplomatic staff would be reduced from 12 to 5, no consular duties would be performed, and our diplomats would work out of an Interests Section in another country's embassy. Depending

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 106, SCC 217, 12/03/79, Iran. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found. Carter initialed and wrote "Zbig" in the upper right-hand corner.

on the Libyan response, explanation and willingness to compensate, this can be reviewed later.² (C)

5. *Next Steps*. The SCC tomorrow will consider a scenario for the diplomatic efforts over the next two or three weeks. It will also examine the longer range objectives and strategy of our relations with Iran.³ (S)

² Carter checked the Disapprove option and wrote: "Call Libyan Chargé in. Give Khadafi 24 hours to reply satisfactorily to a presidential demand. Then suspend (not break) relations."

³ The summary of conclusions of the portion of the December 4 Mini-SCC meeting pertaining to Libya noted the following: "Mr. Aaron reported the President's view that we should call in the Libyan Charge and give him 24 hours to make a satisfactory response. If such a response is not forthcoming, we should suspend relations. State will follow up." (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 106, SCC 218, 12/04/79, Iran)

111. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, December 5, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

2. *US Libyan Relations*—Dave Newsom called in Libyan People's Bureau head Ali El-Houderi this morning and told him that:

—we do not consider Foreign Secretary Turayki's apology for last Sunday's attack on the Embassy satisfactory;²

—you are personally and urgently concerned with the situation and want the Libyan Government to acknowledge responsibility for the incident and to provide compensation for the damage;

—pending these actions, we are suspending the operation of our Embassy and reducing the staff to a small group;

—this does not affect the status of the People's Bureau here in Washington but it does cause us to think very seriously about the future of our diplomatic mission in Tripoli.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 12/79. Secret. Carter initialed and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Turayki's apology was not found.

Dave also phoned the Libyan Ambassador to the UN who doubted that Libya would accept responsibility for the attack. He did, however, comment that his country would pay compensation, but felt that the two issues should be separate.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

112. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 6, 1979, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher
David Newsom
Harold Saunders

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Claytor

JCS

General Lew Allen
General John Pustay

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Frank Carlucci

Justice

Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti**

Energy

John Sawhill**

White House

Jody Powell
Lloyd Cutler**

Hedley Donovan

Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC

Colonel William Odom
Gary Sick

**Present for domestic issues only.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

6. *Libya*. We continue to hear rumors that Qadhafi may order an oil cutback. Many of the same companies are affected as were affected

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 106, SCC 221, 12/06/79, Iran. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found. Carter initialed and wrote "Zbig" in the upper right-hand corner.

by the Iran situation. The companies want us to maintain some American presence in Libya, but they do not object to a considerable reduction as planned. If there is a cutback, we will need to reallocate supplies. This is complicated because the Libyan oil is such high quality. Energy is examining options.² (S)

Political-Military Issues:

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

3. AWACS. The aircraft will arrive tomorrow morning. After the arrival, we will notify our allies and the Saudis.³ The SCC agreed that it would be useful to treat this deployment as a routine training operation, stressing that these units would be training with U.S. forces in the Mediterranean and that the aircraft would visit U.S. facilities elsewhere in the region during the deployment. In that regard, it was recommended that we approach the Italians for landing rights in Signonella, Sicily, at the time of notification. Because of the possible implications of U.S. support for Egypt against Libya, we will stress that this was planned before the recent events in Libya. We would anticipate the AWACS aircraft remaining about two weeks in Egypt. Defense is drafting a statement which can be used following notification of allies. This will be discussed further today for consideration at the meeting tomorrow.⁴ (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

² Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "I want extra efforts made to enhance relations with all AOPEC nations. (I assume US embassy ? in Libya will be resolved)."

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "Assess advisability of also notifying Libya." The aircraft were deployed to Egypt.

⁴ Carter underlined "about two weeks" and wrote in the left-hand margin: "They will stay as long as needed." Brzezinski placed an asterisk at the end of this paragraph and wrote beneath the last item: "* Subsequent to the meeting, the President approved a 48-hr. holdover in Signonella, to disassociate the Egyptian deployment from the U.S.-Libya problem. (10:30 a.m. by telephone with Z.B.) ZB."

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, December 9, 1979, 1445Z

1891. Subject: Conversation With Ali Houdairi in Tripoli.

1. I have just had a wide-ranging 3 hour conversation with Chief of the Libyan Peoples Bureau in Washington, Ali Houdairi, followed by a quick tour of the damaged Embassy. Houdairi worked hard to emphasize prospects for better relations in future. He saw Qadhafi yesterday (December 8) and has an oral message for President Carter which he will deliver on his return to Washington (via London) probably arriving Tuesday.² Houdairi apparently urged Qadhafi to receive me (as he had been received by the President) but Qadhafi declined with the comment that he never receives Ambassadors. (He does in fact on rare occasions receive Ambassadors). Instead Qadhafi said he would send a special emissary to talk to me (probably Liaison Secretary Qaud). I will have some frank observations to send back to Qadhafi if this occurs.

2. Our conversation centered on what really happened at the Embassy December 2 and the question of security then and in the future. I observed that in the interest of containing the crisis and not foreclosing the future we were not insisting that the Libyan Government acknowledge responsibility for having organized the attack, though we knew very well that elements of the Libyan Government were involved from beginning to end. I gave him details to back up this statement. He seemed genuinely surprised at some of the items, such as tools supplied by the Popular Resistance office across the street and removal some Embassy files to official Libyan vehicles and the Peoples Resistance building. He did not try to refute any of this evidence.

3. I told Houdairi that before we could begin our assessment of where we stood and what would be an appropriate U.S. diplomatic establishment in Tripoli in the future, we needed a simple acknowledgement of Libyan responsibility for the lack of security that had resulted in entry of the Embassy. Houdairi seemed to think this would be forthcoming (but we have no idea when).

4. On security I bore down hard on the inadequacy of verbal assurances of the kind that proved worthless December 2. He argued

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156-1905. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² December 11. See Document 117.

that “it cannot happen again” implying that Qadhafi had told him so. I replied that even if we were confident that the Libyan Government did not intend that the Embassy should be touched, there was now a proliferation of revolutionary committees eager to display their zeal. We would therefore need automatic access to effective security forces that could be brought to the Embassy in case of an emergency. Houdairi replied that all popular organizations were under the discipline of the government (which of course destroys their claim that the attack was spontaneous). Nevertheless he thought the Libyan authorities would cooperate to provide us the kind of security we believed necessary (this will take some doing!).

5. I emphasized that the U.S. Government would be making decisions based on all information and evidence available. I added that consideration the Libyan Government gives to our requirements over the coming days and weeks will have an important bearing on the outcome of our deliberations.

Comment: Houdairi remained upbeat in spite of the heavy emphasis on what had been done by whom at the Embassy and our serious security concerns for the future. This optimism (“relations will be [garble—better?] than at any time in the last 10 years”) was apparently based on the fact that a personal contact and relationship has been established between President Carter and Col. Qadhafi.³ Ironically, this is something we in the Embassy have been hoping would happen for some time. We would like to share Houdairi’s optimism. Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that it is based on his meeting with the man who counts here. Experience, however, speaks for caution when dealing with Qadhafi, and this is only the beginning of the dialogue.

Eagleton

³ Presumably a reference to Qadhafi’s message to Carter in response to an earlier message from Carter conveyed by Brzezinski to Houdairi on November 27. The messages mostly concerned possible Libyan efforts to secure the release of the U.S. hostages in Iran. The Embassy transmitted Qadhafi’s message, which was read to Eagleton by Shahati in a November 29 meeting, in telegram 1866 from Tripoli, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790549–0948)

114. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, December 10, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

3. *Libya*. Charge William Eagleton met today with the head of Libya's Foreign Mission Liaison Office, Ahmed Shahati. While the meeting was cordial, it contained nothing beyond the general assurances on security that the Embassy has been receiving regularly since before the December 2 attack. Authoritative word on Libya's position will have to come directly from Col. Qadhafi himself. Libyan People's Bureau Head Ali El-Houderi is now en route to Washington with a message for you from Qadhafi, which may give us a clearer understanding of where US-Libyan relations are headed.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 12/79. Secret. Carter initialed and wrote "Warren" in the upper right-hand corner.

² See Document 117. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "NY Times interview interesting, somewhat misleading." In the interview, published in the December 11 issue, Qadhafi said that he wanted to improve relations with the United States. (Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Libyan Leader Sets Aside Threats To Curtail Oil Exports to the U.S.," *New York Times*, December 11, 1979, p. A1) In telegram 1894 from Tripoli, December 11, the Embassy transmitted a full transcript of the interview. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570-0590)

115. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, December 14, 1979, 1315Z

1925. Subject: Basis for a Continuing Diplomatic Relationship With Libya.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. As part of the Department's documentation on Libya I submit comments by Political Officer Hooper. I cannot take exception to them though there are other considerations that should be discussed before final decisions are made. The following five premises, tested by our experiences in Tripoli, reflect our judgements about the foundations of U.S.-Libyan interests:

—A. Qadhafi is prone to lie. This habit tends to raise doubts about the validity of his remarks contained in official exchanges or public utterances, and about reassurances and pledges conveyed by his representatives in the Libyan Government.

—B. The U.S.-Libyan petroleum relationship is self-sustaining. Although American oil company officials find a U.S. diplomatic presence convenient, the absence of U.S. diplomats from Tripoli would not have a significant impact on economic relations predicated upon a clear mutuality of interests.

—C. U.S.-Libyan educational/cultural ties are also to some extent self-sustaining. Visa services for Libyan students can be provided by other U.S. Embassies in Europe and the Middle East.

—D. The U.S.-Libyan political dialogue will flounder as long as Qadhafi remains in power. The Libyan leader is fundamentally opposed to U.S. political interests in the Middle East.

—E. A U.S. diplomatic presence of undetermined size can provide useful information about developments in Libya to the Washington community. The utility of such a presence, however, must be carefully assessed in the context of the above premises.

Eagleton

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

116. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated

Nov 30—SCC. Mexico refuses the Shah.² Implementation.

Dec 1—SCC. McHenry to address SC in evening. Economic aspects of sanctions.

Dec 3—SCC. Economic sanctions. Shah's residence. Vance briefed on Libyan attack on U.S. Embassy Dec. 2.³ SCC agreed suspend relations with Libya. You commented: If we are confident the Government of Libya abetted the attack, we should break relations; signal that we are no longer prepared to conduct normal relations. I do not understand Qadhafi's game. This attack comes immediately after Qadhafi sent a message to the President⁴ and sent emissaries to Khomeini on the hostage issue. Vance said that this was clearly done with their knowledge and acquiescence. We asked for protection and they did not provide it. He favored suspension of relations and the establishment of an interests section. The VP said that was a "soft break" and worried that the mood of this country could explode. You noted the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in Puerto Rico would lead to blaming us for releasing two terrorists.⁵ The VP said the average American sees us as impotent cowards and commented that the situation could poison the next election. DA wondered why we should have a "soft break," noting that Libya was interested in economic relations with us. You replied that it was to prevent a confrontation between the U.S. and Islam. There are more countries than we in hot water. We should suspend relations, demand compensation, and not restore relations until our demands have been satisfied. Vance said the Libyans were worse than the Pakistanis (about paying compensation?). You said something to the effect that in Iran there was a crisis, in Libya suspension of relations, and in Pakistan the chill was warming (?) at which point the meeting ended. (State attendees were Vance, Christopher, Saunders)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 8/80. Secret. Prepared for Brzezinski.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 166.

³ See Document 110.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 113.

⁵ Reference is presumably to the four Puerto Rican nationalists granted clemency by Carter on September 6.

*Dec 4—Mini-SCC.*⁶ Secretary Miller referred to rumors that we intended to freeze Libyan assets. DA reported the President's view that we should call in the Libyan Charge and give him 24 hours to make a satisfactory response. If such a response is not forthcoming, we should suspend relations. State was to follow up. (Newsom and Saunders attended from State.)

*Dec 4—NSC.*⁷ Long discussion of economic sanctions, loan defaults, cooperation with allies, etc. Also a long discussion about next steps on Iran, including more severe measures.

Dec 5—SCC. Warren Christopher stated that the intention was, in the next several days, to suspend relations with Libya and reduce our representation to an Interests Section, probably with the UK as the host power. ZB referred to a (Presidential?) note to Vance which said to protest and if we do not receive satisfaction, to suspend relations. Newsom said the Charge was to be called in today.⁸ There was clear evidence of Libyan Government involvement. We would demand an immediate response. In the meantime, we were suspending our activities and reducing the number of our people. If there is no response from the Libyans, we would inform them in a few days. If the answer was satisfactory, we would take another look at the situation.

*Dec 6—SCC.*⁹ John Sawhill said the oil companies were expressing concern about Libya. They wanted us to keep some people there. Vance said our intention was to "suspend operations" not to break relations. Five people would remain. Sawhill said he would pass information from the companies to Hal Saunders. Keeping people in place reduces the chance of an oil cutoff. The same companies that were in Iran are in Libya. If there was a cutoff, they would have to try to reallocate oil. It would be hard to do since the quality of the oil is high. Newsom said we have suspended relations pending a reply from Libya. We could either maintain a small embassy or an Interest Section.

*Dec 7—Mini-SCC.*¹⁰ Warren Christopher reported that we had received two responses back from Libya. They will pay compensation but will not take full responsibility. Eagleton got a more reassuring response (?).¹¹ We are in the process of cutting back from 11 to 6 individuals. We will stop there and see where we may wish to go. He

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 110.

⁷ The minutes of the December 4 National Security Council meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981.

⁸ See Document 111.

⁹ See Document 112.

¹⁰ No record of the December 7 mini-SCC meeting was found.

¹¹ See Document 113.

wondered if the subject had been discussed at the (foreign policy) breakfast that morning. Later in the meeting, Christopher raised the issue once again. He said our options were to keep 6 people and the U.S. flag or to go to an Interests Section. He thought it was to be discussed “upstairs” (i.e. at breakfast). There was some advantage to keeping the U.S. flag. The British were skittish about taking us in.

(A further review to December 15 revealed no further mention of Libya.)

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ali El-Houderi, Libyan People's Bureau

PARTICIPANTS

Ali El-Houderi, Secretary, People's Committee, Libyan People's Bureau

David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

William L. Eagleton, Jr., US Charge, Tripoli

Richard Jackson—P

W. Alan Roy, Libyan Desk Officer, NEA/AFN (Notetaker)

Ali El-Houderi, head of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington, came to the Department at his request for a meeting with Under Secretary Newsom. He opened the meeting with a brief recital of the recent messages that have been sent to Washington by the Libyan Government, citing particularly the two messages from Col. Qadhafi to President Carter (Note: message of November 29 and December 12)² and the December 3 message from Foreign Secretary Turayki.³ He suggested that these messages constituted an answer to Mr. Newsom's demarche made to El-Houderi on December 5,⁴ but indicated that, for the record, he wanted to specifically answer Mr. Newsom directly. He emphasized that what he had to say was not his own message but

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1-12/79. Confidential. Drafted by Roy. The meeting took place in Newsom's office.

² For the November 29 message, see footnote 3, Document 113. The December 12 message was not found.

³ Not found. Presumably it was a response to Vance's message in Document 109.

⁴ See Document 111.

rather a summation of messages previously sent and assurances he received during his consultations in Tripoli. Specifically, he indicated that:

—The Libyan Government regretted the attack on the Embassy and fully accepted its responsibility to provide adequate security to foreign diplomats.

—His government was fully prepared to pay compensation for damage done to the Embassy and that this willingness was a clear recognition of the Libyan Government's "failure" and "negligence" in not providing adequate security for the Embassy.

—Col. Qadhafi has given his personal assurance to President Carter that full and adequate protection will be provided to all Americans in Libya so they might live in a "climate of freedom and security".

El-Houderi expressed in general terms his hope and expectation that a "new page had been turned" in US/Libyan relations and that we both need to "forgive and forget". He expressed his optimism about the future of our bilateral relations and the hope that the "momentum" now in train would not be allowed to slacken.

Newsom replied to El-Houderi by welcoming the assurances given and indicating that we will "accept them at face value". He made it clear, however, that we still would like to see the assurances of future security put into more tangible form. Specifically, he suggested that security units be designated to provide protection for the Embassy and that the Embassy have well established access to these units. In addition he proposed that Charge Eagleton upon his return to Tripoli, be accorded an early meeting with Col. Qadhafi to discuss the various issues affecting the operation of our Embassy in Tripoli.

Mr. Newsom, at this point, brought up something which he described as a "troubling problem" which occurs at the "worst possible time"—specifically the arrest and ongoing detention of Bashir Dultz, a German national who has been the budget and fiscal officer at the Embassy for many years. When serving as Ambassador in Tripoli, Newsom knew Dultz well and has high regard for him. He indicated that this arrest sent all of the wrong signals at a time when Libyan authorities were trying to assure us of future security. He noted particularly that the arrest was causing great nervousness among both national and American employees at the Embassy and that the loss of Dultz' skill as a B&F officer was causing serious difficulty in getting the Embassy reorganized. Newsom made it clear that while Dultz' release was not a condition of improved relations, his release or a full explanation of his arrest would certainly improve the "atmosphere".

Ali El-Houderi indicated that he had no direct knowledge of the Dultz case, but was certain that the arrest had nothing to do with the

Embassy. He suggested that Dultz was well known in Tripoli and many believed he was a “spy”. Nonetheless, he undertook to bring the case to the attention of senior Libyan officials and to pursue it when he goes back to Tripoli later this month. El-Houderi returned to the theme of improved relations and expressed the expectation that while problems still exist, they can and will be worked out.

118. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, December 20, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

4. *Libya*—Today Charge Bill Eagleton and I discussed our relations with Libya. I told him that we assume, based on the messages we have had from Qaddafi, that Libya wants to build a better relationship with the US; that it is necessary for us to have explicit assurances from the Libyans on security arrangements for our mission and personnel and compensation for the damages done in the attack; and that we will build up our personnel strength slowly, beginning after the Tehran hostage situation is resolved. I told Bill it is important that he attempt to establish a direct channel of communication to Qaddafi when he returns to Tripoli after Christmas.²

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 12/79. Secret. Carter initialed and wrote “Cy” in the upper right-hand corner.

² Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “I see no reason why we should not have an ambassador there, provided Khadafi gives the assurances he promised.”

119. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Message from Qadhafi

Ali al-Houderi of the Libyan People's Bureau returned urgently from a visit to Tripoli yesterday to deliver a message from Col. Qadhafi. He called me at noon today and read the following message from "Brother Qadhafi" to be passed to you:

"1. Libya condemns the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan² and is very disturbed by it.

"2. While Libya tries to maintain ties with the Soviets, because they are our major supplier of arms which we need to defend ourselves, this is because the United States denies us the arms which we need to defend ourselves.

"3. You (the United States) are the superpower. You should do something to stop this aggression, which we see not only as a threat to Afghanistan but to the entire Middle East. We will support any action which the United States is able to do, or is capable of thinking of, to stop this Soviet imperialism. We are willing to work closely with you on this."

I told Houderi that if he had any concrete suggestions, we would be interested in hearing them. He said he had none at this time. I suggested that he might ask.

I said we would also be interested in knowing whether Libya is willing to act in the United Nations to condemn the Soviet actions. We believe that if Third World nations are willing to take this step, it would be more important than just the U.S. and its allies. He said he would transmit this and wait for a reply.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Libya: Secretary General Mu'ammar Qadhafi, 3/77–1/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter wrote "Zbig, Push them on UN vote and public condemnation of SU. J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan December 24–25, 1979.

120. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Message to Qadhafi (U)

Attached at Tab A is a proposed message to be delivered by Charge Eagleton to Col. Qadhafi.² Eagleton is scheduled to return to Tripoli in the near future. The purpose of the message is twofold: (1) to provide a substantive response to Qadhafi and keep the dialogue alive; and (2) to provide a lever to insure that our Charge in Tripoli gets comparable high level reception as that accorded to Qadhafi's emissary in Washington. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the proposed message at Tab A. (State concurs).³

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Libya: Secretary General Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, 3/77-1/80. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not attached.

³ Carter checked the Disapprove option and wrote: "Reassess, following Khadhafi's urging 'Americans' to take over our embassy. J."

121. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Message to Qadhafi (U)

You asked for a reassessment of the proposed message to Qadhafi in light of his comment suggesting that Americans take over the U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Libya: Secretary General Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, 3/77-1/80. Secret.

Embassy in Libya and make it into a “People’s Bureau” as the Libyans have done here. (S)

My Staff has conferred with State on this issue. Jonathan Randall has told us that Qadhafi’s remark was made in a jocular manner, and it is our strong inclination not to pick up on it unless he makes it an issue. The best way to find out just what the Colonel has in mind is to arm our Charge with a serious message and then request a direct meeting. (S)

A possible opening for our Charge may in fact occur tomorrow. A Congressional delegation is visiting Tripoli, and there is a real possibility that Qadhafi will agree to meet with them. If he has the message in hand, Bill Eagleton would then be in a position to ask to remain for a one-on-one meeting with Qadhafi or to use the opportunity to let the Colonel know that such a meeting is desired. This will be a useful test of Qadhafi’s real interest in building a working relationship. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft message at Tab A.² (U)

² Not attached. Beneath the recommendation, Carter wrote: “OK, J.” In a January 17 note to NSC/S, Sick wrote: “Approval of message relayed to Dept. of State by phone.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Libya: Secretary General Mu’ammarr Qadhafi, 3/77–1/80) See Document 123.

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 17, 1980, 1827Z

13208. Subject: Talking Points for Proposed Meeting With Col. Qadhafi.

1. (S) Entire text.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–8/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Roy; cleared by Coon, Draper, Sick, and Seitz and in FBO, IO/UNP, and S/P; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0704)

2. In addition to the Presidential message (septel)² Charge Eagleton should use the following talking points in the proposed meeting with Col. Qadhafi:

—Elaborating on the President's point about security for the Mission, we believe it is necessary for a specific security unit to be designated for the Embassy and its personnel and for the Embassy to have communications access to that unit on a 24-hour a day basis. This is the arrangement which the Libyan People's Bureau has in Washington.

—In terms of the high level contact the President referred to, while it is important for the Charge to see Col. Qadhafi himself from time to time, what is essential is that some form of ongoing liaison with the Colonel's immediate staff be established, i.e., not simply with Shahati or Turayki.

—Hopefully such meetings can lay a foundation for the effective discussion with appropriate Libyan officials of all the issues now outstanding between us.

—As confirmation of Libyan interest in the security and well-being of our Embassy, we would like to see a tangible expression of cooperation. Specifically, the Embassy has had an outstanding property claim with the Libyan Government for several years. The Colonel's assistance in obtaining a satisfactory resolution of that claim would be a firm indication of the Libyan Government's commitment to a sound and equitable relationship. Settlement of this claim could be used in form of suitable property which could be used to construct a new building for the Embassy in Tripoli.

—We remain concerned about the status of Embassy national employee Bashir Dultz. His arrest—at a moment when we have been reexamining the whole issue of whether our Embassy personnel can operate under adequate security—has been troublesome. We would hope and expect a prompt and satisfactory resolution of this problem.

3. Col. Qadhafi's response to the President's message and to the points raised in the above talkers will help determine the ongoing nature of our relationship with Libya. A negative response will, of course, require us to review again the full range of options open to us in deciding upon the level and character of that relationship.

Vance

² See Document 123.

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 17, 1980, 1927Z

13254. Subject: Message to Col. Qadhafi From President Carter.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Charge Eagleton should seek an early appointment with Col. Qadhafi to deliver the following message from the President:

3. Begin text: Dear Col. Qadhafi: I have asked our Charge in Tripoli to deliver this message so we can establish a foundation for an equitable relationship, based on mutual respect, between our two countries. I appreciated your messages given to me by Ali el-Houderi of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington,² and want to respond with equal candor.

Two things will be essential for a sound relationship between our two countries. First, our official representatives in Libya must be able to go about their duties safely and securely and they must be confident that they can call upon the Libyan authorities for assistance in assuring that security. I therefore welcomed your firm assurances about the future safety and well-being of our representatives. Second, I believe it is essential that your chief representative in Washington and my chief representative in Tripoli have regular access to senior decision makers. The head of the People's Bureau in Washington will always be able to see us at a high level on important matters. We will plan to proceed on the same basis in Tripoli and would consequently appreciate your designating a close associate of yours with whom our chief representative in Tripoli could remain in close touch.

A sound relationship would help in discussing events of significance to both our countries. In this connection, I share your concern over the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The cynical Soviet reaction could be a chilling precedent for challenges to the integrity of other nations, including Afghanistan's Muslim neighbors. It is obvious from the way the Soviet Union disposed of the Amin government that these neighbors can find little security through policies aimed at appeasing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Libya: Secretary General Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, 3/77–1/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Roy; cleared by Coon, Draper, Sick, and Seitz and in S/P; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0741)

² See Documents 117 and 119.

Moscow. It is up to all of us to help them to stand up to what could be an imminent Soviet challenge.

I would hope that you would instruct your representatives in New York and elsewhere to urge the representatives of other non-aligned and Muslim nations to make clear their united opposition to the Soviet action. Libya's representations could be particularly effective with countries like Ethiopia and PDRY, nations that have concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, similar to the one the USSR used to justify the overthrow of the Afghan Government, the execution of its President, and the occupation of that country.

Pakistan in particular will need support. We will be providing Pakistan with significant economic and military assistance. I hope you will be in touch with the Pakistani Government to ask what Libya could do to be helpful.

Iran could well be the next target of Soviet expansion. This threat is real and may become imminent if Iran's leaders fail to strengthen the country's internal cohesion and restore constructive relations with the West. Our ability to rebuild such a relationship, however, is totally frustrated by Iranian refusal to release the American hostages. It is time for them to resolve this matter so that they can turn their attention to the real threat. Perhaps you can persuade them to listen where we cannot.

It is my hope that the new year will see the beginning of a new page in Libyan-American relations. We are both men of faith and I hope that you will share my prayers for a peaceful and just solution to the problems that beset your region and our world. End text.

4. Talking points will follow septel.

Vance

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, January 19, 1980, 1115Z

46. Subject: President Carter's Message to Qadhafi. Ref: State 13252, State 13254, State 13208.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Morning January 19 I called on Ahmad Shahati, head of the Foreign Liaison Office, to discuss U.S. Libyan relations and request that I be received by Colonel Qadhafi to deliver a message from President Carter. I briefly reviewed the results of my consultations last month in Washington and told Shahati that I had just received a message from the President which he hoped would help establish US-Libyan relations on a new and more positive basis. I emphasized that an essential part of this process was the access of the official American representative in Libya to Col Qadhafi. Hence the President was asking that I be received, as he had received the Libyan representative, Ali al Houdairi, in Washington. I said I would of course be ready to go to Benghazi to see Qadhafi at any time, but suggested that it might be helpful if Houdairi, who is coming to Tripoli January 26, could accompany me to help ensure that our communication was fully understood and placed in the context of his contacts and efforts in Washington.

3. Shahati said he would immediately transmit my request to Qadhafi. He was carefully noncommittal as to whether Qadhafi would receive me. With a smile he referred to Qadhafi's comment in a recent press conference about receiving the US representative if the Americans in Tripoli established a People's Bureau. I said we assumed Qadhafi had been joking and asked Shahati's opinion. He said it was probably not a joke, but he added that Libya respected the American representation in Tripoli. We agreed that I could probably get the support of the American community if it came to a vote, but I added that of course since we respected the position of the head of the Libyan Peoples Bureau in Washington we expected the same for the representative of the President and American people—all of them, not just the local community—in Tripoli. Shahati agreed.

4. I observed that since it was not certain how soon I might be seeing Qadhafi there was a part of the President's message regarding

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800032–0682. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² See Documents 122 and 123. In telegram 13252 to Tripoli, January 17, the Department summarized Qadhafi's message to Carter on Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890016–0622)

Afghanistan that I would ask Shahati to transmit to Qadhafi immediately. I then read from notes (with Mukhtar Jamal recording it) the part of the message on Afghanistan with direct quotes on the request for advice to non-aligned and Muslim nations and the need to support Pakistan. Shahati showed considerable interest and concern about Afghanistan and asked a number of questions regarding the danger to neighbors. I emphasized the vulnerable position of Pakistan and Iran, particularly the latter with its unstable internal political situation and long term Russian ambitions in the direction of the Indian Ocean through Baluchistan. Shahati wanted to know the reason for US concern over such a distant land, and I gave him some historical background. He noted approvingly that we were offering 400 million dollars of aid to Pakistan and, with a logic that I did not entirely follow, he asked whether this was not a time to do something for Libya by getting "the aircraft" passed through Congress. I explained that it was not exactly a question of getting the Congress to pass on the aircraft but rather involved the overall impression of the Congress, Executive and people toward Libya and its policies. I noted that a clearer perception of Qadhafi's attitude toward the hostages in Tehran and toward Afghanistan could be helpful in this regard. Qadhafi would have an opportunity to make his position known to the American public when he is interviewed by Harry Reasoner of CBS in Benghazi a week from now.

5. In concluding, I told Shahati that for the next few days I could be reached in Tunis through the Embassy here and that I would be on hand in Benghazi on short notice if the Colonel wished to receive me.

6. Comment: Ideally the meeting with Qadhafi would take place when Ali al Houdairi is here to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and that follow up actions are initiated to put both relations and the Embassy on a new footing. There remains some question whether Qadhafi will in fact receive me. With Houdairi here the chances of such a meeting will increase, and if it does not come off under such favorable circumstances we will know that a considered policy decision is involved on Qadhafi's part and not simply a typical Libyan communications failure.

Eagleton

125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 1, 1980

SUBJECT

Future of Our Embassy in Tripoli, Libya

The Issue

To assess our exchanges with Qadhafi and to determine the staffing level of our Embassy and the Consular services to be provided to Americans.

Key Factors

Our Charge in Tripoli returned to his post December 31 with the expectation that he would, shortly thereafter, be received by Qadhafi and that he would personally receive the assurances we were seeking as a basis for returning to a more normal diplomatic relationship. We sent him your message to Qadhafi on January 17 and he informed the Foreign Office that he had such a message.² There has been no response from Qadhafi. There have, on the contrary, been some hints that Qadhafi may not intend to carry through with his part of the bargain. We need to decide whether to keep our Embassy at its present minimum size. We need your advice on the disposition of your message to Qadhafi which was intended to be delivered personally to him.

Even if Qadhafi provides a positive response, there is another reason for postponing a decision on the future of our Embassy until some time in March: the possibility that Libyans or Palestinians—possibly without government approval—will undertake further actions or demonstrations against the U.S. during this present period of normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, including an exchange of ambassadors between the two countries in late February. To avoid a repetition of the December 2 attack, I believe that during this period we should keep the mission drawn down to the lowest level possible and undertake no visa issuing or consular activities other than those minimally required to ensure protection of Americans.

While the exchanges you and Zbig have had from time to time since early December with the Libyan representatives in Washington have produced assurances made on Qadhafi's behalf that he wants

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. Secret.

² See Documents 123 and 124.

better relations and will forestall future assaults on the Embassy, the Libyan behavior pattern in this period remains erratic.

The following list of recent Libyan activity is not exceptional but represents the normal pattern of Libyan external involvement. Qadhafi's soothing words can quickly change to vehement invective and his explosive and changeable nature must be constantly taken into account. The weight of intelligence evidence suggests that Qadhafi himself authorized the attack on our Embassy in order to prove that his government was at least as "revolutionary" as the Iranians.³ One can never be certain as to when he will again need to prove his revolutionary credentials:

—There is mounting evidence that the commandos who attacked Gafsa, Tunisia on January 27 were trained, financed, and aided by Libya.⁴

—Despite a call for the release of the Tehran hostages, Libya has made it clear that it will give full and complete support to Iran in any confrontation with the U.S.

—On Afghanistan, Qadhafi is concerned and wants us to help Pakistan, but the Libyan delegate was absent for the General Assembly vote on the condemnation of the Soviet aggression. Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki has publicly defended the Russians, saying that "no one can separate the Arab Nation from a real friend and ally represented in the Soviet Union."

—A recent intelligence report indicates that the Libyan Air Force is carefully monitoring U.S. Sixth Fleet activity in the Mediterranean and may plan to challenge U.S. aircraft over international waters—recent radar lock-on incidents tend to confirm this monitoring activity.⁵

—The Libyan Government has recently pushed Jordan to use any Libyan subsidy under the Baghdad accord to purchase arms only from the USSR.

—Libyan agents in Chad have renewed subversive activities, which may torpedo the Lagos peace accords.

—Libya's insistence on excluding Egypt from the Afro-Arab meeting in Tripoli this month led to the postponement of the meeting.⁶

³ See Document 113.

⁴ See Document 204.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ In telegram 176 from Monrovia, January 9, Ambassador Smith wrote: "Foreign Minister Dennis provided me a full briefing on the state of play of the Afro-Arab summit as seen from Monrovia during a meeting today, January 9. Dennis opened by stating that the meeting was 'cancelled. . . postponed would be a better word. . . anyway, it's not being held.' He attributed the termination of the meeting to Qadhafi's unwillingness to comply with a request from Tolbert to obey the OAU consensus on invitations and invite Egypt." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800015-1161)

—Qadhafi is seeking to topple Arafat and set up a new Palestinian organization because he believes Arafat is too moderate.

—In early January the Central African Republic expelled the Libyan Embassy, citing continuing Libyan-Soviet efforts to undermine the security of the country.

Even so, there are still several good reasons, such as our dependence on Libyan oil and our large American community in Libya, for trying to maintain at least a minimal relationship with Tripoli. We are helped by the Libyan fear of an Egyptian attack. However, no fundamental changes in basic Libyan policy or behavior are likely to occur. Qadhafi is a maverick whose penchant for mischief-making is part of his very nature—and that is not likely to change.

Even in the best of circumstances, the chances of improved relations with Libya are not good and will be affected by other irritants. In particular, the Libyans will continue to make an issue of our unwillingness to sell 747 aircraft or to release the C-130s. While we may decide to retain a mission in Tripoli, we should be under no illusion that, over the long term, we will be able to work with Qadhafi.

Recommendation:

In that context, I believe that we should keep our Mission at its present minimal level of eight (or lower), provide only minimal consular services to Americans, and reexamine its status in mid-March after the exchange of Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors.

With regard to our message to Qadhafi, in the absence of his receiving Charge Eagleton, we recommend it be delivered to the Foreign Minister.⁷

⁷ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations.

126. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 11, 1980

SUBJECT

Diplomatic Relations with Libya

After the Gafsa raid² and the February 4 attack on the French Embassy in Tripoli³ we withdrew our Charge and reduced our Embassy staff to two. We now plan to have Charge William Eagleton return to Tripoli on or about March 13 for the purpose of packing up and paying farewell calls on American community leaders, his diplomatic colleagues and appropriate Libyan Government officials.

In the course of his farewell calls on Libyan officials Charge Eagleton will make it clear to them that he is departing permanently and will, in addition, use the talking points at Tab A to explain to them the reasons for this action.⁴ He will inform the Libyans that we have no wish to slam the door but neither can we maintain a fully functioning Embassy under present circumstances.

There is no plan at present to replace Charge Eagleton with a senior level officer.⁵ Nonetheless we plan to maintain a small relatively junior staff (5) in Tripoli which can provide basic services to the American community and give us some political and economic reporting.

Meanwhile, we are planning to talk with the Libyan Peoples' Bureau representative here in Washington about the status of their operations in the United States. While we have no intention of asking them to close down, we plan to insist that they bring their mission

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77-1/81. Secret. Brzezinski wrote: "OK. ZB 3/28/80" in the upper right-hand corner. Sent to Brzezinski under a March 17 covering memorandum from Sick, who recommended concurrence with the Department's proposal. Brzezinski wrote on the note: "ok with me!"

² See Document 204.

³ In a February 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "Both the French Embassy in Tripoli and their Consulate in Benghazi were sacked by Libyan mobs today in actions clearly related to French support for Tunisia." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80)

⁴ Brzezinski underlined "Charge Eagleton will make" and "he is departing permanently," and highlighted this sentence. Tab A, an undated paper entitled "Suggested Talking Points for Eagleton's Use with the Libyans," is attached but not printed.

⁵ Brzezinski underlined this sentence and highlighted the paragraph.

into conformity with accepted Vienna Convention norms as outlined in our October 10, 1979 note to the Libyan Government (attached).⁶

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

⁶ Attached; printed as Document 107.

**127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to
President Carter¹**

Washington, April 3, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

4. *Expulsion of Two Libyan Diplomats:* In light of intelligence suggesting intimidation and possible violence against Libyan students in the US as early as April 7,² we have decided to notify the Libyans on Friday³ of the expulsion within forty-eight hours of two members of the Peoples' Bureau whom we believe to be directly involved. We are also examining on an urgent basis the status of a number of other Libyans working at the Peoples' Bureau who have not properly registered as diplomats. As a precautionary measure, we are temporarily withdrawing our two officers in Tripoli over this weekend while these actions are in progress.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 4/80. Secret.

² Not further identified.

³ April 4.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, May 3, 1980, 2159Z

117964. Subject: Expulsion of Libyan Diplomats.

1. The following note was presented to the Libyan People's Bureau on May 2: "The Department of State hereby notifies the People's Bureau of the Diplomatic Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahariya that it is aware that members of the staff of the Bureau, Messrs. Nuri Swedan, Ali Ramram, Mohammad Gamudi, and Abdula Zbedi have engaged in conduct which the United States deems unacceptable. In accordance with Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, these persons are herewith declared not acceptable. They are required to depart the United States within 72 hours. Thereafter, the United States will no longer regard them as members of the staff of the People's Bureau entitled to the privileges, immunities and protection which they now enjoy by virtue of their official status and they will be subject to immediate expulsion.

Prior to their departure, these persons will be restricted to travel only by regularly traveled routes between their homes and offices and travel within a one mile radius of their homes as is necessary in connection with final departure preparations. Failure to observe these restrictions will result in the immediate termination of official status and immediate expulsion of the individual concerned. The People's Bureau is further advised of its obligation to communicate to the Department of State the precise departure times of these persons.

The Department reminds the People's Bureau of the specific duty, as set forth in Article 41 of the Vienna Diplomatic Relations Convention, of all persons enjoying privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state."

2. At the time of the presentation of the note the following points were made:

—The United States Government, in declaring persona non grata two diplomats from the Libyan People's Bureau on April 6, made it clear that acts of intimidation against Libyan students in the United States would not be tolerated.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800221-0253. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Madrid, Bonn, Rome, Athens, Valletta, and Tunis. Drafted by Roy; cleared in NEA/AFN, D/CT, L, and P; approved by Draper.

—At that time we told you that if these activities continued, other members of the staff of the People's Bureau could face expulsion—but if the activities ceased we were prepared to regard the incident as closed.

—We very much regret that your government has chosen to disregard this warning and that these activities are continuing in several countries, including the United States.

—Public statements by Libyan leaders—including open threats of the need for “elimination” of opposition—may have been interpreted by some Libyan officials in a manner involving a need to intimidate and threaten others. You are well aware, for example, of the allegations concerning the two murders of Libyans in London and the two in Rome and of your fellow countrymen now being held by the police of those countries.²

—Our action today is not based upon guesses and allegations; and you should know that we are acting on the basis of firm evidence. You are aware that our FBI has been very active in investigating the apparent campaign of intimidation in order to protect Libyan students in the U.S. That investigation has convinced us that this additional action is required. While it is not necessary in diplomatic situations to go into detail, you should therefore be assured that in expelling these four officials, we are acting on the basis of considerable evidence and information.

—As previously—we must warn you in the strongest possible terms that any further activity of this sort or any further intimidation places the status of the People's Bureau in real and serious jeopardy. We are prepared to take further action—if necessary—to ensure that—contrary to the ideas advanced in the People's Bureau note of April 19³ which we handed back to you on April 21—Libyans and all others who are in the United States—whether citizens or not—receive the full protection of U.S. law. We cannot tolerate assaults or intimidation, or other violations of U.S. law directed at these persons.

—When the People's Bureau was first established there was much talk of dialogue. We welcomed that and tried to respond in a substantive fashion. We still desire improved relations with Tripoli; we are still willing to work with the People's Bureau. There are, however, certain standards and norms of international conduct which cannot be ignored.⁴

² See Document 132.

³ Not found.

⁴ Also on May 2, the Department of State instructed the two remaining officers in Libya to leave Tripoli, and the Embassy was closed. (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1980, p. 84) In June, Belgium agreed to represent the United States in Libya; see footnote 29, Document 134.

3. For London: Please give text of note and talking points to FCO.
4. For other addressee posts: You may draw on note and talking points as appropriate to brief host government.

Newsom

129. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, May 5, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

5. *Libyans Fail to Depart*. In a response today to our note of Friday² expelling four Libyan diplomats, the Libyan People's Bureau argued that the four are not diplomats but private citizens, and that they do not plan to leave. We replied that their behavior had been unacceptable and that we would now be obliged to revoke their visas, effective today. We made it clear to the Libyan representative that we still desire good relations with Tripoli and would prefer that the four leave voluntarily. If they do not leave by tomorrow afternoon, however, we will escort them to the airport for the next available flight out of the country.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 5/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Warren" and "Where is appointment of Griffin Bell?" in the upper right-hand corner.

² May 2. See Document 128.

³ Carter wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin. In a May 6 memorandum to Carter, Christopher wrote: "The four members of the Libyan mission whom we ordered expelled remain in the mission here. State Department and FBI representatives went to the mission tonight, and informed the mission authorities that the four are required to leave the US; and that we will not alter this decision." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 5/80)

130. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Libyan Mission (U)

Newsom would like to take the following steps this afternoon (and is now consulting with Justice):

- to call in the head of the Libyan mission and make these points:
 - in addition to the need for the 4 PNG'd officers to leave;
 - the Mission must complete the process of regularizing its status as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention;
 - it must complete the relevant forms, and submit them to Protocol;
 - any official relations must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law and international practice and convention;
 - failing this*, the mission must be closed, effective within 24 hours of delivery of the note; and
 - for all persons whose status has not been regularized, visas will be revoked, and they will be expected to leave the country;

—in implementing the above, State would (probably) prevent the entry to the mission by anyone, and escort anyone leaving to the airport. (S)

State wanted this brought to your attention, in particular because of two possible retaliatory actions by Libya:

- harassment (or worse) of the U.S. community in Libya (which State judges to be a moderate risk, since Libya needs these people); and
- a possible reduction or cut-off of oil supplies to the U.S., which are 9% of our imports. (S)

At the same time, at the noon briefing, State will say:

- we continue to require the 4 officers to leave; and
- we will be in further touch with the Libyan mission in the near future with regard to the overall status of the mission, to make our views known. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81. Secret. Sent for urgent action. A stamped notation on the memorandum, dated 5/8/80, reads: "ZB has seen."

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve this course of action (subject to Justice's concurrence):²

² Dodson checked the Approve option and wrote: "per Robert Hunter who discussed this with ZB."

131. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA M 80-10242

Washington, May 16, 1980

LIBYA'S RECENT ROLE AS A PATRON OF TERRORISTS

The level of Libyan support for terrorism abroad, which tends to fluctuate according to Qadhafi's moods, seems once again to be rising. For a variety of reasons, Qadhafi has apparently decided to risk Western disapproval and unfavorable world opinion by supporting expanded terrorist activities. Although forecasting Qadhafi's near and mid-term actions is difficult because of his quixotic personality, the current trend indicates a more active and dangerous involvement in support of terrorist groups and activities for at least the near term. As part of this new facet of Libyan support for terrorism, Qadhafi [1 line not declassified] is expanding the capabilities of his terrorist teams.

Goals and Ambitions 1979-80

Despite his own shifting moods and the erratic changes in Libyan foreign policy, Qadhafi continues to be driven by three basic causes: championing Islam, assisting people he considers to be fighting wars of "national liberation" and defending the Arab Nation as he defines it. In promoting these causes Qadhafi has in the past supported groups whose connection to Islam, national liberation, or pan-Arabism was

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 85T00287R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 116: Libya's Recent Role as a Patron of Terrorists. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, International Issues Division, Office of Political Analysis (OPA), and coordinated in the Near East-South Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, East Asia Pacific, and African Divisions and the Center for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior in OPA.

highly tenuous. In the past several years Qadhafi apparently ceased aiding the more peripheral of his old clients while at the same time picking up a few new clients particularly in Latin America, with equally peripheral claims to his assistance.

Libyan support for terrorist groups seems to reflect the following priorities:

a. Palestinians, who combine the causes of national liberation, Islam, and pan-Arabism.

b. Other Arab dissident groups seeking the overthrow of moderate Arab regimes.

c. Muslim groups abroad who are minorities in states ruled by non-Muslim majorities, such as the Moro in the Philippines and the Pattani in Thailand. There is also evidence that Qadhafi is willing to assist Muslim extremists in Muslim-dominated states outside of the Middle East such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.

d. National liberation movements in southern Africa, Latin America, and, to a diminished extent, Western Europe.

Support for the Palestinians

Palestinian radicals remain the principal beneficiaries of Libyan aid. Qadhafi continues to seek domination over as many Palestinian factions as possible; he has even offered financial assistance to the al-Saiqa group, which is controlled by Syria. Libya continues to provide unknown (but presumably significant) amounts of money to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP). Qadhafi is also courting the Black June Organization (BJO), whose relationship with its Iraqi patrons seems to have cooled considerably. Libya is recently reported to have offered bases in Libya to the BJO; [2 lines not declassified].

Qadhafi is aware, however, that Palestinian rhetoric is seldom matched with concrete action. He recognizes that Libyan support for Palestinian groups has yielded meager results, and he may introduce more qualifiers on his financial aid. [5 lines not declassified]

Libya nonetheless is likely to continue to court the radical Palestinian groups while at the same time seeking to bring them more fully under Libyan control. Qadhafi's prospects for success will remain limited by Palestinian unwillingness to become the tools of Libyan foreign policy, and by the unwillingness of other Rejectionist Front nations to let Libya become the main patron of the Palestinians.

Although the April Summit Conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in Tripoli provided Qadhafi and Arafat an oppor-

tunity to paper over some of their differences, it is clear that the meeting resolved no fundamental issues.² Arafat is currently trying to distance himself from the Conference's more radical positions. While Arafat is not dependent on Libya for either funding or weapons, Qadhafi eventually needs a *modus vivendi* with Fatah, the largest of the PLO's groups, if he is to credibly claim that he is at the forefront of the Palestinian struggle. He doubtlessly will try to hold Fatah to all agreements it initialed, but Libyan or Libyan-backed attacks on the Fatah leadership may also occur in an effort to replace Arafat and his associates with more radical Palestinians. Nayaf Hawatmeh, leader of the pro-Soviet Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), is reported to be Syria's and Libya's candidate to replace Arafat as PLO chief.

Support for Arab Dissident Groups

Qadhafi continues to aid a number of groups seeking the overthrow of moderate Arab regimes. In January of this year, with the complicity of some Algerian officials, Qadhafi trained, armed, and launched Tunisian dissidents in the ill-fated Gafsa raid.³ Other targets include Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, and Oman. [2 lines not declassified] Libya has also supplied training and equipment to POLISARIO forces fighting the Moroccan army and has also assisted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman/Bahrain.

Campaign Against Libyan Dissidents

Qadhafi also continues to target Libyan dissidents living abroad. [less than 1 line not declassified] Libya has embarked on a campaign to silence critics of the regime through either kidnaping or assassination. [4 lines not declassified] Qadhafi seems sufficiently worried by dissident criticism that he is willing to risk Western censure by carrying out attacks in London, Rome, and other cities. [9 lines not declassified]

Support for Muslim Groups Outside the Middle East

Libya continues to supply some material support to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim organization seeking independence for part of the southern Philippines. [3 lines not declassified] There are strong indications that the level of Libyan support for the Moros has declined over the past four years.

Libya also supports the other Muslim insurgency in the Pacific region by offering limited training to some members of the Pattani

² In telegram 3269 from Tunis, April 17, the Embassy summarized the Summit proceedings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800197-1208)

³ See Document 204.

United Liberation Organization based in southern Thailand. [4 lines not declassified] The Indonesian government consistently refuses to allow the Libyans to open an embassy in Jakarta.

In November 1977, Libya was strongly suspected of abetting a coup attempt in Bangladesh with some Soviet help. [5 lines not declassified]

Sub-Saharan Africa

During 1979 Qadhafi's Sub-Saharan strategy suffered two major setbacks with the toppling of the Amin regime in Uganda and the Bokassa regime in the Central African Republic (CAR). The Ugandan adventure was particularly costly for Qadhafi in terms of men and supplies lost as well as international prestige. To recoup some of his losses, he is reportedly sponsoring the "Central African Liberation Movement," which is presumably targetted against the current French-backed CAR regime. Recently Qadhafi demonstrated that he has not forgotten Amin; he showed a willingness to cross even his allies by hindering a Cuban effort to transport Ugandan cadets to Havana via Tripoli.

The Libyans are reportedly training a number of dissidents from African countries at a camp south of Tripoli. In the past year trainees there have included nationals of Tanzania, Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa, and Namibia.

Libya continues to challenge the French for dominance in Chad. Qadhafi's past role involved the training of Chadian forces in a Libyan camp near the Chad/Libya border. Libya has supported each of the major factors at one time or another during the protracted conflict, [3 lines not declassified].

Support for Other National Liberation Movements

Qadhafi's earlier support for a wide variety of West European terrorist groups has been greatly diminished, although he still has indirect links through some radical Palestinian groups. One reason why support for European groups is not high on Qadhafi's list of priorities is that they are neither Islamic nor Arab and can only with difficulty be considered "national liberation forces." In addition, Qadhafi has shown an increasing awareness that meddling in the internal political affairs of industrial countries produces few results and has attracted an enormous amount of negative publicity.

Past Libyan financial, training, and logistics help for the Provisional IRA seems at an end, [3 lines not declassified] the only real IRA link with the Middle East in recent years has been with al-Fatah. There is no indication that Libya has any further connection with the remnants of the German Baader-Meinhof Gang. Indeed Qadhafi offered to help the FRG track down the Gang's members in 1978 and called them "disturbed persons."

Libya's connection with Italian terrorist groups is more ambiguous, although at the time of the Aldo Moro kidnaping Qadhafi offered the Italian government any assistance requested. There have been [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports suggesting that Red Brigade members received training in Libyan camps, and that there may be indirect ties between that organization and Libya via the Palestinian radical groups (particularly the PFLP).

There is no current evidence of Libyan support for Spanish terrorist groups. [*4 lines not declassified*] At present, most material support for terrorism in Spain comes from either indigenous sources or ethnic Basques [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Both Fatah and the PFLP are providing arms and training for ETA, but the direct Libyan connection seems to have been broken.

Libya is still willing to play a role in support of Latin American terrorist groups, in part because they more fully meet Qadhafi's criteria for national liberation movements. In January of 1979 Libya hosted a conference of "National Liberation" and invited representatives from a number of groups such as the Chilean MIR, the Colombian M19 Movement, Salvadoran groups, and the Sandinistas. With the encouragement of the Soviet Union and Cuba, Fatah is now reportedly supplying weapons and training to Salvadoran terrorists, with Libya and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen supplying additional training. Libya's role in Latin America is likely to be that of providing guerrilla training while Cuba plays a more active operational role.

Frustrations and Setbacks 1979-80

In late 1978 and early 1979 Qadhafi showed signs of moderating his support for international terrorism and discussed anti-terrorist issues with both US and West German officials. At that time he indicated a genuine concern that Libya's international reputation as a patron state for terrorism was damaging both the country's and his own image. Since mid-1979, however, Qadhafi has suffered a number of setbacks in those areas he considers most important: championing the cause of Islam, the Palestinians, and pan-Arabism.

One of Qadhafi's major psychological setbacks was the publicity garnered during 1979 by the Iranian Revolution, and particularly by Khomeini. Prior to the fall of the Shah, Qadhafi styled himself the leading spokesman for Islam and saw Libya as the prime source of Islamic ferment. Khomeini appeared, captured world attention, and capitalized on a growing resurgence of Islamic self-awareness worldwide. Although Qadhafi hailed the Iranian Revolution and claimed it was modeled on his own, Libya's relations with Khomeini's Iran have been very uneven. The Iranians believe, with good reason, that Qadhafi caused the disappearance of the Lebanese Shia leader Imam Musa

Sadr. Because of this, Iranian clerical leaders are reluctant to accept Qadhafi's proffered friendship and have kept him at arm's length.

For the near term, Qadhafi is likely to continue to be fascinated by the Iranian revolution and seek ways to capitalize on it. The sacking of the US embassy in Tripoli in November 1979 was a crude imitation of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran. Qadhafi is likely, however, to become increasingly jealous of Iranian prominence in Islamic affairs, and his relationship with Iran may become increasingly adversarial. Before the fall of the Shah, Libya helped train Iranian terrorists. While there is no evidence of current Libyan meddling in Iranian internal affairs, Qadhafi might be tempted to contact opponents of the Tehran government if relations between Tehran and Tripoli deteriorated further.

The rupture of relations between Fatah and Libya, although initiated by Qadhafi, must be regarded as a setback for him. As one of the major contributors to the Palestinian cause (financial aid, weapons, and training) Qadhafi has always sought a correspondingly major role in helping to shape Palestinian policy. The PLO, and Arafat in particular, have resisted Qadhafi's tutelage. The current dispute between Fatah and Libya is partly the result of the conflict between Arafat's inclination to work out a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian problem and Qadhafi's call for military action against the signers of the Camp David accords. Arafat has also intimated he can live with Israel, whereas Qadhafi wants all Jews who immigrated to Palestine after 1947 expelled.

The toppling of the Amin and Bokassa regimes were also serious setbacks for Qadhafi. In addition, Libya is embroiled in the conflict in Chad and likely to come up against his old nemesis, the French.

Qadhafi faces continued discontent among his own people, and there have been several assassination attempts against him recently. His much publicized recent campaign against corruption and dissent seems to have further alienated the military. He is also increasingly paranoid about Libyan exiles and wants them silenced.

Qadhafi is also clearly not served by his reorganization of the Libyan Foreign Affairs Secretariat, which is apparently in the process of being phased out and replaced by the Foreign Liaison Office of the Libyan General People's Congress. Such expertise in determining and implementing foreign policy as Libya had managed to accumulate is rapidly becoming dissipated.

1980: A New Phase?

Libya may be entering into a new and more dangerous form of patron state support for terrorism as a result of Qadhafi's frustrations at home and abroad. His earlier moves in the direction of moderation seem to have been scrapped: witness the burnings of the US and French

embassies in Tripoli, the Gafsa incident, his vendetta against moderate Palestinians and Libyan exiles, and his current willingness to target heads of state. While some of these activities are merely a reversion to Qadhafi's behavior of the early 1970s, there are indications that he is now willing to take greater risks and may be developing greater capacity to carry out his threats.

In the past, some of Qadhafi's enemies, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], were targeted for assassination by Palestinian groups equipped and trained by Libya. Many of these projects fell through because of the ineptness of the terrorist groups. [*3 lines not declassified*] By eschewing unreliable surrogates and using his own resources, Qadhafi improves his chances for a successful assassination of an offending head of state. By using his own resources, Qadhafi's activities can also be traced back directly to him; his apparent unconcern about how such actions are perceived abroad is in itself an ominous trend.

The assassinations of prominent Libyan exiles in London and Rome in mid-April of this year and the subsequent discovery of a weapons cache intended for future operations in Europe are also directly traceable back to Qadhafi with no cutouts. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the murders may be the first in an extensive Libyan effort against dissidents living in Western Europe.

[*1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified*]

132. Special Analysis Article in the *National Intelligence Daily*¹

Washington, May 30, 1980

LIBYA: Eliminating the Opposition

With his continuing purges at home and killings of dissidents abroad, Libyan leader Qadhafi has deepened discontent with his 10-year-old regime to dangerous levels. As his opponents grow increasingly desperate and the attempts against him multiply, the odds against him increase. [classification marking not declassified]

Qadhafi apparently launched his latest moves against domestic opponents to force Libya into his revolutionary mold, although he may

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, (DI) Job 82T00466R: Intelligence Publications Files (1980), Box 3, Folder 1: National Intelligence Daily. Secret.

have been reacting to conspiracies uncovered at home or abroad. He has been chafing for some time at the failure of the Libyan people to adopt the nebulous social and political theories enunciated in his “Green Book.” [*classification marking not declassified*]

In January 1977, Qadhafi proclaimed Libya a “jamahiriya”—a coined word roughly translatable as “state of the masses.” In March 1979, he divested himself of all official positions except command of the armed forces—a move that in no way altered his power.² [*classification marking not declassified*]

Economic changes accompanying the political moves worked increasingly toward the elimination of private capital and completed the alienation of the middle class. In April 1979, death was prescribed as the punishment for economic crimes. [*classification marking not declassified*]

This February widespread arrests began—mainly bureaucrats at first, then senior military officers and members of the “people’s committees,” which ostensibly supervise all aspects of public life. Perhaps 2,000 have been arrested, and many have been publicly humiliated. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Those arrested have been singled out for their alleged lack of revolutionary fervor and for so-called economic crimes. The purges have resulted in a major upheaval of Libyan life. An atmosphere of fear and suspicion has come close to paralyzing the normal operation of Libyan institutions. [*classification marking not declassified*]

As a result, there have been scattered reports of local riots and perhaps four assassination attempts against Qadhafi—the latest just last week. Qadhafi reportedly wears a bullet-proof vest and lives in a mobile “command van” enabling him to change his location unpredictably. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Killings Abroad

Qadhafi’s opponents in exile have for years been organized loosely into perhaps three groups, some with overlapping membership, and they have received financial assistance from Egypt and Iraq. Although some of the exiles may retain some following in Libya, they probably

² In telegram 393 from Tripoli, March 13, 1979, the Embassy reported on the General People’s Congress: “Libyans and foreign diplomats we have talked with in past ten days display no willingness to suspend their disbelief that Qadhafi has indeed turned over power to the people during the March 1–2 General People’s Congress. The Libyan leader has retained his authority as Supreme Commander of the military, and is now subject to even fewer institutional restraints in shaping Libyan foreign policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790115–0868)

are incapable of posing a significant threat to Qadhafi. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Qadhafi believes that Libya's revolutionary image cannot tolerate any organized opposition. This March the regime published a declaration calling for the physical liquidation of enemies of the revolution abroad. Within a few weeks a Libyan student was kidnaped in London by members of the Libyan "people's bureau"—Libya's version of an embassy. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Murders apparently committed by Qadhafi's special "hit squads" now total nine—two in London, four in Rome, one in Beirut, one in Bonn, and the latest, on 21 May, in Athens. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Exiled groups probably are more determined than ever to move against Qadhafi, if only in self-defense. Consequently, they are likely to accept a greater degree of risk than in the past. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Threat at Home

Little information is available on the individuals or groups responsible for past assassination attempts against Qadhafi. Some of those involved, however, seem to have been members of the military or security forces. There is nothing to indicate that other states have backed these attempts. [*classification marking not declassified*]

An organized coup attempt is most likely to come from within the military, elements of which are known to have been disenchanted with Qadhafi for years. His recent inauguration of "revolutionary committees" inside military units have undercut discipline and eroded morale. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Qadhafi has always been careful to guard against moves from the military by transferring officers frequently and by installing trusted followers—usually tribesmen—in sensitive positions. The purges and assassinations, however, almost certainly have broadened support within the military for action against Qadhafi. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Succession

Should Qadhafi be assassinated, a struggle for power could be touched off. Since Qadhafi's only remaining office at present is commander in chief of the armed forces, there would be no immediate need to name a successor; Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi, the General Secretary of the General People's Congress, is technically chief of state. Key candidates to wield actual power also would include Qadhafi's closest associates, particularly Abd al-Salam Jallud, considered his de facto deputy. [*classification marking not declassified*]

A military coup presumably would replace all of Qadhafi's men with some kind of military council, and a period of protracted instability might follow. Any military group probably would be more conservative, at least in terms of domestic policy. [*classification marking not declassified*]

133. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 25, 1980, 11:05–11:43 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting in ZB's Office

PARTICIPANTS

ZB, David Aaron, Madeleine Albright, Gary Sick, Robert Kimmitt, Les Denend, Trudy Werner

ZB: Preparation for likely hearings.² I will be pressed to provide information on (1) nature of my contact with Billy Carter in general. Will need full chronology. I don't think there was much—occasionally at a State Dinner or something like that. (2) full chronology of November 20 initiative,³ November 27 meeting,⁴ any subsequent meetings with Libyans in January, February, March; the letter from Qadhafi;⁵ what was happening here at the time. Gary to get record of when the Libyans first reacted, and how, to the taking of the hostages. Did they publicly endorse? condemn? Need date of letter or message from Qadhafi to Khomeini. Also chronology of public events in US-Libyan relationship. Go back through NID, PDB, State INR summary. Get texts of our public comments on the interview by Qadhafi to the effect that our relations would change.⁶ As I recall we immediately tried to neutralize it.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 81, Carter (Billy)/Libya/Hearings: 7–8/80. No classification marking. Alfred Friendly also attended the meeting.

² On July 24, the Senate approved the creation of a special panel to investigate Billy Carter's dealings with Libya. (Judith Miller, "Billy Carter Inquiry Set Up, President Vows Cooperation," *New York Times*, July 25, 1980, p. A10)

³ Not further identified.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 113.

⁵ Presumably the message delivered during Brzezinski's November 29 meeting with Houdairi.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 114.

Bob Kimmitt to check when there was a phone call from ZB to Billy Carter by checking phone bills—sometime between March 26 and April 2, 1980.

Vance took his phone records with him. The State legal adviser has anything else there is. We have asked them to elaborate on Vance's statement.⁷

ZB feels confident that he consulted Vance. ZB recalls talking with Vance about the contact and Vance saying that it was worth a try. ZB knows he (Vance) was briefed on all of the meetings with Houdari.

Kimmitt to get documentation on the planes. What was the position of the various departments on the planes? What position did we take? How were we involved in it? Were there any calls to anyone here from Billy Carter or Coleman? Also about the trucks.⁸

Gary Sick: State is also working on a very detailed chronology.⁹

ZB wants to know NSC/White House role.

Alfred: Use a filibuster technique by detailing how cool the relationship was.

Gary Sick to give ZB a paper on status of the relationship in general and particularly at the time of the hostage crisis.¹⁰ We did not have an ambassador there. Since when? Since when have they not had an ambassador here? What did we have there? What did they have here? Some people were expelled by them? When? We know that on December 12 the relationship was very fragile indeed.¹¹

Kimmitt: We should stay within the President's mandate as expressed in the statement yesterday¹² and not get involved in any discussion of the full US-Libyan relationship. Wider questions should be referred to State. ZB to stick to the narrow charge given by the President.

ZB: will address myself to the two matters in which I was involved: the initiative to engage the Libyans in this effort and then the March call. Also talk about the atmosphere prevailing at the time. How the

⁷ Not further identified. Vance resigned on April 24.

⁸ Reference is to the Oshkosh trucks and C-130 planes.

⁹ See Document 134.

¹⁰ Not found.

¹¹ See Document 115.

¹² The July 24 statement reads in part: "The President will instruct all members of the White House staff to cooperate fully with the special subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee as to requests for information about the relationship between Billy Carter and the Government of Libya, as well as about any contacts between any member of the White House staff with Billy Carter or with the Department of Justice relating to Billy Carter." For full text of the statement, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, p. 1420.

suggestion was made. How it was transmitted from Rosalynn to ZB. Will then discuss the call in late March,¹³ indicate why I said what I said, and then will say I had no further dealings with the guy and no further knowledge of the issues.

Alfred: You will be asked a lot of the questions that could have been asked if the Zorinsky bill had gone through. Questions such as “how often did you see people like Houdairi?”

ZB: To the extent it is germane I will reply. But I am going there to discuss a specific case.

Madeleine: Atmospherics are important. Lance disarmed the committee at the beginning by the length and detail of his statement. He provided everything. They did not have to drag any information out. Any information dragged out leaves the impression that there is more information to be dragged out. While the people there are your friends, they are up for election—Leahy, Mathias, Bayh are all up for election—so it is not a friendly operation. You also have to be prepared for questions that are totally off the wall.

DA: Your attitude cannot be one of saying, “that is not the reason I am here.”

ZB: I don’t intend to antagonize them and will keep my cool even if I am abused.

DA: On handling questions, I strongly recommend that you be as professorial as possible in your choice of language. Don’t give them your good one-liners.

Alfred: Whether it is Christopher or ZB who gives the overview of the Libyan relationship should be decided.

ZB: It has not been my primary responsibility and I am not in a position to give a thorough detailed review of this matter.

Alfred: You should have from State a detailed overview including the number of times Roy, Newsom, Saunders would have been talking to officials from the Libyan bureau here.

ZB will dictate a preliminary statement dealing with the three encounters—November 20 and 27 phone calls and meeting; subsequent meetings with Houdairi, and the March phone call; and the meeting in July.¹⁴ Put in context. Will ask Alfred to to rewrite it and will give Gary a crack at providing externalities.

What should be covered in the statement:

¹³ The Senate panel planned to inquire about a telephone call in March between Brzezinski and Billy Carter in which Brzezinski warned Carter about his ties to Libya. (Steven R. Weisman, “Questions and Answers on Billy Carter,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1980, p. B26)

¹⁴ Not further identified.

1. Simple facts and chronology pertaining to Billy Carter;
2. The context of the initiative;
3. Then some comments on US-Libya relations.

There should also be some comments on ZB/JC family relations. It just so happens ZB has not had much contact, but has seen Mrs. Stapleton, Miss Lillian prior to trips abroad. Specific examples?

DA: What prompted you to make the March phone call. Will you give them the piece of paper that you had?¹⁵ Why didn't you give the piece of paper to somebody else? You knew that Billy was being investigated. What made you assume the law enforcement agencies had that piece of paper? Get into the dissemination thing because all of that stuff automatically goes to Justice. Who would have seen it? This should be done from the standpoint of the system that provides privacy. David to prepare this part of the statement.

ZB: In addition to briefing the President on it I knew, because of the established system, that this paper would reach the following agencies for the following reasons. David to write this. My own judgment was that it was important for me to make certain that Billy not engage in anything embarrassing or unethical—on the face of it I saw nothing illegal. Why didn't it get to Justice? I will take position that when I saw the report I acted on it by phoning Billy Carter and telling him not to do anything embarrassing to the Administration or to the President personally. I do not feel I should comment on the relationship between the two brothers, which is difficult and sensitive.

Alfred: Didn't it occur to you all in November that the one thing that this would do is make the Libyans think that Billy Carter was very important?

ZB: That is hindsight. We didn't know. Besides, they already knew that he was the President's brother and we knew that they already had a high estimate of him. We were trying to exploit that. What if it had resulted in the release of the hostages? Who would have complained?

Alfred: With all of the history between Billy Carter and the Libyans how could you have ignored the possibility that this gesture would have enhanced him greatly?

ZB. We didn't think it would enhance him over and above the fact that he was the President's brother. All he did was introduce me to the Libyan official. We wanted to convey to the charge that this was a matter of high importance and that the President was personally interested. This was not just a routine approach.

When were the 13 released?

¹⁵ Not found.

Alfred: The press is playing up the coincidence that you used Billy in November and in March they gave him a down payment.

We should try to get together a chronology of public statements made about Billy and Libya. One of the things that staffers will do is go through what is available and jump at it.

Why didn't you make it clear that Billy Carter was not speaking for the US Government? Why didn't you tell the Libyans to treat him like anybody else?

ZB: For one thing I certainly had no knowledge that he was on a retainer or that he was about to get a loan from them.

DA: One of the magazines had a piece about Billy's Libya connection. It was quite extensive and made his contacts clear.¹⁶

Les: I will start a file and as everybody develops information we will compile it for future reference. Any questions you need to get answers to will be here.

Bob Kimmitt should try to work out what NSC policy is on briefing people. How do outsiders get briefings? Do you give secure information to uncleared people? This should be taken up at the Staff meeting. What are the instinctive rules that people follow in talking with people.

Madeleine: Try to find out what State has in a way that they can't wave a piece of paper in the middle of this that we are not aware of.

DA: We should ask State for every single message during this period. I would get all traffic, all desk memos. What you want to look out for is a little memo that says, "Well, Billy Carter is doing all of this but we should stay out of it because he is the President's brother."

Les: To get it we are going to have to go through Christopher or Owen. Then they will, when asked, say that they provided all of this to NSC or to ZB.

Madeleine: How do we avoid the danger of something that is floated out?

Les: Lloyd Cutler said this morning that State would let us know through him everything that they are doing, all requests they have responded to.

Madeleine: We should dovetail with Cutler. Is it good to know everything? Or is it better not to?

¹⁶ Not further identified.

Les: Cutler thinks that the only surprises that will come out will be trivial.¹⁷

¹⁷ President Carter held a news conference on August 4 during which he made a statement and answered questions about his brother's activities. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1477–1493. For the report on the Senate investigation, see *Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya: Report Together With Additional Views of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate Individuals Representing the Interests of Foreign Governments to the United States Senate*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, September 1980)

**134. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, July 30, 1980

SUBJECT

United States-Libyan Relations During the Qadhafi Era

The attached memorandum provides the information which you have requested on U.S.-Libyan relations.² To put the subject in proper perspective the memorandum covers the full period from the Libyan Revolution on September 1, 1969 to the present.

Peter Tarnoff³
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: Carter (Billy): 1–7/80. Secret.

² See Document 133.

³ Bremer signed for Tarnoff.

Attachment**Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State⁴**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

United States-Libyan Relations During the Qadhafi Era

Relations with Libya Following the Revolution. Relations between the United States and Libya have been uneven and troubled since the current Libyan Government came to power on September 1, 1969. Relations got off to a shaky start because of the close identification between the United States and the government of King Idris. In late 1969 and early 1970, Ambassador Joseph Palmer saw Qadhafi and Prime Minister Abd as-Salam Ahmad Jallud on several occasions but, after the forced closure of Wheelus Air Force Base in June 1970, the Embassy found it virtually impossible to get appointments with anyone except middle-level Foreign Ministry officials.

The 1970–1972 Period. Throughout the period 1970–1972, Ambassador Palmer made it clear to the Libyan Government that the key to good relations was reciprocity—and a dialogue and negotiations—on all points. With reference to the issue of U.S. support for Israel and U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, Ambassador Palmer told the Libyans that the United States was making genuine efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of which Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands was a part. Palmer was told by Libyan officials that, if there were a change in U.S. Middle Eastern policy or general improvement in the Middle East situation, relations could improve.

In addition to Libya's strident and disruptive Middle East policy and the difficulty of establishing effective communication with the Libyan Government, other significant factors had a negative effect on U.S.-Libyan relations: (1) almost continuous high-level Libyan attacks and denunciations of U.S. policies; (2) Libyan support for Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists through the provision of arms, funds, and training; (3) Libyan support for subversion or insurgency against countries which, in Libya's view, were not sufficiently militant on the Arab-Israeli issue, were tolerant of U.S. or Soviet influence, or were engaged in suppressing armed Palestinian or Muslim movements within their territories; (4) the termination in February 1972 of nine bilateral agree-

⁴ Secret.

ments between the United States and Libya;⁵ (5) the Libyan-directed reduction in July 1972, despite U.S. protests, in the number of personnel on the U.S. Embassy staff;⁶ and (6) the Libyan announcement in October 1972 that, effective January 1, 1973, Libya would not recognize passports of any foreign government unless, in addition to the official language of the specific country, the pertinent information was written in Arabic.⁷

As regards the reduction in the Embassy staff, the Libyans said that it was an effort to curtail and to control what the Libyans referred to as “non-diplomatic activities” of the Embassy staff and also because of Libyan dissatisfaction over the 1972 U.S. refusals to allow the export to Libya of C-130 aircraft contracted and paid for by the Libyan Government or the purchase of F-5 fighter aircraft.⁸

1972–1973 Assessments. In late 1972, Ambassador Palmer concluded that there was no utility in remaining, and Washington agreed. Following his departure, other negative developments took place, including: an attempt to shoot down an unarmed USAF C-130 reconnaissance plane;⁹ the partial nationalization of American oil companies; the refusal by the Libyan Government to allow the Embassy’s Economic Officer back into Libya because his passport was not translated into Arabic; and declaring *persona non grata* the Political Officer who protested the exclusion of the Economic Officer. These events led to a high-level U.S. assessment of U.S. relations with Libya, an evaluation of prospects for their improvement, and a review of options available to protect U.S. interests in Libya.¹⁰

In early 1973, we decided to maintain diplomatic relations with Libya and to maintain an official presence in Tripoli headed by a Charge; but not to appoint an Ambassador. Our reasons were based on the following policy concerns: (1) to endeavor to remain in communication with governments with which the United States had serious disagreements; (2) to be in a position to help counter Libya’s disruptive political activism in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, while

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 86.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 89.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 17 and 20.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Documents 91 and 93.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 8.

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 13, 17, 19, and 21.

encouraging any possible constructive role that oil-rich Libya might be able to play on the international scene; (3) to help protect the large remaining private U.S. stake in the Libyan oil industry and the contribution which that investment made to the U.S. balance of payments; (4) to help ensure continued U.S. and Western European access to Libyan oil; (5) to be able to assist approximately 2,800 American citizens living in Libya; (6) to maintain some contact with the Libyan populace; (7) to retain the ability to gather intelligence on Libya; and (8) to be in a position to exploit any change in the Libyan Government.

Relations in the Wake of the Downgrading of Representation. Relations following Ambassador Palmer's departure did not improve. For almost two years they were marked by additional nationalizations of American oil companies and attendant unsettled claims, refusal to pay compensation for nationalized and damaged U.S. Government property, difficulties with the passport and governmental access problems, opposition to U.S. Middle East peace efforts, support for terrorism, and the 1973–1974 oil embargo.

A Turning Point (1974–1975). In late 1974 the Libyans began to profess a desire for improved relations in an effort to lessen dependence on the Soviet Union, to obtain access to U.S. military goods and technology (in particular, to gain release of the C-130s), and to regain international status and respectability. In April 1975 the Libyan Government informed the United States that it wished to post an Ambassador in Washington and that it had lifted the ceiling on U.S. Embassy personnel in Tripoli.¹¹

We decided in May to accept Libya's proposal to send an Ambassador to Washington and to raise the ceiling on our respective personnel in Washington and Tripoli pending consultations with Egyptian President Sadat, but not to send an Ambassador to Tripoli. The reaction by President Sadat and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fahmy was negative. Sadat said that the proposed action would vitiate the positive reaction to his meeting at Salzburg with President Ford.¹² (Qadhafi had criticized Sadat for attending.) It would be viewed in Egypt and the Arab world as a slap at him and as a lack of concern about Qadhafi's attacks against Sadat and against the opening of the Suez Canal and about Qadhafi's subversive activities in Egypt. Fahmy expressed concern that it would be viewed in the Arab world as a U.S. endorsement of Libya's recent arms deal with the Soviet Union.

In July 1975, we informed the Libyan Chargé in Washington that the United States reciprocated the Libyan desire for better official

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 38 and 40.

¹² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Documents 177 and 178.

relations but better relations required a common understanding about the dialogue we might conduct.¹³ The U.S. did not ask other countries to agree with all of its policies as a condition for good relations. The problem was not that Libya disagreed with U.S. policy but that it actively opposed and sought to undermine U.S. efforts toward a peace settlement in the Middle East and that Libya criticized other countries in the region who were cooperating with the United States. Because Libya had continued to undermine the search for peace and to give assistance and refuge to terrorists, relations at the Ambassadorial level would have to await a general improvement in relations.

The 1976–1978 Period. In the period from 1976 to 1978, our Chargé established a relationship with Col. Qadhafi's immediate staff and was able, from time to time, to make representations to senior officials on various issues. Nonetheless, Libyan support for terrorist groups continued and the relationship with Egypt—already poor—was completely broken. Qadhafi's Government was directly implicated in an attempt to assassinate President Sadat in early 1977 and this, plus a series of incidents along the already troubled Libyan-Egyptian border, led to a brief border war in July of 1977.¹⁴ Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem completed the breakdown and by early 1978 Libyan policy and propaganda had become virulently anti-Sadat.

Aircraft Policies. Although we had consistently blocked the sale of such military aircraft as C-130s and F-5s, we had, since the early 1970s, permitted the sale of non-military commercial aircraft such as Boeing 727s and 707s. In early 1978, however, we opposed the sale of two additional Boeing 727s to Libya (nine previous sales had been approved since 1973).¹⁵ This action was taken because of our concern over Libyan support for terrorist groups as well as over the extent to which Libya had become embroiled in confrontations with neighboring states such as Chad and Egypt. This decision greatly increased tensions. In the months following this decision, however, there was at least the impression that Libya was "cleaning up its act." The style of Libyan support for terrorist groups had been changed. Financial support and training continued, but Libya stretched out the period in which it avoided direct involvement in the planning or execution of international terrorist incidents. In October of 1978, Libya ratified the Hague Convention, the most important of the three international conventions on hijacking (Libya had ratified the Montreal Convention in 1974 and the Tokyo

¹³ Telegram 179372 to Tripoli, July 30, 1975, summarized the July 24 meeting between Atherton and the Libyan Chargé. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750261–1138)

¹⁴ See Document 20.

¹⁵ See Document 91.

Convention in 1976). These and other factors, coupled with a well argued economic case by the Commerce Department in June 1978, led to a reversal of the Department's position on the 727s in November of 1978, after we had secured written Libyan assurances that these aircraft would be strictly for civil use.¹⁶

Other 1978 Developments. On the political front, U.S. contacts with Libya became more frequent. U.S. representatives were received at senior levels both at the Foreign Ministry and at the newly-created Foreign Liaison Office, headed by Shahati. Under Secretary Newsom, in a meeting on October 18, 1978 with Libyan Foreign Secretary Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, said that the Administration recognized that there had been positive developments, such as the accession to the hijacking convention and the settlement of nationalization cases.¹⁷ He said that the Congress was being kept informed of these matters and that the Administration would keep in mind the possibility of normalizing relations. The Under Secretary said, however, that Libya's image with the Congress and the U.S. public as a supporter for terrorists and a meddler in the affairs of other nations would have to improve before this could take place.

Thereafter we explored possibilities of persuading Libya to take a public stance against international terrorism.

The 1979 Turning Point. In early 1979 we were cautiously optimistic that some improvement in relations with Libya was at last possible. In January Ahmed Shahati, head of the Libyan Foreign Liaison Office, came to the United States as head of a Libyan People-to-People delegation with the expressed purpose of working to improve Libya's image in the United States and eventually to establish better relations between Washington and Tripoli. On January 11, 1979 he told Under Secretary Newsom prior to his U.S. tour that he hoped that 1979 could be the "turning point" in relations between the two countries.¹⁸ During the week prior to that meeting, as an extension of its decision to allow the resumption of commercial aircraft sales to Libya, the Department had informed Commerce that it would have no objection to the sale of three Boeing 747s to Libyan Arab Airlines (with the same specific proscriptions against military use as were applied to the two 727s).

The 747 decision, however, attracted Congressional criticism. The revelation in March of 1979 that Libya had used a part of its Boeing 727 fleet (there is no evidence that the two 727s under specific restric-

¹⁶ See footnote 4, Document 96.

¹⁷ See Document 96.

¹⁸ A summary of the brief courtesy call on January 5, 1979, was transmitted in telegram 7874 to Tripoli, January 11, 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790062–0670)

tions were ever used) to ferry troops and military supplies to support the Idi Amin regime greatly increased Congressional opposition to the export of 747 aircraft.

Our policy since the early 1970s was to prevent the sale to Libya of any U.S. manufactured items with direct or significant military value. Once commercial civil aviation aircraft had been used for military purposes, we believed that we had no alternative but to apply that policy to the 747 aircraft. Accordingly, in May of 1979, we recommended to the Commerce Department that the export of these aircraft not be allowed. The Libyans were furious.¹⁹

Shortly after the decision on the 747s, Under Secretary Newsom in Tripoli met in June with Major Jallud.²⁰ (At that point Jallud had no definable position in the Libyan Government, but he was regarded as second only to Qadhafi in the Libyan hierarchy). The talks with Jallud were frank, but promising; both sides expressed an interest in finding a way to work out a *modus vivendi* in which we could “agree to disagree” on some of these issues and look for points of similarity on others.

The results of this meeting, though inconclusive, were sufficiently promising so that a decision was made to arrange a similar meeting between Secretary Vance and Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki during the UN General Assembly sessions in October of 1979.²¹ As with the meeting between Newsom and Jallud, many points of disagreement were discussed. A specific decision, however, was reached to formalize the dialogue between the United States and Libya and to arrange a series of meetings in which both points of disagreement and areas for cooperation could be identified and discussed. To this end Turayki designated Libyan U.N. Ambassador Kikhia as his representative for these discussions and Secretary Vance appointed Under Secretary Newsom as the U.S. representative.

The first meeting between Newsom and Kikhia occurred on November 8, 1979.²² It was agreed that a series of meetings between Libyan and American representatives would be held to discuss trade and cultural exchanges as well as political issues. Newsom particularly thanked Kikhia for his helpful position in the UN on the question of the U.S. hostages in Iran and the Libyan Ambassador’s message to Secretary General Waldheim calling for the release of the hostages.²³

¹⁹ See Document 203.

²⁰ See Document 101.

²¹ See Document 106.

²² See footnote 3, Document 106.

²³ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

(Note: Libya did not at that point have diplomatic relations with Iran. The Iranians believed that Libya had been responsible for the death of the Iranian-born Lebanese Shii'a leader, Imam Musa Sadr; an earlier fence-mending visit to Tehran by Major Jallud had been cut short and Jallud reportedly had been ordered out of the country at the instructions of the Ayatollah Khomeini.)

The Embassy Burning. Momentum generated by Ambassador Kikhia's helpful position on the hostages, strengthened by a November 22 Libyan Foreign Ministry statement also calling for the release of the hostages, began to be off-set by Qadhafi's overriding identification with the Iranians in their confrontations with the U.S. The ambivalence came to a halt on December 2, 1979.²⁴ On that day, a Tripoli mob demonstrating in support of the Iranian revolution attacked and badly damaged the United States Embassy in Tripoli. Reports in the aftermath of the attack indicated that it had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the highest levels of the Libyan Government, and suggested that it was part of an ongoing (though still unsuccessful) attempt to curry favor with the Iranians.

Immediately after this attack, our efforts concentrated on getting the Libyans *inter alia*: to accept responsibility for failing to provide adequate security for the Embassy; to agree to compensation for damages; and, most important, to give assurances about the security of official and non-official U.S. citizens in Libya.²⁵ Though extracted slowly, by early January 1980 such assurances were in hand and attention was then given to next steps.

In mid-January 1980, our Chargé returned to Tripoli, taking with him a message from President Carter which made it clear *inter alia* that the United States expected the Libyan Government to provide security for our personnel—but also held the door open for a resumption of the dialogue we had tried to foster in 1979.²⁶ He was instructed to seek an appointment with Qadhafi, so as to assure future access to senior Libyan levels.

While our Chargé awaited unsuccessfully for an appointment with Qadhafi, it became apparent that the January 27, 1980 commando attack on Gafsa in Tunisia had been planned and financed by the Libyans. Tripoli reacted to French and U.S. aid to Tunisia in the wake of that attack with a violent propaganda barrage directed against both countries. On February 4, 1980, both the French Embassy in Tripoli and the French Consulate General in Benghazi were attacked by officially

²⁴ See Document 108.

²⁵ See Document 117.

²⁶ See Documents 122 and 123.

inspired mobs. In light of that attack it was decided to withdraw our Chargé from Tripoli; he departed on February 8.²⁷

Confrontations. In March of 1980, a Libyan campaign of intimidation and assassination—directed against Libyan students and dissidents abroad—began (thus far nine Libyans have been murdered in Europe). In the U.S., there has been extensive evidence of intimidation, but thus far no murders. In early May, at the time the Libyans were notified we were expelling four members of the staff of their People's Bureau (which replaced their embassy on September 1, 1979), the Department withdrew the last two American officers from Tripoli and closed the Embassy.²⁸ (Six Libyan diplomats in all were expelled in this period.)

After the expulsion of the People's Bureau members, which came close to producing a total rupture in relations, we were able to come to a mutually acceptable arrangement with the Libyan Mission and its status has now been effectively regularized. We have, however, informed the Libyan Government that—while their People's Bureau in Washington need not be affected—we do not at this point plan to send American personnel back to Tripoli. The Libyans have been told that we have asked the Belgians to represent our interests in Tripoli for the time being.²⁹ The Department and the Belgian Embassy in Tripoli now await Libyan concurrence for this arrangement to become effective. We have, however, told the Libyans that this need only be a short term arrangement and that, depending on Libyan actions over the coming period, we remain prepared eventually to reopen the Embassy in Tripoli.

Summation of U.S. Contacts with Libya. In the early period of the Libyan Revolution, United States contacts with Libyan officials were at such low levels that this became a major factor in the decision to not appoint a successor to Ambassador Palmer in early 1973. By the mid-70s, however, though operating at the Chargé level both in Washington and Tripoli, contacts had stabilized at the working level and both Libyan and U.S. diplomats were routinely meeting at the Country Director and Deputy Assistant Secretary level.

²⁷ See Document 126.

²⁸ See Document 128.

²⁹ In a June 24 memorandum to Carter, Christopher wrote: "Belgium has agreed in principle to become the protecting power for the United States in Libya." Christopher also noted: "Under this arrangement, we would maintain diplomatic relations with Libya, and the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington would continue to operate; but Belgium would act as protecting power in Libya as long as it seems prudent for our Embassy to remain closed. This arrangement will provide some protection for our interests, without subjecting US officials to the likely harassment and physical jeopardy they could face in Tripoli." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 6/80)

The October 1978 meeting between Under Secretary Newsom and Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki was the highest level meeting between U.S. and Libyan officials to that point, and set the stage for subsequent meetings. High ranking Libyan officials met with Mr. Newsom and—in the specific case of the second meeting with Turayki—with Secretary Vance. Contacts with the Embassy continued normally at the Country Director and Deputy Assistant Secretary level.

With the creation of the People's Bureau in September 1979, contacts between the Department and the new People's Committee Secretary continued on the same basis as that which had existed with the Embassy. The Bureau was told, however, that such contacts would be “informal” and “unofficial” until the diplomatic status of People's Bureau members was resolved (their diplomatic status was determined in an April 24, 1980 Department of State Diplomatic Note).³⁰

³⁰ In telegram 108887 to Tripoli and London, April 25, the Department transmitted the text of the April 24 note. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800204–0507)

135. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 16, 1980, 4:30–5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Libyan Actions Directed Against U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft

PARTICIPANTS

State

Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA

William McAfee, Deputy Director for Coordination, INR

CIA

Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

[*name not declassified*], OSR

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 9–10/80. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found.

Defense

David McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary, ISA
Leonard Hildebrandt, Country
Director, North Africa, ISA
Donald E. Nielsen, Special
Coordination Staff, DUSD (PR)

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant
to the Chairman

White House

David Aaron
NSC
General Jasper Welch
Alfred Friendly
Captain Gary Sick
Captain Chris Shoemaker

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

David Aaron began the meeting by asking for an assessment of the Libyan attack on our reconnaissance aircraft.² (C)

General Pustay said that our only source for believing that an attack occurred was [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; there were no aircraft sighted on U.S. radar, no missiles seen, no damage sustained. The crew of the airplane is now reviewing their tapes. [*classification marking not declassified*]

Gary Sick asked if the Libyans could have staged the entire thing. (C)

Pustay responded that this was a possibility; [*2 lines not declassified*].

In response to questions about the nature and location of our reconnaissance flights, Pustay pointed out that these flights are well beyond the Libyan-claimed waters and clearly in international airspace. No tracks go into the contested areas. The reconnaissance missions are designed to test Libyan air defense. (S)

David Aaron pointed out that, in that case, the flight was a success. (S)

Aaron then asked why, in the face of an increasing pattern of Libyan probes, over the past several months, we do not protect these aircraft. (S)

Pustay responded that it is too expensive to keep fighters over our reconnaissance flights. He pointed out that, during the forthcoming naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, the carrier KENNEDY will provide cover for these flights. (S)

David Aaron then said that, for the immediate future, we should provide CAP for our flights. DOD was tasked to do this. (S)

McGiffert then asked if we should consider cutting back on the reconnaissance flights through the area (currently about one per day, although none are scheduled until September 21). (S)

² See Document 139.

All agreed that we should not. (C)

David Aaron then turned the discussion to the naval exercise planned for September 20–21 near the Gulf of Sidra. He asked if any ships are planning to venture south of the Libyan-declared line. (S)

Pustay responded that some vessels, probably frigates, will sail south of the line to warn stray ships in the area and to reassert our contention that the Gulf of Sidra is international waters. No live firing will take place south of the line, however. (S)

Draper said that State agrees that the exercise should take place as planned. State denied permission for a similar exercise in June only because the time was not right. (S)

David Aaron said that the group should stay in close touch over the next few days on the subject of the exercise. (S)

David Aaron then asked if we should make a demarche to the Libyans over their harassment of our reconnaissance flights. (S)

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

David Aaron then asked about Jack Anderson's probes on the Libyan affair. (C)

Friendly said that Anderson's people had picked up on an earlier series of accusations about Libya. Two relevant allegations concern our cancellation of the exercise in June and a supposed Libyan attack against our reconnaissance aircraft. Both questions are manageable. (C)

David Aaron then closed the meeting by asking Defense to provide a copy of the rules of engagement for our forces in the exercise and for the CAP which will support our reconnaissance flights in the future. (S)

136. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Libya

The attached is a speech which Qadhafi made yesterday—the same date as the apparent hostile intercept of the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.² The tone of the speech is bellicose in the extreme, and it lends substance to the seriousness of the Libyan reaction.

The last paragraph, in particular, is a virtual call for war with the United States, referring to the forthcoming exercise as an invasion of the Arab homeland. Given the nature of this speech, we would probably be well advised to assume that the attack yesterday was real and that Qadhafi may in fact be planning some kind of suicide mission in conjunction with our exercise.³

I have talked to State (Draper) who is intensely aware of the risks. (State is having some psychiatrists examine Qadhafi's recent words and behavior on the grounds that he may have finally gone totally insane.) However, Draper believes—and so do I—that we should proceed with the exercise.

You may wish to have another meeting this week to go over the rules of engagement, military options, and risks prior to the commencement of the exercise this weekend.⁴ We should take every possible precaution.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 9–10/80. Secret. Aaron wrote "Send a copy to Pustay" in the upper right-hand corner and initialed the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Aaron underlined "some kind of suicide mission in conjunction with our exercise," and placed an asterisk in the right-hand margin.

⁴ Aaron drew a line from this sentence and wrote beneath the paragraph: "YES Set it up."

137. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 18, 1980, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Libyan Actions Directed Against U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft and U.S. Exercise Plans

PARTICIPANTS

State

Under Secretary Matthew Nimetz
Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for NEA
William McAfee, Deputy Director
for Coordination, INR

Defense

David McGiffert, Assistant
Secretary, ISA
Leonard Hildebrandt, Country
Director, North Africa, ISA

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant
to the Chairman

CIA

Robert Ames, NIO for Near East
and South Asia
[*name not declassified*], OSR

White House

David Aaron

NSC

General Jasper Welch
Captain Gary Sick
Captain Chris Shoemaker

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting was convened as a follow-up to Tuesday's discussion of Libyan actions directed against our reconnaissance flights and probable reactions to our naval exercise.² Qadhafi's speech on Tuesday increased awareness of Libya's threats to challenge us in the region.³

From the discussion, four basic issues emerged to be discussed by the MBB lunch meeting.⁴

1) Which option for the exercise should be selected?

a) Continue the exercise as planned, with limited naval and air surveillance in the area claimed by Libya.

b) Modify the exercise so that only air surveillance in the Libyan-claimed area is conducted.

c) Keep *all* naval and air activity out of the area.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 141, Luncheon Meetings: MBB: 8–9/80. Secret.

² See Document 135.

³ See Document 136.

⁴ No record of the lunch meeting of Muskie, Brzezinski, and Brown was found.

There are potential costs to manning the area under threat from Qaddafi as well as possible costs from an incident that might be charged to a deliberate U.S. provocation—particularly in the light of the current Senate investigations.⁵

2) What is the most detailed and accurate assessment of the incident in which the Libyans allegedly fired two missiles at our reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace?

3) Should we instruct our embassies in Syria and Libya to make demarches on Qaddafi's recent threats as they relate to the exercise?

4) What are the specific rules of engagement for aircraft and naval vessels located in the Libyan-claimed area? If we pick the aircraft only option (b), should they break off if Libyan aircraft approach or should they stay and plan to defend against any hostile actions?

⁵ See Document 133.

138. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Libya's Qadhafi: Seeking Significance Through Confrontation

The emergence of the martyrdom theme in Qadhafi's recent speeches is not mere rhetorical posturing. It reflects a dangerous state of mind for the erratic Libyan revolutionary, who is prone to aggressive action when under stress.

Qadhafi's rhetoric in association with the call for merger for Libya and Syria reflects a qualitatively different and ominous turn. Characterizing the resolution for merger as "the resolution of death," he exhorted his people to be prepared to die through confrontation rather than submit. He then went on to identify the target of his aggression: "The forces of exploitation inside the Arab world are but a link in the chain

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 9-10/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center.

of the forces of world exploitation—a chain which ends in Washington.” With characteristic flair, Qadhafi indicated that if he could not persuade his people collectively to go down fighting, he would himself become a Fedayeen and join the PLO. (S NF)

The call for union with Syria and confrontation with the Arab right and the US must be viewed in the context of the past year, which by all accounts was a year of failure for the fiery revolutionary who has hoped to assume the mantle of his idol Nasser. But domestically, Qadhafi’s People’s Revolution has fallen far short of his goals and he is faced with growing dissidence within Libya. External events affecting Qadhafi include: being pushed out of the limelight by the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the failure of Libya’s intervention in Uganda, and the break with Fatah. (S NF)

Most painful for the intensely religious Qadhafi was the shift of attention to Ayatollah Khomeini, who generated a revolutionary fervor in Iran that Qadhafi had never approached in his own efforts to create an Islamic republic. The hurt was compounded when Khomeini rejected out of hand Qadhafi’s offer of support. (S NF)

It is not an accident that Qadhafi’s rhetoric has a haunting resemblance to Khomeini’s—especially in the quest for martyrdom and the need to confront the United States, the embodiment of imperialist exploitation. (S NF)

And just as Khomeini unified his people by identifying the outside enemy as the source of Iran’s troubles and successfully involving Iran in a confrontation with the US, so too an outside enemy would at once satisfy Qadhafi’s psychological and political needs. (S NF)

Thus, the combination of Qadhafi’s frustration and the model provided by Khomeini in Iran could well lead Qadhafi to provoke a confrontation in order to gain significance, rationalizing the cost of a likely military defeat in terms of the Muslim value of martyrdom. This is the dangerous portent in Qadhafi’s call for death rather than submission. In Qadhafi’s psychological calculus, it is better to be involved in a losing confrontation than face failure as a revolutionary leader and the humiliation of being ignored. (S NF)

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, September 24, 1980, 2304Z

255507. Subject: (S) Libyan Interception of RC-135. Refs: A) State 249006 B) State 249249.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Ref A reported Sep 18 Washington Post account of Libyan interception of and possible attack on US RC-135 and included guidance prepared for Department's daily press briefing Sep 18. Subsequent to dispatch of ref A, guidance and its use was modified (see para 6 below).

3. Facts of incident: On Sep 16, an RC-135 aircraft flying a central Mediterranean track within international airspace aborted its mission and returned to Hellenikon based on indications that Libyan fighter aircraft may have initiated hostile action against it. Available evidence suggests that there may have been Libyan intent to engage the RC-135 using air-to-air missiles. This incident is an example of occasional harassment by Libyan fighter aircraft of US reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace which dates back to 1972.

4. FYI. The first serious incident occurred on March 21, 1973, when two Libyan mirages fired upon an RC-130 operating out of Hellenikon.³ The RC-130 was not hit, but evasive action resulted in damage to aircraft and the declaration of an emergency as it approached Hellenikon. This incident caused Greek officials to focus on nature of US flight operations at Hellenikon and during subsequent 1975-77 DCA negotiations, the Greeks demonstrated extreme sensitivity over reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon and challenged US authority for staging of US reconnaissance aircraft from there. A subsequent search by both parties never turned up a written agreement or evidence of a verbal agreement specifically authorizing US reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon. This circumstance and Greek sensitivity resulted in our agreement in the initialed but unsigned 1977 DCA to provide the Greeks with a dols 3.5 million quid and allow Greek participation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800457-0182. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Rome. Drafted by Pugh (EUR/SE) and in OSD/ISA; cleared in INR/INC, NEA, T, EUR/SE, and NSA; approved by Ewing.

² Telegram 249006 to Athens, September 18, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800445-1074. In telegram 249249 to several posts, September 18, the Department transmitted guidance to Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Valletta, and Rome regarding the Libyan incident. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446-0609)

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 8.

in reconnaissance ground activities at Hellenikon in return for GOG authority for the US to continue to use the base for reconnaissance air operations and ground activities. End FYI.

5. You will note that our press guidance does not mention that the US operates RC–135 aircraft out of Hellenikon. While this is no secret, our intent was to avoid any press focus on Hellenikon which could rekindle Greek sensitivities and cause US reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon to become an issue again in the forthcoming negotiations on a new DCA. We have not seen any additional articles in the US press nor have Department or DOD received any follow-on inquiries. However, the Greek press, perhaps through reporters in Washington, could still pick up on this one and raise questions in Athens. Should this occur, we believe Embassy should be prepared to brief MOD Averoff and/or senior MFA officials promptly. For this purpose, you are authorized to draw on background in paragraph 3 above, press guidance in paragraph 6 below, and the following additional points:

—US reconnaissance flights in the Mediterranean are always conducted in international airspace well away from the airspace of any country. (This was the case in all the incidents mentioned above.)

—Such flights from several bases in the Mediterranean occur on virtually a daily basis;

—Given this frequency, such an incident is, indeed, an infrequent occurrence;

—The Libyan regime has conducted almost all of these occasional interceptions.

In any discussion, you should stress need for your interlocutors to maintain confidentiality of sensitive info re US ability to detect possible attack as described.

6. Modified press guidance, as used on Sep 18, follows:

“Q. What can you tell us about the Libyan attack on a US reconnaissance flight as reported in the Washington Post?

A. I have no comment on that story.

Q. What action are we taking in response to this attack?

A. The United States has no hostile intent toward Libya and we do not in any way seek confrontation with that country. Nonetheless, we are prepared to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of our aircraft operating in international airspace.

Q. What steps?

A. I think the statement speaks for itself.”

7. For Rome. Should it be necessary to discuss the incident, you should do so only with high-ranking officials whose discretion can be trusted, following the guidance given in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above.

Christopher

140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, October 17, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

5. *Possible Assassination Attempt of a Libyan Dissident*: The Libyan student who first alerted the U.S. Government to the Libyan intimidation campaign earlier this year was shot and seriously wounded in Colorado Tuesday in what looked like an assassination attempt.² The FBI has indications the gunman was hired by Libyan authorities. While there have been no reported assassination attempts since June, there is growing evidence the intimidation campaign might be starting up again here and in Europe. We met with the FBI and CIA to assess the incident and our response. As a result of the meeting, we plan to:

- mobilize greater surveillance of Libyans likely to have been involved;
- warn potential Libyan targets in this country;
- inform European governments and explore the possibility of a common strategy;
- consider a public information campaign;
- assess the possibility of deporting known militants.

We called in the head of the Libyan People's Bureau today to warn him of the consequences of an assassination campaign in the United States. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 10/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² Tuesday, October 14. In telegram 277512 to multiple posts, October 18, the Department reported on the attack on Faisal Zagallai, a Ph.D. candidate at Colorado State University: "The assailant was a middle-aged male Caucasian—probably American (exact description will be furnished to overseas police authorities through appropriate channels). While the assailant has not as yet been apprehended there is reason to suspect that he was a hired 'gun' in the pay of Libyan authorities." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800496–0830)

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Greece¹

Washington, October 21, 1980, 2107Z

281548. Subject: Possible Renewal of Libyan Assassination Campaign—Update. Ref: State 277512.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Shortly after the drafting of reftel it came to the attention of the Department that the official Libyan news agency (JANA) in an October 17 (1920 GMT) English language broadcast (FBIS 102 of 18 October) was claiming that the attack on the Libyan graduate student had been carried out by a member of the “World Revolutionary Committee”. The report justified the attack on the grounds that the student had become “an agent and spy for American intelligence”.

3. In response to this statement from JANA the Department called in the head of the Libyan People’s Bureau and gave him the following note:

Begin text: On October 17, 1980 the Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA), in an English language program, broadcast at 1920 GMT, claimed that the October 14 attack and serious wounding of Faisal Zagallai, a Libyan graduate student at Colorado State University, was carried out by a member of the “World Revolutionary Committee” and justified the attack on the grounds that Zagallai “became an agent and spy for American intelligence.” This claim by JANA is made despite the fact that earlier in the day representatives of the People’s Committee had told officials of the United States Department of State that the attack had been carried out without the knowledge or approval of Libyan authorities and expressed their own “regret and shock” over the incident. At this meeting the State Department representatives, in the strongest terms, made it clear just how seriously the United States Government regards such an act. They made it clear also that any official involvement in this attack either by the Libyan Government or those representing the Libyan Government could have grave consequences for relations between the United States and Libya.

The Department of State must now reiterate—in the clearest and most unequivocal terms—how seriously it regards an attack of this

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800503–0511. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Roy; cleared in P, NEA/AFN, L, D/CT, EUR/WE, EUR/CE, EUR/NE, SY, and INR; approved by Constable.

² See footnote 2, Document 140.

nature carried out within the sovereign territory of the United States. The clear disagreement between the JANA account and the People's Bureau account of this deplorable attack leaves the Department no choice but to demand from the Jamahiriya a comprehensive and definitive official explanation of this incident. In view of the gravity of the issue, this official explanation is required within 48 hours from the receipt of this note. End text.

4. On October 20 the Libyan People's Bureau responded to the note indicating that their response came from Tripoli and represented the official position of the Jamahiriya;

—In the report in question the Libyan news service (JANA) did not reflect the views of Libyan authorities—the media “does not make foreign policy”.

—The Libyan Government and its officials had nothing to do with this incident.

—The Libyan Government asks the United States Government to take full responsibility for the safety of Libyan students in the United States.

—In addition the Jamahiriya asks that the Colorado incident be fully investigated and that the People's Bureau be given a full report of the attack.

5. The Department does not give this denial any real credibility and is considering additional steps which may be necessary in response to this incident. Addressees will be kept fully informed of any such measures. You may draw upon the above points in briefing your host government.

Christopher

142. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, November 14, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

5. *Expulsion of Libyan Students*: Ali El-Houderi, head of the Libyan People's Bureau, returned from Tripoli with guidance from Libyan authorities in response to our recent representations requesting that certain student leaders as well as one activist member of the People's Committee leave the country.² El-Houderi came in today and made the following points:

—Libyan authorities have a great desire to see relations with the United States improved and hope a new page can be turned.

—The Committee has already communicated the request for voluntary departure to the students involved. Some students have already departed. Others will be leaving at the end of the fall semester. Some, however, wish to remain and the People's Bureau claims it has no legal means of compelling their departure.

—The People's Committee member has resigned. He will leave when he completes his degree work in December.

This is progress, but we will assess whether it effectively reduces the possibility of renewed violence against Libyans living here or whether we should take stronger measures. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 11/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² Not further identified. In a November 3 memorandum to Carter, Muskie wrote: "Ali El-Houderi, Head of the Libyan People's Bureau, has returned to Tripoli to seek guidance on how to respond to our October 31 request for the cooperation of the People's Bureau in arranging the voluntary departure from the US of certain Libyan students and a diplomat." (Ibid.) The October 31 request was not found.

143. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, December 9, 1980, 2041Z

326043. Subject: Libyan Protest Over U.S. Military Maneuvers in Egypt.

1. On November 26 Department received the following note from the Libyan People's Bureau:

Begin text: Quote: The People's Bureau of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya presents its compliments to the Department of State and wishes to submit the following cable addressed to the American Government, outlining the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's position vis-a-vis the military maneuvers being conducted in Egypt by United States' forces. The text of the cable:

1. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya strongly protests the military maneuvers being conducted by the U.S. forces on the Egyptian soil, as well as the presence of these forces therein, for the fact that, such military maneuvers and presence are taking place along the eastern borders of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and as such have a dangerous impact, and direct results on the safety and security of the Libyan Arab people, and the territorial waters thereof.

2. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya views the violations of Libya's air space and territorial waters by U.S. military airplanes taking part in the said maneuvers as provocations which we vehemently reject, and which will be met by force if necessary. We interpret this behavior of the American Government to be an escalation of the hostile actions which the U.S. Government is conducting against the Libyan Arab people.

3. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya further views these military maneuvers, and the resultant violations of our air space and territorial waters as a serious threat not only to the safety and security of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya alone, but to the safety, and the security of the areas as a whole.

4. The Office of Foreign Liaison draws the attention of the U.S. Government to the dangerous and negative consequences resulting from the escalation of these provocative, and hostile actions, and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800587-0654. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent to Algiers, Cairo, London, Athens, Rabat, USUN, Niamey, Tunis, and Valletta. Drafted by Roy; cleared in NEA/AFN; approved by Draper.

charges the U.S. Government with all the responsibilities resulting from such actions.

5. In light of the above, the Office of Foreign Liaison demands that the U.S. Government immediately work to stop these provocations, and reiterates its position that the U.S. Government will be held solely responsible for the deterioration of the area's security, as a result of these provocations. Unquote. End text.

2. In response on December 2 DAS Draper called Libyan People's Bureau Head Ali el-Houderi to the Department and handed back the note as unacceptable. In doing so he made the following points:

—We have investigated the allegations made in that note and find they are false. The note is irrelevant and tendentious and is therefore returned.

—We wish, however, to emphasize just how thoroughly these charges were investigated—right down to the local unit commander level. No violation of Libyan territory or entry into areas claimed by Libya occurred during the deployment of the U.S. forces to Egypt, during maneuvers in Egypt, or during withdrawal from Egypt. The Rapid Deployment Force maneuver was strictly a training exercise and the force was in Egypt with the full concurrence of the Egyptian Govt.

—The tone of this note is also disturbing. When you returned from Tripoli you indicated a desire on the part of the Jamahiriya to work for improved relations. The tone of this note does not bear out this desire.

—In the interest of frankness and understanding we want to make clear our position on Libyan territory and on U.S. military maneuvers in the region.

—The United States—and for that matter most other governments—does not recognize Libya's claim to a 32 degree 30 minute bay closing line for the Gulf of Sidra.

—United States Air and Naval units carry out periodic training exercises in the section of the Mediterranean north of the Libyan coast. From time to time these units cross the 32 degree 30 minute line. Libya must understand that the United States and the majority of the nations of the world regard this area as "high seas".

—From time to time Libyan units have intercepted U.S. aircraft over the Mediterranean. Occasionally these aircraft were south of Libya's unrecognized 32 degree 30 minute line. On most occasions, however, the aircraft were well out beyond such a line. In all cases the aircraft were operating in what is regarded as international airspace. During these intercepts, Libyan aircraft have from time to time given some indications of hostile intent. We in no way seek confrontation with Libya over this but we will of course protect our aircraft.

—The United States has fully participated in the Law of the Seas negotiations and subject to Senate confirmation (just as Libya's agree-

ment would be subject to General People's Congress confirmation) we are prepared to join with the rest of the world in setting agreed upon standards for the recognition of territorial waters. The Libyan UN Mission will confirm, however, that Libya's claims to rights over the Gulf of Sidra as a historic bay and of the bay closing line at 32 degrees 30 minutes are not reflected in the draft convention.

—Finally, Libya should understand that these exercises and maneuvers in no way represent a hostile intent toward Libya nor are they meant to be provocative in any way. We understand, for example, Libya's concern over the area near the Egyptian border. We have told you privately and have stated publicly that the United States Government urges both Egypt and Libya to exercise maximum restraint along that border. Our policy in this regard has not changed.

—Our naval exercises, our flights in this region, will continue. At no point will they violate territory which the rest of the world recognizes as forming a part of the Jamahiriya. From time to time such units will cross the 32 degree 30 minute line—but not with hostile intent.

3. In reply el-Houderi indicated that the violations of territory referred to in the note may not necessarily have occurred during the maneuvering in Egypt but that "some violations have occurred". He defended the reference to the use of force as "a matter of principle" to which every country had a right in defense of its territory. He emphasized that the note, while reflecting the views of Libya's leaders, was not meant to "search for trouble" and that Libya also wished to avoid incidents. As often before, he expressed the hope that the U.S. and Libya could get beyond such problems and establish more cordial relations.

4. On another subject Draper raised the status of the Libyan students asked by the Department to leave the United States. (FYI: In response to increased activity of Libyan revolutionary committees in the Libyan student community in the United States the Department has asked the People's Bureau to arrange for the voluntary departure of 19 Libyan students from the United States. These students are among those most active in such committees. The People's Bureau has told the Department that some of those students are already in the process of departing, but evidence available to us does not bear this out. End FYI). El-Houderi agreed to furnish the Department with a report on the current plans of each student.

Muskie

144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 12, 1980, 0823Z

328854. Subject: Libyan Assassination Campaign. Ref: A) London 25609,² B) State 281548,³ C) Roy/Hooper Telcons,⁴ D) State 326043.⁵

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Department noted with considerable interest British expression of willingness to coordinate response to the renewal of the Libyan assassination campaign (ref A).

3. With respect to the Colorado shooting,⁶ the FBI continues to investigate but has not yet established a definite link to Libyan authorities. Nonetheless, nothing has emerged from that investigation which would alter the original assumption that the Colorado shooting was politically motivated.

4. We have warned the Libyans that any confirmation of official involvement in this shooting or any repetition of such an incident would have serious consequences for U.S./Libyan relations. In addition, we have asked the Libyans—voluntarily—to arrange for the departure from the United States of 19 students and one member of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau. The students are among the most active leaders of the revolutionary committees, twenty-two of which have been identified across the U.S. The People's Committee member was the People's Bureau link to these committees. To date there is no indication that these people have made any effort to leave the U.S. Voluntary departure is the only avenue for quick removal of the students from the US; an attempt to deport them would involve full appeal rights under US laws and could take up to three years.

5. We have requested the People's Bureau (ref D) to give us an update on the status of those asked to leave and will assess where we go next upon receipt of the Bureau's response.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800595–0269. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, Bonn, Dublin, and Copenhagen. Drafted by Roy; cleared in NEA/AFN, NEA, EUR/NE, EUR/EX, and D/CT; approved by Newsom.

² Telegram 25609 from London, December 5, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800581–0071.

³ See Document 141.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See Document 143.

⁶ See Document 140.

6. For info addressees: You may draw upon paras 3–5 if you deem it appropriate to brief your host government.

7. For London: You may draw on paras 2–5 in briefing FCO and, as well, inform FCO of action we took re recent Libyan note (ref D). The Department will keep both the FCO and the British Embassy in Washington fully informed on this subject. In addition, the Department is quite willing to hold exploratory talks on coordination with FCO at the appropriate time (para 4 ref A). We are also quite interested in Oliver Miles' idea for a joint US–EC statement. On this we would look to FCO for advice on how best to work out the modalities for such a statement but would be fully prepared to cooperate. Department remains convinced that this assassination threat is one which affects equally the United States and our European allies and that joint action of this sort could ultimately be one of the most effective approaches for dealing with this challenge.

Christopher

Morocco

145. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)¹

Washington, January 14, 1977

Dear Phil:

(S) Confirming our conversation of 11 January,² during which we reached agreement on Moroccan base proposals contained in Gene McAuliffe's letter of 22 September 1976,³ I have initiated the following actions:

a. instructed Navy to implement its plan for closing the Kenitra Naval Communications complex during FY 1978;⁴

b. instructed Air Force to make detailed site surveys and to finalize plans to place a deep-space surveillance site (GEODSS) in Morocco subject to approval of the project by King Hassan;

c. asked Air Force to prepare plans for a weapons training center and appropriately instrumented ranges in Morocco. Use of live ordnance would not be authorized at this facility;

d. instructed Air Force not to pursue further its proposal to establish SAC and MAC facilities in Morocco; and

e. informed Navy that we do not consider it propitious to seek King Hassan's approval to use Moroccan beaches for fleet amphibious training.

(S) I also have asked Air Force to incorporate an air-to-ground training option as an adjunct to the weapons training center plans, as this could prove an attractive inducement for the GOM to accept the joint training facility. The air-to-ground function would involve the use of small inert bombs and require only a modest dedicated ground area and relatively little air space. The facility would give the Moroccans

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1/77-12/78. Secret. Drafted by Wootten on January 13.

² Not found.

³ McAuliffe's letter to Habib is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1/77-12/78.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 86.

a highly valuable practice bombing range, as well as helping USAFE meet annual training requirements for US air units stationed in Europe.

Sincerely,

WP Clements⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

146. Memorandum From William Quandt and Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 2, 1977

SUBJECT

Moroccan Base Closure

The JCS has determined that the naval communications facilities in Morocco are no longer required for support of US military forces. These communications functions have been superseded by satellite capabilities and alternative installations in the Mediterranean area. Navy is anxious to close these facilities, and has prepared a schedule of gradual withdrawal from now until the end of FY 78. This lengthy process has been designed to minimize the economic impact on the Moroccan workers currently employed at the facilities and was worked out on the basis of close consultations with Ambassador Anderson in Rabat. At present, the facilities are maintained in an active status but are not being used.

A proposal to notify King Hassan of our intent to close this facility was submitted to Secretary Kissinger in December 1976.² He was concerned that the closure of these facilities (and the consequent closure

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1/77–12/78. Secret. Sent for action. Aaron and Inderfurth initialed the memorandum. Aaron wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "ZB. I believe we should get out but the package we are offering the king is anemic. We should insist on more from the Bureaucracy before oking the closure. DA."

² Not found.

of the small communications training school attached to them) would signal a lessening of US support for Morocco. This concern had been recognized earlier, and Defense had been asked to prepare a list of possible alternative military facilities or installations which could be discussed with the King at the same time he was notified of our impending withdrawal of the communications station and communications school.

Defense presented a list of possible alternative sites and facilities which could be proposed to the King, including (in ascending order of sensitivity):

- Establishment of a USAF ground-based electro-optical space surveillance system (GEODSS) with scientific as well as military functions, involving about 55 (mostly US) personnel, as part of a global network now being installed;

- Location of a MAC staging and refueling site, primarily for emergency humanitarian missions in Africa [but co-located with a larger installation, e.g. the SAC proposal below];³

- Increased use of Moroccan port and air facilities by US forces (which can be handled on a case-by-case basis without a formal approach to the King);

- Use of Moroccan coasts for small joint amphibious exercises by Sixth Fleet units;

- Establishment of a USAF weapons tactical training center for gunnery and bombing practice by air units stationed in Europe (comparable to the functions performed by Wheelus AFB in the past); and

- Establishment of a SAC forward operating facility for B-52 deployments and refueling in response to military contingencies in Europe.

On January 14, following a telephone conversation between Mr. Clements of Defense and Undersecretary Habib at State, Defense informed State (Tab A)⁴ that they would proceed to implement the Navy's plan to close the Kenitra facilities, to actively pursue only the first of the six options, and to prepare the staff work for a modified version of the tactical training center. In fact, Defense did *not* proceed, pending a written response from State.

A State Department reply is currently being prepared which will refer to the Clements letter, concur in the scheduled closure of the Communications facility and school, approve proceeding with an approach to King Hassan on the GEODSS site, and limit any further

³ Brackets are in the original.

⁴ Tab A is not attached, but is printed as Document 145.

action on the other proposals to staffing by the JCS, recognizing that the proposals for a weapons training center or a SAC/MAC facility represent a considerably greater US military presence than would be practical or desirable at this time. Ambassador Anderson has asked that the Communications School be maintained if at all possible, and State may raise with Defense the feasibility of retaining the school in some form (or possibly replacing it by training programs in the US) as a means of cushioning the effect of the base closure.

We concur fully with the State position, and we believe that this situation is well in hand and on the way to a satisfactory solution. However, we would naturally wish to monitor the follow-through and implementation, particularly with respect to the Communications School. The Moroccan base issue was studied in some depth by an interagency group last fall,⁵ and the State Department letter is fully consistent with the findings of that group. Further study would be possible, but the real effect of another interagency review would be to delay the termination of an overseas military facility for which we have no further need. Nor do we want to encourage the bureaucracy to think about a highly visible military presence in Morocco. We can find many other ways to keep US-Moroccan relations on an even keel.

RECOMMENDATION: That we concur with the State Department approach, while continuing to monitor the implementation phase.⁶

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 85.

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, February 12, 1977, 2332Z

32727. For Ambassador. Subject: US Military Facilities in Morocco. Ref: A. State 7401 (Notal) B. Rabat 776 (Notal).²

1. You are authorized to utilize February 12 audience with King Hassan to express to King in general terms our intent with respect both to phasedown of Kenitra and installation of GEODSS station in Morocco. Note that, as Hassan himself foresaw, technological improvements have rendered our facilities at Kenitra unnecessary and that is the sole reason for our decision to close them. You should couch GEODSS proposal in terms that underscore US desire maintain presence as visible reminder of firm US support for Morocco.

2. Tell King that you have not yet received detailed descriptions of either proposal but that you expect to be able to present them to His Majesty at an audience which you will request after your return from Amman. Request King's preliminary reaction to your generalized approach before you depart for Amman.

3. FYI. Department exploring possibility of continued operation of communications school in line with your concerns but this issue should not repeat not be raised with Hassan at this time. If Hassan raises subject reply that you are unable to address specifics in absence of detailed proposals.

4. With respect to possible visit by Hassan to U.S., you should tell him you have been assured the new administration is aware of his interest. Given many Chiefs of State who have expressed similar interest, need to focus initially on Middle East leaders directly involved in helping get Arab-Israeli negotiating process started as quickly as

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 1–6/77. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Atherton and in PM, H, DASD/ISA, and S/S; approved by Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0454)

² In telegram 7401 to Rabat, January 13, Atherton wrote: "Although DOD remains anxious to move on Kenitra phase-down and related issues, I agree that formal demarche to King Hassan in remaining days of current administration has high potential for misunderstanding. We will need to review and refine proposals for early action in new administration. In our view, we will want to examine further all possibilities for putting existing facilities to new uses, so as to lessen impact of changes." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770012–1022) In telegram 776 from Rabat, February 10, Anderson requested guidance on the "Kenitra package" for his February 14 audience with Hassan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 1–6/77)

possible, and press of business on many fronts. We are sure King will understand why it has not yet been possible to deal with this question at such an early stage of the new administration.

Vance

148. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 14, 1977, 1935Z

835. For Secretary's party. Subject: U.S. Military Facilities in Morocco. Ref: State 032727.²

1. During hour-long February 14 meeting alone with the King, I made the Kenitra and GEODSS demarches as instructed by reftel. Discussion of other matters is being reported septels.³

2. The King said he understood perfectly reason for eventual phaseout of Kenitra complex, appreciated the spirit behind our GEODSS proposal, and indicated he would welcome this facility.⁴ He then recalled that when he had seen former DOD DepSec Clements in July, 1975,⁵ the latter had lamented that unlike the Soviets, the U.S. had no Mediterranean facilities for its nuclear powered submarines, and only had Tunisia where they could resupply on the southern littoral. Hassan said he had told Clements on an "ultra secret" basis that he would be willing to receive American experts to look into the possibility of establishing bases for nuclear submarines along Morocco's Mediterranean coast in "one or more locations",⁶ noting there were many protected areas along this coast which would be ideal for such

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 1-6/77. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 147. Vance was en route to the Middle East.

³ In telegram 852 from Rabat, February 15, Anderson reported on Hassan's views on the Middle East and the Soviet threat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770001-0546)

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "welcome this facility."

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 70.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "possibility of establishing bases for nuclear submarines along Morocco's Mediterranean coast in."

facilities. The King said he wished me to reiterate to Secretary Vance his willingness to discuss this question, adding that he did not exclude the possibility that the U.S. and Morocco might be able to reach agreement.

3. As he had throughout the conversation, Hassan repeated that he and his country were firmly opposed to Communism, that “the Soviets are my enemy”, and that he wished to help the U.S. in any way he could. He had earlier gone on at some length about how the U.S. should “use” Morocco and its unique position in Africa to help stop Soviet encroachments. He displayed a particular sensitivity on the question of Libya, which he charged was the Soviet Union’s arsenal for future subversion in Africa.

4. As a seeming afterthought, the King said that while new technology may have made our communications facilities in Morocco obsolete, he recalled reading recently that U.S. communications satellites might be vulnerable to Soviet attack. Speaking for himself, he said that he always sought to leave himself more than one escape hatch and suggested the U.S. might want to consider retaining a part of what it already had just in case.

5. I suggested that we maintain strict confidentiality on this subject to avoid giving any wrong impressions as the scenario developed. He wholeheartedly agreed. I said I would request a further audience when I received detailed description on the Kenitra phaseout and on GEODSS. He said he looked forward to seeing me after Amman.

6. Comment: King Hassan’s preliminary reaction to both Kenitra and GEODSS was positive. I interpret this initial conversation as reflecting the King’s understanding of our position and his willingness to cooperate with us. We should be able to proceed without any fundamental damage to our excellent relations provided we implement our plans with full sensitivity to Moroccan concerns.

Anderson

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 8, 1977, 2357Z

51623. For Ambassador. Subject: US Military Facilities in Morocco. Ref: A. State 32727; B. Rabat 835.²

1. During your forthcoming audience with King Hassan you are authorized to provide him with briefing information on closure of Kenitra and proposed establishment of GEODSS site in Morocco. Recommend that you prepare aide memoires based on paras below as indicated (Kenitra—paras 2–8; GEODSS—paras 10–15; press guidance—para 17) which can be left with him for his study. Suggest that you maintain same reassuring approach adopted in February 14 meeting and that in your introductory remarks you express USG appreciation for his forthcoming and understanding attitude and his acceptance in principle of US plans for Kenitra and GEODSS. You should make the point that the information is provided for his background, and emphasize that we only wish, at this time, to obtain his agreement with these plans, and will coordinate execution with appropriate GOM officials.

2. Plan for phase down of Naval shore facilities in Morocco. Advances in satellite and computer technology have resulted in changes in U.S. Naval communications which have rendered U.S. facilities in Morocco unnecessary. Consequently the Navy will begin to phase down these facilities on 1 June 1977 and the process will be complete by 30 September 1978.³

3. We expect to return use of the land at Sidi Yahia to the Government of Morocco by 31 December 1977 while the land at Bouknadel and the land and facilities at Kenitra will be relinquished by 30 September 1978.

4. We would expect in the future to enter more formal discussions with the Government of Morocco to determine which buildings and facilities at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel will be left in place and transferred to Moroccan ownership. Within statutory limits and procedures

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 1–6/77. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by McAuliffe and in S/S, H, PM/ISO, and NEA/P; approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770080–0282)

² See Documents 147 and 148.

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “the Navy will begin to phase down these facilities on June 1, 1977” and “by 30 September 1978.”

and with the exception of some unique items, we intend to offer to Morocco, at minimum cost, certain items of equipment and materiel, including some communications equipment and associated antennae as well as about 400 family housing units. Navy records indicate more than 600 permanent or semi-permanent buildings at the three sites have a total value of approximately dollars 59 million. (FYI: Term “at minimum cost” could mean anything from market value to free of charge. End FYI.)

5. Moroccan employees hired through the Moroccan Office of Administration, whose annual salaries total about dollars 2 million, will receive severance pay in accordance with the existing labor contract. The plan is to release the 113 Moroccan employees at Sidi Yahia and 30 of the Moroccan employees at Bouknadel during the period October–December 1977. The remaining 15 Moroccan employees at Bouknadel and all 361 Moroccan employees at Kenitra will be released during the period January–September 1978.

6. Some 130 Moroccan employees are paid from non-appropriated funds such as those generated by recreational activities and clubs and their positions will be terminated in keeping with the rate of reduction of available non-appropriated funds which will result from the departure of American personnel.

7. According to initial estimates, severance pay for all Moroccan employees will total approximately dollars 2 million while accrued annual leave payments will add dollars 500 thousand more. Also, we will help set up a cooperative program with labor unions and local community organizations to aid in placing Moroccan employees in new jobs.

8. After 1 June 1978, funds will not be available to continue operation and maintenance of the base at Kenitra and for the remainder of the period until 30 September 1978 all US effort at Kenitra will be directed toward closure.

9. FYI: Possibility of continuing operation of communications training school still under consideration. If King should raise subject you should explain that matter is under study and we expect decision in near future.⁴ End FYI.

10. Proposal for establishment of ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance (GEODSS) system in Morocco. Moroccan geography and climate provide favorable conditions for establishment of a GEODSS site which would become part of a global network of similar sites supporting passive monitoring of objects in very high-altitude

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph and underlined “communications training school.”

earth orbit. This effort will support the mission of SpaceTrack which maintains a continuous daily accounting of all space objects.

11. The GEODSS station will consist of as many as four 20–30 inch aperture telescopes, low light level TV cameras, digital computers, control consoles and communications equipment. It will be operated and maintained by US civilian contractor personnel, sponsored by the Department of Defense and perhaps augmented by as many as five US Air Force personnel, in the numbers listed below for each phase of the project. Construction—12 men, installation and checkout—15 men, normal operation—40–50 men.⁵

12. The station is designed so that a major portion of it, primarily the technical equipment, could be disassembled and removed within two weeks. To house this equipment it will be necessary to build a structure with 10,000 square feet of floor space and four exterior domes for the telescopes. If approved by the Government of Morocco, construction would begin in the last quarter of calendar year 1978 and would entail maximum use of local labor and materials. While the US will bear all establishment and operating costs we would hope that the Government of Morocco would provide the necessary land free of rent or other charge.⁶

13. It is hoped that GEODSS can be installed within an existing Moroccan facility so that its identification with the US would not be emphasized. In this regard, assuming no additional cost to USG, Moroccan scientists and officials would be welcomed and could have access to the facility for collection of data on stars, planets and other celestial objects including scientific or geodetic satellites. In addition, the Government of Morocco can be provided data collected during operations.

14. The US will seek radio communications for the GEODSS site and submit entrance requirements for all Defense Department personnel and aircraft through normal channels.

15. Based on earlier generous agreement in principle of His Majesty King Hassan II, the US Air Force requests permission to make detailed site surveys in Morocco to determine at which location GEODSS would operate most efficiently.

16. FYI: (Not for discussion with Hassan) That portion of this project which relates to capacity of GEODSS system to provide data for anti-satellite targeting purposes is classified Secret XGDS-3. Verbal approval in principle which King Hassan provided February 14 will meet DOD budget submission deadline, enabling construction to begin in CY 78. However, DOD would prefer that US-Moroccan agreement

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph.

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

on GEODSS be spelled out eventually in exchange of notes; this aspect will be the subject of separate instructions. End FYI.

17. Following is press guidance which Department and DOD propose to use if Kenitra or GEODSS should be raised by media representatives. No formal public announcement is planned either for GEODSS or Kenitra except for statements to be provided Moroccan employees regarding termination of their positions. Following press guidance to be used only after clearance by King Hassan. Begin text: Press guidance:

Q. Is it true that we are closing our base in Morocco?

A. We have not had “bases” in Morocco since the early 60’s when we evacuated our SAC sites at the request of King Hassan II. We have maintained a small naval communications facility and supporting training command in Morocco, but advances in technology make these facilities no longer necessary. We are closing them in the context of overall programs aimed at saving money and redistributing personnel to areas of greater need. We will begin a gradual closing of the facilities 1 June 1977 and they will be completely shut down by September 30, 1978.

Q. Are we replacing the current facilities with any other kinds of “facilities?”

A. King Hassan has very generously granted permission for the U.S. to locate a satellite tracking station in Morocco. This station has nothing to do with the closing of Kenitra. This would be a largely civilian-manned facility with about 45–50 persons possibly including five U.S. Air Force personnel. Naturally the scientific information it generates would be made available to the Moroccan Government and Moroccan scientists would be welcome to use the telescopes for their own scientific inquiry if they wished to do so.

Q. This appears to be a cutback. Does it signal some kind of chill in our relations with Morocco?

A. Definitely not. We have had friendly relations with Morocco for 200 years and they are especially close right now. No one should read into this any indication that our relationship with Morocco is anything but warm, cooperative and based on mutual respect. This change is being made in full consultation with the Moroccan Government.

Q. Do we have plans for other installations on Moroccan soil?

A. No. Were we to see any such need in the future, naturally we would consult with Congress, as we are in this case, and seek agreement with the Moroccan Government. End text.

18. FYI: (Not for discussion with Hassan) With one exception all other DOD proposals for military activities in Morocco have been set aside. That exception is aerial weapons/tactics training center for which

USAF has expressed pressing need.⁷ After additional study in Washington concept has been modified substantially to encompass joint US-Moroccan air-to-air and air-to-ground training using advanced range instrumentation, weapons simulations, and small inert bombs. Department has agreed to give further consideration to this modified proposal as soon as DOD completes its internal, strictly in-house preparatory studies. Until DOD has completed these studies and Department has reviewed them and reached a decision, aerial weapons/tactical training center proposal has no repeat no official status.⁸ End FYI.⁹

Vance

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "is aerial weapons/tactics training center for which USAF has expressed pressing need," and wrote in the right-hand margin: "What do you think? We should be involved in review of this before any decision made."

⁸ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "no official status."

⁹ In telegram 1457 from Rabat, March 17, Anderson reported on his March 14 audience with Hassan and a follow-up session with Laraki on March 15. Anderson wrote: "We thus have Moroccan green light to proceed with overall plan for Kenitra complex and GEODSS, and specifically to have GEODSS team conduct detailed site survey. At the same time, these are obviously delicate matters for the GOM, as reflected in the fact that the highest levels of GOM will be dealing with even routine details and in the King's and Foreign Minister's obvious wish to play down publicly the military aspects of U.S. presence in Morocco." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770092-0162)

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, April 17, 1977, 2205Z

86333. Subject: Conversation Between Secretary Vance and Moroccan Ambassador.

1. Secretary Vance met with departing Moroccan Ambassador Abdelhadi Boutaleb Friday, April 15, at 3:00 p.m. Also present was Assistant Secretary Atherton. Conversation dealt with four subjects: Zaire, Southern Africa, Western Sahara and Middle East.

2. Zaire: Boutaleb stated Moroccan forces in Zaire in response to Zairian appeal addressed to Morocco and other countries to uphold principle of territorial integrity. Morocco intervened in part because appeal was made directly by Zaire Foreign Minister, but principally because it was also addressed through OAU and it was through OAU that GOM decided to respond. Other African countries, including Egypt and Sudan, are considering providing assistance. Morocco was pleased to note April 15 statement of acting OAU President expressing support for Zaire position and approval of aid given Kinshasa government by other African countries. Morocco sees Katangan invasion of Zaire developing within framework built by African tours of Soviet President Podgorny and Cuban Premier Castro. Latter also visited Algeria twice before going on to East Germany and Moscow, and GOM perceives certain parallels between Soviet and Cuban backing of invasion of Zaire and troubles in Sahara. Morocco understands reasons why U.S. does not wish insert itself directly into Zaire conflict and feels that Moroccan intervention in Zaire, in support of ideals shared with U.S. and in keeping with Moroccan duty as African state, entitles Morocco to expect and demand more American support and understanding.² Therefore, irresponsible and sometimes even responsible American voices justifying Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa hard to understand.³

3. Secretary Vance replied that Moroccan action in Zaire is an example of African cooperation and may serve as catalyst for stability

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 1–6/77. Secret; Immediate, Exdis. Sent for information to Tel Aviv, Algiers, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kinshasa, Lagos, London, Moscow, Nouakchott, Paris, Pretoria, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Tarnoff and Twaddell; approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–0674)

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

³ An unknown hand highlighted and placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

helping to ensure success of attempts to negotiate solution. In terms of Soviet and Cuban actions, Secretary noted he has spoken to Russians several times, as recently as April 15, on dangers of intervention in Africa. U.S. urged Russians, their friends and colleagues, to avoid expanding scope of problem. Believe substance and import of message was understood but we will be watching carefully for results.

4. Southern Africa: Secretary volunteered background on current Owen Mission noting it stems from prior U.S.-U.K. agreement to attempt to convene a constitutional conference which would include all nationalist leaders, Front Line African states, Rhodesia and South Africa. U.S. would participate as co-convenor if other parties so desired. Should constitutional conference succeed, British Parliament would then pass enabling legislation to be followed by three to six month transitional period, under rule of a British Governor General with order secured by Commonwealth troops, during which time preparation would be made for a referendum. U.S. direct involvement stems from concern that only broad positive action could head off renewal of fighting which would provide greater opportunities for Soviet penetration and radicalization of region.

5. Ambassador Boutaleb described U.S. actions as timely and assured Secretary that Morocco will consistently support all U.S. initiatives for peace in Africa and Middle East.

6. Western Sahara: Boutaleb described Moroccan activity in Sahara as prompted by concerns for territorial integrity, peace and stability, and contrasted Moroccan intentions in conflict with destabilizing designs of "our antagonist". Boutaleb noted that Moroccan portion of Sahara entirely under control, which prompts Algerians to attack weaker Mauritania. He also commented that Moroccan Sahara policy enjoys support of most of Arab League and OAU except for those countries which side with external forces for instability in Africa. Boutaleb expressed appreciation for past U.S. understanding and support, particularly our favorable vote in 1975 UNGA.⁴ He noted that Morocco has often voted in support of U.S. interests. Morocco regards Sahara issue as closed, but looks forward to receiving support and understanding, especially from U.S., should necessity arise.

7. Referring to irresponsible statements by Americans on foreign policy matters, Moroccan Ambassador noted remarks by delegation of Black Americans in Algeria which met with Polisario leaders and made statement accusing Morocco of genocide in the Sahara. Boutaleb,

⁴ Reference is to UNGA Resolution 3458B, adopted on December 10, 1975, which supported the Morocco Accords, the tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, and the right of the Saharan people to self-determination. For text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, pp. 189-190.

slightly agitated, described delegation statement as incoherent and ignorant.

8. Secretary stated delegation has no connection with USG and was not reflecting U.S. national policy. Boutaleb agreed with Secretary's statement that, as few Americans likely ever to have heard of delegation or its spokesperson, less said about the incident the better.

9. Regarding Sahara, Secretary noted U.S. understanding of situation and sympathetic consideration of Moroccan standpoint while reaffirming that U.S. remains neutral on substance of issue. Secretary requested Moroccans keep us informed of future developments.⁵

10. On Middle East Boutaleb described Moroccan position as consistently moderate and counseling moderation with other Chiefs of State and with PLO. Morocco has encouraged parties to accept Resolutions 242 and 338⁶ and strongly supports all U.S. efforts to achieve just and lasting peace in the Middle East in interest of all concerned. Morocco does not recognize right to acquire territory by force, but if states concerned should decide to cede some portion of their territory, Morocco would not object.⁷ Morocco does not shirk its duties as Arab state; King Hassan has wide audience among Arab leaders and is more than willing to make his contacts and best efforts available to aid U.S. peace initiatives as he did in past. King would be prepared help with PLO (Boutaleb repeated this offer three times). In response to question from Secretary, Boutaleb stated that Geneva Conference must be well prepared in advance in order to succeed and that present comings and goings of area leaders represent, in effect, beginning of the Geneva Conference. When it meets, conference should simply ratify agreements reached previously.⁸ Key to success is prior agreement to some form of simultaneous recognition by Israelis and PLO. On possibility of referendum in West Bank raised by Secretary, Boutaleb stated that it would be inconsistent with Moroccan policy elsewhere to support referendums when they conflict with principle of territorial integrity.⁹

11. Secretary Vance expressed appreciation for Moroccan support for U.S. peace efforts and noted President Carter's commitment to bring concerned parties together in 1977. Secretary described meetings in U.S. with involved heads of state as useful and expressed hope for

⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 59.

⁷ An unknown hand wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: "What about Sahara?"

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "Geneva Conference" and "should simply ratify agreements reached previously," and placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

⁹ An unknown hand underlined "referendum" and the last sentence of this paragraph.

renewed movement toward Geneva after Israeli elections, but described remaining differences between parties as broad and deep despite some signs of narrowing. He noted that U.S. will keep Hassan's offer of assistance very much in mind.

Vance

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 3, 1977, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Ahmed Osman of Morocco

PARTICIPANTS

President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert Anderson, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco
Mr. William B. Quandt, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Prime Minister Ahmed Osman of Morocco
Ambassador Ali Bengelloun of Morocco

President: I am proud to have you here in Washington.

Prime Minister: This is the first time I have been here since 1970.

President: How is King Hassan?

Prime Minister: Fine.

President: I am proud of our relations and it has been a pleasure to exchange communications with His Majesty. There is a deep friendship that binds us, and we have been particularly pleased by the constructive role that Morocco has played on behalf of peace in the Middle East. His Majesty has shown courage, knowledge, and has earned the trust of other leaders. This is a great credit to King Hassan.

Prime Minister: I want to thank you for taking time to see me on such short notice. I am embarrassed because this is a difficult mission

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.

since I am carrying bad news and I would like to excuse myself in advance. His Majesty has sent me to say that he would like to postpone his official visit to the United States.² He hesitated before requesting this, because he attached great importance to the visit and he had been preparing himself carefully. It is difficult to give you the reasons for his decision, but there were two basic concerns: First, his preoccupation with the situation in the region. There has been no spectacular new element, but recently he did see the President of Mauritania, Ould Daddah. As you know, Morocco is tied to Mauritania by a defense pact, and we have just decided to send an important number of troops to Mauritania. They are now being sent and His Majesty felt that he should stay in Morocco to supervise personally this move. Secondly, His Majesty is preoccupied by the situation in the Middle East and by the cleavage that is emerging between the peace camp and the rejection front. The President knows of the contacts that Morocco has taken to facilitate communications between the interested parties and I can give you more details on this later.

This is the object of my mission, and if you have some time I would be happy to discuss some of the problems in our bilateral relations, in the situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

President: Please relay to His Majesty my complete understanding of his decision. The need for change in plans is something that I can understand. I had also planned a trip, but domestic problems caused me to delay it. Also please relay my regret, and my determination that in the near future we will have the chance to meet personally and discuss matters of mutual concern. One of the reasons I consider his decision to be easily understandable is that there are no urgent differences between us that require immediate consultations. He has reconfirmed his friendship for our country by sending you. The fact that the King asked you to come to convey his message is a sign of his concern and I appreciate it. We have time for a brief summary of the situation in Northwest Africa and other matters, and we will have some time to consult more extensively with Secretary Vance. It would be a pleasure to hear your views on developments in your own region and in the Middle East.

² In telegram 6008 from Rabat, November 2, the Embassy informed the Department that Hassan was scheduled to visit the United States December 7–10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770405–0966) In a December 2 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "Bengelloun has said the Prime Minister's mission will be related to King Hassan's state visit, and he hinted in a conversation with Ambassador Anderson that Osman may request postponement of the visit. Conceivably, Osman could be coming to test our reaction to the King's outstanding request for arms to use in the Western Sahara or to elicit our cooperation in some initiative related to the Middle East peace process." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1/77–12/78)

Prime Minister: The President's words will be welcome to His Majesty. His Majesty is very embarrassed and he does want the visit to take place. I won't take long, but I do want to say a few words about the situation in North Africa. We are having difficulties with Algeria. We consider that the problem is not one of territory or the conflict over the Sahara. Algeria says that it has no territorial claims. We consider that we are involved in a plan that goes beyond Algeria and involves foreign intervention in Africa. There is an axis from Moscow through Algeria and Havana, and Angola was part of this operation. We have seen the example of what happened in Shaba. Algeria is a pawn in this and is part of a vast machination. We think that in the last few months the African countries have come to see this conspiracy. Algeria's neighbors, Mali, Niger, and Chad, have come to understand the dangers and they have the same analysis as we do. We want the United States to be aware of this.

Our action in Shaba encouraged these other countries. It showed that an African country, though it is far away and is white, would come to the aid of another African country. Africans want to protect their independence, and they want at least moral aid from outside. Concerning the Sahara conflict, there has been little change. It is guerilla warfare of the hit and run variety. But the situation in Mauritania has become dangerous. The Polisario is only a name and in fact it is Algeria that is behind this conflict. We are seeing increasingly sophisticated arms, and Algeria is now attacking Mauritania. Very recently Ould Daddah visited Morocco, and, as part of our common defense agreement, he asked Morocco to occupy several Mauritanian positions. It has been decided that Morocco will respond. We hope that this will deter the Algerians.

We have been receiving all mediators, but this has never led anywhere. We have not lost hope. We hope that Algeria will again become reasonable.

Algeria is now pursuing an ideological war. There is an ideological cleavage between the so-called progressive, and it is worth considering whether this word is appropriate, but the Algerians want to accentuate the left versus right difference. There is a risk of escalation in the Middle East over this issue and it could spread to the Sahara. This is the situation in North Africa. We hope for American help, and we want moral support first of all. We also want diplomatic support. This will help us enormously. We see ourselves as all being in the same boat and all confronting the same dangers.

President: I recognize the threat that comes from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Algeria to peace in Africa. We have tried to express our concern over the Cuban presence in Africa, which has been supported by the Soviet Union. Anything that Morocco can do to build public

concern in Africa against the Cuban position would be of great help. We also have a deep concern over Algeria's attitude which is an obstacle to harmony in the Middle East and North Africa. I want to continue the closest consultations with King Hassan. I would like to be kept informed of Morocco's needs. We have a clear expression of the Moroccan role in the Shaba-Zaire conflict. It was an inspiration to us all. It reaffirmed for African leaders the belief that borders should not be changed by force. If you permit, I would like to write a personal note to King Hassan about his decision to cancel his visit.

Secretary Vance: How do you expect Algeria to proceed? Do you expect more military activity?

Prime Minister: We saw, before the King's declaration concerning the right of pursuit,³ that the Algerians would attack and then retreat to Tindouf. We have increasingly been seeing the use of sophisticated arms. We don't expect a full war. If Algeria is objective, they have no reason for a war. Algerian opinion is not engaged over the Sahara issue. Maybe if Tindouf were involved, but not the Sahara. Algerian soldiers are not motivated. And no one would win such a war. Its outcome would be uncertain. Therefore, objectively, Algeria should be deterred. We hope they will be deterred. We have everything to lose in such a war. Morocco wants to develop its economy and we think that the recent democratization in Morocco will allow the full flowering of our economic growth. This deters us from wanting war.

Secretary Vance: What are the realistic chances of productive results coming out of mediation efforts and that of the OAU Conference?

Prime Minister: All of these efforts have failed. There is no desire for peace and detente in Algeria. The Algerians wanted the Saudis to mediate, and Crown Prince Fahd came and we welcomed his efforts, even though we had doubts about their success. In the end, the Foreign Minister of Algeria sent a letter to the UN Secretary General which was nothing more than a diatribe and was an insult to the Saudi effort.⁴ Now the issue goes to the OAU. But no one wants to concern himself with this problem. Morocco is already in the Sahara and is administering the territory. No one wants to change that. Most African countries support us. We are trying now to go to the Summit at the OAU, and once and for all the issue will be examined. The OAU cannot solve the problem. This can only be done by the interested parties. In the past, this meant Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, and they have already settled the problem. Now the OAU will be held in Cairo, and we will

³ See footnote 7, Document 217.

⁴ Reference is presumably to Bouteflika's November 10 letter to the President of the Security Council, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 4550 from USUN, November 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770418–0116)

go and the majority will be with us.⁵ If the problem is settled, we are ready to resolve all problems with Algeria, including borders and economic cooperation, as was agreed in 1972.⁶

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

⁵ The OAU meeting in Cairo was cancelled; see footnote 3, Document 220.

⁶ Reference is to the June 15, 1972, convention relating to the tracing of state borders between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Kingdom of Morocco.

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 23, 1977, 0228Z

306028. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Moroccan Ambassador.

1. Bengelloun's principal interest in brief meeting December 22 prior departure on consultations was in underlining his government's desire for a U.S. response to its arms request.² He said Morocco counts on U.S. to help it maintain regional equilibrium which now upset by Algerian acquisition of Soviet weapons both directly from Soviets and via Libyans. He mentioned in this context current visit to Tripoli and Algiers of Soviet Chief of Staff. Moroccans are peaceful, Bengelloun insisted, and want U.S. arms only to defend their national territory. Moroccans not concerned by situation in Mauritania where French are helping, but they are worried about their vulnerability in the north, near Oujda and the Mediterranean. Algerians are unhappy with King's position on Middle East and have been attacking him. Moroccans are worried about what Boumediene might do. Bengelloun contrasted Morocco's constructive geopolitical and Middle East policies with those of Algeria and noted greater similarity between Moroccan and Ameri-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/77-2/78. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Sober; approved by Tarnoff. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770478-1129)

² In telegram 223262 to Rabat, September 16, the Department summarized Vance's September 13 meeting with Laraki, during which Laraki presented the Moroccan request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0320, P800020-1617) For the Moroccan list, see Attachment 3 to Document 222.

can free political structures than between those of Algeria and U.S. Stating that Boumediene about to visit Arab capitals to encourage resistance to Sadat, Ambassador concluded that U.S. knows where its friends are.

2. In responding, Secretary said U.S. in process of making final decisions on Moroccan request and other military assistance questions. U.S. is sensitive to Moroccan needs and sees Morocco playing a constructive geopolitical role. Secretary cited President's reference in meeting with Prime Minister Osman to the importance of bilateral relations over and above geopolitical concerns.³ Asked by Bengelloun if it would be possible to make a final decision on the Moroccan arms list prior to the President's departure on December 29,⁴ Secretary said he doubted it would be. However, he looked forward to seeing Bengelloun again when both return to Washington. Bengelloun expressed desire discuss legal aspects of Moroccan position. Secretary responded he would welcome opportunity for such an exchange as there are elements he does not fully understand.

3. On Polisario hostages, Bengelloun said UNSYG Waldheim had not realized Boumediene had provoked a domestic political dispute in France by allowing French Communist Party Chief Marchais to announce prospective release. According to Bengelloun, Waldheim appreciates Moroccan opposition to his involvement but feels he must fulfill his commitment.

4. Bengelloun asked if Secretary had any special message to convey to King on Middle East which might update whatever was discussed between King and Ambassador Anderson December 20.⁵ Secretary replied that he expects meeting on Sunday to make progress but it is unreasonable to believe, as some people do, that Sadat and Begin will resolve all issues in one meeting.⁶ Secretary said he knows Begin is going to Egypt in a reasonable frame of mind, and he believes Sadat also will be reasonable. He expects the meeting will continue the momentum of the peace process.

5. Ambassador expressed King Hassan's best wishes for Under Secretary Habib's recovery. Secretary voiced his appreciation and informed Bengelloun that Habib has been taken off critical list.

Vance

³ See Document 151.

⁴ Carter traveled to Warsaw on December 29 for an official visit.

⁵ Anderson reported on his meeting with the King in telegram 6965 from Rabat, December 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–1294)

⁶ Begin and Sadat met at Ismailia on Sunday, December 25.

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 7, 1978, 0039Z

57412. Subject: Moroccan Arms Request.

1. As you know, we have had a series of informal consultations with Members of Congress on the Moroccan request to purchase arms they have told us would be used in the Sahara (and presumably Mauritania). Although there has been support from some members, our sample indicates there would be a major confrontation with key groups in Congress and no guarantee of success should we decide to accede to the Moroccan request. Chairman Diggs of the HIRC Subcommittee on Africa and Dick Clarke, his counterpart in the SFRC, are both firmly opposed, as is Fraser.² Support from traditional friends of Israel has declined since Sadat's withdrawal of his negotiators from Jerusalem³ and Hassan's support for that withdrawal. A resolution of disapproval would certainly be introduced, despite a generally sympathetic attitude toward Morocco. I fear there is a chance such a resolution would be approved, given sentiment against transfers of U.S. arms to Africa and concerns related to self-determination. A major complicating factor in coming months will be the controversy over major aircraft sales, such as F-15's for Saudi Arabia and F-5's for Egypt. There could be a backlash in this situation which we fear would focus on Moroccan use of U.S. arms in the Sahara, increasing the chances for disapproval.

2. Under the circumstances, I have decided not repeat not to submit the arms request to the Congress at this time. We will, of course, wish to continue our traditional military assistance relationship under the terms of our 1960 agreement.⁴ In this respect, it will be necessary, in communicating our negative response on the purchase of new military equipment intended for use in the Sahara, to remind the GOM that the equipment previously acquired from us under the terms of our bilateral agreement is for use solely for the defense of territory which the U.S. recognizes as under formal Moroccan sovereignty.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780101-0722. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Nouakchott, Madrid, Jidda, Cairo, and Dakar. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in NEA, H, L/NEA, AF, EUR/WE, PM, and NSC; approved by Vance.

² See Documents 219 and 220.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, footnote 4, Document 198.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 223.

3. I well understand the disappointment with which the GOM in general, and the King in particular, will receive this unwelcome news. As for our presentation, I understand that at Ambassador Bengelloun's lunch on December 3 Prime Minister Osman stated to you that this particular arms request is only an element in our overall relations and what is really important is Moroccan confidence in the strength of American sympathy and political support.⁵ Whether or not Osman was accurately portraying Hassan's views, we believe we should take our cue from Osman's comments in our discussions with Moroccans on this subject. We should emphasize the positive, noting our support and sympathy for Morocco, our determination to continue to support Morocco's modernization program, etc.

4. Following is text of letter to Boucetta which you are asked deliver.

Quote: Dear Mr. Minister: In the months since we met in November⁶ the administration has carefully considered your government's interest in purchasing the OV-10 aircraft and Cobra helicopters for use in the Western Sahara. As I told you at that time, this request posed problems for us. Because of these problems, we have held informal consultations with the Congress. I regret to inform you that on the basis of these consultations we do not believe it would be wise to move ahead with these purchases at the present time.

As the President indicated to Prime Minister Osman during his December visit, the United States Government places a high value on its relations with Morocco, and we welcome and admire the constructive policies followed by His Majesty in pursuit of peace and justice at home and abroad.⁷ We have been pleased to receive the assurances expressed by Moroccan leaders, including yourself, of the high regard the United States enjoys in your country. We are hopeful that our present inability to furnish weapons for use in the Western Sahara and Mauritania will not detract from the cordial cooperative spirit which has animated our bilateral relations throughout the reign of His Majesty.

External involvement in Africa's affairs has become as worrisome to us as it is to you. We appreciate your concern for your own defense in this environment and, subject to congressional appropriations, we will continue to assist your government to improve its military posture in accordance with the terms of our military assistance accord. Sincerely, Cyrus Vance. Unquote.

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ For a report on the November 7 meeting between Vance and Boucetta, see Document 216.

⁷ See Document 151.

5. The following are talking points which, with the exception of the first, you may use at your discretion when transmitting my letter:

—(Obligatory talking point) the terms of the military assistance agreement between the U.S. and Morocco restrict the use of equipment furnished under its provisions to the defense of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco recognized by the United States. This area does not include that portion of the Western Sahara now under Morocco's administrative control. Nor does the agreement authorize Moroccan use in other nations of equipment furnished by the U.S. Government.

—Our congressional consultations revealed strong opposition to the arms proposal, hearings were scheduled by critics of Morocco, and we were informed that a motion of disapproval would have been introduced had we proceeded with the sale of the OV-10 or Cobra helicopters.

—Our consultations coincided with administration efforts to obtain congressional support for the sale of aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In view of the importance of these sales to the prospects for peace in the Middle East, and taking into consideration congressional opposition to any expansion of U.S. arms sales to African and Middle Eastern nations, the administration decided this would be an inappropriate time to press the Moroccan arms request.

—The U.S. is more actively pursuing the search for a peaceful settlement to the dispute over the Western Sahara and urged African governments to attend the March summit conference on the Sahara.

6. Department will be informing Congress of this decision. We will employ following talking points in framing press guidance and suggest you do also:

—Our relations with Morocco are excellent and have been animated by close cooperation for many years.

—Our decision against authorizing sale at this time of the desired arms should not be interpreted as indicating any change in our friendly relations with Morocco.

—This decision does not alter our existing arms supply arrangements with Morocco conducted under the terms of our bilateral accord.

—As far as the Sahara dispute is concerned, the U.S. position remains one of neutrality and advocacy of a peaceful settlement.

Vance

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 8, 1978, 2005Z

1410. Subject: Moroccan Arms Request. Ref: (A) State 057412, (B) State 057525 (Notal).²

1. As has been customary with Foreign Minister Boucetta, he received [me] immediately on March 7. During 40-minute meeting I carried out instructions reftels, making oral points para 5 reftel (A) (except for first part of final point) and delivering English text, plus Embassy's unofficial French translation, of Secretary's letter. Boucetta's reaction was predictably one of deep disappointment and total dismay. He undertook to inform the King without delay.

2. Before my presentation, Boucetta led off the conversation with criticism of Dep Asst Secy Veliotos' March 1 testimony before the HIRC (State 52784).³ While agreeing with positive assessment of US-Moroccan relations, he said he found comments on human rights in Morocco "unacceptable" and took particular umbrage, as he had in the past, with our failure to recognize the many GOM steps re self-determination taken during the past two years by continuing to differentiate between administrative control and sovereignty in the Sahara. After reviewing the Veliotos statement and the contents of the UNGA Sahara resolution for which we voted in December 1975,⁴ I explained that the purpose of the March 1 HIRC hearing was to present the Executive Branch's justification for military assistance during next fiscal year beginning October 1. I recalled that GOM National Defense Administration had already been informed of our new request to Congress for \$45 million in FMS credits for Morocco, the same amount as for the preceding year.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780105–0098. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris.

² See Document 153. In telegram 57525 to Rabat, March 7, the Department wrote: "U.S. response to Moroccan arms request, which is described septel, should be conveyed to Boucetta ASAP, and by all means prior to his departure for U.S. During that meeting please try to learn what you can about Boucetta's visit to U.S, including whatever he is willing to reveal about contents of message he is to bring from King." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780101–0834)

³ In telegram 52784 to multiple posts, March 1, the Department transmitted the text of Veliotos's statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780094–1211) He reiterated the U.S. position that Morocco had administrative control and authority in the Western Sahara but not sovereignty.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 150.

3. In the GOM's view, Boucetta continued, the negative reaction facing the September 1977 Moroccan arms request⁵ did not lie in Congress, but rather in the Department of State. I responded that I had understood this was the view of Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun, but that in my view, this was not correct. I then reviewed (a) Boucetta's conversation with the Secretary last November that the arms request posed problems for US,⁶ (b) the subsequent decision to consult informally with the Congress and (c) finally the change in jurisdiction in January of consideration of the arms request from the Middle East Subcommittee to the African Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committees of both houses, with the leadership of the latter being critical of the request. Boucetta acknowledged that the problem was probably more complicated than he realized. My guess is that until Bengelloun faces the realities of the role and attitudes of Congress and faithfully reports same to his government, Boucetta will remain skeptical of the inability of the Executive Branch to carry out a policy which he believes is clearly in the U.S. as well as the GOM interests.

4. I next recalled that in a brief discussion with Royal Counselor Guedira on February 25 before leaving for COM meeting in Tunis, he had asked me about the status of the Moroccan arms request.⁷ Boucetta said he was aware of the conversation when I had told Guedira I had no precise information but sensed there were problems in the Congress. Now I had a private letter from the Secretary to the FonMinister on the subject.

5. Boucetta then read the Secretary's letter aloud in French, commenting that the U.S. decision was "really regrettable". Regarding the phrases "at the present time" and "our present inability", Boucetta said with some feeling that the problem was urgent as Morocco needed the arms now to face up to the increasingly serious threat from outside.

6. I went on to cover in full obligatory first talking point para 5 reftel (A), stressing that, apart from Morocco's September arms request per se, under the terms of our 1960 agreement the arms provided by the U.S. were for use solely in Morocco, not in the Sahara or Mauritania. Boucetta said he fully understood the terms of the agreement, and once again noted that our definition and that of his government differed as to the confines of the Kingdom of Morocco. Boucetta said he looked forward to discussing this question further with the Secretary on March 11.⁸ I ended this part of the conversation by mentioning that the purpose

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 152.

⁶ See Document 216.

⁷ Not found.

⁸ See Document 223.

of our congressional consultation had been to explore the possibility of amending the 1960 agreement to permit use of US-furnished arms for the defense of the Sahara and Mauritania, and that congressional opposition had been focussed specifically on this point because of the question of self-determination.

7. Boucetta undertook to pass Secretary's letter without delay to the King, along with a report of our conversation. King would be highly disappointed, and would probably find it difficult in view of his conversations with visiting U.S. officials in recent months to understand how USG could arrive at this conclusion, Boucetta added.

8. Regarding last para of reftel B, Boucetta gave no indication of substance of King's message he will be carrying to President despite occasion during conversation when he could have done so.

9. In brief reference to OAU Sahara mediation efforts, I mentioned that Washington had sent circular cable to a number of our Embassies in Africa supporting the holding of special Sahara summit in Libreville, now again postponed.⁹ Boucetta replied that this summit would in any case have accomplished nothing. The Moroccan position was clear: there was no question of abandoning the Sahara. I noted the desirability of further efforts to try to reach a peaceful solution in the Sahara and to meet concerns about self-determination. While a referendum now appeared impractical, I wondered, speaking personally, whether one might consider a visit of a prestigious, neutral group to sound out opinion in the Sahara after two years of Moroccan/Mauritanian administration, followed by a report to UN. Such efforts might have positive impact, for example, in the Congress. Boucetta noted the idea with interest, but naturally made no commitment.

10. As Boucetta had others waiting to see him, we could not review draft press guidance para 6 reftel (A). Action requested. We would appreciate knowing in advance when Congress (and specifically who in Congress) to be informed by Department. Also request Embassy be provided any subsequent definitive press guidance. Believe it important that GOM be informed in advance on both counts.

Anderson

⁹ In telegram 37164 to the OAU Collective, February 13, the Department wrote: "The US is neutral on substance of this dispute. We have expressed to concerned and interested parties our belief that dispute should best be resolved on regional basis. We believe that OAU Western Sahara extraordinary summit meeting, with substantial OAU member state participation, could be useful step in direction of peaceful settlement." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) The OAU summit was held in Khartoum in July. See footnote 3, Document 220.

155. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Proposed Visit of Moroccan Foreign Minister

King Hassan of Morocco has sent his Foreign Minister to Washington with a written message to be delivered to President Carter. Secretary Vance tried to forestall this by agreeing to host a luncheon for Boucetta next Saturday. However, the Moroccans insist that nothing but a meeting with the President will do and they are pulling out all the stops. They are particularly upset at the present time by our decision not to approve² the sale of aircraft and other weapons to be used outside Moroccan territory against the Polisario guerrillas. Refusal of the President to meet with Boucetta would be seen as another slap in the face, despite their helpfulness in Zaire and in support of Sadat. If the President's schedule permits, a brief meeting would be greatly appreciated.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab A.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1978. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum.

² Inderfurth wrote "at this time" in the right-hand margin. See Document 153.

³ Tab A is not attached. Aaron wrote beneath the recommendation: "ZB—The question is whether the brief meeting would take the place of the guns. What would the Pres. say? DA." Brzezinski wrote: "No. Set up appt. with the V.P. if possible. (The P. has seen the Moroccans enough). ZB." See Document 156.

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 18, 1978, 0407Z

70308. Subject: Meeting With Moroccan Minister Boucetta.

1. Foreign Minister Boucetta met for approximately thirty minutes with Vice President Mondale on March 14. Also present were Ambassador Bengelloun, Ambassador Anderson, DepAsstSecy Veliotos and Mr. Clift, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Vice President.

2. Boucetta emphasized Morocco's desire to maintain the best of relations with the US. Noted that such relations were in our mutual interests given shared values of freedom and liberty, and common views on security goals. Noted this is critical period in Africa and Middle East and emphasized Morocco intends remain on path of moderation, wisdom and freedom. Emphasized significant progress in Morocco in field of human rights and political freedoms, drawing on his own personal experiences to underscore this fact, cited comparison with unnamed "other" countries, and made point that Morocco is model in Third World. Boucetta congratulated President Carter for his leading role in sensitizing world to human rights considerations.

[3.] In turning letter over to Vice President, Boucetta emphasized the handwritten comment by King in margin which emphasized King's personal dedication to US-Moroccan friendship (unofficial English translation of letter follows septel minus King's marginal comments which apparently were only on French original).² Boucetta explained that subject of letter concerns preoccupation of King and GOM with Sahara. He stated that he had discussed this issue in great detail with Secretary Vance;³ he put Sahara into context of Soviet and Cuban threat to Africa, noting in this context that Morocco has chosen the side of the United States.

[4.] Boucetta said that letter dealt with "certain public statements" by administration officials (letter cites Mar. 1 remarks by Veliotos before congressional committee),⁴ which distinguish between Moroccan

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780121–0575. Secret. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, and Madrid. Drafted and approved by Veliotos; cleared in the White House.

² Telegram 66888 to Rabat, March 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1469) A copy of the unofficial translation of Hassan's March 8 letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 3–6/78.

³ See Documents 223 and 224.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 154.

administrative control and sovereignty in the Sahara, noting such statements would be seized on by Morocco's "opponents" and could cause problems in our relations. Boucetta noted that decision to send him here had been made by King, and King's letter written, before U.S. had informed Morocco of decision not to sell OV-10's and Cobra's to Morocco for use in the Sahara. He stated that the King was dismayed and very sorry to receive our negative reaction and could not understand why we would not help Morocco against an adversary who was receiving unlimited arms from the Soviet Union. Boucetta said that in the message conveying negative decision, Secretary had indicated we could not go forward "at this time" to the Congress. He understood that there may be some reason on our part to delay such action but he hoped and urged us to review situation and to present Moroccan request to the Congress as soon as possible.

[5.] At appropriate points during Boucetta's comments, Vice President Mondale emphasized great importance to US of our close relations with Morocco and our respect and appreciation for King. Vice President assured Foreign Minister that he would personally deliver King's letter to President and that he would also discuss issues raised by Boucetta with Secretary Vance. He noted that President Carter would focus personally on letter and would reply in near future.

[6.] Boucetta expressed his condolences on the death of Senator Humphrey, extolled the Senator's virtues as a human being and statesman and stated that Morocco would like to be officially associated with any memorial planned for Humphrey. He emphasized that Senator Humphrey belonged to all of the people of the free world, to which, of course, Morocco belonged. Vice President expressed his deep personal appreciation for Foreign Minister's tribute to Senator Humphrey and he asked his assistant, Mr. Clift, personally to follow up with Ambassador Bengelloun concerning a Moroccan contribution to the HHH memorial.

[7.] At very end of meeting, Boucetta stated that the King very much hoped to come to the United States for an informal working visit of perhaps a day and a half in near future. In making this presentation, Boucetta emphasized that what he meant was that the King wanted to come here in the very near future. In reply, Vice President expressed our great appreciation and respect for the King and noted that we would of course be happy to welcome him to the United States. The Vice President cautioned, however, that the date for any visit would depend upon President's schedule. Boucetta said he understood and repeated how much the King wanted to come in the very near future.

[8.] On behalf of the Vice President, Mr. Clift emphasized to both Ambassador Anderson and Veliotis after the meeting that the Vice President had not made any commitment as to timing for such a visit and he hoped this was clear to the Moroccans.

Vance

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 1, 1978, 0800Z

1955. Subject: King Hassan's Comments on OV-10s and Cobras.

1. At small March 20 dinner, which was our first meeting since my return from Washington five days earlier, King Hassan welcomed me in his customarily warm manner and said laughingly, "Well, I see you were not able to bring me back the OV-10's." After greeting the other guests, he said he wanted me to know that he had no need at this time for the OV-10's and the Cobras, that the situation was well in hand in the Sahara, but that he would definitely need the OV-10's and Cobras in the future for the defense of his country [*less than 1 line not declassified*].²

2. In a follow-up conversation same evening with a high-ranking American visitor Hassan expanded on what he had told me earlier. He said that Morocco does not really need the OV-10's and Cobras for the defense of the Sahara, but they are required for the general defensive plan for Morocco.³ In this connection, he noted GOM was receiving sixty-two new Puma helicopters and seventy-five Mirage F-1 aircraft with delivery of the latter to begin in April.⁴

3. Comment: As was the case with Foreign Minister Boucetta and Secretary Vance,⁵ King Hassan accepts our present inability to approach the Congress on the sale of OV-10's and Cobras, but already counts on a forthcoming U.S. response once the temporary problem cited by the Secretary (i.e. sale of aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) is overcome.

Anderson

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 9, Morocco: 3-6/78. Secret; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

³ An unknown hand placed a star in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "sixty-two new Puma helicopters and seventy-five Mirage F-1 aircraft."

⁵ See Document 224.

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 17, 1978, 1731Z

2248. Subject: Moroccan Use of American Arms: April 14 Discussion With Foreign Minister Boucetta. Ref: State 077779.²

1. FonMin Boucetta received me, with Ambassador to U.S. Bengelloun present, on April 14³ for hour-long frank, but always friendly discussion on Moroccan use of American arms. I began by reviewing FonMin's mid-March discussion in Washington,⁴ also referring to King Hassan's March 20 private comments that he had no need for the OV-10's and Cobras in the Sahara, as the situation was well in hand and he would be receiving Mirage F-1's and Pumas from France, but that he would need them in the future to defend his country [*less than 1 line not declassified*] (Rabat 1955).⁵

2. Drawing fully on points contained in reftel, I continued with detailed presentation of case for Moroccan respect in practice of U.S. interpretation of Morocco's territorial limits specified in 1960 bilateral military assistance agreement, noting likelihood of close congressional questioning on this issue and potential adverse linkage with next year's FMS credits for Morocco. Also outlining current blockage of APC's, I concluded with request for assurances on end-use of U.S. military assistance, specifically including FMS equipment already in Moroccan inventories and future commercial sales under munitions control procedures. Regarding non-use in the Sahara of FMS equipment furnished in the future, neither Boucetta nor Bengelloun contested my repeated references to Bengelloun's assurances given in Washington March 13 (para 6 of State 069811).⁶

3. FonMin responded that Morocco did not wish to complicate our bilateral relations and in fact hoped to help the Department in any way it could in problems it might have with Congress. In this regard, he said he wished to reiterate, as he had done in Washington, his

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 3-6/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 77779 to Rabat, March 25, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780132-0112.

³ An unknown hand circled "April 14," drew a line to the dateline, circled "17," and wrote: "? Three days to get this out?"

⁴ See Document 223.

⁵ See Document 157.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 224.

categorical assurances that past or future materiel furnished by the United States would never be used for aggression, that it would be employed solely for legitimate self-defense, and that Morocco would fully respect any and all agreements with the United States. He considered that these assurances should assuage concerns in Congress.

4. Asked about the applicability of these assurances because of our differing interpretations of Morocco's territorial limits, Boucetta repeated, again as he had explained to the Secretary in Washington, that he could not state there was a difference between two parts of Morocco—Morocco with and Morocco without the Sahara. He and Ambassador Bengelloun then repeated that I was accredited to the Kingdom of Morocco which included the Sahara, and noted that when Tarfaya and Sidi Ifni had been recovered from Spain, the United States recognized that its then Ambassador became accredited to the Morocco that included these two areas with no questions raised. Without belaboring the point, I merely noted this subject was reviewed at length with him in Washington by Department officers who explained the differing circumstances between the Sidi Ifni/Tarfaya and the Sahara cases. FonMin then recalled Secretary Vance's undertaking to review personally the background of the Sahara situation, and hoped this move would remove the unfortunate U.S. distinction between administrative control and sovereignty. Boucetta went on to say he just could not understand how "two allies" could reach a point where one defines the territory of the other to the political and security detriments of the latter. Recalling the origin of the secret 1960 agreement, he said he could quite understand U.S. concern over the use against Israel of US-furnished arms either directly by Morocco or through transfer to a third country. This, he said, has not and will not occur.

5. When I mentioned the Secretary's concern previously expressed to Boucetta over the presence of F-5s in Mauritania (and I added here the same holds true for F-5s in the Sahara), the FonMin said he was not aware of F-5s in these areas at this particular time. Persuaded the issue would not arise during the current congressional hearings on military assistance, he commented that as far as he knew there was no longer any public focus on this issue. I said that there had been past press reports of F-5s in Mauritania and in the Sahara, that there could very well be future press reports about F-5s in these areas, and that in Washington's view, the best solution would be a quiet withdrawal of the planes in question. Boucetta then asked rhetorically if this meant that the U.S. wished Morocco to cease helping Mauritania against external aggression. If so, this would contradict President Carter's statement of support and understanding for Moroccan assistance to Mauritania and his concern over the threat to peace in Africa from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Algeria expressed to PriMin Osman in Washington

on December 3 last year,⁷ and the U.S. should inform the GOM without delay. I responded that, on the contrary, the administration had had informal consultations with the Congress in an effort to be responsive to Morocco's needs, and that in these consultations we explored the question of amending the 1960 agreement to expand its scope to include the use of U.S. equipment by Morocco for the defense of Mauritania.

6. At the conclusion of meeting, Boucetta acknowledged that he was fully aware of U.S. concerns regarding Moroccan use of American arms in Mauritania and the Sahara, and reiterated he hoped that GOM had provided adequate assurances in this regard. In view of continuing U.S. preoccupation, however, Boucetta indicated that he was instructing Ambassador Bengelloun to address the subject in greater detail soon after his return to Washington on April 16. Bengelloun added that he would request meetings with the Secretary and with his "very old friend", Under Secretary Newsom, to discuss this and other urgent business.⁸

7. Department repeat as desired.

Anderson

⁷ See Document 151.

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph, circled "April 16," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin. When Newsom met with Bengelloun on April 20, their discussion of Moroccan use of U.S. arms was "brief." (Telegram 103687 to Rabat, April 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780172-11190)

159. Letter From President Carter to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, April 25, 1978

Your Majesty:

Thank you for the message brought to Washington by Foreign Minister Boucetta.² I regret my schedule did not permit a personal

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 3-6/78. No classification marking.

² See footnote 2, Document 156.

meeting, but the Vice President and Secretary Vance have informed me of their discussions with the Minister.³

Secretary Vance had the opportunity for a thorough exchange of views with Foreign Minister Boucetta on a variety of issues of common concern. We welcomed this occasion to consult closely and to obtain from the Foreign Minister directly your Government's views on these important matters.

As you know, our exchanges here included a full discussion of the specific issue of my Government's public statements regarding the Sahara. I trust Your Majesty now appreciates the circumstances under which such statements were made and understands that, in all our public statements concerning Morocco, we seek to emphasize the excellent character of bilateral relations, appreciation for the cooperation Morocco traditionally has extended the United States, and the great admiration in this country for the courage with which you and your advisers have defined Morocco's international orientation.

I have been informed of your suggestion for discussions here in Washington next month. Unfortunately, my calendar for May is very crowded, as several state visitors are already scheduled, and there will be a NATO summit in Washington at the end of the month. I suggest, however, that through our foreign ministers we find a time for a meeting which will be mutually convenient. I look forward to the chance to exchange views with you.

In the meantime, you have my very best personal wishes and you can be assured of the lasting bonds of friendship that bind our two countries.

Respectfully yours,

Jimmy Carter

³ For a summary of Boucetta's meeting with Mondale, see Document 156. For a summary of Vance's meetings with Boucetta on the Western Sahara, see Documents 223 and 224.

160. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Admiral Turner's Report on King Hassan's Views²

King Hassan has long hoped that we would see Morocco as belonging to the same category as Iran as a medium-size power sharing common interests with the United States. To this end, he has developed a fairly articulate presentation of the Soviet threat in Africa and Morocco's potential role in meeting it. As we saw in Shaba, there is a limited Moroccan capability to act, but it should not be exaggerated. The King has his hands full back home and, as much as he might wish it, Morocco is not in the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Egypt league in terms of our national interests. (S)

Hassan comes on as very strongly anti-Soviet in his talks with us, but he is a shrewd operator who knows how to hedge his bets. His Prime Minister was recently in Moscow to conclude a very large phosphate deal.³ In years past, Morocco has purchased Soviet military equipment. [1 line not declassified] Hassan is helping to bring about Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement. Like most Middle Eastern leaders, Hassan is skilled at keeping several balls in play at once. (S)

I do not think that we should aspire to a dramatically increased role in Morocco. The French are taking the lead, appropriately, in meeting Morocco's military needs, and Hassan has now admitted that he does not have an urgent need for the OV-10s and Cobras. Our interest is primarily to keep the Soviets out of North Africa, and to that end we should quietly be trying to ease Moroccan-Algerian tensions. For the first time, the Algerians have talked seriously to us about a political solution to the Sahara conflict. This may not be possible, but then again it may be. In any case, I think we need to look at how we can use our leverage with Morocco—recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara and release of the OV-10s and Cobras—to get some movement on the political front. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1/77-12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² Turner's April 10 report is *ibid*.

³ Reports on Osman's Moscow visit are in telegram 4258 from Moscow, March 11, and telegram 1556 from Rabat, March 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780109-0771 and D780114-1274, respectively)

King Hassan wants to visit Washington between May 21–23. I do not think we will have our own thoughts in order by then, and I am not very enthusiastic about non-substantive symbolic visits at a time when the President has plenty of serious business to attend to. I would favor a visit once we have a policy. (S)

My preferred scenario is as follows:

1. PRM on North Africa—you have a draft to be signed.
2. Newsom visit to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in June.
3. Hassan visit in July or later. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the PRM on North Africa.⁴

⁴ Brzezinski wrote beneath the recommendation: “OK done.” See Document 30.

161. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 15, 1978, 11 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of President’s Meeting with King Hassan

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
Hon. Richard Parker, Ambassador to Morocco
Mr. Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
Mr. Jerrold Schechter, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Translator

H.R.H. King Hassan II, of Morocco
H.E. Mohamed Boucetta, Minister of State in Charge of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador to U.S.
H.E. Driss Slaoui, Director General, National Company for Investments
H.E. Abdelhadi Boutaleb, Minister of Information
H.E. Ahmed Reda Guedira, Counselor to King Hassan II

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco 1978. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

H.E. Ahmed Ben Lachen Dlimi, Director, Directorate of General Studies and Documentation

H.E. Moulay Hafid, Minister of the Royal Household

The President: The King and I met last night for about half an hour and we will have a few minutes at the end of our meeting here to talk privately as well.² Last night we discussed the desirability of increased cultural exchange and in expanding the opportunity for students to study in the United States. We also want to increase American business investment in Morocco, and we understand the process of Moroccanization that is underway. We are eager to participate in mutually advantageous ways in expanding our trade relations. We hope to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement. Your constructive leadership in the non-proliferation treaty and in non-proliferation policies is appreciated. I hope that any differences that prevent rapid progress can be removed during your visit.

King Hassan: When I take leave of you today, I want you to know how much I appreciate what I have seen and heard here. The President has twice praised our ancestors who brought our two countries closer together. I hope that these forty-eight hours that we have had together have measured up to the level of our past. Today we can multiply our relationship ten times over because of rapid means of communications.

Many observers of Morocco are surprised by our plans, both on the external and internal fronts. We seem to run in all directions. This is part of our historical legacy. It is no surprise that we have troops in Shaba. One thousand years ago our teachers were in the Sudan. We took medicine and science to Europe. Wherever we went, we never took things for ourselves, but we left elements of civilization behind. The President should know that our actions in the Middle East and in Africa are not exhibitionist, they are part of our history.

We never want to put our friends in an embarrassing situation. As long as we can go on alone, we will do so. When we can't, we will call for help. Mr. Saunders came to see me last summer to ask what kind of assistance the United States could offer.³ I don't downgrade material economic assistance, but the best form of aid is for the United States to say in each of its embassies throughout the world that the United States and Morocco are very close friends. This is the strongest form of aid and it hurts no one. It is an effective form of assistance.

Countries, of course, do not live by sentiments alone. Morocco has been passing through a difficult financial period. This is not because

² Carter and Hassan met on the afternoon of November 14 for a discussion on Iran. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid*. They also met privately that evening after the State dinner.

³ See Document 230.

our economic prospects are poor. These are circumstantial problems, not fundamental ones. They go back to 1972. We were suffering from a certain restlessness, and we sent our troops to Golan and Sinai. When the October 1973 War took place, we left behind everything that we took. This meant that we had to redraw our plans for armaments. At the time, the prices were all right. But later prices went up by as much as five times. This left us with debts of one billion dollars with France, and a bit less with the United States. We have done everything possible to try to pay off all of our debts, and I believe the last installment is due to the United States at the end of the month.

At the Rabat Summit Conference in October 1974, several billion dollars were allocated to the countries that participated in the October War.⁴ I presided over the Conference as its host. Compensation was offered to me, but I turned it down, and I have remained consistent since then. The Saudis do help us, but less than you might expect. We should not have to knock on doors each time a problem arises. We need some mechanism to deal with these financial problems as they come along. The United States could help in economic cooperation.

There is a big project which is about to be concluded now with Westinghouse involving the extraction of uranium from phosphates. This could be a guarantee of Morocco's future. Morocco has fifteen hundred years worth of reserves of phosphates. These may be turned into a source of energy which Morocco can export. We are also looking for oil and are hopeful to find some. We are oriented to developing medium-sized industries throughout the country. We have serious unemployment problems and we need to create jobs which do not entail excessive costs. We are also working in the agricultural sector. Each year our hydraulic plans produce one million new hectares of land. We are concentrating on intensive agriculture, and we are interested in agro-business projects. Morocco should not depend on the European market for food. But agro-business requires heavy capital investment. It is expensive. In this field, the United States leads the world. We are also making efforts at cattle raising in Morocco. We have worked with the King Ranch with considerable success. A market for our products already exists, for example in Spain. The capital can be found for our projects, but it takes thirty years to train the man to make the projects work. The scholarship funds that you have offered will help inject new blood. I hope that young Moroccans will learn initiative from America. I hope that they will learn about competitive-

⁴ The Arab League Summit, held at Rabat October 26–29, 1974, voted unanimously for the creation of an independent Palestinian state and recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. See also footnote 2, Document 223.

ness and to use their imagination. It is all very well to create wealth, but we cannot hide it away. It must be put to good use.

General DeGaulle said that Morocco is one of the countries to be blessed by its location on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean can now be seen as a closed sea. With the advent [of] supertankers, and the vulnerability of the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean has changed in significance. Morocco controls one of the openings to the Mediterranean. Morocco is also a link to black Africa, and therefore excites the greed of many countries. We have to defend what we have tenaciously. I therefore would like to outline to you a plan.

The President and I are of the same generation. I believe that we are both optimists. I believe that we should think of building a tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar. This would be the salvation of Europe. Think of the possibilities of the exchange of raw materials from Africa to Europe. This could not be cut off by Soviet submarines. I once mentioned this to Franco, and some documents were prepared, but we were not able to pursue the idea. I was too far ahead of him in my thinking. But, you, Mr. President, run several miles every day. You can look forward and understand the importance of this project. It could be an inspiration to others. You and I could initiate this as we come to the end of this millenium.

I would like to talk about the security of Morocco. I do not want my country to be overarmed, but I want military hardware that is both reliable and suitable. I don't want to preclude a U.S.-Moroccan military relationship. I hope that the President looked at the maps that I left yesterday.⁵ This part of Africa will be an increasingly heavy burden for the defense of the free world. Suppose Zaire falls. Then Sudan and Egypt will be vulnerable and Africa could be split in two. This would end the use of the Suez Canal. This could pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia. The northern side of the Mediterranean is not so tranquil either. One-half of Italy is under Communist control. Look at Yugoslavia after Tito's death. Turkey, a member of NATO, is a neighbor of Iran. My neighbors to the south, Libya and Algeria, are also shifting to red. I'll be alone with France at the western end of the Mediterranean. Spain is not reliable. It cannot be counted on for now. The King of Spain does not want to use his powers. The majority in Spain is fearful. The left is in disarray. The most intelligent man in the country is Carrillo, the Secretary General of the Communist Party.

Morocco alone cannot fill the role of the advanced defense of the free world. I don't need to go on further with you, Mr. President. I

⁵ Not found.

say this mostly to convince myself, not you. I know that you already understand these issues.

I have another idea for looking at the law of the sea in a new way. We should talk about the law of the right to the sea. This would be a new doctrine. We would provide some land-locked countries, such as Mali, Chad, and Niger, who have no lung to breathe, no effective communications, with access to the oceans. The international community could undertake to build railroads, and these could be multinational in ownership. They would provide oxygen to these countries. It would help them communicate. I am also convinced that the food needs of the future will come from the sea. We should not leave some countries without access to these resources. I think that the United States, guided by your philosophy, Mr. President, could start a project of this sort. This would win you a place of honor.

I'll end with a biblical reflection. If I have sown good seeds, I am sure some of them will take root.

The President: This has been very interesting and instructive. You have clearly described the situation as it exists in your area. Our long-standing friendship has been strengthened by your visit. You and your sons have captivated my entire family.

I know the economic problems that exist, both in your country and in mine. We can't always control prices. I understand the circumstances that lead to this, including the recent decline in prices for phosphate. But I am convinced of the basic strength of your country and of your policies and I know your future is bright. We both have great phosphate deposits and strong agricultural systems. To some extent this makes us trade competitors, but also puts us in a position to share our technology and our information. An important example is the Westinghouse project. We also have phosphates in Florida and we are doing some experiments there. We can share our information. Oil shale is another aspect of your future development, and your development of those resources can be rapid. It would be a good idea for us to send some of our business and government representatives to Morocco to explore more fully the investment opportunities and the projects in which we could cooperate. I will ask Secretary Vance to pursue this, if you do not object. Secretary Vance will meet with you tonight and will talk to you about this after consulting with our Secretary of Commerce.⁶

King Hassan: We have reached an advanced stage of talks with Occidental Petroleum. They have an idea of developing oil shale in place without pollution, and without requiring much water. There is some concern about these techniques in the United States and I would

⁶ See Document 163.

suggest that Mr. Hammer be encouraged to come to Morocco to work out these projects first. We are less worried than you are about pollution.

The President: You will be talking with Secretary Schlesinger this afternoon and you might raise this issue.⁷ There is also the question of a nuclear cooperation agreement. If there are no other joint issues now, perhaps we can spend a few minutes in private. (The President spent fifteen minutes with King Hassan alone.)⁸

⁷ No record of this meeting was found.

⁸ No record of this private conversation was found.

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 18, 1978, 1737Z

293669. Subject: King's Visit: Military Supply Discussions.

Summary. During his visit, King Hassan assured the Secretary that U.S. furnished weapons would not be used outside Moroccan territory. We informed the Moroccan party that this assurance fell short of our requirement and the issue of use of American equipment in the Sahara remains unresolved. We intend to pursue the subject further with Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun. End summary.

1. At the White House meeting on the morning of November 15 the Secretary had a brief side discussion with Foreign Minister Boucetta and Ambassador Bengelloun during which Bengelloun raised question of arms for Morocco. The Secretary said we wanted to help but we needed some assurances regarding how arms would be used. Bengelloun said Morocco was ready to give assurances that they would be used only for legitimate self-defense. Secretary said we had a congressional problem with regard to use of these arms in the Sahara. Bengelloun contested this but the Secretary held his ground and said we did indeed have a political problem and we needed to take it into account

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78-8/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Parker, who was in Washington for the King's visit, and F.O. Smith; approved in S. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Paris, Nouakchott, Madrid, and Moscow.

in our policy. What we needed was an assurance as to where the arms would be used and for what purposes. If the Moroccans, for instance, would tell us they would be stationed at such and such places in northern Morocco and be used only against an invasion threat, that would be satisfactory.

2. Afternoon of November 15 Ambassador Bengelloun told Ambassador Parker that US should show more comprehension of Moroccan needs. He said he was counting on Ambassador Parker to get USG to change its position from that set forth by the Secretary in the morning. (There was no opportunity to report this conversation to the Secretary before he met with the King that evening.)

3. King opened meeting with the Secretary evening November 15 by saying he thought his trip had opened a large window. He did not want to look at problems through the keyhole. If the Department felt the Moroccans must give a letter guaranteeing that American military equipment would not be used outside Moroccan territory, Moroccans would do so. In this regard he suggested jocularly that we might consider Kosygin formula.

4. King then described how he had sent Prime Minister Osman to Soviet Union to sign agreements regarding phosphates and fishing.² There was no problem with the phosphates, but Soviets were obviously dragging their feet on the fishing agreement, regarding which they had earlier been very keen. It appeared that question of Sahara coastline was bothering them. Prime Minister was authorized to sign the phosphate agreement and return. Hassan then summoned his Ambassador from Moscow and sent him to see Kosygin and ask him personal question on King's behalf: Why did Soviets not want to sign agreement? Was it because of Algerian pressure?

5. Kosygin, who had just returned from the Sino-Soviet border area hit the ceiling at the mention of Algerian pressure, pointing out that Soviet Union was an independent state. Ambassador asked if this was the Soviet answer to the King's question. Kosygin told him to wait ten minutes during which he would draft a text. Kosygin left Ambassador in his office and returned shortly thereafter with typed text in French saying Soviets would fish along Moroccan coastline in accordance with Moroccan laws.

6. In any event, Hassan did not want to embarrass his friends. Any time he might ask for American equipment he would not use it outside Moroccan frontiers. As he had said to President day before, most impor-

² See footnote 3, Document 160.

tant thing U.S. could do for Morocco was to have its Ambassadors around the world openly say that Morocco was our friend.³

7. Assuming King's remarks regarding arms were shorthand response to Secretary's earlier statement to Boucetta and Bengelloun, Secretary said he thought we could proceed on that basis.

8. November 16 Ambassador Parker telephoned Ambassador Bengelloun to clarify the nature of the assurances we were expecting from King Hassan regarding use of American weapons. Bengelloun said King's meaning was very clear. He, Bengelloun, was to send the Department a letter stating that American arms would be used only for the defense of Morocco and would not be used outside Moroccan territory. Ambassador Parker noted that in Moroccan context this would include the Sahara. Bengelloun replied "of course", but this did not mean that they would necessarily be used there. The King did not want to embarrass the United States and would do his best to avoid it. But he could not make a distinction between the Sahara and the rest of Morocco in a document.

9. Ambassador Parker told Bengelloun that unfortunately he had not been able to inform the Secretary about Bengelloun's remarks Wednesday morning⁴ on the need to modify the American position on assurances. The Secretary had assumed that the King's remarks reflected his acceptance of the conditions the Secretary had specified in his morning conversation with Boucetta and Bengelloun, i.e., a commitment where the arms would be and what they would be used for. Ambassador Parker suggested that it might be stated that the arms would be stationed in northern Morocco and used only in the case of invasion in the east. Bengelloun replied that an attack was also possible from the south or even from the sea. He protested that what Ambassador Parker was suggesting went beyond the limits of diplomacy. Ambassador Parker told him he felt there had been a misunderstanding, and he called back later to confirm this. His remarks had been conveyed to the Secretary who said he did not want to spoil the visit and raise the subject with the King this evening, but the Moroccans should have no question in their minds that there had been a misunderstanding. The Secretary had interpreted the King's remarks as meaning that he would accept the position set forth by the Secretary to Bengelloun and Boucetta in the morning. Secretary could not go beyond that.

10. We intend to pursue this issue with Ambassador Bengelloun in an effort to get the type of assurances mentioned by the Secretary in his initial conversation reported para 1 above. In the meantime, we

³ See Document 161.

⁴ November 15.

are using press guidance prepared for the visit which states that we do not want to sell Morocco arms for use in the Western Sahara, that we will continue to consider new requests for arms sales to Morocco on a case by case basis, and that we will of course consult with Congress as required by law.

Vance

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 18, 1978, 1739Z

293672. Subject: Royal Visit: Secretary's Conversation With Hassan.

1. Secretary met with King Hassan at Blair House following Moroccan Embassy reception evening November 15.² Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun, Moulay Hafid el Alaoui, Dlimi, Saunders and Parker were present. Boucetta and Boutaleb joined meeting later. Conversation began with military supply (septel),³ continued with Sahara and later turned to situation in various countries in Middle East and Africa.

2. Following discussion of military supply, Secretary said there were two other things he wished to bring up. First of all, he had heard that the King's appearance at the National Press Club lunch had gone very well and had been well received. He congratulated King. Secondly, he had talked to the Secretary of Commerce and they had agreed to put together a group of government and business people under Mrs. Kreps, at a time to be agreed on, to follow up on President's suggestion regarding a trade mission made that morning. It remained to be decided when group should go. King said the sooner the better. Secretary said he had asked Mrs. Kreps to get in touch with Ambassador Bengelloun.

3. Returning to Sahara, Secretary said he had been pondering King's earlier remarks on subject and agreed with him that it was not in our joint interest to have a weak, independent state at that location on the Atlantic. On the other hand, we must be realistic. There was a political

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780476–0283. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers. Sent for information Priority to Paris, Nouakchott, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Jidda, and Khartoum. Drafted by Parker; cleared in S; approved by Saunders.

² Vance also met with Hassan on November 14; see Document 236.

³ See Document 162.

problem. With regard to the United Nations, Moroccans could count on our support for their position that question should be left in hands of OAU Wise Men rather than be subject to new resolution. (This had been requested during talk between Secretary, Boucetta and Bengelloun at morning White House meeting); on other hand, His Majesty, as a statesman and politician, must recognize that there was a difficult problem for us. We had voted for the UN resolution regarding self-determination and we had a problem with our Congress over this issue. King interjected that this was a formal problem having nothing to do with our fundamental relationship. Secretary agreed, but said we must nevertheless follow a neutral policy.

4. King said this was of course a topical (ponctuelle) neutrality. The Sahara problem was his to resolve. He thought it would diminish as Boumediene went. In that regard it would not be easy to pick a successor. Two candidates had already asked him to sponsor them during his visit to the United States. He refused to say who they were, noting that there were others who would also ask the same service. He seemed to be in high good humor over this.

5. King said that whoever succeeded Boumediene would not have his influence. He would have many domestic problems and would not wish to be involved in external ones. Secretary asked King's views as to who successor would be. King said there were at least three factions (clans). First was Bouteflika's. His position was weakened by his play-boy image and fact he was gone from Algiers most of the time. He nevertheless had support of the frontier army (sic) because he came from border area. Second was Yahiaoui, former Commandant of military academy, who controlled the party apparatus. Third was Mirbah, Chief of Military Security, who had control of individual liberties of Algerians. Whoever arrived to power would not stay in place too long.

6. King said Yahiaoui's mentor was Zbiri who had been in exile in Morocco for last five years. Yahiaoui could not act without his blessing. Mirbah had caused too much harm to too many people to be popular.

7. King said Boumediene and he were to have met in Belgium the last week in September, at Algerian request. Col. Dlimi had been at the office of Col. Raas, Chief of Belgian Intelligence, when Mirbah had arrived and said the meeting was off. Raas had been very embarrassed. He had already arranged for three chateaus to be available, one for each party to live in and one of them to meet in. Belgians had nevertheless kept the whole affair secret.

8. Dlimi had asked why meeting was cancelled and Mirbah said he did not know. King had then received letter from Boumediene saying that Moroccan position on Palestine made it difficult for him to meet with Hassan. King chuckled over this and wagged his head

in jolly fashion noting that when letter had been sent Boumediene was already en route to Moscow for treatment.

9. King said he belonged to ancient school of diplomacy, that of Mohamed. One should talk and talk, and strike (taper) the other from time to time. He was not a violent man and he did not want war. He must admit, however, that had he had the means to reduce Algeria to impotence for 30 years he would have done so.

10. Secretary asked which of the men King had mentioned was closest to Soviets. King said it was certainly not Bouteflika. He thought it was Mirbah. The Algerian Intelligence Services were closely patterned after the KGB. He turned to Dlimi for confirmation and latter agreed and said all their training was Soviet. He was sure Secretary would agree that Soviet training could mean a change in geopolitics of the region if a Soviet protege came to power.

11. Secretary asked what Qadhafi was going to do in near future. King said if Boumediene remained they would have to fight sooner or later when Bourguiba disappeared. The eclipse of Boumediene would mean that Qadhafi would move into the ascendant. If a new leader of Algeria was not a member of the refusal front, that would cause changes in the area.

12. Secretary said we understood Sudanese had taken very strong position at Baghdad and that various threats had been made by the hardliners against Numayri. What did King think this might lead to and what could we do to help them? King said it was, of course, Iraq and Algeria who were the menace to Sudan. King said we should keep Sudanese close to Egypt and give a hand to Zaire. Secretary said we were trying to help Numayri with F-5s and C-130s. We needed to give him high priority regarding other material he needed. We could also help him economically, perhaps with an agricultural program. King said we should ask the Vatican to use its influence so that there would be no more fighting in the south. Most of the people there were Christian. Secretary said we might be able to do something in that respect.

13. Secretary noted that Kenya played a key role in Africa and asked if we should try to help there as well. King said yes we should, but we should also watch out for the British and keep them from playing their traditional role of tribal politics, which was very dangerous.

14. King noted that he had been asked at lunch about the Baghdad Summit. He had replied that Khartoum had been a war summit, while Rabat had been a peace summit. The Baghdad Summit, with its emphasis on no separate peace, was simply a hard-line application of the

Rabat Summit.⁴ As he had told the President earlier, he was convinced that the latter's use of antibiotics at Camp David had reduced the abscess and that which remained could not cause much harm. Jordan, Iraq and Syria, together or separately, could not harm Israel seriously. Begin should not capitalize on this too long but it was a fact. Meanwhile, something must be done about Jerusalem. This issue was particularly troubling to the Saudis; Secretary said he hoped we would be able to come up with an answer regarding Jerusalem, but this would take time. We obviously could not do it today; King nodded and said emotions are obviously running too high.

15. Secretary said he wanted pose question to King as friend. Would it be a good idea to have Prince Fahd come to the states to talk about Arab-Israeli problem? King said he would not come if Egyptian and Israeli delegations were here and negotiating or if the treaty had just been signed. If he came he should come in a crisis scenario, i.e., when negotiations were broken off and both parties had gone home.

16. Discussion turned to Guinea and Secretary said we had feeling Sekou Toure was about to change his line. King said he would turn, but he had to be approached on tip toes. He had been sent to Czechoslovakia by the French for training in postal work and had returned with a Marxist veneer which had no substance beneath. He was a "primaire" who did not even have a college degree. He would change, but he was afraid to have it said he had done so. The key lay with Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who had a father and son relationship with Sekou.

17. Secretary said he wanted skip again to other side of continent and asked about the two Yemens. What did King think about situation there? King said that existence of two Yemens was mistake of British imperialism. Frontiers in that area were largely superimposed and meaningless. Secretary noted that we had been prepared to send delegation to South Yemen to look into restoration of relations, but Saudis, who had originally encouraged us to do so, had subsequently changed their mind and asked us not to. Now Saudis themselves had informed us that they were in contact with South Yemenis and they seem to be returning to the idea that we should try to reestablish relations. We were bemused by the Saudi reversals.

⁴ The Arab League Summit convened in Baghdad November 2-5 in response to the Camp David Accords signed in September. The Summit resolved that the Accords harmed the rights of the Palestinian people and urged the Egyptian Government not to ratify the agreements and to align itself with the Arab League. The League also froze its relations with the Government of Egypt. For a summary of the meeting and text of the final communiqué, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 29659-29660. Regarding the Rabat Summit, see footnote 4, Document 161.

18. King said Saudis had recently installed perfect young man, Prince Turki, as a Chief of Intelligence; he seemed, however, to be the only man they had, and their information on the Yemen was poor. A few months ago they had been proud to say that 50 percent of the South Yemenis were in Saudi Arabia working and that they were being allowed to repatriate their earnings to Aden. Some two months ago, however, Moroccans had become very concerned at number of South Yemenis fleeing to Saudi Arabia because they suspected there were some black sheep among them. (Implication was that change in Saudi policy might relate to this.) In any event, if there were further untoward incidents in South Yemen, Saudis would reverse their policy again.

Vance

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 18, 1978, 2046Z

293692. Subject: King's Visit—Meeting With Secretary Brown.

1. Following is memorandum of conversation between King Hassan and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Blair House November 17. Colonel Dlimi attended from Moroccan side and from U.S. side, Deputy Secretary Duncan, ISA Assistant Secretary McGiffert, Executive Assistant Adm Hanson and ISA Africa Region Director Roberts. Interpreter was Alec Toumayan.

2. Begin text:

GEODSS (S)—Secretary Brown explained U.S. interest in a ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance site in Morocco. It would track satellites out to 22,000 miles as part of a global network of five stations, manned by military and contract personnel, and would have both scientific and defense uses. Morocco had agreed in principle but the memorandum of understanding has not yet been signed.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78–8/80. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Paris, Kinshasa, Brussels, Dakar, Algiers, Nouakchott, and Madrid. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in DOD/ISA; cleared by Bishop and in OSD and AF/C; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780476–0536)

King Hassan observed that he had accepted the GEODSS in principle, just as the U.S. had agreed to sell the Cobra helicopters and OV-10 planes in principle. "But I am making no linkage," he said. "We can get helicopters elsewhere if this is embarrassing."²

The King then asked about the size of the site (10 acres), its "civilian configuration" (scientific mission could be public, but the information has military significance elsewhere), and staffing (6-7 military, 40 contractors). The King emphasized that he wanted to be as realistic and discreet as possible about the site. There were political and security elements—"the more that is known, the more I am threatened." He wanted the staff proportion changed, with the military—in civil dress—constituting the preponderant element because they were disciplinable and trained to be discreet. Secretary Brown agreed to adjust the ratio as possible and suggested that the civilians could be selected for discretion. The King proposed doing both, noting, "I'd feel more relaxed."

Helicopters (S)—Picking up the King's reference to helicopters. Secretary Brown noted that the Hughes 500 was, though less armed, more versatile and much less expensive than the Cobra—about a third less. The King said he was familiar with the Hughes and indicated that it was acceptable.³ Secretary Brown noted that Secretary Vance had been discussing the use of military equipment with the King and that such sales would be considered in this light. The King laughed and observed that the President had twice "kidnapped" the Secretary just as they were getting down to business. The next talk, however, would be at the Moroccan Embassy where "I have extra-territorial rights."⁴

Mutual interests (S)—Secretary Brown then observed that the U.S. and Morocco have mutual interests, a long history of relations, and close cooperation in the defense area since the 1950s when we established bases. King Hassan responded that Morocco's attitude toward the U.S. and U.S. equipment had been constant. Morocco had chosen its camp and was in that camp. Secretary Brown noted that the U.S. was continuing to make many ship visits, that these were much appreciated, and that hopefully the problem that Secretary Vance had been discussing would be resolved in the spirit of cooperation.

The King replied that if the two executives are in agreement, they should be able to "dress up" the terms.

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

³ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences in this paragraph.

Secretary Brown cautioned that some executive agreements survive congressional examination while others do not. King Hassan observed that it seemed illogical that the U.S. should sell planes like the F-15 and F-16, with their capabilities, in the Middle East but not 150 mph helicopters to Morocco. Secretary Brown responded that he was about to bring up the Middle East case also, but to make the point that the executive had had a very difficult time persuading Congress to accept it, and in fact had barely succeeded. King Hassan then asked what the Arabs were going to do for pilots, and how long their training would be—noting somewhat jokingly that if they had chosen Mirages, Morocco could have furnished pilots. Secretary Brown pointed out that there would be no F-15 deliveries until 1981 and that pilot training would take about two years. “Everything will be finished by then”, the King concluded.

Namibia (S)—King Hassan commented that Walvis Bay was the Soviets’ real interest. It was the only deep-water port for 400 kilometers in either direction and very few people were watching it. Namibian human rights and segregation were not really involved. Secretary Brown observed that those ideas might not affect the Soviets but they did others. King Hassan responded, “We defend general concepts too, but peacefully. This ties our hands. It’s a paradox.”

Shaba (S)—Secretary Brown observed that in Shaba both the U.S. and Morocco had stood up for their ideas. This was true, the King acknowledged, but he had no illusions there—“the people are not very solid.” While he did not wish to refight old problems, he noted that Korea had its suppliers as did Vietnam. Had Zaire been fully supported two years ago, perhaps at a cost of \$17 million, it could have settled matters differently in Angola.

“Now”, he said, “we are the United States in Zaire, we are only 2,000 and I fear for my men.” If the people were on Morocco’s side, he said the situation would be “okay”. But the people are against the Zairian Army and would reject all authority if they could. If there were another invasion the Moroccan forces could do little. The U.S. should recognize that it was Savimbi and UNITA, by moving their forces to the Zambian border, that had really caused the Katangan guerrillas to withdraw. Morocco is now supporting the security burden alone, and “it has cost \$4 million to date.”

Secretary Brown observed that he could sympathize personally as the Defense Department had spent \$15 million in Shaba support and has not been repaid. King Hassan emphasized that a solution would have to be found. “We cannot stay beyond the end of the year”, he said, “and I fear we may be headed for a catastrophe.” Secretary Brown asked to what extent France and Belgium were contributing. The King responded, “very little.” Belgium was interested in commercial matters

and the security of the Kolwezi mine technicians; the French were concerned with intelligence. "Whether I stay or leave", he said, "I do not know to what bank window to go." Perhaps when the forces are withdrawn Morocco would put half of them in France and half in Belgium to recoup their costs.

Invitation (S)—King Hassan then excused himself for transferring all his problems to the Secretary and invited Mr. Brown to spend one or two days in Rabat for further talks. He would ask the President to authorize it. Secretary Brown said he would like to accept and noted that Morocco had been very supportive in Middle East-European relations. The King smiled, noted that Morocco was perhaps a far-western European country, and suggested that further discussion of the GEODSS program could be carried on with his Ambassador in Washington.

End text.

Vance

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 3, 1978, 2218Z

306394. Subject: Military Supply to Morocco: Search for Assurances. Ref: State 293669.²

1. Summary: As follow-up to discussions during King Hassan's visit, Assistant Secretary Saunders met with Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun November 27 to discuss language GOM could employ to assure USG on use of U.S. military equipment. Bengelloun said that GOM understood USG did not want equipment used in the Sahara, but GOM could not use wording which implied that Sahara was in any way different from rest of Morocco. It also did not want to limit its self-defense options. Following meeting, Department gave Bengelloun text for Bengelloun to carry to Rabat later in week to seek GOM concurrence. End summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780499-1124. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, and Madrid. Drafted by Smith; cleared in PM, L, H, AF/W, and NEA/AFN; approved by Saunders.

² See Document 162.

2. Ambassador Bengelloun opened conversation by saying the King's visit had been very important for US-Moroccan relations. Moroccans considered it had been a success, particularly because the King and President Carter had been able to establish a personal relationship. Saunders responded that we, too, had been very pleased with the visit. He noted that the communique had contained more substance than was often the case and had usefully described the breadth of our relations.³ The Secretary, he said, thought that it was a very positive thing for the King to have come when he did. All in all, the visit provided the US and Morocco with something to build on in their bilateral relations.

3. Saunders then said that he hoped it would be possible to move ahead, on the basis of the visit, to resolve our differences over use of US military equipment. He then reviewed briefly the discussions which had occurred during the King's visit (reftel). The Secretary had mentioned a possible approach which might help resolve the problem, i.e. for Morocco to give US positive assurances on where and how the equipment would be used rather than a negative assurance that the equipment would not be used in the Western Sahara. The idea for such assurances had come from Saunders' discussion with the King in July, when the King had volunteered that he would deploy Cobra helicopters in the north for use against Algerian armor.⁴ Saunders then gave Bengelloun in writing, in both French and English the following formulation: Quote: We would like an assurance which allows us to draw the conclusion that weapons purchased in the United States will not be used in the Sahara. This could be done by stating that the weapons will be stationed and used elsewhere. For example, we might be given the assurance that weapons would be stationed in northern Morocco for use in case of a conventional Algerian attack. Unquote. He cautioned Ambassador Bengelloun that all three sentences should be read together. Together they met Moroccan requirements by avoiding any specific mention of the Western Sahara but would give us the assurance which we needed in dealing with Congress.

4. In reply Ambassador Bengelloun said that he personally had discussed with the King USG concerns, i.e. that arms not be used in the Sahara. He noted that the King had asked the Secretary if an assurance that the arms would be used in Moroccan territory to repel external aggression would suffice. The main Moroccan concern was that it did not want to give any impression, particularly in writing, that it drew a distinction between the Sahara and the rest of Morocco.

³ For the text of the joint press statement issued on November 17, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 2055–2056.

⁴ See Document 230.

On the other hand, the King had said he did not want to cause difficulties for his American friends. Bengelloun said that Morocco was ready to find a formula which would enable it and USG to resolve this difficulty.

5. Saunders interjected that the problem with the formula proposed by the King at Blair House was that it did not rule out use in the Sahara.

6. Bengelloun responded that the problem with the formula which had just been given was that it did not deal with the possibility of an attack by Algeria in the south. Morocco had a frontier with Algeria there, but under the proposed formula it would not be able to use US-supplied arms to repel an attack from that direction. Perhaps language could be developed stating that Morocco would use the arms only against an external attack, regardless of where it came from. Such a formulation would be consistent with the 1960 bilateral military assistance agreement. Also, it would have the advantage of not naming Algeria specifically.

7. Saunders said that he was very conscious that what Algeria did in backing the Polisario constituted a threat to Moroccan forces. Did Bengelloun's formulation exclude use of US-supplied arms against the Algerian proxy, the Polisario? If so, something might be possible.

8. Bengelloun stated that he understood that the USG did not want Morocco to use US arms against the Polisario. But the Polisario was only the creation of Algeria, and it sometimes even attacked inside what the USG recognized as Moroccan territory. What about the use of US arms in that case?

9. Saunders replied that this would be a clear cut case of self-defense.

10. Bengelloun then summarized: Morocco wished to avoid, first, any statement that there was a difference between the Sahara and the rest of Morocco, and, second, any limit on its options of legitimate self-defense. He wanted to find a formula which would avoid these two problems and which he could present to the King.

11. AFN Director Bishop suggested that we could assure Morocco that we would have no objection to redeployment of US-supplied arms to repel an attack against territory we considered Moroccan. Saunders added that perhaps the Moroccan assurance could state that the arms would be deployed to repel conventional Algerian attack. There was a difference between the Polisario, which was no real threat to Morocco, and Algerian regular troops.

12. Bengelloun said that the Polisario could exist only with Algerian support. It was using sophisticated weapons that it could only obtain

and operate with Algerian help. The battle was not between Morocco and the Polisario but between Morocco and Algeria.

13. Bishop explained that the US was trying to help Morocco respond to an attack by Algerian tanks and aircraft. If Morocco was involved in the Sahara, it would still need to keep some arms in reserve for use against Algerian attack. We wanted our arms to be in that category. An Algerian attack would be most likely in the north, but if there was an Algerian attack in the south we would have no objection if the arms were moved to the south.

14. Bengelloun then asked what would happen if there were Cuban advisers to the Polisario. Those would be foreign troops. Bishop replied that he was talking of a main force engagement, not of one mounted in Land Rovers.

15. American side then proposed formula along the lines of that which appears below. Saunders said that if we got acceptable assurances, he would personally discuss them with individual Senators and Congressmen. He hoped this would help ease congressional concerns. There were Congressmen who favored self-determination but also those who were basically friendly to Morocco but had problems with use of US arms in the Sahara. Saunders noted that it was important to have a formula which Morocco could live with—nothing would be worse than a formula which would cause Morocco problems in the long run, because it would be important to have scrupulous adherence to the language of the assurances. On the other hand, it was important to get the issue out of the way because sales were being held up pending its resolution. He cited as examples the Moroccan request to purchase helicopters manufactured in Italy under US license (CH-47), as well as other helicopters (TOW-Cobra and/or Hughes 500). Saunders promised to give Ambassador Bengelloun language before the Ambassador's departure for a brief visit to Rabat later in the week. He noted that Ambassador Parker would be available if Bengelloun wished to propose any modifications in the language while he was in Rabat.

16. Saunders also said that it would be helpful if Ambassador Bengelloun could bring back from Rabat some indication of how the Committee of Wise Men was going. The Committee was important for Morocco in the OAU context, for both of us in the UN, and for the administration in its dealings with Congress, where there were people who wanted to see evidence of self-determination.

17. On November 29 Bengelloun was given following formulation as possible text for Moroccan assurance: Quote: Weapons will be used in accordance with the U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement of 1960 solely to defend the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of

Morocco in the event of a major attack on the armed forces of Morocco by the armed forces of a foreign state.⁵ Unquote.

Vance

⁵ In telegram 318490 to Rabat, December 19, the Department informed the Embassy that Hassan rejected the formulation "on grounds it would prohibit deployment of subject equipment to Zaire, should Moroccans be called on to send forces there in future. King exhorted Bengelloun and USG to use 'imagination' and find another formula." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523-0754)

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, December 22, 1978, 1912Z

322156. Subject: Military Supply—Search for Assurances. Ref: State 306394 (Notal).²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun was unable to give NEA Assistant Secretary Saunders much rationale for King Hassan's rejection of proposed formula for assurances on use of U.S. arms. Saunders answered the King's specific question on use of U.S. supplied equipment in a country such as Zaire and gave Bengelloun the text of assurance which would be acceptable in case of CH-47 helicopters built in Italy under U.S. license.³ End summary.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78-8/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, and Rome. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in NEA/AFN; cleared by Bishop; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780530-0206)

² See Document 165.

³ In telegram 321816 to Rome and Rabat, December 22, the Department explained why the sale was not approved: "In case of CH-47 helicopters, we would not be willing to approve U.S. sale without assurances which would convince us that Morocco does not plan to use them to consolidate Moroccan control of the Western Sahara. Moroccan intentions regarding the CH-47's have been unclear. Italian Ambassador's statement quoted Rabat 7697, implies that while CH-47's will not be used in combat operations, they will be used to support Moroccan military establishment in the Western Sahara." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780529-0956) Telegram 7697 from Rabat, December 8, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780506-0988.

3. Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun called on Assistant Secretary Saunders December 21 at our request to discuss further, following Bengelloun's visit to Morocco, issue of Moroccan assurances on use of U.S. military equipment. Draper from NEA and Bishop and Smith from AFN attended, as well as interpreter.

4. Saunders opened discussion by asking Bengelloun for [omission in original] noted that Congress would reconvene soon and that we would have to cope with the issue at some point in the context of congressional inquiries. There was also the more pressing problem of the CH-47 helicopters.

5. Bengelloun explained that his discussion of assurances with the King at Fez on December 7 had been quite brief. The King discussed the issue with him while walking around the garden just after seeing Sadat's special envoy. Bengelloun showed the King the formula we had prepared (reftel). The King asked, "How can I intervene in Zaire if I make such a commitment." Bengelloun inquired what he should do once he had an answer to that question. The King replied in essence, "Just ask the question and get back to me with the answer".

6. Bengelloun said that he personally believed that the King was seriously concerned about the issue. He was thinking about it but might not yet be ready to share his thoughts and conclusions, Bengelloun suggested. His Majesty could not renounce the defense of the Sahara and might be considering language which would permit him to assure the defense of that area by using other than U.S. equipment.

7. Saunders replied with regard to the King's question that if Morocco had a need to use U.S. equipment elsewhere, it could discuss it with us. That was done this year in the case of Zaire, when we gave our approval. There was no prohibition under our bilateral accord as long as we agreed beforehand to use of the equipment elsewhere.

8. Saunders then suggested that even without resolving the larger problem, it might be possible to work out an ad hoc solution so that the six Italian built, U.S. licensed helicopters could be delivered to Morocco. Bishop noted that this was an urgent matter because two were ready for delivery and the rest would be ready soon. Saunders then handed Bengelloun a draft assurance, noting that the idea for this type assurance originated when the King told him in July⁴ that TOW-Cobra helicopters would be based in northern Morocco for use against Algeria. Saunders said he recognized that the CH-47s were transport helicopters, making them a different case. Bishop added that we had discussed use of the CH-47s with the Moroccan Air Force, which had not been prepared to say that they would not be used in the Sahara.

⁴ See Document 230.

Saunders said he was prepared to continue talks on the broader question of assurances but added that the formula proposed for the CH-47s, if accepted, might suggest something which would prove useful elsewhere as well.

9. Following is draft assurance on CH-47 helicopters given Bengelloun, which was prepared after Washington representative of Agusta-Bell informed Department December 20 that GOM prepared to agree to an assurance to obtain delivery of helicopters:

Begin quote: The helicopters will be stationed and used in northern or central Morocco and will be used elsewhere only in the case of a major attack by the regular forces of a foreign state, or as agreed between the Moroccan and U.S. Governments. Unquote.

10. Bengelloun said he thought the King would appreciate the U.S. effort in developing the language for the CH-47s. However, in telephone call to Bishop later in day Bengelloun said he doubted King would agree to assurance text provided by Saunders and that he wanted to discuss it further on December 22 before sending text to Rabat. While agreeing to further discussion, Bishop stressed his understanding that GOM anxious to take delivery of CH-47s.

11. Bengelloun then discussed what he called the heart of the problem—the question of how Morocco was to defend a territory over which the U.S. recognized its administrative control. The Polisario was equipped with Soviet weapons supplied through Algeria or Libya, while the Moroccan Army was “mostly equipped with American arms”. What was Morocco to do?

12. Saunders replied that while the defense of the territory was one aspect of the problem, the other was the UN resolutions and the need for an act of self-determination.⁵ The U.S. was hoping, he said, that the OAU Committee of Wise Men could help resolve the latter aspect of the problem.

13. Bengelloun replied that Morocco was waiting for a visit to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott by the Presidents of Nigeria and Mali, who had been designated as a two-man subcommittee to study the problem and report to the larger OAU Committee of Wise Men. However, the Polisario continued its attacks. Morocco was only defending the key centers and would never be the aggressor by carrying the attack to “the other side”. Happily, there as yet had been no large scale attacks using armored vehicles and tanks, which he said would require Morocco to use its U.S. tanks for defense. But from time to time Morocco

⁵ Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolutions 31A and 31B, adopted on December 13, 1978. The United States abstained on Resolution 31A and voted in favor of Resolution 31B. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 874–876.

had to use its air force for reconnaissance. Bengelloun said he hoped the Wise Men would be able to explain to Algeria that Morocco would not relinquish sovereignty but that it would be possible to work for economic cooperation in the area.

15. Bengelloun added that Morocco recognized that it still had problems in the UN. The King had been very grateful for the U.S. support for the pro-Moroccan resolution in this year's UNGA.⁶

Christopher

⁶ UNGA Resolution 31B left consideration of the Western Sahara in the hands of the Organization of African Unity and its Wise Mens Committee.

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 29, 1979, 1904Z

652. Subj: (S) Italian Helicopters for Morocco.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Department please pass following message to White House for Dr. Brzezinski.

3. King Hassan has asked that I convey to President Carter through Dr. Brzezinski his deep concern with our position on supply of arms to Morocco which is blocking delivery of Italian-made Chinook helicopters to Morocco. King rejects categorically and once and for all idea that he or his government give us positive assurances such equipment would be used elsewhere than in the Sahara. He said such assurances would be dishonest, and if given sincerely would give us protectorate over Morocco and American Ambassador would be like High Commissioner, telling Morocco where it could and could not put equipment that it was paying for with its own money. Morocco was a small country but it had a flag, a tradition and pride.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840125–1267. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

4. The King continued that U.S. was in need of allies today but one began to wonder what good it was to be an ally of the Americans (a reference to the Shah). We were prepared to fly Moroccans to Shaba and let them use American weapons to support American interests there, but we were not prepared to let them have unarmed helicopters to defend their homeland. He found our position incomprehensible. He indicated that he was tired of hearing that we had congressional problems and said if we felt we had to go to Congress about the sale of helicopters to Morocco, he would have to go to Parliament about our request for GEODSS installation.

5. King noted that we were free country and if we decided we could not let Morocco have these helicopters, then so be it. Our relations would inevitably suffer and Morocco would have to look elsewhere (a reference to Soviets). He would regret this, but Morocco simply could not accept limitations on its sovereignty. He was not prepared to be a beggar going to the U.S. once a week for help. He had other possibilities.

6. King said President Carter had told him that any time he had a private message, it should go through Dr. Brzezinski. He had considered writing a long letter but had decided it was quicker to have me send a telegram. He would like to have a definitive answer by the end of this week as to whether we could release the helicopters unconditionally.

7. Above is summary of remarks King made during session which, with interruptions, lasted for an hour and a half. It took place in anteroom of Royal Palace at Marrakesh. Also present were Italian Ambassador Mezzalama, Foreign Minister Boucetta, Royal Counselor Reda Guedira, Secretary General of Defense, Colonel Achabar, and Commander of the Air Force, Colonel Kabbaj. King started off by explaining issue was essentially bilateral one between Morocco and Augusta Bell, but he felt I should be there too in view of role of my government. He then proceeded to tell Italian Ambassador in brief that he wanted Italians either to start delivering the helicopters or to return the \$12 million Morocco had paid on account. Failing this, he was going to go to the "international chamber" in London and sue. This would, of course, have serious impact on commercial relations between the two countries and it would shake local confidence in Italian ability to deliver. Italian Ambassador explained that his company had undertaken contract only after checking with Department of State and receiving favorable advisory opinion which indicated that transfer of helicopters to Morocco would be approved. Suddenly they had discovered that American Government had changed its position and was blocking the sale.² They were like a man hit on the head by a roof tile.

² See footnote 3, Document 166.

8. For my part, I said that my government was very interested in maintaining our supply relationship with Morocco and we were looking for a pragmatic way to do so. I knew Moroccans were skeptical about our claim of congressional problem, but from the remarks of the Secretary and Under Secretary Newsom I was confident that senior levels in the Department felt there was indeed such a problem and that Morocco risked finding itself in same position as Indonesia or Turkey. I did not think the parallels were that exact, but Congress often did not understand such things.

9. I said we were not demanding withdrawal of equipment already in Sahara, nor had we interrupted the flow of conventional weapons, as King had noted earlier in our discussion. We were prepared to help Moroccans defend themselves against the Algerians, but we had problems about the use of our equipment in the Sahara. Since we understood that the helicopters were going to be based at Rabat-sale and used primarily for logistical support, why not give us some oral assurances to that effect which we would keep to ourselves?

10. King replied that location of military equipment within Morocco was none of our business. This was purely Moroccan concern and he could not accept idea that location of such equipment must be cleared with us. If that was a requirement, we should forget the whole thing and the Moroccans would make other arrangements.

11. Before and during King's absence to attend Cabinet meeting, I had rather lively debate with Boucetta and Guedira, both of whom strongly echoed everything the King said in spades. Guedira was in fact rather offensive. Before King left room, he had said that if we did not permit the transfer of helicopters, it would lead eventually to a break in relations. King did not second this and Boucetta tried to calm Guedira down, but it clear that all of them are quite excited about this issue. Former Ambassador Neumann, who is here on visit and has been making yeoman effort with Moulay Hafid al-Alaoui and Colonel Dlimi on subject, reports similar emotional reaction from Dlimi, who very upset. He plans to stay in Marrakesh a little while longer and hopes to have chance to see King himself and try to explain realities of American politics and desirability of pragmatic solution. Although he and I were rather optimistic about chances of selling our assurances approach before I saw King this morning, I believe we can now forget it. Choice now before us is to approve helicopter sale without conditions or to disapprove it. There is no viable middle ground as far as GOM concerned.

12. Comment. As I had made clear before, I think our policy on this question is both misguided and inconsistent.³ We should have no

³ See Document 238.

illusion about seriousness of what King is saying. If we do not find way on our own to approve this sale, there will be a serious deterioration in our relations here. How serious I am unable to say. It will stop short of the break in relations which Reda Guedira is talking about, but I am not sure how far.

13. It seems to me that there are valid reasons for our agreeing to the transfer. I summarize some of them as follows:

A. Continued blocking of delivery is going to cost a friend and ally a good deal of money and standing in Morocco.

B. SecDef 4502 DTG 020636Z Sept 77 informed MUSLO that "we anticipate no problem in issuing Boeing required export license." This was when Moroccans were planning to buy equipment in question from Boeing.⁴ We subsequently (Nov. 21, 1977) suggested to Moroccans that they go to Augusta Bell, and interposed no objection to sale.⁵ Both Moroccans and Italians therefore had every reason to believe we approved, and I suspect we did give Italians favorable preliminary opinion.

C. The aircraft in question are relatively inoffensive and at least according to Italian Ambassador, will not be brought into action for another year and a half. It will take that long to train the crews and assemble necessary equipment. By that time, who knows what the situation locally is going to be.

D. While I will not belabor the strategic importance of Morocco, we can ill afford to alienate the Moroccans to the extent we will if we do not let the transaction proceed. We may find the Moroccan argument specious, but this is a vital issue to them and they are very worked up about it.

14. I suggest that the only effective way of dealing with the crisis which is now looming in our relations is a message from the President to Hassan. I would hope it would say that we have reconsidered our

⁴ In telegram 2431 from Rome, January 31, the Embassy expressed concern that this issue would damage relations with Italy: "The USG was apparently ready to authorize Boeing to sell Morocco helicopters, but now refuses Agusta the same authorization." Italian Prime Minister Andreotti also expressed his concern "that the Agusta sale of Chinooks be resolved and has 'noted' our decision to sell Boeing civil aircraft to Libya after denying Aeritalia authorization to sell its G-222 military transports." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-1687)

⁵ Not found.

position in the light of the King's remarks to me and are prepared to authorize the sale of the Chinooks.⁶

15. Note: King has obviously decided take a stand on Chinook issue. Even if we settle this favorably, question of other items wanted by Moroccans will still be posed. We can be certain Moroccans will not be prepared give any positive assurances regarding them. They may be less aggrieved by refusals, however, since they have already had considerable discouragement on those items we are likely to turn down.

16. Department please repeat Rome.

Parker

⁶ A January 30 National Security Council memorandum summarized Hassan's concerns for the President: "Hassan commented that the location of military equipment within Morocco was purely a Moroccan concern and he could not accept the idea that it must be cleared with us and if that was a requirement, we should forget the whole thing and he would make other arrangements. Hassan would like to have a definitive answer by the end of this week as to whether we could release the helicopters unconditionally." Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "I think we should approve the sale." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79) Telegram 26500 to Rabat, February 1, instructed the Embassy to inform Hassan that the delivery of the helicopters had been approved in response to the "King's personal interest and the high value the U.S. places on its bilateral relations with Morocco." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-1689) A February 10 article in the *Washington Post* announced the approval of the sale: "The decision is a one-time exception to the administration's policy of refusing to provide arms to Morocco as long as the Moroccans fail to pledge formally that they will not use the weapons in the guerrilla war in the Western Sahara, the officials said." (Jim Hoagland, "U.S. Allows Single Arms Sale to Morocco," *Washington Post*, February 10, 1979, p. A17)

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 15, 1979, 0418Z

63459. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom's Meeting With Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun, March 12.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790119-0224. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, and Nouakchott. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in NEA and PM/SAS; approved by Newsom.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Begin summary: In March 12 meeting with Under Secretary Newsom, Moroccan Ambassador, acting on instructions, delivered strong demarche urging rapid delivery of spare parts for Moroccan F-5s. Newsom told him that barring problems with Congress during consultation process which currently underway, he expected to be able to inform Ambassador shortly that U.S. would agree to spare parts delivery. Newsom underlined problem posed for Department in its dealings with Congress on military assistance for Morocco by absence of assurances on equipment use. Bengelloun urged U.S. to look at its relations with Morocco within strategic context. Newsom informed Bengelloun U.S. is ready to sign FY 1979 FMS agreement. End summary.

3. Stating that he had been instructed to make a demarche requesting urgent delivery of F-5 spare parts, Bengelloun commenced discussion with review of Moroccan version of events surrounding possible Hassan-Boumediene summit prior to Boumediene's death.² He then accused Algerians of refusing to receive a Moroccan delegation to Boumediene funeral and of subsequently rebuffing Boucetta's conciliatory overture. He mentioned *inter alia* that French President Giscard d'Estaing had wanted to mediate the dispute between Morocco and Algeria but that he, like the Moroccans themselves, had been frustrated by Bouteflika's response to Boucetta, which indicated that the new Algerian regime intends to continue Boumediene's Saharan policy. Having concluded therefore that no solution would be possible through negotiation, Hassan, the Ambassador said, had sent a special message to the Parliament announcing the formation of a Committee of National Defense. Bengelloun then described Tan Tan attack, emphasizing that it occurred on territory indisputably Moroccan.³ He warned that the situation could become "dramatic" if such attacks continue.

4. Continuing, Bengelloun said his government wants U.S. understanding, especially in cases when congressional intervention is not necessary. He said that on April 20, 1978, his government had signed a 2 million dollar agreement for F-5 and C-130 spare parts. 258,000 dollars had been paid on October 9 and 190,000 dollars on December 18. The Pentagon says that the spare parts are available. Morocco's need is urgent, and no congressional approval is necessary. There is an imbalance in the air power of Algeria and Morocco. Algeria has enormous military resources, including the latest MiGs. They even are using, in support of the Polisario, Chinook helicopters sold to Libya by the United States.

² Boumediene died on December 27, 1978.

³ See footnote 7, Document 37.

5. Newsom responded that he understood that there had been a problem regarding payments under the spare parts contract but that money had been made available. While ordinarily Congress would not need to be notified of this transaction, the Department had had correspondence from the Congress criticizing the fact that F-5s were being used in the Sahara.⁴ The Department did not want problems with Congress to become more serious. It had taken steps to notify Congress of the spare parts sale and expected to continue the notification process the following day; the process should be completed shortly. If problems arose, the Department would be in touch with the Ambassador. Explaining further, Newsom said that because some consider that there has been a technical violation of the U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement, there is a risk that Congress could cut off all arms sales to Morocco. Unfortunately, the U.S. had not been able to obtain from Morocco any assurances regarding use of American equipment which might be helpful in discussing the issue with Congress. Bengelloun interrupted by saying that his government could not understand why the U.S. makes a distinction between what it is doing vis-a-vis Algeria and what it did in Zaire. The enemy is the same, i.e., the Soviets and the Cubans, and the fight is the same.

6. In responding, Newsom explained that in legal terms help given Shaba was justified as assistance to a friendly country to preserve its territorial integrity. This assistance was not justified on the basis of Cuban, Russian or Angolan roles. The Sahara problem, he noted, is regarded by many as a still unresolved territorial question. Returning to the theme of assurances, Newsom said that in their absence the Department was burdened with the task of defending U.S. military assistance to Morocco and must go to the Congress each time it intends to extend assistance. Bengelloun replied if Morocco were to evacuate the Sahara, the territory would briefly become a democratic popular republic and eventually an Algerian province. Twenty million Moroccans refuse to surrender any Saharan territory. The Algerians had created the Polisario after the Sahara had been liberated from the Spanish. Why should there be concern for the self-determination of less than 100,000 Saharans in the Western Sahara and none for the 500,000 Saharans in Algeria? Morocco could not agree to any assurance language because it could not accept any distinction between parts of Morocco. Reminded that some of the proposed assurance formulas were based on the nature of possible conflict rather than territorial distinctions, Bengelloun said this approach also had proved unacceptable in Rabat.

⁴ See Document 235.

7. When Newsom said the United States wants to be as helpful as possible in a situation where it cannot accept the incorporation of the Sahara into Morocco, Bengelloun asked if the United States wanted to see Algeria become the most powerful state in the region, dominating Morocco. He characterized U.S. assistance to Yemen as coming a year too late. The U.S. should be looking at the situation in Northwest Africa in a strategic context. Morocco occupies an important position geographically. It has democratic institutions and many other similarities to the United States. Algeria and the U.S. have only an energy relationship in common. There are 20 million Moroccans and 74,000 Saharans. Within a Middle East context, Morocco is helpful to the United States, while Algeria stimulates opposition. When Newsom asked which countries have officially recognized Morocco's recovery of the Sahara, Bengelloun avoided a direct reply, pointing out instead that no formal recognition had been necessary or accorded by foreign states when Morocco earlier had recovered other portions of its patrimony. All the countries which have recognized the SDAR, he said, are Communist. He reminded Newsom that Hassan suggested to the Secretary that the U.S. adopt the formula worked out between Morocco and the USSR in their fisheries treaty. As described by Bengelloun, this formula states that the treaty applies to all Moroccan territory, and each side is free to determine what territory this encompasses. Newsom commented that this formula would not be very helpful with Congress.

8. In concluding discussion on other items, Newsom informed Bengelloun that the U.S. is ready to sign the FY 1979 FMS loan agreement with Morocco. He also expressed pleasure that the Crown Prince will be visiting the U.S., at which point Bengelloun requested security coverage. Bengelloun mentioned as he parted that the King expects to receive Secretary Kreps during her forthcoming visit to Morocco.⁵

9. (FYI: In connection with paragraph 5 it will not be possible to inform Bengelloun this week regarding spare parts. Cong. Solarz has called for a closed meeting on the subject on March 19. Congressional Relations people believe result will be positive but that we should wait until then. End FYI).

Vance

⁵ See Document 170.

169. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, March 21, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Morocco.]

7. *US/Moroccan Relations*—ICA has signed an agreement with a Moroccan delegation for a \$500,000 academic exchange program to be jointly funded by the two countries. This is the first step towards following up the commitment you and King Hassan made last November to have our two governments work towards increasing academic exchanges.² Another commitment will be implemented April 1–4, when Juanita Kreps visits Morocco to promote US trade and investment. These activities are a helpful counterpoint to the strain in our relations over our military supply policy.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 3/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Cy” in the upper right-hand corner.

² See Document 161.

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 3, 1979, 1816Z

2215. Dept pass White House for the President from Secretary Kreps. Subject: Meeting at the Palace Between his Majesty King Hassan and Secretary Kreps, April 3, 1979.

1. (S) Entire text

2. Today the King received me in his office in Rabat. He saw me alone with only our U.S. interpreter Alex Toumayan present, and we talked for over an hour. His welcome was warm and genuine. He was most gracious in his references to his meetings with you and what he

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

described as the “good vibrations” he had felt and the good rapport between you. His tone throughout was friendly, informal, candid and relaxed. I had expected a more general meeting, but the King’s choice was clearly a private session, despite the fact that the Prime Minister, two other Ministers, and two Ambassadors were kept waiting throughout the audience. An account of our meeting follows.

3. In greeting the Secretary the King said that he was not prepared to discuss economic matters in English. He could afford a grammatical mistake, but could not afford to make a mistake when discussing figures. The Secretary said that she had talked to the President before she left and that he took a great interest in her mission. She was bringing his personal regards and a personal message from the President.

4. The King stated that President Carter had done a great deal and history would note his record. A foundation was one thing—results were another. The secret of overall success is rapid transition to self rule on the West Bank and Gaza. Under the treaty this would take two to three months (sic). Otherwise, we would have a situation where the Palestinians, PLO and the other groups will be trapped in a three-way situation. (1) Engage in subversion in Israel, which they cannot pull off. (2) Terrorism in other Arab countries which is totally illogical. (3) Retaliation against residents of the West Bank, meaning fighting against other Palestinians. The only way out is quick passage to self-rule.

5. The period of five years allowed for the creation of a Palestinian state in effect boils down to no more than two and one-half. We cannot afford to let anything tarnish what the U.S. has done for peace. As for Jerusalem, Presidents Carter and Sadat were right not to raise it. Begin has closed the door. Religious considerations override anything else. Better to wait for the socialists to come to power in Israel. Someone like Shimon Peres will settle this matter in a more flexible manner. Those were the King’s views on the subject in case the President should ask, as he well might.

6. The Secretary expressed her gratitude and that of the President for the King’s courage and leadership since President Sadat’s initial visit and also praised the King for all he had done during the fall for the sake of peace. She stressed that the President, Secretary Vance and all members of the administration were primarily concerned at present over President’s Sadat’s possible isolation after Baghdad.² The King reassured her completely on that score. He pointed out that Prince Fahd may soon become Foreign Minister and since he is coming to his villa in Fez, he will come to talk to the King about this. The King assured the Secretary that he and the Saudis had decided to scream

² See footnote 7, Document 101.

and yell like everyone else at Baghdad but not change anything they were doing. He asked her to convey this very confidentially to the President and said that only two or three of his Ministers were informed. [garble] Secretary thanked him for these reassurances and said she knew that President Carter would appreciate them very much.

7. The King expressed his worry over two situations (1) The Soviet Union has recently suffered a defeat in Vietnam. It is a diplomatic defeat because the Soviet Union did not honor any of its treaties with Vietnam. Furthermore, two-thirds of the people of the Soviet Union are Asians and they do not like to lose face. He fully expects to see a trouble spot develop somewhere around the world in the coming weeks as part of a global drive on the part of the Soviet Union to score a token success somewhere. (2) The situation in Iran which the King had discussed at considerable length when in the States.³ The King felt that the Shah was not completely out of the picture. Let us assume that in an empire like Iran each different ethnic group now asking for autonomy should receive it—this could only lead to a confederation. In the United States local origin does not matter, but in Iran everybody would want to be the head of a new confederation. It is conceivable that within the constitutional framework the son of the present Shah could play the role of a unifying national symbol. The Shah himself had told the King he was completely disgusted and would never ascend the throne again. The King considered that this was not an urgent matter but one that the President might want to keep at the back of his mind.

8. The King asked for the help of the President and the Secretary with respect to the First National City Bank (FNCB) withholding payment on \$450,000 worth of checks drawn by the Shah on his account at FNCB. The checks were presented for collection by the Moroccan bank which had first been assured in writing (copy available) that the funds were available. Three days later FNCB announced that it had been requested by the Iranian National Bank to freeze the account and was so doing. It was not the first time that FNCB had been unfair in its dealings in Morocco. The Secretary assured the King that should follow this up as best she could with both the President and FNCB.

9. The King described the present difficulties in Morocco as being of an acute financial nature, more so after the oil price increase of the last couple of days. But there was no way to stop Morocco's economic "take-off". In Morocco social, educational and economic problems are interlocked. Since all education is free for the public, in ten years the entire budget will go for education if no solution is found, and 15,000 new teachers must be trained each year. By the year 2000 if 36 new

³ See footnote 2, Document 161.

classrooms have not been built every day, the requirements cannot be met. This is clearly impossible as both the Secretary and the King agreed. The time may come, the King said, when he may have to decree that higher education must be paid for by those who can afford it.

10. At the same time, the King said, one cannot have situation where industrial projects are waiting to be carried out and there is a lack of technically trained staff to carry them out. The King knows that agriculture will remain the prime resource of Morocco—both land and sea cultivation. He looks to oil shale as the major resource for the future, giving the preference to the “hammer” in situ process which has a cost of \$9 per barrel. Oil shale permits energy self-sufficiency in Morocco.

11. In agriculture the problem lies in the lack of large cultivation areas permitting intensive cultivation. The King was anxious to have the Secretary help in arranging for agribusiness groups to come to Morocco. The Secretary expressed our keen interest in developing relations between Morocco and the agribusiness sector. The President of OPIC had discussed those possibilities. We are eager to cooperate by linking projects and potential investors. The Secretary had worked with the Ministers of Commerce and Agriculture outlining the process which we could follow. The King announced the recent creation of an inter-ministerial task force to facilitate foreign investor contacts. This would change what he described as a situation where, typically, an American investor spends three months making the rounds of Ministries to secure various permits and after three months gives up and goes home. This inter-ministerial task force will meet every two weeks and examine foreign investor proposals. They will set aside those they do not want. Those that are going forward will be accepted and signed simultaneously by all Cabinet Ministers. This streamlining will facilitate matters as will also the sending to the Moroccan Embassy in Washington of a strong agribusiness/commercial unit.

12. The Secretary expressed her gratification and stressed the excellent rapport she had established with the Ministers with whom she had had working sessions as well as with the Prime Minister. She felt they were eager to address themselves to existing problems in order to move forward in the sense desired by both President Carter and His Majesty.

13. The King went back to energy and costs to state that so far Morocco was paying for the cost of the inter-African force in Zaire, \$55 million in cash so far, and when the Belgian Foreign Minister had asked how Morocco would be reimbursed the King had said no bill would be presented but he would like the U.S., France, U.K., Belgium and the FRG to invest in specific projects in Morocco up to the equivalent amount. The EXIM Bank could be the instrumentality through

which the USG would make such contribution. EXIM was already very active in Morocco. They could take a share in phosphates, Bureau of Mine Research and Prospecting (BRPM), oil, etc. EXIM had helped Morocco acquire its first 747. Morocco was ready for a second one because it was such an eminently profitable aircraft.

14. The King asked for the Secretary's help in resolving the delicate matter of the alleged bribe paid by Grumman Aircraft to a former Lebanese Prime Minister who was alleged to have then turned it over to a Moroccan figure. The King was emphatic in stating that he wanted the President to assure the U.S. Attorney General that this matter must be explored thoroughly and all possible light shed upon it. The entire truth must come out. The Secretary responded that although she was aware of the problem she had not been briefed about it in detail. She knew that the Attorney General would pursue this matter very seriously and she would discuss it with the President, because he, too, would want this point to be put to rest quickly.

15. The King invited the Secretary to come back for a private vacation with her family. He expressed interest in having his children know the Secretary's children. He felt it was particularly important for the Crown Prince, age 16, to know younger people slightly older than himself. The King invited the delegation to come in for greetings and summarized very briefly for Minister Guessous some of the points he had discussed.

16. As the Secretary was departing, the King asked when a mission of U.S. business investors could be arranged.

17. The Secretary responded that we had not brought investors on this trip because we felt that additional preparations were necessary. Once sufficient preparations are completed, a mission could be arranged at the King's convenience. The King concurred that the schedule should be carefully worked out in order not to waste time.⁴

Parker

⁴ In telegram 2228 from Rabat, April 4, Kreps reported to the President on her visit to Morocco, commenting that "our mission was unexpectedly successful and I believe may contribute to your broader objectives." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790154–0412)

171. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Morocco (U)

The NIE on Morocco does indeed paint a rather bleak picture, but it is not totally convincing.² First, when there are interagency disagreements, the reasoning leading to different assessments is not spelled out. Second, we are seeing a post-Iran tendency at CIA to go on record with pessimistic assessments in order to blunt future criticism of complacency. Nonetheless, not all is well in Morocco. (S)

What can we do? Only a limited amount, I fear. Some of the King's problems are of his own making. Others require long-term solutions. Briefly, *Hassan's rule is threatened by the following:*

—*The Sahara war.* It has been dragging on with no signs of success. No one believes a pure military victory is possible, but Hassan shows little willingness to accept a political compromise. Even if we do liberalize our arms transfer policy, we will not be able to help turn things around in the Sahara. We might, in fact, encourage Hassan to conclude that the military option is viable. (S)

Recommendation: On a case-by-case basis, we should continue to approve some Moroccan arms requests; we should encourage Senate efforts to restore FMS for Morocco to the full \$40 million that we requested; but we should not have illusions that these steps will significantly improve Hassan's position. (S)

—*Economy.* The economic downturn is serious and is hurting Hassan. Phosphate prices are low, the economy is not very well managed; corruption is rampant; and the Saudis have cut off aid, largely because they could not keep track of where it was going. More money from us will not do much good, but the Saudis could help. (S)

Recommendation: That we approach the Saudis to discuss the situation in Morocco and ways in which Saudi Arabia could help. King Khalid is reportedly planning to visit Morocco later this month. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski drew an arrow pointing to Quandt's name and wrote: "Can you give me a memo to State along the lines you outline? ZB. 5-1-79."

² Not found.

—*Leadership*. [less than 1 line not declassified] and many of his advisers are corrupt and incompetent. Not much we can do here to help. (S)

Recommendation: That our Ambassador find some occasion to discuss with King Hassan the lessons learned from Iran, with emphasis on corruption and lack of responsiveness to demands for social change as prominent themes. Hassan is smart enough to get the point, even if he is unwilling to do much about it. (S)

Finally, we have been quietly exploring whether there is some way to encourage a political solution to the Sahara conflict. State's status report is at *Tab A*.³ We have also just heard that the Saudis are prepared to help find a solution, which would be very encouraging. There are distinct limits on how much we can expect to do to mediate the Sahara conflict, but some of our friends could do more. *In short*, Hassan's problems are largely of his own making; the situation is serious, but probably not desperate; we have limited direct influence. (S)

³ Not attached.

172. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, May 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Morocco (U)

I would like to be sure that we are doing all that we reasonably can to help Morocco in the present difficult circumstances. In particular, you might consider the following steps:

—Additional PL-480 for Morocco. This would have an immediate positive impact on the Moroccan budget.

—Consultations with Saudi Arabia on the situation in Morocco. By expressing our concern and our own willingness to do more, we may encourage the Saudis to resume some of their aid.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79. Secret.

—Case-by-case consideration of Moroccan military requests. While an abrupt shift in our policy is probably not called for, we should look for opportunities to continue making approvals of appropriate individual cases.

—Continue to encourage efforts to bring the Sahara conflict to a peaceful negotiated solution.

In addition, it might be worth asking Ambassador Parker for his views on whether it would be useful and feasible to raise with the King the problems of corruption and economic stagnation. Perhaps the necessary points can be made by sharing our assessment of the underlying factors that led to instability in Iran. (S)

Please keep me posted on the measures that can be taken to help Morocco.² (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

² Brzezinski wrote at the end of this sentence: "I gather the situation is steadily deteriorating."

173. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 25, 1979

SUBJECT

Moroccan/American Relations

To improve our relations with Morocco, and to give King Hassan some assistance in his efforts to maintain his position, the Department already has taken a number of initiatives in recent weeks along the lines mentioned in your memo to the Secretary.² The signature of Morocco's 1979 FMS agreement was accelerated. We have supplied

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79. Secret.

² See Document 172.

additional spare parts and ammunition for F-5 aircraft. We agreed to provide the Sea Sparrow missile and other U.S. equipment for a Corvette being built in Spain for Morocco. We have authorized U.S. manufacturers to make sales presentations responsive to Morocco's interest in acquiring aerial tankers. And Northrop-Page has been given permission to make a sales presentation on an intrusion/detection communications system which the Moroccans apparently want to buy. We will give sympathetic consideration to further Moroccan requests for defensive military equipment not primarily suited for use in the Sahara. We are asking the Pentagon if it can suggest items of military equipment which the Moroccans would find useful to defend their recognized borders. However, sympathy for Morocco in the Congress has eroded as Hassan has distanced himself from Sadat.

The Department continues to believe the Sahara conflict can be resolved only through negotiation. We have told the French, the Spanish and interested OAU members that we favor mediation efforts and are prepared to be of assistance. The French have denied that they are engaged in mediation and appear uninterested in working with us or anyone else to help resolve the conflict through diplomacy.³

The Spanish are engaged in a mediation effort. Their Prime Minister has spoken with the Algerians and Polisario representatives in Algiers. King Juan Carlos is scheduled to visit Rabat in early June, and the Spanish Foreign Minister will be visiting Nouakchott. The Spanish are interested in working with us but have not indicated how they think we could be helpful. Head of State Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Traore of Mali have consulted with the parties to the Sahara conflict, in what the Nigerian Foreign Ministry has described as a factfinding mission, rather than an attempt at mediation.

We believe it would be premature to decide to try to mediate the dispute ourselves, particularly while the Spanish are engaged in this process. We will continue to consult closely with them, as well as with the Nigerians and Malians.

Morocco is among those countries which will be candidates for allocation of reserve PL-480 funds as we draw nearer the end of the fiscal year. Unfortunately, there are numerous claimants, and the total sum available is expected to be less than \$20 million.

³ In telegram 14359 from Paris, May 7, the Embassy reported on Parker's meeting with French Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs Journiac: "Journiac said French position has been consistent. France has not been and is not willing to be a mediator. France is willing to play a facilitative role and has made suggestions to the parties. Not being itself a party to the conflict, France does not intend to go further." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790206-0935)

Relations between Morocco and Saudi Arabia have been on the upswing recently. Crown Prince Fahd has visited Hassan, and King Khalid is expected in Morocco later this month. Hassan undoubtedly is making his case for additional assistance directly to Saudi leaders, and we already have an unconfirmed report that the Saudis have resumed aid to Morocco.⁴ Given these circumstances, the advice some time ago from a responsible Saudi official that we avoid becoming involved in the Saudi-Moroccan relationship, and the current condition of our own relations with the Saudis, we think it best to let the Moroccans speak to the Saudis for themselves.

Corruption persists in Morocco, and the King recognizes that it is a liability for his regime. We currently are discussing with the Moroccan Government the negotiation of an agreement between the Department of Justice and their Ministry of Justice which would facilitate the exchange of information American authorities might have about bribery of Moroccan officials by American corporations. We are confident that the King is aware of the perils of economic stagnation. But the Moroccan Government has little choice but to reduce expenditures, given the heavy burden of foreign debt incurred before phosphate prices tumbled. Ambassador Parker shares these views on corruption and economic stagnation in Morocco.

A recent analysis by our military mission in Rabat has underlined Hassan's responsibility for the poor performance of his armed forces in the Sahara. The mission identifies the Moroccan Army's most serious problem as the King's refusal to delegate authority for the conduct of the war. Since the coup attempts mounted by military conspirators in 1971-72, the King has been his own chief of staff, and it is unlikely he will allow his military officers the freedom of action they need to wage war efficiently.

Given Morocco's inability to resolve the Sahara conflict militarily, and the fact Morocco will remain in the doldrums economically for at least another 18 months, Hassan's position will be precarious for some time. Our ability to influence events is limited by Hassan's unwillingness to take advice, his poor performance as an administrator, and

⁴ In telegram 3607 from Rabat, May 24, the Embassy reported on Khalid's May visit: "On the Sahara, the Saudis promised efforts to end Algerian-Moroccan tensions (ref A, C) and there have been reports—as yet unconfirmed—that they may have agreed to a renewal of untied financial assistance to Morocco which could be used in the war effort." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240-0333) In telegram 137751 to Rabat, May 30, the Department informed the Embassy that a Moroccan source claimed that Saudi Arabia agreed to a \$3 billion aid package: "1 billion dollars for military equipment, 1 billion dollars for economic infrastructure, and 1 billion dollars for specific development projects." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790244-0703)

the massive amounts of capital which would be required to freshen Morocco's economy. He would not be interested in hearing our views on the origins of the Iranian revolt. We can help him best by encouraging a negotiated end of the Sahara conflict. Occasional demonstrations of Administration support will be helpful in reassuring the King, the military, and the political parties of our interest in his regime, particularly in its security, but we cannot expect them to be decisive in preserving the monarchy.

Peter Tarnoff⁵
Executive Secretary

⁵ Wisner signed for Tarnoff.

**174. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Duncan) to President Carter¹**

Washington, May 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco, May 29, 1979

I attach hereto a complete recitation, in chronological sequence, of my two and one-half hour meeting with the King.² The King seemed pleased that you had sent an emissary and the atmospherics throughout my one-day visit to Fes could not have been better. A summary of our discussion follows:

1. *Peace Negotiations.* The negotiating process has polarized the Arab world against Egypt and could bring results opposite to those we desire. Nevertheless, all Arab countries except Iraq and Syria want peace (and perhaps Libya, which is an enigma). The people of Iraq and Syria want peace but the leadership sees the peace process as threatening to their positions. The King said that President Assad of Syria is a "broad thinker" and understood the necessity for peace in the region, but is a "minority within a minority."

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1–8/79. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Vance and Brown.

² The memorandum of conversation is attached but not printed.

I mentioned the Strauss appointment to the King, that he had your confidence and that he is a skilled, fair, and capable negotiator.³ The King said he wants "to help you 100 percent," because both you and he are "believers" in the peace process. He emphasized that he must "monitor" progress on the West Bank-Gaza negotiations about to commence in Alexandria, and that progress on this issue is essential.

2. *The Palestinian Issue.* The King said the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty should be "put aside" pending the commencement of treaty negotiations with other involved States. This brings the Palestinian issue into focus. The King repeatedly commented on the overriding importance of the Palestinian issue. He said, with great conviction, that no other Arab country would undertake their peace negotiations until there has been some accommodation with the Palestinians. He said that the Arab countries were more afraid of the PLO than they were of Israel.

The King said he met with the PLO in Fes two weeks ago. They are "ripe" for a negotiation. He said that if the U.S. would "not veto" the proposed Jordanian resolution addressing the rights of the Palestinian people to self determination, the PLO would immediately thereafter accept U.N. Resolution 242. He inferred, without explicitly so stating, that he and King Khalid had discussed this approach during Khalid's visit to Fes last week. This would enable other involved countries to begin negotiations, looking to a comprehensive treaty, of which the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty would be a part.

King Hassan recommended "informal and very discreet" contacts between the U.S. and the PLO, observing that earlier contacts between General Walters and the PLO had remained secret and moreover had demonstrated that the PLO will honor commitments. While he recommended there be "no agenda," agreements such as the above could be discussed. He admitted that such contacts were "not without risks," and offered "his residence and his services" to assist if desired.

3. *Jerusalem.* King Hassan takes very seriously his chairmanship of the Jerusalem Committee.⁴ Jerusalem is the single issue around which all 900 million Moslems of the world will rally. He intends to be deeply involved in the resolution of the Jerusalem question, but was pessimistic as to early progress because of Prime Minister Begin's attitudes. He said that if a man like Shimon Peres, a person of "much broader view

³ Robert S. Strauss was named the President's Special Representative to the Middle East peace negotiations in April.

⁴ Reference is to the Al-Quds committee, an offshoot of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose purpose was to support Moslem claims to Jerusalem, including the formation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

and intellect” than Begin should succeed Begin, he would be much more optimistic.

4. *The Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-U.S. Relations.* Sadat made a “blunder” when he failed to consult with the Saudis prior to his trip to Jerusalem. King Khalid told King Hassan that other Arab nations would see him “either as a fool or as an accomplice” if he renewed support of Egypt “at this time.” King Khalid said the Saudis were in an impossible dilemma: They know they must continue their close relationship with the U.S. over the long term, yet their relations with the other Arab states and their concerns about the PLO require a current posture somewhat more distant. King Khalid told King Hassan during their meeting last week that the Saudis would continue oil exports, would be constrained on price increases, and that they recognized clearly their long term best interests required a close relationship with the U.S. King Hassan urged that we not pressure Saudi Arabia to re-commence aid to Egypt “at this time,” and that we permit things to “cool off” for several months. The King told me he continues “very confidential” contacts with Sadat which he sees as constructive and potentially helpful.

5. *Africa*

a. King Hassan said he would withdraw his troops from Shaba Province by July 1, that their morale was poor, and that this venture had “cost him \$60 million.” Prior to the withdrawal he will send instructors to Zaire to train Mobutu’s soldiers. I told him I had heard of a “phased” withdrawal plan to occur over two or three months. He was quite emphatic that this would not be acceptable; that he must withdraw all of his troops now. (Since there was an obvious disconnect in what Mobutu had said publicly, and what I was hearing from King Hassan, I did *not* tell him we were prepared to participate in the airlift to return his troops and equipment to Morocco. I felt we might wish to negotiate a “phased” withdrawal, and should withhold any such offer until that time.)

b. Rhodesia. King Hassan believes that the Rhodesian “experiment” must work, and that the comments of Ambassador Young are not helpful.⁵ He urged that we make Andy “keep quiet.”

⁵ Possibly a reference to remarks Young made warning against recognition of the newly-elected government in Rhodesia. In a televised interview, in which he also opposed lifting sanctions, Young suggested the economic sanctions could force Muzorewa to negotiate a settlement. He also called into question the legitimacy of the election: “Mr. Young said the election in Rhodesia was ‘stolen before it got there,’ meaning the Constitution drawn up by Prime Minister Ian D. Smith was fraudulent in that it served to perpetuate white minority power.” (“Young Warns Against Recognition of the New Rhodesian Government,” *New York Times*, April 26, 1979, p. A15)

6. *Bilateral Relations.* The King said we understood his views on all bilateral issues, his problems in the Western Sahara, and his specific arms needs. Rather than go over them again, he said he would only mention that economic development was essential for Morocco; that “freedom and poverty cannot co-exist”; that his projected population growth (from 19 million to 40 million by the year 2000) required significant economic development. He mentioned phosphate, oil and oil shale as having economic potential, and solicited our help on these or other development initiatives.

He said he had asked King Khalid for various forms of assistance, and seemed optimistic that he would receive it.⁶

He said that the Mediterranean was “very polluted politically” and that Morocco’s enemies did not want to see the “constitutional example” of Morocco succeed. If his development needs are not met, an extreme government of either the left or right would inevitably be the result.

7. *Conclusions.* In my judgment, the King was speaking to me out of deep conviction and a genuine desire to be helpful. He feels himself under great pressure from a combination of economic problems and a war in the Western Sahara that may not be winnable. The lack of Saudi aid, discontinued in 1978, has affected the Moroccan economy adversely, and he feels compelled to re-establish this economic assistance. This has driven him to an accommodation with Saudi views on the peace negotiations.

He thinks he has made a valuable suggestion on the Palestinian issue which could enable peace negotiations to commence with other involved states. He would welcome your asking him to assist you on this.

I would recommend an interagency review of our arms supply policy to Morocco in view of Polisario incursions into Moroccan sovereign territory, and a reassessment of our options to assist in a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara issue.

The King spoke of you and your family in the warmest possible terms emphasizing throughout the meeting his desire to help you in any way possible. He said he would welcome a “privileged” channel of communication with you such as he had with U.S. Presidents “prior to Watergate.” He asked me to mention to you that his wish is that

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 173.

the next U.S. Ambassador to Morocco be a political employee rather than a career diplomat.⁷

CW Duncan Jr.

⁷ In a June 5 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski wrote: "After reading Charles Duncan's report on his meeting with King Hassan, the President has asked that we move now on the appointment of a more compatible ambassador." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979)

175. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 18, 1979

SUBJECT

VBB: Morocco (U)

I believe we are moving toward a moment of truth with Morocco. The main operational issue involves a long-standing request for OV-10 aircraft, and our long-standing reluctance to sell them. Dick Parker, in his valedictory recommendations from Rabat, strongly advised us to avoid the hassle we got into with the Chinook helicopter business and accede sooner, rather than later, to the Moroccan request for OV-10s.² Morocco increasingly views the issue as a test of our relationship. (C)

I agree with Parker's point of view and urge you to raise this issue during your next VBB lunch (July 20, if possible).³ State has been divided, with PM favoring the sale, the human rights people opposing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 101, Meetings (President/V-B-B and Turner Breakfasts, Luncheons and Meetings Topics): 5-8/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Sick, Kimmitt, and Albright.

² In telegram 4319 from Rabat, June 22, Parker offered his "final thoughts" on U.S. relations with Morocco. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79)

³ No record of the lunch meeting was found, but see footnote 2, Document 176.

it, and the Bureau performing a masterful bit of fence-sitting—the net effect of which has been immobility (seen by Hassan as hostility). (C)

We should now use the time Charlie Duncan's mission⁴ bought us not only to forestall some predictable bad effects (flowing from Moroccan perceptions that we are unwilling to help our friends) but, equally important, to influence the course of Western Sahara developments in a constructive way. In this connection, the following circumstances are particularly relevant: (C)

—continuing Polisario attacks on Morocco proper dramatize the dangerous turn of the Sahara conflict (and the deterioration of Morocco's military position); (U)

—clandestine reports attest to increasing Moroccan disillusion, especially among middle-grade military officers, concerning prospects for a favorable outcome to the war;⁵ (C)

—the UN "debate" last month⁶ and the tenor of the OAU wisemen's report point to Morocco's deteriorating political position internationally;⁷ (U)

—the flap over what Guedira, the King's counselor, was or was not authorized to disclose publicly is indicative of the turmoil inside the highest levels of the Moroccan government over next steps (especially vis-a-vis this week's OAU summit in Monrovia); (C)

—Next week's Congressional hearings on Morocco coincide with growing public interest in the North African situation and gives us a chance to make a helpful move vis-a-vis Morocco in particular and our interests in the area in general. (C)

In my view, the cumulative impact of these developments is bringing Morocco to a point where, more than any other time since the Western Sahara conflict began, the possibility of some meaningful compromise (i.e., willingness to negotiate a political solution) may exist. In order to negotiate, however, Hassan will have to do so from a position of perceived strength rather than weakness. (C)

The OV-10 could be a major factor in that perception. As Gary Sick has argued, we would have to accompany the provision of that equipment with a number of clear assertions, among them: (a) we do not believe Morocco can achieve a military solution, with or without the

⁴ See Document 174.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ The Security Council convened on June 20 to consider this issue. For a summary of the four meetings, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 1047-1048.

⁷ In telegram 2707 from USUN, June 26, the Mission summarized the Wisemen's Committee report and recommendations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790287-1083) See also footnote 4, Document 45.

aircraft; (b) the aircraft are intended to improve Morocco's negotiating position; and (c) we continue to care how Morocco uses the arms we provide (the misuse of which would be a hindrance to our good relationship). We would, of course, approach the Algerians and explain the OV-10 supply on the grounds of the Polisario's more aggressive posture, reiterating the need for a negotiation between Maghrebian neighbors to resolve a no-win situation. (C)

In short, the sale of OV-10 to Morocco can be used to help nudge Morocco into a more favorable negotiating frame of mind. There are, of course, risks: Hassan, in refusing or simply ignoring our strictures, could get the idea that we are ready to help him fight to the bitter end, in which case the OV-10 would simply embolden him on his military course. Moreover, we should be very clear that these aircraft will perform no miracles, either militarily or politically; still less can they provide a solution to Morocco's larger problems of economic management and leadership. At the very least, however, they can remove a major irritant in our relationship which has taken on some adversely symbolic value in a country where symbolism is all-important. The sale would provide a tangible and much desired earnest of our friendship and preclude (in the event of military catastrophe) any plausible claim that we denied Morocco, in its hour of need, the one piece of equipment they most required. (C)

I recommend a pitch to Cy Vance along the above lines, appropriate parts of which he could instruct Hal Saunders to include in his Congressional testimony.⁸ I feel confident that you would get strong support from Harold Brown. Gary Sick, Bob Kimmitt, and Madeleine Albright concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you raise during the next VBB lunch the question of providing OV-10 aircraft to Morocco and seek Vance's and Brown's agreement to approve such provision.⁹

LATE ITEM: Newsom has now scheduled a meeting for tomorrow at 10:45 to plot Saunders' testimony. Unless I hear differently from you, I will peddle the above points as NSC input, which can help prepare the ground for your VBB.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 245.

⁹ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

176. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Liberalized Military Supply Policy for Morocco

In line with our efforts to move toward a more flexible arms supply policy for Morocco,² we have begun consultations with the concerned Congressional committees on this subject, but will not have their considered views until early September.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has said it would reserve judgment pending a fact-finding trip to the area by Committee staff. That trip is now scheduled to start August 17; the staff has other business in the area and won't be back to report until early September.

Steve Solarz, who chairs the Africa Subcommittee of the HFAC, is now traveling in the area. He said he would reserve judgment until after his trip and until he had conferred with his Committee colleagues in early September.³

Since we took Congress into our confidence in advance and stressed we wanted its views before any decision was made, I believe we are obligated to let these consultations run their course before making any specific decisions about new arms systems for Morocco. I will let you know by mid-September how these consultations work out and what we propose to do. Meanwhile, we are using the intervening period to try to restore effective communication with Hassan and to explore with other governments what possibilities may exist for bringing the protagonists in this struggle to the negotiating table.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Confidential.

² In an August 7 memorandum to Vance and Brown, Brzezinski wrote: "Confirming the understanding we reached during our July 20 meeting, you should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that we adopt, without delay, a more flexible position regarding US military supplies for Morocco in the wake of stepped-up Polisario attacks within that country's internationally recognized boundaries. This specifically includes the sale of OV-10 aircraft, the timing and feasibility of which the Secretary of State will determine following early consultations with appropriate committees of Congress." (Ibid.)

³ See Document 242.

177. Letter From Senator Frank Church and Senator Jacob Javits to President Carter¹

Washington, September 21, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee met on September 20, 1979, to consider U.S. arms transfer policy to Morocco and the general situation in northwest Africa. This meeting was held in response to your Administration's request for the Committee's advice on this matter.

After a thorough discussion of the issues, the Committee came to the following conclusions:

(1) The United States should reaffirm its strong disposition in favor of a negotiated settlement to the Saharan conflict and should begin a concerted diplomatic initiative to find a negotiated settlement.

(2) The United States should appoint a seasoned American ambassador to Morocco of the kind most suitable to open communications again between the United States and King Hassan.

(3) The United States should furnish Morocco with weapons suitable for the defense of that country and as an expression of support for the Moroccan Government. These weapons should be furnished for the defense of Morocco, but we recognize that such weapons might be used in the Saharan conflict.² The United States should make it clear that provisions of these weapons is not an American endorsement of Morocco's policy in the Sahara and therefore the United States should not provide weapons that would be suitable only for counterinsurgency operations in the Western Sahara.³

The Committee unanimously supported the first two findings above and approved the third by a vote of 6 to 3 with one abstention.

The Committee also wishes to express its satisfaction at the way in which your Administration conducted consultations on this matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jacob K. Javits
Ranking Minority Member

Frank Church
Chairman

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Unclassified.

² An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

³ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

178. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, October 9, 1979

SUBJECT

US/Saudi Military Support for Morocco (S)

Acting Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Naif met with Ambassador West Sunday² at the request of Crown Prince Fahd to appeal for US/Saudi cooperation in providing military assistance to King Hassan. Naif stated that Saudi Arabia is prepared on an urgent basis to fund the military assistance Morocco needs to defend itself and to reestablish a military balance in the region—a step Fahd believes will not be possible without full U.S. assistance. According to Naif, Fahd wants to know as soon as possible whether we are willing, in principle, to furnish military equipment, including planes, light weapons, heavy weapons, and even ammunition, to Morocco in an expeditious manner—including from U.S. stocks. Naif indicated that Saudi Arabia is prepared to pay the costs involved. (S)

The President has asked for our advice on the response to this Saudi demarche. Could you please provide me your views on an urgent basis. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Secret.

² October 7. In telegram 7052 from Jidda, October 8, West reported on his meeting with Naif. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV): 9–10/79)

179. Letter From President Carter to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, October 28, 1979

Your Majesty:

I have been deeply concerned about the intensified military pressures you and your country have been facing in recent months. This situation is increasingly threatening to Morocco and to the stability of the region. As you know, I have decided on certain changes in our policies governing sales of military equipment to your armed forces which are designed to help you meet the immediate military situation.²

It is important that we be in close communication at this juncture. In particular, I am anxious to consider with you the scope of my decision, the purposes it is designed to serve, and how we may best proceed to implement it.

To that end I have asked Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, to visit Rabat as soon as possible to meet with you.³ I hope that you will receive him and talk to him as freely and frankly as you would to me about the serious matters that so concern us both in this critical period.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Morocco: King Hassan II, 4/77–12/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 49.

³ See Document 248.

180. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Morocco Arms Package: F-5 Replacements (C)

With the formal notification date hard upon us for the Morocco arms package,² I flag a late (and on balance beneficial) development which I need your guidance on. It concerns the quantity of F-5 aircraft we want to include in the package. (C)

You will recall that 8 F-5s was the number we settled on prior to Christopher's mission to Morocco,³ since this represented needed replacements for what the Moroccans had already lost. In our inter-agency proceedings since then that number tended to assume a magical character; there are now, however, persuasive technical, financial, and political reasons which make it advisable in my judgment to adjust that total upward to 20: (C)

—*Technical*. The Moroccans have F-5s in the earlier A and B models, which Northrop no longer makes. Replacements in whatever quantity would be from newer E and F models, and the Air Force has convinced me (and State) that a mixture of systems would be operationally very bad, especially from a maintenance support standpoint. (C)

—*Financial*. The Saudis are willing to finance a total F-5 replacement program of 20 aircraft (making a full squadron); however, given their emphasis on urgent supply, State does not believe that Saudi financing will be available in two or more tranches (in other words, if we limited ourselves to 8 now, we have no assurance that we could secure financing for more at a later date, whereas they agree to underwrite all 20 right now). (C)

—*Political*. There are indications that the Moroccans may not wish to take any F-5s if they are held to a complicated mixed-system set-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79-1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "DA has seen."

² In a January 3 note for the file, Rentschler wrote: "Formal Congressional notification to occur as soon as Congress reconvenes, now scheduled for January 22. Arms sales package will be ready in case Congress reconvenes earlier than the scheduled date." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1980)

³ See Document 248.

up; if that happens, the overall size of the package would be very modest (a difference roughly between \$250 million and \$73 million); and while the two situations are not organically related (and should not be), I am concerned how an overly modest arms package—our first in 1980—will play in terms of the public post-Afghanistan stance we want to project. (C)

There are two major question-marks connected with an upward adjustment, and both have been answered to my satisfaction:

—*Congressional Support*. State's own legislative people—are you ready for this?—are confident that Congress will go along with it. Solarz and McGovern will bitch, but they will do so in any event, and regardless of the initial package's composition. State also feels that it is much better to go in for a total now, rather than coming back with an additional request when and if we think circumstances warrant. (C)

—*Conditionality*. The experts in both DOD and State assure me that we can retain full control over the pace of delivery and that if Hassan has not been sufficiently forthcoming on the political negotiation track, we will preserve enough flexibility in the mechanics of the supply to slow it down, or suspend it altogether. (C)

Hal Saunders & Company favor the upward adjustment, which does not violate the President's decision in any way (no specific number was ever cited in the decision memo,⁴ and all 20 aircraft would technically be "replacements" since Morocco would agree to remove their older F-5 models—which I understand are in pretty sorry shape in any event). I would like to tell Hal that we support this too, which will undoubtedly determine Christopher's position. (Defense strongly favors the 20 in light of the factors outlined above).

Madeleine Albright and Bob Kimmitt concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize me to inform State that we support the inclusion of 20 F-5s in the package, provided they foresee no serious Congressional problem and that we retain full control over the pacing of supply.⁵ (C)

2. If you approve the 20, I think it would also be useful for Madeleine to call Stone and help set the stage.⁶

⁴ See Document 49.

⁵ An unknown hand checked the "OK to go for 20" option. See Document 182.

⁶ An unknown hand checked the Yes option.

**181. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, January 19, 1980

SUBJECT

King Hassan's Offer to USG

We have unofficial word from King Hassan that Morocco is ready to provide "bases, transit and support facilities, or whatever is needed" to the U.S. in connection with U.S. efforts to develop a readiness posture vis-a-vis the southwest Asia region. The channel is unofficial but considered reliable: a Casablanca businessman known to be a close confidant of King Hassan, whom the King has used in the past to convey similar messages.

A Memorandum of Conversation in which this point was made is attached.²

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78-8/80. Secret.

² The January 17 memorandum of conversation between Coon and Bengelloun is attached but not printed. In the exchange, Coon wrote: "I said the basic issues regarding the arms package had not changed but the recent southwest Asian crisis had doubtless strengthened the argument that we needed to help our friends." Bengelloun replied: "The King wanted the U.S. Government to know that Morocco stood 100 percent behind the U.S. Government in the latter's effort to contain the expansionist Communist forces of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and elsewhere. He had heard that the U.S. might be interested in developing its standby military capabilities in the southwest Asian region. To this end, the King wanted the U.S. Government to know that Morocco was ready to provide 'bases, transit and support facilities, whatever was needed.'"

182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 22, 1980

SUBJECT

Morocco Arms Sales Package (U)

To confirm the understanding we reached earlier today, the arms package being readied for formal Congressional notification this week should include 20 F-5 aircraft. It is understood that provision of all 20 aircraft to Morocco is conditional upon Moroccan progress toward a political negotiation of the Western Sahara conflict and that we will retain strict control over the pace of delivery; that point should be stressed in our presentation to Congress. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Confidential. A copy was sent to Brown.

183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, January 28, 1980, 2119Z

24299. Eyes Only for Ambassador Duke from HH Saunders. Subject: U.S. Use of Moroccan Facilities.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The Chairman of the JCS, General Davey Jones, asked me to let you know of a conversation which he had with Colonel Kabbaj, Chief of the Moroccan Air Force, during his visit here. Davey asked Colonel Kabbaj—explicitly stating that he was not asking for anything—what the Colonel thought the Moroccan Government's view would be if the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders; cleared by Coon; approved by Saunders.

U.S. asked Morocco for use of military facilities in Morocco in connection with trouble that we might have with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Colonel Kabbaj on the spot responded unequivocally that we could use Moroccan facilities for that purpose and would be welcome to send a survey team to Morocco to determine what facilities would be available in relation to possible U.S. needs. The Colonel then said that he would consult with King Hassan, and General Jones said that he was not asking for that right now. The Colonel said that he was going to do it anyway and came back a day later with confirmation, reportedly from the King, of his position. Colonel Kabbaj had one request—if we begin talking formally with the Government of Morocco on this subject, that you talk directly and only with the King in the first instance and not with the Foreign Ministry.

3. This message is not intended as an instruction to you to take any step at this point. We simply want to alert you to this background of any future instruction and to pass on to you the request that, if this subject comes up in any way that requires discussion with the Moroccan Government before you receive instructions, you talk in the first instance only with the King.

Vance

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 31, 1980, 1735Z

716. Subj: (C) Long-Term Planning for US Military Access and Overflights in a Southwest Asian Contingency. Ref: State 019797.²

1. (S)—Entire text.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0164. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo and Tunis.

² In telegram 19797 to Cairo and Rabat, January 23, the Department addressed the need for long-term planning for military access in light of the potential for regional instability in Southwest Asia and Soviet involvement in regional conflicts: “The great distances and the need for timely response will place extraordinary demands on our total resources. It is essential that we gain the cooperation of those countries which lie along the most likely supply routes in providing transit, refueling or overflight permission.” The Department requested an in-house Country Team assessment of the intrinsic and extrinsic costs of securing access. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–1110)

2. This Country Team assessment considers the background of our military relationship with Morocco and the likely political context in which the GOM would consider a US request for access and/or overflights; the Moroccan logistical and support infrastructure and potential, and the prospects for the most likely scenarios.

3. Background and political considerations

A. Our “military relationship” with Morocco dates from the landings in World War II. Following the closure of our SAC bases in 1963, the US Navy maintained significant communications and support facilities (and some training for the Moroccans) under a “handshake agreement” until, at USN initiative, they were closed as redundant in 1978. The USAF airlifted many of Moroccan forces participating in Morocco’s two interventions in Shaba, and the GOM on short notice permitted the refueling here of some of the F-15 aircraft returning from their demonstration sortie to Saudi Arabia in 1979, when our European allies did not appear very receptive. Several years ago King Hassan came close to offering us additional facilities (e.g. Mediterranean submarine bases) in implicit return for stronger US support for Morocco. This country opens its ports to US Naval NPW and conventional ship visits. On the military assistance side the US has furnished approximately \$533 million worth of grant and FMS equipment during the past 21 years, and remains Morocco’s second most important source of arms.

B. The above having been said, however, there has been a fairly steady erosion in King Hassan’s readiness to accommodate our numerous requests for unrequited favors, reflecting the tremendous growth in the importance of the Sahara issue and our failure fully to support his position. Also playing a role is his increasingly restricted room for maneuver in terms of domestic political realities. Indeed our request three years ago to establish a USAF GEODSS (deep space optical tracking) facility has effectively been shelved following an initial acceptance in principle (perhaps significantly, the GOM had particular difficulty with the USAF’s insistence on legal status and a written agreement, the antithesis of the USN’s successful use of the “handshake agreement” formula). Since late 1977 the US unwillingness to sell much of the equipment sought by Morocco for its fight with the Polisario has burdened our relations. The recent Presidential decision to remove restrictions on a limited amount of equipment has lightened the load to some degree, but it will require more to convince King Hassan that the costs of a clear alignment with the United States will be offset by a steady, long-term commitment to Morocco’s security as Morocco defines it.

C. History, conscious choice, and to a degree Western policies have coalesced to encourage Morocco’s role as associate of the West. Yet first and foremost it is a Third World nation, member of the NAM, and Arab League stalwart. While Morocco’s affinity for the West has

often given it a useful private and sometimes public role, this sentiment has not been enough to engage Morocco in the full responsibilities of a US ally.

D. Beyond a strong but amorphous attachment to its Arab, African, and Third World "vocation", Morocco's nominally non-aligned stance results from a practical assessment of its long-term interests. In the past Saudi Arabia has provided, for example, relatively massive financial assistance; the lesser Gulf states, sometimes constrained to appear less steadily pro-American, have come through with vital development funds. Morocco's reluctance to identify fully with the West has also made possible its reasonably good relations with states as diverse and influential as Iraq and Guinea. A key consideration across the board is Morocco's desire to obstruct Algerian attempts to build a solid Arab/African front against it on the all-embracing issue of the Sahara. Finally in domestic terms, Morocco's Third World vocation, Arab credentials and steady support of the PLO have largely insulated the King, the ultimate decision-maker, on the issue of strategic cooperation with the US now before us, from important domestic pressures.

E. In considering a firm commitment to strategic cooperation with the US, King Hassan would have to balance the considerable concrete interests devolving from its present stance against the compensation which that cooperation would bring. This does not mean that we will not receive "signals" of Morocco's readiness to furnish us access and overflights, but it does mean we should weigh these indications carefully.

4. Morocco's logistical and support capability:

A. There are numerous airfields or air bases in Morocco which could accommodate the support of a deployment force. Depending on the nature, magnitude and duration of the airlift, several are naturally more advantageous than others. Assuming the deployment aircraft to be of the C-141, C-5 and KC-135 type, the following airfields could be utilized: Agadir/Inezgane, Casablanca/Nouasseur, Fes/Saïss, Kenitra, Marrakech/Menara, Meknes/Basantine, Oujda/Angad, Rabat/Sale, Sidi Slimane and Tangier/Boukhalf. Each of these airfields differs in its capability to provide support. Except for an extremely limited deployment operation the more readily discernible problem areas would include: fuel availability, runway bearing capacity, aircraft parking facilities, aircraft servicing, maintenance support, aircraft support equipment, fire and crash equipment, billeting and messing facilities, radar capability and runway length during summer operations. Many of these could be surmounted through United States logistical support. However, unless long term construction improvements are made the main problems confronting a large scale deployment are fuel availability and aircraft parking space. At present Morocco distributes fuel to

virtually all its airfields by truck from Casablanca. This is a very slow process which would proportionately hinder support as the distance from Casablanca to the selected airfield increases. Morocco does have a fairly extensive petroleum pipeline which connects Casablanca to several airfields. However, this pipeline has been deactivated, and it is not known whether reactivation is feasible. Aircraft parking space is also a major problem, for the only airfields constructed to accommodate large number of aircraft are the former Strategic Air Command bases at Casablanca/Nouasseur, Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (now essentially deactivated).

B. In discussing Morocco's capability to provide support for a deployment, certain assumptions must be made and various scenarios envisioned:

—Limited support—If it is envisioned that Moroccan airfields be used solely for transiting aircraft to obtain fuel for minor maintenance and for aircrew changes we think that approximately ten aircraft per day could be accommodated at any of the above airfields. This would tax the Moroccan capability to provide fuel over an extended period to those airfields more distant from Casablanca. However it could be accomplished with existing assets and a dedicated effort by the Moroccans and with the proviso that large numbers of aircraft would not be on the airfield at the same time. For this limited support, optimum bases would be Casablanca/Nouasseur, Rabat/Sale and Kenitra to facilitate fuel delivery.

—Moderate support—Transiting of Moroccan airfields by ten to twenty aircraft per day for fuel, minor maintenance and aircrew changes. Based on the present fuel distribution procedures it is envisioned that only Casablanca/Nouasseur could accommodate our requirement. However, this would not preclude use of Casablanca/Nouasseur in conjunction with one or more additional airfields. This also assumes that over an extended period fuel deliveries to Casablanca would be increased.

—Heavy support—Transiting of Moroccan airfields by more than twenty aircraft per day for fuel, maintenance, crew rest, aircrew changes and aircraft parking. This scenario over an extended period would require a major effort to upgrade the present Moroccan fuel distribution system. Consideration would have to be given to the use of truck, rail, air, sea and/or reactivation of the petroleum pipeline and also evaluation of the suitability of fuel storage facilities at Casablanca/Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir. Although deactivated, consideration may be given to use of Ben Guerir if the necessary repairs are feasible.

—Air refueling support—Any of the aforementioned bases could also be utilized as staging bases for aerial tanker aircraft. This, however,

would also be subject to the fuel and aircraft parking limitations previously mentioned. As one can readily see, the range of options available in Morocco depends greatly on the type of support required and the extent of any improvements in facilities.

—Other military considerations—There are several other possibilities which might be discussed such as use of Moroccan airspace or landing beaches for training. Staging of grand forces moving forward to SW Asia in ports is also a possibility.

5. Conclusions:

A. The range of possible scenarios is virtually infinite. Thus the comments below are keyed to the increasing level of involvement which might be required. While Morocco may provide signals of receptivity to approaches, we should not forget that somewhere on the scale the burden on Morocco's other interests becomes very heavy. Virtually no form of cooperation, moreover, will be palatable that could identify the use of Morocco for moves perceived to be helpful to Israel or as attacking another Arab or even non-Arab Islamic country.

B. Simple overflight requests should pose few problems. Neither should the simple transit/refueling of manageable numbers of aircraft. Neither would necessarily imply a direct quid pro quo.

C. If our goal is truly "dependable access to transit and refueling" at anywhere near the scope suggested reftel things become more difficult. Realistically, a firm Moroccan promise to allow large-scale US access and transit would almost certainly require (1) a clear definition of purposes for which transiting American forces would ultimately be used, and (2) a substantial (albeit maybe implicit) US commitment to Morocco's own security, quite possibly including assistance in defense of its Sahara claims. US costs for Morocco's long-term strategic cooperation—and that is how "dependable access to (large scale) transit and refueling" directed at global trouble spots would be interpreted—would have to offset the large costs to Morocco which that cooperation would bring: A relinquishing of non-aligned credentials, strong internal criticism, exposure to Soviet pressures, weakening ties with Arab regimes donor and otherwise, who are now at odds with the United States or might be at some time in the future. The prospect of extracting untrammelled US support in Morocco's Sahara claims might well be too tempting for the Moroccans to ignore. Moroccans have convinced themselves firmly that defense of their Saharan claims equates to defense of their national security, and indeed the outcome of the Sahara war is vital to the future of King Hassan, whose decision would define the Moroccan position. (3) And, quite possibly, willingness to undertake long sought-after, concrete U.S. assistance programs that would allow the GOM to deal meaningfully with a badly deteriorating economy. Embassy planning to submit series of cables on the state of the

economy and the implications which the absence of any significant relief over the next 18 months can portend. It is possible that a forthcoming U.S. position on economic issues may prove to be a key signal in terms of the GOM's readiness to facilitate the types of U.S. military measures contemplated in reftel and earlier paragraphs of this cable.

6. Department may wish to repeat this cable to the military addressees of its reftel, which use of Exdis precludes this post from doing. State 26678 received.³ Report on point B requested will be submitted separately.

Duke

³ Not found.

185. Letter From the Ambassador to Morocco (Duke) to President Carter¹

Rabat, October 16, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

It was just about a year ago that your decision on arms sales to Morocco was made known, and your appointment of me to implement that policy soon followed. As we reach this first anniversary, it might be useful to review what have been the results so far.

I am convinced that a process leading to a negotiated settlement of the Saharan war has begun and that your policy decision has directly contributed to much of the progress made so far.

Because of the leverage the new policy has given us, our bilateral relations have been productive, our views are carefully and cordially considered, and I have been enabled to make the point that we agreed to sell arms in order to ensure Moroccan engagement in the approach to a settlement which is sufficiently satisfactory all around to endure and enhance regional security.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. No classification marking.

The evidence of progress so far is as follows: last year Morocco refused to attend the Monrovia OAU Conference; this September at Freetown it agreed for the first time to meet with "all interested parties" and was represented at the Prime Ministerial level.² The latter conference concluded with a call for a UN-supervised cease-fire in place and for a "fair and general" referendum to be organized by the OAU with UN help. The Moroccans have accepted a *de facto* cease-fire but maintain that because the Saharans under their flag made their choice known in 1975 through their provincial assembly and in several local elections since, a referendum is unnecessary. Foreign Minister Boucetta, however, has indicated privately a good deal more flexibility in his government's position on this.

The Algerians, who, in my opinion, have thus far been an obstacle to negotiations, have recently shown indications of increased understanding that our arms sales agreement is designed to enlist the participation of all parties in the search for peace. Although Algeria still maintains it is not involved, it seems to be more interested than before in being able to turn its undivided attention to its Eastern Flank.

All of the parties are now engaged, and I am convinced that they have been caught up in a momentum that could well lead to a negotiated settlement. As one who is associated with the implementation of your policy, I wish to bear witness to its promising results and to express total support for its continuance in your next administration.

With all good wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

Angier Duke
Ambassador

² See footnote 4, Document 45. The OAU met in Freetown on September 12.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Muskie and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 6, 1981

SUBJECT

Initial Delivery of Six OV-10 Aircraft for Morocco (C)

The President has determined that we should proceed immediately with the initial delivery of six OV-10 aircraft to Morocco as envisioned in his arms sales decision of October 19, 1979.² Please let the President know about implementation.³ (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Confidential.

² See Document 49.

³ In a January 12 memorandum to Carter, Muskie wrote: "Arrangements have been made for the OV-10s to be ferried to Morocco by the contractor after acceptance from the manufacturer. The first two OV-10s are scheduled to arrive in Morocco during the last week of January. Two more are scheduled for acceptance in February, followed by two in March." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 1/81)

Tunisia

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, February 12, 1977, 0019Z

32245. Subject: Habib-Hedda Meeting of February 11, 1977.

1. In brief conversation with Under Secretary Habib, Ambassador Hedda renewed request for security supporting assistance for Tunisia and gave views on various options for exchanges of high-level visits.

2. Recalling background of Foreign Minister Chatty's October meeting with Secretary Kissinger² and subsequent discussions, Hedda asked that new administration consider extending security supporting assistance to Tunisia to set example for others in region of potential rewards for close cooperation with US. He said he had talked to Sens. Humphrey and Percy and Cong. Zablocki and found them receptive to idea. Hedda also renewed request for "political" meeting with high US representative, to precede an early meeting of Joint Commission.³

3. Habib asked if security assistance question would be an essential agenda item for Joint Commission; Hedda said no, question could best be decided independently. Habib asked if next Joint Commission meeting in Tunis could be chaired for US by someone other than Secretary Vance in view of latter's crowded travel schedule in next few months. Hedda said it would be most desirable for the Secretary to attend Joint Commission, perhaps at some point during his March Moscow trip, but he was sure GOT would be pleased if Habib himself were to lead US delegation in place of Secretary. He reiterated GOT appreciation for political/military support that Habib had helped to organize during difficult days in August, 1976.⁴

4. On the subject of a possible high-level Tunisian visit to the US, Habib said we will have to look into question of visit by Prime Minister Nouira, since health appears to preclude visit by President Bourguiba. However, he noted that there is an overwhelming number of requests

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770050-0377. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Wilkinson; cleared in NEA and S/S; approved by Habib.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 127.

³ The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission first met in Washington in May 1975.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 126.

for high-level visits. Hedda recognized this difficulty, but asked that US give first priority to its best friends. Nouira would not want to make a State visit, just a brief working visit without fanfare which would take very little of President Carter's time.

5. Habib said we should plan firmly for a Joint Commission meeting, and that he would explore questions raised by Hedda with Secretary Vance during trip next week, as well as with Ambassador Mulcahy at scheduled Amman meeting. In conclusion, he briefed Hedda on purely exploratory nature of the Secretary's Middle East trip.

Vance

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 15, 1977, 1818Z

2076. Subject: Visit by Under Secretary Habib to Tunisia.

1. In April 12–14 visit to Tunis, Under Secretary Habib received extremely warm welcome from GOI and met at length with leading GOT officials. He met with President Bourguiba for forty minutes, PriMin Nouira for ninety minutes and FonMin Chatty for two hours. He also called on MinDef Farhat, MinInt Belkhodja and SecState for Foreign Affairs Turki. Discussions focused on Middle East, Africa, Libya, and US-Tunisian relations.

2. Middle East: President, PriMin and FonMin all urged U.S. to play active role in finding peaceful Middle East settlement. In their view, solution to Palestinian question is of overriding importance if settlement is to be achieved; they stressed importance of Palestinian representation at Geneva and separate Palestinian state. However, they had no clear ideas to offer on manner in which Palestinians should be represented at Geneva. They clearly supported separate Palestinian state and were unenthusiastic about Palestinian association with Jordan.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77–6/78. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers and Paris. Sent for information to Tunis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

3. Habib explained that principal purpose of his North Africa trip was to discuss U.S. Middle East policy at request of the Secretary with area's leaders. Secretary had travelled to Middle East² to hear views of both sides and President had already met with Rabin and Sadat³ and would be meeting with Hussein, Asad and Fahd over next six weeks to hear their views.⁴ Following these meetings and after Israeli elections, Secretary hopes to make another trip to Middle East to explore views further. U.S. role is to facilitate the resolution of differences between opposing sides. Continuing U.S. discussions with Middle East leaders are intended to narrow differences between confrontation states in order to make progress toward peaceful settlement and convene Geneva Conference, hopefully before end of 1977. Extensive preparations are essential to ensure success at Geneva. Habib stressed that U.S. had no current plan for settlement but is trying to get interested parties to consider possible solutions to key outstanding areas of disagreement. For Israel the nature of peace is most important, while for Arabs border and Palestinian questions have highest priority. He asked for Tunisian support for U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve peaceful settlement.

4. Bourguiba briefly reviewed history of Tunisia's Middle East policy, dating from his 1965 Jericho speech.⁵ He confessed to considerable pride in fact that all other Arab states, who had ostracized him once, had now come around to his concept of peaceful resolution in ME. Nouira and Chatty agreed with Habib that present conditions augur well for urgent efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of Arab-Israeli questions. Sadat needs peace in order to concentrate on economic development and Egypt, Syria and Israel all find cost of defense establishments burdensome. They stressed importance of settling as many questions as possible before Geneva Conference formally convenes because of extreme difficulty in reconvening should conference fail to achieve settlement. In discussion of Palestinian question, Chatty suggested that Israeli security would be enhanced by separate Palestinian and Jordanian states rather than by confederation or similar unitary state. Habib pointed out that Israel remained opposed to independent,

² Vance traveled to Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria February 15–21.

³ For the memoranda of conversation of Carter's meetings with Rabin and Sadat, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 18, 20, 25, and 27.

⁴ For the memoranda of conversation of Carter's meetings with Hussein, Assad, and Fahd, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 30, 32 and 36.

⁵ In his March 3, 1965, speech, Bourguiba advocated a two-state solution for a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

probably strongly irredentist Palestinian state between itself and Jordan.

5. Africa: Current developments in Africa were also examined at length. Tunisian leaders are very concerned over continuing increase in Soviet influence in Africa both directly and by means of Cuban surrogates. They stressed importance of the U.S. playing a direct role in Africa. In their view, no other Western country has as much influence throughout the continent as the U.S. They expressed full approval of Moroccan-French action re Zaire and strongly encouraged U.S. to provide more support and play stronger role in Zaire and elsewhere in Africa.

6. Habib asked President for his views on current deterioration in Africa below Sahara. President launched into discourse on Soviet machinations in Africa, citing Podgorny visits, Soviet fleet activities, and Castro travels. He blamed American "Vietnam complex" for lack of firm U.S. hand in Africa. He made strong plea for U.S. to make its weight felt on this continent. Habib assured President that sincere and positive U.S. policy would be followed in Africa, but noted American desire to feel that Africans themselves wanted American presence and were willing to do their share in their own interest. Bourguiba assured Habib that, among African states, perhaps all but the few "Marxist" radicals wanted the U.S. and friendly Western nations to concern themselves with African affairs.

7. Habib reviewed U.S. policy in Zaire, Rhodesia, Namibia and Ethiopia. He stressed U.S. support for African nationalism and encouragement of African states to work together against external intervention.

8. Libya: Tunisian leaders were especially concerned about Soviet influence in Libya and unpredictable, aggressive nature of Qadhafi regime, particularly toward Tunisia. While Tunisia would prefer to devote its limited resources to economic development, heavy Libyan purchases of modern Soviet arms, including MiGs and submarines, have forced Tunisia to undertake its own defense modernization program. Tunisia has turned to France, U.S., and Italy for arms.

9. Describing continental shelf dispute as serious, Nouira emphasized Qadhafi's refusal to use ICJ or alternatives to arbitrate dispute. Tunisia is fully prepared to submit matter to arbitration by either appropriate organizations or technical experts. Habib assured Nouira that U.S. will support Tunisian efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of shelf question.⁶

⁶ See Documents 3, 4, and 5.

10. Chatty told Habib that Qadhafi during March 29 Tobruk meeting offered Tunisians loan of 20 million dinars per year for next four years for economic development. Chatty undertook to discuss offer with his government, but asked how Tunisia could be expected to live continually in fear of Libyan invasion while taking handout from Qadhafi. Chatty saw this as an effort to sidetrack continental shelf issue. Habib asked whether GOT felt Egypt would eventually use force against Qadhafi. Chatty said that, while he did not really know, it might under certain circumstances be necessary; however, GOE had threatened Libya before and had done nothing in the end. Habib stressed the value of exchanging information frequently on Libyan situation. He undertook, upon return to Washington, to review latest intelligence available to U.S. and would transmit useful items to Chatty through Ambassador.

11. Chatty told Habib that Prime Minister Nouira returned from Moscow convinced that Soviets are generally encouraging Qadhafi in his foreign adventures, although they are probably not counseling him in detail in each case and probably not at all in his confrontation with Tunisia. Soviets declined to discuss continental shelf issue in any detail with Tunisians, calling it "too complex" and of no direct interest to USSR.

12. U.S. military assistance: Minister of Defense Farhat reviewed Tunisia defense modernization objectives and strongly urged USG to provide expeditiously major items of equipment which Tunisia wishes to acquire under FMS. Tunisian armed forces require upgrading and modernization to defend against possible threats from better armed neighbors Algeria and Libya. Current disagreement with Libya over continental shelf underscores urgency of Tunisia's military equipment needs. Tunisia therefore hopes USG can provide \$125 million in FMS credits over next five years.⁷ Forthcoming U.S. assistance is particularly important this year because of Tunisia's economic problems.

13. Farhat voiced particular concern over delays encountered in acquisition of Chaparral⁸ air defense missiles; he asked whether delivery could be expedited. Habib undertook to look into question after returning to Washington. Farhat raised Tunisian interest in Redeye.⁹ Habib explained that although many countries have Soviet Strella missile, USG does not usually sell Redeye because of concern it may fall into terrorist hands. He also explained that sales of missiles such as

⁷ An unknown hand underlined "urgency of Tunisia's military equipment needs" and "hopes USG can provide \$125 million in FMS credits over next five years," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "Chaparral."

⁹ An unknown hand underlined "interest in Redeye."

Redeye presently included in general review of arms sales policy requested by President. He assured Farhat that U.S. recognizes Tunisia's strategic situation and intends to assist Tunisian defense modernization program, subject to congressional approval of annual appropriation requests. He hoped Congress would approve \$25 million in FMS credits for Tunisia during FY 1978. Habib and Farhat also discussed U.S. policy on Security Supporting Assistance, sales of surplus ships and shift from grant assistance to FMS credits.

14. Farhat also deplored current U.S. policy of charging FMS recipients for replacement costs of equipment, citing case of Chaparral/Vulcan system. GOT is being charged \$65,356 apiece for current model of Chaparral missile instead of original value, which they understand was considerably less. Even with modest size of desired system, Tunisia is being impoverished by such policies. Habib was not sure if anything could be done to alter current policy but promised to look into matter on his return to Washington.

15. Chatty expressed the hope of GOT that U.S. would provide maximum possible military aid to Tunisia.¹⁰ Habib said he had been alerted to possible bureaucratic blockages in Washington concerning pricing and delivery of FMS materiel and would do his best to untangle these problems. Habib also assured Chatty that Washington deeply appreciated problems which peaceful Tunisia was now facing from its unstable, unpredictable neighbor Qadhafi.

16. Joint Commission: Chatty expressed GOT preference for hosting next Joint Commission meeting after Prime Minister Nouria's Washington visit. Habib, while agreeing that such sequence also struck him as most advisable, said that schedule facing Secretary might indicate reverse order for visit and Joint Commission. In any case, he felt it would be July or August before we could be ready to fix¹¹ dates for Joint Commission.

17. Invitation to Nouria: Invitation on behalf of President to Prime Minister Nouria to make official visit to U.S. either late this year or early 1978 was extended. Nouria expressed appreciation for the President's invitation and agreed that further arrangements and dates for visit would be discussed in Washington with Ambassador Hedda. Habib also informed Bourguiba of invitation and regretted that President himself could not travel again to U.S.¹²

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined "maximum possible military aid to Tunisia."

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined "July or August before we could be ready to fix dates for Joint Commission," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

¹² An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph, circled "Invitation to Nouria," underlined the phrase "further arrangements and dates for visit would be discussed in Washington," and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin. Nouria did not visit Washington until November 1978; see Document 198.

18. U.S.-Tunisian friendship: President Bourguiba reviewed history of close Tunisian-American friendship dating from World War II and generosity of U.S. in assisting Tunisia's development. He assured Habib that close relations would always continue. He asked Under Secretary to convey his warmest greetings to President Carter, Secretary Vance, and former Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.

Anderson

189. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, June 29, 1977, 0700Z

4546. NEA for Atherton, PM for Gelb and Ericson. Subject: Visit of Director, DSAA to Tunis. Ref: CHUSLOT 4489.²

1. Summary. We were honored and pleased to have had LTG Fish, Director, DSAA visit Tunisia, 24–26 June. General Fish was the bearer of some exceptionally good news to our Tunisian friends (and to us as well). We discussed FY 77 FMS credit and possible end-of-year credits; the Chaparral, Vulcan and FAAR purchases; and a general wrap-up of Tunisian military requirements. End summary.

2. LTG Fish attended the Tunisian Armed Forces 21st anniversary dinner, visited the Tunisian Military Academy, and was most warmly received at a dinner for him, hosted by Sec Gen of Defense Alouini. LTG Fish additionally held very profitable discussions with Defense Minister Farhat and his deputy, Ahmed Bennour.

3. General Fish discussed the Tunisian FY 77 FMS credit agreement, indicating that it would indeed be \$25 million as we had hoped. Apparently the additional \$10 million in FY 77 credit authorization for Tunisia is included in the Presidential Determination request and we understood that it should be received in the near future.³ We further understand from General Fish that if GOT desires additional end FY 77 credit, we can have Ambassador Hedda ready to sign an additional FMS credit agreement before 30 Sept. The Tunisians were of course elated

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77–6/78. Confidential; Priority.

² Not found.

³ See Document 191.

over this news which will permit them to sign their FAAR and Vulcan (see SecState from CHUSLOT 4489) Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) as soon as the paperwork can get to us.

4. We also informed the Tunisians of the 28-month delivery schedule in their Chaparral buy (vice 30 months). General Fish hand-carried their FAAR radar LOA and discussed the realization of a complete air defense system in the 1979 time frame.

5. General Fish mentioned to the Tunisians the possibility of a reduction in missile costs for their Chaparral buy but made no firm commitment until legal clarification is received.

6. Ministers Farhat and Bennour, as well as the Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces, were most appreciative of the fine effort of General Fish. We too appreciate State Department's backing DOD and helping the Tunisians realize their much needed defense requirements.

7. The Tunisians took the opportunity to outline to us some of their out-year military hardware requirements such as two missile and M48A5 tanks. With good financial planning based on the news of credit availability, the Tunisians will be well on the road to achieving their modernization program.

8. My personal thanks to the Department for the fine support it is giving Defense Department in assisting Tunisia. General Fish's visit was one of the most welcome and profitable we have had.

Mulcahy

190. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 6, 1977

SUBJECT

Waiver of the \$40 Million Ceiling on FY 1977 Military Assistance, Credits and Guaranties for African Countries, under Section 33(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

This memorandum asks you to exercise your authority under section 33(b) of the Arms Export Control Act to waive the \$40 million statutory ceiling on the total (excluding training) of grant military assistance and foreign military sales (FMS) credits and guaranteed loans to African countries in fiscal year 1977. The waiver of the ceiling is urgently needed to permit implementation of FMS financing programs, especially to make progress payments on prior purchases.

Background

Section 33 (a) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, imposes an annual \$40 million ceiling on military assistance and FMS financing for African countries. Section 33 (b) of the Act provides that you may waive this ceiling when you determine that a waiver is important to the security of the United States, and promptly so report to the Congress.

The \$40 million ceiling has ceased to be a realistic limitation and has been waived successively in recent years. Last year, the Ford Administration justified to Congress FY 1977 security assistance programs for Africa which exceeded the \$40 million ceiling by more than \$60 million. In North Africa alone our program justifications for Morocco and Tunisia exceed the ceiling. Subsequent reprogramming has only slightly increased the total African program.

Although Congress declined last year to repeal the ceiling, it approved the requested funding levels. This Congressional action appears to assume that the ceiling again will be waived. Congress, therefore, should expect you to waive this limitation in order to implement country programs at the levels it has approved. We will report your determination to Congress on your behalf and provide it with the attached justification,² as has been the practice with previous determinations.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Confidential. There is no indication Carter saw the memorandum.

² Not attached.

As shown in the table at Tab 1,³ our planned FMS financing in Africa for FY 1977 consists of FMS programs for seven countries—Zaire, Senegal, Liberia, Gabon, Kenya, Morocco, and Tunisia. These programs total about \$108.5 million.

Arms Control Considerations

The waiving of the \$40 million African ceiling will not conflict with your recently announced policy to restrain conventional arms transfers. The FY 1977 FMS financing programs for African countries will be used to finance purchases of defense articles and services by countries whose defense is important to the security of the United States and whose unfriendly neighbors are armed with superior weapons. Consequently, the sales which result from waiving this \$40 million ceiling should not adversely affect regional distributions of power or promote arms races in Africa.

Publication

Section 654 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires that the waiver be published in the *Federal Register* unless you conclude that such publication would be “harmful to the national security of the United States.” Since the program levels are public knowledge, publication in this case would have no harmful effect on the national security.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve and sign the determination at Tab 2, and thereby approve the attached justification.⁴ The Department of Defense concurs in this determination.

³ Not attached.

⁴ Tab 2 is not attached. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but see Document 191.

**191. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (Lance) to President Carter¹**

Washington, July 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Presidential Determination to Waive the Ceiling on Military Assistance to Africa

I concur in Secretary Vance's recommendation that you sign the attached determination waiving the \$40 million ceiling on military assistance (including grants, credits, and loan guarantees) for Africa in fiscal year 1977.²

This determination is necessary, since the Administration's proposed 1977 budget levels for the eight African countries exceed \$40 million, and the Congress has not agreed to eliminate the ceiling provision in current security assistance legislation.

By approving this determination and transmitting the required justifications to Congress, you would also be approving an increase in fiscal 1977 FMS financing for Tunisia from the budgeted \$15 million to \$25 million. The amounts shown for all other planned country programs in the attached table³ were previously approved and reflected in the 1978 Congressional Presentation document.⁴

The Tunisian increase would be used to accelerate delivery of the integrated air defense system (Chaparral missile batteries, radar, and Vulcan anti-aircraft guns) which Tunisia has begun purchasing to meet what it perceives to be an increased threat from Libya. This increase for Tunisia is not likely to raise questions about your overall policy of restraint in arms transfers, since the 1978 FMS credit program nearing final approval by the Congress includes \$25 million for Tunisia.

Funds are currently available for this reallocation, but OMB believes such increases should have Presidential approval. Accordingly, if you agree, your approval of this increase will be conveyed to State when you sign the Presidential Determination for the ceiling waiver.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Confidential.

² Not attached. For Vance's recommendation, see Document 190.

³ Not attached.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Carter checked and initialed the option to approve an additional \$10 million for Tunisia.

192. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Waiver of \$40 Million Ceiling on FY 1977 Military Assistance, Credits and Guaranties for African Countries Under Section 3(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended.

I attach at Tab B² a memorandum from the Secretary of State recommending a Presidential Determination (at Tab A) to waive the \$40 million statutory ceiling on the total (excluding training) of grant military assistance and foreign military sales (FMS) credits and guaranteed loans to African countries in FY 1977. This waiver will permit implementation of FMS financing programs, especially progress payments on prior purchases. The Act permits you to waive the ceiling when you determine that a waiver is important to US security, and promptly so report to the Congress.

The \$40 million ceiling has ceased to be a realistic limitation and has been waived successively in recent years. There is strong indication that Congress assumes that the ceiling will again be waived. Our planned FMS financing in Africa for FY 77 totals about \$108.5 million.

Your waiver of this ceiling will not conflict with our policy of restraining conventional arms transfers. The Secretary of State will report your Determination of Waiver to Congress on your behalf and provide Congress with the Justification at Tab C.

At Tab D lies OMB's memorandum concurring in the Determination of Waiver.³ It also points out that your making this determination would constitute approval of an increase in FY 77 FMS financing in Tunisia from \$15 to \$25 million. Neither I nor OMB find any difficulty with such an increase. Further, OMB points out, and I concur, that this increase is unlikely to raise questions on the overall arms transfers policy, since the 1978 FMS credit program includes \$25 million for Tunisia. Accordingly, if you agree, your approval of this increase will be transmitted to State upon your signing the Determination.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Confidential. Highland initialed for Brzezinski. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² Tabs A–D are not attached. Tab B is printed as Document 190.

³ Printed as Document 191.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A waiving the \$40 million ceiling on FY 77 military assistance to Africa, as set out above, and approve the additional \$10 million for Tunisia at Tab D.⁴

⁴ Beneath the recommendation, Dodson wrote: "signed Tab A 8/12/77, approved Tab D 8/12/77." Presidential Determination No. 77-19 and the justification, August 12, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia.

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, September 21, 1977, 2337Z

227725. Subject: Under Secretary Habib's Meeting With Tunisian Ambassador Hedda on September 20.

1. Hedda met with Habib September 20 after having cancelled meeting last week in order to return to Tunis for consultations.

2. Hedda briefly recounted economic situation, noting Tunisian balance of payments problems have been assuaged by 100 million dollar loan from Chase Manhattan and CitiBank. Hedda then relayed GOT's willingness to schedule Joint Commission meeting for the spring after Prime Minister Nouira's visit to U.S. (septel reports Hedda's subsequent request for October timing.)² He also reiterated suggestion Tunisian Minister of Economics and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce meet in Washington during the fall to explore further avenues of increasing U.S.-Tunisian trade and investment. Habib agreed with Hedda on spring timing for Joint Commission and said the Department would assist fully in Hedda's proposal for a fall meeting between Tunisian Economics Minister and Secretary of Commerce in Washington.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770344-0096. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Leggio; cleared in NEA, DOD, S/CPR, AF/E, the Department of Commerce, and PM/SAS; approved by Habib.

² Telegram 226021 to Tunis, September 20, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800020-0663.

3. Hedda said GOT is still in process of deciding on purchases of FAAR and Vulcan systems, TOW missiles, and F-5's. Habib asked whether GOT had changed its position on FMS sales since, during the last year, the GOT had pressed U.S. for increased FMS credits and now seems to be unable, or unwilling to use present FMS allocations. Hedda assured Habib that GOT expects to spend much more than present FMS credits and that final decisions on what to purchase, which are still pending, should be finalized soon.

4. Habib said he would then recommend that Tunisia receive an additional 10 million dollars in FMS credits out of unused worldwide balance for FY 1977. Habib said he would sign recommendation September 20.

5. Hedda brought up question of Menzel-Bourguiba dockyard use by the Soviets, which Deputy Assistant Secretary Veliotos had raised on September 2.³ Hedda said when he brought up question in Tunis during his consultation Noura and other GOT officials expressed astonishment regarding U.S. concern on this strictly commercial procedure. Hedda relayed that economic conditions, especially unemployment, had required GOT to make available the repair facilities to all nations. Hedda remarked that the U.S. Sixth Fleet had previously studied possibility of using Menzel-Bourguiba dockyard facilities but never responded to GOT on outcome. He reiterated GOT strong preference for Sixth Fleet utilization of dockyard facilities instead of Soviets. Habib noted U.S. concern that Soviet fleet repairs in Menzel-Bourguiba dockyards increase Soviet capability in Mediterranean area, which is not in U.S. interest. Habib said we would look into possibility of Sixth Fleet usage of Menzel-Bourguiba facilities.

6. Regarding Noura visit, Hedda relayed preference for January–March 1978 period. Habib said he was also in favor of this timing and would try to get an answer on request shortly.

7. Hedda then requested a briefing on the U.S. position on the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Habib described U.S. position regarding Somalia and Ethiopia. He said Somalis had approached U.S. to replace Soviet military assistance. U.S. agreed in principle to supply Somalis with defensive arms, but, since inception of Ogaden conflict, U.S. had informed Somalia that we would not provide arms to Somalia

³ In telegram 213505 to Tunis, September 7, the Department reported on the September 2 meeting: "Veliotos noted the number of Soviet naval vessels being repaired at Menzel-Bourguiba dockyard. He said that while obviously Tunisian affair, USG hopes to be informed if this signals any change in GOT policy, and he suggested subject be discussed with Ambassador Mulcahy in Tunis. Hedda replied he unfamiliar with subject and would have to inform himself." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323–0955)

so long as Ogaden conflict remains unresolved. Habib said U.S. had decided not to get in Ogaden dispute. At this time, therefore, we are not providing arms to either side. We do have some ongoing economic assistance programs in Ethiopia and we are preparing to have some economic assistance programs as well with Somalia.

8. Regarding Middle East conflict, Habib noted the next few weeks will be significant. U.S. is still hopeful a Geneva Conference will be held by end of year and will try to get all parties to agree.

9. Habib said Secretary would appreciate Foreign Minister Chatty's views when they meet in New York during UNGA session.

10. Habib then thanked Hedda for GOT's support in Committee of 24 on Puerto Rico vote.

Vance

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 3, 1977, 11:30am

PARTICIPANTS

Tunisia

Foreign Minister Habib Chatty

Ambassador Ali Hedda

Ali Tekaia, Counselor of Embassy

U.S.

The Secretary

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Philip C. Habib

Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

Theodore S. Wilkinson, NEA/AFN, (notetaker)

SUBJECT

Tunisian Request for Security Supporting Assistance; Middle East Peace Negotiations

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 2/77-6/78. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkinson; approved by Wisner on October 15. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the UN Plaza.

Referring to his earlier conversation with Mr. Habib,² Chatty said he would like to discuss only one major bilateral concern with the Secretary, before turning to multilateral matters. Chatty said that the Tunisian Government sets great store by its relations with the U.S., which are exceptional and of a very special nature. Thanks to the U.S. Tunisia has reached a stage close to economic take-off. However, it now needs an extra boost, and the U.S. could provide this in the form of Security Supporting Assistance.³ Chatty recalled that he had discussed this with the previous Administration.

Chatty said his rationale for renewing the request for Security Supporting Assistance derives from Tunisia's unique geographic situation. Together with Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, Tunisia helps to serve as a buffer between the two great power blocs, but it is the weakest link in the chain—weaker even than the Sudan. This had been brought home with particular starkness during the confrontation with Libya. Chatty said this was the only major bilateral issue he wanted to bring up. Other issues could be discussed with Mr. Habib in the context of the U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission. He added that the Secretary might want to take some time to think about his proposal. If it was not possible for Tunisia to have Security Supporting Assistance, he hoped that economic assistance and military sales credits could be increased, for the same reasons.

Secretary Vance said that we share the view that relations between our two countries are of great importance, and that we must maintain and strengthen them. He said that we were planning to continue our economic assistance, within the limit of funds available, at approximately the current level.

Regarding Security Supporting Assistance, the Secretary said that we would be willing to explore the matter once more, but his initial reaction was that the Tunisian interest would not be served by this type of aid. We were already getting increasingly penetrating questions from Congress about the large share of total assistance that goes into Security Supporting Assistance. In Tunisia's case, the question might

² In telegram 243728 to Tunis, October 11, the Department summarized Vance and Habib's October 3 meeting with Chatty: "During brief meeting with Habib prior to meeting with Secretary, Chatty raised question of a visit to Tunis by Habib and scheduling of Joint Commission. Habib said uncertain course of Middle East negotiations in coming months would make it difficult to accept commitments in October and November, and that it might be best to put off Joint Commission dates until early in 1978." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770370-0562)

³ Originally known as Defense Support Assistance, Security Supporting Assistance was a form of military aid that allowed recipients to purchase arms without using their own resources. In 1978, it was renamed the Economic Support Fund.

be put to an up or down vote in Congress, which would be risky. He asked Mr. Habib for his view on the question.

Mr. Habib agreed that Tunisia does not fit in the category that would appeal to Congress for Security Supporting Assistance. He said that we have set a target for military assistance, and that we are looking for ways to increase our economic assistance. The Secretary concluded that Security Supporting Assistance was not a favorable avenue for Tunisia to pursue. He asked what Tunisia's immediate needs were, what total amount of assistance was at stake, and in what time frame. Chatty replied that Ambassador Hedda could follow-up with precise figures. The important thing to keep in mind was that Tunisia receives economic support from many countries, but that U.S. support has always been a key factor. Other countries follow the U.S. lead. U.S. aid is doubly important; first, for the amount of aid itself; second, because of the example the U.S. sets for others. A U.S. decision to discontinue assistance would be little short of disastrous for Tunisia. The Secretary said that we have no intention to discontinue our assistance.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, January 9, 1978, 1625Z

159. USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR also for POLADs. Subj: Menzel Bourguiba: Tunisian "Astonishment" at U.S. Attitude. Ref: Tunis 0072.²

1. Summary: On January 7 I was summoned by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Turki and given a strong demarche regarding U.S. attitude on Soviet fleet repairs at Menzel Bourguiba arising from recent NEA/AFN discussion with Tunisian Charge. Turki said he believed U.S. under erroneous impression Soviet use of Menzel Bourguiba based on accord, agreement or contract of formal written nature, which he denied. He reiterated known GOT position and repeated regret U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780013-0286. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Paris, USNATO, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and COMSIXTHFLT.

² In telegram 72 from Tunis, January 5, the Embassy reported on a January 3 meeting between Zablocki and Farhat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780008-1068)

and Western allies have failed to avail selves of repeated GOT offers to use repair facilities. He stressed apparent lack of congressional opposition to GOT exemplified in attitudes of HIRC Chairman Zablocki and others during recent Tunis visit. In response I restated our basic dissatisfaction with fact that Tunisia was now, however unwittingly, contributing to the increased operational capability of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. End summary.

2. With apologies for bothering me on a Saturday, Brahim Turki, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asked me to come to MOFA urgently. Upon arrival I found him in unusually cool mood. He launched at once into an expression of “astonishment” over the contents of recent report from Tunisian Charge d’Affaires Tekaya on the subject of Soviet fleet repairs at Menzel Bourguiba following talk with AFN Director. GOT was “astonished” that USG is still apparently under the misapprehension that GOT has concluded a formal written accord, agreement or contract with the USSR regarding the use of ship repair facilities at Menzel Bourguiba. Tunisian “astonishment” (a word repeated at least five times during our talk) is all the greater because GOT, from the first time U.S. raised this subject, has made a clean breast of its motivations—purely economic and “sociological”—in agreeing on case-by-case basis to allow repairs of “a non-military character” to be made at Menzel Bourguiba by Soviet ships. He stated he was at Prime Minister Nour’s side all during his 1977 visit to USSR and could assure me that USSR use of Menzel Bourguiba is based entirely on simple oral agreement by Nour who stipulated that repairs would be agreed to on a case-by-case basis and must not be of a military character. Each case is subject to specific examination and approval by the Minister of Defense, who, said Turki, has rejected as many applications as he has approved over past six months. He especially stressed the fact that the Soviets had never sought any written agreement on use of the shipyard. Turki added that the Soviet Ambassador has “pursued me by telephone even into my home” pressing requests for facilities for individual ships which MOD has either delayed action on or refused to admit.

3. The Secretary of State then reviewed the (to me) well-known story of GOT’s 10–15 year effort to promote Menzel Bourguiba’s great potential usefulness to the West: Bethlehem Steel’s long-studied and finally negative decision in mid-1960’s not to invest in and upgrade Menzel Bourguiba; French refusal to continue utilizing its facilities and a more recent Krupp decision against participating there. He described the history of post-independence Menzel Bourguiba (formerly Ferryville) which once employed 3,000 workers and the economic disaster which has beset the community since 1963, of the millions of dinars

Tunisia has spent on make-work programs to keep only 800 men and their families solvent. This closely followed the lines of Defense Minister Farhat's exposition to CODEL Zablocki, which resulted in an expression of understanding of the GOT position from the HIRC Chairman and no expression of opposition from other HIRC members or staff present (reftel). Turki made much of this point and again expressed "astonishment" that Tunisia's motives were being called into question by Department, when the U.S. above all others should know where Tunisia's sympathies lie.

4. After this, I said I appreciated, as did my government, the GOT's courtesy and cooperation in discussing this matter with us and in permitting COMSIXTHFLT and his engineering experts to update our knowledge of Menzel Bourguiba's facilities which formed the basis of our recent decisions communicated by me to ex-FonMin Chatty and Defense Minister Farhat not to use the shipyard for USN purposes.³ However, I hoped the GOT would continue to bear in mind that our basic dissatisfaction stems from the fact that Tunisia was now, however, unwittingly, contributing to the increased operational capacity of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, a matter of great importance to us. I repeated to him as I had to Chatty and Farhat earlier the concern of the NATO Secretariat for the possible impact on the balance of forces in the Mediterranean that this new advantage to the USSR could signify.

5. In reply Turki said he knew of no other NATO country which had indicated its unhappiness over this matter and interrupted our conversation to call his Director for Europe and America Mejdoub to ask whether representations over Menzel Bourguiba had been received from any source but the USG. He was told by Mejdoub that no other NATO Ambassador or Foreign Ministry had so far raised a question on it. Turki concluded by saying that Tunisia, since independence, has always enjoyed a frank and friendly relationship with the United States.

³ In telegram 9120 from Tunis, December 23, 1977, Mulcahy reported on his December 22, 1977, meeting with Chatty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770480-1114) In telegram 295497 to Tunis, December 10, the Department transmitted instructions for the meeting with Chatty: "We believe it would be useful to let the Tunisians know of recent concern expressed within NATO that apparent agreement with the Soviets re Menzel-Bourguiba signals a shift in orientation of Tunisian foreign policy (this was assertion in NATO staff document which we have suggested be changed). You should emphasize point that Soviet use of Tunisian repair facilities runs real risk of tarnishing Tunisia's image among its friends in Congress, who are sensitive to actions which would increase operational capabilities of Soviet Mediterranean squadron." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770460-0001)

It has been a relationship based on complete mutual confidence. Why now does the State Department exhibit this lack of confidence in Tunisia?⁴

Mulcahy

⁴ In telegram 8286 to NATO capitals and other posts, January 12, the Department reported that Tunisia had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union for repair and maintenance of Soviet naval vessels: "Tunisian officials have cited as justification for their decision the disinterest of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in using the installations and Tunisian need for the revenue earned by maintaining and repairing foreign vessels." Addressees were requested to brief host governments and tell them "USG would welcome their support in making Tunisians aware of seriousness with which some of its important Western friends view Soviet use of Menzel-Bourguiba." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780017–0832)

196. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

NI IIM 78–10004

Washington, February 28, 1978

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]

TUNISIA'S STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

Recent developments in Tunisia, including the 26 January rioting in Tunis and other cities that accompanied the country's first general labor strike,² are part of the evolving contest to determine who will run Tunisia when ailing 74-year-old President Habib Bourguiba leaves the scene. A group of conservative, pro-Western Bourguiba loyalists—

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads in part: "This memorandum—at the request of the Department of State—was prepared by Mr. Brian Flora, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and [name not declassified], of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center." The note continues: "The memorandum was coordinated at the working level among representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and the Armed Forces."

² In telegram 631 from Tunis, January 27, the Embassy provided a preliminary assessment of the riots in Tunisia during a planned nationwide labor strike. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780040–0984)

headed by Prime Minister Nouria and including Habib Bourguiba, Jr.—has consolidated its control of the government and can be expected to quell forcibly any further disorders.

The Nouria government clearly intends to use the recent outbreaks of violence to bring the labor movement back under the effective control of the party and government. Labor leader Achour will be made the scapegoat, but the political and economic discontent basically responsible for the recent disturbances will remain.

The January disorders reflect strong currents of discontent which have been building over the years as a result of rapid economic, social, and cultural changes. These changes have increased popular expectations beyond the government's capacity to satisfy them.

We expect that Nouria will continue as Prime Minister and will succeed Bourguiba. Given his control of the government and party apparatus, Nouria will become Tunisia's president and would have a considerable advantage over other contenders in a subsequent presidential election.

The departure of Bourguiba will be the acid test of Tunisia's political stability. Greater reliance on repressive measures over an extended period of time would erode the successor leadership's legitimacy and increase the risk that some group within the military might eventually step in to form either a conservative authoritarian regime or a reform-minded military government.


We believe the military, whose support will become increasingly important in the post-Bourguiba era, will remain loyal to Nouria or any other legitimately constituted government. Although we lack good information on the attitudes of junior officers, we judge the likelihood of a Qadhafi-style coup attempt by young officers espousing radical Arab sympathies as very remote.

We believe Nouria and most leaders of the political establishment probably recognize the dangers of a long-term policy of repression. Over time, these leaders are likely to seek a compromise with other moderate interest groups to preserve Tunisia's civilian-dominated political system.

Barring a sustained deterioration of the economy and/or prolonged civil disorders, we believe that a moderate, pro-Western government is likely to remain in power for the next three to five years.

Over the longer run, Tunisia could see the emergence of a regime that would be less overtly pro-Western and more dogmatically non-aligned. Such a regime probably would accelerate Tunisia's drift away from close identification with the United States.

We do not expect Tunisia to align itself with the USSR, although the Soviets may be permitted greater access to ship repair facilities. It is unlikely that Tunisia would accord Moscow base rights.



675108 1/76

DISCUSSION

End of the Bourguiba Era

1. President Habib Bourguiba, the ailing 74-year-old leader who has dominated Tunisian politics since the struggle for independence against France, is nearing the end of his rule. The government, the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), and the national labor confeder-

ation have begun the contest for power, which was not expected to erupt until after Bourguiba's death.

2. Bourguiba's genius has been his ability to make Tunisia's closed one-party system work for nearly 22 years behind a democratic facade. He is the father of his country and still enjoys a high level of popular support. The fruits of his leadership have been a relatively high degree of political stability and economic well-being. Under Bourguiba's leadership, Tunisia has maintained a moderate, flexible approach in foreign policy.

3. His ruling style has been paternalistic, highly personal, and autocratic. His stranglehold on power [*6 lines not declassified*].

4. President Bourguiba's age and failing health increasingly prevent him, however, from exercising tight control over the government and party. He suffered a massive coronary attack in 1967 and has developed a progression of medical ailments, [*2 lines not declassified*]. As a result, the country's day-to-day affairs are now largely the responsibility of Prime Minister Hedi Nour. Bourguiba still provides some general policy direction, however, and he continues to assert his authority to resolve critical situations, such as the dispute with Libya last summer over the continental shelf.³ (See accompanying map.)

Succession Politics

5. The overriding political issue in Tunisia is presidential succession. For more than a decade Bourguiba has vacillated over what procedures should be used to choose his successor. This vacillation has encouraged political maneuvering by those who see themselves as presidential material.

6. Tunisia's constitution provides that in the event of a vacancy in the presidency, the prime minister automatically assumes the office for the duration of the then current five-year term of the National Assembly. Presidential candidates must then be nominated by one or more elected officials, approved by a government commission, and run in a nationwide popular election. The next Assembly election is slated for November 1979. The timing of Bourguiba's departure from the scene could therefore be an important factor in his immediate successor's ability to consolidate control over the party and governmental apparatus.

7. The 66-year-old Nour has been a trusted adviser of Bourguiba since the struggle for independence and Prime Minister since 1970. He is a conservative on domestic issues and a proponent of Tunisia's moderate, pro-Western foreign policy. Although widely respected for

³ See Documents 3-5 and 9-13.

his management of the economy, Nouira lacks a political following [5 lines not declassified].

8. Over the past year a feud between the Tunisian labor movement—headed until recently by Habib Achour—and the government-party establishment led by Nouira has grown into a major political contest.⁴ Achour has attempted to use recurring labor unrest to discredit the Nouira government. [4 lines not declassified]

9. The labor-government confrontation produced serious splits in the Cabinet in 1977 over whether to negotiate with striking workers or to suppress labor agitation forcibly. Nouira and other hard-line ministers were allied against Belkhodja and other officials who favored a conciliatory approach.

10. Late last December, Nouira took his case to the President and threatened to resign if the Interior Minister was not dismissed. Belkhodja and the Surete Chief were promptly relieved of their duties, and within a few days the Foreign Minister and several other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials either resigned in protest or were fired.

11. As a result of these personnel changes, Nouira now exercises greater control of the government and directs a Cabinet of political conservatives more in keeping with his—and Bourguiba's—outlook. Moreover, Bourguiba's reaffirmation of his confidence in the Prime Minister has strengthened Nouira's hand, at least in the short run. The leadership changes also constituted a warning—since fulfilled—to Achour that the government was prepared to deal forcefully with labor unrest.

12. The most significant change in the government lineup was the addition of Habib Bourguiba, Jr., who was given the title of Special Adviser to the President. He is even more hostile than Nouira to labor agitation and is likely to counter the influence on the President of Madame Bourguiba, his stepmother, who has been a supporter of Belkhodja, Achour, and former Foreign Minister Masmoudi.

13. The younger Bourguiba's reemergence in politics, after seven years of semiretirement, has led to speculation that he is being groomed to succeed his father. Although the President has repeatedly raised this idea, we doubt that the younger Bourguiba aspires to the post or that he has altered his objection to creating what might look like a hereditary presidency. [3 lines not declassified]

⁴ The dispute began when party director Mohamed Sayah attempted to undermine Achour's position. Subsequently, union leaders decided to abandon a labor-government agreement calling for austerity measures, including a wage freeze, during the current five-year plan. [Footnote is in the original.]

[Omitted here is a detailed discussion of Tunisia's social and political situation.]

US Interests in Tunisia

74. Tunisia has four good Mediterranean Sea ports—in an area which has relatively few such facilities. The importance of Tunisia's ports to the US 6th Fleet should not be minimized. Tunisia is one of the few Mediterranean countries which permit routine port calls by the 6th Fleet, including its nuclear-powered ships.

75. Perhaps more important to US strategic interests is the denial of Tunisia's naval facilities to the Soviet Union. If the Soviets are allowed to undertake frequent and extensive servicing of their submarines or establish a permanent floating base of auxiliary ships in port, US strategic interests would be significantly affected.

76. US political interests are served by the generally moderate approach to international problems Tunisia has taken in the various international political forums of which it is a member (the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the United Nations, and the non-aligned movement). While Tunisia's size and wealth preclude leadership roles, it has consistently used its influence to encourage dialogue and compromise in conflict situations. Tunisian moderation has generally been supportive of US policy objectives, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In international organizations, Tunisia has typically worked against gratuitous criticism of US and Western policies and has sought to promote cooperative relationships between the Third World and the Western democracies.

77. Direct US economic and commercial interests in Tunisia are modest (US-Tunisian trade in 1977 was only about \$150 million; US private investment in Tunisia is roughly \$85 million). The US economic stake could, however, increase if Tunisia's petroleum and gas resources prove to be as extensive as recent exploration suggests. Nonetheless, Tunisia's small population and its lack of significant national wealth preclude its becoming economically significant to the United States.

78. Perhaps more important to the United States is Tunisia's potential role as a model for Third World economic development. Tunisia's economic performance since 1970, in part the result of foreign and domestic private capital, demonstrates the benefits of a relatively free mixed economy. It is in the US interest to see Tunisia's experiment in economic development succeed.

Tunisia's Perception of the United States

79. The overall image of the United States in Tunisia remains positive, and most members of the Tunisian elite believe their country's close association with the United States since independence has been

beneficial. They are well aware that roughly one-third of Tunisia's total foreign economic assistance has come from the United States. The United States has also been a major source of military aid, and President Bourguiba has often referred to the US 6th Fleet, whose visits the country accepts virtually on request, as Tunisia's "shield in the Mediterranean." Indeed, Tunisian leaders perceive that US power has contributed to the country's security against outside interference. Ideologically and culturally, most of the elite and much of Tunisia's population prefer the West over the Communist world.

80. On the other hand, since the late 1960s the United States has become relatively less important to Tunisia economically, politically, and, to some extent, militarily. US influence and the US "privileged" relationship with Tunisia has slowly eroded as US aid has declined in importance. Economic aid from the World Bank, France, various Arab states, the Soviet bloc, and China have lessened Tunisia's dependence on the United States. Politically, close US identification with Israel has been a sensitive subject in Tunisia's domestic politics. It risks becoming more so if Egypt's peace initiative falters and the Arabs blame the failure on the United States.

81. In a strategic sense the Tunisian leadership also may have perceived a shift of international power relationships in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has provided vast amounts of military equipment to both Algeria and Libya. Tunisian leaders continue to be aware of the activity and increased capability of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Tunisians reportedly have been disturbed by what they consider signs of US inability to defend US interests in the Third World. Their doubts about US resolve stem from their perceptions of the failure of the United States in South Vietnam, the US decision to opt out of the Angolan civil war in the face of the Soviet-backed Cuban intervention, and the apparent inability of the United States to take action in the Horn of Africa. As a result, it appears that the Tunisian leadership has concluded that it would be prudent to become more visibly nonaligned in the East-West context, while remaining pro-West in outlook and sympathy.

[Omitted here is a detailed outlook for Tunisia's near-term future.]

197. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Tunisian Prime Minister Nourira

The primary purpose of this visit is to underscore the continuing good relations that we enjoy with Tunisia, one of the most moderate, yet socially progressive, of the Arab states. Since Tunisian independence in 1956, we have worked closely with President Bourguiba, and even in his recent years of failing health he has remained emotionally pro-American.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Tunisia received more aid per capita from the US than any other developing country. Political stability and generally sound economic and social policies have moved resource-poor Tunisia into the ranks of middle-income countries. As a result, our own aid programs are no longer as essential on economic grounds, but they still symbolize the special relationship that exists between our two countries.

In addition to economic assistance, Tunisia has been receiving FMS credits, and in FY 1980 they expect at least \$25 million as the final installment of a promise we made to help with their military modernization. OMB is likely to recommend that this be cut back to \$15 million. I do not believe that this is an appropriate time to cut back substantially on the modest FMS program for Tunisia, particularly since we may not be able to meet the full \$25 million promised for FY 1979.

Nourira will be particularly interested in discussing the regional situation in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as economic cooperation. I suggest you make the following points:

—We are trying to work closely with our friends in the Middle East and North Africa to enhance the prospects for regional stability and orderly development. To reach this objective, we count heavily on countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran. We also want to open doors to cooperation with other countries in the region—Syria, Algeria, Iraq.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Secret. Sent for action. There is no indication Carter saw the memorandum.

—We remain committed to resisting Soviet intervention, directly or by proxy, in this region. Any Libyan threat to Tunisia would be a matter of grave concern to us and Tunisia could count on our support.

—As part of our regional and global strategy, we have been trying to bring about an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The first step in this process will be peace between Egypt and Israel and the beginning of a transitional process resulting in Palestinian self-government.

—Tunisia, and President Bourguiba in particular, understands the need to work toward objectives in phases, consolidating at each stage those gains that have been made, while not losing sight of the goal. This is the spirit behind what we are trying to do with the Camp David agreements. (Tunisians pride themselves on their reputation for being pragmatic and rational, particularly in comparison to their eastern Arab neighbors. Some reference to these Tunisian traits will be highly appreciated by Nouira.)

You may also want to pursue these additional topics:

—The situation in Algeria after Boumediene.²

—The prospects for private investment, joint projects, increased trade. Secretary Kreps is planning to go to Morocco and could also stop in Tunisia.

The State Department memo covers a number of other points (Tab A).³ I do not recommend that you discuss the human rights situation in Tunisia. Nor do I believe it appropriate to raise with Nouira the question of Soviet use of naval repair facilities unless we are in a position to offer the alternative of using those facilities ourselves. This is strictly a commercial question for the Tunisians.

Biographical sketches are at Tab B.⁴

Jim Fallows' office will provide welcoming remarks and toast material.

² Brzezinski wrote at the end of the sentence: "(N's views might be interesting)."

³ Not attached. Vance's November 21 memorandum to Carter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia.

⁴ Not attached.

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 29, 1978, 11:10 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Prime Minister Nouira of Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Hon. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)
Hon. Edward Mulcahy, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
Mr. Stephen Bosworth, Ambassador-Designate
Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff
Mr. Jerrold Schechter, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan, Translator

H.E. Hedi Nouira, Prime Minister
H.E. Mohammed Fitouri, Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Hassan Belkhodja, Minister of Agriculture
H.E. Mustafa Zannouni, Minister of Planning
H.E. Ali Hedda, Ambassador to U.S.

President Carter: I want to welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister. We have had close relations for many years and I want to thank you for the advice, counsel and support which you have offered us. Your visit here provides the opportunity for discussing the situation in the Middle East and Africa, as well as our bilateral relations, which will grow stronger as a result of your visit to our country.

Prime Minister Nouira: I want to renew my expression of gratitude and thanks for your hospitality. President Bourguiba hopes to see you someday in Tunisia. He wants to express to you the longstanding friendship between our two countries and the esteem he has for your efforts for peace and your efforts to create a more livable world. The cooperation between our two countries is important both practically and in terms of quality of the relationship. Tunisia is a small country with few resources. We are just emerging from a state of underdevelopment. We are trying to build our idea of development on two humanistic ideas: work and the right of man to enjoy the results of the process

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 11/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

of economic growth. We think we have had good results. We are among the most successful countries in the developing world and our per capita income is increasing. We apply the maxim that if we help ourselves, our friends will then help us. Thirty percent of our GNP is invested, and we use taxes to reallocate our revenues.

Tunisia is an old civilization, but we have a young population. Fifty percent of the population is under thirty years of age. This places lots of demands on the government. European influence is strong and people want western standards of living. Two-thirds of our investments are directly productive for the population. The rest goes to infrastructure and so forth. Twenty percent of our total population is in school at one level or another. Eighty percent of our students receive financial support. The result of our previous four-year plan was a six percent rate of growth from 1973 to 1976. We have raised our goal a bit for this current plan, partly because of demographic pressures. Our population is growing at 2.6 percent annually. The number of people living below the poverty level in Tunisia has been reduced from 27 percent to 16 percent in the last ten years. This is defined by a per capita income of \$125 annually.

There are still some regions of Tunisia which are underdeveloped, particularly in the northwest and in the center. We still have immigration from those areas and we need to do more. Nearly one million people live in these five provinces. The United States Government was one of the first to show an interest in helping in those regions, and we hope that this U.S. contribution can be increased. The central area of Tunisia is a weak point in our overall development. It is very important to us. Tunisians want peace and stability so that they can continue with economic and social development. We are very attentive to whatever can be done to make men feel more secure. We are very attached to global and regional efforts to bring peace and to let people work and improve their lives.

We only spend seven percent of our budget on external security, but we must be aware of what is happening beyond our borders. There are some who want to destabilize Tunisia, because they see it as an embarrassing example, a model of what can be achieved. We have to look to our right and to our left. There is already a competition for power beginning in Algeria. There are three leading personalities who could end up with responsibilities. We have good relations now, but we must be careful. In the other direction, Libya has ambitions. On September 1, 1978, Qadhafi recognized the failure of previous efforts at unity with Tunisia and spoke of the need for new approaches based on popular revolutionary committees that would be formed in open

or in secret.² These would be used to destabilize the “reactionary” Arab states. On October 14th, we discovered a large supply of arms that had come from Libya. There were enough light arms to equip an entire company. We didn’t say much at first and when we did reveal this fact, the Libyans sent their foreign minister to deny it. But we don’t believe them. Qadhafi wants to be a prophet of a certain point of view. He is a megalomaniac.

In the Mediterrean area, we are interested in your efforts to bring peace to this “lake of civilization”. Peace is contagious, as is subversion. We hope for success. When we have some troubles internally, we believe they are caused by outside interference, not by internal problems, since we are close to all levels of our society. Tunisia does not have several faces, and we have the courage of sticking with our opinions. We believe that truth pays.

President Carter: Let me respond briefly. We have observed with admiration the economic prosperity and growth in Tunisia. This is not just a growth of GNP, but also involves a balanced distribution of the better quality of life. This is unprecedented among the nations that I have studied. Your continued commitment to further growth is of great interest to us. Our American business community is increasingly in joint ventures and investment in Tunisia. There are great opportunities for agricultural business to cooperate with Tunisia. I believe that the soundness of your economy will guarantee your future success.

The economic prosperity, stability, independence, and security of Tunisia is of great importance to the United States. This is not only important because it benefits your people and the United States, but it helps extend Tunisia’s positive influence throughout North Africa and the Middle East. We have close consultative relationships with Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iran. This is a very important stabilizing factor as we face the challenge of increasing Soviet intervention in the area which is so heavily influenced by you. We have been interested in developing a balanced approach in our dealings with the Arab world and Israel. Following Tunisia’s lead, there have been good developments among some Arab countries who no longer see their primary goal as the destruction of Israel. As President Bourguiba saw, Israel is here and will survive and we are commit-

² In telegram 6725 from Tunis, September 21, the Embassy commented on Qadhafi’s speech: “Qadhafi proclaimed in essence that the January 1974 Jerba unification agreement between Tunisia and Libya, ‘temporarily rejected by the forces of regionalism,’ is still valid. He continued that lesson had been learned by this rejection and that as a result, Libya has now been forced to choose another method—that of ‘popular revolution.’ He then explained that this involved the creation of ‘peoples revolutionary committees’ which would work—openly or secretly—to seize power and establish unity.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389-0947)

ted to the Israelis and to their peaceful existence. There is a recognition of this by an increasing number of Arab leaders.

We believe that President Sadat has taken a courageous and proper step in seeking peace with Israel. This may lead, if it is successful, to a greater harmony between Israel and her neighbors, as well as more cooperation among our Arab friends. This is important at a time of transition or instability in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, and even in Iran, as well as the western part of North Africa. We share your concern about the well-being of the Palestinians and your commitment to see the U.N. resolutions, especially U.N. Resolution 242,³ implemented and peace brought to this troubled region. I hope that my assessment of the Camp David agreements is correct. I see them as a major step forward in accomplishing those hopes and aspirations. Doors will be opened for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from much of the occupied territory, and for the establishment of an autonomous self-governing authority and the return of those Palestinians who have been displaced in the 1967 War and thereafter. It will eliminate the Israeli occupation government, and although future negotiations are yet to be conducted, the opportunities are unprecedented and those who object to these efforts can only hurt the prospects for peace and the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, to which we, of course, are committed. It is obvious that in any complicated negotiation there are facets of agreement that are not fully acceptable to the leaders involved. But further violence in the Middle East will open the prospects for regional instability from India as far as the Atlantic Ocean. We see very clearly the possibility for regional conflicts and instability. We hope that we can continue to make progress and to guarantee peace. Instability enhances the influence of the more radical leaders, such as your neighbors, and we think that peace between Egypt and Israel followed by peace between Israel and all of her neighbors and the realization of the rights of the Palestinians and the establishment of autonomy in the occupied territories will be an important step forward. Over lunch it would be helpful to us to have your assessment of the political and military situation in your region, and the possibility of changes in Algeria, if President Boumediene does not survive. We want to see that our attitudes are compatible with your own as we face the future.

(From 12:15 to 1:30 p.m. a general discussion took place at lunch.)

The *Prime Minister* reviewed the situation in Algeria, which he called a very centralized regime where all decisions were made by

³ Adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967. For text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1967, pp. 257–258.

President Boumediene who dealt with a group of equally important ministers and advisers. There is no hierarchy around Boumediene, and there is no acknowledged successor. The leading candidates in the Prime Minister's view are Yahyaoui, the present head of the party and former head of the military academy. Some say that the second contender is Bouteflika, the foreign minister, but the *Prime Minister* said that he did not believe that Bouteflika had a chance. The third name that is mentioned and the real second runner is the minister of interior, Abelghani. He has two qualities, the fact that he is a former military officer, and the fact that he succeeded smoothly to the ministry of interior. Another possibility is the former head of military security, who has not always had the confidence of Boumediene, Colonel Draï. Finally, some people mentioned the commander of the Oran district, Chadli Bendjedid who is not well-known. Yahyaoui represents a trend that is seen now in the area, such as in Iran, a certain religious fundamentalism. The most moderate and balanced of the successors would be Abelghani, and the most extreme would be Draï.

Secretary Vance asked about the Baghdad Summit,⁴ and the *Prime Minister* replied that the real decision at Baghdad was a decision not to decide. It was an attitude of wait and see. There were many mental reservations. The *President* noted that the final communique had looked very negative in its attacks on Egypt. It seemed as if the radical leaders had prevailed. The *Prime Minister* said that this was only partly true. The question of any concrete steps against Egypt will be left to another meeting of foreign ministers who would meet once an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was signed.

The *Foreign Minister* noted that there were pressures at Baghdad to take immediate action against Egypt, and that initially Saudi Arabia worked hard to soften this approach. Tunisia played its part, and was helped somewhat by Jordan and Kuwait. Sadat, in the Foreign Minister's view, did not help his own friends. He refused to receive the delegation that was sent and he insulted many of the Gulf States. This added to the tension at Baghdad. The results that were achieved were the best that were possible under the conditions. They were conditional recommendations.

The discussion then turned to Tunisia's agricultural prospects. The *Prime Minister* placed emphasis on the need for quality, since Tunisia could not aspire to a large export of its agricultural products.

The *President* mentioned that the U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission had not been sufficiently active, and perhaps more could be done to

⁴ Reference is to the ninth Arab League Summit, held in Baghdad November 2-5. See footnote 4, Document 163.

encourage joint ventures. He mentioned that Secretary of Commerce Kreps might consider stopping briefly in Tunisia. The *Prime Minister* agreed that our commercial relations were not adequately developed.

The luncheon ended with the President sending his best regards to President Bourguiba, and expressing his hope that they would someday meet personally.

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, March 24, 1979, 0000Z

73047. Subject: Ambassador Hedda's Call on Under Secretary Newsom March 20.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Prior to his departure for Tunisia to participate in the Joint Commission meeting, Ambassador Hedda called on Under Secretary Newsom. The Ambassador raised three main issues: (a) Tunisian expectations that there will be a substantial increase in U.S. assistance to Tunisia as a result of the highly successful Nouria visit and the Joint Commission meeting; (b) the FY 1979 and 1980 reduction in FMS credits for Tunisia; and (c) the possible sale of Boeing 747s to Libya as reported in the U.S. press.²

3. Ambassador Newsom began by noting that the U.S. has spoken of phasing out aid to Tunisia for a number of years, but for valid reasons we have committed ourselves to assistance through the end of the current five-year plan. Through the Joint Commission meeting and with the participation of Mrs. Kreps, we hope to move into an effective relationship built on trade and investment. Although he did not exclude the possibility of further economic assistance, Newsom indicated that the U.S. would like to use the Joint Commission meeting as a vehicle to find other ways to cooperate. Bishop mentioned the possibility of PL 480 funds after 1981. Hedda noted that the Secretary

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0993. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Tripoli. Drafted by Pudschun; cleared in NEA/AFN, NEA, M/CT, EB, and D; approved by Newsom.

² In a March 3 article in the *Washington Post*, the Associated Press reported that Libya was granted permission to purchase three Boeing 747s and two Boeing 727s. ("State Dept. Approves Sale of Jumbo Jets to Libya," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1979, p. A6)

had been encouraging about additional assistance for the central Tunisia rural development project during the Nouira visit.³ He also said that aid levels to Tunisia are ridiculously low when compared to aid figures recently publicized in the press. Newsom concluded the discussion of aid levels by noting that he had never before this year of extreme budgetary constraint seen senior U.S. Government officials dealing with allocations of such modest amounts of money.

4. In response to Hedda's remarks on FMS credit to Tunisia, Newsom indicated that he hoped the 10 million dols reinstated by the Solarz subcommittee would be sustained but that, in any case, we would try to provide in future years the total figure mentioned by then Under Secretary Habib in 1976.⁴

5. Finally, Ambassador Newsom indicated that the issue of selling 747s to Libya remains under study. We sold the Libyans 727s with the understanding that they would not be used for military purposes. If it were proven that the 727s were now being used in Uganda, it would affect our decision as to whether or not to sell 747s to Libya. In any case, the situation is far from settled. Hedda asked whether this proposed sale indicated any change in Libyan policy or in U.S. policy toward Libya. He also noted that 747s are too big to be used commercially in North Africa. Newsom responded that the situation with Libya is a difficult one for the U.S. Although the Libyans have made several approaches to the U.S. in an effort to improve relations, to the extent Libya supports international terrorism, it will be very difficult to normalize relations. In response to a question from Newsom, Hedda indicated that Tunisia sees little, if any, change in Libyan policy.

Vance

³ Telegram 305925 to Tunis, December 3, summarized Vance's November 30 luncheon meeting with Nouira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497-0969)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 124.

200. Letter From President Carter to Tunisian President Bourguiba¹

Washington, March 27, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

On the occasion of the fourth meeting of the U.S.-Tunisia Joint Commission, I would like to extend my best wishes to you and to Prime Minister Nouira.² I am very pleased that Secretary Kreps was able to participate in this meeting as the head of the delegation from the United States. Her presence is evidence of our continuing serious interest in Tunisia's well being and security.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the very impressive economic development which Tunisia has achieved during the twenty-three years you have led your country. I am confident this Joint Commission meeting will provide an occasion to strengthen and reinforce the friendship and cooperation which the United States and Tunisia enjoy.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 7/78–7/80. No classification marking.

² An oral message from Carter to Nouira, prepared by Quandt on March 27, is *ibid.*

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, April 5, 1979, 1620Z

2842. Dept pass OPIC EXIM AID Peace Corps and Dept of Interior. Subj: (U) U.S. Tunisian Joint Commission: Summary of Proceedings and Implications for Future Bilateral Relations. Ref: Tunis 2703.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790157–0277. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent for information Priority to the International Communication Agency, Department of Commerce, and Department of the Treasury. Sent for information to Algiers, Rabat, and Tripoli.

² In telegram 2703 from Tunis, April 2, the Embassy transmitted the text of the joint communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790151–1089)

1. Summary. The fourth session of the U.S. Tunisian Joint Commission met March 30–31 in Tunis under the chairmanship of Secretary of Commerce Kreps and Minister of Commerce Ben M'Barek. A productive and frank exchange of views reflected increased emphasis on commercial and other non-aid relations and resulted in one major new development—the establishment of a U.S. Tunisian Binational Committee on Communications. The U.S. delegates on the Economic Development Subcommittee had a somewhat delicate and difficult task as the Tunisians were intent on our declaring that our concessional assistance would be made available beyond 1981. We noted that 1982 is quite distant and we are not at this time in a position to address the question of aid after 1981. The Trade and Investment Subcommittee encountered few differences and shared a desire to move to practical steps to increase two-way trade and the U.S. commercial presence in Tunisia. We are optimistic that the establishment of a Binational Committee on Communications will facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. In a period when Middle East developments could have put stress on our bilateral relationships, the Joint Commission meeting definitely served to strengthen these ties. End summary.

2. The fourth session of the U.S. Tunisian Joint Commission met in Tunis, March 30–31. The American and Tunisian delegations were headed by Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps and Minister of Commerce Slaheddine Ben M'Barek, respectively. In addition to her participation in the Joint Commission session, which received extensive local press coverage, Secretary Kreps called on Prime Minister Nouira (Tunis 2669)³ and Minister of Plan Zaanouni (memcon to follow)⁴ OPIC President Bruce Llewellyn also participated in the Joint Commission and called on the Presidents of API (the investment promotion agency) and BDET (the state industrial development bank) and Minister of Agriculture—memcons have been forwarded to Washington.⁵ The Joint Commission was held at the Sidi Bou Said Hotel, just outside of Tunis. The pleasant surroundings and atmosphere of the hotel added to the congeniality of the meetings. This was in sharp contrast to the institutional atmosphere of the "Maison du Parti," where the last Joint Commission meeting in Tunis took place.⁶

³ In telegram 2669 from Tunis, March 30, the Embassy summarized the private meeting between Kreps and Nouira, in which they discussed the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty signing, the PLO-Fatah, and the potential for war between Egypt and Libya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790146–1045)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Neither found.

⁶ The Joint Commission last met in Tunis October 17–20, 1975. The Embassy reported on the proceedings in telegram 6306 from Tunis, October 23, 1975. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750368–0420)

3. The Tunisians had their “shopping lists” ready. Yet in spite of the fact we said “no” to some requests, the meetings had an upbeat flavor. This was especially true in the Educational and Cultural Cooperation Subcommission. Although funding is (and will be) limited, and important framework—in the form of a Binational Communications Committee—was established to further exchanges between Tunisia and the U.S.

4. The most important issue for the GOT in the Economic Development Subcommission clearly was that of extension of bilateral concessional loans and grants after 1981. Following Tunisian Co-Chairman Khelil’s presentation on the importance of continued U.S. economic assistance after 1981, U.S. Co-Chairman Wheeler reaffirmed the U.S.’s intention to provide substantial assistance through the end of the fifth plan. We noted that 1982 is quite distant and indicated the USG is not yet in a position to address the question of post-1981 aid. (In subsequent discussion on wording of the joint communique regarding continued U.S. participation in Tunisia’s economic development, it was made clear to the Tunisians, who fully understood, that the wording does not commit the U.S. to concessional aid after 1981. Rather, as specifically stated in the Economic Development Subcommission, it was understood by both delegations that no decisions have been made regarding the period after 1981. It was also understood by both parties that aid decisions applicable to Tunisia are governed in part by our desires to move to less concessional form of assistance in middle-income countries.)

5. The second priority for the GOT during the Economic Development Subcommission concerned near-term aid levels. This reflected in repeated requests for information about the amounts of funding programmed for projects, in particular for Central Tunisia Rural Development (CTRD); in the tabling of a dossier on an expanded 22-delegation central Tunisia project costing TD100 million, for which an AID contribution of TD 83 million was requested; and in a request for commodity aid of \$10 million per year in 1979, 1980, and 1981. In response:

A. We stressed that we have taken very seriously our pledge to provide substantial assistance through 1981. Because good projects were available, we last year accorded twice as much aid as we originally estimated.

B. We ruled out commodity aid, but did give an indication, subject to the usual caveats of congressional approval and availability of funds, that approximately \$25 million might be available for CTRD. In providing this estimate, we stressed the importance of the sub-project planning process through the Central Tunisia Development Authority. Regarding an expanded central Tunisia project, we expressed apprecia-

tion for the opportunity to learn the full scope of GOT planning for the region, but noted that the program appeared to be more suitable for multi-donor financing.

C. With regard to PL-480 Title I food aid, we indicated it would probably be possible to reach annual levels in 1980 and 1981 on the trend of the last several years, i.e. in the range of \$10-12 million, assuming that strong developmental justifications can continue to be made as was done for the FY79 Title I agreement via application of proceeds to CTRD.

D. Regarding PL-480 Title II, we stated that the GOT may wish to consider gradual assumption of responsibility for supplemental feeding programs. (In discussions with Khelil following the subcommission sessions, Wheeler put the issue in terms of two options: a gradual unilateral phase-down of Title II shipments by the U.S.; or discussions leading to mutual agreement on a transition schedule permitting orderly budgeting and administrative decision-making on both the U.S. and GOT sides.)

E. In respect to the housing guaranty program reference was made to on-going negotiations for a \$25 million investment program to be authorized in FY79, to be followed by second tranche of \$25 million in 1981. Both sides expressed satisfaction with negotiation and confidence these would soon be satisfactorily concluded.

6. The Subcommittee on Trade and Investment reviewed a number of issues of mutual interest. There was ample give and take, and common ground was reached on most topics.

7. The following are highlights of the discussions:

A. The Tunisians noted their imports of \$2 billion. They felt Tunisia should be an interesting market for U.S. manufacturers, as 70 percent of imports are capital goods, and expressed disappointment at the limited response of U.S. firms to calls for tender.

B. In response to a GOT request, we explained that their thorough understanding of GSP could result in more favorable treatment for Tunisian exports in the U.S. The Tunisians seemed eager to pursue GSP, in particular to start using the petition system. We expect further GSP discussion both in Washington and Tunis.

C. CEPEX (Tunisian export promotion agency) would like to be able to call on U.S. Department of Commerce resources for assistance in gathering American market information, and in organizing two Tunisian buying/selling missions to the U.S. It was agreed that the U.S. Department of Commerce (through CAGNE) would provide such assistance.

D. API (Tunisian investment promotion agency) requested that OPIC locate and financially support American investment advisors for

its New York and Tunis offices. We explained OPIC could not meet this request given its limited resources. However, the OPIC representative reiterated that it continues to be upbeat on Tunisia. By coming up with good specific projects for OPIC to market in the U.S., Tunisia could preempt more OPIC resources. Further, OPIC is willing to consider devoting more of its time to the Tunisian program.

E. The Tunisians requested OPIC provide funds for an agribusiness expediting office in Tunis. We explained that OPIC had invested over \$1.5 million in support of agribusiness council activities in developing countries, and only one project had ever been realized, and, therefore, funding for such an office would not be possible. We made the point that OPIC remained available to assist American investors with insurance, loans and feasibility study funding for their Tunisian investments.

F. We explained USAID's reimbursable development program, and how this program—with funding for prospection and orientation visits and feasibility studies—increases the possibilities for access to U.S. technology, especially in the American private sector. The Tunisians seemed quite interested; this promises to be an excellent tool for bolstering our export development program in conjunction with USDOC and EXIMBank.

G. Other topics were discussed, i.e., discrepancies in reporting trade statistics, problems encountered in identifying and formulating private investment projects, and agreement in principle was reached to resume negotiations for a U.S. Tunisian tax treaty. This last topic needs to be pursued; we will follow up in the coming week.

8. The work of the Educational and Cultural Cooperation (third) Subcommission proceeded smoothly without any major disagreements between the two parties. The relative ease with which agreements were made can be attributed to discussions with the Tunisian side before the formal opening of the commission. Indeed, discussion of a draft accord and memorandum had already taken place. Meetings of the subcommission therefore were devoted to listening to the Tunisian requests for aid in the areas of education, cultural, information, youth and sports and then to agreeing on final drafting of official documents. The subcommission decided to establish a Tunisian-U.S. Binational Committee on Communications to discuss and implement joint programs on a case by case basis. This committee will meet quarterly in Tunis.

9. Only two major points requiring negotiation arose in discussions of this subcommission. The Tunisians objected to use of term "cost sharing" in relation to financing exchange programs. They felt it implied an equal division of costs in all cases. Instead, language calling for the apportioning of costs was settled upon. On another issue, we had wished to get the Tunisians to agree to facilitating the work of

American archaeologists, including all phases of field work and digs. The Tunisians refused to accept the mention of field work and excavations in any official document. They simply promised to facilitate cooperation between archaeological institutes, thus revealing extreme sensitivity to safeguard what is for them an important element of their national heritage.

10. On the whole, we found in the third subcommission that the Tunisians, while intent upon presenting their “shopping list”, were content to settle for the establishment of a Binational Communications Committee in the hope they could achieve their ends through regular and less formal negotiations with ICA Tunis.

11. In sum, the Joint Commission meeting went well. The presence of Secretary Kreps and OPIC President Llewellyn clearly signaled our interest in Tunisia. Although the Tunisians were slow getting started, the entire proceedings went smoothly, and the hospitality offered Secretary Kreps was equal to any afforded a visiting Minister. There were no dramatic new departures, but the meeting—at a time when other developments in the Middle East might have placed stress on our bilateral relations—contributed to the maintenance of our excellent relations and gave reasonable promise of strengthening developmental, cultural and commercial ties.

Bosworth

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, May 4, 1979, 2257Z

113911. Subject: Letter to Tunisian Prime Minister Nouira.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following is text of letter signed by Secretary Vance on May 3, 1979 to Tunisian Prime Minister Nouira. French text follows. Please deliver text of letter and translation as soon as possible.

3. Begin text:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 7/78–7/80. Secret; Immediate. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

Quote: Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have been very pleased to learn from Secretary Kreps of the success of the recent Joint Commission meeting. She also described to me her conversation with you.²

As I indicated during your visit to this country last November,³ the United States remains committed to assisting in your country's continuing efforts to develop its economy and improve the living conditions of the Tunisian people. I understand that during the Joint Commission meeting and the subsequent visit of Export-Import Bank President John Moore⁴ there were very encouraging discussions about the contributions which the American private and public sectors can make to this process. I recall your particular interest in the development of central Tunisia and have been pleased to learn that initial agreements will be signed with your government in the very near future. Discussions already have begun with Ambassador Hedda on the achievement of the objectives of the new Subcommission on Education and Cultural Exchange.

In your talks with Secretary Kreps, you emphasized the need to bring the Palestinians into the Middle East peace process. I can assure you that the United States Government regards their participation as essential to the achievement of a just and viable peace. They are, as you know, invited to attend the negotiations that are to open within one month as members of the Egyptian or Jordanian delegations.⁵ We hope they will choose to engage themselves in the negotiations, because it will be through such engagement that they can best influence the outcome of the negotiations. We hope Palestinian leaders will realize that these negotiations offer the first real opportunity they have had in thirty years to make significant progress toward the realization of their legitimate aspirations.

² See footnote 3, Document 201.

³ See footnote 3, Document 199.

⁴ Moore visited Tunisia March 31–April 4. In telegram 2906 from Tunis, April 10, the Embassy summarized Moore's meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790166–0796)

⁵ In telegram 4080 from Tunis, May 18, Bosworth reported Nouira's gratitude for the letter and his skepticism about the planned negotiations: "He said he noted that U.S. position continued to be that Palestinian participation in the second round of negotiations could be accomplished through inclusion of Palestinians in the Egyptian and or Jordanian delegations. He said this seemed most unlikely. There is no way that Sadat can speak for the Palestinians and it is unlikely that Jordan will agree to participate in the negotiations, much less agree to the CDA formula on Palestinian participation. In the meantime, events within the Arab world are going from bad to worse. The Prime Minister said he is increasingly convinced that some new move is required on the Palestinian issue and that this can only come from the U.S." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790225–0917)

These negotiations will be difficult, but President Carter and I are determined to do everything possible to help the parties achieve a successful outcome. President Bourguiba, you, and Tunisia's other early leaders have experienced personally the frustrations but also the ultimate success of protracted negotiations. I hope you will remind others of your eventual success and encourage those reluctant to participate in the present process to overcome their understandable hesitation and join the effort to achieve a settlement providing justice for all concerned.

Permit me to use this occasion to express my hope that you will join those resisting any attempt to expel Egypt from the Islamic Conference. I think you will agree that the survival of moderate government in Egypt is important to peace in North Africa. The current campaign to punish Sadat will, if successful, encourage the least responsible in the area, undermining the security of the region and the position of moderates in it.

Sincerely, Cyrus Vance End quote. End text.

[Omitted here is the French translation of the text.]

Vance

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, June 19, 1979, 1635Z

16228. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom's Meeting With Tunisian Prime Minister: Libya, Arab League, Peace Process.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom and Prime Minister Nouira met June 18 in Tunis for review of Newsom's visit to Tripoli and exchange of views on bilateral relations with Libya, intra-Arab dynamics including Tunisia's augmented role in Arab League, and status and prospects for peace process—especially on Palestinian issue. Under Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Bosworth; Prime Minister by Acting Foreign Minister Sahbani, Presidential Counselor Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and Ambassador Hedda. Responding to Under Secre-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790279-0109. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Tunis.

tary's exposition, Nouira emphasized coolness in GOT-Libyan relations and indicated both support for U.S. export ban on aircraft for Libya and skepticism that Qadhafi would embargo oil exports to USA. He said GOT had not sought Arab League headquarters and assured Under Secretary that GOT would not let it affect U.S.-Tunisian relations. Under Secretary stressed even-handed USG approach to Arab-Israeli dispute and hope that moderate Arabs would avoid positions exacerbating relations with Egypt and rendering difficult positive response to progress in peace process. Nouira reiterated suggestion for formula to meet Palestinian requests for participation in process. Under Secretary expressed appreciation for GOT role as "bridge" within and outside world. Both stressed value of continuing frank exchanges between the two governments. End summary.

2. Under Secretary explained that President Carter and Secretary Vance had asked him to visit Tripoli to discuss U.S.-Libyan relations following GOL messages conveyed in various ways and most recently through Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.² Under Secretary had been asked to take opportunity also to visit Rome for general discussions with Italian Government and Vatican. He was happy also to visit Tunis, this being first such opportunity since 1976. Under Secretary said U.S. was conscious of Tunisia's more central position now in Arab world and confident that U.S.-Tunisian relations would remain close.

4. Prime Minister responded that Tunisia finds it difficult to communicate with Libya even on bilateral matters. He supposed Libyans would have suggested to Under Secretary that if USG will not sell Boeing 747's to Libya, Libya might withhold petroleum sales to United States. He expressed skepticism Libya in fact would take such action. He noted that in context of erratic Libyan policy one could observe two constants. Qadhafi had not as yet interfered with petroleum or banks. Apparently he realized these two sectors were essential to his purposes. Nouira suggested Libya had no legitimate need for 747 aircraft for commercial service. Given importance of U.S. oil market to Libya, he doubted Qadhafi would embargo exports to the United States.

5. Nouira added that for first time one could note organized opposition to Qadhafi, centered in a European country abroad. Opposition was beginning to act; Qadhafi faced trouble ahead.

6. In respect to Tunisia's role in Arab League, Nouira said, Under Secretary should be reassured that relations with United States remained constant; they would not be affected by Tunisia's host of Arab League. In fact, GOT had not sought this role. It had only reluc-

² For Newsom's discussion with Jallud and Turayki in Tripoli, see Document 101. For Tito's June 13 letter to Carter, see footnote 4, Document 101.

tantly been persuaded by other Arab states to accept it. Baghdad decision to exclude Egypt from all Arab organizations was being implemented, but not precisely as reported in Egyptian press. There were distortions in reporting, for instance in respect to recent OAU agricultural meeting in Tunisia. In any event, USG should rest assured that Tunisia was and would remain the same both geographically and politically.

7. Under Secretary reviewed his conversations in Libya with Foreign Minister Turayki and Major Jallud. Perhaps because he did not carry a more specific response on the 747 question, Qadhafi remained unavailable. He was said to be in Sirte. Newsom said primary Libyan desire appeared to be to discuss aircraft export ban. He explained that ban resulted from Libyan use of commercial aircraft in support of military operations in Uganda. Libyans made clear their own perception that U.S. action was "punishment". They in turn were considering reprisals, possibly affecting petroleum exports to the USA.

8. Newsom explained to Libyans that their support for Amin and for militant groups from Northern Ireland to South Africa led the U.S. Government, backed by the Congress, to believe U.S. should take no action—such as aircraft exports—that would enhance Libyan ability to intervene abroad. Jallud indicated support for "liberation movements" abroad remained integral part of Libya's foreign policy. Under Secretary gave Libyans no hope for a change in U.S. decision on aircraft export. Nevertheless, Libyans indicated they still attribute importance to relations with the U.S. It was not yet clear whether they would take reprisal action and, if so, what type of action.

9. Libyans also raised question of U.S. military sales to Egypt; Under Secretary explained these were not unusual or alarming under present circumstances. He made clear to Libyans that USG would favor neither Egyptian military action against Libya nor Libyan action against Egypt.

10. Re peace process, Under Secretary said he found GOL attitude uncompromising. Jallud voiced Libyan attitude toward PLO, emphasizing PLO must include all factions and indicating Libyan support of Arafat as mainstream Palestinian voice was assured only as long as he remained representative of various Palestinian factions and "true interests of the Palestinian people." Prime Minister Nouria commented that Arafat and Libya were not closely aligned and that Arafat—certainly not the only possibility for Palestinian leadership—represents moderate sentiment compared with other factional leaders such as Jelil and Hawatma (Sahbani also mentioned Habash).

11. Prime Minister felt USG, in deploying diplomatic resources, should devote more attention to working with the Arab moderates—the agnostics on peace process that was promisingly launched at Camp

David. He said GOT had the benefit of the personal interpretations of Presidents Carter and Sadat, for instance in respect to Palestinian autonomy question. These, however, appeared to be at complete variance with that of Prime Minister Begin, which, he said, was completely out of line with international law. Begin apparently wished to exploit fact that U.S. was moving into election year.

12. Under Secretary responded that it was a tragedy that Arab opposition inhibited Palestinian participation in negotiations. This may well lead Israelis to believe that, since Egypt stood alone, they need make no concessions. He suggested Palestinians and moderate Arabs could change face of peace process by showing willingness to participate in negotiations. Whether or not it was politically realistic, it was a fact. Prime Minister acknowledged Under Secretary's logic, though it was only an assumption.

13. Under Secretary spoke of negotiations getting under way in Alexandria and Haifa which, so far, had been caught up mainly in procedural questions. One of these, however, was not unimportant. Israelis were asking for better definition of U.S. role as "full partner" in the talks. It seemed Israelis wished to diminish U.S. role, while Egyptians and U.S. thought it important that we remain a principal player. Under Secretary commented it was hard to credit the charge of some Arab states that USG is allied with Israel when in fact latter resists U.S. role in negotiations.

14. Under Secretary proceeded to outline issues USG realizes are essential to make formula on Palestinian autonomy acceptable to Arabs. These include settlements, land and water rights, Palestinian participation, and ultimately, Jerusalem. He acknowledged USG had heavy responsibility in negotiations and wants Arab world to know we accept this responsibility.

15. We know attitudes of Arab governments and difficulty of their giving open support for our efforts. However, we do want these governments (a) to understand what we are trying to do, (b) to have confidence in the genuineness of our efforts, and (c) to recognize our real interest in the rights of Palestinian people. We want them to be ready and able to join with us in peace process when we show we can produce results.

16. We also hope to minimize intra-Arab tensions. We hope Arab-Egyptian relations will not be made intolerable, that Egyptian-Saudi relations will be stabilized. We hope intra-Arab relations will not so deteriorate as to bar acceptance of negotiations when they show results. We will make every effort to keep Tunisian Government informed and, as always, will value Tunisia's advice and counsel. We know Tunisia has long been important as a bridge between factions in Arab world, as well as a means of interface and articulation of Arab views to other peoples. Nour expressed appreciation of Under Secretary's exposition and his concern with Tunisian views.

17. Under Secretary asked if Prime Minister saw a nuance in Syrian position—especially that of President Assad—which would distinguish it from those of Iraq and Libya. Nouira agreed such a nuance existed even though President Assad had little room to maneuver. Re question of U.S. relations with PLO, Newsom said U.S. aware from indirect contacts of position of PLO. U.S. continued to require that PLO accept existence of Israel and 242³ as condition for direct talks. Recent PLO positions have been equivocal. Nouira said that despite his close PLO contacts he could not define PLO position. Much of problem seemed to center on PLO acceptance of Resolution 242. He thought an answer might lie with recognition of Israel with its implied, modified or amended language going beyond 242's reference to Palestinians as mere refugees to recognition of their rights as people. Prime Minister suggested USG might meet political requirements of PLO by combining essence of Resolution 242 with elements of declarations made jointly with Tunisian, Japanese and Soviet Governments. These declarations, he said, had been tacitly accepted—or better—by PLO leaders.

18. Under Secretary expressed interest in views and ideas articulated by Prime Minister and said he would transmit these to Secy of State Vance. Close contact would be maintained with Tunisian Government through the American Ambassador in Tunis. Prime Minister agreed on value of continuing contact and asked Under Secretary to convey his best regards to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance.

19. Department repeat as desired.

Gardner

³ See footnote 3, Document 198.

204. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, January 28, 1980, 2040Z

778. Subj: Commando Raid in Tunisia: GOT Request for Emergency Military Equipment. Ref: A) Tunis 0741; B) Tunis 0765.²

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Dept please pass AmEmbassy Tripoli.

3. It is still difficult to assess the real nature and magnitude of the immediate security threat faced by Tunisia. However, we can draw certain preliminary conclusions based on the briefings given me by Prime Minister Nouira and Defense Minister Sfar, the GOT's public statements, and supplemental information we have been getting from local sources.

4. It is evident that the attack on military and police installations in Gafsa was carried out by a trained, relatively well-armed force. There was little, if any, active support for the attackers from the Gafsa populace. Reports in numbers of the attacking group range from 30 to 300. But whatever the number they were able to inflict considerable damage and, despite GOT statements to the contrary, may still not have been completely suppressed.

5. While most, or even all, of the attackers were Tunisian, the attack was in all likelihood organized and supported from outside Tunisia, probably from Libya. The group apparently did come in from Algeria, but the role, if any, of Algerian authorities is unclear.

6. There have been some mild labor disturbances over recent price increases elsewhere (bus drivers in Tunis, rail workers in Sfax, etc.). But there is currently no evidence these are likely to become serious or that they are directly linked to events in Gafsa.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0817. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, London, Paris, and Rabat. Sent for information to DIA, CINCEUR, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, USAREUR, INR, NEA, USCINCRED, DIRNSA, and several additional military offices in Europe and the United States.

² In telegram 741 from Tunis, January 28, the Embassy made a preliminary report on the commando attack on government installations in Gafsa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0078) In telegram 765 from Tunis, January 28, Bosworth reported on the briefing he received from Nouira regarding the Gafsa attack and Tunisian charges that it was “the first step in a full-scale Libyan move against Tunisia. Nouira said the commando group of 100 (Tunisians and non-Tunisians) came into Tunisia from Libya via Algeria. He said he has no precise indication of the GOA role in the incident, but fears that ‘some Algerian agencies’ must have at least known the attack was coming.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0396)

7. Nouira and Defense Minister Sfar claim to have convincing evidence that the attack in Gafsa is not an isolated, one-time event. In my judgement, they may be reading whatever intelligence they have in the most alarming possible light, but they are not simply crying wolf. They are sincerely worried. We have first-hand reports of substantial troop movements from the north to the south and we expect similar movements are taking place into northwest Tunisia as well.

[8.] In fact, we judge it unlikely—although perhaps not inconceivable—that Libya, with or without any Algerian acquiescence is preparing to launch a full-scale invasion. However, if Col. Qadhafi has decided he wants seriously to destabilize Tunisia, he can probably achieve that result through a series of Gafsa-type attacks, carried out with more of the Tunisians he is believed to have recruited and trained from among the 80,000 Tunisians working in Libya. Tunisia, with its long frontiers, is vulnerable to such attacks. The GOT's self-confidence would begin to falter and eventually we might well see a breakdown of public order and even military defections.

[9.] This is the situation within which we must structure a response to the urgent GOT request for assistance in the form of helicopters and APC's. The request seems appropriate in military terms. Our judgement is that the lack of adequate surveillance and transport capabilities is one of the Tunisian military's most glaring weaknesses in trying to cope with events such as that in Gafsa.

[10.] More importantly, a US failure to respond effectively and credibly to the Tunisian request will almost certainly have a profound impact on our overall bilateral relationship and quite possibly on Tunisia's basic international orientation. Even if the Tunisian assessment of the current situation proves to have been exaggerated, a demonstrated US reluctance or inability to provide assistance when Tunisia perceives an acute, immediate threat to its national security cannot help but influence future GOT decisions on matters of fundamental importance to the US.

[11.] At the same time, however, I recognize that the Tunisian request for equipment, modest as it might seem to them, will be difficult to satisfy, particularly within the time period they expect. (I assume that any such equipment would probably have to be drawn from DOD inventories.) Also, it would be useful to gain a bit more time to obtain a more complete assessment of the events in Gafsa and the short-term threat of further such incidents. Moreover, we would need in any event much more detailed information concerning the specifics of the desired equipment, etc., before we could respond.

[12.] Therefore, I recommend that I be authorized to respond to Nouira's request on an interim basis by saying that (a) we are seriously concerned by the apparent threat to Tunisian security and are actively

considering the GOT's request for emergency assistance and (b) that we would propose to bring in quietly, but quickly a small team of experts to review Tunisia's immediate needs in the areas they have highlighted and determine how we can be most helpful.

[13.] We may find that with the additional time this procedure would give, the currently acute Tunisian concern will moderate to the point at which we can credibly respond to their request on a less urgent basis by, for example, restructuring and perhaps accelerating pending FMS credit purchases (e.g. early delivery of APC's (is) now scheduled for 1981, etc.) However, realistically we will also have to be prepared to follow through with at least some equipment on the emergency basis which underlies the procedure we have proposed.

[14.] The Country Team concurs unanimously in the analysis and recommendations contained in this message.

Bosworth

205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, January 30, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Tunisia.* In response to Tunisian concerns that the Libyans might be ready to mount a commando attack by sea on a Tunisian port city, we are undertaking air and sea surveillance of the area. We do not have any intelligence which would confirm the Tunisian claims.

We informed both our Embassy in Tunis² and the Tunisian Ambassador in Washington³ this afternoon of our willingness to provide the 30 Armored Personnel Carriers and 6 UH 1N helicopters Tunisia has requested urgently to deal with possible future guerrilla attacks. The 30 APCs can be ready for air shipment in five to seven days and will cost \$5 million. The six helicopters will cost \$34 million, which will

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Cy" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Telegram 26809 to Tunis, January 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800053-0912)

³ Telegram 28210 to Tunis, February 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800057-0028)

require a waiver of the 36 (b) notification requirement if Tunisia confirms it wants to go ahead immediately.

The Tunisian Ambassador was concerned about the costs of the helicopters, and wondered whether the equipment could be “leased” for some critical months.⁴

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

⁴ In a January 31 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: “The problem now is the cost of the items requested which, Nouira feels, would strain Tunisia’s development plans. A Tunisian Army general will meet with DOD Friday for further discussions of prices, credit terms, possible leasing arrangements, and airlift possibilities. We are also planning to make our interest in Tunisia’s sovereignty clear to the Libyans and have offered to send a military survey team to Tunisia.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80)

206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 2, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

2. *Assistance to Tunisia*—We have responded effectively and quickly to Tunisia’s request for help in the aftermath of the Libyan-supported raid into central Tunisia. Our actions should gain us a positive reaction in Tunisia and elsewhere by demonstrating our capacity to assist moderate friends when threatened.

Today, the Tunisians agreed to an emergency equipment package of 30 APCs and six transport helicopters. The \$18 million in costs which they will pay will cover all air and sealift expenses, spare parts, training, ammunition, and other support. A letter of offer and acceptance for the APCs was signed today, and ten should be ready for delivery to Tunisia by air within a few days. Since the “major defense equipment” content of the APC and helicopter packages is less than \$7 million in each case, there will be no need for Congressional notification. We intend to brief Congress fully, however.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. There is no indication Carter saw the memorandum.

In additional steps this last week, we responded within hours to the Tunisian request for aerial and sea surveillance, and undertook other intelligence efforts designed to detect potential new attacks by land or sea.² Sixth Fleet vessels will call at Tunisian ports in the next few days. We also are informing Libya that we retain a longstanding interest in Tunisia's independence, sovereignty, and integrity, and would view with serious concern any outside interference in Tunisian affairs.³

Defense's role in bringing about this outcome was outstanding. Graham Claytor did a most effective job in pulling this together.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

² In telegram 26684 to Tripoli, January 30, the Department informed the Embassy of the execute order for surveillance operations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800053–0756)

³ In telegram 28794 to Tripoli and Algiers, February 2, the Department transmitted the following message for Foreign Secretary Turayki: "The U.S. has long been interested in the independence, the sovereignty, and the integrity of Tunisia and will continue this interest. In keeping with its longstanding relationship, the U.S. is prepared in principle to provide Tunisia added military equipment if Tunisia so requests and discussions between our two governments are now taking place on this issue. The U.S. would view any outside intervention in the affairs of Tunisia with serious concern." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800057–0710) In telegram 83 from Tripoli, February 3, Eagleton reported that the message was delivered orally February 2 at 6 p.m. to the Chief of Protocol, who was the senior officer present. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079–0584)

207. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, February 5, 1980

SUBJECT

Tunisia (U)

To consolidate the favorable P.R. effect, as reflected in current press play, of our stepped-up assistance to Tunisia and to prolong the initial satisfaction of the Tunisians themselves, someone from the White House, ideally you, should soon visit Tunisia as a visible sign of the President's interest in that country. (C)

In my view, a mid-March visit by a ranking White House emissary would do the following useful things:

—demonstrate the President's personal support for Tunisia and our gratitude for the gutsy positions it has adopted on issues of major importance to us; (C)

—build additional credit in a Moslem country (which also happens to be the headquarters of the Arab League) at a time when we have an enormous stake in the fate of contemporary Islam; (C)

—convey a pointed signal to neighboring countries (read Libya) that we care what happens in and to Tunisia. (C)

(If I weren't stopped from doing so by the Hatch Act,² I could think of a few domestic policy reasons which would make such a visit worthwhile as well.) (U)

Two C-5As and a C-141 will be delivering the modest number of APCs we promised by the end of this week. Because of 36(b), however, the UH-1N choppers (assuming Congress approves them) will be much longer in transit, at least two months. Tunisia already feels, with some justification, that we have taken it too much for granted and that it has assumed sizeable risks in its pro-West positions without much benefit of the compensating closeness we reserve for some other countries. In that connection, I note that the only ranking USG figures to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Tunisia. Confidential. Sent for action. Stamped notations on the memorandum read: "ZB has seen" and "DA has seen." Aaron wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "ZB—What do you think? I'm always ready as you know! DA."

² The 1939 Hatch Act prohibits Executive Branch employees, with a few notable exceptions, from engaging in various forms of political activity.

visit Tunis in none too recent times have been Juanita Kreps³ and David Newsom⁴—not exactly the top of our batting order (Don McHenry may be passing through later this month on the tail-end of a larger tour). (C)

We are dealing here with a very sensitive bunch (like most North Africans) where a bit of personal massaging and symbolism can go a long way. This will be particularly useful if we are to avoid disgruntlement flowing from the protracted delivery time for the choppers and the less than wildly generous terms through which the Tunisians are obliged to fund them. The torching of the French Embassy in Tripoli provides enough drama for the moment (and may even, via Gallic outrage, produce additional anti-Libyan measures likely to please Tunisia); but come mid-March, when our own helicopters have not yet arrived, chances are good that without some personalized attention from us Tunisia will be pissed. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you give serious consideration to making a quick visit to Tunisia around mid-March and that I begin discreetly to lay the groundwork.⁵ (C)

³ See Document 201.

⁴ See Document 203.

⁵ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Beneath the approval line, Brzezinski wrote: "Hold for a more important occasion. ZB."

208. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 15, 1980

1. *Support for Tunisia*—I reviewed with Tunisian Ambassador Hedda this afternoon the steps we are taking to respond to Tunisia's request for US support following the Gafsa attack.² These include a public statement of support Don McHenry will make during his visit

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² In telegram 42828 to Tunis and Beirut, February 16, the Department reported on Vance's February 15 meeting with Hedda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800083–1016)

to Tunis February 21,³ a Congressional Delegation to Tunisia headed by Clem Zablocki during Easter recess,⁴ and a military technical team visit in the near future to look at Tunisia's long-term needs, in addition to the armored personnel carriers and helicopters already agreed upon. Also, at Hedda's request, we are taking up with the Congress the idea of a joint resolution supporting Tunisia. Hedda seemed to appreciate these efforts.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Tunisia.]

³ In telegram 1527 from Tunis, February 21, the Embassy transmitted the text of McHenry's public statement of support for Tunisia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800091-0712)

⁴ Telegram 3100 from Tunis, April 12, reported on the visit by the congressional delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800184-0127)

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 27, 1980, 1315Z

1703. Subject: Presidential Message: Bourguiba to Carter. Ref: State 51824.²

1. Confidential-Entire text.

2. Following is an Embassy translation from French of a letter dated February 25, 1980 from Tunisian President Bourguiba to President Carter. The President's son, Habib Bourguiba Jr, plans to deliver the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Tunisia: President Habib Bourguiba, 11/78-5/80. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 51824 to Tunis and Paris, February 26, the Department transmitted a message from Hedda: "Bourguiba, Jr. is on way to Paris with message for Giscard and plans to go on to Washington Wednesday night or Thursday morning with message for President Carter from Bourguiba. Both messages concern threat from Libya and were planned earlier but Nouira's incapacitation has added unforeseen note of urgency. Tunisians are requesting 15 to 20 minutes with President." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800100-0521)

letter personally during his forthcoming visit to Washington (reftel). This translation was made from a copy of the French text which Bourguiba, Jr gave to me.³

3. Begin text

Mr. President:

Each time that world peace is threatened or that the principles governing the relations between states are disregarded, our regular contacts at the highest level have brought us to consult one another, and to note with satisfaction an agreement of views with regard to the great problems of our time. This identify of view is the result of our common dedication to the moral and political values which, in the last resort, have proven to be the basis of the free world.

In the course of the last several months, the world has been subjected to frequent and flagrant violations of the United Nations Charter. Asia and Africa, in particular, have been shaken on various occasions by violent actions which betray a more or less open will towards hegemony, if not domination. It is in Africa, where the challenges of underdevelopment and misery are most extreme, that the will to destabilize is brought to bear most sharply, without the community of nations having taken decisions commensurate with the danger. Our own area in North Africa has become the most immediate target, this threat deriving from the unchecked activism of the Libyan regime.

Today, Mr President, Tunisia in its turn is the object of an attempt at destabilization. You will understand if, at this particularly grave moment, I share my concerns with you. I am pleased on this occasion to express Tunisia's profound gratitude for the spontaneous and unre-served support which, in these difficult moments, we have received from you, the American people and its leaders.

Thanks to the diligence and understanding of your administration we received expeditious delivery of a first shipment of defensive military equipment. At the same time, American political figures have proclaimed their support for Tunisia and their attachment to its independence.

This attitude has been a great comfort to me and to my colleagues. It is interpreted in Tunisia as a true indication of the esteem and active solidarity which are the basis of the constancy and stability of relations between our two countries.

³ In a February 27 memorandum to Carter, Vance requested that the President meet with Bourguiba, Jr. and stated that it was "important for U.S.-Tunisian relations." Carter wrote: "Cy, ok, 10 minutes or so—J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Tunisia: 1/77–1/81) See Document 210.

The aggression of January 27, 1980 against the town of Gafsa was conceived, elaborated and directed by the Libyan regime.⁴ Our investigation has given ample proof of this. At the same time, the results of the investigation and the statements made by the principal (Libyan) leaders confirm, moreover, that Tripoli—this hardly being its first intervention—no longer conceals its determination to bring down our regime by any means available. No doubt the existence on its border of a country which is profoundly peaceful, very lightly armed, fundamentally dedicated to the cultural, social and economic progress of its citizenry, and basing itself on a political and developmental model aiming at human development, is considered a warlike act. In fact, Tunisia is an embarrassing example—given the bad conscience of those who, possessing considerable natural resources, have constantly given priority to ideological and political considerations over the demands of development. These represent two irreconcilable points of view, given the primary interest of states in development.

But the Gafsa aggression has a considerably broader significance. Through the destabilization of Tunisia, wedged in between two regimes with different ideologies, the balance of the entire region is placed in jeopardy. In creating a new area of tension, Libya is facilitating the introduction of Soviet influence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean—with unavoidable consequences for the future peace and security of the entire Mediterranean and, consequently, of the Western world.

Given the perils which lie in wait for it, and facing the challenges which confront it, Tunisia intends to remain faithful to the image which it has won through 25 years of political and constitutional stability, and by a sustained effort—through flexible planning—dedicated above all to human development. Swept today in a wake which it had never judged so urgent, Tunisia must meet the strong and equally urgent demands of simultaneously reestablishing internal political confidence and of developing a security force capable of dealing with the unforeseeable. Thus, Tunisia turns to the most powerful of its friends, the United States of America. In the immediate future and for the next several months it will be a question of lessening the vulnerability of our country through continuous strategic and military support in order to forestall any initiatives aimed at its integrity and sovereignty. At the same time, it is a question of enlisting your indispensable cooperation with regard to special financing in order quickly to redress the balance of arms necessary to the defense of our frontiers.

⁴ See Document 204.

In thanking you again for your support, and in counting on a reinforcement of security assistance by the United States of America, I beg you to believe, Mr President, in the expression of my highest regards and my constant and faithful friendship.

Signed Bourguiba

(Penned note added as follows:)

My right arm and principal collaborator, Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, during the night suffered a problem of circulation in the brain and had to be flown urgently to Paris for treatment at the Hopital de la Pitie where he will be treated—just as was my son, Habib Jr, eight years ago—by Professor Pertuise, who took his neuro-surgical training at an American school.

Signed: With friendly best wishes,

Bourguiba, Carthage 2/26/80

End text.

Bosworth

210. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 29, 1980, 1:15–1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders, Bureau of Near Eastern and South

Asian Affairs, Department of State

Gary Sick, NSC Staff

Mr. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tunisia

Tunisian Ambassador Ali Hedda

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 7/78–7/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office.

The media was invited in for the first few minutes during which the President noted the long friendship between the United States and Tunisia and congratulated them on their economic and social development. He noted that we would view with concern any outside interference or threat to the nation and people of Tunisia. He expressed gratitude for the help Tunisia has offered us on issues of great importance to us. Mr. Bourguiba replied that he was grateful for the President's remarks.

The President opened the private meeting by noting his great concern for the recent unwarranted attack on Tunisia from Libya.

Mr. Bourguiba expressed gratitude for the prompt and spontaneous rescue of the U.S. which provided assistance immediately. Prime Minister Nouira and President Bourguiba both send their great thanks. President Bourguiba as soon as he was able to appraise the quality of the equipment which was sent, gave a great boost to the morale of the army and the people by saying that the U.S. is now with us, so let ten Qadhafis come! In that way, he has now committed the U.S. to our defense!

The President said we are with Tunisia, within the limited budget constraints we face. We would hope to be able to provide the necessary assistance. The recent delivery was about the fastest we have ever made.

Mr. Bourguiba said that the attack was a clear attempt to destabilize Tunisia but it had not succeeded. The population remained faithful to the regime and Tunisia's friends came to its rescue, the foremost of whom was the United States. Tunisia will never forget that. However, on the basis of Qadhafi's own threats, the attempt will occur again. Now that Prime Minister Nouira is ill, Qadhafi expects that his opponents will combine to form a government more to his liking. In 1956 Tunisia made a choice in favor of people above materialism. In 1980, that same choice has resulted in a nation which disturbs those neighboring countries who made other choices. The regime is still fragile, although it has advanced more in human terms than the others have been able to do with all their oil and gas. Tunisia must be able to defend itself, so it must divert the little nature has provided away from development. Tunisia must have the capability at least to detect and deter future actions of the sort which happened recently. He did not anticipate direct military action but future attempts of the same type of guerrilla operation. Tunisia's friends and those who share its values must share this concern. The decision the U.S. takes will have a great psychological effect. It will persuade those who are timid to speak up in Tunisia's behalf and will encourage Tunisia to keep on with its efforts. It will help Tunisia to keep high its honor and be a little showing of the Free World and idealistic world in the world of materialism. He was aware that the U.S. has financial and other problems, but he wanted to stress that Tunisia is one of the links of the Free World.

The President asked if Tunisia has close relations with President Sadat of Egypt.

Mr. Bourguiba said their relations were good until the whole Arab world reacted to his gesture in 1977. It was courageous but it was at the wrong time. Sadat was too weak and he could not oppose the hard bargainer on the other side of the Talmudic negotiations.

The President observed that Egypt would be a good friend for Tunisia.

Mr. Bourguiba said that since the Arab League had moved to Tunis, President Sadat had begun to speak a little badly of Tunisia.

The President said that he hoped Tunisia would have contacts with Egypt. Sadat's feelings about Qadhafi would overcome whatever other concerns he might have. The movement of the Arab League was not important to Sadat, as he had told the President privately. Sadat has a deep distrust of Qadhafi. The President repeated the assurances he had stated earlier, that our prompt delivery of military assistance was a clear signal of our concern for the security and independence of Tunisia. He felt that the U.S., France and other friends could help Tunisia overcome the propaganda attacks being directed against them by Libya.

Western Sahara

211. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance in Switzerland to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Geneva, May 20, 1977, 1605Z

Secto 4127. Subj: Secretary's Meeting With Waldheim: Sahara Problem.

1. During working breakfast May 19 with the Secretary, UN Secy General Waldheim said he wanted to bring the Secretary up to date on the following recent developments with respect to the Sahara and to seek his assistance.

2. Waldheim said that when he was recently in Saudi Arabia, he had met with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika, who had asked for his help in finding a face-saving formula² for Algiers. Subsequently, when he was in Maputo, he had been approached by an emissary of Boumediene's (phonetic spelling Sahnoun) with a further request for his assistance.

3. One idea that had occurred to him, Waldheim said, was the autonomy for the Sahara. With both the OAU and UN divided on this subject, however, King Hassan felt in a strong position and Waldheim doubted that he was ready for a face-saving solution. He was nevertheless in touch with a Moroccan representative in Geneva to explore whether any new approach to this problem was possible. The Algerians hoped for a solution before the African summit in Gabon in July and were urging him to visit the area. Waldheim said he wanted first, however, to see whether Morocco was ready for any kind of face-saving procedure such as, for example, a process of consultations with Saharoui leaders. He had also discussed this problem with Sadruddin Aga Khan, who is carrying out census of Saharouis in Algeria.

4. Waldheim said that Boumediene's emissary had told him the Moroccans were massing troops on the Algerian border. According to Sadruddin Khan, there was no doubt the Algerians are supporting the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2-12/77. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State. Sent for information Priority to USUN, Algiers, Madrid, and Nouakchott. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in Geneva to meet with Gromyko to discuss SALT and the Middle East.

² An unknown hand underlined "face-saving formula."

Polisario,³ and he is concerned about a possible Moroccan preemptive strike across the border against Tindouf.

5. The Secretary said we have good relations with Hassan and could use our good offices in support of the Secretary General.⁴ Waldheim said we could tell Hassan of the approach to him by Boumediene's emissary in Maputo, who had said that Algeria is worried about the situation and has asked the Secretary General to take an initiative which could contribute to a solution of the problem.

6. Waldheim said he was cautious about again involving himself in the Saharan situation after his last experience. King Hassan takes the position that the problem has been solved and that the self-determination requirement was fulfilled through his consultation with the Saharoui Assembly. Neither Spain nor Algeria accepts this, however, pointing out that Hassan only consulted a rump assembly consisting of Moroccan stooges. They did not agree that this fulfilled Morocco's obligation under the Moroccan-Mauritanian-Spanish agreement.⁵ What is needed, Waldheim concluded, is a face-saving formula for the Algerians.

7. Before deciding how to proceed in support of Waldheim's request for help, we would like Rabat's analysis and recommendations. We would also welcome any comments that info addressees may have.

Vance

³ For a detailed report on the Polisario Front, see Document 221.

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁵ Reference is to the 1975 Morocco Accords; see footnote 5, Document 31.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 17, 1977, 2250Z

141679. Subject: Reply to Waldheim Regarding Sahara Problem. Refs: A) Secto 4127,² B) Rabat 2841,³ C) Algiers 1287,⁴ D) Madrid 3987,⁵ E) Rabat 2790,⁶ F) Nouakchott 1226.⁷

1. As you have seen from reftels, our Embassies in the area recommend strongly against our getting involved in any Waldheim initiative on Sahara problem and question whether there is anything constructive

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770218-0936. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkinson and Peck; cleared in NEA, IO, and D/HA/ORM; approved by Vance.

² See Document 211.

³ In telegram 2841 from Rabat, May 25, the Embassy wrote: "French Ambassador Raimond told Ambassador May 23 that he had just read a confidential report that Waldheim had discussed 'some kind of autonomy' as a possible element of Sahara solution, and that both Algerians and Moroccans had turned Waldheim down." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770186-0693)

⁴ In telegram 1287 from Algiers, May 22, the Embassy wrote: "We believe US should be extremely wary of getting involved in SecGen Waldheim's initiative on Sahara because we are skeptical of Algerian motives." The Embassy also expressed concern regarding the possible consequences of U.S. support: "If foregoing analysis correct, utilization of USG good offices in support of Waldheim initiative on behalf of Algerians would, from Algiers viewpoint at least, uselessly complicate our relationship with Hassan in order help Algerians extricate themselves from temporarily tight bind and pursue their diplomatic efforts. It would do little to ingratiate us with Algerians or resolve basic conflict." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2-12/77)

⁵ In telegram 3987 from Madrid, May 23, the Embassy commented on Spain's position on the Sahara: "If the U.S. decides to become involved in any sort of initiative on the Sahara, we urge that we consult with the GOS at an early stage, if only on a closely held basis. Such consultation is not only entirely consistent with our treaty relationship, but in addition, Spain's long-time experience in the area suggests the GOS might have some helpful insights." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183-0714)

⁶ In telegram 2790 from Rabat, May 23, Anderson wrote: "I have thought long and hard over the past year as to how we might usefully involve ourselves. Unfortunately, I do not believe our involvement in support of Waldheim would have any useful result nor do I see any way that our national interest could be other than hurt by the inevitable failure of a Waldheim initiative. Our relations with Morocco would be undermined and we would have unwisely and needlessly introduced an element of superpower involvement into a situation which has devolved onto a regional body." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183-0386)

⁷ In telegram 1226 from Nouakchott, May 27, Handyside wrote: "Lengthy list of volunteer mediators who have stepped forward unsuccessfully over past twenty months underscores fact mediator can only help disputants who truly wish to resolve an outstanding problem. That has not been case in past in Sahara dispute. There is little hard evidence that Sahara protagonists have yet sufficiently altered their positions to make present any different." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190-0044)

SYG could do at this point. We share negative assessment of prospects for Waldheim initiative, and understand dangers of U.S. involvement in enterprise which could needlessly complicate our relations with Hassan and do little to ingratiate us with the Algerians or resolve the basic conflict. We also wish to avoid introducing an element of superpower involvement into a situation which we have told both sides we believe should be settled on a regional basis. Nonetheless, we see no harm in simply informing Moroccans of Algerian approach to Waldheim while stressing our own “hands off” policy.

2. Among other factors which incline us towards a not overly encouraging response to Waldheim are: Waldheim’s fear that the Moroccans may be planning a preemptive strike or that the French may intervene on the side of the Mauritians is not supported by intelligence reports or on-the-scene observers.

—A French report indicates that the Moroccans and Algerians already have turned down Waldheim’s proposal for “some kind of autonomy” for the Saharans as an element of a possible solution.

—The French are concerned that a Waldheim initiative might complicate their efforts to free their hostages captured by the Polisario at Zouerate.

3. Looking to the future, we recognize that the Western Sahara issue requires our continued attention because it is potentially destabilizing and shows no signs of going away. There are indications that the Polisario has strengthened its infrastructure and its operational capacity despite significant military commitments by Morocco and Mauritania. It seems unlikely that the guerrillas will be able to win a military victory and a clash between Morocco and Algeria also appears remote, but the strains of maintaining their levels of activity in the Sahara put pressures on all three governments involved. In addition, we are concerned about the human rights problems associated with the thousands of Saharans living in refugee camps in Algeria. With this in mind, we are considering a possible response to the UNHCR’s renewed appeal for contributions for Saharan refugees.

4. For USUN: Given Waldheim’s own ambivalence and the exploratory nature of his exchange with Secretary on this matter, we believe that an informal, oral reply would be appropriate. Please seek meeting with SYG to deliver message, on behalf of the Secretary, drawing on the following talking points:

—During your recent meeting with the Secretary in Geneva there was a discussion of possible initiatives to resolve the Sahara dispute.

—We have given careful thought to Algeria’s proposal and to your own ideas as to possible face-saving formulas. We have also solicited the views of our Embassies in the area.

—Our judgment is that the Moroccan Government would not be receptive at this time to an outside initiative, whatever its origin.

—In addition, we have consistently maintained the position that this problem can best be resolved on a regional basis, and that it should not become a source of contention among the major powers.

—As you requested, we plan to inform King Hassan through Foreign Minister Laraki of the approach made to you by Boumediene's emissary in Maputo.

—For the reasons cited above, however, we are disinclined at the moment to become further involved in discussions of possible face-saving solutions.

—Should it appear in the future that either side were contemplating action against the other, we would be prepared to reconsider our own diplomatic role.

5. For Rabat: Per Waldheim request in ref A, you should apprise FonMin Laraki during your next routine meeting with him of approach to Waldheim by Boumediene's emissary, noting that you are merely carrying out SecGen's request to Secretary Vance that this info be passed on to King Hassan. You should tell Laraki that we believe it is entirely appropriate for Waldheim to continue to explore possibilities of a solution, but reassure him that U.S. is maintaining its "hands-off" position and does not wish to become involved in these endeavors.⁸

Vance

⁸ In telegram 3429 from Rabat, June 22, the Chargé reported on his meeting with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, describing his reaction as "highly negative." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223-1106)

213. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 15, 1977

SUBJECT

The Western Sahara Conflict

The conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara is not a high-priority foreign policy concern at present, but we have no interest in seeing the tension continue. Morocco is clearly unhappy with the drain on its resources required by the fight against evasive Polisario guerrillas, and Algeria has hinted that it wants a face-saving settlement. It is not inconceivable that both parties may turn to us to provide good offices.

Background to the Dispute

You are no doubt aware that Morocco maintained historic claims to all of Mauritania up until 1970, and to parts of Algeria until 1972. (These latter are still unsettled.) As Foreign Minister Laraki noted to you, Morocco does not subscribe to the OAU principle of inviolability of the frontiers inherited from the colonial period.²

The Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara is not overwhelmingly impressive, but the alternative of permitting a small nomadic population of some 70–80,000 to exercise the right of self-determination has not exactly caught fire either. We need not, however, accept as truth the version of history that the Moroccans have been promoting.

Despite what Laraki said to you, the division of the area between Morocco and Mauritania was quite arbitrary, as the division line shows. It was not in any precise manner based on tribal allegiances. (See maps at Tab A.)³ In any case, nomadic tribal allegiances have not been very stable, and the dominant sentiment is one of fierce independence and disregard for such niceties as frontiers.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 87, Spanish Sahara: 5–12/77. Confidential. Sent for information. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum. A copy was sent to Richardson.

² No record of a meeting between Brzezinski and Laraki during Laraki's September 12–13 visit to Washington was found. Vance met with Laraki on September 13; see footnote 2, Document 152.

³ Tab A is attached but not printed.

Tom Franck's article at Tab B summarizes the main stages leading to partition of the Western Sahara.⁴ The Moroccans try to buttress their case by legal arguments, but the simple fact is that they annexed the territory by force. Some of the population no doubt welcomed them; others fled, and now live in refugee camps in Algeria. Polisario, which traces its origins to 1968, managed to win Algerian backing, and decided to fight. Algeria's motives are no doubt mixed, but Boumediene was clearly angered at the way in which Hassan outmaneuvered him, and he sees the Polisario, which consists of good fighters who know the territory, as a low-cost way of keeping Morocco off balance. The danger, of course, is that the fighting will escalate to the Morocco-Algeria level.

Like most observers, I see little chance that the Moroccan fait accompli can be reversed. Nor do I feel that it necessarily should be, although I find the legal pretensions of the Moroccan case a bit hard to take. (I'm sure the Somalis will find comparably strong arguments if and when they annex Ogaden, Djibouti and parts of Kenya.)

Before King Hassan arrives for his December 7–8 visit, it might be worth considering whether we should offer our good offices to reduce the tension between Morocco and Algeria. The most that we could expect Hassan to concede would be a limited degree of autonomy for the western Sahara and reintegration of some Polisario leaders into Morocco. Some symbolic act constituting self-determination—voting for the regional assembly—would then have to take place. By now, that would probably give Boumediene enough to allow him to disengage as gracefully as possible from an overextended position. Unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict on which we spend all our time, this one is not vital to world peace. But it might still be resolved, and at very little cost to us in time or effort. The Moroccans claim that there is nothing to be decided, but they do seem worried about developments. So the time may be ripe for getting beyond the absurd legal arguments about who is right and who is wrong, and trying to find a solution to a problem which needlessly distracts Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria from more serious issues of development.⁵

⁴ Tab B, entitled "The Spanish Sahara and Portuguese Timor as Precedent," is attached but not printed.

⁵ Brzezinski highlighted the first two sentences of this paragraph, placed a question mark in the left-hand margin, and wrote: "How about leaving this to France?"

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 29, 1977, 1215Z

5951. For the Secretary. Subject: King Hassan on Sahara Situation.

1. King Hassan called me to his retreat at Bouznika October 27 to express extreme unhappiness at the suspension of deliveries of paid for ammunition for US-supplied 54 M-48A tanks, which “are sitting at Errachidia without ammunition.” The subject, which I believe is on the road to a satisfactory resolution, is described in a separate telegram.² King went on to discuss current military situation in Sahara. He indicated he wished Secretary to have this information before latter’s meeting with Foreign Minister Boucetta November 7.³ (Boucetta will be prepared to go into greater detail.)

2. King stated that there had been serious escalation in Sahara guerrilla warfare during recent weeks. Polisario now had armored vehicles, advanced automatic weapons, and large numbers of scouting vehicles. Polisario’s repair capabilities were “unbelievable.” Quantities of equipment in Polisario hands had increased tremendously.

3. When our people come over a dune, King continued, they might well meet a wall of armor. Saharans themselves could not possibly operate this far more sophisticated equipment in Polisario inventory. There was no question but that regular Algerian forces were operating this equipment. King wanted Secretary to know that further indication of non-Saharan involvement in the fighting was recent aborted Algerian efforts in Dakar to recruit Senegalese for Polisario guerrillas and President Senghor’s intention to have public trial condemning this action (see Rabat 5579 for my conversation with former Foreign Minister Laraki on this subject.)⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770398–0780. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Moscow, Nouakchott, Paris, and USUN.

² In telegram 5950 from Rabat, October 29, Anderson wrote: “King stated that this situation raised ‘1000 questions’ in Moroccan minds regarding U.S. policy. He wondered if Belgium, France and other NATO countries, who had the same tanks, had been cut off by the U.S. as Morocco had been, even though some were manufacturing their own ammunition. Morocco had already been in contact with certain countries with a view to purchasing tank ammunition from them, and received positive replies, and would now proceed with purchases.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770398–0723)

³ See Document 216.

⁴ Telegram 5579 from Rabat, October 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770367–1057.

4. Furthermore, French intelligence from assets in Dakar had informed him of significant number of new air fields in Chegga area of Mauritania, near northwestern corner of Mali, and of Soviet-provided AN-12 aircraft flying large quantities of equipment into that area.

5. King stated that something had to be done. He was the only one in the whole area making serious effort to prevent collapse of moderate regimes in Africa and ward off creeping Soviet take-over of the continent. King expected recurrence of Shaba insurgency, and had had reports that infiltration had already started up again.

6. King stressed that it was the U.S., and only the U.S., which could effectively prevent further Soviet inroads. He recalled a statement by Secretary in support of territorial integrity of Sudan, which he welcomed. To ensure this integrity, however, one must be concerned about the situation neighboring on Sudan. He cited Soviet-equipped Qadhafi in Libya, and "the virtual Soviet takeover of Ethiopia," as well as strong Soviet position in Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. After recalling his initiative in Zaire, King said he could not combat the Soviets alone, especially in Northwest Africa in the face of increasing Soviet military deliveries to Algeria. The problem, as he saw it, was two-fold: (a) no Soviet limitation on the use of arms and equipment by the Algerians and (b) possible Soviet or Cuban manning of the more advanced items. On the latter point, King said that he knew the Algerians were not good pilots, and therefore he would not be so concerned about recently delivered MiG-21's but for possibility that non-Algerians might be flying them.

7. King urged U.S. to enter discussions with Soviets to induce them to stop the current Algerian escalation threatening Morocco and Mauritania. Recent Sahara escalation had come about "either because people were illogical or logical." King had to assume latter, which would lead to conclusion that this was part of Soviet strategy in Africa. At this point, King recalled that Presidential Assistant Brzezinski, in September 13 conversation in Washington with former FonMin Laraki, had expressed understanding of Soviet threat in Africa and support for Moroccan efforts to counter this threat⁵ (having received no account of this conversation, I was unable to comment.)

8. King noted that Royal Counselor Reda Guedira was currently in Paris for private meeting with Giscard d'Estaing to brief him on situation and to urge France to weigh in with the USSR.

9. A serious problem for Morocco was that its friends were in the "moral camp," King continued, with its enemies in the camp without morals. The U.S. and France and other friends would undoubtedly

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 213.

stop deliveries of military equipment in case of a serious outbreak. Morocco must therefore build up stocks in self-defense, as those allied to the immoral camp would not suffer a cut-off of supplies.

10. King emphasized that he would never ask the U.S. to get into another Vietnam or Korea, and that Morocco would do the fighting but must have the wherewithal. In this connection, he noted current visit of Deputy Air Force Chief Colonel Terhzaz to Washington to discuss with U.S. Navy release of six used OV-10 aircraft which he looked forward to receiving soonest. As the United States well knew, Morocco would never commit aggression, King continued, but it must defend itself against escalating attacks from outside its borders. If the escalation continued, he would have to react. He did not, however, want to be forced into a position where he would have no choice but to respond with a counter offensive. If Moscow could be persuaded to restrain the other side, this possibility would remain academic.

11. Comment: While King studiously avoided alarmism, he clearly views mounting military pressures, especially against Mauritania, as very serious, and within the larger context of Soviet expansionism in Africa. He therefore sees a more active U.S. role vis-a-vis the Soviets as increasingly urgent.

Anderson

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, November 3, 1977, 1144Z

6025. Subj: Foreign Minister Boucetta Comments on Sahara.

1. During conversations before and after my October 27 meeting with King Hassan,² Foreign Minister Boucetta expressed concern over military situation in Sahara and Mauritania. He indicated a pronounced escalation was under way and that Moroccan forces were under increasing pressure. He stressed that "one should never lose one's head, but one could not just sit back with arms folded," especially in view of the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/77–2/78. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 214.

emotions of the growing number of families of Moroccans killed and wounded. I noted that Moroccan success on diplomatic front had no doubt caused frustration for the other side, leading to increased military activity. At same time, Moroccan resort to increased force, such as any direct confrontation with Algeria, could detract from or even reverse its diplomatic efforts in OAU and Arab League. Boucetta concurred, but believed that something had to be done. He confessed, however, to be at a loss as to specific moves.

2. Turning to UN situation, Boucetta said Algerians were trying to induce as many countries as possible to talk about Sahara in Fourth Committee with a view toward having question put on UNGA agenda. Morocco would be working toward same outcome at UNGA as last year, namely deferring to OAU as the organization already seized with the matter. Boucetta recognized need to have a new Moroccan Ambassador to UN assigned as soon as possible, and hoped for Royal decision in very near future.

3. Boucetta wondered what Algerian game really was. I noted this was regular question from American visitors, and that answer no doubt involved wide-ranging competition between a revolutionary socialist system and a progressive monarchy, with Sahara having added to Algerian frustration. Boucetta thought that Sahara was expensive for Algeria, although probably more so for Morocco. He was persuaded that Sahara war was not popular in Algeria, and that it would be in Moroccan interest to increase the cost of the war effort for Algeria so that the Algerian people would become increasingly disenchanted. Boucetta said that war was obviously not the way, but he did not know how to go about it. At this point, he mentioned increasing diplomatic pressure in Arab, African and other capitals to weaken even further Algerian pretensions of Third World leadership. He also alluded to increasing U.S. economic ties with Algeria which undoubtedly bolstered an economy that was not working very well and certainly indirectly helped Algeria to pursue its policy with the Polisario. While he did not, as had been done informally with me in the past by the Prime Minister, the former Foreign Minister and other key Moroccans, ask rhetorically why the U.S. did not use its economic relations to force a change in Algerian policy, he had that look in his eye. Frankly, I think he is bright enough to know that this would be a non-starter, especially when the GOM is putting the finishing touches on a long-term phosphate agreement with the Soviets.

4. During earlier conversation Oct. 22, which touched on recent House International Relations Committee hearings on Sahara, Boucetta said that after a briefing from Professor Mohammed Bennouna, who testified before the Committee, he found the statement by Deputy

Secretary of State Veliotis a good one,³ but was perplexed over the points made about the use of U.S. arms in the Sahara. For example, to say that we did not really know much about U.S. arms in the Sahara because our people do not visit the disputed areas gives ammunition to the other side which can claim the U.S. questions Morocco's right to be in the territory and is therefore no longer neutral on the substance of the issue. It was clear that Boucetta's problem here is that he equates sovereignty with administrative control. When I pointed out Veliotis had stated that we acknowledged latter, but have refrained from taking a position on the former, he appeared to understand more clearly that part of the statement on the use of U.S. arms. I then reviewed for him the considerations relating to Moroccan use of U.S. equipment, pointing out that our agreements contained certain restrictions, for example on where such equipment might be used and on transfers to third parties. Boucetta said he was aware of these points, but considered that as a general principle, Morocco might obviously have to use equipment from whatever source to defend Moroccan territory and that of Mauritania against externally supported aggression, while having no intention to commit any aggression against Algeria. If the aggression against Morocco and Mauritania ceased, he concluded, the costly use of GOM military hardware would also cease.

5. Comment: Boucetta's concern over escalation in Sahara closely echoes that of King Hassan (Rabat 5951 Notal).⁴ He obviously understands that direct military moves against Algeria could cause more problems than would be solved. On other hand, he shares growing sense of frustration among Moroccan leadership, which has not yet been able to find an effective response against Algerian-Polisario military pressures.

Anderson

³ In telegram 245767 to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott, October 13, the Department transmitted the text of Veliotis's October 12 statement, which set out the U.S. position of refraining from "acknowledging Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to sovereignty over the disputed territory, while acknowledging their administrative control of the territory." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770373–0920)

⁴ See footnote 2 above.

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 8, 1977, 2144Z

267508. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta—Western Sahara.

1. Boucetta opened November 7 substantive discussion with statement that he hopes shared ideals give Morocco "privileged" relation with U.S. Morocco has chosen democracy and is in process of political liberalization, a trend unusual in Third World and in contrast with Algerian example. Morocco has been concerned by development of axis linking Moscow, Algeria, Luanda and Havana and has tried in Shaba and elsewhere to use limited means at its disposal to counter this axis' activities. Turning to the Sahara conflict, Boucetta said Morocco had been both colonized and decolonized in phases, with the decolonization of the Sahara following procedures quite common among Francophone colonies, i.e., including consultation with provincial assembly. He described Polisario as quote a fiction—a creation of Algeria. Unquote.

2. When Boucetta said Hassan instructed him to raise with Secretary issue of recent Polisario use of heavy weapons, Secretary commented that U.S. intelligence experts have seen no such evidence. Boucetta welcomed Secretary's suggestion that American and Moroccan intelligence experts meet. Boucetta then elaborated on Moroccan claims, stating Antonov aircraft transporting arms and men to areas near Chegga, and elsewhere in Mauritania and Mali. He said that as he left Rabat Hassan had told him Moroccan forces had seen or had recovered battle debris proving that Polisario using armored cars and 23 mm artillery, which Boucetta said must be manned by Algerians and/or other non-Saharans. FonMin said French press has carried interview of Algerian NCO captured in Mauritania who said he was one of 500 Algerian artillerymen in a 600-man band which infiltrated Mauritania. Polisario have been mutilating faces of their own dead when leaving corpses on battlefield to prevent identification of Algerians, Boucetta said.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/77-2/78. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers and Nouakchott. Sent for information to Moscow, Paris, Madrid, USUN, and the Department of Defense. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in S; approved by Atherton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770412-1042)

3. FonMin then indicated difficulties with tank and other ammunition but said he understood these would be resolved at technical level within the week. He pledged Morocco would not use military weapons for aggression but added that Morocco was sure of justice of its position and hoped U.S. too would be on side of justice and of Morocco's right to recover its territory.

4. In responding, Secretary said during meeting later in day with Soviet Ambassador he would urge the Soviets to counsel the Algerians to exercise restraint in circumstances which appear to be endangering the peace.² Secretary added that in meeting planned for following day with Bouteflika he would urge that Algerians seek to solve the dispute through restraint and diplomacy rather than military conflict. After Boucetta explained state of play in UN's Fourth Committee, Secretary said he would consult with Ambassador Young. Secretary did not respond to Boucetta's statement that later in year Morocco may be looking for U.S. to support its contention that self-determination has occurred in Western Sahara should Morocco decide to try to have Western Sahara deleted from agenda.³

5. Turning to U.S. military assistance, Secretary told Boucetta that in spirit of frankness he wanted Moroccans to be aware both practical and congressional problems would have to be considered.⁴ He cited reopening of OV-10 production line as example of former and possible objections of some Congressmen to use in Western Sahara of American supplied military equipment as example of latter. Secretary concluded that U.S. wants to be as helpful as it can be, but existence of these problems makes it impossible to make any commitments before we talk to Congress. FonMin responded that Moroccan need is great, repeated that U.S. furnished weapons would not be used for aggression, but added Moroccans would defend their entire territory.⁵

6. With respect to diplomatic situation, Boucetta said Morocco could act with the flexibility necessary, but the issue is more the preservation of Morocco's territorial integrity than self-determination. He voiced apprehension that time might be running against Morocco. While Morocco's friends are studying the situation carefully, Algeria

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin. In telegram 266736 to Moscow, November 8, Vance summarized his meeting with Dobrynin: "I told Dobrynin that I had been talking with the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Boucetta, and was concerned about the potentially explosive situation in the Western Sahara. I urged the Soviet side to exercise its influence with the Algerians, and warned that as larger units became involved, the danger increased." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0388)

³ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph.

is being encouraged by their delay in taking a firm position.⁶ He lauded as clear France's statements on Western Sahara and said a firmer U.S. position is necessary to keep Algeria from going too far.

7. Subsequent discussion concerned Middle East and is being reported via septel.⁷

Vance

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁷ Telegram 267504 to Rabat, November 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071-1617)

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, November 11, 1977, 0346Z

269859. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika—Western Sahara.

1. Summary: In hour and half conversation with Bouteflika focused principally on Sahara conflict, Secretary urged Algerians to exercise restraint, telling FonMin he had urged restraint on Moroccan FonMin previous day. Bouteflika attacked French, whom he accused of exaggerated reaction and of inciting Moroccans to start war with Algeria. Secretary relayed French message that Algerian help in release of hostages would begin improvement in Franco-Algerian relations desired by Paris.² Bouteflika was non-committal. He conveyed Boumediene's response to Secretary's message on hostages, which also was non-committal. Bouteflika repeated earlier Algerian warning of grave consequences of any violation of frontiers by Morocco. After he expressed

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2-12/77. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Rabat, Nouakchott, Paris, Madrid, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Twaddell; approved by Veliotis.

² In telegram 268307 to Paris, November 9, the Department summarized Vance's meeting with French Ambassador-designate de Laboulaye. Regarding the French hostages, de Laboulaye said: "If the hostages are released, France would restore normal relations with Algeria." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0802)

pessimism regarding OAU and UN mediation efforts and ruled out bilateral negotiations with Moroccans, Secretary said he would reflect on earlier decision that U.S. should refrain from direct role while these organizations tried promote peaceful settlement. End summary.

2. Foreign Minister Bouteflika, accompanied by Ambassador Maoui and Counselor Abdelkader Bensmail from Algerian Mission to UN, called on Secretary November 8 at Bouteflika's request. Principal topic was Western Sahara; other topics being reported septel.³

3. Reminding Secretary of their previous meeting in Paris,⁴ FonMin said it would not be necessary to repeat background to Sahara conflict. Secretary replied U.S. concerned by escalation of tension in Northwest Africa. This had been discussed previous day with Moroccan FonMin, and Secretary told Bouteflika he had urged Moroccan Government to exercise restraint and seek a solution by diplomatic means rather than military.⁵ Stating he also would urge Algeria to act with restraint in a dangerous situation, Secretary invited Bouteflika to give his views on how dispute could be resolved.

4. Replying, Bouteflika said Saharans regard Moroccans and Mauritians as occupiers of their national territory and are contesting this occupation not only in the Sahara but in Morocco and Mauritania. Algeria believes the material and diplomatic support it furnishes Saharans is consistent with its United Nations obligations. Algeria has no territorial or economic ambitions and expects to return to a policy of friendship with its neighbors once the conflict has been resolved on the basis of free consultation. In meanwhile struggle becomes harder due to logic of oppression which generates even greater resistance. Algeria believes Saharans' situation must concern the U.S., for human rights which U.S. espouses are indivisible and applicable everywhere.

5. Continuing, Bouteflika said it is not Algeria's business if Saharans fight the Moroccans and Mauritania in the Western Sahara or in Morocco and Mauritania, or if in observance of the rules of war the Moroccans and Mauritians pursue the Saharans into Western Sahara.

³ In telegram 269543 to Algiers, November 10, the Department summarized Vance's November 8 discussion with Bouteflika on the Middle East. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770415–1224) In telegram 270642 to Algiers, November 11, the Department summarized Vance's discussion with Bouteflika on OPEC. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770418–0040) In telegram 270649 to Algiers, November 11, the Department summarized the conclusion of Vance's meeting with Bouteflika in which they discussed the new SALT agreement and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770418–0052) Vance also reported to Carter on his meeting with Bouteflika; see Document 62.

⁴ See Document 60.

⁵ See Document 216. An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

However, any pursuit into Algeria affects Algerian sovereignty.⁶ In his speech Hassan spoke of violation of Moroccan borders—Algeria recognizes only the pre-Madrid Accord borders.⁷ Bouteflika stated that, although Algeria gave Polisario moral and material support, there was no truth to stories that armed attacks against Morocco or Mauritania originated in Algerian territory. He cited “great distances” involved to support this line. (Note: It was unclear, but presumably he was not ruling out such attacks in Sahara against Moroccan and Mauritanian forces since GOA does not recognize claims of both countries to Sahara.)

6. Turning to mediation efforts, Bouteflika said in three years’ efforts Arabs and Africans had not been able to reconcile the parties, nor had the UN Secretary General. Spain, he said, now has declared that it transferred administration, not sovereignty to Morocco and Mauritania and that sovereignty can be transferred only by popular choice.

7. Bouteflika said Hassan had made statement stronger than Green March anniversary speech in November 7 interview with Paris-based Arab language newspaper, adding that Algerian Government’s position is that any violation of Algeria’s borders will receive an appropriate reply and that Algerian papers are stating that any such violation would be considered a declaration of war.⁸

8. Shifting discussion to French, Bouteflika said their performance has been remarkable. In an aside he said Boumediene had asked him to tell Secretary how deeply he had been touched by sensitivity, delicacy, and lofty objective set forth in Secretary’s message to Algerian President.⁹ Picking up theme, Bouteflika said history of Franco-Algerian war weighed on present relations. AFP had reported that French nuclear forces alerted as part of French reaction to capture of hostages, and Algeria found it strange that such a response could stem from

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁷ In telegram 6101 from Rabat, November 7, the Embassy transmitted the translated text of Hassan’s November 6 speech delivered on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Green March. In his speech, Hassan declared that “there are no quarrels between the Moroccan and the Algerian peoples,” but stressed: “I have sacred duties as King of the country and as the Supreme Commander of the Royal Armed Forces. I would thus find myself constrained—and I repeat, constrained—to use the right of pursuit, even if this leads to crossing borders and interferes with the sovereignty of neighbors. However, I say that the responsibility—all the responsibility—for this will lie with the Algerian leaders.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770410–1043)

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁹ An unknown hand placed a checkmark next to this sentence. In telegram 260951 to Algiers, USUN, and Paris, November 2, the Department transmitted the text of Vance’s message to Boumediene regarding Algerian efforts to secure the release of French nationals held by the Polisario. The message reads, in part: “I am confident that with characteristic wisdom and statesmanship, Algerian and French leaders will achieve a positive solution to this issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770402–0572)

an incident of this nature. There had been threats by several cabinet members, and the French media was engaged in an anti-Algerian campaign without parallel since the war. He characterized French policy as quote state terrorism unquote and said problem cannot be resolved by blackmail or intimidation. Meanwhile Algerian offer made in May, to facilitate contacts between Polisario and French Government still stands.

9. Continuing, FonMin said quote all this noise unquote may have been intended to disguise the reinforcement of the French military in Dakar, the expansion of the French military presence in Mauritania, and the dispatch of supplies and military technicians to Morocco. French actions (which Algeria has learned included a rebuffed request from the French General Staff to the Spanish Government for use of Las Palmas) have prompted two theories: (1) France wants a second Algerian war—which is difficult to believe; or (2) that France is encouraging Morocco to wage a second war with Algeria—which Algeria has reason to believe to be true. However, although disappointed by France's attitude, Algeria does not despair and continues to hope France will adopt a position suited to her regional interests rather than an election campaign.

10. Bouteflika said in view of events which had occurred since he told Secretary in Paris of Algerian hopes that Carter administration would help safeguard fundamental principles, and bearing in mind that both Hassan and Boumediene are scheduled to visit the U.S. within the next nine months, he wondered if Secretary's reflection on problem had led to belief that U.S. could work with Algeria to help avoid any quote stupid confrontation unquote.¹⁰ Concluding, he said Algeria's borders had been defined by the blood of martyrs in wars with France and Morocco and any violation of them would have catastrophic consequences.

11. Secretary then informed Bouteflika that in earlier conversation that morning French Ambassador-designate de Lablouye had said France wants an improvement in its relations with Algeria and would regard clearing up question of prisoners as a good step in this direction. Vance said de Lablouye had asked him to pass this to Bouteflika. FonMin did not respond other than to state he knows de Lablouye.¹¹

12. Continuing, Secretary said that in his discussions with Boucetta, Moroccan had said his government has no aggressive designs and would prefer to see the Sahara dispute resolved by peaceful means. Secretary commented that he thought it should be possible to find

¹⁰ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹¹ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

some basis on which exploration of means to find a peaceful solution could be made, and he mentioned ongoing Fourth Committee discussion.¹²

13. In responding, Bouteflika outlined history of abortive discussions under OAU aegis, stating there no longer is an African capital where such discussions can be held. He said that when OAU talks appear imminent Moroccans press for UN talks and when these appear likely Moroccans call for OAU meeting. He said OAU ad hoc committees either resolve problems quickly or the problem persists indefinitely; they cannot provide magical solutions. Asked if there is any chance to resolve the dispute on a bilateral basis, Bouteflika responded "absolutely not".¹³ Algeria would not exchange access to phosphates for its honor and would have all the corridor to the sea it needs once good relations are restored with Morocco or Mauritania. No solution is possible without a homeland for the Saharan people,¹⁴ he insisted.

14. Secretary concluded Saharan portion of discussion with statement that although he had said earlier that conflict should be resolved with help of Arabs or Africans, he would like to reflect on this, especially as Hassan and Boumediene would be coming to U.S.¹⁵ He said he would be in touch with Bouteflika again after reflecting further on problem.

Vance

¹² An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. For a summary of the discussion of the Western Sahara in the UNGA Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization Committee), which began on October 31, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1977, pp. 881–882.

¹³ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "a homeland for the Saharan people."

¹⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, November 23, 1977, 1630Z

2959. UNCINCEUR for POLAD. Subj: The Sahara Two Years After the Green March.²

1. Summary: Although Morocco and Mauritania control most of Sahara militarily and enjoy reasonably solid diplomatic position, case is far from closed. Polisario has developed organizational and even popular base, government in exile, effective international PR effort, as well as seemingly efficient fighting force. At this juncture, Mauritania is hurting militarily, Morocco has felt sufficiently pressed to escalate intensity of conflict, and following seizure of more French hostages, France has increased its commitment to support Mauritania.

2. Despite risk of no-win Algerian-Moroccan war, we see no intention on either side of abandoning hard line positions, and therefore believe U.S. should stay out of conflict and maintain policy of neutrality. At same time, we should remain in touch with Soviets on question as well as with protagonists. End summary.

3. The setting: Events in the Sahara since mid-October have escalated the tension in the region to a level not seen since the immediate post-Green March period in early 1976. The successful Polisario attacks at Sebkhath Oum Drouss Oct 13–14 and at Zouerat Oct 23 seem to have provoked King Hassan's declaration of the right of hot pursuit of Polisario guerrillas across the Algerian frontier. The Polisario's Oct 23 kidnapping of two more French technicians working in Mauritania, and the apparent French decision to bolster the defenses of that country, have added a new dimension to conflict and given the Algerian regime both a new cause and perhaps even pause for reflection. The latest attempts at mediation seem to have gone nowhere, and as this telegram is written it appears that the Polisario may have put the fat in the fire by launching new attacks within the Sahara, in southern Morocco, and on the Zouerat iron ore train in Mauritania.

4. In this situation, we submit the following analysis of where the conflict seems to us to stand, the prospects for a settlement, and how the U.S. interest is affected.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 87, Spanish Sahara: 5–12/77. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Geneva, USUN, Moscow, and USCINCEUR. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnote 6, Document 37.

5. Politico-military balance sheet in the Sahara; the dossier remains open: At the second anniversary of King Hassan's Green March into the Sahara, conflict over the former colony continues unabated. Major elements in the situation are:

A. Moroccan-Mauritanian position established: After two years, no amount of Algerian-Polisario propaganda can disguise the fact of Moroccan-Mauritanian control over the major strategic points within the former colony. The strength of the Moroccan Armed Forces in and near the Sahara is estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 and the Mauritanian Army has grown rapidly to meet the Polisario's challenge. Although the Moroccans may have abandoned some remote outposts such as Bir Lahlou in the Eastern Sahara, their control over all major towns is undisputed as is their ability to retake any villages which for tactical reasons they have evacuated. We have the impression that Polisario "operations" against Saharan towns are very minor.

B. Moroccan-Mauritanian position strong: A major Algerian diplomatic campaign has made almost no progress in breaking the virtually unanimous Arab support for Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover of Sahara, and the Africans and the rest of Third World, while often championing the right of self-determination, seem unwilling to enter the fray. Thus, the special OAU summit on Sahara has yet to be held, and few countries other than the eleven that have recognized Sahraoui Republic,³ are prepared to be in the forefront of a fight for repudiation of the Madrid Agreement and condemnation of the Moroccan-Mauritanian occupation. Most Third World governments seem to recognize the complications inherent in situation and prefer to look the other way.

C. The Polisario alive and well: The two years since the Green March have seen Algeria and the Polisario transform the latter from a small, poorly armed band of several hundred into an organization possessed of a "government in exile", a political structure with representatives around the world, a well organized "popular base" in the Tindouf refugee camps, an effective international PR effort, an apparently efficient fighting force of several thousand men. Within the military stalemate existing on the ground, the Polisario has expanded the sophistication of its armaments and consequently the size and scope of its operations to a point at which the Mauritanian Government is hurting both militarily and economically and the Moroccans are sufficiently under pressure to provoke King Hassan's November 6 "hot pursuit" speech.⁴ Diplomatically the Polisario, if unsuccessful in obtaining worldwide support for its cause, has at least begun making

³ See footnote 3, Document 45.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 217.

its case more effectively around the world, notably in the U.S. and at the U.N. In short, the Polisario appears to be an organization that will be with us for awhile.

D. Refugees: Since the Green March, the Algerians and the Polisario have built a nucleus of people who left the Sahara into an impressive group of refugees all apparently fired with Sahraoui nationalism and a longing to return to their "homeland." It is certain that, among these people are refugees who lived in the former Spanish Sahara, who feared or were made to fear the Moroccans and to a lesser extent the Mauritians, and who therefore fled to Algeria. It is only slightly less certain that the camps contain a significant number of Saharans who have arrived from other areas of the desert, either to escape the Sahel drought or simply because the Algerians and Polisario induced them to come. Still, however much one questions their origins, the refugees, thanks to a major organizational effort by the Algerians and the Polisario, have become for the outside world "a people" whose rights as a group must be taken into consideration in a settlement of Sahara problem. Paradoxically, continuation of Sahara conflict is itself developing a national identity among a nomadic people who never really had much of one before.⁵

E. France and its hostages: Following the Polisario's taking of two further French hostages in Mauritania last month, France has shown herself more willing to go to Mauritania's aid even though this has meant the deterioration of Franco-Algerian relations. What effect French assistance may have on the sagging Mauritanian war effort remains to be seen. In Algeria, it has produced a new burst of Francophobia and has fueled the regime's fear of a Rabat-Paris axis bent on destroying the Algerian revolution. But, so far, this Francophobia has not triggered any sort of violent reprisals against French nationals or property in Algeria.

6. Current attitudes: At this stage of conflict, the attitudes of principal players appear to us as follows:

A. Algeria: Algerian Sahara policy would appear to have had some short-term success even if that policy's mid to long-term benefits to Algeria are questionable. The difficulties facing Mauritania as a result of Polisario activity are clear proof of guerrillas' effectiveness, and King Hassan's hot pursuit announcement suggests that Moroccan casualties have become sufficiently serious to force him to react with increased intensity. That this Algerian "success" has brought Algeria and Morocco closer to a war neither side wants is a point that we feel is

⁵ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

not lost on the Algerian leadership. For the moment, however, the Algerian regime is obsessed with the diplomatic defeat represented by Madrid Agreement and seems totally preoccupied with making the Moroccans pay for that setback.⁶ The leadership here has good reason to believe it is scoring points in this department, and despite the apparent disinterest of the Algerian people to the struggle, its overriding interest at the moment seems to be in keeping up the pressure.

B. Polisario: The Polisario's interest in the conflict differs from the Algerians' only in that it would not appear bound by fear of an Algerian-Moroccan war. Such a conflict would serve only to dramatize its cause, and could produce a new situation from which it could conceivably profit.

C. Morocco: It appears from our vantage point that King Hassan's commitment to his present Sahara policy remains total and that of his people only slightly less so. Moroccans talk from time to time of "face saving" solutions for Boumediene, but are understandably unwilling to make any of the sort of concessions the Algerians are looking for. Morocco's continued talk of giving Algeria economic concessions in a Moroccan Sahara misses the essential point that the Algerian interest in conflict is geopolitical, not economic.

D. Mauritania: While more directly threatened by the current state of affairs in Sahara than King Hassan, our impression from Algiers is that the Mauritanian Government's commitment to staying with the Sahara war remains high. This impression is supported by a general preception here that the current state of affairs involves Ould Daddah in a struggle for his political life.

7. U.S. interest: To sum up, the protagonists in the Sahara conflict seem for the present committed to their present policies, and no political or military solution is in sight. In this situation, we see the following U.S. interests:

A. To stay out: The Sahara conflict is not one which we can reasonably expect to influence nor one in which we have a vital stake.⁷ A war between Algeria and Morocco would touch a major American interest only if the LNG facilities at Arzew were attacked, and a military victory by either Algeria or Morocco would not be of crucial importance to us. We would therefore do better to limit our efforts, as we have been doing, to counseling moderation. Both sides have asked, and will probably continue to ask, that we play a mediatory role; at the moment,

⁶ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁷ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

however, each is committed to a policy diametrically opposed to that of the other and appears interested in our “mediation” largely as a means of encouraging us to exert pressure on the other and of presenting statesmanlike image to the world.

B. To continue our present policies: With no political solution to problem evident, our present policy of neutrality on the substance of issue seems most logical. The administration seems to have succeeded in convincing the Algerian regime of its neutrality in the conflict, and we should strive to maintain this stance by avoiding taking positions on the issue in forums such as U.N. Our present level of military assistance to Morocco is accepted as a fact of life of the region. We believe it best to continue it at its current contemplated level.⁸

C. To keep in touch with Soviets: A major threat to our interest would be an escalation of some future Algerian-Moroccan conflict in which we and the Soviets would find ourselves resupplying our respective clients. We have the impression that the Soviets, perhaps because of their interest in Moroccan phosphates, are more genuinely neutral on the Sahara question now (see Algiers 2954)⁹ than they were in 1975 and 1976. It is obviously in US interest that they remain so. We believe it would be well to discuss issue regularly with the Soviets and to urge their continued neutrality.

D. To continue high-level contact with the protagonists: To keep up with possible shifts in the attitudes of the protagonists, we should continue the practice of discussing the Sahara issue often with regime spokesmen from both sides. The Boumediene and Hassan visits to Washington will be useful in this regard.

8. We would welcome comments on foregoing particularly from Embassies Nouakchott and Rabat as well as other addressees.

Haynes

⁸ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁹ Telegram 2954 from Algiers, November 23, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770436–0711.

219. Letter From Representative Donald M. Fraser to President Carter¹

Washington, November 29, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that King Hassan of Morocco will be visiting the United States during the first week of December.² I am taking this opportunity to discuss with you the United States' relations with Morocco and U.S. foreign policy on the situation in Western Sahara.

The Subcommittee on International Organizations held a hearing on the right of self-determination in Western Sahara in October of this year. As you know, this issue has been discussed in the United Nations for well over a decade, from the time Sahara was a Spanish colony. The question has been discussed primarily in light of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The United States endorsed the 1974 General Assembly resolution which put before the International Court of Justice the question of Morocco's and Mauritania's historical and legal claims to Western Sahara. In 1975 the International Court of Justice rendered an advisory opinion stating, *inter alia*, that while there were historical and legal ties among the three areas in question, this did not negate the right of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara.³

Following its visit to Western Sahara in May and June of 1975, the United Nations Visiting Mission reported that there was a strong consensus among the Saharans favoring independence and opposing integration with its neighbors.⁴ Since Spain's agreement to partition the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975, fighting between Moroccan and Mauritanian troops and the liberation movement, POLISARIO, has intensified in Western Sahara.

The United States has supported the principle of self-determination in a number of United Nations resolutions, including some specifically addressing the Sahara issue. At the subcommittee hearing, the State

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 87, Spanish Sahara: 5-12/77. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Vance, Young, Christopher, and Brzezinski.

² The King postponed the visit; see Document 151.

³ UN General Assembly Resolution 3292, adopted on December 13, 1974, requested the ICJ advisory opinion. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, pp. 805-806. Regarding the October 16, 1975, advisory opinion, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, pp. 871-873.

⁴ For details on the report of the Visiting Mission, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, pp. 177-178.

Department official stated that the United States Government's policy on the territorial conflict in the Sahara is one of neutrality.⁵ Yet it is unrealistic to claim a policy of neutrality on the state of war existing between the POLISARIO of Western Sahara and the troops of Morocco and Mauritania, given (1) the United States' substantial military assistance to Morocco and (2) United States international obligations to the principle of self-determination. Our silence is consequently synonymous to acquiescence to the status quo in this region.

Clearly, the basis of U.S. policy (or lack of it) toward the Sahara question is not to impair our very close and long-term relations with Morocco. But this raises a fundamental question: Does the United States refrain from expressing its ideas of supporting its international obligations in cases involving a country with whom we have good relations?

As you no doubt know, several provisions in the Foreign Assistance and Military Sales Act and the Arms Export Control Act limit use of military assistance to internal and collective defense, and prohibit such assistance for acts of aggression. Given Morocco's military activities in Western Sahara, there is some serious question of whether the United States, in providing military assistance to Morocco, is in violation of United States law.

Given the important role of the United States in this region, I urge you to discuss with King Hassan the issues of self-determination for Western Sahara and the impact of U.S. military assistance in this conflict. Apparently in the past, quiet diplomatic channels were rarely, if ever, used to address this problem to the Moroccan Government.

I am well aware of the increasingly delicate nature of the problems in this region. But I am equally aware of the dangerous consequences of the United States weakening its credibility by not being committed to its international principles. This administration has already established an unfortunate precedent on the question of self-determination by accepting as a *fait accompli* Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and by voting in the Fourth Committee a few weeks ago against the United Nations resolution that supports the right of self-determination in East Timor.

I have little doubt that United States relations with Morocco are important. Yet, given the human rights policy commitments by your administration, the United States should establish with its friends and foes alike that certain fundamental rights, including the right to self-determination, play an integral part in formulating American foreign policy.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 215.

Your attention to these matters is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Fraser⁶
Chairman
Subcommittee on International Organizations

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

220. Letter From Representative Donald M. Fraser to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, December 2, 1977

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In light of the upcoming visit by King Hassan of Morocco, I recently wrote the President a letter on the question of the conflict in Western Sahara, urging him to discuss with the King the issues of self-determination in the Sahara and the question of U.S. military assistance to Morocco. Although I sent you a copy at the time, I am enclosing another one for your information.²

As a follow-up to this letter, as well as subsequent meetings between the subcommittee staff and U.S. government officials on this subject, I thought I would put in writing some specific points and recommendations on U.S. policy toward Western Sahara.

United States official policy on Western Sahara remains essentially unchanged from the past:

—U.S. is neutral in the conflict;

—U.S. acknowledges administrative control of Western Sahara by Mauritania and Morocco without acknowledging their claims of sovereignty;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material. Middle East, Subject File, Box 87, Spanish Sahara: 5-12/77. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Christopher, Young, Brzezinski, Flaten, Richardson, Quandt, and Veliotis.

² Not attached; printed as Document 219.

—The question of exercise of self-determination is a fair legal question, but the United States does not make a judgment on it, as this would prejudice a peaceful resolution of the dispute and would negatively affect our relations with Morocco, as well as Algeria and Mauritania;

—The United States has urged on occasion that those involved in the dispute should, in resolving the problems, avail themselves of the international organs as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

In past administrations, this official policy has been used as a facade covering a posture of abstaining in actions that would upset our good relations with Morocco.

The present administration, however, has committed itself to actively upholding and promoting international human rights, which include the right to expression of self-determination. It therefore seems important that the United States Government substantiate its official policy toward Western Sahara in the following manner:

—The United States should begin to make clear, through quiet diplomatic channels, to the nations involved—Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria—that it intends to more actively pursue, bilaterally and through the United Nations organs, its public policy, than has been the case in the past; that there are important differences in the manner in which the United States has carried out this policy in the past and how it will be carried out in the future;

—The United States strongly supports an end to the fighting in the region;

—The United States supports the idea that participants in the conflict work out conditions under which the people of Western Sahara can be allowed to determine the status of their political future *under international auspices*;

—The United States should show great interest in the upcoming meeting by the Organization of African Unity that will reportedly be held in Egypt in March of 1978,³ to resolve the conflict in this region;

—The United States should consult with Spain and France, both of which are on record as favoring self-determination and both of which take the position that even the Madrid Agreement has yet to be carried out by Morocco, with a view to seeing what further can be done to assist in the process of self-determination;

³ The OAU meeting in Cairo was cancelled. At the OAU Summit held in Khartoum July 18–22, 1978, regarding the Western Sahara, the OAU adopted a resolution to set up an ad hoc committee, known as the Wisemen's Committee, "to find a solution to this question compatible with self-determination." See footnote 4, Document 45.

—The United States should reiterate that U.S. law limits use of its military assistance to internal and collective defense, and prohibits such assistance for acts of aggression.

Your consideration to these matters is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Fraser⁴

Chairman

Subcommittee on International Organizations

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

221. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

No. 897

Washington, December 16, 1977

THE POLISARIO FRONT: THE FOURTH ELEMENT IN THE SAHARA EQUATION

Summary

Over the past two years, the Polisario Front has created from the estimated 30,000 to 80,000 Saharan refugees (not all of whom are of Spanish Saharan origin) the skeleton of a state structure, mobilized and politicized the population to an unexpected degree, conducted an effective international public relations campaign, and—with strong Algerian backing—fought Mauritania and Morocco to a military stalemate. It has, in sum, become a relatively independent political and military force (and in the eyes of much of the world, a “people”) that will have to be reckoned with in any future settlement of the Saharan dispute.

The image of the Polisario which has appeared in the sympathetic Western press—that of a noble band of refugees from the former Spanish Sahara who have taken up arms to struggle for self-determination

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Prepared by Flora; approved by Stoddard.

against the invading forces of an occupying power—is only partly accurate. Knowledge of the Polisario Front’s leadership, composition, ideology, and ultimate objectives is limited, but examination of the available evidence indicates that:

—The number of refugees from the Western Sahara is greatly inflated by the Polisario. A large percentage of those Saharans grouped in camps in Algeria are not from the former Western Sahara.

—The traditionally independent and warlike Reguibat tribe, including many members from Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco, makes up the backbone of the Polisario leadership and rank and file.

—The type of nationalism which motivates the Saharan population, excluding its leadership, is probably more akin to Reguibat/Saharan yearning for freedom from external domination than to a specific nationalism tied to the artificial boundaries of what was once the Spanish Sahara.

—Polisario leaders, at least some of whom are leftist dissidents from Mauritania and Morocco, are ideological allies of Algeria; their goals probably include the toppling of the Ould Daddah regime in Mauritania.

It is also clear that Algeria has used the Polisario to punish its former ally Mauritania for “betrayal” and to cripple Morocco, its only geopolitical competitor in the region. The extent to which Algeria is involved directly in Polisario military operations is not known, but the evidence suggests that Algerian advisers accompany the Polisario on missions and that many of them actually command various Polisario units. In addition, large numbers of Polisario soldiers appear to have been recruited from Saharans who were not originally from the former Spanish Sahara.

Origins of the Polisario Front

The Polisario Front was created in May 1973 from a melange of obscure Saharan nationalist and tribal groups whose principal goal was the independence of the Spanish Sahara. Its political manifesto announced that the Polisario, the sole representative of the Saharan people:

—had chosen “revolutionary power and military action” as the only means to liberate the Saharan people; and

—was a part of the Arab revolution and considered cooperation with the Algerian revolution essential in the struggle to protect the Third World from aggression.

Little is known about how the Polisario makes decisions, but the ruling structure apparently went through an initial stage of rather broad collegial leadership. The Front’s organizational framework,

established at its 1974 Congress, includes a 24-man executive committee, a six-man directorate divided into political and military wings, and a Secretary General. Decisionmaking within the Polisario is probably informal and based on the consensus of a handful of key leaders, among whom the Secretary General, Mohamed Abdelaziz, appears to play a dominant role.

The leadership of the Polisario Front has been composed of relatively young Saharans (not necessarily of Spanish Saharan birth), many of whom—including El Ouali, Polisario founder and leader until his death in June 1976—had been students in Morocco, where their leftist political views and association with Moroccan leftists made them suspect to the authorities. In the absence of long-term support from Morocco, the Polisario leadership turned to Libya and Algeria, both sympathetic to the Polisario ideology. Algeria, increasingly alarmed at Morocco's irredentist policy toward the Spanish Sahara, quickly assumed a major supporting role for the Polisario.

The Military Campaign


Polisario guerrillas conducted small attacks against isolated Spanish outposts throughout 1974 and 1975. Following the tripartite agreement signed in Madrid in November 1975, in which Spain ceded administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania, Spanish forces gradually withdrew from the Saharan interior. Polisario guerrillas moved into the resulting vacuum with Algerian logistic support and temporarily controlled much of the eastern and southern portions of the former Spanish colony.

As Moroccan and Mauritanian troops advanced into the territory, Polisario guerrillas directed their attacks against these forces, but by early 1976 the guerrillas were forced to abandon virtually all of their fixed strongpoints in the Sahara. The Polisario has continued, however, to wage an effective guerrilla campaign from bases in Algeria. Over the past 18 months it has concentrated its attacks against economic and military targets in Mauritania.

Estimates of guerrilla strength vary from 3,000 to 6,000 combatants. Although the Polisario Front depends mainly on Algeria for arms, training, and supplies, Libya has also been a source of weapons and financial support. Moroccan claims, some of which are based on reports from Polisario defectors, that Cuban advisers are providing training for the guerrillas in Algeria have not been confirmed. Weapons in the Polisario inventory, for the most part of Soviet origin, include small arms, land mines, machine guns, grenade launchers, and shoulder-fired SA-7's.

The guerrilla units, rather than attempting to gain control of population centers, have concentrated on quick, sharp attacks on Moroccan

and Mauritanian outposts and military columns. Familiar with the terrain and accustomed to the harsh desert climate, they have been able to evade the conventional forces of their opponents. Their use of Land Rovers has enabled them to move long distances over rugged terrain and to range freely throughout the Western Sahara and northern Mauritania. Evidence over the past six months suggests that the units have improved their command and control and their communications capability. This has apparently enabled them to operate more effectively in larger units, as demonstrated in successful attacks against economic targets in northern Mauritania and ambushes of Moroccan military columns.



The Saharan Republic

On February 27, 1976, the day following Spain's formal withdrawal from the territory, the Polisario announced the creation of a government-in-exile, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). The creation of the SDAR was clearly intended to counter the vote of the Moroccan-dominated rump session of the former Saharan territorial assembly, the *Jemaa*, which on the previous day had endorsed a motion to integrate the Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania. The SDAR has a nine-man cabinet (of little-known figures), a revolutionary council, and a legislative body.

Algerian and Polisario efforts to obtain recognition of the SDAR have been relatively unsuccessful. Thus far, only Algeria, nine African states, and North Korea have extended diplomatic recognition. It is doubtful that many of the governments which recognized the SDAR knew much about it at the time. Most probably they acted out of solidarity with Algeria or because the Polisario's cause looked more "progressive" than that of Morocco and Mauritania.

Who Are the Saharan People?

The Polisario Front recruits its cadres and soldiers from among the Saharan tribesmen gathered, for the most part, in the Tindouf area of Algeria. The precise numbers and origins of these tribesmen are much disputed.

—A 1974 Spanish census determined that there were only 74,000 indigenous Saharans in all of the Spanish Sahara.

—Algeria and the Polisario publicly claim that there are over 100,000 refugees from the Western Sahara. The steadfast refusal of Algeria to permit an accurate survey of the numbers and origin of the population gathered in the camps around Tindouf makes these claims suspect.

—Morocco, for its part, claims that there are no more than 15,000 "real" former inhabitants of the Western Sahara, most of whom were lured or "escorted" there by Polisario guerrillas, and many of whom are currently being kept there against their will by Polisario guards. Morocco cites the testimony of occasional Saharans who have fled the camps and returned to Moroccan-controlled towns as evidence of its claims.

The nomadic nature of the Saharans, who traditionally have disregarded national boundaries, makes the population in the area fluctuate widely, depending on seasonal and climatic conditions. It is clear, however, that in the past two years Algeria and the Polisario have gathered a body of perhaps 30,000 to 80,000 Saharans capable of demonstrating impressively before foreign observers their desire for freedom and a return to a Saharan "homeland." This number includes those

Peoples of Western Sahara



persons who lived in the former Spanish Sahara and feared, or were made to fear, the Moroccans and Mauritians as they occupied the territory and who therefore fled to Algeria. The refugee camps there also contain a significant number (conceivably even a majority) of Saharans who arrived from other areas of the desert (Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and even Morocco), either to escape the Sahel drought or because Algerian and Polisario spokesmen induced them to come.

The Reguibat Tribe: Backbone of the Polisario

At least seven of the known Polisario leaders (including the Secretary General), as well as much of the rank and file, are members of the Reguibat tribe, one of the most powerful of the Saharan peoples. The tribe, which is found in much of the Western Sahara, as well as in parts of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, and Mali, may number as

many as 300,000 members when all of its relations through inter-marriage are counted. The Reguibats are known for their ferocity, pride, ability with firearms, and remarkable desert tracking ability. They apparently are united in opposition to the Sahara's annexation by Morocco and Mauritania because of:

- their traditional resistance to external domination; and
- the heavy-handed manner in which Morocco moved into the Western Sahara, involving the mistreatment of members of the Reguibat tribe.

The Reguibat from the former Spanish Sahara (perhaps one-third of the territory's population) and other Saharans recruited from the population of other countries (principally Mauritania) have given the Polisario guerrilla units a source of manpower skilled in the ways of desert warfare.

A large portion of the 2,500 Saharans (mainly Reguibats) who served with Spanish troops in the colony also joined the guerrillas. In addition, the Polisario apparently has had little trouble recruiting and indoctrinating young Saharans who wish to follow the "noble" pursuit of arms. Benefiting from Algerian sanctuary, extensive materiel and logistics support, and advisory assistance (the extent of which is unknown), the Polisario has been able to fight Morocco and Mauritania to a draw and force them on the defensive in much of the Western Sahara and northern Mauritania.

The Politicization of the Refugees

Algeria and the Polisario leadership have undertaken a program of indoctrination of the Saharan refugees in Algeria. The refugees, grouped into 20–30 camps, are undergoing political and military training aimed at preparing them to return to an independent Saharan state. They are also being taught an Islamic-based mixture of Marxism and pan-Arabism.

The extent to which the Polisario leadership has been able to create a sense of genuine national identity among a nomadic people who have roamed freely for many centuries is not known. The type of nationalism which motivates the Polisario rank and file is probably more akin to the Reguibat/Saharan yearning for freedom than to a specific nationalism tied to the artificial boundaries of what was once the Spanish Sahara. Nevertheless, the Saharans have become, in the eyes of much of the world, a "people" whose rights as a group must be taken into consideration in any settlement of the Saharan issue.

Political Strengths of the Polisario

Public Relations. Despite the relatively poor diplomatic showing of the SDAR thus far, the Polisario Front has learned to manipulate the

international press. Numerous journalists in search of a good story have been given carefully structured tours of Polisario refugee camps. These tours have emphasized the abject living conditions of the refugees, but they have also highlighted the refugees' high morale (generally manifested by orchestrated popular demonstrations) and their determination to continue the struggle for independence. Many correspondents have also been taken along on guerrilla raids deep into Moroccan or Mauritanian zones, where they have witnessed Polisario attacks on the outposts of the "invaders."

Most journalists have commented favorably on the valor, determination, and martial skills of the guerrillas. The press reports thus have kept the Polisario in the news despite the fact that most governments have ignored the plight of the refugees and their claim to an independent Saharan state.

Recent Diplomatic Successes. Although Algeria and the Polisario have not scored any particularly dramatic diplomatic victories over the past year, they have, according to the US Mission to the UN, made some progress in advancing their cause during the recent debates in the UN General Assembly, particularly with respect to the African delegations. The Arab states, on the other hand, remain diplomatically committed to Morocco, with only Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq supporting the Algerian/SDAR cause. The Polisario has also gained considerable sympathy within the Spanish *Cortes* and in general appears to be making its case more effectively around the world. Several factors appear to have contributed to these Polisario successes:

- persistent efforts of Polisario diplomats backed by the full weight of Algerian diplomacy;
- the strong legal case of the Polisario for its stated goal of self-determination;
- success of the public relations campaign, noted above; and
- the Polisario's growing military capabilities, which, with strong Algerian support, have demonstrated to the world that the Saharan guerrillas cannot be defeated easily and will not wither away as a source of tension and potential conflict in northwest Africa.

Who Controls the Polisario?

The Moroccans and the Mauritians maintain that the Polisario, led primarily by renegade Moroccan and Mauritanian leftists, is a tool of Algeria and would have no life of its own if Algerian support were to be withdrawn. The Algerians, of course, claim the opposite: they say they are supplying equipment and sanctuary for the Polisario out of respect for the "sacred cause" of self-determination which is being fought by an independent group of Saharan patriots over whom they exercise no control.

Analysis of the available evidence points to the following conclusions:

—Algeria is using the Polisario guerrillas to weaken Morocco, its only competitor in the region, and to punish Mauritania, which prior to the Sahara dispute had been a close ally of Algeria, for its “betrayal.”

—Without Algerian sanctuary and materiel support, Polisario military operations against Morocco and Mauritania would subside to “manageable” levels within a few months. However, the guerrillas could probably continue their harassing raids in the interior of the territory for several years, especially if alternative sources of weapons (Libya, for example) were found.

—The Polisario leadership, with a strong following within the Saharan refugee population, has formed an independent entity with its own interests and objectives.

The actual political leadership of the Polisario Front is probably a relatively small number of Saharan militants, ideologically sympathetic to Algeria, whose aspirations for, and commitment to, an independent Saharan state are genuine. There is mounting evidence, however, that this leadership has wider territorial and ideological aspirations. As early as 1975, Polisario leaders sought the creation of an extensive Saharan state centered on Mauritania. This aspiration probably reflects the strong influence of exiled Mauritians within the movement and the growing numbers of Mauritanian Saharans in the refugee camps. A major objective of the June 1976 assault on the Mauritanian capital and the subsequent efforts to cripple the Mauritanian economy was apparently not only to force Mauritania out of the war but also to try to topple the Ould Daddah regime and to replace it with an Islamic socialist republic ideologically aligned with Algeria.

The extent to which Algeria has participated in the formulation of the Polisario’s goals and strategy is unknown. It is apparent, however, that Algeria’s motives go beyond a concern for the rights of the Saharans to self-determination. In many respects, the objectives of the Polisario are consistent with apparent Algerian regional goals. At a minimum, it is fair to assume that the Polisario’s repeated efforts to disrupt the Mauritanian economy would not take place without Algerian acquiescence, if not encouragement. The French have cited circumstantial evidence pointing to a major Algerian role in the formulation of the overall Polisario military strategy, and there are indications that Algerian military advisers are playing an important role in guerrilla military operations and may even be commanding units participating in guerrilla operations within the Sahara and Mauritania.

Algeria is using a powerful group of Saharan nationalists for its own national purposes. Their common objectives, however, should not obscure the existence of the Polisario leadership’s separate interests.

222. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sober) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 5, 1978

SUBJECT

Moroccan Use in the Western Sahara and Mauritania of U.S.-Supplied Military Equipment

ISSUE FOR DECISION

We need to decide how to respond to the Moroccan Government's request to obtain from U.S. sources military equipment and training that would be used in the western Sahara and Mauritania against the Algerian-supported guerrillas of the Polisario Front.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

On September 13 then Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki gave you his Government's request for additional U.S. military assistance (Attachment 3). The Moroccan Ambassador subsequently suggested his Government wanted the weapons for defensive purposes along the Moroccan-Algerian border.² But through various sources, including the current Foreign Minister, it has become clear that the intended use is for the western Sahara and Mauritania.

The Moroccan request poses legal problems. These are described at Attachment 2. Briefly, the question is whether our supply of training or equipment for Moroccan use against the Polisario in the western Sahara and Mauritania is possible under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and the terms of our classified bilateral military assistance agreement with Morocco. The combined current effect of these two documents is to restrict the use of American-furnished equipment solely to the defense of the Kingdom of Morocco. We have accepted Moroccan *de facto* administration of the Sahara territory under the tripartite (Spain-Morocco-Mauritania) accord of 1975. But we do not recognize Moroccan claims to sovereignty over Sahara territory, which was acquired without an expression of self-determination called for by UNGA resolutions and the ICJ.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/77-2/78. Secret. Sent through Benson. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in EUR/WE, H, L/NEA, IO/UNP, L/PM, ACDA, AF, EB, HA, S/P, INR/RNA, and PM. Attachment 2, an undated paper entitled "Memorandum of Law," is attached but not printed.

² See Document 152.

If our arms will, in fact, be used to consolidate the annexation of western Sahara without regard to self-determination, the proposed sale will not be consistent with the Arms Export Control Act because such consolidation will constitute neither "legitimate self-defense" nor "internal security", the relevant purposes authorized by the Arms Export Control Act.

To overcome the less serious territorial aspect of the legal problems we could amend our bilateral agreement via an exchange of notes to permit use of American-supplied arms in areas subject to Moroccan administrative control and in northwest African nations with which Morocco has collective defense arrangements. (Morocco has such an agreement with Mauritania.)

Congress must be informed if our agreement is to be amended to permit the Moroccans to obtain military equipment and training for use outside the Moroccan borders we recognize. Congress also will have to be notified of some specific sales. The Moroccans would have their Congressional supporters—for they are fighting an externally-based guerrilla group supplied with Soviet arms by the Algerians and the Libyans. Moroccan attitudes on the Middle East also are appreciated by Israel's friends on the Hill, who would be quite helpful given Hassan's public backing of Sadat's peace initiative. It is doubtful Congress actually would block the proposed sales.

The Moroccan Government recently was criticized sharply by Amnesty International for its alleged violations of the human rights of its citizens.³ AI claimed that without due process there have been extensive arrests, detentions and even executions of persons politically opposed to the present regime. After initially hotly denying the validity of AI's charges,⁴ the Government amnestied 58 political prisoners.

Our desire to respond positively is based on our close relationship with King Hassan, who has been sympathetic to American interests throughout his reign and has given us strong support on Middle Eastern and African problems important to the U.S. Within the Third World,

³ In telegram 18303 from London, November 7, 1977, the Embassy wrote: "AI pamphlet lists six issues of particular concern: a) prolonged incommunicado detention before trial; b) torture and death in detention; c) infringement of legal procedure during trial; d) use of state security laws to suppress political and social opposition; e) use of death penalty for certain political and criminal offenses; and f) extremely bad conditions in detention centers." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770412-0160)

⁴ In telegram 6402 from Rabat, November 25, 1977, the Embassy reported on the November 21 Ministry of Justice statement regarding the Amnesty International report: "The statement attacks Amnesty International report, calling its allegations the work of 'troublemakers' and 'so-called (foreign) observers,' whom it accuses of being motivated by 'pure and simple dishonesty.' Proof of allegations in AI report termed 'lightweight,' and 'inspired from the exterior with a view to creating a climate of suspicion against Morocco.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770437-0305)

he has been almost uniquely cooperative in military and intelligence matters, e.g., permitting us to maintain bases in Morocco and to schedule regular visits by nuclear-powered warships. He partitioned the Sahara with Mauritania to repossess territory most Moroccans believe was stripped from Morocco during the colonial era. The move won him universal domestic acclaim, but failure to hold on to the area could cost him his throne. He knows his request poses problems for us. But he expects us to overcome these obstacles. Should we prove totally unresponsive, his disappointment will cast a shadow over bilateral relations for some time to come.

Your decision on this issue will also affect the use of U.S. military equipment already furnished the Moroccans under our military assistance programs. An affirmative response to the current request would imply consent for the Moroccans to employ previously-furnished equipment more extensively in the western Sahara and Mauritania as the war continues. (There is some evidence this already is beginning to occur).

THE OPTIONS

1. Authorize NEA and PM to incorporate in the current FMS program for Morocco the OV-10 aircraft and other weapons included in the Moroccans' arms list.

Pro

—Would satisfy the desire of the Moroccan Government for U.S. military assistance.

—Would best preserve our important bilateral assets in Morocco and assure its continued positive cooperation on a variety of important regional issues.

Con

—Given the clearly-stated intention of the Moroccans to use the equipment on their list outside the Moroccan borders we recognize, would expose the Administration to charges of collusion in the violation of the terms of our bilateral arms agreement with Morocco.

—Given what we know of Moroccan intentions regarding use of this equipment, and absent some indication Hassan intended to offer the Saharans self-determination, would risk violating the Arms Export Control Act in providing military equipment for purposes not authorized by that legislation.

—Entails risk Congress would reject the proposed sales when the Letters of Offer and Approval were sent to it.

2. Tell the GOM that we will consult with Congress regarding our intention to amend our bilateral military assistance agreement to permit

use of U.S. furnished equipment in the western Sahara and Mauritania, and provide many of the arms desired by the Moroccans; provided that the GOM will state its commitment to organize, once peace has been restored in the contested area, further consultations with the Saharans originating in the territory, under the aegis of the United Nations, to permit the Saharans to exercise their right to self-determination.

Pro

—Aside from recognition of Moroccan/Mauritanian sovereignty in the contested area, (which would be inconsistent with UN and OAU positions), is the most positive response consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.

—Would be consistent with the text of the 1975 UNGA resolution for which we (and Morocco) voted.⁵

Con

—Could disappoint the King, who will resist agreeing to any exercise in self-determination which could call into question the annexation of the Sahara.

—If interpreted by the Moroccans as a disguised U.S. refusal, would adversely affect bilateral relations, U.S. interest in Morocco, and our relations with other African and Middle East moderates.

—May be criticized as a subterfuge to permit Hassan to continue to consolidate control while avoiding indefinitely an act of self-determination.

—May prejudice our acceptability as an intermediary, should we subsequently wish to exercise that option.

3. Suspend action on the Moroccan arms request while a diplomatic solution to the Sahara conflict is pursued by mediation. Tell the Moroccans their request remains “under review”, since we believe it would not be prudent to raise with Congress the issue of the arms request until the possibility of a negotiated settlement has been further tested.

Pro

—In the long term the dispute must be solved diplomatically. A purely military resolution appears unlikely.

—Should the Algerians reject mediation efforts, chances would be better for obtaining Congressional approval for a subsequent liberalization of end use restrictions on U.S. equipment supplied Morocco.

⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 3458B adopted on December 10, 1975. See footnote 4, Document 150.

Con

—There is, at best, only a modest hope that the U.S. could facilitate a diplomatic solution or that any peaceful resolution will be possible soon.

—The Moroccans quickly would perceive that we were stalling, and strain would develop rapidly in our bilateral relations, with a consequent adverse effect on U.S. interests in Morocco, and on our relations with other African and Middle East moderates.

BUREAU POSITIONS

NEA believes the preservation of the privileged U.S. position in Morocco requires the most positive response which is consistent with U.S. law and our international commitments. NEA therefore favors Option 2, which, if acceptable to the Moroccans, would respond to their military assistance needs from the U.S. without compromising our support for self-determination, our advocacy of a negotiated settlement, our refusal to recognize Moroccan/Mauritanian sovereignty in the disputed area, or our neutrality on the issues in dispute. AF, PM, H, and IO also support Option 2. L opposes Option 1 as the least defensible legally. L favors Option 2, in the light of all considerations, even though it raises some legal problems.

ACDA believes a positive response to the Moroccans could prompt escalation of the Sahara conflict and favors Option 3. S/P also prefers this Option. HA favors Option 3, with the proviso that the Moroccans also would be told there would be no further action on their request until they have made a more forthcoming response to recent Amnesty International charges of human rights abuses. NEA opposes Option 3 as tantamount to outright rejection of the GOM request, inasmuch as a negotiated solution is most unlikely in the foreseeable future because of the irreconcilable basic objectives of Algeria and Morocco.

*Recommendations:*⁶

That you authorize transmission of the telegram at Attachment 1 informing the Moroccan Foreign Minister that the USG is prepared to provide some of the weapons requested by the GOM, subject to consultations with the Congress and the required amendment of our bilateral defense agreement—provided the Foreign Minister provides you with assurances that once peace has been restored in the disputed area the Moroccan Government will organize, under the aegis of the United Nations, further consultations with the Saharans originating in

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of any of the recommendations.

the territory to permit them to exercise their right to self-determination.⁷ This Option is favored by NEA, AF, L, IO, H, and PM.

ALTERNATIVELY, that the Department suspend action on the Moroccan arms request pending a further effort to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Sahara conflict. This Option is favored by ACDA, S/P, and HA.

ALTERNATIVELY, that you instruct NEA and PM to initiate the procedures necessary to furnish Morocco with OV-10s and additional arms on the Laraki list within the context of our existing bilateral military assistance agreement.

Attachment 3

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁸

Washington, undated

THE MOROCCAN ARMS REQUEST

The Moroccans have requested:

—24 OV-10 counter-insurgency aircraft, 6 to be supplied in early 1978 from DOD inventories, 18 to be supplied from new production. Cost: about \$50 million.

—24 TOW-equipped Cobra helicopters. These are available only from production—lead-time 24–30 months. Cost: about \$70 million. The GOM might settle for a ground-based TOW, a less expensive alternate.

—160 V150 Cadillac-Gage armored cars. Available commercially; lead-time 15 months; export license required.

—Assignment of 10 US military officers to teach anti-guerilla combat tactics in French. If we are to provide such training, DOD prefers that it be in the US.

In addition, the Moroccans have expressed an interest in up to 6 CH-47 transport helicopters, either through FMS or commercial channels. Cost: about \$50 million.

REDEYE and STINGER have also been requested. We have informed the GOM that Department would not agree to sale of these man-portable air defense weapons.

⁷ The draft telegram at Attachment 1 is attached but not printed. For the final instructions to Rabat, see Document 153.

⁸ Secret.

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 15, 1978, 1458Z

66283. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Foreign Minister Boucetta: Western Sahara.

1. Summary: In March 11 working luncheon with Secretary, Fon-Min Boucetta outlined in detail GOM's justification that it has acquired sovereignty in Sahara and continued to reject U.S. distinction between administrative control and sovereignty. Although told forcefully that USG holds that USG-furnished arms may not rpt not be employed in Sahara, Boucetta gave no commitment GOM will so restrict use of these arms. Second meeting scheduled for March 12. End summary.

2. Western Sahara was principal subject of conversation during Secretary's March 11 working lunch with Foreign Minister Boucetta. Latter opened with statement that he welcomed chance discuss not only bilateral issues but problems which could impact on bilateral relations. On the Sahara, declarations had been made by responsible U.S. officials which, if repeated, risked creating situation which could encourage some sectors of international opinion to believe there had been a change in U.S. position. Minister then outlined in detail history of colonization and decolonization of Morocco, emphasizing fragmentary nature of each process, and Hassan's preference for patient peaceful means to accomplish decolonization.

3. With respect to the Sahara, Boucetta continued, King had been similarly prudent, becoming engaged only after obtaining a clear expression of Algeria's position at 1974 Rabat Summit conference,² when Boumediene stated his country had no territorial claims and agreed to the parts of the Sahara which would go to Morocco and Mauritania. Spain subsequently tried to create a state that everyone realized would not be viable, and Green March occurred. UN in 1975 had required that sovereignty be resolved by interested parties. ICJ

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 3-6/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Paris, and Madrid. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Veliotis; approved by Houghten. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780115-0496)

² In telegram 5253 from Rabat, October 29, 1974, the Embassy summarized the proceedings of the Arab League Summit, which focused primarily on the PLO, but also addressed the Western Sahara: "On Sahara, conference reportedly decided to support joint Moroccan-Mauritanian request to resort to ICJ and appeal to Spain to go along with this and abstain from any unilateral measure which might harm traditional and fruitful Spanish-Arab friendship." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740307-0950)

ruled there existed between Saharan population and Morocco ties of allegiance which, said Boucetta, could have no significance other than sovereignty. At time of Green March Security Council passed three resolutions urging parties to negotiate, and Madrid Accord signed. By its terms, continued Boucetta, Spain ceded all responsibilities and powers and agreement stated that the political desires of the Saharan population would be expressed by the Jema'a.

4. Boucetta described February 1976 Jema'a action as consistent with the procedure by which all Francophone African countries acceded to independence and said it was similar also to procedure employed in West Irian with approval of UNGA, and support of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. When Spain gave up its powers, Morocco took them up, thus acquiring all the attributes of sovereignty. This was reaffirmed in subsequent local and professional body elections, as well as in the election of seven (and nomination of two additional) representatives from the Sahara to Morocco's national legislature. In stating there is a difference between sovereignty and administrative control, USG is encouraging some sectors of international opinion to adopt erroneous ideas regarding Morocco's sovereignty.

5. Commenting that foregoing had been merely legal aspects of an essentially political problem, FonMin said Morocco had chosen free world in which to live, but efforts are being made to destabilize Northwest Africa, e.g., in Canaries and Mauritania, which is weak link in chain, perhaps to recreate situations like Angola and Horn. Morocco hopes its situation will be understood in Washington, where a decision had been taken which Morocco hopes would be only temporary. A problem would be created, he concluded, if the distinction between sovereignty and administrative control were to be repeated by responsible U.S. officials.

6. Responding, Secretary reminded FonMin that USG has remained neutral in its public position on Sahara dispute. Prior to decision to which Boucetta referred, administration had consulted extensively with leadership of Congress and decided not to try to proceed with OV-10 and helicopter sales because they would have been rejected by Congress, because these arms would have been used beyond Morocco's borders. Secretary said he wanted make clear that restriction of 1960 agreement regarding use outside Morocco's borders³ applies also to equipment already furnished Morocco. To permit other use would require amending 1960 agreement, and this would not be an appropri-

³ The 1960 bilateral security assistance agreement limited Morocco's use of U.S. military equipment to the defense of its internationally recognized borders.

ate time to do so. Administration strongly supports regular 45 million dols FMS program; Congress is receptive to it; and Secretary continued, in his opinion, Congress will approve it.

7. At Secretary's suggestion, Veliotis then briefed FonMin in more detail on congressional consultations, emphasizing opposition of key committee chairmen. Bengelloun described conversation in which he said Senator Clark indicated he might call Secretary to mention changed view; and Secretary replied Clark had not discussed subject in recent meeting. Boucetta commented that recent visits of U.S. legislators left Moroccans with impression they enjoyed more support in Congress than Department indicated.

8. Secretary told Boucetta arms decision should not be misinterpreted as reflecting lack of U.S. support for Morocco. In both administration and Congress there are strong feelings regarding importance of bilateral relations and great admiration for Hassan's courage. Boucetta expressed appreciation, then repeated that GOM unable understand distinction U.S. making between administrative control and sovereignty, as GOM recognizes only one Morocco. He assured Secretary U.S. arms would never be used for aggression, only defense. Bengelloun then attacked Algeria for efforts to achieve regional hegemony.

9. Ambassador Anderson described one of his first conversations with King in which Hassan said he would not place U.S., France, or other countries which had supported him in a difficult position on Sahara. Prime Minister Osman had told the President last December Morocco wanted diplomatic and moral support.⁴ In requesting USG in essence to acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty in Sahara, which would be the case if that area were considered by US to be included as part of Morocco under the terms of the 1960 agreement, GOM asking USG take a step virtually no other government had yet taken. He then repeated suggestion made earlier in week to Boucetta that in view of aborted OAU special summit, effort be made to find formula, perhaps with assistance of a prestigious, neutral group, to recast self-determination issue in today's circumstances rather than on resolutions of doubtful enforceability in current situations.

10. Boucetta replied that no other government had taken public position similar to that of U.S.; Spanish Government had recently signed fishing accord which acknowledged Moroccan sovereignty in waters off Sahara; and no government is incorporating any reservations on restrictions regarding Sahara in agreements with GOM. Secretary reiterated that 1960 arms bilateral does not authorize Moroccan use of U.S. arms in Sahara. Brief discussion on Horn then ensued which being

⁴ See Document 151.

reported septel.⁵ Secretary invited Boucetta resume discussion March 12, and second meeting scheduled for morning.

11. FonMin did not mention contents of message from King. Although informed meeting with President had not been possible arrange, and invited have FonMin deliver communication to Secretary to be passed to President, Bengelloun persisted with request that Boucetta be received either by President or Vice President.⁶

Vance

⁵ Telegram 66282 to Rabat, March 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780118-0827)

⁶ In telegram 70308 to Rabat, March 18, the Department summarized Boucetta's March 14 meeting with Mondale, in which he delivered Hassan's letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780121-0575) In telegram 66888 to Rabat, March 15, the Department transmitted the text of the letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176-1469)

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, March 15, 1978, 1501Z

66285. Subject: Secretary's March 12 Meeting With Moroccan Foreign Minister: Sahara.

1. At March 12 follow-up meeting (see septels for other details) Secretary told Boucetta that although he would look himself at background to Sahara situation it was clear there could be no change during 1978 on OV-10s and Cobras.² He then mentioned his concern about use of F-5s in Sahara. Stating that certain Congressmen who are aware F-5s are there may use this knowledge to try to defeat arms package for Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, Ambassador Anderson added there

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 3-6/78. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Paris, Nouakchott, and Madrid. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared by Velities; approved by Houghten. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780115-0687)

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

had been numerous press reports about presence of F–5s in Sahara as well as in Mauritania, and that these Members of Congress and their staffs, focusing on our relations with Morocco, were well aware of them. Secretary then explained that some Congressmen claim F–15s sold to Saudis will be used against Israel, and Department has been arguing that U.S. would impose restrictions prohibiting such use. Congressional opponents might well cite presence of F–5s in Mauritania and Sahara as evidence such restrictions are ineffective.

2. Continuing, Secretary said he also concerned that in current week's markup of 45 million dols FMS program for Morocco some Congressmen may claim presence of F–5s and other U.S.-furnished equipment outside Morocco require imposition of restrictive amendments to FMS legislation. Secretary said he did not wish see any obstacle created for traditional military sales program, which he valued in our relations and wished to see continue.

3. Boucetta said he thought these were matters which would not arise unless stirred up. Noting that no one had brought them up before, he saw no need to bring them up now. Continuing, FonMin commented he could not state that there was a difference between two parts of Morocco—Morocco with and Morocco without the Sahara. With the passage of time, and with no questions asked, problem would take care of itself. Morocco needs U.S. help, he said, but not at expense of its basic principles. (In separate conversation with Ambassador Anderson previous evening on limitation of use of U.S. arms imposed by 1960 agreement, a troubled Boucetta reiterated non-aggressive, purely defensive purposes, and went on to say that if Morocco could not use U.S. equipment for these purposes, it would have no choice but “to take other dispositions”; even though it preferred to retain its close military relationship with the U.S.)

4. Secretary said Department understands subject will be raised, and that it will be used against MidEast arms package. Ambassador Anderson added that the Congress had already raised these issues; after Veliotis' recent appearance at committee hearings, Department had been given about thirty supplementary questions to answer for record, and use of U.S. equipment outside Morocco is raised in these questions. Secretary suggested Department and Moroccan Ambassador Bengelloun work together to deal with these questions.³ FonMin agreed with this suggestion.

Vance

³ In telegram 69811 to Rabat, March 18, the Department summarized the March 13 meeting among Boucetta, Bengelloun, Anderson, and Department officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780120–0759)

225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, March 21, 1978, 1743Z

72238. Subject: Moroccan Arms Request. Ref: State 57412.²

1. Department is concerned that Algerians may misinterpret negative decision on Moroccan request for arms to use in the Sahara as signalling estrangement between Rabat and Washington. While we cannot preclude Algiers taking this position in its own media—to embarrassment of Moroccans who complained of Algerian media misinterpretations during Foreign Minister Boucetta's talks in Washington—Department does want to disabuse Algerians of any real misunderstanding concerning relations between U.S. and Morocco. We do not want to give Algerians any reason to conclude that U.S. would be less concerned by any step up in Polisario attacks against Morocco or Mauritania.

2. Ambassador should seek appointment at Foreign Ministry during which he should make following points:

—Following consultations with Congress, the administration has decided not to sell at this time arms to the Moroccan Government for use in the Western Sahara and Mauritania.

—The U.S. plans to continue its traditional military supply relationship with Morocco.

—The U.S. is aware that the Algerian Government is providing military assistance to the Polisario movement and does not believe this encouragement of the Polisario's attacks on Algeria's neighbors either promotes a peaceful settlement of the Sahara dispute or furthers the interests of peace in the region.

—The U.S. remains firm in its advocacy of a peaceful settlement and will continue to urge the nations involved to exercise restraint.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780124-0746. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Nouakchott, Paris, and Madrid. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in AF/W; approved by Veliotis.

² See Document 153.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 27, 1978, 1106Z

967. Dakar for DATT. CINCEUR for POLAD. Subj: Moroccan Arms Request. Ref: State 72238 (Notal).²

1. Charge called on MFA Director Western European and North American Affairs Amine Kherbi March 26 to convey points made in para 2 reftel. Kherbi reacted strongly to wording of points alleging this was change in U.S. position as given previously by U.S. officials including NEA/AFN Director Bishop, the Ambassador and Charge variously to Political Affairs Director General Bousselham, MFA Director General Sbih and Kherbi himself. He felt U.S. should now clarify its position of neutrality now that we were incriminating Algeria directly and unjustly. Kherbi said it was in fact the “neighbors” themselves who were invading the Western Sahara. He said we were falsely insinuating and that this did not look to him like neutrality. He asserted that the Western Sahara was territory occupied by force by Morocco and Mauritania in a manner contrary to accepted international practice and contrary to the UN resolution on the issue. He regretted “that the U.S. interpreted erroneously the legitimate attempt by the Saharan people to assert their right to self-determination.” If peace was menaced, he said, it was not because of the legitimate defense of the Saharan people of their rights but rather because of the genocide perpetrated by Morocco and Mauritania. He said he saw Charge’s presentation as a new pressure applied to Algeria and he asked clarification of “this new manner of characterizing the situation in the Western Sahara; this unreal interpretation.” He asserted that he saw the presentation as a negative element in the search for a peaceful solution of the Western Sahara problem. “This does not reassure us”, . . . he said; “We ask if the United States really wants peace in the region . . . the U.S. cannot speak of neutrality if it continues to arm Morocco.”

2. Charge handed aide memoire to Kherbi during course of conversation. Kherbi remarked that he found document superfluous and unacceptable.

3. In amicable give and take following Kherbi’s initial strong reaction, Charge emphasized that presentation of points represented nothing new regarding U.S. position; that facts of case were clear: Algerian

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780132–0964. Confidential. Sent for information to Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and USCINCEUR.

² See Document 225.

provision of military assistance to Polisario and Polisario attacks against Mauritania and Morocco. Charge noted that perhaps no U.S. official had described situation in Western Sahara in those terms before but said that did not change facts. Charge said purpose of our making points to GOA was to be absolutely certain that U.S. administration's decision not to sell arms at this time to Morocco for use in Western Sahara and Mauritania would not be misinterpreted by anyone as a change either in our position of strict neutrality or in our advocacy of and strong desire for a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara problem.

4. Comment: Embassy has shared Department's concern that Algerians might misinterpret negative decision on Morocco's request for arms (para 1 reftel). For this reason Ambassador stressed to Presidential Counselor Ismail Hamdani prior to Ambassador's departure on leave 14 March that negative decision changed in no way our neutral stance on the Sahara issue and had no bearing on our traditional military supply relationship with Morocco. Other Embassy officers also have made these points in their conversations with Algerian officials.

5. Kherbi's agitation at presentation was in contrast to uncommunicativeness with which he normally receives our demarches.

Stephan

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, March 30, 1978, 1000Z

1023. Subj: GOA Follow-up to U.S. Demarche on Western Sahara. Refs: A) State 072238, B) Algiers 0967 (Notal).²

1. Summary. Director General for Political Affairs of MFA followed up on most recent USG demarche on Western Sahara in meeting with Ambassador Haynes. In course of this followup meeting, he cautiously indicated GOA willingness to embark on negotiated political settlement of Sahara conflict. However, GOA insists on Polisario participation in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 1-12/78. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Documents 225 and 226.

any such negotiations and commits itself to accept any solution agreed to by the Polisario. Implicit in GOA approach is a USG role in bringing parties together and mediating in negotiations. Director General promised to contact Ambassador again in few days after further consultations with Polisario. Our recommendation to Dept will be made after this next contact. End summary.

2. Director General for Political Affairs in MFA, Abdelkader Boussselham, called me in on Wednesday, March 29, for followup discussion of March 26 demarche (see reftels) made by Charge d’Affaires in my absence. Boussselham opened discussion by stating GOA recognized two substantive elements in U.S. demarche: (a) explanation of U.S. decision not to sell arms to Morocco for use in Western Sahara and Mauritania and (b) criticism of GOA support of Polisario.

3. With respect to first element of U.S. demarche, GOA wants USG to know that it considers decision not to furnish arms to Morocco as a wise and courageous move that can only contribute to the achievement of peace in the region. In this sense, Boussselham said, GOA appreciates and welcomes the decision.

4. However, with respect to the second element of the U.S. demarche, Boussselham said GOA no longer considers it productive to repeatedly restate rationale for its support of Polisario or to debate whether the Polisario or the Moroccans are the aggressors in the Sahara. What is significant, Boussselham said, is that the GOA recognizes that, practically speaking, no military solution is possible in the Sahara. Boussselham said his government recognizes that the only enduring solution is a political one and that, furthermore, the GOA wants its friends to help the GOA find that political solution.³ However, he emphasized that any political solution must be reached with the participation of the Polisario. Whatever the Polisario accepts as a solution will be acceptable to the GOA, Boussselham concluded.

5. I asked Boussselham if I was correct in inferring that the GOA was ready to participate in negotiations for a settlement of the Sahara conflict around the conference table with all the interested parties, namely the Polisario, the Moroccans and the Mauritians. In principle, Boussselham said, this was the case, but he asked me to wait a few days before advising the USG. He claimed he needed the time to sound out the Polisario on their readiness to negotiate.⁴ He also labelled as

³ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

false the rumors circulating in past weeks that GOA and GOM had already been sounding each other out on such negotiations.⁵

6. I asked Boussselham if he would speculate on the ground-rules for such a meeting that would be acceptable to all parties. He speculated that such negotiations would have to be preceded by a preliminary meeting of the interested parties on neutral territory such as at the UN in New York. However, he further speculated that all parties to the preliminary meeting would have to agree to honor its secrecy. He felt safe in guaranteeing that the GOA and the Polisario would abide by a condition of secrecy. He agreed with my stated assumption that the purpose of a secret preliminary meeting on neutral turf would be to hammer out an agenda for the negotiations to follow.

7. As has been the case with all my recent discussions with GOA functionaries, Boussselham concluded our discussion of a possible political solution to the Sahara conflict with a reminder of the importance to the GOA of continued improvement in US-Algerian relations. He said, "we are called upon to travel a long road together and we share a common goal of improving our relations in all areas while scrupulously avoiding misunderstandings."

8. In closing, Boussselham expressed his personal pleasure over the nomination of Ambassador David Newsom for the post of Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He said, "in Ambassador Newsom, we will have a man who understands the Maghreb."

9. Comment: This is the first direct indication we have received here of GOA willingness to be involved in reaching a political solution to the Sahara conflict. While never specifically stated, it was implicit in Boussselham's remarks that the USG would act as the organizer of this speculated scenario and would serve as mediator in the course of negotiations. However, before we recommend a USG response to the Dept., I will want to hear what Boussselham has to say when he contacts me again in a few days as he promised to do (see para 5 *supra*).⁶ Nevertheless, the fact that the discussion of a negotiated political settlement was first initiated by the GOA itself, leads me to be more guardedly optimistic about its chances of taking place than if the USG had proposed it. I welcome any comments from the action and info posts, but urge that the Secret/Exdis designation of this communication be strictly respected.

Haynes

⁵ See Document 228.

⁶ In telegram 1170 from Algiers, April 11, Haynes described his April 9 follow-up meeting with Boussselham, who "downplayed" official Algerian interest in U.S. mediation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155-0854)

228. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable¹

IN 0611241

Washington, April 28, 1978

COUNTRY

Morocco/Algeria/Mauritania

SUBJECT

Possible Meetings Held Between Representatives of Morocco and Algeria to Discuss a Settlement to the Dispute in the Western Sahara [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

See below

1. [*4 lines not declassified*]

2. The Governments of Algeria and Morocco are conducting direct bilateral negotiations in an effort to finally resolve the dispute regarding the sovereignty of the Western Sahara. Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu has offered to host these negotiations in Romania but with no active role as mediator. Discussions are held directly between Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika and one of King Hassan's most trusted political advisors, Ahmed Reda Guedira. Bouteflika and Guedira have met on two or three occasions in Bucharest, but have been unsuccessful in formulating an agreement acceptable to both parties. The Algerians continue to insist on a role for the Polisario and question the legitimacy of Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]* *Comment:* King Hassan will never accept debating Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara. However, Morocco is willing to continue negotiations until the issue is resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.) [*2 lines not declassified*] Bucharest State telegram 0379, 20 January 1978,² reported the possible involvement of Romania in negotiating a settlement between Morocco and Algeria but Rabat Embassy telegrams 383 and 548, and Nouakchott Embassy telegram 208,³ all of late January 1978, contained information from high-level Moroccan and Romanian officials disputing Romanian involvement in any negotiations.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 1–12/78. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² Not found.

³ Telegram 383 from Rabat, January 20, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780031–0907. Telegram 548 from Rabat, January 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780042–0148. Telegram 208 from Nouakchott, January 20, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780033–0008

3. [2 lines not declassified]

4. In late March–early April 1978, there were two meetings between Moroccan and Algerian Government representatives to discuss the dispute in the Western Sahara. [2 lines not declassified] Morocco was represented by King Hassan's brother, Prince Moulay Abdallah, and Algeria was represented by Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Both meetings should be characterized as tentative and exploratory. There are no plans to hold further meetings. [4 lines not declassified] *Comment:* Although the second meeting ended without specific plans for another meeting, the possibility of holding future meetings was not discounted.)

5. At the first meeting, the two representatives agreed that a political solution must be sought to settle the Sahara dispute and that this would best be accomplished by direct contact between the two governments without the use of intermediaries. Morocco stated that Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara is not subject to negotiation or discussion. At the second meeting, the Algerians, who initiated the meeting, proposed accepting Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. However, Algeria would force Mauritania to give up its claim to that portion of the Western Sahara now within Mauritanian borders—a claim the Algerians say is unjustified. The Moroccans responded that this formulation surpassed the limits of a realistic solution. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment:* The Algerians are suggesting that the portion of the Western Sahara claimed by Mauritania be turned over to the Polisario/Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) under the rule of the SDAR. The initial meeting between Morocco and Algeria took place without the knowledge of Mauritania. Mauritania has since been advised by the Moroccans of the negotiations.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment:* On 13 April 1978, Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah arrived in Libya on an official visit to request Libyan President Mu'ammar Qadhafi to mediate the Western Sahara dispute. It would appear that the Mauritanian leader was not aware of the ongoing negotiations between Morocco and Algeria.)

6. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment:* [1 line not declassified] Both Algeria and Morocco have publically denied recent press reports of secret negotiations.)

7. [1 line not declassified]

8. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissemin: [2 lines not declassified]

229. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, June 10, 1978

1. *Meeting with Foreign Minister Bouteflika*—During a lengthy conversation with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika today he gave me a letter from President Boumediene to you protesting France's military intervention in the western Saharan conflict.² I outlined at some length our African policy. It was useful to have the chance to discuss these issues with him. I stressed the importance of prompt resolution of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems and asked their support, particularly with Nujomo—with whom they have a close relationship. He indicated they would help. Bouteflika correctly pointed out that a solution to the Namibian problem would have a positive spill-over effect on Angolan-Zairean issues.³

Bouteflika acknowledged there have been secret peace talks between Rabat and Algiers on the western Sahara war. However, he said these have not been productive. I indicated we would continue to be neutral on this issue.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 6/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² See Document 63. In telegram 148838 to Algiers, the Department transmitted the text of the English translation of Boumediene's letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–0111)

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: "Many leaders say that Boumediene is a top man—very influential. Again—we should strengthen ties with him." For Carter's reply to Boumediene's letter, see Document 64.

230. Memorandum From William Quandt and Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Weekly Report

Consultations with King Hassan of Morocco. Following the policy guidance laid down by the PRC concerning North Africa,² Assistant Secretary Saunders met last week for three hours with King Hassan of Morocco.³ His primary objective was to insure that technical violations of the US-Moroccan military agreement of 1960 would be resolved so that our normal military supply relationship can continue uninterrupted. The major problem had involved the stationing of F-5 aircraft in the Western Sahara. King Hassan has now assured us that the F-5s will not be used in the Sahara, and we have some intelligence information confirming that they have already been removed. The King did say that he intended to use the F-5s in Mauritania, and he was informed that this would be acceptable if both the Mauritanian and Moroccan Governments were to make an official request that we permit the stationing of the F-5s in Mauritanian territory. The King continues to be interested in acquiring Cobra helicopters, and he was informed that we would be prepared to act positively on his request. In brief, the most difficult issue in US-Moroccan relations has been satisfactorily resolved for the moment. (S)

The King also spoke at length about the situation in the Middle East, and was very doubtful that Prime Minister Begin would have the capacity to show sufficient flexibility in the months ahead. He was clearly concerned that Sadat's initiative might fail, thereby discrediting all moderate forces in the Arab world. To protect Sadat's position, Hassan is anxious to convene an Arab Summit meeting and believes that Sadat should not meet with Israelis anywhere on Arab territory prior to such a summit. (S)

Finally, King Hassan and his colleagues were clearly concerned by the new situation in Mauritania.⁴ They have been told by the Maurita-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 105, Multiple Issues: 1977-1981. Secret.

² See Documents 33 and 34.

³ In telegram 4443 from Rabat, July 22, the Embassy summarized the July 21 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302-0367)

⁴ Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah was removed from office in a bloodless coup on July 10.

nian Government that close cooperation with Morocco will continue. We have heard directly from Mauritanian sources, however, that the new regime is very anxious to end the war, even if this means ceding control over the Mauritanian sector of the Sahara. If Mauritania were to take such a unilateral step, there would be strong sentiment in Morocco for annexing that portion of the Sahara. For the moment, such a dramatic development seems unlikely. We have some evidence that plans are underway for King Hassan to meet with President Boumedienne of Algeria to try to find a political solution, but the prospects for early success remain dim. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, August 4, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

2. *The Sahara Dispute*—Moroccan and Algerian emissaries have been in Paris this week, where each has been received separately by President Giscard d'Estaing. The French are being very silent about the content of these exchanges, but there is little doubt they are trying to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the Sahara conflict.² Prospects for a diplomatic solution improved substantially following the Mauritanian coup last month, when the country's new rulers made clear their intention to get out of the war, which is ravaging Mauritania's feeble economy. The Polisario's proclamation of a ceasefire in Mauritania further enhanced peace prospects.

The keystone of a negotiated settlement appears to be the establishment of a Saharan political entity in that portion of the Sahara now

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 8/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² In telegram 24186 from Paris, August 2, the Embassy summarized the French effort: "The French are moving into a more active diplomatic role in an effort to settle the Western Sahara issue. They appear to see themselves less as mediators than as message-carriers and encouragers." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780317–1150)

occupied by Mauritania. The Nouakchott regime is prepared to surrender this territory, and the Algerians have dropped their demand that the Polisario be given the opportunity to establish a Saharan state which would encompass all of the former Spanish Sahara. What is unclear is the acceptability of such an arrangement to the Moroccans, who have troops in the area, and whether or not the Polisario would be satisfied with only this fragment of the territory it claims.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, September 20, 1978, 2346Z

239613. Subject: Moroccan Use of F-5 Aircraft.

1. Department believes that Moroccans and Algerians are again exploring possibility of a negotiated settlement to the Sahara conflict. We realize that before a settlement is in sight, or replacement aircraft are available, Moroccans are unlikely to withdraw F-5s currently stationed in Sahara. However, to remind King that this use of F-5s creates a serious problem in Morocco's military assistance relationship with U.S., and thereby hopefully put some additional pressure on him to seek a political settlement to the dispute, Ambassador is requested to make following points during his farewell audience with Hassan.²

—U.S. understands GOM continues to station F-5 aircraft in Sahara. Given our disagreement regarding the consistency of this use of American supplied equipment with the terms of the 1960 U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement, and the reluctance of Moroccan authorities to guarantee that military equipment to be purchased in the U.S. will not be employed for the defense of the Sahara, the U.S. has found it necessary to suspend action on requests for sales of most significant combat items.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78-8/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Nouakchott, Paris, and Madrid. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in PM/SAS and AF/W; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384-0711)

² An unknown hand placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

—Time is fast approaching when administration must inform Congress there has been a violation of U.S.-Moroccan military assistance agreement. It would be very helpful when giving this notification to be able to inform the Congress that some assurance had been received from the Moroccan Government regarding the eventual withdrawal of the F-5s from the Sahara. If the administration cannot inform the Congress that some such assurance has been received, it is possible that even more serious problems could arise in our military assistance relationship.

—The administration hopes it will be possible to reach some understanding on this issue prior to the King's State visit³ to avoid having it arise during the visit, when we would prefer that the emphasis be on the broad range of shared objectives and cooperation between Morocco and the U.S.

Christopher

³ See Document 161.

233. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, September 26, 1978, 1735Z

5946. Subj: Moroccan Use of US Equipment in the Sahara.

1. Summary: Royal Counselor Reda Guedira, in a September 25 substantive meeting complementing my perforce brief ceremonial farewell call on the King, carefully set forth Hassan's position on the use of US-origin military equipment in the Sahara: (1) there was a definite misunderstanding between the King and Saunders on July 21; the King's reference to removal of F-5's from the Sahara was in terms of their eventual junking and did not imply their transfer elsewhere;²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78–8/80. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 230. An unknown hand underlined "their eventual junking and did not imply their transfer elsewhere."

(2) Morocco does not consider the presence of F-5's in the Sahara violates the 1960 accord and contends that US recognition of Morocco's administrative control over the area implies recognition of Morocco's right to defend the security of the people; (3) If the US maintains its position—which no other of Morocco's multiple suppliers holds—then the US risks forcing an end to the military relationship between the US and Morocco; (4) the King looks forward³ to discussing this subject in depth with President Carter during his November State visit. End summary.

2. Guedira opened by referring to his August 4 meeting with me in Casablanca (Rabat 4776)⁴ and his subsequent discussions with King. It was clear he said, that there had been a definite misunderstanding at the July 21 meeting between the King and Assistant Secretary Saunders on Moroccan use of F-5's in the part of the Sahara which Morocco claims. Noting his own presence in the meeting, Guedira said he and the King distinctly recalled that what the King had said was that the F-5's are getting old, that at some point they will be junked (mis a la ferraille), and that at that time they would no longer be used in the Sahara. However, this did not imply a transfer from the Sahara⁵ while they were still needed there. The King, Guedira said, did not and could not have given any assurances that might have precluded his duty to defend Morocco as the situation required, and, in any event, would have constituted a derogation from his sovereignty. The King likes and respects Saunders and wants to make certain this misunderstanding is cleared up.⁶ (Guedira correctly recalled that the King had become rather excited during this part of the conversation.)

[3.] Guedira went on to say that in Morocco's view there was no breach of the 1960 agreement. The King had asked Guedira to emphasize this to me. The US agreed that Morocco had administrative control over the Sahara as a result of the Madrid Accords and the UN resolution for which the US had voted. Morocco did not agree with or accept the distinction between administrative control and sovereignty, but leaving that question aside, there was no dispute on the former. If Morocco had administrative control it must have the means to maintain the security of the territory and to protect its people. This means using as necessary not only F-5's but any equipment acquired from any country.

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase beginning with "the US risks forcing" and the words "looks forward," and wrote "sure" in the right-hand margin.

⁴ Telegram 4776 from Rabat, August 8, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780324-0009.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "this did not imply a transfer from the Sahara."

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

[4.] I interjected that the United States, as Guedira was aware, had laws which it was obliged to follow. In the case of any country which did not use equipment in accord with governing agreements, Congress must be notified of a violation. Guedira repeated that Morocco did not consider itself in violation of the 1960 agreement quite aside from the question of sovereignty. He, Guedira, did not understand why Secretary Vance was obliged to report a violation, since there had been none.

[5.] Guedira went on to say that to protect itself Morocco was dependent on imported arms from France, the US, Belgium, Russia and others. The only country which imposed a restriction on the use of those arms in the Sahara was the US. Even Russia imposed no such restrictions despite its pro-Algerian attitude. Speaking with a note of regret, Guedira said very carefully, “if you wish to maintain this position—which we consider incorrect—then the US will have to take upon itself the responsibility for bringing the military relationship between the US and Morocco to an end.” The King did not want to see this happen, said Guedira, but felt he had no choice and had therefore asked Guedira to make the Moroccan position clear.

[6.] Obviously, Guedira said, this is a subject which the King looks forward to discussing in depth with the President on his visit to the United States.

[7.] Comment: Allowing for some hyperbole and desire to shock us into a more favorable attitude, we believe that the GOM’s position—unrealistic though it may be in terms of its own long-term interest—reflects the immediacy and seriousness of the situation in which it finds itself. The King, government and most Moroccans have come to consider the Sahara conflict as a matter of national survival, with casualties having increased and Polisario pressure redirected exclusively on Morocco following the Mauritania coup. Guedira has confirmed our belief that Morocco would not remove F–5’s from the Sahara. Further, it is now clear that Morocco in its present mind-set of near-desperation believes it cannot provide a statement of its intention to eventually withdraw the F–5’s (ref State 239613),⁷ and that its determination to use anything necessary to defend the Sahara extends to all equipment at its disposal.⁸ The King has drawn a line which has made it difficult to see the precise modalities for maintaining a satisfactory working relationship and protecting US long-term interests which flow from Morocco’s location, pro-West orientation and moderate stance on international questions. I believe that we should, nevertheless, continue to seek a solid basis for our relations, and that our interests are best

⁷ See Document 232.

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted this and the previous sentence.

served by postponing a direct confrontation which would rigidify the GOM position and reduce our room for maneuver. We clearly should put off notification of Congress of a technical violation of the 1960 agreement pending the outcome of the King's November visit. By that time, the GOM will have had time to reflect on the fact that its arms relationship with the US remains key to its security. Moreover, it is possible that Morocco-Algeria contacts may have permitted some easing of Morocco's back-to-the-wall attitude. In sum, the climate for discussions with the GOM on limiting the use of US equipment in the Sahara may improve and allow consideration of new ways to handle the problems in our arms relationship.

[8.] More specifically, the conversation with Guedira marks in our view the death knell of the formula that would have permitted the use of US-origin equipment by Morocco in Mauritania upon the joint request of those two countries. The most satisfactory way to avoid a confrontation against our long-range interests would appear to be for us to tell Congress (after the State visit) that Morocco had technically violated the 1960 agreement in using US equipment in Mauritania but had withdrawn this equipment. We would further inform Congress that we have entered into discussions with the GOM on our differing interpretations of the applicability of the 1960 agreement to the Sahara.⁹

Anderson

⁹ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph and placed two checkmarks in the right-hand margin.

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mauritania¹

Washington, October 11, 1978, 1502Z

257218. Subject: Mauritania UNGA Bilaterals.

1. Foreign Minister Laghdaf, accompanied by Ambassador Moulaye el Hassen and Director of Political Affairs Kharchi, met with Secretary Vance for one hour October 5. Assistant Secretary Moose was also present.

2. Following opening amenities, Laghdaf said he wanted to use this opportunity to explain to the Secretary the new political and economic orientation of Mauritania following the recent change in government. Basically, the Government of Mauritania wishes to strengthen its ties with the U.S. Laghdaf said the previous government in Mauritania was not oriented toward the West and had not created the best conditions to foster bilateral relations.² He elaborated, saying a one-party system had not provided appropriate freedoms and nationalization and other economic policies had not been conducive to promoting good economic relations. The new government, he said, had announced the establishment of democratic institutions, including a multi-party system, and declared that the economy of Mauritania would be liberalized. These actions had been taken because it is in keeping with national character and because it is the best way to develop the country. He felt it was important for Secretary Vance to know this because he was aware of the importance that the U.S. attaches to the promotion of human rights everywhere in the world. He hoped that U.S. investors would respond to the new conditions.

3. Laghdaf then turned to the Western Sahara problem.³ He said he recognized that the U.S. was not directly involved but was sure the U.S. would like to see peace in the Sahara as well as elsewhere in the world. Laghdaf said the new government in Mauritania was determined to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict which pitted brother against brother and neighbor against neighbor and was seeking U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 62, Mauritania: 10/78. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Sent for information to Rabat, Algiers, Paris, Madrid, Dakar, and Jidda. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted in AF/W; cleared in AF/W and S/S; approved by Moose. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780415–1246)

² An unknown hand underlined this and the previous sentence.

³ An unknown hand underlined "Western Sahara problem."

help in reducing tensions and attaining peace.⁴ The GIRM, he said, was prepared to work for peace and would like the U.S. to let the full weight of its influence be felt in establishing a dynamic for peace. He looked to the U.S., France and Saudi Arabia to make their friendly influence felt on both Morocco and Algeria.

4. The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister about the current status of the conflict and what form a compromise settlement might take. In response Laghdaf described the recent background and lamented the fact that although Mauritania has contacted both the Polisario and Morocco, there has not been much change in their positions, which remain far apart.⁵ He noted that even though the Polisario has a ceasefire with Mauritania, attacks continue against Mauritania in the border areas. Laghdaf estimated the Polisario fighting force at about 5,000. He explained that despite the ceasefire, Mauritania had to keep its forces mobilized and that because of the tensions, phosphate and other natural resources in the region were not able to be exploited.

5. Laghdaf conceded with a smile that the second part of the Secretary's question was much harder. There are a number of factors which make for intransigence on the part of the parties to the conflict, he explained. He prefaced his comments with the observation that the Sahara, from a cultural and social point of view, is Mauritania.⁶ He continued that Morocco had made clear that it would not tolerate a "mini-state" influenced by Algeria on its southern border. Laghdaf felt that King Hassan might not be so intransigent if the political entity on his southern border were of the same political orientation as Morocco, that is one that is not "ideologically hostile" to Morocco. Algeria, he said, does not want to see Morocco expand southward and supports self-determination of the Saharan people. Laghdaf guessed that if the Polisario were to accept unification with Mauritania, Morocco would not necessarily oppose such a move but that it would be unrealistic to think that Morocco would abandon entirely its claim to the Sahara. As for the Polisario, Laghdaf described it as divided into two camps. One group relatively young and inexperienced, sought total independence. The other group probably would not be opposed to some sort of link with Mauritania. Laghdaf thought it was even possible that Morocco

⁴ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the words "Secretary" and "asked," the phrase "current status of the conflict and what form a compromise settlement might take," and this sentence.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "a number of factors which make for intransigence on the part of the parties to the conflict, he explained," and this sentence.

might cede a small portion of its claim by means of border rectification if some sort of federation between Mauritania and Sahara were effected.⁷

6. The Secretary asked if the second group would accept the proposition of linkage between Mauritania and the Sahara or would it simply cede part of the northern region of the Sahara and insist on autonomous control of the rest. Laghdaf replied that the moderates could accept some sort of federation in areas such as defense and foreign affairs but would want internal autonomy. Mauritania's first choice would be total integration but could accept a federation arrangement tending toward eventual absorption. When the Secretary asked what the desires of the people living in the Western Sahara were, Laghdaf said they want to stay where they are but the Polisario claim the people support them and want a state of their own. Laghdaf said that in this respect, Mauritania, within the framework of a general settlement, would not reject or oppose a free expression of determination by the Saharan people.⁸

7. Secretary Vance then asked where the negotiations stood at present. Laghdaf stressed again that Mauritania had taken the initiative to seek a peaceful solution. Algeria, he said, had accepted the proposition of Mauritanian expansion to the north if the Polisario agreed. However, Algeria was unalterably opposed to any southward expansion by Morocco. Laghdaf, restating an earlier point, confided that Morocco had expressed in confidence that it could make some territorial concession within a federation agreement between Mauritania and Polisario. He stressed the extreme confidentiality of this information, saying that only President Saleck and King Hassan know this "bottom line" of their negotiating position.⁹

8. Assistant Secretary Moose asked the Foreign Minister if, in the absence of an agreement between Morocco, Algeria, the Polisario and Mauritania, it is likely that the Polisario will consolidate its position in the Mauritanian portion of the Sahara and, if so, could Mauritania and Morocco accept such de facto occupation or would Morocco act to eliminate the Polisario presence. Laghdaf quickly replied that Mauritania has not and will not accept the Polisario installing themselves there and denied that the Polisario has succeeded in doing so. Mauritania, he said, would agree to Polisario control of the Mauritanian portion

⁷ An unknown hand underlined this sentence and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.

⁸ In this paragraph, an unknown hand underlined the first sentence, highlighted the second and third sentences, and underlined the last sentence.

⁹ An unknown hand underlined the first three sentences of this paragraph and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to the last sentence.

of the Sahara only within the context of an overall peace settlement.¹⁰ He described the present situation as “provisional” and indicated that if efforts to reach a peace agreement should fail, fighting would likely recommence. It would weaken Morocco, he explained, if Mauritania accepted the status quo as a permanent condition.

9. The Foreign Minister closed the conversation by thanking the Secretary once again for taking time from his busy schedule to see him and regretted placing yet another problem on his already full plate.

Christopher

¹⁰ An unknown hand highlighted and underlined the second and third sentences of this paragraph.

235. Letter From Representative Cardiss Collins to President Carter¹

Washington, November 13, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that King Hassan II of Morocco is due to arrive in Washington on November 14 for the purpose of meeting with the President, officials at the State Department² and Members of Congress.³ While the King's visit will provide an opportunity to reaffirm our traditional ties with Morocco, a loyal ally of the United States, both in Africa and the Middle East, it is my hope that the Administration will take this occasion to reiterate its present policy towards Northwest Africa in general and the Western Sahara in particular.

As you know, Morocco and until recently, Mauritania, have been engaged in a military conflict with guerillas of the Patriotic Front for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Trips/Visits File, Box 112, 11/14-15/78 Visit of King Hassan II of Morocco: 11/78. No classification marking. Collins (D-Illinois) was a member of the House International Relations Committee.

² See Documents 161, 162, 163, and 236.

³ Hassan met with Members of Congress on November 15 at the Capitol. Telegram 292512 to Rabat, November 18, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780474-1136)

the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro. Due to Algeria's support of the Polisario and a tradition of border conflict between Morocco and Algeria, the Western Sahara issue has threatened on several occasions to escalate into a more general conflict between Morocco and Algeria, with serious consequences for U.S. interests in both of these countries as well as in Africa and the Middle East generally. While the potential for such escalation continues to exist, recent diplomatic efforts have succeeded in reducing the scope of the actual fighting to the northern two-thirds of the contested territory.

Against this background, the Administration's stated policy has been to acknowledge Moroccan and Mauritanian administrative control but not their sovereignty over that portion of the Sahara to which their governments claim jurisdiction. At the same time, our country has wisely supported efforts to resolve the substance of the dispute through the regional mechanism of the Organization of African Unity.

This position of neutrality implies that our government continues to stand by its interpretation of the 1960 bilateral defense agreement with Morocco which limits the use of American weapons to the defense of the Kingdom of Morocco itself, not including the Western Sahara. It is my hope that the State Department will view any requests for arms or military aid from Morocco in that light. In particular, I am concerned about reports to the effect that Northrup Corporation is currently under contract to design a \$200 million underground surveillance system for Morocco's use in the Western Sahara.

I also suggest that the King be encouraged to seek a peaceful resolution of the continuing conflict, through the exercise of genuine self-determination on the part of the Saharoui people.

Yours truly,

Cardiss Collins
Member of Congress

236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 16, 1978, 0016Z

291469. Subject: Secretary's Meeting with King Hassan: Western Sahara.

1. During Secretary's November 14 call on King Hassan at Blair House discussion turned to Western Sahara after exchange on Middle East reported septel.² Hassan initiated this portion of the conversation with invitation to Secretary to give a lawyer's distinction between administrative control and sovereignty. Secretary replied that in law the two terms are defined differently. Commenting that as a friend and a fellow lawyer who welcomed an exchange more frank than that which might occur between heads of state, Hassan added that he expected there would be some differences of legal opinion, as Secretary was of the Anglo-Saxon school of law while he was of the Mediterranean school.

2. Continuing to respond to Hassan's original request, Secretary said administrative control could be accorded without sovereignty being acquired, and he cited example of U.S. trusteeship in Micronesia. Hassan replied that Spain was able to give Morocco only the powers Spain held. Spain had not given Morocco sovereignty in the Sahara because Spain did not have sovereignty. Therefore sovereignty must have resided elsewhere. In fact, sovereignty resided with Morocco. King then made comparison with Morocco's experience under the protectorate, when the French Resident General functioned as the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs. The French were permitted by treaty to undertake administrative reforms but not to undertake structural reforms. When Morocco signed its treaty of independence with France, Morocco did not recover sovereignty, it recovered administrative control.

3. Turning from the legal discussion, Hassan commented that there must be some sovereignty in the area. The Western world had three choices: Moroccan sovereignty; that of 35,000 Saharans as a first step to something else; and an Algerian Marxist state. Morocco is not asking

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 69, Morocco: 7/78-8/80. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Madrid, and Paris. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in NEA/AFN and AF/W; approved by Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780473-0262)

² Telegram 291489 to Rabat, November 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139-1866)

the U.S. to engage in war in the Sahara, Hassan continued. Eighteen million Moroccans now, and forty million by 2000, will consider the Sahara Moroccan. On the other side are 3,000 agitators driven by Algeria to demand a republic. Stating this is not really a problem for him, Hassan explained that he did not want his friends to appear embarrassed when they help him. When U.S. diplomats speak of Morocco's rights he would like to see them talk about Morocco's rights without questioning whether or not they exist.

4. At this point the Secretary had to leave the room to receive a telephone call from the President. While he was absent, Hassan was informed that Boumediene had left Moscow and reportedly returned to Algeria. He commented that he still thought Boumediene "finished". When the Secretary returned, he informed the King the President had asked him to come immediately to the White House. It was agreed that the Secretary and Hassan would resume their discussion of the Sahara the following day.³

Vance

³ See Documents 162 and 163.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 4, 1979, 0810Z

43. Dept pass USCINCEUR Vaihingen Germany for POLAD. From the Ambassador. Subj: U.S. Policy in Morocco.

1. Summary. Continued impasse on arms issue is likely to affect our relations with Morocco and our military relationship in particular. We should take another look at our policy on arms and particularly implications of our position as it relates to self-determination in the Sahara. Creation of independent Saharan state is unlikely to further our interests in this area and we should stop talking about self-determination if we don't want it to happen. End summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790004-1366. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris.

2. The periodic ebb and flow in our relations with Morocco is linked closely to the very subjective attitude of the Chief of State, who is inclined to react according to whether he sees our actions as inimical to or in support of his own positions and views. As we indicated before his departure, he went to Washington troubled in mind because he was uncertain where the USG stood. Indicative of his attitude was his remark to President Carter that all he wanted was for our Ambassadors everywhere to proclaim that Morocco was our friend.² In other words, he wants our moral support and he wants the Algerians to know he has it. He also wants our material support, but felt that it would spoil the tone of the visit for him to raise such issues. It was nevertheless clear that he hoped the visit would lead to resolution of the current impasse over future arms deliveries. He hoped to convince us that our interests lie with unequivocal support for Morocco in the Sahara. That he did not do so must have been a disappointment and an irritation, but at least he left with the hope that we would be able to work out an arms formula everyone could accept.

3. In the afterglow of the visit, various doors opened and the Government of Morocco displayed its friendliest smiles to us. There has been no outward change in the past month, but there will be as the realization sinks in that we are making no progress on the arms question and that while the final communique struck a very positive note,³ the amount of flesh we are going to be able to put on the bones is rather meager; cooperation in the energy field is not going to mean a lot of USG money; the Secretary of Commerce will come for a day-and-a-half;⁴ we cannot begin to meet their PL-480 demand; and we may have some money for increased student exchanges, but it is for next year (1980), not this. While we are approaching these activities with a positive spirit and believe something effective will eventually emerge, the box score is not very exciting because we are dealing with some pretty modest figures.

4. The progress we hope to make in the above fields is worthwhile, but it will not counterbalance the growing military supply problem, which is a vital question to Morocco. If we understand the implications of the cable traffic correctly, we are unwilling to supply further equipment the Moroccans need for use in the Sahara unless they permit an exercise in self-determination there. This would seem to be consistent with the PRC recommendation that we should urge Hassan to be more forthcoming about carrying out UN resolution on consultation with

² See Document 161.

³ For the text of the November 17 joint press statement, see *Public Papers: Carter*, 1978, Book II, pp. 2055–2056.

⁴ See Document 170

the local populations as part of the process of self-determination.⁵ While we may say we will settle for positive assurances the arms will be used elsewhere, we evidently mean that those assurances must clearly rule out use in the Sahara, unless Moroccan sovereignty is first ratified by a plebiscite or other act of free will by the Sahraouis. We are also imposing the same conditions on the acquisition of helicopters manufactured by the Italians.⁶ All of this may become irrelevant because of the \$60 million in FMS arrearages the Moroccans have now informed us they cannot pay, but they just may get that money from the Saudis. Meanwhile, to add to local unhappiness we have told the Moroccans that just in case they should ask us (which they haven't yet) to take their troops home from Shaba, we won't do it.

5. Although we assume there has been no change in our position vis-a-vis Morocco, the impression created in Moroccan minds by our statement to Benjelloun on the above matters is likely to be that we have toughened our stance.⁷ The King, in that case, will be mystified that after the warmth of the exchanges during his visit the sledding has gotten so tough so quickly, and may deduce that the young men in the Department repeatedly conjured up by Ambassador Bengelloun have triumphed over the sound instincts of his good friends the Secretary and the President, and that they are busily undermining the structure so carefully put together during the visit. With Bengelloun reportedly under criticism from his local detractors for the low level of U.S. press coverage of the King's visit, he will likely redouble his efforts to push his conspiracy thesis.

6. I have several observations. The first is that a policy of support for self-determination in the Sahara is in accord with our principles and makes a good deal of sense in terms of our relations with the African states. It does not make much sense, however, with the Arab states, most of whom have already approved the Moroccan acquisition of the territory in question as being an expression of Arab unity and fulfillment of a historical claim, and who recall that Boumediene appeared to bless such action at the 1974 Arab Summit in Rabat.⁸ They realize that were it not for Algeria, the Polisario would never have gotten off the ground and the Moroccan action would have gone unopposed. They attribute crass, geopolitical motives to Boumediene and are not particularly interested in the Polisario.

⁵ See Documents 33 and 34.

⁶ See Document 167.

⁷ See Document 166.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 223.

7. Assuming, however, that for non-Arab reasons we want to see self-determination in the Sahara, it is logical for us to withhold arms and to attempt to exert pressure on Hassan in the direction of a plebiscite or other action designed to give the Saharans a voice in their future. (One would like to find similar means to support self-determination across the board, say for the Armenians and the Biafrans, but the principle is easier to apply some places than it is others. That need not detract from its validity, but it makes for cynical reactions when we do not apply it universally.)

8. The second observation is that we should be in no doubt that in the unlikely event of a free vote in the Sahara, the Saharans would opt for independence. They do not want to be part of Morocco. They want to have their own ministate and become Cabinet ministers, relying on the international community and their phosphates to keep them in Mercedeses. There are worse things that could happen, and in human rights terms, narrowly defined, there is much to say for such a state. It would be a focus of weakness, however, and it would not make great sense if we are interested in area stability. In utilitarian terms of the greatest good for the greatest number it will be hard to defend. Perhaps we do not care all that much, but I rather think we do.

9. The emergence of an independent Saharan state in the area controlled by Morocco cannot be brought about without upsetting the internal political order in this state. Hassan cannot give up the Sahara. He will be finished if he does, and we will go the way of Abdel Aziz, whose empire was partitioned by the French and Spanish.

10. In brief, if we really mean what we say about self-determination, and we are intent on pressuring the Moroccans in that direction, we should be aware of the shoals ahead. In the unlikely event such pressures succeeded, we could face a foreign policy disaster with the creation of a mini-state on the Saharan coast. If they do not succeed, we will still incur the resentment of the Moroccans, which could seriously harm our interests in this area.

11. If, on the other hand, we don't really mean it, we should stop talking about it. As seen from here, the only realistic solution is some sort of negotiated settlement between the Algerians, Mauritians and the Moroccans, from which the Saharans might emerge with a piece of Mauritania, but which would not affect the Moroccan hold over their portion of the Sahara. Perhaps one could say that a nod would then have been given in the direction of self-determination, but it would be an essentially cynical settlement between the three powers and the Polisario. There would be no meaningful act of self-determination in the area controlled by Morocco. If, however, this is what we want to see happen, we should consider how we are going to help bring it about, and whether we are prepared to take a more active role in

promoting it. In any event, a change in rhetoric could seem to be in order, i.e., we should start talking about accommodation rather than self-determination.

12. My third observation is that if we maintain our current position on self-determination, it will affect our military relationship with Morocco. There is undoubtedly a good deal of linkage in Hassan's mind between what we want from him and what we have done for him lately. He is grateful for our recent votes in the United Nations,⁹ for the warmth of his welcome in Washington and for our expressed intent to be helpful in various fields, but he weighs them against the military questions and the fact that we are unwilling to sell him arms he needs for the Sahara, which is an obsession locally today. When he is in such a frame of mind, he is unlikely to be helpful to us on such matters as GEODSS. He will drag his feet, people will not answer telephones, and we will experience a good deal of frustration. He could always surprise us, of course, and decide it is in his interest to entangle us further in a web of relationships he can eventually use to draw us along, but he may also choose just to keep us dangling and to extract a quid pro quo before we are able even to start the project.

13. I realize that the adversary process on which our government is based normally leads to fuzzy lowest common denominator solutions, and that either-or propositions are inherently noxious to Washington. I would respectfully suggest, however, that we have two broad choices today; we can continue to withhold arms in the absence of assurances that Hassan will find it very difficult to give and even more difficult to honor, and we can continue to speak about, and by implication press for, self-determination. This policy is viable, but it has consequences for our much valued military relationship. We could also withhold arms but stop talking about self-determination. Alternatively, we can reexamine the legal decision which has put us in our current bind and accept the argument that Morocco, like Israel in Sinai, has certain rights and obligations as an occupying power and that these include defense of the territory in question. Use of FMS-supplied equipment in the Sahara would therefore not be in violation of the 1960 agreement. This would have certain consequences in our relations with Algeria which I am at this point unable to assess, but it would not be inconsistent with efforts to promote a negotiated settlement between the Moroccans and Algerians, the latter presumably being less ready to talk if they think the Moroccans are losing.

[14.] It seems to me that our first step in taking a decision should be to consider thoroughly what we want to see occurring in this part

⁹ See footnote 5, Document 166.

of North Africa and how we can envisage developments here impacting on the security of the region and our interests. I realize that we went through an intensive policy review last spring,¹⁰ but it seems particularly timely, now that Boumediene has gone, to look at the wider picture again. The Department may feel that it has a coherent policy for North Africa, but there is an apparent contradiction between what we are doing and what we expect to happen on the ground.

Parker

¹⁰ See Documents 30–32.

238. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the Embassy in Morocco¹

Algiers, January 11, 1979, 1030Z

93. Dept pass USCINCEUR Vaihingen Ge for POLAD. From the Ambassador. Subj: U.S. Policy in Morocco and North Africa. Ref: (A) Rabat 0043;² (B) State 005792; (C) Algiers 0078; (D) Nouakchott 0066; (E) FBIS London 041233Z Jan 79 (Total).³

1. Summary: I heartily concur with Ambassador Parker's suggestion that the United States reexamine its policy in Morocco and, by

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790016–0768. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris.

² See Document 237.

³ In telegram 5792 to Algiers, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris, January 9, the Department requested comments on "Ambassador Parker's thoughts contained refel." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790011–0866) In telegram 78 from Algiers, January 10, the Embassy wrote: "Even though U.S. interests, as reflected in refels dovetail, this Embassy believes that the current U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Western Saharan issue needs further scrutiny. Changes among the important players during the past seven months (i.e., and a new regime in Mauritania), plus apparently growing pressures on the GIRM to conclude a rapprochement with Polisario and some sort of acceptable peace, and the reality of the Polisario's apparent ability to hang in there militarily against the Moroccans, lead us to conclude that U.S. policy in the area should be reexamined in light of these new developments." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790062–0939) Telegram 66 from Nouakchott, January 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009–0103. The London FBIS report, January 4, was not found.

implication, North Africa. From here, however, the creation of some sort of Saharan state seems just a matter of time whatever action we choose to take or not take. I feel, therefore, that the United States should prepare itself in light of recent events in the area for the changes that are likely to occur in the upcoming months. Such a newly considered policy should enable us to be ready for what happens and not taken by surprise. End summary.

2. I want to endorse strongly the thrust and conclusion of Ambassador Parker's refreshing cable (ref. A). As addressees are aware, I have felt for some time that the time is ripe for a North African policy review and for analyzing and identifying specifically U.S. interests in the region and the conflicting claims on us which the nations in the region have.

3. As ref C tries to make clear, there are no current U.S. bilateral policies with either Algeria or Morocco which greatly disrupt our bilateral goals and [garble—objectives with] the other. In this light, I would like to examine the Western Saharan question as it is seen from Algiers.

4. Mauritania wants out of the Western Saharan fray. This has been reported by well-informed observers (refs. D and E). The GIRM graphically displayed its desire for improved Algerian-Mauritanian relations by sending its Foreign Minister to President Boumedienne's funeral. Ould Saleck's New Year's message (ref. D) further demonstrated this policy. The big question seems to be not whether Mauritania will opt out of the Western Saharan conflict, but when and how, and what will be Morocco's reaction.

5. Polisario is alive and relatively well. Boumedienne did not create it, although he certainly helped it create a national conscience in the Sahara. In spite of the lack of widespread popular Algerian support for the organization and its cause, the GOA continues to back Polisario strongly (see para 7 below). If this Algerian support were to dwindle or even disappear, most observers believe that Polisario now has enough cohesion, moral and political consciousness, and military equipment to continue to harass Moroccan (and if necessary, Mauritanian) forces in the Western Sahara.

6. According to non-official American and other Western observers who have recently visited the Moroccan-controlled portion of the Western Sahara and Saharan refugee camps near Tindouf, at least among some of the more articulate Saharans, there is considerable feeling against Moroccan and Mauritanian domination. Para 8, ref A confirms this feeling. As the conflict continues and strong Moroccan military activity becomes necessarily repressive, these antagonistic Saharan feelings are likely to deepen, thereby enhancing Saharan nationalism.

7. Contrary to earlier beliefs that Algerian support for Polisario would diminish after Boumedienne's [garble—death there] is every indication that this will not be the case. Interim Chief of State Bitat made

a big issue of continued GOA backing for Polisario when he opened the National Youth Congress January 6 and the Polisario observer to the Congress was given special attention. Indeed, it would be unwise to believe that Algeria would give its Moroccan rival a break in the Western Sahara at this time. All arguments run counter to such a conciliatory move. The post-Boumediene regime must demonstrate its revolutionary credential. The GOA views the U.S. vote on the Sahara as a demonstration of international support for its Saharan policy. Even if it does not go very deep, there is some intellectual and philosophical support for Polisario as a liberation movement among Algerians. For those Algerians who cherish their revolutionary history and credentials, and especially for the present government, it would be very difficult to abandon Algerian support of Polisario. Mauritania seems to be leaning Algeria's way and Polisario forces are not being defeated in the field. Morale in the refugee camps, as reported by private U.S. and other Western observers, is good.

8. Morocco, on the other hand, seems to be painting itself into a corner. It is true that there appears to be genuine, widespread support for King Hassan's Saharan policy in Morocco. However, Hassan is in a weak position in the Sahara given Morocco's increasing isolation, the strength of the Saharan opposition and his internal headaches (a sluggish economy, deeply seated social inequalities and, in the possible future, an army that is tired of fighting a losing battle).

9. In light of the foregoing, there are policy implications which the United States has not faced squarely:

A) The United States cannot afford to ignore reality:

1) Given the apparent Polisario strength and continued GOA support, the Saharan conflict is not going to wither and die. On the contrary, it is most likely to continue at its present level.

2) We understand that the southern or Mauritanian-administered portion of the Western Sahara is already controlled by Polisario to a great extent.

3) The Saharans do not want to be part of Morocco (para 8, ref. A).

B) A Saharan mini-state is probably imminent:

1) Given the above realities, it is likely that the GIRM will sue for peace with Polisario soon. Polisario leaders, such as Omar Hadrami, member of the Executive Committee and Revolutionary Council (talking to non-official American visitors in Algiers recently), have repeatedly stated that Polisario will reject any offer of territorial sovereignty which does not include both parts of the former Spanish Sahara. Hadrami reportedly said that if Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco agreed to a solution which gives Polisario only the Mauritanian section of the Sahara, Polisario "would go it alone until the final victory." In

spite of such avowals, however, it is quite possible that Polisario would accept less than the whole loaf, i.e., the Mauritanian-administered area.

2) If such a mini-state is created, whether or not the United States likes it, it can (or should) do nothing to prevent it.

3) No-one knows what sort of ideology a Polisario-led Western Saharan state would follow. Probably, but not necessarily, it would lean heavily on the GOA and Algerian rhetoric. On the other hand, Polisario leaders have repeatedly told journalists and scholars that the Front has no ideology except to win independence. Whether completely true or not, this acknowledgement that Polisario has not chosen sides can be used by Western nations, including the United States, to develop positive relations with a new Western Saharan state. Comment: On the other hand, lack of official American contact with Polisario ties our hands and prevents us from developing the relationships which will be vital if the Western Sahara becomes independent. End comment. One must add that there is a great risk of misunderstanding the Sahara crisis, if we try to force it into the East-West ideological context with which we have grown accustomed to dealing.

D) At this late date, the United States cannot retreat from its public position supporting self-determination in the Western Sahara. It is our position, for good or ill, and we are stuck with it. To change it would win few friends and disappoint many, especially African, states. For years, we have used the self-determination slogan to mollify the OAU. To discard it now would be to risk considerable alienation in African circles. What's more, self-determination has become an irreversible process in the last half of the twentieth century.

E) Morocco and King Hassan need the United States at least as much as we need them. While the King has often aligned his policies with ours, he has acted primarily out of his own interest, not that of the United States.

10. In light of the above, accommodation (para 11, ref. A) may offer the United States a way out of the present dilemma. A third option (in addition to the two mentioned in paras 13 and 14, ref. A and drawing from para 11, ref. A) is a trilateral agreement with Polisario to give it "a piece of Mauritania." In spite of Polisario's protestations (see para 9 B) 1) above), such a compromise would probably be accepted, however reluctantly, and seems the most likely from where we sit. Such an option raises further problems, of course (the probability that such a state will be a staging area for attacks into Moroccan-administered Sahara, and its viability), which would have to be carefully examined.

11. Finally, I wish to reiterate my total agreement with Ambassador Parker's call for a policy review. North Africa is a region in ferment. I want to see the United States ready for those changes, not, as too often happens, simply reacting to events. We have been asked by the

President and the Secretary to develop a more creative and imaginative foreign policy. Therefore, let's try to anticipate and influence future events, not just on the sidelines as a situation falls to pieces. Current experience shows us how difficult it is to put the pieces together again.⁴

12. Comment: We apologize to Embassy Rabat for "poaching so heavily in its territory" in this cable. Nevertheless, we do hope that addressees will see some value in "the view from Algiers."

Haynes

⁴ Carter approved the sale on January 30. See Document 167 and footnote 6 thereto.

**239. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, April 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Mediating the Sahara Conflict

Following the PRC meeting of March 27,² a Sahara Working Group was established under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders to explore the possibilities for U.S. participation in efforts to mediate the Sahara conflict. The Group's first meeting on April 5 was attended by representatives of the National Security Council, Defense/ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the State Department. In conformity with its recommendations, the following steps have been undertaken or will be shortly:³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79. Secret; Exdis.

² See Documents 38 and 39.

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "following steps have been undertaken or will be shortly."

1. Our Ambassadors to Madrid, Rabat and Algiers met with the Spanish Foreign Minister and other senior Spanish officials April 19 for a discussion which is reported in Madrid's 5416.⁴

2. Ambassador Parker will hold similar consultations with senior Quai and Elysee officials on May 3.⁵

3. Instructions are being sent to several African capitals to ascertain the status of OAU mediation efforts.⁶

As soon as we have Ambassador Parker's report of his conversations in Paris, and we have some reaction to our inquiries in African capitals, the Sahara Working Group will meet again to consider appropriate further steps. A discussion paper already has been prepared identifying some of the possible elements in several settlement formulas.⁷ By May 21, a study of Morocco's difficulties containing the Polisario military threat should be finished.⁸

Peter Tarnoff

Executive Secretary

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "met with the Spanish Foreign Minister." See Document 40.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "Parker will hold similar consultations with senior Quai and Elysee officials." Telegram 14359 from Paris, May 7, reported on the meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790206–0935) See also footnote 3, Document 173.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "OAU mediation efforts." In telegram 127425 to Addis Ababa, Bamako, and Lagos, May 19, the Department wrote: "Department is interested in any information addressee posts might develop on OAU subcommittee's recent discussions concerning Western Sahara conflict. Specifically, we are interested in your host governments' assessment of Obasanjo/Traore mission and any new flexibility on part of parties to dispute to negotiate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790228–0109)

⁷ See Document 37.

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. The study was not found.

**240. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, August 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Proposed Presidential Message to King Hassan of Morocco

Events in the western Sahara are moving rapidly following Mauritania's separate peace with the Polisario. The Polisario has mounted a major attack on a Moroccan position at the southern end of the Moroccan portion of the western Sahara. Morocco appears to be in the process of claiming the former Mauritanian portion of the western Sahara.² While such a move might temporarily reduce pressure in Morocco to attack Polisario bases in Algeria, the situation is unsettled and fighting could escalate rapidly. We recommend that the President send a friendly message to King Hassan acknowledging the problems he is facing and reiterating our interest in a peaceful solution. A proposed message is attached.³

Peter Tarnoff

Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 33, Morocco: 1979. Confidential. There is no indication Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

² Mauritania and the Polisario concluded a peace agreement on August 5. Mauritania renounced all territorial claims to the Western Sahara. In an August 17 memorandum to Carter, Christopher wrote: "Morocco has 'incorporated' the former Mauritanian portion of the Western Sahara into Morocco as its 37th province. Although Algeria has denounced this Moroccan takeover as 'aggression,' it will not ask for a UN Security Council meeting at this time. The Polisario have vowed to continue their attacks in Morocco proper." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 8/79)

³ The undated message is attached but not printed. In part, the message reads: "I want you to know that I have been deeply distressed by the attacks on your forces well inside Morocco. I sympathize with you in this situation, and recognize that there have been other recent developments which have serious implications for Morocco and the region. All of us must do our best to ensure that these developments will not lead to further widening of the conflict. In this regard, I am uneasy about the possible repercussions of the reported new Moroccan moves in the Tiris al-Gharbia."

241. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 18, 1979

SUBJECT

Proposed Presidential Message to King Hassan of Morocco (C)

State's memo at Tab A² encloses the text of a Presidential message to Hassan, intended, I suppose, to counsel Kingly restraint in the Sahara conflict. I see at least three things wrong with this handwringing text: (C)

—It is not even-handed (why a letter to Morocco and not one to Algeria?);

—There is no carrot and precious little stick (Hassan will not be interested in the President's "sympathy" at this point; he wants material support);

—The pious tone of this message, far from encouraging Hassanian second thoughts, will merely incense him and promote a siege mentality. (C)

In short, since such a message can do no good—and could well add another sour note to our relations with the King—let's *not* commit the President to an exercise in futility. That futility is underscored not only by Steve Solarz' recent consultations in Paris³ (where the French reiterated their determination to avoid a mediating role in the Maghreb for the simple reason that they cannot identify the elements of a possible solution), but by Wednesday's as then-unpublished de Borchgrave interview with Hassan⁴ (the latter repeats his convincing assertion that he will hang on to the Sahara with Churchillian defiance). (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That we tell State to forget the idea of a Presidential message for the time being, for the reasons I've indicated above (I could do this orally with Saunders & Co.).⁵ (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1-8/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Albright, Hunter, and Kimmitt.

² Not attached. Printed as Document 240.

³ In telegram 26136 from Paris, August 17, the Embassy reported on the August 14 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790374-0719)

⁴ In telegram 5765 from Rabat, August 16, the Embassy transmitted the text of de Borchgrave's interview with Hassan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372-0892)

⁵ Aaron initialed the Approve option. Dodson wrote in the left-hand margin: "Told Bremer about this."

2. That we couple the above instruction with need for State to conclude Congressional consultations on arms supply question as quickly as possible⁶ (i.e., in early September when Solarz *et al.* are back in session). (C)

⁶ Aaron highlighted this sentence and wrote: "Expand on this. What's unresolved, why needed, etc. DA."

242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, September 8, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. *Solarz on Western Sahara*—Steve Solarz has concluded from his recent trip to North Africa² that the US should not change its policy against providing arms to Morocco for possible Saharan use. He had previously leaned towards permitting the sale of military equipment such as OV-10's and COBRA helicopters. Solarz told Dave Newsom today that he now thinks the Polisario is not anti-US and could be an important force in the area. In addition, he thinks that self-determination for the Polisario within an overall territorial settlement would be consistent with American ideals and serve our interests; an altered arms policy would arrest favorable trends in US-Algerian relations and changes in Algerian policies toward the Soviets; the situation within Morocco is not as bad as pictured and the US-Moroccan relationship is not as threatened as he had expected (he believes it can weather an unchanged arms policy), and Morocco is increasingly isolated diplomatically because of OAU summit decisions and its annexation of the former Mauritanian sector of the Western Sahara. Solarz predicted that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 9/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² In telegrams 5655 and 5664 from Rabat, August 13, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Solarz and Hassan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-2052 and P840131-2051, respectively) In telegram 2993 from Nouakchott, August 18, the Embassy reported on Solarz's discussions with Mauritanian officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790375-0891) In telegram 2284 from Algiers, August 21, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Solarz and Ben-djedid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790381-0538)

the Administration would face strong opposition within Congress if it changed its arms supply policy. He was grateful that the Administration had actively sought Congressional consultations on this issue.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

243. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Moroccan Arms Policy

You agreed at the last V-B-B that Vance would send a recommendation forward on Moroccan arms policy this week and we would promptly have a PRC. State's preparations have been thrown into turmoil by the fact that Steve Solarz came back from Morocco opposed to loosening up our arms relationship so that Morocco could use the equipment to defend the Western Sahara which they administratively control.²

I believe that it is important to get a fundamental assessment of where developments are heading in Northwest Africa and our policy options. State is, and always has been, strongly pro-Algerian. Morocco has been a good strong friend, but the strength of that regime can be questioned. The war in the Sahara drags on and the Polisario appear to be gaining strength.

In this situation, I believe we should take the time to have a PRM. It should be accompanied by a serious intelligence assessment of the trends in Northwest Africa—political, military and economic. Unlike past PRM's, it should be prepared on a close-hold basis.

I believe this is far preferable to rushing ahead with an *ad hoc* decision on Moroccan arms policy. We are under no time pressure from the Moroccans. We have several months in which to make a deliberate, careful decision.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 48, PRM/NSC-34. Secret. Aaron drew an arrow pointing to Brzezinski's name and wrote: "J. Rentschler, get going. DA."

² See Document 242.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the preparation of a PRM on our policy toward Northwest Africa.³

³ Brzezinski checked the Approve option and wrote at the bottom of the page: "but give it a *very short* time frame. ZB."

244. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 18, 1979

SUBJECT

PRM on Morocco (C)

After *privately* discussing the subject of David's memo (attached)² with Hal Saunders, I question whether a PRM exercise, no matter how short the time frame, is really the route we want to pursue now. Saunders made two relevant points:

—State has finally reached the point, prefigured in a number of VBB discussions, where Vance can submit an options paper to the President (in fact, Saunders wants to schedule a PRC on this subject ASAP);³ as Saunders testily noted, it was the unrelenting pressure from us which accelerated this process, which we now seem inclined to protract with a PRM.

—More important, it is Saunders view—which Gary Sick and I share—that the options for discussion are already based on all relevant inputs from the intelligence community, Defense, and other agencies

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 48, PRM/NSC-34. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Albright, Sick, and Kimmitt. Gates wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "State wants a PRC this week before CV goes to N.Y. (per VBB last week), RG." An unknown hand circled "PRC" in the Gates note and wrote: "PRC 124. Urgent action Wednesday." Dodson wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "cy to Rentschler 9/20."

² Attached and printed as Document 243.

³ See Document 42.

and address our relations in the region as a whole (as they did at the time of our last PRC in late March).⁴ A PRM would thus be “another piece of paper” covering old ground, essentially duplicating the draft options paper already developed (see Tab B).⁵ (C)

In my view there is really only one issue we need to address, and one that has not changed since I first took up North Africa in the NSC three months ago (it predates that experience by at least two years, as I can attest by service in the area myself): do we or do we not decide to help the Moroccans in ways that *they* perceive as helpful? For better or for worse, the OV-10 has become a litmus test of our reliability and further defines the question: do we or do we not provide that specific assistance in a situation where the bureaucracies are in basic agreement on only one thing, to wit, our relationship with a trusted, traditional, and strategically important friend continues to deteriorate? (C)

There *is* one area where I think we do need better intelligence (which I am trying to acquire through Madeleine) and that concerns the Hill: to what extent would a liberalized arms supply decision draw significant Congressional flak? State is mesmerized by Solarz, sees him as a formidable opponent who must be accommodated. I question this, as do others outside State: Wouldn't the strong pro-Moroccan stands of Javits and Stone offset any downside Solarz would introduce? More important, are we now willing to defer the function of formulating foreign policy to one Member of Congress, however influential he may be? (C)

Meanwhile, we need to decide whether to go through with the PRC originally envisaged (UNGA engagements will complicate the near-term scheduling). Gary Sick and I strongly favor the PRC route now, leaving open the possibility of a PRM should the meeting not produce a satisfactory outcome. And by outcome I mean a decision which, after stewing over this subject for these many months, would clearly not be “ad hoc.” (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Go with PRC and defer a PRM for the time being⁶

Scuttle the PRC and proceed with a PRM (C)

⁴ See Document 38.

⁵ Tab B, a September 18 draft action memorandum from Saunders to Vance, is attached but not printed. For the final options paper, see Document 41.

⁶ Aaron initialed this option and wrote beneath the options: “I wanted a PRM because I had the impression nothing was happening in State.”

245. Letter From Representative Lee Hamilton to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, September 19, 1979

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to offer you some comments and thoughts on how U.S. policy might help move the situation in the Western Sahara toward a peaceful solution. I appreciate the way in which the State Department has consulted with Congress on this issue and I trust you will find our input helpful.

Recent information from press reports and our intelligence community indicate to me that the situation in the Western Sahara is evolving:

- Mauritania has signed a peace agreement with the Polisario and several thousand Moroccan troops have apparently been withdrawn from Mauritania;

- The war is not a stalemate, it is not now going in Morocco's favor;

- Morocco is now using a defensive "garrison" strategy, the offensive "hot pursuit" strategy appears to have failed;

- The costs to Morocco of the war are increasing financially and politically and in terms of losses of military equipment and men;

- Middle and low-level military seem to want out of the war;

- What started as a popular movement for Moroccans and the King in late 1975 has now turned into a risky venture in which many, including perhaps the King himself, perceive the monarchy to be in trouble, and under attack;

- King Hassan has been angered by American refusal of arms for the Sahara war but at the same time he seems to appreciate the fact that U.S. arms cannot turn the war around in his favor;

- The U.S. has not had close or frank relations with the King [illegible].

- Polisario attacks into southern Morocco have shaken an awareness of the war into the Moroccan people and changed their attitude toward accepting a settlement.

The conclusion that I draw from this information is that the war is now a grave political liability for King Hassan and U.S. policy, while it should be supportive of the King personally, should not be supportive of his efforts in the Sahara. We need the confidence of the King to persuade him to modify a disastrous policy.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Unclassified.

It is part of my assessment of the situations in Iran and Nicaragua, situations which eroded so quickly, that we failed to deal firmly and frankly with long time friends: we were often prisoners of their whims and policies. I was dismayed to learn from others who attended the July 24th hearing of Assistant Secretary Hal Saunders before the Solarz subcommittee that we have not discussed the Western Sahara problem with King Hassan for over a year.² If that report is correct then I would urge you to begin talks with him as soon as possible.

I do feel that we can urge King Hassan to accept a peaceful solution as a way of maintaining our support and friendship. King Hassan must now have some understanding of the multiplying political risks to him of not resolving peacefully the Western Sahara issue. His recent press conference indicating that chances were now more favorable for talks with Algeria on the Western Sahara certainly should be taken as an encouraging sign and we should follow up on it with an active, positive policy posture supporting a negotiated settlement.³ If we reassure King Hassan that we can continue strong military support to Morocco for defensive purposes if the Western Sahara situation is resolved then I think we use positive leverage to achieve objectives that we should want:

- self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara achievable as outlined by the recent OAU resolution for a Western Sahara referendum;⁴

- support for and good relations with a strong, moderate Morocco free of its conflict in the Western Sahara and thereby free to play a more active role in the peace process;

- improvement in relations with Algeria;

- reassurance to African states and Middle East states that the United States is sincere in seeking peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and that the United States is willing to make a great effort to play this facilitating role.

² In telegram 196360 to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott, July 28, the Department summarized the July 20 and July 24 Senate and House hearings on the Western Sahara: "Department has used these hearings to test possible congressional receptivity to a relaxation of present USG policy of not selling Morocco arms for use in Western Sahara." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790344–0085) For text of Saunders's testimony and statement, see *U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, July 23 and 24, 1979*, pp. 77–116. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979)

³ In telegram 5380 from Rabat, August 20, the Embassy reported on Hassan's August 19 press conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790379–0787)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 45.

Therefore, I would suggest a policy strategy composed of the following elements:

A. Publicly reject the sale of equipment such as the OV-10 and state why we will not sell it. We should follow a policy of modest arms sales for Morocco. Our immediate goals in our arms sales policies should be three-fold: 1.) be partially responsive to the King's need for defensive equipment for Morocco; 2.) disassociate ourselves from his Saharan policies in strong terms but leave us with the ability to try to influence him privately; and 3.) seek to build a new confidence relationship with the King to enable us to help him out of his disastrous course in the Western Sahara;

B. Convince Morocco that self-determination of the Saharan people has not occurred but will have to occur if a settlement is to be reached. Support and explore all possible ways of achieving a settlement which guarantees self-determination for the Western Sahara but also allows King Hassan to save face in accepting it. Additional measures should be taken to try to involve third parties, particularly Spain, which have some responsibility for the existing problem and give them the support required to play a constructive role. The efforts that have been made so far are inadequate to exclude this as a possibility;

C. Seize this problem as an opportunity to work more closely with the new leadership in Algeria, establish new rapport and set our relations on a positive footing for the future. While we should not expect Algeria to be able to deliver Polisario agreement in a settlement Algeria can and should be involved in a positive way with encouragement from us;

D. Don't ignore Mauritania. The new leadership there has chosen a difficult course in terms of its relations with Morocco by signing a peace agreement with the Polisario. The government has little leverage in the present situation. While not seeking to anger Morocco more, there must be some concrete things we could do to show some support to Mauritania;

E. Deal with the Polisario directly and involve them in any settlement plans or preparations from the outset. At a minimum our contacts and communications with the Polisario directly and through third parties,—France, Spain, U.N.,—should be sustained and more accurate;

F. Give new priority to the problem by assigning a special ambassador and team to work on the issue and as soon as possible designate a new ambassador for Morocco.

King Hassan's Saharan dilemma has reached a critical phase. Any encouragement we give him to pursue the war against the Polisario could spell disaster for him and for our policy in the region.

I hope these suggestions and thoughts will be useful in your policy planning. Please keep me informed of developments in the Western Sahara and of any new developments in our policy.

With best regards.
Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

**246. Letter From Representative Stephen Solarz to
President Carter¹**

Washington, September 19, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

The State Department, as you are undoubtedly aware, is currently re-evaluating our policy of restricting the sale of arms to Morocco which are suitable for use in the Western Sahara.

In an effort to get a better understanding of the implications of a change in policy for U.S. interests in the region, I recently traveled to Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Spain and France in my capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in order to personally study the problem.² During my trip I met with all of the principal leaders involved including King Hassan II of Morocco, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, Prime Minister Ould Haidalla of Mauritania, and the leadership of the Polisario Front.³ While I have already briefed Undersecretary of State Newsom on my conclusions, and will be seeing Secretary Vance this week, I would like to give you a brief report on my principal observations and conclusions.

My basic recommendations are these:

1) We should continue our current policy of providing Morocco with arms for its own defense but not with arms specifically suitable for use in the Western Sahara;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Unclassified. A stamped notation on the letter reads: "Congressional Liaison" and is dated September 20. A copy was sent to Beckel.

² See Document 242 and footnote 3, Document 241.

³ No detailed account of the meeting with the Polisario was found. In telegram 2299 from Algiers, August 22, the Embassy provided a summary of the meeting between Solarz and Polisario Assistant Secretary General Bachir Mustapha Sayyed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790383–0736)

2) We should quietly encourage efforts by friendly intermediaries, such as Spain, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and France, to bring the parties to the conflict together in order to encourage a peaceful settlement and help King Hassan extricate himself from a conflict he cannot win militarily and which, if it continues, may well undermine him politically; and

3) We should simultaneously remove the existing prohibitions on contact between our diplomats and Polisario officials and on visits by our diplomatic personnel to the Moroccan-held areas of the Western Sahara.⁴

I believe it would be a fundamental contradiction of the principles on which our country was founded if we were to assist in the suppression of a genuinely indigenous and internationally recognized effort to achieve self-determination, in the absence of any compelling strategic and political considerations to the contrary. In the case of the Western Sahara, I believe that the provision of arms to Morocco to combat the Polisario would be compatible with neither our ideals nor our interests.

When I began my visit to the region, Mr. President, I leaned toward the view that there might well be a convincing strategic and political case for changing our arms sales policy. But I came away from my trip persuaded that the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara would have significant negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy and that the advantages cited in behalf of such a course of action are either minimal or non-existent.

In the first place, I'm convinced on the basis of detailed and exclusive conversations with the leaders of the Polisario as well as the observations of knowledgeable journalists and diplomats that this is an authentic national liberation movement which has managed to create a national as opposed to a purely tribal sense of political consciousness, and that it is likely to play a major role in the political future of the region. An independent Saharan entity would have a probable population of over 100,000 and a substantial resource base. Furthermore, of all the liberation movements in the world, there is none I can think of that is seemingly less hostile to and potentially more friendly towards the West than the Polisario. Based on my conversations with the Polisario leadership, it is clear that they are neither pro-Marxist nor pro-Soviet. Indeed, the leadership has specifically refrained from asking the Soviets for military support because it does not want to internationalize the conflict. And it has indicated that in the context of

⁴ In telegram 46369 to Rabat, February 24, the Department transmitted guidelines for contact with Polisario representatives at post. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Algeria, 10/31/79-11/3/79: Briefing Book [III])

an independent Saharan state it would be inclined, for economic and geopolitical reasons, to look to the West, not the East, for support. Consequently, while we may not have any real interest in facilitating the establishment of some kind of Saharan homeland in the Western Sahara, it seems to me we clearly do not have any significant interest in preventing it.

Second, while Morocco would clearly like to purchase counter-insurgency weaponry from us, I am persuaded after my conversations with both Moroccan officials and U.S. diplomats in Rabat that a continued refusal on our part to provide this equipment would not occasion a serious break in our relationship, although it would undoubtedly be a [illegible] of continued irritation. In fact, the state of U.S.-Moroccan relations is much better than I was led to believe before I made the trip, partly because of U.S. cooperation in the Shaba airlift, the recent Congressional decision to increase U.S. military aid by 50%, the sale of spare parts for the F5s, and the Administration's approval of the sale of U.S.-licensed Chinook helicopters to Morocco by Italy.⁵ In fact, Moroccan leaders seem much more interested in our diplomatic understanding than in the arms sales issue per se. We also have to ask what an improvement in Moroccan-American relations would actually produce. If the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara would lead the Moroccans to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, endorse the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and effectively support the Camp David process—thereby providing President Sadat with additional backing in the Arab world—it would be possible to make a very persuasive case for some change in our arms sales policy. But to the extent that the King has decided to sever relations with Egypt and refrain from supporting the Camp David process because he clearly believes that the opposite course would be incompatible with his own political interests, it is exceedingly unlikely that a change in our arms sales policy would produce a reversal of his present position.

Third, a change in policy would undoubtedly bring to a halt the improvement that has taken place in our economic and political relationship with Algeria, which is Polisario's major external supporter. In recent years Algeria has become a much more important economic partner of the U.S. than Morocco. Thus Algeria provides 9% of our crude oil imports (16% of East Coast imports); U.S. firms have won over \$6 billion in construction contracts since the early 1970s; and Export-Import bank exposure is now at the \$1.4 billion mark. Algeria has also begun to take more moderate positions on a number of international issues which are consistent with our own policy objectives. The

⁵ See Document 167 and footnote 6 thereto.

Algerians have worked with Yugoslavia to try to prevent Cuba from moving the Non-Aligned Conference toward a directly pro-Soviet position, worked for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two Yemens, and opposed Soviet and Cuban policy in Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda. Furthermore, the election of President Chadli Benjedid, who unlike former President Boumedienne is more of a pragmatist than an ideologue, has created new opportunities for improvement in our bilateral relations. There is reason to believe that, if and when President Benjedid consolidates his power, the stage will be set for further progress in the relations between our two countries. But such an improvement will probably become impossible if, in the interim, we eliminate the restrictions on the sale of arms to Morocco which are suitable for use in the Sahara. I thought you would be interested in knowing that as my meeting with Benjedid concluded and he escorted me to the door, he indicated that he was very much looking forward to his forthcoming visit to Washington next year, although he indicated that he would not be able to come if in the interim we abandoned our policy of neutrality on the conflict in the Western Sahara.

Fourth, a change in our arms sales policy would have adverse consequences for our relations with a number of important African and Third World countries. At its Monrovia summit this July, the Organization of African Unity voted overwhelmingly to approve the recommendations of five African Presidents (Nimeiri of Sudan, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Traoré of Mali, Touré of Guinea and Nyerere of Tanzania) for a cease fire and internationally supervised referendum in order to achieve self-determination in the Western Sahara.⁶ This represented a clear evolution in the OAU's position on the conflict, and I was particularly impressed by OAU Chairman and Liberian President Tolbert's advice, when I was in Liberia last month, that the vote indicated "a clear consensus in Africa for an independent Saharan state" and "Africa would look with much disfavor" upon a change in our arms sales policy.⁷ In particular, Nigeria and Tanzania are likely to take equally strong positions. In the aftermath of the OAU vote, Morocco's diplomatic position has been greatly weakened and we will probably see growing support for the Polisario position at the United Nations, in other world forums, and in acts of individual diplomatic recognition. While few states are likely to permit bilateral relations with the U.S. to suffer due to this issue alone, a change in our policy will probably contribute to cumulative downturns where there are also

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 45.

⁷ In telegram 6173 from Monrovia, August 8, the Embassy reported on Solarz's meeting with Tolbert. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790360-0171)

other matters of concern. It would also deeply disappoint many of our African friends who have appreciated the determination of your Administration to view African problems in an African context and who would see such a change in policy as an implicit repudiation of the new direction in which you have moved our African policy.

Fifth, Morocco's international isolation has been accentuated by its recent *de facto* annexation of the Mauritanian-administered portion of the Western Sahara. A U.S. decision to provide Morocco with arms for use in the Sahara at this time would appear, both at home and abroad, as a reward for aggression. I understand that the Department has been preparing a new legal interpretation of our military agreement with Morocco that would recognize Morocco's "lawful administrative authority" in its sector of the Sahara and thereby enable us to provide arms that could be used in that sector to defend Southern Morocco.⁸ But this would not justify their inevitable use in the formerly Mauritanian sector to defend a clearly illegitimate act of territorial annexation.

Sixth, by removing restrictions on arms sales to Morocco we would run the risk of internationalizing what has so far been a localized crisis. Until now, Polisario has refrained from requesting Soviet military assistance. If we change our policy, the Soviets could see an opportunity to gain an advantage, particularly in view of Polisario's widespread diplomatic support, and begin to become involved in a conflict from which they have so far abstained.

Seventh, some people have argued that a change in policy would increase our influence with Morocco and put us in a better position to urge Morocco to negotiate a resolution of the conflict. In reality, I believe it would be likely to have the opposite effect. During the course of my conversation with the King, he made it clear that he looked to U.S. arms for the Sahara as a means for producing a quick Moroccan victory. To the extent that both the King and his chief military advisers believe that a military victory is possible—in spite of the opinion of knowledgeable military observers that such a victory is impossible—our selling Morocco arms suitable for use in the Sahara would not encourage Morocco to make the concessions necessary for a diplomatic solution. I also suspect that such a change in policy would result in a hardening of the Algerian position, and to the extent that Algerian cooperation is necessary for a peaceful resolution of the problem, would reduce the chances for a negotiated settlement. Since our major interest in the Sahara is in ending the war rather than in facilitating any particular outcome of the war, and since the only way to end the war is by political rather than military means, I think it would be a serious

⁸ Not found.

mistake to initiate a change in policy that would make meaningful negotiations more difficult to achieve.

Eighth, some have suggested that a change in our arms sales policy would be seen by other countries as a manifestation of our willingness to help a friend in need. While there are some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt which would clearly be pleased by such a development, I do not believe they view our arms sales policy toward Morocco as a litmus test of our determination to come to the aid of friendly countries. To the extent that we provide Morocco with arms for its own self-defense, but not for use in the Sahara, we can maintain that we are willing to help our friends, although not by providing assistance in a war of dubious legitimacy which has attracted virtually no international support. Also, if we changed our arms sales policy, other friends of the U.S. with interests in the region would be very displeased, particularly Spain, Liberia and Nigeria. Still other friends, such as Kuwait, North Yemen, Tunisia and Jordan, are not particularly concerned with this issue and could easily accept a continuation of our previous policy.

Lastly, it seems to me that from the moment the State Department began to actively consider the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara, all the subsequent developments in the region have militated in favor of a continuation of our present policy: the OAU has voted overwhelmingly in favor of self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara; the Non-Aligned Conference has strongly supported the new OAU position; Morocco has annexed the Mauritanian-administered section of the Sahara and been denounced by its former partner as an aggressor; and both President Tolbert and Tunisian President Bourguiba have called for regional peace conferences to deal with the conflict. Also, if the purpose of a change in arms sales policy is to improve our relations with Morocco, I hope you will take into consideration that such a change would inevitably result in a significant confrontation between Congress and the Administration. Even if the opponents of a change in policy were not successful—although once the facts were made known to a currently indifferent Congress, the prospects for passing restrictive legislation would be quite favorable—the confrontation itself would probably do our relations with Morocco more harm than good.

Finally, Mr. President, I would hope that instead of increasing the level of militarization of the conflict in the Sahara we could, without taking the lead ourselves, quietly encourage other interested parties, such as Saudi Arabia, Spain and Liberia, to take the initiative in moving the dispute from the battlefield to the conference table. In this regard, I believe it will be helpful if we quietly ease the existing prohibitions on contact between our diplomats and Polisario officials and on visits

by our diplomatic personnel to the Moroccan-held areas of the Western Sahara. For us as a matter of policy to refrain from these potentially informative contacts is to deprive ourselves of the information needed for rational decision-making. We paid a significant political price by depriving ourselves of such contacts in Iran.

I hope that you will take these views into consideration in your decision-making on this complex problem. Needless to say, I would be more than happy to meet with you personally to discuss the matter further, if you thought that such a meeting would be useful.⁹

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Solarz
Chairman
Subcommittee on Africa

⁹ Senators Church and Javits also wrote Carter about U.S. arms sales to Morocco and the Western Sahara on September 21; see Document 177.

247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 22, 1979, 2308Z

275033. For Charge. Subject: Western Sahara Policy Review.²

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. At earliest opportunity please convey following message to King Hassan, either directly or through a channel of established reliability:

A. The U.S. Government has decided to proceed with congressional consultations on the possible sale to Morocco of a limited number of OV-10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and other material to be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–0140. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, and Tunis. Drafted by Coon; cleared in NEA, NSC, and DOD; approved by Newsom.

² For the policy review and the President's decision on the arms sale to Morocco, see Documents 41, 42, and 46–49.

supportive of Morocco in dealing with increased military challenges.³ We are not in a position at this time to predict the result of these consultations but wanted His Majesty to be aware of the direction in which our policy is moving.

B. The decision is based on the U.S. desire to support a long time friend of the U.S. in reaching a solution to a difficult problem. At the same time, it is essential that the U.S. and Morocco have a common view of the purpose of this support. That is, it is important that we both understand that a liberalized U.S. military supply policy is for the purpose of stabilizing the situation and thereby encouraging both sides to come to the negotiating table.

C. The U.S. believes that the continuation of the conflict in the Sahara is in no one's interest, including that of Morocco and that the time has now come for Morocco to move from a position of renewed strength to take the lead in negotiating a resolution of the conflict. The U.S. hopes that, by making known its willingness to strengthen Morocco's defense, the Government of Morocco will be in a better position to negotiate a peaceful resolution with all the parties principally concerned. We will want to undertake discussions at an appropriate time on the full context and implications of the President's decision. Indications of progress toward a peaceful resolution will play an important part in the implementation of the President's decision.

3. FYI only: While President's decision involves provision of 6 OV-10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and other material useful in the Sahara, the full package is conditional on the King's willingness to negotiate with the Algerians and the Polisario. Decision states the OV-10's should not be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations. However, we believe that best tactic is to raise this requirement in a discussion with Hassan that follows this initial presentation, and where this requirement could be placed in the context of a description of congressional and other restraints on U.S. policy in this area.

Christopher

³ In telegram 275034 to Algiers, October 21, the Embassy was instructed to inform the Government of Algeria of congressional consultations on the sale of military equipment to Morocco: "As we have previously told GOA, the United States, as a friend of Morocco cannot be indifferent to Morocco's legitimate defense needs. We wish to respond to these needs in a context which will, at the same time, promote meaningful moves on the part of all concerned toward a fair settlement. We hope that if, within this context, Morocco shows an inclination to move toward a settlement, such moves will be reciprocated by Algeria and the Polisario." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483-0146)

248. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 31, 1979, 1705Z

7739. Subject: (U) Call by Deputy Secretary Christopher on King on October 30.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Summary: During two and one-half hour session with King Hassan and his principal advisers, Deputy Secretary Christopher discussed the President's recent decision on arms assistance to Morocco. Hassan set forth his reactions, military needs, and thinking on the prospects for reaching a peaceful solution to the problem of the Western Sahara. End summary.

3. King Hassan received Deputy Secretary Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray, Mr. Trattner of the Deputy Secretary's staff, and Charge Moffat for a wide-ranging two and one-half hour discussion late morning October 30. Flanking the King were his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, his three Royal Counselors and Moroccan Ambassador to Washington Bengelloun.

4. Mr. Christopher began with an expression of appreciation to the King for receiving him on short notice during a busy holiday week. He had been instructed by the President to come to Morocco as soon as possible to talk to His Majesty. Mr. Christopher elaborated upon the President's high regard for the King's role and position, and Hassan's support for the U.S. policies in a number of areas. Dep Sec said the President had instructed him to speak to King very directly about the President's decision to supply additional military equipment to Morocco. Christopher emphasized the President's determination to support our friends, and to assist Morocco so that it could seek a peaceful solution from a position of strength.

5. Mr. Christopher detailed the kind of equipment envisaged in the President's decision and the reasoning behind it. He focused particularly on OV-10's and TOW-mounted Cobras, indicating that we were less sure of Morocco's interest in the Cobras, since it had been quite some time since we had heard from the GOM on this subject. Should the GOM prefer another kind of armed helicopter, such as the Hughes 500, we would try to accommodate their preference. (At the afternoon meeting held with Foreign Minister and the military staff, Moroccan

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2003. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

Air Force Col. Kabbaj indicated to Mr. Murray that a discussion with the King following Mr. Christopher's morning meeting had resulted in a decision to drop the Cobra altogether, and select instead the Hughes MD500, which he described as less costly and less sophisticated and much better suited to Morocco. Col. Kabbaj indicated that he was making a formal request at the King's instruction).²

6. Mr. Christopher explained that he was accompanied by Mr. Murray from DOD who was prepared to discuss Morocco's equipment needs in detail if that was desired. He noted that Mr. Murray had just returned from Saudi Arabia. Given the magnitude of the sales contemplated, they would have to be presented to the Congress. It was important to begin this process as early as possible because the President was anxious to carry this through.

7. Mr. Christopher then gave his analysis of the climate within Congress and emphasized how important it was for Morocco to help us with Congress. We would have an insurmountable problem unless Congress could be convinced that His Majesty sincerely desired meaningful negotiations.

8. Though the U.S. had no blueprints for solutions to the conflict in the Western Sahara, and wanted to be neither arbiter nor mediator, we felt the time was ripe for the King to take the lead toward negotiations. Our discussions with the Algerian Government led us to believe that President Bendjedid's government in Algeria does not wish to see a change in the Government of Morocco and on the contrary views the continuation of Hassan's regime as important for stability of the region. We hope the King will now demonstrate the statesmanship he has shown throughout his life by entering into a new phase of negotiations, reflecting his country's renewed strength.

9. We have followed closely the twists and turns of the situation, and believe that negotiations could succeed only if all interested parties participated. We are aware of the difficult situation concerning the Polisario and prescribe no formula, but hope that the King will find some way to include the Polisario in the search for a peaceful solution.

10. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude to His Majesty for hearing him out and expressed his interest in listening to His Majesty's views about the manner in which the negotiating process might be started, the form a solution could take, as well as His Majesty's evalua-

² In telegram 285147 to Rabat, Algiers, and Jidda, November 1, the Department provided an account of the afternoon meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503-0552)

tion of how the Tunis meeting³ and President Tolbert's upcoming visit could be used as occasions to move forward on the negotiating front.

11. His Majesty responded that he would speak in all candor since he felt that clarity was the best form of diplomacy. He would start with Mr. Christopher's last comments. He would have much preferred that this joint working session between long-standing allies and friends could have been devoted to ways of developing Morocco's resources in the field of energy and production rather than talking about war. His Ambassador in Washington could explain at greater detail that the present state of belligerency had been neither foreseen nor desired by Morocco. Would it be logical to seek peace between Israel and the Arabs, and not want peace between Morocco and Algeria? Peace was His Majesty's overriding concern for the sake of both his country and his own career. The King indicated that having doubled his borders in the past three years he could think of nothing better than the prospect of peace and regional cooperation.

12. He was pleased that his American friends recognized that a stronger Morocco would be in a better position to pursue negotiations. He wanted the President to be assured that the problem of the Sahara was not a territorial problem. The nature of the conflict was the incompatibility between a totalitarian and a democratic regime that could not survive and co-exist in the region. Moscow's expansionism was opposed by the peoples of the region who do not want to be colonized by Moscow. Negotiations were needed but it would not be easy.

13. His Majesty had a political plan in mind and [garble—would share?] it with President Carter when the time came. He would communicate it to the President personally. The year 1980 would be favorable to peace and negotiations, but Morocco must have the assistance of all its friends in the U.S. and the Arab world.

14. The King asserted that Congress would not be so blind as to refuse to help the President, if Congress understood that Morocco was indispensable to the survival of Israel (because if Morocco was lost the Straits of Gibraltar would not be free and Israel could not be resupplied nor could Greece and Turkey be supported). Surely this argument ought to convince hesitant Congressmen.

15. His Majesty stated that Libya was at the root of all the problems of the region but Khadafi was not the mastermind, decisions were made in the Kremlin.

16. Hassan then turned to the discussion of military equipment, stressing that the OV-10 was an indispensable weapon for the form of desert warfare forced upon him. It would remain useful for years

³ The Arab League Summit was held in Tunis November 20–22.

to come and he thought it might be a good idea to look for ways to reactivate the production line. (In the afternoon staff talks, reported separately, Ambassador Bengelloun indicated that they had already talked to Rockwell executives along those lines informally on a number of occasions and that he foresaw no problems).

17. The King felt that there should be a joint Saudi-Moroccan approach to Rockwell if the U.S. agreed. The King argued that OV-10s would be of great use in the Arabian Peninsula in countering guerrilla warfare, such as the Dofar rebellion. Mid-air refueling was also a vital need to be met. (At the subsequent staff discussions, the Moroccans indicated that they had chosen the KC-135 for this purpose and might also adapt some of their C-130s for that purpose). The King emphasized that the kind of equipment he needs [garble—must] be conventional, sturdy, lethal and reliable. He described some of the difficulties encountered by equipment in desert warfare conditions and stressed that the Armed Forces plan of 1974 had made no provision for desert warfare. No one had thought there would be a war between Algeria and Morocco.

18. At this point, however, Morocco knew that the OV-10 was definitely the kind of aircraft it needed. The Cobra also met Moroccan requirements. But six of each would not give Morocco the strong position it needed to negotiate; in fact it would create more dangers for Morocco because it would arouse the enemy without giving Morocco the necessary strength. If six of each was all that he could have he would prefer to turn them down because it would not help him. The King reiterated the need to reactivate the OV10 production line for the sake of a number of countries in the area who would need this kind of defensive aircraft. The U.S., he said, should think in terms of weapons its non-NATO allies need.

19. The King stressed the importance of obtaining more F5E's and indicated that in 10 or 15 years Morocco would have the most credible air force in Africa and that this would serve all of Morocco's friends. At present, aircraft numbers favored Algeria.

20. If Algeria stopped supporting the Polisario then Libya would take over completely and this would create a danger for Algeria itself. The King felt that at some point Algeria and Morocco would become objective allies against the threat of Polisario actions. Algeria's economic situation was very shaky and its agriculture had collapsed. President Bendjedid wanted to renounce Boumedienne's experiments and hoped to achieve a wider opening to the West. However, Libya and Moscow would not let him act freely.

21. Algeria and Morocco could inflict considerable damage on one another in a war. It would be a crime for either side to initiate it, and it would take a couple of generations to recover. The King wanted the

President to be convinced that he would not make war against Algeria and would not go beyond his borders. He just needed the means to score a few points in the field. Then he could work on the King's real problems here: 3.5 percent annual population growth, the need for schools, teachers and food for these growing numbers.

22. Morocco's problem was compounded by its geographical location and the absence of good neighbors. He described Mauritania as being in total disarray and Spain as having to relearn to live within the international community after 40 years of isolation. If Morocco was lost, the Sixth Fleet could go into dry dock. In conclusion the King wanted the President to be assured that he had always been loyal with his partners, even with his enemies. There was all the more reason to be loyal when dealing with a friend like the U.S. and President Carter.

23. If given means to score in the field, he felt that 1980 could bring peace to the region. He had a plan which he would communicate orally to the President when the time came. The sooner he could score the sooner that time would come. He summarized the equipment needs by describing the Cobras, OV10 and F5E as three indispensable links in one continuous chain and pointed out again the inadequacy of numbers since to have one aircraft flying, have to have TOW in maintenance.

24. Mr. Christopher responded with a brief technical discussion on the Cobras, F5Es and OV10s and their availability. He explained that the 6 Cobras offered for early delivery would be from our own forces. We were prepared to offer additional Cobras, but these would come from production with a long lead time for delivery. We need an indication from His Majesty so that we can go to Congress and begin the process of consultation.

25. At Mr. Christopher's request, Mr. Murray explained that our equipment is either in the hands of our own soldiers or in production. We had made a major decision to withdraw OV10s and Cobras from our own inventories. This would enable us to start early delivery with both political and military impact. Mr. Christopher discussed the 20 F5Es which the Moroccans had believed available from the cancelled sale to Egypt. Mr. Murray pointed out that the aircraft were without engines or ground support systems and had been offered to other governments for eventual purchase. Mr. Murray was not sure what other aircraft were available as an alternative to the F5E. Mr. Christopher indicated readiness to hold additional discussions at the expert level in the afternoon as suggested by His Majesty.

26. Turning to the OAU's mediation efforts and President Tolbert's visit, Mr. Christopher asked the King for an evaluation. The King responded that President Tolbert would be here [garble—next Saturday?] and that he would talk about the OAU's role in the Sahara. The

problem was that President Tolbert often changes his mind. African-style palavers were time-consuming. The King was of course himself an African but was also a European by education. The procedure he had in mind would be much quicker and more effective; the King indicated he could say no more at this point. He appreciated importance of the President's decision. It indicated that the U.S. would not hesitate to choose between its friends and those who are not. It was an important international decision and would be welcomed in Africa to give renewed courage to some who were beginning to worry. If the King wanted the war to drag on he would only ask for smaller quantities of equipment but he did not want the war to go on. He wanted to be able to move rapidly. He reiterated that he wanted the President to be assured that he would not violate Algerian territory or Algerian air space. The process that would lead to peace from a position of strength was taking shape in his mind. He would seek international agreement for it, not just African support alone, because he wanted Morocco to be rid of the problem once and for all. He did not want to say more at this point but would share his plan with the President when the time came.

27. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude for the time devoted by the King, and the candid discussions of the issues. The President had made an important and difficult decision that indicated our support of a long time friend. The King would see that the implementation of that decision would reflect our determination to stand by our friends.

28. Mr. Christopher then asked to see the King privately for a few minutes. He gave him the President's letter stressing the importance the President attaches to his private correspondence with His Majesty.⁴ The King replied he would treat also very confidentially. Mr. Christopher discussed his forthcoming press comments. A brief discussion of the Tunis Summit resulted in the King's statement that he felt his presence was required and he would attend. The King said that after Baghdad, the time has come to restore a calm atmosphere. The King expressed his hope for an early arrival of Ambassador and Mr. Christopher confirmed that this would be around December 1. In parting the King asked Mr. Christopher to convey his strong personal regards to the President, to Mrs. Carter and to "his friend" Miss Lillian.

⁴ See Document 179.

29. The above has not been cleared by Mr. Christopher.⁵ Department may wish to repeat to Algiers for attention of Mr. Brzezinski.

Moffat

⁵ In telegram 7712 from Rabat, October 30, Christopher summarized the meeting with Hassan for Vance and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77–11/80)

249. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, November 2, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

Spanish Government:

Mr. José Pedro Perez-Llorca y Rodrigo, Minister of the Presidency
Mr. Pedro Lopez Aguirrebengoa—Director General of African and Continental
Asian Affairs in Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador José Maria Ullrich y Rojac, Spanish Ambassador to Algeria
Mr. Joachim Ortega, Chief of Cabinet of Minister of the Presidency

U.S. Government:

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr., Ambassador to Algeria
Mr. Robert Gates, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan, State Department interpreter

SUBJECT

Western Sahara and Spanish-Cuban Relations

On November 2, 1979, Dr. Brzezinski, accompanied by Ambassador Haynes, Mr. Gates and Mr. Toumayan, met at the residence of the Spanish Ambassador to Algeria for one hour of talk over breakfast with the Spanish Minister of the Presidency, Mr. José Pedro Perez-Llorca y Rodrigo, at the latter's request. In setting up the meeting,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons, Brzezinski: 9–12/79. Secret. Drafted by Haynes. The meeting took place at the Spanish Ambassador's residence. Brzezinski led the U.S. delegation to the 25th anniversary celebration of the Algerian revolution.

the Spanish Ambassador explained to Ambassador Haynes that the Minister, who was heading up Spain's delegation to the Algerian 25th anniversary celebration of the revolution, wanted to take advantage of his presence in the same place with Dr. Brzezinski to discuss, in particular, the problem of the Western Sahara. In opening his remarks, the Minister explained to Dr. Brzezinski that he wanted to talk about Spain's concern for this region as he thought it would be helpful to have such a preliminary discussion in preparation for future meetings in Madrid.²

The Minister explained that Spain was concerned about the state of Morocco's military preparedness and about the present political situation in the region posed by the warfare in the Sahara. He said that it was the Spanish view that the U.S. global interests required us to be interested in the current problems in North Africa, but that Spain has a very direct regional interest in North African developments because of the problems it is having with the liberation movement for the Canary Islands and the constant threat that Morocco will one day swallow up the Spanish enclaves in its territory. In addition, he said that any intensification in the Sahara situation inevitably affects Spain, citing as one example of such an effect the fact that Spain is in the same position as the United States as a big purchaser of Algerian oil and gas.

Spain, he said, has observed an apparent change in U.S. policy in North Africa. He felt that Spain would agree with the United States that Morocco must be stabilized, but was not sure that he understood the subtle shades of the changed U.S. policy. Therefore, he specifically asked Dr. Brzezinski whether the U.S. has an outline of what it thought might be a peaceful solution to the Sahara crisis.

In replying, Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. does not have a specific view of the nature of a settlement. He expressed the opinion that the nature of any eventual settlement was probably unclear even to the actual participants in the Sahara conflict themselves. However, the U.S. judgment is that neither side has the ability to impose a military solution on the other without engaging in a mutually destructive war. The United States does feel, Dr. Brzezinski said, that in time there will be movement toward a political solution through means of indirect approaches of third parties. It must be understood that the U.S. does not intend to become a mediator in this dispute, preferring to leave that to the Arab countries, the OAU and ultimately to Algeria and Morocco themselves. Nevertheless, Dr. Brzezinski emphasized, it is the U.S. concern not to have a military solution imposed on a friend of

² See Document 255.

the U.S. and it is important that anyone with any ideas of imposing such a solution see this clearly. He added that as long as one side or the other feels that it can prevail militarily, there will be no impetus to negotiate.

Dr. Brzezinski continued that the U.S. is counting on common sense in Algeria and Morocco to create the conditions for a solution. Just when or how those conditions will be created, no one knows at this time. At the same time, we cannot ignore the growth in Algerian military strength which is readily explained by virtue of the fact that Algeria won its liberation struggle with arms.

The Minister agreed with Dr. Brzezinski's view that the Algerians were building up militarily and compared them to the old-time Prussians. Dr. Brzezinski felt they were more like the old-time Polish nationalists with whom they shared a revolutionary mystique with a sometimes inflated sense of their strength, but ultimately quite realistic. He told the Minister that he was moderately optimistic that Algeria would not ultimately seek a military solution.

The Minister then asked Dr. Brzezinski whether it was the political aim of the United States to keep the conflict and the expectations of people in that conflict as low as possible. He continued by asking for Dr. Brzezinski's assessment of the situation which saw Morocco's isolation increasing in the world community at the same time that support for the Algerian position was growing. Dr. Brzezinski replied that it was, indeed, this phenomenon of isolation which made it essential for the Moroccans to find a formula that would give the people of the Western Sahara an opportunity to express their desire for self-determination.

The Minister then asked Dr. Brzezinski if the United States saw this conflict in the Sahara becoming part of the East-West struggle. Dr. Brzezinski replied that so long as this conflict does not escalate, it will remain outside of the East-West struggle. However, if the conflict escalates, Dr. Brzezinski felt there was a good chance that it could become a new element in the East-West struggle. The Minister then asked whether the U.S. felt that furnishing arms was one way to prevent escalation of the conflict. Dr. Brzezinski replied that he felt that this action of the U.S. would keep King Hassan from lashing out in frantic anxiety. He then asked the Minister how Spain assessed the situation.

In reply, the Minister said that Spain felt that there was a sense of frustration in the Moroccan army and in certain of the internal political forces in Morocco. Frustration, he said, tends to radicalize positions. Therefore, Spain would certainly share the U.S. view that King Hassan will need a state of tranquility in order to make the right decisions.

At this point Director General Aguirrebengoa expressed the opinion that, beginning about a year ago King Hassan abandoned long-

range planning in favor of conducting his war effort on a day-to-day basis. The Director General felt that Hassan had to do so in order to give himself the flexibility to restrain his army and certain other forces in his country from acting out of desperation. Dr. Brzezinski then asked the Director General whether he felt that our decision on arms supply to Morocco would be helpful. The Director General replied that such a decision would only be helpful if it does not escalate the war; but, he felt that there was a great danger that escalation could result from the decision.

The Minister said that our common objective is to prevent the destabilization of Morocco. Should the King lose his throne, a successor government that was characterized by either a left-wing or a highly nationalistic regime would pose serious problems to Spain and within Spain and could have a serious impact on Spain's internal politics.

Dr. Brzezinski then asked the Minister whether the Spanish had any expectations that the current situation would result when they handed over the Spanish Sahara to the joint administration of Morocco and Mauritania. The Minister replied that none of his generation in the Spanish Government had been involved in those events at that time. He said that Franco's politicians had several alternative choices to face up to in giving up the Spanish Sahara: (a) allow a war to be waged for control of the territory, (b) seek a provisional arrangement which would allow Spain to get out of its colonial administration peacefully, or (c) get out altogether without any arrangement and risk a clash inevitably between Morocco and Algeria. All the current generation can do at this stage is wonder what it would have done at that time under the same circumstances.

Turning to the question of population in the former Spanish Sahara, the Minister said that he felt it was a complete mystery. It was clear, however, that the people who inhabit the territory from time to time were nomadic tribes, often with some connection or relationship to each other, who did not acknowledge colonial or national frontiers. At about the time that Spain gave up its administration, Spanish authorities were trying to count and to settle the population. On this basis, the official figure that the Spanish arrived at for a referendum in 1974 was 73,563. He said that Algeria's claim that the population is 1,000,000 is pure nonsense. Dr. Brzezinski said that it would certainly be helpful if the Spanish could turn over their population records to some impartial authority. The Director General said that they had already given sixty pounds of such documents to the United Nations in January 1978 and that those documents included such specific information as names, numbers in family and literacy. The Spanish estimate that they may have missed at the most 8,000 or 10,000 of the nomadic occupants of the territory in their census.

Dr. Brzezinski asserted that, because of the Spanish experience in the Western Sahara, they were perhaps best able to say what in fact were the basic desires of the people of the territory. The Director General replied that, in the past, none of the people of the territory had any notion of nationalism, but that since 1975 a definite spirit of nationalism had developed, particularly in the refugee camps in the Tindouf area. As a result, he said, now one has to consider all of the related tribal peoples of the Sahara who have been politicized and who have acquired a sense of nationalism, and he would consider this number something closer to 200,000.

The Minister was quick to point out that if this number of politicized nomadic and tribal peoples prevail in their struggle to control the Western Sahara, a destabilizing situation will be created in which all of the areas over which they roam will be placed in dispute. This, he said, could include southern Morocco and all of Mauritania.

The Director General, returning to the subject, expressed the opinion that the problem was no longer one of decolonization. He said that the politicized Sahraoui are clearly more than the 73,000 in the last Spanish census and that they are a reality with which we must deal. As such, they represent a real danger to Morocco and Mauritania. If the Sahara conflict is not resolved in a way that gives them some homeland, the problem is sure to expand. Unfortunately, Spain has not only lost time, but has also lost control, in working toward such a solution. The Minister continued that if there is a bad solution to the Sahara conflict, Spain will be a principal loser. In this connection, he emphasized that Spain does not want to see a triumphant hegemonic Morocco any more than it wants to see such an Algeria.

Referring to possible solutions, Dr. Brzezinski indicated that King Hassan was toying with the idea of turning Mauritania into a sovereign Sahraoui state. The Director General responded that, in the past, this might have been a logical and natural solution and that all of Mauritania and the Tiris El Gharbia might have been reconstituted into a Sahraoui state. But, now it is too late.

The Minister said that it would now be impossible to return to a status quo ante in which the inhabitants of the Western Sahara could be led peacefully to vote on whether they wanted their freedom or wanted to be associated with Morocco.

Ambassador Haynes asked the Spanish present whether they felt that the Polisario could be identified with any particular political ideology. The Director General replied that, at the start of this conflict, the Polisario was attempting to indoctrinate the people in a socialist ideology in the manner of Algeria's FLN. However, as far as their possible Communist orientation was concerned, the Director General was of the opinion that Communism would not find a fertile ground

among the Sahraoui because of certain firmly entrenched religious and cultural traditions. The Minister added that, in any scenario in which the Polisario succeeds in obtaining some territory with which to create a state, that state could only be organized in the radical socialist mode. The problem would then become who would be that state's "big brother": Algeria or some Eastern Bloc power? But such a scenario would definitely destabilize Morocco because it would then be surrounded on all sides by incompatible regimes.

The Spanish Ambassador asked Dr. Brzezinski what had happened in his meeting yesterday with Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia.³ Dr. Brzezinski replied that he had told the Foreign Minister that he did not expect Algeria to "approve" the USG decision, but did feel it was important that he "understand" it. In this connection, Dr. Brzezinski told the Foreign Minister that the U.S. aim was (a) to seek a political settlement, (b) to provide the basis for the parties to the conflict to think in political terms, and (c) to let the Algerians know that the USG stands behind its friends. Dr. Brzezinski said that, after having had several contacts with Algerian leaders, he was convinced that they were fairly realistic. He did not have the impression that they were eager to intensify the conflict. Thinking out loud, the Minister responded to this latter point by asking, "But, what if Morocco resorts to 'hot pursuit'?"

Dr. Brzezinski said that he is sure that all parties feel a "political solution" would mean an outcome that they desire. However, he said that he had impressed upon the Algerian Foreign Minister the fact that a political solution will mean that neither the Algerians nor the Moroccans will achieve their optimum objectives.

He concluded the discussion of the Western Sahara by saying that he was impressed with the realism of the Algerian leadership whose stands were not emotional. Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. desires to keep bilateral channels of communication open to them. He said that it was essential that this struggle not grow into one that changes Algeria from a realistic, independent, radical power into one that is ideologically aligned. To do so would only internationalize the problem.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

³ See Document 75. Brzezinski also met with President Benjedid later on November 2; see Document 76.

250. Letter From President Carter to King Hassan II of Morocco¹

Washington, December 13, 1979

Your Majesty:

I would like to take the occasion of Ambassador Duke's arrival in Rabat to reiterate our interest in a continuing close relationship with a strong Morocco at peace with its neighbors.

Now that we have begun the process of notifying Congress of our intentions to provide Morocco with new forms and quantities of military equipment, I hope that you will move boldly toward the achievement of a negotiated settlement of the dispute in the Western Sahara. Such an initiative would be particularly useful to us as we proceed with the process of Congressional consultations on specific sales. I hope an occasion will arise soon which will provide the opportunity for a tangible step toward negotiations.

The volatile nature of current world events makes it all the more important that the Western Sahara dispute be resolved peacefully before it can be exploited by other interests. I was particularly pleased when Deputy Secretary Christopher reported to me that you have a plan for negotiations in 1980 that you will communicate to me at the appropriate time.²

Ambassador Duke has my full confidence and I hope you will speak to him as you would to me personally. In particular, I hope you will feel free to convey to him your views on how a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara dispute might be achieved.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 13, Morocco: King Hassan II, 4/77–12/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 248. In an October 31 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: "As his reporting messages indicated, Warren found the King in a very protective mood with respect to possible negotiations, saying that he would reveal his plan only to you, and at the right moment, and being completely noncommittal on involvement of the Polisario." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 10/79)

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, February 5, 1980, 1255Z

814. Subject: (S) Moroccan-Algerian Talks.

1. (S)—Entire text.

2. During Linowitz visit February 4 King Hassan mentioned that “after year and a half” he had gotten discussions started again with the Algerians. Talks had taken place a few days previously and would resume “in earnest” in the next week.

3. From other sources we have learned that Royal Counselor Guedira went to France on January 23 and met with the Algerians on January 25. To the best of our knowledge Guedira remains in Paris.

4. The above information and the Boucetta interview (Rabat 0796)² reinforce my earlier contention that the Moroccans have essentially done what we wanted in demonstrating their willingness—and what appears increasingly as eagerness—to talk seriously about the Sahara.

5. Suggest Department repeat this cable to Algiers and to Tunis Eyes Only for Coon and possibly Paris.

Duke

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² In telegram 796 from Rabat, February 4, the Embassy reported: “In an interview with a Parisian Arabic weekly, Foreign Minister Boucetta took a conciliatory line on the Western Sahara and related issues. Boucetta reaffirmed Morocco’s desire for a dialogue with Algeria and King Hassan’s continued willingness to meet with Algerian President Bendjedid. Boucetta did not rule out Polisario representation in an Algerian delegation during Moroccan-Algerian talks.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800067–0975)

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 15, 1980, 1:45–2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Their Majesties King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. James M. Rentschler, NSC

King Juan Carlos I
Queen Sofia
Spanish Ambassador to the United States, José Llado

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Turning to the Western Sahara conflict, *the King* asked the President if he thought we will be successful with Morocco. (C)

The President replied that he hoped so. He expressed hope that the King could use his influence in that area. (C)

The King stated that King Hassan is very difficult. You can't imagine that man. Hassan thinks nothing of calling the King to announce that Morocco has just seized some of Spain's fishing boats and in the same breath complains that Spain isn't supporting Morocco on the Sahara. The King said he told Hassan that the latter knows very well what is expected of Morocco. And yet Hassan doesn't want to change his position. He is stubborn, stubborn, stubborn. (C)

The President laughed and told the King he would follow his leadership. (C)

The King said that in his view Algeria was not too far away from being willing to talk seriously about the conflict. Suarez, during his visit there, had the same impression. (C)

The President asked the King if he thought Hassan was approaching a time of talking. (C)

The King replied that if Hassan sees internal difficulties he may be willing to talk; but if he finds that people, on patriotic and nationalistic grounds support him, he will stay as he is. The King went on to say that in 1974 the Spanish were in a sense traitors on the question of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House living quarters.

self-determination. They should have pushed this more. In any case, the King added, he has a small feeling that Hassan may not be so strong internally. For example, he has made Dlimi general. And after all, what is Dlimi? (C)

Queen Sofia asked if Dlimi would go against Hassan. (C)

The King replied that he didn't know. He hoped not. (C)

The President observed that Hassan seems pretty determined not to give up his claims to the Sahara. (C)

The King asked if we would reactivate our former naval base at Kenitra. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he would doubt it. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that we needed staging areas—in Portugal, Spain, and possibly Morocco, too. (C)

The President asked if anyone was taking the responsibility of trying to work out an agreement among the parties. We have our own hands full and cannot take on a mediatory role in North Africa. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that Tolbert of Liberia was willing to try but did not really seem to have the necessary stature or competence. (C)

The King said that he had tried to interest Abdullah² in the process. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that Abdullah enjoyed some influence. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he thought the five Wise Men had some chance; however, Hassan would not talk to them. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we considered the new Algerian leadership rational; we believe Hassan could deal with it. (C)

The President said that he has sent Hassan a strong message urging him to negotiate.³ (C)

The King said he might be more willing to do so now that he is getting American help. (C)

The President said he hoped that was true; but it could work out the other way. (C)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

² Polisario representative to the United Nations Majid Abdullah.

³ See Document 250.

253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania¹

Washington, April 5, 1980, 2327Z

89873. Subject: Meeting With Polisario Representative.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: NEA/AFN Director Coon and Deputy Director Smith met Polisario representative Majid Abdullah at Coon's house April 3. Abdullah took standard Polisario position and indicated no flexibility at his level. He did emphasize that Polisario did not claim any portion of what USG considers Morocco proper. Coon explained U.S. policy and overriding U.S. interest in encouraging all parties to move toward peaceful compromise solution of Western Sahara conflict. He expressed USG concern about attacks in Morocco proper and said future contact would be difficult in context such attacks. End summary.

3. Meeting, which was first full exchange between Department representatives and Polisario, opened with both sides expressing pleasure that contact had finally been established. Majid noted importance Polisario attached to USG position and hoped that meeting would be followed by other contacts. He acknowledged that he was not in a position to go beyond his organization's standard policy and suggested it would be helpful for future contacts to include higher-level Polisario representatives. Coon did not react specifically to this but did return to subject later, noting difficulty future contacts when Polisario attacking in Morocco proper (see below).

4. Majid presented Polisario as national liberation movement. He emphasized territorial as opposed to tribal base for organization. It was losing its young men in the fighting but was willing to continue the struggle. Morocco, he argued, was the aggressor, and the Polisario's objective was to keep it from winning. It was not opposed to the regime in Morocco and did not claim any of Morocco proper. It recognized the need to "save face" for King Hassan. However, he had taken a harder line following the U.S. arms supply decision. Morocco was no longer willing to meet with the Polisario, although such a meeting had occurred a year ago in Bamako, where Gen. Dlimi and Royal Counselors Reda Guedira and Bensouda had represented Morocco.

5. Coon emphasized USG view that compromise solution would be necessary. Purpose of our arms supply decision was to encourage

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800171-0648. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Madrid, and USUN. Drafted by Smith; cleared in NEA and AF/W; approved by Newsom.

movement toward such solution. Earlier policy had not visibly helped improve situation, and in addition had harmed U.S. interests in Morocco and our ability to communicate with highest level of Moroccan Government. We had therefore changed our position in an effort to re-establish our ability to make our views known to Morocco. We had also decided to visit Western Sahara and to have official contact with Polisario. We had not, however, changed our position on substance of the problem. We continued to be neutral on eventual status of territory. We did not recognize Moroccan sovereignty. Also, we did not recognize Polisario claims to the territory (and meeting with Majid did not indicate recognition of those claims).

6. Coon continued by noting that we believed neither side could win a military victory. He drew Majid's attention to Assistant Secretary Saunders' January 24 congressional testimony,² for which Majid had been present. U.S. did not believe Morocco could win a military victory. On other hand, we did not believe Polisario could win either, in view of Morocco's much larger population and resource base. Also, Polisario victory would have destabilizing effect in region which would not serve interests of anybody, including Polisario. It could lead to overthrow of King Hassan, which would probably result in military, more hawkish Moroccan regime. (Majid disputed this point, arguing that Polisario felt Moroccan military was more realistic about situation than was the King.)

7. USG, Coon explained, did not claim to have more expertise on the subject than the parties themselves, and it was for them to work out modalities for negotiations and for a compromise solution. We believed a real compromise was necessary, but we would not offer suggestions on how that might be achieved. Negotiations might be possible with the Polisario as a member of the Algerian delegation, but it was really for the parties to work out the "shape of the table". We wanted to do what we could to encourage the parties but would not rpt not serve as mediators ourselves. The dispute was not of our making; we wished to get on the business of cooperating with all of the peoples and governments of the region in pursuit of shared goals of economic and social development.

8. USG position in the future would be influenced by degree of flexibility shown by the parties to the conflict.

² For text of Saunders's statement and testimony, see *Proposed Arms Sale to Morocco: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, January 24 and 29, 1980*, pp. 2-28. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980)

9. Coon then pointed out that a second reason for our policy review last year³ had been Polisario attacks in Morocco proper. Polisario should understand that attacks in Morocco proper significantly changed the situation, bringing into play historic U.S. friendship and support for Morocco. Polisario should be aware of how widely this view was held within the United States.

10. In particular, Coon continued, whole question of his meeting with Majid had been thrown into doubt by recent very large scale fighting in southern Morocco. Future contacts would not be automatic and were not guaranteed. They would be difficult in the context of such attacks.

11. Majid replied by reiterating that Polisario did not claim territory in what USG considers Morocco proper, but it considers there is military justification to pursue attacks there. Polisario believed that colonial frontiers were best left unchanged, and it did not claim Tarfaya Province, which had become part of Morocco in 1959. However, Morocco had important bases within Morocco proper used for military operations in the south. He named specifically Tan Tan, Zaag, Ngueb, Zagora, Agadir and Goulmime. Moreover, Morocco did not recognize any distinction between Morocco proper and the Western Sahara. Therefore, Polisario felt it fully justified to attack in the southern part of Morocco proper. He added, that in the case of the latest fighting Morocco had taken the initiative, not the Polisario.

12. Meeting concluded amicably but with clear understanding that as far as U.S. concerned, future meetings were not guaranteed.

13. For Rabat: Although we made no commitment to do so. We believe we should inform Moroccans contact has taken place. Suggest this be done through Ambassador Bengelloun, who is now in Rabat and who was channel we used originally to tell Morocco we would be talking to Polisario. In view of our desire not to get in middle, we should only tell Bengelloun that Majid repeated standard Polisario line.

Vance

³ See Documents 41, 42, and 46–49.

254. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 7, 1980

SUBJECT

State Contacts with Polisario (C)

I am not sure whether you have seen the attached report of a contact last week here in Washington between State and a Polisario rep.² The meeting was neither discussed with nor cleared by either me or anyone in Bob Hunter's office. (C)

I strongly question whether now, when the first items of equipment in the arms package are being readied for delivery and when the Moroccans have just suffered more serious military reverses in the south, is the right moment for contacts of this kind, which at best will probably confuse our friends and stand to promote Polisario "legitimacy." In fact, given our interest in eschewing any kind of mediatory role, I question whether *any* moment will be right for such contacts. (C)

Unless you have already cleared something on this matter with Saunders or Newsom (or Christopher?), I favor instructing State to lay off dealing with the Polisario.³ (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Morocco: 9/79-1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen." An unknown hand drew an arrow from the subject line to the note "JR 4/11" in the upper right-hand corner.

² Not attached. See Document 253.

³ Aaron initialed the Agree option. Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the page: "DA, Call Newsom. This shld have been cleared with us. ZB." Aaron wrote "Done" next to Brzezinski's note and drew an arrow to the left-hand margin next to it and wrote: "ZB, Was agreed in PRC/SCC that there would be such a contact. No more meetings until Polisario pulls out of Morocco. DA 4/10." For the PRC meeting, see Document 42.

255. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Embassy in Portugal¹

Madrid, June 26, 1980, 1151Z

9702. For Dr. Brzezinski and Under Secretary Newsom only from Todman—No other distribution should be made. Subject: The President's Meeting With Prime Minister Suarez: North Africa and the Western Sahara.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Following is an uncleared draft memorandum of part of the conversation between the President and Prime Minister Suarez at the Prime Minister's office, with Spanish Ambassador Llado and Ambassador Todman present, on June 25. A separate cable reports the other main subject discussed.²

3. The President asked for Suarez's views on North Africa and Western Sahara. He was aware that there were many who did not believe that Hassan intended to negotiate and he understood that the Spanish Government also thought that Hassan might threaten the Spanish enclaves on the African continent. In view of the Spanish special interests in this issue he wondered what possible solutions the Spanish saw.

4. Suarez said it was a very difficult situation with no good solution in sight. The official Spanish position was in favor of self-determination for the Saharoui people. Spain recognized the Polisario as representing the Saharoui people in struggle but not as representative of the whole of the Saharoui people. However, the Polisario does have full support from Libya and Algeria, and recently it reportedly has obtained support from Mauritania where it might find territory for establishing a state. The creation of a Saharoui republic was included on the agenda for the OAU meeting in Sierra Leone and there was a good chance that the Polisario might receive the necessary additional recognition for the admission of the Saharoui state. In that case, Morocco would leave the OAU.

5. Ambassador Todman said his information from some Africans was that other OAU members might also leave the organization in that case, thus causing a split which most members wished to avoid. He

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 6/80. Secret; Immediate. The telegram was repeated to the Department of State for S/S only on July 1. Carter visited Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal after attending the G-7 Economic Summit in Venice.

² Telegram 9701 from Madrid, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-0106)

understood that an effort would be made to establish another study commission in order to postpone the issue while attempts continued toward a negotiated solution.³

6. Suarez said that Morocco also wished to see the issue postponed and had just proposed that a two-thirds majority be required to approve the recognition of a Saharoui state. He believed that the majority of the African states favored postponement while seeking some arrangement between Morocco and Algeria.

7. Suarez said he had been pleased to learn from the President during their Washington meeting that the U.S. intended to provide arms to Morocco only in an amount sufficient to defend itself and give it the strength and confidence to negotiate but not enough for a military victory.⁴ The problem, as he saw it, was that Morocco wanted the entire former Spanish area and of course that was impossible to achieve especially without some understanding with Algeria. Libya was now exacerbating the situation by working closely with the Soviet Union and providing increased assistance to the Polisario. This worried Algeria to a point where it was anxious for a political solution. The difficulty was that Hassan seemed unwilling to negotiate. Hassan wants Spain to side fully with Morocco over this issue while Algeria wants Spain to side with the Polisario. Spain's efforts are aimed at seeking a reasonable balance in the area. Spain wished to see Hassan continue in power and believed that Algeria shared this view, but unfortunately there did not appear to be any way to get Hassan's cooperation. The Algerian President had expressed willingness to hold talks with Hassan and other Arab leaders, including Fahd, and had agreed to assist in arranging for the meetings but Hassan had refused.

8. Suarez added that Spain had an additional problem with Morocco over a fishing agreement which had been signed in 1977 and ratified by the Spanish Parliament only after a prolonged and bitter debate on grounds that the agreement had appeared to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the entire area. Nevertheless, Morocco has still not ratified the agreement. There have been temporary agreements, the last of which is due to expire on June 30. The Spanish offer to Morocco has been very generous in terms of credits offered and assistance to modernize the Moroccan fishing fleet. However, in the negotia-

³ At the OAU Summit in Freetown July 1-4, the issue of Polisario admission, which divided the member nations, was postponed. (Leon Dash, "Angry Debate on Western Sahara War Dominated Meeting of African Leaders," *Washington Post*, July 5, 1980, p. A8)

⁴ Carter and Suarez met in the Cabinet Room at the White House on January 14 from 12:39 to 2:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) For the text of the White House statement released that day, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, pp. 82-83.

tions Morocco has been pressing as well for the right to transport citrus and other fruits and vegetables through Spain to Europe. This poses very serious problems since Morocco has to pay only a 4 percent duty while Spain must pay 12 percent. Spanish producers were totally opposed to allowing transport of the Moroccan produce and had threatened direct action to prevent it. At the same time, the people of the Canary Islands, who are interested in fishing, wish to see a fishing agreement signed as soon as possible.

9. Suarez said the Spanish Government had the impression that Morocco was prepared to exert pressure on Ceuta and Melilla in order to try to force the Spanish hand in the negotiations. If Morocco were to do that then he could assure the President that Spain would react violently. Spain realized that the two small enclaves were difficult to defend; therefore, Spain would have to take offensive action. Plans were ready for such action but he prayed that he would never have to put them into effect. The President said that would mean war and Suarez replied, "exactly." Suarez said a delegation would be leaving on June 26 for negotiations with Morocco. He hoped it would succeed in reaching some agreement to permit continuation of normal relations after June 30.

10. Suarez said the matter of Spanish exports was further complicated now because of the problems that France was creating for Spain by stopping or even burning trucks carrying Spanish produce. He expected to receive French Prime Minister Barre next week to try to reach some agreement on several outstanding issues, including agricultural trade, the Common Market and terrorism.

11. Suarez said that Spain had also had problems with Algeria which had been supporting the Basque terrorist group, ETA, as well as the Canary Independence Movement led by Cubillo. However, that stage seems to have passed and relations with Algeria were getting better. A major project exists now for the construction of a pipeline for Algerian gas to pass through Spain to Europe.

12. The President said it appeared that Hassan was becoming increasingly isolated and that he should realize that he needed Spain. It was difficult to see how Hassan could expect to obtain transport rights under the conditions which Suarez had described or what Hassan could expect to gain by exerting pressure against Ceuta and Melilla.

13. Suarez said that in six to seven months, after Spain had been able to make some new arrangements with the Common Market and to deal with the special situations in the Canaries and in Valencia, it might be possible to work out an arrangement for the transport of Moroccan produce, but it was not possible right now.

14. The President asked Ambassador Todman what he thought we could do to help and the Ambassador suggested that in view of the

gravity of the situation as described by Suarez and the action he indicated he was prepared to take, it would be well for us to advise Hassan.

15. Suarez said Spain could always sign a fishing agreement with the Polisario, which would in fact be to Spain's advantage since the best fishing grounds were off the parts of the Sahara claimed by the Polisario. However, Spain did not want to go that far since it still wished to be as helpful to Hassan as possible.

16. The President said maybe we could let Hassan know of the Spanish fears and of our own view that any attack against the Spanish enclaves would be a very serious matter and would not be looked at favorably by the United States.

17. In answer to a question by the President on how long had Ceuta and Melilla belonged to Spain, Suarez replied for more than 500 years and certainly well before the creation of Morocco as a country. Spain had been trying very hard and will continue to try to deal with Hassan but they find him to be a very clever, astute person who cannot be trusted to keep his word. Hassan's actions over the next few days on the fishing agreement would greatly influence the future course of Spanish-Moroccan relations.

Todman

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, July 30, 1980, 2356Z

202300. Subject: Reported Moroccan Policy of Pursuit Across International Borders.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. We are concerned at current indications that increased Moroccan combat effectiveness may be accompanied by increased tendency toward pursuit of Polisario forces including temporary violations of international frontiers. These indications include possible recent penetrations of Algerian and Mauritanian airspace by RMAF aircraft.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800365-0950. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers. Drafted by Coon; cleared in NEA, INR/RNA, S/P, NSC, P, PM, and L; approved by Christopher.

Recently, we have statement to us by Moroccan source² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the RMAF is now prepared to pursue Polisario even if it means violating neighbor's air space. Source also indicated that eventual attacks against Polisario bases in Algeria or Moroccan-Algerian aircraft dog-fights could not be ruled out.

3. Department cannot view with equanimity an apparent development of Moroccan tactical doctrine which entails significant new risk of engaging Morocco in a direct military confrontation with Algeria. We believe therefore that at an early opportunity you should convey our concern to King Hassan, either directly or through suitable intermediary. Circumstances of Moroccan source's talk with our people were such that you cannot refer directly to it in discussion with Hassan but we believe you can make the point by indirection.

4. In formulating your specific message, you may incorporate the following talking points:

—We continue strongly to support the goal of a compromise settlement in terms that all interested parties and particularly Morocco can live with.

—We understand Morocco's need to make a strong military performance against Polisario. This was an important concern underlying the changes we made in our arms policy last fall.

—While we have made clear our continuing support for Morocco's territorial integrity, we have at the same time believed that that integrity would not be enhanced by any widening of the war, particularly if it involved Algeria.

—We told the Polisario this spring that we would not maintain a continuing dialogue with them while they were operating inside territory of Morocco.³

—We are therefore concerned at recent reports that in late June or early July RMAF aircraft entered Algerian air space in pursuit of Polisario forces. We understand that similar incursion may have occurred in Mauritania.

—We hope that this does not mean that henceforth Moroccan combat aircraft and perhaps other forces may be authorized to follow doctrine of pursuit of retreating Polisario forces into Algerian territory. We find it easy to construct scenario under which this could quickly lead to a serious confrontation between two countries.

—We do not believe such a doctrine of hot pursuit is needed to persuade either the Polisario or the Algerian leadership of the impor-

² Not found.

³ See Document 253.

tance of compromise as a prerequisite of a negotiated settlement. On the contrary, an extension of the war resulting from hot pursuit could adversely affect Moroccan position internationally and in the U.S.

Muskie

257. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, August 2, 1980, 1237Z

5436. Subject: Reported Moroccan Policy of Pursuit Across International Borders. Ref: (A) State 202300,² (B) State 202281.³

1. (S)—Entire text.

2. Summary and introduction: Ambassador Duke delivered message (ref B) and carried out instruction (ref A) with Royal Counselor Guedira afternoon August 1; DCM accompanied him. Guedira received us at home, alone. Meeting lasted an hour and was cordial throughout.

3. Ambassador opened with presentation of Deputy Secretary's message (second reftel) which Guedira received with pleasure, asking for copy to show to King (later same day).

4. Ambassador, noting he was speaking under instruction, then moved to question of Moroccan policy with respect to pursuit across international borders. He rehearsed points made in para 4 first reftel ticks (except fourth, on Polisario dialog, which inopportune in light Guedira's replies—see below) eliciting firm response from Guedira along following lines:

A. King, from outset, has been concerned to contain conflict with Algeria at lowest possible level. As consequence, when Polisario began to attack incontestably Moroccan territory from Algeria and to retreat

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370–0874. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers.

² See Document 256.

³ In telegram 202281 to Rabat, July 30, the Department transmitted a message from Christopher to Hassan regarding the release of political prisoners: "It is bound to have a positive impact on a variety of civil rights and other groups in the U.S. and lend increased weight to your declared intention to strengthen democratic institutions in Morocco. Those of us in the U.S. Government with a special commitment to strengthen existing ties of friendship and understanding between our two countries find this development particularly heartening." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800365–1030)

into Algeria (which, from the point of view of international law, places responsibility squarely upon Algeria), King wrote Boumediene a letter, which Guedira said he drafted. Letter stated that Morocco had not heretofore exercised right of hot pursuit (*droit de suite*) and did not now intend to do so, but should not be pushed too far.

B. Guedira, in response Ambassador's question, said he knew King's mind and will on this issue and could affirm unequivocally that Morocco's policy had not rpt not changed. What had triggered these representations from a friendly government?

C. Ambassador, having adverted to June/July RMAF penetration of Algerian airspace and possible recent incursion into Mauritanian air,⁴ Guedira nodded and said that Algiers had protested at the time through Tunisian Ambassador here (Tunisia is Algeria's protecting power in Morocco since rupture between Rabat and Algiers). Moroccans had responded that incident was inadvertent ("border is hard to determine at jet speed"), aggression against Algeria was not rpt not intended, and Morocco's posture on *droit de suite* remained unchanged.

D. Ambassador, Guedira continued, had been present when King had received US UN PermRep McHenry.⁵ King had told McHenry that he wanted Morocco and Algeria as well as other parties to the Saharan dispute to talk. King's attitude had been constant. It was unchanged. King would not do anything vis-a-vis Algeria, particularly now (read in the post-Freetown summit phase)⁶ which would make it harder, or even impossible for Algerians to sit down with Morocco.

E. Guedira went on to express "our" deep preoccupation with the trend of Mauritanian policy towards Morocco. "They are worse than the Algerians". He denied any Moroccan incursion and pointed to incoherence of Mauritanian allegations of Moroccan attacks first on this town then on that one etc. He asked whether we knew that population of Nouadhibou had demonstrated July 31 "against GIRM's lies"? Ambassador responded that Boulanouar admittedly very close to border; Mauritians had, however, shown our Charge American-made ordnance which, they asserted, was used by Moroccan aircraft in the alleged incident.

5. Ambassador closed this part of conversation by presenting Guedira with copy of HFAC (Zablocki) July 8 report on CODEL's recent

⁴ See Document 256.

⁵ In telegram 4739 from Copenhagen, July 17, McHenry reported on his July 14 meeting with Hassan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900073–1957)

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 255.

visit to North Africa.⁷ While GOM would not agree completely with contents of the report, Ambassador said, it nevertheless reflects authors' understanding of Morocco's interest in moving towards a negotiated solution of the Saharan problem, a crucial point.

6. Conversation then moved to subject of Morocco's post-OAU Freetown Summit intentions, a topic we will cover in septel. It ended with request by Guedira that we supply informal copy of talking points Ambassador had used to carry out his instructions, and this was subsequently done.

7. Ambassador has not had opportunity clear this message but is aware of its transmission.

Sebastian

⁷ Zablocki met with Moroccan officials on April 7 to discuss a negotiated Saharan settlement. (Telegram 2479 from Rabat, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800181-0015)

258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, August 4, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. *Moroccan "Hot Pursuit" Doctrine Denied; Mauritanian Accusations:* Ambassador Duke has raised the question of Moroccan "hot pursuit" policy with Hassan's Royal Counselor Guedira,² pursuant to instructions we sent him last week after learning that Moroccan aircraft violated Algerian airspace.³ Guedira "affirmed unequivocally that Morocco's policy had not changed"; that Morocco had not heretofore exercised the right to hot pursuit and did not now intend to do so; and that Hassan would not do anything vis-a-vis Algeria that would make it harder for the Algerians to begin talks with Morocco.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 8/80. Secret.

² See Document 257.

³ See Document 256.

Meanwhile, Mauritanian authorities and media have been hotly accusing Morocco of an unprovoked air attack against Mauritanian territory on July 29.⁴ Their story has shifted several times both as to the location of the attack and the damage, but an onsite inspection by our Charge in Nouakchott lends credence to the view that ordnance struck ground up to 6 km inside Mauritanian territory. The Moroccan action was apparently limited to a couple of strafing runs close to Mauritania's border with the western Sahara. The Mauriticians have chosen to make a major issue of it. They withdrew their Ambassador from Rabat last weekend. Morocco has categorically denied that any such attack took place.

In Nouakchott, President Haidalla protested vigorously to our Charge over the use of U.S. arms in Moroccan aggression, since unexploded rockets allegedly found after the "attack" were of U.S. origin, as confirmed by our Charge's onsite inspection.⁵

Whatever the facts (and we may never know for sure), the Mauritanian outcry seems designed essentially to whip up anti-Moroccan sentiment and perhaps set the stage for steps to tilt Mauritanian "neutrality" in the west Saharan dispute closer to pro-Polisario, pro-Algerian positions.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

⁴ In telegram 2851 from Nouakchott, July 30, the Embassy reported on the Mauritanian accusations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800364–1125)

⁵ In telegram 2903 from Nouakchott, August 2, Chargé Schrager reported on his meeting with Haidalla. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370–0782)