

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1977–1980**

**VOLUME XIX**

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**SOUTH ASIA**



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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

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Volume XIX

## South Asia

*Editor*

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Washington  
2019

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate

with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1979 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. The Department's central files for 1980–1981 will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign*

*Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

### *Editorial Methodology*

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, D.C. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-

ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2014 and was completed in 2018, resulted in the decision to withhold 10 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 12 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 38 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration's policy toward the South Asia region.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*The Historian*

# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume, which is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter, covers U.S. policy toward South Asia from 1977 until 1980. For background and context, the editor suggests reviewing *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E-7, South Asia, 1969–1972; *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E-8, South Asia, 1973–1976; and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971. Readers interested in U.S. security policy during Carter's Presidency should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume IV, National Security Policy. In particular, it is recommended that readers review *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume XII, Afghanistan, which includes documentation on a major facet of U.S.-Pakistan relations during this period. In addition, *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, which includes coverage of U.S. policy regarding the Indian Ocean, complements this volume's chapter on U.S.-India relations.

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XIX*

During the first three years of Carter's Presidency, U.S. relations with South Asia were shaped by three factors: tensions over nuclear proliferation, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, and the Carter administration's preference for developing closer ties with democratically-elected governments. Consequently, U.S.-India relations improved while relations with Pakistan withered. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, and with it the ending of détente, caused a major shift in U.S. relations with South Asia. Recalling U.S. policymaking at the height of the Cold War, Carter sought closer relations with Pakistan in order to thwart what his administration feared to be a new era of Soviet expansion. Carter found a willing (if conflicted) partner in Pakistani President Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as the policy priorities that had shaped U.S. relations with South Asia before 1980 were largely abandoned: Carter's efforts to enlist support against the Soviet Union eclipsed the administration's fear of nuclear proliferation; U.S. sponsorship of India-Pakistan rapprochement suffered from the attempt to send Pakistan large-scale military aid; and U.S.-India relations, which had thrived under Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai, soured when



newly-reelected Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not condemn the Soviet invasion.

The editor divided the volume into six chapters: a chapter dedicated to each country covered—Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—with an additional chapter devoted to issues related the region as a whole. Because South Asian countries were relatively isolated from one another—a situation due to regional tensions arising from the aftermath of the 1971 crisis and India's 1974 nuclear test—the Carter administration's bilateral relations with the subcontinent's countries were related, but not intertwined.

For the first half of the Carter administration, U.S.-India relations benefited from the uniquely cordial relationship between Carter and Desai. Shortly after coming to power, Desai and Carter began their remarkable exchange of letters. As the exchange grew in frequency, so did the length and the warmth of the letters. The rapport between the two leaders contrasted sharply with the difficult relationships that Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford had with Prime Minister Gandhi. While the correspondence between Carter and Desai presents a unique intimacy between the leaders of the world's largest democracies, U.S.-India relations at the working level were beset by difficult negotiations over nuclear proliferation issues. Thus the contrast between the two major threads in the volume's chapter on India—high-level rapport versus tough working-level negotiations—is reflected in the two main types of documents presented: letters between Carter and Desai on the one hand, and memoranda of conversation between Department of State officials and the Indian representatives in Washington, as well as cabled records of conversation between Ambassador Robert Goheen and his counterparts in New Delhi, on the other.

Tensions over nuclear issues were a constant source of friction in U.S.-India relations during the Carter administration. Fueled by the by-product of civilian nuclear power plants, India's first nuclear test in May 1974 provoked popular alarm and congressional distrust of India's civil nuclear power plants. Subsequent legislation and the administration's new non-proliferation policy threatened the existing U.S. agreement to supply uranium to Indian nuclear power plants. The Department of State and the National Security Council were the key agencies involved in the non-proliferation negotiations. In particular, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretaries Harold Saunders and Thomas Pickering, and Deputy Under Secretary Joseph Nye led the Department's negotiating team with significant involvement from National Security Council Staff members Thomas Thornton and Gerald Oplinger.

Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistan relations revolved almost exclusively around nuclear proliferation issues, and,

unlike U.S.-India relations, without the ameliorating effect of a personal rapport between the countries' leaders. Documentation on the impasse over Pakistan's nuclear program details the administration's growing concern that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later General Zia-ul-Haq used Pakistan's civil nuclear power plants as a cover to design and build nuclear weapons. The editor selected documents that reflect significant interest in the issue from the highest levels in the White House and at the Department of State. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Christopher, Saunders, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom negotiated frequently with their Pakistani counterparts. Carter often issued policy decisions through his marginalia, but only met with high-level Pakistani officials late in his administration.

General Zia's suspension of the constitution and assumption of power in July 1977, as well as the protracted battle over ousted Prime Minister Bhutto's fate, exacerbated the tense standoff over Pakistan's nuclear program. Because Carter did not want to give his imprimatur to the imposition of martial law or to Bhutto's arrest by establishing close relations with Zia, there was little correspondence between Carter and Zia. The suspension of democracy in Pakistan, suspicion of its nuclear program, as well as fears of an arms race in South Asia, prompted both a sharp contraction of U.S. military sales to Pakistan and a U.S.-led international effort to halt Pakistan's acquisition of advanced weaponry, as well as nuclear technology. Consequently, the Department of Defense played no significant role in policymaking toward Pakistan. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the management of relations with Pakistan shifted from the Department of State to the White House, and, to a smaller degree, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The documentation reflects this shift. After 1979, memoranda of conversation and letters between Washington and Islamabad reveal Carter's personal interest in U.S.-Pakistan relations, while Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski took charge of the U.S. efforts to support Pakistan militarily.

Reflecting the administration's attention devoted to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, the chapters that cover these countries are considerably smaller than those for India and Pakistan. The documentation consists mostly of Embassy reporting and policy formulation at the Assistant Secretary and Country Director level. Promotion of democratic governance and the administration of P.L.-480 food aid represent the most significant policy initiatives toward these countries. However, Bangladeshi membership in the United Nations Security Council during the Iranian hostage crisis brought Bangladesh in conflict with the White House and the Department of State, thus occasioning documentation of high-level meetings and policy decisions.

Like all recent *Foreign Relations* volumes, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation, rather than implementation of policy or day-to-day diplomacy. The National Security Council and the Department of State are the key players in the policymaking process; the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency played more limited roles.

*Acknowledgments*

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, David Stanhope, and James Yancy. Thanks are also due to Nancy Smith, Director of the Presidential Materials Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration, and to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency were accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance.

John Collinge began the research for this volume. The editor conducted additional research, selected the documentation, and edited the volume under the supervision of Kathleen Rasmussen, Chief of the Global Issues and General Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by Kathleen Rasmussen and Stephen Randolph, then *The Historian*. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth performed the technical and copy editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

**Seth A. Rotramel, Ph.D.**  
*Historian*

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# Sources

The Presidential papers of Jimmy Carter are the best source of high-level decisionmaking documentation for U.S. policy toward South Asia from 1977 to 1980. The richest collection of documents on U.S.-South Asia relations are the Brzezinski Material and the Staff Material in the National Security Affairs files. Of most value within the Brzezinski Material are the Office File (of special note therein are the Weekly National Security Reports and the Country Chron files); the Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File; the Country File; and the Subject File, which contains the Evening Reports from the Department of State and high-level memoranda of conversation. In the Staff Material, the following were of particular worth: the Staff Office File, which includes the Outside the System File and the Presidential Advisory Board materials; the North/South File, which originates from the eponymous NSC Staff cluster and contains Thomas Thornton's file; and finally the Global Issues File with key documentation on nuclear proliferation. Additional material on South Asia is in the Plains File and in the donated collections of both Zbigniew Brzezinski and Walter Mondale.

The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland (Archives II) houses extensive material on the Carter administration's policy toward South Asia. The Department of State's Central Foreign Policy File is crucial for following the day-to-day flow of diplomatic cables. Also at Archives II are relevant Department of State Lot Files, which include lot files from the Embassies in Colombo, Dhaka, Islamabad, Kathmandu, and New Delhi, as well as for individual officials, especially Cyrus Vance, Edmund Muskie, Warren Christopher, and David Newsom.

Compared to the Carter Library and Archives II, the Department of Defense records in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330 offered less high-level documentation on U.S.-South Asia relations. However, this volume benefited from the inclusion of Central Intelligence Agency documents, most notably from the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (Jobs 81B00012R, 81B00401R, 82M00501R, and 80M01542R). Also, documents from the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, proved valuable, namely from Tin's 980643000012, 980643000013, 980643000015, and 980643000018.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian

maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State, Washington, D.C.

*INR/IL Historical Files.* Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination contain records from the 1940s through the 1980s and are maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

*Lot Files.* These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262

Office of the Secretariat Staff

Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241

Records of Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135

Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154

### National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

*Central Foreign Policy File.*

Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113

Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Entry UD-07, Lot 81D155

### Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Donated Material

Donated Material

Papers of Mary E. King

Papers of Walter F. Mondale

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Brzezinski Office File (Weekly National Security Report)

Cables File

Country File

Inderfurth and Gates Chron File

President's Daily Report File

President's Daily CIA Brief File

President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File

Staff Evening Reports File

Subject File

Trip File

VIP Visit File

## Staff Material

Global Issues

Middle East

North/South

Office

National Security Council, Institutional Files

Plains File

Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary

Records of Peter Bourne

**Central Intelligence Agency**

National Intelligence Council

Job 83B01027R: Policy Files

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Job 80M01542A: Executive Registry Subject Files

Job 81B00112R: Subject Files

Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981)

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Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence (DI)

Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978)

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# Abbreviations and Terms

**A/AS**, Office of the Ambassador at Large and Special Representative to the President for Nonproliferation Matters, Department of State  
**ACDA**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**AFP**, *Agence France-Presse*  
**AICC**, All-India Congress Committee  
**AID**, Agency for International Development  
**AID/ASIA/PNS**, Bureau for Asia, Office of Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka Affairs, Agency for International Development  
**AIR**, All India Radio  
**Amb**, Ambassador  
**AMCIT**, American citizen  
**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty  
**APC**, armored personnel carrier  
**ASEAN**, Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
**ASROC**, anti-submarine rocket

**BAF**, Bangladesh Air Force  
**BBC**, British Broadcasting Corporation  
**BDG**, Government of Bangladesh  
**BLD**, *Bharatiya Lok Dal*  
**BNP**, Bangladesh Nationalist Party  
**BOP**, balance of payments

**C**, Confidential; Carter  
**CA**, covert action  
**CANDU**, Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor  
**CCC**, Commodity Credit Corporation  
**CCD**, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament  
**CEA**, *Commissariat à l'énergie atomique*  
**CENTO**, Central Treaty Organization  
**CEQ**, Council on Environmental Quality  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIA/DDO/NE**, Near East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CIEC**, Conference on International Economic Cooperation  
**CINCEUR**, Commander in Chief, European Command  
**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command  
**CIRUS**, Canadian-Indian Reactor Uranium System  
**CMLA**, Chief Martial Law Administrator  
**CODEL**, congressional delegation  
**ConGen**, Consul General  
**COS**, Chief of Station  
**COW**, Committee of the Whole (related to UNCTAD)  
**CPI**, Communist Party of India  
**CPM**, Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
**CTB**, Comprehensive Test Ban  
**CU**, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

**D**, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State  
**DAO**, Defense Attaché Officer  
**DAO/ODRP**, Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan, Defense Attaché Office  
**DC**, developed country; District Coordinator  
**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence  
**DCMLA**, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator  
**DDCI**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
**DEA**, Drug Enforcement Agency  
**DepSec**, Deputy Secretary  
**Dept**, Department of State  
**DeptOff**, Department Officer  
**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DIG**, Deputy Inspector General  
**DirGen**, Director General  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DOD/ISA**, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense  
**DOE**, Department of Energy  
**DPRK**, Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
**DPSA**, deep penetration strike aircraft  
**DRA**, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

**EB/IFD/OMA**, Office of Monetary Affairs, International Finance and Development Division, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**EB/OFPP/FFD**, Office of Food Policy and Programs, Food for Freedom Division, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**ELINT**, Electronic Intelligence  
**EmbOff**, Embassy Officer  
**ERDA**, Energy Research and Development Administration  
**ESF**, Economic Support Funds  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/RPE**, Office of OECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**Exdis**, Exclusive Distribution

**FAO**, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization  
**FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
**FBO**, Foreign Building Operations, Department of State  
**FGI**, foreign government information  
**FMS**, Foreign Military Sales  
**FonMin**, Foreign Minister  
**FonSec**, Foreign Secretary  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany  
**FSF**, Federal Security Force (Pakistan)  
**FSN**, Foreign Service National  
**FSS**, full scope safeguards  
**FY**, Fiscal Year

**GE**, General Electric  
**GNP**, gross national product  
**GOF**, Government of France  
**GOI**, Government of India; Government of Iran

**GOJ**, Government of Japan  
**GON**, Government of Nepal  
**GOP**, Government of Pakistan  
**Gov**, Government; Governor  
**Govt**, Government  
**GOY**, Government of Yugoslavia  
**GSL**, Government of Sri Lanka  
**GSO**, General Services Office  
**GSP**, Generalized System of Preferences

**H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State  
**HA**, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State  
**HA/NEA**, Office of Near East and Asia, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State  
**HFAC**, House Foreign Affairs Committee  
**HIRC**, House International Relations Committee

**IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency  
**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
**ICA**, International Communications Agency  
**ICBM**, intercontinental ballistic missile  
**IDA**, International Development Association  
**IDCA**, International Development Cooperation Agency  
**IFCEP**, International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program  
**IG**, Interagency Group  
**I-HAWK**, Improved Homing All the Way Killer (surface-to-air missiles and launcher)  
**IMET**, International Military Education and Training  
**INA**, North Africa, Near East and South Asia geographic section of the United States Information Service  
**INFCE**, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation  
**INM**, Bureau for International Narcotic Matters, Department of State  
**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INR/DDC**, Directorate of Coordination, Office of Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INR/DDR/STA**, Nuclear and Scientific Division, Office of Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INR/IL**, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INR/RNA/SOA**, South Asia Division, Office of Research Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**INR/STA or INR/DDC/STA**, Office of Strategic Affairs, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State  
**IOZP**, Indian Ocean Zone of Peace  
**ISID**, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)  
**ITC**, International Trade Commission  
**IV**, International Visitor Program

**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**JNU**, Jawaharlal Nehru University  
**JSD**, *Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal* (Bangladesh)

**KANUPP**, Karachi Nuclear Power Plant

## XX Abbreviations and Terms

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**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

**LAW**, light anti-tank weapon

**LDC**, least developed country

**Limdis**, Limited Distribution

**L/N**, Nuclear Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State

**LPH**, landing platform helicopter

**LPM**, Politico-Military Affairs, Legal Advisor, Department of State

**MAP**, Military Assistance Program

**M/CT**, Office of the Director for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State

**ME**, Middle East

**MEA**, Ministry of External Affairs

**MFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MISA**, Maintenance of Internal Security Act (India)

**MLA**, Martial Law Administration (Bangladesh)

**MNA**, Member of the National Assembly (Pakistan)

**MOFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MRBM**, medium-range ballistic missile

**MSG**, marine security guard

**MTN**, multilateral trade negotiations

**NA**, National Assembly

**NACC**, Non-Aligned Coordinating Committee

**NAM**, Non-Aligned Movement

**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NCOIC**, Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge

**NCP**, Nepalese Congress Party

**NDP**, National Democratic Party (Pakistan)

**NEA/INS**, Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**NEA/IRN**, Office of Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, De-  
partment of State

**NEA/PAB**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern  
and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**NEA/RA**, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, De-  
partment of State

**NFZ**, Nuclear Free Zone

**NIEO**, New International Economic Order

**NNPA**, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

**Nocontract**, no contractor distribution

**Nodis**, no distribution

**Noforn**, no foreign dissemination

**Notal**, not received by all addressees

**NPT**, Non-Proliferation Treaty

**NRC**, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

**NSA**, National Security Agency

**NSC**, National Security Council

**NWFP**, Northwest Frontier Provinces

**NWFZ**, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

**OASD/ISA/NESA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security  
Affairs, Near East and South Asia Division

**OAU**, Organization of African Unity

**ODA**, Official Development Assistance

- OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
**OES**, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State  
**OES/NET**, Nuclear Energy and Technology Affairs Division, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State  
**OES/NET/NEP**, Office of Non-Proliferation and Export Policy, Nuclear Energy and Technology Affairs Division, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State  
**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget  
**OPEC**, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
**OPIC**, Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
**Orcon**, originator controlled  
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OSTP**, Office of Science and Technology Policy
- P**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
**PIA**, Pakistan International Airlines  
**PINSTECH**, Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Technology  
**P.L.**, Public Law  
**P.L. 480**, Food for Peace (formally Public Law 83-480, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954)  
**PM**, Prime Minister  
**PM/ISP**, Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**PM/NPP or PM/NPO**, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**PNA**, Pakistan National Alliance  
**PNE**, peaceful nuclear explosion  
**Pol**, political  
**PPP**, Pakistan People's Party  
**PRC**, People's Republic of China or Policy Review Committee  
**PTI**, Press Trust India
- QML**, Qayyum Muslim League (of Pakistan)
- R&D**, research and development  
**RAPP**, Rajasthan Atomic Power Project  
**RCD**, Regional Co-operation for Development (CENTO)  
**refair**, reference airgram  
**reftel**, reference telegram  
**RG**, Record Group  
**RMO**, Regional Medical Officer  
**Roger Channel**, Department of State limited distribution channel for sensitive intelligence matters  
**RSO**, Regional Security Officer
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State; Secret  
**SA-7**, Soviet shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile  
**SANFZ**, South Asia Nuclear Free Zone  
**SANWFZ**, South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone  
**S/AS**, Office of the Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters, Department of State  
**SCC**, Special Coordination Committee  
**SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

## XXII Abbreviations and Terms

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**SecGen**, Secretary General

**Secy**, Secretary

**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

**SLFP**, Sri Lanka Freedom Party

**S/MS**, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State

**S/NM**, Office of the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State

**S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**SSA**, Security Supporting Assistance

**S/S-I**, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**S/S-O**, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**SSOD**, Special Session on Disarmament (United Nations)

**SSR**, Soviet Socialist Republic

**SYG**, Secretary General

**T**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology

**TACAIR**, tactical air support

**TAPS**, Tarapur Atomic Power Station

**TDY**, temporary duty

**TOW**, tube-launched, optically-guided, wire-guided

**U**, Unclassified

**UAE**, United Arab Emirates

**UN**, United Nations

**UNCTAD**, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

**UNEF**, United Nations Emergency Force

**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly

**UNHCR**, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNIFIL**, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

**UNP**, United National Party (Sri Lanka)

**UNSYG**, United Nations Secretary General

**USAID**, United States Agency for International Development

**USDA**, United States Department of Agriculture

**USDOCOSouth**, Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe

**USG**, United States Government

**USICA**, United States International Communications Agency

**USIS**, United States Information Service (foreign arm of the United States Information Agency)

**USLO**, United States Liaison Office

**USN**, United States Navy

**USNATO**, United States Mission to NATO

**USNMR**, United States National Military Representative

**USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations

**VOA**, Voice of America

**Z**, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)

# Persons

- Aaron, David**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Abdul, Mahmood**, Aviation Minister of Bangladesh; Chief of Staff of the Bangladeshi Air Force; Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator of Bangladesh
- Ahmed, Aziz**, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan until March 28, 1977; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan from March 30 until July 5, 1977
- Akhtar, Abdul Rahman Khan**, Lieutenant General; Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan from June 21, 1979
- Akhund, Iqbal**, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations; Chairman of the Group of 77 from 1979; Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations
- Ames, Robert C.**, National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
- Amin, Hafizullah**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan from September 14 until December 27, 1979
- Arafat, Yasser**, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
- Arif (Aref), Kahlid Mahmoud**, Lieutenant General; Army Chief of Staff, Pakistan
- Armocost, Michael H.**, member, National Security Council Staff for East Asian and Chinese Affairs from January 1977 until July 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs from July 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from January 1980
- Atherton, Alfred L. Jr., (Roy)**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1978; Ambassador at Large until May 22, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979
- Atwood, J. Brian**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from August 3, 1979, until January 14, 1981
- Bajpai, Uma Shankar**, Indian Ambassador to Pakistan until June 1978; Secretary (West) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India from June 1978 until April 1980; Indian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China from April 1980
- Baker, Howard**, Senator (R-Tennessee)
- Ball, George W.**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February until December 1961; Under Secretary of State until September 1966; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from June until September 1968.
- Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias**, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka from May 22, 1972, until July 23, 1977
- Banisadr (Bani Sadr), Abulhassan**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran from November 12 until November 29, 1979
- Barooah, Dev Kant**, President of the Indian National Congress from 1975 until 1977
- Barre, Mohamed Siad**, President of Somalia; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia from 1976 until 1977
- Bartholomew, Reginald**, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from February 1977 until September 1977; member, National Security Council Staff for USSR and East Europe Affairs from November 1977 until April 1979; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1979 until May 1981
- Bazargan, Mehdi**, member of the National Liberation Front and the Liberation Movement of Iran; Prime Minister of Iran from February 1979 until November 1979
- Begin, Menachem**, Prime Minister of Israel from June 21, 1977, until October 10, 1983



- Benedict, Lawrence N.**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Bengelsdorf, Harold**, Director of the Office of Nuclear Affairs, Nuclear and Technical Programs, Department of Energy
- Bennet, Douglas J., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from March 1977 until August 1979; Administrator, Agency for International Development, from August 1979
- Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., (Tap)**, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from April 1977
- Bergland, Robert**, Secretary of Agriculture
- Bergsten, C. Fred**, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs
- Berry, Maxwell K.**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali**, Prime Minister of Pakistan until July 5, 1977
- Bingham, Jonathan**, member, House of Representatives (D-New York) until January 3, 1980
- Birendra, Bir Bikram Shah Dev**, King of Nepal
- Bista, Kirti Nidhi**, Prime Minister of Nepal from September 12, 1977, until May 30, 1979
- Black, Eugene**, President of the World Bank from 1949 until 1963
- Blood, Archer K.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in India
- Borg, C. Arthur**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State until April 15, 1977
- Bowdler, William G.**, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from May 14, 1975, until April 19, 1978; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until December 17, 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from January 4, 1980, until January 16, 1981
- Brezhnev, Leonid**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brown, Emmerson M.**, Assistant Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Brown, Harold S.**, Secretary of Defense
- Brown, Leslie**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology
- Brown, William C.**, Director of the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Byrd, Robert C.**, Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader
- Byroade, Henry A.**, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan until April 23, 1977
- Callaghan, James**, British Prime Minister until May 1979
- Carlucci, Frank C., III**, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal until February 5, 1978; thereafter Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
- Carrington, Lord Peter**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom from May 1979
- Carswell, Robert**, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
- Carter, Hodding, Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesman of the Department of State from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980
- Carter, James Earl, (Jimmy)**, President of the United States
- Carter, Lillian**, mother of President Carter
- Carter, Rosalynn**, First Lady of the United States
- Chaudhry, Fazal Elahi**, President of Pakistan until August 14, 1978
- Chavan, Yashwantrao Balwantrao**, leader of India's Congress Party in Parliament until July 1979; thereafter Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs until January 1980
- Christopher, Warren**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977

- Church, Frank F.**, Senator (D-Idaho) until January 3, 1981; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from January 3, 1979, until January 3, 1981
- Civiletti, Benjamin**, Attorney General from August 1979
- Claytor, W. Graham, Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy from 1977 until 1979; Acting Secretary of Transportation during 1979; Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 24, 1979, until January 16, 1981
- Clifford, Clark**, Secretary of Defense from February 1968 until January 1969; Special Presidential Emissary to India in 1980
- Clift, A. Denis**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Clough, Susan S.**, Private Secretary to the President
- Cogan, Charles**, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from August 1979
- Cohen, William S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Maine) until January 3, 1979; thereafter, Senator
- Constable, Peter**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan until July 1979; thereafter Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Coon, Jane**, Office of Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; thereafter Director, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1979; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Courtney, William F.**, Consul General in Bombay, India, from 1975 until 1980
- Crawford, William R., Jr.**, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus until March 27, 1978; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Curren, R.T.**, Director of North African, Near Eastern, and South Asian Affairs, International Communication Agency
- Cutler, Lloyd**, Counsel to the President from 1979
- Daoud Khan, Mohammed**, President of the Republic of Afghanistan until April 28, 1978
- De Mel, Ronald Joseph Godfrey**, Cabinet Minister of Finance and Planning of Sri Lanka
- Dehlari, Saeed**, Private Secretary to the Pakistani Foreign Minister
- Deitz, Robert**, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State
- Denend, Leslie**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from July 1977 until June 1979; Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1980
- Deng Xiaoping**, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China
- Derian, Patricia**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
- Desai, Morarji**, Prime Minister of India from March 24, 1977, until July 28, 1979
- Despres, John**, National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation, Central Intelligence Agency
- Dharia, Mohan**, Commerce Minister of India from March 1977 until July 1979
- Dixit, Jyotindra Nath**, Economic Minister of the Indian Embassy in the United States until 1978; thereafter Spokesman for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
- Dobbins, James F.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Dobelle, Evan S.**, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, from March 2, 1977, until May 22, 1978
- Dodson, Christine**, Deputy Staff Secretary of the National Security Council from January 1977 to May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary
- Donovan, Hedley W.**, Senior Adviser to President Nixon from 1980
- D'Souza, P.P.**, Joint Secretary (Americas), Indian Ministry of External Affairs

**Dubs, Adolph**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1977 to 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from June 1978 until February 1979

**Eklund, Sigvard**, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

**Erb, Guy**, member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics from September 1977 until January 1980

**Evans, Ben**, Executive Secretary of the Central Intelligence Agency

**Fahd, ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud**, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia

**Falco, Mathea**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

**Farley, Philip J.**, Deputy Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters

**Fernandes, George**, Minister of Industries of India

**Forbes, John D.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

**Friendly, Alfred**, journalist and former managing editor of the *Washington Post*

**Fuller, C.**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**Gallucci, Robert L.**, Chief of the Nuclear and Scientific Division, Office of Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Gandhi, Indira**, Prime Minister of India until March 24, 1977, and from January 14, 1980

**Gandhi, Sanjay**, son of Indira Gandhi

**Gedi, G.S.**, Political Counselor at the Indian Embassy in the United States

**Gelb, Leslie H.**, Director of the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from February 1977 until June 1979

**Ghulam, Ishaq Khan**, Minister of Finance of Pakistan from July 5, 1977

**Gilinsky, Victor**, member, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

**Gilligan, John**, Administrator of the Agency for International Development

**Giri**, see Tulsi Giri

**Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry**, President of France

**Glenn, John H., Jr.**, Senator (D-Ohio)

**Goheen, Robert F.**, U.S. Ambassador to India from May 26, 1977, until December 10, 1980

**Gokhale, Ashok**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Indian Embassy in the United States, until August 1980

**Gonsalves, Eric**, Indian Ambassador to Japan until June 1978; Additional Secretary (Asia) for External Affairs of India from June 1978 until July 1979; Secretary (East) for External Affairs of India from June 1979

**Graves, Ernest Jr.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency from 1978

**Greene, Myles**, Office of Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**Griffen, George**, Division Chief, Office of Research Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union

**Guhin, Michael**, Non-Proliferation and Export Policy Division, Office of Nuclear Energy and Technology Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State

**Guiringaud, Louis de**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France until November 29, 1978

**Habib, Philip C.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 1, 1978

- Haider, Khurshid**, Director General of the Department of the Americas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan
- Haksar, A.N.D.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Indian Embassy in the United States from August 1980
- Hamilton, Lee H.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)
- Haq**, see **Huq**
- Haroon, Mahmoud**, Interior Minister of Pakistan from July 5, 1978
- Harriman, William Averell**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943 until 1946; Lead U.S. Delegate to the 1978 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament
- Hartman, Arthur A.**, U.S. Ambassador to France
- Hayward, Thomas B.**, Admiral USN; Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pacific Command, until May 9, 1978; Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1978
- Heck, Louis Douglas**, U.S. Ambassador to Nepal from May 26, 1977, until May 19, 1980
- Holbrooke, Richard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from March 1977
- Hornblow, Michael**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng)**, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China until 1980; Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
- Huda, Mirza Nurul**, Minister of Finance for Bangladesh from 1979; Adviser to the President of Bangladesh from 1980
- Hummel, Arthur W., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until March 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from June 8, 1977, until July 19, 1981
- Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1965, until January 20, 1969; Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until his death on January 13, 1978
- Humphreys, Marvin**, Director of the Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- Huntington, Samuel P.**, member, National Security Council Staff for National Security Planning, from February 1977 until August 1978
- Huq, Mohammad Shamsul**, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to the President of Bangladesh until June 1978; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh
- Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick)**, Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until April 1979
- Isham, Heyward**, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti until July 8, 1977; Director of the Office for Combatting Counter-Terrorism, Department of State, from October 26, 1977, until August 1, 1978
- Jacomet, André**, Nuclear Nonproliferation Adviser to the President of France
- Jayewardene Junious Richard**, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka from July 23, 1977, until February 4, 1978; President of Sri Lanka from February 4, 1978; Secretary General of the Non-Aligned Movement from February 4, 1978, until September 9, 1978
- Jayne, Edward II, (Randy)**, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
- Jenkins, C. Ray**, Special Assistant to the President from 1980
- Jilani Khan, Ghulam**, Lieutenant General; Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense of Pakistan from October 6, 1977, until April 4, 1980; Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence until September 16, 1978; Governor General of Punjab from May 1, 1980
- Jones, David C.**, General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 21, 1978
- Jordan, Hamilton**, Assistant to the President until August 6, 1979; thereafter White House Chief of Staff until June 2, 1980

- Kaiser, Khwaja Mohammad**, Bangladeshi Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Kanakaratne, Deshamanya Neville T.D.**, Sri Lankan Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Karim, A.H.S. Ataul**, Additional Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh from July 1979
- Karmal, Babrak**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan until December 27, 1979; Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan from December 27, 1979
- Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr.**, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Khalatbary, Abbas-Ali**, Foreign Minister of Iran until August 1978
- Khalid bin Abdulaziz al-Saud**, King of Saudi Arabia
- Khan, Munir Ahmed**, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
- Khan, Musharraf Hussain**, Admiral; Chief of the Navy of Bangladesh until November 3, 1977; Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator until November 3, 1977
- Khan, Nasim (Begum) Wali**, leader of the Pakistani Awami National Party and the Pakistani National Alliance
- Khan, Sultan Mohammad**, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States from January 3, 1979
- Khatri, Padma Bahadur**, Nepalese Ambassador to the United States
- Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah**, exiled leader of the Iranian Shi'ite sect until February 1979; first Supreme Leader of Iran from December 1979
- Kibria, Shah Abu Muhammad Shamsul**, Bangladeshi Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva; thereafter Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Group of 77 Preparatory Committee for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development V
- Kimmit, Robert M.**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues, from January until June 1977; Legal Counsel, National Security Council Staff, from August 1978 until January 1981
- King, Harrington**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, from July 1979
- King, Mary E.**, Deputy Director of the Peace Corps
- Kirk, Roger**, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969, until November 11, 1975; Secretary of State from September 22, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Koirala, Bishweshwar Prasad**, Prime Minister of Nepal from May 27, 1959, until December 15, 1960
- Komer, Robert W.**, Adviser to the Secretary of Defense on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs until September 27, 1979; thereafter Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Kosygin, Alexei**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until October 23, 1980
- Kraft, Timothy E.**, Special Assistant to the President for Appointments from 1978 until 1980
- Kreisberg, Paul (Dusty)**, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Kreps, Juanita**, Secretary of Commerce
- Kundu, Samarendra**, Minister of State, Ministry of External Affairs of India
- Kurihara Hiroyoshi**, Director of Safeguards Division, Nuclear Safety Bureau, Science and Technology Agency of Japan, until July 1979; thereafter Science Counselor, Embassy of Japan

**Kux, Dennis H.**, Director, Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

**Laboulaye, François de**, French Ambassador to the United States until 1980

**Lake, W. Anthony**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**Lande, Peter**, Director, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Director, Office of India, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until 1979.

**Larosière de Champfeu, Jacques de**, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund from June 17, 1978

**Lee Kwan Yew**, Prime Minister of Singapore

**Madhavan, A.**, Joint Secretary, America Division, Ministry of External Affairs of India

**Mahmud, Mufti Maulana**, founder of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Party in Pakistan

**Maltsev, Victor Fedorovich**, Soviet Ambassador to India until 1977

**Mark, David E.**, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Markey, Edward**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts)

**Masters, Edward E.**, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh until November 27, 1977; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia

**Mathews, Jessica Tuchman**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues, until June 1979

**Maynes, Charles W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

**McAfee, William**, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**McGiffert, David**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from February 1977

**McHenry, Donald F.**, Permanent Representative to the United Nations from September 23, 1979

**McIntyre, James T.**, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget until March 1978; thereafter Director of the Office of Management and Budget

**Mehdi, Hayat**, Minister-Counselor of the Pakistani Embassy in the United States

**Mehta, Jagat**, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India until 1979

**Melone, Harry R.**, Office Coordination Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Miklos, Jack C.**, Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iran, until May 1978; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

**Miller, G. William**, Chairman of the Federal Reserve from March 8, 1978, until August 6, 1979; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury from August 6, 1979

**Mills, Hawthorne Q.**, Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Greece from July 1977 until March 1978; thereafter Chargé d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan from February 1980

**Moherly, Sir Patrick**, Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Defence), British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Mondale, Walter (Fritz)**, Vice President of the United States

**Moynihan, Daniel Patrick**, Senator (D-New York)

**Mulligan, J. Patrick**, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**Murphy, Daniel J., Sr.**, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

**Muskie, Edmund S.**, Senator (D-Maine); Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981

- Naik, Niaz A.**, Additional Foreign Secretary (multilateral affairs), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, until October 1978; thereafter Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Naqvi, Sayed Ali Zamin**, Major General (Ret.); Chief of Security for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
- Narayanan, Kocheril Raman**, Indian Ambassador to the United States from August 22, 1980
- Nehru, Jawaharlal**, Prime Minister of India from August 15, 1947, until May 27, 1964
- Newsom, David D.**, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until October 6, 1977; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978
- Nimetz, Matthew**, Counselor of the Department of State from April 8, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs from February 21, 1980, until December 5, 1980
- Noble, Stephen**, Special Assistant for Nuclear Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
- Nolan, Richard M.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Minnesota) until January 3, 1981
- Nooter, Robert**, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of the Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, until May 1977; Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, from May 17, 1977, until 1979
- Nosenzo, Louis V.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs
- Nye, Joseph**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1977 until 1979
- Ober, Robert F., Jr.**, Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Obey, David**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin)
- Odum, William E.**, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Ohira Masayoshi**, Prime Minister of Japan from December 1978 until June 1980
- Oksenberg, Michel**, member, National Security Council Staff for East Asia and China, until February 1980
- Oplinger, Gerald**, Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues, from June 1979 until January 1981
- Owen, Henry D.**, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, until March 1977; member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics; Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for International Economic Summits from October 20, 1978
- Oxman, Stephen A.**, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State
- Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza**, Shah of Iran until February 1979
- Palkhivala, Nani**, Indian Ambassador to the United States until 1979
- Patel, Hirubhai Mulljibhai**, Finance Minister of India until 1980
- Peck, Robert**, Director, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1979
- Percival, Bronson E.**, Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Percy, Charles H.**, Senator (R-Illinois)
- Pickering, Thomas R.**, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan until July 13, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from October 10, 1978
- Piracha, Riaz**, Additional Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

**Powell, Joseph, (Jody)**, White House Press Secretary  
**Premadasa, Ranasinghe**, Prime Minister of Bangladesh from February 6, 1978  
**Press, Frank**, Adviser to the President on Science; Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Department of State, from March 1977  
**Pustay, John**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1979

**Qaddafi, Muammar**, Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya

**Rahman, Ziaur, (Zia)**, Chief Martial Law Administrator of Bangladesh until April 21, 1977; thereafter President of Bangladesh  
**Ram, Jagjivan**, Deputy Prime Minister of India from March 24, 1977, until July 28, 1979; Minister of Defense of India from March 1977 until July 1, 1978  
**Rana, Farouk**, Director, United States Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan  
**Rao, P.V. Narasimha**, Foreign Minister of India from January 1980  
**Raphel, Arnold L.**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Pakistan until 1978; thereafter Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1979  
**Read, Benjamin H.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from August 1977 until October 1978; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Management  
**Reddy, Neelam Sanjiva**, Speaker of the Lok Sabha from March 26 until July 13, 1977; President of India from July 26, 1977  
**Reinhardt, John E.**, Director of the U.S. Information Agency from March 1977 until March 1978; thereafter Director of the International Communication Agency  
**Renfrew, Charles B.**, Judge, Deputy Attorney General from February 27, 1980  
**Roch, Robert**, Deputy Assistant Director for Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**Rockefeller, Nelson**, Governor of New York from 1959 until 1973; Vice President of the United States from December 19, 1974, until January 20, 1977  
**Rogers, Bernard W.**, General, USA; Army Chief of Staff until June 21, 1979; Supreme Allied Commander Europe from June 22, 1979

**Sadat, Anwar**, President of Egypt  
**Sahib, C.R. Krishnaswamy Rao**, Principal Secretary to Indian Prime Minister Charan Singh  
**Sarbanes, Paul**, Senator (D-Maryland)  
**Sathe, Ram Chandra Dattatraya**, Indian Ambassador to France until November 1978; Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India, from November 9, 1979  
**Sattar, Abdus**, Vice President of Bangladesh  
**Saunders, Harold H.**, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until January 16, 1981  
**Saxbe, William B.**, U.S. Ambassador to India from 1975 until 1976  
**Sayem, Abu Sadat Mohammad**, President of Bangladesh until April 21, 1977  
**Schaffer, Howard B.**, Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan until 1977; Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in India from 1977 until 1979; Director, Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1979  
**Scheske, Ulrich**, West German Ambassador to Pakistan until December 1979  
**Schlesinger, James R.**, Secretary of Energy  
**Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of West Germany  
**Schneider, David T.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in India, until 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh from March 2, 1978, until July 25, 1981  
**Sebastian, Peter**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State



- Seignious, George M., II**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from December 4, 1978, until January 3, 1980
- Seitz, Raymond G.H.**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State
- Sethna, Homi**, Chairman Atomic Energy Commission of India
- Shah, Prakash**, Liaison Officer in the Ministry of External Affairs of India
- Shahi, Agha**, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan until July 6, 1977; thereafter Adviser on Foreign Affairs until January 14, 1978; thereafter Foreign Minister
- Shahnawaz, Sardar**, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, from June 7, 1977, until May 29, 1980
- Shankar, Vidya**, Principal Secretary to Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India
- Shariff, Muhammad**, General; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan until 1978
- Sick, Gary**, member, National Security Council Staff for Middle East and North Africa Affairs
- Siddiqi, Mustafizur Rahman**, Bangladeshi Ambassador to the United States and Mexico until 1978
- Siegel, Jeffrey**, Nuclear and Scientific Division, Office of Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Sievering, Nelson**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Nuclear and Technical Programs, Department of Energy, until 1978; Deputy Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency from October 1, 1980
- Singh, Charan**, Minister of Home Affairs of India from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Prime Minister from 1977 until July 28, 1979; thereafter Prime Minister until January 14, 1980
- Singh, Kewal**, Indian Ambassador to the United States until 1977
- Singh, Manmohan**, Director of the Industrial Development Bank of India until 1980; Secretary in the Ministry of Finance of India from 1977 until 1980
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters from July 14, 1977, until November 10, 1980; Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency from July 14, 1977, until November 10, 1980
- Smith, William Y.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Solarz, Stephen J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)
- Sparkman, John**, Senator (D-Alabama) until January 3, 1979; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until January 3, 1979
- Spiegel, John W.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until 1978; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom until 1977; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 28, 1980
- Stennis, John C.**, Senator (D-Mississippi); Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services
- Strauss, Robert S.**, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
- Subrahmanyam, Krishnaswamy**, Secretary, Defense Production Division, Ministry of Defense of India
- Sullivan, John H.**, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International Development, from April 1977
- Sullivan, William H.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines until April 26, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Iran from June 18, 1977, until April 6, 1979
- Tape, Gerald**, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency until 1980
- Taraki, Nur Mohammed**, Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; President and Prime Minister of Afghanistan

**Tarnoff, Peter**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from April 4, 1977

**Templeman, Donald**, Director, Office for the Developing Nations and Finance, Department of the Treasury

**Thornton, Thomas P.**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues

**Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia from November 1945 until May 4, 1980

**Toussaint, Donald R.**, U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka from November 27, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to the Maldives from December 17, 1979

**Trattner, John**, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State

**Trudeau, Pierre Elliott**, Prime Minister of Canada until June 4, 1979, and from March 3, 1980

**Tsongas, Paul E.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) until January 3, 1979; thereafter Senator

**Tulsi, Giri**, Prime Minister of Nepal until September 12, 1977

**Turki al-Faisal**, Prince Director of the General Intelligence Directorate of Saudi Arabia

**Turner, Stansfield**, Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977

**Usman, Amir**, Director General for Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

**Vajpayee, Atal Bihari**, Minister of External Affairs of India from March 26, 1977, until July 28, 1979

**Van Doren, Charles**, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**Vance, Cyrus R.**, Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

**Veliotis, Nicholas A.**, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until January 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from January 1977 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from September 17, 1978

**Vellodi, Mullath Aravindakishan**, Secretary (East) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India

**Vest, George Southall**, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977

**Watson, Thomas J. Jr.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 29, 1979, until January 15, 1981

**Welch, David**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology

**West, John C.**, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

**White, John**, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget

**Wise, Phillip M., Jr.**, Deputy Appointments Secretary to the President from August 1977 until May 1978; thereafter, Appointments Secretary to the President

**Wisner, Frank, G., II**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 28, 1979

**Wolff, Lester L.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York) until January 3, 1981; Chairman, House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

**Wriggins, William H.**, U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka from July 14, 1977, until December 13, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to the Maldives from March 3, 1978, until December 13, 1978,

**Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammed**, President of Pakistan from March 25, 1969, until December 20, 1971

**Yaqub Khan, Shabzada**, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until January 3, 1979; thereafter Pakistani Ambassador to the Soviet Union

**Yew, Lee Kwan**, Prime Minister of Singapore

**Zablocki, Clement J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); Chairman of the House International Relations Committee

**Zia-ul-Haq, Begum**, wife of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq

**Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad**, General; Army Chief of Staff of Pakistan; Chief Marshal Law Administrator from July 5, 1977, until September 16, 1978; thereafter President of Pakistan

**Zia-ul-Haq, Zain**, daughter of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq

# Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

## *Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency*

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

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<sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.<sup>3</sup> In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

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<sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

<sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

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<sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

<sup>6</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate*, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.<sup>9</sup>

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

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<sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.<sup>10</sup>

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.<sup>12</sup>

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,<sup>13</sup> which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40

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<sup>10</sup> For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

<sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

<sup>12</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

<sup>13</sup> For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.



reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive" covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.<sup>14</sup>

*Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group*

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.<sup>15</sup>

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in polit-

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<sup>14</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

<sup>15</sup> Public Law 93-559.

ical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.<sup>16</sup>

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.<sup>17</sup> Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."<sup>18</sup> In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management

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<sup>16</sup> Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

<sup>17</sup> The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59–62.

<sup>18</sup> Executive Order 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719–720.

and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.<sup>19</sup>

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of Presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for Presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own Presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives

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<sup>19</sup> Executive Order 12036, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the "SCC" were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, although Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification” (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new Presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about Presidential findings remained in place, the new act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> P.L. 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96–450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp. 1–2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280–281.



# South Asia

## South Asia Region

### 1. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 10, 1977

#### SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #16

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Asia.]

#### 4. *Proposal*

*Ganges and Brahmaputra Water Development (Maps Attached)*<sup>2</sup>

The middle and lower Ganges and Brahmaputra River valleys—in the eastern India-Bangladesh region—are the home of some 200 million of the world's poorest people. The outlook is for further deterioration in the food/population ratio and by the end of this century the area will predictably be a disaster area dwarfing the Sahel.<sup>3</sup> If we had foreseen the Sahel disaster, we would have undoubtedly acted to avert it. This disaster is foreseeable and probably avoidable.

The key to the problem is water. The region suffers from floods and droughts and the division of available water has already caused an important international dispute between India and Bangladesh. The World Bank and others see prospects of large-scale water management, combined with intensive rural development programs, turning this area into a highly productive agricultural region. The benefits for the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 5-6/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. In the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig—In each instance when there is a problem or need, please let me know what action is already being taken. J." Brzezinski initialed beneath Carter's note.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976, Documents 14 and 20.

people living there will be substantial, and the international community will also benefit if the region becomes a contributor to the world food balance rather than a disruptive drain on it. The political stability of the region should also be enhanced.

The costs will be immense—but nowhere nearly as large as the human and economic costs of ecological disaster. The project could only be undertaken on a multilateral basis along the lines of the successful Indus waters program two decades ago.<sup>4</sup> Participants should not, however, be limited to World Bank members. The Soviet and, perhaps China, should also become involved in an endeavor that is the concern of all mankind.

The recipients will also have to be organized multilaterally. Bangladesh, Nepal, and India will have to coordinate their involvement since there will be costs as well as benefits for each. This exercise in cooperation should be politically useful since Nepal and Bangladesh have yet to learn how to live comfortably with their large neighbor.

This multilateral approach has an additional benefit for us. It would permit us to transfer large amounts of resources to India in a way that would spare us the agonies of a bilateral assistance program and be clearly targeted on the poorest region of India.

State and AID have been looking at this idea now for six months—sympathetically but without much sense of urgency. We understand that the World Bank is interested in doing a feasibility study. The principal political obstacle—the India-Bangladesh quarrel over the distribution of Ganges waters—is just about overcome. An indication of American interest could facilitate final settlement and focus world attention on one of the major global issues. The technical, financial, and political obstacles could still turn out to be prohibitive, but we need to find out—and a high-level push sometimes makes obstacles seem less difficult.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in Karachi in September 1960 by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan, and the President of the World Bank. See *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, vol. XV, South and Southeast Asia, Document 97.

<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Let’s proceed w/ a plan. Include degree of Congressional involvement.”

## 2. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, July 14, 1977, 0920Z

9955. Subject: USG Policy in Kashmir: Joint New Delhi/Islamabad Message. Ref: Islamabad 6958<sup>2</sup> (Notal).

1. This message transmits the joint recommendation of Embassies New Delhi and Islamabad regarding USG activities in the Indian and Pakistani held portions of Kashmir. It was drafted following consultations between the two Missions and has the concurrence of concerned members of the Country Teams of both.

2. We believe that in general our policy toward our activities in Kashmir should be revised to provide for an approach more consistent with present-day political realities in the subcontinent. The Kashmir issue has been largely dormant for years, and though neither country is willing to acknowledge this formally or publicly, both sides have evidently come to accept the present partition of the state on a de facto basis. This unacknowledged acceptance of the de facto division of the state has led to a reduced sensitivity on both sides to the activities of the US and other powers in Kashmir, and to the significance such acts may have for international recognition of the continuing formal claims of the parties involved. The fact that the Kashmir issue has not received serious consideration in international forums for over a decade and has been recognized by India and Pakistan in their Simla Agreement<sup>3</sup> as a matter to be dealt with bilaterally probably furthers the more relaxed approach both sides seem to have adopted toward US and other foreign activities in the divided state. This assessment is reinforced by our awareness that both parties are apparently interested in our having certain types of programs in Kashmir, and are presumably prepared to accept our undertaking similar activities on the other side of the line of control.

3. Against this background, both Embassies agree that our overall approach should be to support in both parts of Kashmir activities of the sort carried out elsewhere in India and Pakistan provided the activities themselves are not controversial. We should not go out of our way to include Kashmir in our programs and our programs there

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770250–1000. Confidential; Exdis; Stadis. Sent for information to Islamabad.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The Simla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, ended hostilities between India and Pakistan after the 1971 crisis over East Pakistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 272 and 274.



should not be greater in scope than those in other parts of the two countries.

4. AID activities. We should be prepared to respond favorably to Government of Pakistan requests for the inclusion of Azad Kashmir and the northern territories in projects which operate in the provinces of Pakistan such as basic health services, primary education, and barani agriculture. Such activities can be properly viewed as natural extensions of what we are doing in the Pakistan provinces. At the same time, we would recommend that we avoid support for road-building activities. It seems to us that however innocuously “non-military” these might appear, they would have a potential for misunderstanding which it is not in our interest to risk.

5. Should we resume bilateral aid program in India, we should be prepared to respond to requests for their application to Kashmir in the same way as we recommend we do in Pakistan. We see no objection to PL 480 Title II activities by voluntary agencies in Kashmir if they elect to carry them out and the GOI agrees.

6. USIS activities. These have greater relevance to Indian Kashmir, with its university, press, and larger target audience. We recommend that we carry out a program there similar in scope to those we undertake in other Indian states in which we do not have USIS offices. We should be prepared to carry out programs with the University of Kashmir if these are reasonable and consistent with our all-India program. Our activities in Azad Kashmir and the northern territories would be more limited, perhaps roughly similar to those in the less developed districts of the Pakistan provinces.

7. Scientific and technological research. We should respond favorably to requests for USG participation in joint scientific and technological research projects in Kashmir provided these projects meet the criteria established for such activities elsewhere in India and Pakistan. On both the Indian and Pakistan side, the only potential projects we are now aware of are in the agricultural field.

8. Commercial/trade promotion. We see no reason why we should not carry out normal commercial and trade promotion activities in Kashmir.

9. Meetings. We would recommend against the scheduling of bilateral intergovernmental negotiations in Kashmir. In defining this prohibition, which in practice would be relevant only to Indian Kashmir, we would include any meeting involving a US group subsidiary to the Indo-US Joint Commission,<sup>4</sup> and thus having a government flavor. (This would not, of course, preclude necessary negotiations between

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 79.

USG officials and officials of the local Kashmir governments on such matters as AID and USIS programs.) We believe the holding of such meetings there could possibly be misinterpreted in Pakistan, particularly if they were well publicized. There are, in any event, many other cool places in India where they could be arranged. On the other hand we would have no objection to US officials or private Americans funded by the USG attending multilateral meetings sponsored by private Indian organizations. We would consider such attendance at meetings sponsored by the GOI or by international organizations on a case-by-case basis in the framework of our overall policy.

10. High level calls. To our recollection, no American Ambassador has called on either the President of Azad Kashmir or the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. We are not certain what reaction on the other side would be to such calls in the future, but would recommend against them as possibly provocative. We have no objection to other officials of the Embassies continuing to call on these and other senior leaders in Kashmir, as they have in the past.

11. In light of the sensitive nature of these recommendations, both Embassies suggest that initial distribution of this message be restricted to action offices in the Department, and that these offices then contact other concerned Washington agencies to work out approved new policy guidelines on the basis of this joint New Delhi/Islamabad cable.

**Goheen**

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### **3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1977

#### **SUBJECT**

Eastern Waters Proposal

You requested a study of a possible initiative for an international development project for the Lower Ganges and Brahmaputra valleys,<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, India: 1-8/77. Confidential. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Good report—Let's hold. I'll discuss with Desai as first move. J."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 1.

the so-called “Eastern Waters” of the subcontinent (see map at Tab A–1).<sup>3</sup> The Near East and South Asian Interdepartmental Group response is at Tab A; summary and conclusions are on pages 1–2.

The report reaffirms the vast potential of such a project. Dramatic improvements in the lives of some 300 million people could be achieved; a significant improvement in the global food/population ratio could result; and over the long run, potentially serious political conflicts could be defused. The technical problems should be soluble. In the words of the report, “There are few, if any, areas in the world where international assistance might produce more dramatic benefits for large numbers of people.” And there is no area in the world where there are more desperately poor people. At the same time, however, the report underlines the many uncertainties involved in an undertaking of this type; its very high costs; the many alternative approaches to meeting the challenge; and the extreme political sensitivities of the nations who would be affected. We clearly need much more knowledge about all of these factors.

The immediate choices concern whether and to what extent the US should become involved in an effort to initiate the study and then, depending on the answers, how to approach the regional states and Congress. We must also consider how best to explain our interest in the project to the American public. Policy options and agency recommendations are on pages 10–13 of the report. In short, the issues are:

1. Whether to raise this matter with the Indians and other states involved (a) by a Presidential letter to the heads of government, (b) in a discussion with Indian Prime Minister Desai later this year, or (c) through ambassadorial exchanges. I agree with the IG chairman’s proposal on page 11 of the report that Ambassador Goheen inform Desai when he sees him on the subject of visits that you would like to discuss this matter when you meet with Desai,<sup>4</sup> and may raise it before then in your UN speech.<sup>5</sup> Depending on how the Indians react, we would then decide whether to mention the project in the UN address. A Presidential letter would also be an acceptable course of action, but we would probably not get a reaction from Desai in time to plan for the UN speech.

2. The format for congressional consultations. I agree with the report’s unanimous recommendation that we inform selected members

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<sup>3</sup> The tabs were not found attached.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 90–92.

<sup>5</sup> Carter did not raise the issue when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 4. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1715–1723, or *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 56.

of Congress immediately after our initial exchanges with the regional states.

3. Means for announcing your decision. In my view, the UNGA speech would be the most effective means of calling international attention to this issue and catalyzing action. Also, a proposal of this sort would be a useful addition to a speech that may be short on initiatives in the North-South area.

The OMB dissent at Tab A-2 questions the utility of US investment in this project unless the regional states themselves request a feasibility study and the study shows that the project is viable. They are concerned that a prominent US role in requesting such a study might raise expectations about future financial support which may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, helping to launch a feasibility study stops well short of any long-term commitment to finance the project. And, by taking no action at this time, we may let an important political and developmental opportunity pass, since waiting for the Bank or the regional states to move will guarantee interminable delays.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That the US take the lead in calling for an Eastern Waters feasibility study. You would do so through your UN address, but, Goheen would inform Desai of our intentions beforehand. If he raises no objections, we would then inform the other regional states and discuss the proposal with interested members of Congress.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Carter did not check either the Approve or Disapprove option.

**4. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton and Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1977

SUBJECT

South Asian Nuclear Free Zone Vote in the UNGA

We would like your guidance on the stand that we should take with State on our UN vote on a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone.<sup>2</sup> Such an NFZ would make sense and would be in line with the endorsement that the President gave to the NFZ concept in connection with the Tlatelolco signing (Tab A).<sup>3</sup> Voting for the resolution would also be a much-needed shot in the arm for US-Pakistani relations which are nearing an all-time low.

On the other side, the Indians have made it very clear that (a) they see this resolution as a Pakistani political ploy (which it is), and (b) their nuclear concern is with China and unless China is brought into the system India will have nothing to do with it. Thus, the UN resolution will not further the cause of a South Asian NFZ. India will be unhappy—perhaps strongly so—with a positive US vote (we have abstained in previous years) and this could have a negative impact on the Carter-Desai meeting.<sup>4</sup> Less likely (but possibly) a positive vote could (a) cause India to be less forthcoming on controls, or (b) provoke them to introduce an Indian Ocean NFZ resolution which would include Diego Garcia.

Our previous abstentions were on the grounds that we support NFZs only when the regional states are in agreement. In this case they obviously are not, and a change to a positive vote could mark a revision of this traditional position—at least to the extent of urging regional states to work out NFZ arrangements. We could temper our vote somewhat by (a) abstaining but speaking fulsomely in support of the idea of an NFZ that was acceptable to all regional states or<sup>5</sup> (b) voting in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 22, United Nations: 8–12/77. Confidential. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 82.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached. For Carter's May 26 remarks on the signing of Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known as the Tlatelolco Treaty), see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 1027–1028. See also footnote 5, Document 87.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 90–92.

<sup>5</sup> Aaron underlined the word “abstaining,” and in the right-hand margin next to it drew a vertical line and wrote: “DA, my preference.”

favor with a disclaimer that we were only expressing a preference in principle and did not imply any political pressure on India.<sup>6</sup>

The vote may come early next week.<sup>7</sup> State needs an input by Friday<sup>8</sup> so that it can alert the Indians in advance if we intend to cast a favorable vote.

The choice is a close one. Thornton marginally prefers an abstention (coupled with a strong statement of support in principle) so as not to complicate the President's Delhi visit.<sup>9</sup> Tuchman believes that we should vote in favor in order to preserve the credibility of our generally positive position on NFZs.

What is your preference? Abstain<sup>10</sup>\_\_\_\_\_ Vote for\_\_\_\_\_

Should we push this point strongly with State? Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_

If "yes", on what grounds?\_\_\_\_\_

Do you think State needs raise the issue with the President? Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_

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<sup>6</sup> Below this paragraph, Aaron wrote: "ZB—I believe we should do (a). Indian Ocean disarmament has gone far enough at this point. DA."

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words "vote may come early next week."

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words "by Friday." Reference is to Friday, November 11.

<sup>9</sup> In the left-hand margin next to the preceding two sentences, Inderfurth drew a vertical line from which he drew another line to the bottom of the page where he wrote: "I agree with Tom—abstain but couple this with a strong statement in support of the principle. I do *not* believe our credibility is really on the line here. What is more at stake is US-Indian relations. Rick."

<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski checked and initialed this option.

**5. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kathmandu, December 19, 1977, 0925Z

5528. Subject: Observations of Kathmandu Chiefs of Mission Meeting.

1. There follow the principal observations of the December 15–18 Kathmandu Chiefs of Mission conference.

2. U.S. interests. We identified the following, not necessarily all-inclusive list of U.S. interests in the South Asian region:

A. We should develop close working relations with India. This is important not only because India is the predominant power of the region and hence plays a key role in preserving regional stability, but also because India is a major participant in the North/South dialogue.

B. We have a strong interest in the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This concern derives in part from our vital interest in the security of Iran.

C. We have an interest in the economic and social development of the countries of the region.

D. We have an interest in nuclear non-proliferation, in human rights, in eliminating narcotics production and trafficking, in preventing an arms race (India/Pakistan, US/USSR) and in trade and investment.

3. Achieving our objectives. The following are our observations on the means to be used in attempting to achieve some of these objectives:

A. India. Our relations with India should substantiate our expression of goodwill. However, while working toward a closer relationship with India, we believe it important that we not bestow a special mantle on India or hold up India as an example of the kind of political-economic development we specially admire. This conclusion is based on our beliefs that:

(1) India does not want to be so regarded.

(2) Such an embrace of India would be regarded by many in the area as a return to the Cold-War psychology.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770471–1077. Secret. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, New Delhi, and Tehran.

(3) The other countries of the region would find such an embrace alarming as encouraging Indian hegemony in the area.

(4) Our pursuing such a course would likely stimulate the Soviets to do more to woo India.

(5) It is not yet at all clear that the Desai government will succeed in spurring India's development within the framework of democratic institutions.

B. Iran. The Shah has a vision of a cooperative network of Indian Ocean littoral countries akin to ASEAN. He does not himself want to take the lead in any such grouping, but appears to be willing to accord India a leading role provided Pakistan becomes reconciled to that situation. We should stay in the background as, if and when this possibility develops so as to make certain it will represent genuine regional forces.

C. Pakistan and Afghanistan. We should continue to work to resolve the reprocessing issue so that we can resume our formerly close relationship with Pakistan. In the interim, we should do what we can to maintain our ties through economic assistance, including PL-480, and cash sales of military equipment in accordance with our global and regional arms sales policies. With respect to Afghanistan, the visit of President Daoud should be used to provide public and private expressions of U.S. support for Afghan independence and sovereignty.

D. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We believe it useful to assist the Jayewardene government and to encourage the Zia government goals of economic growth and development within a democratic framework.

E. Nepal. We welcomed good state of our relations and Nepal's moderate role in multilateral organizations. We agreed Nepal was a logical candidate for increased developmental assistance as one of the poorest which fortunately had the same developmental priorities as the USG and because growing ecological degradation was a threat to its own development. Moreover, Nepal will perforce play a key role in any plans to develop the water resources of the Gangetic River basin.

F. Development. We believe our AID and Peace Corps programs in the region should continue to stress the alleviation of poverty. We attach particular importance to programs which will increase agricultural productivity, and to health programs which include the promotion of family planning.

G. Arms transfers. We concur in the general principles of our arms transfer policy announced last spring, including our not becoming a major arms supplier to South Asia or introducing sophisticated weap-



ons in that area.<sup>2</sup> But we believe that we need some flexibility, for example:

(1) If the Indians obtain major new arms systems, we should permit the Pakistanis to obtain appropriate defensive weapons.

(2) We should be prepared to permit India to diversify its arms procurement away from the USSR to Western European suppliers.

H. Human rights. We had a useful discussion of ways in which our human rights policy could be more effectively implemented. In this connection, we would welcome visits from Assistant Secretary Derian and her principal associates to the area.

I. High-level visits. We welcome the establishment of a pattern wherein top U.S. officials visit one country (e.g. India) without necessarily visiting another (e.g. Pakistan) on the same trip. But we note a dearth of high-level visits to any area country other than India and Iran and hope that can be rectified.

J. Consultations. To encourage their constructive participation in the North/South dialogue, we should consult with/keep the South Asian governments informed on developing U.S. policy on North/South issues, on US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian Ocean, on U.S. policy toward other countries in the region, and on other international issues of mutual interest.

K. The President's visit. We recommend that at the conclusion of his visits to Tehran and New Delhi the President send personal messages to the Chiefs of State of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. These messages should convey his pleasure at having been in the area and his regret that he was unable to visit the addressee's country and should also contain some comments about the purposes and results of his visit to the area.

Heck

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<sup>2</sup> On May 17, the Carter administration issued PD/NSC-13, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," which aimed to restrain the sale and transfer of conventional weapons. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271. Telegram Tosec 40355/115278 to New Delhi and Geneva, May 19, transmitted talking points for presentation to host governments, including: "We have pursued an arms transfer policy in the subcontinent that would not upset the military equation nor make us a major supplier to the region. This continues to be our policy." and "Our South Asia approach under the new global arms policy continues to be one of not disturbing the process of regional normalization." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770179-0431)

## 6. Editorial Note

On March 10, 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 into law. The bill, which he had sent to Congress on April 27, 1977, incorporated the Symington and Glenn Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Symington Amendment, which was section 305 of P.L. 94-329, the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, added section 669 to Chapter 3 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Amendment barred U.S. economic and military assistance to any country that imported or exported spent nuclear fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology but failed to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards. The Glenn Amendment, which was section 12 of P.L. 95-242, the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, enacted on August 4, 1977, revised section 699 to Chapter 3 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Glenn Amendment reaffirmed the provisions of the Symington Amendment in regard to uranium enrichment. However, the Amendment implicitly equated the reprocessing of spent fuel with proliferation, as the law required the cutoff of U.S. economic and military aid to any country that imported or exported reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology whether or not the country complied with IAEA safeguards.

The Symington and Glenn Amendments both conferred on the President the power to waive the cutoff of aid but retained for Congress the power to override such a waiver. Under the Symington Amendment, in order to issue a waiver the President needed to determine that a cutoff of aid "would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests" and to have received assurances from the country in question that it would not seek nuclear weapons capability. In order to forestall a cutoff under the Glenn Amendment, the President needed to determine that it "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-242, expanded the provisions of the Glenn Amendment to include a U.S. commitment to develop an international fuel bank (the International Nuclear Fuel Authority), from which purchasers could obtain nuclear fuel without political preconditions. The act also created the concept of "sensitive nuclear technology," which was defined as information which was "not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water." The act included the same stricture against

reprocessing spent fuel that was in the Glenn Amendment, as well as the same Presidential waiver procedures.

After signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act into law, President Carter declared that he recognized that “nuclear power technologies now in operation, which do not involve nuclear fuel reprocessing, can and must provide an important source of energy for our Nation and for their countries. Our current once-through fuel cycle is and will continue to be a significant contributor to our energy supply.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 501*)

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**7. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Iran and Pakistan

Re the attached:<sup>2</sup>

I have indeed given quite a bit of thought to this question, particularly in connection with Newsom’s recent visit.<sup>3</sup> (You got copies of some of the things that I wrote in that connection;<sup>4</sup> I can send additional ones to you if you want.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 10/8–21/78. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. In the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “OK—persuasive—what concrete steps should be taken? ZB.”

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is an August 7 memorandum to Thornton in which Brzezinski asked: “Have you been giving any thought in what way, if at all, we ought to be either encouraging or assisting the development of some common defense arrangements between Iran and Pakistan, and perhaps even some form of cooperation between Iran and India, in the light of developments in Afghanistan? Or is that unnecessary?” On April 28, Communist forces in Afghanistan led by Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the Daoud Khan government. For the coup’s effect on U.S.-Pakistani relations, see Documents 276, 278, 283, and 293.

<sup>3</sup> For Newsom’s visit to Pakistan, see Documents 293–295. Documentation on Newsom’s visit to Tehran is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979. He also visited India (see footnote 6, Document 106, and Document 107), Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

The Newsom trip in itself was a move to show our concern over the Southwest Asia regional problem and in his conversations in the area Newsom stressed our regional approach to problems.

We could go somewhat further and focus more on defense cooperation; at a minimum, we should reiterate at all possible opportunities our regional approach.

What we should look for is a regional arrangement that includes Iran, Pakistan and India.<sup>5</sup> The key is to get Iran and India together first and then draw Pakistan in.<sup>6</sup> If Iran and Pakistan should team up first, that would risk alienating India and would undercut our policy in southern Asia.

We should not of course seek to play the kind of role that we did in the formation of the Baghdad Pact. Those days are past, both in terms of the international situation and our own perceived interests and capabilities.

If there is going to be defense cooperation, it will have to emerge out of the situation in the region. I think it is very unlikely that we would ever see formal pacts, joint staffs or anything of the kind. Even joint exercises would be pretty far down the way. There should, and can, however, be a growing sense that the security of these three countries is interrelated—and this should become clear to those who might mount possible threats. This might be better termed political, rather than defense cooperation.

The problem is not a mechanical, cross-border attack kind of threat. All of the defense pacts in the world could not have forestalled what happened to Daoud—or what some day may happen to the Shah. A manifested sense of shared security concern would, however, deter the Soviets from taking advantage of developing situations.

In sum, I see virtue in having our people continue and intensify the kinds of approach that Newsom took and, particularly with the Shah, being somewhat more explicit about our hopes for regional security (and political and economic) cooperation. Until Pakistani sensitivities have cooled down over the nuclear and Bhutto matters,<sup>7</sup> however, there is little that the Iranians or we can do to move matters ahead.<sup>8</sup> Over the longer term, in dealing with the Pakistanis, we should make increasingly clear our belief that they must find their security within

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<sup>5</sup> Brzezinski underlined the words "Iran," "Pakistan," and "India."

<sup>6</sup> In this sentence, Brzezinski underlined the words "is to get Iran and India" and "then draw Pakistan in."

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 282 and 272, respectively.

<sup>8</sup> Brzezinski drew a horizontal line in the left-hand margin next to this section of this paragraph.

their own region, rather than looking outside. (That is why I am opposed to CENTO.)

I have coordinated these comments informally with Gary Sick. He, in turn, showed me his memo on Iran and NATO.<sup>9</sup> I strongly support most of the negative considerations that he put forth, and am skeptical about the positive ones. To hit a few high points:

(1) From the South Asian perspective, an Iranian NATO link would make impossible the kind of Southwest Asian regional security understandings discussed above. Aside from that, it would be seen as a threat by India and promote closer Indo-Soviet ties.

(2) In my personal view, this is not the sort of thing that lies at the heart of NATO. NATO (or the trilateral relationship, if you prefer) is a grouping of like-minded people with similar values. Iran just does not belong and including it would weaken NATO. I am surprised that the European Cluster was not more negative.<sup>10</sup>

(3) Again, the kind of threat that the Shah faces—internal for the most part—is simply not containable by a military alliance. The Dulles pacts were anachronistic because they defended against the wrong kind of threat. NATO plus Iran would be similarly flawed.

(4) I know little about military matters, but stretching NATO capabilities that far impresses me as unwise. Do we even think that we could defend Asiatic Turkey?

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<sup>9</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski made a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. Reference is to the European Cluster of the NSC Staff.

8. **Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Iran and India

Attached is our previous correspondence on this subject.<sup>2</sup> Most recently you asked for specific ideas on how we could further Iranian and Indian political/security cooperation. I took the question on vacation with me and also posed it informally to the State Planning Staff member who knows the area well.

Both of us came out at about the same place—that there is not much that we can or should do to stimulate cooperation. Both Iran and India are at least well aware as we are of the security problem in their region and of their own limitations and capabilities in dealing with it. In fact, they are doing fairly well in moving towards cautious cooperation on the economic and political levels—and this must precede anything very substantial in the security area.

We, frankly, have little to contribute. The days are past when countries looked to us for guidance on this kind of matter—especially countries as independent-minded as these two. Also, given our limited relevance to South Asia, there is not all that much that we can offer.

Most important is that we do nothing to impede cooperation.<sup>3</sup> This goes back to my familiar litany on not getting more deeply involved with CENTO which poses a barrier to Indian cooperation.<sup>4</sup> It also means doing nothing that will cause Pakistan to look to us for the kind of active involvement that would allow it, once again, to disregard the imperatives of its geopolitical position.

Since the State Department (i.e. Vance) is not of this opinion, I don't think there are any sweeping policy decisions that we can take; we can (and shall), however, watch closely all individual actions and statements to see that they do not get too far out of line.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 10/8–21/78. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 7.

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski drew a line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: "OK."

<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski drew a line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: "OK."

We have one important thing going for us: The Indians are beginning to share our (and Iran's) concern about the situation in Afghanistan. History has been the best teacher, but some of the concerns that I shared with Mehta when he was here are beginning to appear in the Indian analyses of the situation.<sup>5</sup> We are keeping in touch with the Indians on the Afghan situation and that is probably about all that is needed on that side. I have also asked State to make sure that the Iranians are aware that the Indians are beginning to shift their position on Afghanistan and the Soviet role there. I suggested that they tell the Iranians that we are keeping in touch with Delhi on the subject and believe that it would be useful for Iran to do the same.

Pakistan is, in fact, the greatest obstacle to Indo-Iranian cooperation in securing West Asia. Unfortunately for them there is only one country that can provide reasonable guarantees for their security—and that is India. Further down the line, once the Pakistanis have gotten over the traumata of the reprocessing cancellation and the Bhutto affair, somebody should sit down with them and tell them the facts of life as we see them. When the time is ripe, you might consider doing this in a dinner conversation with Ambassador Yaqub Khan.<sup>6</sup>

Gary Sick concurs.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Mehta accompanied Desai to Washington in June. See Documents 103 and 104. On April 28, Communist forces in Afghanistan led by Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the Daoud Khan government.

<sup>6</sup> Brzezinski drew a line in the left-hand margin next to this and the preceding sentence and wrote: "OK."

<sup>7</sup> Brzezinski underlined this sentence. At the bottom of the page, he wrote: "See #4 of your earlier memo. It implied us doing something. The question is still *what?* ZB."

## 9. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Colombo, January 11, 1979, 1030Z

182. Dept for Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Saunders. Subj: Report of South Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference. Ref: 78 State 327405.<sup>2</sup>

Summary: While there is great diversity in the arc extending from Bangladesh to Yemen, we believe we can generalize regarding the problems there and regarding a broad strategy for dealing with them. The problems are chiefly caused by unfulfilled economic expectations and the resulting demand for greater political participation. They are complicated by the invitation the parallel instability presents for foreign intervention. We propose a political and economic strategy of orderly change (our definition of stability) for meeting this threat to U.S. interests which would consist of two main elements: the insulation of the nations of the region from external intervention and the provision of economic assistance where necessary to ease economic pressures while domestic problems are being worked out. Looking at the South Asian sub-region, a fundamental change has taken place in Afghanistan, which is no longer a buffer and which is a potential Soviet ally in pursuing its irredentist goals. Pakistan, threatened from Afghanistan, is a nation of weakness whose economic and political development programs have faltered. The resulting instability has added to Pakistan's often exaggerated fear of threats from across its eastern and western borders. On the other hand, India's relatively stable and effective institutions have made possible notable achievements which, when considered with the country's size and resources, give India great potential influence in South Asia and possibly in the larger region, including Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790017-0040. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, New Delhi, and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 327405 to multiple posts, December 30, 1978, Saunders, noting that he would be unable to attend the January Chiefs of Mission meeting in Colombo, indicated his interest in the status of regional and extra-regional relationships, as well as whether there were "a sensible way of thinking about some region larger than South Asia." He noted, however, that he had "no illusions about our developing either a tightly knit strategy toward that region nor about any possibility of new formal relationships among the nations there. But the practical fact is that, with the increased instability across that region, we must find new ways of talking about the area and new doctrines for expressing our relationship with it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780539-0512)



In view of this situation we propose for South Asia a U.S. sub-strategy of insulation and economic support to meet the threat to U.S. interests there. The strategy would include the following elements:

(A) Insulation of Pakistan from outside intervention through a warning that no state should intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs while that country works out its domestic problems.

(B) U.S. provision of substantial security supporting assistance to Pakistan to ease economic pressures while solutions to political problems are pursued.

(C) Limited military sales to Pakistan and India and consultation with each about sales to the other.

(D) An important Indian role of monitoring the effort to insulate Pakistan from outside interference and of influencing the Soviets to desist.

(E) Indian reassurance to Pakistan that it faces no threat from India.

(F) Major U.S. actions to strengthen our relations with India in order to support this strategy.

(G) Chinese support to our strategy which we anticipate because of Chinese interest in stability on the subcontinent.

(H) Close consultations at senior levels with India to convince it our strategy is consistent with its interests and with Pakistan to give it confidence during its days of adversity.

(I) Consultation with our NATO Allies and other friends (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Japan) to attain their active support for our strategy.

(J) Increased high-level exchanges with all the countries of the region to demonstrate our interests and concern.

In proposing this policy for South Asia we have rejected a military course of action. Such a course would risk causing India to become more dependent on the Soviet Union because of a perceived U.S.-Pakistan threat to India. We believe we should hold the military option in reserve, however, in the event that our insulation strategy is not effective. Key to this strategy is Indian willingness to reassure Pakistan and effective Indian influence with the Soviets. We believe there is a good chance that India will see both these actions in its interest and that the Soviets will respond because of their desire to protect their valuable relationship with India.

Observations and recommendations concerning the other countries of the region are contained in the body of our report. End summary.

1. We have examined the situation in Southwest and Southern Asia, interests and U.S. strategies to protect those interests over the next five years against the background of recent Washington studies<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

and the questions posed for us by Assistant Secretary Saunders (reftel). We have agreed upon the following conclusions and recommendations.

2. While there is a great diversity among the nations extending along the arc from Aden to Bangladesh, we believe there are sufficient similarities among them so that we may generalize regarding the problems there and a broad U.S. strategy for dealing with those problems. Throughout this area the demands for modernization have not been met by the pace of modernization; promises of economic development have not been met by the managers of that development. Economic dissatisfactions have created a demand for wider political participation. At the same time, especially in Islamic countries, modernizing developments have stirred reaction and added to instability. In many nations, political institutions have proved unable to meet this demand and political instability has resulted. The causes of this instability are internal.

3. Another common characteristic of this broad region is the threat that the Soviet Union will intervene to take advantage of instability to the detriment of U.S. interests. Finally, virtually all of the nations of the region have influence over either access to oil or its transport; or they are important to the security of nations with such influence. The expansion of Soviet hegemony in this area would both alter the global balance and add to the perceptions of reduced U.S. influence and reliability.

4. While we claim detailed knowledge only of the South Asian portion of this region, we believe it is possible to generalize regarding a broad strategy, to be broken down into regional sub-strategies, designed to meet the threat to U.S. interests from instability and Soviet intervention. Stated briefly, this strategy would be one of insulation of the nations of the region from external intervention while they resolve their own internal problems and direct their energies toward fulfilling the economic aspirations of their people. In appropriate cases the U.S. would supplement actions designed to insulate the region from external intervention with economic assistance intended to ease economic pressures while domestic problems were being worked out. We see this strategy as primarily political and economic and would not see recourse to military measures unless our effort to insulate the region from Soviet intervention failed. Should we have to pursue a military strategy elsewhere in the broad region, we should be aware that this could involve costs in Indo-U.S. relations.

5. Our deliberations focused on the South Asian countries and we did not attempt to consider Iran in depth because of the absence from our deliberations of Ambassador Sullivan. Viewing the region as a whole, we saw all the nations struggling to meet public demands for economic betterment and greater political participation with widely

differing results. All were concerned at the external threat posed by the proximity of Soviet power to the area, especially the expansion of its role in Afghanistan. Considering the countries individually, we concluded that a fundamental change had taken place in Afghanistan with the result that it is no longer a buffer; the Soviet Union now sees Afghanistan as an investment in their favor in the global balance. We can expect the Afghan regime to summon Soviet help to meet any counter-revolutionary movement and the Soviets to respond with materiel and, if necessary, men. While the regime in Kabul seems relatively secure, we believe it will be preoccupied with consolidation for some years before it is able to pursue its irredentist objectives in Pakistan.

6. For the time being, we should maintain a low-profile presence in Afghanistan, bearing in mind that we do not wish to be seen as providing undue support to an authoritarian, Communist-oriented regime which is showing itself to be callous in the human rights field. At the same time, we wish to maintain access to the regime to demonstrate that there is an alternative available to complete dependence upon and eventual subservience to the Soviet Union and to work with the new government on narcotics control problems. Our hope is that the new regime may eventually pursue a more independent nationalism that emphasizes regional stability and the avoidance of a provocative policy toward Pakistan. Our leverage with Kabul may increase should it find that U.S. and free world assistance is crucial to Afghanistan's economic and social progress and/or should Afghanistan face a series of bad harvests and seek food support from us.

7. Confronted with this geopolitical change in Afghanistan, Pakistan is a nation of weakness. Its programs of economic and social development have faltered. Its political institutions had failed to meet public demands for economic improvement and wider political participation. The trend toward the application of conservative Islamic doctrine may retard economic and political revival. It is insecure and irrationally fearful of threats from across its western and eastern borders. We concluded, therefore, that Pakistan must now be the focus of U.S. concern in South Asia.

8. India, on the other hand, has been able to develop stable political institutions which have permitted orderly change (our definition of stability); its economic development has been slow, but has provided just enough hope of future progress to moderate popular discontent. India's political structure, even with the quarreling of its key figures, and its vast diversity have made possible the containment and resolution of political disputes. Its stability and resulting achievements, its size and its resources make it central to dealing with the problem of Pakistan.

9. Nepal has enjoyed an almost static stability for many years. Its apparent calm has concealed economic and political discontent which

could within several years cause tensions beyond the capacity of current governmental institutions to control.

10. Bangladesh is currently trying to develop a political structure which will provide for both the administration of development programs and the broadening of public participation in government; and there is some prospect that the new structure can provide for orderly change. U.S. supply of ample food stocks has eased this process. However, given Bangladesh's turbulent history and its vast economic problems, there is at least equal prospect of a return to turmoil and frequent changes of regime.

11. Sri Lanka, like India, has developed political institutions which over the years have managed orderly change, if uneven economic achievement. This stability should continue if external assistance is sufficient and not unduly intrusive.

12. In the South Asian regime generally, we believe our strategy should be primarily one of assisting governments to meet economic aspirations. We should be careful to avoid planning and programs which stimulate aspirations more rapidly than they can be fulfilled; this will require restrained application of often overly stringent aid criteria. We should encourage economic reform and wider participation in government, but recognize that orderly change will usually be much slower than we would wish. In some countries, such as Pakistan, there will be period of political stress and it will be in our interest to use our economic assistance in ways which will ease economic pressures while political problems are resolved.

13. During our deliberations we focused our attention on the problem of Pakistan caused by the changes in Afghanistan, uncertainties in Iran, and the internal weakness of Pakistan. Pakistan typifies the threat to U.S. interests which exist in varying degree throughout the arc from Bangladesh to Yemen. Unstable governmental institutions have failed to provide adequate economic achievement. Domestic discontent has complicated traditional regional rivalries and brought additional problems to a weak governmental structure. The changes in Afghanistan invite Soviet intervention, threatening U.S. interests.

14. We have examined the Southwest Asia security situation and propose the following U.S. approach to the Pakistan problem.

First, we would seek to insulate Pakistan from external intervention so that it could work out by itself its own internal political problems. For this purpose we would inform the Soviets that we expect them not to intervene in Pakistan's affairs.

Second, in order to ease the economic pressures which complicate Pakistan's effort to develop stable political institutions, the executive will have to mobilize whatever effort will be necessary to provide Pakistan with substantial security supporting assistance.

Third, recognizing that the Pakistan problem is not a military one, we would continue our policy of restraint in providing equipment to Pakistan. We would discuss these transfers with India. Similarly, we would exercise restraint in regard to military sales to India, keeping Pakistan informed regarding any sales.

Fourth, we would make clear to India our expectation that India, in its own interest, would play a major role in contributing to conditions which would give the best prospect for stability and freedom from external interference in Pakistan. We would expect that India, like the U.S., would use its influence to insulate Pakistan from Soviet interference. Our estimate is that the Soviet Union would be reluctant to risk its good relations with India for an uncertain prospect in Pakistan and that therefore to that extent good India-Soviet relations could serve U.S. interests. We would also expect that India's own interest would prompt it to reassure Pakistan regarding the security of its border with India and any sort of Indian interference. At the same time, we would inform Pakistan that we did not accept its exaggerated view of the threat from India.

Fifth, because of the importance we attach to India's role in this strategy, we would take actions designed to strengthen our bilateral relations. We would manage our policies toward India in the same way that we do with regard to other major nations where we have important interests. This might include flexibility in applying our nuclear non-proliferation policy. The most senior U.S. leaders should consult frequently and frankly with the Indian leadership. We should consider policy concessions in areas of interest to India, such as trade.

Sixth, what the Chinese say and do with the Pakistanis is crucial to our strategy. We would inform China in detail of our South Asian strategy and seek its cooperation. We believe the Chinese also see their interest in countering Soviet influence served by stability in South Asia. Assuming that Sino-Indian relations continue to improve, Peking may therefore urge the Pakistanis to work out a viable relationship with India. We consider that our new relationship with China will be a positive support to our strategy since it provides additional reassurance to Pakistan and better foundation for our attaining Chinese cooperation. That new relationship could have negative results however, if India concluded it had been achieved at the cost of U.S.-Indian relations. Consequently, it is particularly important that we take steps to indicate to the Indians the importance we attach to our relations with them.

Seventh, we would consult closely and frequently through visits of senior U.S. officials with the Governments of both Pakistan and India. We believe that such consultations can achieve important political results even though they are not accompanied by additional commitments of resources. Since India would be central to our strategy, we

would discuss with the Government of India our analyses and plans regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the region generally. By so doing, we would seek to obtain India's confidence that our strategy was consistent with India's interests. By presenting our policy so that its limits and its consistent application over a period of time are clear, we would hope that India would accept a greater U.S. economic and security participation in Pakistan than would be the case were our policy open-ended and undefined. The objectives of our consultations with Pakistan would be both to keep the government informed of our views and policies and build Pakistan's confidence based upon our friendship and support. The initial result of our consultations with Pakistan regarding our new policy would be—to put it mildly—disappointment; nonetheless, we think we should be candid as in time we consider our consultations and our actions can produce the confidence we seek.

Finally, we would consult with our NATO Allies and other friendly countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Japan) seeking to obtain from them an appreciation of the Pakistan problem similar to ours and their active engagement in policies consistent with ours.

15. In proposing this policy we have considered and rejected a military course of action designed to protect Pakistan from Soviet expansionism via Afghanistan. We see no practical way of strengthening CENTO and we believe that the stability of the area would not be seriously affected if it is allowed to quietly fade away. We believe that India can do more to reassure Pakistan (and conversely to undermine its stability) than any other nation. If we pursued a U.S. military strategy we would risk creating an Indian perception of a new threat to India and we would risk stimulating closer Soviet-Indian relations, thus adding to the dangers of Soviet penetration in the subcontinent. However, we believe we should hold a military option in reserve in case our insulation strategy is failing.

16. We recognize that the success of this policy will depend upon India's tolerance for our actions in Pakistan and India's pursuit of its own interests in the manner we project. India's tolerance will depend upon the limits we impose on the steps we take to strengthen Pakistan's security, the effectiveness of our consultations, and the credibility of our efforts to improve bilateral relations. Our review of India's history indicates that the Indians, when they have seen their interests threatened by developments in neighboring countries, have taken decisive actions to protect those interests—but only after deliberation and the development of a clear and present threat. We therefore believe our strategy presents the best—although uncertain—prospects for success. But it may require considerable patience on our part. While we should review our policy if Mrs. Gandhi should return to power, our estimate

is that the actual foreign policies she would pursue would not be markedly different from those of the present government. Her rhetoric would, of course, be considerably different and might heighten Pakistani concerns.

17. As for the smaller countries in South Asia, we should continue our support of Sri Lanka's efforts to develop a more prosperous and equitable society. We should also continue to use our assistance policies to ease political strains and support a strategy of orderly change in all three states. We should also monitor closely developments in Bangladesh and Nepal because of prospects for instability and turmoil in these countries which could affect the stability of the whole area and invite outside involvement.

18. Request S/S distribute as appropriate to other posts such as London, Moscow and Peking.

**Wriggins**

## 10. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: PRC Meeting on Southwest Asia and Saudi Arabia

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Warren Christopher (Chairman),  
Deputy Secretary  
David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Harold Saunders, Assistant  
Secretary for Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs

#### *Treasury*

Secretary Blumenthal  
Anthony Solomon, Under  
Secretary for Monetary Affairs  
Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary  
for International Affairs

#### *Defense*

Secretary Brown  
Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary  
David McGiffert, Assistant  
Secretary for International  
Security

#### *Office of Management and Budget*

Dr. John White, Deputy Director  
Ed Sanders, Associate Director for  
International Affairs

#### *Commerce*

Stanely Marcuss, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for Trade  
Regulations

#### *Energy*

Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary  
for International Affairs

#### *Joint Chiefs of Staff*

General David C. Jones  
Lt. General William Smith

#### *Central Intelligence Agency*

Dr. Robert Bowie, Deputy Director  
for National Foreign  
Assessment

Robert Ames, NIO for Near East  
and South Asia

#### *White House*

Dr. Brzezinski

#### *National Security Council*

Thomas Thornton  
William Quandt  
Rutherford Poats

The PRC met to discuss the broad question of strategy in Southwest Asia (the region from Yemen to Bangladesh) as well as specific issues relating to Saudi Arabia. (S)

1. *Regional Strategy*. There was a broad consensus on the existence of domestic instability in many parts of this region that either has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 88: 1/23/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions incorrectly describes the meeting as a Presidential Review Committee meeting. The minutes of the meeting were not found. Brzezinski sent the Summary of Conclusions to Carter under a January 29 memorandum, requesting that he approve it. Carter initialed the memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 72, PRC 088, 1/23/79, Saudi Arabia and Southwest Asia)



external effects or could be exploited by outside forces. While there are many interrelationships, differences within the region preclude a single strategy except in the broadest terms. The Indian subcontinent, Iran and the Arabian peninsula do, however, comprise logical subregions. The group recognized that there was no clear correlation between amounts of resources expended and positive results; the region is sufficiently important, however, that we should make a major effort to get whatever resources we believe are necessary, and we should develop greater flexibility in applying resources such as security supporting assistance. Several members commented on the need for better analysis of the economic problems of the area and how they relate to political and security factors. The State Department also offered to circulate a list of current US commitments to the states of the region. (S)

2. *South Asia*. With specific regard to the subcontinent, there was general acceptance of the strategy proposed by the meeting of the Subcontinent Chiefs of Mission in Colombo<sup>2</sup>—reassure Pakistan to enhance its sense of security; provide economic assistance and limited military sales to Pakistan; recognize the prominent and promising role of India; seek to reduce Indo-Pakistani tensions; encourage regional cooperation; and promote Sino-Indian dialog. There was no support for expanded military arrangements along the lines of CENTO. State, NSC and other concerned agencies will draw up specific recommendations for action in implementing this South Asian policy and will explore it with our Ambassadors in the region. Deputy Secretary Christopher is seeking to reschedule his consultations in India<sup>3</sup> and Pakistan<sup>4</sup> for mid-February. This would be an appropriate time to discuss our ideas directly with the parties. The need to assess Indian and Pakistan sensitivities was noted. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Asia.]

5. *Capabilities for Action*. We need to look at our economic and military resources for meeting the needs of some of the countries in the region. A suggestion was made that we might try to shorten lead times for delivering certain types of military equipment by advance purchasing. This would help to overcome the belief that we are unable to respond quickly to meet the requests of our friends. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 9.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 129–131.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 325 and 326.

## 11. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 22, 1979, 4–5:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

PRC Meeting on Regional Implications of Iran—Minutes

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Warren Christopher, Deputy  
Secretary

David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

Bill Crawford, Deputy Ass't. Secr.  
for Developing Nations

Matthew Nimetz, Counselor

#### *Treasury*

Arnold Nachmanoff, Deputy  
Ass't. Secretary for  
Developing Nations

#### *Defense*

David McGiffert, Ass't. Secretary  
for Near Eastern, African and  
South Asian Affairs

#### *Joint Chiefs of Staff*

General David Jones, Chairman  
Lt. General William Smith

#### *Central Intelligence Agency*

Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director

Dr. Robert Bowie, Deputy Director  
for Nat'l. Foreign Assessment

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Henry Owen

#### *National Security Council*

Gary Sick  
Thomas Thornton

*Christopher:* The main purpose of my visit is bilateral discussions with India.<sup>2</sup> We want a genuine discussion to see if our improved relations with India are perhaps in some jeopardy, especially because of disputes in the nuclear area, such as the slowness of the NRC,<sup>3</sup> the collapse of the proposed safeguard committee,<sup>4</sup> and Indian dissatisfaction with progress on CTB and SALT.<sup>5</sup> I want to begin to persuade the Indians that they should not be so obsessed with Pakistan and to promote the idea of common interests between the two countries. It is in India's interest for us to strengthen the Pakistanis. We need to give them as much reassurance as possible on the nuclear side by showing that we are reliable suppliers.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Meetings File, Box 96, 2/22/79: PRC re Iran, 2/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are incorrectly titled "Presidential Review Committee Meeting" and misdated "February 23, 1979." The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> For Christopher's discussions in India, see Documents 129–131.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 120.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 127.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 118.

*Bowie:* Did you understand that the Saudis have counseled the Pakistanis to forego their nuclear option, and that the Pakistanis said they would do so if they had an adequate arms supply from the United States?

*McGiffert:* I told them about the Pakistani program and the effect that it would have on American assistance.<sup>6</sup>

*Brzezinski:* We see this trip as extremely important. India is important to us in itself and also because our improvement in relations with it is one of the notable gains of the Carter Administration. I think that you should pursue two goals. The first is to help resolve a range of bilateral issues. The nuclear issue is the most important of these. But our bilateral relationship should not be the central concern of the talks. More important are larger international issues. You should try to see if India cannot work with us in containing the Vietnam-China conflict. It would be good if you could get India to understand what we are doing, and get a general endorsement of our position. We would like to see the Indians urge the Soviets to exercise restraint. You should ask Desai or the Foreign Minister if they have urged the Soviets in this direction, and if not, why not? If they did do so, what did the Soviets say? Our maximum goal should be to get India to support the U.S. idea that this issue is an Indo-Chinese problem.

The second set of issues revolves around Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. We need to develop a systematic dialogue with the Indians. You should tell them that we would welcome their analysis and advice. For the first time in 200 years, Afghanistan has become an extension of Russian power. What conclusions do they draw from this? You should also ask them about their attitude toward Pakistan. How can we be helpful in altering the Pakistani viewpoint? We are willing to work closely with them on this. In the same way with Iran, we would hope that we could work together. You should tell them of our hopes for the Bazargan regime and seek their advice. Also, you should register with them our concern about the Soviet role. You should lay these things out clearly.

The third area relates to Middle Eastern stability and oil. We and India have a common interest here. Instability in the Middle East influences the price and availability of oil, both of which are critical to Indian development. We play a benign role in the Middle East as regards peace and oil and we would like to see if they could help us. You should treat India as a big country and as a partner. We have a

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<sup>6</sup> McGiffert accompanied Secretary Brown on his visit to Saudi Arabia February 10–11. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 185 and 186.

basic complement parity of interest and you should press them to take action which is in our mutual interest.

*Christopher:* What you have said is very helpful. In the agenda that we sent out to New Delhi we sought to emphasize the global issues. The Vietnam-China issue is, of course, now an additional issue. As you know, they have asked us to help them in the matter of oil deliveries.

*Brzezinski:* When you go to Pakistan, you should tell the Pakistanis exactly what we told the Indians about our attitude.<sup>7</sup> They should know what our relationship is to India and how we value it, and they should know what we are attempting to do. With regard to President Zia, I wonder how long we can go on waiting to invite him. We have been putting off a number of issues until the Bhutto case is over, but that has dragged on and on.

*Newsom:* The most important issue we have to be concerned with with the Pakistanis is the nuclear issue.

*Brzezinski:* Should we not invite Zia in order to shore up his position?

*Christopher:* No, not until the Bhutto issue is settled.

*Brzezinski:* Well then, you should lay the problem out to him and explain that we would like to have him come, but can't until these matters are straightened out.

*Christopher:* The nuclear inspection team will be going to Pakistan one week after I am there. The results that they come back with will be an important bench mark. We cannot do anything in the aid area before that.

*Brzezinski:* We should also get from the Pakistanis a comprehensive assessment of the internal Afghan scene.

*Owen:* We need to emphasize to them the impact of our nuclear legislation and its automatic nature<sup>8</sup> with regard to their economic requirements.

*Newsom:* At a recent meeting we discussed a possible change in legislation that would bring the terms of the Symington amendment in line with the terms of the Glenn amendment and thus give the President more discretion in dealing with the Pakistani case.<sup>9</sup> As long as India is a potential nuclear threat, the Pakistanis will continue to pursue their nuclear option. Our non-proliferation and security policies are going to come into conflict.

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<sup>7</sup> For Christopher's discussions in Pakistan, see Documents 325 and 326.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 6.

<sup>9</sup> See Document 321.

*Christopher:* I will let them know what the legal situation is. I think the President is unlikely to ask for any change in legislation.

*Brzezinski:* I agree.

*Aaron:* We may be coming to the point again where we have to look at the whole question of restrictions on Presidential authority in general. If we were to send up a list of unwarranted restrictions, perhaps we could include the Symington amendment in them.

*McGiffert:* There is also a question to be raised about the enhancement of U.S. military presence off-shore, as I discussed in the Persian Gulf. The Indians have always opposed American military presence; how should we raise this issue with them?

*Brzezinski:* What kind of military presence do you mean? Strengthening Diego-Garcia?

*McGiffert:* It could be that or also more ship days in the area.

*Jones:* We are also thinking of putting an LPH with 200 Marines stationed in the Persian Gulf.

*Christopher:* At some point this group will have to consider the entire Indian Ocean arms control issue and how we wish to approach it. We are not really ready yet to say anything about this to the Indians.

*McGiffert:* The question could be raised in principle though. What do they think about it in general?

*Smith:* Over the last several weeks we have had a substantially increased naval presence? What has been their reaction to that?

*Aaron:* Their view is that it is their lake, after all it is named the Indian Ocean. They will simply say no.

*Christopher:* With regard to other issues, we need to get a read-out of the Vajpayee trip to China and to reassure them that our China policy will not be at their expense.

*Brzezinski:* And we also want to seek information on their efforts in dealing with the Soviets.

*Turner:* There is another issue. The non-aligned movement is growing in importance and vulnerability. The next conference will be held in Havana and we should do all we can to sabotage that. We should point out the problems that are developing in the non-aligned movement and urge the Indians to keep it non-aligned.

*Brzezinski:* That is an excellent point and there has been some exchange on this in the correspondence between Desai and President Carter.

*Christopher:* I think the Indians feel embarrassed about the way the movement is going and the little they have been able to do about it.

*Brzezinski:* The Yugoslavs have been better in this regard than have the Indians.

*Christopher:* We have persuaded the Pakistanis to postpone their withdrawal from CENTO. Disintegration of CENTO, however, is merely a matter of time.<sup>10</sup> I will urge them not to be precipitate but at the same time reassure them that we have concern for their security and reaffirm the 1959 bilateral.<sup>11</sup>

*McGiffert:* DOD supports that position.

*Turner:* They probably don't have very much faith in these reassurances since they didn't help them in 1971 when half their country was broken off.

*Christopher:* We certainly will need to give them more support once the nuclear question is settled. Development aid does not seem to be a very promising channel; AID is reluctant to add anything to what they are doing already. What are the other options? FMS? SSA? PL-480? We should think of this in terms of the President's speech at Georgia Tech.<sup>12</sup>

*Aaron:* State should consult with DOD and explore what it is possible to do in terms of security assistance.

*McGiffert:* Pakistan could be included in a supplemental request, but only if the nuclear issue is settled.

*Christopher:* India would react very negatively to FMS for Pakistan.

*Aaron:* SSA, however, is very hard to get.

*Thornton:* India's concern is not with the amount of weaponry that Pakistan gets, but the factor of U.S. involvement. India has been paranoid about this ever since we became deeply involved in South Asian politics through our arms supply policy to Pakistan in the 1950's. FMS would be a very bad signal to the Indians

*Newsom:* We seem to be ignoring some of the realities that we face in Pakistan. The military supply issue is very important from the President's view, and we have to face up to their military concerns. Clearly, SSA would be preferable.

*Aaron:* If FMS is easier, shouldn't we go for that?

*Thornton:* FMS means acquisition of weapons, and that is not their problem. The problem with Pakistan is domestic and rests heavily upon economic matters where SSA or other kinds of economic assistance could be helpful.

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<sup>10</sup> See Documents 326, 329, and 330.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 6, Document 281.

<sup>12</sup> For the text of Carter's remarks on foreign affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, February 22, see *Public Papers: Carter 1979*, Book I, pp. 300–306, or *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 111.

*Turner:* I agree with Thornton that the problem is a domestic one. Our analysis shows that Zia is on very weak grounds, especially because of his economy.

*Nimitz:* He is also in great political difficulty. The Baluch tribesmen are a particular threat.

*Owen:* General Zia is just now in a position to make the kind of economic reforms that are necessary. Shouldn't we supply military equipment? This is a country run by the military, and they usually want weapons.

*Thornton:* No, keeping the military in line is not the problem that Zia has; to the extent that it is the problem, it is not because of lack of weapons.

*Christopher:* SSA would certainly be the most useful. It would strengthen the economy, it doesn't offend India, it is free of restraints that we find in the AID mandate. Also, we should address the problem of debt rescheduling.

*Nachmanoff:* The balance of payments problem is not central to Pakistan's difficulties. What they lack is the domestic will and ability to take tough decisions. Debt relief at this point would be a serious mistake. Congress would see it as a back-door means of granting aid and would resent it.

*Owen:* When will the balance of payments situation become critical?

*Nachmanoff:* In about 9–12 months. When that happens we would steer them to the IMF. There could be some rescheduling then, but we are not able to do it in advance.

*Newsom:* But we seem to be precluding the possibility of discussing debt relief with other creditors.

*Nachmanoff:* We are not the only political hold-out on this. The Paris Club would be the forum, but it meets only in cases of imminent default.<sup>13</sup>

*Owen:* What if other nations ask us to talk about Pakistani debt relief?

*Nachmanoff:* We don't do that until there is the threat of imminent default and the prospect of a stabilization program. Of course we discuss these things informally all the time with other creditors.

*Christopher:* It seems that everything we propose to do faces serious problems.

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<sup>13</sup> The Paris Club, first convened in 1956, is an informal and voluntary group of officials of the major creditor countries that develops coordinated policies to help countries having trouble repaying their debts.

*Owen:* FMS and SSA seem to be the choices. There is nothing wrong with the latter, except for a lack of money.

*Christopher:* My order of preference is SSA, talk about debt relief, and FMS in third place. When I was in Germany recently the Germans pressed me very hard on the debt relief question for Pakistan. They want us to begin talks so the Pakistanis will know what to expect when trouble comes.

*Nachmanoff:* We shouldn't mislead the Pakistanis into thinking that we will go to debt relief short of a crisis.

*Owen:* But there is certainly going to be a crisis. Shouldn't we begin to talk about what we can do?

*Nachmanoff:* Debt relief should not be undertaken without a stabilization.

*Christopher:* The Germans wanted to hold anticipatory talks to head off the crisis.

*Nimitz:* We should talk to the Pakistanis about their debt situation.

*Nachmanoff:* Sure, we should tell them to go talk to the IMF.

*Owen:* I think Christopher should tell them that we hope they will talk to the IMF and we will be prepared to talk to the other creditors.

*Nachmanoff:* Treasury is flatly opposed to debt relief and we should not mislead the Pakistanis. Talking to them will not help their problems. We should say to them, first, there is no current debt crisis. Second, they should go to the IMF about their deteriorating situation, and third, we should look at the issue if the criteria are met.

*Christopher:* I propose to say that if there is a crisis, we are prepared to work with other creditors.

*Newsom:* All we have been doing up until now with the Pakistanis is citing our theology on this point.

*Christopher:* Let me summarize. We should talk to the Pakistanis about the possibility of SSA.

*Newsom:* This will be in the paper that we are preparing on a possible supplemental.

*Owen:* I will approach OMB to see if they agree. It is unfortunate that they are not here. (Note: Owen later talked with OMB, who said that it would not be advisable to mention SSA to the Pakistanis at this time.)

*Newsom:* We are all expressing concern about instability and about the role of the Soviets in this area. We have to face up to the fact that dealing with this is going to cost money, and we have to ask for more resources.

*Owen:* I agree that SSA is the most appropriate type of assistance and we'll get back to you very shortly on the subject of it after I have talked to OMB.



*Christopher:* The minutes should also show that we find FMS to be a less desirable, but nonetheless important possibility.

*Jones:* I support that strongly. We will enhance our credibility by providing military equipment.

*Newsom:* In financial terms, FMS just doesn't make sense for a country that is already overburdened with debt.

*Christopher:* Turning briefly to Afghanistan, I have asked our Charge in Kabul to come to meet with me in Delhi. I want to take this opportunity to assess him and see what our actions should be in terms of replacing Ambassador Dubs.<sup>14</sup> We could either leave our present Charge there, or send in somebody if we think we need a stronger person. It certainly, as I read the reports of the circumstances around the shooting of Ambassador Dubs, becomes increasingly complex.

*Newsom:* It is important that you outline to the Indians our rationale for our actions in Afghanistan.

*Turner:* There are several other matters which you should keep in mind on this trip. There is going to be a meeting here next week on how we might, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], stimulate covert action against the government in Afghanistan,<sup>15</sup> [*4 lines not declassified*].

*Thornton:* Getting back into that relationship with the Pakistanis, or even suggesting it, would be a very strong signal to them about our willingness to get reinvolved the way we were before.

*Nimetz:* If anything, the Pakistanis are moving in the other direction, more towards the Soviets. [*1 line not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

*Owen:* One more thing, when you are in India it would be very helpful to emphasize the importance that we attach to the MTN in meeting LDC concerns, and in getting the MTN signed by April. Indian action in this would be an extremely important precedent.

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<sup>14</sup> Dubs was kidnapped and killed on February 14 in Kabul. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 36.

<sup>15</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 38 and 45.

## 12. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 5, 1979

### SUBJECT

The Christopher Trip to India and Pakistan: Somber Implications (C)

The trip had two sets of goals.<sup>2</sup> In India we sought to open a dialog on regional security and move the nuclear question along a bit. In Pakistan we sought to reassure Pakistan of our concern and at the same time turn them around on nuclear matters.

We failed in all respects and things are probably worse than they were.<sup>3</sup>

You will have seen the various cables as to what happened. There were two sets of reasons why we came away in such poor shape. In the purely tactical sense, we hit the two countries at the worst possible time—Zia had just decided to reverse himself on accepting a nuclear surgery [*survey*] team,<sup>4</sup> and Desai's foreign policy was under intense parliamentary attack.

The more important reasons, however, are the underlying ones of our non-proliferation policy and our overall image.

I cannot overemphasize the costs of our non-proliferation policy to our regional political and security objectives. In India, it is widely perceived that Desai's attempt to move closer to the US and farther from the USSR has been a policy debacle because of our hard line on Tarapur and safeguards. In Pakistan, we will almost certainly be prevented from carrying out the President's instructions to be helpful to Pakistan because of their nuclear policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen." Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under a March 14 covering memorandum in which he noted: "I would normally summarize the enclosed report for you, but it is so direct and striking that I think it might be worthwhile for you to read it in full. Our relations with India and Pakistan are so important that I do not feel the five minutes this will require is too much of an imposition—and it might be more useful to you than a brief summary by me in our daily report." In the upper right-hand corner of Brzezinski's covering memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, C." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For Christopher's discussions in India, see Documents 129–131. For Christopher's discussions in Pakistan, see Documents 325 and 326.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 323.

I am not making a case for revising these policies although I think that the Indian one is especially counterproductive. I do urge, however, that we consider whether the gains that we are making in the non-proliferation area (either elsewhere in the world or in a longer term in South Asia) continue to outweigh the costs that we are paying. And, of course, that decision may be in Congress' hands, not ours. (S)

The image question is more elusive, but I got the impression that neither side seemed to think it was important to undertake a serious discussion with us—maybe because we do not seem worth the effort at this point. The Indians simply refused to discuss the things we were interested in. They played the meetings to their domestic audience in terms of how they told us off on several issues (Tarapur, Southeast Asia) and the distance that they were able to put between ourselves and them. This is understandable in terms of their domestic problems, but it tells us something about the value they put on the US relationship at this point. I am attaching an excerpt from a recent report by the very perceptive Indian Ambassador in Kabul.<sup>5</sup> It probably reflects a widely-held view. In Pakistan, Zia and Agha Shahi are probably considering a major reorientation of their policy—one in which the US plays a negligible role. We are evidently not going to be able to do much for them because of the nuclear problem, and they are smart enough to understand that in no circumstance will we build upon them as the foundation of our regional policy. Worse, perhaps, they may have come to the conclusion that it wouldn't help them much even if we did. (S)

Is all lost? Hardly. The unfortunate timing of the visit had a lot to do with the poor outcome and the atmosphere might be quite different in a few months. (It would have been much more favorable if the visit had taken place in early January, as originally planned.) The actual outcome is not much different from that I had expected in India; it was the tone that was particularly disturbing. Some seeds may have been planted with the Indians that will start to bear fruit later. The crucial next step will come during the Vajpayee visit late next month.<sup>6</sup> The Pakistanis are now looking into the abyss and may have some second thoughts. Pickering's visit there may provide them with a chance to find a way to step back.<sup>7</sup> (S)

There were some interesting things on the personality side. Jagat Mehta was at his absolute worst—vague, elusive and condescending. Agha Shahi, on the other hand, was better than I have ever seen him. He was businesslike and spared us the usual contentious rhetoric. Very

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<sup>5</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>6</sup> See Documents 138 and 140.

<sup>7</sup> Pickering did not visit Pakistan. See footnote 3, Document 325.

simply, he wanted to know exactly what the costs would be to Pakistan and made virtually no attempt to pull any wool over our eyes. Christopher was absolutely first rate in dealing with the Pakistanis. He was direct and forceful; a lawyer who had mastered his brief. In India he was less effective. He is less comfortable in dealing with concepts and must have been very tired. Under the circumstances though, I doubt that anybody would have come off much better. (S)

Next steps:

—Pickering must go as soon as possible to Pakistan (if the Paks agree to receive him). Prior to his trip we will have to get a firm hand on both the carrots and the sticks that we have to offer.

—When Vajpayee comes here I think it is extremely important that the President see him briefly<sup>8</sup> and that you spend some time with him. Vance will not be much more effective than Christopher was in getting our concepts across.

—In the interim, I think we should convey to the Indians that we are unhappy at the way they handled the meeting and, especially, their press briefings. We have an answer pending to Desai's letter<sup>9</sup> which will give us some opportunity to get our point across;<sup>10</sup> we could also do some press backgrounding ourselves. I will work with State on this.

—We should talk to the Chinese and Saudis on an urgent basis about the state of our relations with Pakistan and enlist their help in turning the Paks around.

—We should look further at Christopher's proposal for an ASEAN-like arrangement to replace CENTO. I doubt, however, that our views on this will make much difference. (S)

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<sup>8</sup> Carter underlined "President see him briefly," and in the left-hand margin wrote: "Ok, J."

<sup>9</sup> See Document 126.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 133.

### 13. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 23, 1979, 4–5:30 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

PRC on Pakistan and Subcontinent Matters—Minutes

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *State*

Warren Christopher, Deputy  
Secretary

Amb. Gerard Smith, Special  
Representative of the  
President for Non-  
Proliferation Matters

David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

##### *Defense*

Charles Duncan, Dep. Secretary

Robert Murray, Dep. Ass't.  
Secretary for Near Eastern,  
African, & South Asian Affairs

##### *Energy*

Amb. Holsey Handyside, Dep.  
Ass't. Secretary for Internat.  
Programs

##### *OMB*

Randy Jayne, Assoc. Direc. for  
Security & Internat. Affairs

##### *AID*

Robert Nooter, Acting  
Administrator

Jack Sullivan, Ass't. Administrator  
for Asia Bureau

##### *ACDA*

Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director  
Charles Van Doren, Ass't.  
Director, Non-Proliferation  
Bureau

##### *JCS*

Lt. Gen. William Smith

##### *DCI*

Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director  
John Despres

*Christopher:* The Pakistanis are fairly down the nuclear road and it seems unlikely that the Indians are going to cooperate in a regional nuclear arrangement. We however are looking for a regional non-use/non-development pledge which could then be expanded to include safeguards and then we would hope to end the Pakistani nuclear program. Thus far it has been discouraging. India is the key to the nuclear free zone concept but they will not cooperate unless China is fully involved. We should see now whether there is agreement on where we should go for the next month or so.

*Duncan:* I agree that we need to deal with both of the two countries and get them to renounce a nuclear capability. Therefore we should

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 102, PRC: Pakistan 5/23/79: 5/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

be very careful what we do for the Pakistanis in a military way. We should certainly pursue any possibility of Indian flexibility.

*Christopher:* I am not sure that India fully recognizes how great their role is in stimulating Pakistani fears. I think Bob Goheen should try and bring this home to Prime Minister Desai.

*Aaron:* It seems to me that we are following what is left of a policy that Zia turned down several weeks ago.<sup>2</sup> A piece of that was an arrangement between India and Pakistan. Maybe we should now look to see if there are any broad incentives which we could bring to bear on Pakistan. If there are none, that leads us to some important conclusions. Should we not consider first whether Goheen should pursue the conversation with Desai or whether Gerry Smith might also go along? Second, in the long run is the US the right country to work this out? We carry a lot of baggage in South Asia. Perhaps we could find a European or Mexican to do the job.

*Christopher:* The UK comes to mind but they have already been turned down by Desai. We thought perhaps to get Desai and Zia together at the Non-Aligned Meeting in Havana, assuming that Zia will not be at the Commonwealth Meeting.<sup>3</sup> Goheen can make the first probe and perhaps Smith or somebody else could join in.

*Newsom:* I suggest that some individual, perhaps non-American, should go to India, Pakistan, and also to China. We and the British could lay the groundwork. We would convince the parties that their actions constitute a threat and that they should accept such a third party involvement.

*Christopher:* Yet no country seems in a better position than the United States to bring influence to bear. The Carter-Desai relationship is of great value although it of course also involves its costs.

*Newsom:* This is a complex task that will require the full time engagement of the person or team. Perhaps it should be mounted by the IAEA or just by an outstanding individual such as Ellsworth Bunker.

*Keeny:* I generally agree, especially that Gerry Smith be included when Goheen meets with Desai. We shouldn't develop that until we find the proper person.

*Gerard Smith:* I think that the China angle needs more exploration than we have done so far. Also the problem needs more ventilation. Other countries are just not taking it seriously. At the least we want to build a case so that when the NPT Review Conference takes place and we hear arguments about the need for a full flow of technology,

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 341.

<sup>3</sup> The Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Havana September 3–9. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting took place in Lusaka August 1–7.

we can point to the Pakistani case. Also I think we should go to Congress to get the law amended so that we can fulfill our contract and continue to supply fuel to Tarapur. Feeling about non-proliferation is not that pervasive in Congress and we should be able to get an Amendment. We need finally to have a joint intensive examination of this problem on an international basis (setting up an international group).

*Christopher:* The State Department thinks that an international group would have too much visibility and would give Pakistan a handle for claiming that we were exerting undue pressure. On the basis of his talks in London Secretary Vance has said that he wants this idea put in limbo.<sup>4</sup> I think we could pursue much the same thing around the edges of the IAEA next month. I will get Vance's approval on that. It is then agreed that we should ask Goheen to pursue this matter with Desai—the idea of a non-use/non-development pledge including perhaps China. Then we should test the idea out on the Chinese.

*William Smith:* We should also however put as much pressure on India as we are on Pakistan. The way we are acting, when a country gets a nuclear capability we just give up on it. We should also bear in mind that we have previous commitments to Pakistan and we should live up to them.

*Keeny:* We would certainly have to have something from India in order to get the legislation amended to permit Tarapur supply—support for our regional idea.

*Gerard Smith:* Pressure did not work on Pakistan and it is not going to work on India either. What we need is a new approach.

*Duncan:* A change on Tarapur supply and military sales to Pakistan would have to be conditional on an Indo-Pakistani agreement.

*Gerard Smith:* All through Europe and elsewhere we have lost tremendously because we are seen as waltzers on commitments that we have made.

*Christopher:* I would certainly distinguish between Pakistani and Indian cases. There is certainly no indication that military supply will buy off Pakistan.

*Newsom:* Is there really anything that we can do to deter Pakistan before it explodes a nuclear device?

*Christopher:* Well, perhaps getting an Indian non-nuclear pledge is worth a try.

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<sup>4</sup> Vance visited London May 20–24 for talks with British officials. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

*Turner:* I would draw attention to the weakness of General Zia. It is unlikely that he will give in on a prestige issue like this. You saw the report this morning that Pakistan plans to set off a nuclear explosion before November.<sup>5</sup> We are skeptical about this but we cannot discount it entirely.

*Christopher:* The Pakistani experience shows the weaknesses of our procedures in controlling nuclear technology. A group that works on the edges of the IAEA could consider that broad question. Also is not Pakistan more dangerous than India since it has more of an incentive to share its explosive technology?

*Despres:* There has been a lot of talk about an Islamic bomb<sup>6</sup> and we know that Pakistan has a great material interest in sharing its technology. There is no substantial evidence however that they are doing so.

*Christopher:* Let us move on now to US-Pakistani military sales policy. We told Agha-Shahi that we expected an adverse reaction from Congress on military supply but that we would explore it. Pakistan says that they want to give us a modest list. Our consultations with Congress were in fact quite negative and if we get such a list from Pakistan the most we can do is review it. The two main items that we have to decide today are the Gearing Class Destroyers<sup>7</sup> and an Inertial Navigation System for the Mirages that France is going to supply.<sup>8</sup> Should we proceed with the Gearings? The Pakistanis have not pressed us; it is we who are anxious to reach a decision. I think that we should hold the Gearings in abeyance rather than send the wrong signal by pushing the Pakistanis to take them.

*Christopher:* I agree. We have to think in longer terms of dealing with Pakistan and India and may want to provide incentives quickly at some later stage.

*Jayne:* Can't we rearrange the sequence of destroyer sales to various countries so as to keep the Pakistani request in abeyance?

*William Smith:* The JCS believes that we have made a commitment to Pakistan on this and we should follow through.

*Newsom:* These destroyers were part of a package that we had offered before the Symington Amendment came into effect. We have offered them again and the Pakistanis have not responded.

*Duncan:* Why push them then? The only real pressure is from the US Navy. Let's keep them in reserve for use later.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 345.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 345 and footnote 5, Document 348.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 340.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 285.



*Newsom:* The Pakistanis are in fact probably waiting for a firmer offer from us. They do not want to be turned down.

*Aaron:* I am concerned that later we are going to have to deal solely with the Pakistanis. I don't think it is wise to get the Chinese directly involved aside, perhaps, from urging the Pakistanis not to go nuclear.

*Gerard Smith:* The Chinese did sign the Tlatelolco protocol.

*Christopher:* Let us now take up Inertial Navigation System. We have furnished similar systems for the Pakistanis but we turned down the sale of it to the Indians for use on their Jaguars.<sup>9</sup> Should we now again turn it down for the Pakistanis? I do not think we should.

*Duncan:* Well how would that be consistent with what we have done with the Indians? Why not keep this in reserve also?

*Aaron:* How would we explain to the Indians if we turned them down and sell it to the Pakistanis?

*Christopher:* I would explain it to them in terms of the different type of aircraft involved.

*Newsom:* I would also point out that we have a tacit agreement with the French not to oppose any Mirage sales to Pakistan. Of course this would not stop the Pakistanis from buying the plane; it would just make them a less valuable weapons system.

*Christopher:* Is there no comparable system from some other source?

*William Smith:* No system that would be quite as good.

*Duncan:* We should think of systems for both Pakistan and India as part of our overall package of incentives.

*William Smith:* I think we should move now. We should not alienate Pakistan any more than we have already. They must certainly expect these navigation systems.

*Christopher:* It is not really clear what the capabilities of the various kinds of available systems are. I think we should have a paper on this and JCS should work together with the State Department in preparing one. This will also give us a bit more time to work this into our strategy.

Let us now take up the question of the PL-480.

*Nooter:* We will be expected to speak to the PL-480 issue at the Consortium meeting in early June.<sup>10</sup> We have pledged \$80 million worth of wheat, of which we have provided \$40. The Pakistanis do not need the other \$40 this year and the question is whether we should provide them something more than the \$40 that they have already. Also, we do not have any money to pay for more. It is possible that

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 141.

<sup>10</sup> The World Bank's Aid to Pakistan Consortium of international donors met in Paris June 5–6.

we could find \$25 million dollars worth of vegetable oil from the Zaire and Portugal accounts if we wanted to supply this for political reasons. We have to decide though how the PL-480 fits into our overall tactics. I have been talking about FY 1979 so far—what should we say about PL-480 at the Consortium for 1980? There is \$40 million in the Congressional presentation with a possibility of an agreement of as much as \$180 million in Title III support over the next three years. Should we raise the Title III possibility at Paris?

*Jayne:* We told the Pakistanis that the second \$40 million for FY 1979 was conditioned on performance. According to the Agriculture Department there are real problems with their level of performance. If we were to offer an additional \$40 million in PL-480 to them at this point it might look to the Congress like we are trying to make up for the \$40 million worth of development assistance that we had to cut.

*Christopher:* Are we committed for \$80 million?

*Jayne:* No; the second \$40 million was conditional.

*Sullivan:* We did at the pledging session say we expected to provide \$80 million. We also should bear in mind that part of the delay on terms for the Title III agreement is the result of our own inability to get our act together on that.

*Nooter:* The political factor is determining here; you can really do whatever you want.

*Christopher:* If they go forward with the nuclear option, Congress will certainly cut off PL-480 as well as development assistance.

I think that we should go forward with what we have committed and we have no obligation to do more.

*Nooter:* At the Paris meeting we can say that we are reconsidering the situation in light of the nuclear situation.

*Aaron:* The real question is what signal we want to give to the Pakistanis?

*Newsom:* Should we say that we are responding to pressures from Congress?

*Christopher:* I think that we are going to lose the whole PL-480 in FY 1980. We should tell Congress that we are keeping our commitment but that we are phasing the program out until the Pakistanis mend their ways.

*Newsom:* The question is whether we want to maintain bilateral relations with Pakistan even if there is no nuclear agreement. There is really little chance that they will not set off the device. Do we want to disassociate ourselves completely from them or try to keep up a normal presence?

*Christopher:* Henry Owen and others have come under very heavy fire from Congress. It would be hard to explain to them doing anything to which we were not already committed.

*Gerard Smith:* Can we not make an argument on humanitarian grounds?

*Jayne:* We are pressuring all sorts of needy countries all over the world on Title III criteria. Congress appreciates this and we shouldn't look like we are making Title III into a political incentive in Pakistan. It would be better to use Title I for that.

*Christopher:* We could also make all of this part of the package that we could use in supporting a possible agreement, together with the Inertial Navigation System and the Gearings.

*Sullivan:* How direct a linkage should we make to the nuclear question at the Paris meeting? If we do not say anything at Paris the Pakistanis will take it as a signal. We need decisions first on supplying vegetable oil in FY 1979, second on a Title III negotiation instruction that we are preparing now, and third on what we should say at the Consortium meeting on June 5.

*Christopher:* Supplying the vegetable oil would really be straining the situation. I think we should be silent. As far as the Title III agreement goes, we should not send out any instructions but keep it under review.

*William Smith:* At the last PRC meeting we spent our time figuring out how to woo the Pakistanis.<sup>11</sup> Now we are trying to figure out how to punish them and are showing pique.

*Turner:* [3 lines not declassified]

*Christopher:* Will any of these items help us in that regard?

*Turner:* Something is always better than nothing.

*Aaron:* But what is our strategy? Do we agree that the old two track strategy is bankrupt? Do we really have any leverage?

*Christopher:* We found that they did not want to be wooed along the lines of our two track strategy.

*Gerard Smith:* Remember we are not only dealing with the perceptions of Pakistan but the perceptions of other countries. We need to show determination about non-proliferation. Certainly if we are going to discuss these matters at the Summit<sup>12</sup> it will help if we can show that we have taken some painful decisions.

*Newsom:* I think we should separate the PL-480 and the arms supply issues and keep the former on developmental terms.

*Nooter:* If the Pakistanis can assume continuation of PL-480 you've lost an important bargaining chip.

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<sup>11</sup> See Document 333.

<sup>12</sup> Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna June 16–18. They signed the SALT II Treaty and issued a joint declaration on regularizing U.S.-Soviet consultations. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 199–208.

*Christopher:* We will still remain open on the two track policy; if the Pakistanis want to resume that discussion with us about the 1959 agreement we would be prepared to. We are now dealing with two issues: the first is our strategy on the nuclear option and the second is how we deal with minor bilateral issues. We are agreed on everything except PL-480. We do not want to make an extra effort in FY 1979. In regard to FY 1980 I think we should stay with the present situation but point out that our ability to help Pakistan in this regard would depend first on its observance of the conditions of the aid and secondly Congressional attitudes.

*Christopher:* There are some other items on the agenda. It is clear that debt rescheduling is impossible at this time. We do not need to get into the question of Indian nuclear supply; we can keep that for later. I do wish though that the NRC would make a decision.

*Mathews:* The last I heard was that we would get a 3 to 2 vote in favor of supply of the current shipment.

*Christopher:* The Soviets also, I am told, do not want to have the South Asian nuclear question on the Summit agenda.

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#### 14. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 4, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your good letter of May 21.<sup>2</sup> The arrival of summer in Washington recalls the pleasure of your visit just one year ago.<sup>3</sup> I am still nourished by memories of the time that we spent together and the thoughts that we shared, not only about the issues of the day but of the world we both hope to see. While our letters cannot substitute for the kind of exchange that is possible when we are together, they mean much to me. The only drawback is that we seem to spend much

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890025-2392. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In addition to covering a range of international topics, Desai's May 21 letter to Carter expressed Desai's concern with Pakistan's nuclear program and reported that he had invited Zia to New Delhi for talks. (Telegram 139948 to New Delhi, June 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790248-0841)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 103 and 104.

of the time discussing nuclear matters without, I fear, making much progress.

In contrast to recent press reports, my government has in fact not come to any conclusions concerning a solution of the South Asian nuclear problem.<sup>4</sup> On the contrary, we are looking for ways in which we can be helpful—both in averting the grave dangers of a Pakistani nuclear explosive program and in finding a solution to our differences over Tarapur. This is why I have asked that you receive Ambassador Goheen for a frank and informal discussion of these problems.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps together we can come up with solutions that elude us individually.

As I look back over the year or so since we last met, I see a mixed picture of matters in which we share an interest. We have reached agreement on SALT but I will not be satisfied until the end of that road is reached and nuclear weapons are no longer part of the world's armories. I shall be meeting soon with President Brezhnev, not only to sign this agreement, but also to set the stage for the development of our relations during the coming decade. You too will be meeting with the Soviet leaders shortly. I hope that you will impress on them the importance of creating an environment of reduced tensions that will make it easier to take the urgent next steps—SALT III and a Comprehensive Test Ban.

In the Middle East, we have also made some important progress. I of course agree with you that the Palestinian problem is critical, and the United States will remain a full partner in the next phase of the negotiations that will deal with issues of great concern to the Palestinians. But there is a great danger in focussing excessively on what remains to be done at the expense of what already has been accomplished. The significance of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is not that it is just a first step, but that it is the first concrete manifestation of peace in that region in decades. I was proud to have helped in the process, but the real accomplishment belongs to Israel and Egypt. Their actions required statesmanship and courage.

The thought of Egypt being excluded from the Non-Aligned Movement is especially distressing to me as, I am sure, it is to you. Such a step, with an accompanying condemnation of the Peace Treaty, would only discredit the NAM in the eyes of those of us who see it as an important element in the changing global structure. The NAM must continue to look to such countries as India for the meaning of genuine non-alignment.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 146.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 145.

Some of the other developments of the past year are less encouraging. Peace still eludes Southeast Asia. I warmly welcome your decision to withhold recognition from the two contending sides in Kampuchea. As you correctly point out, neither side has control of the country. I would add that neither side has a moral base from which to solicit international support. The people of Kampuchea deserve something better than the choices that are now being offered. Let us keep in touch and see if our two countries cannot help them find it.

Even as I write this letter, I am faced with difficult decisions on Zimbabwe. I am very concerned about the demands of real majority rule. I hope that some way can be found to meet these demands while at the same time meeting the equally pressing demand of simple humanity—avoidance of bloodshed, repression and suffering. This is a dilemma that must be considered by all of us who are concerned with justice in Zimbabwe.

I have a mixed view of the situation in South Asia. The highlight, of course, continues to be the good relations between our own two countries based on shared values and aspirations. In Afghanistan, as we have discussed before, the deterioration has been striking. The threat of a Pakistani nuclear capability is also discouraging. Nepal is encountering difficulties, although these could contain within them the seeds of a democratic political order.<sup>6</sup> On the positive side is the strengthening of democratic institutions in Bangladesh and your efforts to strengthen relations with your neighbors. I was very pleased by the decision of Pakistan to send its Foreign Secretary to New Delhi for consultations<sup>7</sup> and your renewed invitation to President Zia to visit India. I hope that these were successful and can lead to further, higher-level contacts when conditions are ripe. I know from my own experience during the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations that the task of putting the past behind and making the impossible become a reality is a long and arduous process. We simply cannot decree the kind of world we hope to see and expect that it should become so; we have to work for it, one building block at a time.

Finally, I would like to return to a matter which I raised when I was in India—international support for an integrated water development plan for the eastern subcontinent.<sup>8</sup> I am aware of the problems that this involves for India and have refrained from reiterating this proposal in public. The excellent progress that you have made on water matters with Bangladesh and with Nepal on Karnali suggests that the

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 225.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 353.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 92.

time may be approaching to take another look at this idea. I certainly do not want to let this become a political issue; I believe it is important, however, that the South Asian nations begin to address this concept and to suggest how the international community can help.<sup>9</sup> The food needs of the region and the world continue to grow and years, even decades, will elapse before a large-scale water development program can reach its full potential. Over time, it could provide the underpinning for stability that the smaller nations of the region so badly need. I look forward to hearing your thoughts and advice on this matter.

As always, it was good to hear from you. I look forward to exchanging impressions on Soviet matters following our respective visits. Rosalynn joins me in sending our warmest wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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<sup>9</sup> Tension between India and Bangladesh caused difficulties for the proposed Eastern Waters project. Telegram 4024 from Dacca, July 16, reported that on July 14, Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Kibria “raised ‘for the record’ the growing difficulties between Bangladesh and India. Kibria reviewed the issues of the Eastern Waters, land and maritime boundaries and disputed islands which are a matter of contention between the two nations. The Foreign Secretary also reviewed recent Bangladesh-Indian relations and the BDG’s efforts to ensure harmony with India. In cool and professional terms, yet with conviction, Kibria claimed the GOI is employing unfair tactics which threaten to ‘suffocate’ Bangladesh ‘without a shot being fired.’ The GOI response to Bangladesh’s proposals for a South Asian summit meeting has been neither positive nor negative, says Kibria, but the GOI is stalling.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800342–0220) On July 24, the *New York Times* reported that “India has dammed the Ganges at Farakka, gaining the capacity to regulate flows into Indian and Bangladeshi channels of the river basin. As a result there has been almost constant negotiation and discussion of how many cubic feet of water a second should be released to which country. The Bangladeshis say that unless a heavy flow is maintained during the dry season saline waters will infiltrate upstream, destroying croplands. Bangladeshi scientists contend that the ecology of the river basin that nurtures this fecund but overpopulated land could easily be damaged. For its part, India has argued that it needs to store Ganges water and send it down the Hooghly River in the dry season to flush out the port of Calcutta, which is silting up. In addition, the waters are needed for irrigating Indian farmlands.” (Michael T. Kaufman, “To Bangladeshis, India Seems a Domineering Giant,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1980, p. A2)

## 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan and India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 15, 1980, 2124Z

11865. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Indo-Pak Relations. Refs: (A) State 9863;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 9606.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S—Entire text).

2. The following is an expanded account of those portions of the US talks with Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi which dealt with India.<sup>4</sup>

3. The Pakistani presentation on India demonstrated Pakistan's continuing concern over India's superior power and questionable intentions toward Pakistan, although for the first time the Indian threat seemed slightly less pressing to them than the Soviet/Afghan threat.<sup>5</sup>

4. Shahi made it clear that the GOP will continue to pursue its effort at improved relations with India. He acknowledged that this process had started during Mrs. Gandhi's previous term as Prime Minister, but nonetheless regarded her return to power<sup>6</sup> as a development that could complicate Indo-Pak relations. He described her as being "obsessed with Pakistan" and said Pakistan would be watching to see which of Mrs. Gandhi's advisors she brought back in. He expressed particular apprehension about T.N. Kaul.

5. Shahi said that Mrs. Gandhi was in his judgement quite capable of reaching some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union at Pakistan's expense. He mentioned Pakistan's continuing concern about the existence of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and cited the recent Indian statement in the UNGA on Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

6. As expected, Shahi made disparaging remarks about our sensitivity to Indian reactions to proposed US-Pak arms deals. He asked rather pointedly whether, if we were unwilling to supply advanced combat aircraft to counter the Indian Jaguars, we would be able to guarantee that India did not use these arms against Pakistan. Expanding on the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0701, N800001-0715. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Beijing, London, Moscow, Paris, Bonn, and the White House. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in S/S-O and S/S, and by Peck, Schaffer, and Raphael; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 410.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 409.

<sup>4</sup> Shahi was in Washington on January 12. See also Documents 407 and 408.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 394.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 165.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.



disparity between Indian and Pakistani military strength, General Arif, Chief of Staff to President Zia, stated that 80–90 percent of the Indian Army was stationed on Pakistan's borders. He said the Indian Army was four times the size of Pakistan's, that the Indian Air Force was three to four times as large, and that the Indian Navy was ten times the size of its Pakistani counterpart. He said that the qualitative superiority of the Indian forces was far greater than this numerical comparison would indicate.

7. The Secretary's opening statement (reftel B) included a reference to the improved Indo-Pak relations of the past few years, "an accomplishment of which both governments can be proud," and to our own desire to have good relations with India. The Secretary specified that we would not allow India to "veto" our judgements of what was appropriate in US-Pak relations.

8. At the end of the discussions in the Department, the two sides had a brief exchange in which the Pakistanis were trying to obtain a more precise sense of what we would do to implement our 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan in various contingencies. In the course of this exchange, Shahi asked what the US role might be if, despite the best efforts of the US and Pakistan, concerted pressure on Pakistan was exerted by India and Afghanistan. The Secretary replied by saying he would want to think further and study the 1959 agreement further on that issue.

Vance

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## 16. Editorial Note

On January 23, 1980, nearly a month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter delivered his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress and declared what became known as the "Carter Doctrine:" "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Carter explained that, as a component of the U.S. commitment to safeguard the Persian Gulf, "We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I*, pp. 197–198) The

full text of Carter's address is also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138. Part of this plan was to build up the U.S. naval support facility at Diego Garcia. On April 6, the *New York Times* reported: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying a plan to spend \$1 billion over several years to enlarge the United States naval and air bases on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, including widening the runway to accept B–52 bombers." (Richard Halloran, "U.S. Base in Indian Ocean May Be Enlarged," *New York Times*, April 6, 1980, p. 16)

The increase and strengthening of U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean was a reversal of the Carter administration's earlier policy of demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. In a March 9, 1977, news conference, Carter had explained that, in an effort to secure a second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the United States had "proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized, that a comprehensive test ban be put into effect, that prior notification of test missile launchings be exchanged." (*Public Papers: Carter*, 1977, Book I, p. 348)

Telegram 15433 from New Delhi, July 23, relayed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's opposition to the U.S. plan to expand the military facilities on Diego Garcia as expressed to the Indian Parliament: "Mrs. Gandhi attributed the instability in Southwest Asia both to the encouragement given by foreign powers to the insurgents in Afghanistan and to the introduction of Soviet forces in that country. However serious the recent developments might be, she did not believe that they justified the jettisoning of detente. She also criticized the increase of superpower naval activity in the Indian Ocean and maintained that the expansion of the Diego Garcia facility would result in an increase of military activities by other countries." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800354–0911)

For documentation on the development of U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean region during the Carter administration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.

**17. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, March 7, 1980, 0520Z

4824. For the President and the Secretary. Subj: Report of South Asia Chiefs of Mission Conference.<sup>2</sup> Refs: A. '77 Kathmandu 5528, B. 79 Colombo 0182.<sup>3</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: Since our last meeting in Colombo a year ago (ref B) there have been substantial changes, mostly for the worse, of a global and regional nature that affect the prospects for stability and orderly economic and social development in the South Asian countries as well as their relations with the US. The collapse of Iran and the extension of Soviet power into Afghanistan have posed new and serious challenges to US interests in the area and have shocked the nations of this historically troubled and complex region.

3. These events present the US with difficult decisions as well as some opportunities to evolve new relationships with South Asian nations, especially India and Pakistan. In dealing with the Afghan problem India can be helpful or a spoiler. Pakistan in pursuit of greater security against old (India) and new (Afghan/Soviet) threats has developed or strengthened its association with the Islamic and non-aligned nations to supplement its ties with China. The other countries of the region are troubled by events in Afghanistan and what they portend for stability in the area as well as by the effect on their interests of a return to power of Mrs. Gandhi.

4. Underlying current security concerns is the continuing awareness that one of our major tasks in South Asia continues to be to contribute to the economic and social development of the people of the region.

5. We have concluded that US interests in South Asia continue to be limited and that it is in our interest to minimize the possibility of a direct confrontation with the USSR in the area. Pakistan does not appear to desire direct US involvement at this time, and India is more

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800122–0611. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Beijing, London, Moscow, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> In a March 14 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski summarized the findings of the South Asia Chiefs of Mission meeting. Carter initialed Brzezinski's memorandum, indicating that he saw it. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 3–4/80)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 5 and 9.

likely to avoid over-commitment to the Soviet Union and adopt more responsible policies toward Pakistan if the US is not so involved. However, if faced by substantial Soviet escalation we will have no choice but to involve ourselves directly and we should be prepared to meet this contingency.

6. Recommendations are contained in paras 33–41. End summary.

7. The South Asia Chiefs of Mission met in New Delhi March 3–5, 1980, for the third in their round of annual meetings which started in Kathmandu in December 1977 (ref A) and continued in Colombo in January 1979 (ref B). Participants this year were Ambassadors Goheen, Heck, Hummel, Schneider, and Toussaint, Charge Mills, and NEA/DAS Coon and NSC Staff member Thornton from Washington.

8. We reviewed last year's report and recommended strategy (ref B). Our principal findings have held up reasonably well during the year, especially our recognition of a fundamental change in Afghanistan which we saw to be no longer a buffer, and which had acquired a potential Soviet ally in pursuing irredentist goals. We also concluded then that Pakistan was a nation of weakness, while India had great potential to influence South Asia and possibly the larger region including Iran. We advanced a strategy of insulation of the region and economic support to meet the threat to US interests. The key to this strategy was Indian willingness to reassure Pakistan and to exert effective influence with the Soviets. We rejected a military course of action but felt we should hold the military option in reserve. Where we went wrong was in overestimating the role the then Indian Government was able or willing to play. In addition, we too readily assumed that Pakistan would be compliant to US suggestions. It is now clear that we must lower our previous expectations of what countries of the region can or will do—as some countries of the region have lowered their expectations of us.

9. Although this strategy was advanced against a background of relative regional stability and lowered tensions, Afghanistan cast its shadow over this historically troubled and complex region.

10. The sudden collapse of Iran—a key element in the American security framework in Southwest Asia—followed by the sudden extension of Soviet power into Afghanistan have posed new and serious challenges to vital US interests in West Asia. Our response has included an enhanced US military presence in the Indian Ocean<sup>4</sup> and efforts to support and reassure regional states facing potential external threats. The very rapidity of these changes, the sudden injection of superpower rivalry into the region—all coming on top of basic instabilities in the

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 16.

South and Southwest Asian areas—have made it difficult for regional leaders and their politically-conscious elites to absorb the implications of and fashion policies responsive to these new circumstances. More than ever in the past, this is a region out of kilter with itself and with external powers.

11. Not surprisingly, while there have been some new and constructive policy departures by regional states, more often than not old suspicions have been revived and longstanding tensions exacerbated. Indeed, in looking at the area this year again, we were struck anew by its complexities and by the subtleties of regional relations which are not always easy for the US to grasp or to take into account in doing business with these countries. We are faced with paranoias that deeply affect relations among the South Asian countries—for example, Pakistan is intensely concerned by a perceived Indian threat to its security. India is equally emotional over the issue of arms to Pakistan, and the small countries are troubled by what they consider to be a domineering and potentially threatening neighbor—especially with Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. The situation is further complicated by the interplay of other major actors on the scene—the USSR, China, and the US—each with mutual suspicions of one or the other or both.

12. There are some encouraging signs. Seeing Soviet activities in Afghanistan as a major threat to the region and to the Gulf, China has begun to seek to improve its relations with India. This increased Chinese flexibility towards India may result from a realization that it has so far backed the weaker of the major countries in the area and a wish to hedge that bet. It is also in China's interest not to push India closer to the Soviets. China is making a considerable effort to consult with us, although this relationship has not yet reached the stage where it will share with us details of its activities and assistance to Pakistan. We should encourage China in these trends.

13. Secondly, countries of the region may be in a position to play a role in easing the transition of Iran from its present isolation to a more rational relationship with the region and the outside world and in attempting to communicate with Iran on our behalf as we look for some way to relate to that country.

14. Regionally, South Asia finds itself confronted by increased pressures from outside powers as a result of the Afghan problem. India, the dominant country of the region, is disturbed by this intrusion of the outside world, by increased superpower activity in neighboring oceans, and by what it fears may become a major-power confrontation in the area. Threats to India's interests caused by these developments could lead it to move closer to the Soviets than is its current inclination. These developments have also brought into sharper focus a new web of international connections—with the Islamic and non-aligned nations

added to China—which Pakistan has evolved over recent years. Pakistan's ability to look to these nations to meet its needs is altering its relations with the US in ways that may put less strain on our relations with India.

15. Developments in Afghanistan, the nature of the US response globally and in the region, and the threat which these developments pose to Pakistan dominated our discussion. The consensus was that the Soviets are in Afghanistan to stay for some time and that their next step is likely to be a major effort at a military solution. In the circumstances, we felt that the neutralization proposal currently being considered by some countries would probably not produce a real solution at this time but may be useful tactically. Farther down the road, a political solution might be put together involving a government acceptable to the Afghans and not dependent on Soviet military support. India could play a role in achieving this objective and we should encourage it in that direction.

16. Meanwhile, we understand US objectives in Afghanistan to be to (a) get the Soviets out of the country promptly and deter them from further adventures; (b) work toward the installation of a government acceptable to the people; (c) make the Soviets pay substantially while they remain in the country. In doing this we should avoid trying to humiliate the Soviets or paint them into a corner. We recognize Soviets have legitimate interests in Afghanistan, while ours are minimal.

17. We were impressed by the very tenuous balance between making the Soviet occupation costly and making it so costly that the Soviets may respond by escalating and widening the conflict. This would obviously have dangerous consequences for our interests and those of the countries of the area.

18. We were particularly disturbed by what we understand to be a lack of adequate US military resources in the region to cope with further Soviet advances and the apparent lack of clarity in the nature and extent of our commitment to Pakistan.

19. Pakistan, which we regarded last year as the sick man of South Asia, has grown weaker. The government lacks both popular support and confidence in itself, and its weakness and fragility give us little room to maneuver. The country faces serious economic problems which are complicated by GOP policies and the prospect of a negative transfer of resources from donors unless debt rescheduling is undertaken in the context of IMF prescribed reforms. We see no real hope for significant rapprochement with India or for deflecting Pakistan's determination to proceed with its nuclear program. Further, Pakistan has become ambivalent about US military assistance. It is torn between its need to strengthen itself militarily and by the risks to its credentials with its new friends which such a step may entail. A drawing back in Islamabad

seems matched by similar second thoughts in Washington. While this development may be desirable within the region, globally it may result in a lessening of confidence in US commitments.

20. In considering a role which India could play in dealing with the Afghan situation, three possibilities occur: it could be supportive of Soviet actions in Afghanistan; it could reluctantly acquiesce in the Soviet takeover; finally, it could work to help bring about a Soviet withdrawal by diplomatic or other means. It is unlikely that India will pursue the first option, and we and others should avoid actions that would cause it to do so. It is in our interest to persuade India to pursue the third instead of the second option.

21. The GOI appears to be trying to put the debacle of its position on the UNGA resolution regarding Afghanistan behind it and move to a more balanced position. The GOI has found itself out of step with the countries of the region for which it aspires to speak and with most of the Non-Aligned Movement. So far Mrs. Gandhi appears to want good relations with the US, but her efforts and ours are threatened by the tendency of both sides to overreact to the public rhetoric of the other instead of being guided by national interests. We must maintain a dialogue with India and convey our interest in having India's help in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. At a minimum, we need to dissuade India from undermining our efforts.

22. However, in spite of reports of Indian initiatives to develop a regional plan of action or to explore other ways to "defuse the situation", India's role to date has been essentially passive. Salient exceptions are the GOI's refusal to endorse Soviet action in Afghanistan as sought by Gromyko during his recent visit to India<sup>5</sup> and its campaign against US arms to Pakistan. India does not appear to have worked out any plan of its own, and we doubt that India will take a leadership role in the Afghan situation; perhaps the most we can expect is that India not cause problems with Pakistan. We considered the possibility of the GOI giving Pakistan a sense of confidence to deal with its own ethnic and security problems by moving troops away from the border with Pakistan. Indo-Pak military talks on a mutual withdrawal are an attractive objective, but may not be achievable.

23. India asserts its interest in a stable Pakistan and in the integrity of Pakistan's borders. The GOI has conveyed such assurances to the GOP. However, Indian restraint could rapidly change if Pakistan starts falling apart or succeeds in acquiring a nuclear capability.

24. Continuing around the region, we were reassured by the current reasonably satisfactory state of affairs in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka,

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 171.



but troubled by uncertain prospects for Nepal's stability and economic viability.

25. Bangladesh continues to enjoy relative stability, but opposition to the regime is increasing and its political structure is fragile. As one of the moderate non-aligned and Islamic countries, it is playing a generally constructive, albeit cautious, role in international fora. While friendly to the United States, Bangladesh has been worried about its perception of a gradual change in the global balance in favor of the Soviets. It seeks a reversal of this change and supports a strong US determination to meet its commitments in the Persian Gulf and to Pakistan. Bangladesh, which recognizes the extent to which India can affect its security and stability, does not wish to get too far out of step with India and leave itself overexposed. It also wishes to remain within an Islamic consensus. However, it is prepared to be responsive to our requests for support on issues of importance to us where such responses do not undermine its own interests. We should recognize that the more we ask, the more Bangladesh will expect in return in assistance and reassurance.

26. In Sri Lanka, the prospects for stability are reasonably good until the next elections in 1983. US interests are well served by the present government. It provides us with a VOA facility under an agreement which ends in 1981; and we have begun negotiations for a greatly expanded facility to reach Soviet Central Asia and West China as well as northern India. We hope for acceptance of increased US naval visits, and continued moderation in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Sri Lankans are proud of the progress they have made in economic development and in turning to a market economy. They feel the success of this experiment, which is being watched by the Third World, is important to them and to the US and the West. They hope the US and other donors will contribute additional assistance to insure its success.

27. While the Maldives Islands have escaped our attention in the past, our concern about Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean underlines the importance of insuring that the airport facilities at Gan Island do not fall in the wrong hands.

28. Nepal is a different story. It is disturbed by Soviet ambitions in Asia and Soviet activities within the country. It is paranoid on the subject of its relations with India and anxiously awaits indications from New Delhi whether the new government will continue the policy of good neighborliness of the Janata government or will revert to the hardline policy formerly pursued by Mrs. Gandhi. It considers itself particularly vulnerable at this time because its economy is in trouble and politically it is in a state of transition as it seeks a popular mandate on the type of political institutions the country wants in the forthcoming



referendum.<sup>6</sup> Should the political or economic situation deteriorate, Nepal could become a permanent burden on the international community and a serious threat to regional stability, and even promote a Sino-Indian confrontation.

29. While our attention has been focused on the Afghan problem we wish to flag our very sober observation that South Asia may well be the area for a major setback in our nonproliferation effort. We believe Pakistan is determined to continue developing a nuclear device. This development would require India to reconsider its nuclear options. We must therefore look beyond our present nonproliferating world. We should of course continue to seek to retard these developments in India and Pakistan.

30. We recognize that US policies have necessarily been evolving, particularly in the two months since the Soviet invasion into the region. However, we have, quite frankly, been disappointed that we have not been receiving timely policy guidance and views from Washington. This deficiency occurs not only in Washington's discrete programmatic decisions but it also has been evident in the field of broad policy and strategy.

31. In the long run, the security of the nations in the subcontinent depends on their ability to make social and economic progress. While managing our response to regional crises, we must continue to devote major attention to the development of the water resources of the Gangetic and Brahmaputra River basins. Although progress in this direction is not encouraging, the importance of the subject to the welfare of the area justifies, in our view, a more active though quiet US role with the concerned countries and with international institutions like the World Bank, which eventually should be major participants in this effort.

32. Conclusion and recommendations follow:

33. We conclude that US interests in South Asia continue to be limited. Our attention has been focused on the security of this region because of the global implications of Soviet invasion and because our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region are threatened by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and collapse of Iran.

34. Because of the nature of our interests in South Asia, the complex factors concerning India and Pakistan described above, and the military disadvantages to the US in this region, we believe it is in our interest to minimize the possibility of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in this area. Pakistan does not appear to desire direct US involvement at this time. India is more likely to avoid over-commitment to

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 227.

the Soviet Union and adopt more responsible policies toward Pakistan if the US is not so involved. As noted above, we recognize that the absence of direct US involvement now may lessen confidence elsewhere in the world in US commitments; but, considering only factors within South Asia, on balance this policy seems designed to serve US interests here best. If faced by substantial Soviet escalation we will have no choice but to involve ourselves directly and we should be prepared to meet this contingency.

35. Despite disparities between US global and Indian regional preoccupations and the impediments posed by our differing historical experience, we need to work to build firmer and more enduring relations with India as the largest and strongest nation in the region, as a functioning democracy, and as a leader among the non-aligned.

36. While we may not be able to persuade India to support actively US policy and/or initiatives on the Afghan problem, we must seek to avoid having India undercut our efforts and move toward greater reliance on the Soviet Union. To these ends, we should

- keep India abreast of our views and initiatives regarding the Afghan problem in a timely fashion;

- encourage India to use its good relations with the USSR to urge Soviet restraint and withdrawal from Afghanistan;

- seek to encourage closer Sino-Indian relations and to reduce India's fears over the emergence of a US-PRC-Pakistan axis;

- encourage India to strengthen and extend its reassurances to Pakistan, including perhaps a less threatening positioning of Indian forces;

- convey to India and the regional states our acceptance of genuine non-alignment;

- maintain in a substantial way our interest in advancing India's economic and social development;

- reassert our interest in helping India meet some of its pressing national defense requirements, especially in respect to sophisticated types of equipment;

- seek to increase cultural, scientific, and commercial ties.

37. We should find constructive ways to adjust to Pakistan's apparent decision not to have too close a military and security relationship with us.<sup>7</sup> While keeping open our offers of congressional reaffirmation of our 1959 security commitment, and of resuming development aid despite the Symington Amendment, we should be responsive to Pak desires that our principal material help be in economic aid and cash

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<sup>7</sup> See Documents 413–416.

military sales. It is important that we promptly agree in principle to a rescheduling of Pakistani debt repayments subject to Pak economic reforms. We will need to pay close attention to newly emerging Pakistani attitudes, and avoid too-great Pak discouragement and turning away from us. This will require patience in maintaining a supportive posture in order to place on Pakistan the responsibility for determining the scope and level of bilateral relations. We must maintain momentum in efforts to help Pakistan obtain increased aid from traditional donors, particularly Arab oil producers.

38. In addition, we should continue to

- work toward limiting and/or terminating Pakistan's nuclear development;

- urge rapprochement with India;

- augment our exchange of views with Pakistani leaders as evidence of our continuing support and concern.

39. We should find better ways of keeping the other countries of the region—Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal—informed of our policies and actions designed to meet the Soviet threat to the region. The three countries are concerned and need reassurance that a further Soviet advance will be prevented and that our strategy for doing this will not endanger their relations with India. For this purpose our Embassies should receive more information to convey to local governments about US policies and actions, and at an appropriate time—as major policies are determined and after they have been discussed with India and Pakistan—a senior US official should visit the three countries.

40. We must not forget that for the long term our major business in the region is helping meet unfulfilled economic expectations. The Afghan crisis requires that we attach an even greater priority to economic development in the region, and we should not permit our preoccupation with crises to divert us from the task. We will need both a stable staff and the resources for this purpose.

41. More generally,

- while we should continue to seek to retard nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, we need to look beyond our present nonproliferation policy and develop new strategies to deal with a proliferating world;

- we need to develop and implement effective narcotics programs, especially in Pakistan where the government has on its own recently taken very encouraging steps to curtail production;

- we need to settle the Palestinian and Jerusalem issues which continue to be vital elements in our relations with Islamic countries and to some extent also with India;

- we urge the strengthening of Embassy staffs, as we feel the State Department personnel of our Embassies have been cut so extensively

that it is difficult for Ambassadors to provide adequate direction to other elements of the Mission, to coordinate their activities, and to perform our vital functions of political, economic and military reporting.

Goheen

## 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, December 1, 1980, 1106Z

12390. PACOM/EURCOM for POLADs. Subject: (S) Pakistan, India, and the Brezhnev Visit to New Delhi. Refs: A) New Delhi 24475;<sup>2</sup> B) New Delhi 24682.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: As Pakistanis and others in South Asia await the arrival in India on 7 December of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev,<sup>4</sup> we feel it important to record the deep sense of concern and foreboding which official Pakistanis have expressed to us, from General Zia and FonMin Agha Shahi on down, about the implications of the visit for South Asia as a whole and for Pakistan in particular.

3. Admittedly, there is an element of 'knee-jerk' in this concern about Soviet-Indian co-operation in the region. But these latest Pakistani concerns should be read against the deteriorating fabric of Indo-Pakistan relations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Indira Gandhi's return to power in late 1979 and early 1980. Respectively,

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800572-1098. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Karachi, Peshawar (pouch), Lahore, USNATO, Moscow, New Delhi, Beijing, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 24475 from New Delhi, November 21, transmitted a report on India's defense policy in the 1980s, which was prepared in the office of the Embassy's Defense Attaché. The report found that India would most likely "maintain and perhaps increase the size, mobility, and firepower of her present conventional defense forces," and would need to decide whether to develop and maintain a nuclear arsenal, as well as grapple with other strategic decisions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800572-0192)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 24682 from New Delhi, November 25, reported general pessimism among Indian officials that Brezhnev's December 8-11 visit would result in any significant changes to Indo-Soviet relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800564-1011)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 210.

they should be seen also against Pakistan's own sense of weakness in the face of continuing Soviet threats and intimidation and the latest round of what the press and others term as "war hysteria" in India, as summarized last week in the *Manchester Guardian*. End summary.

4. It is a truism in South Asia to say that Pakistanis are pre-occupied with India and that Pakistani anxiety about India—bordering at times on paranoia—is the bedrock concern of Pakistani foreign and security policy. Pakistanis in particular fear the prospect of collusion between India and the Soviet Union, and the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is for Pakistan a worst-case come to fruition. They believe, almost to a man, that the events of 1971, including the splitting off of what is now Bangladesh and the fighting between India and Pakistan, were the product of decisions arrived at jointly in the Kremlin in Moscow and the South Block in New Delhi. Many refer anxiously but with conviction to a Kabul-Delhi-Moscow axis in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last year.

5. Worry about Brezhnev visit: Thus it is that official Pakistanis from President Zia-ul-Haq on down through the senior and middle levels of the Foreign Ministry, have expressed to us (and to our British confreres) a deep sense of concern and foreboding about the planned visit of Soviet President Brezhnev to New Delhi. They fear the Brezhnev-Gandhi get-together will have serious and potentially damaging implications for Pakistan's security.

6. To appreciate the sense of concern they express, it is necessary to go beyond the normal, almost reflexive, response of Pakistanis to events in India. Just that alone would not account for the strength of the anxiety Pakistanis have expressed to us.

7. Soviet pressures: Rather, as Pakistanis construct it, the Brezhnev visit provides an opportunity for the Soviet Union, with Indian help to bring its campaign of threat, isolation, and intimidation against Pakistan—as a consequence of the situation in Afghanistan—to new and alarming levels. Pakistanis see, in the left and not-so-left press in India, a rather remarkable—to them—series of articles alleging vast military expenditures by their government and a military build-up on the Pakistani side which they know to be untrue. These are combined with an alarmist spate of headline stories in India suggesting that war between Pakistan and India might be possible this fall, that there is a build-up of tension along the Kashmir ceasefire line, etc.

8. Indo-Pak relations: Although Zia has dismissed these instances of "war hysteria" in the Indian press and has again extended the olive branch to the Indian Government, officials remain concerned. They assess all of this activity against the almost year-long decline in relations between the two countries—prompted in part by differing perceptions over the Afghanistan situation but fed also by suspicions about the

returned Indira Gandhi and by the essential deadend reached in the Simla peace process without some beginnings of a reconciliation over Kashmir. They fear also—as do Indians on the other side—the benefits that weak leadership on either side might derive from conjuring up foreign devils; they recognize in Gandhi a master of this art, but they see in her as well the tough, unyielding adversary of old, prepared to take hard decisions regardless of world opinion.

9. What Pakistanis fear at the high end of the scale is that either on its own, to curry favor with the Soviets, or as a direct result of Brezhnev's prodding, India will begin to exert increasing pressure on Pakistan's "other" border. They foresee even the possibility of clashes between forces along the hoary ceasefire line (CFL) in Kashmir and on the long border which runs from the sea nearly 1000 miles to the south. They see in Indian allegations of border violations the setting of a stage for an Indian riposte.

10. Even those who do not anticipate actual conflict, express their deep concern over the possible pressures of a less violent nature, including propaganda, subversion, troop movements, and exercises, all of which could bring the temperature of Indo-Pakistan relations to or near a boiling point and keep Pakistani military concerns ever more riveted on the Indo-Pakistan border. Although the Paks have not reduced significantly their forces facing India since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they have thinned out experienced units from those forces to act as the nucleus of units a-raising for service along the Pak-Afghan border. Tension on the CFL or on the border could halt, even reverse, this process.

11. Most Pakistanis would predict Indian/Soviet actions on a lower scale, limited to political pressures alone; they nonetheless fret over the long-term implications of the prospect—as they see it—of the Brezhnev visit's resulting in a tougher Indian stance vis-a-vis Pakistan, whether by Indo-Soviet collusion or coincidence. This, they fear, could add a Soviet-inspired/directed worsening relations along the Indo-Pakistan border to the Soviet pressures Pakistan is feeling internationally and along its northwest border with Soviet Afghanistan, setting the stage for an erosion of Pakistan's hard-line policy with regard to the Soviet rape of Afghanistan.

12. These concerns, we believe, have some validity. The Soviets already played a successful role in sparking and/or fanning Iranian propaganda against Pakistan, designed to isolate Pakistan, as well as to tone down Iran's previously strong criticism of the Soviet invasion. Gandhi's government has also taken actions designed to isolate Pakistan, such as quietly blocking Pakistan's efforts to re-join the Commonwealth. It makes little difference whether one accepts the Pak view that India is "playing the Soviet game," or ascribes such Indian actions

to India's own nationalistic desire to see Pakistan (and all India's neighbors) in a subordinate position to India; as seen from Islamabad, there is little doubt that Indian policy is to try to diminish external support for Pakistan. Recent wild exaggerations (and fabrications) in the Indian press of Pakistani present and planned military equipment acquisitions, and Gandhi's statement carried in a wire service account in the Pak press Dec 1 that "Pak activities on the Indian border" will be a subject for discussion during the Brezhnev visit to India will heighten Pak concerns about Indian, and Soviet intentions.

13. Implications for the US: Our concern in this is two-fold.

—First of all, we are and have long been committed to Indo-Pakistan reconciliation as the best guarantor of relative stability in the heart of South Asia. The Simla process, under which that reconciliation from the dark days of 1971 has gone forward, has clearly foundered. The mutual suspicions and hatreds on both sides are such as to ensure that when relations are not positively improving, they must almost inevitably worsen; no middle ground or natural plateau seems possible.

—Second, a secure Pakistan is one of the important pillars of our policy of resisting and highlighting Soviet aggression in Afghanistan; to the degree that [omission in the original] will grow.

Hummel

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## 19. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, December 23, 1980, 1035Z

13331. Military addressees also for POLAD/INTAF. Subject: (S) Pakistan and U.S. Security Policy for the Indian Ocean Region. Ref: Islamabad 12795<sup>2</sup> (Notal).

1. (S) Entire text.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800609–0033. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Karachi, Lahore (pouch), Peshawar (pouch), New Delhi, Kathmandu, Dacca, Colombo, Jidda, Kuwait, Beijing, London, Moscow, CINCPAC, USNMR SHAPE, and CINCEUR.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 338.



2. Summary: This is the second of a series of three think pieces on U.S. policy in the region. The first dealt with Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> This deals with the Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia region. The last will deal with US/Pakistan relations.<sup>4</sup>

3. The 1980's will challenge the U.S. ability to marshal political, economic, and military resources sufficiently and credibly to deter the Soviet Union from further encroachments in the Indian Ocean, South/Southwest Asian, Gulf, and Middle Eastern regions. Geographically, Pakistan sits on the edge of this complicated area, in a blocking position between South and Southwest Asia. Economically, it is not in itself a prize for either superpower contender. But politically, this Islamic republic is a "frontline" state that other more important nations in the region watch much as farmers do a weathervane, looking to U.S. action here as indicators of American willingness and resolve to add substance to rhetoric in defending vital U.S. interests in the security of the overall region. Over the next several years—an interval in which a new administration in Washington will set the content and tone of its foreign policy—Pakistan will be a testing ground (and unfortunately, not an ideal one) of American ability in this area to meet the growing Soviet challenge of the 1980's. We will need both to demonstrate the viability of a Southwest Asian security framework and to make it credible to our friends in South Asia as well. End summary.

4. No more than three years ago, then Deputy Assistant Secretary Spike Dubs was able to tell the Congress that things never looked better in South Asia and its environs.<sup>5</sup> India and Pakistan were embarked on a new round of relaxing their long-rocky relationship, Pakistan and Afghanistan were on the verge of settling their differences on Pushtunistan and the Durand Line, Pakistan and Bangladesh had kissed and made up, and the Shah was still the policeman at the Gulf. Iran and India, with a reluctant Pakistan, seemed also moving toward some sort of collaborative arrangements.

5. As 1981 dawns, nothing of this remains. There have been fundamental changes in the regional balance of power. The Shah is gone, and radicalized, Islamic instability has taken his place on his portion of the Indian Ocean rim. His successors are warring with Arabs in a conflict for which no end is in sight. Indo-Pakistan tensions have re-emerged, the consequence mainly of the suspicions on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border which Mrs. Gandhi's return to power has re-

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2 above.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 471.

<sup>5</sup> Dubs testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on March 22, 1977. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 11, 1977, pp. 344-346)



kindled. The Soviet Union has an army of occupation in formerly non-aligned Afghanistan, fighting for its life and the life of an unpopular Soviet puppet government whose very imposition was recognition of the failure of two previous Communist governments in that country. CENTO is no more, and Pakistan, once a staunch US ally on the Rim, has become a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

6. The changes have prompted massive new thinking about the security of the region by US policymakers and have produced not only a flat Washington commitment to fight for its interests in the Persian Gulf area but a broader confrontation with the Soviet Union throughout the region, ending the truce-like atmosphere [garble] evoked.

7. The changes have provoked also new policies by the United States. After almost thirty years of token presence, we now have had an Indian Ocean fleet made up of two carrier battle groups for more than a year, despite the severe pressures this puts on the rest of the fleet and on the retention rates of skilled servicemen. We have developed new plans for the utilization of US–UK facilities at Diego Garcia and have negotiated formal agreements for naval and air access and support at other important facilities along the Indian Ocean rim. We have or are creating a Rapid Deployment Force for the region, with pre-positioned materiel at Diego Garcia.

8. In political terms we have sought to defuse what appeared some time ago to be a budding confrontation between the US and radical Islam—the high point of which was the widespread acceptance of the canard that the US had something to do with the attack on the Qaaba in November 1979,<sup>6</sup> leading to a round of attacks on US installations in a number of Islamic countries, especially here in Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> We have sought also to shore up our relationships with various nations of the region in an effort to prevent further erosion of the Western position.

9. And with regard to Pakistan, we have seen a [garble] this nation—now a “frontline” state facing Soviet ground and air forces in nearby Afghanistan—seek accommodation with the reality of resurgent Soviet power in the area. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan brings Soviet forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean, and Pakistan stands in the way.

10. In one sense, Pakistan is peripheral to the main region of contest, which is the Gulf region generally and both Iran and the Arabian Peninsula specifically. In another sense, Pakistan itself can be looked upon as a Persian Gulf state, the port of Karachi just down the coast from the Gulf of Oman and Karachi itself closer in miles to the Straits

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 375.

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 376–385.

of Hormuz than to Pakistan's capital city of Islamabad. And in still another sense, Pakistan is in a blocking position between the regions defined as Southwest and South Asia, sharing the Islamic heritage and traditions of the Persian and Arab lands to its west, but modified by the historic and pervasive encounter with South Asian Hinduism to its east. It is also a "frontline" state vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is through Pakistan that the anti-Communist insurgency in Afghanistan is being supported and fueled from outside sources.

11. We have often said that US interests in Pakistan are essentially derivative, mainly of its geopolitical position on the southern edge of the Eurasian landmass. Pakistan has no natural resources which either we or the Soviet Union (or India) covets, but its loss—as a potential bulwark against further spread of Soviet influence south and eastward—has been seen over the years as a development which would affect our position in the region significantly.

12. Pakistan offers the following to US planners concerned with this part of the world:

- a well-trained and well-disciplined military establishment of nearly one-half million men, in need of new equipment but respected for its capabilities with the second-rate equipment it now has;

- a talented people, backing up this military establishment, providing a substantial manpower pool from a population of around 80 million and providing also thousands of expatriate workers—skilled and otherwise;

- a position of increasing effectiveness and influence in multilateral diplomacy—aided by an able and dedicated Civil and Foreign Service establishment—in such areas as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference Organization;

- an almost unique position of access to the 1500-mile border Pakistan shares with neighboring Afghanistan as well as the nearly 400-mile border shared with Iranian Baluchistan; and,

- a complex of facilities and airbases, starting with the man-made Karachi harbor and including as well the new port Qasim to its east, as well as the airfields surrounding the harbor—all of these important in halcyon days for the support of a much smaller American military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean area and available again, under the right circumstances and terms, for easing the support burden we have now assumed by our upgraded military and naval presence in the region.

13. Unfortunately, Pakistan also offers us an almost unavoidable involvement in its historic enmity, irrelevant to our interests, with India, a much larger, more important, and much less malleable country to its east—a country which is well on its way to establishing itself as

the number one indigenous military and naval power in the Indian Ocean region as a whole.

14. The greatest single obstacle to a stronger Pakistani contribution to the Western security effort in the area is the parlous state of Pakistan-American relations, a subject that will be explored in some detail in a following message. It is only in the most recent of months that the long cooling period in the relationship—based mainly in the American pursuit of global interests to the detriment of those of a regional or bilateral nature—has begun to thaw. But there is a long way yet to go, because rightly or wrongly the United States is still the outside security linkage which Pakistan perceives it needs to enable it to stand firm in the face of Soviet pressure. It was Soviet pressure in the 1950s which provided the setting in which the early American-Pakistan relationship was spawned, and it is those pressures still—directly and in Pakistani eyes through India—which provides the basis of the US-Pakistani security relationship of today.

15. Pakistanis have tended over the years to see this relationship in terms of an explicit guarantee against Soviet expansionism and an implicit guarantee that the US would not sit idly by while India acts out a revanchist fantasy at Pakistan's expense. It has been seen almost exclusively in its South Asian context, because the threats which a paranoid Pakistan saw to its very existence seemed through most of its years as a nation to derive from the unresolved issues of the 1947 partition of what had been British India.

16. The challenge to US planners concerned with the evolution of a Southwest Asia security framework is to broaden the focus of Pakistan's international concerns from the purely South Asian preoccupation with India, through the new anxieties brought about by the Russian presence in Afghanistan, to a wider Southwest Asian perception. Only when the focus is so broadened do the measures which do not have the comfortable bilateral fixation of earlier years make any sense as a reassurance to Pakistan, as to the Gulf region in general, that the United States will react effectively if the Soviet Union moves against them.

17. The problem is one involving several aspects of American credibility, for Pakistan's current doubts about American will and interest to stand up to the Russians if Pakistani territory is at stake undercuts our credibility in the region as a whole. Our oldest security relationship with any country in the region is the one we have with Pakistan, and while it has undergone major stresses and shifts in emphasis, as Pakistan has moved into the mainstream of the turbulent politics of Third World diplomacy, there are positive elements within the relationship which remain to be tapped and re-awakened. Even FonMin Agha Shahi—no friend of the United States—feels compelled to look constantly for signs of a new American willingness to take what he terms

“the bold decisions” necessary to bolster the friendly countries of the region and safeguard both their interests and America’s in preventing further erosion of the anti-Communist, pro-Western position here.

18. Yet another element of credibility is involved in Pakistan’s doubts, in the first instance growing out of Pakistan’s experience in 1965 and 1971 conflicts with India, and aroused anew by such constraints on effective American action abroad as the War Powers Act, the assertion of a more vigorous legislative role in foreign policy, the erosion of executive freedom, and the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate evidence of diminished confidence and interest in foreign places.

19. The challenge is to get Pakistanis to broaden their security receptivity to the same width as their threat perception so that American military and political actions taken in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, since the fall of Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan, are seen by Pakistanis as having direct relevance to their security. Too often the Paks see U.S. actions in a specifically bilateral context involving the U.S. and only one of the other Rim countries or a specific reaction to an immediate crisis such as the continued detention of American hostages in Iran. Only rarely does it seem to occur to Pakistanis—because of their South Asian myopia—that their Saudi and pan-Islamic diplomacy is coincident with our mutual interests in a broader move to construct political ties which complement the purely strategic and military aspects of our regional response.

20. Yet another problem results indirectly from Pakistan’s close links to the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran. The difficulties we have in meshing the Arab-Israel peace process with satisfying Saudi and other Arab objectives are mirrored in Pakistan, where the diplomatic discomforts caused by US policy in the Levant have important domestic and international resonances. So too with Iran. The US confrontation with Iran through the early months of 1980 paralleled an intensive effort by the Pakistanis, especially Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, to keep the Iranians focussed on the Soviet danger and to influence the direction of the Iranian revolution in ways constructive to the security of the region as a whole. The Pakistani effort eventually collapsed, as the Iranian Foreign Minister who played a key role was gobbled up by the cannibalism of a revolution in full spate. But Pakistan cultivates Iran still, and only after the hostage situation is behind us is there much hope that the US-Iran confrontation will recede as an impediment in US relations with Pakistan.

21. Overcoming the climate of suspicion, of disappointment, of disparate security perceptions, and of latent non-alignment, an American-Pakistan security relationship will not be easy. It will involve important choices of a strictly bilateral nature (septel). It will be costly, no doubt. It will require a much better understanding of the perceptions

of those inhabiting this Indian Ocean rim state so that American responses are played in terms other than those which sound attractive to Western audiences in Washington, Bonn, or Paris. And it will also require a much more aggressive and credible informational effort than we are currently engaged in overseas to have a chance of gaining public awareness of our actions and appreciation of their relevance to Pak security concerns.

22. The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and other events have fractured the shaky symbiosis of the region, leaving challenge and opportunity for the US to construct a system of relationships divorced from the euphoria of the 1950s and early 1960s and from the disillusionments thereafter—a system that will deter Soviet adventurism as well as protect US interests. Pakistan is an important, we would even say vital, element in such an evolution. Our own economic lifeline reaches into the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula; important parts of it pass along the Pakistan Makran coast. But the political environment for its protection may well begin at the Khojak, Tochi, and Khyber passes which lie astride the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and are part of the historic invasion routes into South Asia from Southwest and Central Asia.

**Hummel**

# Bangladesh

## 20. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1977

*Ambassador Masters' Views on Present Situation in Bangladesh and Recommended U.S. Programs (Summary of Dacca 246)*<sup>2</sup>

### POLITICAL SETTING

Masters has been favorably impressed by General Zia.<sup>3</sup> While not charismatic, he is sensible, hard working, incorrupt and a dedicated patriot. His policies, statements and actions are right, but as with virtually everything in Bangladesh, follow-through at lower levels of the government falls short. The Army is Zia's power base. While not totally cohesive, it is by far the strongest political force in the country. Zia clearly commands wide support in the army, but there are other contenders for power which would be strengthened if the economic progress of the past year were to falter.

We cannot be certain how long Zia will remain in office or how repressive his government might become. We should, given the fragility of political institutions and traditions, avoid a commitment to him or any other single individual. Thus far there has been no significant opposition to Zia's tightening of authoritarian control. Most people are more interested in adequate food, jobs and price stability than in elections under present circumstances. Zia probably has several years to show what he can do. By then, and by one means or another, he will have to (a) legitimize his own regime or return to a government which, directly or indirectly, is accountable to the people or (b) become more repressive to retain power against what is likely to be rising opposition.

In foreign policy Zia is conservative, non-communist but pragmatic. He seeks good relations with everyone but leans ideologically

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770025-0305. Secret. Drafted by Douglas B. Archard (NEA/PAB) on January 18. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum for Atherton.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 246 from Dacca, January 14, transmitted Masters's extended report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770014-1034)

<sup>3</sup> General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman. When Sayem took office in November 1975, Zia took over Sayem's former position as Chief Martial Law Administrator.

toward the U.S. and U.K. Zia would like us to undertake responsibility for Bangladesh's defense. Masters has stressed that efforts to draw us too closely into these matters would not only fail, but would endanger the broad base of support for economic assistance within the U.S. Government. He believes Zia now understands this and that this, in part, explains the recent spreading of his international options, as by his successful trip to China.

#### *ECONOMIC BACKGROUND*

Bangladesh shows clear signs of economic life. The Government has expanded the scope for private enterprise, controlled smuggling, encouraged exports, checked rampant inflation, and—taking advantage of good weather—produced a record rice crop.

But the pace of economic development measured by industrial production (still ten percent below 1969/70) and project implementation is disappointing. Also, family planning requires more vigorous action if Bangladesh is to survive. Population is growing at about three percent annually while agricultural production is growing at only one percent.

#### *U.S. PROGRAMS*

*Our Objectives:* Masters suggests two USG objectives in Bangladesh: first, to do what we can to contribute to stability in South Asia (and Bangladesh is undoubtedly its most vulnerable area) and, second, to fulfill our humanitarian desire to help these "poorest of the poor." Except for these objectives, we have no vital or even very important interests there.

*Program Recommendations:* For these reasons, the major U.S. role should continue to be in the field of economic aid. This and three other areas require urgent attention.

1. *Military Equipment and Training:* Masters recommends we not get into a grant MAP or concessional sales program. He recommends the U.S. initiate the same type of limited military sales and other programs in Bangladesh as in other nations of South Asia. This would require a Presidential Determination. This would allow the sale of limited noncombat items available as excess U.S. equipment at reduced prices. He recommends establishing a small Defense Attache office.

2. *USIS Activities:* Masters recommends immediate assignment of a third USIS officer, upgrading of USIS Bangladesh from resource allocation group eight to at least group seven, and doubling of the present cultural exchange program.

3. *Office Building:* He urges moving ahead rapidly with construction of a new chancery. The Foreign Service Inspectors said last year that the Dacca Embassy was one of the worst in the world. He asks that

everything possible be done in FY 77 so that construction can actually start at the beginning of the next fiscal year.

4. *PL 480 Negotiating Instructions*: To better encourage a vigorous BDG food grain procurement program, Masters requests prompt transmittal of PL 480 negotiating instructions.

*Current Status of Recommendations*

1. *Presidential Determination (PD)*: We have recently sought a PD for Bangladesh but encountered objections from L, H, and DOD/ISA, partly on the grounds that the new Administration should make the decision. As soon as possible we will again seek a Determination.

*Excess Equipment*: With a PD, Bangladesh would be eligible for purchase of excess U.S. equipment. The BDG turned down our offer of a minesweeper which we offered them as a hydrographic research ship. (They asked for it to use as a minesweeper but we and DOD do not favor this.) We are still looking for another ship for hydrographic purposes.

2. *Third USIS Officer and Upgrading Resource Allocation Group*: USIA's Deputy Assistant Director for INA will discuss the recommendations with Masters in Dacca this February.

*Increasing Cultural Exchange Program*: CU's current planning figure for the FY 78 Bangladesh cultural exchange program would almost double the current level.

3. *New Dacca Chancery*: NEA is working closely with FBO to ensure that all possible steps are taken prior to availability of construction funds in FY 78.

4. *PL 480 Negotiating Instructions*: We are attempting to get USDA to provide the Embassy with instructions. USDA has dragged its feet due to a desire to get more food in the package than Embassy Dacca wished.



**21. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, April 22, 1977, 0948Z

2146. Subj: Zia to Presidency: Background and Prospects. Ref: Dacca 2109.<sup>2</sup>

1. Why action now? We are not yet certain why Zia acted to assume the Presidency now. It is possible that Sayem's health has deteriorated to the point that he can no longer function in his office (para 5 below). It is known that Zia (and we believe others in the military) were unhappy with Sayem's plodding performance in his titular and portfolio duties (para 3), but whether there was an immediate specific difficulty is not now known. More likely, but still far from confirmed, is that a series of events beginning at least as early as Sayem's opposition to last November's postponement of the general elections have accumulated military impatience with Sayem and some or all of his civilian advisors and an issue, perhaps minor in itself, precipitated what appears to have been a sudden decision. One question hanging fire was Bangladeshi representation at the Commonwealth Conference in June. We assume, that the decision, while possible Zia's alone, was taken in full coordination with the key members of the Army. Whether Admiral Khan and Air Vice Marshal Mahmood were included is not clear.

2. Anomaly removed: The elevation of Zia eliminates an anomaly which was created last November when he displaced Sayem as Chief Martial Law Administrator, but permitted Sayem to remain as formal Head of State. Sayem then retained the ceremonial duties, but he also continued to act as Chairman of the Council of Advisors (i.e. Cabinet) and by virtue of that position was necessarily involved to some extent in the affairs of the country. He also then retained his portfolios of foreign affairs, defense, law and parliamentary affairs, and establishment (i.e., control over the Civil Service as an institution).

3. Sayem's position? We have known for some time that Zia was unhappy with the management of the Foreign Ministry (see Dacca

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770140–0370. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Calcutta, Islamabad, New Delhi, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2109 from Dacca, April 21, reported that Zia was sworn in as President that day with little advance notice, and that "Dacca itself appears completely quiet although news has been public for several hours. No danger to Americans is apparent or anticipated. Mahmood told Ambassador that BDG did not expect any trouble or 'at least nothing we cannot handle.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770139–1199)

1461)<sup>3</sup> and Sayem was replaced in this portfolio last month by Shamsul Huq. Zia now holds the other portfolios and must retain them (likely in the case of defense and establishment) or find new appointees for them (probably law and parliamentary affairs). He must also decide whether or not to retain his own portfolios of finance and home affairs. It would seem probable that he will drop these; even an energetic General can keep only a limited number of balls in the air at the same time. We assume he will have no problem with reshaping the Council if he chooses, as it presumably stands dissolved in a legal sense with the resignation of its Chairman.<sup>4</sup>

4. Zia and the Army: Another post which Zia must decide to retain or drop is that of Chief of the Army Staff. There were rumors during the evening of April 21 that Major General Ershad would become Chief of Staff and would also be appointed a Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, placing him on a par with Admiral Khan, the Navy Chief, and Air Vice Marshal Mahmood, the Air Force Chief. Prior to his November elevation Zia himself was a DCMLA. While the promotion of Ershad is in itself logical, it is also important to note that Zia's power base is in the Army and he could wish to retain his place in the direct chain of command. Were Ershad (or someone else) promoted it would set off a series of changes which Zia could be expected to use to maintain or strengthen the loyalty of the Army to him. (Zia is, of course, "Commander-in-Chief" by virtue of being President.)<sup>5</sup>

5. Sayem's "ill health": Mahmood told the Ambassador that Sayem had been ill, but this was said without much conviction. The Foreign Secretary noted Sayem "had been ill for two days". So far as we have been able to observe the rather remote former President he looks no better or worse than he has for some time. He is quite elderly, 61, and suffers from hypertension. Regardless of the actual state of his health, we would not be surprised to see Sayem leave Bangladesh for "treatment" abroad.

6. Policies: Except for the expected rearrangement of portfolios at the advisor level we foresee little change either in the method of governance of the country or in the policies which the administration will pursue. Zia, no doubt, hopes that by his energy and direct leader-

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1461 from Dacca, March 21, reported Zia's complaints "that the Council of Advisors was not an effective group and that he felt one problem was in the Foreign Ministry where President Sayem held the portfolio." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770097-1187)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2154 from Dacca, April 23, reported that the Council of Advisors met under Zia's chairmanship on April 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770141-1034)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2154 from Dacca, April 23, reported Zia's announcement that he would retain his post as Chief of Staff of the Army.

ship at the top he will be able to instill a higher level of enthusiasm and greater efficiency in the government. He has already in his series of talks to newly elected Union Council Chairmen tried to invigorate that level of the government machinery.

7. New pronouncements: Zia is to speak to the nation on the evening of April 22. We assume that the basic content of this address will be the programs he has recently outlined to the Union Council Chairmen (see Dacca 1963),<sup>6</sup> but more than this will be expected by many. Looked for by some is a schedule for elections to a national representative body. The plodding progress of local elections is continuing but to many this is not enough.

8. Reaction: We have noted in septels<sup>7</sup> that observable public reaction to the change has been almost totally absent. Dacca is going about its usual Friday business. A large gathering of officials and private citizens at the British Queen's birthday reception last evening greeted the news (which came just before the guests arrived and many heard it for the first time there) with almost no concern. There are no signs that the administration expects any adverse reaction. Police are in their usual numbers in the city and no unusual military activity has been observed.

9. We will be commenting further after the content of Zia's address is known.<sup>8</sup>

## Masters

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 1963 from Dacca, April 15, reported Zia's April 13 speech given at the inaugural conference for the Union Parishad. To guide the efforts of the Union Chairmen, he outlined a six-point plan: "forming of food committees for facing the uncertain food situation; building up rural industries; building houses in the rural areas strong enough to withstand natural calamities; eradication of illiteracy; inspiring the people to accept voluntarily family planning; increasing textile production through optimum use of looms and increasing cotton production." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770131–0398)

<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>8</sup> In Zia's address to the nation on the evening of April 22, he announced that general elections would be held in December 1978, reassured Bangladeshis that there were sufficient food stocks in the country, and "warned also that the government and people of Bangladesh would not tolerate any disturbance of peace from any quarter." (Telegram 2151 from Dacca, April 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770140–0732)

**22. Letter From Bangladeshi President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, May 21, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I avail myself of this opportunity to express deep appreciation of the people of Bangladesh and that of my own for the generous assistance we have received from the Government and the people of your great country. On our part we have made a sustained effort to use this valuable assistance in a constructive manner for generating a process of rapid socio-economic development. We have taken various steps to streamline our administration and to increase productivity in all sectors of our economy. We are paying special attention to agriculture, population control and rural development with a view to improving the condition of life of our people.

2. In spite of priority attention to production of foodgrains Bangladesh continues to face a sizable annual deficit. Hence, we have been obliged to depend on substantial supplies of foodgrains from abroad. Unfortunately, our food production has suffered a set-back this year owing to natural causes, and the total yield is substantially below initial estimates. The full impact of this shortage will be felt during the latter part of this year.

3. In these compelling circumstances we have to act urgently to bridge the food gap. Failure to take timely action will result in spiralling of foodgrain prices as also of all other essentials, and thus place these commodities beyond the reach of the common man. Such an eventuality will seriously disturb the delicate socio-economic and political balance that the present Government has been striving so hard to maintain. At the same time if Bangladesh has to finance the import of large quantities of foodgrains out of her own limited resources it would deal a crippling blow to her economic development programmes.

4. I am writing to urge that, as the biggest food-donor to Bangladesh, your country would, as in the past, come to our help with the utmost expedition. It is my earnest request and sincere hope that you and your Government would please respond most urgently.

5. I am happy to inform you that we are taking all necessary measures to gear up the administrative machinery that would enable us to receive without difficulty additional shipments at our ports, ensure

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77-12/80. No classification marking.

adequate and safe storage, prevention of wastage and speedy distribution of foodgrains to various parts of the country.

6. Kindly accept, Mr. President, my best wishes for your personal health and happiness and for the continued progress and prosperity of your people.

**Major General Ziaur Rahman**

*President, People's Republic of Bangladesh.*

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## 23. Letter From President Carter to Bangladeshi President Zia<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 23, 1977

Dear President Zia:

Thank you very much for the good wishes conveyed in your letter of May 21<sup>2</sup> which Ambassador Siddiqi delivered to the White House on June 10.<sup>3</sup> I was pleased to hear about the steps that you have taken to streamline your Administration and increase productivity. I particularly welcome your wise choice of the crucial areas of population control and agricultural production for special attention, for I fully share the belief that economic development must in the first instance help those whose needs are greatest. I take great satisfaction in the role that the United States has been able to play in helping you meet these important goals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the letter to Carter for his signature under a June 23 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 22.

<sup>3</sup> In his June 23 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 1 above), Brzezinski noted that Siddiqi had delivered the letter to him to deliver to Carter. In a June 10 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance that during their June 10 meeting, Siddiqi conveyed to Brzezinski the Bangladeshi "desire that we go ahead with the research reactor. They are unwilling to sign the NPT as a condition but hinted strongly that they would sign it if there were no linkage. I raised the question of full-scope safeguards as a possible alternative to the NPT and said that we would look into the question. Siddiqi made the customary pitch for military assistance. I was unresponsive. Finally, he reiterated General Zia's desire for a visit to the United States. I pointed out that we were trying to space visits so that they would be more meaningful. When my staff member showed Siddiqi out, he told him unofficially that there was no prospect for any state visit this calendar year." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770144–0652)

The United States will certainly continue to give sympathetic consideration to your request for food, and we will do all that we can to help in your drive for self-sufficiency.<sup>4</sup>

As you know, on April 1 our governments signed a PL 480 Title I agreement for 200,000 metric tons of foodgrain. This grain has now begun to arrive, only ten weeks after the signing. Currently, we are negotiating an amendment to the April agreement for an additional 150,000 tons. As soon as this is concluded, we will coordinate with your government to ensure as prompt arrival as Bangladeshi port conditions will allow. We hope to begin negotiations very soon on a second amendment to provide some of the vegetable oil which you have requested.

This is not as much grain and oil as you have asked for, partly because of considerations of price and availability in the United States. As you know, I do rely very heavily on the estimates and recommendations that Ambassador Masters provides to me from Dacca. If there are areas where you disagree with our assessments, it would be most useful if your officials discussed these further with the Ambassador. I do want to assure you that the needs of Bangladesh are very much in our mind. If it should become necessary to provide additional food in response to changed circumstances, I assure you that we will be able to move rapidly to help.

I have followed with great interest the recent political developments in Bangladesh and am pleased to hear of your recently announced plans to hold further local elections and to have general elections before the end of 1978.<sup>5</sup> The cause of democracy is an important one to Americans, and I am pleased that we share it with nations such as yours.

I have also been pleased by the progressive normalization of relations among the nations of South Asia. All parties have shown truly impressive statesmanship at a time when there is much talk of peace in the world but the talk is seldom followed up by action. I have pledged myself and my Administration to the pursuit of peace through action. I look forward to working together with you in our varying ways to achieve the imperative goal of peace. As you know, I have made far-reaching proposals in such areas as the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons as our contribution to this process.

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<sup>4</sup> In his June 23 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 1 above), Brzezinski noted that "State has reaffirmed its strong belief that shipping more food to Bangladesh now would not only risk it being wasted but would also have a negative effect on Bangladeshi self-help in the agricultural field. The approach to you is an attempt to end-run our Ambassador in Dacca."

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 8, Document 21.

The problem of meeting the world's legitimate energy needs without adding to the risk of nuclear proliferation is one of particular concern to me.

Ambassador Siddiqi also restated your desire to purchase an atomic research reactor. It will certainly be much easier for us, however, to deal on nuclear matters with nations that have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A decision on this matter is, of course, one that you must make in terms of your own national interests. I hope, however, that you can see your way clear to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a contribution to our common goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons that can only be harmful to all of us.

Once again, thank you for your letter. You can be sure that this Administration will continue to accord high priority to helping you and your government in your efforts to improve the human condition in Bangladesh.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**24. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Terrorist Hijacking of JAL Aircraft

As you may know, the Japanese Red Army terrorists hijacked JAL in Bombay and forced it down in Dacca.<sup>2</sup> At least ten American citizens are reported on board, maybe as many as twenty. The terrorists made

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Inderfurth and Gates Chron File, Box 4, Gates Chron: 9–10/77. Confidential. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 5415 from Dacca, September 28, reported that "Foreign Secretary Tabarak Husain informed Ambassador at 11:40 a.m. Dacca time by telephone that a Japanese Airline aircraft radioed Dacca that it had been hijacked and requested landing rights in Dacca. Tabarak said BDG may request guidance from Embassy on how to handle situation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770352–0875)

demands on the Japanese Government for \$6 million cash and the release of eight terrorists from Japanese prisons. The Japanese Cabinet, in crisis session, agreed to \$6 million but refused to release the prisoners. The hijackers turned down this offer and reported that John Gabriel, Chairman of the Board of Garfield Bank and reportedly a friend of President Carter, would be executed at the end of an hour and a half if their demands were not met.

The Japanese Cabinet queried the State Department about the President's reported friendship with Gabriel. I went directly to Jody Powell and Susan Clough who brought back the following information and guidance:

—The White House refused to answer the question about the President's friendship with Gabriel.

—The Japanese Cabinet should make their decision without allowing this reported information about Gabriel's relationship with the President to influence their decision.

That information has been reported back to State and presumably relayed to the Japanese Government. This negotiation will probably continue on thru the night. I will handle queries from State and hopefully be able to avoid bothering you or the President.

If in fact they execute one or more American citizens at announced intervals, the situation will almost inevitably require a White House response. A small group, Ben Read, Hay Isham, Matt Nimetz and Harold Saunders has been informed by Christopher to ponder contingencies. We can turn to this group as a starting point for developing White House responses.



**25. Memorandum From the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism (Isham) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1977

SUBJECT

JAL Hijacking

*Summary of Developments*

*0700 hours–1 pm, October 1*

At approximately 7 a.m. (EST) hijackers and Mahmood came to a confrontation over the Japanese insistence that all hostages be released in exchange for the six prisoners and the \$6 million, with the hijackers insisting that only 57 hostages would be given up in exchange and the balance at the final (undisclosed) destination. After protracted and heated discussions, the hijacked plane unexpectedly moved toward the runway as if to take off.

At this point, Mahmood put into effect what clearly was a prearranged plan by quickly moving trucks, fire engines, and other vehicles on to the runway, blocking the aircraft's further movement. At this point, four shots were fired by hijackers in the air, presumably to warn off blocking vehicles. That standoff continued for a period of time while Mahmood sought to persuade the hijackers to return their aircraft to its original position.

Throughout this period, Mahmood continued to press his argument that all hostages should be released in exchange for meeting the hijackers' demands. He argued that the hijackers had more than adequate guarantee of their safety with the plane's crew of 14. In response, hijackers replied that Japanese Red Army had carried out a "successful" hijacking at Kuala Lumpur, clearly implying they did not intend to accept Mahmood's proposal and wanted additional hostages as guarantees. (*Note: In the Kuala Lumpur incident, Japanese officials and JAL executives offered themselves as substitute hostages for the passengers, a proposal which the terrorists in that incident finally accepted.*)<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memos to WC from Offices/Bureaus. Confidential. Drafted by John Karkashian (M/CT).

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to an August 1975 incident in Kuala Lumpur when the Japanese Red Army stormed a building and took U.S. and Swedish diplomats hostage. The hostages were exchanged for imprisoned JRA leaders who were flown to Kuala Lumpur on a JAL aircraft.

Hijackers subsequently moved their aircraft back to its original position and Mahmood embarked on a new proposal for a staged exchange of prisoners and money for hostages. Mahmood's proposal consists of exchange of one prisoner with \$1 million for 10 hostages. The completed exchange would give the kidnappers the 6 Japanese prisoners plus \$6 million, while the hijackers would have released 57 hostages. After completion of this operation, more than 70 hostages will remain on the aircraft, plus the plane's crew of 14. The first stage of this exchange began at approximately 1200 hours, October 1 and the first ten women passengers released were depicted on TV in Dacca.

An unexpected development came at 1040 hours when hijackers released John Gabriel for humanitarian reasons. Gabriel is diabetic, has a prostate condition, and has coronary heart disease. Gabriel is now in Dacca hospital undergoing treatment. He has been visited by Embassy officers and has been examined by Embassy doctor. Embassy reports Gabriel is in some pain but is lucid. Gabriel had been singled out as the first victim in the series of hijackers' ultimatums.

The most critical phase will occur when the present exchange operation is concluded, and Mahmood resumes efforts to persuade the hijackers to release the remaining passengers in Dacca. Mahmood may surface a proposal for the use of two Japanese officials as substitute hostages for the passengers. We have suggested that the GOJ consider asking the BDG to have one of their officials as a third substitute hostage, to bolster the hijackers' assurances as to their safety once aloft.

**26. Memorandum From the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism (Isham) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1977

SUBJECT

JAL Hijacking

*Summary of Developments*

*1:00 p.m.–5:30 p.m., October 1*

With dawn in Dacca barely three hours off, prisoner/hostage exchanges on the sixth and final tranche have halted, for reasons which we deduce are connected with Mahmood/GOJ tactics to renew the substitute hostage proposal in more specific and weighty terms. The hijackers have protested the delay in delivering the sixth prisoner and are becoming testy. Meanwhile, Bangladesh Vice President Sattar has appeared at the tower.

GOJ efforts to arrange sanctuary for the hijacked aircraft are in the final stages, with overflight permission obtained from India, Pakistan (along with fueling rights), Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Egypt, however, has thus far refused the overflight permission, and the GOJ has asked us to help in securing their agreement. We have instructed Embassy Cairo to do so. The ultimate destination—described by the GOJ only as a “North African country”—is almost certainly Algeria—a point from which the liberated passengers could make relatively easy onward connections.

Four Americans have been released by now (Mrs. Carol Karabian, Mr. and Mrs. John Gabriel, Mr. Kurt Krueger), and six remain on board (Mr. Jenable F. Caldwell, Mr. Joel Chance, Mr. Walter Karabian, Mr. William D. McLean, Mr. Thomas P. Phalen (the US communicator) and Mr. Eric Weiss.

We have been keeping the families and interested Congressmen informed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memos to WC from Offices/Bureaus. Confidential.

**27. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, October 2, 1977, 0018Z

5583. Subject: Hijacking and Internal Security in Dacca.

Control tower has reported to hijackers "a serious development" which has nothing to do with the hijacking. The tower advised the hijackers that "unruly uniformed people who are armed" may approach the aircraft. If this happens, the tower stated, the hijackers should take "full defensive positions and after checking with the tower as to identity of the people, be prepared to shoot them" to protect the passengers and crew.

**Masters**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770382-0854, D770359-0634. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Tokyo. Sent for information to DIA.

**28. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State and the Embassy in Japan<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, October 2, 1977, 0135Z

5586. Dept for M/CT and S/S–O. Subject: JAL Hijacking & Internal Security.

1. Radio Bangladesh at 0700 is giving news as usual with no repeat no mention of coup.

2. Tower discussions have resumed but without Mahmood. Hijackers wanted to send a representative to the tower for face-to-face negotiations but tower said there were internal problems and “unruly elements” on runway. Advised hijackers to remain calm and situation, which speaker described “as a sort of coup d’etat”, should clear up in half an hour.

3. At radio station there is no activity (0715) and guards, although heavily armed, are lounging about in normal fashion.

**Masters**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770359–0648. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to DIA.

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**29. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, October 2, 1977, 1650Z

5608. Subject: Internal Security.

1. We understand there was heavy involvement of Air Force personnel in attempted coup early this morning October 2. 120 coup suspects have been rounded up as of midday, and an estimated 250 were involved, according to reliable source.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770359–0814. Confidential. Sent Priority to the Department of State.

2. EmbOff was told by Bangladesh Red Cross official, who assisted in aftermath of attack at the airport, that 41 bodies of rebel troops were removed by Red Cross from the tower area. Some were young Air Force officers. All rebels there were killed. We have also learned that an undetermined number of rebel dead were also removed by military from site of rebel attack at officers' mess across from airport. Heavy rebel losses also reported there.

3. Australian High Commissioner told the Ambassador today he had spoken to wife of Air Vice Marshal Mahmood. She said loyalist forces killed when coup forces stormed airport tower early this morning included seven Air Force military police (provos) and four Air Force officers. The officers included Mrs. Mahmood's brother-in-law (unnamed), the base commander, and an officer named Nabi. Mrs. Mahmood said her husband "miraculously escaped". We understand, as reported earlier, that he was slightly wounded. He did not return to airport tower. A Bangladesh Biman official told EmbOff that altogether 14 Air Force officers were killed in the tower attack.

**Masters**

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### 30. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, October 4, 1977, 1320Z

5681. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: The Mutiny.

Summary: The mutiny in the midst of the hijacking episode has left many questions unanswered so far. The motives of the mutineers and the amount of coordination among them and those in Bogra and Chittagong are in doubt.<sup>2</sup> The role, if any, of the JSD is not certain. So far unity has been displayed by the highest levels of the MLA as all appear to support Zia and are prepared to work with him. The future

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770361-0929. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Colombo, Islamabad, Kathmandu, New Delhi, Calcutta, CINCPAC, and DIA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 5592 from Dacca, October 2, reported that according to a Group Captain in the Bangladeshi Air Force, "there was an incident in Chittagong just after midnight October 2 in which troops fired rifles. Incident was apparently contained quickly. It is not known whether both Dacca and Chittagong incidents were coordinated to follow earlier Bogra incident. In Bogra, two officers were killed by sepoys." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770359-0671)

will depend on this unity and on a strong position taken by Zia and his associates. End summary.

1. The drama associated with the hijacking of a JAL aircraft to Dacca was at a temporary lull when the exchanges of Japanese prisoners for hostages and money had been completed sometime after midnight on Sunday, October 2. The radio exchanges between the tower and the aircraft were minimal and it was expected that the aircraft and the remaining hostages would leave Dacca for an unknown destination shortly after sunup. Suddenly, a new factor interjected itself into the hijacking scenario and into the political situation in Bangladesh. Shooting had begun in the adjacent cantonment at about 3 a.m. and shortly after it spread to BAF officers mess across the roadway from the airport and finally into the control tower itself as Air Force personnel apparently attempted to wipe out the senior officers of the BAF who were on duty there in connection with the hijacking.

2. There are very many factors which at this time are still unknown. The usual pattern of questions for journalists of who, what, where, when, how and why simply do not have clear cut answers on the basis of information presently available to us from our sources and from consultation with several diplomatic colleagues. Even the sequence of events is hard to establish with certainty.

3. From the two principal targets (the BAF officers mess and the tower) it seems that higher ranking BAF officers including Air Vice Marshal Mahmood were the targets of the mutineers. There have been reports that personnel from other services were also involved including a signal unit stationed at Savar, but the BAF mutineers were the most prominent. These were successful in killing eleven BAF officers, according to an official statement, two of whom were Group Captains and one a Wing Commander (and of these two were in BAF Intelligence and thus on duty at the tower). Mahmood himself escaped injury, according to his wife "miraculously". It is reported also that the attackers were from the BAF Ground Defense Unit and that they had ransacked the unit weapons storage area at about 1 a.m. and shortly afterward began firing. The earliest an American heard the firing in the cantonment from the nearby Gulshan residential area was shortly after 3 a.m. There were perhaps some killings in the cantonment itself as the official announcement has said that ten soldiers were killed although names and locations of their deaths have not been given.

4. At 0555 Radio Bangladesh broadcast a statement which proclaimed a revolution had been successful and that the "leader" would soon address the nation. (We now have an exact text which is being

sent by septel.)<sup>3</sup> Five minutes later the station began its regular programming for the day with a Quranic recitation and no further mention of the revolution or its leader was made. One of the mutineer groups apparently infiltrated the main broadcasting studio and transmitter next to the Hotel Intercontinental and put the message out on the already activated transmitter.

5. The 9th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Mir Shawkat Ali, moved quickly to restore order. Ninth Division troops and police retook the radio station in a brief firefight near the Intercontinental. Troops came to the airport both from the terminal side (west) and across the runway from the north and east. The area was reasonably secure before seven a.m. Sporadic firing continued in the cantonment for several hours after that.

6. During the firing the task of negotiating from the tower was taken over by a Foreign Ministry official (S.A. Jalal from the American Directorate), and Mahmood was not heard from again as long as the plane was in Dacca. We believe he and other senior officers went into hiding. The JRA hijackers said that they wished to drop off more hostages and leave as soon as possible. The tower stated that there "had been something like a coup d'état" but that it was internal and not in any way directed at them. It also said that under the circumstances further releases would have to be delayed. Several hostages released later said that the firing could be heard clearly in the hijacked aircraft. Their initial reaction was that this was a commando raid against the plane.<sup>4</sup>

7. With the immediate threat from the mutineers cleared up by mid-morning, President Zia addressed the nation in a very short speech at 1145. He said that "misdirected personnel" had caused the trouble but that the unified forces of Army, Navy, Air Force, Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and police had thwarted their attempt to overthrow the government. He appealed for unity and said measures would be taken against those who had acted against the nation.

8. It seemed clear even at that time that in the moment of danger, all of the highest levels of the BDG had acted in concert. Two of the frequently rumored rivals of Zia, Shawkat and Major General Golam

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5673 from Dacca, October 4, transmitted the texts of the initial announcement and the subsequent short radio address by the coup leader, who announced a revolution and called for support. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770362-1012)

<sup>4</sup> On October 2, the hijackers flew from Dacca to Kuwait, where they released seven hostages. From there the hijackers flew to Damascus, freeing ten hostages, and finally to Algiers, where they released the remaining 19 hostages and surrendered to Algerian security forces. ("Japanese Hijackers Free Hostages and Give Themselves Up in Algiers," *New York Times*, October 4, 1977, p. 1)



Dastagir (Director General, BDR), used their commands in support of the regime. On October 3, a meeting was held and a picture published in the press of the participants who included all of the leaders: Zia, Mahmood, Rear Admiral Khan, Shawkat and Dastagir among them.

9. Security measures have been taken including much more rigid control on entry to military installations, an earlier curfew, searches of vehicles for weapons and personnel, and stronger guards on key personnel. However, the atmosphere in Dacca is more relaxed than it was in the first hours after the mutiny.

10. While the preceding gives an outline of the events so far as we know them there are still many unanswered questions. In addition to the Air Force and signal unit, there are reports of some Army, possibly some BDR and some civilians (including some masquerading as military or BDR) being involved. The leadership of the group is also unclear as is the level, if any, of coordination (a) between units in Dacca and (b) between the incident a few days earlier at Bogra as well as the one we have heard about in Chittagong, also on October 2. (The latter incident was apparently small and quickly suppressed.)

11. The goals of the mutineers are also a mystery. We (and the BDG itself) have known that there were grievances within the Army over pay, housing and other amenities. The recent pay increase did not satisfy the expectations of the sepoys and their equivalents in the other services. The Bogra incident is reported to have been over these grievances and several Army officers were killed there. Military sources state that the goal was not repeat not the overthrow of the regime but to set officers and enlisted men against each other.

The radio broadcast, however, took a different line and said a revolution had been successful. It seems logical that the broadcast and the mutiny were part of the same package but that the former banked on the success of the latter.

12. In the realm of speculation, therefore, it is possible that the authors of the radio message counted upon a much wider uprising than actually occurred, one which could have displaced the Zia regime. There seems to have been no direct attack on Zia himself, surely the person who would have been hit if a change in government were the immediate goal. An explanation may thus be that the BAF mutineers were the only ones who tried fully to carry out their mission and the others either (a) failed, (b) chickened out, or (c) were counted upon prematurely or incorrectly.

13. The identity of broadcasters themselves is not certain. Also if a number of units were expected to work together some coordination was necessary. The BDG has already, privately, fingered the underground wing of Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) for this role and had additionally suggested that a “foreign power” might be involved. The

“foreign power” is presumably India. However, if both India and the JSD were acting together it would be one of the strangest combinations in Bangladeshi history. The JSD is strongly anti-Indian and elements associated with it demonstrated this by trying to kill the Indian High Commissioner in December, 1975.

14. Although the foreign connection seems unlikely (despite the glee with which AIR reported the events and the exaggerations of the Calcutta press), the JSD participation (or leadership) is not improbable. Given to rash acts, the underground wing could well have attempted to do something like this. It is felt that the JSD has some support in the military (the party claimed in November, 1975, to have put Zia in office). But it also draws support from students and the Dacca University campus was quiet all day Sunday.

15. The prospects for Bangladesh following the events of the mutiny depend very much on how Zia and his associates play it. If they continue the unity which apparently is present now and at the same time refuse to accede to demands from the sepoy level which they think are beyond the means of Bangladesh they may emerge stronger than they were before the incident. The meeting of Oct. 3 implied that a tough line would be taken. Whether it will and whether the necessary unity will be maintained remains to be seen.

16. The international image of Bangladesh has no doubt been tarnished. It can be seen as a country which, when it does not have natural disasters, seems to be able to manufacture human ones. However, this, too, could be overcome in time by a demonstration of strength by Zia and his colleagues, but given the past track record, the job will be difficult.

**Masters**

**31. Letter From President Carter to Bangladeshi President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I was very pleased to learn of your government's invitation to the Peace Corps to begin a program in Bangladesh.<sup>2</sup>

The next step is for the Peace Corps and your advisers to develop the kind of program that will be of most use to your country. We will take special care to make sure that the training program for the Volunteers provides them with extensive training in local languages, sensitivity to the culture of the people they will work with, and technical training designed specifically to meet the needs of the people of Bangladesh. I want this program to be of value to your country, and for Peace Corps Volunteers to perform at the highest possible standard.

My mother served as a Peace Corps Volunteer near Bombay, and her experience enriched our family's life. So I am especially proud of the work of our Volunteers. Through individual service, they demonstrate in a personal way our commitment to the people of the world, and our desire to work with them in developing resources.

With best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In a November 17 telegram to Dacca, Mary King summarized the negotiations with the Bangladeshi Government to field Peace Corps volunteers in Bangladesh. After in-depth conversations between U.S. and Bangladeshi officials at the Geneva World Health Assembly in May, a formal Bangladeshi invitation was made to King on October 31. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Mary E. King, Box 13, Bangladesh)

### 32. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, June 5, 1978, 1018Z

3568. Paris for Toner Bangladesh Consortium Delegation. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Initial Reactions to Zia's Victory. Ref: Dacca 3548.<sup>2</sup>

Summary. President Zia, polling 77 percent of the vote (with almost all stations reporting), has been elected to a five year term as President of Bangladesh. Somewhat incongruously, we do not know at this time when the five-year clock will begin and, more importantly, the constitutional nature of the office in which he is to continue is unclear. His victory margin follows a pattern which began in 1937 of substantially large margins in each election held in the eastern Islamic portion of what was once united India. The turnout was very close to that of the 1970 elections in East Pakistan. No untoward incidents have been reported in the press or were noted in our observation or those of others with whom we have talked. The principal nonparticipant, Ataur Rahman Khan, has noted the peaceful nature of the polling, so far only one Awami Leaguer has specifically charged "rigging" although Osmani also has claimed some "irregularities" occurred. Zia is to hold press conference evening of June 5; Osmani morning of June 6; Osmani will, no doubt, expand on his June 4 charges of irregularities and his earlier ones of intimidation. Nonetheless most observers with whom we have spoken, including foreign correspondents, feel that the conduct of the election was fair by South Asian standards. Two parties remained banned during the poll, although members of both participated prominently in the campaign, and perhaps a thousand political prisoners remain in jail for various reasons, but it is unlikely that the final result has been affected by either circumstance. Zia's next tasks will be to define the roles of the President and the Parliament and to prepare for the Parliamentary elections promised for December. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Schneider**

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234-0132. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Colombo, Islamabad, Kathmandu, New Delhi, Paris, Calcutta, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3548 from Dacca, June 5, reported the results of Bangladesh's June 3 Presidential election and Zia's June 4 press conference, during which he said "that the peaceful polling indicated that Bangladesh was now a more 'mature' nation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780233-1233)

**33. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, June 19, 1978, 1011Z

3854. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Conversation With Bangladesh President Zia: U.S.-Bangladesh Relations.

Summary: In my first bilateral meeting with Bangladesh President Zia since our talk after presentation of credentials,<sup>2</sup> I sketched out my view of the basis for U.S.-Bangladesh relations, seeking by my emphasis on economic assistance and omission of mention of military matters to get across the concept that our aid was at the heart of our ties. I spoke of U.S. appreciation for the process he had initiated toward effective and representative government. I mentioned the importance we attach to regional stability, emphasizing both our support to South Asian bilateral negotiation and to the sovereign equality of the participants. I then mentioned some of the potential trouble spots in our relations: effective aid performance, aid to the poor, human rights and Bangladesh positions on international issues of importance to the U.S. In reply the President spoke warmly of our good relations and talked at length and optimistically of his plans for development. He also expressed pride in his program “to bring about democracy”. Speaking on relations among South Asian countries, he advocated further negotiations to settle all differences, and seconded my emphasis on the sovereign equality of the negotiating nations. He cautiously reciprocated my proposal for cooperation on certain international issues. The President’s behavior toward me since my arrival suggests that he wants to make a special effort to develop closer ties with the U.S., perhaps better relations than will be possible. My presentation may give him some idea of the possibilities and limitations; our future dialogue should spell out the rest. While I do not plan to pursue the President, I believe I can expect that he will wish to see me from time to time. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256–0109. Confidential. Sent for information to Islamabad, New Delhi, Kathmandu, Colombo, Kabul, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Schneider was appointed on March 2 and presented his credentials on March 29. In telegram 1961 from Dacca, March 30, Schneider reported that his discussion with Zia at the credentials ceremony seemed “worth reporting briefly since it turned out to be considerably more than the usual protocol session. That Zia spent forty-five minutes with me—one of his staff members said this was the longest he had spent with any new Ambassador—is an indication of the value he puts on the benefits which come (or which he hopes will come) from his relations with the U.S. Most of his presentation was a cool and rational pitch for continued U.S. support to Bangladeshi development.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780145–0728, D780139–0062)

1. Since the election campaign ensued quite soon after I presented my credentials in March, I deferred seeing President Zia until after June 3. I met him at a reception he gave for local Ambassadors several days after that date and two days later he invited the High Commissioners of Britain, Canada and Australia and me and our wives for a quiet and informal dinner at his modest residence in the cantonment. There he spoke at length and with pride of his accomplishments during the past two and a half years and of the successful election process. As I did not have an opportunity for private conversation with him on that occasion I asked for an appointment (and received it within several hours) and met with him in his office on June 17. Adviser for Foreign Affairs Shamsul Haq and Foreign Secretary Tabarak Husain were also present but participated very little.

2. After expressing my appreciation for the warmth with which members of his government have received me (it has been a most friendly arrival), I told the President I wished to discuss our bilateral relations, which I thought were very good. I then laid out for him what I thought was the foundation in the U.S. for our good relations, trying by my emphasis on our economic relations to get across the concept that our aid relationship was at the heart of our ties. I noted the support I had found for our assistance around the country in the U.S.; I mentioned the friendly support I had found on the Hill and told him of the President's personal commitment, on both moral and national interest grounds, to U.S. assistance to underdeveloped countries such as Bangladesh. I told him that I felt this was a valuable constituency which we both should protect and nourish.

3. I then told him that I believed the U.S. attitude toward stability in Bangladesh and in the region generally also supported good relations. I said that his efforts to establish leadership and effective institutions to carry out programs to benefit the Bangladesh people were appreciated in Washington. We had been impressed by the progress toward representative government, the movement away from martial law, the release of political prisoners and the recent elections. These were all directed toward increased stability and development in Bangladesh, which we supported. I then addressed myself to South Asia, saying that we appreciated the way in which the President, with his colleagues, in the other South Asian nations, had gone about resolving their differences on a bilateral basis. This had been constructive and had contributed to a regional stability in which the nations could concentrate on their domestic needs. I said that the USG viewed this as a process among sovereign equal nations and we viewed Bangladesh in this light. We did not consider that any nation had any right to hegemony in the area. Finally, I said that the U.S. considered Bangladesh, particularly in the light of its achievements in the past two years, to be an

important and responsible participant in the global dialogue on international issues in U.N., North-South, non-aligned and Islamic fora.

4. I told the President that I saw several sensitive areas in which problems could develop which could undermine the foundation of our relations. I mentioned four: their performance in our aid programs; the importance of meeting the needs of the poorer sections of his society; human rights (see separate telegram);<sup>3</sup> and their positions on international issues of particular importance to the U.S.

5. The President made a discursive reply which nevertheless spoke to most of my points. He said he agreed with virtually all the points I had made. Our relations were good and he wanted them to stay that way. He expressed his great appreciation for our aid; the U.S. was the largest donor of aid to Bangladesh and it was badly needed. He talked at some length (as he had at dinner several nights before) about what he was doing to carry out development programs. He spoke of his great expectations for Bangladeshi agriculture (in my opinion, over-optimistic expectations) and of the beginning which had been made in family planning. (See separate telegram on development issues.)<sup>4</sup>

6. Responding to my comments on internal developments in Bangladesh, Zia explained that present conditions here must be understood in terms of the nation's history: the first five difficult years; and the process they had started only two and a half years ago. (He described how on November 7, 1975 he had sat down at a broken desk in a shattered office and said to his staff, "let's get to work.") He described with pride steps which had been taken to create a government and, now, to "bring about democracy." He was particularly animated when describing the Presidential elections and the quiet and peaceful way in which they were conducted (Contrary to what happens in other countries, he said, "I did not permit the military to be involved in any way in conducting the elections."). He was pleased with the coverage he received in the international press at election time. He knew that in a democracy the press had to have free access; he welcomed them, understood that there would be both good and bad in their reports and was satisfied with the net result. He told me that the usual condition

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3846 from Dacca, June 19, Schneider reported that during his June 17 discussion with Zia, "I raised the issue of political prisoners. I said that Americans in and out of government were still concerned about political prisoners. I explained to him why American feelings on this issue are strong, noting our conviction that it was our deeply held values which enabled us to work out the problems of Vietnam and Watergate. I explained that President Carter, a deeply religious man, held strong personal convictions about the dignity of the individual. It was logical, I said, that these values would emerge in the U.S. view of the world." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780254–1209)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 34.

after elections in this region was for the politicians to forget about their pledges and to lose contact with the countryside. He planned to change this. He gave particular emphasis to his plans for decentralization, for involving local bodies in the development process.

7. The President referred to my mentioning of the negotiated differences among South Asian nations. The concept of sovereign equality was of great importance to Bangladesh, he said. He appreciated the help which the U.S. had given on the Farakka issue<sup>5</sup> and “on the border”.<sup>6</sup> Now, he explained, there should be a greater exchange of delegations between the South Asian nations; there should be trade agreements. The nations should resolve their remaining differences.

8. Finally, in regard to Bangladesh’s positions on international issues, the President said that Bangladesh belonged to various international groups. He was sure, however, that it could provide support to U.S. moves for (and here he paused to search for the right word) peace.

9. Thereafter the conversation turned to development issues and certain specific issues, (Belbagco,<sup>7</sup> the Chancery,<sup>8</sup> and the Cholera Research Lab)<sup>9</sup> on which separate messages will be prepared.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The Farakka Barrage, located in the Indian state of West Bengal close to India’s border with Bangladesh, diverts water from the Ganges in order to flush out silt from the Port of Calcutta. Tension arose between India and Bangladesh when the dam was completed in 1975, because it reduced Bangladesh’s water supply. Telegram 6446 from Dacca, November 8, 1977, reported Bangladesh’s and India’s November 5 water sharing agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770412–0234) The Carter administration supported efforts to ameliorate the regional frictions caused by Indo-Bangladeshi water sharing issues; see Document 1.

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> Belbagco was a U.S. firm operating in East Pakistan. After the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the new government nationalized the firm’s assets, claiming that Belbagco was partially financed by Pakistani funds. In 1976, Belbagco’s parent company issued a claim demanding compensation. In telegram 3847 from Dacca, June 19, Schneider reported that when he raised the longstanding issue during their June 17 meeting, Zia indicated that the matter had been resolved. Schneider rejoined that it had not, noting “the lamentable demise” of the most recent U.S. offer, “when the Ministry of Industries had virtually cut it in half by changing the exchange rate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780254–1187)

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 3874 from Dacca, June 20, recounted Schneider’s attempt during their June 17 meeting to secure Zia’s help in expediting the Bangladeshi Government’s approval of the start of construction on the proposed U.S. Chancery. Schneider “told him that our present Chancery had the reputation of being the worst in the world and I did not believe either of us wanted that situation to continue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256–0455)

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 3679 from Dacca, June 9, reported interest in Bangladesh in the internationalization of the Cholera Research Laboratory (CRL), noting: “Controversy is characterized by repetition of serious charges of professional misconduct by past and present CRL employees and Bangladeshi members of scientific review committee and ethical review committee. Charges of personal misbehavior are being made.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780249–0138)

<sup>10</sup> Not found.



10. Comment: The President's behavior toward me since my arrival has suggested that he wishes to make a special effort to develop close relations with the U.S. Knowing this, I sought to use our discussion to indicate to him my sympathetic interest in his programs, particularly those of economic development, and to indicate those areas in which I believed relations could be close, the steps which would be necessary to protect such close relations, and (indirectly by omission) those areas in which cooperation is unlikely. While all three of Zia's military chiefs have raised military sales with me (I have discouraged them from expecting any change in our policy), Zia did not even allude to any military need. I conclude that he understands. I suspect, however, that he desires a political relationship which may extend beyond what we will be able to offer. His allusion to his desire to visit the United States (see separate message)<sup>11</sup> is an illustration of what he desires and what we may be unable to give.

11. One is impressed by Zia's sincerity and his warm and quiet manner. He is obviously enjoying his job and that job has become increasingly the job of a politician. He made the usual allusion to being only a military man, but he is clearly now much more than that and is learning politics rapidly and having some success at it. One is also impressed by an element of unreality in Zia's approach to development. He speaks in broad generalizations and in great South Asian sweeps of optimism. He impresses me as a man who has been on the campaign trail too long and who should come home and dig into the routine of government administration for a while. It is uncertain whether or not he will; he spoke of going back on his speechmaking circuit soon.

**Schneider**

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<sup>11</sup> In telegram 3882 from Dacca, June 20, Schneider described Zia's indirect requests to be invited to visit the United States and meet Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256–0933)

### 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, June 20, 1978, 0623Z

3875. Subj: Conversation With Bangladesh President Zia: Development Issues. Ref: State 107370.<sup>2</sup>

Summary. During my conversation with Bangladesh President Zia on June 17 I spoke of the urgent need for increased food production and more effective family planning in view of a likely global shortage of food. I mentioned to him three areas of difficulty in his family planning effort. He talked optimistically of his expectations of Bangladesh agriculture and emphasized great gains in the area of motivation concerning family planning. End summary.

1. During my initial calls on Bangladesh officials with responsibility for development matters I have taken every opportunity to point out the urgent need for agricultural development and family planning because of the prospect of global food shortages. I made these points to the Advisor for Food, the Food Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and various other officials. I took the opportunity of a long conversation with Bangladesh President Zia on June 17 to make the U.S. position on these issues abundantly clear.

2. I used as a starting point a comment Zia had made about agricultural improvements which had been made in Bangladesh. Agreeing with him on how important increased food production was, I told him of the heavy responsibility the U.S. felt because it was the residual supplier of food grain to deficit countries. I explained that all projections indicated that we could not continue doing this for long and that there would be a global food shortage if deficit nations did not do two things: increase food production and cut population growth. I said that he should understand that the hard position my staff and I sometimes took with his government on food and development issues was the result of our determination that our aid be fully directed toward increased food production and improved family planning.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780256-0549. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 107370 to multiple posts, April 27, requested Chiefs of Mission to "establish and report on a continuing dialogue with host country leadership regarding the need for the nation to deal more effectively with population/food problems in order to meet basic needs of the poor through self-help measures and to advance their own plans and aspirations for economic development." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780180-0086)

3. In reply, Zia resumed his comments about his agricultural development programs. He spoke of the very great increases in production which could be achieved by growing another crop with the help of irrigation during the winter season when, he said, Bangladesh's farmlands are only 30–40 percent utilized. He said most people would be surprised at the dramatic increases which could be achieved, mentioning a period of two years in which there could be a sharp increase. (At dinner last week<sup>3</sup> he had spoken of a possible increase in production of eleven million tons a year, of which only three would be necessary for domestic consumption.)

4. I asked him what of family planning. He said, as he had last week, that the matter had been a most delicate one, particularly because of religious issues, and he had had to proceed carefully. But that was now straightened out and now the religious leaders were on his side. They were citing the Koran to support his family planning program. Now family planning in Bangladesh was making progress. But the government had to keep people working on family planning as there was much to do. I told him that my staff, whose business it was to find problems and try to resolve them, told me that there were troubles in his program. There was a need for better supervision, for better cooperation between health and family planning personnel and for technically trained personnel, who were leaving the country. The President did not speak to my points but instead replied that the important thing was that Bangladeshis were prepared to accept family planning.

5. Comment: There is an air of unreality to some of Zia's comments about both agriculture and family planning. While his personal (and public) commitment is commendable and his determination to push his government to carry out the programs he has promised in his campaign is impressive, his estimates of what is being and can be accomplished are only optimistic.

**Schneider**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 33.

**35. Letter From Bangladeshi President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, June 26, 1978

Excellency,

You may be aware that Bangladesh is a candidate for membership of the UN Security Council for the term of 1979–80. I have instructed my Ambassador to apprise you of the merits of our candidature and also to discuss this issue with concerned members of your Government.

Bangladesh's candidature underscores our commitment to the United Nations Charter and our election would afford us an opportunity to play a vigorous role in striving for the maintenance of international peace and promotion of understanding between nations.

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Commonwealth and as a least developed country, Bangladesh has been actively participating in the various important international organizations. Bangladesh has thus been in the mainstream of all significant international movements committed to peace, stability and progress. It has been her constant endeavour to contribute in a constructive manner to deliberations on international issues on the basis of justice and fair-play. Bangladesh has at all times striven for a realistic and balanced approach to issues in a spirit of understanding and conciliation.

I am happy to inform you that we have already received assurances of support from a number of friendly countries. The Ninth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Dakar has also endorsed our candidature. Election of Bangladesh to the Security Council would also vindicate the principle of geographical rotation in filling vacancies in various UN organs and thus help towards realization of our shared objective of making the United Nations organs more representative in character.

In view of the cordial and friendly relations existing between our two countries, I hope it will be possible for Your Excellency's Government to extend its support to our candidature. Your valuable support would go a long way towards ensuring our success in the election.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

**Ziaur Rahman**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80. No classification marking.

**36. Letter From President Carter to Bangladeshi President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 4, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Some weeks ago, I was pleased to send you my congratulations on your election as President of Bangladesh.<sup>2</sup> I am aware that your election was part of a process by which your country, under your leadership, is endeavoring to establish effective representative government under the safeguards of a constitutional system. I understand that parliamentary elections are to be held before the end of the year,<sup>3</sup> and I am both pleased and impressed by your courage and determination.

I had hoped we might have an opportunity to meet and talk if you came to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly. However, I fear that this will not be possible. I hope you will understand that I must give close attention to domestic affairs in the next few months, in particular, to the Congressional elections in November. For this reason, I will have to limit very severely my meetings with foreign leaders who may be visiting the United States during the General Assembly session. I do hope we will be able to meet at some future date.

Ambassador Schneider has kept me informed of your efforts to bring representative government to Bangladesh. He has also described your efforts to improve economic and social conditions in your country. I am impressed by your decision to give priority to agriculture, family planning, and rural development. Your success in these crucial areas could well set an example for other countries. I am pleased that our governments have been able to conclude new agreements that support important programs launched under your leadership.

I appreciate the points which you laid out in your letter of June 26 about Bangladesh's candidacy for a seat on the United Nations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 144463 to Dacca, June 7, directed the Embassy to convey the following message to Zia: "My heartiest congratulations on your victory in the June 3 Presidential election. I look forward to continuing to work with you toward peace and prosperity for our peoples. Sincerely yours, Jimmy Carter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780238–0618)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5367 from Dacca, August 31, reported that the date of Parliamentary elections was not set; however, the Bangladeshi Elections Secretary indicated to the Embassy that he believed they would be held no later than December 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780356–1137)

Security Council.<sup>4</sup> As you know, the United States customarily defers taking any position on elections to United Nations bodies until the preferences of the respective regional groups are known.<sup>5</sup> We will, of course, take full account of the considerations you mentioned in your letter.

I am very pleased with the way relations are developing between our two countries. I appreciate the opportunity to exchange correspondences with leaders of important and friendly countries such as yours from time to time.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 35.

<sup>5</sup> In an August 16 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff wrote: "Bangladesh is competing with Japan for endorsement by the UN Asian Regional Group. We believe the Asian Group may refrain from making an endorsement, which will require that the voting be by secret ballot in the General Assembly. You should be aware that, although this is not known to other governments than the Japanese, we are committed to support Japan, which we consider the more worthy candidate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780140-0128)

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### **37. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in Bangladesh<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 29, 1978, 2353Z

Secto 11015. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minister.

Summary: Vance-Huq meeting touched on possible visit to US by President Zia;<sup>2</sup> BD competition with Japan for seat on Security Council,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780399-0027. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to the Department of State. Vance was in New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 11, Document 33.

and desire for US support;<sup>3</sup> Belbagco expropriation case,<sup>4</sup> where Huq promised early satisfactory resolution; and problem of US Chancery in Dacca,<sup>5</sup> where Huq proposed land exchange.

1. Secretary Vance met with Foreign Minister Huq for twenty minutes morning September 29. Also in attendance, on Bangladesh side, were UN Ambassador Kaiser, appointed Ambassador to US Husain, and Associate Foreign Secretary Chowdhury. Under Secretary Newsom also attended with Bangladesh Desk Officer Fuller.

2. Following exchange of views on Secretary's trip to Middle East<sup>6</sup> and peace framework process, Huq expressed the appreciation of President Zia for the letter received from President Carter<sup>7</sup> and described progress in Bangladesh in the areas of economic development and movement toward representative government.

3. Huq quoted statement in President Carter's letter to the effect that he was looking forward to a meeting with Zia and recommended that a mutually agreeable time be set. Under Secretary Newsom reminded the Bangladeshis of President Carter's regret in not being able to receive Zia this fall, and Secretary remarked that we "ought to find a date" for a meeting in the future.

4. Huq spoke generally of Bangladesh's geo-political position as a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, pointing out that while there was a centrist government in New Delhi, the two neighboring Indian states of West Bengal and Tripura were Communist-ruled. Huq acknowledged that Bangladesh had had a problem with Burma over the refugees from Arakan but agreement had been reached and repatriation was under way.<sup>8</sup>

5. Huq then came to main thrust of his talk with Secretary, reminding him that when they last met—on October 6, 1977—he had asked for US support for Bangladesh candidacy to Asian seat on Security

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 35.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 33.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 8, Document 33.

<sup>6</sup> Vance visited Jordan September 20–21, Saudi Arabia September 21–24, and Syria September 24.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 36.

<sup>8</sup> By mid-November, in excess of 5,000 refugees had left Bangladeshi refugee camps and returned to Burma. ("U.N. Says 5,000 Burma Moslems Have Left Bangladesh for Home," *New York Times*, November 16, 1978, p. A2)

Council.<sup>9</sup> Secretary reiterated what President Carter had told Zia in his letter—that the US, as is customary, will defer to the regional consensus, and asked when one might emerge. Huq replied that none would emerge. Indian Chairman of Asian Group had reported that there was an overwhelming majority in favor of Bangladesh candidacy over Japan and that a conciliatory group had suggested that Japan withdraw and instead run next year. Kaiser pointed out that Bangladesh candidacy had been endorsed by non-aligned powers, Islamic Foreign Ministers, Arab League and majority of the African states. Outer Mongolia, another candidate, had withdrawn and pledged its support for Bangladesh. Even some Japanese had reservations against their country's continued pursuit of Security Council seat—against a friendly state like Bangladesh, which had never served on the Council, when Japan did not have a good chance of winning.

6. Huq stated that unless Bangladesh is “let down by some of our friends” it will gain a clear two-thirds majority in the voting. Secretary noted that when he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, the latter did not raise Japan's candidacy with him, and said US “will consider” the Bangladesh candidacy.

7. Huq expressed thanks for US economic assistance, particularly food aid, and indicated with US help the outlook in agriculture was good this coming year.

8. Vance affirmed that relations between US and Bangladesh were “strong and positive”. US Government was pleased with directions taken by Bangladesh and appreciated BD position taken on Puerto Rico resolution in non-aligned conference.<sup>10</sup>

9. Secretary, however, observed there was one irritant in BD/US relations—the Belbagco expropriation case. Foregoing discussion of matter, Huq promised an early resolution of the issue “to the Secretary's satisfaction”.

10. Then, on his own initiative, Huq raised the problem faced by US Embassy in Dacca in establishing an appropriate Chancery. Land that Embassy owned, Huq pointed out, was in “educational-cultural

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<sup>9</sup> Telegram 245536 to Dacca, October 13, 1977, reported Vance's October 6 meeting with Huq in New York. Besides requesting U.S. support for Bangladesh's bid for the Asian seat on the UN Security Council, Huq expressed at the meeting “the hope for an early meeting between Presidents Carter and Zia; indicated distress over reports of recent statements by Deputy Secretary and Ambassador Goheen on Indian leadership in the subcontinent and noted Bangladesh efforts to establish good relations with its neighbors, most notably by the recent initialing of a Farakka agreement. Huq also asked for an additional 250,000 tons of food grains in FY 78 and reiterated the BDG request for some excess military equipment through FMS.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770372-0995)

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 6, Document 131.



zone". As BDG had done with the British who had land that had been earmarked by BDG for a hospital, the BDG would be happy to arrange for an exchange of land with the US on a no-cost basis so that US could build its Chancery in an appropriate area. Secretary said we would "take a look" at this idea. Huq assured him that whole matter would be "taken care of". (Huq did not raise the zoning problem faced by Bangladesh Embassy with respect to its Chancery on a residential plot on Massachusetts Avenue).

11. Meeting closed with an invitation by Huq to Secretary to visit Bangladesh. Latter expressed hope he would be able to do so sometime in future.

Vance

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### 38. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, December 12, 1978, 0901Z

7404. Pass Peace Corps. Subject: Feeler on Withdrawal of Peace Corps.

1. Former BD Ambassador to the U.S. M.R. Siddiqi paid a "courtesy" call on Ambassador on December 8. DCM sat in. After initial pleasantries, and emphasizing he was speaking unofficially, Siddiqi raised question of Peace Corps in Bangladesh, noting it had become a major element in political opposition's criticism of present government (read Zia). He said he had had to leave hurriedly one Awami League public meeting (in September) at which he was scheduled to speak because critics of the Peace Corps agreement threatened violence. He suggested that in view of the Peace Corps agreement's having become a political liability for the BDG, we might wish to take the initiative to offer to withdraw it. Siddiqi said he had discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Shamsul Huq and it became evident during the conversation that his demarche had the approval, and was perhaps at the instigation, of the Foreign Minister.

2. The Ambassador, also speaking unofficially, commented that he thought there had been less criticism of the Peace Corps agreement in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780515-0052. Confidential.

recent weeks. He noted that the agreement would not be abandoned without publicity, and that while such publicity in Bangladesh might ease a political problem, in the U.S. it would be likely to reflect unfavorably on U.S.-Bangladesh relations. If the Peace Corps agreement were to be withdrawn, there would have to be more formal inter-government discussions, and the initiative should come from the BDG. He suggested that for the government to give in to criticism of the Peace Corps might merely encourage the critics to take up some other aspect of U.S.-BD relations.

3. Siddiqi appeared not to have considered the possibility of unfavorable publicity in the U.S. He recognized that other U.S.-BD enterprises might be threatened in the future. When Siddiqi realized that the Ambassador was unlikely to take the initiative he had suggested, he said that the BDG also would be unlikely formally to take up the issue. He concluded that the situation should be kept under review and, perhaps, if all remained quiet until after the elections,<sup>2</sup> no action on the agreement would have to be considered.<sup>3</sup>

**Schneider**

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<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 7201 from Dacca, December 1, "President Zia announced November 30 that Parliamentary elections will be held January 27, 1979. In same speech he promised that martial law would be withdrawn." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780495-1009)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7403 from Dacca, December 12, Schneider confirmed that Siddiqi's "remarks reflect a concern which we know exists at high levels in the BDG. I believe the best thing for us to do is to sit tight and leave the initiative to the BDG, if it chooses to take one. In the meantime, I believe it is best that we do nothing whatsoever to cause attention to be focused on the Peace Corps prior to the elections here." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780514-1101)

**39. Letter From Bangladeshi President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, December 29, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I was glad to have received your letter of September 4, 1978.<sup>2</sup> I am deeply grateful for the keen interest expressed by you in our endeavour to establish a democratic system of Government in Bangladesh. We are having general elections to the Parliament on 12 February 1979. It is our belief that representative government is the sine qua non for the active participation of the people at large in the process of economic and social development.

Our economic plans are primarily aimed at providing maximum benefits to the poorer section of the society mostly located in the rural areas of Bangladesh. I am encouraged to note your understanding of the priorities attached by us to agriculture, family planning and rural development. With the continued co-operation and assistance of friendly countries we hope to be able to achieve our social and economic goals of ensuring food, security, shelter and adequate health care for our people.

I deeply appreciate the increased level of assistance received from your great country.<sup>3</sup> Particular mention should be made of the much needed and valued food assistance received from the United States. We are now working on a plan to gradually reduce our food gap. This will however take some time and possibilities of a sudden crisis cannot be ruled out. From this point of view firm and advance commitment of food aid including supply of edible oil is of great importance to us. I am hopeful that we shall continue to enjoy your understanding in this respect. We hope the quality and quantity of assistance from the United States would continue to improve as our ability to make better and effective use of such assistance keeps on increasing.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80. No classification marking. Zia handwrote the salutation.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 36.

<sup>3</sup> It is unclear to what increase Zia referred. Telegram 7027 from Dacca, November 24, transmitted the text of an aide-mémoire from the Bangladeshi Ministry of Food that requested an additional 100,000 tons of rice. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780487–1160) No response to the request was found. Telegram 321650 to Dacca, December 22, reported that, at a December 19 meeting with Bergland, Tabarak Husain did not raise the issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780529–0447)

The development of the Ganges water basin is a key to the development of the concept of regional co-operation in the area. Nepal has indicated her willingness to participate in the development of the Ganges basin covering Nepal, India and Bangladesh.<sup>4</sup> India still does not seem to admit the logic of our proposal. In this we see a pragmatic role for our mutual friends and well-wishers.

Bangladesh feels honoured that the international community has reposed its trust and confidence in her by electing her to the non-permanent Asian seat in the Security Council. It is indeed a heavy responsibility but we are looking forward to playing our role in the Security Council in promoting the cause of global peace, stability and progress.<sup>5</sup>

Warmest personal regards.

Yours Sincerely,<sup>6</sup>

**Ziaur Rahman**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 7489 from Dacca, December 15, reported that the Indian and Bangladeshi delegations to the Joint Rivers Commission met December 9 and considered the Bangladeshi proposal to include Nepal in arrangements to share the Ganges waters. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780520-1030)

<sup>5</sup> On November 30, the General Assembly elected Bangladesh to a 2-year term on the Security Council.

<sup>6</sup> Zia handwrote the two closing paragraphs.

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#### **40. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, March 2, 1979, 0920Z

1289. CINCPAC for POLAD. Department pass AID/ASIA/BIS. ICA for NEA. Subject: Bangladesh's Parliamentary Elections. Ref: A. Dacca 965;<sup>2</sup> B. Dacca 1075.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790096-0720. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to New Delhi, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Colombo, Calcutta, CINCPAC, and USICA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 965 from Dacca, February 15, offered predictions on how well the BNP would do in the upcoming Parliamentary elections. The Embassy thought that the most likely outcome was that the BNP would win between 50 and 75 percent of the vote. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790073-1099)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1075 from Dacca, February 22, reported Zia's February 19 press conference, during which he predicted a BNP election victory large enough to obviate the need to form a coalition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790086-0134)

## 1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary. The February 18 Parliamentary election was the culmination of President Zia's carefully controlled three-year transition from a martial law regime to an elected constitutional government; the result should provide Zia with a reasonably solid base for launching his experiment in democracy. The strong performance of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) appears due in large measure to voter satisfaction with the President himself. Zia campaigned hard, and it is generally perceived that many BNP candidates would not have won without his support. Bangladesh's system of single-member constituencies and the large number of candidates in most of them have given the BNP better than a two-thirds majority in the new Parliament with about 41 percent of the total votes cast. It is generally considered that the BNP will remain amenable to Zia's leadership for the short term at least, despite the party's lack of cohesiveness and tradition. Among the opposition parties, the Awami League showed that it retains a hard core of support and organizational strength but also continues to suffer from serious limitations. The Muslim League proved that it still has a following, although one which is likely to remain limited. The radical JSD has developed a regional base, strength from which it might be able to expand to a position of national strength under certain circumstances. Prospects for opposition unity in Parliament are slim, given the mutual antagonisms among Awami League, Muslim League and JSD. We believe the cumulative impact on outcome of election-day improprieties (and in which opposition as well as BNP reportedly engaged) was limited and consider election reasonably fair and honest by South Asian standards. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Schneider**

#### 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 9, 1979, 1721Z

148757. For the Ambassador. Subject: Presidential Message to President Zia—Food Aid. Ref: Dacca 3200.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text)

2. Following is Presidential message which responds to the letter from President Zia<sup>3</sup> that was delivered by Finance Minister Huda during his visit to Washington in May.

3. Begin Presidential message: To President Ziaur Rahman: Thank you for informing me of the foodgrain situation in Bangladesh and its relationship to your great task of restoring democracy.

Your special envoy, Dr. Huda, recently discussed this subject in detail with officials of my administration. He indicated the importance that you attach to the maintenance of an adequate reserve of food and to Bangladesh's efforts to increase food production.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790262–0373. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Hallock R. Lucius (NEA/PAB); cleared in S/S and S/S–O and by Thornton; approved by Lucius.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3200 from Dacca, May 31, Schneider reported: "On my return to Dacca, I find a justifiable atmosphere of crisis due to the drought induced shortfall in domestic food grain production and virtual shutdown of hydroelectric power from Kaptai. To the food shortfalls caused by drought and other factors in the Aman (November–December) and Boro (April–May) harvests has now been added the prospect of a substantial additional shortfall in the aus harvest (August) because of a 50 percent drop in precipitation during the spring (April–May) rains upon which the aus and jute crops are dependent. One returning to Dacca becomes immediately aware of drought conditions from the brownness of the countryside and the searing dry heat which has replaced the normally humid thunder showery weather of this season." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790245–1040)

<sup>3</sup> In his May 3 letter to Carter, Zia indicated that he was sending Huda to Washington to brief Carter on the situation in Bangladesh and to "explain to you the objective of his visit which has a crucial economic and political bearing." Zia ended his brief letter with the comment: "The return of democracy to Bangladesh is a matter to which I personally attach the greatest importance. However, it is essential that the successful development of democratic institutions in Bangladesh receives the full support of our friends." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bangladesh: President Ziaur Rahman, 4/77–12/80)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 127683 to Dacca, May 19, summarized Huda's May 11 meeting with Christopher and Schneider. The discussion focused on Huda's report of food shortages in Bangladesh and his request for additional food aid. Christopher "noted steps we have taken to ease food problem in the short term i.e., call forward of 97,000 tons of Title II wheat and signing of Title III (May 11) agreement for 400,000 tons of wheat." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790228–0269)

As soon as we learned that your foodgrain stocks might be unusually low during the summer, we took steps to accelerate negotiation of the second agreement in our three-year food-for-development program and to expedite shipments of the 400,000 tons of wheat provided in that agreement.

In response to your request, we have once again reviewed our food aid program. We have reluctantly concluded that budget constraints and earlier commitments preclude our provision of additional assistance this fiscal year.

We will continue to follow closely the food situation in Bangladesh and your government's food and development policy decisions. It is in the context of these decisions that we—and I assume others—will consider participation in your plan for a larger grain reserve.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, we will stand ready to use our aid programs, not limited to PL 480, to help your government meet any food emergencies that may develop.

Thank you very much for the lovely jute carpet which you recently sent me. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sharing with me the fine artistry of your people. With warmest personal regards, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End Presidential message.

**Vance**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2545 from Dacca, May 1, reported Zia's plan to build up a reserve of grain stocks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790204–0044)

## 42. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, November 26, 1979, 1105Z

7909. Subject: Temporary Reduction of the U.S. Presence: Preliminary Bangladeshi Reaction. Ref: State 305426.<sup>2</sup>

1. S—Entire text.

2. On afternoon of November 26 I informed Acting Foreign Secretary Ataul Karim of our intention to thin out American personnel in Bangladesh along lines of para 9 reftel.<sup>3</sup> I took pains to point out that this was an action being taken in a number of countries and it reflected in no way on the adequacy of protection which has been provided by the BDG. That, I said, had been thorough and excellent and we greatly appreciated it. I also said that we would retain some personnel from most USG agencies and continue existing programs. The measure, I said, was entirely precautionary and was designed to assist the BDG in its protection task. I also told him we were giving similar advice to private Americans.

3. Although he received the information calmly, Karim was surprised and distressed. He asked if we had some concern about protection provided by the BDG and I replied that we did not; our action was precautionary. He asked if, in view of my response, I would recommend that the action in Bangladesh be rescinded. I replied that I could not do that but that I would report his proposal to the Department. He inquired from what other countries were Americans being thinned out, asking specifically if they included India and Southeast Asian countries. I replied there was some consideration of Calcutta and Bombay but that no Southeast Asian countries were included.

4. I believe Karim's reaction is only a forerunner of more severe BDG disappointment about our action. They will see our inclusion of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790544-0243. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 305426 to multiple posts, November 26, reported: "In the light of the situation in Tehran, the allegations of US and US-Israeli involvement in the seizure of the mosque in Mecca, fabricated stories of US-Israeli collusion to invade Iran, anti-US demonstrations in Islamabad, Calcutta, Dacca and Izmir, and continuing calls from Tehran for anti-American actions, we have decided that there should be a significant thinning out of staffs and a reduction in the number of dependents at certain posts during the period immediately ahead." The instructions that followed included the Embassy in Dacca as a post "where a temporary reduction of the US presence will be carried out." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790543-1061)

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 9 of telegram 305426 instructed Embassies to inform host governments about the reduction in staff and emphasize that it was a precautionary measure. (See footnote 2 above.)



Bangladesh as a reflection of our judgement regarding the law and order situation here and the ability of the government to maintain control. However, I believe this reaction will pass; there is sufficient underpinning for our good relations for them to survive this episode.

5. I am briefing heads of voluntary agencies and U.S. businesses this evening and following up with a meeting with NATO Ambassador and, thereafter, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

Schneider

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#### 43. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 29, 1979, 9:41 a.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

President Carter  
President Zia of Bangladesh

*President Carter:* Good morning. How are you?

*President Zia:* Hello. I got your message late last night.<sup>2</sup>

*President Carter:* I want to express my appreciation for your support of our efforts to free the hostages, especially your Ambassador in Tehran who has worked with our Chargé there.<sup>3</sup>

Your presence on the UN Security Council is important to our efforts. Other nations will look to Bangladesh for leadership.

Iran is defying the Security Council<sup>4</sup> and the World Court.<sup>5</sup> We have been persistent in our efforts to use peacekeeping forums to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860159–1224. Confidential; Nodis. Carter spoke to Zia by telephone from the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) Dodson sent the memorandum of conversation to Vance under a January 3, 1980, covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860159–1223)

<sup>2</sup> Carter first attempted to reach Zia at 8:24 p.m., December 28. The call was not completed. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> L. Bruce Laingen was serving as the Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran when he was taken hostage, along with more than 50 other U.S. diplomats and citizens on November 4.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 457, adopted unanimously on December 4, called on Iran to immediately release the U.S. hostages. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 311–312)

<sup>5</sup> For the text of the World Court's December 15 ruling that the Government of Iran had violated its international legal obligation to the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1980, pp. 49–53.

present our case. The time has come to decide whether to enforce the directives issued by the World Court and the United Nations.

Secretary Vance will make a presentation today asking the UN Security Council to attempt to obtain the release of the hostages from Iran.<sup>6</sup> Following that, if Iran does not cooperate, we ask that the Security Council take action under articles 39 and 41 of chapter VII.<sup>7</sup>

I am asking your support on this two-step procedure. Can you support us in this effort?

*President Zia:* Thank you for your call. I appreciate your confidence in Bangladesh. You can count on us to uphold international law and the Geneva Convention. We have just completed a Cabinet meeting here at which we spoke with your Ambassador Schneider for over two hours. He will be reporting. (Dacca 8657)<sup>8</sup>

I appreciate the patience you have shown, and believe that your plan to have Secretary Vance ask the Secretary General to approach Iran should produce results. We have requested Iran to release the hostages. You can be assured we will do our best.

*President Carter:* Let me respond by saying how much I appreciate your statement. We want to continue our actions through peaceful means as long as they produce results. We have a great investment in the UN. Iran presents a test case of whether UN actions are to be observed. If the Secretary General fails, then we need your support for action under articles 39 and 41. Will you cooperate with us?

(At 9:48 AM the connection was interrupted for approximately five minutes—until 9:53 AM.)

*President Zia:* We have talked at length with Ambassador Schneider and are committed to uphold international law and the Geneva Convention. We believe that with the latest developments, Iran will release the hostages. Your willingness to allow more time is very much appreciated.

I would like to raise two additional points. We are taking what action we can. Our Foreign Minister has sent a message to Mr. Vance.<sup>9</sup> We will stay in close touch.

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<sup>6</sup> Vance's statement printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1980, pp. 67–68.

<sup>7</sup> Article 39 of the UN Charter declares that the Security Council is empowered to declare the existence of a threat to peace. Article 41 covers the types of measures to restore peace that the Security Council may recommend to United Nations member states.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 44.

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 332653 to Dacca, December 28, transmitted the text of Huq's December 26 message to Vance, which referred to the efforts outside of the UN Security Council that Bangladesh had undertaken to alleviate the Iranian hostage crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800003–0612)

*President Carter:* I want to say also that we have been extremely concerned about events in Afghanistan. I hope that you will join with others if you have not already done so in condemning the Soviet actions there.<sup>10</sup>

*President Zia:* We have received your message<sup>11</sup> and will follow-up. I also want to thank you and the people of the US for all the help earlier this year when our agricultural production was severely affected by drought. Thanks from me and from the people of Bangladesh.

*President Carter:* We have had good relations with the government and the people of Bangladesh. Our assistance is a signal of how deeply interested we are in the well-being of your people. You can count on us.

The conversation ended at 9:58 AM.

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<sup>10</sup> For details of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Document 394.

<sup>11</sup> Telegram 333360 to multiple posts, December 28, instructed Chiefs of Mission to deliver a message from Carter to the Head of State or Government of their host country on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, urging him or her to “speak out in the strongest terms against this violation of a sovereign, non-aligned country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1258, N800001–0554, N790010–0486) Schneider delivered the message to Zia the evening of December 29: “Zia needed no convincing of the gravity of the situation.” (Telegram 8659 from Dacca, December 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–1346, N800001–0103)

#### 44. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State and the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, December 29, 1979, 1722Z

8657. Subject: Security Council Action on Iran: Bangladesh Position.  
Ref: A) State 333641;<sup>2</sup> B) USUN 06395.<sup>3</sup>

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Summary: Bangladesh has concluded that economic sanctions on the hostage issue even under our two stage approach would have unfavorable results and it hopes the US will review its position. President Zia and Foreign Minister Shamsul Haq fear sanctions might cause destabilization in the region at the time of the events in Afghanistan, would undercut the moderates in Iran who are moving in the direction of release, would risk pushing Iran to the left, and might give the Soviets opportunities to take advantage of the situation by, for example, meeting Iran's economic needs. President Zia is concerned that should Bangladesh support sanctions, opposition political parties might whip up emotions after Bangladesh had persevered through "traumatic events" and established democratic government. Bangladesh has been strongly influenced by the positions of the Arab League, Pakistan, Kuwait, India and the UAE. Foreign Minister Haq has written again to Ghotbzadeh appealing for release of the hostages. He has also proposed a meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers to find a peaceful solution to the hostage issue. Both President Zia and Foreign Minister Haq say they would "travel anywhere" to help find a solution. I told the President that I was sure President Carter would be very disap-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800002-0003. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 333641 to multiple posts, December 29, instructed posts to "immediately inform highest appropriate level of host government" of the need for the United Nations to "take urgent steps to ensure that its decisions are respected" on the U.S. hostages in Iran. Given the preference of several Security Council members for a two-stage process, however, the United States was "therefore agreeable to adoption by the Council of a resolution which would bind Iran to respect the Council's decision and which [would?] decide that if Iran did not comply by an early date (to be specified in the resolution), the Security Council would immediately apply sanctions under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800001-0559)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 6395 from USUN, December 29, reported that McHenry agreed to propose to the Security Council a two-stage resolution against Iran. The first stage would demand the hostages' release, and the second stage would impose economic sanctions. McHenry called for a vote no later than December 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800019-0770, D800001-0651) For Vance's statement before the Security Council introducing the resolution, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1980, pp. 67-68. The U.S.-proposed draft was adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 461 on December 31. Bangladesh abstained in the vote. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 311-312)

pointed at his decision and that I could not predict the reaction of the American people who were greatly roused and would watch the SC proceedings carefully. I said that further delay beyond the two stage approach was not an acceptable option and that we preferred concerted UN action. Bangladesh hopes that if we proceed with our approach to sanctions, its position may nevertheless be helpful and that we will understand their reasons for not supporting us. They seem fully aware of the seriousness of their decision, which Zia made after over four hours of deliberations today. They are obviously worried over our reaction and hope for our understanding. The Foreign Minister has sent a letter to Secretary Vance explaining their position.<sup>4</sup> President Carter's message (State 333770)<sup>5</sup> arrived after my meeting with Zia and after this message was drafted. I will deliver it immediately. End summary.

3. President Zia elected to see me on the evening of December 29 when he was informed that I had a message for him from President Carter on Afghanistan,<sup>6</sup> but he spent most of a two hour meeting explaining his position on Iran. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Shamsul Haq and Foreign Secretary Kibria. He explained that he had met for four and a half hours that morning to examine all aspects of the sanctions issue. Then he beckoned to Haq to set forth their position, which he did with Zia intervening from time to time in such a way to indicate clearly that their decision was his. It was clear from the pains they took with their presentation and their careful reaction to my rather grim response that they were fully aware of the possible consequences of an unfavorable US reaction to their decision not to support sanctions.

4. Haq began by sympathetically expressing appreciation for US concerns about the hostages and US desires to function within the UN. He also commented that he believed the US request for sanctions following Iranian failure to react to the SC resolution,<sup>7</sup> the SYG's efforts, and the World Court's decision<sup>8</sup> was "consistent with international principles".

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 333770 to Dacca and USUN, December 29, transmitted a message from Carter to Zia, which urged Zia to support the U.S. draft resolution. Carter concluded: "Our nation hopes and expects that members of the Security Council will face squarely and courageously their international obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The American people and the Congress will find it difficult to understand if we do not have Bangladesh's support on the issue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–1348, N800001–0093)

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 11, Document 43.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 43.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 5, Document 43.

5. But, Haq said, after extensive deliberation, they had concluded that economic sanctions would have “unfavorable results” and they hoped that the US would review its position and not press for sanctions. Sanctions, Haq said, might be destabilizing in the entire region; this, he explained, was supported by events in Afghanistan. The President recalled his comments to me earlier in the week about the Soviet threat to the region and his questions regarding how our tactics in Iran might affect Soviet efforts to take advantage of the situation.<sup>9</sup> Haq explained that more and more leaders in Iran were veering toward release of the hostages. A delay of a week or ten days, after which sanctions would be inevitable, was not long enough to take advantage of the moderates, whose position would be undermined. Sanctions would also be ineffective. Haq and Zia both said they did not wish to push Iran to the left, commenting that the students were pro-Soviet. Then the Foreign Minister, with the President annotating his remarks, explained that there were certain domestic realities they had to consider. Bangladesh had gone through “traumatic experiences” but had managed the transition to democracy. Their population is Islamic and opposition parties “might whip up emotions”. Kibria added that they had some thousand Bangladeshis in Iran also to consider. Zia added the “hard facts” that the Soviets would take advantage of an embargo and meet Iranian needs. Finally, Haq said that they had taken into account the views of other nations, attaching particular attention to a statement by the Arab League, which they hoped we would see as helpful, and mentioning positions of Pakistan, Kuwait, India, and the UAE.

6. Saying that he had sent a message to Secretary Vance explaining the Bangladesh position,<sup>10</sup> Haq then reviewed actions which Bangladesh had taken or was prepared to take to be helpful. He said that he had sent a message to Ghotbzadeh, stating that this was the right moment for Iran to act in response to the international community by releasing the hostages in a manner consistent with Islamic principles and human values. Haq said he had also written to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference proposing a meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers to find a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the problem. Finally first Haq and then Zia said that both the President and the Foreign Minister would “travel anywhere” if the parties to the dispute believed it would be conducive to a solution.

7. The Foreign Minister concluded with his appeal for the US to reconsider its position. But, he said, in their view the US has a majority

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<sup>9</sup> Schneider met with Zia on December 24. (Telegram 8570 from Dacca, December 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171-1357)

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 9, Document 43.

in the Security Council and even if it goes ahead with sanctions, the Bangladeshi position should be helpful. Haq concluded by saying that he hoped their position would not be seen as unfriendly. Zia said that whatever happened they will support international law.

8. My reply made the meeting more somber. I said I was personally very disappointed and I knew that the President would be as well (Zia said that President Carter had tried to call but the hour had been too late).<sup>11</sup> I described again the intensity of feeling in the US on the hostage issue (Zia said they had their own confirming reports from their representatives and private Bangladeshis in the US). I said that the American people would be watching closely the Security Council deliberations and I could not predict what their reaction might be. I explained that there were also certain realities in the US and that waiting indefinitely was not a feasible alternative for the US. I cited the President's statement that the US would act as it considered appropriate but preferred concerted international action.<sup>12</sup> I argued that the moderates would be strengthened through the psychological effect of a decision in favor of sanctions. I said that if we were to have influence with which to meet the Soviet threat to Iran, we must have a solution to the hostage issue and the Iranians should be made to understand that. Finally, I said that we had definitely decided to proceed on a two stage process toward sanctions.

9. Zia was visibly worried about my response and he and Haq made additional efforts to assure me of Bangladesh's friendship and to ask for US understanding. I said I would report their views as carefully and as sympathetically as possible but I could not predict the reaction of the American people.

10. I believe Zia has carefully considered the sanctions issue and understands the possible consequences for US-Bangladesh relations of his decision. On Islamic issues he has never been willing to depart from the positions of the moderate Arabs and on sanctions he makes no exception.

**Schneider**

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<sup>11</sup> See footnote 2, Document 43.

<sup>12</sup> In remarks to reporters on December 28, Carter stated: "The United States reserves the right to protect our citizens and our vital interests in whatever way we consider appropriate in keeping with principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. But our clear preference is now, and has been from the beginning of this crisis, for a quick and a peaceful solution of this problem through concerted international action." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II*, p. 2287)

**45. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, January 1, 1980, 0611Z

2. Subj: Dec 31 SC Meeting on Iran. Ref: State 0069.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Prior to the receipt of reftel, Foreign Minister Shamsul Haq and Foreign Secretary Kibria asked me to come to the Foreign Ministry on January 1 in order to convey to me President Zia's desire for good relations with the US despite Bangladesh's abstention in New York. I replied that the United States Government was deeply disappointed at Bangladesh's position. I said I was greatly concerned about the effect of Bangladesh's abstention on the future of US-Bangladesh relations. Since the meeting I have, as instructed reftel conveyed to Kibria the dissatisfaction of the USG and informed him that neither the American Government nor the American people can understand such abstention on a matter of such importance to the US and the civilized community of nations.

**Schneider**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800005-0004. Secret; Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 69 to multiple posts, January 1, directed Chiefs of Mission to express either gratification or dissatisfaction to their host country's governments for their support or lack thereof for UNSC Resolution 461, which was adopted on December 31, 1979. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Dacca to "indicate to host government our dissatisfaction with their abstention on this resolution. You should say that whatever the particular considerations which led host government to abstain, neither the American Government nor the American people can understand such abstention on a matter of such importance to US and to the civilized community of nations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800004-1052)



**46. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State and the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, January 12, 1980, 0815Z

257. Subject: Iran Sanctions: Position of Bangladesh. Ref: State 008679.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

2. I called on Foreign Secretary Kibria on the morning of January 12 and told him that Zambia would vote for the U.S. resolution and that we hoped Bangladesh would also support it. Kibria, who had already heard of the 24-hour delay, expressed appreciation for this U.S. decision. I made it clear that we would probably need to press ahead for a vote in any event.

3. Kibria then conveyed to me the Bangladesh decisions, taken after President Zia met with a group of Cabinet and political colleagues, to abstain on sanctions. He gave three reasons, all of which the Embassy has set forth in detail previously:<sup>3</sup>

(a) The BDG considers that in a region in which unsettled conditions had been further stimulated by Soviet aggression, sanctions would further destabilize the area. He mentioned Iran and the Gulf states and expressed concern about leftist groups taking advantage of the situation.

(b) Bangladesh has consulted the major Islamic nations and does not find support for sanctions. Kibria listed Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (the Bangladeshis consulted the Saudi Arabians on December 11 and ascertained that the Saudis opposed sanctions).

(c) President Zia is concerned about internal political repercussions of Bangladesh's support to sanctions. Kibria said that they were worried about political groups which would seek to exploit religion to undermine the stability which Zia has brought to Bangladesh.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0900. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 8679 to multiple posts, January 12, reported that the United States agreed to a 24-hour delay on the UN Security Council vote on a U.S.-proposed resolution imposing sanctions on Iran that was scheduled for January 12, pending clarification of an Iranian proposal "involving a General Assembly resolution discussing Iran's grievances which could lead to the beginning of the release of the hostages." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0512)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 44.

4. In reply I drew on the arguments used by Ambassador McHenry in his meeting with the nonaligned SC members on January 11.<sup>4</sup> I made clear the extent to which the U.S. has set forth a series of ideas to the Iranians and the complete lack of results. Availing ourselves of the procedures of the Security Council in order to impose sanctions was the next logical step. I expressed disappointment in Bangladesh's decision to abstain.

5. Comment: I believe this is the considered Bangladeshi view. Any chance to alter it was lost when the Saudis told the Bangladeshis of their opposition to sanctions.<sup>5</sup>

**Schneider**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 109 from USUN, January 11, reported McHenry's January 11 discussion with representatives of non-aligned members of the Security Council, during which he said that the United States would be willing to develop "a forum for airing of Iranian grievances;" "to facilitate legal action by GOI in US courts to recover assets of former Shah that may be judged to belong to Iranian national treasury;" "to lift the freeze on Iranian assets and to facilitate normal commercial relations on understanding that Iran will meet its financial obligations" after the release of the hostages; and "to reiterate statements already made [garble—regarding?] U.S. respect for integrity of Iran and the right of Iranian people to choose their own form of govt. The U.S. recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran as the legal government of Iran." McHenry also noted that the Shah was "not under U.S. control. This is a matter between the Govts of Iran and Panama." Summing up, McHenry "suggested that these points covered the question of Iranian grievances and took account of various ideas put forward by non-aligned and other delegations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800018-1193)

<sup>5</sup> The UNSC vote on the U.S. draft resolution calling for sanctions on Iran took place on January 13. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and Bangladesh abstained. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 309-311)

**47. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, January 23, 1980, 0735Z

461. Subject: Bangladeshi Abstentions on Sanctions. Ref: A) State 333770<sup>2</sup> B) Secto 130003<sup>3</sup> C) State 0069.<sup>4</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

2. I believe our credibility requires that we demonstrate in some tangible way to President Zia our displeasure at his failure to support US on sanctions. Deciding how to do this is complicated by our continuing interest in development and stability in Bangladesh and our interest in the continuation of Bangladesh's moderate stance as an Islamic nation and as a participant in international deliberations. For these reasons I would not propose that aid or food levels be affected but I would suggest a rebuke in regard to another of Zia's objective: his desire for close rapport with President Carter. Since the basis for that rapport has been destroyed, we might just as well let Zia know.

3. I propose that this be done by sending a fairly direct and sharp response to Zia's long and excessive request to the President for various forms of aid (State 315730).<sup>5</sup> We can't meet his inflated requests anyway and rather than giving him a polite and indirect response, I suggest we tell him briefly we can give him no aid above planned levels and that food assistance will depend entirely on BDG performance. (We should leave ourselves leeway to support necessary food reforms.) The letter should also turn down his request for military assistance. I do not repeat not suggest that we explicitly interrelate our response with Bangladesh's vote. The letter may circulate beyond Zia. He will nonetheless understand that the letter's sharp and direct tone is the result of his refusal to help us on sanctions. I believe Zia is realist enough to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039–0560. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 44.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 45.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 315730 to Dacca, December 8, 1979, transmitted the text of Zia's November 12 letter to Carter, in which Zia reiterated his requests for more food and other types of assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790566–0221) In response to Zia's letter, telegram 321056 to Dacca, December 13, 1979, the Department informed the Embassy: "It does not appear likely however, that we will be able to respond positively in any significant way." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790573–0488)

respect a country which takes firm actions in accordance with its interests.

Schneider

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**48. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 27, 1980

SUBJECT

Additional PL 480 for Bangladesh

Ambassador Schneider has reported that Bangladesh's winter and spring harvests will probably be smaller than normal (Tab 1).<sup>2</sup> Even a small decline in food production can cause severe hardship in Bangladesh where so many live at or below accepted nutritional standards (Tab 2).<sup>3</sup> Many poor people simply cannot afford to buy sufficient food at higher prices. Their only recourse is to food distributed from government stocks and those stocks are replenished almost exclusively from imported foodgrains. If Bangladesh is forced to purchase food on the world market again this year it would further strain their already precarious balance of payments situation and jeopardize important economic development programs.

In addition to the humanitarian and development aspects of the problem, food has historically been the key political issue in East Bengal. A government which fails to cope with severe shortages may be the target of coup attempts and other political violence. It is in our interest that this moderate, friendly government remain in power.

We are not certain of the dimension of the emerging food problem, but we believe that the situation is more serious than last year. In order to get additional food in before the monsoon, we need to make a decision now. The Ambassador has recommended that we supply

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800046-0876. Confidential. Drafted by Benedict; cleared in S/P and EB/OFP/FFD and by Schaffer and Coon. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Saunders's behalf. A stamped notation at the top of the first page of the memorandum reads: "CV."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 769 from Dacca, February 7; not attached.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 853 from Dacca, February 13; not attached.

100,000 tons of wheat under Title I in addition to the 400,000 tons already being provided under Title III.<sup>4</sup>

In your memorandum to the President of January 17,<sup>5</sup> you recommended that no additional PL 480 be made available to Bangladesh because of the government's Security Council abstentions on economic sanctions against Iran. We have since expressed our serious displeasure to Bangladesh over their abstentions and reduced development assistance levels for FY 81 to the FY 80 level.

*Recommendation:*

Given our humanitarian and development concerns, that you authorize us to seek interagency agreement to provide additional wheat to Bangladesh from the current PL 480 reserve so as to lessen the probability of serious malnutrition problems there.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 8398 from Dacca, December 14, 1979, transmitted Schneider's recommendation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790574–1008)

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Vance checked the Disapprove option and dated his decision "2/28/80."

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#### **49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1980, 0026Z

52939. For the Ambassador. Subject: Demarche to BDG on Unsatisfactory Role in Iranian Crisis. Refs: (A) Dacca 672;<sup>2</sup> (B) Dacca 461;<sup>3</sup> (C) Dacca 413.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800102–0184. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Drafted by Benedict; cleared in IO, EUR/SOV, S/S, and S/S–O and by Peck, Coon, and Thornton; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 672 from Dacca, February 2, Schneider requested information on U.S. policy toward Bangladesh in the wake of Bangladesh's abstentions in the UNSC votes on Iranian sanctions. Schneider reported that he expected to meet with Zia within the week. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800058–0017)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 47.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 413 from Dacca, January 22, summarized the diplomatic efforts that the Bangladeshi Government was undertaking with Iran regarding the hostage crisis, noting that the Bangladeshis "had on several occasions informed Iranian Government that it believed release of hostages could not be made conditional on establishment of or outcome of UN commission or investigation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800049–0521, D800037–0057)

1. (C—Entire text)

2. You should seek an appointment at an appropriately high level in the BDG to discuss BDG's performance on the hostage issue and to respond to President Zia's November 12 letter to the President.<sup>5</sup> You should make clear that this demarche constitutes our reply to Zia's letter. Talking points are as follows:

—President Zia's letter of November 12 to President Carter which outlined Bangladesh's development plans received careful consideration. The U.S. will continue to have great sympathy for Bangladesh's development needs.

—President Zia's request has come at a particularly difficult time in view of the need for budgetary restraint in the U.S. We intend, however, to continue to play an important role in supporting Bangladesh's development programs through the provision of economic assistance and food aid.

—At the same time I have been instructed to reiterate the deep disappointment we felt that Bangladesh was unable to stand with the majority of the Security Council on December 31 and January 13 in supporting the resolutions calling for economic sanctions against Iran. The holding of 50 American hostages at our Embassy in Tehran continues to be a matter of grave concern to the American people and we hope that we can count on the support of Bangladesh in bringing about a peaceful solution to this serious problem.

**Vance**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 47.

**50. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, March 21, 1980, 0524Z

1583. Subj: BDG Inquiries About Visit to Washington by President Zia in August.

1. C—Entire text.

2. In a March 20 meeting, Foreign Secretary Kibria told Ambassador that in view of the great importance which Bangladesh attached to the August session on global negotiations of the UNGA Committee of the Whole, he would like to advise President Zia to attend. Kibria said that a visit by President Zia would highlight Bangladesh's interest in the global negotiations and call attention to Bangladesh's economic problems. Kibria asked whether, if Zia should accept this advice, it would be possible to arrange a one-day visit to Washington which would include a meeting with President Carter. Kibria said he hoped that despite the preoccupation with the election campaign at that time, the USG's currently heightened interest in this region might make Washington receptive to an August visit by Zia.

3. Ambassador told Kibria that he would of course forward this inquiry to Washington for consideration. However, Ambassador noted that the Democratic Convention would be held in August, following which the Presidential campaign would be in full swing; hence, it would be wrong not to discourage hopes of arranging a Zia visit to Washington. In an "off the record" aside to Kibria after the meeting, Ambassador noted that the strongest reason for feeling it necessary to discourage his hopes was the severe USG disappointment over Bangladesh's abstention on Iranian sanctions votes in the Security Council.<sup>2</sup> Kibria replied that he understood this.

4. Action requested: Please advise as soon as practical what response we should give to Kibria.

**Helble**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800170–0536, D800143–0900. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In a March 26 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton reported that on March 26 he "met with Ambassador Schneider (Bangladesh) who is concerned that Vance is keeping Bangladesh on a blacklist because of their poor behavior on Iranian sanctions in the UNSC. We have slapped their wrists hard, they have been very helpful on Afghanistan, and there is no point letting this drag on forever. We should turn a new page." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Staff Evening Reports File, Box 28, 3/22–27/80)

## 51. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Dacca, April 4, 1980, 1000Z

1877. Subject: Attitudes Toward US Policy and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Ref: State 88475.<sup>2</sup>

1. S-Entire text.

2. Summary. The initial BDG reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of genuine concern and strong opposition, an attitude reflected in its active role in the Security Council's consideration of Afghanistan. Subsequently, concern over anticipated Soviet and Indian pressures appeared to cause a certain pulling back. High-level BDG-GOI meetings seemed to ease these apprehensions, and the BDG's posture gradually resumed its firmness; by late February, its stance was at least as firm as it has been at the time of the invasion. U.S. responses allayed to a considerable degree initial BDG skepticism that US actions would be adequate, although some doubts about US constancy and firmness linger. The BDG was generally supportive of our proposals to aid Pakistan, although we have recently heard echoes of the Pakistani view that the size of our proposed military package was such that it would have increased Pakistan's vulnerability rather than enhancing its security.<sup>3</sup> End summary.

3. The initial BDG reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was generally a strong one. While the government itself tended to be cautious in its public statement, preferring formulation which referred to foreign troops rather than explicitly condemning the Soviets, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, at a meeting presided over by President Ziaur Rahman, adopted a resolution explicitly condemning the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Privately, senior BDG officials made it clear that they regarded the Soviet intervention as far more than a defensive move; they saw it as an extension of Soviet power into the region, which has aims beyond Afghanistan and which could cause a sort of domino effect among nations of the region. Hence, the BDG saw the Soviet move as a matter of immediate concern to Bangladesh. In line with this view, the BDG played a leading and prominent role in calling for a Security Council meeting on Afghani-

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800190-0382, D800169-0652. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 423.



stan and offered to help draft the Security Council resolution on Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>

4. During the first half of January, we sensed a certain pulling back by the BDG, and President Zia even told the Ambassador later that the BDG had felt that it had gotten “too far out front” on the Afghan issue. It was reliably reported that the Soviets had spoken in strong terms to the Bangladeshis and threatened various types of retaliation; the BDG was also concerned about the Soviet potential for stirring up subversion in Bangladesh. In addition, the BDG was concerned by Mrs. Gandhi’s initial statements on Afghanistan<sup>5</sup> and probably feared that too forward a policy on Afghanistan could jeopardize relations with India. Hence, at the time of the Uniting for Peace initiative,<sup>6</sup> the BDG was less active, and Bangladeshi representatives were even reported to have told others at the UN that this time the initiative should be left to the Western nations (although the BDG eventually co-sponsored the UNGA resolution). At the same time, the BDG tried to downplay its role in calling for a special Foreign Ministers meeting of the Islamic Conference on Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

5. Following President Zia’s January 21–22 meetings with Mrs. Gandhi, the BDG’s apprehensions appeared to begin to wane. Evidently the BDG sensed that the Indians themselves were taken aback by the strength of world reaction against the Soviet intervention and were unlikely to put strong pressure on the BDG to moderate its policy. By late January the BDG seemed to be returning to a stronger policy. Although the BDG Foreign Minister apparently avoided mentioning the Soviets by name in his address to the January 26–28 Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, the BDG appears to have played an active role there; it was not among those who lodged reservations to provisions of the resolution adopted by the conference, and Bangladesh was named in the final declaration of the conference as the country which had called for the meeting. The February 12–14 visit to Dacca of Indian External Affairs Secretary Gonsalves appeared to further ease BDG apprehension, and we understand that the Bangladeshis spoke quite

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<sup>4</sup> The January 7 draft Security Council resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Security Council members in favor of the resolution called an emergency special session of the General Assembly, which adopted the resolution on January 14. See footnote 5, Document 413.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

<sup>6</sup> “Uniting for Peace” is a procedural maneuver in the United Nations that is stipulated in section A of UN Resolution 377 A (V), whereby the General Assembly may recommend actions to respond to a threat to international peace and security in the event that the Security Council is unable to do so as a result of a split vote among its permanent members. This procedural maneuver made possible the January 14 resolution by the emergency special session of the General Assembly. (See footnote 4 above)

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 422.

bluntly to the Indians about the Soviet intervention during that visit. Shortly afterward, the BDG decided to cancel Bangladesh's planned participation in the Moscow Olympics.

6. The foreign policy debate in Parliament in the last week of February also indicated that the BDG was following a firm and unambiguous line on Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister described Soviet intervention as a violation of the principles of non-interference and renunciation of force and argued that it therefore dictated a strong BDG response in international fora. The Prime Minister also strongly denounced the Soviet intervention. While there have been no subsequent occasions for Bangladesh to speak out publicly on Afghanistan, we believe there has been no change in BDG policy since then. Indeed, in his March meeting with DAS Coon, President Zia took a firm position on the Soviet intervention.<sup>8</sup>

7. The immediate BDG attitude toward the US in the wake of the Soviet intervention was skepticism that the US would act sufficiently firmly. However, most BDG officials were favorably impressed by the measures the US took, particularly the reaffirmation of the 1959 commitment to Pakistan,<sup>9</sup> the cancellation of grain sales, and the Olympic boycott. These measures allayed BDG skepticism to a considerable degree, although it has been clear from private conversations that BDG officials still harbor some doubts about U.S. constancy and willingness to fight if necessary.

8. Initially at least, the BDG was also generally supportive of our proposals to aid Pakistan militarily and economically, despite some carping about our perhaps not having consulted the Indians adequately before plunging in. In conversations with BDG officials, it was clear that they regarded Pakistan's defense needs as more sizeable than what we were prepared to provide, but they seemed to believe that our proposed assistance would be useful. Since Pakistan's rejection of our aid package,<sup>10</sup> however, we have heard some echoes of the GOP's views from BDG officials. In a recent meeting with the Australian High Commissioner, the Foreign Minister reportedly took the line that the military package the U.S. had offered was so small that it would have made Pakistan more vulnerable rather than enhancing its security.

**Helble**

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<sup>8</sup> Telegram 1367 from Dacca, March 10, reported Coon's March 8 meeting with Zia. Coon briefed Zia on U.S. positions on the Afghan and Iranian crises. Zia remarked that "Bangladesh in the UN, in the Islamic Council, and in the NAM had done everything a small nation could do to indicate opposition to Soviet aggression." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800124-0746)

<sup>9</sup> See Document 406.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 423.

**52. Telegram From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Dacca, April 15, 1980, 0945Z

2108. Subject: Letter to President Carter From President Ziaur Rahman on Hostage Crisis.

1. C–Entire text.

2. BDG Foreign Secretary Kibria on April 15 handed Ambassador a letter to President Carter from President Ziaur Rahman. Kibria asked Ambassador to send letter to Washington and noted that letter would also be handed over by BDG Embassy in Washington.

3. Text of letter is as follows:

14 April 1980

Dear Mr. President,

As we celebrate our New Year's Day our friends abroad are naturally in our thoughts. On behalf of the people of Bangladesh and on my own behalf it gives me great pleasure to send you our warm greetings on this happy occasion and wish the friendly people of the United States of America continued progress and prosperity.

It is, indeed, a matter of satisfaction to us that our two countries are bound by close ties of friendship based on mutual understanding, shared democratic and human values and similarity of views on many of the international issues. We sincerely hope that these ties will grow still stronger during the year ahead.

Mr. President, as you, of course, know, we in Bangladesh attach great importance to peace and stability because peace and stability are a pre-requisite for progress in achieving our objectives of economic and social development and raising the quality of life of our people. We, therefore, view with great concern some of the recent developments in our region. Armed occupation of a small non-aligned South Asian country by a great power and earlier a similar military intervention in Indo-China indicate a growing disregard for the basic principles of the U.N. Charter and pose a serious threat to the security of small states and also global peace and stability. Bangladesh, therefore, took a firm stand against such foreign interventions in the Security Council, at the United Nations General Assembly and also at the extraordinary

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800188–0528. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held recently in Islamabad.<sup>2</sup>

In the circumstances, Bangladesh is naturally disturbed at the continuing impasse over Iran-U.S. relations. We consider an early resolution of this problem as an imperative for peace and security in our region. We have, therefore, been making all possible endeavours in this direction at various levels. Guided by our commitment to international law and conventions we consistently stood for the release of the American diplomatic personnel detained in Tehran. We are continuing our efforts in seeking a peaceful and honourable solution of this problem keeping in view the realities of the situation.

Recently, I have addressed a personal message to President Bani Sadr underscoring the necessity of an early solution of this problem in the interest of peace and security in our region.<sup>3</sup> With a view to initiating a movement in this direction, I have suggested a number of steps, such as the transfer of the American hostages to the custody of the government and allowing the heads of Missions to visit them. In this connection, I have also stressed that such action would also be in the fine tradition of Islam and contribute in easing the present tension and leading to an early resolution of the problem.

While looking forward to a favourable response from the Iranian President, we are also consulting like-minded Islamic countries with a view to a possible initiative at the forthcoming Islamic Conference for finding a speedy and peaceful solution.

I wish you, Mr. President, good health and success.

With kind personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Ziaur Rahman)

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 51.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2109 from Dacca, April 15, noted that "Zia's letter to Bani Sadr is the result of a proposal made to him by K. M. Kaiser and of efforts Kaiser has been making at my urging to remedy the damage to U.S.-Bangladesh relations caused by previous faint support to the U.S. on the hostage issue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800188-0527)

4. Account of meeting at which Kibria presented letter follows by septel.<sup>4</sup>

Schneider

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2114 from Dacca, April 15, described Schneider's April 14 meeting with Kibria, during which he informed Schneider that "BDG Ambassador in Tehran, Humayan Kabir, has been very active and has secured access to some second-echelon members of Revolutionary Council. Through these contacts on the Council, BDG Ambassador has attempted to have certain points brought to attention of Khomeini—although not always successfully, Kibria acknowledged." Kibria also reported Bangladeshi efforts at consulting Islamic countries on "the need to find a solution to the Iran crisis." The Embassy commented: "We believe this initiative reflects two recently heightened BDG concerns: A) a realization that its unhelpfulness was causing lasting and increasing irritation within USG, and B) genuine concern over the effect of intensification of the crisis on the Islamic world and its relations with the West." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800188–0553)

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**53. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1980

SUBJECT

Possible Visit by Bangladesh President (C)

President Ziaur Rahman is lusting mightily for a chance to meet with the President, even if only for an hour office call. According to the Bangladesh ambassador (who is looking under all the rocks in town on this one) he would most like to come in connection with a visit to the UK (June 20–21) and a *possible* stop for a visit in Ottawa. (C)

It is a close call:

—On the positive side, Zia is trying very hard to establish something like orderly democratic government in Bangladesh. His country is in the Security Council and is being helpful on Afghanistan. Most of all, Zia is really trying to hold off the Soviets, at some domestic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Bangladesh: 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. "ZB has seen" is stamped in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.

political cost. They have invited him to Moscow. He is seen in Bangladesh as being pro-American and getting little political attention for his efforts. (C)

—On the negative side, there are obvious time constraints. Zia's longevity in office is probably not terribly bright (although he is a better prospect than anybody else around in Bangladesh) and there may be better cases for the President to invest his limited time in. Most of all, of course, Bangladesh failed us on the Iran vote in the Security Council and has not been able to atone for that by its largely ineffectual attempts to play a useful role on Iran in some other way. (C)

Unless there really is no time available, I come down on the positive side. It is not a bad idea for us to do something for one of our openly avowed friends occasionally. The Iran vote weighs heavy and because of it, Vance is likely to be opposed to a visit. In my view, though, this is another case of continuing to inflict punishment long after the transgression has been committed. (C)

If you think there is absolutely no possibility of a visit, let me know and I will turn the whole thing off. If you want to keep the option open at least, I will undertake some further inquiries with Ambassador Schneider in Dacca and within State. (C)

#### *Guidance Requested*

Keep the option open<sup>2</sup>

No prospect; turn it off

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<sup>2</sup> This option was checked. To the right of the checkmark, Aaron wrote: "Seems reasonable to have an office call *if* limited to that! DA."

**54. Letter From President Carter to Bangladeshi President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter on the occasion of your New Year's celebration.<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Carter joins me in wishing you and the people of Bangladesh all success and happiness in the year ahead.

I very much appreciate your sharing with me your concerns regarding the serious threats to peace and stability in Asia. The similarity of views between our two governments on these questions is gratifying. I am also pleased to note that Bangladesh continues to value the close ties of friendship and cooperation between our two nations, and I want to assure you that we share these sentiments fully.

Bangladesh's strong stand against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has been an important element in the impressive show of international solidarity that Soviet actions have provoked. I am particularly pleased by Bangladesh's decision not to participate in the Moscow Olympics, since this is clearly one of the most effective means of demonstrating to the Soviet people our determination never to condone aggression. I trust that with Bangladesh's support and example, the Islamic Foreign Ministers will reaffirm next month the strong position they took on Afghanistan at their last meeting,<sup>3</sup> especially their principled stand against participation in the Moscow Olympics. That action would add great moral weight to the growing move to boycott the Olympics.

I appreciate your initiative in writing to President Bani Sadr about Iran's continued detention of American citizens and, in particular, your support for the early transfer of the hostages to the custody of the Iranian Government. I hope you can understand the depth of our anger and frustration at the manner in which the Iranian authorities have dealt with us during recent months. Unfortunately we were unsuccessful in the rescue operation that would have resolved this problem to the benefit of the hostages,<sup>4</sup> my country, and the international community. We will not, however, let up in our efforts.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–1752. Confidential; Exdis. A typed note indicates the letter was pouched to the Embassy in Dacca.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 52.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 422. The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers next met May 17–22 in Islamabad.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 439.

My decisions to strengthen economic sanctions and sever diplomatic relations<sup>5</sup> will have a much better chance of persuading the Iranians to take some positive action if they are reinforced by parallel actions on the part of our friends, especially those with some influence with Iran. The Iranians must be made to understand that the continuation of this crisis will seriously damage their political and economic interests and their standing in the community of nations. Perhaps the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference will provide an opportunity to bring these points home to the Iranians. I pray that your efforts and those of our other friends will help us resolve this crisis peacefully and soon.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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<sup>5</sup> Carter announced his decision to sever diplomatic relations with Iran and strengthen economic sanctions on April 7. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 611–612)

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**55. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Possible Visit by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh

*Issue for Decision*

Whether to recommend that President Carter invite Zia to call on him while he is in the US to address the UN Special Session on global economic issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800123–2126. Confidential. Drafted by Benedict. Concurred in HA, AID/Asia, and IO, and by Schaffer, Erb, Coon, and Van Doren. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum for Saunders.



*Essential Factors*

President Ziaur Rahman will visit the US from August 25 to 27 to address the UN Special Session on global economic issues. The Bangladeshis have approached Embassy Dacca,<sup>2</sup> USUN<sup>3</sup> and the Department<sup>4</sup> with a request for an office call on the President and perhaps a lunch. The President met Zia very briefly in Tokyo at the Ohira memorial service,<sup>5</sup> and subsequently sent him a message from AIR FORCE ONE expressing his interest in meeting with Zia again.<sup>6</sup> We understand informally that the initial contact in Tokyo went very well.

Such a meeting would provide an important opportunity for the President to recognize a leader who has by and large supported high priority Administration objectives, including especially Afghanistan, the hostages, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights. Bangladesh is also a major recipient of US development and food assistance.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the attached Tarnoff-Brzezinski memorandum recommending a Zia visit.<sup>7</sup> This recommendation is supported by HA, IO, IDCA, AID and ACDA.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2497 from USUN, June 25, reported that Kaiser approached McHenry to inquire about the possibility of a meeting between Carter and Zia. According to the telegram, "Kaiser said, again emphasizing the personal nature of his remarks, that Zia is honestly trying to establish democracy in Bangladesh and has tried to help us on Afghanistan. Kaiser also said that despite the vote of Bangladesh, they had tried to be helpful on the hostages. Kaiser expressed his profound hope that President Carter will understand Zia's problems and find time in his admittedly busy schedule for a brief meeting." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800312–1113)

<sup>4</sup> In a July 21 meeting with Coon, Tabarak Husain repeated Bangladeshi requests to arrange a meeting between Carter and Zia. (Telegram 193621 to Dacca, July 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800352–0116)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 56.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Not attached. Tarnoff's July 30 memorandum to Brzezinski, which conveyed the Department of State's recommendation to invite Zia to meet Carter, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Bangladesh: 1/77–1/81.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher checked the Approve option. To the right of his checkmark, he wrote: "as revised." Beneath these words, a stamped notation reads: "30 Jul 1980."

## 56. Letter From the Bangladeshi Embassy in the United States to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 21, 1980

The Embassy of the People's Republic of Bangladesh presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to request the following message received from President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh to His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America be transmitted to its high destination:

Message begins:

"Dear Mr. President,

I was delighted to receive your message of July 10th.<sup>2</sup> Our meeting at Tokyo was short but very useful.<sup>3</sup> It gave us an opportunity to exchange views on some important matters of mutual interest. I fully agree with you that meetings of this sort, at a high level, are essential to strengthen the ties of friendship between our two countries. I am also looking forward to meeting you again.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours

(Signed) Ziaur Rahman"

Message ends.

The Embassy of Bangladesh avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800098-1772. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Carter visited Tokyo July 9-10 in order to attend former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's funeral. No memorandum of conversation of Carter's meeting with Zia was found. Telegram 3776 from Dacca, July 5, reported Kibria's July 4 telephone call to Schneider, during which Kibria informed him that Zia would attend Ohira's funeral and wished to briefly meet with Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800323-0060) Telegram 179560 to Tokyo and Dacca, July 8, informed the Embassies: "The President's schedule as of the party's departure from Washington does not include a meeting with President Zia. The President's stay in Tokyo will be very brief, hence, his schedule there will be quite limited." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800327-0469)

**57. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 27, 1980, 1:30–2:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

The President's Meeting with President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Thomas Ehrlich, Director, IDCA  
Henry Owen, Special Representative for International Summits  
David Schneider, Ambassador to Bangladesh  
Jane A. Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
Gerald A. Funk, NSC Staff  
  
President Zia  
Foreign Minister Shamsul Huq  
Agriculture Minister Nurul Islam  
Information Consultant Daud Khan Majlis  
Ambassador Tabarak Husain  
Additional Foreign Secretary, Ataul Karim  
Director General, Mr. M.R. Osmany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President met privately with President Zia for about 25 minutes and then joined the others in the Cabinet Room.<sup>2</sup>

*President Carter* said he was pleased and honored to receive President Zia in Washington. President Carter reviewed the subjects covered in their private meeting, indicating that there was a remarkable compatibility in the goals of the two countries. He noted President Zia's leadership in the Muslim world and in the region. He referred with pleasure to Bangladesh's contributions in the Security Council and especially commended President Zia's speech the previous day to the Special Session of the General Assembly, noting Zia's reference to the need for concessional petroleum prices and greater investment by OPEC countries in underdeveloped countries.<sup>3</sup> President Carter said

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Zia was in Washington for 8 hours on August 27.

<sup>2</sup> Carter and Zia meet privately in the Oval Office from 1:30 to 1:50 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> In a August 26 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Carter that Zia "made two significant proposals in his address to the UNGA Special Session: That OPEC cut prices to LDC's by 50%" and "That OPEC invest in LDC's." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 91, Bangladesh: Zia/Carter Meetings: 4–9/80)

he was impressed with Bangladesh's efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency and noted that this would be a great achievement. He said the U.S. will continue its commitment to assist Bangladesh's development until that time when Bangladesh can achieve self-sufficiency and perhaps even become a food exporter. He also noted with pleasure the progress made under Zia to democratize the political structure and attain domestic stability. (C)

*President Carter* noted that the two Presidents had discussed the aggressive challenge posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan and elsewhere. He also remarked on the benefits of the growing friendship of both countries with China. The President reported that President Zia had told him about his recent visit to China, which included seven hours of discussions with Chairman Hua. (C)

*The President* expressed appreciation for Bangladesh's help on the hostage issue<sup>4</sup> and hoped that President Zia's tenacity and enthusiasm will not wane. A resolution of this problem would contribute to the stability of the whole region. (C)

*President Zia* responded by expressing his appreciation to President Carter for making his time available during a very busy period. Referring to the political campaign, Zia said he wished to see President Carter's reelection and prayed for it. He agreed that the views of the two Presidents were nearly identical. He expressed appreciation for the support of the American people during the 1971 War of Independence and the generous assistance provided for his assurance of support in the future. (C)

*President Zia* referred to Bangladesh's development plans and described the voluntary efforts in Bangladesh to dig canals and increase irrigation in order to expand food production. *Secretary Muskie* observed that there ought to be a way to tell the story of Bangladesh as an illustration of the value of providing assistance to the developing world. *President Zia* commented on the enormous dimensions of his problems, given Bangladesh's population of nearly 90 million people, but he stressed his commitment to quick and speedy development with food, education and family planning as highest priorities. He said he personally spent about 20 days each month touring the countryside and visiting projects. (C)

*President Zia* affirmed that Bangladesh's stand on Afghanistan and Kampuchea<sup>5</sup> was taken on principle and that these principles were

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 52.

<sup>5</sup> Bangladesh supported the ASEAN resolution at the 34th United Nations General Assembly that called on Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia (Kampuchea). UNGA Resolution 34/22 was adopted on November 14, 1979. For the text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 306–307.

especially important to smaller countries. He said that Bangladesh will do everything possible to help in the stabilization of the South Asian region. He mentioned Bangladesh's proposal for a South Asian Forum or Conference<sup>6</sup> and said that such a grouping might help regarding Afghanistan. (C)

*President Carter* asked when *President Zia's* proposed six-nation South Asian conference might take place. *President Zia* replied that Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka had responded positively; India had agreed in principle, and the Pakistani President had reacted positively and agreed to examine the issue when the two had discussed this proposal at *Tito's* funeral. He was hopeful that the gathering would take place. He assured the President that Bangladesh would do anything possible for world peace and stability. (C)

Responding to a question regarding Bangladesh oil imports, *President Zia* said that Bangladesh would import over two million tons next year and expressed appreciation for the U.S. proposal to help find oil and additional natural gas resources in Bangladesh.<sup>7</sup> *President Carter* remarked that he had met with Congressional leaders that morning<sup>8</sup> to discuss programs of the IMF and World Bank and he hoped they would invest more in efforts to find new oil and gas resources and to encourage food production. (C)

*President Zia* said he would like to raise a subject and leave it for our consideration. Bangladesh needed to build up its defense forces. He was aware of U.S. policies in this regard but felt it was necessary to raise the subject. He noted that following the 1971 War Bangladesh had had to develop its armed forces from an absolute zero. Bangladesh did not need advanced weapons but did need some radar and aircraft for the Air Force as well as such things as missile boats for the Navy. (C)

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked about Bangladesh's perception of the threat, and *Zia* responded by mentioning Southeast Asia, India and even Burma, noting the communist influence in Eastern India and the Burmese insurgent problem. (C)

At the conclusion of the meeting the two Presidents spoke to the press which was assembled outside the White House.<sup>9</sup> (U)

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 2762 from Dacca, May 16, reported that at a May 15 press conference, Huq announced that "Bangladesh has proposed a summit meeting of six South Asian countries to 'explore the possibilities of creating a forum for consultation and development of cooperation on a regional basis.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800246–1009)

<sup>7</sup> No record was found of this proposal.

<sup>8</sup> Carter's meeting with Members of Congress took place from 8:15 until 8:29 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>9</sup> See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1577–1579.

**58. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Eligibility of Bangladesh to Purchase Defense Articles and Defense Services  
Under The Arms Export Control Act

*I. ISSUE*

I am recommending that you find that the sale of defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) to Bangladesh “will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.” Such a finding is a condition of eligibility for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) under Section 3(a)(1) of the Act.

*II. BACKGROUND*

Bangladesh has a long-standing interest in developing the U.S. as a source of supply for military equipment and training. President Zia raised the issue during his August meeting with you.<sup>2</sup> Former Soviet sources of supply have now been completely closed down as a result of conscious choices by the present Bangladeshi leadership to move toward a more moderate and truly non-aligned foreign policy.<sup>3</sup>

There are good reasons for us to respond positively to these moves. We should continue to encourage a leadership that has already shown a readiness to identify with U.S. positions, often accepting political risks to do so. The Bangladeshis have given very positive support on Afghanistan, signed the Non-proliferation Treaty,<sup>4</sup> and played a constructive role in the Security Council and the Non-Aligned Movement. Bangladesh is the only South Asian country denied FMS eligibility.

Internally, the military is the most cohesive element within a still developing Bangladeshi institutional framework. It has played a critical role in responding to natural disasters and promoting economic development. Maintenance of the military’s effectiveness and credibility is important to the stability of Bangladesh.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810021–1965. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 57.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 51.

<sup>4</sup> Bangladesh signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on August 31, 1979.

Initial sales under the FMS program would be directed toward expanded training in much needed managerial skills and the acquisition of dual purpose military equipment which would enhance the military role in economic development. We plan to limit both material and training programs to modest levels consistent with the priority we assign to economic development and population control.

#### LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Bangladesh is at present not eligible to purchase defense articles and services on a government-to-government basis. Section 3(a)(1) of the Act provides as one of the conditions of eligibility for any foreign country to purchase defense articles or defense services from the United States Government that the President find that such sales “will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.” Authority to make this finding is reserved to the President by Section 1(a) of Executive Order 11958 of January 18, 1977.

ACDA does not object to this Determination. Future transfers will be reviewed by ACDA on a case-by-case basis.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

Although not required by law, we believe that notification to the Congress and publication of your finding in the *Federal Register* would be helpful in its implementation. We do not anticipate any unfavorable Congressional reaction. All previous eligibility findings now in effect have been so notified and published.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the attached Determination,<sup>5</sup> thereby also approving the attached justification.<sup>6</sup> In accordance with established procedures, your Determination and the attached justification will be furnished to the Congress. The Determination alone will be published in the *Federal Register*.

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached. Carter signed Presidential Determination No. 81–1 on December 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810007–0325)

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper prepared in the Department of State entitled “Justification for Presidential Determination on the Eligibility of Bangladesh to Make Purchases of Defense Articles and Defense Services Under the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended.”

# India

## 59. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, January 19, 1977, 1305Z

906. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Mrs Gandhi Calls For a "Snap Poll". Ref: A. New Delhi 773<sup>2</sup> B. New Delhi 848<sup>3</sup> (Notal).

1. In a nation-wide radio broadcast on the evening of Jan 18, Prime Minister Gandhi announced that the Lok Sabha was to be dissolved and elections held in March. Elections will be for the 542 seats in the Lok Sabha. This represents an increase of 19 over the current 523 seat Lok Sabha, the result of election district redemarcation and population increases since 1971. There are also two nominated Anglo-Indian members of the House.

2. Mrs Gandhi opened her brief (10 minute) speech with a justification for imposing the Emergency 19 months ago.<sup>4</sup> The country had been on the brink of disaster and the government had to act firmly in order that India would survive. She had emphasized at that time that the Emergency would be temporary, and in fact the restrictions imposed have gradually been replaced. Party leaders and workers have been released and press censorship has been eased. She observed that in her travels around the country she had been pleased to discover a sense of purpose and strength among the people. The Emergency produced an atmosphere of discipline which had enabled the government to vigorously pursue policies for the uplift of the weaker sections

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77033-0905, D770020-0078. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Beijing, CINCPAC, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 773 from New Delhi, January 17, provided a report and analysis of the rumors that "continue to flit around Delhi that the PM will decide to hold snap elections in March or even April this year." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77017-0210)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 848 from New Delhi, January 18, announced: "Rumors which built quickly in last week that elections were on the way in India have now materialized with decision that they will be held March 16. This announcement, being made later this evening in Delhi, follows release late this afternoon of Congress (O) leader Morarji Desai and Jana Sangh President L.K. Advani from detention under MISA. At this point it is not clear whether Emergency will be ended before elections are held. We understand Parliament will not be called into session prior to elections, but will confirm this later." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77018-0672)

<sup>4</sup> On June 25, 1975, Gandhi invoked the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971, thus declaring a state of emergency. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976, Documents 204 and 208.



of society: she cited the recent amendments to the constitution and also the anti-dowry and family planning campaigns as examples of these socially necessary programs which had been launched. The PM stated that the nation had made great strides in the past 18 months, particularly in the economic field. Work had been resumed on many development plans which had been interrupted by the economic crisis and political disturbances. Inflation had been checked, production increased, and grain stocks were the largest in years. The 20-point and five-point programs have shown tangible results. While conceding that farmers and workers were experiencing difficulties and that prices of a “few” commodities had “slightly” increased, she assured her audience that the GOI had initiated corrective steps which would produce quick results. At the same time, Mrs. Gandhi warned that there could be no return to the chaotic times which prevailed before the Emergency: “Elements which rise to stir up economic trouble will be sternly dealt with.” It was essential that people live by “certain codes and norms of behavior” so that government functioning is not obstructed.

3. Mrs Gandhi said that since India was now more healthy, efficient and dynamic than it had been for years, the question now was how to restore the political processes which the government had been forced to restrict. India was based on the principle that the government derives its power from the people, and that every few years the people express their views by a free choice of their governing leaders. Even though legally the current Lok Sabha can continue for another 15 months, she stated that she strongly believed that the government and Parliament “must report back to the people and seek sanction from them to carry out programs and policies for the nation’s strength and welfare.” Thus, she had asked the President [garble] Sabha and order fresh elections. The polling is to take place in March. She concluded: “The rules of the Emergency are being further relaxed to permit all legitimate activity necessary for recognized parties to put forth their points of view before the people.” The PM urged parties to refrain from violence and vilification. “Every election is an act of faith, an opportunity to cleanse public life of confusion.”

4. In announcing that she was asking for the dissolution of the Lok Sabha the PM has implied that she is not planning on holding state legislative elections at the same time. We are reliably informed that at least Kerala state elections will be held at the same time as Parliamentary elections. No other state elections appear to be planned at this time.

5. We are struck by three points in the PM’s speech:

(A) Despite the steadily-increasing rumors and speculation in the past few weeks, the announcement of elections still appears to have come as a surprise to most Indians. Congress President Barooah was suddenly forced to cancel a trip to Manipur, Tamil Nadu and Kerala

which was to begin today. Foreign Minister Chavan was caught in Bucharest, about to leave for Prague, and is now reported to be rushing back to Delhi. One Congress MP told an EmbOff right after the announcement that he had been talking to an AICC General Secretary that very morning who professed to know nothing about the chances for elections in March; another earlier in the day expressed doubt there would be elections. It thus appears that as always Mrs Gandhi had kept her thoughts very much to herself.

(B) The PM clear that although restrictions “are being further relaxed,” the Emergency will not be lifted for the poll. Moreover, she set forth several—largely undefined—rules of conduct for the contesting of the elections: in order that government functioning not be impaired, she warned that there can be “no preaching of hatred, no practicing of violence, no encouragement of subversive activities, and no lowering of standards of public life.” As for political parties, the PM counseled them to “eschew violence and refrain from vilification and calumny. People should neither believe in nor give currency to rumors and gossip.” Mrs Gandhi has thus laid down a vaguely worded code of conduct which the opposition will have to observe, and she of course will be the sole authority who can later define these rules of the game.

(C) Mrs Gandhi expressed concern about India’s image. In her broadcast, she said that there is a new respect for the country abroad “despite criticism” and called on the people to go to the polls with the firm resolve “to uphold the fair name of India as a land committed to the path of reconciliation, peace and progress.”

6. Opposition leaders quickly reacted to the announcement. They generally welcomed the news but uniformly emphasized that in order to be meaningful the elections must be “free and fair.” Congress (O)<sup>5</sup> leader Morarji Desai, who had been released hours earlier,<sup>6</sup> stated that the short notice would be a handicap to the opposition, but this problem would be faced. Some leaders, such as the Jan Sangh’s A.B. Vajpayee and rebel Congressman Krishna Kant, contended that all [garble] and [garble] detainees must be released, that all guidelines and restrictions on the press be removed, and that all curbs on public meetings be lifted. Vajpayee added that true to her style, the PM has again gambled, “but this time she might lose.” According to Samachar (with which the Communists have been feuding recently over distorted reporting), the CPI welcomed the news wholeheartedly, but also urged that the

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<sup>5</sup> In 1969, the Indian National Congress Party split into two factions: the Indian National Congress (O), “O” for “Organization,” which was led by Congress Party leaders opposed to Gandhi; and the Indian National Congress (R), “R” for “Requisition” or “Ruling,” which was led by Gandhi.

<sup>6</sup> Desai was imprisoned in 1975 for his opposition to the Emergency.

Emergency be lifted immediately. J.P. Narayan has reportedly been asked by opposition leaders to come to Delhi immediately to assist in the creation of a united non-Communist opposition party. We presume from all this that the opposition is not at this time actively considering boycotting the election. It remains to be seen whether it will review this option later.

7. We learn that the President is definitely proclaiming the dissolution of the Lok Sabha some time today and as of this evening the current session of the lower house will be considered to have been terminated. The result is that there is no chance of holding a so-called “lame-duck” session of the current Lok Sabha to approve a “vote on account.” Such a vote would allow the continued disbursement of government funds through the end of the financial year (March 31). This means that the newly-elected Lok Sabha will have to have a brief session immediately after the election and before March 31 to pass the “vote on account.” Later on, probably in April–May, it will reconvene for a more lengthy and leisurely regular budget session to consider and pass the budget for the new financial year beginning April 1.

**Schneider**

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**60. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, January 28, 1977, 1232Z

1326. Subject: India's Perceptions of Its Relations With the US.

Summary: Almost a year ago, the Indian Government began a modest effort to improve US-India relations both by quelling anti-US allegations and better taking into account U.S. concerns on certain international issues. More recently, senior Indian officials have appealed for better communications between the two governments. In response, the Charge in recent weeks has had a series of conversations with senior Indian officials concerning their views of US-Indian relations. These officials have without exception shown a desire for improved relations and, when questioned, expressed dissatisfaction with past ties. Such dissatisfaction has usually been expressed in terms

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77031–1003. Confidential; Exdis.

of what they have seen as the failure of the US properly to “understand” India, that is, to understand either the Indian Emergency or India’s regional interests in South Asia. Our discussions have revealed that Indian suspicions remain strong that the US has in some way been acting against India’s interests in South Asia. Our conversations also reveal continued Indian sensitivity that the USG does not consider India “important”; to this has been added an Indian rationale for importance: India’s role in maintaining South Asian stability and in building bridges between North and South in the dialogue between the developed and underdeveloped world. We conclude from these conversations that Indian suspicions of the US remain strong and are not likely to be altered easily. In regard to an Indian role in the North-South dialogue, we recommend that the USG develop a more specific bilateral economic dialogue with the GOI on issues of importance to us. Finally, we believe that general statements of policy regarding South Asia can be helpful in gaining greater confidence in our relations, but that they should be firmly grounded in the realities of our [omission in the original] improve relations with the US. The steps it has [omission in the original] have been modest but significant and they have been in response to positions set forth by the United States. We told the Indians the US would not be used as a political scapegoat and our relations could not prosper so long as we were accused of interfering in Indian affairs. Those accusations ceased almost a year ago. We asked the Indians to take into account US concerns regarding Puerto Rico and Korea at Colombo.<sup>2</sup> They did so, entering reservations on both resolutions. Indian officials from the Prime Minister down have shown great cordiality to Americans and have urged us to step up our communications. This Indian initiative is modest. Mrs. Gandhi still makes vague references to foreign interference and Indian positions on international issues—such as Law of the Sea and mass media—give us severe problems. But the fact is the GOI, for the [omission in the original] has come to us on its own initiative to seek better relations.

2. In response to India’s suggestions that we improve communications and in an effort to probe for Indian attitudes toward the relationship they wish to strengthen, the Charge has in recent weeks had a series of conversations with a group of senior Indian officials who have [omission in the original] relations; Professor P.N. Dhar, Secretary to the Prime Minister; G.P. Parthasarathi, head of the Ministry of External Affairs Policy Planning Council with the rank of Minister of State and Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary of the Government of India. Added to this was a conversation at which the Charge was present, between

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<sup>2</sup> The Non-Aligned Movement held a summit meeting at Colombo August 16–19, 1976.

Congressman Solarz and Mrs. Gandhi in early December.<sup>3</sup> This telegram summarizes certain views on US-India relations expressed by these officials.

3. All of our conversations have revealed an Indian desire for better relations. Since Indian efforts began long before the US elections, they are not related only to the new administration, although, at present, there is a sense of anticipation within the GOI that the prospects for a favorable US response have improved with the change in Washington. All of our conversations have also revealed a dissatisfaction with past US-India relations and it is these expressions of dissatisfaction which have been most revealing about Indian attitudes. During the past year Indian officials have deliberately been more restrained in the expression of views such as these; in this case we have sought their views and they have given them fully but carefully. The Department will recognize much that is familiar and only a little that is new.

4. Most Indians we have talked to have asked for a “better US understanding of India;” their meaning has varied somewhat but followed a general theme. Mrs. Gandhi spoke to Congressman Solarz about a lack of understanding in the US of “India’s difficulties” (i.e., the emergency). Her comment was her first and most vigorous response to Congressman Solarz’ question as to what the United States could do for India and it followed a 45-minute soliloquy on why the emergency was necessary. Thus she placed her first priority on US acceptance of her regime.

5. The theme that the US somehow does not understand India has emerged with surprising consistency in our other conversations. While, as in the case of Mrs. Gandhi, this has sometimes related to internal developments in India, more often it has concerned India’s regional interests. Thus P.N. Dhar spoke of inadequate US understanding of India’s interest in South Asian stability and the measures which India must take to preserve that stability. G.P. Parthasarathi spoke of the need for a better US understanding of India’s interest in the region. For his part, Mehta argued that if US-India relations were to be good the US should accept the practice of the resolution through bilateral negotiations of the problems of South Asian nations. In several of our conversations Indian officials (e.g. Dhar and Mehta) have alluded directly or indirectly to their suspicions that in some way the US has been acting against Indian interests in their relations with India’s neighbors. For his part, Parthasarathi implied that the US had resiled from

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 17522 from New Delhi, December 6, 1976, reported on Solarz’s December 2, 1976, discussion with Gandhi, during which Gandhi defended her decision to declare the Emergency in 1975. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760450–1291)

the US position on South Asia which Dr. Kissinger had set forth during his visit to India in Oct. of 1974. Dr. Kissinger had said that India had “a special role of leadership in South Asian affairs” and that “the US strongly supports the efforts of peaceful settlement on the subcontinent free of imposition or pressure or outside interference.”<sup>4</sup>

6. Another common view of US-India relations, which we have heard more than once from P.N. Dhar, is that the US attaches little importance to India. In our conversations, Indian leaders have argued that India’s role in both regional and world affairs should be of interest to the US. In the region Indian officials here have argued that the steps India takes in South Asia are designed to contribute to regional stability, and therefore should serve US interests. On the global scene, Foreign Secretary Mehta argued forcefully that the Indian role in the North-South dialogue should be of interest to the US. Mehta said that India had a strong interest in cooperative resolutions to North-South problems. He described India as a partly developed country which, because it is an exporter of manufactured goods and importer of commodities had some interests in common with the developed world. Mehta argued that India is therefore qualified to play a bridge-building role between the developed and underdeveloped world and asked if this was not of interest to the US. Other Indian officials have dealt with this subject more cautiously, Dhar simply citing difficulties India has had with the OPEC countries in the North-South dialogue and Parthasarathi making it clear that while India is a “partly developed country” and “moderate” nation which is interested in a cooperative outcome of the dialogue, it must strictly pursue its own interests within the Group of 77.<sup>5</sup>

7. Most of our conversations have revealed that the Indians are aware that there are certain issues which may cause problems in our relations. Parthasarathi, for example, took the initiative to raise the issue of human rights, saying that a deliberate policy of relaxation was in effect, that a number of political prisoners had been released and that more would be released. (The elections were announced after this conversation took place.) The others—Dhar, Mehta and Mrs. Gandhi herself have limited themselves to defenses of the Emergency, ranging from Mrs. Gandhi’s highly political argument that she had to declare the Emergency in order to maintain rational government to Mehta’s intellectual statement about the balance between the political and economic needs of the nation. There also is recognition that nuclear policy will be an early problem. Parthasarathi commented that failure to work

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<sup>4</sup> For the records of Kissinger’s October 1974 discussions in New Delhi, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 179–182.

<sup>5</sup> The G-77, a coalition of 77 developing UN member states, was founded in 1964 to promote the economic interests of its members.

out the Tarapur problem would be “a bad sign” in regard to US-India relations.<sup>6</sup> We have, however, received no indication just how seriously the GOI would view a possible cut off of US nuclear fuel for Tarapur. We have also discussed (at our initiative) the subject of arms transfers in the area and this led directly to discussions of the proposal to sell A-7s to Pakistan in the context of Pakistani plans to obtain a nuclear reprocessing facility.<sup>7</sup> Only Parthasarathi interrelated A-7s and the reprocessing facility in his reply; he expressed the view that the sale of arms would not prevent Pakistan from obtaining a reprocessing capability if this was what Pakistan wanted. The result would be Pakistan’s obtaining both A-7s and the facility. We pointed out in our discussions that India’s posture of opposing almost all major arms sales to Pakistan lacks conviction in view of the depleted state of Pakistani armaments and India’s clear superiority. When we mentioned a possible arms limitation agreement with Pakistan, both Mehta and Dhar recalled that this had already been discussed with Pakistan twice. Mehta said once the Pakistani elections<sup>8</sup> (and now, the Indian elections) had been completed India could speak to Bhutto again on this subject.

8. Comment: The comments which we have received from all sides about the lack of US understanding of India indicate that Indian doubts and suspicions about US policies and activities in South Asia remain unchanged. As the Department is aware, Mrs. Gandhi has for many years harbored suspicions that we oppose her regime and in some way have been engaging in activities directed against it. She has continued to harbor these views despite categorical assurances which she has received from both Ambassadors Moynihan and Saxbe and Secretary Kissinger. The declaration of the Emergency and the reaction to it of the US press and Congress has reinforced Mrs. Gandhi’s feelings that the US does not accept her government. Public and private expressions of US interference in India have ceased because we made it clear that US-India relations could not be satisfactory so long as they continued.

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<sup>6</sup> By the terms of a 1963 agreement between the United States and India, the U.S.-built Tarapur nuclear power station was supplied with enriched uranium from the United States for the anticipated 30-year lifespan of its two reactors. In return, India agreed to purchase fuel only from the United States, placed Tarapur under IAEA safeguards, and did not reprocess spent fuel unless both signatories agreed under the Joint Determination clause. Since India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive, the shipments of uranium from the United States to India were delayed. Telegram 14844 to New Delhi and Bombay, January 22, reported India’s January 21 aide-mémoire, which informed the Department that in order to maintain Tarapur’s output of electricity, nuclear fuel needed to arrive in India by February. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820081–1623, D770024–0458) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 237.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 232.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 234.



This does not mean, however, that Mrs. Gandhi no longer has doubts about us. In fact, the single thing Mrs. Gandhi would most like from the USG is probably an explicit indication that we accept her regime. It is not clear, however, that Mrs. Gandhi could effectively define exactly what she means by US "acceptance" of her regime. She and other Indians sometimes seem to interpret an opposition to Indian policies or actions and lack of understanding of Indian concerns and interests in the region of the subcontinent as "non-acceptance."

9. Suspicions that US policies in regard to India's neighbors are in some way designed to undermine India's interests also have a long history well known to the Department. That they remain is clear from our dialogue of recent weeks. Again Indian perceptions contrast sharply with reality as, with the exception of 1971, virtually all concrete US actions since 1965 have supported India's interests in South Asia. India's present day concerns seem more related to their perceptions of what we may be about to do rather than our past actions. Some of this may be tactics to keep us from changing our policies. When one probes, however, he finds deep suspicions which seem to have more than a tactical foundation.

10. We have perhaps contributed to this condition by occasional proposals or actions which seem to the GOI to be inconsistent with our stated policy such as our proposal to sell A-7s and our tactical maneuvering on the Farakka issue in New York (which caused the Indians to believe we were encouraging Bangladesh to move its resolution).<sup>9</sup> But the fact is that the GOI has been slow to recognize change in US policies and in the objective situation in South Asia. We have discussed this with the Foreign Secretary who on an intellectual plane attributes it to the slowness of governments to appreciate new international environments but who nevertheless continues to reflect his government's suspicions based upon earlier US policies. We therefore doubt that this condition can be easily or rapidly altered.

11. We find Foreign Secretary Mehta's remarks about India's role in the North-South dialogue of interest but they have that Indian quality of vagueness which frequently admits inconsistencies between declaration and action. We find a more realistic basis for judging India's role in the North-South dialogue in Parthasarathi's statement that, while India is a moderate and has an interest in cooperative solutions, India will pursue its own interests within the Group of 77. Indeed, we under-

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 5, Document 33. In November 1976, Bangladesh submitted a draft resolution to the UNGA Special Political Committee calling for an immediate resolution of the dispute regarding the Farakka Barrage and diversion of the Ganges waters. Pakistan withdrew the resolution after consultations between Bangladesh and India. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 208-210.



stand that India has in fact played a moderate role and as a result has on occasion been helpful to the US. We believe, therefore, that rather than rejecting Mehta's rationale we should try to make our bilateral dialogue with him and other Indian officials on international economic issues more specific. We should monitor Indian performance and discuss particular issues with senior Indian officials in Delhi. We have had some success with such a dialogue on political issues (Puerto Rico and Korea). In doing this, we should make sure that the notoriously uncoordinated GOI is aware at high levels of the effect of positions on economic issues taken by its negotiators at international conferences on US interests.

12. We conclude from our recent conversations that the Indians are quite sincere in their efforts to improve their relations with the US; it is clear that they would welcome a friendly and sympathetic statement of the view of the new administration regarding US relations with India. In considering how we might respond to the Indian initiative, we should, however, recognize that there are both difficult issues and a long history of distrust which may stand in the way of improvement. Sometimes in the past US statements of sympathy and appreciation have created exaggerated expectations in the minds of Indian officials. We believe that general statements of policy in regard to India can contribute to greater confidence in our relations but consider that such statements should be firmly grounded in the realities of our relations and our positions on issues between us which must be resolved. Such a course, we believe will best lead to the stable mature relationship which we have talked about for so long but thus far failed to achieve.

**Schneider**

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**61. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, January 31, 1977, 1145Z

1400. USCINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Morarji Desai Launches Janata Party Campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770033–1084. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and CINCPAC.

1. Morarji Desai, veteran Congress (O) leader and Chairman of the newly-formed Janata Party, launched the opposition's campaign at a mammoth public rally in Delhi on Jan 30. Estimates of the size of the crowd ranged from 50,000 (police estimate and that also used over VOA) to 150,000 (according to one of our local employees who was present). In his hour-long speech Desai outlined what will probably be the major planks of the Janata Party's manifesto. They follow closely the themes we touched on in New Delhi 1254.<sup>2</sup>

2. The issues were clear, Desai said: the elections were a choice between democracy and dictatorship, between law and lawlessness, between progress and false claims of progress. Desai added: "This election will determine the future of India. Democracy has been sufficiently weakened in India in the last [garble]. It has been sterilized. This election will decide whether we will remain an independent people or turn into a nation of slaves." He said that the Emergency had unleashed a "reign of terror" on the people and sought to refute Mrs Gandhi's claims that the Emergency was necessary to arrest the chaos created by the opposition. He regretted that the Prime Minister had branded him and his colleagues as traitors and enemies of the people. It was not the opposition which had indulged in character assassination, but rather Mrs Gandhi. Desai urged people to abjure violence and not to disturb the meetings of other political parties. Jan Sangh leader Atal Behari Vajpayee addressed the rally along similar lines and in particular criticized the government for allowing prices to rise. He also delivered a strong attack on the use of compulsion in the family planning campaign.

3. Desai avoided making a personal attack on the Prime Minister, criticizing instead her policies and actions during the Emergency. He ignored Sanjay completely. Opposition leaders may adhere to this line during the campaign in an effort to focus attention on issues rather than personalities. At one point Desai stated that his party's fight was against the ruling party and not against any individuals.

4. Janata Party rallies were held in other major cities as well. J.P. Narayan addressed a large public meeting in Patna and claimed that democracy was at stake in the elections. Janata Vice Chairman Charan Singh told a large crowd in Kanpur to throw the Congress out of power and thus save Indian democracy.

5. Although a common theme in the speeches was the demand for the release of all political prisoners and total lifting of the Emergency, it appears that Janata leaders are still undecided on whether this issue

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1254 from New Delhi, January 27, the Embassy outlined the campaign issues in the upcoming Indian elections and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the contending political parties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770030-1066)

will cause them to boycott the elections. A group of Janata Party leaders (including Vajpayee but excluding Morarji Desai) called on the Prime Minister on Jan 28 to press these demands. The same day Charan Singh stated in Lucknow that the Janata Party might reconsider its decision to participate in the elections if all opposition leaders and workers are not released immediately. However, at the Jan 30 Delhi rally, while Desai conceded that his party faced tremendous odds in the poll, he said it could not boycott the elections, since there was no other viable alternative.

6. Comment: The rally in Delhi was the first such opposition gathering since the rally of June 25, 1975 (held at the same venue) at which J.P. Narayan had repeated his call to security forces to disobey “illegal” orders. The Emergency was proclaimed in the early hours of the next morning. One of our local employees who attended yesterday’s rally estimated the crowd to be four times as large as the previous time. The audience was essentially middle class and seemed to consist mainly of people in government and private employment, teachers, students and shopkeepers. Large numbers of Sikhs and Muslims were present. During the speeches Janata leaders pleaded for contributions from the audience. The response reportedly was excellent, and many people seemed to go out of their way to offer donations.

**Schneider**

**62. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Trip to India

The logistics of the trip took up a lot of time, but everything worked out very well.<sup>2</sup> I think the Carters and everyone else involved were quite pleased. I am meeting with people in Hugh Carter's office to help them set up a more formalized procedure for meeting crises of this type. After that, I hope to back out of the administrative side.

Miss Lillian performed magnificently, and the reaction of the Indians was beyond all expectations. We consistently drew prime press coverage, getting considerably more attention than the Soviets or any other delegation. My guess is that we have not had such good press in India since our response to the famines of the late 1960s and perhaps even since the Chinese invasion of 1962.

Two points need to be made in this regard, however:

—We have to be careful that expectations do not get raised beyond reasonable levels. Some Indians are finding it hard to believe that Jimmy Carter is not also the savior of India.

—Secondly, this extremely favorable coverage and high-level attention was done at the behest of the Indian Government. The GOI clearly wants to improve relations with us, and I gather Mrs. Gandhi sees this to her advantage.

The election situation is quite confused. The Embassy is not willing to make any confident predictions and Mrs. Gandhi, herself, is running

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 17, India: 2-8/77. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, an unknown hand drew an arrow pointing to the initials "DA," which were crossed out, and wrote: "See note" with an arrow to Brzezinski's name where it appears as the addressee of the memorandum. See footnote 5 below.

<sup>2</sup> Thornton accompanied Lillian Carter on her trip to India. The party visited New Delhi February 13-14 to attend the funeral of Indian President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. While in New Delhi, Ms. Carter met with Prime Minister Gandhi. Telegram 2124 from New Delhi, February 13, reported that "Mrs. Gandhi said she had been deeply moved by the President's request to his mother to represent him at the funeral." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051-0580) After the funeral, Ms. Carter visited Bombay February 15-16. From 1966 until 1968, Ms. Carter served as a Peace Corps volunteer in India. For an account of her return to the village where she served, see William Borders, "Lillian Carter Goes 'Home' To Her Clinic Post in India," *New York Times*, February 16, 1977, p. 3.

very scared. I think that she will hold elections, though, and if I had to bet on the outcome it would be that she will win big. The opposition is a sad bunch of has-beens, and their election could lead to chaos. Whatever we may think of Mrs. Gandhi, she is the only force capable of holding India together.

I was favorably impressed by the political climate. I think the elections will be fair; the opposition is getting reasonable, if not equal, press coverage, and about the only political poster I saw frequently was one reminding Indians that their vote was secret.

For a host of reasons, I think the greatest danger would be that Mrs. Gandhi would feel that she had to postpone the elections. This is why I am glad the President has made favorable comment<sup>3</sup> and why I am appalled at the press treatment Mrs. Gandhi is receiving in the States. Bear in mind, incidentally, that I am no great admirer of hers and was ostracized by the Indian Ambassador for my known opposition to the emergency.

We had very few substantive discussions. The delegation, plus myself, called on the Foreign Minister for a pleasant courtesy call that was generally upbeat. Several of us met with Jagat Mehta, the Foreign Secretary. The conversation was wide ranging and thoughtful. He was clearly concerned about our policy on supply of nuclear fuel to the Tarpur power reactor<sup>4</sup> and provision of A-7s to Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> His message on the latter was that any A-7s would be bad; it is a question of type of aircraft rather than quantity. The Embassy in New Delhi will be doing a message on the conversation.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, two State officers and myself met with the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Sethna. Much of the conversation was highly technical but I sought (as with Mehta) to point out that we have a new Administration genuinely interested in nuclear reduction as well as nonproliferation.<sup>7</sup> We need to work cooperatively

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 60.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 232. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Aaron wrote: "ZB—The A7's have enormous range. DA."

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 2371 from New Delhi, February 17, provided an account of the February 14 conversation with Mehta, during which he noted that "climate of opinion in India and US was much improved for Indo-US relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770056-0266)

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 408 from Bombay, February 17, reported Thornton, Dubs, and Kux's meeting with Sethna in Bombay. During the discussion, Dubs "pointed out that the new administration is determined to consider nuclear problems within the framework of an overall approach which gives first priority to nonproliferation objectives. To this end it is making a study of all programs which affect nonproliferation including fuel supply. The study is targeted for completion at the end of February and it is hoped that decisions can be taken on urgent nuclear matters in March." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057-0298)

with India in finding broad nonproliferation strategies that meet both of our interests. Unofficially I encouraged Sethna to give us his ideas on what would be a good political context for India to make forward steps in the nonproliferation area. It will be interesting to see if he comes up with anything, and I will be in further touch with Jessica on this.

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**63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #3

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

2. *Alerts*

*India.* Despite the success of Mrs. Carter's visit to India<sup>2</sup> and the efforts of the Indian Government to improve relations with the U.S. there are some real clouds on the horizon:

—One is the issue of whether or not to continue our supply of nuclear fuel to the Indian power reactor at Tarapur.<sup>3</sup> This reactor provides a significant part of the electricity for the Bombay area.

—The second is the move to reduce India's share of IDA loans. It currently gets 40 percent; a disproportionate amount compared to other countries but far less than it would be entitled to on a per capita basis. We have also not provided for bilateral assistance to India in the current budget submission.

—The third item is the appearance in Indian newspapers of allegations that a very high-level CIA spy ring has been broken up in New Delhi.

Any of these might be manageable on an individual basis, and perhaps all of them can be managed together. But the Indian elections

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed at the top of the first page of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 62.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 60.

are coming up, political tempers are running high, and the press has virtually a free rein.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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**64. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #6

1. *Opinions*

*India's Political Future*

The election victory of the Janata Party in India seems to mark a major shift in Indian politics.<sup>2</sup> For the first time, a party other than Congress will rule; democracy and human rights should be fully restored; and a government is in power that will probably be less well disposed towards the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> The change, however, needs to be put in perspective. The victorious coalition lacks a common program and embraces widely different ideologies. Indeed, it is in many ways a carbon copy of the Congress Party but without an organizational framework. Its political weight is more to the right of center than Congress but in a country needing radical change, this is not necessarily a recommendation. Certainly India's objective problems remain. The possible pro-American tilt of the new government is also not without problems. Our ability to help India economically or politically is limited

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1521 from New Delhi, February 1, reported: "Leaders of the four main non-Communist opposition parties (Congress (O), Jan Sangh, BLD, and Socialist Party) organized to form a single Janata Party on Jan. 20. In the following week, leaders of the new party were announced. Congress (O) leader Moraji Desai is Chairman, BLD President Charan Singh is Deputy Chairman." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770035–0949) For the Carter administration's public statement on the new government, see footnote 3, Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> In a report on the political background of the newly-elected Indian Prime Minister, telegram 4161 from New Delhi, March 24, concluded that Desai "has strongly opposed Indian Communists and has criticized Indian policy as being tilted toward the Soviet Union." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770101–0042)

by objective factors and we may face expectations that we cannot fulfill. Further, no rational Indian Government can reject the Soviet Union as long as it feels threatened by China. Finally, some of the members of the ruling group hold chauvinistic views that could threaten the peace of the subcontinent and result in dangerous pressures on the nuclear front. In sum, we are facing a period of uncertainty and will want to take the measure of the new government very carefully before we adopt a definitive policy line towards it.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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## 65. Editorial Note

On March 27, 1977, the Department of State alerted multiple posts, including the Embassy in New Delhi, that President Jimmy Carter intended to announce nuclear power policy decisions related to an ongoing policy review. The Embassies were instructed to explain to senior government officials that although Carter's announcement focused on U.S. domestic nuclear power issues, it also had international ramifications. The Department noted that the statement announced a domestic moratorium on reprocessing and recycling of plutonium and, conjointly, increased restrictions on supplying nuclear fuel to countries that reprocessed spent fuel or showed indications of developing nuclear weapons capability. (Telegram Tosec 30017/67973 to multiple posts, March 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0698, N77002-0195)

In response to the Department's instructions, Deputy Chief of Mission David Schneider informed Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Singh Mehta on March 28 that "the US was consulting with only a small number of important states in advance of the President's announcement and went over orally the talking points in the Department's instructions." Mehta replied that "the US presentation would require considerable internal GOI examination. It would be difficult, he said, for the GOI to comment before April 1, particularly since a new government had entered into office only two days before." To the Department, Schneider commented: "While in an initial statement PriMin Desai indicated some flexibility regarding testing, I doubt that there will be a basic change in Indian nuclear policy." (Telegram 4381 from New Delhi, March 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056-2232, N770002-0212) On March 24, Desai made a brief statement regarding future Indian nuclear policy, the transcript of



which was sent to the Department in telegram 4323 from New Delhi, March 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770104–0566)

In a March 29 memorandum, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed President Carter that “our Embassy in New Delhi has supplied a cautious reading of Prime Minister Desai’s press statement that: ‘We do not believe in nuclear weapons at all. That policy stands. I do not know whether it is necessary to have a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, but if it is not necessary it should never be done.’” In the left-hand margin next to the quoted excerpt of Desai’s statement, Carter wrote: “We may use India’s position, if favorable, to influence the French/Pakistan sale.” Christopher continued: “Following a meeting with Foreign Secretary Mehta, our Embassy cabled that they doubt there will be a basic change in Indian nuclear policy. We need to test this judgment and to influence the new government in the right direction.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 3/77)

On April 1, Schneider met with Mehta, Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Homi Sethna, and Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Mullath Vellodi in order to discuss Carter’s upcoming nuclear policy statement. Schneider reported: “Their concerns turned out to be not so much related to the President’s general proposals as to GOI problems regarding Tarapur. They seem to be worried about the implications of extended discussions on general policies for finding an early way to keep Tarapur in operation.” After discussing storage pools for spent fuel at Tarapur, Vellodi “asked about the implications of the President’s announcement for Indian programs in the area of plutonium reprocessing, peaceful nuclear explosions, the use of plutonium in the Indian nuclear program and fast breeders. The Foreign Secretary asked what could India do about programs and facilities to which it had devoted resources and which might be affected by policies falling from the President’s announcement.” Schneider “replied that the President’s announcement would have implications for some of these matters and I believed that more specific questions such as these would be addressed at a later stage.” (Telegram 4686 from New Delhi, April 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2624, N770002–0371)

Carter gave his nuclear power policy statement on April 7. In comments to the press on the same day, he twice singled out India as an impetus for the new restrictions. Carter said that “we have seen recently India evolve an explosive device derived from a peaceful nuclear powerplant, and we now feel that several other nations are on the verge of becoming nuclear explosive powers.” Later in the press conference, when asked whether some nations were seeking reprocess-

ing technology in order to attain nuclear weapon capability, Carter answered: "Well, without going into specifics—I wouldn't want to start naming names—I think it's obvious that some of the countries about whom we are concerned have used their domestic nuclear powerplants to develop explosive capability. There is no doubt about it. India, which is basically a peaceful nation, at least as far as worldwide connotations are concerned, did evolve an explosive capability from supplies that were given to them by the Canadians and by us." The transcript of the press conference and the text of the policy statement are in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 581–588.

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**66. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, April 13, 1977, 1126Z

5286. Subject: Early US policy Toward the New Indian Government.

1. Begin summary: The outlines of Indian foreign policy are becoming clearer: moderate nonalignment, more balanced relations with global powers, but no marked change in relations with the USSR. We believe early GOI maneuvering to preserve its relationship with the Soviets should not trouble us. We do have important interests, however, in areas such as Indian democracy, the balance of India's relationship with global powers, and India's nuclear policy. We believe our current stance toward the new govt of making known our warm and friendly regard while leaving it to that govt in due course to let us know what relations it wishes, continues to be correct. We have some concern, however, regarding whether signals being received by the GOI from us are consistent with the first part of this stance. As far as the GOI is concerned our position regarding a cut back of India's multilateral assistance through IDA V remains unchanged.<sup>2</sup> We have been critical of India in our remarks on US nuclear policy. The issue of US arms sales to Pakistan has again arisen. Consequently I believe we should

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770128–0219. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.

<sup>2</sup> IDA V refers to the fifth replenishment of developmental loans given by the International Development Association. Under pressure from Congress, the Carter administration supported reducing India's 40 percent share of the loan allotment for South Asia. (Telegram 50289 to New Delhi, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770078–1094)

be on the lookout for things we can do to reinforce our stance of friendly sympathy for India's new democratic govt without taking the initiative on new programs. I recommend that we take an early decision to support India's share of IDA V at 40 percent. An early reply to Prime Minister Desai's warm substantive letter to the President would be helpful.<sup>3</sup> Any reassurance we could give the Indians regarding military sales to Pakistan would calm this area of GOI concern. Finally, if we are likely to approve another interim shipment of nuclear fuel for India an early decision would support our relations. End summary.

2. The foreign policies of the new Indian Govt are gradually emerging in clearer form. Indian performance at the Nonaligned Coordinating Committee meetings adds further evidence that India will remain a dedicated member of the movement but that the trend in its policies will continue toward the side of moderation.<sup>4</sup> It also is evident that the Indians desire no marked change in their relations with the Soviet Union but they will practice a more balanced form of nonalignment; they will gradually back away from what the previous govt called a "special relationship" with the Soviet Union,<sup>5</sup> substituting more equal relations with the US, China and the USSR. India will seek to do this in ways which it hopes will not deprive it of the benefits it receives from the USSR and which will take into account the mutual interests it has with that country. The new govt's early initiative with the Soviets is understandable. It wishes to counteract the impression that a major shift toward the West was to take place. This explained the talk between Foreign Minister Vajpayee and Soviet Ambassador Maltsev and the invitation to Gromyko to visit Delhi in late April.<sup>6</sup>

3. It appears to us that this early maneuvering poses no threat to our interests and indeed it would be a tactical mistake for us, by early actions in our relations with the GOI, to suggest that we were bidding against the Russians. Only grief came from this process when we practiced it here in the past and there is little reason for us to do it now

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<sup>3</sup> In an April 2 letter to Carter, Desai expressed hope that India and the United States could strengthen bilateral cooperation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 5, President, Europe and Asia, 12/29/77–1/6/78: Stop Papers, New Delhi, 1/1–3/78 [I])

<sup>4</sup> The NACC Foreign Ministers meeting took place in New Delhi April 6–11. A summary of the final communiqué is in telegram 5196 from New Delhi, April 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770126–0553, D770128–0578)

<sup>5</sup> Regarding India's "special relationship" with the Soviet Union under Gandhi's leadership, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 257.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 4844 from New Delhi, April 5, the Embassy analyzed Vajpayee and Maltsev's meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770118–0344) Telegram 6035 from New Delhi, April 27, reported on Gromyko's April 27 meeting with Desai. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770147–0186)

in view of favorable trends in Indian foreign policy which are taking place without any US stimulus whatsoever.

4. We do have important interests at stake in India, however, and should keep under continuous examination what we should be doing to protect them. First, of course, is Indian democracy; the changes in India have made the world a somewhat more congenial place for us. While the salvation of Indian democracy will have to come largely from within the country, there will be things that we can do to help and our interest in India's form of govt should be sufficient justification. We also have an interest in India's maintaining a better balance in its relations with global powers. Although we should not expect major change, we can see prospect of continued improvement (and this process began under Mrs. Gandhi's govt) in Indian conduct in multilateral institutions; India will still vote against colonialism and imperialism and with the nonaligned but there will be occasional issues on which it may depart from the Soviets in ways that are helpful. For example, at the nonaligned meetings they argued against Guyana and Cuba on Puerto Rico and once again entered a reservation when their position was not accepted. It is in our interest to encourage this process. We also have an interest in India's nuclear policy and whatever new flexibility may exist as a result of the change in govt. We caution, however, that too much should not be read into the Prime Minister's press conference remarks about testing.<sup>7</sup> Indian Atomic Energy Chairman Sethna, for example, told our Consul General in Bombay that he had spoken to the Prime Minister about his statement on explosions and Moraji had said that there would be no explosions unless there was a clear need for them. This, according to Sethna, was only a restatement of existing policy. Nevertheless, there is a new govt on the scene which must make decisions on nuclear policy and the manner in which we start out with them is important to our interests.

5. Thus far the Embassy has recommended that we not crowd the new govt and that we remain in the stance of making known our warm and friendly regard for the new govt while leaving it to that govt in due course to let us know what relations it wishes. While we believe this continues to be the proper US stance, subject to continual testing as our communications develop with the new people, we have some concerns as to whether we are, in fact, actually fulfilling the first part of this stance. We have commented favorably on the election process

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<sup>7</sup> At a press conference on March 24, Desai publicly stated his reservations about nuclear testing. (Telegram 4311 from New Delhi, March 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770103-0112)

and the President has sent a friendly letter.<sup>8</sup> The Indians have told us that their policy will emerge in the form of the actions they take rather than declarations and, indeed, they probably look to our actions for similar indications. They are probably receiving conflicting signals. As far as they know it remains our intention to cut back sharply on India's share of multilateral assistance through IDA V. If the new Prime Minister has not yet been briefed on this he will be soon and it will come as a surprise. The Indians will also have noted that in another area of policy concern to the US we have been critical of India; India was the only country singled out for critical comment in our announcement of our domestic nuclear policy.<sup>9</sup> The new govt has gone through its first experience with US arms sales to Pakistan. Although to us that was a minor transaction, the Foreign Minister was concerned by it; perhaps because he has not gone through the confidence building experience by which the previous govt became accustomed to routine sales. In addition, reports have now hit the Delhi press of the military equipment the US might sell to Pakistan if that country gives up a reprocessing facility. Finally, the word will filter up to members of the new government that the US is moving very slowly and cautiously in regard to a bilateral aid program.

6. I believe that some of these US signals are in order as it is best that the GOI be aware of our views at the outset so that we can avoid unnecessary surprises later. Thus the Indians know that we have differences on nuclear policy. Since there is a danger of overexpectation on the part of the new govt (some of the strong anti-Communists in it formed their views years ago when the US was understood to reward its friends with resources) the GOI should know of our concerns about a possible new bilateral aid relationship and our views about its possible dimensions. We should be on the lookout, however, for things we can do to reinforce our stance of friendly sympathy for India's new democratic govt without our taking the initiative on new programs. I can think of several ways we might do this at present. We could make an early decision to support retention of India's share of IDA V at 40 percent. Should we do this, we ought to inform the Indians right away. They know we decided to reduce their share because of opposition to India on the Hill and they would consequently understand that a change was a result of Washington's very favorable reaction to the return of India to democracy. This would be a good message to get across in such a concrete way; our actions would be seen as consistent

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<sup>8</sup> Telegram 67742 to New Delhi, March 26, conveyed Carter's congratulations on Desai's assumption of office and the reaffirmation of the democratic process. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770105-0060)

<sup>9</sup> See Document 65.

with what we have said about the elections. Another helpful move might be a reply to Moraji's warm and substantive letter responding to the President's message of congratulations. There may be some reason for the President to send such a letter before Ambassador Goheen arrives.<sup>10</sup> Reply need not deal specifically with substance but instead could set the stage for the Ambassador's doing so after his arrival and in the interim maintain the atmosphere of sympathetic interest. If a letter is sent care should be exercised that it not arrive too close to the Gromyko visit as we would not wish it to appear designed to offset any Soviet initiative. Another area of Indian concern is our nuclear discussions with Pakistan and what military equipment we may (or, rather, may not) be prepared to offer Pakistan in return for its giving up a reprocessing facility. Anything which we might be prepared to tell the Indians, particularly about whether or not A-7 aircraft are in our negotiating package, could have a helpful effect on the atmosphere here. Finally, if we are likely to approve another interim shipment of nuclear fuel for India, it would support our overall relations and our negotiating position on nuclear matters if we did so soon. It is good that we are now moving promptly to assist them to solve their problem of how to store additional spent fuel. The more we squeeze the Indians on Tarapur fuel and storage without making basic policy decisions, the more we raise their frustrations and lower their estimate of our regard for them.

7. With the Nonaligned Conference out of the way I now intend to call on the Foreign Minister and follow up with courtesy calls on certain other members of the govt. These calls will duplicate what Ambassador Goheen will do some weeks later but I believe we cannot afford to wait; we need to be in contact and I don't trust the filter between the official and political level. I intend to make these calls only as substantive as the Indian Ministers wish them to be. But I will indicate our friendly interest in the new govt. I would plan to tell the Foreign Minister that we see no need to hurry in developing our ties and that in fact we see merit in proceeding carefully in order to preserve stability in our relationship. I would hope that I might be authorized to comment favorably on the moderation and balance shown by the GOI in managing the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference here. Other Embassy officers are already making contact at other levels within the Janata Party and Congress for Democracy. The new govt is composed of people of widely varying views and we will be unable finally to assess its policies and judge our response without a much more thorough knowledge of its personalities.

Schneider

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<sup>10</sup> On April 7, Carter nominated Goheen as Ambassador to India. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 578*)

**67. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, April 18, 1977, 1212Z

5522. Subject: GOI Reaction to US Nuclear Power Policy.

1. In the absence of the Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs Secretary Vellodi called in the Charge April 15 to convey India's initial reaction to the President's statement on nuclear power policy.<sup>2</sup> Vellodi's statement followed a visit to Delhi by Indian Atomic Energy Chairman Sethna and therefore may be viewed as a considered GOI position on US policy as set forth thus far.

2. Initially, Vellodi reviewed Indian concerns about Tarapur along lines already reported to the Department. In regard to the President's nuclear power statement, he said that Foreign Secretary Mehta had already conveyed an initial reaction (New Delhi 5220)<sup>3</sup> to the specific references made to India. Citing the reference to "Canada's unfortunate experience" Vellodi reviewed the long Indian negotiations with Canada which had resulted in an agreement which, however, the Canadian Government did not ratify with the result that all cooperation was terminated.<sup>4</sup> Although the GOI could have taken the position that Canada had acted unilaterally and therefore might have abrogated the agreement, the GOI had not prevented the continuation of bilateral safeguards.

3. Vellodi then turned to the substantive portions of the President's statement explaining that he understood further elaboration would be forthcoming. He said that the GOI had started a nuclear power program 20 years ago, taking into account its energy needs and alternate sources of power. It had made a considerable investment in resources and technology and committed these for the future. Any suggestion that this program should be radically modified would be extremely difficult for the GOI to accept. In regard to the fast breeder reactor, Vellodi said, the GOI was interested in using its known large resources of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133–1131. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 65.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5220 from New Delhi, April 12, reported Mehta's "impromptu personal comments" regarding Carter's nuclear policy statement, which noted the statement's "discriminatory aspects." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770128–0589, D770126–0740)

<sup>4</sup> Canada terminated its supply of nuclear fuel and technology to India after allegations that Canadian materials were used in India's 1974 nuclear test. For more information on the Indo-Canadian nuclear relationship after India's nuclear test, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 201.



thorium which were of great importance because Indian uranium resources are of very low grade. Vellodi said the US meaning regarding examination of new fuel cycles was unclear. If the US proposal implies that India must scrap or introduce modifications in its existing and planned programs, the GOI would be faced with an almost impossible task.

4. In conclusion Vellodi said the GOI was always prepared to discuss these nuclear policy matters on a bilateral basis as it has been doing. Its initial reaction, however, is one of concern that the US proposal would present almost insurmountable difficulties for the Indian nuclear program. In reply the Charge drew from State 067973<sup>5</sup> and the President's announcement to indicate that the US recognizes the importance many nations attach to nuclear power and wishes to explore a variety of measures to assure access by all nations to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel storage. He said that consultations on these subjects would continue as US policies are refined.

**Schneider**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 65.



**68. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) and the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Nooter) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1977

*Bilateral Aid to India*

*Issue for Decision*

In view of the changed situation in India,<sup>2</sup> we need a position on a possible resumption of bilateral development assistance to India.

*Background/Analysis*

We have not had a bilateral development lending program with India since 1971 when we suspended this type of aid. We have, however, continued PL 480 programs and these totaled \$225 million in FY 1976 and \$150 million in FY 1977. (The amount dropped because the Indians did not need U.S. wheat.) We have also contributed substantial assistance for Indian development indirectly through the World Bank's soft money window, IDA. At the present lending level under IDA IV, India is receiving \$600 million annually of which about \$200 million is attributable to the U.S. share of overall IDA funding. With the full IDA V replenishment, the U.S. indirect lending might increase to over \$300 million annually.

*Case for Bilateral Aid.* While the Indian economy has substantially improved in recent years, basic long-term problems remain: low per capita income, inadequate agricultural growth rate, high unemployment and underemployment, a substantial debt burden and inadequate domestic capital formation. The Desai Government has stressed the need for more rapid development emphasizing fuller employment and increased production in agriculture and small scale industry. These objectives are consistent with A.I.D.'s Congressional mandate.

In addition to a clear developmental requirement, offering to resume aid would be a positive political signal. It is also appropriate that we give recognition to a country like India that improves its human rights stance.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850085–1790. Confidential. Sent through Richard Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Drafted by Kux and Priscilla Boughten (Office of Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, Bureau for Asia, AID); cleared by Thornton, Hoopengardner (Department of the Treasury), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Paul Boeker, and Atwood.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to the new government; see Document 64.

*Case Against Bilateral Aid.* The argument against a resumption of aid rests on the history of past problems. Our large-scale assistance program of the 1950s and 1960s created frictions because of Indian sensitivity to what they perceived as U.S. intrusion into Indian domestic economic policy and their resentment about the debtor-creditor relationship.

The Indians are unlikely to prove any less prickly on aid matters in the future. An argument can be made that our overall bilateral relationship would be strengthened by concentrating on helping the Indians with multilateral assistance, PL 480 and trade concessions without resuming bilateral lending.

*Size and Tactics.* The Development Coordinating Committee (DCC) reviewed the India aid question and agreed we should be willing in principle to resume bilateral development aid at a modest level in FY 78 (at about the \$60 million level), and design a sharply focused, low profile program. A dialogue with the Indian Government is essential to be absolutely certain that a mutually satisfactory program can be designed and also to see whether the new government really wants us back in the bilateral aid business. Treasury believes we should not pursue the aid question in an aggressive manner.

At the same time, the Development Coordinating Committee agreed that in terms of our North/South strategy and bilateral relations with India, the IDA V replenishment should have the highest priority in terms of trying to mobilize support on the Hill. State, AID and NSC hope it will be possible to obtain the full IDA V appropriation without any implied USG commitment to seek a cut in India's 40 percent share and believe that this level is reasonable in terms of absorptive capacity and economic criteria. Ultimately, India's share of IDA V commitments will depend on the Bank Board's review of lending criteria. Treasury does not wish to prejudge the outcome of this review and believes that it would be premature to attempt to arrive at a justifiable share for India before studies of IDA lending criteria now in progress within the USG and the World Bank have been completed.

We do not need to take any action on the Hill at this time on bilateral aid. Although we have not included India in our FY 1978 AID budget request, there is a good chance Congress will, on its own initiative, authorize an Indian program of about \$60 million within our existing FY 1978 request. Our ability to accommodate a \$60 million program will depend upon the size of Congressional cuts and their impact on AID's existing programs. Thus, if we discuss FY-78 AID with the Indians, we will say that we are prepared to consider a program at the \$60 million level if they are interested, but that the actual amount would, of course, be subject to adjustment as a result of final Congressional action on the AID appropriation request. A budget supplemental

later in the year is possible although we will have to judge whether it is practical at the time.

We have considered the question of India's nuclear reprocessing capability as a possible bar to bilateral aid under the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 669). Concerned offices in AID and State agree that the Indians are not in violation. Since Section 669 was passed in June 1976 they have not delivered or received, to or from any other country, any "nuclear processing or enrichment equipment, materials or technology." Before entering into a bilateral program with India, we would acquaint them with this provision in our law in view of their possible future potential to produce and export the proscribed item.

### *Options*

Basically, there are two choices:

—We can leave matters as they are, and not resume a bilateral program. We would, however, continue our PL 480 aid and our assistance through multilateral lending agencies.

—We can decide in principle to resume a bilateral program if India wants one.

State (NEA and EB) AID, NSC and Treasury all concur in our resuming a bilateral program. With regard to size, there is agreement that we should have only a medium sized program for FY 78 (presumably at about the \$60 million level, subject to adjustment based on actual appropriation levels). We do not have to decide now on the size of a FY 79 program.

### *Recommendation:*

That you approve our willingness in principle to resume bilateral lending to India should the Indians be interested, with a program for FY 1978 tentatively estimated at about \$60 million, subject to the caveat on actual appropriation noted above. Informal technical discussions could commence in Delhi after Ambassador-designate Goheen arrives (in mid-May) but we would pace these carefully to avoid creating problems for IDA V on the Hill.<sup>3</sup>

ALTERNATIVELY, that we stay with the status quo, and not resume bilateral assistance for India.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The recommendation was neither approved nor disapproved. Minnies drew an arrow from the Approve option to the bottom of the page where he wrote: "Cooper & Vance discussed issue. Cooper subsequently held meeting & it was agreed that instructions should be drafted that approved resumption of discussions—at a slow pace—on bilateral assistance for India. Todd Minnies 5/19." Minnies also noted that Kux, one of the drafters of the action memorandum, "was at above meeting."

<sup>4</sup> The alternative was neither approved nor disapproved.

## 69. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of April 2<sup>2</sup> responding to my message of congratulations on your election.<sup>3</sup> Shortly after assuming office, I wrote to your predecessor, suggesting that we might occasionally exchange views on matters of importance to our two countries.<sup>4</sup> Now that you have had some time to settle in on your new duties, I would like to make the same proposal to you.

I read with great interest your eloquent address to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting and found in it many themes that are identical to my own views.<sup>5</sup> The combination of self-reliance and helping others whenever possible is also a basic American belief. We share, too, a common interest in narrowing the economic gap between wealthier and poorer nations; this is certainly a major commitment of my Administration. There is a lengthy agenda of development issues that our two countries will be addressing bilaterally and in multilateral meetings. Since our goals are the same, I am sure we can find broad agreement on the best ways to reach them. We take pride in having helped India in the past, and we are prepared to help again in the future.

Our two countries are also concerned with questions of peace and security. Here, too, our goal is identical—a peaceful, stable, and just world—and I am sure we can agree on many of the steps to take.

You and your predecessors have frequently emphasized the need to reduce danger of nuclear weapons. I share your concern; as I said in my Inaugural Address, our ultimate goal should be the abolition of nuclear weaponry.<sup>6</sup> As first steps toward this goal, we have made far-reaching proposals to the Soviet Union. I hope they will give us a positive response. This is a long and difficult road, however, and I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 5, President, Europe and Asia, 12/29/77–1/6/78: Stop Papers, New Delhi, 1/1–3/78 [I]. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 66.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 66.

<sup>4</sup> Carter's message to Gandhi was sent in telegram 30678 to New Delhi, February 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770048–0799)

<sup>5</sup> The text of Desai's address to the NACC is in telegram 4981 from New Delhi, April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121–0756)

<sup>6</sup> The text of Carter's inaugural address is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 1–4.

hope that I can count on your support and advice as we take each step ahead.

As you know, my government has studied the problem of nuclear proliferation, and we have recently taken some steps, at considerable potential cost to ourselves, to demonstrate our commitment. We continue to support the spread of nuclear technology related to legitimate energy needs, but we strongly believe that this must be accomplished in ways that minimize the danger of military applications. Nuclear explosive technology is particularly dangerous; that is why I paid close attention to your comments on India's program. You will, of course, make your decisions on the basis of Indian interests; but I am confident that your decisions will also reflect the long-term needs of all mankind.

In the areas of potential conflict near India, the Middle East and Africa, there is no basic difference in Indian and American views. We intend to pursue peace in the Middle East as a matter of highest priority. Although many serious problems remain unresolved, my talks with Israeli and Arab leaders indicate a basic willingness on both sides to move toward peace and a realization that the price of failure would be terribly high.

In Southern Africa, also, the time has come for action. Clearly the only viable and just solution to the Zimbabwe and Namibia problems is one that assures rule by the majority. We will work actively toward that end. I am also acutely aware of the problems posed by the apartheid system in South Africa. The cause of justice that Mahatma Gandhi championed there must become a reality.

As we approach discussions with the Soviet Union concerning demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, I would welcome any suggestions that you might have on realistic means of resolving this issue and meeting the legitimate needs of all interested parties.

As you know, the United States is firmly committed to a policy of development and independence for all South Asian states. India and its neighbors should be free to focus on developmental tasks rather than armaments. We support normalized relations among Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, free from external involvement, and have been greatly impressed by your progress in reducing tensions. We seek no special role for ourselves and want to do nothing that will upset this process.

I ask your indulgence for having written at length, but I am convinced that mutual understanding between India and the United States is a vital element of world peace. My interest in India stems from my mother's years there. From her experience, and my own, I know that Indians and Americans share many basic values and care deeply about fundamental human rights. Two countries as diverse as ours will not agree on all matters; our shared interests and values should, however,

provide a sound framework within which we can work out specific differences. Ambassador Goheen is perhaps uniquely qualified to represent the United States in these terms. I look forward to staying in close touch with you through him and directly as we each shoulder our new responsibilities.

Sincerely,<sup>7</sup>

Jimmy Carter

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<sup>7</sup> At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: "With best personal wishes—J.C."

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## 70. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in London<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 6, 1977, 0109Z

Tosec 40024/103235. Subject: Action Memorandum: Nuclear Cooperation With India (S/S/ No. 7711932). For the Secretary from Christopher.

1. Issue for decision. We need to decide on a strategy to deal with India, including an executive branch position on a long-pending license before the NRC<sup>2</sup> for the export of slightly enriched uranium fuel for two reactors at Tarapur.

2. Background/Analysis. India is the sole third world country which has tested a device, using plutonium from the CIRUS reactor built with Canadian assistance and heavy water obtained in part from the U.S.<sup>3</sup> As the possessor of additional unsafeguarded facilities as well as access to substantial unsafeguarded plutonium, India poses a significant nuclear problem.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770158-0782. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Ober and Nosenzo; cleared by Dubs, Nye, Energy Adviser Richard Ahearn (S), and Van Doren, and in ERDA, DOD, and S/S; approved by Christopher. Vance was in London with Carter May 5-11 to attend the G-7 Economic Summit and a NATO Ministerial meeting.

<sup>2</sup> The Nuclear Regulatory Commission controlled U.S. exports of nuclear fuel to foreign consumers. Although the NRC had the authority to deny licenses for shipments, the President could override a NRC decision (subject to a congressional veto).

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976, Document 163. CIRUS was the Canadian-built research reactor at Bhabha Atomic Research Center near Mumbai, India.

3. Our immediate problems relate to Tarapur and what we should do about the heavy water at CIRUS.

4. Our overall goals are to induce India

—to forego further nuclear testing;

—to adopt export policies similar to ours;

—to eventually put all its activities under safeguards. Of all the above conditions, the last will clearly be the most difficult for India to accept.

5. Political/nonproliferation context. India is the symbol for many Americans of the misuse of civil nuclear cooperation for explosive purposes. The previous administration's weak reaction to the Indian explosion led to severe criticism. A U.S. decision now to go ahead with continued supply to Tarapur could be seen as a quote business as usual unquote attitude. On the other hand, action to cut off supply to Tarapur could jeopardize controls we now have over U.S. fuel already in India. A U.S. cutoff could also have the effect of driving the new Desai government toward the Soviets and would be damaging to bilateral relations. Desai's nuclear policies will probably take shape gradually. His March 24 public remark implied opposition to testing: quote if it is not necessary to have (peaceful nuclear explosions), we should not have them.<sup>4</sup> Unquote. But elements in the new government aligned with the nationalist Jan Sangh Party have in the past favored a nuclear weapons policy.

6. A cutoff of Tarapur fuel could drive India to seek further nuclear independence and lead the non-aligned and LDC's in a coalition of nuclear cooperation that could undermine the existing nonproliferation regime.

7. Tarapur fuel supply. In accordance with the 1963 agreement and the implementing contract, the U.S. is obligated to provide enriched uranium for the two Tarapur reactors until October 1993. In turn, the Indians are obligated to use only U.S. fuel and to accept safeguards on the facilities and fuel. The reactors, built under our aid program, provide 15 percent of the power in the west Indian states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, having a combined population of 77 million (1971).

8. The U.S. supplies various grades of enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride for the reactors. The fuel is fabricated into the fuel assemblies by India, a process that takes about a year. The last license for fuel was approved in July. In the absence of fresh fuel, the Indians have been running the fabrication facilities on scrap (and consequently at 20 percent capacity) since February 1977. Key

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 66.



questions are whether and when to supply additional fuel, and how best to handle the spent fuel from Tarapur.

9. New fuel needs to reach India this month to enable the Indians to resume full operation of their fuel fabrication facilities and to operate the Tarapur reactors efficiently beyond the middle of next year. The current shipment could arrive as late as August without causing a total shutdown of the fabrication plant. Since there is a substantial inventory of fabricated fuel assemblies for the reactors, we could withhold fuel until spring 1978 without actually affecting operation of the reactors; but this would close the fabrication facility and almost completely draw down the inventory of fuel. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission vehemently objects to this possibility. Prime Minister Desai told Parliament April 6 that quote if there is a delay beyond May 1977 (in the fuel arrival), the operation of Tarapur . . . could be affected by mid-1978. Unquote. Desai went on to say that India had informed the U.S. of the quote adverse effect unquote of a delay on the power situation in western India, and had quote emphatically unquote conveyed its view that such delays were not consistent with the Tarapur agreement.<sup>5</sup>

10. Options. We appear to have four options:

First: Cut-off the supply. A Cut-off of the fuel supply to Tarapur would satisfy those who do not want nuclear cooperation with India so long as it does not renounce further testing and is not a signatory to the NPT. If we cut off fuel supply, the reactor operation would have to be stretched out by reducing power levels and then shut down unless the Indians made arrangements with the Soviets to replace us as the source. We believe the Soviets are prepared to replace us if they can do so consistent with the London guidelines.<sup>6</sup> The Indians could argue that our action is a material breach of the 1963 agreement, which specifically obligates us to fuel the reactors. They could claim that India was relieved of its obligation to maintain safeguards at Tarapur and to obtain our approval for reprocessing of the Tarapur spent fuel.

Second: Orderly disengagement/interim shipment. If disengagement is the strategy adopted, we believe it is important to try for an orderly withdrawal under which the Tarapur spent fuel is removed and its reprocessing in India avoided. Under this option we would inform the Indians we are prepared to recommend that the NRC

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<sup>5</sup> Desai's April 6 responses to questions from the Lok Sabha were reported in telegram 5027 from New Delhi, April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121-0900)

<sup>6</sup> The London Guidelines, which were adopted between 1975 and 1978 by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, sought to regulate the spread of nuclear fuel by limiting exports of materials, equipment, and technology to non-nuclear states unless those states complied with IAEA safeguards.



approve a final fuel shipment, but we would require advance assurances on the continued safeguarding of all U.S. fuel, including spent fuel, and agreement in principle on its disposition.

Third: Withhold fuel unless and until Indians agree to all our new conditions and policies. This would be the best choice if it would work. The problem is that there is little chance of successful negotiations. The new Indian Government, relying on the conclusions of U.S. experts Last and Kiefer,<sup>7</sup> has put itself on the record as to the quote adverse effect unquote of any delay in fuel supply. We would be putting the new government in a corner before it had time to shake down its position. If unsuccessful, we would find ourselves poorly positioned for orderly disengagement. It is doubtful if the resulting damage to bilateral relations could be confined only to the nuclear area. We would be forcing the Indians into closing down their Tarapur fuel fabrication operation in August if no agreement is reached by that date (with probable cutbacks in reactor power to stretch out existing fuel), and into seeking Soviet fuel.

Fourth: Early negotiations/recommend NRC approve interim shipment. U.S. leverage with the Indians would be maximized if we ship additional fuel under the pending license while we try to negotiate understanding on outstanding nonproliferation issues. The fuel shipment we would offer to supply would allow the Indians, after they complete processing the remaining scrap in August, to run their fabrication facility for another six months at full capacity. However, they will not be able to complete fabrication of any additional fuel rods until we provide them with a further shipment of a different enrichment, essential to fabrication of full assemblies. In this way, we would be responsive to Indian desire to keep their fabricating facility in operation while not in fact providing the complete mix needed for reactor fuel assemblies. This should meet Desai's political needs while providing time to try to negotiate an overall nuclear understanding.

We would advise the Indians that, consistent with our nonproliferation legislation,<sup>8</sup> detonation of an Indian nuclear explosive device would result in the termination of fuel supply. We would also follow up on an earlier Indian suggestion that unsafeguarded U.S. origin heavy water at CIRUS be combined with U.S. origin heavy water in the Rajasthan reactors under safeguards.

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<sup>7</sup> George Last and William Kiefer, contractors for the Department of State, were sent to India in September 1976 in order to assess the fuel supply levels at Tarapur. (Telegram 2334 from Bombay, September 7, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760337–0694) They reported that fuel production would be affected if a shipment of enriched uranium arrived later than May 1977. (Telegram 689 from Bombay, March 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770100–1055)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 6.

If we proceed cautiously and avoid putting Desai in a corner, we appear to have some prospect of influencing Indian nuclear policy in the direction of our long-term objectives although negotiations will be difficult. If we fail, there could be domestic U.S. criticism that supply should have been cut off earlier. But an effort toward orderly disengagement may still be possible at that point.

11. Conclusions: Under the circumstances, we favor option 4. Without undercutting our overall nonproliferation posture, an interim shipment provides time to see whether a satisfactory understanding on nuclear matters can be achieved with Desai. It will also avoid presenting the new government, which we have warmly welcomed, with a strongly negative political signal. In addition, this should act as a clarification of U.S. policy to foreign observers by signalling a U.S. willingness to negotiate rather than impose new conditions in existing agreements.

12. Recommendation: That you authorize us to inform the Indians that we are prepared in principle to recommend NRC approval of a further interim shipment if they agree to early negotiations on outstanding nuclear questions.<sup>9</sup> (Option 4)

Clearances: State—NEA: ADubs, T: Mr. Nye, OES: Mr. Nosenzo, ACDA: CVanDoren, ERDA: GHelfrich, DOD: Col. Harlow, Energy Adviser: Mr. Ahearn. NSC views are being cabled by septel to Brzezinski.<sup>10</sup>

**Christopher**

<sup>9</sup> Vance approved the recommendation. (Telegram Secto 4008 from London, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-1260, N770003-0268)

<sup>10</sup> No telegram was found. In a May 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, upon which an unknown hand wrote: "Sent to ZB via DACOM 5/5pm," Aaron outlined the NSC Staff's view on the Department of State's recommended proposal to the Indian Government. He noted that Tuchman had "serious doubts and reservations about the wisdom of this step," while Thornton supported the initiative in order to have an impact on Indian nuclear policy and to send the Desai government a positive signal. Aaron considered it detrimental to the administration's overall non-proliferation goals. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, David Aaron, Box 214, Aaron, David: Chron File, 5/1977) Telegram Tosec 40243/107344 to New Delhi, May 13, informed the Embassy of Vance's decision and directed it to convey the message to the Desai government that the Carter administration would recommend that the NRC issue an export license on the condition that India agreed to negotiations on other nuclear questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770168-0437) The instructions were rescinded, however, after Carter approved delaying action on the issue until he returned from London. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Aaron and Tuchman, May 11; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Desai (Prime Minister) Visit to US: 6-9/78, Nuclear, 5/77-4/78) The Department communicated the instruction to delay informing the Indians to the Embassy in telegram 107972 to New Delhi, May 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770169-0315)

**71. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*Nuclear Supply to India.* We will inform the Indian Ambassador tomorrow that we have decided to recommend an interim supply of low-enriched uranium for India on condition that they agree to early negotiations with us on outstanding nuclear issues. Our Charge in New Delhi will make a parallel approach there and we will be advising concerned members of Congress of the decision. When we receive official confirmation of India's willingness to negotiate, we will advise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Executive Branch support for the shipment. Making an interim shipment such as we envisage will provide time to see whether a satisfactory understanding on nuclear matters can be worked out with Desai and his new government.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 5/77. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "To Warren, J."

<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Do not ship India any fuel unless they agree to the strictest international safeguards—Similar to what Canada demands."

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**72. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*Nuclear Supply to India.* My note to you Thursday night on this subject<sup>2</sup> was unclear in that it did not point out that, under the terms of its Agreement for Cooperation with us, India is *already committed* to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 5/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 71.

accept strict safeguards for the proposed interim supply of fuel for Tarapur that we recommended. (These IAEA-administered safeguards are identical to those which will apply to the exports of highly-enriched uranium that you approved prior to your departure for London.) In addition, following the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, an exchange of letters with the Indians was negotiated which effectively rules out the use of the plutonium in our spent fuel in a nuclear device.

Consistent with the policies you have announced, we want considerably more from the Indians if we can get it. Ideally, we would like to induce India to forego exploding a second nuclear device, to conform their own future nuclear exports to those of the other suppliers, and eventually to place under safeguards the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities they have developed without direct outside help. We have only modest leverage. While the new Indian Government desires better relations with us, they can turn to the Soviets to fuel Tarapur if we refuse to honor our agreement to do so.

This brings me to your conversation with Bob Goheen yesterday.<sup>3</sup> In light of the controls we already have over our nuclear fuel supply to India and your instruction to Goheen to speak directly to Desai on this matter, my inclination is to ask him to make a broad approach. He should begin with the two points you stressed, i.e., the importance we attach to the safeguards over our supply to Tarapur and your desire that Desai personally assure us that he understands that India is obligated not to use U.S. material in a nuclear explosive device. But, I think Goheen should also brief Desai in some detail on the direction of the Administration's non-proliferation policy, seek his commitment to enter into good faith discussions with us regarding the further restrictions described above, and tell him that our ability to continue to provide low-enriched fuel will depend on the success of those talks.<sup>4</sup> If you agree with this general approach, we will prepare, and staff through the NSC, a message from you to Goheen giving him instructions for his meeting with Desai.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>3</sup> Goheen met with Carter on May 13 before he left for New Delhi. During their meeting, Carter asked him "to take up the Tarapur question personally with the Prime Minister after he arrives in India this weekend." (Telegram 114162 to New Delhi, May 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0819, P800020-1924, N770003-0406) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting was found.

<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "ok."

**73. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, May 16, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your letter of the 4th May.<sup>2</sup> I am encouraged by its warmth and friendliness to express myself fully and frankly on the various issues you have covered in it and hope that you will not mind if I do so at some length.

I welcome your suggestion that we should periodically exchange views on how to strengthen our bilateral relations and on larger questions of concern to the world community. Such exchange of views is bound to promote better understanding of each other's point of view particularly when sometimes they may be at variance.

As you know, when India became independent, it chose to steer its policies, as far as possible, clear of the pressures of power blocs. Free from ideological and military groupings, nevertheless maintaining its own national stance, India has tried its best to play a helpful role in the fashioning of a world order which would permit nations diligently to work for their own development and in the process obtain maximum international cooperation consistent with their national dignity. We joined in the effort for the elimination of colonialism, economic exploitation and racial discrimination because these were factors which caused tensions and were apt to disturb world peace and stability. We have tried to adhere to this course and to see that generally our aims and objectives do not, in any way, come in conflict with the legitimate aspirations of other countries.

We have also realised, as members of the world community, the need for international cooperation in improving the economic well-being of the vast brotherhood of poverty-stricken and backward people spread all over the developing and under-developed countries of the world. They have suffered grievously from the ravages of history and per force had to lag behind while other countries developed, sometimes at their expense.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–0542. No classification marking. Carter initialed at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the letter and highlighted several passages. Michael Hornblow, Acting NSC Staff Secretary, sent the letter to Tarnoff under cover of a May 24 memorandum recommending that it be sent to Goheen for his information. Hornblow also requested "recommendations on the timing and substance of a reply to this letter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–0541)

<sup>2</sup> Carter's letter to Desai was dated May 2. See Document 69.

I am very happy to find that in your letter, you have been good enough to recognise the validity of our quest for self-reliance as also our concern for correcting the imbalances between nations. I have always seen that the leaders of American public opinion believe that the enlightened opinion and national interest of the U.S.A. would be best served through the recognition of the realities of the situation prevailing in different countries, their inter se relationship and a realisation of its own significant role in the attainment of peace, prosperity and stability of the world community. I am happy to say that it has performed that role to a reasonable degree despite adverse factors and criticism at home and abroad. I particularly welcome, Mr. President, your enlightened approach to the problems that beset the world and demand solutions which in several cases cannot be kept pending except at national or international peril. I believe that notwithstanding occasional differences in economic and political approach to those problems, there is great potential for mutual cooperation to realise our shared goals. Indeed, I firmly believe that with the importance you attach to mutual understanding a new chapter is opened in our relations which would be based on the mutual confidence and appreciation of each other's point of view and difficulties.

The U.S.A. commands immense resources of wealth, power and technology from which my country has benefited substantially. India's progress in economic and technological self-reliance has enabled it to make available its own experience relevant for the developing countries. Without hesitation, we shall continue to place our capabilities at the disposal of the developing countries. We shall always cooperate with developed ones in order to ease the dangers of confrontation, reinforce the spirit of cooperation and build a network of harmonious relationships.

You have mentioned your concern about the danger of nuclear weapons. I am happy to see your interest and initiative in obtaining international agreement to safeguard the world against the dangers of dissemination of these terrible engines of mass destruction. We hope that your negotiations with the Soviet Union will not only lead to the arrest of the vast and, if I may say so, wasteful accumulation of nuclear weaponry but in course of time also result in total disarmament in this destructive field.<sup>3</sup> We have an interest in securing the weaponry to constructive and developmental purposes, which nuclear energy can serve. While abhorring the use of atomic energy in quest of instruments of destruction, we are fully resolved to remove impediments in the exploration of that energy for peaceful purposes. Scientific progress

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<sup>3</sup> Vance held talks with the Soviets in Moscow March 28–30, in large part to discuss SALT. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 17–23.

has to be utilised for the welfare of mankind and it would be as criminally neglectful to fail to exploit it for that purpose as it would be wantonly inhuman to divert it for warlike aims. This to my mind has to be the cornerstone of our policy in the utilisation of atomic energy and I am sure you will appreciate the genuineness and sincerity of our conviction.

My Government is quite clear that we shall not use nuclear technology for warlike purposes whatever others may do and I have publicly reaffirmed this commitment. For us it is not a policy but an article of faith. But, faced as we are with gigantic problems of development and limitation of fossil fuel, we cannot but rely on nuclear technology and scientific progress to meet our future energy and developmental requirements. It is an instrument of industrialisation with immense potentiality. It was more than two decades ago that India embarked on a systematic programme of training our scientists in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have invested a vast amount of scarce technological and financial resources on a carefully integrated programme for the use of nuclear energy for our developmental needs. We could not possibly abandon this investment towards national self-reliance, or even easily substitute it. We have, therefore, to persist in the course we set 20 years ago and I feel certain that those who have any lingering doubts about our intentions will realise, as the years roll by, that we have matched our actions with our intentions.

It is true that India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty; we have made our reasons for not doing so clear more than once and I feel strongly that we are entitled to be believed that our objections are based on strong convictions. We also did carry out an underground Peaceful Nuclear Experiment in 1974. Here again I do not see why our bonafides are suspect. We have done nothing to follow it up on harmful lines. We have no hidden designs and our policy in this matter is an open book. We have subjected, wherever we were required to do so, our exploration of atomic energy to prescribed safeguards. We did not violate the Partial Test Ban Treaty to which we are a party and I am advised that there was no radioactive venting. This is in contrast to other countries which, before and after the Treaty continued to carry out atmospheric nuclear tests, releasing radioactivity which spread around the world.

I hope you will agree that discriminatory restraints are inconsistent with our national dignity and freedom to pursue our developmental goals through scientific progress is an undeniable national right and obligation. I see no justification for doubting that India is second to none in adopting a responsible attitude towards present and future world peace. That is fundamental of our foreign policy and the restraints which we have exercised in the transfer of sensitive technol-



ogy is proof enough that India in no way wishes to accentuate the dangers of proliferation of weapons.

As regards the Tarapur reactor, we planned it on the assurance of enriched fuel being made available for its requirements. We did so through a bilateral agreement which embodies full and adequate safeguards against any danger of misuse. It is vital to industrial production in the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat which at present receive a significant part of their energy requirements from the Tarapur station. We do hope, therefore, that the question of future shipments for Tarapur and the disposal of nuclear waste will be satisfactorily resolved and that it would free us from a real anxiety and threat to the well-being of a sizeable rural and urban population.

Mr. President, let me assure you that India will actively join in any form of discipline, devised through international agreement, which aims at real nuclear disarmament side by side with efforts to immunise the world against the dangers of nuclear misuse. I feel that discipline in the matter of non-proliferation must start with the countries which have already developed nuclear competence of a high order and as such pose greater danger and not directed to controlling the struggling ambitions, in developmental efforts, of countries like India.

We remain constantly aware of the problems in West Asia, for us a neighbouring region with which our own welfare is linked, and with which is bound up the prospect of peace in this part of the continent. Your basic approach to the problem is greatly to be welcomed, and we share your hope that a fair and just peace can be established. On Southern Africa, too, both our countries have tried to promote a solution that the majority will find acceptable and which would end the collective denial of human rights through racial discrimination. We have always felt that the American role could be most important and we are happy with the recent initiatives taken by your Administration.

I have noted with interest what you have said about demilitarization of the Indian Ocean.<sup>4</sup> This is a matter of concern for us, and we shall certainly elaborate our thinking on the question so that this Ocean may remain free from the unpredictable military and political consequences of great power rivalries.

In the few weeks since the new Government took office in India, we have further invigorated our efforts in the search to strengthen confidence and co-operation with our neighbours. I am greatly encouraged by your approach to the process of normalisation in South Asia so that this region remains free from external interference. Any diver-

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<sup>4</sup> At a press conference on March 9, Carter called for the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 348.



sion from this path of peace, stability and cooperation, can only add to the burdens of our people. It is, therefore, our sincere hope that there would be no induction, into this region, of arms supplies and sophisticated weapons which could revive tensions and rekindle irresponsible passions.

We are looking forward to the arrival of Ambassador Goheen who has a record of understanding and sympathy for Asia. I have no doubt that he will confirm the warm feelings and affection which the people of India have for the U.S.A. I have also every hope that his efforts will be constantly directed towards promoting the mutual interests of our two countries.

During her visit to India we welcomed Mrs. Lillian Carter as a true and committed friend of the people of India who have treated her as one of themselves.<sup>5</sup> We are grateful to her for having stimulated your own interest in the struggle and achievements of India. While we shall maintain close liaison through our respective Ambassadors, I should like to urge that there can be no substitute for personal exchanges between national leaders. I am very happy, therefore, to extend our cordial invitation to you to visit India at an early date convenient to you. I can assure you that the Indian people will spontaneously demonstrate their regard for you and for the United States. It will be an occasion to reflect that these two large functioning democracies drawing strength and inspiration from their respective peoples can work together in close and constructive relationships not only for themselves but for the common interests of the community of nations.

With my best personal regards and wishes

Yours Sincerely<sup>6</sup>

**Morarji Desai**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 62.

<sup>6</sup> Desai handwrote the last sentence and closing.

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## 74. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, May 27, 1977

### PARTICIPANTS

Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India  
Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary  
V. Shankar, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
A. Madhavan, Joint Secretary, America Division, Ministry of External Affairs  
Robert F. Goheen, American Ambassador  
David T. Schneider, Deputy Chief of Mission

### SUBJECT

Tarapur: Indian Nuclear Policy

During the course of the Ambassador's first call on Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Ambassador mentioned that President Carter had asked him to address certain nuclear issues.<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he should do so on this occasion. Desai readily agreed.

The Ambassador said the President wanted him to speak to Desai personally. The President had declared his goal as ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and is trying to move the US and other powers in that direction. At the same time, the Ambassador said, the President is deeply concerned about the second generation of plutonium use. The Ambassador then told Desai that the Executive Branch was prepared to approve and recommend to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the pending license for Tarapur as requested by the Government of India, but in this connection, he said that the President had asked him to get certain assurances. First, as the Prime Minister is aware, US nuclear fuel used at Tarapur is under IAEA safeguards. Also, India has agreed not to use this fuel for any purpose except generation of power at Tarapur without prior agreement. The Ambassador explained the US people were very suspicious of any supply of nuclear materials because of the Indian explosion of 1974. Consequently, the President had asked the Ambassador to ask the Prime Minister for his personal confirmation that any material the US had supplied would not be used in a nuclear device.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Nuclear: 5/77-4/78. Confidential. Drafted by Schneider on June 2. The meeting took place in the Office of the Prime Minister.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 72. Telegram 118926 to New Delhi, May 23, provided Goheen with instructions on how to proceed with discussions first with Desai and then Vajpayee about Tarapur fuel supply. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770003-0482)

The Prime Minister replied vigorously and emotionally saying there was no question about that, India stood by its agreement. "Are we breaking the agreement—no, it is the US which is doing that." Desai said India would carry out all safeguards out of self respect despite its feelings about the NPT. In regard to the NPT he said that if "they do away with weapons we will sign." Desai then spoke about India's explosion. He said his predecessor had not been wise in the way she carried it out. He said it had been done with the help of Canada and was only for peaceful purposes. India should have taken Canada into confidence on this he said. Then there would have been no problem. There was no question of India's "trying to be clever" about the explosion. Desai said he feared his predecessor was trying to make an impression within India. As a result Trudeau was upset. The Prime Minister said he would speak to him in London.

The Ambassador then asked if the GOI would agree to enter into discussions with the US on nuclear matters. Desai said he would be very glad to do so. Even if the US refused to supply more fuel for Tarapur he would agree he said. But the US had to make the proposal first. The Ambassador said there were two levels of discussion. First technical matters such as fuel storage and second, more important, how the US and India can move forward in parallel to prevent nuclear misuse. Desai replied "most certainly", saying he saw a great danger if atomic weapons continue. He said India was not interested in any way in the use of nuclear energy for warfare. He recalled his statement to the press that nuclear weapons were no good for defense; they only demoralize. India's conventional arms can defend the country. He said he was not going to touch nuclear weapons. India has said that for 30 years; it will remain honest. Even if the country is destroyed it will not go to nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Goheen said he thought the President knew and appreciated Mr. Desai's view and therefore wanted to open a serious dialogue. In some ways our policies were not the same. We wanted to discuss how we could bring them together. The Prime Minister again said he was glad that the Ambassador had raised this as he could not suggest it himself. There ensued some discussion of the spent fuel storage problem during which it was mentioned there were three ways of handling the spent fuel. Desai said he was agreeable to all three. He said that he had no intention of using the spent fuel (apparently for an explosion). He said he was not sure an explosion had been necessary. The Prime Minister then explained that he had not expressed doubt in public regarding whether the explosion was necessary as that was a reflection on Mrs. Gandhi. She had no intention to develop nuclear weapons but was more politically minded. The Prime Minister said he was not politically minded. Mrs. Gandhi had been basically

wrong but Desai did not want to pass public criticism on her. The Prime Minister said there was no question of having another explosion. Even if it were proposed he would not do it—he would carefully consult people—he would consult the US. The Prime Minister went on to say that he didn't like "this space business", asking "why do it?" He said that he was reconsidering what to do about the space program. He wondered if any useful purpose had been served by the trip to the moon. India did not want to go into things like that; it must first feed its people.<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Goheen then explained that the President had stressed that the US wants to be helpful in the development of energy, including nuclear energy. The Prime Minister said we must do this otherwise what was the use of India "asking for your help." The Ambassador then explained our desire that India join in the fuel cycle evaluation program<sup>4</sup> and mentioned nuclear exports. The Prime Minister replied that India "did not want to keep these things secret." It wanted to "make it available to those who seek it but for peaceful purposes only." He then carefully explained "we do not want to pass on knowledge in any way in which it will be misused."

Mr. Shankar then interrupted to say that Dr. Sethna had wanted him to raise the question of reprocessing for experimental purposes. The Prime Minister asked why and Shankar explained for peaceful purposes. In that case, the Prime Minister said, that was all right. The Prime Minister then said if India received nuclear material from the US, how could it misuse it? Shankar explained his meaning, saying that our agreement provides for how it is to be used and the Prime Minister concluded this portion of the conversation saying that India was bound to carry out this agreement.

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words: "must first feed its people," and put an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to these words.

<sup>4</sup> The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program (INFCEP) was a U.S. initiative that was formally established in October 1977. Its purpose was to identify ways to guard against nuclear weapons proliferation while promoting nuclear energy production. See footnote 2, Document 267.

**75. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, May 28, 1977

## PARTICIPANTS

Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs  
V. Shankar, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Government of India  
M.A. Vellodi, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs  
A. Madhavan, Joint Secretary, America Division, Ministry of External Affairs

## SUBJECT

Tarapur

When the Ambassador returned to carry out the second stage of his instructions with the Foreign Secretary<sup>2</sup> he found Shankar and Vellodi also waiting to receive him. Mehta started out saying there would have to be consideration of the matter the Ambassador had raised. They were getting further elaboration—not negotiating. The Ambassador said that when the Foreign Minister met Secretary Vance the two might talk about how to set up the machinery to carry on discussions.<sup>3</sup> The Ambassador then said that the first thing he wanted to say—and this was not a precondition—was that he was sure the GOI understood that should India move to a second device this, in effect, would mean the end of nuclear cooperation. This was not a condition; it just reflected the state of opinion in the United States. The Ambassador then said that our negotiations would be on two levels. First were matters such as disposition of spent fuel and working out the storage problem for which arrangements were in process. Vellodi interrupted to say that disposal of spent fuel was directly related to reprocessing. He reviewed the history of the construction of the Tarapur reprocessing facility which he said was done with the knowledge and approval of the US and as a part of the agreement. He cited the history

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Nuclear: 5/77–4/78. Confidential. Drafted by Schneider on June 3. The meeting took place in the Office of the Indian Foreign Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 74. For Goheen's discussion of Tarapur with Desai, see Document 74.

<sup>3</sup> Vance and Vajpayee met on May 31 in Paris during the CIEC. Telegram 132120 to New Delhi, June 8, summarized the meeting. While discussing general energy policy, Vajpayee addressed the nuclear issue, explaining: "The Prime Minister was opposed to development of nuclear weapons but there was a strong commitment to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Vajpayee reviewed Tarapur history, noting there was a clear U.S. commitment to supply uranium. India was ready to talk, but the manner in which fuel had been withheld raised questions of attaching new conditions to a contractual obligation." Vance stressed "the desirability of beginning discussions promptly." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–0734)

of USG consideration of the design of the plant and the understanding that before reprocessing there would be a joint determination of safeguardability. He then pointed out that the IAEA in September had asked the US about safeguardability but received no reply. The GOI wanted us to know that as far as disposal of Tarapur spent fuel was concerned it became pertinent only if reprocessing does not take place. The Ambassador agreed that this could be discussed in the course of negotiations. Shankar remarked that it would be better to have the agreement on Tarapur on the agenda. The Ambassador concluded that he would report that this was an important thing the GOI wished to take up. The Ambassador then said there was another point he wished to raise concerning the future negotiations. Should, for some reason, such as a second nuclear explosion, there be a need to terminate our agreement, we would like to be sure that the current safeguards would be continued. He said that he believed the Indians were in fact continuing the safeguards on Canadian facilities. Furthermore, the US would want some adequate safeguards on the US heavy water in CIRUS and RAPP.<sup>4</sup> The Ambassador said that our vote in the IAEA on Soviet heavy water for RAPP would be contingent on the assurance of safeguards covering the heavy water we have supplied to CIRUS and RAPP.

The Ambassador then turned to more general policy questions in the future negotiations saying that we hoped that the GOI will forego peaceful explosions, that India would consider full scope safeguards, and that the GOI would adopt export guidelines at least comparable to those of the London suppliers group.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the Ambassador invited Indian participation in the fuel cycle evaluation program<sup>6</sup> and handed over the latest US paper on this.<sup>7</sup>

There ensued a series of Indian questions and comments on the Ambassador's presentation. Shankar asked which subjects of negotiation would be peculiar to India and which would be of universal application. The Ambassador replied that the only subjects peculiar to India were those related to the specific situation at Tarapur and the US heavy water. Shankar then referred to Tarapur and asked to what extent the existing agreement had been implemented, to what extent had it not been implemented, and were there any grounds for its reconsideration. The Ambassador replied that the USG had gone through a major review of policy and we needed to discuss how our

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 70. Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) was a nuclear power station of Canadian design and Indian construction. RAPP's two reactors came online in 1973 and 1981, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 70.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 74.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

new perceptions fit Indian policies. Shankar asked if it was the US purpose to modify the objectives and considerations of US-Indian nuclear cooperation. The Ambassador replied that this was not our purpose if examined broadly. Much time had elapsed since our agreement was signed. India has moved in the direction of breeder reactors and reprocessing. We asked that India be aware that we now realize plutonium will be difficult to keep out of the hands of unscrupulous people. On a worldwide basis we need more time. We do not intend to lay down the law but we need time to consider what to do about the problem.

The Foreign Secretary intervened to say that it was most important that the Tarapur power production program should not be interrupted for direct or indirect reasons. Some things must be renewed, others reconsidered, but Tarapur must stay in operation. Mehta said that there were implications that the President's policy would have a different bearing on different countries. He mentioned the principal reasons for India's objection to NPT (discrimination against certain countries) and said that they should be borne in mind should, in the process of our policy review, there be any nuances of discrimination. The Ambassador replied that in his talks with the President and Joseph Nye there had been a definite desire to treat India as we would treat other countries. There was no disposition to be discriminating or punitive in the White House or the Department. There were, however, in the Congress and the general public people who were disposed in that direction.

Shankar then raised the problem of what he called public psychology in India. India had kept to the agreement it had signed. If an agreement, which was concluded to produce power for the benefit of people, must be reopened, then there will be a real public opinion problem in India. He also described it as a political problem—both internally and internationally. Shankar also said the Prime Minister did not want to place limits on the right of scientific inquiry, on utilization of important sources of energy and the use of science for the betterment of the people. He asked how much would our proposals impose limits of this sort. Shankar also asked why it was that Indian assurances of peaceful development of atomic energy had not been accepted. Why must India give additional safeguards which will impinge on science?

The Ambassador replied that he could understand why these questions were raised because of delays on the US side. The Indian explosion came as a great shock to the US and this was compounded as some US heavy water was used in the device. India may say there was nothing specific in an agreement against that but nevertheless this had a very heavy impact in the US. The Foreign Secretary asked if India had not had a PNE would it have made any difference. The Ambassador answered in the affirmative citing the very strong congressional reac-

tion even among India's friends. Shankar asked what factors were responsible for the timing of the US initiative and the Ambassador answered, the new President and his new policy. He then spoke of the President's desire to consult openly in advance of decisions. Shankar asked if a logical follow up would not be the cessation of all nuclear tests. The Ambassador answered that the President had proposed this and Shankar rejoined that they had heard of a new US test the other day. Shankar said this was one of the things that rankled in the Prime Minister's mind. He believed example was better than precept.

Vellodi asked about the factual situation regarding nuclear export legislation on the Hill.<sup>8</sup> He said it was the GOI understanding that the bill could pass by September or October and asked what timeframe for discussions did we have in mind. Was it our intention to hold discussions in the interim period before passage of legislation? He also asked whether, in view of the administration's provision in its proposed legislation for renegotiation of proposed contracts, our objective in discussions would be renegotiation of the Tarapur contract. The Ambassador replied that it was important that we talk together and see if we can move toward cooperation. It would help the President's legislation if we could say we were having serious discussions with India. The Foreign Secretary also asked what time frame we had in mind for negotiations. The Ambassador said he had no instructions but that Nye wanted early talks about setting up negotiations. Shankar asked if our interim shipment was linked only with India's willingness to have discussions. The Ambassador replied that he had already reported that the Prime Minister was willing to have discussions so that the President could make the recommendation to the NRC right away and the NRC could issue the license. He did not know how long this would take but understood the more acute time problem related to storage.

Vellodi then began a discussion of US heavy water, saying we had already exchanged much information on this. In regard to CIRUS he said the necessary information has been provided concerning whether it is possible to know that US heavy water is still there. The situation regarding US heavy water in RAPP was different. When India needed heavy water it made an agreement with the Canadians. They did not have sufficient heavy water so they obtained it from the US. There was no ambiguity here. The GOI treats the heavy water as Canadian and understood that Canada would either substitute that water or India would return it to Canada. It was later agreed because of practical difficulties, that instead of shipping the US heavy water from India

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 6.



the Canadians would replace it in the US. Vellodi confirmed that the GOI was having discussions with the IAEA on Soviet heavy water and so far no final agreement had been reached. The Ambassador said that he had understood the US heavy water in CIRUS could be moved to RAPP and put under safeguards there. He said the CIRUS heavy water was very sensitive in the United States.

As the conversation drew to a close, the Ambassador said that his feeling was that from the standpoint of State, ACDA and the White House, there was a real disposition to try to meet and talk with India in terms of equality and good faith. He hoped the GOI would exploit that situation and help move us forward from the difficulties of the past. The Foreign Secretary replied that at this stage the Foreign Minister is away, and the Prime Minister is going to London. They may talk about this subject there. He said “the question has been raised with the Prime Minister . . . the answer can be given only after the Prime Minister’s return on June 17. But then there would be the Indian budget.” It would also be necessary for the Cabinet to consider the issue. The Ambassador promptly and firmly replied that he had been asked to get the assurance of the Prime Minister regarding safeguards on Tarapur and Indian readiness to enter into discussions.

He had already transmitted that assurance to the USG.<sup>9</sup> Mehta answered that India was not going back on that. The only matter was the time schedule. After some discussion of negotiations on technical matters regarding Tarapur and general policy negotiations, Shankar said the former should be taken up immediately but the latter should wait until the GOI has political guidance.

Shankar said that there were bound to be discussions on this subject in Parliament since it is a public matter. There would be pressure on the Prime Minister to commit himself to a course from which he might have to depart during discussions. Shankar said he doubted the Prime Minister would want to have serious discussions when Parliament was in session. It will adjourn on August 5. The GOI would like to approach negotiations as free from “complications” as possible.

As the conversation closed the Ambassador left his talking paper which summarized the second stage of his instructions with the Foreign Secretary.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> In telegram 7675 from New Delhi, May 27, Goheen transmitted Desai’s assurances, made during their May 27 meeting, regarding India’s nuclear program. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2642, N770003–0536)

<sup>10</sup> Telegram 8040 from New Delhi, June 6, contains the text of the talking paper that Goheen left with Mehta. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770200–1036)

**76. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 31, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*India.* Ambassador Goheen raised the Tarapur question in his initial meeting with Prime Minister Desai. Desai promptly accepted the three conditions you set for recommending approval of the long-pending shipment of low-enriched fuel: (1) Indian willingness to maintain IAEA safeguards on Tarapur,<sup>2</sup> (2) Desai's personal assurance that U.S. fuel would not be used in a nuclear explosive device,<sup>3</sup> and (3) agreement to enter into negotiations with us on non-proliferation questions.<sup>4</sup> Desai told Goheen he was critical of the manner in which Mrs. Gandhi conducted the 1974 Indian test, that he was not planning to authorize another test,<sup>5</sup> and that if the question came up he would consult with us.<sup>6</sup>

On the basis of Desai's positive response, our recommendation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license the fuel shipment will go forward this week. Joseph Nye is tentatively slated to meet with the Indian Foreign Secretary in London June 10 to arrange to open the non-proliferation negotiations.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 5/77. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "To Warren, J."

<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined: "maintain IAEA safeguards on Tarapur." See Document 74.

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined: "U.S. fuel would not be used in a nuclear explosive device."

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined: "enter into negotiations with us on non-proliferation questions."

<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined: "not planning to authorize another test."

<sup>6</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "ok—I would like this in writing."

**77. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

3. *India*: Regarding your comment on Warren Christopher's May 31 evening report on the Indian nuclear question,<sup>2</sup> I believe we ought to reply to Desai and tell him we welcome the assurances which he conveyed to Bob Goheen on IAEA safeguards, non-use of U.S. material in nuclear testing, and India's willingness to negotiate Tarapur and other non-proliferation issues. We should also welcome Desai's assertion that he plans no further nuclear tests and would consult with us if he changes his mind. This message could be contained in a letter from you which replies to his May 16 letter.<sup>3</sup> Since Desai's letter dealt at great length on the nuclear issue, it would be logical for your response to develop this issue further. I will send you a draft shortly.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 6/77. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Cy, J."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 76.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 73.

<sup>4</sup> In left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "ok—be specific."

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**78. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, July 13, 1977, 1317Z

9924. Subject: Indian Nuclear Policy.

1. In Lok Sabha discussion July 13 triggered by short notice question on supply of enriched uranium to Tarapur, Prime Minister Desai went further than he has before in public statements on peaceful nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770249–0475. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Bombay.

explosion issue by declaring in answer to a question that he had come to the conclusion that no nuclear explosion is necessary for peaceful purposes. Challenged on this by opposition leader Chanva, Desai retreated somewhat, stating that he would not make this commitment for all future time. In doing so, he reiterated earlier line that if explosion was proved necessary then he would consult with others before proceeding. In this connection, he stressed importance of bringing others to share conclusion that explosion was necessary, if such conclusion ever reached. But later in course of half hour discussion, when asked whether the US had been seeking since 1974 to rewrite the agreement for fuel supply to Tarapur because 1974 PNE had been misunderstood, Desai replied that there was no question of any more explosions for peaceful purposes. This had been “cleared in our (Indo-US) talks” Desai said.

2. In answer to specific question which had prompted discussion—whether USG had agreed to resume Tarapur fuel supply and if so, under what condition—Desai gave very brief reply. He stated that supply had been resumed and that while there had been no pre-condition as such, there had been an “understanding” that discussions would be held between US and India on the larger question of nuclear proliferation.

3. When, despite this statement, Desai was asked if there had been any condition that India would open its nuclear facilities for international inspection, Desai declared that there was no such condition. He added that if there is such a condition, he will never agree to it. When a member subsequently claimed that Desai had earlier agreed to international inspection, Desai denied he had ever said such a thing. He asked amid cheers why he should give such an undertaking when “they” do not allow him to inspect their installations.

4. Asked whether US was exerting pressure on India to “toe their line” and sign the NPT, Desai said he had stated that unless those who possessed atomic weapons and went on with explosions gave them up, GOI could not sign treaty.

5. Foregoing based on Samachar account and report of EmbOff who attended debate but, under Parliamentary rules, was not able to take notes. Given importance of subject, we intend to send in supplementary message when we get full text of debate, probably tomorrow.

**Goheen**

**79. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, July 13, 1977, 1324Z

9926. For Deputy Secretary Christopher from Ambassador Goheen.  
Subj: US-India Relations.

1. Roy Atherton has suggested that when settled in I should put down some overall impressions of the state of play here and ideas for future initiatives. This cable attempts to do that. I particularly hope that it may be helpful to you as you prepare for your stop here.<sup>2</sup> These observations are based on conversations I have had with Prime Minister Desai, every member of his new government, but one, and the various civil servants with whom I have been doing business.

2. There can be no doubt that the interest of the Desai government in good relations with the US is genuine. The restoration of democratic government and an equitable rule of law here is a matter of deep pride. It carries with it feelings of affinity toward the USA, while the high value which the Carter administration attaches to human rights is likewise highly congenial here now. Also appreciated is our recognition of India both as the major South Asian power and as a leader, generally on the side of moderation, among the non-aligned nations. The President's initiatives with respect to arms control, a nuclear test ban, and demilitarization of the Indian Ocean have been regarded favorably—although the apparent downgrading of the last in the recent Moscow talks<sup>3</sup> and extensive news coverage of the neutron bomb<sup>4</sup> have clouded the picture. Another important link, I believe, is the strong parallelism

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770249–0451. Confidential; Exidis.

<sup>2</sup> En route from Europe to New Zealand, where he attended the ANZUS conference, Christopher stopped in New Delhi on July 23 and met with Vajpayee and other Indian officials. At the meeting, Christopher spoke broadly about U.S. foreign policy objectives, while Vajpayee outlined India's regional relationships. (Telegram 10426 from New Delhi, July 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770263–1089)

<sup>3</sup> The first round of U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean was held in Moscow June 22–27. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 108.

<sup>4</sup> On July 7, the *New York Times* reported that “President Carter will decide whether to recommend production of neutron weapons, which are designed to kill by radiation rather than heat and blast, Jody Powell, the White House press secretary, said today.” Despite arguments that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb would hamper U.S.-Soviet efforts to negotiate a strategic arms limitation treaty, “Mr. Powell said that the neutron arms being considered would be tactical rather than strategic in nature. When asked if a neutron warhead could be mounted on a strategic missile, he replied, ‘If you wanted to put a peanut on a trailer.’” (“Decision on Neutron Arms Output Likely in August, Carter Aide Says,” *New York Times*, July 7, 1977, p. 10)

in our and the GOI's sense of what the priorities in India's development efforts should be.

3. At the same time, however, there appear to remain certain reservations, or at least a hesitancy about possibly committing India too far or too fast in our direction. Partly this comes about from the need to retain good relations with the USSR, coupled to India's realization that the Soviets have been its consistent supporters, while our record is much more erratic. The apparent reserve also arises at least in part, I believe, out of continuing divisions and differences in point of view within the Janata Party—differences which have to some extent been patched over on the surface but seem not yet to have been basically resolved—as, for example, on the matter of a resumption of US bilateral aid. Desai's global perspective and his Gandhian point of view are not universally shared. We suspect that even within the Cabinet there are hawks as well as doves on the nuclear issue, and there are clearly some whose economic views are more collectivist than Western in orientation, while others value the private sector and seem eager for a resumption of US aid and technical assistance.

4. Of the Prime Minister's good faith and goodwill I have no question at all. He has been extremely friendly toward me in both my meetings with him. He feels that he and President Carter are on the same wave length. The time recently accorded the White House Fellows by the Prime Minister and other top officials is another indication of the desire to be more open toward the US and to cultivate more two-way understanding.

5. In Foreign Minister Vajpayee, however, I sense a greater reserve toward us than in most of the Cabinet members with whom I have met. I cannot tell how deeply this reserve may reach. It may be no more than a mannerism in dealing with foreigners, or it may simply reflect a sense of limited experience in international affairs. Certainly in his various statements of national policy, including responses to slanted questions in the Lok Sabha,<sup>5</sup> Vajpayee has been trying to steer the country on a course of "genuine non-alignment" and also to establish India as a constructive, bridging influence with respect to North-South issues. It remains of course to be seen how these Janata lines of policy will be implemented vis-a-vis particular issues and as time goes on. When in the opposition, Vajpayee was a quite parochial nationalist and all for India's development of atomic weapons. But since he has had to assume responsibilities in the union government, he has adopted

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 9343 from New Delhi, June 30, summarized Vajpayee's June 29 address to the Lok Sabha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770233-1113) Further analysis of the address was transmitted in telegram 9414 from New Delhi, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770236-0501)

a much broader, more internationally attuned stance. We have no real reason to be suspicious of his moderation or even-handedness, despite the air of reserve noted above.

6. What might we be doing that we aren't to build on the goodwill, reduce the suspicion or reserve, and create strong and more durable relationships? Generally I think our current posture is about right. I understand it to entail strong approval of the restoration of civil liberties and democratic government in India; respect for India's status as a regional power and leader among the non-aligned; a manifest readiness to be supportive and helpful, when and as India wants our help, coupled with recognition that modern India possesses very considerable scientific, technological, and industrial competence in its own right; and, finally, a deliberate effort not to let ourselves slip into becoming either patronizing, or discriminatory, or overly intrusive in our dealings with India. If we can make our specific actions be, in fact, expressions of such a stance, I have no doubt that increasingly close relations with us will be sought by the GOI and that our chances of reaching viable accommodations will be enhanced where our national interests seem to differ. We should not, of course, expect that India will do this at the cost of the benefits it obtains from its relations with the Soviets.

7. Several specific propositions seem to me to grow out of these general observations. First, the size and composition of the Embassy appears about right to nurture the gradually growing political, economic and cultural relationships that we should be seeking.

8. Our policy with respect to bilateral aid should continue to be one of readiness, not of impatience, to begin negotiations when the Indians wish. I assume the GOI will come to that decision. When it does, to start small as we are planning (at about \$60 million) but to plan to step up the levels significantly in each of the following two years (perhaps into the range of \$100–150 million for FY '79 and \$100 million more for FY '80) seems to be appropriate strategy. Such gradualism should let us hold down any too great increases in the US presence and draw to the maximum extent on India's own expertise. (The Indian Finance Ministry, it should be noted, regards \$60 million as a very small start, and I feel it would be a mistake to be too hesitant about getting our aid up to more substantial levels once we have made a satisfactory start.)

9. One of the best ways of recognizing and taking advantage of India's again open society, in ways which are of mutual benefit, is to step up educational and cultural exchange, including many areas of science. The current government has expressed an interest in this. The resource limitations on our side are embarrassing. I hope the Department can make strong efforts to increase substantially the support

available for activities under the Indo-US Subcommissions for Education and Culture and Science and Technology.<sup>6</sup>

10. With our interest in channeling US development assistance to the neediest and the heightened emphasis which the Indian Government proposes to put on rural development, we should be considering how agriculture and rural development can best be given heightened attention under the aegis of the Joint Commission. The cooperative, equal partnership aspects of the Joint Commission might give our aid style here a healthy new look. Perhaps bilateral aid for the purposes mentioned should become a major topic of the Economic and Commercial Subcommission, while technical assistance and seminars aimed at rural education, agricultural education, and other rural technologies might be made priority concerns for each of the other two subcommissions as well.

11. The Carter administration's policy of consultation in advance with the Indian Government on multilateral issues is distinctly to the good. In conveying respect for India's status and views, it reduces latent suspicions, and it should be carried out whenever possible.

12. High-level intergovernmental contact is important to the relationship we seek. The possibilities currently on the stove are of a good level and scale for '77. Thus, though only for a day, the prospect of your own visit here is very welcome to the GOI as well as to us. We hope that Vajpayee's wish to visit Washington at the time of the UNGA can be accommodated, but we attach even more importance to securing a Vance visit to New Delhi during 1977. Anticipated keenly also is the possibility of a congressional visit this winter in response to the interest expressed by leaders of the Indian Parliament. For 1978 we urge that consideration be given to a visit here by the President or by Mrs Rosalynn Carter and that an invitation also be extended to Prime Minister Desai to visit Washington.

**Goheen**

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<sup>6</sup> The Indo-U.S. Joint Commission was established in October 1974. Telegram 15519 from New Delhi, November 2, 1974, summarized the Commission's purpose as overseeing "the work of three Subcommissions: Education/Culture; Science/Technology; Economic/Commercial; which in turn meet annually to exchange views on bilateral and multilateral issues within these three broad areas of interest. The objective is to mobilize the two bureaucracies toward progress on these issues while isolating them to the extent possible from the political relationship." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770403-0481) The Joint Commission first met in Washington in October 1975. For the statements by Kissinger and Indian Foreign Secretary Chavan and the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1975, pp. 620-622.



**80. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I read your May 16 letter with great interest.<sup>2</sup> I appreciate both its warmth and its candor.

It was very kind of you to invite me to visit India, and I am happy to accept your invitation. I intend to limit travel abroad during the first part of my Administration, but I will place India high on my agenda for foreign trips. In the meantime, is there any chance that you might be able to come to the United States—perhaps early next year? You have many admirers here, and I can assure you a warm welcome. I especially look forward to a meeting with you and hope you can come.

In the spirit of our earlier correspondence, I would like to share some thoughts with you on nuclear questions. I was deeply impressed by your letter, and by what you have said publicly on a number of occasions regarding your strong and principled opposition to nuclear weapons. Clearly, we share the fundamental goal of preventing what you so aptly term “nuclear misuse”. India’s eagerness to find ways to reduce the danger of a nuclear holocaust is very heartening to me. At the same time, I fully understand your position that India must use nuclear technology to meet its future energy and developmental requirements, and your resistance to discriminatory arrangements.

All nations share a moral responsibility to do what they can in this critical cause. We are currently working on a key step toward the objective of reducing the dangers of nuclear war—a total nuclear test ban arrangement.<sup>3</sup> Like the 1963 treaty to end atmospheric testing, a comprehensive test ban would be a non-discriminatory multilateral understanding. In view of the leading role that India has historically played in this question, I would hope that you will work closely with us in reaching a comprehensive test ban.

On Tarapur, I was delighted with your forthright and positive response to Ambassador Goheen, whom I had personally asked to discuss this with you.<sup>4</sup> Your prompt assurances to me that India would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 17, India: 2–8/77. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 73.

<sup>3</sup> U.S.-Soviet exploratory discussions regarding a comprehensive test ban treaty were held in Washington June 13–16, followed by U.S.–U.K.-Soviet discussions July 13–27 in Geneva. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 162 and 165.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 74.

maintain international safeguards on Tarapur, would not use material supplied by the United States in a further nuclear explosion, and would enter into negotiations on nuclear matters were extremely encouraging. On the basis of your response, I authorized a recommendation that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issue the long-pending license for enriched uranium fuel. I am pleased the shipment is now on its way.

The new US nuclear export policy, which will be a major element in our discussions, is designed not only to reduce the risk of possible misuse of civil nuclear technology for military purposes, but also, equally important, to ensure its fullest possible application for economic and scientific advancement. Along with the vast majority of nations, the United States sees the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard system as a means of promoting worldwide confidence that nuclear materials are not being misused. Comprehensive IAEA safeguards do not in any way impair a nation's ability to develop and use nuclear technology for civilian purposes; if your technical people have any doubts on this matter, we will be glad to address them in our discussions.

To demonstrate our own support of the IAEA safeguards system, the US is itself currently negotiating arrangements for these controls on all American civilian nuclear installations. This is the identical responsibility that would be undertaken by non-nuclear weapons states, but I recognize that, psychologically at least, we are asking others to do more than we are able to do ourselves. This frankly disturbs me, but I see no alternative until we and the Soviet Union are able to move along the road toward nuclear disarmament. We cannot afford to put off establishing as many global norms as are realistically possible until political conditions are ripe for nuclear disarmament. Comprehensive IAEA safeguards are among the most important norms for preventing nuclear misuse.

A related point concerns the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program.<sup>5</sup> I have proposed this as a way for interested countries to consider how best to enhance the use of nuclear power in achieving development and energy goals, while minimizing the technical possibilities for misuse of this technology for military purposes. As one of the world's leaders in nuclear technology, your country has much to offer in making this important program a success. I very much hope that India decides to join in this cooperative effort. Public discussion of highly technical aspects of this proposal has perhaps caused some misunderstanding. We are not trying to force others to abandon expensive investments in their nuclear power programs. We are seeking

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 74.

through the Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program to develop safer technology to reduce the chances of proliferation and improve the safety and economic performance of future fuel cycles.

I have written at length on the nuclear question because I feel, as you do, that it is crucially important for humanity. India has an opportunity to set a principled example for others to follow in the interest of our shared objectives. I would hope India exerts its traditional role of moral leadership in this vital area.

Turning briefly to another subject, I would like to ask for your help in dealing with an aspect of economic development that is much in the forefront of my thinking: the need to focus primary attention on improving the lot of the rural poor. I have been struck by the emphasis your government is placing on increasing employment and raising the living standards in the countryside, where the vast majority of your people live. Since India has much expertise in rural development, I think American specialists would gain from exchanging views with your experts so that we would have the benefit of your experience, counsel, and cooperation in shaping our own assistance programs for the developing countries. If you think this idea worth pursuing, Ambassador Goheen could work out the details with the appropriate people in your government.

I also want to keep you abreast of progress in our talks with the Soviets concerning arms control in the Indian Ocean.<sup>6</sup> As you know, delegations met in Moscow last month, and a second meeting is scheduled for September. The initial session was concerned mainly with questions of definition and setting forth opening positions; the negotiations were serious and gave me grounds for cautious hope. The two sides agreed that our initial efforts should be directed toward a stabilization of the military situation to prevent the development of an escalating arms race in the Indian Ocean. The precise nature of the stabilization agreement and possible subsequent reductions in forces will have to be determined in the later meetings.

In closing, let me say again how pleased I was with your letter. I also want to thank you for the warm reception that you and other members of your government accorded Ambassador Goheen. I am encouraged by Secretary Vance's good meeting in Paris with Foreign Minister Vajpayee<sup>7</sup> and by reports of the constructive manner in which our representatives at various multilateral gatherings are working together. I am heartened by the way that dialogue between India and the United States is developing, and I sense a growing mutual trust

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, Document 79.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 75.

and confidence between us. This is as it should be between countries with so many shared interests and values.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 22, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

8. *India: Nuclear Question:* With the Tarapur shipment on the way, our nuclear discussions with India move into a more intensive phase. Joe Nye will be in India with ACDA and ERDA colleagues August 1–3 and plans to follow up the points in your July 15 letter to Prime Minister Desai.<sup>2</sup> In the meanwhile, Desai has publicly declared his opposition to further testing, including PNE's, and his stand has triggered opposition criticism and the charge that he is bowing to U.S. pressure to obtain fuel supplies for the Tarapur reactors.<sup>3</sup> There has also been increased Indian press discussion of the comprehensive safeguards issue and support for continued Indian opposition to accepting IAEA safeguards on indigenously produced nuclear facilities.<sup>4</sup> When pressed on this issue in parliament, Desai stated only that he would never accept a discriminatory arrangement. Comprehensive safeguards will be the main problem in our nuclear negotiations now that Desai has ruled out further testing.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 80.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 78.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 10155 from New Delhi, July 18, summarized editorial commentary in the Indian press regarding safeguards and Desai's renunciation of PNEs. On July 16, the independent Indian newspaper *Statesman* argued, for example, that the United States might eventually insist that all nuclear facilities be placed under international safeguards. The paper warned: "That would be too heavy a price to pay even for the future of Tarapur, which is dependent on American fuel supplies." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770256–0414)

**82. Telegram From the Consulate General in Bombay to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bombay, August 2, 1977, 1441Z

1848. USIAEA. Subj: Nye Visit to New Delhi: Discussions at MEA.

Summary: Discussions which Nye, Sievering, and Van Doren had at MEA were marked by frank, open, and amicable exchanges of view.<sup>2</sup> The Indians seemed genuinely interested in learning detailed USG positions on broad range of nuclear issues. Nye told the Indians that the meeting was a good augury for periodic consultations in future and hoped it would serve as a model for such meetings.<sup>3</sup> He noted the remarkably similar moral commitment of PM Desai and President Carter against proliferation. He called INFCEP central to what we were trying to achieve. Replying to Nye's hope that the Indians would agree to participate, Mehta said they were inclined in principle to do so. They agreed to give us a reply by mid-August, and expressed a keen interest in the way we thought the program could best be organized. They were not responsive to Nye's mild suggestion that if they should wish to join the Suppliers' Group they would be welcome to do so in the future. The Indians were interested in our discussion of PNEs and thought that if the Sovs. would also agree to exclude these from the CTB this would make things easier for the PM. The Indians were not sympathetic to the idea of the South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,<sup>4</sup> which Nye cited as one possible way by which GOP leaders could satisfy their public opinion that Pak security was being enhanced. Discussing congressional legislation now pending,<sup>5</sup> Nye observed that we are facing a situation which will require full scope safeguards within two years, or disengagement as amicably as possible. He pointed out

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770276–0753. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> According to the body of the telegram, Mehta, Shankar, and Vellodi attended the meeting.

<sup>3</sup> After their stay in New Delhi, Nye, Sievering, and Van Doren traveled to Bombay in order to consult with Sethna and other Indian officials from the Department of Atomic Energy on August 2. Telegram 1878 from Bombay, August 4, summarized the discussions, which focused on technical aspects of spent fuel storage, reprocessing, and safeguards. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770279–0871)

<sup>4</sup> In 1974, and again in 1976, Pakistan submitted draft resolutions in the UNGA that proposed the establishment of a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. India and Pakistan could not agree on whether to include China. India favored inclusion, whereas Pakistan opposed it. Neither resolution was adopted. Telegram 5145 from USUN, November 10, 1976, discussed the history of the issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760422–0412) See also Document 4.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 6.

the advantages (and absence of disadvantage) in these safeguards. Referring to Desai's Parliamentary statement on inspection,<sup>6</sup> he offered orally to the Indians the opportunity to participate in a bilateral inspection of a facility the US was putting under IAEA safeguards as an example of how inspections were carried out. The Indians adopted a more positive interest in full-scope safeguards than we had anticipated. Far from dismissing these as politically unacceptable, they questioned us closely about them. Mentioning one technical point (the others will be discussed in Bombay), Nye said we accepted the Sethna-proposed solution of shifting the US-origin CIRUS heavy water to RAPP I. At the conclusion of the talks, the Indians expressed an interest in further discussions, Shankar stressing the importance of holding these before the possible autumn US visit of PM Desai. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Courtney

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 78.

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**83. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1977

The following are our comments on the points raised by the Indian Ambassador in his July 22 conversation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to WC from the White House. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In a July 25 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski reported on his July 22 meeting with Singh, who said that India was interested in arms procurement from the United States as it did "not wish to be so fully dependent on the Soviet Union." Brzezinski was in favor of exploring this point. Singh also regretted the absence of any mention of India in Vance's June 29 speech about Asia at the Asia Society and was concerned that the House Appropriations Committee planned to hold hearings on how India used economic assistance. Singh said that he hoped soon to meet Carter and noted that Desai would like to visit the United States. Finally, Singh expressed the hope that Vance might make "a positive comment" regarding Desai's statement on no further PNEs. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, India: 1-8-77)

### 1. *Arms Sales*

The Ambassador asked about the U.S. reaction to low-key, non-controversial Indian arms procurement to lessen dependence on the Soviets and promote more genuine non-alignment. The Department believes that a positive U.S. reaction would be in our interest and also consistent with the President's overall policy of restraint on arms transfers. Sales to India now run only \$4 million annually of total Indian external arms procurement of about \$200 million. These could be increased along the lines suggested by the Ambassador, consistent with the policy stated in your July 1 memorandum on U.S. military supply policy to Pakistan and India,<sup>3</sup> without creating Congressional problems or further straining relations with Pakistan. We would want to look carefully at Indian requests in terms of the technology involved and would prefer that our sales be strictly in the defensive category.

One reason for the Ambassador's approach has been past difficulties the Indians have encountered in USG processing of even modest requests. State is in touch with Defense to assure that DOD understands that our South Asia arms policy is to be applied evenhandedly with India and Pakistan, that relations with India are substantially improving, and that the President desires an expansion of contacts. On the latter point, the Indian Army Commander General Raina is coming here in September and Admiral Holloway is visiting India. These will be the first high-level military visits since the 1971 Indo-Pak crisis.

### 2. *High Level Statement on India*

Secretary Vance's recent Asia speech upset the Indians because of its omission of India.<sup>4</sup> As you noted, it was intended as a Far East speech, but unfortunately the Asia Society did not point this out. Still, Kewal Singh has a point. In recent years senior officials have been spare in their public comments on India and we are looking for ways to say more publicly about India.

Singh's reference to the House Appropriations Committee relates to language inserted in the Committee report on the FY 78 AID bill calling for special hearings on India should we resume aid. We are not certain that the Committee will pursue this idea, and in any case we may be able to avoid separate hearings by including the FY 78 program with the regular FY 79 hearings early next year. Singh's nervousness about the House report, which he mentioned to me and also the Vice

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Vance's June 29 speech focused on East Asian and Pacific nations. For the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1977, pp. 141–145. An extract is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 48.

President,<sup>5</sup> underscores how touchy the Indians are to any implication they are being singled out for special treatment.

### *3. Meeting with the President*

The Department believes that a call by the Ambassador on the President would be a useful indication of the improvement of relations with India. During my July 23 stopover in Delhi, I was personally struck by the friendly, positive and pragmatic attitude of the new government.<sup>6</sup> I believe the President's willingness to see Singh, even briefly, would be justified. Desai has gone out of his way to be available to Bob Goheen.

### *4. Invitation to Desai*

As you recall, the President has invited Desai here next year in his July 15 letter.<sup>7</sup> Desai has now proposed coming this fall, before he visits Moscow.<sup>8</sup> If the President's schedule permits, we think this would be highly desirable. An early Desai visit could be essential in buttoning down a nuclear agreement with the Indians. This subject is covered in more detail in a separate memo.<sup>9</sup>

### *5. Desai's Nuclear Statement*

On the nuclear question, the Ambassador expressed the hope that we comment positively on Desai's strong stance against nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup> We have already done so privately in the President's July 15 letter and during Joe Nye's August 1–3 trip to India,<sup>11</sup> and publicly in conversations with Indian journalists stationed in Washington. I am not sure that further public comment would be helpful. Since our nuclear negotiations are in mid-stream, too much public comment on Desai's remarks may create internal problems for him in India.

### *Relations with India*

More generally, I believe the improvement in relations is proceeding extremely well. It is now clear that Delhi reciprocates our interest

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 166511 to New Delhi, July 16, reported on Christopher's meeting with Singh, during which they discussed general bilateral issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770254–0479) Clift's July 14 memorandum to Dodson summarized Mondale's July 13 meeting with Singh, during which Singh expressed his government's desire for deeper Indo-U.S. relations. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Vice Presidential Chronological Files, Box 108, Vice Presidential Chron Files, [7/1–15/1977])

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 79.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 80.

<sup>8</sup> In an August 3 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff discussed Desai's proposal to visit the United States at the end of October. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770136–1820)

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 78.

<sup>11</sup> See Document 82.



in a substantially more cooperative relationship and I think we can usefully expand and broaden our contacts.

—Talks on bilateral aid began last week on a possible \$60 million program in FY 78.<sup>12</sup> We have as a tentative planning figure a \$136 million program for FY 79. We will want to assess carefully the course of our initial programs before committing ourselves to larger and longer programs in India.

—In addition to the military exchanges mentioned above, a possible Desai visit and perhaps a trip to South Asia by the Vice President, a number of other trips are also either scheduled or under active consideration over the next six months. The sum total of these should demonstrate publicly the substantial improvement in relations.

—Commerce Minister Mohan Daria will visit Washington August 29–30. He will see Commerce Secretary Kreps and Special Trade Negotiator Strauss.

—Foreign Minister Vajpayee is tentatively planning to visit Washington in late September. We have told the Indians that the President will probably not be able to see him although this could be merged with Desai's meeting with the President, if this works out.

—U.S. Congressional delegations are scheduled tentatively to visit India in October or November.

—Secretary Vance is planning to visit India in early December for bilateral consultations and for a Joint Commission meeting. The visit will take place either just before or after the annual NATO Ministerial talks December 8–9.

—The Indian Health Minister is being invited and will probably be here in the fall.

**Warren Christopher<sup>13</sup>**

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<sup>12</sup> Telegram 10754 from New Delhi, August 1, reported that discussions between the Embassy and the Indian Ministry of Finance began on July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274-0605)

<sup>13</sup> Christopher signed "Warren" above this typed signature. In an August 17 memorandum to Christopher, Brzezinski agreed with the equal treatment of India and Pakistan in terms of arms sales. Brzezinski added, "I think we should move on this in a very low-key way, however. This is hardly going to be a major element of our relationship, and I would not want to push sales to the point that they became an issue with Congress and end up doing more harm than good." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to WC from the White House)

**84. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, August 16, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of July 20.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry that I have been rather late in replying but our Parliamentary Session is just over.

Some issues have arisen in global and bilateral relationships which may climax during the U.N. Assembly Session and I feel that our meeting at an early date might help us to view them in a spirit of mutual understanding. I am glad that there is now an early prospect of our meeting and am looking forward to a frank exchange of ideas on those and some other issues which you have raised in your letter.<sup>3</sup>

I appreciate very much the spirit and manner in which you have expressed your thoughts about the nuclear policy particularly its sincerity and candour. We recently had discussions with Mr. Joseph Nye, whom your Administration had sent out to explain some of the technical aspects to us.<sup>4</sup> I was pleased to hear him confirm that my own statements on nuclear policy had helped to remove certain misconceptions in American minds about our plans. All that I would say in this connection is that in mutual relationship trust and confidence in each other are rewarding and productive of results while suspicions and misgivings only make matters worse.

We recognise the rationale behind the proposed U.S. law on nuclear non-proliferation. I am sure that you will agree that States which have been manufacturing and developing atomic weapons are at a disadvantage in persuading those who have not only professed but also practised their conviction in its peaceful uses. Such adherence to peaceful uses of atomic energy has established a greater credibility in the genuineness of their determination to pursue the course they have set for themselves. In the circumstances we have the right to be trusted to ensure that our own research and scientific development of atomic energy does not transgress the peaceful limits. We on our part have accepted safeguards on a bilateral basis to satisfy, to the fullest extent necessary, those from where we have secured raw material or technology. To expect us to accept a system of safeguards which may or may not be applicable to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036-0696. Secret; Nodis. Tarnoff forwarded this letter to Brzezinski under an August 25 covering memorandum, noting that the letter was delivered to the Department of State on August 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036-0695)

<sup>2</sup> Carter's letter to Desai was dated July 15. See Document 80.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 83.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 82.

a given utilisation of atomic energy or which may adversely affect our own development merely to allay the suspicion or feelings of others would not, in my view, be fair.

You have been frank in conceding that there is an element of discrimination as between the nuclear-weapon countries and the rest. American willingness to accept that safeguards on civilian installations would be seen as a well-meant gesture is appreciated and I have no hesitation in accepting its sincerity and genuineness, but it is difficult to accept it as applying to all those who are engaged in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. We do not wish or intend to emulate the latter, but we do want to be autonomous in the pursuit of our peaceful development according to our own resources.

On the fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme, we would explore all reasonable avenues of cooperation. Your explanation on the subject is very reassuring and my mind is quite receptive to any scheme you might suggest in respect of this programme. I acknowledge that our association with this programme might turn out to be of mutual benefit.

The prospects of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which you have held out is both important and encouraging as it would remove a sensitive element of discrimination and may bring the chances of acceptance of non-proliferation, both internationally and nationally, much nearer. It may even lead to self-imposed restraints by countries themselves. You can also rest assured that we shall support all non-discriminatory measures towards nuclear disarmament. All these aspects can be reviewed by us in further detail when we meet.

I must also thank you for keeping us informed about the Indian Ocean talks between USA and the Soviet Union. The area is naturally of deep interest to us. I also support very warmly your joint decision to keep the U.N. Ad-hoc Committee in the picture.<sup>5</sup> By such small gestures great confidence can be established.

Our Governments are in touch with each other about U.S. assistance to India. It is heartening to know of your interest and support for the priority we want to give to rural development. India can become a land of plenty if every field is watered and every acre is fertilised. If others help us to help ourselves, this vision can be realised in no distant future.

Altogether, I think our relations are moving towards greater sense of realism, mutual respect and beneficial cooperation. I can assure you that we will grasp the hand of friendship which is offered to us to cement relations of dignity and common advantage. But a condition

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 79. Desai was referring to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

precedent is, as you will readily concede, that we eschew mutual suspicion and build our relationship on complete trust in, and frankness with, each other. Indeed stronger relations can make a contribution to resolving broad international problems and bring about more just, more moral and more equitable world order. And let me say without reserve that your own attitude of mutual confidence and willingness to share each other's thoughts are going to promote it much more than the conventional methods of diplomacy which have ruled international relationships hitherto. I shall therefore close with my warmest regards and good wishes to you and with the hope that our meeting shortly will forge a link of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

Morarji Desai

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**85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Information Items

*Intelligence*

*Indian Preparations for Your Visit:* Cabinet-level Indian officials, in preparation for your visit, have identified a number of issues for possible discussion. According to a reliable source, the following have already been developed:<sup>2</sup>

—Nuclear. India will insist on coming to no agreement on NPT. While the Indian government plans to note only that "reasonable safeguards" will be provided for the Tarapur reactor, the officials acknowledge that this reactor needs U.S. fuel.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily Report File, Box 4, 10/16/77–10/31/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 13495 from New Delhi, September 24, reported: "The announcement in Washington and New Delhi of President Carter's visit to India November 27–29 was headlined in the Indian press, Saturday, September 24. Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta personally broke the news to pressmen here Friday evening, a step the press credited as evidence of the importance the GOI attaches to the event." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770349–0161)

—Joint Commission. India believes the Joint Commission should be more effective and wants more areas of jurisdiction placed within its purview.

—Aid. India believes trade is more important than aid and will press for greater access to U.S. markets for Indian products. State believes that trade will be their heaviest area of concentration.

—Indian Ocean. India supports declaring the ocean a zone of peace, and is considering a proposal of trilateral cooperation there with Iran and the U.S.

—Defense. India hopes to be able to buy small quantities of modern weaponry from the U.S. By keeping the quantity of purchases down and not publicizing defense matters, it aims to prevent a weapons race on the sub-continent and avoid provoking Pakistan.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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## 86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 5, 1977, 0210Z

264782. For the Ambassador or Charge. Subject: Presidential Trip.

1. Please be in touch immediately with highest appropriate Indian official to have the following message passed to the Indian Head of State from President Carter.

2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: I regret to inform you that the press of urgent business in connection with the congressional consideration of my administration's energy program obliges me to postpone my visit to your country. I ask your understanding for this difficult decision. The cementing of the close ties between our two countries is of the highest priority to me. However, the extreme importance of the proposed energy program—not only to the United States, but indeed to all energy-producing and energy-consuming countries throughout the world—necessitates my staying in Washington to ensure its management through the congressional process. The energy legislation which I have placed before the Congress is complex and involves intensive Parliamentary debate. We are nearing the closing stages of that debate, which will require my personal involvement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0786, P800020–1917. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by David Anderson (S/S); cleared by Inderfurth; approved by Anderson.

I know that my postponing the visit to your country will cause personal inconvenience to you and to your senior advisors who have worked so hard to ensure the trip's success. I am, of course, still most anxious to visit with you and will be in touch with you as soon as I can to try to arrange an acceptable date.

Secretary Vance will be announcing the postponement of the trip on Monday, November 7, at 10:00 am Washington time.<sup>2</sup> Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

Vance

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 15905 from New Delhi, November 9, the Embassy reported Indian reaction to the postponement of Carter's visit, which was characterized as "low key and sympathetic." However, the Embassy warned that "should the 'postponement begin to appear more like a 'cancellation' we suspect that these delays would give rise to misunderstanding, and an effort by unfriendly elements here to read more into it than would be warranted." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770414-0645) Carter's visit was rescheduled for January 1-3, 1978.

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## 87. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 1, 1977, 3:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Indian Nuclear Issues

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *India:*

Ambassador Palkhivala  
Mr. Gokhale, Minister  
Mr. Rajan, First Secretary

#### *U.S.:*

Joseph S. Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science  
and Technology (T/D)  
Adolph Dubs, Deputy Assistant Secretary (NEA)  
C. David Welch, Notetaker (T)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Entry UD-07, Lot 81D155, Box 16, India 1977. Secret. Drafted by Welch; approved by Nye. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

Mr. Nye greeted Mr. Palkhivala, the Indian Ambassador, and his colleagues, Mr. Gokhale and Mr. Rajan. Mr. Dubs expressed regret at the serious injuries sustained by Indian Embassy employee Koteswar, who was stabbed by an unknown assailant.<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador expressed thanks for the sympathy extended and said he feared that Koteswar might not survive, but he was young and strong and they had not given up hope. In addition, other members of the Embassy had received threats and this worried him. Nye sympathized and noted that no society is immune to terrorism today.

Ambassador Palkhivala said that he had come in to discuss with Nye the nuclear issues in our relations with India. To begin, he wanted to make several points.

First, India was not and did not intend to be, a co-sponsor of the non-aligned resolution on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Development. Nye expressed his gratitude for the Indian support of our opposition to this resolution.<sup>3</sup> He added that the U.S. position on the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SANWFZ)<sup>4</sup> should be understood in the context of our desire to maintain a consistency with President Carter's support of nuclear weapons free zones in general and the Treaty of Tlatelolco<sup>5</sup> in particular. The vote was well received by Pakistan;<sup>6</sup> but we did not intend, he emphasized, for this vote to read as directed against India, with which we have excellent relations.

Ambassador Palkhivala thanked Nye for his explanation and said that the second point he wanted to raise concerned the pending license

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<sup>2</sup> Silla Koteswar was attacked on November 28 outside the Indian Embassy in Washington. According to the report on the incident in the *Washington Post*, the Indian Embassy's press counselor suspected it was an act of terrorism. See "Stabbed Diplomat Remains Serious After Surgery," *Washington Post*, November 30, 1977, p. C2.

<sup>3</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/32/50, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development, was adopted on December 8. An unknown hand wrote: "GS—IO explains this Yugo-Pak resolution competes with a Finn resolution we favor" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. "GS" presumably refers to George Seignious, Director of ACDA.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 82.

<sup>5</sup> The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in Mexico City on February 14, 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968. Protocol II, which called upon nuclear-weapon states to agree to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty and to promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties to the Treaty, was signed by Vice President Hubert Humphrey on April 1, 1968. Carter signed Protocol I of the Treaty, which bound overseas nations with territories in Latin America—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands—to the terms of the Treaty, which prohibited the manufacture, testing, storage, and use of nuclear weapons in Latin America, on May 26, 1977. For documentation on the Carter administration's efforts to convince other Latin American nations to sign and ratify the Treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 4.

applications for Tarapur fuel.<sup>7</sup> He noted there were two applications on file and that it was very urgent for action to begin on the one presented in January. The Ambassador noted that supplying fuel to Tarapur would not involve a “breach” of the pending non-proliferation legislation<sup>8</sup> since this particular fuel supply would not last beyond the 18 month deadline (in both the House and Senate versions of the legislation) for the imposition of full-scope safeguards. A delay in the issuance of this license could involve very high financial costs for India if the fuel had to be shipped by air. If the license were not issued, blackouts<sup>9</sup> in the Gujarat area could result. Most importantly, if this license were held up it could affect adversely the setting and tone surrounding President Carter’s visit. Tarapur could then turn into a serious political issue in India and would be used against the Desai government by the opposition. “In confidence,” he said, Prime Minister Desai had already received a question in Parliament on Tarapur and had responded to the effect that he expected “no problems” in getting the fuel. In sum, he said, there were three arguments favoring issuance of the license: one, the economic and energy reasons; two, the political weight given by the opposition to any actions on Tarapur; and, three, the need to assure a proper environment for President Carter’s visit.

Nye responded that we could fully appreciate the economic and political importance of Tarapur, but that he wanted to point out in a frank manner that there were views within the U.S. Government which questioned the technical imperatives of fueling Tarapur now.<sup>10</sup> Nye admitted that these technical views ignored the larger, more important political arguments for granting the license. The Administration will proceed with processing the application through its various phases. The Ambassador said he had tried to convince Commissioner Gilinsky that the fuel fabrication plant at Tarapur ran on a precise schedule tuned to the fuel requirements of the Tarapur reactors. He had pointed out that any delay in fuel fabrication caused by a licensing delay would ultimately hamper the operation of the Tarapur power reactors. Nye said he would report this and would make every effort to expedite Executive Branch review of the license but he could not predict the ultimate outcome.

The third issue the Ambassador wanted to discuss was President Carter’s visit. He said that it was the GOI’s desire to have something said on the nuclear issue in a joint declaration. He reiterated India’s total agreement with the intent of the pending non-proliferation legisla-

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<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand underlined “pending license applications for Tarapur fuel.”

<sup>8</sup> See Document 6.

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand underlined “blackouts.”

<sup>10</sup> An unknown hand underlined “now.”



tion and Desai's strong support for the principle of non-proliferation. Desai had even pledged not to explode any more nuclear devices. Would the U.S. be receptive to language that supported India's efforts and views in this area? In addition, he said, it would be very helpful to say that the US is not pressing for a full scope safeguards treaty and that, despite our differences, the dialogue between our countries is amicable and free of coercion.

Nye said that he understood completely the Indian concerns on full scope safeguards (FSS) and added that a mention of India's support for the IAEA and the international safeguards regime would be suitable language for a declaration. He noted that there were two ways to approach Indian adherence to FSS. First, it could be done as a "treaty" through a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering all facilities (INFCIRC-153). Second, it could be done facility-by-facility (INFCIRC-66) through IAEA inspections, thus increasing incrementally the number of such facilities under safeguards. Nye stated that India could gradually approach FSS by the latter avenue and thus reduce the political visibility of the issue. Furthermore, India already had safeguarded facilities so this would not be a novel step. Moving towards FSS in this manner, he emphasized, could defuse the political invective while meeting the deadline called for in the pending legislation. Ambassador Palkhivala did not reply to this but said that anything such as a "treaty" would have to pass Parliament and would therefore invoke a political debate.

The Ambassador asked whether the international opposition to the Administration's policy on FSS troubled Nye. Nye replied that those attitudes were changing; for example, Brazil has everything under safeguards and thus is in effect under FSS. Our differences with them are over the reprocessing issue. All NPT nations are under FSS, and the number of nations that do not adhere to FSS is small and shows signs of declining. Since FSS are applied by the IAEA, an international body, national sovereignty is respected; therefore, even nations with indigenously developed facilities have gone to FSS. We see these as positive developments, especially given the pending legislation's requirements for FSS after 18 months.

Mr. Gokhale said that what really worried India was the discrimination inherent in the NPT and the political problems it conjures up in India. He asked whether a statement might be made before the visit that will counter the rumors and press stories (he cited a NYT editorial)<sup>11</sup> that suggest that President Carter will deal with the NPT as subject of the visit. Nye said that the USG was cognizant of this problem.

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<sup>11</sup> Not found.

Gokhale added that India has shown commendable restraint in “passing on” nuclear technology and “there is recent evidence of this”. Any expression or recognition of this helpful attitude would assist India in preparing for the President’s visit.

Nye asked whether they meant a statement *before* the President’s trip. The Ambassador replied that this was not necessary but it should be reflected in any declaration. Dubs said we were preparing a draft declaration.<sup>12</sup> The Ambassador noted that the American Embassy in New Delhi had been given an Indian draft and the Department presumably received a copy.<sup>13</sup> Dubs added that we could consider making positive remarks along the lines suggested by the Ambassador in any comments to the press, preferably after the visit.

The Ambassador also asked about the return of spent fuel policy—should something be mentioned about this in the declaration? In response, Nye said we could mention something about Indian interest in the policy. As an aside, the Ambassador said India might be the first nation to take advantage of the new policy.

Mr. Gokhale asked for a clarification of the new fuel bank policies. Nye said this idea was being worked on in the context of our preparations for INFCE and that we would have more to say about it in Working Group 3 on fuel assurances. The fuel bank would be international in character and available to those nations that met certain non-proliferation obligations. Gokhale asked what that meant for Tarapur. Nye replied that FSS might be a condition, in which case the Tarapur situation would be unchanged. The key focus of the bank was on the guarantee of a reliable supply of nuclear fuel that would be insulated from capricious and arbitrary political cut-offs. International control over supply leverage would guarantee this to states accepting certain obligations.

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<sup>12</sup> Not found. An unknown hand underlined this sentence, drew a line from it to the right-hand margin, and wrote: “GS—I’ve asked Dubs to discuss at 3:15 briefly.”

<sup>13</sup> Telegram 15378 from New Delhi, November 1, relayed the text of the Indian draft of a joint Indo-U.S. declaration. The draft proclaimed that India and the United States shared beliefs in democracy; the dignity of the individual; the right of self-determination; the importance of openness, decolonization, peaceful arbitration of conflict, and disarmament; and the need for a restructuring of the international economic order on a more equitable basis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770401–0712) Regarding the final version, see footnote 13, Document 92.

**88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 23, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

6. *Indian Nuclear Policy*: Prime Minister Desai reiterated to the Indian Parliament on December 22 that India would not “explode any nuclear device for peaceful purposes or make any nuclear weapons.” He also implied that fuel for the Tarapur reactors would be forthcoming as in the past and said that the matter would be discussed during your visit.

Commenting on the pending US non-proliferation legislation, the Prime Minister said that if there was any clause in the bill which affected “our self-respect it will not be accepted by us. But I have no control over the United States Congress and I cannot prevent them from passing any legislation.” This underlines the importance of making progress on full scope safeguards during your visit to New Delhi.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 12/77. Secret. Vance wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Merry Christmas—Cy.” Beneath Vance’s handwritten note, Carter wrote: “cc Cy, J.”

<sup>2</sup> Carter’s planned to visit India January 1–3, 1978. In the left-hand margin next to this and the preceding paragraph, Carter wrote: “Good.”

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**89. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, December 27, 1977, 1139Z

18465. For the President from Ambassador Goheen. Subject: Observations Concerning Prime Minister Desai.

1. It may be helpful for you to have some of my personal perceptions of how Prime Minister Desai looks on your visit and particularly of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770481–1288. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

attitudes and constraints that are likely to guide his approach to issues that you will be discussing. In sending you these observations, I have sought to supplement rather than to duplicate those contained in the "scope paper" prepared by the Department of State.<sup>2</sup> The last version of the latter which we have seen here seems to this Embassy to be on target in all respects.

2. Atmospheric: Before discussing the Prime Minister's views, I would like to assure you that there is widespread popular interest in your impending visit to New Delhi. Your policies with respect to Southern Africa and your declared interest in India and in the problems of the Third World have won much approval here. More particularly, your visit is seen to mark a recognition of India's place in the world, a welcome affirmation of shared democratic values, and the launching of a new era of good relations between India and the United States. As these statements imply, popular expectations seem to be general rather than specific. There appears now to be little speculation that you will come offering any big handouts. In recent days there have been increased expressions of concern in the Parliament and in the press that you might try to exact concessions from India on nuclear matters that would challenge India's sovereignty and inhibit her development of nuclear energy. The government's spokesmen have reiterated that India will not be coerced in these matters, and most popular opinion seems to be that our differences over nuclear policy will not be allowed to spoil "the new beginning" in cordial relations between the two countries.

3. In Prime Minister Desai's mind, your visit is an important counter-balance to his recent visit to Moscow.<sup>3</sup> It caps, as it were, his effort to establish a foreign policy of "genuine non-alignment" and have it recognized as such. His aim in "genuine non-alignment", with an emphasis on the word "genuine", is an India that is on equally good terms with the major powers and one that is accepted by them as a sovereign equal, not regarded as dependent or tied into any "special relationship". There is no question but that ideologically the Prime Minister is more in tune with the United States and the Western democracies than with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. But he does not want India to get caught again in either an ideological or

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<sup>2</sup> The paper, an undated memorandum from Christopher to Carter, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 5, President, Europe and Asia, 12/29/77-1/6/78: Stop Papers, New Delhi, 1/1-3/78 [I].

<sup>3</sup> Desai visited Moscow October 21-26. A report on his visit is in telegram 15700 from Moscow, October 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770398-0815)

power struggle between the East and the West. Above all, he wishes to establish and have recognized India's independence and integrity.

4. As you know from his correspondence, the Prime Minister feels that you and he share very basic religious and moral values. He hopes, I believe, that these can help to build not simply good relations but friendship, mutual understanding and respect between the two countries. He will therefore be most interested whether you perceive India's best interests as he does. Therefore let me expand a little more on this matter of non-alignment. The Prime Minister believes that in both its internal development and its external relations, India should choose its own course and make its own destiny to the fullest extent possible. Hence he frequently cites the virtues of self-reliance and fearlessness and opposes India considering itself a part of any bloc. This desire to have India stand on its own feet applies to its position in the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, and among the democracies. But it does not preclude working to advance common interests with any or all of the foregoing; neither, in practical terms, is the Prime Minister likely to find it in India's self-interest to take strong, overt positions against majorities in either the Non-Aligned Movement or the Group of 77.

5. A parallel view, held as a matter of both principle and prudence, is that each nation has a right to determine its own form of social and political organization. Consequently, except where patent racism is involved (e.g., in Southern Africa), the Prime Minister believes that India should forego criticism of other societies. His reservations on this score extend to the emphasis on human rights that we have inserted into American foreign policy, even though he himself has been a very strong champion of human rights within the Indian society for many, many years. The Prime Minister would not hold the job he has unless there were strong streaks of pragmatism and practicality in him alongside his deep moral idealism. A desire not to antagonize the Soviets and endanger their arms supply to India seems to me clearly to be an important element in the reservations just cited. Likewise, India under his direction remains more than scrupulous about not doing or saying anything that might seem pro-Israel and so endanger its relations with the Arab states as oil suppliers and as potential supporters of Moslem Pakistan against Indian interests.

6. The Prime Minister heads a Cabinet that is still a collection of men with differing views, loyalties, and ambitions, rather than a cohesive entity. With respect to foreign affairs, in company with Foreign Minister Vajpayee he seems to have established, along the lines indicated above, effective leadership and clear policies which have general acceptance or at least have encountered no serious overt challenges. The same applies to the portfolios which the Prime Minister holds for

atomic energy, space, and science and technology. With respect to domestic affairs, his technique has been to give the several Ministers great leeway in their respective areas of responsibility and to try through patience and consideration to hold together competing personalities and interests. The results have been little real movement to date in the areas of economic policy and development and an often mediocre administrative performance. These facts appear to reflect limits that the Prime Minister perceives to his power to lead in these areas rather than lack of concern or conviction, for while he is respected by his colleagues, his own political base is not such that he can impose his will on them.

7. In the area of nuclear policy, the Prime Minister took a very courageous step in declaring that his government would not pursue the development of explosive devices. He made that decision as a matter of moral conviction, because he believes the possession of nuclear weapons would not strengthen India's security, and because he must also have been confident that he could sustain his position against dissenters in his own party as well as in the opposition parties. When it comes to the acceptance of full-scope safeguards, however, much less clear are both his own private views and his ability to surmount what is clearly widespread and influential opposition to such a step within his own party, in the Congress Party, and in India's scientific establishment.

8. The Prime Minister has stated publicly that he would never accept any agreement that was discriminatory, or that made India subservient to an external power, or that impeded India's development of nuclear science and technology. Whether he can reconcile in his own mind his deep convictions about India's independence and sovereignty and the acceptance of safeguards administered by the IAEA, in which India is hardly an outsider, is something that we simply do not know. Even if he should be able to make this reconciliation personally, two things seem clear: (a) he would react negatively, out of both personal and national pride, if there were any indication that America was trying to strong-arm him; and (b) he would have a hard time overriding the noisy and passionate opposition that he knows a public endorsement of full-scope safeguards will arouse among members of India's political and intellectual elites. If, then, you can move him toward the acceptance of full-scope safeguards, as we hope that you can, we believe that he will need both time and all the persuasive arguments that you can give him to build broader support for the step before he can announce it as a matter of public policy.

9. One thing not adequately recognized in the "scope paper" is the extent to which China figures in the rationalizations of India's leaders. On the non-proliferation front, the Prime Minister is likely to ask you

what our government is doing to deter China from the development and use of nuclear weapons. The implication usually is that if the Western powers are not leaning on China to forego nuclear proliferation, they should not be leaning on a peace-loving country like India which has renounced nuclear explosions.

10. On the Indian Ocean I have not found either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister to be assertive about the idea of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Privately they have been both relaxed about and appreciative of the bilateral US–USSR talks,<sup>4</sup> although publicly the GOI continues to aim at the removal of all external military forces from the Indian Ocean area. India's long-standing ambition to be recognized as the dominant regional power and a major force in the world, does, I believe, guide its leaders to want to be the monitors of the Indian Ocean and the assurers of security in the region, perhaps in company with Iran, but they are realist enough not to want to push hard for that objective now.

11. If development assistance becomes a subject for discussion, you will find the Prime Minister a proud man not looking for handouts. He is unlikely to present India as poverty ridden; he is more likely to stress India's strengths and potentialities to which we can [garble] relate in helpful ways, as, for example, through the transfer of science and technology. The resumption of bilateral development assistance, which we are now discussing at the level of \$60 million for FY '78, is regarded more as a political gesture, an earnest of goodwill on both sides, than as a matter of much economic moment. India's preferences for resource transfers are through multilateral channels and debt-relief, both of which it regards to entail less psychological dependency. At the same time, however, US aid through bilateral as well as through multilateral channels has a particular significance for India because of America's weight in the Consortium and the importance that the Indians attach to our example there for the other donors.<sup>5</sup>

12. We have been picking up some indications here, as has also the Department in Washington, that the Desai government is interested in reducing its dependence upon the Soviets for military equipment.<sup>6</sup> It seems unlikely, however, that the Prime Minister will seek to establish a major arms supply relationship with the United States under current circumstances. His government is well aware of the limitations laid

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<sup>4</sup> The second and third rounds of U.S.-Soviet talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean were held September 26–30 and December 6–10. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 115 and 117.

<sup>5</sup> The World Bank's Aid to India Consortium of major lending countries was organized in 1958 to support the economic development of India.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 83.

down in your arms-supply policy both as it applies globally and in this region. India's leaders also remember the instability that has characterized US-Indian relations in the past. They therefore will be reluctant to assume any sort of heavy dependency upon us until the "new beginning" has shown a proved capacity to produce a firmer and more consistent relationship than that which India and the United States have enjoyed over India's thirty years of life as a nation.

13. On a personal level, I have found the Prime Minister friendly and easy to talk with. When he first stands up he may move slowly, as befits his age, but there is nothing creaky about his mind. It is clear and incisive. He is a man of principle who speaks in a straightforward manner and expects his words to be believed and trusted. Occasionally he tends to be laconic; but he listens closely; has an active, quiet sense of humor; and seems to enjoy the give and take of discussion. Many say that his extended period in jail during the Emergency has mellowed him and made him less dogmatic and inflexible than he was earlier reputed to be. My own experience tends to confirm that his extraordinary internal self-discipline has fewer sharp external edges now than used to be the case. I find him very much at peace with himself.

Goheen

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## 90. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, January 2, 1978, 9:45–11 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Carter and Prime Minister Desai

### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The President

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Ambassador Robert Goheen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 1/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Rashtrapati Bhavan, the official residence of the President of India. Carter was in India January 1–3.



Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Thomas P. Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

*India*

Prime Minister Morarji Desai  
Home Minister Charan Singh  
Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee  
Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram  
Finance Minister H.M. Patel  
Commerce Minister Mohan Dharia  
Industries Minister George Fernandes  
Minister of State for External Affairs Samarendra Kundu  
Ambassador to the US Nani Palkhivala  
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister V. Shankar  
Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta

The meeting began at 9:45 a.m. (after a private meeting between the President and the Prime Minister which began at 9:00).<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Desai welcomed President Carter, noting that the work of the Joint Commission would now be closer since easier collaboration was possible. He asked the President what he would like to talk about.

The President replied that he had read about the accomplishments of the Joint Commission; we are eager to strengthen it through direct involvement. We also would like to explore new areas such as agriculture and rural poverty where we have problems, also.

The Prime Minister jokingly said there was no comparison.

The President replied that we do see some similarities and hope to profit from Indian experience. Information from the space satellite would be helpful for agriculture; the Landsat Agreement will be announced shortly.<sup>3</sup> (The President discussed the functions of Landsat at some length.) Later on the Indian side will be utilizing our space shuttle in connection with its own notable space capabilities. (The President then presented the Indians with a model of the space shuttle.)

The President noted that we will continue to cooperate on power and that, as he had told the Prime Minister privately, he will request approval for the pending Indian license request for uranium for Tarapur.

The President then continued to describe the progress we are making in SALT on qualitative and quantitative limits, the reduction of inventories, and ultimately elimination of nuclear weapons. The President hopes that Brezhnev will come to the United States this year to

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<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation was found of the private meeting.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 18644 from New Delhi, December 30, 1977, conveyed the text of the LANDSAT Agreement with India and the Indian Government's concurrence in it. The agreement provided for access by the Indian Government to satellite imagery taken by U.S. satellites of Indian territory. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780002-1264)

conclude the SALT negotiations. He noted that we have agreed in principle with the Soviet Union and the UK on a comprehensive test ban involving both military and peaceful tests. We hope to add France and China later. The Soviets had withdrawn their previous objections to not having France and China involved from the beginning as well as their desire to exclude PNEs. The United States, like India, is ready to stop all tests; we are following Indian leadership in this.

The President said we are also pursuing non-proliferation. We are concerned about South Africa, Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and others, and are trying to induce them not to develop an explosive capability. There are problems because of the German and French sales to Pakistan and Brazil; there is some progress, however, as you described to me (sic). We and the Soviets have been monitoring South Africa with satellites and hope this will discourage them from testing, which they have the capability of doing.

We are trying to ensure at the same time that nuclear energy will be available adequately in the world. We recognize that we and the Soviets are the worst violators on nuclear weapons. The President hopes that he and Brezhnev will be able to end this.

The Prime Minister said everything will be all right when you and the Soviets agree.

The President noted that the Chinese problem may remain.

The Prime Minister said that they will come around.

The President said he hopes that India can guarantee that. The Soviets are worried about China.

The President said that we are also discussing the Indian Ocean with the Soviets—another area where India has taken the initiative on arms control. We recognize the predominant influence of India in the Indian Ocean area, but we thought it best to start with the Soviets, and others could be involved later. Progress has been good.

Secretary Vance said that an agreement will be drafted in February.

The Prime Minister said there should be reductions until ultimately nothing is left except peace.

The President said we have good relations with the Soviets and the Prime Minister's good offices (his visit to Moscow and correspondence with President Carter) have been helpful.

Turning to the Middle East, the President said that he admires Sadat's courage. We have been encouraging direct negotiations between the parties but with no success, and Sadat's trip was a fine move.<sup>4</sup> He took a chance and the President is going to Aswan to

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<sup>4</sup> Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem November 19–21, 1977.

reassure him. We cannot abandon UN Resolutions 242 and 338; we believe the Israelis should withdraw. Some small border changes are possible and the Arabs concur in this. The Palestinian question should move toward self-determination. We do not believe that there should be a Palestinian nation between Israel and Jordan and some Arabs agree with us privately. The Palestinian entity should have a tie to Jordan so that the radicals cannot build a disruptive military force. The Israelis are mistrustful and feel threatened. Sadat and Hussein<sup>5</sup> have encouraged them but they will be cautious. Secretary Vance will meet with the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers in Jerusalem on January 15. The President noted that he had just met with Hussein and the Shah and they will meet Sadat later. We pray that there will be a resolution since war in the Middle East will affect the peace and safety of the world. We, Japan, Europe, India, and others are all vulnerable with regard to oil and the conflict could involve many countries. The Jerusalem issue complicates matters further. Negotiations will be long and difficult but all parties seek an agreement. Syria is abusive in public but Assad's<sup>6</sup> private conversation is much more constructive. Roy Atherton sat in on the Cairo meetings so we have been kept informed. We will offer support when called on; both sides have confidence in us and want us to participate.

The Prime Minister said that if the United States and the USSR can agree on a solution, there will be no problem. The President pointed out that we have issued a joint statement and it still provides a basis for a viable solution.<sup>7</sup>

Foreign Minister Vajpayee said that this was a big step forward but there has been backward movement on the Soviet side.

The President said we and the Soviets got a lot of abuse and now Sadat and Begin<sup>8</sup> are sharing it. Israel, the US, Egypt, Jordan, the Shah, and perhaps the Saudis are in agreement, but the Israelis are reluctant. There could be an interim arrangement for joint administration (Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and the UN); then there would be a referendum.

The Prime Minister said this would be possible if Israel withdraws. Pressure will mount on the Palestinians and there can be guarantees to Israel.

The President noted that Begin says that Israel does not claim sovereignty over the occupied territory but it does need to retain some

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<sup>5</sup> King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan.

<sup>6</sup> Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria

<sup>7</sup> The U.S.-Soviet joint statement on the Middle East, issued on October 1, 1977, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 120.

<sup>8</sup> Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.

military outposts to maintain security. We feel that the UN could do this.

The Prime Minister reiterated the US and the USSR should come to an agreement.

The President warned him not to overestimate American influence over Israel.

Secretary Vance noted that we are in constant touch with the Soviets.

The President said that the Soviets do not always agree with us but we keep them informed. He saw two differences between us and the Indians: We do not believe the Palestinian entity should be autonomous and we do not see the PLO role as significant. We have tried to get the PLO to accept the existence of Israel and have told them we would deal with them, but they have refused. Sadat is disgusted with the PLO and Hussein probably is, too. The Palestinians do have a right to run their own affairs, however, and to have a homeland of their own.

The Prime Minister said that the PLO can be contained if others put pressure on them and that depends on the United States and the Soviets.

The President asked under what circumstances India could establish relations with Israel.<sup>9</sup>

The Prime Minister said that this could only be after peace is achieved. To do so beforehand would mean losing influence with the Arabs. He pointed out that India recognized Israel informally. There is an Israeli consulate in Bombay.

The President noted the parallel of our trade representative (sic) in Cuba.

Turning to the Horn, the President said we are discouraged with the Somalian and Ethiopian situation and are concerned with the military buildup in Ethiopia and the danger of invasion of Somalia. We have no solution; perhaps a semi-autonomous state is possible in the Ogaden. We do not approve of the Somali attack. We need to discuss these issues with the Soviets and we will be discussing them soon with France and South Africa. Does India have any suggestions?

The Prime Minister said that the US and USSR should put pressure on both sides to accept a border commission. He had warned Brezhnev against supplying arms.

The President asked whether Desai thought the UN could play a role.

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<sup>9</sup> India did not establish official relations with Israel until January 1992.

The Prime Minister replied that the UN does not have the strength without US and Soviet support.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee pointed out that neither side had approached the UN.

The President observed that despite Nigerian efforts the OAU is a doubtful quantity. We cannot do much until the Somalis and the Ethiopians are ready.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee said that the situation involving Somali liberation forces reminded him of Kashmir.

Prime Minister Desai said that India had declined to sell arms to the Somalis and had not provided any weapons to Ethiopia.

Secretary Vance said that despite press stories, we had not approved transfers of arms to Somalia from third countries.

The President noted that we have no diplomatic relations with China although we do have a strong presence there. He asked Desai to describe Sino-Indian relations and give us some advice.

The Prime Minister said he was glad that the US was improving relations with China and India is trying to bring them around, also. They invaded India, however, and India's land should be returned.<sup>10</sup> India would not, however, resort to war. Ambassadors were exchanged last year; India responds to China on trade, etc. The two countries cannot be close, however, until China gives up the occupied territory; the Chinese must initiate negotiations on that.

He continued with the observation that the Soviets are concerned about improvements in Chinese relations with India and the United States. He had reassured Brezhnev on this score.

The President said we had not made much progress in normalizing relations with the Chinese. We still have obligations to Taiwan. President Nixon negotiated the Shanghai Communiqué and we honor its terms,<sup>11</sup> including one China. We have greatly reduced our military presence in Taiwan, but we want to be able to have normal trade relations with them at the same time we have diplomatic relations with the PRC. We are still optimistic. The change in government there has caused some delay, and we are preoccupied with the Middle East and SALT. We exchange ideas with the Chinese. Like India, we do not want to play them off against the Soviets or see Sino-Soviet relations get worse.

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<sup>10</sup> In what became known as the Sino-Indian War, Chinese forces attacked Indian forces in 1962 and captured disputed territory along the Himalayan border.

<sup>11</sup> Issued on February 27, 1972, during President Nixon's first trip to China, the Shanghai Communiqué established a *modus vivendi* for Sino-U.S. relations. The text of the agreement is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 376–379.

The Prime Minister said that the Chinese are a difficult people and questioned how the US could possibly abandon Taiwan. The PRC would ultimately come around.

The President said we will not abandon Taiwan.

The President turned to North-South issues and said we respect India's leadership among the LDCs. We are trying to break down trade barriers, ensure food supplies, support commodity prices and give more aid to the needy. India is now giving aid itself and we admire its agricultural successes. Perhaps Desai could suggest how we could do a better job.

The Prime Minister said that the non-aligned countries with whom India associates are LDCs. In many cases this was because colonial powers exploited them and they, therefore, expect help. Desai said his position is that we should depend first on ourselves and help each other. Not all LDCs believe that, however. Other developed countries should follow the US lead and help the LDCs to grow. Then there would be no more North-South problem. Desai sees only one world in which blocs, such as a non-aligned bloc, do not make sense. The LDCs will require help, however, and nobody can remain alone in the modern world. It is always hard for the weak to act reasonably; the strong should give them confidence. The LDCs are hurt by commodity and trade problems and sympathetic dealings on these will avert bad feelings.

Finance Minister Patel noted the growth of protectionism in the developed countries. The Prime Minister said that disarmament will mean a surplus for everybody; this makes disarmament all the more urgent.

The President noted that LDC rhetoric has disrupted discussions and makes it difficult for us to assure the cooperation of Congress.

The Prime Minister pointed out that they have strength only in abuse—something he does not like.

Patel said that trade barriers block industrial development in the LDCs.

The Prime Minister said that trade is better than aid.

The President noted that the American Executive is more liberal than Congress. He and Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica agreed that discussions would be better held in Committee. This would avoid the public debates that inflame Congressional opinion. We do, however, recognize grounds for criticism, and it is in our national interest to see the LDCs develop. There is no good mechanism for cooperation and communication between the LDCs and DCs. We look to India for help.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee noted that India does not engage in abuse and, as Secretary Vance knows, played a constructive role in Paris at CIEC.<sup>12</sup>

The Prime Minister said that Indian friendship does not depend on help. Nothing is going to be accomplished at the UNGA. (Vajpayee agreed.) Things must be done quietly lest there be a vicious circle. India tells this to the other LDCs.

Commerce Minister Dharia said that India wants to see trade barriers relaxed on small-scale industry so it can be integrated with US manufacturers. A mechanism of this type should be developed. There should be preferential trade treatment that would generate employment.

The President asked if the Joint Commission would be best for this or should Secretary of Commerce Kreps come to India?

Foreign Minister Vajpayee said we should decide to have more official-level consultations.

Foreign Secretary Mehta noted the Indo-US bilateral meetings that had been held in 1969 and 1970.

The President said that these could begin again.<sup>13</sup>

The President said that US business is discouraged about the investment atmosphere in India. The IBM and Coca Cola experiences have scared people off.<sup>14</sup> We need to encourage business exchanges and work on better cooperation. We are not blaming the Indians for exercising their sovereign rights.

Finance Minister Patel said the key is trade and that the fault was with IBM and Coca Cola policies. He discussed Indian foreign investment law at some length maintaining that a company can maintain control even with a 40 percent share. He said India would be selective in new investment.

The Prime Minister said he had dealt with IBM and Coca Cola. IBM had refused to train Indians to take over their positions. Coca

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<sup>12</sup> See footnote 3, Document 75.

<sup>13</sup> Annual Indo-U.S. bilateral talks ceased as a result of the 1971 South Asia crisis. Efforts to resume talks began as early as 1972. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 209.

<sup>14</sup> The *New York Times* reported that the Coca Cola and IBM corporations quit India because of "India's Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, which requires most foreign companies to divest 60 percent of the equity of their subsidiaries to local shareholders by the end of 1977. (Companies that manufacture strictly for export are exempted.) Throughout its history, I.B.M. has been adamant about running the whole show, saying it had to if it was to operate efficiently. In April 1976 I.B.M. issued a compromise plan that would have broken IBM India into two companies, one of which would have been 60 percent owned by local interests. This month India rejected the proposal. I.B.M. responded yesterday by announcing it had decided to pull out." (N.R. Kleinfeld, "I.B.M. to Leave India and Avoid Loss of Control," *New York Times*, November 16, 1977, p. D1)

Cola should never have come here in the first place. It is habit-forming and the Prime Minister suspects that their formula is behind this. Coca Cola drove out other Indian products because it is addictive.

The President said that the real need is to have understanding in the business community and American business should come to India and learn.

The Prime Minister said that Eugene Black had written very much the same thing to him when he (Desai) was Commerce Minister. India welcomes technology in areas where it does not have a capability.

The President said he will have Secretary Vance get Secretary Krepes to recommence trade talks.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee noted that the Joint Business Council had discussed these matters also.

The Prime Minister said there should be more frequent meetings.

Finance Minister Patel said the United States should begin to play a larger role in the aid consortium.

The Prime Minister turned to the visa issue and said there are delays and harassment of visa applicants.<sup>15</sup> Could that be improved?

The President pointed out that about one-half of Indian non-immigrant visa applicants stay permanently in America and we have limits on immigration.

Ambassador Goheen noted that this was a difficult problem and described it in some detail.

Prime Minister Desai said that he wants Indians to return to India and that we should throw out those who overstay their visas.

Minister of State Kundu asked how a person can prove that he is not a potential immigrant.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee cited the incident of some students who were not allowed to return to finish their studies when they came home on vacation.

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<sup>15</sup> Telegram 14707 from New Delhi, October 18, 1977, reported: "we have a visa problem because large numbers of Indians seek non-immigrant student and exchange visitor visas to enter the US and then move into our labor market by adjusting from non-immigrant to resident status. The problem is intensified by the poor job market in India for degree holders and the vastly more attractive opportunities for them in the U.S. Consular officers frequently have to refuse non-immigrant visa applicants who cannot offer persuasive evidence of their intention to return to India upon completion of their studies or visit. A more stringent application of visa regulations, particularly in New Delhi, has sharply increased the refusal rates for all non-immigrant visas in the past three years. This higher refusal rate is beginning to create some friction with Indian Govt officials who intervene on behalf of individual applicants, particularly students." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7700382-0624)



President Carter said that we had to comply with our laws but we would do what we can. Ambassador Goheen should develop ideas on this. Perhaps India could help us on the screening of these applicants. The Prime Minister said perhaps this would be possible.

The President turned to the special UN session on disarmament where we hope India will play a leading role.<sup>16</sup> We need ideas and would like to know what India perceives in terms of procedures and results.

The Prime Minister said that disarmament must start with nuclear weapons and this should be done in stages. It will be difficult at first but we should persist.

The President asked what the SSOD might accomplish before conclusion of SALT and CTB negotiations.

The Prime Minister said that they should be concluded before the SSOD.

The President said that we expect all of these things to go on simultaneously as well as agreements on conventional weapons transfers. Is India prepared to play a leading role?

The Prime Minister said India seeks to mediate, not lead.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee noted that India is meeting on this subject with the other non-aligned countries.

The President said we would like to consult with the Indians.

The Prime Minister said that he may take part in the SSOD.

The President said that when he does, he should also pay a visit to Washington.

The Prime Minister said he will pay a visit to Washington and visit the UN incidentally.

The President asked for public support of the Panama Canal Treaty.

The Prime Minister said he would be glad to do that.

The President discussed our activities in Africa; working with the frontline Presidents, Nigeria and Britain on Rhodesia and with the five-power group on Namibia.<sup>17</sup> In both cases there is danger that “an internal solution” will be adopted. Mugabe and Nkomo are afraid to fight elections since they have been outside the country for so long. We hope that UN leadership will provide transition. There is bad

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<sup>16</sup> The UNGA Special Session on Disarmament was held May 23–June 30.

<sup>17</sup> The Front Line States—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—worked together to promote the transition to democratic majority rule in South Africa, The Western Contact Group of five nations—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany—engaged in a diplomatic effort to achieve a peaceful transition to independence for Namibia.

dissension among the frontline presidents and the freedom fighters. We want to do what we can, including protecting the legitimate interests of the whites. We are discouraged but doors are not closed. Does India have any suggestions?

The Prime Minister said that India wants the problem solved soon lest it become a volcano for the whole world. He had had a long talk with Callaghan and blamed the British for the Rhodesian problem. The issue should be settled peacefully, especially because of dissensions among the black leaders. The prerequisite is the removal of Smith<sup>18</sup> which means pressure from the UK and the US. Smith is good at dividing people and should be thrown out. Pressure should also be applied on South Africa in this regard.

The President said that the bad problems are dissension among the black leaders and the Cuban intrusion. There are more than 27,000 Cubans in Africa. We have asked them to withdraw, and most Africans are also concerned about their presence. Foreign military troops should stay out of Africa.

The meeting thereupon concluded at 11:00 a.m.

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<sup>18</sup> Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia.

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## **91. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, January 2, 1978, 1209Z

17. Department for Hodding Carter Jr. Department pass NSC for David Aaron and Jessica Tuchman. Subject: Press Pool Report on Presidential Quotes in Nuclear Talks With Desai January 2, 1978.

1. FYI Following was dealt with by Jody Powell in pool report and at briefing at three p.m. today Delhi time:

2. Begin text of pool report

At expanded bilateral talks at Rashtrapati Bhavan this am,<sup>2</sup> Carter chatted with Vance during photo session. Sound techs got barely audi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780004-1224. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 90.

ble tape from which this is drawn. Carter refers to previous talks with Desai, the second of which had just concluded before this photo session began.

"We had a good talk," Carter told Vance. "He's pretty adamant about the nuclear fuel thing," Carter said, referring to Desai. "I pointed out we put him in the same category as the great nations like Germany and Canada and he agreed with that," Carter continued.

"He said if we could sign a comprehensive test ban, that might be enough of a change to warrant some modification of their position. He didn't give me any commitment but I told him I wanted to avoid any complications in the future because our Congress is going to pass a law I supported after 18 months."<sup>3</sup>

The tape is bad and there are unintelligible passages. Carter said Desai pointed out that there is an agreement presumably about U.S. fuel for Tarapur power station.

Then, Carter talked about what the U.S. was willing to do in the way of supplying nuclear fuel.

"I told him I would authorize transfer of fuel now . . . it didn't seem to make an impression on him," Carter said in a very rough passage on the tape.

Then, Carter very clearly told Vance that "when we get back, I think we ought to write him another letter, just cold and very blunt."

Jody Powell was made aware of the contents of this pool report and information became available which attempted to place the obviously sensitive quotes in the perspective seen by the American side. The information was on deep background.

There is also an on-the-record comment from Powell below.

On deep background, it is understood that the President would like to see as many questions on Indian acceptance of international safeguards tied down as possible before legislation he referred to passes Senate. It has already passed House.

There is a belief that there might be technicalities in the legislation that could add to difficulties in dealing with Indians. The U.S. side feels it would have more flexibility while still satisfying the needs of controls if it moves faster.

The Indians and the U.S. have a contract for the supply of fuel to the Tarapur power plant near Bombay. The Indians feel they have lived up to it, thus the adamant attitude on the part of Desai to which Carter referred.

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<sup>3</sup> The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. See Document 6.

Carter, as you probably know, freed a shipment of fuel to India early in his administration. The U.S. has another application pending, one to which the President apparently referred.

But for the awkwardness of the way it all came out, the Carter administration is known to think that the India situation could represent a case history for its policy of exporting nuclear fuel in order to have influence with nuclear nations in pursuit of non-proliferation.

Officials are known to be concerned that the U.S. actions demonstrate to other nations that it does not intend to use duress as a negotiating tool, and that it can be relied on as a supplier.

These officials believe that any conflicts can be worked out in a way that reconciles both the U.S. interest in imposing safeguards and the Indian sensitivity to infringement on sovereignty and any curtailment of its research or power development program.

Insofar as Carter's "cold and very blunt letter" is concerned, Powell had this to say on the record:

"The President's use of that term in a situation in which he was unaware he was being taped was not in any sense a reference to the tone of the relationship or the discussions on the issue, but simply a statement of his feeling that following the visit, there ought to be a written communication which set down the facts of the situation, including the imminent possibility of legislation which the administration supports, which would restrict the transfer of technology and material. We have complete confidence the Indian Government shares our concern on non-proliferation and that we also understand and sympathize with their desire not to have international controls which would in any arbitrary fashion constrain legitimate development, particularly of power and research by their scientific community. We believe that these two concerns, ours and theirs (safeguards and development), can be resolved. It's our desire the discussions be conducted between equals without any perception of duress from either side."

Pooler's note:

Room was full of people when President made his remarks. He, Vance and Brzezinski sitting together on U.S. portion of round table. Cameras opposite, people milling on all sides. As pictures taken, President said these words to Vance. On either side and behind his head, apparently beyond reach of his peripheral vision, were mikes of sound techs, including NBC pool who got tape. End text.

**Goheen**

**92. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, January 5, 1978, 1241Z

222. Subject: President Carter's Visit to India: January 1–3, 1978.

Summary: This message sets forth a brief record of President Carter's visit to India, January 1–3, 1978. The highlights of his busy schedule are outlined, and the content of the bilateral discussions is summarized. These talks included disarmament and nuclear proliferation, the Indian Ocean negotiations, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, South Africa, relations with China, North-South issues, Indo-American nuclear cooperation, cooperation in agricultural and energy research, the development of the Ganges and Brahmaputra River systems, cooperation between US and Indian industry, and foreign investment. The atmosphere throughout the visit was friendly, and the President's reception by the Indian public was enthusiastic. The determination of Prime Minister Desai and his colleagues not to allow the disclosure of the President's conversation with the Secretary on the nuclear question<sup>2</sup> to sour the atmosphere is a testimonial to the good will that prevailed. It is clear that the President established an excellent personal rapport with the Prime Minister. The editorial comment, in the wake of the visit, while generally reflecting the atmosphere described above, also expressed some reservations. For the most part, these focused on the differences in the nuclear field. End summary

Highlights of the President's program

1. January 1:

(A) At his arrival at Palam Airport, New Delhi, the President and Mrs. Carter were greeted by President and Mrs. Sanjiva Reddy, Prime Minister Moraji Desai, Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, other members of the Cabinet, members of Parliament, Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions, and officers of the Embassy. The ceremonial portion of the arrival included a 21-gun salute, the playing of the national anthems of both countries, and a review of the troops. This was followed by welcoming remarks by President Reddy and President Carter.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780009–0220. Confidential. Sent for information to Brussels, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Warsaw, Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 91.

<sup>3</sup> In his remarks at the welcoming ceremony, Carter emphasized India and the United States' shared democratic values and mutual commitment to world peace. The text of the remarks is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1–2.

(B) Shortly after their arrival at their suite in the Rashtrapati Bhavan (the residence of the President of India), President and Mrs. Carter paid a formal call on President Reddy and his family.

(C) Arriving at the Ramlila grounds (used for large public events) in the late afternoon, the President was accorded a civic reception by over 300,000 people. He was welcomed by the Prime Minister, the Mayor of Delhi, and the Deputy Mayor each of whom addressed the assemblage in Hindi. The President's speech was translated into Hindi.<sup>4</sup>

(D) On his return from the civic reception to Rashtrapati Bhavan the President met with the Prime Minister for a forty-five minute private discussion.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. January 2:

(A) The second day of the visit began at 9:00 a.m. with a private meeting between the President and the Prime Minister at Rashtrapati Bhavan. After about thirty-five minutes, the two principals were joined by the senior members of their staffs for the "expanded bilateral talks".<sup>6</sup>

(B) Shortly before noon, the President and Mrs. Carter laid a wreath at Rajghat, the memorial to Gandhi. This was followed by a meeting with the American official and private community (including Embassy Indian employees and American Embassy school children) in front of the Chancery. The President spoke<sup>7</sup> and a choral group from Dubuque, Iowa, the Clark-Loras Singers, entertained.

(C) A working lunch was held at the Ambassador's residence with Prime Minister as the principal guest.<sup>8</sup>

(D) President Carter then delivered his major address to a capacity audience at the central Hall of Parliament.<sup>9</sup> In attendance were current and past MP's, senior officials of the GOI, and other dignitaries. The Prime Minister introduced the President, and following President Car-

<sup>4</sup> In his speech, Carter reiterated the moral values shared by India and the United States. Text of the remarks is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> No memorandum of conversation was found of Carter and Desai's January 1 private meeting.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 90 and footnote 2 thereto.

<sup>7</sup> Carter expressed his appreciation for the work done by the Embassy and its staff. He also noted that "India is a special place because of Gandhi, because of Nehru, because of Desai and others. There is a sense in the world that moral leadership derives from the Indian people in a direct and continuing fashion." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 3-5)

<sup>8</sup> No memorandum of conversation was found of the working luncheon.

<sup>9</sup> In the Lok Sabha, Carter praised Indian democracy, outlined bilateral policy initiatives, and drew comparisons between Indian and U.S. moral values. Carter also offered to supply India with heavy water—or very high-grade nuclear fuel—without preconditions: "Because of an accident that did occur in your heavy water production plant, we will make available to India, also, supplies from our reserves of heavy water." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 5-11)

ter's speech, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, K.S. Hegde, delivered a short speech of thanks.

(E) The next event was a State banquet at Rashtrapati Bhavan hosted in honor of President and Mrs. Carter by the President of India. At the conclusion of the dinner President Reddy and President Carter exchanged toasts.<sup>10</sup> The evening concluded with a cultural presentation.

3. January 3:

(A) President Carter's program for the final day of his visit began in the early morning with a visit to Daulatpur-Nasirabad, a typical village in near-by Haryana State. The Prime Minister accompanied the President in the ride to and from the village, and this afforded them an additional opportunity to converse. In addition to the two principals, a few senior members of the President's staff and several Indian Ministers also participated in the visit.

(B) While the visit to the village was taking place, Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Vajpayee participated in a meeting of the Indo-American Joint Commission.<sup>11</sup> A memorandum was signed providing for a LANDSAT station in India.<sup>12</sup>

(C) On their return to Rashtrapati Bhavan, President Carter and Prime Minister Desai signed the Delhi Declaration, a document setting forth the commitment of both nations to work for world peace, disarmament and the furtherance of human rights.<sup>13</sup> The ceremony included brief remarks by the President.<sup>14</sup>

(D) The finale of the visit was a formal departure ceremony at Palam Airport. The national anthems were played, the President inspected the honor guard, there was a 21-gun salute, and Air Force One took off for Riyadh at 2:00 p.m. (local time).

Bilateral discussions:

4. In the expanded bilateral meetings, the President and Prime Minister Desai engaged in broad discussions of global issues.

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<sup>10</sup> In his toast, Carter shared his impressions of India. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 11–16)

<sup>11</sup> Telegram 343 from New Delhi, January 6, reported that at the meeting when the Subcommittee reports were read, Vance and Vajpayee discussed Indian attitudes on foreign investment and called for more work to be done on North/South issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780011–0678)

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 3, Document 90.

<sup>13</sup> The text of the Delhi Declaration is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 17–18.

<sup>14</sup> In his remarks, Carter explained that the Declaration "proclaims our belief that each individual has inalienable rights, our commitment to justice among nations and within societies, and our determination that disputes must be resolved without violence, especially in this age when nuclear weapons threaten the total destruction of humankind. Above all else, we affirm that states, like individuals, bear moral responsibilities for their acts." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 16–17)

(A) The President informed Desai of the present state of SALT negotiations and asked for the Indian assessment of the Special Session on Disarmament. The Indians were skeptical that much progress could be made in the SSOD before SALT and CTB arrangements had been made. Non-proliferation was also discussed and the Indians emphasized their concern that China be involved.

(B) The Indians did not respond to the President's brief discussion [of] the Indian Ocean negotiations and did not mention Diego Garcia. There was coverage of the Middle East, the Horn of Africa (both sides emphasized they were not supplying weapons) and South Africa where the Indians stressed the importance of bringing pressure on Ian Smith. In his discussion of Sino-Indo matters, Desai noted little sign of movement and welcomed US ties with China. Desai voiced support of the Panama Canal Treaties. In a number of instances Desai emphasized the need for US-Soviet cooperation in bringing about peace in the Middle East, arms control and other goals.

(C) In the discussion of North-South matters, President Carter explained our current policy and our concern that excessive rhetoric by the LDCs would make it hard for us to carry through on our hopes in this area. Desai responded by stressing self-reliance and the need for international cooperation. He, too, saw rhetoric as counterproductive and was skeptical of a large UN role.

(D) Discussions on nuclear matters were held mainly in private. They were frank and each side set forth its position. The door was kept open, however, for further discussions. The President announced his intention to recommend an additional shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor and offered to provide India with heavy water.

(E) The President presented the Prime Minister with a model of the space shuttle, on which India has reserved space for one of its satellites. The President and the Prime Minister laid emphasis on agricultural research and development, and this topic, along with energy research, was highlighted in the President's speech to the Indian Parliament. The President also expressed interest in the development of the Ganges and Brahmaputra River systems to increase agricultural production and the generation of hydroelectrical power production there. The Indians expressed considerable concern over developing protectionist sentiment in the West. They also expressed interest in developing mechanisms that would permit some integration of small-scale Indian industry with large American industries. The President noted that many businessmen felt India did not want foreign investment. After some discussion of this, it was agreed that Commerce Secretary Kreps should visit India to discuss the problem.

(F) Finally, it was agreed that the bilateral Indo-U.S. talks which had been held annually at the Deputy Secretary level would be



resumed. The President invited Prime Minister Desai to visit the U.S. and the invitation was warmly accepted.

The atmosphere during the visit

5. The President's visit was marked by a display of goodwill and friendship from all sections of the Indian people. The reception accorded the President by the Indians who lined the streets as he drove between the airport and Rashtrapati Bhavan was enthusiastic. The welcome he received at the Ramlila grounds was impressive by any standard. Despite the barrier of language, his reiteration of the American commitment to human rights was well understood and appreciated. For its part the Indian Government went to great lengths to make the visit a success. Even the single incident that threatened to mar the visit, the recording of the President's private conversation with the Secretary on the Indian position on full scope safeguards, was handled deftly by the Indian side. The Indian Foreign Secretary joined Presidential Spokesman Jody Powell in defusing the problem, and the Prime Minister made a public point of declaring that he was not upset. The response of the Indians to this incident, that it did not sour the atmosphere testifies to the goodwill and friendship created by the visit. Indians with whom we have spoken, were uniformly impressed by the President's sincerity, and it is clear that he established an excellent personal rapport with Prime Minister Desai and the other senior officers of the GOI with whom he came in contact.

Editorial reaction

6. The general warmth of the public and official reaction to the visit was reflected in most national newspapers, but editorialists also expressed in varying degree some reservations. A number of editorials stressed the warmth of the personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister and viewed the visit as symbolizing the end to the "tilt", the US recognition of the "pre-eminence" of India in the subcontinent, and the shared ideals between the two countries. The "Statesman", for instance, called the visit an "historic" one, important for the sincerity of the expressions of good will. The nuclear issue received the most specific attention, with all editorials endorsing the GOI position. As to be expected, the pro-Moscow "Patriot" condemned the U.S. nuclear position and termed the visit in consequence a "flop". Almost as hardline, however, was the "Times of India" which in two editorials characterized the nuclear dispute as going to the "very core" of the relationship and thus chose to call the visit "not much of a success." Other editorials had a broader perspective of the visit and its accomplishments and thought that the offer of another Tarapur fuel shipment and of heavy water had been "enough for the moment." The President's speech to the Parliamentary group was called by the "Hindustan Times" a major foreign policy address which was applica-

ble not only to India but also to all Third World countries. The "Economic Times", the "Hindu", and the "Indian Express" were impressed by the areas of cooperation enumerated by the President in his speech but were also mildly critical of the lack of progress in the North-South dialogue. The Delhi Declaration was described by one paper as "an impassioned plea for unity in the cause of humanity," and several noted in this context the strong foundation of shared moral values between the two countries. Criticism of the Declaration as generalized rhetoric came from a few who misinterpreted the purpose of the Declaration by looking upon it, not as a statement of principles, but as a record of the talks themselves. In sum, the satisfaction on the part of the press with the general tenor of the visit was tempered by an awareness of the implications of specific disputes such as the nuclear one. This was best summed up by a "Hindustan Times" comment: "Mr. Carter's Delhi visit has been an occasion for both countries to rededicate themselves to common ideals which, when ties weaken, are however, the first to be forgotten."

Goheen

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**93. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

First of all, I want to thank you again for your magnificent hospitality to Rosalynn and me and for the generous outpouring of friendship for the United States which I encountered throughout my stay in India. My visit to your country was among the most memorable experiences of my life, and I feel deeply enriched by it. I shall never forget my visit to "Carterpoori", and I thank you particularly for including it in my program.<sup>2</sup>

I was also very glad of the opportunity you and I had to talk together at length. I appreciated your frankness and candor in our discussions of the nuclear problem. (You were as frank with me as I was with Secretary Vance!)<sup>3</sup> I now have a much better understanding

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780032-0527. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 92.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 91.

of your belief that the burden is on the nuclear weapons states to demonstrate their *bona fides* in reducing the risk of nuclear war and destruction. As you said in your letter of January 9,<sup>4</sup> there is a greater measure of common ground between our two countries than is generally realized—or even than we ourselves realized before our meeting. The declaration of common principles that we jointly signed<sup>5</sup> testifies to our shared interest in preventing further nuclear proliferation and in bringing about the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Your statements following your meeting with a delegation of United States Senators and after Prime Minister Callaghan's visit to New Delhi were particularly encouraging because they served to reinforce publicly our conversations about the context in which India would be willing to make a commitment to accept full-scope international safeguards.<sup>6</sup>

Your first concern, a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty among the major nuclear weapons states, is something that I am seeking vigorously as an essential step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. I share Prime Minister Callaghan's optimism that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union will be able to agree on the basic elements of a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty later this year. With the constructive support of India and the other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I have every hope that a treaty with international participation can be brought into effect rapidly.

Your other concerns, relating to determined efforts by nuclear weapons states to agree on limitation and progressive reduction of nuclear stockpiles, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 850 from New Delhi, January 17, transmitted the text of Desai's January 9 letter to Carter, which expressed his appreciation for Carter's visit and lauded the improvement in Indo-U.S. relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780024–0897)

<sup>5</sup> See footnotes 13 and 14, Document 92.

<sup>6</sup> According to telegram 527 from New Delhi, January 10, the January 5–7 visit to New Delhi of several U.S. Senators served "to underscore the growing bonds of friendship linking our two govts. With the exception of several exchanges on nuclear proliferation, substantive content was largely limited to familiarizing Senators with Indian situation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780015–1147) According to telegram 437 from New Delhi, January 9, Callaghan, who visited New Delhi January 6–11, declared to the Indian press that the "impression" he gained from his talks with Desai was that "India is prepared to accept full-scope safeguards for all its nuclear plants, including those using heavy water, provided the nuclear haves agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty, involving the progressive reduction of existing stockpiles and their eventual elimination." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780012–0931) Telegram 701 from New Delhi, January 13, reported Desai's remarks at a January 12 press conference, when he confirmed his openness to full-scope safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities under certain conditions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780020–0178)

weapons, are key objectives of our current strategic arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union. The prospects are good for a SALT II agreement in 1978 which will place important constraints on the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons and on the modernization of existing ones. The agreement should—for the first time—result in significant reductions in the stockpile of the world's nuclear delivery systems. I will not, however, be satisfied with these levels; I intend to move rapidly toward SALT III negotiations aimed at even lower levels of strategic forces, and even tighter constraints on development in nuclear weapons.

I sincerely hope that this progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban and in Strategic Arms Limitation on the part of the major nuclear weapons states will provide the context you are seeking for India's acceptance of comprehensive international safeguards.

Because the question of safeguards is so central to non-proliferation objectives and important for Indo-US nuclear cooperation, I want to state our position with the utmost clarity.

As I told you in New Delhi, legislation will soon pass the US Congress that will place conditions on US nuclear exports to reduce the risks of proliferation. A key element of this prospective legislation is a requirement, as a condition for export licensing, that 18 months after enactment, all of the nuclear facilities of the importing country be under IAEA safeguards. This provision would apply to fuel shipments for the Tarapur reactor.

The draft versions of this legislation permit a Presidential waiver of its restrictions. My Administration's support for the legislation in all of its current major provisions is such, however, that I see no way that I would be able to waive them. A waiver would call into question my determination to strengthen international safeguards in a non-discriminatory fashion.

One element of our position which has been subject to misinterpretation is the link between fuel shipments and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While I hope that India will eventually see its way clear to adhere to the NPT, I also understand your reasons for not taking such a step at this time.

We are, therefore, prepared to continue shipments to Tarapur beyond the 18-month deadline and carry on other forms of nuclear cooperation if India places and maintains all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards, even without acceptance of the NPT. It is my understanding that only a small number of additional facilities would need to be safeguarded to cover all of India's current activities. In the meantime, as I stated in New Delhi, I am recommending to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the shipment of 7.6 tons of enriched fuel for Tarapur.

I was deeply impressed by the sentiments expressed so eloquently in your letter of January 9. We have, I believe, established the kind of relationship that will stand us in good stead as we deal with these nuclear questions—which are not simple ones of right and wrong, but the much more difficult kind where each side recognizes that the other is also substantially right. I feel much more confident after our meeting that we will be able to find a solution that will not only be mutually suitable but will also contribute to the broad international goals that our two countries share.

As you point out, differences on the nuclear question must not come in the way of the other important tasks that lie before us. Thus, even if my optimism is belied and we are not able to find a mutually acceptable arrangement on nuclear matters at this time, it is important that we continue to focus on other areas of cooperation and ensure that the conclusions we reached in New Delhi are promptly and fully implemented.

I hope we will continue corresponding until we meet again in Washington later this year. Ambassador Goheen will be in touch with your office soon so that we can settle on a mutually convenient time. I very much look forward to strengthening our friendship and continuing a dialogue which holds promise of benefitting the United States and India alike. Rosalynn joins me in sending our warmest greetings; we are planning already how best to reciprocate your unparalleled hospitality.

Sincerely,<sup>7</sup>

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>7</sup> Below his handwritten signature, Carter wrote: “Best wishes! J.”

#### 94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 16, 1978, 0208Z

40777. For Ambassador Goheen. Subject: Desai's Letter to President of February 7.

1. Quoted below for your information is the text of Prime Minister Desai's letter of February 7 to the President. The original was delivered to Dr. Brzezinski by Ambassador Palkhivala on February 15.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President, Ambassador Goheen conveyed to me on February 1 your letters of January 30<sup>2</sup> and January 31, 1978.<sup>3</sup> I am indeed gratified at what you have said about your visit to India. Your feelings of friendship are warmly reciprocated by our people who, through your visit, have developed a feeling of great respect for the sincerity of purpose which you bring into your approach to public policy. Due to the impact of your personality and approach to problems Indo-U.S. relations stand on firmer ground today and this, I am convinced, is in our mutual interest and enlightened approach to the solution of world problems.

I share your concern for the dangers in the present situation in the Horn of Africa and its potential for escalation. We had briefly discussed this conflict when you were in New Delhi. Ethiopia and Somalia, apart from being neighbours linked to us by the Indian Ocean, are also members of the nonaligned fraternity of nations. It is in this spirit that we had, some time ago, urged the need for restraint and amicable settlement on the parties to the dispute. The situation has been so tense that any concrete initiative has so far seemed premature. Meanwhile, fighting continues and the dangers of international peace being damaged have, I agree, increased. It has been our view that intra-African problems should be resolved in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. We were disappointed that the efforts of the OAU to bring Ethiopia and Somalia

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2212, N780002-0599. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Drafted by Dubs; cleared by Thornton and in S/S; approved by Dubs.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 93.

<sup>3</sup> In his January 31 letter to Desai, Carter warned of a Soviet naval build-up in the Red Sea, the purpose of which was to supply Ethiopian troops fighting in the Horn of Africa. Carter asked Desai to raise the issue with the Soviets and Cubans in order to try to deescalate the situation. (Telegram 25994 to New Delhi, February 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047-0344) Similar letters were sent to several other Heads of State; for the text of the letter to Nigerian President Obasanjo, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 48.

together have not yet met with success. In the meantime outside intervention has accentuated both the dangers and difficulty of resolving the dispute.

A just and peaceful settlement would require recognition of the principle of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region. But beyond this, we agree, that such problems, as the present Somalia-Ethiopia conflict, require restraint on the part of the bigger powers as they could become more complicated by increasing rivalry and foreign military involvement. If your information about the Soviet build-up of arms proves correct, the dangers and the complications have come closer than one would have hoped or expected.

In view of your letter and the possible gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa, I am writing to President Brezhnev and will convey our concern at the dangers involved in this build-up and the consequent escalation. It is particularly important that Ethiopia, with an augmented military capability, should not attempt to cross the old established frontiers. I am, therefore, urging that any development which would have the possibility of encouraging either party to continue or enlarge the scope of the present conflict should be scrupulously avoided and instead steps should be taken that the dangers are reduced and not increased. I would also urge that the Soviet Union and the USA should mutually consult each other to defuse the situation and perhaps to persuade both parties to respect the letter and spirit of the OAU Charter. Meanwhile, in order that the conflict is defused, I would stress the importance, Mr. President, for counselling on Somalia and its friends and supporters the urgency of their accepting a clear responsibility to respect established frontiers in the African continent.

I am happy, Mr. President, that you have candidly explained your views about the nuclear problem in your letter of January 30, 1978. I am glad that after our conversations with you and later with Prime Minister Callaghan<sup>4</sup> there is now a better understanding of my belief that it is the primary responsibility of the nuclear weapon states to reduce the risk of nuclear war and destruction. As you know, soon after your visit, I have also had occasion to discuss it with visiting Senators and Congressmen from the USA.<sup>5</sup> It remains our view that firm steps need to be taken by the nuclear weapon powers to abandon the nuclear tests, to halt the production of nuclear weapons and progressively, within a fixed time-frame, eliminate their nuclear stockpiles if the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be meaningfully

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 93.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*

achieved and energies directed purely to the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While we understand your sincere concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, you would appreciate that having unilaterally foresworn the intention to manufacture these weapons of mass destruction, and having devoted ourselves exclusively to peaceful purposes of atomic energy, we are genuinely sensitive and concerned about arrangements which are considered inequitable or discriminatory.

You would recall, Mr. President, that in my discussions with you, I had told you of the fears expressed to me by President Brezhnev at production of the neutron bomb by the USA.<sup>6</sup> I had myself expressed my serious apprehension that the deployment of neutron bomb by USA could trigger a new arms race by forcing the USSR to produce similar or matching weapons and negate the search for nuclear disarmament. Mr. Brezhnev has now expressed to me serious Soviet anxiety at the prospect of the deployment of the neutron bomb which may cause a setback to the quest for agreements on limiting strategic weapons and international detente. I sincerely hope that it would be possible for the USA to recognize the dangers inherent in the possibility of a new arms race being triggered by the neutron bomb and the fears about security which it engenders and would strongly urge that, in the interest of the very objectives of non-proliferation you should refrain from going ahead with its production. Such a decision could radically improve the climate for detente and disarmament.<sup>7</sup>

I am greatly looking forward to my forthcoming visit to the United States and to renew the personal contacts which we have established during your visit to New Delhi. Apart from members of the administration, I have told the delegation of Congressmen, led by Congressman Wolff, when he so requested me that I would be happy to meet members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. They themselves have also invited me to do so. I am also planning to utilize the opportunity of my visit to the USA to address the forthcoming UN General Assembly Special Session, which may then be in session, depending on mutually convenient dates for my visit.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 79.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 1728 from New Delhi, February 2, Goheen reported that Desai had suggested to him that if the United States cancelled deployment of the neutron bomb, the Soviets might stop their activities in the Red Sea, saying that "there might be some possibility of a trade-off in the interest of better mutual understanding and world peace." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780051-0310) In telegram 35706 to New Delhi, February 10, Vance directed Goheen, if asked, to reject any linkage between Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa and the U.S. deployment of the neutron bomb. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063-0140)



I have always maintained that even though we may have our differences on specific issues, the perspective of world problems, as viewed from New Delhi and Washington, may not be always identical, India and the United States have so much in common that we would do ourselves and future generations a disservice if we did not cement closer and friendlier ties between our governments, institutions and peoples. I sincerely hope that these exchanges of visits and our personal correspondence will play a significant role in building up a climate of mutual trust, warmth and friendship in our relations. I need hardly reiterate that I fully recognise the importance of personal exchange of views and, like you, would wish to continue our personal correspondence.

Please convey my personal regards to Mrs. Carter and tell her on my behalf how much we all here admire her for the warmth and affection which she has shown towards our country.

With warm regards, yours sincerely, End quote.

Vance

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**95. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the President's Special Assistant for Appointments (Kraft)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai

The history of the Desai visit runs as follows: Desai was originally invited to come to the United States last fall; when the President decided to visit India, Desai agreed to postpone his visit here. While in New Delhi, the President and Desai agreed (in my presence, incidentally) that Desai should visit Washington at the time of his appearance before the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament. The Indians then told us that Desai proposed to speak to the SSOD on May 25 and would like to come to Washington either directly before or after

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, India: Prime Minister Desai, 6/12–15/78: Cables and Memos, 2/27/78–6/8/78. Confidential.

that date. We responded that the time before the NATO Summit was bad and Desai very considerably agreed to put his trip to the UN off until after the first week of June.

The President's invitation was clear and cannot be reneged on. Given the reception that the President received in New Delhi, plus the immense importance that Desai attaches to his personal relationship with the President, it is clear that an official visit is indicated. Our relations with India are important and Desai personally holds the key to attainment of our nuclear non-proliferation goals as regards India. The Indian Ambassador has pointed out the incongruity of our asking Desai for help on The Horn while refusing to schedule a visit.<sup>2</sup>

The Indians have been exceptionally accommodating throughout the whole history outlined above. Desai is a major international figure who cannot be left dangling while we sort out all the details of the President's schedule.<sup>3</sup> Among other things, he must firmly schedule his UN appearance and that depends on us.

Ambassador Goheen, the State Department and I have all been approached by the Indians—politely but urgently.<sup>4</sup> I have assured them that I will pursue the matter and am determined that we respond to them with some degree of consideration—i.e. by giving them reasonable advance notice.

There can be no doubt that there will be a Desai visit and the visit will be at the official level. As a matter of policy I therefore want to move ahead immediately in assigning a specific date for it in the time-frame set forth in my memorandum on visit scheduling.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On the Horn, see footnote 3, Document 94. No other record of Palkhivala's comment to Brzezinski was found.

<sup>3</sup> Kraft underlined "Desai is a major international figure who cannot be left dangling," and wrote beneath this paragraph: "The President (of the U.S.) is a major international figure who should not be jerked around by haphazard & indiscriminate scheduling—That's why, oddly enough, he has *one* office to prepare his schedule, *in coordination* with foreign and domestic policy advisors—TK."

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 3069 from New Delhi, February 27, reported that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was under pressure to finalize Desai's schedule. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780089-0312) In a February 28 memorandum to Carter, Vance communicated his concern that the date of Desai's visit was not yet finalized, adding: "The Indians have been pressing us for an answer, and I believe we should reply very soon." In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "What is the hold-up?" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 2/78)

<sup>5</sup> Vance handwrote below this last paragraph: "I feel strongly that it is very important to go ahead with this meeting. Cy."

**96. Letter From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Goheen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 29, 1978

Dear Bob:

I thank you for your letter of February 22.<sup>2</sup> I, too, had to await a holiday to reply. In this case it is simply getting the President out of town so I have some free time. As you may know I have had Africa added to my area of personal responsibility and that is very time consuming.

I think you are very right in raising the question of contingency planning for disengagement on the nuclear front. I think that is something best originated on your side, perhaps with Courtney's assistance. Why doesn't the Embassy do a piece setting forth how you see this process proceeding and what we should do to ease the transition? I have by no means given up hope on the safeguards issue but certainly the odds are not such that we can afford to wait in our planning. I have some hopes for Joe Nye's meeting with Vellodi in New York next week.<sup>3</sup> I shall probably go along. I am distressed that it has taken this long to get this meeting on the tracks. You are probably right though in saying that we should hold off until the Tarapur shipment has improved. Frankly I don't think we have very much time on this issue. The Indian position is likely to get increasingly hard and if we do not have something worked out, or at least headed in the right direction, by the time Desai gets here we will be in very deep trouble.<sup>4</sup>

On the subject of the visit one thing that we should do is take another look at how good the follow-up has been on the last visit. Peter<sup>5</sup> will no doubt have shared with you the work that we had done in various agencies about a month ago assessing the state of the follow-up.<sup>6</sup> As you know it is very spotty and a lot of the fault lies with the Indians. At the same time however it is very difficult to get

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, India: President's Trip (1978) Follow Up: 12/77–3/78. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Vellodi and Nye met on April 14. Telegram 101268 to New Delhi, April 20, reported on the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780169–0353)

<sup>4</sup> In a March 27 letter to Carter, Desai agreed to visit Washington June 13–14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780088–0137)

<sup>5</sup> Peter Tarnoff.

<sup>6</sup> In a March 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton outlined the progress of the follow-up. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, India: President's Trip (1978) Follow Up: 12/77–3/78)

our bureaucracy enthused. Juanita Kreps' refusal to go to India is symptomatic.<sup>7</sup>

I will generate another assessment exercise about a month before the Desai visit takes place. Would it be possible for you to ensure that the Indians do the same thing so that when Desai and Carter get together they have a clear picture of what has and has not been done? I never cease to marvel at the ability of the bureaucracy to be unresponsive.

As I think about the June meeting four topics come particularly to mind:

—The nuclear question is obviously going to feature very large but as I mentioned above most of the ground work will have to be done beforehand.

—I think the President should give another nudge to the Eastern Waters question.<sup>8</sup> I appreciated your run-down on the conversations you have had. I mention it now and then here. One of the problems we have is that AID doesn't like the idea. Therefore they tend to talk it down.

—The President should this time talk about conventional arms limitation and especially the DPSA problem if the Indians have not made up their minds by then.<sup>9</sup> We are nowhere near strongly enough on record on this matter which is going to cause problems. I discussed this last matter at some length with Gokhale but got nowhere. (I am attaching the Memcon from that meeting that you may find of interest.)<sup>10</sup>

—Finally I believe we should have a very frank talk about bilateral aid. The trouble that we are beginning to have on the Hill because of the

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<sup>7</sup> In his March 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton expressed his frustration that Kreps had not yet scheduled a trip to India. He requested that Brzezinski "call Juanita Kreps and forcefully remind her that the President has offered her up." See footnote 2 above.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 3.

<sup>9</sup> In a March 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton outlined the issue of Indian procurement of deep penetration strike aircraft: "The Swedes have asked us to permit them to sell Viggen aircraft (over which we have a handle because of US-origin components) to the Indians. This is a deep penetration strike aircraft of the kind we would certainly not want to sell to the Indians ourselves; hence we should not permit third-country transfer." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 99, Evening Reports: 3-5/78)

<sup>10</sup> Attached but not printed is a March 29 memorandum for the record, in which Thornton summarized his discussion with Gokhale. Thornton told Gokhale that "it was quite unlikely we would approve sale of the Viggen" and that he hoped to "avoid the situation in which we had to turn down an Indian request." Gokhale informed Thornton that he understood his "point but added that as far as he knew the Viggen is not in serious contention."

India-Vietnam deal is only symptomatic.<sup>11</sup> Any bilateral aid program is going to become the target for carping and criticism. Carter and Desai should face the issue of whether it is a good idea to have such a program at all. If I were an Indian it would certainly not be worth the trouble to me unless extremely large sums of money were involved.

I am glad you found the tone of the President's last letter satisfactory.<sup>12</sup> Never hesitate to let us know when there are problems since you are much closer to the scene than we are. Also, when we receive a letter from Desai it is helpful if you let us know as soon as possible what you would like to see in the reply. We are under pressure here to get replies out within a week; thus a rapid input from you is very helpful.

I look forward to seeing you when you are back next time even if only for the visit. I am keeping in reasonably close touch with the Indian Embassy here. Gokhale impresses me but the Ambassador seems to flutter around a lot. He is probably quite effective however in the public relations area. The life of an Ambassador is not an easy one as you have no doubt experienced while awaiting this ponderous bureaucracy's attempt to get dates for the Desai visit, etc. I really appreciate your patience on that.

Please give my regards to John Thompson when you see him. I will be writing to him soon.

Sincerely,

**Thomas P. Thornton**<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> In a March 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton explained that Representative Clarence Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, had "latched onto the fact that India is providing credits for Vietnam and some food as well. (This came out of the Pham Van Dong visit to Delhi.) I gather that the credits are essentially supplier credits to help the Indians sell locomotives and other things from their excess production capacity. Nonetheless, this highlights again the perils of having a bilateral aid relationship with India." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 99, Evening Reports: 3–5/78)

<sup>12</sup> Carter's March 8 letter to Desai focused on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms issues and hostilities in the Horn of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840165–1922)

<sup>13</sup> Thornton signed "Tom" above this typed signature.

**97. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, April 4, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I have already written to you last month dealing with various international questions of importance to our countries.<sup>2</sup> A report has come to me suggesting that both Israel and South Africa were secretly building up nuclear weapon technology and obtaining fissionable material. I could not include this aspect of the matter in my letter to you because I was trying to get the reports verified. From the subsequent reports I feel that there is some reasonable ground for suspicion that both these countries have acquired part of their nuclear technology and fissionable material clandestinely from USA, UK and probably France. On the one side we are being asked to accept safeguards against proliferation even in the pursuit of our peaceful objectives while on the other hand countries which are determined to go ahead on objectionable lines for political considerations are able to obtain dangerous materials clandestinely or through connivance. I would therefore suggest that this matter might be closely examined in depth and adequate precautions taken to ensure that such clandestine exports do not take place to the prejudice of the nuclear policy of confining its use for peaceful purposes.

I realise how keen you are to ensure fool-proof arrangements against risks of proliferation but if clandestinely or through connivance exports of such material can take place, it would mean a serious setback to that policy. That is why I thought it best to write to you.

As my programme at present stands, I propose to leave for London on the 5th June and after a short stay come to New York on the 8th afternoon in time to address the Disarmament Conference on the 9th.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780087-2173. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Desai's March 27 letter to Carter dealt mostly with U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms issues, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. Desai also addressed Indo-U.S. nuclear relations noting that while in favor of continuing negotiations on nuclear fuel shipments, he was "distressed that the pending shipments of enriched uranium for Tarapur are being delayed, even after your announcement made in the central Hall of Parliament on 2nd January 1978. I wonder if it is realized that power being such an important aid to production, the well-being of thousands of persons is involved." (Telegram 86185 to New Delhi, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780145-0898)

I shall be in Washington on the 12th afternoon or evening and leave for New York on way to London and India on the 14th night or 15th morning.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

**Morarji Desai**

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**98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 9, 1978, 0058Z

91105. Subject: April 7 Call on Secretary by Indian Ambassador Palkhivala.

1. Indian Ambassador Palkhivala accompanied by DCM Gokhale and First Secretary Rajan called on Secretary April 7. NEA Assistant Secretary Atherton and Country Director Lande (notetaker) also sat in. Lengthy meeting covered nuclear cooperation, Desai visit and possible purchase of DPSAs by GOI.<sup>2</sup> Highlights follow.

2. Meeting opened with general review of June 13–14 Desai visit. Ambassador noted Desai would address SSOD on June 9 and then travel to San Francisco, return to New York and arrive in Washington June 12. Initial planning meeting with Ambassador Dobelle was scheduled for April 17 and arrangements seemed to be going well.

3. On the nuclear fuel issue Ambassador expressed concern about postponement of April 7 NRC decision.<sup>3</sup> Further delays were being

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004–0355. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Sent for information to Islamabad, London, Paris, and Stockholm. Drafted by Lande; cleared in S/S; approved by Atherton.

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed April 7 memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 90251 to New Delhi, April 7, reported Nosenzo's April 6 discussion with an NRC Commissioner who said that the NRC's "key concern" was "the applicability of existing no-nuclear explosive and safeguards assurances on U.S. nuclear fuel supplied for Tarapur in the event India fails to meet full-scope safeguards requirement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–242) in the allotted time and the U.S., as a result, terminates further supply." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780151–0630)

interpreted by Indian press, public and some Members of Parliament as a deliberate pressure tactic. The GOI knew that the NRC was an independent body but the GOI was having difficulty in explaining the delays to the Parliament particularly in view of attacks by Mrs. Gandhi on the GOI as "selling out" to the US.

4. The Secretary explained that if the NRC had voted on April 7 the result would have been a 2-2 vote. This would have left the decision to the President who would have approved the export license. However, a significant delay would have ensued since the President's decision would have had to lay before Congress for 60 days. Instead we submitted additional material to the NRC which the NRC is currently considering. We are hopeful that a positive vote will follow. NRC now scheduled to meet on Indian application April 17. (Lande subsequently told Ambassador that this information was highly sensitive and it was agreed that the Indian press would simply be told that the Indian Ambassador had expressed concern about NRC delays and that the Secretary had told him that the administration continued to support the license application and hoped for early approval.)

5. The Ambassador then raised the DPSA issue noting that he was aware of some US apprehension about this possible purchase. The Secretary stated he was concerned that such a purchase would cause an arms race in South Asia. We had refused to sell DPSAs (A-7's) to Pakistan<sup>4</sup> but if India bought such aircraft Pakistan would also try to do so. The USG would refuse to sell DPSAs to Pakistan but they could be obtained elsewhere.

6. The Ambassador gave a lengthy exposition of the Indian case for a DPSA purchase. He asserted that the relative Indo-Pakistani aircraft balance had been reduced from the historical 3-1 ratio to 2-1. India did not want to increase the number of its aircraft but wished to replace older Hunters and Canberras with a DPSA. Pakistan had introduced DPSAs to South Asia and had 60 such aircraft (Mirages). India presently had no DPSAs but planned to purchase only 30 aircraft at a cost of \$8 million each. The GOI needed such aircraft in order to be able to reach Pakistani air bases if Pakistan started a new war and in the case of possible hostilities with China. The Secretary concluded the discussion by stating that he would take another look at this problem and would request an analysis of the situation. However, he repeated his concern about a further spiralling of arms purchases in South Asia. The Ambassador offered to provide additional data if there were any discrepancies between USG and GOI data.

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<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin of an April 2 memorandum from Christopher, Carter indicated his decision to exclude A-7's from a potential aid package for Pakistan. See footnote 4, Document 240.



7. At Ambassador's request, Secretary reviewed status of our current efforts with respect to Middle East and Southern Africa, and explained Presidential decision on deferring work on enhanced radiation weapons.

Vance

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99. **Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1978

*India.* Recent press stories reporting that the CIA placed two nuclear-powered monitoring devices in the Himalayas in the 1960's to monitor Chinese nuclear activity are correct in major respects.<sup>2</sup> One of these devices was lost in an avalanche and never functioned; the second did function for several years and was later removed. Assertions in some stories that the Indian Government was not informed of the placement of the devices are incorrect, although the present Indian Government evidently was not aware that the operation had occurred until the stories appeared. We have asked Ambassador Goheen to suggest to the Indian Foreign Secretary that he obtain the history of the project from his intelligence service.

The Desai Government will be particularly concerned with the possible environmental impact of the remaining device. We are reviewing a 1967 AEC study to ensure that we can confirm to the Indian Government that we see no environmental danger. We are taking the standard public position that we do not comment on allegations relating to intelligence activities and that this should not be taken as a confirmation or denial of the story.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 4/78. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 93545 to New Delhi, April 12, reported that the story appeared in the April 1978 edition of *Outside* magazine and on the April 12 broadcast of the *Today* show. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780157–1085)

## 100. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, April 17, 1978, 1326Z

5991. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Prime Minister's Statement on the Himalayan Incident.<sup>2</sup> Ref: New Delhi 5959<sup>3</sup> and New Delhi 5988.<sup>4</sup>

1. We believe that Prime Minister's statement to Parliament today has effectively defused what was becoming an increasingly emotional issue here and one that might have had long-lasting reverberations.

2. While the Prime Minister's decision to reveal that the alleged activities had occurred did not follow the policy we sought to urge on the GOI, we believe that the manner in which he presented the matter not only was judicious and sound in the context of internal Indian politics but that it also projects and reinforces the attitudes of cooperativeness and credibility which he seeks to have characterize the relationship between his government and ours.

3. Consequently, I wish to suggest that the President's next letter might contain words of appreciation for the judicious and effective way in which Morarji has handled this problem.<sup>5</sup> He has made it work to build a stronger acceptance of close Indo-U.S. relations when it might have been instead a cause of festering distrust.

Goheen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164-0251. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay, Calcutta, CINCPAC, Dacca, Hong Kong, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, and Beijing. Sent for information to Colombo and Madras.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 99.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 5959 from New Delhi, April 17, transmitted the text of Desai's April 17 message to the Lok Sabha regarding the discovery of a nuclear-powered monitoring device in the Himalayas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164-0193)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5988 from New Delhi, April 17, which provided a summary and analysis of Desai's April 17 message to the Lok Sabha, reported that in response to questions concerning "CIA activities in India," Desai "turned aside the CIA angle rather deftly by repeatedly emphasizing that the decision on the device was 'taken at the highest levels of both governments.' He said: 'Don't blame the CIA or the CBI (India's Central Bureau of Investigation). They were just acting on orders from the highest political levels.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164-0239)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 102.

**101. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Your Lunch Today with Gerry Smith

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

INDIA—The NRC voted yesterday 4–0 that it could not issue an export license for Tarapur and forwarded the sale to the President, who must now send it to Congress for 60 days.<sup>2</sup> The additional delay will cause more floods of negative press in India, and will force us to halt all other diplomatic efforts in the nuclear area. Until the Tarapur shipment is resolved, everything else must wait. Meanwhile, the President must decide on how to handle the heavy water dilemma<sup>3</sup>—that also will face heavy sledding at the NRC.<sup>4</sup> Tarapur may prove to be very unpopular in Congress.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 45, Nuclear Proliferation: 9/77–4/78. Secret. Aaron initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In an April 27 message to Congress, Carter transmitted Executive Order 12055 “authorizing the export of 7,638 Kgs. of low-enriched uranium to India.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 790–791)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 9, Document 92. Telegram 6374 from New Delhi, April 24, which reviewed Carter’s January visit to New Delhi, observed that “the President’s offer to supply India heavy water, made during his address at Parliament, was not anticipated by the GOI. With hindsight, we believe it would have been better to have raised this possibility with the GOI in advance, so that we might have had an idea as to where they would use the heavy water, if they accepted our offer. This would have avoided the possibility of embarrassment we are now facing.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780174–0397)

<sup>4</sup> In a January 11 memorandum to Brzezinski, Mathews explained possible reactions to the offer: “While provision of heavy water does not violate the letter of the new pending legislation, it certainly violates the spirit of that law. It will provoke an angry reaction on the Hill—Ribicoff’s statement in New Delhi that it is ‘inconceivable’ that the US would supply heavy water to India. It is almost certain moreover, that this offer would run into heavy opposition in the NRC where the export license must be approved.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Nuclear: 5/77–4/78)

## 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 9, 1978, 2027Z

117948. Subject: Presidential Letter Dated May 8 to Prime Minister Desai.

1. Please transmit to Prime Minister Desai the following text of a Presidential letter dated May 8, the signed original of which is being pouched.<sup>2</sup>

2. Begin text: Qte Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letters of March 27<sup>3</sup> and April 4,<sup>4</sup> which Ambassador Palkhivala transmitted to me. Both the questions and the hopes that you raised deal with concerns that are also much on my mind.

I fully understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's inability to reach a decision on the Tarapur license must have caused deep concern in India.<sup>5</sup> I appreciate the skill and patience with which you have handled this matter in the Lok Sabha. The NRC action was contrary to the strong recommendation that I made following our meeting in New Delhi; therefore I have submitted to Congress an Executive Order authorizing the export.<sup>6</sup> This order must lie before Congress for 60 days before it enters into effect, and shipment will take place immediately thereafter unless Congress should disapprove this export. I need hardly tell you that I will urge Congress in all appropriate ways not to take such action.

With regard to the offer of heavy water that I made to you in New Delhi,<sup>7</sup> I have instructed my Consul General in Bombay to get in touch with Mr. Sethna to discuss how this can best be implemented. Since heavy water now also comes under the purview of the NRC, we will have to consider closely how we can best approach this question.

I want to assure you that I remain fully committed to resolving our differences on non-proliferation policy. I have closely followed Ambassador Goheen's talks with you as well as other discussions between American and Indian officials. I am determined, as you are,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196-1126. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S; approved by Lande.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of the signed original was found.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 97.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 97.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 101.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 101.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 9, Document 92.

not to let the excellent relations between our two countries be damaged by what is, I believe, a disagreement over means rather than ends. Frankly, one of the major concerns of both the NRC and Congress has been the frequent mention in India of possible future removal of international safeguards from nuclear material supplied to India by the United States. I look forward to discussing with you in detail how we can best resolve this and other issues within the constraints posed by our national policies.

In this connection, we continue to seek a significant SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union as well as a Comprehensive Test Ban. I believe that Secretary Vance's recent visit to Moscow made progress in this area and we will follow it up actively.<sup>8</sup> The major nuclear weapons states must indeed take the lead in reducing vertical proliferation and instituting procedures for the ultimate nuclear disarmament that you and I seek. I am determined to do my part.

In your letter of April 4, you raised questions about Israel and South Africa and the need to ensure that clandestine nuclear exports not undermine our non-proliferation objectives. I appreciate your bringing these concerns to my attention and would be very much interested in receiving information as to the nature and source of these reports. May I suggest that you designate an appropriate officer of your Embassy in Washington to discuss the technical aspects of this question with the State Department or National Security Council Staff?

In the case of Israel we no longer have a nuclear cooperation program and the small amount of fuel transferred earlier remains under international safeguards. All activities of our programs in South Africa are fully safeguarded. The resumption (or continuation) of these programs will depend on the agreement of the governments concerned to accept full-scope safeguards. In neither case do I believe that diversions have taken place. I naturally share your concern that clandestine export of nuclear materials or technology not undermine the international safeguards system. We are taking maximum precautions to prevent this; the best way to prevent proliferation, however, is to have all states place their peaceful nuclear activities under international safeguards. This is the course that we have urged on South Africa, Israel, Argentina, and Egypt as well as on India.

Turning to other issues that we have discussed in our correspondence, my decision to defer production of enhanced radiation weapons is meant to give the Soviets an opening to exercise their own restraint

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<sup>8</sup> Vance had discussions with Brezhnev and Gromyko in Moscow April 19–23.

in conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments.<sup>9</sup> I hope they will give an appropriate response. It was a decision to which I gave long consideration. Advice from you and others was of great help to me and I thank you for it. My ultimate decision will of course be influenced by the extent of Soviet restraint.

On the Middle East, the United States remains pledged to exert every effort to bring the parties to an agreement and is in continuing contact with Israel, Egypt and others involved. The situation in Southern Lebanon, which you cite in your letter, has, I believe, improved somewhat in recent weeks. The United Nations force established by the Security Council for that area is well on its way toward reaching full operational strength, and Israel has begun the withdrawal to which it is pledged. We have made clear to them our hope that withdrawal will be completed expeditiously.

Meanwhile, I hope that India will give its unreserved support to the vital work that the United Nations force is performing in Southern Lebanon.

I particularly appreciate your efforts in seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Horn of Africa. President Siad's decision to withdraw his troops from the Ogaden was a welcome first step, but a permanent solution can only be achieved by a political settlement. We are following closely the efforts of the O.A.U. to find a basis for permanent stability in the region. The withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban combat forces from the area would be an important step in that direction. I am particularly concerned at the prospect of Cuban military involvement in Eritrea which would add dangerously to regional destabilization. I am sure you share my view that the problem of Eritrea, like the Ogaden, requires a political rather than a military solution.

As a last point, may I express my admiration and appreciation for the manner in which you handled the Himalayan device problem.<sup>10</sup> If there is any way we can be helpful to you with respect to environmental monitoring or any other aspect of this unfortunate matter, please let Ambassador Goheen know.

Rosalynn and I look forward with anticipation to your visit. I am glad that you have decided to visit several parts of our country—not only to enable you to see America but, equally, to enable a wide range of Americans to share my experience in meeting you.

Sincerely,  
Jimmy Carter.

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<sup>9</sup> On April 7, Carter issued a statement announcing his decision to delay production of the neutron bomb. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 702*)

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 4, Document 100.

His Excellency  
Morarji Desai  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi  
End text.

Vance

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### 103. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 13, 1978, 11:25 a.m.–12:18 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Carter and Prime Minister Morarji Desai of New Delhi

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Robert Goheen, United States Ambassador to New Delhi  
Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary  
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary  
Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council  
Peter Lande, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary  
  
Prime Minister Morarji Desai  
Foreign Minister Atul Vajpayee  
Mr. Vidya Shankar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister  
Mr. Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary  
Ambassador N.A. Palkhivala  
Mr. Arjrun Asrani  
Mr. V.Y. Tonpe  
Mr. H.S. Shah  
Mr. S.V. Purushottam

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 6–7/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Desai was in Washington June 12–15 after visiting New York, San Francisco, and Omaha. Vance's June 7 memorandum to Carter briefing him for Desai's visit is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, India: Prime Minister Desai, 6/12–15/78: Briefing Book.

The President and Prime Minister joined their staffs at 11:25 after a 20-minute private meeting.<sup>2</sup> The President gave Desai two books.

*President Carter* then outlined the results of their private conversations. Each side had reaffirmed its well understood positions on the supply of nuclear fuel. Desai understands that we are talking with the Soviets on CTB and SALT and the two sides understand each other very well. They had agreed on the explosive nature of the African problem; the need for restraint in approaching it and for minimizing outside interference. They discussed the need for progress in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the problems and opportunities represented by the new situation in Afghanistan. The President outlined Pakistan's concerns; the Prime Minister stressed his belief that the Afghans are independent-minded and religious.

*Prime Minister Desai* reported that he had had good talks in Brussels and London. The Belgian Prime Minister was worried about Zaire and agreed with Desai that the Africans should solve their own problems. The OAU should be helpful in this regard. He had also discussed Africa with Prime Minister Callaghan. Desai said that Africa is creating much anxiety and asked if the President had seen Nyerere's statement.<sup>3</sup>

*President Carter* replied that he and Nyerere had exchanged letters on this subject.

*Desai* said that Nyerere is worried about foreign forces in Africa. Desai recognizes that the United States is clearly opposed to this. He said that since the Cubans were invited however one cannot find fault with their presence. Desai said he had passed on to the Soviets the President's concerns about Ethiopia and Somalia. The Soviets replied that matters should be solved through discussions and that the Cubans were only helping to defend Somalia. Desai had answered that this was alright but the Cubans should not stay on and he chided the Soviets on the way they had shifted back and forth in supporting Somalia and Ethiopia.

*Desai* continued, urging that the Cold War not recur. America can be very helpful by taking an objective view and enabling Russia to do it (sic). The US and the Soviet Union should come closer together; this will also make the nuclear talks successful more quickly. Public rhetoric

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<sup>2</sup> No memorandum of conversation was found of the meeting.

<sup>3</sup> According to telegram 2455 from Dar es Salaam, June 8, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, condemned "Western neocolonialism in Africa." The Embassy suggested that Nyerere's statement "represents a sudden (but possibly temporary) collapse of faith in U.S. intentions." Days before, the United States supported French and Belgian troops' efforts to evacuate Europeans from Kolwezi in Southern Zaire, who were being threatened by the Congolese National Liberation Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-2642)



causes problems. He noted that China and the Soviet Union are on bad terms but believes that China will ultimately fall in line if the US and USSR cooperate. The Chinese have shown more open-mindedness after the death of Mao.

*Desai* further said that Sino-Indian relations are bad and it's mainly China's fault. Chou En-lai had criticized *Desai* in 1961 for sheltering Tibetan refugees. *Desai* had countered that *Nehru* had helped China by recognizing Chinese suzerainty in Tibet but China had failed to grant Tibet autonomy. India was only providing refuge to the Tibetans and would do the same for Chou En-lai if he needed it. (The President interjected humorously that he would remember that.) *Desai* said that the Chinese had attacked in 1962. They had been successful because *Krishna Menon* and General *Kaul* had mismanaged the Army. When *Desai* came to power last year he said India would be friends with China but Peking did not respond. India would not work through intermediaries. The Chinese did then send a delegation and made an important statement in Nepal. *Desai* had a frank talk with the delegation, which they took well. He pointed out to them India's long standing support of China since 1938. The issue of Chinese seizure of Indian land had to be settled so that the two countries can become true friends. The Chinese said they would solve it through friendly discussions. Thus relations are improving now. The Romanian Prime Minister<sup>4</sup> came to Delhi after visiting Peking and said the Chinese are eager for friendship. The Foreign Minister will go to China perhaps in September. *Desai* concluded by saying the report in the June 12 New York Times was wrong since there is no question of India giving up land.<sup>5</sup>

The *President* said we have found the new Chinese leadership to be much more interested in friendship and we are pursuing normalization.

*Desai* said he was worried that we had promised equipment to China that we had refused the Soviets. The United States should not appear to be using China against the Soviets.

The *President* replied that the computer in question<sup>6</sup> could be used by the Soviets for missile guidance but Chinese technology is not that

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<sup>4</sup> Manea Manescu.

<sup>5</sup> Citing *Desai's* June 11 interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," the article claimed India was "prepared to accept China's seizure of 14,000 square miles of disputed territory between 1957 and 1962 and to acknowledge the present boundary formally at some point in the future." (David Binder, "India Ready to Drop China Border Claim," *New York Times*, June 12, 1978, p. A6)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 134548 to all East Asian and Pacific diplomatic posts, May 26, reported that IBM had received an order from the Chinese Government for a computer system for Shenyang Air Compression. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223–0271)

far advanced and they can use it only for peaceful purposes. We have explained this to the Soviets.

*Desai* replied that that was good but the Soviets are worried and he is anxious to see the US and the Soviet Union become very friendly.

The *President* reassured him that we are making steady progress in our negotiations. The press tends to emphasize negative aspects.

*Desai* said he is impressed by Soviet sincerity and the United States should not use China as a lever on them. He asked how our relations with China could be good unless we gave up Taiwan. That, however, would be a breach of trust.

The *President* pointed out that we do not own Taiwan but agreed that it was a difficult problem. He said that we are certainly not moving too rapidly forward in the area of international friendship and that the pace was too slow for his taste.

The *President* then discussed follow-up to the January meeting. He mentioned that Secretary Kreps and Deputy Secretary Christopher would be going to India in the fall and that the business community was going to send a full-time representative to Delhi to facilitate Indo-US cooperation. He also noted that the visa rules have been changed at India's request.<sup>7</sup>

A discussion of the Indian student visa problem ensued between *Ambassador Goheen* and *Foreign Minister Mehta*.

The *President* noted that the Prime Minister had said that the flow of scholars had been interrupted by Mrs. Gandhi and asked Deputy Secretary Christopher to see if that could be reversed. (The reference was to the Experiment in International Living.) He said that he would write to *Desai* on how this could be started up again.

*Foreign Secretary Mehta* pointed out that some exchanges had been resumed, notably the Harvard program.

The *President* said *Desai* had told him that the name "Peace Corps" was badly received in India because it had been too much involved in political matters. *Desai* had told him however that India would welcome technicians under a different name.

The *President* then asked if the Joint Commission was functioning well.

*Ambassador Goheen* said that it was, especially in the Science and Technology area, including solar energy.

The *President* urged *Desai* to write to him anytime a problem arose. He went on to suggest Indo-US diplomatic consultations before the UN Human Rights Commission meeting this September. (*Desai* agreed.)

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 15, Document 90.

The *President* cited human rights progress in Latin America, Indonesia, and Philippines and noted the commitment in the human rights area that we share with India.

The *President* expressed his hope for success in the MTN and that we had added two or three Indian export items on the tariff-free list.

*Desai* noted that textiles are a particularly great problem.

*Ambassador Palkhivala* described the great demand for Indian textiles here and said that in the first four months of the year India had disposed of its entire quota.

The *President* asked if there was any possibility to give special consideration to Indian hand-woven fabrics that are not competitive with American textiles.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said he would look into it.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* noted that India had liberalized its imports.

The *President* expressed pleasure at the increase in Indo-US trade which is mutually beneficial. He then asked about the status of the Nepal-India joint water project.

*Desai* responded that they have an agreement and may be asking for outside financial assistance. He then went on to describe a large-scale irrigation project which the FAO and IBRD are looking at. If successful, this would stretch from the Himalayas to southern India, provide great amounts of power, and a three-fold increase in crops. It has to be examined closely however since the Himalayas are unstable mountains.

*Desai* said they had been worried about the presence of a nuclear device on Nanda Devi but took responsibility since it was there at their request.<sup>8</sup>

The *President* expressed appreciation for the way this had been handled by *Desai* and said he was glad that neither of them had been involved in it. He asked what the possibilities were for a nuclear free zone in South Asia.

*Desai* said it was meaningless to have just one area free of nuclear weapons and noted that India has declared it will not have nuclear weapons.

The *President* said that we and others have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco.<sup>9</sup> This was a step in the right direction although he cannot say how important it is. He then said we are concerned about Pakistan.

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<sup>8</sup> See Documents 99 and 100.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 5, Document 87.

*Desai* said that if that satisfies them and that if they became friendly. . . . (Note: *Desai* obviously intended to be ambiguous here.) He wondered however who they feel insecure about.

The *President* named India and Afghanistan.

*Desai* said they shouldn't be. India had never attacked them or taken anything from them. The problem should be solved through more friendly relations throughout the region. Pakistan has more powerful weapons than India but India is not worried about that. He will not complain if we give arms to Pakistan but it will be dangerous.

The *President* noted that our arms sales in South Asia are very low.

*Desai* said that the Pakistanis threatened to turn to the Soviet Union and reject CENTO.

The *President* observed that CENTO is a pretty dormant organization and that Pakistan feels insecure.

*Desai* said that their own attitude is at fault. India should have helped Bangladesh in April 1971 but the Soviets kept Mrs. Gandhi from doing that. India wants to be of assistance to Bangladesh which is not aggressive. The Punjabis are the problem. There is danger of Pakistan splitting into four parts and this would mean danger for all of us. India prefers to have a strong neighbor.

The *President* expressed fear that if Pakistan feels weak it will turn to large arms purchases and nuclear weapons unless we assure them.

*Desai* said they should be reassured that India will not attack them.

Turning to the Bhutto case, *Desai* said he doesn't think Bhutto will be hanged.<sup>10</sup> India has said nothing directly to them but *Desai* has indirectly pointed out that he doesn't believe in capital punishment.

The *President* said we have expressed our concern privately.

*Desai* said Pakistan would misunderstand any Indian statement; they look for opportunities to misunderstand. India looks forward to the time when the whole region draws closer together. Iran wants to have a rail connection but Pakistan refuses.

The *President* asked if there is a place for Afghanistan in that circle of friendship. (*Desai* nodded yes.) He asked if India envisions a written friendship agreement.

*Desai* said that the frontier people are the problem but would not be if the Pakistanis treated them well. The Pakistanis always do the opposite of what India says. It is the principle of their existence.

*Foreign Secretary Mehta* said he had pointed out to the Pakistanis that India had not interfered in their recent political difficulties and

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<sup>10</sup> See Document 272.

told them not to talk about Afghanistan and India as a pincers directed against them.

Desai said he did not want to see an increase in the Soviet presence anywhere, including Afghanistan.

Thereupon the meeting ended at 12:18.

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#### 104. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 14, 1978, 10:30–11:29 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Carter and Prime Minister Morarji Desai of New Delhi

##### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Robert Goheen, United States Ambassador to New Delhi  
Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary  
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary  
Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council  
Henry Owen, President's Special Representative  
Peter Lande, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary  
  
Prime Minister Morarji Desai  
Foreign Minister Atul Vajpayee  
Mr. Vidya Shankar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister  
Mr. Jagat Mehta, Foreign Secretary  
Ambassador N.A. Palkhivala  
Mr. Arjun Asrani  
Mr. V.Y. Tonpe  
Mr. H.S. Shah  
Mr. S.V. Purushottam

*President Carter* began the meeting with comments about the visit that he and Desai had made to the Lincoln Memorial the previous night.<sup>2</sup> He said that they had discussed the need for increasing political

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 6–7/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> From 9:40 to 9:53 p.m. on June 13, Carter and Desai visited the Lincoln Memorial. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

stability in South Asia. They had also discussed Pakistan's unwarranted concerns, its internal problems, and its insistence in making nuclear weapons. Afghanistan had also come up. Desai had told him of the steps India had taken to alleviate Pakistani concerns and intentions. The President noted that we have restrained our arms sales policy and want to reassure Pakistan. He asked if the Prime Minister had any advice to offer.

*Prime Minister Desai* said that Pakistan exists on anti-Indianism. India is unable to do much with them, and the United States should tell them that they should not be afraid. Pakistan is in CENTO and despite its threats to withdraw Desai does not think that they will do so. Desai said India would be willing to do anything reasonable, but it should not be offered as a sign of weakness. He said that they were able to deal with the Pakistanis easily and spoke with them frankly. Desai commented that Agha Shahi is particularly difficult but by being reasonable himself, Desai forces Shahi to be reasonable.

The *President* asked how serious the Soviet threat to Afghanistan is.

*Desai* replied that the Soviets have few chances there. The Afghans are proud people. They have poor relations with Pakistan, but India's relations with them are good and have remained so after the coup. The Indians do not encourage the Pushtuns and other border tribes against Pakistan. Until Pakistan settles down and sheds its imagined fears, however, its situation will be difficult. The real problem is the domination of Pakistan by Punjabis. A dissolution of Pakistan would be a disaster for them and for India. India wants to see Pakistan strong but that is only possible if there is not Punjabi domination. The U.S. should take an initiative. (The President said that we could.) Desai had invited Zia to come to Delhi and he wanted to come. He then hesitated, but even so Desai told him that he should come at his leisure and that India would understand.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that our relations with the Pakistanis are very tenuous because of the reprocessing issue<sup>3</sup> and the Bhutto case.<sup>4</sup> We want to get back to normal in our relations with Pakistan, especially in the economic area. Under Secretary Newsom will go there in July to try to give them a greater sense of confidence.<sup>5</sup> We will be in close touch with India about this.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* said that we should try to persuade Pakistan to closer economic cooperation, including in the field of transportation. He noted general concern over Afghanistan and said that we

<sup>3</sup> See Document 273.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 272.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 293 and 294.

should not react in a way that will force them into the Soviets' arms. The Pakistanis are in a state of panic, but that will not have the desired effect. We will do what we can, and does the United States have any suggestions?

The *President* said that we will respond after the Newsom visit.

*Desai* noted that the Sallal agreement<sup>6</sup> went well and there are signs that the Pakistanis wish to be friendly.

*Ambassador Goheen* said Agha Shahi has suggested a regional pact to ban nuclear weapons. That kind of reassurance might be a good step for the Pakistanis.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* asked how this would reassure them with regard to Afghanistan.

*Ambassador Goheen* said it would be part of a broad policy of reassurance.

*Desai* said they would be willing to sign a no weapons pledge, but it would be better if everyone signed it.

*Foreign Secretary Mehta* said that India was prepared to consider nuclear free arrangements and had told Agha Shahi that they would discuss it privately during the Zia visit. The Pakistanis leaked this at the SSOD, however, and had thereby soured the atmosphere.

*Desai* noted that Nepal also wants a declaration and this should be for the whole region. The question, however, was whether China would join in.

*Dr. Brzezinski*, responding to a question from President Carter, then gave a description of his recent visit to China. He said that his trip had not been a negotiating mission, but rather an attempt to advance the normalization of bilateral relations. He also wanted to discuss global matters with the Chinese and matters of bilateral cooperation short of recognition. For the most part, they had discussed views of world affairs.

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that among other things the Chinese were worried about Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan. Their policy seems to be similar to America's and India's but they have more concern and anxiety than India does. Pakistan is particularly unstable and this would have bad consequences for India. There was some uncertainty about Southeast Asia; they believe Vietnam is seeking domination and

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<sup>6</sup> On April 12, Indo-Pakistani talks produced an agreement on the dispute over the Chenab River in Indian Kashmir. India secured the right to build the Salal Dam and a nearby power plant in exchange for adherence to Pakistani views on the projects' designs. Telegram 6067 from New Delhi, April 18, announced the agreement and reported on the issues at stake. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780166–0845)

the Soviets are encouraging them. They took a tough line on Korea but did not pursue it. Dr. Brzezinski also reassured them on SALT.

*Dr. Brzezinski* said there had been no anti-India remarks, although there had been some criticism of Mrs. Gandhi. It was only a brief, passing discussion. He found the regime less doctrinaire and ideological. They have made a long term commitment to domestic modernization and this involves contacts with the West and basic change. They continue to believe that war is inevitable, but now have come to the conclusion that it can be postponed. Their leadership is impressive.<sup>7</sup>

*Desai* said that the greatest change is the opening up of China, and this is a great change for the better.

The *President* then offered some specifics on the CTB negotiations. He said we are approaching it cautiously and that 3 or 4 questions remain and these are soluble. They are first, the length of time the CTB would be in effect. It cannot be permanent because neither we nor the Soviets know whether our nuclear weapons will deteriorate and have to be able to test. Second is the question of verification. The Soviets are strongly opposed to intrusion but we will be able to meet this by installing sensing devices. Third is the question of how long the Soviets will remain with CTB if others continue to test nuclear explosives. We see the CTB as a demonstration to convince others that they should join it. We are making good progress; the Soviets seem to be more forthcoming and they are increasingly flexible and are negotiating in good faith.

The *President*, turning to SALT, said there are two remaining issues. First, the question of new missiles and what kinds of prohibitions should be put on them. Second, the Backfire bomber, which is a political issue here. The SS-20 is also a problem for our allies. We, ourselves, are not threatened by it but neighboring countries (including India) are within its range. It is a very formidable weapon and we hope that other nations will express concern over its development. We have a standing invitation to Brezhnev to come here to complete a SALT agreement. For his part, the *President* said, he would like to conclude one tomorrow.

*Desai* said he was happy to hear of progress in these areas and agreed that the Soviets are sincere. If a CTB is limited in time, France and China might not come in at all. If it is permanent, then there will be more pressure on them to join it. It would be even better if no new weapons were made at all.

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<sup>7</sup> For the records of Brzezinski's discussions with Chinese leaders during his May 20–22 visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 108–111.



The *President*, speaking in confidence, said that we and the Soviets had discussed a permanent ban providing that France and China join at some future time. The French objected, however, for they do not want to be under public pressure. The Soviets are also reluctant because of their fear of China, which is now deploying ICBM's and MRBM's. We, too, want to assess the reliability of our stockpiles pending elimination of them through a SALT agreement. The President said he knew this was contrary to Desai's beliefs, but we would not get any alternative arrangement approved.

*Desai* said it would be a good idea if all the weapons deteriorated. He would like to get Brezhnev and Carter together and talk to them.

The *President* said that this SALT II agreement will, for the first time, result in the disassembly of nuclear weapons. Under SALT III, the cutbacks will be greater. The Soviets want to cooperate, but they are very cautious.

*Desai* said that one's own trust should generate trust in others. More trust is expected of us (by which he apparently meant the democracies.)

The *President* then discussed Africa. He noted that the Cuban troops in Ethiopia have incurred a lot of dislike. The Cubans should not get involved in Eritrea. We need help from the Soviets and others in solving the Namibia and Rhodesia problems. The Front Line States have been very constructive, but the Soviets and Cubans have not. To the extent that India has influence with them, it would be good if it could urge them at least to be neutral.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* said India had sought to help Ethiopia through the NAM. They, however, passed the ball to the OAU who failed and the Cubans came in. There should have been an early effort to discourage Somalia from its aggression.

The *President* said we had little involvement in the conflict. Gromyko had told him that Siad Barre had violated an agreement with the Soviets on the use of weapons. The U.S. used its influence on Ethiopia not to cross the border against Somalia. The President said he has no criticism of the Soviets for aiding the Ethiopians. Now, however, Ethiopia is dominant and the 15,000 Cubans there should leave since their presence will be destabilizing and ultimately intensify the Ethiopian conflict.

The *President* noted there were also 23,000 Cubans in Angola. We are in a dispute with Castro about his role with the Katangans. The Cubans play a major role in Angola and the President has no doubt that they trained the Katangans. Castro has recently modified his claim by saying that they had not trained Katangans "recently". The President said he did not know what "recently" meant, but that is now all in the past and we hope that African opinion has been aroused to restrain

Neto and the Cubans. We are also concerned that Algeria and Libya are trying to make changes in borders. We just want to see stability and majority rule and want to keep outside forces out. We have never supported any Pan-African force. We do encourage reform and the strengthening of the Zairian economy.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* said India had stated that the continued presence of great powers' forces in non-aligned countries is wrong. India will not allow Cuba to become a leader of a non-aligned.

*Foreign Secretary Mehta*, responding to a question by Brzezinski, said that criteria for membership in the non-aligned movement are flexible.

Originally it was non-membership in multilateral defense agreements. There is, however, no constitution to define criteria for admission or expulsion.

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* said that Cuba is trying to radicalize the NAM. India rejected their attempts to align the NAM with the Socialist bloc.

*Desai* said that India is the only truly non-aligned nation and even it wasn't a year ago. The non-aligned must not become a bloc.

The *President* said that non-alignment can be a constructive force. If all the leaders in the world had *Desai's* good will it would be a better world to live in.

*Desai* replied that if all the nations of the world were governed by moral considerations, it would be a better world to live in.

The *President* urged *Desai* to write directly to him whenever a problem or issue arose.

*Desai* said that is the nature of their relationship.

Thereupon the meeting concluded at 11:29 a.m.

**105. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Rhesus Monkeys

You were asked to discuss monkeys with Desai;<sup>2</sup> State needs to know the outcome of the discussion so that the American scientific community can be informed.

Did you raise the issue with Desai?<sup>3</sup>

Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_

If you did raise it, did Desai:

Refuse any further shipments?<sup>4</sup>\_\_\_\_\_

Agree to continued shipments?\_\_\_\_\_

Agree, but with conditions; if so, what conditions?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Desai (Prime Minister) Visit to US: 6–9/78. Confidential. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> In a June 7 memorandum to Carter, Vance listed as one of the U.S. objectives during the Desai visit (see Documents 103 and 104) the end of India's global ban on the export of rhesus monkeys. Vance suggested that Carter make the point that the ban was detrimental to medical research and production of the polio vaccine. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, India: Prime Minister Desai, 6/12–15/78: Briefing Book)

<sup>3</sup> Carter checked "Yes."

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked this option. He initialed "J" at the bottom of the page and wrote: "a) He has deep religious convictions, b) His government/people agree with him, c) U.S. has grossly violated promises in past, d) We've had years of warning."

## 106. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, July 13, 1978, 0834Z

10699. Kabul for Under Secretary Newsom. Subject: India and the CTB. Ref: State 174235.<sup>2</sup>

1. The fact that neither the FonSec nor the FonMin accompanied the PM on his return apparently accounts for the PM not having been reminded to announce India's readiness to sign a genuine, five-year CTB (one such as was described to him by the President<sup>3</sup>) in the press conference following his landing in Delhi.<sup>4</sup>

2. Now, however, FonSec Mehta says a problem has arisen. The GOI is troubled by the July 1 New York Times story over the by-line of Richard Burt which says that U.S. military and nuclear experts have forced a change in our position so that certain kinds of testing will be permitted and the duration of the CTB will be reduced to 3 years.<sup>5</sup> Mehta indicated that these reported changes in the prospective CTB are very disturbing to the GOI, and he seemed to be saying that India would not become a party to so limited a CTB. Since we had not seen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780286-1122. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Kabul.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 174235 to New Delhi, July 11, the Department instructed the Embassy to ascertain the status of the proposals made in Washington June 12-13 by Desai and other Indian Government officials during their meetings, in which "Desai told members of Congress that he was prepared to announce publicly that India would adhere to a nondiscriminatory CTB and that this would be announced at his first press conference following his return to Delhi. Similarly, Mehta, Shankar and others told us that they were prepared to consider various proposals we had advanced regarding safeguards and would be back to us on them." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780283-1059) Desai met with about 50 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee on June 13. (Thomas O'Toole, "Desai Says India Won't Sign A-Pact Just for U.S. Uranium," *Washington Post*, June 14, 1978, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 103.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 10669 from New Delhi, July 12, reported Goheen's inquiry to Shankar about the proposals regarding the CTB and nuclear safeguards made by Desai and other Indian officials during their June 12-13 visit to Washington. When approached, Shankar "made it appear that they had not had much consideration since the return of the PM's party to India. It was agreed that I would call on him again within the next few days to explore these questions more fully." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780285-0606)

<sup>5</sup> Burt reported that the opponents to the original CTB were the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Energy Department, commenting: "The problem, as described by officials, is that critics of Mr. Carter's earlier decision have argued that the United States needs to be able to carry out much larger tests to insure the reliability of weapons, explosions equivalent to some 3,000 tons of TNT." (Richard Burt, "U.S., in a Shift, Asks Less Than a Complete Test Ban," *New York Times*, July 1, 1978, p. 4)

the New York Times story or been alerted to these possible changes in the U.S. position, I was caught at a loss and could only offer to seek clarification. Please provide guidance ASAP.

3. Let me add that I felt it embarrassing to both Under Secretary Newsom and myself to have been instructed to raise with the GOI the matter of India's commitment to sign a CTB, as we did yesterday with V. Shankar and Jagat Mehta,<sup>6</sup> without having been given any warning of this alleged change in what we were talking about. Even if Burt's story does not correctly portray the current U.S. position, the Department should know that a story like this, on a topic of so much interest to the GOI, in an "*authoritative*" newspaper like the *Times*, is bound to be flashed to the GOI and draw its attention. In such situations the Embassy needs a comparable alert, together with guidance.<sup>7</sup>

Goheen

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<sup>6</sup> For a summary of Newsom and Goheen's July 12 meeting with Shankar, see Document 107. Telegram 10720 from New Delhi, July 13, reported the July 12 meeting among Newsom, Goheen, and Mehta, who discussed regional issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287-0095)

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 178747 to New Delhi, July 15, the Department responded: "We appreciate your concern but are not able to furnish you further guidance or comment on the Burt story at this point. We will send you additional guidance ASAP as basis for further discussion with GOI." No further response was found. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780290-0209)

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## 107. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, July 13, 1978, 1058Z

10721. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom's Meeting With Prime Minister Desai.

1. Under Secretary Newsom, accompanied by Ambassador Goheen and DeptOff, met for forty-five minutes with Prime Minister Desai July

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067-2340. Secret; Priority; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Islamabad, Kabul, London, Paris, and Tehran.

12. Minister of External Affairs Vajpayee, Foreign Secretary Mehta and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Shankar also present.

2. Newsom opened meeting by explaining that at the request of Secretary Vance he was visiting Iran, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to share views with leaders of the region. He had three principal purposes during his talks in the region: (a) continuing the close consultations with the GOI previously demonstrated by the two meetings between President Carter and the Prime Minister; (b) examining the situation in Afghanistan in order to assess what U.S. policy should be toward the new Afghan regime;<sup>2</sup> and (c) visiting those countries interested in stability and peace in the region to learn how the U.S. can contribute to regional stability. In this connection, he said he would see whether there is a way for Pakistan to suspend its plans for a reprocessing capability so that the US can resume its assistance programs.

2. Newsom assured the Prime Minister that if the US resumes its programs for Pakistan, it will be done in a way which will not escalate the level of military equipment in the region. As he had explained during his earlier call on Defense Minister Ram,<sup>3</sup> if Pakistan can be convinced to suspend the reprocessing plant, the US anticipates it may receive from Pakistan requests for F-5 aircraft and some other equipment. In such case, the US would consider sales and possibly some credits, but no grants. Any U.S. arms programs for Pakistan would be restrained, as President Carter had told the Prime Minister. The US has made no final decisions and could do nothing for Pakistan until the reprocessing issue is resolved.

3. In response to a request for his views, the Prime Minister stressed that India wishes to see complete understanding between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. He and the Shah see these three countries plus Iran as key to regional stability. India's relations with Iran and Afghanistan are good. While the new Afghan leaders follow a Communist philosophy, he does not believe that the April coup was Soviet inspired. (Newsom commented that the US had reached the same conclusion on Afghanistan, is keeping an open mind and will consider further aid programs.) Because of its nationalistic tradition and Islamic roots, Afghanistan is not likely to come under foreign domination. Although

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<sup>2</sup> On April 28, Communist forces in Afghanistan led by Nur Muhammad Taraki overthrew the government of President Mohammad Daoud Khan.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 10719 from New Delhi, July 13, transmitted the record of Newsom's July 12 discussion with Ram on weapons sales to India and Pakistan and a potential regional agreement renouncing nuclear weapons. Ram said that India could postpone the deep penetration strike aircraft "decision by 'one month or so'" and also "generally indicated Indian acceptance of restoration of a limited US arms supply relationship with Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780300-0587)

India is not apprehensive about developments in Afghanistan, it is still prudent to be careful and not unsuspecting. (Newsom noted that the Shah is also keeping an open mind on Afghanistan.)

4. On Pakistan, the Prime Minister noted that the Afghan coup has made the GOP apprehensive and fearful that the DRA will cause problems along the Pak-Afghan border, interference which he personally does not expect. The Prime Minister told the Under Secretary that he could be helpful in Pakistan by guaranteeing the GOP of India's good intentions. India will not interfere in Pakistan's affairs and will give Pakistan no cause for complaint against India. He cited his refusal to say anything about the Bhutto case.<sup>4</sup> Because India is the bigger state, India has a duty not to interfere with Pakistan. India can only help Pakistan if the latter asks; to offer assistance would only make Pakistan suspicious of India's intentions. India is prepared to provide food to Pakistan if it asks directly. He noted that internal conditions make it difficult for the GOP to improve relations with India; the GOP is fearful of strong domestic feelings in Pakistan against India. However, India will continue to behave in a friendly manner toward Pakistan, and hopes Pakistan will eventually be convinced of India's sincerity. India seeks complete freedom of economic relations with Pakistan. He supports the kind of steps the Shah would like to see developed in transit trade and economic cooperation among the countries of the region but does not believe Pakistani acceptance is likely. He referred to Pakistan's insistence on government-to-government trade.

5. Ambassador Goheen expressed respect of USG for India's determination not to develop nuclear explosives. Pakistan does not have the same confidence which India has shown in foreswearing nuclear weapons. He asked whether a bilateral agreement between the two countries on this subject was possible. The Prime Minister said India has already firmly declared its nuclear policy, including before the United Nations. If Pakistan makes a similar declaration, he will immediately welcome it but India cannot pressure Pakistan into doing so. Rumors that India is working with France against the reprocessing plant are untrue and the subject was not discussed during his meeting with the French President. The Prime Minister asked however, whether it was not unfair for India to sign nuclear treaties (presumably the NPT and CTB) if Pakistan did not.

6. The Prime Minister continued by describing Pakistan as adventurous by nature, as India has twice found out, but he is not worried about threats to India from Pakistan. India is strong militarily. However, Pakistan is able to concentrate its forces in one area while India

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 272.

must defend two borders; therefore the military balance between the two countries is precarious. Shankar added that Indian public opinion has been disturbed by increases by Pakistan in the number of its aircraft and divisions since the 1971 war, and he is not sure how Indian public opinion will regard resumption of US arms supply to Pakistan. In concluding the discussion of Pakistan, the Prime Minister indicated his understanding of what the US might do to assist Pakistan if the reprocessing issue can be overcome.

7. Regarding fuel shipments for the Tarapur nuclear reactor, Newsom stated that we expected a resolution against the present shipment to be defeated in the House today.<sup>5</sup> The second shipment will be considered by the NRC when the fifth Commissioner is in place, probably within several weeks.

8. In response to a question by Newsom, the Prime Minister said that India would be prepared to contribute troops to UN forces in both Namibia and Zimbabwe.

9. Newsom raised question of whether India saw the possibility of a human rights initiative within a U.N. context. In reply, the Prime Minister said he believed the West must be cautious in seeking change in Communist states. Improved East-West relations and progress in disarmament could be jeopardized by overzealousness. India adheres to the principle that every country should be allowed to determine its own form of government and social system. Newsom commented that there appeared to be a philosophical difference between US and India over how to go about improving international respect for human rights. India apparently believes democratic countries can best improve human rights by their own example but that it is difficult to institutionalize human rights improvements through the UN. The U.S. felt that continued international pressures could be helpful. Desai agreed with this analysis.

10. Meeting concluded with Newsom stating that the US would continue to keep India informed of its policies in the region and that he would advise the Prime Minister through Ambassador Goheen of the results of his present trip.

11. In brief call on Secretary Shankar prior to meeting with Prime Minister, nuclear subjects were discussed. Newsom said we expect Tarapur fuel shipment to move forward very soon and next shipment to come before NRC as soon as fifth Commissioner sworn in. In answer to Newsom question, Shankar said he thought Prime Minister had

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<sup>5</sup> On July 12, the House of Representatives voted 227 to 181 against a resolution to override Carter's April 27 decision to authorize the export of nuclear fuel for Tarapur. ("House Backs Nuclear Fuel for India," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 1978, p. A13)



already made a public statement regarding Indian adherence to a non-discriminatory CTB, as Desai told President Carter and US Senators he would do. He would check and get back to Ambassador Goheen.<sup>6</sup> If a statement has not been made the Prime Minister could easily do so in the Parliament. Shankar also said Indians are agreeable to holding further technical talks; he indicated no preference for timing or locale of talks.

Goheen

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 106.

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**108. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, July 17, 1978, 1026Z

10869. Subject: Nuclear Topics: Meeting With PM's Principal Secretary, V. Shankar. Ref: (A) State 174235;<sup>2</sup> (B) New Delhi 10669;<sup>3</sup> (C) New Delhi 10699.<sup>4</sup>

1. International committee on safeguards. In a meeting late Friday,<sup>5</sup> Shankar confirmed that the Indian AEC has considered and approved in principle the idea of India promoting the establishment of a high level, independent committee of scientists to examine safeguards questions and make recommendations. This idea was first proposed by PM Desai to PM Callaghan in London in June, and through their High Commissioner here the British have recently given it some further encouragement. The idea was also discussed but not probed very deeply in conversations in the USA between Shankar and Nye.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0918. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Islamabad, and London.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 106.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 106.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 106.

<sup>5</sup> July 14.

<sup>6</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this discussion was found.

2. According to Shankar, the committee's mandate has not yet been formulated in any precise way. Generally the Indians have in mind an examination and resultant proposals directed at "measures necessary to prevent nuclear research and development along peaceful lines being switched to serve military purposes." Shankar sees this as including but not being limited to the tasks laid down in the non-paper Nye gave him on this subject in Washington.<sup>7</sup> But India would prefer the committee's charge to be broader than a consideration of the problems posed to or by India alone. It hopes the committee can somehow find both "universalized solutions" and ones that will not require use of "the hated phrase, full scope safeguards". At the same time India hopes that this initiative (when launched) will show that it takes seriously the need to deal with the dangers of horizontal proliferation, and in this spirit it is also seen to meet at least part way the first requirement laid down by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Senator Sparkman's June 21 letter to President Carter.<sup>8</sup>

3. The prospective membership of the committee has grown since the Washington talks. The GOI now envisions a panel of as many as seven, including in addition to India and the USA representatives from the UK, West Germany, France, Japan, and either Brazil or Argentina. The members are envisioned as "independent scientists of high standing, nominated by the governments but not tied to them". Not much thought seems to have been given yet as to just how such a committee might be put together or how it would be expected to function.

4. The official launch vehicle will probably be a Desai letter to President Carter, possibly with parallel letters to PM Callaghan and Chancellor Schmidt. Shankar recognizes that much more thought needs to be given to defining the committee's scope and objectives. He hopes that enough of this can be accomplished in the next week or so to enable a draft letter to be put before PM Desai within the next two weeks. (Comment: I have pointed out to Shankar that his description of the committee's purpose appears to be pointed at finding some new, minimal anti-proliferation arrangements and that we are unlikely to want to take part in anything that might serve to undercut the IAEA or lead to some separate new monitoring system. Shankar agreed those would be undesirable results. He thought they could be avoided and agreed that more attention needed to be given both to the relation of

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<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> Not found. According to the *Washington Post*, the letter was sent after the Senate vote to approve the continued export of uranium to India. The article quoted Sparkman's letter: "The executive branch and the Indian government should base their discussions on the anticipation that if full-scope safeguards are not achieved, it is highly unlikely that a waiver allowing continued exports would be acceptable." ("Senate Panel Warns India On Atom Fuel," *Washington Post*, June 21, 1978, p. A16)

this plan to the IAEA and to a more exact definition of the committee's mandate before any public launching. There are obvious difficulties for us in the Indian plan as currently phrased; yet, the fact that the GOI seems to be about to put forward a (more or less) conciliatory non-proliferation initiative seems to me to be distinctly encouraging. We probably should not try to do more to shape the proposal at this stage, because that might be construed as trying to take the play away from them, but when they have a fleshed-out proposal to offer, I trust that we shall be prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent possible.)<sup>9</sup>

5. Other nuclear topics: Our discussion ranged over a wide area in addition to the foregoing. Specific noteworthy items were as follows:

(A) CTB: Shankar made clear that there is no question of India signing a CTB that is "discriminatory" or "incomplete". He confirmed that India would accept one that had a limited term of life and one that did not initially include China and France, but not one which permitted certain levels of testing and hence was "discriminatory" in favor of the nuclear weapons powers.

(B) Alleged Soviet offer: When I queried Shankar about the Times of India's report of an informal Russian offer to replace US as a supplier to Tarapur (ref. New Delhi 10790),<sup>10</sup> Shankar said emphatically that there had been no such offer. He added that India would neither seek nor countenance such an offer while our contract remained in effect.

(C) Limited term safeguards: Our proposal of a limited time period trial with comprehensive safeguards is a non-starter so far as the GOI is concerned.

(C)[(D)] CIRUS heavy water. Sethna has told the Indian AEC that amounts equivalent to the US heavy water supplied to the CIRUS reactor have already been transferred to Rajasthan and put under safeguards in earlier transfers. I told Shankar that an authoritative statement to this effect would be helpful in view of Senator Glenn's particular interest in this question as recorded in the June 21 Sparkman letter to President Carter.

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<sup>9</sup> In a July 24 memorandum, Vance informed Carter of the Indian proposal to set up a high-level committee to examine the issue of nuclear safeguards, noting that "the frame of reference for such a committee is, however, unresolved." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 7/78)

<sup>10</sup> Telegram 10790 from New Delhi, July 14, reported on the July 14 *Times of India* front-page article about the Soviet Union's "informal" offer to supply enriched uranium to India, a claim contextualized in terms of the possible discontinuation of U.S.-supplied uranium. The telegram quoted the article's reference to other potential suppliers, noting "that 'some encouraging inquiries in this respect were received from the French also.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780291-0623)

(E) Tarapur reprocessing: Whereas Sethna had earlier told Courtney that India would have no need to reprocess Tarapur's spent fuel for five years or so and that had made buy-back look to be a promising answer to that potential problem (at least in our perspective out here), Sethna has now told the AEC that India has needs that call for reprocessing of this spent fuel to begin "after 1981"—i.e., in 2½ years. Consequently Shankar believes, with reference to the fourth point in the June 21 Sparkman to President letter, that the PM is unlikely to approve a US buy-back of the spent fuel at Tarapur if we have to terminate supply there.

(F) Tarapur reracking costs: Sethna has been still giving the AEC to understand that reracking at Tarapur to meet the storage problem will cost the GOI in the neighborhood of \$3 million. Shankar was surprised and unbelieving when I said that for some time my information of GE's estimates of their costs had been about half that amount, while the most recent GE estimate had indicated that the job could probably be done for under \$1 million. (Apparently ours is not the only government in which there is sometimes [less?] than complete candor between certain agencies.)

6. US-Soviet negotiations and the Third World: Shankar expressed concern and at some length over how the Soviets seem always able to lay the blame on US for resisting their "progressive proposals" in such long drawn out negotiations as the CTB, SALT II, and the Indian Ocean talks. Hence delays in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion seriously weaken our credibility in the Third World. He feels that we may not appreciate how concerned the non-aligned are about these issues. He would like the President to share more fully with the Prime Minister obstacles thrown up by the Russian side that may be accounting for some of these delays. He believes the PM is sufficient a realist to understand and accept the fact when specific strategic considerations limit our capacity to be as forthcoming in negotiating with the USSR as we might otherwise wish. And Shankar believes that the Prime Minister, when armed with such knowledge, can help to advance our interests. "You should utilize the PM in persuading Brezhnev", was how he put it.

**Goheen**

**109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 2, 1978, 2050Z

195044. Subject: Prime Minister's Letter to President Carter.

1. The following is text of copy of a letter from Prime Minister Desai to the President received in the Department August 1. Embassy states that original was delivered directly to the White House July 28. Letter itself is dated July 24.

2. Begin text: My Dear President: You will recall that when we met in Washington last month you very kindly told me that we should keep in touch with each other and exchange views on such important developments as may be worthy of attention. I have devoted some further thought to the problems of nuclear proliferation including its disarmament aspects, to the problem of the Middle East and the very delicate yet relevant question of human rights. I have also had the benefit of a discussion with Mr. Newsom<sup>2</sup> who will doubtless convey to you the substance of that discussion when he returns to Washington.

I have now had the benefit of being fully briefed on the detailed discussions our respective officials had both in New York and Washington on Tarapur and related issues. I have also made myself familiar with the discussion in the Congress on Tarapur fuel subsequent to my departure from USA including the vote in the House of Representatives the other day.<sup>3</sup> I feel I should put before you my point of view frankly and without any reserve. In this I am encouraged by my conviction that you and I fully share the same commitment to save the world from nuclear danger. It is therefore up to us both to appreciate each other's problems and predicaments and make a sincere effort, without sacrificing our principles or national interests, to resolve the issues which continue to elude mutually satisfactory solutions.

I shall first deal with the specific problems relating to Tarapur.

On the question of the continued supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur station, I continue to feel, as I explained to you in Washington, that the existing contractual obligations, under which the United States is required to supply enriched uranium fuel, as and when needed, until 1993, should be fully respected. While we understand the objec-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780316–0945. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Albert A Thibault (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S and NEA/INS; approved by Miklos.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 107.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 107.

tives of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, we hold that existing contractual obligations cannot, in any way, be abrogated by a unilateral legislation. I am glad that the U.S. Congress has concurred with your decision to permit the export of 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium. I was particularly pleased to know that in its testimony before Congress on the current pending shipment to Tarapur, the Executive Branch had stressed that the issue under consideration was continued supply over the period provided by law for negotiations and not just the single shipment over which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was divided.<sup>4</sup> I would assume by this that there will be no insuperable difficulty in the way of future shipments. I understand from both your Ambassador and Mr. Newsom that that is the position and I do hope that you share this view.

I understand that the question of re-processing the spent fuel from the Tarapur station was also discussed by our officials. Quite frankly, I do not understand why there should have been and now should be any delay in initiating the 'joint determination' as provided for in our agreement.<sup>5</sup> The Tarapur station and the reprocessing plant are under safeguards and, in fact, the reprocessing plant was set up with the knowledge and concurrence of your government. If there are any technical problems connected with the safeguarding of the reprocessing plant, these can be looked into by a joint team of experts. The delay in reprocessing the spent fuel from the Tarapur station is causing serious storage problems apart from adverse effect on parliamentary and public opinion. I sincerely hope that this issue can be resolved without further delay.

During our talks, I have repeatedly assured you that we fully share your concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But as is stated in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the recent United Nations Special Session on Disarmament,<sup>6</sup> 'non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all states to apply and develop their programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs'. The Final Document also stated that international cooperation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-

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<sup>4</sup> For the text of Nye's statement before the House International Relations Committee on May 23, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1978, pp. 45-47.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 60.

<sup>6</sup> The Final Document of the United Nations 10th Special Session of the General Assembly, which was the first session to be devoted to disarmament, held May 23-July 1, was contained in UN Resolution S-10/2 adopted on June 30. The document made "recommendations concerning new international machinery for disarmament negotiations." For the full text, see *Yearbook of the United Nations* 1978, pp. 19-23.

discriminatory basis. It is in this context that we view the problem of safeguards. We are perfectly willing to accept safeguards provided they are applied in equal measure to nuclear activities in all states and are devised in conformity with the objective of preventing proliferation and switchover to military purposes, without any injury to peaceful pursuit of atomic research and development. Any other basis for the application of safeguards would be discriminatory and prejudicial. I have always maintained and I think I am right in doing so that the real danger to the world and mankind comes from the military use of nuclear energy.

We have indicated our willingness to engage in a technical study aimed at reaching agreement on what would constitute the essential elements in a standardized and universally acceptable safeguards system. I have reason to believe that your advisers would be amenable to the idea of a small committee of independent scientists who should subject this question to expert objective study of what is required to serve the purpose of non-proliferation without adversely affecting peaceful pursuit of exploitation of atomic research and development.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the countries concerned could be U.S.A., India, West Germany, U.K., Brazil and Japan. I hope that this suggestion, which is entirely prompted by our keen desire to be cooperative and constructive will be acceptable to you.

During our talks in Washington, we touched upon the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I was greatly encouraged by your assurance that the negotiations on this treaty were making good progress. I was, therefore, very distressed at the reports that the CTB would exempt testing in the low kiloton range and that the duration of the treaty is likely to be reduced to three years.<sup>8</sup> I hope for the good of all of us that this is not true. If, on the other hand, these reports are true, the so-called Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be yet another threshold treaty, permitting the continued testing and development of nuclear weapons. I would appreciate it very much if you could clarify the situation. I doubt whether without a non-discriminatory and really comprehensive treaty with safeguards against clandestine breaches we would find it possible to subscribe to it.

As regards SALT II, I realize that you are greatly concerned at the slow progress, but unfortunately every time some delay occurs, USSR publicly expresses its grievance against USA. USA's version of the discussion seldom sees the light of the day. The result is that international opinion which insists on an early conclusion of the talks in order

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 5, Document 106.



to take the implementation of this policy further becomes both critical and impatient. In the meantime the situation changes, further disillusionment takes place and the world feels that there is more of talk and much less of action for implementing these pre-conditions to nuclear disarmament. At present the whole burden of securing early result in this task falls on the USA and the USSR.

One most unfortunate result of this delay is that countries which wish to take meaningful steps towards disarmament are precluded from doing so. The U.N. Special Session devoted to disarmament has just finished. Some results have been achieved but in a number of matters the onus of not going forward falls heavily on nuclear military powers. Consequently the role of nuclear military powers is highlighted in the public mind and psychologically the movement towards disarmament receives a setback. If we have to achieve meaningful progress in disarmament, we must avoid creating this sense of disillusionment and disappointment. I know how sincere and committed you are to nuclear disarmament and am very happy that in spite of difficulties in your bilateral relations with the USSR, you have decided to de-link SALT from other issues and to press on with the negotiations in which your Secretary of State is playing such an important role.

Similarly, it is unfortunate that the talks on Indian Ocean between USA and USSR appear to have been suspended.<sup>9</sup> You are aware of the very strong feelings that this question arouses in this part of the world. I earnestly feel that since most of the previous colonial countries are situated in this geographical region it is very necessary that at least USA's role on this particular question is better understood and better appreciated. You had created a very good impression with your attitude to this question earlier and so far as I am concerned I know that you feel the same way even now but the suspension of the talks is now having an adverse effect particularly since generally the case is presented in such a manner as to ascribe to USA the role of being obstructive or dilatory. My own request to you is to consider the matter in isolation from other sensitive matters the impact of which probably accounts for the suspension of the talks.

On the question of Middle East I have been thinking in the light of our discussions. I have made my position clear to you. I just want to say that according to my reading of the situation the question of withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, on which the world opinion is practically unanimous, cannot be divorced from measures to instill a sense of security in the government and people of Israel.

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<sup>9</sup> The U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean were suspended in February. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region, Arabian Peninsula, Document 121.



The strategic position of Israel is such that it is only the good intentions and peaceful attitudes of the neighbouring states which can promote a feeling of security and inviolability of its frontiers. The guarantee which USA and USSR may offer might in the light of previous similar guarantees be treated with a great degree of caution and circumspection by Israel. I am wondering whether we can try to arrange for some positive assurances from Arab countries on this issue. As far as I can see, Israel does not seem to entertain fears from Egypt but is uneasy about the attitude of other states in the region, the PLO and the Palestinians. I feel that we must address ourselves to this problem in right earnest and am wondering whether a meaningful effort on this question on the part of USA and USSR will not be fruitful. President Sadat's attitude of understanding and cordiality towards USA and the Russian influence on Syria and the helpful attitude on the part of Jordan might be of some help in this direction.

Finally, I come to the question of our relations with Pakistan and your statement at our discussions combined with what Mr. Newsom told me regarding the normalization of your relationship with Pakistan. I certainly welcome such normalization if it is not at the cost of misunderstanding of the moves by Indian public opinion and causing an arms race between us and Pakistan. I realize that public opinion in the two countries is easily aroused by any adverse trend that occurs in the other. I share your concern at the collaboration between Pakistan and France in the matter of the re-processing plant but I would earnestly suggest to you to consider whether the expansion of the already increased air force of Pakistan is a satisfactory alternative. As it is, Pakistan's Air Force has received considerable accretion after 1971. On the other hand, we have not added any serial [*serious?*] strength to our Indian Air Force and in fact qualitatively rather due to the obsolescence of our equipment for our 7 or 8 squadrons there has been some worsening of the relative situation to our disadvantage. The fact that we are replacing those obsolete aircraft by modern aircraft at a reduced strength cannot be made a ground for grievance, particularly when our peaceful intentions are not only well known but have stood the test of time. To my mind the task of statesmanship lies in bringing about normal situation between us and Pakistan for which we are striving to the utmost of our capability rather than adversely affect the relative situation that exists between the two countries and thereby put normalization in jeopardy. I can assure you that notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan has again begun to harp on the internationally dead question of Jammu & Kashmir and the recent refusal to continue the trade agreement that we had concluded some years ago, I am prepared to play a constructive role in whatever efforts can be made to secure normalization in the relationship between our two countries.

But I would not be able to resist countermeasures on our side if the expansion of Pakistan's air force is facilitated by resumption of hitherto banned sales.

On the question of human rights I have only one submission to make. I think we should not appear to over-stress this issue to the point when it is likely to affect the attitude on other vital and sensitive matters. We have to deal with this problem in a manner which will not result in pushing the countries concerned to the entertainment of any feeling that we are interfering in their internal affairs. While keeping the question alive and dealing with the matter with moderation we should ensure that we avoid creating a situation in which strains and tensions in international relationship are increased.

I must apologize for the length of this letter but I thought that I should communicate to you my thinking on these subjects with a view to helping you to understand us and our stand and to look at the situation in the light of the reactions of the world at large.

With warmest personal regards to you and Mrs. Carter,

Yours sincerely,

(Morarji Desai)

His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

End text.

**Vance**

**110. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, August 4, 1978, 1216Z

11907. Subject: Some Reflections on the Nuclear Policy Debate Within India. Ref: (A) New Delhi 11700;<sup>2</sup> (B) New Delhi 11697;<sup>3</sup> (C) New Delhi 11462.<sup>4</sup>

1. The attacks on Prime Minister Desai's nuclear policy in both houses of Parliament (reftels) once again demonstrate that the nuclear policy is a political issue which cuts across party lines and engages national prestige perhaps more than any other issue in the country. Although the harshest criticism not unexpectedly came from the opposition, the Lok Sabha debate was initiated by a Janata (albeit gadfly) MP who, we suspect, reflects the view of many of his fellow partymen on the necessity for nuclear research and application to the future of India's development. The Prime Minister's unilateral eschewal of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is, simply, not a popular one in India.

2. The argument that India must not miss out on the technological revolution as it had on the industrial one, has strong appeal. It arouses nationalistic sentiment for self reliance, feeds on pride in India's scientific establishment, and draws upon all the arguments of discrimination and exploitation which underlie other developed/developing country issues. The nuclear states, in particular the United States, are viewed as seeking to monopolize nuclear technology and to deprive India of the full benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Even MPs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321–0938. Confidential. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Islamabad, London, Madras, Moscow, and Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 11700 from New Delhi, August 1, reported on the July 31 session of the Rajya Sabha and analyzed Desai's statement that reiterated his opposition to nuclear explosions. Desai condemned the 1974 Pokharan test and argued that it had put India in the difficult position that it now found itself in. The telegram also reported on opposition voiced against Desai in the Rajya Sabha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780317–0028)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 11697 from New Delhi, August 1, relayed the text of Desai's July 31 statement at the Rajya Sabha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780314–1063)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 11462 from New Delhi, July 27, provided an analysis of the criticism in the Lok Sabha and in the press of Desai's policy on nuclear explosions, reporting that "the Indian press has seized on a remark by the Prime Minister in the July 26 parliamentary debate to proclaim that Desai has declared nuclear blasts for constructive purposes are permissible. We have studied the uncorrected transcript of the debate and are quite sure the Prime Minister did not intend to modify his stand on nuclear explosions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780308–0320)

sympathetic to the Prime Minister thus sometimes do not take at face value his assertions that he has banned nuclear explosions out of conviction. Instead, they suggest that his decision, if not a result of US and Soviet pressure, was, at the least, adopted in recognition of India's helpless dependence on nuclear material imports. They further criticize him for having given away this, his only chip, early in the game of negotiating with the nuclear powers and of getting nothing in return.

3. In this respect, the Prime Minister's criticism of the Pokharan explosion of 1974 was probably not politically adept. He faulted it on two counts: (a) it has caused trouble in negotiations with nuclear suppliers, and (b) has added nothing to India's scientific knowledge. On the first count, this leaves the Prime Minister open to charges that he is overly concerned with and dependent on the reactions of the super powers and therefore is himself making a political issue of Pokharan. On the second count, in his bald assessment of the valuelessness of the Pokharan test, he offends his critics by seeming to denigrate the accomplishments of India's scientists. His unfortunate muddle and subsequent failure to clarify his distinction between blasts and explosions adds further to the accusations that he does not understand the nature of and need for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to the demands that there be a full scientific review of his policy. The Prime Minister's remarks that if necessary India can go it alone in nuclear development over the long term get lost in the controversy generated by his stand that he will not debate policy in public with scientists who are themselves divided on the issue and that he alone has the responsibility for making the final decisions.

4. For a man who himself espouses so strongly the independence and self reliance of India, this is hard criticism to take. In response, the Prime Minister has appealed to his critics to see his policy not only in scientific and nationalistic terms but also in the larger humanitarian and political context of controlling the inherently destructive powers of nuclear energy. He has asked them to see his unilateral ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as a goal toward which the whole world is moving. To vindicate his policy and to stress that the issue is an international one which ultimately must be resolved by negotiations among all the nations, the Prime Minister cites the declaration of the SSOD and the negotiations for a CTB. So far, his critics have not responded to his appeals.

5. As the Prime Minister searches for ways which may permit accommodation between our views on safeguards and his, he makes himself increasingly vulnerable to his domestic critics. We do not see the Prime Minister succumbing to these critics. He has taken what he sees to be a principled position on nuclear explosions, and he is a stubborn and courageous man. He will, however, be increasingly belea-

guered unless his basically unpopular position is buttressed by real progress internationally on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear weapons limitations.

Goheen

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# **111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1978, 2202Z

206714. Subject: Presidential Letter Dated August 14 to Prime Minister Desai.

1. Please transmit to Prime Minister Desai the following text of a Presidential letter dated August 14, the signed original of which is being pouched.

2. Begin text: Quote—Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have read your letter of July 24<sup>2</sup> with great care and appreciate your views on various matters of mutual interest. I shall be equally candid in my comments in the belief that you would wish this to be characteristic of our exchanges. I too have given further thought to the issues you raise.

There is no doubt that we share a deep-felt commitment to containing the dangers of nuclear proliferation; I believe that this was manifest during your visit to the United States. I hope that you derived from your visit and from the subsequent debate in Congress on shipment of additional fuel for Tarapur a sense of the deep concern the American public and the Congress feel about nuclear proliferation. I welcome your strong hope that our two countries can reach agreement on the key issue of comprehensive safeguards.

In this connection, we are ready to explore with you the idea of a committee of independent scientists who would review India's concerns about the impact of safeguards on peaceful nuclear research and development.<sup>3</sup> The IAEA provides a universally accepted safeguards system designed to avoid adverse effects of the peaceful applications

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780334–0415. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S–O and NEA/INS; approved by Miklos.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 109.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 108.

of nuclear energy. I would see the proposed committee's task as examining the impact upon your programs of various types of safeguards under the IAEA system. The committee could also be useful in assessing the safeguards experience of other nations such as Japan and Sweden which, like India, have advanced nuclear programs. To achieve the goal we desire, we must be sure to define the committee's scope so as to make it clear that neither of our nations is casting any doubt on our confidence in the IAEA or its safeguards system.

I believe our experts should meet in the near future to agree on the functioning of the committee. In the meantime, we intend to recommend very soon to the NRC that it approve the pending shipment of about 17 tons of enriched fuel for Tarapur. The cooperation, during the period which our law permits, is further evidence of our willingness to cooperate. We hope it will improve the atmosphere for talks between our experts.

With respect to the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel, I must candidly say that we are simply not in a position to proceed to a joint determination. As you know, we have ceased construction of the commercial reprocessing facility in the United States primarily because of our conviction that the spread of commercial reprocessing presents significant proliferation risk.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, we are working to limit the spread of sensitive facilities generally. We believe that such activities should be minimized until we examine, with all our partners, ways to satisfy energy needs with technological and institutional approaches that are most resistant to proliferation. This issue is under intensive study within the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) program. We appreciate India's participation in this important undertaking.

I fully share your concerns over the continuing need for a non-discriminatory CTB with safeguards against clandestine breaches. I can assure you that such a treaty remains a high priority goal of this administration. We want a treaty which will gain the widest possible international support including—very importantly—that of India. The treaty which we seek would be a comprehensive ban which would not permit kiloton-level testing. We will also continue to seek adequate verification arrangements.

On duration, we have decided to pursue a limited duration treaty but a final decision as to the length of the duration has not been made. Whatever the treaty duration that is agreed on, there would, of course, be a multilateral review conference of treaty parties during the concluding year to consider whether there should be a replacement treaty.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 65.

As you know, Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva last month as part of our continuing effort to resolve the issues remaining in SALT.<sup>5</sup> The meeting was useful and provided a basis for further narrowing of our differences. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Soviet SALT delegations are continuing their intensive work in Geneva.

I can assure you that my own determination to seek prompt conclusion of an equitable and verifiable SALT agreement is as strong as ever, and we are vigorously pursuing the negotiations to that end.

We fully share your view that an agreement on Indian Ocean arms limitations would promote peace and stability in the region and would be in the interest of all states concerned. I personally reiterated my strong interest in concluding such an agreement in my recent speech at Annapolis.<sup>6</sup> We have delayed setting a date for the fifth round of the Indian Ocean talks. As you know, we believe that Soviet and Cuban interventions in the area are destabilizing. We have made our view on this issue clear to the Soviets. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been returned to its pre-buildup levels only very recently. During this entire period, however, the U.S. has carefully refrained from increasing its own military levels in the area. We are keeping the situation under close scrutiny and will seek to resume the talks when the circumstances are appropriate.

Concerning the Middle East, I certainly share your view that assuring Israel that the key Arab states and the Palestinians are willing to live in peace is the central peacemaking problem. It is because of this problem that we have tried so hard to encourage the Sadat initiative, which in large measure was undertaken to reassure the Israelis of the Arabs' peaceful intentions. Secretary Vance has just returned from the Middle East. His discussions and the early September summit meeting at Camp David of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are evidence of our determination to move the peace process forward. We would welcome Soviet support in this endeavor and hope the USSR will use its influence in a positive and constructive way. I hope to be able to discuss this question again with you as the situation evolves. India's great influence could have a significant role to play in the peace process.

I am happy that you welcome the normalization of our relations with Pakistan and that you share my concern about the reprocessing plant. I assure you that we are very conscious of the importance for world peace of a normal and productive relationship between India

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<sup>5</sup> Vance met with Gromyko in Geneva July 11–13.

<sup>6</sup> See *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1052–1057, or *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 87.

and Pakistan. A basic element of our policy toward South Asia for some time has been not to provide arms that would introduce new generations of military technology, encourage a regional arms race, or disturb the normalization of relations in the subcontinent. It is on this basis that we have refused to sell A-7 strike aircraft to Pakistan. These same criteria would likewise preclude sales subject to U.S. approval of aircraft of the capability which India is now considering. We will continue to apply these standards which, though stringent, do not rule out other aircraft which do not introduce a new level of military technology. I can assure you that improvements in our relations with Pakistan will not come at the expense of peace in the area. By considering ways to support Pakistan—especially when, in the wake of events in Afghanistan, its anxiety about its security is at a peak—we believe we would be making a contribution to regional stability. At the same time, I hope that you will use discretion and caution in any decision about new aircraft purchases for India at this delicate stage in South Asian relations.

Turning to the issue of human rights, a principal goal of our foreign policy is still to promote, in cooperation with others, the universal observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries. I believe we agree on a balanced and objective emphasis on the advancement of human rights. I know I have your personal support and encouragement in this respect. I continue to hope that India will share with us in these efforts wherever possible.

Finally, I will turn to the interest you expressed during our meetings in improving educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. I share that interest. I have asked our officials, both here and in New Delhi, to continue seeking with their Indian colleagues ways of enhancing that important activity.

Numerous exchange programs already exist, some on a government-to-government basis, but many involving private institutions. U.S. Government-sponsored programs are designed to complement and reinforce privately sponsored initiatives. Though specific programs have waxed and waned in given years, the overall level of exchange activities has not, I believe, declined appreciably.

Since the creation of the Indo-U.S. Subcommission on Education and Culture, an important portion of our support to educational exchanges has been funneled through this entity and our assistance to this effort has increased substantially over the past three years.

In the field of academic exchanges there exists one problem area. I understand that lengthy clearance procedures required for research and study projects in India have discouraged applications by American social scientists. We have had discussions in New Delhi seeking ways of simplifying these procedures so as to increase the number of American scholars able to study in India. I hope these discussions prove fruitful.



The sharing of ideas and experiences through personal contact is the best and most fundamental means of enhancing understanding between our two countries. We are committed to supporting and strengthening exchange programs, and I am very pleased that you have similar interests. You may be certain that we will continue to give these programs the careful attention they merit.

With all best wishes. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. His Excellency, Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi. End text.

Vance

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## 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 27, 1978, 2307Z

246418. Subject: Desai's September 16 Letter to the President.

Following letter from Prime Minister Desai was received in the Department September 27.

Begin text:

Secret—New Delhi—September 16, 1978

My Dear President,

I am grateful to you for your letter of the 14th August, 1978, which was delivered to me by Ambassador Goheen.<sup>2</sup> I have already sent you a letter dealing with the problem of Israel-Arab dispute.<sup>3</sup> I was anxious that it should reach you in time for the Camp David meeting.<sup>4</sup> I hope it did. I am following the news of the meeting from the press reports and am awaiting the news of the final outcome. You have a very difficult and onerous responsibility and you have my thoughts and prayers for your success.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780395–0422. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by John R. Malott (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S–O and by Lande; approved by Miklos. A copy of Desai's original letter is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1406.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 111.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 228141 to New Delhi, September 8, transmitted the text of Desai's August 30 letter to Carter, in which he shared his thoughts on the Arab-Israeli dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780366–1100)

<sup>4</sup> The Camp David Summit was held September 5–17.

As regards the proposal to have a technical study by a group of independent scientists of problems relating to safeguards,<sup>5</sup> it was not my intention that such a study should be confined to the impact of IAEA safeguards on the Indian nuclear programmes but rather a comprehensive survey of the entire field of safeguards in an effort to try and formulate guidelines which could assist the IAEA in evolving a standardised and universally acceptable safeguards system as envisaged in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the conclusion of the recent United Nations Special Session devoted to disarmament.<sup>6</sup> I do not feel that such an exercise would in any way cast any doubts on our confidence in the IAEA which has, under its statute, a definite responsibility in the field of safeguards and which has a membership large enough to command general support. Nevertheless I feel that a fresh look may promote broader understanding on the question of safeguards, their nature and scope, with a view to prevention of switch from peaceful to non-peaceful purposes. I suggest that we adhere to the terms of reference as I had suggested. I am indeed glad to learn that you have decided to recommend to the NRC, in the meantime, that the pending shipment of about 17 tonnes of enriched uranium fuel for Tarapur can be cleared.

Regarding the re-processing of US-origin spent fuel in Tarapur, you seem to hold the view that the United States is not in a position at present to proceed to a joint determination. You will appreciate that it is already more than a decade for the agreement to have been in force and that USA is closely involved in our project. I am sure you do not wish to take a decision which would not be in accordance with the contractual obligations undertaken by both our countries before the re-processing plant was put up in Tarapur. Even if it were due to a change of policy on your part I would request you to consider the wider implications of going back on a bilateral agreement merely on that account. I could have understood it as coming from any other U.S. President but not you.

I am glad to learn that the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be one which would not permit any weapon testing. This would truly be a significant step towards nuclear disarmament. I am also happy to learn of your determination to press ahead for a satisfactory SALT II agreement. I hope you will soon resume your talks with the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean.

I have already had occasion to describe to you our sincere efforts to promote confidence and cooperation with Pakistan. Notwithstand-

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 6, Document 109.

ing the troubled internal situation, we hope Pakistan and her friends appreciate that while continuing to seek improvement of our relations, we have observed careful restraint in giving her no cause for any misapprehensions and in no way adding to her difficulties. I had a very cordial meeting with General Zia-ul-Haq in Nairobi where we had both gone for the funeral of President Kenyatta.<sup>7</sup> I renewed my long standing invitation to General Zia to visit India and agreed that we could exchange views on all bilateral problems in a realistic attempt at good neighbourly relations and regional stability. I told him that in India people in general had goodwill towards Pakistan and wanted to see it united and what, to my mind, is important—this I conveyed to General Zia—is that the pall of suspicions which had bedevilled our relations and slowed our progress should be lifted through our mutual effort. There is strong logic in improving our trade and economic relations. We agree that Pakistan has every right to pursue its own economic policies but all that we expect is that the attitude towards India should not be marked by special discrimination and prejudice. I must say that General Zia's response and approach was constructive and enlightened and I look forward to meeting him again and continuing the dialogue.

I have only one word to say about its desire to secure arms from abroad including USA. If it genuinely believes in friendship with India need it pile up arms in apprehension of an imaginary threat? Every time we have had to seek arms it has been in self-defense. Even while Pakistan was securing from USA a vast arsenal and facilities as free gift from 1954 to 1965 we became alive to our gaps only after 1962 after the Chinese invasion. Between 1971 and up to date, while it has very considerably added to the quality and quantity of its equipment and forces we have refrained from making any significant additions. But obviously we cannot be complacent if in the process it is reaching near parity, increasing its offensive capability and keeping tension alive. Mr. President, you know that I am a devoted and dedicated man of peace but you will appreciate that I have a responsibility for the defence of our country and our people.

We continue to watch the developments in Afghanistan and counsel others who have influence with her to show concern about it that, in whatever way possible, a cooperative consensus should be reached and a situation not allowed to develop which can only cause or enhance

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 13610 from New Delhi, September 7, transmitted the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' report to the Embassy on Desai and Zia's meeting in Nairobi, which was "basically a get-acquainted meeting" where "both leaders spoke of their interest in further improving relations, but also pointed out the problems they had with their respective public opinions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780365–0775)

anxieties. The new regime in Afghanistan has affirmed the policy of non-alignment. We hope that they would adhere to it recognizing that it would be wiser from their point of view as also in the wider context. Incidentally, it would seem that mutual anxieties between Pakistan and Afghanistan have somewhat eased, and this cannot but be a welcome sign. The visit of General Zia to Kabul last week appears to have had a sobering effect on both sides.

Our attempts to modernize our defence capability are limited and geared to minimal preparations for defensive contingency and to the normal process of modernization and replacement of aging equipment. You will appreciate that we have to take into account the situation both on the northern and western borders and our long coast lines—two seas and one ocean. Pakistan's problem of defence is much smaller and only if it could accept our sincere and keen desire to be genuinely friendly and good neighbourly it would be much easier too. Our proposals for the replacement of our obsolescent aircraft far from leading to an increase in the size of our air force, would actually lead to a reduction in the actual number of squadrons. Considering our size and the diverse contingencies which we cannot ignore, such a replacement programme can scarcely be viewed as starting an arms race or building an offensive capability affecting regional stability.

Foreign Minister Vajpayee has recently been to Tokyo. His visit coincided with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. You are aware of the Soviet anxiety at the Chinese insistence on the inclusion of some unusual clause regarding the dangers of 'hegemony'. For our part, we are against all kinds of domination and every kind of activity which is disruptive of nations' rights to protect their independence and to determine their own national economic and political policies. We are more than ever convinced that our broad approach of promoting beneficial bilateral cooperation with all powers, without seeking to take advantage of differences amongst them, is the correct way of promoting international inter-dependence and safeguarding national independence. In today's world, the concept of a military balance of power would seem to be antiquated and counter-productive to efforts at securing peace. The recent revived intensity of polemics, notably between the Socialist countries, is a new feature of the international landscape. Such diplomatic and propaganda hostility goes beyond legitimate national concerns as it does not always appear to be for positively promoting international understanding but for competitive influence, somewhat unnecessarily complicating the international situation. For our part, we shall remain detached from such negative maneuverings which tend to exploit bilateral or international tensions and disrupt the logic of cooperative inter-dependence.

Consistent with our principles, we intend to seek improvement of relations with China. We would not want to improve relations with

China at the cost of complicating the established mutually beneficial relations with the Soviet Union. I am convinced that, in keeping with India's traditions, our national interests do not in any way harm the legitimate interests of other countries or the requirements of international cooperation.

I fully reciprocate your interest in promoting educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. I do believe that the encouragement we gave to our Joint Commission and its Sub-Commissions at our meeting in New Delhi last January has helped to accelerate the pace of such exchanges considerably.<sup>8</sup> You have referred to the specific problem area of research projects in India in the field of social sciences. I have made enquiries. Difficulties seem to arise only when American scholars seek to undertake research in some sensitive problems or areas. Ambassador Goheen is aware of the position. I hope the scholars would be able to locate numerous other subjects for research in this vast country which could also be useful to their Indian counterparts and could embody the spirit of USA's benevolent interest in our social and economic problems, particularly now that our planning and programming are deeply rooted to the ground. While I have directed that delays in approval of projects be eschewed, I wish to assure you that there is no discrimination against US nationals.

Let me again thank you for your warm and friendly letter and send you and Mrs. Carter my best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Morarji Desai

His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

End text.

**Christopher**

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<sup>8</sup> The Indo-U.S. Joint Commission met in New Delhi, January 3, during Carter's visit. Telegram 343 from New Delhi, January 6, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780011-0678)

### 113. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, September 28, 1978, 0449Z

14802. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Janata in Disarray. Refs: New Delhi 7537,<sup>2</sup> 8656<sup>3</sup> (Notal).

Summary. We are less sanguine now than we were on the eve of Desai's Washington visit in June about Janata's ability to stem the decline in its fortunes. Although the PM seemed to have emerged from the Cabinet crisis at the end of that month in a strengthened position, he was unable to maintain and consolidate his gains. His standing has been damaged by the long, eventually unsuccessful negotiations to work out a compromise with Charan Singh,<sup>4</sup> by the way he has handled

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780430-0974, D780398-0913. Confidential. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Islamabad, Dacca, Tehran, Kabul, Colombo, Kathmandu, Moscow, Beijing, Hong Kong, CINCPAC, and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 7537 from New Delhi, May 12, reported on the political climate in New Delhi, noting that "Desai's government and party are in a state of some disarray. Popular dissatisfaction with both is mounting. Desai's leadership is not under any serious challenge at this time and he may well carry on as Prime Minister to the end of his five-year term if his health permits. But significant changes in the factional composition of the Janata Party government now seem inevitable. The downward slide in the political strength and cohesiveness of the government and the ruling party has become most pronounced since the turn of the year. Mrs. Gandhi's resurgence has dramatized the decline in Janata's popular standing." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780203-0578)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 8656 from New Delhi, June 2, described the political instability in Desai's Cabinet, noting that Indian Home Minister Charan Singh "has been active in defending his position against what he sees as attempts to denigrate him. His tough, outspoken tactics stem from his conviction that he is and must continue to be regarded as a force to be reckoned with in national politics. Yet, we do not believe that Charan Singh will make an outright bid to replace Morarji Desai as Prime Minister." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780232-0568)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 10126 from New Delhi, June 30, the Embassy informed the Department: "The chronic in-fighting within the Janata Party reached a showdown June 29-30 when Prime Minister Desai sought the resignations from the Cabinet of Home Minister Charan Singh and Health Minister Raj Narain. At last report the two Ministers have complied with the PM's request." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780270-0935) After months of negotiations between Desai and Singh to mend the rift in the Janata party's leadership, the Embassy reported that "the prospects for an 'overall settlement' being reached to resolve the Janata Party imbroglio diminished late on August 17 after an apparently inconclusive meeting between Prime Minister Desai and ex-Home Minister Charan Singh." (Telegram 12604 from New Delhi, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780340-0094)

the allegations against his son,<sup>5</sup> and by a series of other parliamentary blunders. Some have found that recent difficulties have brought forth in him traits associated with the “old Morarji” of the fifties and sixties.

We sense a growing disillusion with the old leadership in Janata and a heightened feeling that the Janata experiment in coalitional politics is a transitory phase which will eventually lead to new alignments. There is increasing maneuvering within party ranks as factions and individual leaders seek to preserve their political bases and to maintain options for an uncertain future. Expectations that a more effective administration can be managed under the present leadership appear to have declined. It seems doubtful if organization elections or the upcoming changes in the Cabinet will stem the decline in the party’s prospects. The opposition’s opportunities are limited by the fact that general elections are a long way off and by the generally satisfactory state of the economy following a fourth consecutive good monsoon. Mrs. Gandhi’s momentum seems to have been blunted, but this impression could quickly change were party to win more by elections in the crucial Hindi belt.

For all the disillusion and dissension in party ranks, few observers here believe that the Janata will break apart in the near-term. Desai also seems likely to continue. So does the present unsettled state of affairs in party and government. With both the government and individuals in it more vulnerable than before to criticism from within and without the ruling party, policymakers are likely to rely on courses of action which seem safe and popular. End summary.

1. Introduction. In May and June we submitted messages (reftels) evaluating the state of the Janata government and party on the eve of Prime Minister Desai’s visit to the United States. At that time, it was our view that the Janata was in a state of some disarray, that the party had squandered its first year in office, and that the absence of firm, decisive leadership at the top was the prime cause of Janata’s deteriorating credibility and viability. Nonetheless, we believed that there was still time to “turn things around”, provided that the Janata’s top leadership recognized the extent of the deterioration and took effective corrective action to stem it.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 12299 from New Delhi, August 11, reported Rajya Sabha’s August 10 resolution “‘calling upon’ the Janata government to inquire into charges of corruption against PM Desai’s son Kantibhai and the relatives of Charan Singh.” The Embassy explained that allegations against Kantibhai Desai included “the purchase of choice land at concessionary rates, construction of large mansions, doing favors for Gujarati business friends, ties with smugglers, amassing wealth through questionable means, and interfering in the appointment of persons to high positions in the Reserve Bank of India and the nationalized banks.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0176)



2. Today, eighteen months into the rule of the Desai government, we are less sanguine about Janata's ability to "stem the rot", the popular term here for the ruling party's problem. The Janata Party and government now seem in an even greater state of disarray, their leadership more disunited and indecisive than before. This message, to which Consulate General officers have contributed, seeks to assess the sources of the further deterioration, its impact on US interests, and prospects for the near-term.

3. A good beginning . . . Prime Minister Desai seemed to have emerged from the Cabinet crisis at the end of June in a strengthened position. By acting in a swift and decisive manner in dismissing Charan Singh and Raj Narain, he appeared at last to have decided to crack the whip over his colleagues and take the decisive kind of steps many had been urging him to adopt. His summary treatment of his detractors was widely applauded here as an augury of more assertive leadership.

4. Is squandered. The PM was unable to maintain and consolidate this significant gain. Instead of following up the dismissals with new appointments to the vacated positions, he allowed himself to get caught up in a long and ultimately unsuccessful accommodation effort carried on in such a way as to suggest neither strength nor magnanimity on his part. The participation in this process of prominent second-tier Ministers suggested, not inaccurately, significant divisions in the Cabinet as to how to proceed. It also heightened suspicions about the motives of these Ministers and others, and caused friction with the PM, who questioned their loyalty. (Particularly important from our viewpoint is the report, which we have had from good sources, that the prominent role Foreign Affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee played in the negotiations led to a cooling of his relations with Desai.) And, of course, the long effort inevitably sapped party and government energies which might have productively been put to other tasks. It strengthened the already widespread impression that the Janata is a do-little government whose leaders devote too much of their time to infighting and the promotion of their own narrow political interests.

5. Desai was also damaged over these same weeks by the continuing attention given the affairs of his son. For this, the PM seems as much to blame as his opponents. His stonewalling parliamentary tactics, interspersed with concessions both too little and too late, kept Kantibhai much more in the headlines than he need have been. The net results of the PM's adamant stand on the issue of Kantibhai's corruption has been to lend credence to the suspicion that the younger Desai is indeed implicated in questionable business practices. It has also lowered public esteem for the PM's vaunted moral rectitude, and seemed to many to have personalized to Desai's disadvantage the conflict within the party. To some observers, he and Charan Singh appeared a pair of angry old



men prepared to ignore the good of the country while they pursued their personal grudge.

6. Other parliamentary blunders. The Kantibhai affair was only the most noteworthy instance of clumsy parliamentary maneuvering by Janata during the monsoon session. Its adverse impact on the image of the PM, the ruling party, and the government was heightened by the ineptitude displayed during the session by Janata Ministers in their handling of other controversial parliamentary business. Within the party, the overall outcome of this clumsiness was to prompt more of the by-now familiar backbiting in the ranks and to bring more opprobrium on the PM. It was he who was considered responsible for the Kantibhai strategy while the principal parliamentary managers mishandling their legislative tasks were regarded as “his” men, i.e. trusted loyalists from the Congress (O).

7. The long battles over Charan Singh and Kantibhai also seem to many of our contacts to have revived some of the traits associated with the personality of the “old Morarji”, i.e. the Desai of the fifties and sixties. Much more than during his first year or so in office, we now are told of a Desai again adamant, stubborn, uncompromising, and unwilling to be guided by the views and advice of his party colleagues. Yet at the same time, he continued to be scored for a continuing aloofness in many spheres of policy-making, for an insufficient sense of urgency, for a willingness to allow opposing factions to pursue their skirmishing and for continued delegation to his uneven collection of Ministers an unwarranted degree of freedom of action. Some have remarked that the old high-handed Desai has returned but without his earlier redeeming qualities of administrative decisiveness and skill.

8. Longer term consequences. The events of the monsoon session appear to have had other longer term consequences. One of the most striking trends we have detected is the growing disillusion of ordinary Janata MPs (and, presumably, of other lesser party lights) with the elder leadership. They seem, now much more than before, to wish somehow (but how?) to be rid of the old men at the top. This sentiment extends not only to Desai and Charan Singh, but also to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. Although Ram maintained a discreet silence during the troubled summer months, the well-publicized reports in August of his son’s extra-marital activities not only smeared Ram’s hitherto moderately good image (and perhaps ruined his chances for bigger things in the upcoming Cabinet reshuffle) but also further lowered esteem for the trinity of top leaders who have up to now been regarded as the only men of sufficiently senior status to be seriously eligible for the Prime Ministership.

9. A transitional arrangement. More important is what we sense to be a growing feeling that the Janata is not going to last, that the

Janata experiment in coalitional politics is a transitory phase en route to new alignments. One thesis, now often heard, is that the party will break up on the eve of the next general elections as leaders and factions scramble to position themselves for the balloting. To many, the ruling party increasingly has come to resemble the SVD (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, or United Legislative Bloc) experiments which were undertaken in many north Indian states in the late 1960's. These SVD governments were short-lived, and are still cited as object lessons in the shortcomings of Indian coalition government-making. While the analogy is far from exact, the Janata of today does face many of the problems and contradictions which prematurely ended those SVD efforts.

10. Under these circumstances, there is increasing maneuvering within party ranks as factions and individual leaders seek to preserve their political bases and to maintain options for an uncertain future. Suspicions have inevitably grown among partymen about the longer term intentions of leaders and colleagues. Such an atmosphere of mistrust tends to feed upon itself, creating greater suspicions. It further lessens the chances of any real cohesiveness within the Janata and of the development of the Janata government into a more effective administration.

11. Expectations that a more effective administration can be managed under the present leadership appear, in any event, further to have declined in the past months. To growing numbers of observers, Janata appears incapable of pulling its act together. While it continues to receive high marks in the foreign policy field (though here too dissensions are beginning to surface), it appears to have earned limited popular credit for its handling of economic issues, law and order, and other domestic problems. Above all, the popular perception appears to be that despite its pronouncements, the government has been largely unsuccessful in establishing and implementing new domestic policies. This view, supplemented by the observation that whatever goes well nowadays does so in spite of Janata, not because of it, is ruefully repeated by Janata partymen themselves. It understandably adds to their apprehensions about the future.

12. Can the decline be reversed. Today there is certainly much less expectation than there was three months ago that the Janata can reverse its decline in popular esteem or become anything more than a loose coalition of divergent interests and individuals. Janata leaders have long claimed that the party's organizational elections will put its house in order and pave the way for a truly unified ruling party. Such claims used to be greeted with some skepticism; now they are met with scorn. Indeed, it is still by no means certain that the elections will be held by the end of the year, as now scheduled, or, for that matter, that they will take place at all. The very fact that these elections have been

repeatedly postponed over the past year on various pretexts is a telling commentary on the fragility of the coalition. The main reason for the delays has been the fear that previous party loyalties would come to the fore as each constituent element sought to maintain or bolster its position in the party, further exacerbating factional tensions. Indeed, the expectation that certain groups (notably the Jana Sangh) would dominate the organization following such elections seems to be the main obstacle to holding them.

13. In a similar vein, it was hoped that a major Cabinet reshuffle would improve the government's sagging image and infuse a new sense of dynamism into the administration. We understand that many of the PM's partymen have in fact been urging such a house-cleaning on him. Although Desai may well not yet have decided on which course to follow, most observers now seem to have concluded, ironically, that the Cabinet changes (expected in October) are likely to be limited so as not to disturb the current balance of power among the constituent elements.

14. The opposition. The opposition is of course watching the Janata disarray closely and making its own calculations as to how best to capitalize on it. Congress (I) and others were able to make political hay from the faltering parliamentary performance of the PM and his colleagues during the monsoon session. They can be expected to publicize further evidence of Janata shortcomings, though these hardly require outside agencies to call them to unfavorable public notice. But the opposition's opportunities remain limited by the fact that the present Parliament and most state assemblies still have more than three years ahead of them. The chances of a national election or even of a series of state elections before then seem slim. While opposition groups, with the Congress (I) in the lead, may succeed in mounting campaigns based on local grievances and dissatisfactions with Janata performance, these may be blunted by the generally satisfactory state of the economy following a third consecutive good monsoon.

15. Mrs. Gandhi remains the pivotal figure among the oppositionists. She has been biding her time, and aside from occasional forays into the provinces has not been noticeably active in recent months. Her cause seems to have lost some of the momentum which stunned political India earlier in the year. The breakdown of the Maharashtra coalition government, the failure of her August 9 "Save India Day",<sup>6</sup> and reports of trouble in her party ranks, notably in the relationship between her

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 12201 from New Delhi, August 10, reported that Congress (I)'s "Save India Day," a march and rally, was "Mrs. Gandhi's protest movement against alleged failures and misrule of the Janata government." It was disrupted by unusually heavy rain. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–1067)

and the two south India Congress (I) Chief Ministers, have created the impression that her juggernaut is slowing down. She is also weighed down in legal tangles, and though she has largely succeeded in politicizing the unfavorable findings of the Shah Commission,<sup>7</sup> the possibility cannot be ruled out that the cases lodged in the courts against her will eventually lead to her disenfranchisement.

16. How real this loss of trust actually is may be questioned, however. Good showings in this winter's series of byelections in the crucial Hindi belt could quickly revive the sense of alarm her opponents felt following her stunning state election and byelection wins. It might also lead to further accretions to her ranks from the official Congress. These Congressmen have been able to maintain their battered ranks more successfully than had been anticipated. Janata divisiveness and the expectations that they could be the beneficiaries of the eventual breakup of the ruling party (in a regrouping of past and present Congressmen minus Mrs. Gandhi) has helped keep them afloat in an otherwise unpromising situation.

17. Near term prospects. For all the disillusion and dissension in party ranks, few observers here believe that the Janata will break apart in the near-term. The cement of power is still too strong to make such a development likely. As we have said many times in the past year and a half, the risks of political oblivion remain too dangerous for any one faction to make a break for it. Even such fallen leaders as Charan Singh and Raj Narain still seem unlikely to strike out on their own for fear of finding themselves even more politically isolated. If they do go out, they appear likely to take only a fraction of their party followers with them.

18. Desai also seems likely to carry on in the top job. Despite the mounting frustration with the elder leadership, and the growing speculation within the party about a succession which would bring to the top one of the second rung leaders—Vajpayee, George Fernandes, and Biju Patnaik are the most frequently mentioned—the powers within Janata seem unable to decide on anyone other than Desai for the Prime Ministership. Desai may have his foibles and shortcomings, but he still represents the lowest common denominator in the Janata equation, the one figure in the coalition all can agree to lead the government—albeit with some increasing reluctance. This role of being the indispensable uniting factor has been, and apparently continues to be, a major source of the PM's staying power (assuming that he remains in good health).

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<sup>7</sup> The Desai government appointed the Shah Commission in May 1978 to investigate the excesses of the state of emergency imposed in June 1975. The Commission published its findings in three interim reports, the last in August 1978.

19. If a continuation of Janata rule under Desai seems the most likely prospect at this time, so too does a prolongation of the present unsettled state of affairs in party and government. As we have noted, the odds against Desai's proving able or willing to turn things around have lengthened, and the prospect of increased infighting leading eventually to political realignment has grown. The weakening of the cohesion of the Cabinet, the decline in the PM's political standing, and the uncertainty about Janata's future have all become relevant factors in the decision-making process. In this atmosphere, the scope for bold and courageous initiatives in policy areas of interest to the US will be limited. With both the government and individuals in it more vulnerable than before to criticism from within and without the ruling party, there is likely to be a premium on the safe and what is assumed to be the popular. We should be prepared to take this into account as we chart out further approaches to India. We will be saying more about this in subsequent messages.

Goheen

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#### 114. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 11, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letters of August 30<sup>2</sup> and September 16.<sup>3</sup> You have covered a broad range of subjects and I very much appreciate receiving your views.

I particularly welcome your good wishes and kind words on the Camp David meeting. All of us realize that one meeting cannot solve problems of the magnitude and complexity of those which face us in the Middle East. Still I believe that we have made a strong start on the road toward peace. The United States has a contribution to make in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840145–1912. Secret; Exdis. Sent to Carter for his signature under cover of an October 10 memorandum from Brzezinski, who commented: "Your correspondence with Desai continues to be warm personally but without much give on the substantive side." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 5–12/78)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 112.

bringing the countries of the area together, and we will continue to do all we can to advance the cause of peace. Certainly this goal is of such importance to the entire world that every effort must be made. I appreciate your offer of help and while I see no need for any specific action at this time, I hope we may stay in close touch about the Middle East situation.

Turning to bilateral matters, I am concerned by the lack of significant progress in resolving our differences on nuclear matters, particularly since our objectives are the same. With regard to your idea for a panel of scientists, we understood that your primary concern was whether internationally accepted safeguards might in some way impede India's nuclear energy program.

As you note, there was a consensus at the SSOD, to which the US subscribes, that non-proliferation measures should not interfere in this way. While a small panel of scientists could play a useful role in addressing India's concerns, I do not believe the panel should broaden its focus in the way you suggest.

Such an approach would bring into question the existing international safeguards system, which all parties, including the SSOD, have recognized as a key element in checking proliferation of nuclear explosives. I recognize that it is not easy to agree in advance on the scope of work of an international panel, and I therefore suggest that our experts get together to see if common ground can be found. If you agree, we could arrange a location and time for such a meeting through diplomatic channels.<sup>4</sup>

I recognize that there is a larger question of the relationship between nuclear states and other countries, and of the desirability of steps such as the CTB Treaty and a second SALT Agreement aimed at the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Again, I think you and I agree on the objectives. While undoubtedly we are both disappointed that we have not moved faster and further, I hope we will be able to achieve progress in this area soon.

Your letter also addressed the issue of the disposition of U.S.-origin spent fuel. I am pleased that the most pressing operational need—relieving the congestion in the storage facilities at the Tarapur Power Station—is being met by cooperative action between our two countries.

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<sup>4</sup> In his October 10 covering memorandum (see footnote 1 above), Brzezinski noted that the United States was "making no headway" on the nuclear issue. He continued: "The idea of an international panel to review safeguards was floated by Desai's personal staff and we will pursue it; I doubt, however, that it will solve our problem. In all likelihood, we are going to have to terminate nuclear supply a little over a year from now. Your personal relationship with Desai, backed up by some important shared interests, should suffice to carry us over what will be a very rough spot."

However, as I have explained in my previous letters, the U.S. cannot yet judge the effectiveness of the safeguards on your reprocessing plant since we believe that, for the moment, there is no international consensus on how such sensitive facilities can be adequately protected. We hope that the results of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation, in which we are both engaged, will contribute to the resolution of this issue.

I share your concern about the internal situation in Pakistan and am pleased that you have had an opportunity to talk to General Zia. As you know, we have encouraged Pakistan to pursue productive discussions with your country on all subjects, and we will continue to do so.

In view of the history of South Asia over the past 30 years, your concern about Pakistan's purchase of arms is understandable, and I accept your premise that Pakistan's problems are essentially political. I have not, however, understood that Pakistan has either the intention or the capability of reaching parity in military strength with India, much less to develop a real offensive capability *vis a vis* India, particularly in view of India's great military superiority. I can only hope that India and Pakistan develop a relationship of mutual trust which permits both countries to devote their resources to more productive purposes. For our part, I can assure you that we will not enter into a military supply relationship with Pakistan which would adversely affect stability in South Asia.

We were pleased that Foreign Minister Vajpayee took the opportunity during his recent visit to Kabul to stress the value of a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy,<sup>5</sup> but we have noted that some of the new Afghan Government's recent decisions in this area call into question the extent of its commitment to non-alignment. More serious is the increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the narrowing of the regime's base of support as it continues to purge many of its onetime adherents. Our particular concern is that under these circumstances the Soviet Union may, with or without an invitation, intervene more directly to bolster a weakened regime, an action which would deeply affect other countries in the area and have consequences over a much wider area.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 7666 from Kabul, September 24, reported on Vajpayee's visit to Kabul September 18–20. At the end of the meeting, India and Afghanistan issued a joint communiqué that affirmed non-aligned principles and was "generally devoid of radical Afghan positions." As a result of Vajpayee's visit, India promised assistance and cooperation with Afghanistan's five-year development plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391-0487)



I frankly do not understand the Soviet concern about improved Sino-Japanese relations to which you refer, despite the poor relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Every country wishes to conduct its own foreign policy in light of its own interests, and efforts by other states—however powerful—to exert undue influence on their decisions is unwise.

Finally, I share your satisfaction with the progress of the Joint Commission activities and note that several important meetings will be taking place in New Delhi in the coming months. I appreciate the attention and encouragement you are giving to the enhancement of educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. I believe our dialogue will help strengthen and enlarge those contacts in ways that embody the spirit of sympathetic mutual understanding. American officials here and in New Delhi will work closely with Indian counterparts toward that goal.

Once again my thanks for sharing your views with me.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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#### **115. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, November 13, 1978, 0653Z

17392. Vienna for USIAEA. Subject: Indo-US Nuclear Relations: Decisions Taken at New Delhi Meetings November 10–11.

1. Deputy to the Under Secretary Nye, Assistant Secretary Pickering, and ACDA Assistant Director Van Doren met with GOI reps in New Delhi November 10–11 for further discussions of Indo-US nuclear relations. The Indian side was headed by V. Shankar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, and IAEC Chairman Homi Sethna, and included other representatives of MEA and the Indian atomic establishment. Ambassador Goheen, Bombay Consul General Courtney, and Pol Counselor Schaffer also participated on the US side. This message deals with agreements reached at the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780467–0026. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to Vienna and to Bombay and Islamabad.



November 11 meeting on the earlier Indian proposal for the establishment of an experts committee on safeguards. These agreements were made on an ad referendum basis, and the Indian side will now submit them to Prime Minister Desai for his approval. Given the range of representation on the Indian side and the acceptance without demur by all of them of the action taken we would expect prompt approval by Desai. A septel covers other aspects of the sessions.<sup>2</sup>

2. The two sides agreed to the establishment of a committee to be called the “Ad Hoc Scientific Advisory Committee on Safeguards Questions”. It would have the following terms of reference:

1. To examine the options available within the concept of safeguards on all nuclear activities.

2. To survey the types of safeguards being applied in various countries and their impact on the nuclear R&D and energy programmes of those countries in terms of national priorities, needs and interests.

3. To seek to determine whether there is an appropriate IAEA safeguards programme consistent with paragraphs (1) and (2) and without hindrance to the progress of nuclear energy programmes.

4. Composition of the Committee. The two sides agreed that the Committee will comprise five experts. There will be one Indian expert. (We told the Indians that we assumed that this would be Sethna and they seemed to agree.) The Indians will choose a second expert of different nationality. Similarly, the US will have one expert and will select another. We told the Indians that our expert would probably be Gerald Tape. Both sides agreed on IAEA Director General Eklund as Chairman of the Committee, to serve in his personal capacity. The Indians could not agree that the selections that they and we would make would be subject to the concurrence of the other side, as we had suggested. It was decided instead that we and the Indians would consult about each other’s choices. (The implication of this was that each side would be satisfied with the other’s choice.) In our discussions with the Indians we stressed the advantages of a balanced membership. We reiterated to them that we would have difficulties with the selection of certain nationals, mentioning specifically the Argentines and Brazilians. They appeared to appreciate this, though Shankar stated several times that the Committee’s composition should be on a scientific and not a political basis.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 17390 from New Delhi, November 13, provided further details about the discussions at the November 10–11 meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780466–1170)

4. The decisions reached at the November 11 meeting have been included in an aide memoire prepared by the Embassy for submission to the GOI. The aide memoire reads as follows:

Begin text:

At meetings held at the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi November 10–11, 1978, the United States and Indian sides agreed to the following in connection with the establishment at Indian initiative of an Ad Hoc Scientific Advisory Committee on Safeguards Questions:

1. The two sides will refer the proposals developed at the meetings to their two govts for approval. These include terms of reference for the Committee as follows: (see para 2 above for text of terms of reference)

2. When these proposals are approved by the Indian Govt, Prime Minister Desai will write to President Carter indicating that fact; the United States will then respond.

3. Following approval, the Ambassadors of the two countries accredited to the IAEA at Vienna will be authorized to approach Director General Eklund to request him to serve as Chairman of the Committee in his personal capacity.

4. If sufficient progress has been made by that time, the US and Indian representatives to the INFCE Plenary Session in Vienna in late November 1978 will consult further about implementation of the proposals agreed to in connection with the Committee. Among the subjects of such consultations will be the selection, one by each side, of the additional two experts. Additionally, the Embassy of the United States in New Delhi will consult with the Govt of India on these subjects.

5. Arrangements regarding the establishment of the Committee will be completed by Christmas 1978.

6. The Committee will submit its report to the two govts on an advisory basis by August 1979.

7. Unless there are overriding considerations, the financing of the operation of the Committee will be through each govt bearing the cost of its own representative and of its nominee while the other costs will be shared equally by the two govts.

8. The Govt of India will handle press briefings in New Delhi about the November 10–11 meetings. For that purpose, the following statement was developed:

Availing of the opportunity of the presence of American officials in connection with the Indo-U.S. Sub-Commission on Science & Technology, a meeting of officials of the two govts was held as part of the ongoing dialogue between the two countries on questions relating to their continuing nuclear cooperation. They considered a proposal for the appointment of an ad hoc committee of scientists with a view

to examining certain general questions regarding safeguards and related matters.<sup>3</sup>

End text

Goheen

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<sup>3</sup> In a November 14 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton commented on the establishment of the Committee: "The results of Joe Nye's trip to India are a very pleasant surprise; evidently Desai is doing (by his standards) his best to find a way out. It is still much too early to count chickens however. Mrs. Gandhi will be sure to make a major issue out of any Indian concessions. In talking to State today I urged them to make sure that all relevant US agencies were on board on our accepting the idea. The India Desk, at least, hadn't seen any reason to consult with DOE—whose equipment, after all, will be subject to inspection by the proposed group." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 100, Evening Reports: 11/78–1/79)

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#### 116. Paper Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 30, 1978

##### THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND US RELATIONS WITH KEY DEVELOPING NATIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

##### THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND US-INDIAN RELATIONS

*Active participation in the North-South dialogue is, for India, a natural extension of a broadly based foreign policy that calls for India to seek a leading role in the Third World. Preoccupations with its regional position and with US and Soviet relations, however, are of more immediate concern than the North-South dialogue to most Indian policymakers. India is a force for moderation in the dialogue, in part because of its interest in maintaining good relations with industrialized countries that are potential markets for its exports.*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 1: Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page of this section of the paper reads in part: "This paper was prepared by the South Asia Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research."

*Indian policies on North-South issues are made at the sub-cabinet level in both the Ministries of Finance and External Affairs. Only major policy changes would be determined by the top leadership. Indian representatives to the UN in New York and Geneva apparently do not play a major part in the policy formulation process, but they, as do other Indian representatives to North-South meetings, have broad discretion to adjust to tactical circumstances during the course of international meetings.*

*India's pragmatic approach to most issues suggests that the North-South dialogue would rarely be the cause of Indian behavior in other multilateral meetings, although it could be used as an excuse. India is especially pleased with the recent increased frequency and level of consultations with the US on North-South issues and could thus feel slighted if the US were to decrease or suspend its participation in the dialogue.*

India has long been an active participant in the North-South dialogue, and since 1977 has concentrated on recapturing its position as a leading moderate in the Group of 77. New Delhi views the North-South dialogue as a valuable forum for building a political reputation as a Third World leader, for creating links to other LDCs, and for gaining some economic benefits from the developed countries. India sends highly qualified and well-briefed economic functionaries to the various North-South meetings. But while India's commitment to the dialogue and economic issues as well as regional ties with neighboring states have a greater priority in its foreign policy, and New Delhi's topmost decisionmakers are more involved in these matters. The US gains marks of appreciation in New Delhi when it informs Indian diplomats of the stands it intends to take at North-South meetings.

Being among the first of the LDCs to gain independence and because of the universalistic outlook of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, India has been a founding member of international economic bodies as well as the non-aligned movement. As early as 1948, Nehru called for the formation of an international trade organization. The policy of supporting Third World organizations has been pursued actively, and Indian diplomats assumed high profiles at the Bandung Conference in 1955, hosted the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD II) in 1968, and played a leading role in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, which ended in June 1977. Although India's high profile diminished somewhat in the early 1970s, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi raised it toward the end of 1976, and the present Janata party government continues to be active in the North-South dialogue.

India sees itself as a moderating force in the dialogue. This viewpoint flows from the special place in which India finds itself as an underdeveloped nation with a large industrial sector. India has vast mineral resources and is a major LDC exporter of manufactured goods.

It is also a very poor nation, however, still basically agricultural, whose growth just barely keeps pace with its constantly increasing population. Moreover, India's population, land area, and general dominance in South Asia make it, in Indian eyes, a great if not quite a superpower. Thus policymakers in New Delhi see themselves as peculiarly fitted to bridge the gap between have and have-not states.

At the various international forums, Indian diplomats prefer to work behind the scenes as compromisers. Indian delegates to gatherings that involve the North-South dialogue maintain higher profiles and use every opportunity to cultivate ties with as many Third World countries as possible. Where feelings are strong, they are careful not to alienate the radical or the particularly influential as, for example, on matters dealing with Arab-OPEC sensibilities about Israel or African concerns about colonialism. But the energies of Indian representatives are more likely to be absorbed on coordinating committees and in private discussions, attempting to persuade others to moderate positions and language—especially over concrete economic issues.

India's advanced industrial status sets it somewhat apart from the poorer LDCs, and its demands in the North-South dialogue are often less extreme. Further, India's interest in increasing its market in the developed countries makes New Delhi more conciliatory toward the developed states. India supports most of the standard NIEO demands in North-South negotiations, including

- Lowering or eliminating tariffs on LDC products in developed markets and broadening the Generalized System of Preferences to include more manufactured goods from LDC producers.

- Rolling over and rescheduling official debts to permit more funding for development.

- Making international funding for commodity price stabilization available for general commodity development in the LDCs.

- Transferring the means for technological innovation from industrialized countries to LDCs.

- Extending national offshore sea limits to 200 miles and creating an international seabed authority to share the cost of mineral exploitation with LDCs.

With an eye to accommodating some poorer Third World countries' demands, India has also advocated:

- Permitting the poorest LDCs to subsidize their export industries without attaching penalties on developed country markets.

- Reserving 0.7 percent of developed country GNP for development aid.

- Considering debt relief as a form of aid.

To toe this middle line of not alienating North and South and still obtain its economic goals, India sends well-qualified representatives to dialogue forums. They are usually members of the Commerce or

related ministries and are free to act on their own should unexpected tactical points arise.

The Ministries of External Affairs and Finance have small sections related to North-South affairs—only two men in the former—and contribute to briefings from their distinct policy angles. At present the permanent economic representatives in Geneva and New York have little influence. Matters rarely reach up to the cabinet, and only when a new policy development comes up does a minister become more than perfunctorily involved or perhaps attend a conference. On the whole Indian negotiators are sophisticated and effective.

But the North-South dialogue is not a high priority in Indian foreign policy. New Delhi's major concerns are bilateral relations with the two superpowers and relations with neighboring states. Since taking office in March 1977 the government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai has been striving to achieve a more "balanced" policy of nonalignment toward the US and USSR. On the one hand, Desai has followed the course initiated by former Prime Minister Gandhi in late 1976 of being more receptive to American initiatives. Indeed, Desai and President Carter have established a closer relationship than has previously existed between an Indian Prime Minister and an American President. Policy-makers in New Delhi seem to have a revived appreciation for the fact that the US is India's major trading partner, a key source of sophisticated technology, and the most important source of food grains during periods of monsoon failures. On the other hand, the Indians have been careful to modulate their new openness toward America so as not to antagonize the Soviet Union. Moscow has been India's most reliable arms supplier as well as a consistent supporter during its controversies with China and Pakistan. Since the Janata Party came to power, there have been a number of high-level visits between Moscow and Delhi; the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 has been reaffirmed though in muted fashion; and the Soviet and Indian leaderships reportedly have reached an agreement on the contentious rupee-ruble exchange rate.

Closer to home, New Delhi has been concerned to make India's dominance in South Asia more palatable to neighboring states. The Desai government moved to settle an outstanding dispute with Bangladesh, coming to an interim agreement about the sharing of Ganges River waters.<sup>2</sup> It also acceded to Nepali demands for separate rather than unitary trade and transit treaties. The Janata government has also

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 33.

chosen to be restrained in commenting about Pakistani affairs and has made overtures to broaden diplomatic and commercial relations. With regard to China, New Delhi has responded positively but cautiously to the friendly initiatives of her powerful northern neighbor.

The North-South dialogue rarely impinges on the execution of these policies—or the men who formulate them at the topmost levels of the Indian cabinet. Failures or slowdowns in the dialogue have hardly ever been allowed to influence relations with the superpowers or with adjoining states, and if anything, the reverse is true—New Delhi has used North-South forums to take anti-US or anti-Pakistan stands for the purposes of other foreign policy goals. Indeed, should the extreme occur and the developed countries remain intransigent or even withdraw from the dialogue, the broad outlines of Indian international policy would not change very much—although there would be vociferous condemnation, an international forum would be missed by New Delhi, and there would be a good number of disgruntled, semiemployed negotiators in various Indian ministries. For the present, the American tactic of prior consultations about US stands at forthcoming North-South meetings seems to meet India's sense of involvement and importance.

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#### **117. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, December 2, 1978, 0507Z

18588. Pass Commerce. Moscow for Secretary Kreps. Pass STR. Subject: Secretary Kreps' Visit to India, November 29–30.

Summary: In three-day visit to India, Secretary Kreps sought to allay Indian fears that the U.S. is going protectionist, urged the Indians to participate fully in MTN, and heard repeated pleas for greater long term access to the U.S. market in the longer term for Indian handicrafts, especially textiles. Still, Indians were clearly satisfied with and were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0591. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow.



not seeking to reopen recent textile arrangement.<sup>2</sup> Secretary pointed out that if India wished to resort more to American foreign investment, India would have to take steps to attract investors and improve investment climate. End summary.

1. During her visit to follow-up on the President's earlier commitment to Desai,<sup>3</sup> Secretary met with Prime Minister Desai, Minister of Commerce Dharia (her host), Minister of Finance Patel, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vajpayee. She also met with leading Indian business leaders and addressed the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce.

2. Topics raised during trade talks included MTN, GSP, handloom textiles, new U.S. export policy and US-Indian trade policies. The Secretary reaffirmed our commitment to oppose protectionism at home and abroad. She described the President's new export policy<sup>4</sup> and the role of this policy in U.S. efforts to strengthen our trade balance as opposed to using import restrictions.

3. In discussing U.S. import measures that impact on Indian exports to the U.S., such as countervailing and anti-dumping duties, the Secretary explained that these were internationally recognized remedies designed to counter unfair trading practices and were indispensable to the maintenance of an open market in the United States. She pointed out that these have been utilized with great discretion. She also pointed out that the President only approved import relief in five of the twenty-three cases recommended to him by the ITC.

4. She urged the Indians to negotiate on a contribution to the MTN and to support the formulation of the MTN codes, stressing the importance of LDC participation in MTN to the fight against protectionism. The Indians announced that a Cabinet decision had been made to make an offer in the MTN. The Secretary expressed pleasure that the Indians had decided to take this important step. The Secretary also noted that the US appreciated the recent Indian import liberalization

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 230994 to New Delhi, September 12, relayed the text of an Indo-U.S. textile memorandum of understanding reached after meetings in Washington September 5-9. The MOU modified categories and quantities of textiles that either country could export to the other. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371-0563) The need for increased flexibility in the categorization of textile imports from India arose from an earlier trade embargo against India imposed by the United States. According to telegram 168715 to New Delhi, July 4, India erroneously certified approximately 14 million square yards of handloom fabric as mill-made. As a result, the quota for mill-made apparel was exceeded and subsequent shipments were subject to U.S. embargo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780274-1023)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 90 and footnote 7, Document 96. No memoranda of conversation of Krep's meetings with Indian officials were found.

<sup>4</sup> Carter announced his administration's new export policy on September 26. The policy was designed to encourage U.S. firms to increase overseas exports. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II*, pp. 1630-1635)



measures and expressed the hope that India would pursue further liberalization.

5. Minister Dharia raised the issue of handloom textile exports. He discussed the widespread unemployment and massive property [*poverty*] in India and indicated that the development of handicraft and cottage industries was a primary government goal for correcting this problem. The Secretary responded that she understood that we had just reached an agreement in the textile field with which the Indians were satisfied. Minister Dharia agreed and made clear that the Indian Government was not seeking to reopen the agreement. His remarks, which were repeated on the four occasions he met with the Secretary, were meant to obtain awareness of and sympathy for India's longer-range objectives in the handicraft area. It is clear that at an appropriate time, the Indians would like a more liberal arrangement for their handloom exports.

6. The Indian side proposed the establishment of trade promotion centers in India and the U.S. for the purpose of market surveys, promotion and trade problem resolution. The Secretary explained that we had no authority to engage in joint governmental operations such as this. She suggested that we seek ways to promote trade on both sides through the facilities that we already have. It was understood that the Commerce Secretary Khrisnaswamy Rao Sahib will probably visit Washington early next year to discuss this matter further.

7. On GSP, both Dharia and the businessmen expressed strongly the view that as presently constituted GSP did not allow Indian enterprises to make plans with certainty. The Secretary made clear that competitive need and graduation were essential to have and maintain a GSP and that although there are provisions for dropping GSP items, there are also provisions to add items, a provision which India has used effectively. She pointed to the excellent record of India's utilization of GSP and expressed the hope that this would continue.

8. With Minister Patel, the Secretary discussed Indian investment policy and policy towards foreign pharmaceutical companies. She requested clarification of Indian policies and some indication of areas in which the Indians felt foreign participation might be useful. The Secretary stressed that although investment policy was a matter for the Indian Government to determine, foreign investment can make a major contribution to a developing country and exert a positive influence on employment and growth. She pointed out US position was one of neutrality on foreign investment although we were willing to facilitate investment to LDCs through OPIC. The Indians responded that their investment policy was clear, and included room for foreign companies in industries where technology was needed and was not available indigenously, or through licensing arrangements. Desai, Patel

and Dharia insisted that India's policy is now predictable and constant, and that once foreign investors comply with the rules, they are treated equally with domestic investors. The Indians expressed surprise over the climate of concern which the Secretary said existed among American investors in the Indian drug industry. The Secretary urged the Indians to exercise their drug policy with flexibility and fairness and the Indians responded that they intended to do so. She added that even one firm which felt disadvantaged cast a long shadow on the investment climate. In response to the Secretary's question, the Indians said the government had no plans to attract investment or to identify the specific industry in which foreign investment would be welcome. She pointed out to Dharia that from her contacts with the business community India ranked low in terms of climate attractive to potential investors. In the event the Indian Government wished to send a Minister or officials to the United States to explain Indian policy on the areas in which India sought investment, Commerce would facilitate the visit in the United States.

9. The Indians raised the issue of UNCTAD V,<sup>5</sup> Common Fund<sup>6</sup> and resource transfer. The discussions were cordial, the Indians said that they wanted UNCTAD V to be noncontroversial and productive and the Secretary responded that the U.S. was prepared to negotiate pragmatically and realistically for results that would be truly beneficial to developing countries. On the Common Fund, the Secretary indicated that U.S. could accept a second window with voluntary contributions. The Indian side explained their position on the second window as being integrally related to the Common Fund, and termed it essential to the success of UNCTAD.

10. Minister Patel raised the issue of resource transfer. He discussed the plight of developing countries and stressed the poverty and unemployment that seem intractable in these countries. He urged the United States and other DCs to do everything possible to assist in the development goals of the LDCs. On IDA replenishment, Patel expressed the hope that the US would not question the 40 percent share which India

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<sup>5</sup> UNCTAD's fifth session (UNCTAD V) took place in Manila May 7–June 3, 1979.

<sup>6</sup> At the end of UNCTAD's fourth session (UNCTAD IV) in Nairobi in May 1976, it agreed to consider the establishment of a Common Fund to finance a buffer stock program designed to smooth out primary commodity price fluctuations. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 304–306.

takes.<sup>7</sup> The Secretary discussed the U.S. commitment to helping the neediest and our satisfaction with the stress in India programs to help the poor and rural areas, our own bilateral aid program for India, and our support for the role of the international financial institutions.

**Blood**

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 66, and Document 68.

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**118. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, December 4, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of October 11<sup>2</sup> transmitted to me by Ambassador Goheen. Since then, as you know, Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Dr. Joseph Nye have been in Delhi in connection with the Indo-US Subcommission on Science and Technology.<sup>3</sup> It was suggested that the opportunity may be utilized to exchange views on the question of our nuclear cooperation particularly the proposal to establish an ad hoc Scientific Advisory Committee to examine the different concepts of safeguards on nuclear activities. As a result of the discussions, it was agreed that the following terms may be proposed to the respective Governments:

(1) To examine the options available within the concept of safeguards on all nuclear activities;

(2) To survey the types of safeguards being applied in various countries and their impact on the nuclear R & D and energy programmes of those countries in terms of national priorities, needs and interests; and

(3) To seek to determine whether there is an appropriate IAEA safeguards programme consistent with foregoing paragraphs (1)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–0242. No classification marking. William Brown forwarded the letter to Dodson under a December 15 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–0240)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 114.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 115.

and (2) and without hindrance to the progress of nuclear energy programmes.

We have approved of the above terms of reference. It was also proposed that the Committee would comprise of one eminent Scientist from U.S.A. and another from India to be nominated by the respective Governments; two other Scientists would be nominated in their personal capacity by mutual consultation. It was also agreed that Dr. Eklund, the Director-General of IAEA would be the Chairman in his personal capacity. According to the time schedule discussed, it was hoped that the Committee's report would be available by August, 1979. We have approved of the above proposals and the terms of reference and if you also approve of them, further action to set up the Committee could be taken and other incidental matters as discussed at the meeting can be processed.

We were glad to receive confirmation from the U.S. officials that they saw no present difficulty in the continued supplies of enriched uranium for our Tarapur atomic power station. We are, however, concerned to learn that the N.R.C. have not been able to finalise their conclusions on application XSNM-1222 for 16.8 metric tonnes of enriched uranium and that they would require extra time of 60 days in view of the "complexity and sensitivity" of the application. This is despite the fact that according to the Rules of the Commission no further dilatory formalities are involved if there has been no material change in the situation since the last application was approved. As you are aware, if there has been any change, it has been for the better. I trust, therefore, that your administration will use all the influence at its command to see to it that this shipment is made without undue delay and also that our subsequent application for a further supply of 19.8 tonnes is dealt with expeditiously.

You will also recall that, separately but not unrelated to the shared ideal of arresting the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, I have always emphasized the vital importance of definitive steps towards nuclear and conventional disarmament. It was our hope that, following the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, concrete steps would be taken in the direction of an early conclusion of a truly comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a second agreement with U.S.S.R. on the limitation of strategic arms. I am aware of your interest both in the C.T.B. treaty and SALT-II, but may I once again reiterate that if the world is to recognise that the great powers are in earnest about the dangers of vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapon, the residuary difficulties must be overcome and the agreements finalised without further delay!

I am glad you agree that Pakistan's problems are essentially political. I have also noted your assurance that the United States will not

enter into a military supply relationship with Pakistan which would adversely affect stability in South Asia. Given the relative sizes of the two countries and the respective defence responsibilities, there can be no question of military parity between the two countries. We have done everything possible to assure Pakistan that not only do we have no desire to interfere or add to her difficulties, but we have also firm faith in the necessity of maintaining Pakistan's stability and progress. It naturally hurts us when our bonafides become suspect and a theory of military balance is put forward on grounds of Pakistan's apprehensions or its internal problems which are of its own making. In this context I realise your concern for peace in this region. We naturally have a major stake in that peace and cannot but act in the spirit of achieving and maintaining it.

Like you, we are concerned at the internal turmoil in neighbouring Iran. Based on our experience and my own fervent faith, I had taken the liberty of urging His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran when I met him in June last to democratise the political dispensation, simultaneously with planned and rapid modernisation of the country and to do so early enough and, not in installments, taking into confidence local elements which form public opinion. You and I agree that, with all its shortcomings, the democratic system provides an outlet for the expression of the people's political aspirations and also safeguards against sudden explosions of the kind that have occurred in that country. Outside powers cannot help and could even exacerbate the situation by involvement. A durable solution has to evolve from within. And, the sooner Iran can return to normal Government, associating with it elements representative of the people, the better it would be for a region to which, in a sense, we consider we belong. There is some evidence that the Shahanshah now fully recognises this, and I hope it is not still too late for Iran to find the right mix of economic progress and political and democratic freedom under enlightened administration.

The problems in Africa are, if anything, getting more dangerous. The South African regime seems determined to defy international opinion and attempt its own variant of an internal settlement which is unlikely to provide the necessary confidence for the African majority. No peaceful solution in Zimbabwe seems to be in sight. I had long urged the Frontline States as well as the liberation movements that, with unity of purpose, a regime representing the majority of the people could soon be established. But no one can deny that the longer the basic aspirations of the Africans are frustrated and forms of racist domination continue, the greater are the chances of protracted struggles involving destruction and bloodshed which in turn can only increase the risk of international involvement. I wish South Africa would realise this and take a long-term view of its own interest in a peaceful solution

sooner rather than later. The occupation by Ugandan forces of Tanzanian territory, now allegedly vacated, is another retrograde development. It has exposed the hesitancy of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

All this only indicates that we have troubled situations all around us. But, in India, in spite of all that you may hear about the political problems within this country, we can claim that we adhere firmly to our committed course of democratic and steady evolutionary economic progress. On the other side, South-East Asia is again seething with tensions. We have made a beginning of economic relations with Vietnam and consider it a duty to help that country in its reconstruction after the devastation it suffered. Here again, we are scrupulously detached from bilateral problems between China and Vietnam, or Vietnam and Cambodia. We have long believed that the strength of nationalism must be respected, and there can be no justification for any support of ethnic minorities or territorial claims or interference and involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. We would like to see South-East Asia as a whole free from great power involvement and build a fabric of confidence and cooperation. I was happy to meet your Secretary of Commerce, Mrs. Juanita M. Kreps and hope that her discussions here will help to remove impediments in Indian exports to the U.S. and generally improve our commercial and economic relations.<sup>4</sup>

Over the last two weeks, we have also had meetings in New Delhi of the Indo-U.S. Sub-Commissions for Science and Technology as well as Commerce and Economics.<sup>5</sup> I am glad that such meetings are resulting in not only a better understanding between the scientists, economists and other scholars of our two countries, but are also making progress towards concrete programmes of cooperation and exchanges.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

**Morarji Desai**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 117.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 17493 from New Delhi, November 15, reported on the meeting of the Subcommission on Science and Technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780469-1222) Telegrams 17745 and 17770 from New Delhi, November 17 and 18, reported on the meeting of the Economic and Commercial Subcommission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780474-0281 and D780475-0490, respectively.

**119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 19, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

10. *Mrs. Gandhi*: On a straight party-line vote, the Indian Parliament has voted to expel Mrs. Gandhi from Parliament and imprison her for the remainder of the current session which ends in three days. The charge is contempt of Parliament, specifically Mrs. Gandhi's attempt to block Parliamentary investigation of the financial activities of her son. There is ample legal precedent for this action, and Mrs. Gandhi's obstructionist tactics are well documented. However, the question is whether the jailing will make Mrs. Gandhi a martyr and may contribute to her political fortunes. Many in Janata, including Desai, hesitated; but party unity, in the face of strong support for punishing Mrs. Gandhi, won out. We expect that Mrs. Gandhi will be reelected to Parliament at a forthcoming by-election.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 12/78. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 19514 from New Delhi, December 20, reported that Gandhi was incarcerated the evening of December 19 in the same facility where many of her political opponents were imprisoned during the Emergency. After Gandhi's incarceration, seven members of Parliament began a hunger strike inside the Parliament building, while public protests and demonstrations broke out in various cities around India. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780525–0854) Telegram 19783 from New Delhi, December 27, announced Gandhi's release from jail and reported that "Mrs. Gandhi sought to squeeze maximum political profit from the event, which should bring to an end the agitations launched after her arrest just a week earlier. Her remarks to the press following her release only naturally won front-page treatment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780535–0631)

## 120. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, January 12, 1979, 1320Z

757. Subject: Indo-US Nuclear Relations.

1. Following is text of GOI aide-memoire on India dissatisfaction with delays in shipment of enriched uranium for Tarapur which was handed to Charge<sup>2</sup> by MEA Secretary M.A. Vellodi late afternoon January 12. Vellodi told Charge that the aide-memoire would also be given Assistant Secretary Saunders by Indian Embassy Washington Charge Gokhale when they meet at noon EST January 12 at the Department.<sup>3</sup>

2. (U) Quote: Aide-Memoire

The Government of India view with serious concern the unjustified and persistent delays in the processing of export license applications for enriched uranium for the Tarapur atomic power station by the concerned authorities in the United States.

The Government of India regret to note that one of the pending export license applications (XSNM 1222) for 16.8 tonnes of enriched uranium is being subjected to public hearings on extraneous considerations and matters which have been dealt with at length on earlier occasions. This application has been under consideration of the authorities concerned in the United States for over a year and the deliveries under this application are already overdue.

The Government of India also regret to note that there have been inordinate delays in the granting of clearance by the executive branch. The clearance for the previous application for 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium took more than one year, while the clearance for one of the pending applications (XSNM 1222) has taken nearly 11 months. The Government of India hope that similar delays will not recur in the case of the later application (XSNM 1379) for 19.8 tonnes which has been pending since 11th October, 1978.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790015-0701. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Bombay.

<sup>2</sup> Archer Blood.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 9547 to New Delhi, January 13, reported that Gokhale delivered the aide-mémoire to Saunders at the Department of State, noting that Gokhale "was well aware of NRC's independent status within USG; as result, he dwelt more on question of executive branch delays in submitting its recommendations to NRC. He said executive branch submitted its recommendation on pending application (XSNM-1222) eleven months after receipt. He expressed hope that Executive Branch will submit its recommendation on XSNM-1379 soon, saying this would 'generate better understanding on our side.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790017-0395)



It will be recalled that the agreement for co-operation entered into in 1963 between the Governments of the United States and India, which came into force after all statutory and constitutional requirements of both countries had been met, envisaged timely supplies of enriched uranium for the continuous and efficient operation of the Tarapur atomic power station. It will be appreciated that inordinate delays in the supply of enriched uranium frustrate the basic object and purpose of the cooperation agreement. The delivery schedules and quantities of enriched uranium requirements were jointly determined in consultation with U.S. Government experts in order to permit the nuclear fuel complex at Hyderabad to conduct its fabrication campaigns efficiently and to meet the requirements of the Tarapur station. Applications for enriched uranium have broadly conformed to these agreed schedules. The delay in the shipment of enriched uranium has again resulted in the uneconomic operations at the nuclear fuel complex from December 15, 1978.

It is the earnest hope of the Government of India that the Government of the United States will take all necessary measures to ensure that the pending license applications (XSNM 1222 and XSNM 1379) are cleared without further delays and that all enriched uranium requirements of the Tarapur atomic power station are met in conformity with the letter and spirit of the existing cooperation agreement between the two governments.

New Delhi

12th January, 1979. End quote.

3. In turning over aide-memoire Vellodi orally made two points worth note. He expressed GOI unhappiness that NRC had agreed as one of its terms of reference in connection with the current shipment to evaluate once more Prime Minister Desai's assurances against further nuclear explosions. Vellodi said GOI considered this personally embarrassing to the PM and substantially unnecessary in the absence of any action in the interval which could cast doubt on the PM's earlier assurances. Second, Vellodi expressed the hope that the State Department could find it possible to submit the request for the next shipment to the NRC without waiting for NRC approval of the current shipment.

**Blood**

**121. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Trip Report: India<sup>2</sup> (U)

(You already have my report on Pakistan;<sup>3</sup> the Afghan one will be delayed until I receive some materials from Kabul that I could not carry with me.) (C)

*Domestic.* The Janata party is increasingly unimpressive. Nobody expects it to be a viable contestant at the next elections (1982) yet the chances are good that it will hold together and continue to govern until about then. (This assumes that Morarji will live on or that another leader "above the parties" can be found. Jagjivan Ram is the most likely.) (C)

Indira, in my view, has a good chance of being Prime Minister again in 1982. This is a minority view; most observers see her making a comeback, but not as Prime Minister. I don't see how she can do one without the other, and in any event there is no alternative leader for the Congress Party. Perhaps she can be sidetracked by the various legal cases pending against her, but given the Indian system I think she will gain as much as she loses in the legal process. (C)

*Nuclear.* I was very impressed by the depth of concern on the nuclear issue; specifically, that a U.S. cutoff would be seen as proof that the U.S. is not to be trusted and, more importantly perhaps, that Morarji had bet on the wrong horse in moving away from the Soviets. One senior Foreign Office official implored me to at least find an alternate, non-Soviet source of supply for Tarapur if we have to pull out. Nobody seemed very optimistic about the experts committee coming up with a solution. I have asked CIA to look into the question of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78-12/79. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Copies were sent to Mathews, Oksenberg, Sick, and Erb.

<sup>2</sup> In connection with the Chiefs of Mission meeting that took place in Colombo on January 8, Thornton visited Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan January 1-14. Telegram 323530 to New Delhi, December 23, 1978, relayed his schedule. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780533-0498) For his report on his visit to Pakistan, see Document 320.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 320.

where an alternate supplier could be found.<sup>4</sup> (France?) Jagat Mehta asked me very specifically if we could guarantee that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive capability. Probably the Indians know as much as we do about what the Paks are doing in this direction. If they have such knowledge, it is hard to see how they could accept safeguards. (S)

*Eastern Waters.*<sup>5</sup> I reminded the Foreign Office that we remain interested in this topic. They expect that they will have their own thinking in order (and their neighbors brought into line) in a year or two. This would be quite satisfactory from our point of view. That will be just about the time that our Indian aid program will be getting large enough to be relevant to the problem. (C)

*Aid.* The subject never came up except in the Finance Ministry where I raised it with M.M. Singh. He was polite but made clear that the sums we are providing are pretty trivial in the Indian context. In the Embassy, only AID and Goheen want to have an aid program. My best (and very pro-American) contact in the Foreign Ministry said he thought bilateral aid was a poor idea. (C)

*UNCTAD.* The Indians see trade as the main issue at UNCTAD V, assuming that the common fund is out of the way. They will probably float a proposal for an international adjustment fund that would compensate nations whose industries were adversely affected by reductions in tariffs. This sounds cumbersome; it could be interesting, however, as a mechanism from which the U.S. could benefit to some extent. Otherwise they want UNCTAD to deal with technology transfer. They were massively disinterested in the common fund and COW. (C)

*Iran and Afghanistan.* The Indians are very worried about Iran;<sup>6</sup> they had a profitable economic relationship with the Shah and are always concerned about resurgent Islam that would tend to support Pakistan and perhaps stir up their own otherwise inert Muslim minority. They have clearly fallen off their earlier view that the new Afghan government is a bunch of amiable third world nationalists. The Foreign Ministry is still hesitant to say much but their concern over the growing

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<sup>4</sup> In a January 24 memorandum to Evans, Thornton requested a report from the CIA on the "availability, quality, price and other relevant factors" of potential suppliers. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 1–3/79) In an April 20 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance of the outcome of the CIA's study on alternate fuel suppliers for Tarapur. The study showed [*text not declassified*] alternate supplier of enriched uranium. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 3.

<sup>6</sup> Revolutionary forces in Iran, led by Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council, forced the Shah to leave Iran on January 16.

Soviet role in South Asia is clear. In the Defense Ministry, concern is much more outspoken.

*China.* The upcoming Vajpayee visit to Peking and the US-China normalization focussed great attention on China. Most of all, Indians betray a concern that the U.S. will now turn away from them towards China. This concern is in the economic field (our technology will go to China, not India; trade will be shifted to China, etc.) and political/security (we will connive in supply of arms to China and this will force the Indians to arm more heavily.) They take our acquiescence in the French reactor sale to China as a first evidence of a double standard.<sup>7</sup> Most of all, however, it is an undifferentiated, whining inferiority complex. They have no great expectations of the Vajpayee visit but claim to be willing to move beyond their long list of traditional bilateral problems to serious discussion of the border and regional security if the Chinese are so inclined. Mehta, for example, said it would be interesting to see whether the Chinese would discuss Pakistan with them in a serious way. We should encourage Teng<sup>8</sup> to do so. (S)

*Regional Security.* I told the Indians that we were of course reassessing our views of the regional security problem in the light of events in Afghanistan and Iran and hoped that we could have fruitful discussions on the subject with them. Their responses were tentative, but I think they got the idea. Now it needs to be followed up. *Most important* is to reschedule as soon as possible the Indo-US bilaterals that were postponed from January. You should take this up directly with Vance and Christopher.<sup>9</sup> (S)

*The Embassy.* Mostly at Delhi but also elsewhere I found the Embassy staff poorly informed and generally hostile to our approach on global issues. (They see few benefits and many costs in bilateral relations with host governments.) It is very useful to address a staff meeting and get some of the broad picture across. NSC staff members should do this whenever possible when they are visiting one of our posts, especially the more remote ones. Also it is good public relations given the hostility towards the NSC that permeates the lower reaches of State.<sup>10</sup> (C)

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 324623 to Paris, December 27, 1978, announced that the Carter administration would not oppose France's sale of two nuclear reactors to China. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780534-0670)

<sup>8</sup> Deng Xiaoping.

<sup>9</sup> At the end of the sentence, Brzezinski drew a line to the bottom of the page where he wrote: "will do, ZB."

<sup>10</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Brzezinski drew a vertical line and wrote: "good job."

**122. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*Nuclear Policy Problems in India:* Most middle-level Indian nuclear scientists disagree with the government's stand against signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting full safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities, according to a clandestine source. The scientists are said to believe that these steps are necessary to acquire the foreign assistance that is essential to their work and ultimately to their careers. (S)

Research into gas centrifuge enrichment reportedly is proceeding on such a small scale and with so little direction that India may be dependent for many years on the U.S. supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur power reactors. New Delhi's refusal to accept U.S. conditions on safeguards could eventually force the Tarapur station to close. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 17, 2/1/79–2/7/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

## 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 3, 1979, 0201Z

28920. Exdis—For the Ambassador from NEA-Jack Miklos. Subject: Indian Complaints About Delay in Presidential Reply. Ref: New Delhi 1322,<sup>2</sup> Bombay 0280.<sup>3</sup>

1. We are concerned by complaints lodged in refuels by Shankar and Sethna over delay in President's reply to Desai's last letter<sup>4</sup> as this relates to establishing ad hoc committee. We feel that on behalf of President, we dealt with committee question one week after receipt of Desai letter,<sup>5</sup> and that our agreement in November did not require that our response specifically be in the form of a Presidential letter.

2. Chronology is as follows:

Nov. 10–11—at Nye-Pickering meetings in New Delhi it is agreed that following GOI approval, "Prime Minister Desai will write to President Carter indicating that fact; the United States will then respond" (78 New Delhi 17392).<sup>6</sup> Both sides agree that "arrangements regarding the establishment of the committee will be completed by Christmas 1978." (We note that our agreement called only for U.S. response and did not specify form this should take.)

December 15—Prime Minister Desai's letter of December 4 agreeing to committee is received in Department, one month after New Delhi meeting and 10 days before Christmas deadline.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790052–0655. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Bombay. Drafted by John R. Malott (NEA/INS); cleared in OES and S/S–O, and in substance by Thornton; approved by Miklos.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1322 from New Delhi, January 24, Goheen reported that, in a meeting on January 23, Shankar was "distressed as we that the ad hoc scientific committee has drawn such wide and erroneous attention, much of it critical, and apparently within the GOI he has been having to take the brunt of much of the criticism for having fostered the idea of such a committee. He complained about the delay in the constitution of the committee, much of which he attributes to the President's not having replied to the PM's last letter, about which delay he also complained." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790037–0130)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 118.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 322418 to New Delhi, December 22, 1978, informed the Embassy: "While the President's reply to the Prime Minister's December 4 letter is in preparation, and will confirm our agreement to establishment of the subject committee and its terms of reference as described, we believe it important to move ahead promptly on next steps." The telegram then gave instructions on how to work with the Indian Government to decide upon the composition of the committee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780530–0742)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 115.

December 22—Department cables U.S. agreement to committee, proposes next steps to be taken, and stresses urgency of the task (78 State 322418).<sup>7</sup>

December 22—You tell Shankar of our agreement, but Shankar indicates GOI response is not likely before January 3. You stress importance of getting enterprise moving (78 New Delhi 19836).<sup>8</sup>

January 6—Shankar says GOI prepared to move ahead with next steps in establishing committee but asks you for written statement that President has agreed to committee. You provide this, based on our December 22 cable<sup>9</sup> (New Delhi 0322).<sup>10</sup>

3. Suggest you review foregoing with Shankar and if you feel it necessary or desirable with Desai. You should indicate that the President instructed you as his personal representative to indicate our agreement to this committee, and that you had done so on December 22. Our choice of this method, as opposed to waiting for the dispatch of a letter, was predicated by our desire to move ahead urgently with the establishment of the committee.

4. As to other aspects of Desai letter, a Presidential response will be forthcoming shortly.

Vance

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5 above.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 19836 from New Delhi, December 27, 1978, reported Goheen's appeal for action to Shankar on December 22, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780536–0452)

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 322418; see footnote 5 above.

<sup>10</sup> Telegram 322 from New Delhi, January 6, conveyed Shankar's agreement to notify the Indian "Mission in Vienna to proceed with a joint approach to Dr. Eklund as soon as he got a written statement" from Goheen indicating "that the President had accepted the establishment of the ad hoc scientific advisory committee on safeguards proposed in Prime Minister Desai's letter of December 4." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790008–0738)

**124. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 5, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of December 4.<sup>2</sup> I was especially pleased to learn of your Government's approval of the proposal to establish an ad hoc Scientific Advisory Committee to look into the question of safeguards on all nuclear activities and whether they will affect peaceful nuclear research and development. Because of the urgency of this matter, I had Ambassador Goheen confirm to Mr. Shankar on December 22 my acceptance of the framework for this committee,<sup>3</sup> which had been agreed to during Ambassador Pickering and Dr. Nye's visit.<sup>4</sup> The Committee should be an important step forward in our effort to find a mutually-acceptable solution to the nuclear issues between us, and I trust it will be able to move ahead promptly so that its report will be available to our two Governments on schedule in August 1979.

I fully understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's delay in acting on the latest application for fuel for Tarapur is causing your government concern. I realize this is providing ammunition to those who wish to criticize your stance on peaceful nuclear activities and continued cooperation with the United States. You know the independent status of the Commission within our system of government. We have, however, been able to intervene to expedite consideration and secure a prompt deadline for action by the Commission. I believe that the Commission will act favorably on the application and I will continue to do everything I can to expedite such a decision.

I also want to reassure you of my intention to continue supply during the period provided by law. I believe that the Congress will support this. As for the other pending license application you mentioned, we are working expeditiously to provide our recommendation to the Commission.

I appreciate your continuing interest in the SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations. We are very near an agreement with the Soviets on SALT II. Agreement has already been reached on most of the substantive issues. The remaining issues are important to both sides. Nevertheless, I am hopeful that final agreement will be reached

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790031-0370. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 118.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 123.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 115.



within the near future. Talks on the Comprehensive Test Ban are scheduled to resume as I write this letter. We have made much progress in working out the text of the agreement, but more months of hard negotiations will be required to work out the detailed verification measures we seek. Some of the measures that are essential to the successful implementation of the treaty, such as on-site inspections and the exchange of seismic data from especially-equipped stations, break new ground in arms control verification. These efforts make for complex and difficult negotiations.

The Department of State and our Embassy in New Delhi have briefed officials of your government on our agreement with the People's Republic of China to establish full diplomatic relations.<sup>5</sup> I delayed answering your letter so that I could take into account the meetings with Vice Premier Deng that have just concluded.<sup>6</sup> This step was not taken for any short-term tactical advantage. It is the culmination of a long process of normalization that began in 1972 with President Nixon's visit to China.

I would like to add my personal assurances to you that our decision and the relationship with China that results will not come at the expense of our relations with any other nation. There has been no lessening of our desire for better relations with the Soviet Union or our pursuit of arms control agreements with that nation.

There will be those who will allege that normalization of relations with China is an indication that the United States is turning away from India or will somehow give preference to our relationship with China. I am sure you know that this is not the case. Strengthening of the relationship between India and the United States that you and I have rebuilt remains one of the major foreign policy goals of my Administration. In fact recent developments have only added to its importance. Should any doubt on this matter arise, I hope that in the spirit of frankness and confidence that characterizes our friendship, you will write to me and share your concerns.

Throughout my meetings with Vice Premier Deng, I stressed the importance of stability in South Asia and the importance that I ascribe to the relationship between India and the United States. I also pointed

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 19371 from New Delhi, December 18, 1978, provided an analysis of the Indian Government's reaction to the Sino-U.S. mutual official diplomatic recognition on January 1, commenting: "MEA's cautious reaction, which is diplomatically correct but not markedly exuberant, probably represents concern about the likely impact of the announcement on Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese EmbOff, in chance meeting with US counterpart evening of December 17, said he found Indian statement bland and lacking." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523-0539)

<sup>6</sup> Carter and Deng held a series of meetings January 29–30 in Washington. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 204–208.

out that we looked to China to play a constructive role in eliminating the problems that have long plagued the subcontinent. I believe this is in China's interest and hope that they will in fact do so. Foreign Minister Vajpayee's discussions in Beijing will provide the opportunity to explore not only improvement of bilateral relations but also steps that can contribute to regional stability.<sup>7</sup>

We are, as you know, deeply concerned about developments in Southwest Asia where we have important interests and long-standing ties with several countries. The shift in Afghanistan worries us. We are trying to keep up a productive relationship with the new government but are frankly not finding it easy. With regard to Iran, I share the views that you expressed in your letter. It is important that Iran find solutions to its problems that both meet the concerns of its people and contribute to the peace and development of the region. Outside powers must not aggravate Iran's problems but there may be ways that its friends, including India and the United States, may be able to be helpful.

We are pondering how we can best play a useful role in Southwest Asia, where you and Foreign Minister Vajpayee have made important contributions to improved relations among the countries of the region. I would value your advice on how we can best contribute towards that process and the overall goal of peaceful change in ways consonant with our interests and those of our friends. Deputy Secretary Christopher unfortunately had to postpone his visit to New Delhi but has now rescheduled it for the end of this month. His discussions will be an important contribution to our policy deliberations. Secretary Vance and I will be able to pursue this further when Foreign Minister Vajpayee comes to Washington later this spring.

Secretary of Commerce Kreps has reported to me on her successful mission to India.<sup>8</sup> Her visit is one more example of the vitality of the relations that are developing between our two countries. I believe that consultations between the senior officials of our two governments on both bilateral and international matters can build on the foundation that we have laid and make a major contribution to increased understanding of each other's positions.

Sincerely, with best wishes,<sup>9</sup>

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>7</sup> During Vajpayee's visit to China, which began on February 12, Chinese forces invaded Vietnam. According to telegram 2791 from New Delhi, Vajpayee cut his visit short and left China on February 19 in protest. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790077-1094)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 117.

<sup>9</sup> Carter handwritten: "with best wishes."

## 125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 5, 1979, 2208Z

30708. Exdis for Ambassador from Miklos. Subject: (S) Vajpayee Interview and NRC Decision.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. NRC has expressed concern over Vajpayee interview and his comments on PNE's and nuclear option.<sup>2</sup> Based on our discussion with NRC officials, it clear that interview has had serious adverse impact on NRC attitude toward XSNM-1222. It now seems likely that NRC, which previously appeared to be favorably disposed toward XSNM-1222, will vote against it later this week unless we have authoritative reaffirmation that GOI policy as articulated by Prime Minister remains unchanged. While NRC is aware of your report and clarification from lower level MEA officials,<sup>3</sup> it is felt that it falls short of reassuring NRC Commissioners.

3. Accordingly, request you seek appointment with Shankar and/or Vajpayee to obtain clarification Vajpayee's statement and affirmation that GOI's policy with respect to PNE's and nuclear weapons development remains unchanged. You may point out that we regret having to raise these questions once again with GOI, but Foreign Minister's interview has unfortunately raised questions in Washington and we have no alternative.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790055–0637. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Drafted by John R. Malott (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S–O and in substance by Nosenzo and Thornton; approved by Miklos.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 25801 to New Delhi, January 31, relayed to the Embassy the text of an AFP dispatch, reported by FBIS. According to the dispatch, Vajpayee stated during a January 31 interview in Bombay's weekly magazine *Blitz* that "India could not foreclose its nuclear options 'for all time to come.' He said, 'We will announce them (explosions) to the world and tell them: well, look, we are going to have these explosions, or implosions, or blasts, for peaceful purposes; and if anybody wants to see them, he will be welcome to do that, that is our position.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790047–0580)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1805 from New Delhi, February 1, reported that, despite Vajpayee's *Blitz* (a magazine that the Embassy deemed "anti-US, leftist, and notoriously sensationalist") interview, a "high-level spokesman for MEA and PM's Secretariat assure us that there is no change in the govt's non-proliferation policy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790049–0554)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2139 from New Delhi, February 7, Goheen conveyed Vajpayee's reaction to the NRC's concern regarding the *Blitz* interview, noting that Vajpayee became "somewhat upset when I raised the subject. He said that anyone who had the whole *Blitz* text should be able to see that he had not enunciated any new policy, and, besides, it should be obvious that a Foreign Minister does not have the authority to make policy contradictory to policy declared by his Prime Minister." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790058–0487)

4. FYI: You will appreciate that even if reassurances are forthcoming from GOI, we cannot guarantee that a highly skeptical NRC will act favorably on XSNM-1222. Leave it to you how to convey this without GOI getting any more upset than it probably already is.

Vance

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## 126. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, February 10, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I appreciate your letter of the 22nd December recalling the Delhi Declaration in which we jointly affirmed our faith in the democratic form of Government and the common objectives which we pursue independently of peace and stability, and mutual respect between nations of the world.<sup>2</sup> I am also deeply touched by your message<sup>3</sup> recalling with warmth and satisfaction your visit to India last year. As I was giving final touches to my reply to your letter and the message, I received your letter of the 5th February<sup>4</sup> and I thought it would be best if I also replied to your latest letter. We both have met and discussed matters of common interest twice during the last year. The continuing exchange of letters in which we have maintained our commitment to free, frank and friendly expression of our views has reinforced our personal understanding and promoted healthier respect and understanding between our Governments.

I am convinced that it is only in this way that we can continue to work for a world order in which nations, big and small, enjoy a sense of justice, fairplay and equality and thus help consolidate the fabric of peace, security and stability. Great powers have greater responsibilities. The world order will become safer for diversity and the manifold forms

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890025-2462. Secret; Personal. Daniel McHale, Director of the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat, forwarded the letter to Dodson under a February 21 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790062-1553)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 327058 to New Delhi, December 29, 1978, transmitted Carter's brief December 22 letter to Desai, in which he noted the anniversary of the Joint Declaration signed in New Delhi on January 3, 1978, during Carter's visit (see Document 92). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780538-1137)

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 124.

of Government specially democracies only if it is made secure for smaller countries. This cannot be done by some big powers seeking to create zones of influence or determining the political or economic dispensation of a region or the world at large. The international scene must be a pluralist order and attempts at international discipline must ease their competitive play on the world platform. In this, nations with constructive, peaceful and responsible roles like ours have to play a role against the forces of disruption and involvement outside their own frontiers. In our own humble way we are trying to act up to that approach.

I should like to take this opportunity to express myself on some problems which I believe are of common concern to India and USA. In my last letter, I had expressed my thoughts and anxieties at the situation in Iran.<sup>5</sup> Events moved relentlessly at a rapid pace and the Shah has had to withdraw from his country. As I write, it is not clear how the situation will develop and what Government may be finally established and whether it would soon be in a position to restore stability and rehabilitate its economy. In view of your past commitments in Iran and your stake in the uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States and the major industrial nations, it must be a matter of serious concern for you. Our relations with Iran, limited in comparison but nevertheless important, were developing well but they were primarily of an economic nature, of benefit to the two countries and directed against no other country. The recipe for resolving this difficult situation rests on the wisdom for reconciliation of the civil leaders and the armed forces of Iran.

The situation is undoubtedly of significance from the point of view of stability of the region as a whole but it does seem to me that the utmost restraint must be exercised specially by the great powers if the situation is not to deteriorate and become more dangerous. The Soviet Union perhaps also recognises the imperatives of stability in this area. In this context I do appreciate both your concern and your restraint in regard to these developments and agree with you that we must leave it to Iranians to find a way out of the thicket of troubles and confusion in which they find themselves.

With developments in Iran and change in Afghanistan and the continuing internal problems of Pakistan, there is a completely changed picture in the area west of India. The developments in each of these countries have their own distinct origin and circumstances and in none of them is the problem due to a serious external threat. We have sought to encourage Afghanistan to bend her efforts to internal developments

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 118.

and seek to encourage international cooperation to give continuing support for their efforts. They seem to be somewhat unorthodox in their modes of behaviour but I am sure that they will settle down as they gain more experience of affairs.

I must, however, express my concern at reports that, in the wake of all those developments, the United States might consider inducting or making available sophisticated arms or equipment to Pakistan either on sale or on transfer from Iran. Pakistan already has a disproportionately large armed strength. Your own declared policy is not to contribute to an arms race in the sub-continent. The experience in Iran surely teaches us that the accumulation of arms is no substitute for the resolution of domestic economic and political problems of a country.

I hope that the reports are not true but if sophisticated arms are in fact made available or the transfer of American equipment and military hardware authorised, it would be viewed in India with grave concern, and, incidentally, may hinder the quest for stability or even the protection of US economic and political interests in the region. Our approach to Pakistan is not tactical but part of an integrated policy to resolve problems and promote confidence through a good-neighbourly policy with all the countries around us. We rejoice that through mutual effort, in a reasonably short period of 18 months, the climate of relations has improved simultaneously with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We look upon this improvement as our contribution to the process of international detente in the widest sense. But I must share with you that relations with Pakistan continue to pose a problem for us even though on a personal plane mutually good feelings prevail between General Zia and me. We are trying our best to come closer but it seems that General Zia for reasons of his own cannot avoid the temptation of bringing in the question of Kashmir whenever a public pronouncement has to be made although the problem has ceased to be of any international concern and remains only a bilateral issue under the Simla Agreement.<sup>6</sup>

It is all the more a matter of regret that the movement towards stability in South East Asia which only a few months ago looked propitious should have suffered a setback in Indo-China. We had tried, in a limited way, to promote our relations with Vietnam by responding to their request for economic cooperation. We believe this was the correct policy when Vietnam, after its heroic and nationalistic struggle, faced the gigantic task of reconstruction and wanted to diversify her relations. We had also welcomed Vietnamese efforts to promote under-

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<sup>6</sup> The Simla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, ended hostilities between India and Pakistan after the 1971 crisis over East Pakistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 272 and 274.

standing and resume commercial and economic relations between the ASEAN countries and Vietnam. Though we have always recognised Kampuchea, we had withdrawn our mission when the Pol Pot regime was established and we had not made any bilateral contacts with that Government. Even if we did not comment on it, we were also distressed to hear of the brutalities and the harsh policies pursued by the Pol Pot regime after it assumed control and the Chinese attempts to bolster that harsh regime. While holding no brief for the internal policies of the Pol Pot regime, we are nevertheless distressed at the armed support for the Salvation Front in Kampuchea by Vietnam. If reports of Chinese concentration on Vietnam's border are true and if China resorts to any overt action, it would greatly exacerbate an ugly situation and the resultant situation will be fraught with serious threat to peace in this region and perhaps in the world. We would like to see that the process of building confidence between the independent countries of South East Asia should continue, making the region immune from competitive great power involvement. All countries, big and small, are sensitive about their nationalism. But with mutual respect, economic cooperation between countries can grow and help development and curb the process of insurgencies and tensions which bedevil South East Asia. In all this, I am sure, you will understand and appreciate that India is staying on course in adhering to our policies of non-alignment and the search for positive bilateral cooperation and regional stability in the whole of our continent.

I note your observations on the visit of Vice-Premier Deng to USA and greatly appreciate the sentiments you have expressed regarding Indo-US relationship.<sup>7</sup> I particularly value your remark that development of relationship with China will not in any way be at the expense of US relationship with any other nation. Nevertheless, I hope you will forgive me if I say that the enthusiastic treatment Deng received in the press—if not in official circles—might have caused dismay in the U.S.S.R. and may create complications in the conclusion of SALT-II and the CTB at this delicate stage of your negotiations with the U.S.S.R. As it is, U.S.S.R. is sensitive to any country showing the least gesture to China and vice versa and we note that they sometimes become unnecessarily sensitive on this score. I do hope, however, that you will succeed in obtaining the balance on these complex and important relationships.

Mr. President, let me dwell briefly again on the subject of our bilateral nuclear problems. We have urged your Administration, through your Embassy and our Embassy in Washington, to expedite

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 6, Document 124.



the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station by the concerned authorities in the United States. We have been concerned over the delay in the clearance of our applications; the clearance of the 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium took more than one year, while the clearance of 16.8 tonnes has taken nearly 11 months and the process of clearance of the third application is yet to begin. The Agreement for Cooperation of 1963 between our two Governments envisages timely supplies for the continuance and efficient operation of Tarapur Atomic Power Station. It is a responsibility which obviously was intended to be discharged without any unreasonable delay. The consequences of the delay affect not only the plant but the thousands of beneficiaries of the generation of power. Inevitably the good faith in the implementation of the agreement also becomes a matter in issue at least on the part of those who are keen to exploit any opportunity to throw a spanner in our relationship. In this case the public is apt to make comparison of this delay with the speed with which the U.S. Government gave its clearance to the sale of the two nuclear reactors of US design by France to the peoples Republic of China without safeguards. The technicalities of being a signatory of NPT or not, or being a recognised weapon power are not of any significance when public psychology gets affected. I am somewhat reassured by the expectations that you entertain that the supply of 16.8 tonnes of enriched uranium will be cleared shortly and there will be no further delay on this. Equally, I am encouraged by your assurance that our subsequent application for 19.8 tonnes of enriched uranium could be dealt with expeditiously.

I am also grateful for your assurance that supplies will be continued during the period provided by law. While recognising the independent character of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission I cannot help feeling that the Commission is unnecessarily inquisitorial and dilatory and does not seem to pay any heed to the fact that political and economic consequences are involved and that the delay in the discharge of contractual obligations raises suspicions of *bona fides*.

Having discussed our own nuclear problem I should also like to refer to the problem of Pakistan's nuclear development. We have reason to believe that under the cloak of some other uses Pakistan has been importing equipment openly or clandestinely which might enable it to attain a nuclear capability in directions which may not be consistent with peaceful purposes. It is also possible that your own policy to meet its wishes partially or wholly in regard to defence equipment may fail to deter or dissuade it from that course. There are rather uneasy forebodings of its efforts to acquire this capability and I am wondering whether you have information about these developments.

Should our information about nuclear developments in Pakistan get confirmed, namely that it has obtained clandestinely what it would



have been prevented from getting openly, it would, along with earlier and even now current impressions about such unauthorized exports, mean that those who have the resources, presumably because of their non-peaceful pursuits are not taking adequate precautions against pilferage or clandestine operations of subversive elements. In any case, it shows the utter ineffectiveness of the policy of confining safeguards and inspections to those countries which are committed to pursuit of nuclear research and developments for peaceful purposes.

You have also referred to the situation in West Asia. I have already indicated to you earlier my appreciation of the attitude of President Sadat. I am sorry to find that Israel has failed to make adequate response to Sadat's bold initiative and is adopting an intransigent attitude in respect of an issue on which, as far as I can see, Sadat's credibility with the other Arab powers depends. I wish Israel showed greater recognition of the realities of the problems involved in securing a peaceful existence in the midst of Arab States and the stake of world peace in the security and stability of countries in that region. It has also to appreciate that it has expanded far beyond its originally conceived frontiers and therefore the legitimacy of acquisition of the territories in which Palestinians are interested is bound to be challenged by the Arabs and questioned by the world community. I do hope that your efforts to bring them to the conference table and thereby secure a just and lasting peace in that region will be successful. I wish the meeting between Mr. Brezhnev and yourself could be arranged soon so that on this question also some understanding between both countries on how to secure that peace could be reached. I am quite prepared to help you in solving this problem in whatever way you feel I can.

I am glad that you are satisfied with the mission you entrusted to your Secretary of Commerce, Kreps. I was very glad to meet her and to find in her a sympathetic approach to our problems.<sup>8</sup> I fully appreciate your difficulties in meeting our request fully but as a country in the process of development and particularly in view of our improved relationship I feel that we are entitled to some extra consideration.

I share your view of the importance of consultation between the senior officials of our two countries on bilateral and international matters to the further build-up the fruitful and beneficent relationship between India and USA and am sure that they will benefit from the close bond that exists between us.

I much regret the length of this letter. I thought it best to deal with the issues in some detail so that you may be able fully to understand the working of my own mind on these issues.

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 117.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

(Morarji Desai)<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 127. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, February 14, 1979, 1154Z

2592. Subject: Ad Hoc Scientific Committee on Safeguards. Refs: New Delhi 2337;<sup>2</sup> State 034618.<sup>3</sup>

1. Secret-Entire text.

2. The PM received me alone this afternoon to discuss our differences on the terms of reference. He said he had always understood the scope of the committee's concern to be "non-discriminatory" and that he could never agree to an arrangement based on different treatment for weapons and non-weapons states. In these circumstances he thought the best thing was to let the committee die stillborn.

3. I indicated that I thought that would be acceptable to my government, and suggested that we should agree on a common public explanation that would be minimally damaging. Specifically, I proposed that we emphasize the importance the two countries had attached to Dr.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D840128-1824. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2337 from New Delhi, February 9, documented Goheen and Schaffer's February 8-9 negotiations with Shankar, Sethna, and Vellodi over the composition and scope of the proposed ad hoc scientific committee on safeguards. Negotiations stalled on the question of whether military nuclear facilities were to be excluded, because "the Indians would not accept any explicit undertaking either written or oral to exclude such facilities from consideration." However, the Indian officials agreed to a de facto and unspoken exclusion in the scope of the committee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-1829)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 34618 to New Delhi, February 10, authorized the Embassy to move forward with establishing the ad hoc scientific committee on safeguards based on conclusions reached in the negotiations, but only after Desai was informed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-1827)

Eklund's chairmanship as means of insuring that the committee's work both in fact and appearance not undermine confidence in the IAEA; faced with Dr. Eklund's inability to assume the chairmanship, the two countries had agreed not to constitute a committee that might have those negative results. The PM thought this was a good solution, and emphasized his desire to avoid playing up our differences.

3. When I asked if the PM would so instruct both his spokesmen and those of MEA, he said he wished to have first Washington's response to letting the idea of the committee fade away. Please advise ASAP.

4. Comments: (A) Following the Nye-Pickering visit in which the committee's terms of reference were drawn up,<sup>4</sup> I am sure that the team of Indian negotiators understood very well the limited scope we have all along envisioned for the committee. Quite clearly our interpretation, which we thought the Indians shared, was never communicated to the PM. Moreover, I learned today that he had only recently and with displeasure learned that the whole idea had originated with V. Shankar. The PM had thought he was responding to a White House initiative. (B) The PM received me in a very friendly and relaxed fashion with no others present. After we had disposed of this topic, he led me into a long conversation on other subjects (reported septel),<sup>5</sup> and closed our meeting by saying again that I should never hesitate to come see him either in his office or home even without advance notice.

**Goheen**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 115.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 128.

**128. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, February 15, 1979, 0146Z

2622. Subject: (C) Conversation With P.M. Desai.

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Summary: When I called on PM Desai on the safeguards committee problem (septel),<sup>2</sup> he led me into an extended conversation during the course of which he expressed dismay of U.S. approval of French reactor sale to PRC and the big fuss made in USA over Deng; concern about Bhutto's fate,<sup>3</sup> possible Pakistan disintegration, and the worsening state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; and an interest in Bangladesh's elections.<sup>4</sup>

3. On China: PM first asked how we could threaten nuclear fuel supply to India when we approved French sale of reactors to PRC. (This let me convey to him directly for the first time how long we had worked to discourage the sale, had managed to get peaceful uses assurances built into the transaction, and the fact that there was a less inhibited competitive bidder.) He expressed doubt that one could rely on PRC assurances. He also thought it was a mistake for the Americans to make such a big thing of Deng's U.S. visit and to give him the platform for the sorts of attacks he made there on the Soviet Union. But he also said China had "gotten somewhat better after Mao", and he agreed that it was good that China is opening up to normal contacts with other countries at last.

4. On Pakistan: The PM asked what I thought Zia would do with Bhutto. When I said that my reading of such information as I had led me to think Bhutto would be hanged, he said he thought so too. He went on to say first that if the Pak Army supported Zia in this, there would only be trouble in Sind, but later he spoke about his concern that Pakistan might disintegrate. He said he had written Zia urging clemency (not public knowledge here) and hoped we would continue to do what we can to persuade Zia. He then expressed worry over deteriorating Afghan-Pak relations. When I said they had seemed to me somewhat less bad than previously, he said he had information that Pakistan was harboring and assisting many Afghan dissidents.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790073-0310. Confidential. Sent for information to Islamabad, Dacca, Kabul, and Beijing.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 127.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 309.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 40.

Indo-Pak relations, he said, are plagued by the fact that Pakistanis have been trained for 30 years to hate India; Zia himself had said that to him when they met at Nairobi.<sup>5</sup> Zia had also told him not be troubled if he sometimes publicly voiced Pakistan's claim to Kashmir; he had to do it for internal reason. In the PM's view, Zia remains basically straightforward and well-meaning. He expressed puzzlement, however, at Zia's having forbidden Gafar Khan to come to India for medical treatment as he had wished to. India, the PM said, was not particularly eager to receive Gafar Khan, but he should have been able to come here if he wanted to.<sup>6</sup>

5. On Bangladesh: The PM expressed the view that the impending elections are a step in the right direction. Then he volunteered the fact that the opposition had approached the GOI for financial support. He rejected he said, any such interference in the internal affairs of another country.

## **Blood**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 7, Document 112.

<sup>6</sup> A Pashtun political and spiritual leader and a close friend of Mahatma Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was jailed by Bhutto and remained a political dissident under Zia.

## 129. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, February 28, 1979, 1950Z

3415. Subject: Deputy Secretary's Talks on Nuclear Issues. Ref: State 046843.<sup>2</sup>

1. In the Deputy Secretary's meeting this morning with FonSec J. Mehta, V. Shankar and Vellodi on nuclear questions three items were most noteworthy: (a) the stillborn scientific committee, (b) the GOI's sense of grievance about the delays in Tarapur fuel supply, and (c) the critical place the nuclear issue now holds in Indian public opinion. Ambassador Goheen and Secretary (West) U.S. Bajpai were also present.<sup>3</sup>

2. Initially V. Shankar appeared to be bent on revivifying the idea of the scientific committee (understandably perhaps because he was its father). After discussion, all agreed that the PM's judgment was right and that the committee should be allowed to lie stillborn; at the same time, its demise must be handled carefully so as not to highlight our differences and emphasis must be placed on the continuation of the bilateral dialogue. In other words we agreed to proceed in line with the guidance in the Deputy Secretary's scope paper,<sup>4</sup> as amended by reftel. To possible press inquiries the reply will simply be that there are still some differences with respect to the committee but the two sides are continuing their nuclear dialogue and still hope it may lead to useful results.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-1012. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Christopher was in New Delhi February 28-29. Memoranda of conversation of his meetings with Indian officials were not found. Telegram 46843 to New Delhi, February 26, discussed the Department of State briefing memorandum for Christopher's visit, noting "we believe it desirable to expand points to be made on nuclear non-proliferation to make more explicit that US would like to accomplish, though bilateral discussions, the review intended to be performed by proposed international safeguards committee." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790088-0571) The briefing memorandum was not found. Christopher also visited Islamabad March 1-2. See Documents 325 and 326.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3417 from New Delhi, February 28, summarized the informal meeting that Christopher and Mehta held before the larger bilateral meeting, during which Mehta noted the pressure that his government was under regarding the nuclear issue: "'No Indian can understand how the PRC can have a nuclear license and India not.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-1805)

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to Christopher's briefing memorandum. See footnote 2 above.

3. Shankar and Vellodi then exposed the Deputy Secretary at some length to the bitterness which Indians feel about the delays in licensing of Tarapur fuel.<sup>5</sup> Among the points they made were the following. The average Member of Parliament cannot comprehend the American distinction between the NRC and the Executive. Clearly the US is not acting in the spirit of the original Tarapur agreement.

4. Consequently there is a strong and widespread feeling that the USG is not fulfilling an obligation that it can and should fulfill. There is outrage that the NRC should question the adequacy of the assurances given by India's Prime Minister. Moreover, the delay on the current application has forced the closing of the Hyderabad fuel complex since December 15. When and if the application is granted, the delay will compel India to bear the added expenses of lifting the fuel by air, as it also had to do with the last shipment. The US stand on re-processing has forced them to expend some \$2 million on new storage arrangements for Tarapur, etc. Shankar, in particular, stressed the critical questioning that the government has been encountering in Parliament. He asserted that public attitudes toward our nuclear relationship are hardening (adversely) and that time is running out on our efforts to protect it and keep it alive.

5. Vellodi asked how the Deputy Secretary thought Congress might react to another Presidential waiver if that proves necessary. The Deputy Secretary avoided predicting how either the President or Congress might act if the NRC turns down the current application. He brought out instead that there was also strong public opinion bearing on these issues in the US.

6. CTB and SALT II. Vellodi spoke of the need on our side for some movement against vertical proliferation. The Deputy Secretary spoke with restrained optimism about our hopes for both SALT II and a CTB. Vellodi expressed dismay that no efforts have been made to

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<sup>5</sup> In a February 24 memorandum for the record of a meeting with Carter, Christopher noted: "In connection with the nuclear matter, the President said that he was inclined to give the Indians a limited amount of fuel under the proper circumstances. He asked about the action of the NRC and I told him it was difficult to predict the outcome although we were slightly optimistic. He asked whether Jerry Smith had a close reading of the NRC and I told him I thought that the NRC was an agency whose actions are particularly difficult to predict." Christopher underlined the words "he was inclined to give the Indians a limited amount of fuel," and, in the right-hand margin next to it, wrote: "Hold in reserve—We may need it later." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 1, Presidential Meetings)

inform the UN's CCD on the progress of negotiations or when it might expect the CTB to come before it.<sup>6</sup>

Goheen

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<sup>6</sup> According to telegram 3643 from New Delhi, March 2, which summarized the MEA's spokesman's March 2 statements to the press, the Indian Government highlighted differences between India and the United States during the bilateral discussions. The Embassy found that such a tactic "would appear to be an effort by Indian side to emphasize for domestic audience that GOI presented strong positions during Christopher visit and that GOI is maintaining independent position on issues of importance to India. Spokesman's line may also reflect reaction on part FonSec Mehta to recent public allegations that he is pro-US." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790095-0319)

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### 130. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, February 28, 1979, 1951Z

3416. For Secretary From Christopher. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Meeting With P.M. Desai.

When Bob Goheen and I met with Desai for 45 minutes at 7:30 p.m., we found him spirited and full of talk. He has been defending himself today against allegations that he is taking a U.S. line on various issues, and he gave us his best non-aligned defense.

1. I complimented him on his balanced approach to Indochina (it was revealed today that he has urged the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia) and I told him that I knew President Carter would be pleased in light of his comments to me last Saturday.<sup>2</sup> He countered

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-1809. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In his February 24 memorandum for the record (see footnote 5, Document 129), Christopher recorded Carter's instructions to him: "Try to obtain from the Prime Minister or Vajpayee the nature of assurances that might have been given with respect to the scope and time limit of the Chinese action." In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Christopher wrote: "This just with Vajpayee." Christopher also noted: "The President indicated that I should encourage the Prime Minister to move toward a balanced reaction with respect to the fighting in Indo-China." Christopher underlined the words "balanced reaction" and, in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, wrote: "Yes! No cop outs for NAM leaders."



that the two situations were unrelated and not comparable, with the Chinese far more at fault and the Vietnamese having been wrong but in a good cause. He finally agreed that the two adventures, whether or not related, posed a dangerous threat of escalation. He implied but did not say that he had counseled restraint on the Soviets but he said they would not long stand by and watch Vietnam punished.

2. Desai urged that SALT be “clinched” as soon as possible. He reiterated that the US-Soviet relationship is the most important, and strongly in need of bolstering. He said President Carter and Brezhnev should meet promptly, but doubted that Brezhnev could travel to the United States. He indicated that Brezhnev’s condition may not permit him to fly.

3. Although Desai described it as a disagreement among friends, Desai gave us a good working over on the nuclear supply issue. He added the Framatome sale to the usual litany of discriminations.<sup>3</sup> The nuclear issue is topic no. 1 in the local press, and he is being pressed to take increasingly harsh positions to defend himself (today he said that of course he would not permit inspections in India by another country). I think we can keep the issue from boiling over for a few weeks, but not for long.

4. On Pakistan, he said he met with President Zia at Kenyatta’s funeral and tried to warm up the relationship.<sup>4</sup> He feels he made no progress, especially since Pakistan appears hell bent on the nuclear option. I told him the President hoped he would make an extra effort to develop a closer relationship in light of India’s strong position in the region. He gave us the usual treatment on arms sales to the Paks and we gave him the usual answers.<sup>5</sup>

5. Like almost everyone here, Desai is deeply worried over the risk of escalation in Indochina. He wonders how China can back off from what he regards as a foolish and high risk endeavor. It is no help that Vajpayee was in Peking when the attack started, but it is the substance of the dangerous situation that concerns him most.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The French reactors sold to China would be engineered and built by Framatome. See footnote 7, Document 121.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 112.

<sup>5</sup> In his February 24 memorandum for the record, Christopher noted: “The President indicated that I should urge Prime Minister Desai to take the initiative in seeking a closer relationship with Pakistan. The President said that even though the Indians may feel that President Zia is not in a strong position, that should not prevent them from taking initiatives toward further conciliation.” In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Christopher wrote: “A theme with one and all—*privately*.”

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 7, Document 124. According to his February 24 memorandum for the record, Christopher “explained to the President the adverse Indian reaction to the commencement of the China attack at the time that Vajpayee was in Peking, and he said he understood that this would cause apprehension among the Indians.”

6. Desai's respect and affection for President Carter will carry him through specific disappointments, but his testy and feisty mood tonight was a good reminder that he is a friend but not an ally.

Goheen

### 131. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, March 3, 1979, 0703Z

3650. Subject: DepSec's Visit to India: Second Plenary Bilateral Discussion, March 1. Ref: New Delhi 3541;<sup>2</sup> Karachi 1316.<sup>3</sup>

1. S-Entire text.

2. Summary. At the second plenary round, Indian Foreign Secretary Mehta reiterated the strong Indian public feeling about the supply of US arms to Pakistan, and said it would be "unfortunate" if this issue were to become a revived complication in Indo-US relations. Efforts by the US side to explain the limited extent of our projected arms supply program and the primacy in US-Pak relations of economic assistance seemed to make little impact on the Indians. The Indians stressed their interest in the stability of Pakistan and in improved Indo-Pak relations. The two sides differed in their assessment of Afghanistan. In the Indian view, it would not be helpful for either India or others markedly to reduce economic relations with Afghanistan, though they understood US reaction to the death of Ambassador Dubs.<sup>4</sup> Touching briefly again on Pak nuclear intentions, the Indians said that the US would have to make a judgement on these and on Indian intentions. They urged that this should be done without any discrimination. They

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790097-0048. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Reference presumably should be to telegram 3516 from New Delhi, March 1, which reported the first plenary meeting between Christopher and Mehta on February 28: "After general overview statements by both principals, discussion concentrated on China, Vietnam and Kampuchea, Sino-U.S. relations, Sino-Indian relations, Indo-Soviet relations and U.S.- Soviet relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1316 from Karachi, March 2, transmitted revisions to the memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Christopher and Mehta in New Delhi on March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790096-0489)

<sup>4</sup> Dubs was kidnapped and killed on February 14 in Kabul.

said in this context that the US should recognize that “a sense of frustration” could lead to a reversal of Indian nuclear policy. The Indians reacted negatively to the US suggestion that the elastic definition of the NAM to include countries which did not seem non-aligned could discredit the movement. They maintained that the NAM was not institutionalized and that it was best for all members to say their piece. They welcomed prospective Iranian membership in the movement. The Indians took a hard line on SANWFZ,<sup>5</sup> maintaining that in supporting the proposal the US was not reciprocating the attention to national sensitivities the GOI had shown on such issues important to the US as Puerto Rico.<sup>6</sup> End summary

3. DepSec and Foreign Secretary Mehta held a second plenary bilateral discussion on the morning of March 1. The main subjects covered in the hour and forty minute session included India’s relations with its South Asian neighbors; US military supplies to Pakistan; Pak nuclear intentions; Afghanistan; the Non-Aligned Movement; Iran; the Indian Ocean; and the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In addition to DepSec, US participants were Ambassador Goheen, Thomas Thornton of the NSC, Deputy Director S/P Paul Kreisberg; NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Jack Miklos; John Trattner; Stephen Oxman; and Pol Counselor Howard Schaffer. Mehta was assisted by MEA Secretaries U.S. Bajpai and M.A. Vellodi, Additional Secretary Gonçalves, and Joint Secretaries I.P. Singh, P.P. D’Souza, and A.R. Deo.

4. Regional relations. Mehta expressed satisfaction with the success of GOI efforts to improve relations with its subcontinental neighbors. Progress had been beyond Indian expectations. He touched briefly on economic policy concessions the GOI had made to Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka as part of these efforts. With the elections now completed in Bangladesh, the GOI hoped that there would be even further improvement in Indo-Bangladesh ties. Mehta thought that this GOI policy of improving relations with all its South Asian neighbors should help Pakistan understand the credibility of India’s desire for regional stability and the exclusion of competitive outside involvement.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 4 and footnote 4, Document 82. On December 14, 1978, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 33/65 endorsing the Pakistani proposal for a SANWFZ. The United States voted for the resolution; India voted against it. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 93–94)

<sup>6</sup> In August 1978, the United States sought Indian support in preventing Cuba’s resolution to declare Puerto Rico a non-self-governing territory (i.e., a colony) from coming to a vote in the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization. Telegram 11908 from New Delhi, August 4, 1978, reported Vellodi’s assurances that India would support the U.S. position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321–0828)

5. Pakistan. Mehta stressed Indian interest in Pak stability and GOI efforts such as the visit to Pakistan last year of FonMin Vajpayee to improve relations. Aware of Pak anxieties about Afghanistan, the Indians had sought immediately after the revolution there to reassure the GOP that they would not exploit the situation. India had accepted that Pakistan was entitled to join the Non-Aligned Movement if it left CENTO and was adhering to this position despite Afghan complaints. It did not wish to interfere in Pakistan and was being careful not to take steps which could damage the credibility of this policy. It wanted greater economic cooperation with Pakistan. In the final analysis, it would be for Pakistan to decide whether this Indian approach was a positive one which could allow the Paks to address themselves to the many internal problems they face.

6. Arms to Pakistan. Mehta reiterated that the Indian public feels strongly about the supply of US arms to Pakistan. It cannot be denied that this has complicated Indo-US relations. The GOI did not want this complication. In this context, he argued that no one wanted Pakistan to disarm, but that Pakistan did not require an army larger than the force it had maintained before the establishment of Bangladesh. (He and his colleagues sought to brush aside the point, made by the US side, that the Paks had kept very limited forces in the East Wing before 1971.) He maintained that the lesson of Iran suggested that military power is irrelevant to the quest for internal stability. Pakistan faced major internal problems, and without some means of addressing these, military strength would not matter. He also mentioned that the sale to Pakistan by the US of Gearing class destroyers at low prices had created the impression that the US was subsidizing such sales.<sup>7</sup> The US had spoken of arms sales and not arms aid, but if it was confirmed that there was an element of subsidy, this would have a reaction in India.

7. Mehta said that by contrast with Pakistan, Indian armed forces were being kept down in numbers. The GOI was trying to keep a careful balance between its extensive defense obligations and what its economy could stand. If it was modernizing its forces, this was because it had to replace old equipment; he cited the Jaguar purchase as an example.<sup>8</sup> But Indian defense expenditures remained a relatively small proportion of GNP. In determining defense spending levels, Mehta maintained, India was not thinking of itself as a regional power but was concerned only with the defense of India itself.

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 340.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 141.

8. The Deputy Secretary observed that it was the US perception that India has a clear military superiority over Pakistan and that this is widening. Thornton added that we were not criticizing this, since we do not believe in light of India's size and other factors that numbers should be at issue. He said that we also accept and have commented favorably on GOI policy toward its neighbors. He suggested, however, that there was an inconsistency between the reasonable statement the GOI can make about the purchase of Jaguars and the Indian public's concern that the Paks may replace their old F-86s with F-5Es. He stressed that the USG does not want a major arms relationship with the sub-continent, but that if we sell nothing to Pakistan at all this could damage the minimal national self-confidence it requires. He denied there was any element of subsidy in US arms sales to GOP. Ambassador Goheen stated that it was irrelevant to cite the Iranian experience as an analogy. The US is not talking about building up Pakistan as a major regional power. It is focussing on development and food assistance and has only limited military sales in mind. We must respect the GOP's need to be able to provide for national security and demonstrate this to its people.

9. Mehta recognized the difference between Iran and Pakistan and agreed that the problem of national self-confidence is one which every country must solve for itself. But he warned that judgments as to what was necessary for national self-confidence could be irrational. He said that US should take into account what India was trying to do in making its judgement. But it was only fair to say that it would be unfortunate if US arms supplies to Pakistan were to become a revived complication in Indo-US relations.

10. Mehta also touched briefly on Pak nuclear intentions, a concern the DepSec said the US shared. Mehta said the US would have to make a judgement on both Indian and Pak intentions. India would not be happy with anything that looked liked discrimination, nor would the Indian public accept this. The US should recognize that "a sense of frustration" could lead to a reversal of Indian nuclear policy. Ambassador Goheen pointed out that the US did not discriminate between India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue. If the Paks went for nuclear weapons, any assistance we were providing them would end.

11. Afghanistan. DepSec reviewed US perceptions of Afghanistan. The regime was moving closer and closer to the Soviet Union; the country was under increasingly rigid controls; the DRA was becoming less interested in dialogue or contacts with the West; it has some difficulties with dissident groups within the country; it now has scarcely any qualifications for responsible membership in the Non-Aligned Movement by the definition of the NAM as the USG understands this. When the govt changed last year the USG was rather prompt in recognizing

it. The US had had misgivings, but had maintained various programs in order to have the opportunity to keep open lines of communication and to keep the DRA from falling into the Soviet orbit. Leaving aside the tragic death of Ambassador Dubs, the US experience has been disillusioning. Given the way the DRA appears to feel about the US and its lack of interest in contacts, we are cutting back our economic assistance programs and closing down our military training programs. Because the USG does not want to burn all bridges, it will maintain some programs concerned with meeting basic human needs.

12. Expressing his regret at the death of Ambassador Dubs, Mehta said India assessed the Afghanistan situation differently. He recalled that while the new Afghan Government had for ideological and other reasons turned first to the Soviet Bloc, it had also scrutinized what India had been doing in the country and had decided to continue the relationship. India hopes to carry this on. Its approach to Afghanistan is response-oriented. In its view it would not be helpful for either India or others markedly to reduce economic relations with Afghanistan, though he could understand the reaction in the US following the death of Ambassador Dubs.

13. Mehta thought that the DRA, though broadly in control, faces problems inside the country. Afghanistan, in his view, has its own characteristics, and must find its own basis. It wished to be in the NAM and to maintain diversified economic links. He recognized that it was advantageous for the Soviet Union to have the DRA in power, but questioned whether Moscow had a complete identity of interest with the DRA. He cited Kabul's attitude toward the integrity of Pakistan as an example of a difference between them. He said the Pak-Afghan problem was not now active, and thought that the activation of it by either side would only be counter-productive. Pakistan's concern about Afghanistan was mixed up with its domestic problems, but in any event the GOP has the military capability to deal with any threat.

14. The Non-Aligned Movement. The DepSec said the US was puzzled by the utterly elastic definition of the "non-aligned" concept, and suggested that India should consider if the NAM was not being discredited because of inclusion within it of countries whose policies were so foreign from what is understood as the philosophy of the movement. He suggested that India might seek to prevent the leadership of the NAM from falling into the hands of those who might discredit it.

15. Mehta reacted negatively to this approach. He took the line that the NAM was not institutionalized, and that there was no mechanism to read countries out of the movement. He stressed that the NAM comprises independent countries which can adopt any line they wish and are not subject to discipline. The answer to the problems posed

to the NAM—he mentioned, seemingly in this context, those who want the movement to associate with the anti-imperialist camp—was not for members to stay away but to say their piece. He noted that India discourages the use of the NAM to further bilateral objectives and does not do so itself. When the DepSec said he hoped that India would continue to provide leadership to the NAM, Mehta replied that the movement had no leadership.

16. Iran. The DepSec said that the US had good relations with the new Iranian Government and noted the latter's helpfulness in the evacuation of Americans from Iran and in the prompt action it took when Embassy Tehran was overrun. The US has maintained contacts with some high officials of the government and while relations will not, for a long time if ever, be the same as with the Shah, we are pleased to have a dialogue going. The government faces severe economic and law and order problems. We wish them well, but do not want to hurry them. If they call for US experts and spare parts to maintain the military equipment in which we believe they take a nationalist pride, we will be responsive. In foreign policy, the US expects that Iran will join the NAM and move closer to the Arabs than they had in the past.

17. Mehta observed that the Iranians have to find a balance as to what extent Islam will determine social and economic policies. The immediate problem was law and order. Bazargan was trying to build a national consensus and trying to get the economy going. The developments which had taken place in Iran were primarily domestic in origin. The Soviet Union had been cautious, and may not want too much instability there. Mehta noted that the Iranians had hinted they would pursue a foreign policy more akin to the Non-Aligned Movement. India would welcome Iran into the NAM, not because the NAM was a bloc to be strengthened but because Iran's new character had to be reflected in its foreign policy. On Iran's regional role, Mehta thought this would be less grandiose. There was no shortcut to regional stability. The problem—and India was not advocating any particular approach—was how the countries of the Gulf associate themselves to maintain regional strength. In any event, stability was not military stability only; this was an ingredient but not the only thing.

18. Mehta touched briefly on India's oil import problems. The DepSec recalled that the USG had approached the Saudis on India's behalf.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The 1979 Iranian Revolution caused a sharp decline in importation of Iranian oil to India. Facing a potential energy crisis, the Government of India approached the United States to intercede with Saudi Arabia in order to facilitate the importation of Saudi oil to India. Telegram 3332 from New Delhi, February 27, reported Indian news reports of Saudi Arabia's agreement to supply India with oil. The telegram also conveyed the Indian Government's gratitude to the United States for its role in helping avert an energy crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790089–0887)



19. SANWFZ and the Indian Ocean. MEA Secretary Vellodi took a very tough line with the US side when restating GOI opposition to SANWFZ. He expressed disappointment and concern that the USG would support the proposal, an issue so sensitive for the GOI and Indian public opinion. He said that India had taken US sensitivities into account on such issues as Puerto Rico and this had not been reciprocated. He expressed the hope that the US would abstain. On the Indian Ocean, Vellodi recalled that Foreign Minister Vajpayee had been given to understand by Secretary Vance in October that Vance hoped the US-Soviet talks would be resumed.<sup>10</sup> The subject came up with increasing frequency in India.

20. MTN. The DepSec noted that we were nearing the end of the MTN. He hoped that GOI support would be forthcoming, that an agreement could be worked out, and that India could sign the code under discussion.

21. Department please send info to other posts as appropriate.

**Goheen**

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<sup>10</sup> As reported in telegram Secto 11020 from USUN, October 2, 1978, Vance expressed this hope to Vajpayee on October 2, 1978, at the United Nations in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402-1252)

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### **132. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Kosygin's Visit to India:* Although Kosygin had only mixed success in his visit with Desai,<sup>2</sup> he succeeded in laying the ground-work for a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 3/26/79-3/31/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Carter wrote: "Zbig" and initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Kosygin visited New Delhi March 13-15.



major embarrassment to us. Not only did he offer to build a huge (1 million kw) atomic thermal station for the Indians, but also specifically offered to supply fuel for Tarapur when we pull out. Kosygin agreed that this would entail no safeguards beyond the ones now on Tarapur. The Soviets have thus positioned themselves to extract full benefits when (as appears inevitable) we have to break the Tarapur contract.<sup>3</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Let Soviets supply fuel—ok w/me."

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### 133. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 5, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of February 10.<sup>2</sup> Since it arrived, there have been several developments of great significance for our shared interests, and Warren Christopher has reported to me on his talks with you and with members of your Government.<sup>3</sup> In this letter I would like to focus on several specific issues.

First, however, let me say how pleased I was that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concurred in our recommendation and approved the provision of 16.8 tons of fuel for Tarapur.<sup>4</sup> On March 28, the Executive Branch forwarded to the Commission our favorable recommendation on the next application for 19.6 tons of fuel. I will do all that I properly can to ensure rapid approval.

I appreciate your candor in raising the Pakistani nuclear problem with me and in sharing information available to you. Pakistan is clearly engaged in a significant effort to build a uranium enrichment plant which would give it a capability of developing nuclear explosives. Our best assessment is that it will be several years before Pakistan will be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 1–5/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 126.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 129–131.

<sup>4</sup> The NRC approved the license on March 23.

able to produce enough material for a nuclear explosive device, rather than the six months cited in your Government's analysis.

We have been very active in seeking to forestall the Pakistani program. We have talked to all the countries exporting sensitive nuclear equipment, urging them to enforce existing export controls and to apply stricter ones where necessary. We have reviewed our own procedures as well. While the response from supplier nations has been good, we must face the fact that at best these efforts will probably only delay Pakistan's program.

I do not believe that the Pakistani program demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a safeguards and inspection program. On the contrary, it is the absence of safeguards that has made Pakistan's clandestine effort easier. As you know, Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept safeguards which are also acceptable to India. Whether, in fact, it would do so has never been tested.

We have the entire Pakistani nuclear issue under review and will be in touch with you, with the Pakistanis, and with others in the near future to discuss further how the problem can be dealt with in ways that contribute to the stability of South Asia and to the overall goal of non-proliferation. I would be very grateful if you have any suggestions that you could share with me. The positions that you have taken on nuclear weapons and explosives encourage me in the belief that this difficult question can be solved.

I understand and sympathize with the problems you confront. Placing limits on national flexibility as you have done requires the courage of principle. I face similar problems with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. But we are trying our utmost to do our share in this common endeavor. I am striving to complete this important agreement in the very near future and to obtain its ratification by our Congress. No other objective will receive more of my personal effort and determination than assuring this central contribution to arms control and global peace. We also continue to work toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and will be concentrating more intensively on this matter once a SALT Treaty is reached.

Another major issue that concerns us both is the situation in Afghanistan. I am deeply troubled by the growing scope of Soviet involvement there and have been angered by Soviet allegations that the United States is involved in stimulating the opposition to the Afghan regime. I can assure you that these allegations are false. Based on the information available to us, I also do not believe that the Pakistanis or the Iranians have been involved in any significant way. The uprisings in Afghanistan apparently reflect the discontent of large segments of the Afghan people, particularly their concern that an atheistic government will restrict their freedom of religion.

Reiteration of allegations of foreign involvement, which the Soviets must know are untrue, leads me to the conclusion that they are rationalizing their own involvement and, more disturbingly, laying the propaganda groundwork for a much more extensive insertion of Soviet military power. We have called on the Soviets to desist and to allow the Afghans to settle their own internal affairs. I hope that you will be making the same point to them. I share your goal of keeping external forces out of South Asia. The actions and statements of the Soviets are incompatible with this objective and with the behavior that should be expected from great powers, as you so eloquently set forth at the beginning of your letter.

The barely veiled threats that the Soviets are making to Pakistan have raised legitimate security concerns in Islamabad. Those of us who wish Pakistan well should consider how these concerns (which also affect Pakistan's nuclear aspirations) can best be alleviated.

I agree with you that sophisticated military equipment is not the answer to all of Pakistan's security concerns. At the same time, however, if I may be completely candid, I do not believe that simply telling Pakistan to improve its relations with Afghanistan is a relevant or adequate response to the situation that has emerged. Nor can long-term internal reforms, desirable though they may be, alleviate urgent short-term security concerns. It is critical that we discuss these questions in a straightforward manner, lest we inadvertently create problems for each other. Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit should give us an opportunity for further explorations of each other's views.<sup>5</sup>

You will recall that when I was flying back from Cairo on March 14, I asked Ambassador Goheen to brief you on the results of my visit to the Middle East and to express my firm conviction that the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty represents major progress towards the achievement of one comprehensive peace settlement that we envisioned in the Camp David accords.<sup>6</sup> I know that the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty will be criticized by some, but I also know you will understand that this treaty is the indispensable first step on the long and arduous path toward peace in the Middle East. The reactions of other nations in the region may well pose difficult challenges to us. I hope that we may count on your support in the months ahead as new relationships are built in the region and as we move closer to the comprehensive peace settlement that we all desire.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 138.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 62315 to multiple posts, March 14, instructed the Ambassador or Chargé of each receiving post to deliver an oral message from Carter that described the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty during Carter's trip to the Middle East March 7–13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0927)

Just as I was completing this letter, your letter of March 24 arrived.<sup>7</sup> It raises several important issues that I will want to respond to in detail. I do not want to delay sending this, however, so I will be in further touch with you shortly on Southeast Asia and the other matters that you raise.

Sincerely,<sup>8</sup>

Jimmy Carter

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<sup>7</sup> Desai's March 24 letter to Carter addressed India's relations with the Soviet Union and China, as well as various international and regional issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890026-0261)

<sup>8</sup> Carter handwrote a postscript at the end of the letter: "P.S. It would be very gratifying to see you and General Zia or other top officials of India and Pakistan begin direct discussions of problem issues. *Why not?* J.C." At the top of the first page of the letter, Inderfurth wrote: "ZB, See the President's P.S. It is the *best* P.S. I have seen in two years. Rick." Brzezinski wrote beneath Inderfurth's note: "We talked about it. ZB."

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#### 134. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*Indian Reaction to U.S. Aid Cutoff to Pakistan:* The decision to cut off aid to Pakistan<sup>2</sup> is interpreted in New Delhi as confirmation that Islamabad is developing nuclear weapons. As a result, CIA believes the Desai government's stated policy not to develop a nuclear arsenal will probably be subjected to heavy pressure. Although New Delhi has not yet made an official statement, the government is likely to be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 4/1/79-4/6/79. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote: "Zbig" and initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 335.

pressed in Parliament for an official assessment of the implications for its own nuclear program.<sup>3</sup> (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Tell Cy to try to head this off—We’re losing both ways.”

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### **135. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 23, 1979

#### **SUBJECT**

Your Meetings with Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee (U)

#### *The Setting*

We are at a critical stage in our relations with India. The personal relationship that you have established with Desai has had to carry the main burden of the relationship. In more specific areas, it is not in very good shape and the prospects are for further, possibly drastic, deterioration.

—Our inability to convince India to accept full-scope safeguards is likely to lead to a cutoff of fuel for Tarapur next Spring. The Indian press purveys almost daily anti-American pieces on this theme, and Desai is under intense pressure because of the “failure” of his relationship with you to produce benefits for India in this area. If we cut off the Tarapur supply there is a good chance that the Soviets will replace us and the Indians may assert unilaterally their right to reprocess the spent fuel that has been produced at Tarapur. On top of this, pressures on Desai are already nearly irresistible to change his no-bomb policy in light of the Pakistani program.<sup>2</sup>

—Desai’s (and especially Vajpayee’s) initiative in opening to China has been substantially discredited by the Chinese attack on Vietnam which many Indians see as proof that the Chinese will someday renew their attacks on India. Our normalization with China, meanwhile, is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, Vajpayee Visit: 3–5/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum

<sup>2</sup> [text not declassified]

seen as a threat, presaging a further decline in US interest in India. In specifics, the Indians see China getting the investment, technology and weaponry that India should be getting from the West.

—The Indians are acutely concerned that we may be about to tilt again towards Pakistan as a result of our concern over the Soviet regional threat and our need for intelligence facilities. They are particularly sensitive to US arms sales to Pakistan; even more worried that we will have joint security arrangements that would once again embolden Pakistan to behave aggressively towards India. The Indians also fear that our preoccupation with the Soviet threat will lead to US military buildups in the Indian Ocean.

—Although the Indians and Soviets have their differences, Kosygin's recent visit made a favorable impression and the Desai Government has been made increasingly aware that the Soviets are their only reliable support against China; their only viable source for sophisticated arms; and potentially their fall-back for supply to Tarapur. The Soviets' inability to provide much in the economic area weighs little in light of large Indian foreign exchange reserves and the inability of India to attract Western capital.

—Domestically, Desai's Government has been a disappointment. It is under heavy fire from Mrs. Gandhi and others, and the pro-US tilt that Desai sought to introduce is a particular target of attack—especially as it is seen as having been unproductive.

There are certainly positive developments in the relationship, notably in trade and in general civility of tone. Also, we are reintroducing an aid program.<sup>3</sup> These, however, are not the focus of attention.<sup>4</sup>

Seen from our perspective, the situation is also less than optimal. There have been very few changes in the substance of Indian positions in multilateral fora; Desai has remained rigid on nuclear matters; and India has not opened up to US investment much more than was the case under Mrs. Gandhi. Principally we still benefit from something India is doing in its own interest—keeping the Soviets at arms length and its keeping South Asia quiet, coupled with genuine attempts to cement good relations with all of its neighbors including Pakistan. The Indians have been unwilling, however, to engage in frank discussions of South Asian security matters with us (notably during Warren Christopher's visit), or to recognize that we have any security interests in Pakistan.

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<sup>3</sup> Despite some protests from Congress (see footnote 11, Document 96), the United States resumed aid to India, which, according to telegram 320064 to New Delhi, December 20, 1978, was set in the amount of \$135 million for FY 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526-0593)

<sup>4</sup> In an April 17 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton addressed the issue of the U.S. relationship with India, noting, "What does *not* need to be done is more aid money. The Indians are totally uninterested." In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "I agree." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78-12/79)

*Main Themes*

The attached State Department briefing memorandum<sup>5</sup> sets forth a series of issues that you might want to raise with Vajpayee. The time available is short, however, and I recommend that you focus fairly narrowly along these lines:

—We are concerned with two sets of developments in South Asia. The first is the real change in the Soviet potential for involvement in the region following the coup in Afghanistan. The other is the threat of a nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent. We know what the Pakistanis are doing, and we know the pressures that will build up in India if the Pakistanis move close to a nuclear capability.<sup>6</sup>

—The United States has no desire to play a leading role in South Asia. It is clear that India is the only country that can appropriately do that. That is why we look to India to provide the kind of leadership that will keep South Asia stable and reduce the temptation for outsiders to become involved. We too are the largest power in our region and know how difficult it is to provide leadership without causing resentment. It is a task, however, that cannot be avoided.

—On the nuclear front, what ideas does India have about removing the pressures that have impelled Pakistan to develop a nuclear explosive capability? This is a global problem of great concern to us. It must be of even greater concern to India in the regional context. A regional solution must be found. I suggested to Prime Minister Desai that direct contacts might be of use.<sup>7</sup> Would he be interested in pursuing this and could I be of help?

—On the broader issue of regional stability, how does India propose to deal with Pakistan's legitimate security concerns? The extension of Soviet power into Afghanistan cannot be ignored, and repeated false Soviet allegations of Pakistani backing for the Afghan insurgency can only be seen as threatening. Military equipment is only a small part of the answer. Pakistan needs a broader sense of security. We are trying to contribute to that, but again, India's role is much more significant. We do not think that there is enough time to wait until generations pass and Pakistani distrust of India subsides. We, for our part, will continue to make clear to the Pakistanis that we do not share their belief that India is a threat to them.

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is an April 21 memorandum from Christopher to Carter. A copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, Vajpayee Visit: 3–5/79.

<sup>6</sup> In his April 21 briefing memorandum to Carter on Vajpayee's visit (see footnote 5 above), Christopher reported: "We understand from intelligence sources that Vajpayee's primary objective will be to get US assurances that we will not support Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. He will say that India's policy not to develop nuclear weapons remains firm and Pakistan has no cause for concern. Unfortunately, this position does not deal with the safeguards issue which Pakistan will certainly raise if it is prepared to negotiate at all."

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 8, Document 133.

These are the main themes that you should pursue. You may want to touch on the following points, but I suggest that you do so by working them into the main lines of your presentation. Cy and I will cover them in detail in our private discussions with Vajpayee:

—We are pursuing SALT and CTB vigorously.

—We do not foresee any massive military buildup in the Indian Ocean region.

—We were disappointed by India's negative attitude on the Israel-Egypt treaty.<sup>8</sup>

—We have a positive attitude toward the Non-Aligned Movement but are concerned at attempts to push it towards the Soviets. We hope India will be successful in defeating these attempts.

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<sup>8</sup> Telegram 5690 from New Delhi, April 3, reported Vajpayee's statement in the Lok Sabha criticizing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790158-0749)

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**136. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the  
National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant  
for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, April 24, 1979

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 44, Proliferation: India: 2/76-5/79. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]



**137. Note From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1979

Zbig:

Having read Vajpayee's brief, I see no reason whatsoever for the President to subject himself to those half-assed arguments in the sanctimonious way they undoubtedly will be delivered. I therefore strongly question whether the President should see him at all. You may remember he didn't want to begin with and, since we are not going to get a thing out of it, I would strongly suggest that the President simply cancel him out.

Since the meeting is only 1½ hours away, I thought I should have this note delivered in to you to see if you agree.<sup>2</sup>

**David Aaron<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, David Aaron, Box 216, Aaron, David: Chron File, 4/1979. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote: "DA, Too late—& it's needed for other reasons. ZB."

<sup>3</sup> Aaron signed "David" above his typed signature.

138. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 24, 1979, 9:45 a.m.

## SUBJECT

Meeting with Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee

## PARTICIPANTS

*INDIA*

Foreign Minister Vajpayee  
 Ambassador N.A. Palkhivala  
 Foreign Secretary Mehta  
 A.B. Gokhale, Minister  
 G. Parthasarathy, Counselor  
 B.B. D'Souza, Ministry of External  
 Affairs

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
 Ambassador Robert F. Goheen  
 Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant  
 Secretary, OES  
 Harold H. Saunders, Assistant  
 Secretary, NEA  
 Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant  
 Secretary, NEA  
 Peter W. Lande, NEA/INS  
 (Notetaker)

*SECRETARY VANCE:* May I open this meeting by stating that I look forward to a wide range of discussions on a large number of issues. I would like to stress that the U.S. attaches the greatest importance to its relations with India. We will not always agree on every issue with India but we share the same values. Which issue would you like to address first?

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* I would like to discuss the nuclear issue first. We are grateful that another shipment of enriched fuel has been approved for Tarapur. We hope the next shipment will also be approved. Indeed, we hope that there will be a continuing supply relationship past 1980.

Pakistan is causing some problems in the nuclear area and we do not know why they are seeking a nuclear capability. They are not seeking this capability for peaceful purposes only. We would like to see the Pakistani program stopped. I do not know how this can be done. Pakistan's problems are economic and political. India is not a threat to Pakistan. Our policy is to reassure Pakistan of India's good intentions. We thought we had succeeded in doing so. We wish Pakistan well.

We don't know who is financing Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan cannot sustain such a program economically and it has no military

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lande; approved on April 27 by Wisner. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

justification. Prime Minister Desai has invited General Zia to come to Delhi. If he agrees, all questions can be considered.

We are concerned about attempts to equate Pakistan and India. This would be unfair since Pakistan's program has a military purpose while India's program is peaceful. Public opinion will not accept any attempt to use Pakistan's non-peaceful program as a means to put pressure on India.

We share your objectives in preventing further proliferation of weapons. India has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. However, vertical proliferation continues.

Pakistan may argue that India's 1974 nuclear explosion justifies Pakistan's current activities. This argument is not convincing. India is using restraint in not developing nuclear weapons despite China's weapons program, including testing. If India can use restraint, why can't the Pakistanis? We do not have nuclear weapons. Now is not the time to offer carrots to Pakistan. Pakistan does not need military hardware vis a vis Afghanistan. We will discuss the Afghanistan situation later. How can the U.S. persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program?

Last year when Prime Minister Desai visited Washington, he had discussed the CTB with President Carter.<sup>2</sup> Now the CTB appears to be relegated to the background. If there were real and genuine progress on a CTB and SALT II, arrangements could be devised, including safeguards, for all countries.

We note that you have stopped economic assistance to Pakistan but understand that you are proposing to make military sales.<sup>3</sup>

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Our intelligence agrees with your's on the nature and objectives of Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan is several years away from an explosion. However, it is easier to deal with this problem now than later. We are working with other countries to try to deal with this problem. While earlier the primary problem was reprocessing, it is now enrichment. International cooperation has been good but we have not yet been successful in bringing the Pakistani program to a halt. The Pakistanis do appear to be willing to talk.

*MR. PICKERING:* We are working with other countries to try to prevent the Pakistanis from obtaining equipment for their centrifuge enrichment operation. The Pakistanis are avoiding the supplier guidelines by buying small bits and pieces from various countries. They have evaded government restrictions. In spite of our past efforts, we have no sense of certainty that over a period of years we will be able

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 104.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 340.

to prevent a Pakistani explosion. We were required under U.S. law to cut off economic assistance.

(In response to the Foreign Minister's question), private parties handled all exports from West European countries. Some of the goods the Pakistanis were acquiring were not covered by export controls.

U.S. law states that we must cut off assistance to any country engaged in the import or export of enrichment or reprocessing equipment. There is a limited and strict waiver provision. The law provides that the U.S. cannot extend economic or military assistance other than PL 480. There are no subsidies involved in the sale of military equipment, and cash sales are still permitted.

*AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA:* Who is financing Pakistan's program?

*MR. PICKERING:* We have given careful study to this matter. We estimate that at present the nuclear program is only costing Pakistan about \$10–20 million per year. Such a sum would present no insuperable burden for Pakistan. We do not know of any direct assistance to Pakistan for its nuclear program. There is indirect assistance since money is fungible.

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* We are suspicious about Islamic links. We note that Bhutto referred to the Islamic bomb. We don't rule out financial help from Libya or Saudi Arabia.

*MR. PICKERING:* We have our suspicions about this. Pakistan may have asked but we are not certain. While our experts say that Pakistan's current enrichment program only costs \$10–20 million, these costs would increase in future years if the program were continued. Reprocessing would cost much more.

The French are no longer delivering reprocessing equipment and do not intend to do so. Pakistan apparently has two reprocessing facilities, one laboratory size and one somewhat larger. Reprocessing would take longer than enrichment. It is our estimate that it would take 3–5 years for Pakistan to develop material through enrichment sufficient for a weapon.

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Does your intelligence differ from ours?

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* No. What is Pakistan doing about the trigger device?

*MR. PICKERING:* Triggering is not a major impediment if enrichment techniques are used.

*FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA:* Would Pakistan explode its bomb below ground or in the atmosphere?

*MR. PICKERING:* Either.

*FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA:* Have the Pakistanis obtained designs for a reprocessing plant?

*MR. PICKERING:* Yes, but it is very difficult to move from a design to actual production. Reprocessing facilities are very sophisticated and delicate.

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* How did Pakistan obtain this know-how despite export controls of other countries?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Prior to this Administration, various other countries had been prepared to export reprocessing equipment and technology. The Carter Administration addressed itself to this problem and has brought other countries around. However, substantial transfers of technology had occurred before the cut-off.

*MR. PICKERING:* Reprocessing is very difficult. Enrichment is much easier and more troublesome. One Pakistani individual spent considerable time in Europe and evidently stole plans for enrichment facilities.

*SECRETARY VANCE:* All European countries have cooperated. Enrichment facilities are not technologically difficult.

*AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA:* Which European countries have not been responsive to U.S. requests for export controls?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* All European countries have cooperated. Other countries have enrichment capabilities.

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* Does South Africa have this capability?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Yes. We have urged South Africa to forego both enrichment and reprocessing. If they agree to this and are prepared to sign the NPT, we are prepared to supply them fuel for their power facilities. For a while it looked like we were making progress. Now we have strained relations. South Africa has uranium and is seeking to enrich it. They have not yet enriched it to weapons grade levels.

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* Was any of the South African material illegally diverted from the U.S.?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* No. All we have supplied them is non-weapons grade.

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* What are you doing to persuade Pakistan not to develop nuclear weapons?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Ambassador Hummel is talking to the Pakistanis. We need your help and cooperation in dealing with this problem. We should stay closely in touch.

*MR. PICKERING:* We should work closely together and help and cooperate on this problem.

*FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA:* What is the Pakistan rationale? It could be prestige or it could be India. However, India's ability to influence Pakistan is very limited.

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Pakistan has not crossed the point of no return. We will continue our efforts. You have the same objectives and we should work together.

*FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA:* India has little leverage. If Pakistan has gone so far, would it be prepared to abandon its program?

*SECRETARY VANCE:* I don't know. We have been successful in preventing reprocessing. Now we will try to prevent enrichment. We may fail but we should try. (Vajpayee nodded in agreement.)

*AMBASSADOR GOHEEN:* We recognize that there are public pressures inside India. However, in light of this issue, what could we do together or separately? What could India do?

*FOREIGN MINISTER:* We have refused to cause any difficulties for Pakistan. We have assured Pakistan that we accept the Durand Line.<sup>4</sup> If Pakistan is still apprehensive, they have a psychological problem. What else could we do other than accept full scope safeguards which is unacceptable to Indian public opinion. The Pakistanis are likely to explode a device and to say it was peaceful.

*SECRETARY VANCE:* Not necessarily. If we can stop the enrichment program, they will not be able to explode a device.

*MR. PICKERING:* Our goal is to get Pakistan to accept safeguards and to prevent explosions. This would reassure us both. We would like to stop Pakistan's enrichment program.

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<sup>4</sup> The Durand Line refers to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**139. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1979, 11–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Robert Goheen, U.S. Ambassador to India  
Thomas Thornton, National Security Council  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Foreign Minister of India  
Jagat S. Mehta, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs  
N.A. Palkhivala, Ambassador of India  
P.P. D'Souza, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs  
A.B. Gokhale, Minister, Embassy of India

The President and Foreign Minister Vajpayee spent a few minutes in the Oval Office for picture-taking and Vajpayee gave the President a letter from Prime Minister Desai.<sup>2</sup> They then joined the rest of the party in the Cabinet Room. (U)

The *President* thanked Vajpayee for bringing the letter and said that he found his correspondence with Desai of greater benefit than with almost any other world leader. He values Desai's advice and counsel. (S)

The *President* then said that we are confronted with matters of great political and strategic importance. The United States has no interest in gaining a leading role in South Asia and will defer to India on most matters of regional importance. We are however deeply concerned about an Indo-Pakistani nuclear weapons race. The President said that American policy has been set forth in his correspondence with Prime

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 4–5/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. After his meeting with Carter, Vajpayee met with Brzezinski, Goheen, and Thornton in Brzezinski's office from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. to discuss multilateral issues. (Memorandum of Conversation, April 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 1–5/79)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 104660 to New Delhi, April 26, transmitted the text of Desai's April 19 letter to Carter, which, besides discussing regional issues and Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program, expressed Desai's appreciation that the NRC had approved the most recent shipment of 16.8 tons of uranium, and his appreciation for the release of the next shipment of 19.6 tons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790190–0786)

Minister Desai and is also reflected in US laws with which the Government of India is familiar. We do not seek to impose our will on other countries but the law (which the President signed himself) governs our ability to engage in nuclear cooperation. India will have to decide how it wants to proceed, whether it wishes to go into plutonium reprocessing or even peaceful nuclear explosions. That is India's decision to make. Pakistan, the President said, clearly intends to develop a nuclear explosive capability and we have been much tougher on Pakistan than on India. The President said he was eager to see direct consultations on these matters between India and Pakistan. He is well aware of the attempts India has made to improve relations and hopes that India will make still more. The United States is friends with both India and Pakistan but we do not want to become a mediator. (S)

The *President* said he had been disconcerted at the distortion of Vajpayee's important trip to China by the invasion of Vietnam. He hoped that this lack of Chinese sensitivity would not damage Sino-Indian relations. He pointed out that while Deng was here he was very enthusiastic about improved relations with India and expected much from Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit. Deng hoped that the new governments in both the countries would develop new relations of cooperation and understanding. (S)

*Foreign Minister Vajpayee* pointed out that he had been personally criticized in India and the Indians had been very offended by the comparison the Chinese drew to the 1962 invasion. India however has not lost hope for the relationship. (S)

The *President* agreed that the Vietnamese episode had been a wet blanket and it was certainly not India's fault. Criticism of Foreign Minister Vajpayee was unjust. (S)

*Vajpayee* suggested that the Chinese sought to improve relations with India in order to undercut the USSR.

The *President* replied that he did not think this was the case. Deng had made frequent positive statements and seems to feel that the time had come for the strengthening of Sino-Indian relations. Deng had been very enthusiastic and talked of solving long term disputes. (S)

*Vajpayee* interjected that the Chinese were modernizing their defense forces and this caused particular concern to India when coupled with their assertion of the right to punish neighbors. (S)

The *President* replied that we are not trying to justify the Chinese action. We had done our utmost to prevent it and still think that it was a mistake. (S)

*Vajpayee* expressed indignation that the Chinese had not even told him that they were going to launch an invasion. (S)



The *President* replied that they should have done so and he would make no apologies for them. He hoped however that damage to the Sino-Indian relationship would not be permanent. (S)

*Vajpayee* then addressed regional questions and asked if the United States was thinking in terms of new military arrangements. (S)

The *President* said we were not and have no inclination to play a greater leadership role in southern Asia. We look on India as the strongest and most influential nation in the area and will most often defer to Indian suggestions. We will not always agree with India. We have close friendship with Pakistan and other regional states and we have nuclear concerns over which we strongly disagree with India. It is important however that we understand each other and that these disagreements not stand in the way of our overall relationships. (S)

Concerning Tarapur, the *President* said that he could not predict the future but India must realize that if there is no agreement on safeguards, further cooperation on Tarapur would be impossible. There are other sources to which the Indians could turn for fuel including the Soviet Union. Canada, Australia and others share our views on nuclear explosions; perhaps other countries may have different views. The *President* said he hoped it would not come to a cut-off but he could not circumvent the law. The decision was up to India. (S)

*Vajpayee* objected that the US law is retrospective. (sic) (S)

The *President* said that he does not agree with that interpretation, as he had told Prime Minister Desai. (S)

*Vajpayee* said that India was grateful for the most recent installment of uranium and hopes supply will continue not only until 1980 but to 1993.

The *President* warned against going on false premises. The United States wants to avoid difficulties and still hopes that India and Pakistan, working directly together and without US involvement, can reach a mutual understanding. If they are unsuccessful in devising a safeguard arrangement Pakistan will certainly move to develop a nuclear explosive and this will put India in a very difficult situation. South Asia could become embroiled in a nuclear arms race which would be very embarrassing to India's international position. (S)

*Vajpayee* pointed out that India did not embark on a nuclear arms race against China and the Pakistanis should show similar self-restraint. (S)

The *President* emphasized that we have done everything possible [3 lines not declassified].

*Vajpayee* said however that the United States could do still more. (S)

*Secretary Vance* noted that he had told the Foreign Minister that our talks with Pakistan are continuing and that it is in their interest to work with us. (S)

*Vajpayee* said that the Pakistani nuclear program had no military justification and that the Pakistan economy could not sustain it. (S)

The *President* agreed completely on both points. He then mentioned that Prime Minister Desai had said that Israel was the motivation for the Pakistani program but the President disagreed. In his view, India is the focus of Pakistan's problem. The President thought that if India were to put its spent fuel under safeguards Pakistan would be challenged to do the same and that would have a calming effect. This effect would be felt even in South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and other countries that are within six months of a nuclear explosive capability. (S)

The *President* noted that we have established a unique relationship with the Soviets in restraining nuclear weaponry. Never before have two countries agreed on something like this and we are continuing to work to expand the area of agreement. There are however 10 or 12 countries who could build nuclear weapons almost immediately. They are waiting to see what happens in India and Pakistan. (S)

The *President* said he knew that India had disavowed nuclear explosions, but if Pakistan conducted a test India would find it hard to keep to that line. That is a situation that must be avoided. The President admitted that doing this without impinging on India's sovereignty and pride poses an almost insoluble problem. The decision is India's whether it will seek to get fuel for Tarapur elsewhere and perhaps become involved in a nuclear arms race. The President suggested that he might have a better view of this matter because he can see what is happening in other countries. (S)

The *President* stressed his hope that this difference of opinion will not detract from the precious relationship we have with India in other areas. He urged *Vajpayee*, in his public statements, to say what he was telling him—that we are not trying to abuse India. This is a continuing problem not only with India but with Germany, France, Argentina, Brazil and other countries. We are eager to help in any way that we can. (S)

*Vajpayee* reminded the President that India had to cope with the democratic public opinion. (S)

The *President* recognized this and admitted that we do not have a solution. The decision rests with India. (S)

*Vajpayee* raised the question of storage of spent fuel at Tarapur but the President suggested he discuss that elsewhere since he was not familiar with the technical issues. (S)

*Vajpayee* complained that in the nuclear area the United States was again following a policy of parity between India and Pakistan. (S)

The *President* objected that it was hard for him to talk about balancing relations. He said that if General Zia were in the room he would

tell him that our relations with India are warmer. He went on to say that he does not equate the two countries in his mind and on this issue the Pakistanis are clearly moving towards a nuclear explosive capability. (S)

*Vajpayee* then raised the problem of military hardware, notably the American offer of F-5Es to Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> He said that Pakistan does not need armaments for their problem is political and economic. (S)

The *President* responded that he would not attempt to compare what the Pakistanis have and what India has recently purchased. It is not a matter for us to decide, and all countries should practice restraint. He agreed with *Vajpayee* that military forces, as the Iranian case had shown, did not protect a government from its people. He noted that the American military's mission was world peace, not protecting him from the American people. (S)

*Secretary Vance* pointed out that we have continually refused to sell the Pakistanis advanced or long range aircraft such as the A-7, F-16 or F-18. (S)

The *President* pointed out that his first decision in the arms sales area was to reverse a commitment that had been made to sell A-7s to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> He pointed out that the F-5 is a defensive, short range aircraft. When we have sold it to Egypt the Israelis have not particularly objected. (S)

The *President* concluded by saying that he was pleased to have had this chance to talk with *Vajpayee* and promised to read *Desai's* letter with great care. He expressed his great admiration for *Vajpayee* personally and said that both he and *Secretary Vance* were always glad to consult with him. The *President* said that the relationship with India was precious to him and he wants it to be still closer and firmer. (S)

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 315.

<sup>4</sup> In the margin of an April 2, 1977, memorandum from Christopher, Carter indicated his decision to exclude A-7's from a potential aid package for Pakistan. See footnote 4, Document 240.

**140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India]

*Vajpayee*. We devoted today's meeting with Vajpayee to a variety of multilateral issues and the nuclear question.<sup>2</sup> I urged the Indians to support UNEF renewal,<sup>3</sup> and to resist attempts to expel Egypt and Israel from UN organizations. Vajpayee was non-committal on the first issue but stated that India would oppose expulsion efforts in UN organizations or in the NAM. In the nuclear discussion, he indicated a willingness to explore regional solutions if China could be included in some way. We urged him to reconsider his opposition to a joint Indo-Pakistani statement on the non-development of nuclear weapons.

I think our talks have succeeded in demonstrating our deep concern on the nuclear issue while underlining the broad areas of agreement in our bilateral relations. Vajpayee seems to accept the concept that we have a *mutual* problem in Pakistan.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India]]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 4/79. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The April 25 meeting was the second of two discussions between Vance and Vajpayee. The first took place on April 24; see Document 138. No memorandum of conversation of the April 25 meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> The UNEF II was deployed in the Sinai Peninsula from October 1973 to July 1979 for the purpose of supervising the cease-fire after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and facilitating the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces in the area.

**141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

7. *Indian Jaguar Purchase*: The Indians have expressed interest in purchasing an American made inertial navigation system for the Jaguars they are buying from the UK. You will recall that we encouraged the British not to make the sale—and would not give permission for Sweden to sell the Viggen since it contained American components<sup>2</sup>—because it would introduce a new sophisticated weapons system to the subcontinent.<sup>3</sup> Since we have been opposed to Indian acquisition of this weapons system, we could not justify the sale of American components to support the aircraft. I have consequently disapproved the inertial navigation sale.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 4/79. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy” and initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 9, Document 96.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 92067 to Stockholm, Paris, New Delhi, and Islamabad, April 11, 1978, reported on a March 31, 1978, discussion between U.S. and U.K. officials at the British Embassy in Washington regarding the sale of Jaguar DPSPA to India. After the U.S. officials presented their argument that the British should not sell Jaguars to India because it might start an arms race in South Asia, the British officials pointed out that “Britain had a political commitment to India for this sale dating from August 1975 and a refusal to sell at this time would cause serious bilateral problems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155–0636) Vance also met with Vajpayee on October 2, 1978, in New York. According to telegram Secto 11020 from USUN, October 3, “the only bilateral issue discussed was the Indian intention to purchase deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSPA). The Secretary reaffirmed the US concern that this would set off a spiral of arms purchases and the Indians defended their need for DPSPA.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402–1252) The *Washington Post* reported on October 8, 1978, that India had decided to purchase 40 Jaguar deep penetration strike aircraft on credits extended by the U.K. Government. (“India to Buy Jaguar Jets,” *Washington Post*, October 8, 1978, p. A32)

**142. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 8, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We have just finished an excellent series of talks with Foreign Minister Vajpayee<sup>2</sup> and I hope that he found them as useful as we did. These high-level exchanges are a very helpful way of supplementing our correspondence and it is always a particular pleasure to hear first-hand news of you. As I told Mr. Vajpayee, our friendship is extremely important to me. I was also glad to receive your letter which he brought along.<sup>3</sup> Most of the issues raised in it, and in your earlier letter of March 24,<sup>4</sup> were covered in the talks, but I would like to elaborate on a few points that are, I believe, of special importance to both of us.

Your Foreign Minister and I discussed the Tarapur and nuclear safeguards issues frankly and, I think, usefully. I would only like to reiterate my belief that India's decision will be of immense importance for the future of our world and for the role that India will be able to play in shaping that future.

We also discussed at some length the problems posed by Pakistan's nuclear program. I am doing everything I can to avert this further danger to our shared goal of non-proliferation. I am concerned, as you are, about the implications that a Pakistani nuclear capability could have for the Middle East. It would be mistaken, however, to think that the motivation for Pakistan's nuclear program lies outside South Asia. That is why I hope you and Pakistan, working directly together, can find a solution to this extremely serious problem.

I was particularly glad to hear that you are thinking of reextending your invitation to General Zia to visit Delhi. I am ready to help in any way that I can and look forward to a continuing exchange of ideas on this issue.

You mentioned certain alleged incidents of diversion of nuclear materials. As I wrote to you last May 8,<sup>5</sup> these are allegations based on speculative newspaper stories. I believe the best way to put this matter to rest would be to engage in serious discussions at the technical level. As I mentioned before, we would be willing to do so. I certainly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880122-0659. Secret; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 138-140.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 139.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 133.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 102.

agree with you, of course, that the problem of misuse of nuclear materials is one that has to be guarded against carefully. That is precisely why the United States is so concerned with this subject and so active in promoting it internationally.

Let me touch briefly on two other issues, supplementing my conversation with Foreign Minister Vajpayee. First of all, as I told him, the United States has no intention of creating new military arrangements in West Asia. We have no desire to intervene in the affairs of the region or to see an escalation in the military presence of major powers. The countries of the area can and should work out their own problems through their own internal procedures. We cannot be indifferent, however, when anyone supports actions which intrude upon the ability of their neighbors to resolve their own problems or when they attempt to impose outside military solutions on those countries. I am sure you would be equally concerned over such actions.

Second, I fully share your view that Vietnam is important to peace and stability in Southeast Asia and that the process of bridge-building among the nations of that region should resume. Vietnam's use of its military preponderance to impose and sustain a government of its own choosing upon another state has, however, rekindled old fears and set back the process of reconciliation. Certainly it has had a profoundly negative impact on the movement toward normalization with Vietnam which my Administration had been pursuing since early 1977.

India and the United States share common objectives for Southeast Asia even though our differing historical experiences lead us to emphasize different aspects of the problem. We must work together to mobilize international concern that can bring China, Vietnam and the USSR to act in ways that promise a future to Southeast Asia that is free from the threat of war and of external involvement. The most pressing problem is Kampuchea and I am glad that Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Vajpayee were able to discuss in some detail means of establishing a genuinely independent and neutral government there which reflects the aspirations of the Khmer people and respects their rights. Early recognition by India of the Vietnam-imposed regime would in my view reduce the chances of such an outcome.

Thank you again for your letters and for sparing Foreign Minister Vajpayee to come here and meet with us. I derived from that encounter the same kind of satisfaction that I drew from our meetings last year—that our two countries share a deep understanding and are working toward the same goals. I can think of no better guarantee for a peaceful and hopeful world.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

# 143. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, May 15, 1979, 1319Z

8488. Subject: South Asia Nuclear Problem. Reftel: State 119247.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Summary: I met today separately with FonMin Vajpayee and the PM's Principal Secretary, V. Shankar, to explore further what initiatives India might take or join vis-a-vis the Pak nuclear threat. I turned up no positive leads, but Shankar did suggest that a Carter-Desai meeting might be determinative, and that it might occur following the PM's attendance at the NAM's Havana Summit September 2–7. End summary.

3. My meeting with FonMin Vajpayee was accomplished in the relatively relaxed, give-and-take manner advised in reftel, but it opened no doors toward a resolution of the Pak nuclear problem. On a bilateral agreement backed up only by national means of inspection, Vajpayee took the position that Pakistan's general suspiciousness of India precluded any such step. Until Pakistan's basic attitude toward India changes and it comes to accept the fact that India's intentions toward Pakistan are peaceful and non-threatening, he said, a bilateral agreement would mean nothing, and it would also be hard to sell to the Indian people. When I suggested that a step by India in Pakistan's direction in the form of the offer of a mutual non-development, non-use pact might be just the sort of thing that could help to change Pakistani attitudes, he expressed disbelief. We talked then about the PRC, nuclear weapons free zones, and the Tlatelolco model.<sup>3</sup> The slight opening of a door which he seemed to signal in Washington was tightly closed today. A two-tier arrangement involved unacceptable discrimination. India could never accept the concept of a South Asian

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2606. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Islamabad, London, Beijing, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 119247 to New Delhi, May 11, instructed Goheen to discuss South Asian nuclear matters with Vajpayee as a follow-up to Vajpayee's April 25 meeting with Vance, because "in spite of a fairly unpromising prognosis, we believe we should pursue our private discussions with the Indians as part of a multilateral effort to deal with the Pakistan nuclear problem." The telegram noted that in the meeting with Vance, "Vajpayee indicated some flexibility in India's attitude toward a regional nuclear arrangement, provided China could somehow be included." (See Document 140.) Goheen was instructed to "feel free to respond to Vajpayee's suggestions in a manner that promotes the exploration of ideas." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790213–0819)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 87.



nuclear free zone in which the PRC was either excluded or accorded a favored position.

4. Vajpayee gave me the feeling that he genuinely shares our concern about the dangers inherent in Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear explosives capability not only for the region but for non-proliferation much more broadly. But he seems to see no practical, or politically acceptable way for India to deal with it. It also seems clear that he is determined not to get out ahead of PM Desai on these issues.

5. I was pleased that he dissociated himself during our conversation from what have become common lines of argument in the Indian press—namely, (A) that Pakistan could never have moved so far toward a nuclear-weapons capability without the connivance of one or more of the Western nations, and (B) that the U.S. is playing up the Pakistan menace solely to increase the pressure on India to accept full-scope safeguards. His meetings with the President and Secretary Vance did good service in those respects.

6. I arranged to call on V. Shankar at the same time that I sought an appointment with Vajpayee largely to cover my flank in case the PM or his office should become curious as to why I was calling on the FonMin on nuclear matters which they deem to fall within the PM's prerogative. On the Pakistan nuclear threat, Shankar said the PM rejects both the idea of a bilateral agreement with Pakistan and any nuclear free zone concept. The one thing that might change his mind, Shankar volunteered, was personal discussion with President Carter. He went on to suggest that PM could readily arrange to stop in Washington on his way back from Havana, following NAM meetings there in early September. At a later point in our conversation, Shankar said that "a more meaningful approach" from General Zia might also loosen up the PM's attitude. When I asked what that meant, he said an approach that had more credibility than the letter in which Zia had denied any but peaceful nuclear intentions.<sup>4</sup> Shankar then opined, however, that Zia was probably in no position politically to curb Pak nuclear ambitions.

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<sup>4</sup> According to telegram 3827 from Islamabad, April 1, the Islamabad press was reporting that Zia's letter, a reply to a letter from Desai, reassured Desai that Pakistan had no intention of acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Reportedly Zia suggested that South Asian states should issue an "internationally binding joint declaration renouncing the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and he called on India to support the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SANWFZ)." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150–0260) According to Indian press reports on March 9, Desai's letter expressed "concern over reported Pak efforts to develop nuclear weapons." (Telegram 4094 from New Delhi, March 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790113–0425)

7. Shankar is very concerned that if Pakistan goes nuclear, political pressures within India to do likewise will become intense despite Morarji's determination to resist them. He was perhaps, then, grasping at a straw—or thinking wishfully—when he proposed that a meeting with President Carter might alter the PM's attitude on the problem posed by Pakistan. It is, however, a possibility that we should, in my judgment, try to develop. There is no doubt that the PM attaches a very special value on his relationship with the President. Quite possibly even the President will not be able to change his mind about dealing with Pakistan on this issue, but if anyone can, it will be he.

8. Added benefits of a Carter-Desai meeting at the time proposed are (A) that the President could get Morarji's first-hand assessment of the Havana Summit and its implications for the future; and (B) the two leaders could confer together on how to protect the broader bilateral Indo-US relationship in the imminent event of the end of U.S. supplies for Tarapur. I need not point out, I am sure, that our grace period for licensing will be ending within a week of the close of the Havana Summit and that the survival of good Indo-US relations is going to take determined efforts at the highest levels to overcome the traumas to Indian, and perhaps also American, public opinion occasioned, respectively, by the termination of our Tarapur supply and final confirmation of India's unwillingness to accept full-scope safeguards.

**Goheen**

**144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1979, 2229Z

145754. Subject: Nuclear Export License XSNM–1379. Refs: (A) State 140858;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 137164;<sup>3</sup> (C) New Delhi 7992.<sup>4</sup>

1. During your discussions with Desai on regional nuclear problem (ref A), we believe that in view of NRC questions on XSNM–1379 (ref B), it would be appropriate for you to take up with the Prime Minister the question of Tarapur spent fuel disposition and safeguards.

2. We recognize that there is a degree of conflict between our attempting to continue our overall dialogue with the GOI on securing a satisfactory solution to the safeguards issue and this approach, which is based on the assumption that these efforts will fail. However avoiding a bitter legal dispute with the GOI and finding acceptable arrangements for disposition of the spent fuel are essential to achievement of our non-proliferation objectives. In addition, we have a mutual goal of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790257–0797. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Drafted by Rust Deming (OES/NET/NEP) and Lande; cleared in T, DOE, PM/NPP, S/AS, S/P, P, and by Miklos and Van Doren; approved by Pickering.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 140858 to New Delhi, June 2, communicated ideas on how to break the impasse with India concerning nuclear matters and suggested that Goheen accept Desai's February 14 offer of private informal discussion at his home. (See Document 127.) The telegram noted the Department's belief that the only way the nuclear issue could be resolved would be through Indo-Pakistani nuclear restraint and that Pakistan's stated offer to accept any restrictions on its nuclear activities that were also accepted by India should be explored even though it could be a bluff. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2610)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 137164 to New Delhi, May 29, forwarded a letter from the NRC to the Department of State in connection with the NRC's review of XSNM–1379, the then current application to ship enriched uranium to India. The NRC sought answers to a number of questions about India's prospects for developing nuclear weapons, including: "What is the view of the Executive Branch on the implications of Pakistan's alleged clandestine enrichment activities with respect to the U.S. Government's review of XSNM–1379; i.e. have Pakistan's actions affected, or are they likely to affect, India's nuclear policies or programs in the short or long term?" The NRC also inquired into the future of U.S.-origin spent fuel stored at Tarapur. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790245–0009)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 7992 from New Delhi, May 9, relayed Indian press reports of Desai's comments at a meeting with a parliamentary consultative committee on atomic energy, space, and electronics. According to the press reports, Desai "told the committee that a Pakistani nuclear explosion would not result in a change of Indian nuclear policy as long as he was Prime Minister. He did not believe that a Pakistani bomb would pose a 'security' threat to India. Desai said India had rejected President Zia's idea of a bilateral India-Pakistan safeguards agreement and the demand that India should open its nuclear facilities to international inspection." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790211–0563)

securing approval of the current export license, and in view of NRC's concern about the question of spent fuel, we believe it is appropriate to engage in such a dialogue.

3. We have two objectives in regard to spent fuel: First to secure an affirmation or acceptance that GOI will maintain safeguards on spent fuel if our supply terminates; and second, to see if the GOI would be prepared to consider a return or other mutually agreed disposition of TAPS spent fuel. It may be that in the final analysis we would be unable to buy-back the fuel for our own domestic reasons, but we need a general indication of Indian receptivity to the "take-back" concept. As you know we have not discussed this with India since 1976.

4. While we consider it desirable to resume dialogue with GOI on TAPS spent fuel disposition as soon as possible for reasons known to Embassy, we want to ensure that raising it with Desai in no way detracts from or dilutes full discussion with him of regional nuclear weapons problem. Hence you should raise spent fuel problem only after finishing full discussion of regional problem and only if you believe it would not be counterproductive.

5. You may wish to use the following talking points during your discussions with Desai on these subjects:

—I would like to discuss briefly an issue that is important to both the immediate problem of the next Tarapur license and our longer range relationship whether or not US-Indian nuclear cooperation continues. This is the issue of disposition of the spent fuel.

—As you are aware, the NRC is now considering the next shipment for Tarapur. The Executive Branch has urged it to act favorably and expeditiously on the license.

—The NRC has raised several questions regarding US-origin spent fuel. We would like to clarify with the GOI a number of questions about the spent fuel. In the event that the NRC does not act favorably on the application, these clarifications would also help facilitate congressional consideration of a Presidential authorization.

—We would like to have early discussions with appropriate Indian officials on the general problem of finding mutually agreeable solutions for disposition of the fuel, including determining India's continued interest in pursuing a return of US-origin spent fuel, something which we discussed in 1976.

Vance

**145. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, June 7, 1979, 1334Z

9979. Subject: India and the Pakistan Nuclear Problem. Refs: State 140858,<sup>2</sup> 145772.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Summary: In line with instructions, I met alone for nearly 55 minutes this afternoon with Prime Minister Desai. The atmosphere was relaxed, even at times chatty, but I made no progress along any of the lines suggested in reftels. To us in the Embassy that comes as not a great surprise. End summary.

3. The PM will not accept the idea of a joint non-development, non-use agreement with Pakistan. He said that when they had suggested that he had told them that he had already made a unilateral pledge; if Pakistan did likewise, the two pledges would be as good as a joint statement. When I said that governments change, and more formal agreements may have greater influence on future governments than unilateral pledges, he laughed, said that was not necessarily so, and added, “look at you and Tarapur”. He could not bind a future government in any case, but he hoped the course he had laid down would have influence.

4. When I asked what then he proposed to do about the danger, not only to India but much more widely, should the Pakistanis develop an explosives capability, he said that he proposed to take Zia at his word for now, but if he discovered that Pakistan was ready to test a bomb or if it exploded one, he would act at once “to smash it”. (“It” I take to be the Pak explosives capability.) He said he had recently assured Pak FonSec Shahnawaz that India had only good intentions toward Pakistan and wished to do nothing to cause it difficulties. But also that “if Pakistan tries any tricks, we will smash you”. I gather that he went on to remind Shahnawaz of 1965 and 1971 in order to emphasize India’s readiness to react forcibly when sufficiently provoked.<sup>4</sup>

5. When I led the conversation into nuclear weapons free zones, he made two sets of observations. (A) So long as the super-powers go on testing atomic weapons and menacing not only each other but the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2616. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 144.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 353.

whole world with nuclear weapons, NWFZ's in his judgment mean nothing.<sup>5</sup> He expressed appreciation for SALT II as a "small but important step" and gratification that the CTB negotiations had been resumed.<sup>6</sup> He reiterated that until the US and USSR stopped testing and began a program of nuclear disarmament, India could never accept discriminatory safeguards. (B) He also said that in part his public deriding of NWFZ's was because he was convinced that Pakistan was promoting such a zone for South Asia dishonestly, that it could never be trusted to abide by one, but that he could not say that publicly. He then gave me a fairly long lecture, with illustrations, about how leaders of countries and institutions often have to be careful not to say things that might worsen relations even when they knew the things to be true. His point here again was that he wants to preserve and improve Indo-Pak relations as far as he can in the hope that the Pakistanis will, before it is too late, get more sense about the utility of the limited nuclear capability they may be able to develop.

6. As these views emerged, I decided not to test either the idea of a PRC non-use assurance or that of a high-level, external mediator. As the conversation moved along, both came to me to seem increasingly irrelevant. (Comment: I should add that as talk about some multilateral solution involving the PRC has got around here in India, the introduction of the PRC into the equation has become more and more of an irritant. Perhaps quieter diplomacy undertaken earlier may have had an outside chance—and we never thought it was more than that—of selling that approach. Opinion has now so hardened, that the PRC can never become part of a regional solution, from India's viewpoint, so long as the PRC has nuclear weapons and India foregoes them.)

7. In response to para 9 of State 140858,<sup>7</sup> my view is a time-limited agreement of the sort suggested would be a non-starter here. The attitudes the PM expressed today, as reported above, seem to me to confirm this judgment.

8. Separate message on Tarapur will follow.<sup>8</sup>

9. Department please repeat above message to Islamabad. And Beijing.

**Goheen**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 347.

<sup>6</sup> Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II in Vienna on June 18.

<sup>7</sup> Paragraph 9 of telegram 140858 to New Delhi, June 2, reads: "We would be interested in your views on the probability of Desai accepting a limited arrangement (e.g., 3–5 years) during which the nuclear weapons states would be 'challenged' to move on vertical proliferation. We would prefer this not be discussed with Desai at present." See footnote 2, Document 144.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 146.

**146. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, June 8, 1979, 0617Z

9991. Subject: Tarapur After. Refs: A) State 145754;<sup>2</sup> B) New Delhi 9979.<sup>3</sup>

1. (C)–Entire text.

2. Summary: The subject of Tarapur came up naturally enough, actually initiated by the PM, toward the end of the conversation reported reftel B. On this subject, as on that reported there, Morarji sticks in private to views known from public utterances. Thus I found no substantive “give” but genuine concern not to let these issues sour Indo-US relations. End summary.

3. If the U.S. breaks its contract on supply for Tarapur, the PM insists that India will no longer be bound by any elements of that contract. This applies both to safeguards and reprocessing. At the same time, he continues to hope that we won’t “dishonor” our supply commitment, and until he is convinced otherwise, he won’t commit himself as to future treatment of U.S. supplied spent fuel, despite, he said, heavy pressures to do so. (We agree not to haggle in this discussion on the relative merits of the NRC’s interpretation of the legal obligations of India as vs. the GOI’s interpretation of ours. The PM believes deeply in the sanctity of contracts, as you know, but he did agree today that any protracted confrontation at that level would be unrewarding and bad for Indo-US relations.)

4. When I suggested that maybe India had no real need to reprocess the Tarapur spent fuel for a number of years to meet its known power requirements and that a statement to that effect—that is, an implied commitment not to reprocess this fuel for say three to five years—might be very helpful in the NRC’s consideration of the current license application and also with the Congress if it had to consider a Presidential Determination on that license, the PM nodded as though with understanding, but replied, “at this time, I can’t say that.”

5. I then raised the question of buy-back. His answer was that India had indicated a readiness for that when it thought it could count on continuing U.S. supply. If he could still count on that, he would at once agree to our buying back the spent fuel. After all, it was costing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790259–0885. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information to Bombay.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 144.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 145.

India a lot to provide for its storage. Then he went on to say that the only need to reprocess this spent fuel was to provide fuel for Tarapur.

6. Somewhat disingenuously [*less than 1 line not declassified*], I suggested there were after all other possible suppliers and I reminded him of the point that the President had made of that fact in his meeting with Vajpayee.<sup>4</sup> The PM's reply confirmed that Kosygin had made an explicit offer to replace US at Tarapur, but the PM said he hoped not to have to turn either to Russia or any other possible external source. He has, he said, "made a plan to try to make do" through India's own efforts. In the context, this seemed to me so clearly to mean by reprocessing and refabricating Tarapur spent fuel, that I failed to put that specific question to him.

6. Finally, we talked about preserving the broader US-India relationship whatever might happen at Tarapur. Morarji feels strongly about this—and didn't hesitate to say that he sees the Soviets trying to undermine this relationship at every turn. For my part, I expressed my conviction that he and our President will then both have to take a very strong lead to get supposedly informed public opinion in each of our countries to stop looking at the issues of US supply of Tarapur and India's acceptance of full-scope safeguards as the litmus tests of sincerity and good intent between the two countries. Witness the New York Times there, the Times of India here.<sup>5</sup> Morarji agreed, but if he remains true to style, I expect the most we can expect of him are occasional laconic assertions, no sort of organized effort to marshal public support.

Goheen

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 139.

<sup>5</sup> For an example of opinion pieces in the *New York Times* that placed the nuclear impasse at the center of Indo-U.S. relations, see "Ban the Bomb in South Asia," *New York Times*, April 16, 1979, p. A16. When the *New York Times* reported on U.S. proposals to facilitate the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia ("Curb on Atom Arms in South Asia Urged," *New York Times*, May 27, 1979, p. 8), the *Times of India* responded that the U.S. move "is seen here as a dubious ploy to ignore the unilateral declaration already made by this country and to continue to maintain an artificial parity between India and Pakistan." (Telegram 9263 from New Delhi, May 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790243-0152)



**147. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, July 6, 1979, 0910Z

11858. Subj: The Indian Political Scene: Mid-Summer 1979.

## 1. C—Entire text.

2. Introduction & summary: India in mid-1979 is gripped by an increasing sense of drift and malaise which pervades not only the political arena but also extends to the economic sphere and the larger social order. Developments in recent weeks have heightened the feeling that India faces troubled times which its divided and hesitant leaders will be unable to deal with effectively. Concern over the absence of a strong, determined political leadership at the helm of government able to inspire public confidence has been increased by the apparent lack of a viable alternative within the present political structure. While it would be premature to ring alarm bells (let alone funeral chimes) for the viability of India's democratic institutions, the potential for instability seems greater now than at any time since the Janata government came to power in 1977.

3. Political uncertainties are of course nothing new in Janata India. As readers of Embassy messages will recall, over these past two years Janata has faced a continuing series of greater and lesser crises which have stemmed largely from the coalition character of the party. The opposition has been shaken by repeated changes as the deposed Congress has sought to come to terms with its new outsider role and to deal with the political ambitions of former Prime Minister Gandhi. What seems remarkable about the present situation is that both the government party and the opposition are in obvious flux and disarray. Seen against the background of a weakening economic situation, heightened social disorders, and an increasing willingness of dissatisfied groups to resort to direct action, the simultaneous problems of the governing party and the principal opposition have made more vivid the inherent weakness and ephemeral character of present-day Indian party politics. There are those who profess confidence that from all of this will emerge the long-heralded realignment of political forces, leading in turn to a new stability and sense of direction. While such a result might eventually emerge, the short term outlook seems to be for a further increase in divisiveness and in those disintegrative tendencies

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307-0065. Confidential. Sent for information to Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Moscow, CINCPAC, Madras, and London.

which have so often marked the Indian political party scene. End introduction & summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Goheen

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**148. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1979

SUBJECT

Implications of Desai Resignation

Morarji Desai has resigned as Prime Minister of India.<sup>2</sup> According to Embassy Delhi, the likely successor is Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, the 71 year old token untouchable who has been in every Indian government since independence. Ram is an adroit politician, but mainly known for his personal corruption—which even by Indian standards reaches heroic proportions. (C)

Ram would probably not change Indian foreign policy significantly although Vajpayee will almost certainly be dismissed as Foreign Minister. Ram has, however, recently been closely associated with big military spending and pro-bomb groups. He will thus likely be harder for us to deal with in these areas, but probably not much more so than any other likely successor to Desai. (C)

Any replacement for Desai is likely to be a stopgap. The political disarray, economic indecisiveness and social tensions that brought about Desai's downfall will not change significantly. Also, with Mrs. Gandhi's political fortunes at a low ebb, there is no leader of stature in India who could provide leadership for the nation. For all of his

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Confidential. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed the memorandum at the top of the page.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 12352 from New Delhi, July 15, reported that "Morarji Desai submitted his resignation as Prime Minister this evening (July 15) to President Sanjiva Reddy. The President reportedly asked him to stay on as caretaker Prime Minister until alternate arrangements are made." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790319–1141)

faults, Ram does have a national reputation and following, and is probably the best available choice.<sup>3</sup> (C)

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<sup>3</sup> In a July 18 memorandum, Vance informed Carter that “President Reddy today asked Congress Party Leader Y.B. Chavan to form a new government when it became apparent that neither Jagjivan Ram or Charan Singh could put together a parliamentary majority. Chavan was Foreign Minister under Indira Gandhi but broke with her last year. If he fails to form a government, Reddy would likely turn to Ram—or call for elections, a prospect only Mrs. Gandhi and her supporters would relish.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 7/79)

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#### 149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 27, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

6. *Charan Singh to become India's Fifth Prime Minister*: Charan Singh is scheduled to be sworn in tomorrow afternoon as Prime Minister of India.<sup>2</sup> His coalition government is shaky, however, and India probably will face general elections before spring.

Earlier this week, Indian President Reddy asked both Singh and Morarji Desai to submit lists of Parliament members who supported them. When Desai could not command a majority, he resigned as leader of the Janata Party and said he would retire from political life. Former

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 7/79. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy” and initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 12820 from New Delhi, July 22, reported: “Not surprisingly, Congress leader Y.B. Chavan has failed in his bid to form a new government. His party has declared its support for Chaudhury Charan Singh’s candidacy, but left it deliberately ambiguous what form this support would take. The impasse over the leadership of the Janata parliamentary party continues. President Reddy is receiving conflicting advice about what to do next. Charan Singh thinks that he deserves to be called. The Janata argument is that now that the leader of the opposition has failed, the President should turn back to Janata as the largest party in the Lok Sabha. The President would obviously be happier if he could turn to someone other than Desai as Janata leader, but the Prime Minister’s supporters continue to argue that there is substantial constitutional precedent for Morarji to be called even though he was obliged to resign as PM in anticipation of a no-confidence vote defeat.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790344–0117)

Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram has been chosen as the new Janata Party leader.

Singh is considered an ardent nationalist but is not expected to focus a great deal of attention on foreign affairs. There may be some improvement in India's relations with the Soviet Union. On nuclear issues, Singh probably does not share Desai's moral aversion to nuclear weapons and may move back to a policy which keeps India's nuclear options open.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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**150. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 30, 1979

**SUBJECT**

The Charan Singh Government: Implications for the U.S.

It is difficult to say much about a government led by a man who has no known foreign policy views and has only once been out of India (last year, to Sri Lanka). Also, Charan Singh is on such a tenuous base that he probably won't last long—and even while he does last, will find it difficult to take substantial policy initiatives. (C)

The overall prospect, then, is for stagnation in foreign affairs. There are, however, some likely trends that would develop if Singh stays in office for a while. Even if his stay is short, we may encounter some of the manifestations. In any event, we should start thinking how we want to handle a Charan Singh government. (C)

The Carter-Desai period has marked a high-point in recent Indo-U.S. relations. It is unlikely that relations will be as good under the new Indian government. (S)

The first issue that the new government will face with us is Tarapur. Assuming that we will be unable to make concessions to the Indians,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

we will be off to a bad start indeed. The start will be still worse if, as is likely, Singh is interested in a nuclear weapons option. (S)

The high value that Prime Minister Desai attached to his relationship to President Carter will cease to be a factor. While we will want to establish good relations with Singh, they are unlikely to be anywhere near as warm. Singh, in any case, is little interested in foreign policy. (C)

The new government will want to differentiate itself from the Desai era. Since Desai was popularly perceived as being pro-American, there will be impetus in the other direction. Indeed, this impetus would be there in almost any event since Desai is probably unique among current Indian leaders in his positive attitude to the U.S., mistrust of the U.S.S.R., nuclear issues, and commitment to moral values in foreign policy. (S)

Domestically, the government has shifted somewhat toward the left. This could mean a still chillier climate for U.S. business and investment. (C)

India's relations with its neighbors may also worsen somewhat. Desai bent over backwards (as seen from India's viewpoint) to accommodate the neighbors. The new regime is more nationalistic and less likely to be accommodating. (C)

These, however, are matters of degree. A dust-up over Tarapur would have happened in almost any event. The Carter-Desai relationship was productive more in tone than in substance. Desai, too, recognized the importance, perhaps even primacy, of India's ties to the U.S.S.R. (S)

Above all, India's foreign policy options are not all that extensive, limited by its own national interests and the political environment within which it operates. Broad Indian foreign policy lines have been entrenched since the 1950s and there is no strong pressure for change. (C)

The major difficulty for our relationship may be that marginal Indian policy changes (e.g., on recognition of Kampuchea) could become major issues in a relationship that does not have all that many real major issues. These could build into the familiar circularity of complaints and counter-complaints that poisoned our relations in earlier years. (S)

We cannot prevent this unilaterally from happening. Also, while we may need to show a bit of tolerance to a new government in India, there is no reason for us to bend over very far backward. (C)

Our initial moves should be twofold:

1. Goheen should seek early appointments with the Prime Minister and foreign minister and set forth in clear detail our agenda of concerns—drawn in part from the Carter-Desai correspondence, but add-

ing any issues that we think may be about to become troublesome. At least, we will have made clear to the Indians where our sore toes are. If they step on them, it will be their own fault. It should go without saying, however, that this list should be a reasonable one—emphasizing those four or five issues that could play back with seriously negative effect into our overall relationship. Vance should restate this material when he meets with the leader of the Indian delegation to the UNGA in October. (C)

2. Once it is clear that Singh has some longevity (probably after the mid-August resumption of Parliament), the President should write to him, recalling his correspondence with Morarji and hoping that a similar candid relationship can be established. This letter should not, however, delve into specifics unless there is some especially important issue on the platter. (C)

3. Somewhat later, if Singh looks well entrenched, we should make a direct, high-level contact. Around December-January, a senior American (Vance, Brzezinski, or even Mondale, as part of a larger tour) should visit India or the Indian new foreign minister should be invited here. (A heads-of-state meeting is *not* recommended.) (C)

For some time we should be careful in not overreacting to Indian foreign policy moves. It is a new government and will need some time. If they do something that we have warned them about and directly affects the U.S., we should of course hit them hard. If, however, the issue is not central to our relationship (e.g., Kampuchean recognition), we should seek to keep it in proportion. (S)

Until Gerry Smith completes his study,<sup>2</sup> we aren't sure where he will come out on the Tarapur question. We will, however, have to move fairly quickly, once we have a policy. Barring some feasible ground for a waiver, we will probably have to kill off the Indians' hopes for even the pending license. With Desai gone, there is hardly any justification for going through with it. We probably should, however, go through the process of determining that the new government has no give on the issue. (C)

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 156.

**151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1979

## SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*First Jaguars to India:* New Delhi was scheduled to receive two British-French Jaguar ground-attack aircraft last week, part of a \$1.7 billion deal that includes 40 Jaguars plus the material to assemble 110 more in India.<sup>2</sup> The British are to begin delivering the rest of the planes at the end of the year. Although this is the largest single arms deal in India's history, the USSR will remain India's primary supplier of military materiel. Some Indian officers, in fact, reportedly are lobbying to cancel the assembly rights to the Jaguar in favor of the Soviet MIG-23. Nevertheless, the Jaguars would do much to improve the capabilities of the Indian Air Force. (S)

*French-Indian Discussions on Nuclear Matters:* French officials told former Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee during his recent visit that France wants to increase nuclear cooperation with India, according to a fairly reliable clandestine Indian source. The French promised to supply highly enriched uranium for the Kalkappan nuclear power plant in Madras and offered to sell India a nuclear power plant and help set up more fast breeder nuclear reactors. (S)

Another clandestine source reported that French leaders also assured Vajpayee they would be more careful in future nuclear deals with Pakistan and said they would attempt to discover more about Pakistan's clandestine acquisition of nuclear equipment in Europe. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 21, 7/24/79–7/31/79. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 141.

## 152. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, August 23, 1979, 1317Z

15148. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: President's Decision Stirs Considerable Controversy.

1. C-Entire text

2. Summary: Considerable controversy continues to swirl around President Reddy's decision to bypass Jagjivan Ram, dissolve Parliament, and appoint Charan Singh as caretaker Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most controversial decision ever taken by an Indian President, it has been attacked by Janata leaders as illegal and unconstitutional. Beyond the legal wrangling, however, questions are being raised about the President's motives and prejudices. Ram has said the President lied to him; others suggest deliberate efforts to exclude Ram because of his Harijan origins. The President, some say, favored Singh for caste reasons and that he had an understanding with Mrs. Gandhi. The truth of these allegations is never likely to be known, but at a minimum the trust that has been vested in the impartiality of the presidency in resolving serious political and constitutional problems has been severely strained. It is the kind of psychological damage that India's political institutions, already entangled in a situation with few guidelines, do not need. End summary.

3. Considerable controversy continues to surround yesterday's decision by President Sanjiva Reddy to bypass Janata leader Jagjivan Ram's claim to form a new government in favor of dissolving Parliament and requesting Charan Singh to remain as caretaker Prime Minister. The decision is being widely described in the press as the most controversial taken by an Indian President in 30 years of Indian independence and is likely to emerge as a major issue during the coming electoral campaign.

4. A press release issued August 22 by the President's office cites the unanimous advice to Reddy by the Charan Singh Cabinet to hold a national poll, and goes on to note that apart from Janata, "almost

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790384-1084. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, London, Madras, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 14728 from New Delhi, August 20, reported that on August 20, Singh "submitted his government's resignation to President Sanjiva Reddy, and recommended to the President that elections be held. Singh's resignation followed the earlier announcement by Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (I) that it planned to oppose the motion of confidence in the Singh government that was to have been debated today in the Lok Sabha." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790379-0310)



all parties are unanimous in demanding a fresh mandate from the electorate". Constitutional authorities have challenged the legal basis of the President's reliance on advice from the Singh Ministry, itself appointed by the President a month earlier and lacking a majority in Parliament. In rejecting the President's rationale, various Janata spokesmen have claimed that Reddy abrogated arbitrary authority to himself and acted in a way that opens the door to "Presidential dictatorship", as a statement issued by Ram put it. Former Prime Minister Morarji Desai described Reddy's action as "absolutely unconstitutional," but conceded to an interviewer that it would be difficult to mount a legal challenge to the President. Most observers dismiss as virtually non-existent prospects for impeachment of the President in the Rajya Sabha, as Janata has threatened to attempt.

5. However, beyond the legal wrangling, serious questions are being raised about the President's motives and the intrusion of personal ambitions and prejudices into his decision. Today's front-page editorial in the Indian Express, entitled "In Bad Odor", refers to the "ugly situation" and discusses an apparent misleading of Ram and Janata by Reddy in which the President yesterday morning invited them to submit a list of their supporters, telling them that he was in no hurry to form a decision, and then within half an hour was "in cahoot" with Charan Singh and his colleagues. Immediately after this meeting came word of the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The editorial limits itself to concluding that it was "abundantly clear from all this that the President had already made up his mind about dissolution" when speaking with Ram. The paper hopes that no more than a "perverse pleasure in play acting" on the President's part was involved.

6. An angry demonstration late yesterday afternoon outside the President's house by about 160 Janata MP's heard bitter criticism from Party President Chandra Shekhar who called Reddy a "Lilliputian Fuehrer" and alleged that Reddy was motivated by anti-Harijan feelings and a determination that Janata should not form a government. Ram himself told reporters that Reddy had lied to him and had engaged in a "pre-planned conspiracy" to deprive him of the opportunity to become Prime Minister. These are themes likely to emerge as a major campaign issue for Janata, especially as it seeks to profit by the aspirations of Harijans to see one of their own as the nation's leader. The President is likely to be further denounced in meetings to be held by Janata around the country on August 24 protesting his action.

7. An account now being heard, primarily from Janata sources, but also from journalists and from non-partisan sources, is that, in fact, Reddy has long harbored anti-Harijan feelings and these were a factor, according to those who spoke with him, in blocking Ram from becoming Prime Minister. Reddy, however, appears to have been more

strongly oriented toward Charan Singh than against any single other Janata personality. Observers here note that Morarji Desai, a month ago, was also led by Reddy to believe he had extra time to prepare his list of supporters, only to be informed that there was no such extension and that his deadline had expired. Desai was left humiliated and branded as a prevaricator who sought falsely to pad his list. Reddy then turned to Singh, rather than to Ram who had become leader of the Janata commanding, then as now, the single largest bloc in the Lok Sabha. Linking these events, local sources note that, though from different states, Reddy and Singh come from relatively low status agricultural castes (Singh is a U.P. Jat; Reddy bears the name of his Andhra Pradesh caste), and that in the current politics of backward caste self-assertion, Reddy acted to advance the interest of his caste fellow. Other sources have reported, even before the events of the past week, that there existed some kind of understanding between Mrs. Gandhi and Reddy in which the lady was urging a national government on willing ears in the event that Charan Singh fell. These sources suggest that Mrs. Gandhi would not have decided against Singh unless she was confident that Reddy would not call on Ram to try to form a successor Ministry. However, unable to secure the consensus necessary to form the all-parties administration that he preferred (Ram refused to participate even as nominal Prime Minister, saying that he would have no independent authority), Reddy once again turned to Singh and his [garble] Congress (S) Ministry, giving it the advantage of being in office during the election campaign.

8. Confirmation of these allegations is never likely to materialize, but to the extent they are widely accepted the President's actions will have seriously compromised his office. At the very least, he can be charged with not being seen to act impartially. In the wake of defection-oriented politics in New Delhi, when the utility and relevance of India's British-derived parliamentary institutions are being seriously debated (New Delhi 13341),<sup>3</sup> Reddy may have opened his office, until now regarded as genuinely and scrupulously non-partisan, to attack and

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 13341 from New Delhi, July 30, transmitted the Embassy's assessment that "India's system of parliamentary democracy has withstood a crisis of major proportions. While the system proved to have a number of weaknesses, it was sufficiently flexible to produce a new government within a reasonable period of time. Whether that government will prove viable for more than a few months, however, is questionable. The big winner to emerge from the crisis appears not to be the new Prime Minister but rather former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, whose Congress (I) now holds the key to the success or failure of the Charan Singh government. Another probable gainer has been Jagjivan Ram, who as opposition leader will attempt to position himself to become Prime Minister if the Charan Singh government falls. Turbulence on the state government level appears more than likely." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348-0335)

further politicization. At a minimum, the trust that has been vested in the impartiality of the Presidency in resolving serious political and constitutional problems has been severely strained. It is the kind of psychological damage that India's political institutions, already entangled in a situation with few guidelines and precedents, do not need.

Goheen

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**153. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, September 13, 1979, 1414Z

16687. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With Charan Singh—Primarily on the Nuclear Problem. Ref: (A) State 240341;<sup>2</sup> (B) 223448;<sup>3</sup> (C) 205835.<sup>4</sup>

1. (S)—Entire text

2. Summary: In a half-hour meeting with PM Charan Singh today, I found him well briefed on the nuclear problems and distinctly pessimistic about the ability of both sides to resolve their differences. I emphasized our hope that ways to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution could still be found in the months that remain, our desire to continue discussions with the GOI on this matter, and the desirability of foregoing as far as possible public statements that would further complicate an already difficult set of problems. He dwelt at some length on the issue of the contract and then the danger that would be posed to India if Pakistan develops nuclear weapons. Basically, he stood on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0462. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information to Islamabad and Bombay.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 240341 to New Delhi, September 12, conveyed instructions for Goheen's meeting with Singh. In particular, it directed Goheen to highlight growing U.S. concerns over developments in Afghanistan, reassure Singh that Sino-U.S. relations would not develop at the expense of Indo-U.S. relations, and inquire into India's views on the future of the NAM. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790417–0192)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 223448 to New Delhi, August 25, delivered instructions to Goheen for his discussion of nuclear matters with Singh, which focused on facilitating the pending nuclear export license before the NRC by seeking non-proliferation assurances. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790387–1170)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 205835 to New Delhi, August 8, instructed Goheen to meet with Singh in order to discuss bilateral issues, even though the "life of the Singh government may be short, but we still believe we have something to gain by initiating discussions at this time." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790358–1221)

his Red Fort statement,<sup>5</sup> but in doing so he twice underlined the word “perhaps” in the last sentence of that statement. (This would have that sentence say, “If Pakistan sticks to its decision—I and my colleagues will perhaps be forced to reconsider the entire question.”) We closed on his nodding assent to my repetition that we should not give up hope of some way being found to permit continued nuclear cooperation and that both sides needed to try to avoid foreclosing that possibility by either precipitous statements or actions. End summary.

3. Charan Singh gave me a half-hour’s appointment this afternoon. Others present were Dr. Sethna, Eric Gonsalves, Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib (who seems to be acting as Principal Secretary), and Prakash Shah (notetaker). Since the PM will only receive Ambassadors to discuss predesignated and pressing subjects, our talk was confined almost entirely to the questions of nuclear proliferation and nuclear cooperation, and I could not raise any of the other topics suggested in reftel A. I found the PM well informed, alert, articulate, firm in his views, but not at all abrasive. He did all the talking for the Indians, and seemed to reflect more a resigned disappointment about U.S. nuclear policy and supply than any marked antagonism.

4. I began with some remarks about the importance which my government attaches to India, our mutual values and interests, and our gratification in the qualitative and quantitative improvement in Indo-US relations in the recent years. His reply was, “I echo every word you have said.” And then he spoke about our shared democratic values and the existence in India of much goodwill and understanding toward America. The remaining 25 minutes or so were all on the nuclear questions.

5. I began by laying out quite closely the guidance offered by the Department in ref B, but I perhaps emphasized rather more that we are eager to maintain nuclear cooperation with India if at all possible and that we are taking a hard look at what we, and not only India, can do in order to assure it. I also noted that uncertainty in Washington about India’s future nuclear policy was an obvious complicating factor, but I hoped it might perhaps be overcome by further discussions. Charan Singh’s initial reply was to lecture me (gently) on the fact that we have a contract to supply Tarapur and that Indians could not

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 14495 from New Delhi, August 15, reported Singh’s August 15 Indian Independence Day speech at the Red Fort. According to the English translation of the statement issued by the Indian Government, Singh said: “It has been our decision and remains our decision so far that we do not want to manufacture nuclear bombs or join the race for nuclear weapons. However, if Pakistan sticks to its decision and continues in its efforts to manufacture the bomb or the stockpiling of these bombs, I and my colleagues will probably be forced to reconsider the entire question.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790371-0314)

understand how so large and respected a country as the USA could think of unilaterally cancelling a contract. He turned next to the situation posed to India by the evidence that Pakistan is working to build a nuclear bomb. He maintained that such a development would alter the balance of power in the subcontinent and pose a serious threat to India. Moreover, the Indian people were already much troubled by the reports that had been published on Pakistan's nuclear efforts; many were dissatisfied by the kind of response Morarji Desai had given; he himself felt a responsibility to meet the concerns of the people.

6. After I had offered some rebuttal to the seriousness of the threat to India posed by one or two Pakistani bombs and had urged that the situation should be looked at in terms of the possible global spread of nuclear weapons, not simply as a regional affair, Charan Singh (without acquiescing) took a somewhat different tack. He pointed out that he had made a qualified statement at the Red Fort, one which went no further than Vajpayee had gone on the floor of Parliament in saying that a Pak bomb might call for a reappraisal of Indian nuclear policy. In fact, Charan Singh pointed out, in his Red Fort statement he had carefully said his government might perhaps be forced to consider the no-bomb policy, if Pakistan went ahead to develop one; and he had said that for now the policy remains not to join the race for nuclear weapons.

7. The PM spoke with feeling about the tolerance India had toward Pakistan and the impropriety of Zia's having raised the Kashmir issue at Havana.<sup>6</sup> He asserted that India had no desire to expand its territory, and claimed that he could not comprehend why Pakistan seems always to be so distrustful of India. We also talked about the continuing need for Indian restraint toward, and where possible reassurances to, Pakistan if efforts to dissuade it from a nuclear course were to have any chance of effect.

8. Near the end, in a manner not unlike Morarji's, Charan Singh turned to the greater responsibility and the greater influence which the US and USSR have to bring about a world not endangered by nuclear weapons, and we exchanged views briefly on SALT II, the CTB, and the dangers also inherent in horizontal proliferation.

9. As the meeting ended, I tried to sum up the message I had brought as follows: We have not given up trying to preserve US-India nuclear cooperation. We are exploring whether there are steps we can

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<sup>6</sup> According to telegram 16280 from New Delhi, September 8, which reported Zia's remarks at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, held September 3–9 in Havana, Zia discussed Kashmir and took a "particularly hard line. He asserted that there was a secret agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto at Simla, and that Bhutto had in effect sold out Kashmir to India." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790411–1030) For the Simla Agreement, see footnote 6, Document 126.

take on our part within the allowances of our law which we have perhaps not adequately considered before. We are not simply asking for concessions from India, as in the past, but the degree of uncertainty that attends India's future nuclear policy must be recognized as a potentially serious impediment. Nor in any case can we be sure of success. In these circumstances we need patience on both sides, care to avoid doing or saying things that will prematurely foreclose all chances of a solution, and a readiness to continue discussions. Charan Singh nodded, and said, "Hope must spring eternal."

10. Postscript: At various points in this conversation, the Tarapur license applications were brought up. Our failure to clear them drew various expressions of uncomprehending impatience and begrieved disappointment.

**Goheen**

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#### **154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1979, 2320Z

294036. Subject: Talk With Indian Charge.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. On November 6, Thomas Pickering had lunch with Indian Charge Gokhale. Focus was on bilateral nuclear questions.

3. Gokhale primary interest was on progress or lack thereof in issuance of Tarapur license. Pickering explained the matter was still under active consideration in U.S. and that next step was still response to NRC questions.<sup>2</sup> Since questions focused on attitudes of Indian Government now and in future on nuclear questions, there was a problem in formulating persuasive answer before Indian elections early in 1980. Gokhale indicated that early issuance of Tarapur license would improve climate in India on US-Indian bilateral nuclear relations and implied this would be useful step to take during election campaigning.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790519-0930. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Bombay and Islamabad. Drafted by Pickering; cleared in S/S-O and by Schaffer; approved by Pickering.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 144.

4. Conversation then turned to earlier discussions which U.S. and India had held over possibility of arriving at amicable settlement of bilateral nuclear problem. Gokhale did not wish to commit himself on whether discussion with current caretaker government would be productive or could lead to conclusion. He pressed on timing of current consideration this problem in USG and was told that such remained uncertain. He also sought out information on kinds of options that might be under consideration. Aside from pointing out that such options stretched from issuance of present license on one hand through continuing provision of fuel on the other, no specifics were discussed. Pickering indicated in response to question that Congress in general seemed to be negative on any Presidential waiver of full scope safeguards requirements. They appeared to be somewhat more favorable to issuance of pending two licenses.

5. Pickering asked Gokhale if a response to NRC questions as positive as possible were sent by the State Department this would help Indian attitudes toward any discussion of a general settlement in our nuclear relations. Gokhale said issuance of pending Tarapur license would be most important in this regard, but positive reply to NRC would have some slight helpful effect.

6. Gokhale inquired about Pakistan program and was briefed in very general terms about results of Agha Shahi visit.<sup>3</sup> He confirmed that Indian information on possibility of Pakistan test through use of their own material was roughly same as ours.

7. Pickering discussed South Atlantic event<sup>4</sup> and possibility of action in New York on sanctions on South Africa. Gokhale said he did not believe India would oppose a resolution in New York cutting nuclear trade with South Africa in the absence of safeguards on South African nuclear facilities. He insisted there was no present Indian trade with South Africa and precedent on safeguards did not seem to disturb him.

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 364 and 366.

<sup>4</sup> The South Atlantic Event, or Vela Incident, was a suspected South African nuclear test on September 22 near the Prince Edward Islands, off the coast of Antarctica. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 361–368.



**155. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1979

SUBJECT

The Indian Nuclear Problem (S)

You asked if there is no way of settling this problem. I am afraid that the answer is probably "no." (S)

The reason is that both we and India are standing on quite legitimate issues of principle. We have a compelling case on the non-proliferation front; they have a compelling case concerning sanctity of contracts and (only slightly less compelling) concerning the inherent discriminatory nature of our preferred global nuclear regime. (S)

What we are facing here is the perennial problem of U.S. relations with India. No matter how good our intentions, they will inevitably pale in comparison with global concerns. South Asia is, after all, not of critical importance to us. (Historical parallels: arming Pakistan in the 1950s in the name of containment; tilting towards Pakistan in 1971 because of our Soviet and Chinese interests.) (S)

The Indians will simply not accept full-scope safeguards or any other discriminatory regime. (S)

We have run out of ideas for face-saving compromises. (S)

I see no intention on the President's part to yield our position. There are steps that we could take that would leave us with a fig-leaf (e.g. the "leasing option" that is described in the papers for the PRC,<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 44, Proliferation: India: 9-11/79. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Owen and Oplinger. A stamped notation indicates that Aaron saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> A November 10 briefing memorandum from Saunders, Pickering, and Lake to Vance outlined three options regarding the Tarapur issue. The first option, which was considered unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian Government, called for issuing two pending export licenses for enriched uranium in return for continuation of safeguards over U.S.-supplied fuel, continued U.S. control over the disposition of Tarapur spent fuel of U.S. origin, and a reaffirmation of Desai's commitment against nuclear explosions. The second called for issuing the two pending licenses and offering to supply a third year's tranche at U.S. expense, in return for the same assurances and the option to take back from India the spent fuel. The third option called for a new leasing arrangement with India to supply Tarapur during the lifetime of the reactors in return for all of the above assurances plus additional non-proliferation assurances and U.S. title to the spent fuel of U.S. origin. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Anthony Lake, Box 5, TL 11/1-11/15/79) These options were to be discussed at a PRC meeting originally scheduled for November 14, but the meeting did not take place until December 5. See Document 157.



but it has no support.) We could also tell the Indians to take the issue to the ICJ since it is a world-order question, and we would no doubt lose. But, as I remember, you don't think much of that idea. (S)

So, in sum, "no." We have to get on with the business of minimizing fallout. (S)

As Chaim Weizman said about Palestine: "The problem would be easy if it were one of right and wrong. Unfortunately, it is a problem of two rights." The Greeks based a tragic dramatic theory on this.<sup>3</sup> (U)

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<sup>3</sup> At the bottom of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: "How about agreeing to disagree and getting on with other business? DA." An unknown hand wrote: "11–26–79" beneath Aaron's comment.

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## 156. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 4, 1979, 1354Z

22136. For the Secretary from Gerald Smith and Ambassador Goheen. Subject: Bilaterals With India on Tarapur.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Nothing we heard from Sethna and company<sup>2</sup> changed opinion contained in New Delhi 21671,<sup>3</sup> which we believe should be the line any US decisional efforts should try to follow.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2667, N790009–0580. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 22137 from New Delhi, December 4, reported Smith's December 3 meeting in New Delhi with Sethna, Vellodi, Gonzalves, and other Indian officials. Accompanying Smith were Goheen, Kirk, Van Doren, Nosenzo, Bengelsdorf, and Courtney. Smith began the discussion, which focused on the Tarapur refueling issue, by noting that he had hoped that he would have "authoritative instructions for this session, but that the meeting planned to develop such instructions had fallen victim to the Iranian crisis." As a result, U.S. officials could only "begin informal exploration of the possibilities—on a personal, non-authoritative basis." During the meeting, Indian officials "took hard line but said they would look at the ideas" put forth by U.S. officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790559–0348)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 21671 from New Delhi, November 28, Smith conveyed his reaction to the options under consideration for the December 5 PRC meeting (see footnote 2, Document 155). Smith considered "none of the options realistic. Recommend first license be issued as soon as possible (in context of prospective negotiation looking to safeguards continuance)." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790547–0831)

3. Only step that should be considered at this time is prompt issuance by President of Executive Order granting the first license. This could be justified on basis that:

—This license has been before the NRC for over a year, and further delay would be excessive;

—Since this license was filed more than a year before the deadline specified in Section 128,<sup>4</sup> this order does not involve a waiver of that section, or any diminution of our strong interest in achieving comprehensive full scope safeguards as a norm of nuclear supply;

—The withholding of this license would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of US non-proliferation objectives since it

A. Would risk losing safeguards and other rights we now have over the US origin nuclear materials now in India;

B. Could reduce the prospects for discussions over the longer term on a constructive outcome to the current impasse; and

C. Could reduce the prospects for constructive Indian participation in discussion of measures designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia.

4. I recommend against further discussions of other solutions before the Indian elections. My hunch is that Indian “stonewall” position taken by Sethna December 3 reflected concern of possible leaks during up-coming mudslinging phase of pre-election period and that similar treatment would be given to any further talks before the elections.

5. It does not appear feasible to obtain, in connection with first license, binding Indian assurance that safeguards and non-explosive use commitments regarding our fuel would survive cut-off of nuclear supply.

6. All members of delegation concur in foregoing recommendation, since they believe in the time thus gained changes may develop which could be more promising for a long-term solution.

**Goheen**

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Section 128 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

**157. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 5, 1979, 2:15–2:45 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Minutes: PRC Meeting on Indian Nuclear (C)

**PARTICIPANTS***State*Warren Christopher, Deputy  
SecretaryMrs. Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, Near Eastern &  
South Asian AffairsLes Brown, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, Bureau of Oceans  
and Internat. Environmental &  
Scientific Affairs*Defense*W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy  
SecretaryRobert Murray, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, Near Eastern,  
African & South Asian Affairs*Energy*John Deutch, Deputy Secretary  
Amb. Holsey Handyside, Deputy  
Assistant Secretary for  
Internat., Nuclear & Technical  
Programs*OMB*Dan Taft, Deputy Associate  
Director, Special Studies*ACDA*George Seignious, Director  
Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director*JCS*

Lt. General John Pustay

*OSTP*Ben Huberman, Assoc. Director,  
Nat'l. Security & Internat. &  
Space Affairs*White House*

Amb. Henry Owen

*NSC*

Thomas P. Thornton

*Christopher.* The circumstances have changed considerably on this matter following the many postponements that we have had.<sup>2</sup> The discussions that Gerry Smith had in Delhi<sup>3</sup> show that none of the three options presented in the paper is likely to be acceptable to the Indians.<sup>4</sup> This is especially true in the campaign period in India. Therefore, we come to the discussion of a very stark question—whether to cut off our nuclear relationship with India, or to go ahead with it at whatever cost might be necessary. I believe that the election results could considerably alter both the possibilities for compromise and the costs to us.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Box 45, Proliferation, India, 12/79–1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> The PRC meeting was originally scheduled for November 14, rescheduled for November 21, and rescheduled again for December 5.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 156.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 155.

But I would like to hear your comments now on whether we should fulfill our agreements with the Indians. (S)

*Seignious.* I would like to make three points: First, we should not take a risk in our relations with an important country in that part of the world unless we have to. Secondly, we should sound out the Congress thoroughly on this matter. Third, if we want to grant the first license, we must put the new government of India on very clear notice as to what our legal position is. We do not expect full-scope safeguards, but we must have evidence that they are proceeding toward that goal. Therefore, I pretty clearly oppose reneging on an obligation that we have incurred. But the new Indian government must agree to move in our direction. (S)

*Christopher.* What if they won't do so? (U)

*Seignious.* We should get three minimum conditions when we agree to the second package (i.e. an agreement to supply the material requested under the second license, subject to negotiation). First, we need perpetual IAEA safeguards on all U.S.-supplied fuel. Secondly, the Madras and CANDU reactors should be put under safeguards. Third, the Indians should give us private reassurances on the matter of transfer of nuclear technology and they should make a public statement that it is not the policy of their government to conduct nuclear explosions. (S)

*Owen.* Why not hold up the first license to wait for the new government? (U)

*Seignious.* We would like to lay a framework for cooperation prior to the election and then give the new government ample warning as to our position. (S)

*Christopher.* I feel that with the election only a month away, there really isn't much chance of our doing anything useful at all in that period. I would wait for a new government before we attempt to do anything. (S)

*Owen.* Jerry Oplinger cannot be here today and I would like to present his views. He feels that we have no option but to cease cooperation with India. The Indians have had plenty of opportunities to cooperate with us, and the President has made clear his views in his conversation with Vajpayee.<sup>5</sup> To continue cooperation would damage our non-proliferation goals. Speaking on my own behalf I would prefer to go in the direction of continued cooperation but do not want to do anything until after the elections. If on the other hand we were to follow

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 139.

Oplinger's course then maybe we should inform the Indians now of our decision. (S)

*Claytor*. I agree. We should do nothing now. We do not have to ship anything before March 1980. We have created a bad situation in our relationship because we are backing out of a contract. They could cause us a lot of trouble and take it, for instance, to the World Court. (S)

*Coon*. I do not believe that the elections will make much difference one way or the other. Probably Mrs. Gandhi will come out as the leader of a coalition. She will not accept full-scope safeguards nor will any other government. They will not be likely to agree to most of the conditions that we would put. If we hold off on issuing a license and link it to specific performance, Mrs. Gandhi will see this as a personal attack on her. My preference would be to grant one license now without any negotiations or conditions—or at least set the process in motion for the granting of the license. (S)

*THORNTON*. That, however, leaves you with the same problem when you approach Mrs. Gandhi about the second license and try to negotiate conditions for that. (S)

*OWEN*. Congress would go through the roof if we did that. (S)

*COON*. I also would argue that this is not the time to have still another contentious issue in our relations with one of the countries of Southwest Asia. (S)

*DEUTCH*. I think we should wait for January as you (Christopher) and Henry Owen suggest. Then however I would favor Oplinger's point of view. I would also like to point out that the basic options in the State Department paper simply are not implementable in terms of realities here in the United States. (S)

*THORNTON*. I would want to emphasize the basic issue: We must have some idea of which direction we want to go and recognize the fact that if we are going to have continued cooperation with India we are going to have to make some major concessions in our policy. (S)

*OWEN*. You mean we could, for instance, go the route of continuing waivers. (S)

*KEENY*. What would the impact of a move now be on the Indian elections scene? (S)

*CHRISTOPHER*. If you do something for the Indians now it could easily cause a misunderstanding. We would be seen as meddling in favor of the present government. (S)

*OWEN*. Everybody agrees then that we should not do anything until after the elections. But if we are unable to negotiate full-scope safeguards which way should we go? (S)

*CHRISTOPHER*. I would favor a waiver. (S)

OWEN. I tend to favor continuing cooperation, but we don't have to decide that now. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. India might be extremely uncooperative. I, however, would go a long way to find a means of working us out of reneging on a moral commitment. (S)

DEUTCH. Bear in mind that the Indians might engage in other activities, such as conducting nuclear explosions, which would cause us difficulties. (S)

PUSTAY. I realize this is not a meeting about Pakistan but shouldn't we also think of the implications that our actions have for our policy with regard to Pakistan? (S)

CHRISTOPHER. We would certainly try our best to get Indian agreement on non-development of nuclear weapons and no further nuclear tests. (S)

OWEN. Mrs. Gandhi also might be beastly on a whole range of other issues. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. We should however hear more in favor of the case for doing something within the next month. (S)

COON. I think it is very unlikely that we will be able to negotiate anything before we give the first license that will sell with Congress. What we are trying to do is to buy time to get over the first difficult period of our relationship with the new government. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. But if we could grant one license to the new government, would that not help? (S)

COON. Perhaps, but the fact that Mrs. Gandhi is likely to be leading that new government will make it difficult for us to get Congressional approval. (S)

DEUTCH. I don't see that the problem with Congress is as severe as you are portraying it. Most of the opinion on the Hill is in favor of being more forthcoming. It is only a few Congressmen with special interests that will cause trouble. (S)

BROWN. That may be true but those few key people will give the cue for the other members. We certainly don't see any ground swell of opinion for doing anything for the Indians. (S)

DEUTCH. I just don't agree with you. There will be plenty of other nuclear issues to occupy the attention of the critics. (S)

CHRISTOPHER. Let me summarize the consensus: First, we should not grant a license during the elections. Second, most of the members of the PRC want to engage the new government and continue coopera-

tion;<sup>6</sup> there is, however, a minority that does not think it useful to try to do this. Third, we may be able to decide these matters better in the second week of January. We do not want to chart a course for the President at this point. (S)

*SEIGNIOUS.* We should also take note of the advantage of granting the first license without putting any heavy demands on the Indians for reciprocity. (S)

*OWEN.* Let's look at that question again in January. (S)

*THORNTON.* It would also be helpful for that meeting to have worked out some more specific ideas as to the kinds of proposals that we could put before the Indians and the cost that we are willing to pay. (S)

*CHRISTOPHER.* We also should get a much better idea of Congressional attitudes. (S)

Thereupon the meeting concluded at 2:45 p.m. (U)

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<sup>6</sup> In the Summary of Conclusions of this PRC meeting, Carter underlined the following portion of the section summarizing this point: "to continue cooperation, on some basis other than Indian acceptance of full scope safeguards," and wrote in the left-hand margin next to it: "better, I believe." Carter also wrote: "ok, J" at the top of the Summary of Conclusions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 12/79–1/80) In a December 12 memorandum, Brzezinski asked Carter to clarify what he meant by the comment "better, I believe." Carter wrote on the memorandum: "I underlined pertinent words. This is a fallback position, preferable to terminating relationship. J." (Ibid.)

# 158. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 10, 1979, 1223Z

22529. Subject: Indian Prime Minister's Response to President's Letter on Tehran Hostages. Ref: State 296711.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-Entire text)

2. MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) D'Souza made available to Embassy afternoon Dec. 10 text of Prime Minister Charan Singh's response to the President's letter of November 15 concerning the American Embassy hostages in Tehran. D'Souza said Indian Charge in Washington would probably be delivering cabled text of letter Dec. 10. D'Souza also said that GOI would probably shortly make public the fact of the Prime Minister's response and indicate the nature of the response.

3. Text of Prime Minister's letter dated Dec. 8 follows:

Quote Dear Mr. President,

1. I thank you for your letter of November 15.

2. The incident in Tehran involving the detention of American diplomatic personnel in the U.S. Embassy there, and their safety and well being, has caused us such anxiety and concern from the beginning. Attempts to use force of (sic) threat of force against any country's diplomatic establishment is a matter of universal concern. We share this concern and indeed gave public expression to it on November 30.<sup>3</sup>

3. If I have taken some time to reply to you, it is because we have been pondering deeply over these problems. To take a high public profile would have been the easiest course; but we do not feel that it would have had the desired effect (sic) and may even have proved counter productive. You must have noted that despite the willingness

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790009-0750. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 296711 to New Delhi, November 15, relayed a letter from Carter to Singh, in which Carter urged that "the strongest possible remonstrations or action by your own government could be of great benefit in inducing the Iranian authorities to release the American hostages. You may want to consider reducing the number of your official personnel in Tehran as a way to protest the Iranian treatment of persons with diplomatic immunity." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148-2658) On November 4, 52 American diplomats and civilians were captured in the Embassy in Tehran and held hostage until January 20, 1981.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 21888 from New Delhi, December 1, quoted an unidentified Indian newspaper's account of an MEA statement declaring the "violation of diplomatic immunities and threats to the safety and life of diplomats is in contravention of international law and conventions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790552-00778)



of our Ambassador in Tehran to participate in a joint demarche, the representatives there of a number of countries could not eventually agree upon its modalities. The need to release the hostages and to follow international convention and rules regarding diplomatic missions has been emphasised by us with the Iranian authorities, with whom we have friendly relations, through diplomatic channels. You will agree that the value and effectiveness of these initiatives are best realised away from the public glare. You may rest assured, Mr. President, that efforts expected of India in keeping with its traditions and principles shall continue.

4. Mr. President, I am fully aware of the heavy pressures under which you personally, and the Government of the United States, are working in these extremely trying circumstances. We can only hope that a peaceful solution to the problem will ultimately emerge.

5. We also note that the U.N. Secretary General is making every effort, with the help and support of the members of the United Nations, to bring about a mutually satisfactory solution. I would like to assure you that we fully support the efforts of the Secretary General.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely, signed Charan Singh. End quote.

Goheen

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### 159. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 11, 1979, 1149Z

22615. Subject: Tarapur Supply. Ref: State 319358.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret entire text.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570–0702. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Sent for information to Bombay.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 319358 to New Delhi, December 11, relayed the decision reached at the December 5 PRC meeting: “to take no action on the two licenses now pending for Tarapur fuel. Another meeting will be held in mid-January to decide on an approach to the new Indian Government. At that time, the initial issue will be whether to approve one more fuel shipment without any stringent conditions as a means of creating an atmosphere favorable to further negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570–0021) See Document 157.

2. We here of course are disappointed by the decision not to decide reported in reftel. In preparing for the next step, I wish to reemphasize the importance I attach to our having some specific proposition to put before the new GOI at the earliest possible time following its formation. This argues for a Presidential decision prior to mid-January.

3. As reported in recent messages, a big head of impatience has been built up here on this issue, and America's stock has been sinking. Our trustworthiness and the depth of our interest in India are both suspect. Enough influential people can accept, however, I believe, the fact that the US needs more enduring assurances of India's commitment to non-proliferation than a caretaker government can provide. Besides, most leaders are currently preoccupied with the elections. Therefore while less than desirable, as seen here, this further delay of a decision on the licenses will probably be found tolerable by most political leaders until the new government is formed. But once it is in place, regardless of who becomes Prime Minister, we must be prepared to act fast to lay before her or him what (if anything) we are prepared to offer and on what conditions.

4. Such prompt action may help reduce the suspicions with which the intent of the USG is now so widely viewed and hence perhaps help gain GOI acceptance of a short-term bridge arrangement along the lines proposed by Ambassador Smith and his party.<sup>3</sup> We have very little to offer, and attitudes toward us are now such that if we dilly-dally further the new government may very well say: you have strung us along long enough; if you can't live up to your contract in full, we shall make other more reliable arrangements. That, I judge, is not the resolution to the problem that any of us want.

5. Please inform me as far in advance as possible of the next PRC meeting on this subject. If conditions permit, I would like to be present, and assist in any way I can with related congressional consultations.

**Goheen**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 156.

**160. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*NSC Activity*

*Economic Assistance for India*

I was unable to make this point on Wednesday<sup>2</sup> but in light of India's foreign exchange surplus and less than helpful positions on non-proliferation, the hostages<sup>3</sup> and other issues, the nearly \$640 million in U.S. assistance planned for FY 81 seems excessive. As currently programmed, India will receive roughly \$400 million channeled through the International Development Association of the World Bank, \$100 million in Title II P.L. 480 assistance and nearly \$140 million in bilateral AID projects—the largest AID program after Israel and Egypt. Since you are under pressure from Cy and others to meet high priority U.S. objectives in Latin America and Thailand, you might want to consider a marginal reallocation of proposed Indian assistance. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 12/20/79–12/25/79. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> December 19.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 158.

## 161. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 27, 1979, 4:30–6 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Southwest Asia

### PARTICIPANTS

#### STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

#### OSD

Secretary Harold Brown

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

#### JCS

Admiral Thomas Hayward

Lt. General John Pustay

#### DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

#### WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

#### NSC

Mr. Thomas Thornton, Staff Member

Mr. Marshall Bremant, Staff Member

The PRC met to discuss the situation in Southern Asia, especially in light of recent events in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> Admiral Turner briefed on the fast-moving situation in Kabul, noting that the Soviet military presence in the country was as high as perhaps 10,000. (S)

The policy discussion was based on a paper provided by the State Department.<sup>3</sup> Three points were made in discussing the premises of the paper:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 134: 12/27/1979). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the full text of the minutes of this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 102.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Document 394. Documentation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

—We can usefully exploit the Iranians' fear that we might promote disintegration. In fact, however, it was agreed that disintegration was probably not in our interest unless Iran were, or were becoming, irrevocably pro-Soviet. (S)

—The prospects for Pakistan are questionable in the long run, but not as bleak as the paper suggests. We should not write Pakistan off. It might well be possible for us, for instance, to deal with military or civilian successor regimes as we are dealing with Zia. (S)

—Although India will be disturbed by the events in Afghanistan, it is not likely to take any effective action to impede Soviet expansion. (S)

Regarding policy toward *Pakistan*, it was agreed that we must reopen a fundamental dialogue to reassure them that they do not stand alone.<sup>4</sup> We will also have to offer tangible support and find a way to deal with the nuclear problem. In specifics:

—A high-level, security-oriented mission should go to Pakistan promptly. (S)

—We shall move quickly to approve the pending \$40 million PL-480 program and supply additional refugee relief through UNHCR. (S)

—We shall open the military sales channel (equipment mentioned included artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, helicopters and transportation equipment.) (S)

—On the nuclear issue, we will reiterate our previous policy but will not press for further assurances on testing, given the fact that Pakistan lacks the capability to test in any event and the need to introduce a more positive tone to our relationship. (S)

—We will also explore the possibility of revising the Symington amendment to get into it the national interest waiver provision contained in the Glenn amendment. (S)

With regard to *India*, the following points were agreed:

—We will also send a high-level mission to India as soon as feasible after the Indian elections. (S)

—We are prepared to make available to India some of the high-technology, non-weapon military items that they are interested in. (S)

—The PRC will recommend to the President that he send to the Congress with favorable recommendation the nuclear fuel supply request now with the NRC, and submit the next license to the NRC for their consideration. (It was noted that ACDA, which did not attend the meeting, would have to be consulted. ACDA subsequently gave its concurrence.) (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 396.

## 162. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 31, 1979, 1215Z

23794. Subject: India, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Refs: A) State 333360;<sup>2</sup> B) New Delhi 23716.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary. MEA Secretary Gonsalves called me in this morning on two related matters: The Prime Minister's probable reply to President Carter's message of 29 December, and GOI concerns about reported US arms aid to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> The GOI, he said, stood on its stated opposition to external interference in any country and had been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic channels to urge the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan as well as the avoidance of other actions that might further destabilize the region. He then expressed concern at reported US offer of arms to Pakistan and said GOI hoped US would not turn to military solutions. End summary.

3. Knowing that I would be leaving for Washington tonight, MEA Secretary Gonsalves invited me to meet with him this morning on matters relating to the Afghanistan situation. He said MEA officials would be meeting this afternoon with PM Charan Singh on a reply to President Carter's message of December 29 requesting a firm public statement against the Soviet takeover in Afghanistan (reftel A). Because the PM's letter might not be completed before I left, Gonsalves said

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2696. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 333360 to multiple posts, December 28, relayed a Presidential message denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The telegram also included a special message from Carter to be delivered to the Indian Government, which reads: "On many occasions, my country has expressed its respect for India's policy of non-alignment and its adherence to morality and law in the conduct of foreign relations. India's traditional policy of opposing external involvement in the region also is well known, and we have respected that policy. I believe that Soviet actions in Afghanistan have struck directly at the principles that India has long cherished, and I am sure that their actions are of as great a concern to you as they are to us." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1258, N800001–0554, N790010–0486)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 23716 from New Delhi, December 29, transmitted the following MEA statement that was issued to the Indian press on December 28: "The Government of India has taken note of events in Afghanistan since yesterday and has been kept informed about these by its Mission in Kabul. The Soviet Union has conveyed to the Government of India that at the request of Afghanistan leadership Soviet troops have been sent to Afghanistan to enable it to resist external aggression and interference." "Consistent with the Government of India's commitment to the principles of non-alignment, it supports the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800001–0700)

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 395–399.

MEA thought it might be helpful to review its thinking with me now. The GOI, he said, stood on its expressed opposition to the intervention of foreign forces into other countries (reftel B). In addition he wanted me to know that the GOI has made its opposition to the Soviet actions known to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels and that it intends to continue to press through these channels for the removal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Soviet avoidance of any other steps that might add to the instability of the region.

4. Gonsalves then turned to reported US support for Pakistan, highlighted in this morning's Delhi press. Knowing India's concerns, he said, the GOI would have appreciated consultation by US prior to our decision to arm Pakistan as reported in the press. The US should recognize, he said the "gut reaction" of Indians on this score. More specifically, he said, the GOI questions the advisability of building up Pakistan militarily for the following reasons: The Pak military forces are already considerably larger than when they had also to defend Bangladesh; the types of armaments we are reported to be offering seem to go beyond Pakistan's defensive needs vis-a-vis Afghanistan and hence may constitute a threat to India; there is also of course Pakistan's use of US arms against India on four previous occasions; the Pakistan Government is currently so unstable domestically that giving it further arms could be considered "irresponsible"; and finally, both Pakistan and we should recognize India's effort to prove a lack of threatening intent toward Pakistan. In sum, he said, the GOI wished to urge US not to seek a military solution to the new situation, alarming as it is, but instead to try every available other means of bringing about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

5. In response, I told Gonsalves that I would of course transmit these views to the Department, but speaking for myself I thought the GOI both underestimated the new threat to Pakistan from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and overestimated the existing capabilities of Pakistan's armed forces. In addition, I ventured to say that the mild wording of the GOI's public statement on the Soviet intervention very likely was serving to give heightened importance to the strengthening of Pakistan in the eyes of many people in Washington. If India as the largest regional power and a founder of the NAM would not take a strong stand against the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, it made almost inevitable that other countries would look to other means of expressing this opposition. In reply (not unjustly I suppose) Gonsalves reminded me of the current absence of an effective Indian Government; "Indian activism under current circumstances", he said, "is simply out of the question".

6. N.B. The British High Commissioner in a separate meeting with Additional Secretary Krishna at almost the same time was told that

the GOI is pressing the Soviets for a prompt “de-escalation” of their military presence in Afghanistan. This conflicts with and is less than Gonsalves’ statement to me which spoke of a withdrawal of all Soviet troops as the GOI objective. We have no immediate means of reconciling this difference.

7. Department please transmit the above to Kabul and Islamabad and any other posts at your discretion.

Goheen

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**163. Memorandum From the Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation Matters (Smith) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

US-India Nuclear Cooperation

Secretary Vance advised me that you wished to have my views on the Tarapur matter.<sup>2</sup> I believe the termination of nuclear fuel supply to India would not be in our non-proliferation interest and that it is important to take prompt favorable action on the two pending export applications.

On the first application, in the event that the NRC does not act to issue the license expeditiously, I recommend that you issue an Executive Order authorizing the shipment. On the second application, I believe that the Executive Branch should promptly submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1-3/80. Secret. In a January 3 covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski concurred with Smith’s views and recommended that Carter continue the nuclear fuel supply to Tarapur. Carter checked and initialed the Approve option on Brzezinski’s memorandum and initialed at the top of the memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> At a December 28, 1979, NSC meeting, Carter withheld his approval of the December 27 PRC recommendation to expedite the shipment of nuclear fuel to India (see Document 161) and requested a memorandum on the subject from Smith. (Minutes of NSC Meeting, December 28, 1979; Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC-025, 12/28/79, Iran/Afghanistan, Pakistan) For a portion of the minutes of the NSC meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 107.



I suggest that Ambassador Goheen be authorized to advise the new Indian Prime Minister that we intend to take these two actions promptly. This should begin relations with the new Indian Government on a positive note, and the fuel shipments would provide a “bridge” of up to two years in which we may work out a longer-term arrangement with India. Failure to meet this supply obligation would not only strain relations with India at a time we face grave problems in the South Asian region, but jeopardize continuation of safeguards at Tarapur and U.S. controls over disposition of the spent fuel. Eklund, the Director General of the IAEA, has advised me that the end of safeguards at Tarapur would have a seriously prejudicial effect on the whole structure of international safeguards.

If the NRC does not act favorably on either application, you can authorize the first shipment by Executive Order (subject to Congressional reversal by concurrent resolution) on the basis that failure to supply would seriously prejudice achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, and the second one on the same basis some months later. I believe the circumstances warrant such a determination. No waiver of the full-scope safeguards requirement of the Non-Proliferation Act would be involved, since the two pending applications come within the “grace period” provided by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

Some members of Congress may be inclined to try to override this action. To help head off such an effort, at the time we inform the new Indian Government of the decision to move ahead on the two pending applications, we should seek an understanding that there has been no change in India’s nuclear policy.

Beyond the present two Tarapur licenses, I believe the issue of fuel supply to India should continue to be addressed in the context of U.S. non-proliferation policy and objectives.

## 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 3, 1980, 2355Z

1825. Subject: Charan Singh's Reply to the President on Afghanistan.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Following is text of subject letter delivered to Department on January 2. Begin text:

3. I am writing in reply to your letter of December 30 regarding the situation in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> I am sure that you have been informed of the statement issued by us on December 28 stating that, consistent with our commitment to the basic principles of non-alignment, we support the sovereign rights of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference.<sup>3</sup> We have also expressed our opposition to interference in the internal affairs of any one country by another.

4. We have made it clear to the Soviet Government that we expect withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at the earliest possible moment; that the situation there would be defused; and that we hope no action will be taken which would tend to destabilise the situation in the region.

5. In this context, I must express my surprise and deep dismay that your government has decided to provide military supplies once more to Pakistan. You are no doubt aware of the reasons for our concern. The rapid strengthening of the Pakistan armed forces since 1971 has already made it necessary for us to repeatedly reconsider our own defence arrangements. Inevitably, any supplies to Pakistan will remain available to them long after a resolution of the Afghanistan situation, and our experience indicates that arms acquired by Pakistan, for other ostensible purposes, have been used exclusively against India, in the end. It is also a matter of regret that we were neither informed nor consulted before the decision was arrived at.

6. I do not need to recapitulate to you the efforts which have been made by successive governments in India to improve relations with Pakistan, and thereby improve the climate in the sub-continent. You

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800008-0713. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis. Drafted by John R. Malott (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S, S/S-O, NEA, and by Thornton; approved by Schaffer.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 162.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 162.

have been good enough in the past to commend these efforts. It would be highly retrograde if this movement is reversed for reasons of temporary expediency.

7. In a broader perspective, this region is in a state of considerable instability and turmoil. Increased arms supplies to Pakistan will serve only to increase the possibilities of destabilisation. We would, therefore, urge upon you to bear these broader considerations and long-term perceptions in mind before decisions are finally taken or implemented.

8. We have followed with considerable admiration the efforts of your government to adhere in the recent past to policies of restraint in regard to arms supplies to Pakistan. We would hope that you will continue along this path which is indeed the path of reason. Some of the pressures that you face require a high degree of courage if they are to be resisted in the interest of the common good. We are confident that you, Mr. President, and the United States will not be found wanting in this moment of trial. End text.

9. Embassy should refer to this telegram only in Stadis.

Vance

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#### 165. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, January 7, 1980, 1253Z

302. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Summary Thoughts on Implications of Mrs. Gandhi's Victory.

1. C–Entire text

2. Summary

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Congress (I) Party continues to lead in India's national election returns. She may be called upon to form a government by evening of January 8.<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Gandhi's first attention will be given to selecting a Cabinet and to the convening of Parliament to which a new program will be submitted and a budget. Having been the major issue in this election, she is sure to view her triumph as personal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0363. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, Madras, CINCPAC, Moscow, London, Beijing, Hong Kong, and Islamabad.

<sup>2</sup> Gandhi become Prime Minister on January 14.

vindication and a strong mandate. Though the style of Mrs. Gandhi's government is likely to be very different from Morarji Desai and Charan Singh, we expect no sharp divergence on domestic or foreign policy. Her return to power is expected to lead to an upturn in the Indian economy because of a new surge of confidence in the private sector. A return to an emergency regime is likely to arise only in response to specific challenges rather than as a predetermined objective on Mrs. Gandhi's part. A new factor, however, could be a two-thirds majority, apparently within reach, and thus the option of pushing for basic constitutional changes. Foreign policy was not a significant campaign issue though Mrs. Gandhi pledged a more assertive Indian voice on international issues and in Third World councils. Mrs. Gandhi is unlikely to disturb strong Indo-Soviet relations but will also keep her distance and be receptive to balanced relations with the U.S. Still, Mrs. Gandhi has no confidence in the wisdom of U.S. policy in South Asia. She believes our perceptions and basic assumptions are flawed. Mrs. Gandhi is inflexibly India-first in her attitudes, reacts strongly to pressure on her, and is equally suspicious of the good intentions of either super-power. Thus she is disposed to read the worst into the motives of both the USSR and the U.S. in her reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. We would expect continuing apprehension over the Soviet action but with no corresponding compulsion to try to equate Indo-Soviet bilateral relations with a need for a soft attitude toward Soviet moves in Kabul. End summary

### 3. Mrs. Gandhi leading

As reported separately, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (I) Party continues to maintain its overwhelming margin as initial leads turn into declared wins and new returns underscore an expected triumph at the polls. Actual counting may continue for another day before an official majority is declared and President Sanjiva Reddy calls on Mrs. Gandhi to form a government. Assuming that events develop on these lines, Mrs. Gandhi could receive the call from Reddy by evening of January 8 (local time).

### 4. Focus on domestic issues

As new Prime Minister, her first attention will be given to selection of a new Cabinet and to the convening of Parliament, probably within the next week. In her only public remarks following the establishment of a clear election lead, Mrs. Gandhi echoed her campaign theme by pledging to give first priority to restoration of law and order and to bringing inflation under control. Domestic issues are almost certain to preoccupy Mrs. Gandhi in the first weeks of her government, as she draws up her program and introduces her budget.

### 5. Different style

There is little doubt that the style, if not the substance, of government will be considerably different under Mrs. Gandhi than under

Morarji Desai (to say nothing of Charan Singh). Indira will be in undisputed control of her party, and will likely have a parliamentary majority with which to push through her programs quickly and efficiently. More than this, having triumphed in an election whose only major issue was whether she should return to power, she will certainly view its outcome as a personal vindication and a mandate and thus will be less willing to defer to a divided and repudiated opposition.

6. No divergence in fundamental policies

Because the campaign was devoid of a real debate on issues, there is little of a specific nature that can be cited on policies which Mrs. Gandhi may adopt. Looked at another way, with the exception of Charan Singh's vain efforts to pit rural development versus industrial growth, the campaign was waged on the bedrock of a basic consensus on fundamental policies. We would therefore expect no sharp divergence by Mrs. Gandhi in either domestic or foreign policy.

7. Economic upswing predicted

Mrs. Gandhi's return to office is expected to lead to an upturn in the economy, at least in the short and medium term. The economic environment should improve as the uncertainties of the past are replaced at least by expectations of future stability. Many Indians, though not without reservations and equivocations, predict a surge of confidence within the private sector as Mrs. Gandhi takes control. Moreover, she is regarded as less sensitive to foreign investment in India and has avoided remarks critical of it in the campaign. Indians residing abroad are expected to be encouraged to accelerate remittances. Finally, there is the widespread conviction that Mrs. Gandhi will be far less tolerant of the labor indiscipline which has crippled such vital facilities as the Port of Calcutta, the refineries, production in Indian coal mines, as well as inefficiency and disruptions in public sector management.

8. Domestic policy

We have earlier analyzed the domestic political impact and likely approach of an Indira government (79 New Delhi 22783)<sup>3</sup> judging that reimposition of an Emergency era regime would arise only in response to specific challenges rather than as a predetermined objective on Mrs. Gandhi's part. We believe this continues to be true. A new dimension, however, is that a two-thirds majority for Congress (I) appears to be within reach. This would restore Mrs. Gandhi's capacity to opt for

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 22783 from New Delhi, December 13, 1979, the Embassy transmitted a report on the impact that Gandhi's victory in the January 3–6 elections would have on Indian domestic and foreign policy and on U.S.-Indo relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790579–1159)

the constitutional and parliamentary sanctions which constituted the Emergency regime. Thus a two-thirds majority, coupled with the personal nature of her victory (and, some would add, the enhanced standing of son Sanjay Gandhi), would arm her with the widest range of options with which to bring the opposition to heel. We reiterate that this is not likely to be her intention or desire. She will have the benefit of public support for an initial honeymoon period and the precedent of the Emergency may deter the kind of opposition challenge likely to provoke a crackdown, at least in the short run.

#### 9. Approach to foreign policy

Though foreign policy did not emerge as a significant campaign issue, it was not for want of effort by Mrs. Gandhi. Her standard speech frequently alleged a straying by Janata from traditional Indian non-alignment, a decline in Indian prestige, a failure to assert India's traditional leadership role in Third World councils and a scorning of Indian interests and sensitivities by regional neighbors. On all counts Mrs. Gandhi can be expected to be more assertive. Her only specific campaign pledge was a call for recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. On the crucial question of relations with the Soviet Union, Mrs. Gandhi will do nothing to disturb what is a strong Soviet position in India, based on a vital arms supply relationship, important economic and trade ties, as well as a security backing underwritten by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty with which to confront any perceived threat from China and Pakistan. Nonetheless, Mrs. Gandhi will maintain her distance from the Soviets and having set in motion the effort to reduce dependence on the USSR which was developed by Morarji Desai, she will be receptive to the concept of a balanced relationship with the United States. Mrs. Gandhi's rhetoric and abrasive style, her highly negative image in the West and personal sensitivity to foreign criticism, risk influencing and obscuring the substance of a GOI policy that is likely to be unencumbered by ideological overtones.

#### 10. Relations with the U.S.

Mrs. Gandhi has no confidence in the wisdom of US policy in South Asia. She believes that our perceptions and basic assumptions are flawed, as demonstrated in our support for Pakistan in the past, our hostility to Indian domestic economic policies, our thwarting of Indian security interests, and our equation of India with its smaller neighbors, among others. To cite these is to underscore the burden of past history. To these, is added a deeply held conviction that the USG is personally hostile to her and has plotted to bring her down, a theme that found occasional expression in the campaign and much more frequently in prior years. Yet it would be a mistake to view Mrs. Gandhi as failing to adjust to new realities and to put aside personal prejudices in pursuit of Indian interests. She is inflexibly India-first in her attitudes,

reacts strongly to pressure against her, and is profoundly mistrustful of the good intentions of either super-power. Thus, she is intellectually well equipped to read the worst into the motives and actions of both the USSR and the US in her reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Her technique is to avoid being painted into a pro-US corner which will yield her little support at home while maintaining her strongly felt fear and concern at Soviet intervention.

11. Specific issues

On (A) Afghanistan, therefore, we would anticipate continuing apprehension over Soviet action with no overriding compulsion to try to equate good Indo-Soviet bilateral relations with a need for a soft attitude toward Soviet moves in Kabul.

(B) US arms to Pakistan will excite suspicion, in keeping with the bulk of Indian opinion.

(C) Fuel for Tarapur did not surface as a campaign issue and Mrs. Gandhi did not go out of her way to drag it in. However, she has been vigorous and consistent in her on the record remarks to correspondents in opposing Indian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

(D) Human rights is perhaps the most immediate concern of many Americans who look at Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. Her style of leadership and authoritarian reflexes hold out this potential.

**Blood**

## 166. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 10, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

When I last wrote to you, after the 1977 general elections, I observed that the essence of a democracy is its free electoral system.<sup>2</sup> Now, nearly three years later, the people of India have again demonstrated to the world the strength and vitality of their democratic institutions—and have clearly shown their faith in you. I warmly congratulate you upon your assumption of office.<sup>3</sup>

I have asked Ambassador Goheen to carry this letter to you, with my hope that it marks the beginning of an active and candid dialogue. We have much to discuss with each other. Because India and America are democracies with a free and active press, the underlying policies each of our countries pursues may not always be clear to the other. By communicating directly with each other, I hope that there never will be any doubt about our actual positions. Should any concern arise, I hope that you will contact me or Ambassador Goheen directly.

Strengthening Indo-American relationships is a goal I set at the very beginning of my Administration. We engaged with the Government of India in continuing discussions on a wide range of international and regional issues. Beyond the ties of democratic philosophy that bind our two nations, we have striven to add flesh to our bilateral relationship. As you know, we have resumed both military sales and economic development assistance to India. The work of the Indo-US Joint Commission and its four subcommissions has expanded greatly, and our

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. No classification marking. Telegram 9356 to New Delhi, January 12, directed the Embassy not to deliver this version of the letter to Gandhi because of complications caused by the Indian statement at the January 11 UNGA emergency special session on Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–0275) According to telegram 122 from USUN, January 12, the Indian representative, noting the Soviet assurances to India that the Afghan Government had requested Soviet military assistance, stated: “We have no reason to doubt assurances, particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union with whom we have many close ties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0439) Telegram 10597 to New Delhi, January 13, and telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to revise Carter’s letter in view of the Indian statement at the UNGA; see footnotes 3, 4, and 5 below. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800023–0560 and D800024–0521, respectively)

<sup>2</sup> Carter’s 1977 letter to Gandhi was not found.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to change the last line of this paragraph to read: “I congratulate you sincerely upon your assumption of office.” See footnote 1 above.



two countries are engaged in many cooperative projects in such areas as solar energy and agricultural and medical research. Trade between us continues to grow, as does cultural and scholarly exchange. I want to see this process continue in the years ahead.

With the exception of the tragic and dangerous situation in Afghanistan, I am struck by the improvement in relations among the nations of South Asia over the past five years or so. We have fully supported the major role that India has taken in bringing this about. I sincerely hope that this process—in which you have played such an important part—will continue, and that India will make further progress toward reducing tensions, resolving outstanding issues with its neighbors, and encouraging regional stability.

In this regard, America cannot help but look with grave disquiet and concern at the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Amin Government by Soviet troops. Soviet actions in Afghanistan and the continued presence there of Soviet military forces directly engaged in operations against the people of Afghanistan have serious consequences both for the region and the world as a whole. I know that as the leading power in the region, and as a nation that traditionally has opposed external interference in the affairs of the area, India too is concerned about developments in Afghanistan and their implication for the stability of the region. I am eager to receive your thoughts on this question.<sup>4</sup>

Pakistan is obviously and understandably concerned. We are prepared to respond to Pakistan's needs in the context of the events in Afghanistan. I am fully aware of India's concerns, but I feel the changed circumstances require understanding on both our parts. The U.S. also intends to be more responsive to Indian requests for military equipment, including high technology items that India cannot produce itself. I will ask Ambassador Goheen to keep in close touch with you on these questions.

We are seeking neither alignment with any nation in the region nor confrontation between any nation and the Soviet Union. I am firmly convinced that the nations of South Asia bear the responsibility for their own security. The United States seeks no position of special influence there. We welcome a non-aligned South Asia that seeks equally

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to change the last two sentences of this paragraph to read: "I assume that as the leading power in the region and as a nation that traditionally has opposed external interference in the affairs of the area, India too must recognize the serious consequences of developments in Afghanistan and their implication for the stability of the region. I will be interested to receive your personal thoughts on this question." The telegram also directed that the revised letter be dated January 14 and delivered to Gandhi. See footnote 1 above.

good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, a South Asia free of all external manipulation. But I believe strongly that Soviet actions in Afghanistan—what is, for all practical purposes, their occupation of a sovereign member of the Non-Aligned Movement—strike directly at policies that both our countries have pursued in recent years. It is vitally important that we fully understand each other's views and actions.

The most difficult bilateral issue we face is the future of our nuclear relationship. We are well aware of each other's positions on this question. The resolution of our differences is a matter that we shall want to pursue further with your Government as soon as you find it convenient. In the meantime, I am prepared to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first of the two pending exports for the Tarapur reactors if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not act favorably and expeditiously. I shall also direct that the Executive Branch submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC on the second application. I have asked Ambassador Goheen to discuss with you the difficulties that we may encounter with these exports and ways in which they might be met.<sup>5</sup> The nuclear issue is especially difficult because both of our countries base their positions on principles sincerely held. I hope this token of our good faith will be the first step towards a solution that satisfies all of our common concerns.

Finally, I would like to repeat my hope that this might be the first letter in a regular correspondence. I earnestly seek your views on the many concerns that our two nations share. I recognize that during the history of our relations with India there have been too many occasions when both nations talked but neither listened to what the other was saying. I am as eager to listen as to talk, and to build a future relationship of mutual trust and understanding between us.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 10597 to New Delhi, January 13, directed the Embassy to revise the preceding three sentences to read: "In the meantime, we would be prepared to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first of the two pending exports for the Tarapur reactors if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not act favorably and expeditiously and if your government would agree to provide the assurances which had been made available to us earlier. I would also direct that the Executive Branch submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC on the second application. I have asked Ambassador Goheen to discuss this with you." See footnote 1 above.

**167. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, January 16, 1980, 1216Z

989. From the Ambassador. Subject: My Jan. 16 Meeting With Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

1. S–Entire text.

2. Summary: In my call on Mrs. Gandhi to follow up on the President's letter<sup>2</sup> and carry out the instructions in State 012074,<sup>3</sup> I found her remarkably affable and obviously determined not to generate controversy. In tone her manner matched that of the President's letter and, I feel, was calculated to show that she genuinely would like closer understanding and relationships with the US. At the same time, it was disappointing not to have her come to grips with any of the sensitive issues. On specifics, Mrs. Gandhi welcomed the prospective visit of Clark Clifford but has a problem with the date;<sup>4</sup> recognized that the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan represents a new and dangerous development for the region; expressed (rather mildly) India's distrust of Pak and PRC intentions; queried if we thought the Soviets would attack Pakistan; reported that the GOI is having diplomatic-level talks with the Pakistanis looking to a reduction of tensions and some encouragement in the fact that General Zia for the first time had referred to the Simla Agreement in his letter to her; asserted that the Indian statement in the UN last week was not intended to exonerate the USSR; maintained India's interest in a Soviet withdrawal; reaffirmed a desire to have good relations and not work at cross purposes with the US. Only others present were long-standing MEA liaison officer in the PM's office, Prakash Shah and my Pol Counselor. End summary.

3. Bilateral relations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0467. Secret; Immediate; Stadis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 166 and footnotes 3, 4, and 5 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 12074 to New Delhi, January 15, conveyed instructions to Goheen for his January 16 meeting with Gandhi. Among other points to be made, Goheen was instructed to express the U.S. Government's "deep disappointment with the statement made by the Indian delegation in the UNGA Afghanistan debate," and state that the potential U.S. military aid to Pakistan would be for defensive purposes. Goheen was also instructed to seek assurances that India would not develop nuclear explosives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026–0663)

<sup>4</sup> In a January 9 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski suggested sending a high-level mission to India. In a handwritten note on the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Goheen assess then Clifford." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/9–31/80) Brzezinski's memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 152.

I opened by saying that the President and Secretary had asked me to stress their strong desire for good relations with Mrs. Gandhi's new government. The USG felt that there were many important areas where we could work together or in parallel. We saw no reason to be at cross purposes with India.

Mrs. Gandhi smilingly replied, "yes, that has been my attitude all along."

I told Mrs. Gandhi that as an earnest of President Carter's commitment to good relations with India he wished to send as his personal representative to meet with her U.S. elder statesman and former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford. Mrs. Gandhi replied that this was most welcome. She was tied up with obligatory appearances in Parliament January 23 and 24 and President Giscard of France arrives on January 25 to be here through January 28. She instructed Prakash Shah to schedule Mr. Clifford as soon as possible and promptly inform me of available dates.

#### 4. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China

Drawing on appropriate portions reftel, I assured Mrs. Gandhi of our understanding of India's sensitivity toward our supplying arms to Pakistan and developing more intimate relations with China. However, we were going about these in deliberate ways which sought to avoid adversely affecting India's interests.

Mrs. Gandhi replied that I was correct, India was very sensitive about any strengthening of Pakistan and China, based on India's past experiences with these two countries.

I told Mrs. Gandhi that we see arms to Pakistan as only one component of a solution to the problems of security in the region. We look forward to India playing a major role.

Mrs. Gandhi asked whether the USG believes Soviet armed forces will enter Pakistan. I replied that they obviously have the capability to do so and we have no assurance that they won't. Our intention is to create conditions which will discourage them from doing so.

Mrs. Gandhi said the whole world is concerned with what is happening in this area. The Soviets are already in Afghanistan. Question now is, "how do we de-escalate the resulting tension?". She had no advice for the U.S. as to how this might be achieved.

I replied that we look forward to exchanging views with India on precisely that question, and assured her again that our initiatives toward Pakistan and China were being undertaken in ways designed as so not to hurt Indian interests.

Mrs. Gandhi agreed with alacrity that this was the intent of the U.S. However, the Chinese and Pakistanis may have other intentions. In the past the USG had supplied arms to Pakistan confident in Pakistani assurances that these would never be used against India, but they were.

I replied that the situation in the region today was radically altered in two ways. First, Soviet arms in Afghanistan are on Pakistan's border. Second, India now has an overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan. While the US hopes any arms it supplies will strengthen Pakistan's security against the clear and imminent threat on its northern border, much more important in our view are Indo-Pakistan relations and, if possible, cooperation.

Mrs. Gandhi said, "we are in continuous touch with Pakistan. I took the initiative during my last government to improve relations with Pakistan and will continue to do so." She noted with satisfaction that General Zia in a letter to her had referred "for the first time in a long time", to the Simla Agreement. Continuing to agree that Indo-Pakistan relations were very important to the security problem of the region, she emphasized that these must be sorted out bilaterally with Pakistan since the relations between the two countries were "very special."

Returning to the great amount of recent publicity in the Indian press regarding enhanced Sino-U.S. relations, I reported Secretary Vance's statement to me that the US does not intend to sell arms to China. Economic and cultural relations would grow, but there was no "Beijing-Washington military alliance".

#### 5. Soviet Union

Mrs. Gandhi said she understood that, but doesn't the U.S. understand that whatever Washington does with Beijing provokes the Soviets? The Soviet fear of China is remarkable, "it is their entire horizon."

I replied that we understood Soviet sensitivities about China. There was nothing in the Sino-American relationship which could be construed as threatening to India or the Soviet Union.

#### 6. Tarapur

I reminded Mrs. Gandhi of the President's stated readiness to clear the pending Tarapur licenses upon receipt of assurance of continuing Indian forbearance concerning nuclear explosive development and testing. Mrs. Gandhi replied with a firm, "yes," and added that technical level talks to bring this about should proceed immediately.

I regretted that the U.S. and Indian press had speculated that fuel for Tarapur was one sort of a bribe to India to offset other U.S. moves. This is absolutely untrue. President Carter's decision on Tarapur is simply to affirm our desire to continue a cooperative relationship with India. Mrs. Gandhi said that she fully agreed with this point of view and had already publicly said so.

#### 7. Military sales

I then noted recent Indian interest in purchases of U.S. military equipment and said that the US was prepared to be more forthcoming

in this area, though we did not wish to stimulate an arms race in the region. It was yet another earnest of our desire to recognize legitimate Indian needs and strengthen our relations with India.

Mrs. Gandhi replied cautiously that she understood and appreciated the US offer but its timing might be misconstrued.

#### 8. Afghanistan in the UNGA

I told Mrs. Gandhi of our deep disappointment with the statement made by the Indian PermRep in the UNGA Afghanistan debate, because it appeared so largely to exonerate the Soviets.

Mrs. Gandhi replied defensively, though not unpleasantly, "we have said we do not approve of Soviet troops entering Afghanistan, though they claim they were invited by the Revolutionary Council. The Soviets have said repeatedly that they will get out of Afghanistan. We must create conditions to get them out. Public demands and military pressure won't move them."

Returning to the Indian UNGA statement, I said India's position appeared to whitewash the Soviets. Mrs. Gandhi replied that was not her intention, "we are concerned to have the Soviets so much closer to our own borders."

#### 9. Sign-off

As she concluded this rather pleasant exchange of views I asked if there was any particular message I might convey to the President. She answered that she would be writing to him in reply to his letter.

#### 10. Comment

Shortness of time precluded including a discussion of Iran or raising the issue of possible Indian recognition of Heng Samrin as suggested in State 011994.<sup>5</sup> We shall cable dates when Mrs. Gandhi can receive Clark Clifford as soon as known.

11. Department please pass to AmEmbassy Islamabad and other posts at its discretion.

**Goheen**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 11994 to multiple posts, January 15, directed the Embassy in New Delhi to "approach GOI at appropriately high level as quickly as possible to try to forestall GOI recognizing the Vietnamese-installed and maintained Heng Samrin regime." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026-0522)

**168. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Emissary to India (Clifford)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1980

## SUBJECT

Your Meeting with President Carter (U)

According to my notes, the following were the main points that President Carter made during his meeting with you on January 23.<sup>2</sup> (U)

You should tell Mrs. Gandhi on behalf of the President that she has a friend in the United States. We see Soviet action in Afghanistan as a threat to world peace. We are concerned about India's security, supportive of its attempts to deal with domestic problems, and hope for peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. (U)

The President noted in this context that he had urged both President Zia and Morarji Desai to meet but they had never been able to get together. The President recalled that Agha Shahi had told him of India's suggestion that Pakistan shift forces from its Eastern to Western fronts.<sup>3</sup> The Pakistanis were, however, somewhat skeptical. (C)

You may inform Mrs. Gandhi that Warren Christopher will be visiting Pakistan in early February. (C)

If Mrs. Gandhi raises the question of a visit to the United States, you should tell her that the President looks forward to meeting her and that the respective foreign ministries should discuss dates. You need not, however, raise the possibility of a visit. (C)

You should also stress to Mrs. Gandhi the President's continuing concern, affection and interest for India. This results from his personal ties, including Miss Lillian's time there<sup>4</sup> and his own visit.<sup>5</sup> He noted that many Indians who visit the United States go to Plains and meet with Miss Lillian. He wants to build this friendship further. (U)

The President hopes that he will be able to number Mrs. Gandhi among those world leaders with whom he carries on a continuing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Carter met with Clifford from 9:30 to 9:50 a.m. in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 408.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 62.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 90–92.

correspondence, designed to exchange views on important international and bilateral topics. (C)

The President noted that he hoped that India would be willing to sign a Tlatelolco-type agreement and believes that Pakistan would follow suit. He doubts, however, that Mrs. Gandhi would be interested in that. (C)

The President said that he saw no way that improvement in US-Chinese relations could be anything but good for India. Certainly China would be reluctant to jeopardize those relations by aggression against India. When Deng Xiaoping was here, he spoke with pleasure, even excitement, about the then forthcoming visit of Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee to China. Obviously the Chinese erred seriously by attacking Vietnam during the visit; nonetheless, it was clear that the Chinese looked forward to improving relations with India and we believe they still do. (C)

In the area of arms supply, the President and Dr. Brzezinski made three points:

—We will inform India about the kinds of weapons that we will supply to Pakistan before we seek final approval of the list.

—In any event, we propose to sell defensive-type weapons only.

—As we help Pakistan, we are also prepared to help India in the context of enhancing regional security. (C)

**Thomas P. Thornton<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>6</sup> Thornton signed "Tom Thornton" above this typed signature.



**169. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, February 1, 1980, 1049Z

2224. CINCPAC for POLAD—Handle as Specat. Subj: Clark Clifford's January 31 Meeting With Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Ref: New Delhi 02112.<sup>2</sup>

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary

Mrs. Gandhi greeted Mr. Clifford warmly and responded enthusiastically to the personal message he delivered to her from President Carter.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Clifford stressed the importance the President attaches to maintaining a close personal relationship with Mrs. Gandhi. The President is deeply concerned at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and determined that the Soviets understand any further moves would be opposed by the U.S. U.S. arms supply to Pakistan was part of this effort. However, due to the modest character of the equipment, this should not be a matter of concern to India. We are also prepared to sell arms to India. There is nothing in our relationship with China which threatens India. US aims in South Asia are the same as India's—a region of non-aligned independent nations. We both seek Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The U.S. hopes India will use its influence with the Soviets to that end.

Mrs. Gandhi responded that India wanted good relations with all its neighbors. However, any arms Pakistan acquired would induce a "dangerous state of mind". Zia will use them against India and to suppress his own people. The US was backing an unpopular ruler as it has done in Iran. Mrs. Gandhi doubted if the Soviets would enter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800077–1075, D800056–0643. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, London, Madras, Paris, Tokyo, CINCPAC, USUN, Bonn, USNATO, and Seoul. Repeated to Islamabad in telegram WH80141/Sitto 35, February 2. Aaron sent a copy of telegram WH180141/Sitto 35 to Carter under a February 2 note that reads: "Attached is Clark Clifford's report of his conversations with Prime Minister Gandhi which he regards as 'highly useful.' I think when you read it, however, you will find out that Mrs. Gandhi's position on virtually all issues of importance to us is unhelpful." Carter initialed the telegram. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2112 from New Delhi, January 31, 1980, reported Clifford's January 30 meeting with Foreign Minister P.V. Nasarimha Rao. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800054–07670) An extract of telegram 2112 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 190.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Pakistan. India has made clear to the Soviets that it does not approve of their troops being in Afghanistan. Mrs. Gandhi felt they would remain "until the government in Kabul is secure." Mrs. Gandhi described her own and Soviet fears of China, with which she is committed to have good relations. She deplored the return of the "Cold War" atmosphere and wants good relations with the U.S. Some American Presidents and Western media have been against her, but she has never tilted against the U.S. "She was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S., but pro-India." End summary.

3. Special Presidential Emissary Clark Clifford met with Prime Minister Gandhi for an hour and 20 minutes January 31. Also present on Indian side were Acting Principal Private Secretary C.R. Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, MEA Secretary (East) Gonsalves and note takers. Mr. Clifford was accompanied by Ambassador Goheen and NEA/INS Country Director Howard Schaffer.

4. The meeting was amicable and, in our view, was a highly useful exchange. Mrs. Gandhi was at her attractive best. She spoke candidly and completely without rancor. Her presentation of India's position lasted for an unusually long 30 minutes, without interruption. She made it clear from the outset that she appreciated the opportunity to exchange views and was pleased that the President had sent Clifford, a personal friend and senior advisor, to India for this purpose.

5. Clifford began by expressing President Carter's high regard for Mrs. Gandhi and his greetings to her. The Prime Minister responded enthusiastically to this and asked that she be personally remembered to the President and the members of his family. She recalled with great pleasure the visit of Mrs. Lillian Carter and Chip to India in 1977.

6. Clifford spoke of the shift in political winds in the United States. He said that it was now his personal conviction that President Carter would be renominated and reelected. He would thus have five more years in office, exactly the length of Mrs. Gandhi's newly begun term. He said that it was important that these two leaders of the world's greatest democracies be in close contact and through their dialogue seek to avoid misunderstanding about the policies of their two countries. He said that the President had selected him with a view to conveying to Mrs. Gandhi the importance that he attached to this personal relationship.

7. Clifford opened his presentation by speaking of the growing concern the US had over the past years with Soviet moves. He mentioned the build-up of Soviet military forces, their ability rapidly to deploy these forces in different parts of the world, and Soviet-sponsored activities in Africa and the Indian Ocean area. It was against this background, further complicated by developments in Iran and their impact on the power balance and stability of the area, that we viewed the

Soviet move into Afghanistan. Clifford described this as an abrupt change in what had been until then the Soviet practice of intervening with its own troops only in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. He said that we do not really know why they had moved into Afghanistan. The reason for their move was less important than the fact that they had gone in with a very substantial military force.

8. Clifford said that we had to assess the Soviet move both in terms of what it meant for the South Asian and Southwest Asian region and what it meant for the broader global situation. He stressed that we believe that aggression unopposed leads to further aggression; we had learned bitter lessons in the past on this score. He said we were now seeking to send a signal to the Soviet Union that its move would be politically costly to it and that any further moves would be opposed.

9. One of the decisions we had made following the Soviet invasion was to provide arms to Pakistan. Clifford assured Mrs. Gandhi that this should not be a matter of concern to India. He stressed the modest amount of such equipment, its defensive character, and the fact that it would comprise items designed to enable Pakistan to defend its northwestern frontier against actions from Afghanistan. He added that the major purpose of the assistance was to serve as a symbol, so that the Soviets would be aware that if they were to move into Pakistan, this would be a matter of grave concern to the US. The US is also seeking to get other countries to provide assistance to Pakistan so that the signal to the Soviets will be reinforced. He noted that US is also prepared to sell to India arms of a high level of sophistication if India wishes to purchase them.

10. Clifford said that US-Chinese relations were gradually being normalized. There had been exchanges of delegations and many US Cabinet members have visited China. The most recent Cabinet official to do so had been Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.<sup>4</sup> Clifford stressed that the US did not intend to provide weapons to the Chinese. There was nothing in our relationship with China which could be viewed as a threat to India.

11. Clifford emphasized that the US seeks no special position in South Asia. We wish to see in the region non-aligned, independent nations free to develop their own futures. We consider India the leading regional power. We want no confrontation with the Soviet Union in the region and we understand India's concerns on that score. Nonetheless, we must recognize that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan necessitates a greater interest on our part in the region than we have had

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<sup>4</sup> On January 7 and 8, Brown met with Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao in Beijing. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 290–292.

before. The occupation of Afghanistan brings Soviet forces to within 300 miles of the Persian Gulf. Clifford cited the President's remarks in the State of the Union address about U.S. vital interests in the Gulf and our determination to use force if necessary to protect these interests.<sup>5</sup>

12. Clifford said that in his view we seek the same goals in South Asia as does India. These are that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and that Afghanistan once again become an independent and non-aligned country. Even if they simply seek to establish a puppet government in Afghanistan this would be a matter of concern. We do not want the Soviets to misunderstand our position.

13. Clifford noted that we strongly support the modernization of India and Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to bring it about. He spoke of the President's interest in India and his desire to avoid actions which would be detrimental to India or misunderstood there. He stressed the President's devotion to peace. He also noted that the US did not wish to upset India's relationship with the Soviet Union, which brought certain benefits for the Indians. He hoped that India would be able to use its influence with Moscow to persuade the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

14. Replying to Mr. Clifford's presentation, Mrs. Gandhi stated that India did not want to stand in the way of US relations with China or Pakistan. Though India had faced aggression and sustained hostility from both countries, it was seeking to develop friendship with them. She reviewed her own efforts, begun in 1972, to normalize Indo-Pak relations. She said that she sincerely believed that it was not to India's advantage to have weak neighbors. It wants stable, strong, and independent countries in the region, provided that these do not interfere in India's affairs. She declared that India poses no danger to its neighbors.

15. Discussing Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi said that Pakistan would be encouraged to use these arms acquired from the West against India. The quality or quantity of these arms is not important. Any arms that Pakistan acquires induces a dangerous attitude of mind. In the past, for example, there had been a hardening of Pak attitudes following arms shipments. Pakistan, she said, was unstable, even fragile. Zia was not a popular leader and the arms he receives will be used against the local people—the Baluchis and Sindhis. She said a situation similar to Iran would arise. There, too, the US backed one man even though he lacked popular support.

15. Mrs. Gandhi said she found it difficult to believe that the Soviets would enter Pakistan. She did not in any way wish to excuse their invasion of Afghanistan. Their argument, she said, was that the Paki-

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 16.

stanis had been arming Afghan insurgents and undermining the Kabul government. In justifying their move, the Soviets also said that they feared a US move against Iran. The Soviet Ambassador had told her that Soviet troops were massed on the Pakistan and Iranian borders in order to prevent infiltrations by those trained to upset the present regime. She thought the Soviet position was understandable, since the Islamic fanaticism of the insurgent forces would cause problems for the Soviets in Central Asia were they to make progress in Afghanistan. She reiterated that India had made it clear to the Soviets that it does not approve of their troops being there. India took this position both for its own sake and also because the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan could lead to escalation of a cold-war atmosphere in the region.

16. Mrs. Gandhi observed that the Soviets seemed obsessed with China. She said they feared being surrounded. Afghanistan, she recalled, had been the happy hunting ground for many powers and India was afraid of the effect that any action there will have. The Soviet Ambassador had assured her that Soviet troops would not stay a long time. He had talked of weeks or months, but it was anybody's guess how long they would stay. In her view they would remain until they felt sure that the government in Kabul was secure.

17. Mrs. Gandhi regretted that the Cold War atmosphere had returned and that detente appeared to be a thing of the past. She said that this was worrisome for India for if a Cold War escalates into a hot war it would be too close for comfort.

18. Turning to China, Mrs. Gandhi reviewed her efforts since 1966 to be friendly with the PRC. She complained of the potential for Chinese mischief-making in the northeast and in Nepal. She did not cite any current activities in the region. She declared that if China doesn't wish to be friendly with India this could be a real threat, especially if China is closely tied to Pakistan. This is why people in India have become excited about Sino-Pak ties. Pakistan can't conquer India or occupy Indian territory but the Chinese potential for causing trouble is considerable and this influences the Indian view.

19. Mrs. Gandhi insisted she wants good relations with the US. Although "some" American Presidents have tilted against India, she had never tilted against the US. She complained that the Western press had tried to develop an image of her as pro-Soviet and anti-American. This, she said, was not true. She maintained that she had great admiration for the US where "the talk is higher than anywhere else". She was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S., but pro-India.

20. Clifford observed that the US would be conscious of any misuse by Pakistan of arms we supplied it and these arms would be watched with great care. He raised as a personal suggestion the possibility of

a mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces from the Indo-Pak border. Mrs. Gandhi interjected to say that the "Indian Express" this morning reported Zia's rejection of India's longstanding offer of a no-war pact. She said that India wished further improvement in Indo-Pak relations. To her reiterated comparison of the Shah and Zia, Clifford said that we are not putting our imprimatur on the Zia government. We were supporting the nation of Pakistan and were reacting to the Soviets. Mrs. Gandhi then complained about Diego Garcia. She maintained that Soviet actions will be governed by what China and the US do. She feared escalation and complained that in the past India had not fit into US global strategy. When Mrs. Gandhi mentioned that Gromyko was coming to India on February 12, Clifford expressed the hope that Mrs. Gandhi would use the occasion to work for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He pointed out that the decision to build up Diego Garcia was very recent and directly linked to the increased Soviet presence in the region. Concluding, he noted that the attention of the world was riveted on this part of the globe and that this attention was caused by the Soviets.

Goheen

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**170. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, February 2, 1980, 0745Z

2291. Subject: The Clark Clifford Visit: A Success in Jeopardy.

1. In my judgment Clark Clifford's visit here represented a big plus for America. His personality and presence conveyed with eloquence and conviction both the President's personal interest in India and the grave danger that we perceive in the Soviets' takeover of Afghanistan. He could not have represented us better. The tone and manner of the GOI's response, especially in the case of the Prime Minister herself, reflected their appreciation of his stature as an "elder statesman" and close advisor of the President. The easy candor and lack of rancor with which differences were aired also were designed to signal, I feel sure, a calculated decision to maintain open lines of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800058-0021. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad.

communication with us and to show that India's long-term friendship with the Soviet Union does not preclude—indeed, is counter-balanced by—a desire to have minimally abrasive relations with the U.S. if possible.

2. I must also, however, report considerable distress here at the extent to which Mr. Clifford's credibility (and also mine) is being undercut by some of the news related to the Christopher-Brezinski mission to Islamabad.<sup>2</sup> The press has got the news that the U.S. team has been trying to put together a \$2 billion package of arms for Pakistan. While we have refused to confirm this and tried to brush the report off, it figured prominently in the Lok Sabha debate yesterday. Any U.S.-engineered arms package for Pakistan approaching these dimensions would of course conflict sharply with Clark Clifford's instructions to emphasize to the GOI the limited and non-threatening nature and amount of arms that the U.S. has had in mind for Pakistan. Mr. Clifford's credibility with the Indians will be further threatened by the Gwertzman article in the *New York Times* to the effect that the U.S. intends to enter a long-term military support relationship with Pakistan.<sup>3</sup>

3. The sooner we can clarify to the GOI our actual intent as to the amount and duration of the U.S. and/or U.S.-sponsored arms commitment to Pakistan, the better our chances of limiting the damage to our credibility in New Delhi and protecting the favorable impact of the Clark Clifford mission.

**Goheen**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 423.

<sup>3</sup> See Bernard Gwertzman, "White House Seeks Long-Term Aid to Bolster the Defense of Pakistan," *New York Times*, June 12, 1978, p. A6. According to the article, "The Administration originally thought of seeking only an emergency 'one-time exemption' from the law barring Pakistan from any American aid because of its reputed nuclear weapons program. But Congressional sources and Administration officials said that the Administration now planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to Pakistan without any time limits."



## 171. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, February 14, 1980, 1248Z

3236. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Putting Gromyko Visit in Perspective. Ref: New Delhi 3188.<sup>2</sup>

### 1. Summary

Joint Indo-Soviet statement (text reftel) confirms that primary result of Gromyko visit was an agreement to disagree about the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan and the consequences flowing from that presence. Although the two parties failed to find common ground on this issue, neither had seriously anticipated that agreement would be possible. It would be false to conclude at this point that Gromyko's visit represents a major setback to Indo-Soviet relations or that Mrs. Gandhi now supports Western views of the situation in South Asia. The firmness with which the GOI represented its position, however, is indicative of the tenacity of Mrs. Gandhi, the confidence which her election victory gave her and her determination to avoid involvement in disputes between the super powers. End summary.

2. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi ended at 11:00 a.m. February 14, two hours later than originally planned. This delay allowed Gromyko time for a 45-minute call on Mrs. Gandhi. It also permitted the two sides to complete the text of a bland and awkwardly phrased joint statement which makes ample use of boiler plate language and is all but devoid of substance. It bears the earmarks of a Soviet draft but makes no concessions to Soviet priorities on Afghanistan and related issues.

### 3. No change in positions

Neither party made any headway in changing the established position of the other on Afghanistan. The statement avoids mentioning that country by name and vaguely refers to talks which "reviewed the international situation including the developments in the region and around it." According to G.K. Reddy, diplomatic correspondent of the Hindu, the original Soviet draft was not acceptable to India since the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800092-0944, D800079-0716. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, London, Paris, Moscow, Madras, Tokyo, CINCPAC, USNATO, Islamabad, and Kabul.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3188 from New Delhi, February 14, transmitted the text of the Indo-Soviet joint statement, which was signed at the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet talks held in New Delhi February 12-14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800079-0469)



language on Afghanistan did not include references to inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

4. The only points on which the two sides were able to agree were their determination to develop their relations further, their decision to maintain an exchange of opinions on issues of mutual interest, and their conclusion that the talks had strengthened their mutual understanding.

5. No change in basic relationship

Despite the transparent effort to find a few points of agreement, it would be false to conclude from the joint statement that Indo-Soviet disagreement on Afghanistan portends a falling out between the two countries or even a major change in the relationship which has existed between them since the 1971 treaty. The preservation of that relationship—including economic development projects, arms sales and cultural exchanges—is in the interest of both countries and will be an integral part of their respective foreign policies. Both sides will have an opportunity to demonstrate this fact late next week with the arrival in Delhi of Vice Premier Ivan V. Archipov in his capacity as co-chairman of the Indo-Soviet Joint Commission. The rumored visit of Minister of Defense Dmitry F. Ustinov in March or April will provide another occasion to demonstrate the continuity of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Both parties may search for other occasions in the next two months to show that their relationship remains unchanged.

6. The visit and Mrs. Gandhi

What emerges from this visit is not a cooling of the Indo-Soviet relationship but rather concrete evidence of a confident and tenacious Mrs. Gandhi who has now had an opportunity to show the Soviets and the world that she is to be taken seriously. She is determined to become a force in the international arena while at the same time steering clear of any involvement in super power disputes. Her electoral victory provided her with a mandate, which, she believes, gives her a free hand in formulating both foreign and domestic policy. Since approving (or at least acquiescing in) the January 11 statement by the Indian UN delegate,<sup>3</sup> Mrs. Gandhi has quietly backed away from the Soviets, first abstaining in the UN vote<sup>4</sup> and then issuing the statement in Parliament

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 413.

of January 23<sup>5</sup> and the Giscard communique several days later.<sup>6</sup> During this process, she politely declined to be identified with the U.S. position. She has resisted what presumably was strong pressure from the Soviets. This will win for her plaudits from her party (particularly the Sanjay faction) and will be greeted by segments of the opposition as well. It also separates her from both the CPI and CPM, both of which have supported Moscow on Afghanistan.

7. The likelihood that the scenario of the past two days would be the result of the Gromyko visit appears to have been anticipated by the Soviets from the start. The buildup for the visit in the leftist press emphasized the long standing nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship and only secondarily discussed the Afghan situation. Other issues which might have been expected to play a prominent part in Indo-Soviet consultations (economic cooperation, trade, Kampuchea) received virtually no attention at all. Even anti-US propaganda took a backseat to extolling the virtues of the Indo-Soviet relationship.

8. Even though the Soviets recognized this probable outcome, they obviously concluded that the nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship was such that consultations of some sort between the two governments were a *sine qua non*. Gromyko visited Desai almost immediately after the Janata government took over in March of 1977.<sup>7</sup> To do less upon the return of Mrs. Gandhi to the Prime Ministership would have been peculiar. In addition, the stream of foreign visitors to New Delhi in the post election period to establish contact with Mrs. Gandhi set a pattern which the Soviets had to follow.

9. Similarly on the Indian side there was clear recognition by late January that a common position on Afghanistan was unlikely to result from the Gromyko talks. But the Indians, too, accepted the need for

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1578 from New Delhi, January 23, transmitted excerpts from Reddy's January 23 address to the Indian Parliament regarding foreign policy. Reddy declared that "recent developments in Afghanistan highlight the re-emergence of the Cold War. This is a matter of grave concern. The countries of the region should be allowed to devote their energies to the promotion of regional stability and co-operation with one another. The resources of the region are enormous and should be utilized for the welfare of the people there. To subject these countries to big power rivalries is totally unacceptable to us." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800039-1009)

<sup>6</sup> According to telegram 1904 from New Delhi, January 28, the joint Indo-French communiqué, issued on January 27 during Giscard's 5-day visit to India January 25-30, "declared use of force in international relations and intervention in internal affairs of other countries as 'inadmissible'" and "called on all states to refrain from actions which could intensify great power rivalry and bring back 'Cold War.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800050-0622)

<sup>7</sup> In 1977, Gromyko visited India April 25-27. Telegram 6222 from New Delhi, April 30, 1977, reported on the visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770152-0328) He met with Desai on April 27. See footnote 6, Document 66.

the meetings and made no effort to postpone them or to strike from the agenda the one obversely troublesome subject.

10. The results of the Gromyko visit thus come as no surprise. Both sides will now try to pick up the relationship in less contentious areas. The difference over Afghanistan cannot be forgotten, but neither side is likely to highlight it.

Goheen

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## 172. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 26, 1980, 3:45 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Eric Gonsalves, Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs

Ashok Gokhale, Chargé, Indian Embassy

G. Parthasarathy, Counselor, Indian Embassy

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, NSC

*Dr. Brzezinski* opened the discussion by saying that the U.S. seeks to work with India to find a constructive and serious solution to the Afghan problem. He disavowed any interest in increasing tensions in South Asia or building up Pakistan against India. He pointed out that it would not be in India's interest to see Afghanistan changed from a buffer into a wedge that threatens Pakistani stability. *Dr. Brzezinski* stated his assumption that India does not want to dismember or radicalize Pakistan and that it prefers to see a reasonably vital Pakistan with a secure northern border. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* went on to say that while we do not know why the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, we are concerned about the consequences. We want to work with all in the region. We will shore up Pakistan and will cooperate with Iran after the release of the hostages, with the goal of creating a fabric of security. We hope for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. (At this point *Dr. Brzezinski* quoted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

relevant passages from President Carter's letter to Tito,<sup>2</sup> emphasizing that we had drafted it with the Brezhnev speech<sup>3</sup> in mind.) (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* outlined the USG's hopes for a solution to the Afghan issue including prompt and complete troop withdrawal and a government reasonably representative of the Afghan people. He noted the need to preserve legitimate Soviet interests and permit them to save face. He hoped that India could play a positive role in this regard, but one that recognizes the injustice of what the Soviets are doing. (He noted our disappointment with the Indian UN statement;<sup>4</sup> *Gonsalves* said that it did not represent the views of the current government.) *Dr. Brzezinski* went on to say that we hoped to work in parallel with India toward a suitable solution, although we would not be seen as working together. We expect that Afghanistan will have an Islamic government and a peacekeeping force that will reassure Soviet interests. Such a force might include non-Muslim, as well as Muslim countries—perhaps even India.) (S)

*Gonsalves* replied that there is considerable identity of objectives although our reasons and methods are not necessarily the same. India stands for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity; their principal goal, apart from withdrawal of Soviet troops, is to establish a viable structure of cooperation in the subcontinent. This is impossible if foreign intervention introduces tensions. As far as modalities go, *Gonsalves* agreed that saving of the Soviet face is important. Mrs. Gandhi had pushed Gromyko hard on withdrawal but with little success. Gromyko had gone on at length about foreign intervention. (*Brzezinski* asked if he had offered any proof; *Gonsalves* said he would send us what Gromyko had given them.) (S)

The first requirement, *Gonsalves* said, is to get the Soviets to understand that a non-hostile regime is possible in Afghanistan. Elections are probably not feasible. (*Brzezinski* agreed.) India could not comment, however, on the mechanics at this time. (S)

Turning to Pakistan, *Gonsalves* said that India understands that Pakistan faces new concerns and may need new materiel. There should not, however, be an irreversible U.S. buildup in Pakistan that would result in an irreversible Soviet buildup. The matter of weapons was

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<sup>2</sup> Carter's February 26 letter to Tito addressed how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had changed the dynamic of détente. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2964 from Moscow, February 22, reported on Brezhnev's February 22 speech in which he proclaimed that the need for Soviet military aid would cease to exist if the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors guaranteed the cessation of external interference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800093–0373)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

something that India can deal with. The threat to the integrity of Pakistan comes from within the country and arms only complicate that. He asked for American restraint. (Dr. Brzezinski noted that this is a fair point.) Gonsalves added that U.S. military responses elsewhere in the area (e.g., Persian Gulf) should recognize that arms supply cannot create stability. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* replied that he had stressed this in his public statements. While we have vital interests to protect in the region, the way to do this is not through bases and troop presence in some mechanical transfer of past experiences. We are seeking a more limited and flexible presence. Ultimately the nations of the region must cooperate in guaranteeing their own security. We will, however, support our friends. We will not rush headlong into this policy and are sensitive to the points Gonsalves has made. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* noted that Clifford had reported a surprising meeting of the minds in his visit<sup>5</sup> and we hope to continue the dialogue through the continued exchange of visits. He urged Gonsalves to consider seriously the possibility of a massive Soviet counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan during the spring and the excesses that this would bring. (S)

*Gonsalves* noted the latter point but admitted that he saw no answers at this point. He said that India values continuing consultations and accepts the fact that the U.S. has inputs into Indian policy. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that the reverse is also true; India is also a nation of global and regional importance. (C)

Following the meeting, Thornton met for about 30 minutes with Gonsalves, et al. Only a few new points arose: (C)

—Gonsalves was considerably less optimistic about the possibility of a government coming to power in Afghanistan that would be acceptable to the Soviets. (S)

—In response to a question, he went on at some length about Chinese attempts to assuage Indian concerns—e.g., careful briefing of the Indians before and after the Huang Hua visit to Pakistan. He did not see any easy concrete steps that could be taken. (S)

Before leaving, Gonsalves made several points that he wanted to be sure were on the record: (U)

(1) India was disturbed about reports of the McGiffert discussions in Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> If, indeed, the U.S. is not arming Pakistan to the teeth, it would be best to get this point across in public. (When he turned to

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 169.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 7, Document 426.

specifics, however, Gonsalves only mentioned arming four divisions with tanks and self-propelled artillery. Thornton noted that this would not be an unreasonable requirement for Pakistan; the usual discussion ensued.) (S)

(2) If too much equipment is supplied to Pakistan, the Indians will have to get more from the Soviets. Thornton noted the large Indo-Soviet arms deal in the works; Gonsalves minimized it as very long-term, meant only to balance recent Pakistani acquisitions. (S)

(3) India wants to allay Pakistani concerns so that they can move troops to the Afghan border. Thornton asked if the two military leaderships might get together and Gonsalves said that the Indians were trying to do this. (S)

(4) Gonsalves bore down hard on the need for the U.S. to stop the Pakistani nuclear program. He implied that a Pakistani weapons capability, plus extensive arms supply, would force India to reexamine its nuclear option. Gonsalves seemed particularly concerned about stopping European support (including technicians) for the Pakistani program. Thornton replied that we were doing all that we could but the Indians know as well as we do how difficult it is to stop up all the holes. (S)

Gonsalves concluded by expressing his pleasure at the visit and admitted that he, along with much of the Indian elite, had a very different impression of Dr. Brzezinski's attitudes than reality portrays. (S)

**173. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 26, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

5. *Consultations with Indians on Afghanistan*: In meetings in the Department today,<sup>2</sup> senior Indian Foreign Ministry official Eric Gonsalves said India agrees with the US that the Soviets should withdraw promptly from Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of maneuvering the Soviets into a position of having to honor the commitment to withdraw that Gromyko and Brezhnev had offered. In the Indian view, it is important to convey to the Soviets that the US, China, and Pakistan would not support intervention.

Gonsalves argued that what the Soviets want in Kabul is a government which would not threaten them, not necessarily a Marxist one. The Soviets did not want to keep their troops in Afghanistan since this would inevitably mean that in a few years the US would also build up forces in the area. Gonsalves recognizes the great difficulty of finding a leader acceptable to the Soviets and to international opinion as well as to the Afghans.

Gonsalves expressed apprehension that we might provide Pakistan with large amounts of the kind of military equipment which could be used by the Paks only against India. However, he said India could live with a \$400 million package of US assistance, although it would protest this publicly. He asked that we continue to consult closely with India on the Afghan crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 55448 to New Delhi, March 1, reported on Gonsalves's February 26 meeting with Christopher, Saunders, Coon, and Schaffer, during which Afghanistan and possible arms supplies to Pakistan were discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–0541) Telegram 52786 to New Delhi, February 28, summarized Gonsalves's February 26 discussion with Pickering on nuclear issues, in which Pickering reiterated the need for assurances from India "that existing agreement for cooperation and related understandings continue in force," as well as "on forbearance regarding nuclear explosive development" in order to facilitate approval of the pending nuclear fuel requests by India. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800101–0973)

## 174. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, March 13, 1980, 1149Z

5297. Vienna for IAEA. Subject: PriMin Gandhi's Nuclear Policy.

1. (U) Mrs. Gandhi March 13 responded to questions in the Upper House of Parliament on nuclear matters. An official text of the exchange will not be available until March 14.<sup>2</sup> Indian Wire Service (UNI) report follows. PTI report does not differ significantly.

2. Begin text. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi today reaffirmed India's commitment to the peaceful uses of atomic energy but added that it would not hesitate from carrying out "nuclear explosion or implosion, whatever is necessary, in the national interests."

She told the Rajya Sabha at question time: "We remain committed to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However, the government must look after the interests of the country and study this question in depth. The Prime Minister said we must have our eyes and ears open (to what had been happening in this region) and be in touch with the latest technology. We should not be caught napping."

Since the tension had of late been developing in the region, she pointed out, there was a need for an in depth study of the whole issue.

Replying to another question, she said the matter had to be viewed from the standpoint "whether our entering into the race will safeguard our interest or endanger it."

Since India had been assured by some of its neighbors which had been developing nuclear technology that their intention was to use it for peaceful purposes, "we believe it." The government's efforts would be to lessen tension in the area, she added.

When a questioner insisted on knowing whether the government would deviate from the policy of the previous government "against carrying out nuclear explosion come what may," Mrs. Gandhi expressed her inability to precisely explain the policy pursued by the Janata or the Lok Dal governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800128-1189. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Colombo, Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Madras, and Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 5389 from New Delhi, March 14, transmitted the text of the March 13 exchange between Gandhi and members of Parliament. The Embassy noted: "Though its published form has a relatively smooth flow, actual discussion was raucous and spirited, involving members' interjections, rejoinders, unanswered questions, incomplete thoughts—alternatively expressed in Hindi and English." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800141-0107)



She quoted some statements of then Prime Minister Morarji Desai indicating a difference in stance.

Mrs. Gandhi quoted Mr. Desai as having said in the Rajya Sabha on July 13, 1977 that his government would do whatever necessary (in the nuclear field) in consultation with other people.<sup>3</sup> Who were these “other people”, she asked.

She said the Atomic Energy Department was not kept informed of the government’s policy (by the then Prime Minister).

For some time the Janata government was totally against nuclear explosion she said.

Mrs. Gandhi also quoted from Mr. Desai’s statement of November 13, the same year, to the effect that there was nothing new in his (Mr. Desai’s) nuclear policy as it was the same as laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru.

Mrs. Gandhi said the “caretaker government” did deviate from the policy when Mr. Charan Singh had said that India would reconsider its policy if Pakistan persisted in its efforts to make a nuclear bomb. End text.

3. (C) Comment: While as expected Mrs. Gandhi continues to avoid a categorical repudiation of PNEs in these exchanges, it is noteworthy that she weighs their advisability in terms of the national interest and raises the question of whether such a course might endanger rather than strengthen India’s security.

**Goheen**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 78.

# 175. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, March 21, 1980, 1042Z

5892. State pass NSC/Thornton. Subject: Letter to the President from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

1. S-Entire text.

2. Ministry External Affairs Joint Secretary (Americas) D'Souza March 21 gave DCM copy of Mrs. Gandhi's letter dated 12 March. Original has been pouched on March 14 by MEA to Indian Embassy Washington for delivery.

3. D'Souza said last para of text had not been in MEA draft and had been personally added by Mrs. Gandhi.

4. Begin text.

New Delhi

March 12, 1980

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th January.<sup>2</sup> Since then I have had the opportunity of meeting your special envoy, Mr. Clark Clifford.<sup>3</sup> I appreciate your consideration in sending him to India to discuss matters which are of special concern to us.

We do attach importance to Indo-American relations and wish to strengthen them. They have already assumed diverse and extensive dimensions, and I believe that there is considerable potential for their expansion even though our overall perceptions on various matters may not always converge. Such differences in assessment are not unusual between two democratic countries which have to take into account differing national interests and compulsions. However, I feel that this should not stand in the way of extending and strengthening the existing bilateral cooperation between our two countries.

Our discussions with Mr. Clifford have given us a fairly clear picture of your views on recent developments in this region. Mr. Clifford must have reported to you on our own thinking. There are divergences in our approach, but we also share some common ground and it would be useful for us to continue this dialogue.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800144-0330. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 166.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 169.

We have discussed the Afghan situation with a number of distinguished leaders who have visited India since I assumed office. Our representatives have gone to meet leaders of our neighboring countries. In these crucial times it is important to have a better understanding of their views on problems of direct and immediate relevance to this region. We have also had discussion with your government. These discussions have given us an insight into the thinking of a representative cross section of world opinion, and in particular, of the parties most intimately concerned with current developments. I should like to share with you some general impressions that have crystalized as a result of these discussions.

Our basic approach to this situation was spelt out in the joint declaration that I signed with the President of France on January 27, 1980.<sup>4</sup> The principles enunciated in that document constitute the bed-rock of our position and, in fact, should provide the basis for a satisfactory solution. As envisaged in the Indo-French joint declaration, it has been our consistent endeavor to defuse tension in the region and create a climate of confidence.

Our Foreign Secretary visited Islamabad for detailed discussions with leaders of Pakistan. He carried an unqualified assurance from me and my government that Pakistan had nothing to fear from India. India understands their present anxiety and their concern for their security. Regrettably, however, Pakistan's response was less than forthcoming, and they made no corresponding effort to reciprocate. As an example, Pakistan's insistence on referring to the Kashmir question in international fora in a propagandist and agitational manner, most recently in the Islamic Foreign Ministers' meeting in Islamabad,<sup>5</sup> can hardly be said to conform to the spirit of the Simla Agreement. Nor can it bring about a better climate in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, we shall pursue our objective of normalizing relations with Pakistan.

Mr. President, we are against all forms of foreign interference particularly in the affairs of non-aligned countries. We feel that all nations involved should cease such activities. We are concerned that the Cold War situation has been thrust upon our region. Our anxiety now is to prevent further escalation which would have disastrous consequences not only for India but also other countries in the region. Our first priority is to maintain peace and stability in our region. That is why we have clearly expressed our opinion that the supply of arms to

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 171.

<sup>5</sup> The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held an extraordinary session in Islamabad January 27–29.

Pakistan has no relevance to, nor can it succeed in finding a solution for the present crisis. Such action will escalate tension and the risk of triggering off a regional arms race which would force us to divert our attention and resources away from our primary task of economic development. I believe you agree that the big powers should leave the countries concerned to work out their own destiny in an atmosphere of peace. I might add that we see a glimmer of hope in the reported willingness of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to proceed on the basis of package of moves that would simultaneously involve credible guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and withdrawal of Soviet troops.

I share your hope, Mr. President, that we remain in constant touch on issues that concern us both. This message comes to you with my warmest personal greetings to you, to your able and charming wife and your mother, for whom India has special affection.

Yours sincerely,

(Indira Gandhi)

His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter

President of the United States of America

Washington, D.C. End text

Goheen

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## 176. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, April 4, 1980, 1017Z

6822. For Under Secretary Newsom from the Ambassador. Subject: Indian Attitudes Toward US Policy and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Ref: State 88475.<sup>2</sup>

1. S—Entire text.

2. GOI initial reaction and response to Soviet invasion—Framing of the official Indian response to the Soviet invasion was complicated initially by the absence of an established government in New Delhi,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800169–0698. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

the invasion occurring just before the national parliamentary election on January 3–6. Mrs. Gandhi took office as Prime Minister on January 14, thus, over a three to four week period the Indian position veered from interim Prime Minister Charan Singh's December 29 demand for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops,<sup>3</sup> to virtual endorsement of the Soviet explanation for the invasion by India's UN PermRep on January 11,<sup>4</sup> to the more balanced position eventually adopted by Mrs. Gandhi. Even before her election, while deploring foreign intervention in Afghanistan, she was equally forceful in criticizing the US response and in decrying the development of a Cold War confrontation in South and Southwest Asia. These equivocal views, expressed in several public statements and interviews, appear to have been the basis for the January 11 UN speech by PermRep Mishra, the effect of which was to make India appear as an apologist for the Soviet invasion.

### 3. Change over time of GOI attitude—

India's isolation within the non-aligned group and a strongly hostile domestic reaction led almost immediately to distancing from the language and pro-Soviet alignment expressed in the Mishra statement to formulation of the more nuanced "balanced policy" which now exists. The GOI is committed to "defusing" what it regards as the threat of superpower confrontation in South Asia arising out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its approach is to insist on the unacceptability of foreign troops in Afghanistan, to reiterate frequently and publicly Soviet assurances that their troops will be withdrawn, but without seeking to "condemn" Moscow. In addition to wishing to insulate India's all important bilateral relationship with the USSR, Mrs. Gandhi and official spokesmen assert that Soviet security interests must be recognized and a way devised to reassure the Soviets that these will not be endangered. The GOI balances its stress on Soviet withdrawal with equal attention to what it claims has been a long history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. This, it claims, is the context in which the Soviet intervention must be perceived.

### 4. GOI attitude toward US response to Soviet invasion—

There has been unswerving Indian hostility, both official and popular, to US military support for Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Indians assert that US arms for Islamabad would represent a direct threat to India against a background of three wars between the two countries since 1947. The GOI has also been critical of US efforts to strengthen our military presence in the Indian Ocean and our security links with littoral states, describing these as

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<sup>3</sup> The statement was issued on December 28. See footnote 3, Document 162.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

contributing to the superpower confrontation which now jeopardizes regional peace and security. The GOI also remains very sensitive to any suggestion of US-China-Pakistan cooperation as a link-up which could be turned against India. Mrs. Gandhi also sometimes suggests that such cooperation increases the Soviet sense of insecurity and helps explain Soviet actions in Afghanistan. From the outset the GOI has asserted that while it has no objection to US economic aid to Islamabad, military assistance will not enhance Pakistan's security against the Soviets but may only encourage a fragile and unpopular Zia regime to seek national support by developing an aggressive posture toward India. This possibility, in the Indian view, represents a more serious threat to India and the region than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

#### 5. Change in GOI attitude toward US response to Soviet invasion—

Para 4 is more a formal posture and a set of basic perceptions about the present situation in South Asia than a reflection of current Indian priorities in dealing with Afghanistan. US arms to Pakistan have not materialized, while the Soviet presence continues to be increasingly seen as of indefinite duration. In addition, the series of intensive consultations with the Indians at both the political and working levels has also allayed much of the initial concern with the US response by detailing the specific limits to our assistance and making clear our basic objectives with respect to Pakistan, China and the region. The Clark Clifford visit in late January,<sup>5</sup> followed by CODEL Obey,<sup>6</sup> helped reassure Mrs. Gandhi and the GOI about the limited character of our response and our sensitivity toward Indian interests. These exchanges, as well as the intensive and continuing consultations at the working level, have persuaded the Indians that, regardless of disagreement on specific tactics, we recognize India's key role in coordinating a possible regional response to the Soviet invasion. In short, the change in Indian attitudes cited here flows from their assessment that the US response has also evolved and that includes a recognition that India's role is vital. The fact that the possibility of US arms for Pakistan has receded puts our dialogue on a better footing. This dialogue could profit from more high level US attention.

**Goheen**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 169.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 2930 from New Delhi, February 11, reported on Congressman Obey and his delegation's visit to New Delhi February 7-9. Obey met with Indian members of Parliament, attended a briefing at the Defense Ministry, and attended a reception with Goheen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800073-0817)

**177. Memorandum From Gerald Oplinger and Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Indian Response on PNE Assurances (U)

The attached telegram<sup>2</sup> reports the Indian response to State's last-ditch efforts to obtain a limited no-PNE assurance. India has rejected either a general assurance with a "paramount national interest" loophole, or a commitment limited to US-supplied material. (S)

Thus India has clearly reconfirmed the position that it is free to conduct future nuclear tests, whether we continue supply or not, and that even if US supply should continue, it is free to conduct future nuclear tests with non-US material. (S)

In our view this response disposes of the option of approving the pending licenses, since we would have no assurance that the material would not be used in an Indian PNE unless US supply continues thereafter for the life of the agreement. We can continue that supply only by changing the NNPA to remove its requirement for full-scope safeguard. (S)

The choice is now quite stark: either we change our policy and our law to accommodate the Indian position, or we terminate cooperation.<sup>3</sup> (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 4/80. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 7114 from New Delhi, April 9, is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski underlined the word "terminate."

## 178. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 9, 1980, 4–5:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Non-Proliferation Matters and Tarapur Fuel Licenses

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *White House*

Mr. David Aaron

Ambassador Henry Owen

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Ambassador Gerard Smith (Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation)

Mr. Frank Hodsoll (Deputy Special US Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters)

Ms. Jane Coon (Deputy Assistant Secretary) (Tarapur only)

#### *OSD*

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

Mr. Walter Slocombe (Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning)

#### *Energy*

Mr. Worth Bateman (Acting Under Secretary)

Deputy Secretary John Sawhill

Dr. George Cunningham (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy)

#### *JCS*

General David Jones

#### *DCI*

Admiral Stansfield Turner

[*name not declassified*] (Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence)

#### *ACDA*

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny (Deputy Director)

Mr. Charles Van Doren (Assistant Director, Non-Proliferation Bureau)

#### *OSTP*

Dr. Frank Press

Mr. Benjamin Huberman

#### *OMB*

Dr. John White

Mr. Dan Taft (Deputy Associate Director Special Studies Division)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 4/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes devoted to non-proliferation were sent as a separate memorandum, which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 381.



CEQ

Mr. Gus Speth

*Domestic Policy*

Mr. Stuart Eizenstat

Ms. Kitty Schirmer

NSC

Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield

Mr. Jerry Oplinger

Mr. Thomas Thornton

The following is the record of the second half of the PRC meeting held on April 9, 1980, in the Situation Room. This part of the meeting deals with the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power reactor in India. (S)

*Secretary Vance* opened the discussion by expressing his belief that we have to make a decision on Tarapur now and recommend it to the President. His personal preference is that we should go forward with the two pending licenses and we should not be stopped in doing this by our failure to get any more assurances from Mrs. Gandhi. Obviously, of course, if the Indians were to conduct a PNE that would change the picture. He stressed the great importance of India given the difficulties we face in Southwest Asia, and cited this as a new factor which should influence our decision. He said, in effect, that he supports Option 1A of the State paper.<sup>2</sup> (S)

*David Aaron* replied that his concern is that we see this problem in a wider regional context. He believes that we must be evenhanded as between India and Pakistan, whatever that means. He therefore, against the advice of his staff, wants to cut the whole relationship off now. (S)

*Secretary Vance* responded that our relationship with Pakistan is not a supplier relationship, whereas it is with India. Both India and Pakistan are keeping their PNE options open. He does not see how we can fail to go forward under our contract with India and still say that we are being evenhanded. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> Dodson sent the undated Department of State paper entitled "Tarapur Fuel" to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Schlesinger, Smith, Jones, Turner, and Press under an April 8 covering memorandum. The paper offered two options, each with alternative approaches to deal with the nuclear supply issue with India. Option 1A called for approval of the first shipment and support for the second, as well as cooperation over the long term through either changes in U.S. law to permit continued cooperation or the use of a Presidential waiver. Option 1B called for taking no action and continuing negotiations with India over assurances. Option 2A called for termination of cooperation, with the exception of the two pending export licenses, while option 2B called for immediate termination without fulfilling the two pending export licenses. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 102, PRC: Non-Proliferation, Tarapur 4/9/80: 4/80)

*Aaron* responded that, unlike the State Department, he does not want to keep open the option of a possible change in the law. This would harm our non-proliferation stance and make people doubt that we are serious in our statements about non-proliferation. He does not believe that we can go through the process of issuing the two pending licenses without biting the bullet of a change in legislation. He emphasized that to move in this direction would be seen by Pakistan as a further sign of our lack of interest and felt it pointless to take this loss just simply for the temporary gain of issuing the two licenses. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Claytor* noted his agreement with Secretary Vance. He believes that our policy has collapsed and that there is no point in staying with it. (S)

*General Jones* said he had no strong views but referred back to the earlier part of the discussion and the difficulties that the Gerard Smith proposal might face, for instance, with Congress.<sup>3</sup> He thought that if we could get some additional support for the Smith proposals by denying the licenses to India, that might be worth doing. (S)

(Note: JCS subsequently revised its position to full support of the views expressed by Deputy Secretary Claytor.) (U)

*Mr. Keeny* said that ACDA wants to stretch the issue out as long as possible and avoid a possible collision. He asked what Congress would accept. If Congress should overturn the Presidential recommendation to grant the two licenses, we would have the worst possible solution. (S)

*Aaron* noted that we are going to be asking Congress for a change in the restrictions on Pakistan<sup>4</sup> and will also be floating the Gerard Smith proposal. Adding the Tarapur licenses to this would put a lot of weight on Congressional forbearance. (S)

*Admiral Turner* said that CIA had no comment. (U)

*Henry Owen* said that he was unable to judge the issue without better knowledge of the political realities in South Asia. (S)

*Gerard Smith* said that granting the licenses would not undercut our non-proliferation law or policy. He felt that if a break has to come with India it would be better to come as the result of an act of Congress rather than a Presidential act. He felt that the Pakistanis did not see

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<sup>3</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting recorded Smith's proposal to seek a non-proliferation regime based on generic approval of foreign nuclear fuel requests, as opposed to a case-by-case system. (Ibid.) Smith's memorandum to Carter with his proposal is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 379.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 402.

any serious connection between their case and the Indian case and quoted Ambassador Hummel to this effect. (S)

*Keeny* said that from a non-proliferation point, if there was going to be a break it would be best if it came as a result of Indian action. Second best would be as a result of Presidential action. The worst would be if Congress were to overturn the President. (S)

*Mr. VanDoren* said in his view, after much contact with Congress on these matters, he was convinced that they would overrule the President. (S)

*Assistant Secretary Pickering* said he thought we should try to phase out our nuclear program with India in an orderly manner on the basis of granting the two licenses. This would be well-received in Congress, which is anxious not to have a messy conclusion. (S)

(Secretary Vance left the meeting.) (U)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* emphasized the fact that we have a legal commitment to continue the supply of nuclear fuel to India. Our moral and legal position is badly eroded on this point. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Claytor* expressed his agreement. (U)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* continued by saying that our position should be determined by our contractual commitment. He thought that Congress is perhaps now more understanding of the Indian problem. He pointed out that in our consultations we only talk to those who are interested in non-proliferation. There is a much broader group of members of Congress who would see the issue in political and strategic terms. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Claytor* expressed his conviction that Congress would not override the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense if they all argued in favor of granting the licenses. In any case, it would be worth taking the chance, and he would be glad to go up and work for it. He said he could guarantee the votes of the Armed Services Committee of both the House and the Senate. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that there is obviously a clear issue of dispute as to how to proceed. In any event, of course, we should attempt to get as much from India as possible in the bargain and it would be clearer that a PNE would undercut the whole process. He said that he did not, at this point, want to make any decision on whether we would change the law as it affects India. (S)

*David Aaron* asked what was going to happen to our proposals to change the legislation regarding the Symington amendment as it related to Pakistan. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that that was a quite different subject which should be discussed at the forthcoming PRC on Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> (S)

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 438.

*David Aaron* said that no matter what Ambassador Hummel thought, he was convinced that the Pakistanis would seize on any action we took that appeared to favor India and use it as an excuse to justify some action they would take that would be against our interests. If we were to proceed with the licenses for India, this would have to be balanced by legislation repealing the Symington amendment as it affects Pakistan. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* pointed out that that was impossible to do until we went forward asking for a specific amount of money for Pakistan. (S)

*Aaron* reiterated that the two countries must not be treated separately. (S)

*Mr. Keeny* noted that he saw the situation as different. One was an ongoing process of supply, and the other wasn't. Parallel tracks were not needed for the two. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that the State Department, in cooperation with NSC, would prepare a Decision Memorandum for the President reflecting the two points of view and flagging the many problems that had arisen. (S)

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## 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 22, 1980, 1544Z

106274. NSC for Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: Governor Harriman's Meeting With Indira Gandhi, April 17.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. On April 17, Governor Harriman met in Salisbury with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at her request.<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Gandhi remained silent, so Governor Harriman began the meeting by recalling his own long

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870108-0332. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad. Sent for information to Moscow, Kabul, and the White House. Drafted by Robert C. Frasure (S/S-S), cleared in S/S-O and by Harriman (in draft) and Raphel; approved by Seitz. The telegram was repeated for information Immediate to Beijing, April 29.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1538 from Lusaka, April 14, conveyed Gandhi's request through the Indian High Commissioner to Zambia to meet with Harriman in Salisbury, where, she had been informed, he was to head the U.S. delegation to the Zimbabwe independence ceremony. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800187-0078)

and friendly relationship with India. At the time of the Chinese attack in 1962 upon India, he had gone to India to offer American support and weapons. Times had now obviously changed; however, the American Government wished to improve its relations with India. In that regard, he had a personal message from President Carter to Mrs. Gandhi<sup>3</sup> which expressed the hope that the discussions begun in India recently by Clark Clifford should be continued.

3. Mrs. Gandhi responded that she was all for the continuation of the discussions; however, India continues to believe that “the U.S. has a tilt against India.” Asked to be specific, Mrs. Gandhi smiled and declined to go into detail other than to note that the improvement in Chinese-American relations did not concern India particularly. Harriman stated that we were discussing with the Chinese their improving relations with India and during the recent visit of Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zwang,<sup>4</sup> he indicated their desire to do so.

4. On Afghanistan, Governor Harriman said he wished to assure Mrs. Gandhi that, contrary to what the Soviets had charged, the U.S. was not involved in Afghanistan and had had no connection whatsoever with the forces which had been opposing the Afghan regime prior to the Soviet intervention. The U.S. would favor the neutralization of Afghanistan. The Soviets have practically no support in the country.

5. In reply, Mrs. Gandhi exclaimed, “But how do they get rid of the present government?” (Comment: At several points in the conversation, Mrs. Gandhi who had requested the meeting, appeared to be on the verge of a frank discussion of Afghanistan. Each time, however, she pulled back and became wary, perhaps due to the presence in the room of the Foreign Minister and two aides as well as an American notetaker. End comment.)

6. Mrs. Gandhi continued that the Afghans are a fiercely patriotic people. They do not like outsiders. The Soviets claim that infiltration from Pakistan and Iran keeps the rebellion going. The Soviets tell her that if this outside intervention can be stopped, they will withdraw their troops. Mrs. Gandhi said realistically the Soviets will not tolerate a country unfriendly to them on this part of their border. It would generate unrest in their own Asian republics.

7. Mrs. Gandhi assured Governor Harriman that what she was saying to him, she had also said to Gromyko. However, she commented when a country is concerned with its own national interests, it doesn’t care what people say to or about it.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zang Wen Jin.

8. Governor Harriman suggested that we wished India would take the lead in working out some solution. We had been interested in her proposal some time ago that the country be neutral. We would favor U.N. troops replacing Soviet troops consisting of perhaps Indian, Indonesian, and Algerian forces. Now that the Europeans were promoting the idea, it does not seem to be making any progress. It would have been better if the Indians had pursued it. Mrs. Gandhi smiled, but did not appear to want to discuss the proposal.

9. Asked for her support on Iran, Mrs. Gandhi described it as "a terrible situation." No one seemed to be running the country. She appeared sympathetic, although non-committal, about Bani-Sadr's efforts to solve the crisis.

10. On Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi said that her government was trying to improve relations and pointed to the recent trip to Islamabad of the former Indian Foreign Minister. Note: At the Zimbabwean President's luncheon reception on April 18, General Zia introduced himself to Harriman and had a ten-minute talk. Zia stated that there were practically no Communists and no supporters of the Soviets in Afghanistan. The tribesmen desperately need arms (anti aircraft and anti tank weapons particularly). He said Pakistan did not have any weapons to spare, implying that we should supply them. The tribesmen would be brutally butchered during the summer months unless they got weapons promptly. He told Harriman that he had seen Madame Gandhi and they had had a cordial discussion. No other U.S.-Afghan topics came up.

11. Asked if she had any message for the President, Mrs. Gandhi replied she had nothing in particular other than to extend her best wishes to the President and especially to his mother. On relations, she added, "we are in touch. You have Mr. Goheen in India." Harriman met Mrs. Gandhi at two subsequent receptions. She was cordial and told him that she had an engagement to meet General Zia.

**Vance**

**180. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1980

## SUBJECT

Fuel Supply for Indian Nuclear Reactor—Decision Memorandum (S)

At Tab A is an interagency paper setting forth several options for you to consider regarding further supply of enriched uranium for the Indian nuclear power plant at Tarapur.<sup>2</sup> The first two pages provide a concise background, and a number of options are then treated at some length. This covering memorandum summarizes the options. (S)

The options cluster around three poles: A decision to terminate supply now; agreement to approve one or two of the pending export requests (with several variants); and further procrastination of the issue. (S)

NSC supports the first option in the interagency memo, *an immediate cutoff*, based on the fact that the Indians are unwilling to provide us with assurances that, in the event of a break in the contract, they would not reprocess our spent fuel or use it for nuclear explosives. This is the option most compatible with our non-proliferation policies and has the virtue of getting the agony over with quickly. It will, however, cause serious trouble with India at a critical time and will probably mean loss of controls over the spent fuel already in storage at Tarapur. (There is no way we can secure Indian agreement to maintain those controls except by amending the Non-Proliferation Act or continuing to waive its full-scope safeguards requirement.)<sup>3</sup> (S)

Most agencies want to *provide one or both of the pending licenses* but there are several views on how to go about this. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, 4/9/80, Non-Proliferation and Tarapur (I). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Tarapur Fuel" that outlined options to address the nuclear fuel supply issue. Option 1 called for termination of nuclear cooperation with India. Option 2A called for approving the first shipment, supporting the second, and leaving open the issue of future shipments. Option 2B called for approving the first shipment, supporting the second, and indicating to the Indian government that there would be no further fuel shipments in the future. Option 2C called for proceeding with the two pending licenses and "seeking a change in the NNPA to make full-scope safeguards an 'important goal' rather than a requirement." Option 3 called for continuing to defer a decision on the pending licenses, but resuming a broader bilateral dialogue on regional nuclear issues.

<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "no."

State and JCS<sup>4</sup> prefer Option 2A, to seek NRC/Congressional *approval of both licenses but make no commitment or decision* as to whether *we will try to continue the supply relationship* beyond that (i.e., seek revision of the NNPA to India's benefit). This would postpone, for some months at least, the negative effects of an immediate cutoff but it will only defer the evil day. There is also no assurance that the NRC or Congress will go along with us since we will not have any credible prospect of long-term control over spent fuel. It will also, of course, cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose concerning non-proliferation and be seen by the Pakistanis as discrimination in favor of India on nuclear matters.<sup>5</sup> (S)

Defense favors Option 2B, *approval of both licenses but would inform the Indians that there is no prospect of future supply beyond that*. Possible benefits would include a less acrimonious break than a full and immediate cut-off and greater receptivity in Congress than a policy with no clear end in sight. It is doubtful, however, that this variant would cut much ice with the Indians, and it would provide more nuclear material under conditions virtually assuring the loss of US non-proliferation controls.<sup>6</sup> (S)

OSTP (Option 2C) would remedy one of the problems in the above options by *seeking approval of both licenses backed up by a decision, if necessary*, to seek amendment of the NNPA. This would certainly be the most beneficial for Indo-US relations and would permit us to tell Congress and the NRC that we had prospects for maintaining control over the spent fuel because the contract would remain intact. It is, of course, another question whether the Congress—or you—would want to amend the NNPA and make a major shift in the full-scope safeguards aspect of our non-proliferation policy.<sup>7</sup> (S)

The proposal for *further procrastination* (Option 3) is supported by DOE. The main argument in its favor is that something may turn up if we wait long enough. In fact, though, nobody expects anything to turn up, and dragging out the uncertainty is inadvisable. In addition, the Indians have just told us that they want a quick answer.<sup>8</sup> In the

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<sup>4</sup> After the abbreviation JCS, Carter drew a line to the margin above the text and wrote: "G Smith."

<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "no," crossed it out, and then wrote a question mark.

<sup>6</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "no."

<sup>7</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "no."

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 8101 from New Delhi, April 22, reported that Gonsalves presented Goheen with an aide-mémoire regarding delays in fuel shipments for Tarapur, calling them "wholly unjustified and inordinate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800200-0332)



light of this most recent development, I do not believe that this is a viable option.<sup>9</sup> (S)

ACDA would *approve only the first pending license with no future commitment*. (This option was not included in the interagency paper.) India's need for the fuel covered by the second license is not pressing and this partial stringing-out of the [omission in the original—decision?] will give us more time to see whether Mrs. Gandhi plans a PNE. These are marginal benefits over some other options, counterbalanced by the marginal disadvantages compared to still others.<sup>10</sup> (S)

The fundamental issue that you must decide, of course, is between the integrity of a global non-proliferation policy that is already under severe pressure, and our relations with India—a country with which you have sought close ties and is now of special importance in the light of developments in Southwest Asia. The effects in Pakistan, both for our political relationship and the Pakistani nuclear program, must also be weighed, since Pakistan would see any course of action except Option 1 as discrimination in favor of India. (S)

Unfortunately, there is no weight of opinion behind any option. I would suggest that you focus on the NSC, State/JCS, and OSTP options as the most serious contenders. (S)

*Action Requested*

That you indicate below your preference among the various options:<sup>11</sup>

End fuel supply now (NSC) (# 1)

Provide two pending shipments

—and make no decision or commitment as to the future (State, JCS) (# 2A)

—and make clear that there will be no further supply (DOD) (# 2B)

—and be prepared, as necessary, to indicate preparedness to amend the NNPA (OSTP) (# 2C)

Put off making a decision (DOE) (# 3)

Provide only the first pending shipment (ACDA)>

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<sup>9</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “no.”

<sup>10</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “?”

<sup>11</sup> Carter did not select any of the options; he wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: “Zbig—Poll others between 2A & ACDA—Expedite results to me. J.”

# 181. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1980

SUBJECT

Tarapur Fuel (U)

As you directed, we have polled other concerned agencies as to their preferences between Option 2A (issuance of the two pending licenses without commitment as to the future) and the ACDA Option (issuance of one license only at this time).<sup>2</sup> (S)

NSC and all agencies except ACDA and DOE prefer Option 2A when given this choice. The principal arguments are:

—If we are going to make a gesture to India then it should be gracious. Issuing only one license will dissipate the effect. Your January 14 letter spoke of issuing both licenses.<sup>3</sup>

—If we should obtain evidence of Indian plans for a PNE we can always stop shipment under either license.

—The various negative factors associated with being forthcoming (Pakistani concerns, seeming backing off from our non-proliferation policy) will not be ameliorated by issuing one license instead of two. (S)

On the other side, DOE points out that it may be somewhat easier to gain Congressional support if we are seen to be keeping India on a short leash. (S)

As soon as you have made your decision, we will prepare a letter to Mrs. Gandhi informing her (and making some other points as well). We will also convene a working group to determine how to best approach the NRC and Congress. (C)

*GUIDANCE REQUESTED:*

Do you prefer?

—Option 2A<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, 4/9/80, Non-Proliferation and Tarapur [I]. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 11, Document 180.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 166.

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked this option and initialed his approval. In an April 29 memorandum, Brzezinski informed the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy of Carter's decision, noting that Carter would "proceed with an Executive Order (subject to Congressional veto) authorizing the first export and a favorable recommendation to the NRC on the second on the basis of the assurances provided by the Government of India thus far. The question of supply beyond these two licenses will remain open." (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 79, PRC 137, 4/9/80, Non-Proliferation and Tarapur (I))

—ACDA Option

—Other

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**182. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of March 12.<sup>2</sup> As you point out, we must stay in touch on matters that concern our two countries. We must also be candid with one another in order to avoid misunderstandings and reconcile our sometimes differing perceptions of the serious problems that face the world.

Since I wrote to you about Tarapur in January,<sup>3</sup> officials of our two countries have been examining ways to maintain Indo-US cooperation in the nuclear field. After careful personal consideration, I have decided to move ahead with the two pending license applications.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, I intend to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first export—covered by the license application now pending before the NRC (XSNM-1379)—and I have instructed the Executive Branch to recommend to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it give favorable consideration to the second pending application (XSNM-1569).

There may be significant opposition to these actions in Congress. The law provides that Congress can override my Executive Order. As a leader experienced in the ways of democratic government, you will readily understand that I had to weigh this political risk when considering my decision. I have concluded that the risk is worth taking. I want to do everything I reasonably can to strengthen US ties with an India that under your leadership has developed a renewed sense of self-confidence and stability. I have accordingly directed members of my senior staff to conduct a vigorous effort to persuade concerned Mem-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Trips File, Box 151, (Vice President's Trip To Yugoslavia For Tito's Funeral, 5/6–8/1980). No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 166.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 181.

bers of Congress to allow the exports to go forward. I am hopeful that these efforts will succeed.

As you know, nuclear non-proliferation has been and continues to be a primary concern of my Administration, and we have developed our policies accordingly. I am convinced that our two countries must continue our dialogue on this crucial subject as we look to the future. I trust that approval of these exports will permit us to continue that dialogue in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

I appreciated the thoughtful exposition of your views on Afghanistan. It is reassuring to learn that we agree that the Soviet Union should withdraw its troops. It now appears, however, that the Soviet Union intends to maintain its troop presence in Afghanistan indefinitely, which has grave implications for South and Southwest Asia.

Since I am anxious to prevent any misunderstanding between us, I want to set the record straight concerning the Soviet claim that actions by the United States were in some way responsible for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I can assure you in the strongest terms that my country has taken no action that any reasonable person could describe as a provocation for the Soviet move. We have consistently advocated an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan, free of all outside interference. The fact is that the Afghan people themselves reject the Soviet presence and a Soviet-imposed regime.

India, as the strongest state in the region, can play an important role in efforts to resolve the problem the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created. Our exchanges thus far through diplomatic channels as well as through personal contacts such as those of Clark Clifford, Governor Harriman and Secretary Gonsalves—have been helpful in ensuring that we were fully informed of one another's views. I hope that we can continue to stay in close touch as events unfold.

In your letter of March 12 you voiced your government's concern over the possible supply of military assistance to Pakistan in the wake of the Afghan developments. We recognize your apprehensions and want to assure you again that any military assistance we offer Pakistan is intended to meet that country's legitimate needs in the face of the threat to regional security created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This will remain our policy.

I want to share with you my thoughts on our recent effort to secure the release of our hostages in Tehran.<sup>5</sup> You are aware of the carefully measured steps the United States has taken to convince the Iranian authorities that everyone's best interests are served by a prompt resolu-

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<sup>5</sup> The failed attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Tehran, Operation Eagle Claw, was launched on April 24.

tion of the hostage crisis. We have exercised extraordinary restraint in a clearly intolerable situation, and for many weeks this winter we worked through diplomatic and other channels to find a solution. The Iranians have never made any reciprocal gesture that would have permitted a resolution of this crisis.

In recent weeks I became convinced that the lives of the hostages were being increasingly threatened by domestic turmoil and the gradual unraveling of authority in Iran. In addition, we had no assurance that the Iranian parliament would move quickly or positively to end the crisis. I felt an obligation to seek to remove this source of tension and danger in the world. If our plan had succeeded, the international mood today would be quite different.

Our planned operation was a humanitarian effort, designed solely to rescue our citizens from illegal imprisonment. It was not a military action directed against Iran or the Iranian people. I want to assure you in the strongest terms that the United States will not rest until our people have been released from captivity and returned to their loved ones. We will continue to seek a resolution of the crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means. I hope that we will have your understanding and support in these efforts.

I value highly our friendship with India. I hope that a continuing frank exchange of views will reinforce a relationship based on trust and goodwill. I was particularly touched by your expression of personal greetings to me, my wife and my mother. They join me in sending you and your family our warmest wishes.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

# 183. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research<sup>1</sup>

No. 1377

Washington, May 12, 1980

(U) INDIA IN ASIA: CAUTION IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

## (C) *Summary*

Indira Gandhi returned to power at the beginning of this year confronted by a major foreign policy crisis involving neighboring states. Evidence suggests that she is still groping for policies that will reconcile India's contradictory foreign policy interests. In the meantime, it is unlikely that India will assume the dominant regional role that it might hold in responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Gandhi's major international concern is defusing the Afghan crisis. To date, her government has adopted two general approaches to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has:

- sought to limit the opportunities of superpower confrontation by simultaneously calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and opposing the introduction of Western arms into Pakistan and other Indian Ocean littoral states; and

- attempted to establish a consensus among regional and non-aligned states that the Afghan crisis should be settled politically.

New Delhi has not yet taken any initiatives that specifically address the issue of withdrawal. This hesitation appears to stem from:

- uncertainty over which superpower's actions represent the greater long-range security danger (i.e., the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan or the potential of a countering coalescence of US-Chinese-Pakistani interests);

- a sense that any initiative would be premature until the Soviets conclude that the security situation on their southern frontier permits them to withdraw; and

- fears that an Indian initiative would damage Indo-Soviet ties.

Yet, New Delhi recognizes that the Soviet troops in Afghanistan are the catalysts for superpower confrontation. The Indians are particularly concerned that an extended occupation will make more likely the feared

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 4-6/80. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Walter Andersen and approved by George Harris, both in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia. Thornton sent the report to Brzezinski under a May 19 covering memorandum, in which he wrote: "This entire paper is really worth reading; it gives an excellent analysis of how India sees itself in the current Asian context. If you don't have time for the whole thing, take a look at the summary." A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw Thornton's memorandum; an unknown hand wrote: "5/20/80" beneath the stamped notation. (Ibid.)

coalescing of US-Chinese-Pakistani interests. (The Soviets stand to gain from such fears in that they tend to strengthen Indo-Soviet ties.) There is evidence that Gandhi is becoming increasingly irritated at the Soviet refusal to consider some conciliatory gesture that might lay the groundwork for a lessening of tension. She seems equally concerned that Moscow is not factoring into its decisions Indian national interests.

Should Moscow attempt to destabilize either Pakistan or Iran, Indian vital interests would be directly threatened. Gandhi would then be confronted with three options:

- taking the lead on a political resolution;
- directly pressuring the Soviets to limit their action by moving closer to China and the US, as well as by reducing New Delhi's dependence on Moscow, particularly for Soviet sophisticated arms imports; and
- accommodating to the changed balance of power and working out the most favorable arrangements possible with Moscow.

Under these circumstances, we could expect a major Indian policy debate at the highest levels among sets of advisers who hold different geopolitical views. It is difficult to determine at this time which view would prevail, though it seems reasonable to predict that Gandhi will try to prevent a situation that would result in a shifting of the Asian balance of power in the direction of either superpower. In the interim, she can be expected to support moves that reduce the chances for military confrontation along Asia's volatile southern tier. She can also be expected to support those advisers calling for the modernization of the military to deter potential threats to India's security.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

**184. Memorandum From Gerald Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Tarapur (U)

You asked about the implications of the NRC's unanimous vote against granting an export license for the two pending Tarapur applications.<sup>2</sup> (U)

A negative NRC vote was considered probable. A unanimous vote, including two conservative Commissioners known to favor a more permissive non-proliferation policy, is very damaging. The President must now issue an Executive Order authorizing the exports, which must be reviewed by the Congress. That will be a tougher battle, and the general political fallout will be worse, in the light of the NRC vote. (C)

Perhaps more important, the NRC unanimously rejected State's position that the full-scope safeguards requirement of the NNPA, which became effective on March 10, 1980, does not apply to these two licenses. Congress is now more likely to view the statutory basis for the Executive Order as defective. We could get around this difficulty if the President were also to waive the full-scope safeguards requirement (he may do so), but that would be viewed as an even stronger signal that our non-proliferation policy has been mortally wounded to please the Indians. (C)

In short, the chances of success in Congress will be lower, and the costs even if we succeed will now be higher. As the initial reactions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 5/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton and Kimmitt. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "Need a brief DR [Daily Report] item for the P[resident]. ZB."

<sup>2</sup> A May 16 memorandum to Brzezinski from the NSC Staff for Global Issues reported: "The NRC voted 4-0 today against issuing the first of the two pending licenses (one Commissioner was absent but said he would have voted the same way)." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4-6/80)



from Argentina and Japan suggest (see my evening report today),<sup>3</sup> those costs may be specific and large. (C)

One facet of this worth keeping in mind: if Congress appears to strongly favor the NRC's interpretation of the full-scope safeguards provision—i.e. that it *does* apply to these two licenses—the President could accept this as authoritative and not proceed. That would of course be more difficult in view of his letter to Mrs. Gandhi,<sup>4</sup> but it may be worth considering if the political weather becomes too rough. (C)

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<sup>3</sup> In the May 19 NSC Staff for Global Issues Evening Report to Brzezinski, Oplinger summarized reactions to the decision to issue an Executive Order: "Embassy Buenos Aires reports that the Argentines were particularly upset. We have been pressing Argentina to accept full-scope safeguards; but will not insist on the same thing from India, which has detonated a bomb. The Argentines call this 'strictly a political decision which proves that US nuclear policy is not consistent but expedient;' Japan has asked us to postpone a visit by a US team to discuss renegotiation of our nuclear agreement; MOFA officials cited recent heated debate in Diet, 'with specific attention paid also to US approval of fuel shipments to India.'" (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 182.

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## 185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 21, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

*NSC Activity*

*Tarapur*

Editorial and foreign reactions to the decision to export more nuclear fuel to India have been strongly negative. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has voted *unanimously* against the pending licenses, and has rejected the State Department position that the Nuclear Non-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 28, 5/21/80–5/25/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

Proliferation Act's full-scope safeguards requirement does not apply. This will almost certainly reduce prospects for and increase the costs of getting Congressional approval. Jonathan Bingham has sent word that if you override the NRC, he will submit a resolution of disapproval. He added that Congress might view the two fuel licenses differently because of the time difference in when the applications were submitted; he suggests that you may wish to move only on the earlier application, or send them up separately. If you submit both together, he believes it very likely they will be disapproved in the House. We are evaluating his assessment.<sup>2</sup> (C)

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<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "I'm also concerned about the wisdom of the earlier decision."

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#### **186. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 4, 1980

Subject: Daily Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

3. *Ambassador Goheen on Tarapur Before the SFRC*—Ambassador Goheen met informally this afternoon with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss nuclear fuel exports for the Tarapur reactor. Senator Moynihan supported going ahead with the exports, Senator Javits was skeptical, and Senator Glenn, who presided, urged several times that the Presidential Executive Orders not be sent forward for action in this Congress. (Senator Percy had expressed his reservations earlier at the meeting with Tom Watson.)

The SFRC will hold a formal hearing on the issue on June 18. Senator Glenn gave a hint of the questions to come: (1) "How could we look another nation in the eye" if we allow India to receive the exports under the NNPA? The NNPA is a charade, perhaps, and should be rewritten or discarded; (2) What was the nature of the President's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 6/80. Secret. Carter wrote: "Ed, J" at the top of the memorandum.

commitments to Mrs. Gandhi in the letter of early May?<sup>2</sup> (3) How could it be argued that the “doves” are in the ascendancy in the Indian Government, given the \$1.6 billion arms deal with the Soviets?

I am sending you a note summarizing Ambassador Goheen’s concerns<sup>3</sup> so that you can have State’s views of why this decision should proceed.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

8. *Impact of the Indo-Soviet Arms Deal*—The \$1.6 million Indo-Soviet arms deal so far appears to have had limited impact on regional relations.<sup>4</sup> In a nationwide TV address, Pakistani President Zia announced that his Foreign Minister will be soon visiting Delhi, although Zia expressed concern over the arms deal. The Chinese have given low key, straight news coverage to the arms deal without the sharp criticism one might have expected in the past.

At home, questions about the Soviet deal have been raised on the Hill in connection with IDA replenishment and the Tarapur issue, but we think the damage is containable. We have pointed out that the agreement covers a 4–5 year period and has been in the works for more than 18 months. The soft terms illustrate Soviet willingness to commit resources to wooing India.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 182.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> In this sentence, an unknown hand wrote “b” above “million,” correcting the word to read “billion.” The Indian Government announced on May 28 that it had signed a pact to buy the arms from the Soviet Union. (“India Signs Contract With Soviet for \$1.6 Billion in Modern Arms,” *New York Times*, May 29, 1980, p. A10)

**187. Letter From the Indian Chargé d'Affaires in the United States (Gokhale) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 10, 1980

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to reproduce below the text of a letter, dated June 6, 1980, addressed to you by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi:—

“Excellency,

“I thank you for your kind letter of May 2, 1980.<sup>2</sup>

“Although the crisis in our region continues to be a matter of serious concern to us, in this letter I should like to share my views with you on our nuclear cooperation.

“I can assure you that we value the benefits that we have derived from the cooperation agreement of 1963. The agreement was a fine example of cooperation between our two countries and we should like to see it operate smoothly in the future. Hence I welcome your recent action on the pending shipments for fuel and components for Tarapur. Now that your Regulatory body has left it to you to decide on all the pending applications, I hope that all these shipments can be made as soon as possible.

“I do fully understand the constraints under which you have to operate. It is these conditions in the United States which are causing me concern about the future of our continued cooperation in the nuclear field. Both our countries are democracies and have to work within similar limitations. Over the past few years, delays in the supplies of fuel and essential components and spares for Tarapur seem to have become institutionalised, and uncertainties a permanent feature. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince our people that delays do not constitute a form of denial, particularly since these delays have resulted in the uneconomic operations of our fuel fabrication facility in Hyderabad and adversely affected the operations of the Tarapur station. It is even more difficult to convince our Parliament that we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80–1/81. No classification marking. Carter initialed at the top of the letter. Brzezinski sent the letter to Carter under a June 11 covering memorandum, which Carter also initialed. Brzezinski noted that Gandhi's letter “was timed to reach here before the Congressional hearings of June 11. In this regard it makes a strong statement of India's dedication to peaceful nuclear activities without, of course, eschewing nuclear explosions. At the end of the letter Mrs. Gandhi appreciates the restraint with which we handled the Indo-Soviet arms deal. We understand that she added this paragraph herself.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 6–7/80)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 182.

should indefinitely live with a situation in which fuel shipments for Tarapur are considered on a case by case basis, involving on every separate occasion a personal decision at the highest level in the United States—a decision which, as you have pointed out, is fraught with some political risk as it may be over-ruled by Congress. Our people cannot understand why the existing inter-Governmental agreement of 1963, which met all statutory and constitutional requirements before it came into force should in effect be reviewed by the Regulatory, Executive and Legislative branches in the United States on every single occasion an application is made for fuel or certain components supplies. Also, we have not yet received a response to our communications to implement the provision in the 1963 agreement relating to joint determination of the safeguardability of the reprocessing plant at Tarapur.

“Over the years, our stand has been consistent and firm in favour of utilising atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes. We have been and we remain totally opposed to nuclear weapons and we have been strongly advocating and supporting steps towards universal nuclear disarmament. This policy has required considerable restraint on our part. One of our neighbours has acquired a nuclear arsenal over the years and is now perfecting and extending the scope of its delivery system. While noting potential threats to our security from any direction, we have stood by our policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons and have managed to obtain a general consensus on these issues.

“I hope that we shall both be able to keep the Tarapur question in its bilateral perspective keeping in view the larger overall relationship and shared interests between our two countries. We should be glad to continue the ongoing dialogue on maintaining our cooperation on Tarapur within the framework of the mutual obligations assumed by our two Governments under the 1963 agreement.

“I appreciate the understanding shown by the State Department in briefing the press regarding our agreement on arms with the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> This was the culmination of negotiations started much earlier at the time of the previous Government.

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 141390 to multiple posts, May 29, relayed excerpts from the Department of State's May 29 press briefing, given by spokesman Thomas Reston. When Reston was asked to comment on the Indo-Soviet arms deal, he responded “that the Soviets had been the major arms supplier over a number of years, with the Indians. Beyond that, I really don't have anything that I can offer you at the moment.” Reston also offered to furnish answers to questions on the effect of the arms deal on the shipments of nuclear fuel to India and on the U.S. position regarding reports of the Soviet supply of nuclear reactor technology to India. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800264–0850)

"I shall write again on other matters of mutual concern to our Governments.

"I was delighted to meet Mrs. Lillian Carter in Belgrade.<sup>4</sup> Neither years nor distance has diminished her love for India or the affection of a large number of Indian people for her. What a charming and dedicated family you have.

"With warm regards,

Yours sincerely

Sd/—Indira Gandhi"

With the assurances of my highest esteem.

(Ashok B. Gokhale)<sup>5</sup>

*Charge d'Affaires, a.i.*

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 9390 from New Delhi, May 9, quoted a May 9 article on the front page of the *Times of India*, which reported on Lillian Carter's meeting with Gandhi in Belgrade on the occasion of Tito's funeral. According to the article, "President Carter's mother, Mrs. Lillian Carter, met the Prime Minister at her hotel suite and told her she could not ever forget India. Mrs. Gandhi said everyone who had known Mrs. Carter held her in high respect and affection." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800229-0872)

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 11, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

2. *SFRC Hearing on Tarapur*. This afternoon Chris,<sup>2</sup> accompanied by Gerry Smith, "consulted" with the SFRC on nuclear fuel exports to India. Eight Senators from the SFRC and the Government Affairs Committee attended, with Senator Glenn in the chair. Chris' net assess-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 6/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Warren Christopher.

ment is that the response was more positive—and much less negative—than he had anticipated. If our further soundings confirm this reaction, it will indicate that a concurrent resolution of disapproval, even if it does pass the House, is unlikely to pass the Senate.

Senator Jackson was outspoken in urging that the exports be allowed. Javits said that you should proceed to act under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) and take a “flat line” that our position was legally correct and desirable on foreign policy grounds. Senator Percy is ambivalent because of his authorship of NNPA, but nevertheless agreed that the end result of disapproving the exports would be bad overall for the U.S. in South Asia. Senators Tsongas and Sarbanes’ questions were not hostile and they seem open to persuasion. Even Senator Glenn said that he was “torn two ways” on the issue—regional political considerations versus his concerns about non-proliferation objectives.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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#### **189. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

2. *Tarapur*. I testified this morning, accompanied by Gerry Smith, before a joint hearing of the SFRC and Government Affairs Committee on Tarapur. At the outset, I announced that you had signed the Executive Order authorizing the two shipments.<sup>2</sup> There was a sharp though predictable attack on our position. John Glenn characterized the decision to go ahead with the sale as fatal to the NNPA and recommended changing the law to allow for these exceptions. Bill Cohen used the platform for a partisan political attack, and Ed Markey came over from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 6/80. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> On June 19, Carter signed Executive Order 12218, which authorized the United States to ship 39,718 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to India. For the text of the Executive Order and Carter’s transmittal message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980*, Book II, pp. 1137–1138. In a July 11 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that, in a July 10 meeting between Goheen and Gandhi, Goheen noted that “Gandhi expressed appreciation for the position you have taken on the Tarapur fuel shipments.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/11/80–7/15/80.)

the House to read his press statement attacking the decision. Otherwise, questioning by Frank Church and Chuck Percy was supportive, and other members present appeared undecided.

If, as we expect, Church, Javits and Baker support the proposal, we should be able to carry the SFRC. Now that the Executive Order has been signed, the SFRC will take exclusive jurisdiction of the issue. Our strategy remains fixed on gaining the support of the SFRC and then the full Senate. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is pressing for hearings, and I expect an even rougher time there, probably next week.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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### **190. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, July 16, 1980

Dear Mr. President,

I am deeply touched by your taking the trouble, in the midst of multifarious problems, to send a personal note in addition to the usual message.<sup>2</sup>

Sanjay's special role was not his support to me, important as it was, but the manner in which he was able to harness our youth to constructive purposes in a world where there are so many other pulls.

Your sympathy has special value for it is my own and my Government's desire to improve our relations with the United States of Amer-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80-1/81. Personal.

<sup>2</sup> After the June 23 death of her son in a plane crash, Carter sent Gandhi a message of condolence, no copy of which has been found. In message WH52741/Sitto 105 to Venice, June 24, Dodson forwarded a message from Thornton to Brzezinski arguing that Carter's message "was a pretty pro forma affair" and suggested that Carter might send "a more personal note, perhaps handwritten. Aside from the political advantage, the human factor should also be considered. The lady has just had much of her life's work destroyed in a way that is hard for a non-Indian to understand." Thornton's draft note reads in part: "The task before you in leading your people is undiminished and you have lost an important support. At such times we can only look to our God and to the strength that we have within ourselves. I know that your great courage will not forsake you and that divine help never does. There is nothing that I can say or do that will help you in your sadness, but in a very personal sense as a parent, my thoughts are with you at this difficult time." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 57, Chron: 6/13-30/80)



ica. As I wrote in one of my earlier letters,<sup>3</sup> the circumstances of history, geography and tradition are so different in our countries that it is not always possible to see problems from the same angle. However, this need not stand in the way of friendship and wide-ranging cooperation between us.

Unfortunately there seem to be groups and individuals in your country, and perhaps elsewhere, who do not wish this. Anyone in public life has to be immune to criticism and I have long got used to it, but the pattern of reporting on India in the press and media in the U.S.A., and almost all over the Western world, reveals what seems to be a persistent and concerted campaign of misrepresentation and the deliberate propagation of stories and image-casting which have little, if any, base in actuality. Certain prestigious institutions have become centres of activity against our party, and to propagate the interest of other Indian political parties.

It is not my intention that you should in any way interfere with the freedom of your press or academic institutions but I thought that I should mention that this is of considerable concern to the Indian people, who are made to feel that America does not care for our friendship.

Ambassador Goheen asked me to pursue the question of the American hostages with the Iranians.<sup>4</sup> Our views on this issue are clear. International relations will be impossible if the principle of diplomatic immunity and safety is so quickly and easily violated. There is also the human side of the problem. Those who are thus confined in discomfort and fear have our full sympathy as have their families in their long and anxious vigil.

You are passing through troublesome times and are fortunate to have a loving and capable family to support and cheer you. My greetings to them.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

**Indira Gandhi**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>4</sup> In a July 11 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that, in a July 10 meeting between Goheen and Gandhi, Goheen requested "that the Indian Ambassador in Tehran be instructed to help influence a speedy resolution of the hostage situation, and Mrs. Gandhi seemed amenable to this request." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/11/80–7/15/80)

**191. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 18, 1980

SUBJECT

India's Foreign Policy (U)

I am getting increasingly worried about the tone and drift of India's foreign policy. My concern is shared in the State Department. Specifics:

—The ill-timed recognition of the Heng Samrin regime, and lack of concern for ASEAN ties.<sup>2</sup>

—The poor Indian performance in connection with the Agha Shahi visit.<sup>3</sup>

—Reported Indian demands that the Chinese publicly disclaim any subversive activity in the Northeast as a prelude to normalization.

—Tough Indian posture towards Bangladesh and, probably, other neighbors. (S)

This has all developed in the past month or so, coming against a background of generally positive trends. The all-important (to us) Indian position on Afghanistan has not changed. But it certainly hasn't gotten any better either. (S)

Probably this is a reflection of Indian self-confidence. The Chinese are coming abegging (as the Indians see it); we are bending over backwards on Tarapur; and the Soviets have just provided a really handsome arms package at virtually no cost. To the extent that the Indians continue to play all three ends against the middle—more power to them, I guess, although it is not comfortable. I am concerned, however, that the Hindu variant of *chutzpah* may become so egregious that (a) they will overstep themselves and cause a major foreign policy debacle, or (b) they will do something affecting us that will have serious

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80–1/81. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "OK, depressing, ZB." Below Brzezinski's comment, an unknown hand wrote: "7/22/80."

<sup>2</sup> India announced its recognition of the Heng Samrin regime on July 7.

<sup>3</sup> During Shahi's July 15–16 visit to New Delhi, Foreign Minister Rao "reportedly reiterated India's commitment to seek a political solution of Afghan crisis. Referring to NAM's failure to take initiative in this regard, Rao said that any NAM initiative would have to be 'cohesive and unified'. He reportedly said that India had no inhibitions about joining Pakistan in helping it find a political solution. However, such a move must take all factors into consideration." (Telegram 15072 from New Delhi, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800343–0883)

repercussions. A negative outcome on Tarapur would increase the chances. (S)

In my usual inimitable fashion, I am telling you about a problem with little idea of how to cure it. (South Asia is like that). We had hoped that Muskie would be meeting with Foreign Minister Rao in the coming week, but the State Seventh Floor vetoed the idea of a meeting. Hence we will have no opportunity to get our concerns across that way. (C)

The ambassadorial situation is now worse than catastrophic. The competent Indian Charge is about to leave and will have all of three days overlap with his successor. When we raised this problem—no Ambassador here in over a year—with Indira recently, she noted it but said that everybody she had offered it to had refused.<sup>4</sup> Just as well from what we have heard of the list. Bob Goheen is (quietly) being invalidated back to the States for medical tests and will be gone for an indefinite period, perhaps quite long. The net result is that there is no possibility of a dialog through diplomatic channels. (C)

The one remaining possibility is a Presidential letter. I don't like the idea for a number of reasons, but we may have to turn to it. I have asked State to start thinking constructively and will do the same. Probably it is wisest to wait for a few more indicators; no point in hitting Indira if we can avoid it. (C)

Should, however, the Indians do something in the near future that is counter to our interests, we should slap them hard. We don't want to give them the impression that they will have things all their own way. (S)

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<sup>4</sup> In a July 11 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that, in a July 10 meeting between Goheen and Gandhi, Goheen "mentioned our concern about the year-long vacancy in the Indian Ambassador's slot in Washington, and Mrs. Gandhi indicated that she would try to resolve this problem soon." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/11/80–7/15/80.

**192. Memorandum From Gerald Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 22, 1980

SUBJECT

Soviet Heavy Water to India (S)

According to a recent TD,<sup>2</sup> the Soviet sale of an additional 250 tons of heavy water to India will bring an unexpected improvement in the Indian safeguards situation. It appears that some of this heavy water is to be used in the Indian-built and previously unsafeguarded Madras (MAPP-I) reactor, and the Soviets are requiring as part of the deal that this reactor and any fuel irradiated in it will have to come under international safeguards. (S)

The Soviets had a lot of leverage since without the Soviet heavy water two major power reactors might have been delayed for years. Two Indian reactors *might* not have been safeguarded, and the Madras reactor almost certainly would not have been, except for the Soviet deal. (S)

This is progress, of a sort, but there is an opposite side to the coin. India's indigenous heavy water production can now be used—without cost to its nuclear power program—for the R5, a large Indian built research reactor which will produce gobs of weapons-grade plutonium, and would be the backbone of any serious Indian weapons program. This is the trouble with an incremental safeguards approach (which we tried earlier without success); safeguards on three power reactors are now insured, but at the cost of making life somewhat easier for Indian bomb builders. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80-1/81. Secret. Sent for information A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

**193. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, August 8, 1980, 0746Z

16537. Subject: Prime Minister's Letter to the President. Ref: State 204661.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. We see Mrs. Gandhi's July 16 letter to the President<sup>3</sup> as one more bit of evidence of the recrudescence of her deep-seated suspicions about the U.S. This notion also [1 line not declassified] here (USNATO 5567).<sup>4</sup> [1 line not declassified] and me, Mrs. Gandhi's strictures against the U.S. were considerably broader and stronger than conveyed by [less than 1 line not declassified]. Furthermore, we know now that the demarche made by the MEA to the British, French, Germans and ourselves about India's hawkish image (New Delhi 15616)<sup>5</sup> was directly attributable to Mrs. Gandhi's pique. And, let's face it, the emotional wrench of Sanjay's death has probably reenforced the lady's paranoid feelings.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800379–0297. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 204661 to New Delhi, August 2, requested the Embassy's interpretation of Gandhi's July 16 letter to the Carter and noted that, "in particular, we are troubled by her allusion to 'certain prestigious institutions' which are centers of activity against her party." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800369–0981)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 190.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5567 from USNATO, August 1, reported an account given to Bennet at a July 29 NATO Political Committee meeting in Brussels [text not declassified] of a conversation between [text not declassified] and Gandhi. According to the account, Gandhi argued that "the 'unnecessarily tough' US stance in reaction to Afghanistan had contributed to a toughening of the Soviet attitude. The USSR had wanted to withdraw early on, but had to stay, the Soviets had told her, when security conditions worsened. The PM did not believe the Soviets would advance to the Indian Ocean, but the situation in Pakistan was dangerous and could cause them to retaliate against the Pakistanis for security reasons. She criticized the US rescue attempt in Iran and suggested that the real objective of the aborted mission may have been to take Khomeini and use him as a counter hostage." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800369–0314)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 15616 from New Delhi, July 26, reported that Gonsalves called in Blood on July 25 in order to express "concern that India was being erroneously projected by academics, press and politicians in some foreign countries as moving toward a nuclear weapons capability and throwing its weight around with respect to its smaller neighbors." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy, D800358–0766)

3. When I saw FonSec Sathe on August 4 about the hostages in Iran,<sup>6</sup> I mentioned that we had seen a copy of the Prime Minister's July 16 letter and were completely puzzled by her reference to groups and prestigious institutions in the U.S. which were hostile toward her. I asked Sathe if he could throw any light on the matter. He seemed genuinely surprised to learn of the existence of the letter, saying it must have come directly from the Prime Minister's office. Sathe thought the concerns expressed in the letter were part and parcel with her unhappiness at the tough, sabre-rattling image of herself projected in the Western press. He said that Mrs. Gandhi had been extremely upset when she directed the MEA to call in the four Western representatives and register a complaint.

4. The Embassy is at a loss to identify any specific critical remarks to which Mrs. Gandhi has taken issue. It strikes us that press treatment of her government has been, on the whole, rather favorable. If the President and the United States could receive in India as good a treatment as Mrs. Gandhi and India get in the U.S., we would be congratulating ourselves on a great PR success.

5. It will be very difficult to dispel Mrs. Gandhi's apprehensions, except over time. Despite a generally good press in the U.S. she can always seize upon some insignificant critical remark to fuel her suspicions of us. The dialogue at the Presidential level offers some possibilities, but even here the possibilities seem limited. The argument that the USG does not and cannot control press and academic utterances will only further antagonize Mrs. Gandhi. Perhaps the best approach would be the simple and direct one of (1) expressing concern over her unhappiness and her perception of hostile U.S. institutions; (2) underlining the President's strong attachment to the strengthening of Indo-U.S. relations, viz. Tarapur; and (3) suggesting that Ambassador Goheen, upon his return to New Delhi, talk over these concerns of hers in detail. The President's reply might also usefully pick up the theme of the last paragraph of Mrs. Gandhi's letter.

## Blood

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<sup>6</sup> In his August 4 meeting with Sathe, Blood asked if Indian Ambassador to Tehran Akbar Mirza Khaleeli had been in contact with Iranian officials concerning the U.S. hostages. Sathe informed Blood that Khaleeli had spoken with the President of the Iranian Parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, arguing "that it would be in Iranian interests if they could free themselves of the burden of the hostage issue." Sathe also reported: "According to Khaleeli, Rafsanjani was non-committal, but Khaleeli gleaned the impression that there could be some 'give' in the Iranian attitude." (Telegram 16156 from New Delhi, August 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800372-0794)

**194. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi, August 20, 1980, 1125Z

17354. Subject: New Indian Ambassador to U.S. K.R. Narayanan.  
Ref: State 220818.<sup>2</sup>

**1. Public reputation**

Narayanan is hard working, intelligent and competent. His present position as Vice Chancellor of Nehru University is highly public, requiring him to preside at functions, and address large groups; he is often in the news and presented sympathetically.

**2. Close to but not influencing Mrs. Gandhi**

His relations with Mrs. Gandhi and the Nehru family date to the late 1940's when Nehru brought him into the Foreign Service. This undoubtedly entered into Mrs. Gandhi's selection of Narayanan to go to Washington. His relations with her appear social and familial, rather than policy- or decision-oriented. Narayanan is not identified as an advisor to Mrs. Gandhi, or as a member of her "inner circle."

**3. An executor, not an innovator for Mrs. Gandhi**

To the best of our knowledge, Narayanan has never conceptualized any GOI programs nor initiated policies. He is careful, meticulous exponent of existing policies and can be expected to reliably reflect them while in Washington. Narayanan believes in the worldview espoused by Mrs. Gandhi. The pattern of his career and his personality suggest that he is unlikely to expand, or advocate refashioning existing GOI foreign policies. Within these limitations, Narayanan will be an effective and gracious Ambassador, and an asset in the conduct of Indo-U.S. relations.

**4. Narayanan's current attitudes**

Until recently Narayanan revealed little of his own views on issues and preferred historical and scholarly analysis of non-alignment and other broad foreign policy concepts. However, a recent address (February 15, 1980) at JNU departed from this practice to delineate a global analysis which adheres to Mrs. Gandhi's foreign policy in its intellectual

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800397–0238. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 220818 to New Delhi, August 19, requested information on Narayanan's background, "his attitude toward the US and views on US policies," as well as "his views on Sino-Indian relations and Indo-Soviet ties. In addition, it would be helpful to learn how close he is to Prime Minister Gandhi and whether he may have any special entree into the PM's inner circle." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800396–0585)

assumption. In it, Narayanan discusses: Sino-U.S. cooperation and its implications, relations between ASEAN and Vietnam, Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's relations with the Islamic states, etc. Though India's own position on these questions is not treated, Narayanan offers a rationale for Mrs. Gandhi's approach to such issues. The full text of this address was published in the February 23, 1980 issue of "Mainstream" magazine (New Delhi), which we assume is available to the Department.

#### 5. Conclusion

In the past, we have had much more problematical Indian representatives in Washington than Narayanan. Indeed, he is the best of the many individuals rumored to have been asked by Mrs. Gandhi to take the job, all of whom refused. We believe his instincts will be to communicate faithfully whatever he is asked to carry out. However, we would be surprised if he sought to alter Mrs. Gandhi's rather jaundiced basic view of the U.S., which he may well share.

6. This supplements unclassified biographic information contained in New Delhi 17353.<sup>3</sup>

**Blood**

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 17353 from New Delhi, August 20, relayed biographical information on Narayanan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800397-0306)



**195. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 22, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciated your warm personal note of July 16,<sup>2</sup> as well as your earlier letter of June 6.<sup>3</sup> As you know, the Tarapur matter is still pending before the Congress, but we are making a great effort and are hopeful of success. Authorizing these shipments involved a certain political risk but I am satisfied that the risk was worth taking to promote closer relations between our two countries.

I was struck by the candor of your more recent note and the concern that you raised about India's image in the United States. While there is no general pattern of hostility, there are individual Americans who are ill-disposed towards India. Many of them are at least as critical of me and express themselves just as stridently and frequently. It has always been the strength of our relationship that as democratic societies we recognize in each other the freedom to differ and to express those differences.

I understand your frustration with certain criticism occasionally levelled against India in the U.S. press, just as I am sure you can appreciate my concern at the often deplorable treatment my country receives in some sections of the Indian press. Over time I hope that greater understanding will prevail on both sides, but for the present, this is a part of the reality with which we must deal.

I can assure you that our official statements will always seek to reflect—as I know yours will—an understanding of the importance of our relationship and that we will always strive to distinguish between the allegations of people who would damage our friendship and the truths that are fundamental to it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80–1/81. No classification marking. Sent to Carter for his signature under an August 21 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, Presidential Correspondence: 6/80–1/81)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 190. In his covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski noted: "Hers is a quite remarkable letter, personal and troubled. Her foreign office was unaware even of its existence." Noting that the proposed reply to Gandhi sought to strike a similar "tone and establish a more personal bond between you and Mrs. Gandhi," Brzezinski commented: "Frankly, I don't know whether anything we can do will have a great impact on Indo-US relations. Given Mrs. Gandhi's personalized style of leadership, however, a closer personal relationship could help."

<sup>3</sup> See Document 187.

Let me suggest two specific things you and I can do:

First, in the spirit of your personal note, we can share our concerns privately and candidly. As you yourself wrote, we cannot always see problems from the same angle. As our two countries pursue our national interests, it is inevitable that we will both at times follow courses of action that the other will not welcome. U.S. actions, however, are never intended to harm India in any way. If you should ever have any doubts about our activities or our motivations, please contact me directly so that I can ascertain the facts and present them to you directly. I will do the same.

Second, I look forward to being able to enrich our relationship through direct contact. The ties between our two families lead me to think of you as a friend. I hope that Rosalynn and I will be able to welcome you to Washington sometime in the future. A visit by you to the U.S. would bring India's message to a broad spectrum of the American people.

Once again, thank you for your letter. I have received few letters as President that spoke to me so directly and personally. Among other things, I deeply appreciate your expression of concern for our hostages. Few problems have weighed on me so heavily. In other areas as well, international developments have made it difficult to pursue the long-term goals of my Administration, but I am determined to press on, and look to India, under your leadership, for support.

Let us remain in touch,  
Sincerely,<sup>4</sup>

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>4</sup> Beneath his signature, Carter wrote: "P.S. My mother sends her best wishes to you & your people—J."

**196. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1980

## SUBJECT

Tarapur

## PARTICIPANTS

*Indian Embassy*

Chargé A.N.D. Haksar

Mr. G.S. Bedi, Political Counselor

*Department of State*

Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant

Secretary—OES

Howard Schaffer, Director—NEA/INS

Stephen V. Noble—OES

Pickering reviewed the state of the Tarapur licenses before Congress and explained the basic factors contained in the Nye compromise<sup>2</sup> which Haksar promised to report back to Delhi. Pickering asked the Chargé for his understanding of the Eric Gonsalves-Arch Blood conversation in Delhi in which Gonsalves expressed his worry that the Nye compromise might entail further delay than that already embodied in the legislative process.<sup>3</sup> Haksar explained it was his impression that Gonsalves' concern reflected the frustration built up over the prospect of further delay, and noted further that the point will come when delay will be perceived as default in supplying fuel. Otherwise there is no official position from Delhi on the Nye compromise. Haksar added that personally he believed Delhi's reaction to the Nye compromise may be "less than satisfaction". In reference to the conditions that would have to be met for the second shipment to be sent, he will report

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Entry UD-07, Lot 81D155, Box 16, India, July and on, 1980. Confidential. Drafted by Noble; cleared by Schaffer.

<sup>2</sup> In a July 25 briefing memorandum to Muskie, Atwood quoted Nye's July 23 testimony before the HFAC where Nye "recommended approval of both licenses, but with the stipulation that we agree in writing not to export the second shipment until there is a need in India and, at that time, to provide assurances to Congress that we cannot conclude that India is engaged in preparations for another peaceful nuclear explosion or weaponization of the existing device." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 15614 from New Delhi, July 25, Blood reported that at a July 24 meeting, Gonsalves said that "Joe Nye had thrown the Indians a curve with his compromise solution for Tarapur. Eric said by that he meant possibly going ahead with one shipment and holding up the other shipment for a year pending further talks. Eric said the earlier mentioned so-called compromise of providing the component parts but not the uranium made it very easy for India. Such a step would be a violation of the agreement and all cooperation would cease. Nye's proposal, however, could put the Indians in a difficult position of deciding whether or not we had breached the agreement" concluded by the United States and India in 1963. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800357-0548)

that if the conditions are met (no PNE and no weapons program) that there will be no delay and that the U.S. will be the judge of the conditions. Haksar indicated that the Indians are sensitive to delay and that such sensitivity would color reactions in the press, parliament and government.

Pickering stressed the efforts the administration had been making to forestall congressional action to block the exports. In the aftermath of whatever decision is reached by Congress the USG will do its best to protect the US-India relationship.

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### 197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 10, 1980, 2348Z

241315. Exdis—For Charge in New Delhi. Subject: Tarapur—Instructions for Call to MEA.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. You should telephone MEA Secretary Eric Gonsalves and convey the following:

—We are disappointed but not discouraged by the close Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote September 10 to disapprove the pending Tarapur fuel shipments.<sup>2</sup> We intend to work for a positive outcome in the full Senate. We remain hopeful that this can be attained.

—The exchange of correspondence between the Secretary and SFRC Chairman Church was read into the record by Senator Church

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800432-0687. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in S/S-O, OES, and by Coon, Atwood, and Smith; approved by Christopher.

<sup>2</sup> On September 11, the *New York Times* reported that “both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to reject the projected sale of 38 tons of enriched uranium to India. The double defeat came despite intense lobbying by Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie. He had contended that the sale was needed to maintain cordial relations with India and to retain some influence on India’s nuclear policy.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Two Panels Vote to Overrule Carter and Bar Atomic Fuel Sale to India,” *New York Times*, September 11, 1980, p. A1)

at the September 10 session.<sup>3</sup> Our continuing efforts in the full Senate will be on the basis of the position spelled out in the Secretary's letter.

—We would hope that as we move forward to the completion of our legislatively-mandated procedures, the GOI will exercise patience and restraint.

3. We are conveying a similar message to the Indian Embassy here.<sup>4</sup>

**Muskie**

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 240939 to Bombay and New Delhi, September 10, relayed the exchange of correspondence between Muskie and Church. According to the telegram, Church requested in a September 9 letter to Muskie assurances in writing that the administration would not authorize the second fuel shipment until Tarapur required it; that the administration would consult Congress before permitting the second fuel shipment to Tarapur; and that the administration would not permit the second shipment if India detonated a nuclear device. In a September 10 letter to Church, Muskie agreed to Church's requests. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800431–1177) The letters are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1980, pp. 55–56.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

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**198. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Weekly Report #153

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

3. *Alert*

*Trouble Ahead with India?*

You have already noticed the charges that Mrs. Gandhi has made about U.S. involvement in Indian affairs; there were reported public

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 8–12/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

statements at least as bad (although these have been denied).<sup>2</sup> She has also gone to great pains to explain, if not justify, Soviet actions in Afghanistan as responses to threats from the U.S. and China.<sup>3</sup> Mrs. Gandhi has long been critical of the U.S., but the current rash seems to reflect her depression, even paranoia, following the death of Sanjay. This frame of mind does not bode well for Indo-U.S. relations.

Her poor frame of mind is also affecting the work of the Indian government, which is virtually immobile on a large number of fronts. India's failure to come to terms with the problem posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an example.

On top of these problems, we face a number of other issues that are troublesome. The Indian recognition of Heng Samrin was, to say the least, ill-advised and inconsiderate of our interests. We have cautioned them not to press their case too hard at the UN, but they may well ignore us. Our trade problems and Tarapur are adding fuel to the fire. We may find ourselves faced with a major deterioration in Indo-U.S. relations next year, especially if Tarapur turns sour.

Since Mrs. Gandhi has shown resilience in the past, she may rebound from her present state—probably in ways that would be better rather than worse for us. Your last letter to her<sup>4</sup> provides her with an important potential opening to start working out her long-standing personal problems with the U.S.

There is probably nothing much more we can or should do at this time. The Indians will listen better after you have received a new popular mandate; we need to let some time pass to see how Tarapur plays out; and we will be talking frankly to the Indians in the bilateral political meetings we have scheduled for late October. Initiatives taken now run the risk of being ignored, misunderstood, or lost in the background noise of Tarapur. A PRC might be in order, however, once we get well into November.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 19005 from New Delhi, September 10, Gandhi, when asked by a university student delegation about the possibility of foreign involvement in recurring communal violence, was quoted as saying the CIA was "playing a major role in creating communal trouble" in India. When asked to comment, the MEA press attaché told Blood, "I cannot imagine the Prime Minister saying this." Blood then reminded the MEA official "that the timing of this report was extremely unfortunate in view of the scheduled Tarapur vote" in Congress. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800431-0697)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 176.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 195.

**199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

2. *Indian Reaction to Congressional Committee Action on Tarapur*: The Government of India's public reaction to the negative Tarapur votes was careful and restrained, and paralleled the positions taken with us privately.<sup>2</sup> In a press statement, the Indians reiterated that the votes were "domestic processes of decision-making within the US."<sup>3</sup> India was concerned only with the continued implementation of the 1963 Indo-US Agreement. This, they said, "would require the immediate shipment of the already delayed consignments of fuel," a point designed to avoid any suggestion that India has accepted in advance the compromise agreed to with Senator Church.<sup>4</sup> The statement also expressed appreciation for your efforts.<sup>5</sup>

The Committees' votes got heavy press play, reflecting the prominence the Tarapur issue has so long been given. Editorial reaction, gloomy about the eventual outcome, reflected a sense of weariness and frustration with our lengthy administrative/legislative processes. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 9/80. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 197. In telegram 19029 from New Delhi, September 11, Blood relayed Gonsalves's plan for responding to the Indian press regarding the negative vote in the SFRC. Gonsalves told Blood that "two essential elements of their position would be (1) the legislative process is an internal matter for the US, and (2) the GOI continues to believe that the USG is obliged under the terms of the Tarapur agreement to proceed with the shipment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800432–0915)

<sup>3</sup> Muskie was quoting from the MEA press statement that Blood relayed to the Department of State in telegram 19155 from New Delhi, September 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800433–0287)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 197. According to telegram 240035 to Bombay and New Delhi, September 10, Coon informed Haksar that Muskie conceded to Church's request for assurances regarding the second shipment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800430–0796) The assurances were based on the Nye compromise; see footnote 2, Document 196.

<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Pursue analysis of the peremptory shipment option."

## 200. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

3. *Meetings with Senators on Tarapur*: I met separately with the Republican Policy Group and with Democratic Senators to present our position on Tarapur. The sessions gave me an excellent opportunity to lay out the facts and to encourage support. Bill Saxbe, a former Ambassador to India, attended the Republican meeting and firmly and convincingly supported going ahead with the two shipments. Howard Baker and Chuck Percy also endorsed your decision. Other than a few skeptical questions, no strong opposition was put forth and we made good progress.<sup>2</sup> The Democratic meeting went well also, although only about 15 Senators attended. Frank Church described the decision as a "close call" and argued that in such cases you should be given the benefit of the doubt, especially by Democrats. Paul Sarbanes and Pat Moynihan were also helpful. John Glenn repeated his well-known arguments but didn't seem to make much headway. (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 9/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Ed, J" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "This is very important."

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## 201. Editorial Note

On September 18, 1980, the House of Representatives voted 298 to 98 to reject the Presidential authorization to ship 38 tons of enriched uranium to India for use at the Tarapur nuclear power plant. The *New York Times* reported: "Opponents of the shipment successfully argued that approval would encourage the spread of nuclear weapons because India, which exploded an atomic device in 1974, had rejected international inspections and prohibitions on the production of nuclear weapons. Supporters of the shipment contended that India was merely being punished because of its close ties to the Soviet Union." (Martin Tolchin,



"House Votes to Block Shipment of Uranium for India," *New York Times*, September 19, 1980, p. A3) The Department of State informed the Embassy in India that this vote "brings the House resolution into consonance with the pending resolution of disapproval in the Senate and means that no further legislative action on the issue would be required should the Senate pass its resolution." (Telegram 249156 to Bombay and New Delhi, September 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446–0138)

On September 24, the Senate voted to approve the shipment of uranium for Tarapur. According to the *New York Times*, "After more than seven hours of debate, the Senate voted 48 to 46 to reject a resolution that would have blocked the uranium shipments authorized in June by the President. The House or Representatives voted 298 to 98 last week to disapprove the shipments, but disapproval by a majority of both chambers was required to block the sale. Thus, the Administration's victory in the Senate today prevented an embarrassing foreign policy reversal for Mr. Carter in the midst of a re-election campaign. There had been intensive lobbying by Administration officials, including the President, who telephoned from Air Force One to several of the more than 20 senators who were wavering." (Judith Miller, "Senate Votes, 48–46, To Approve Selling Atom Fuel to India," *New York Times*, September 25, 1980, p. A1) For the September 24 White House statement issued after the Senate vote, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1922–1923.

In a September 26 memorandum, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski informed President Carter that "Ambassador Goheen forwarded a statement yesterday from the Indian government which expressed appreciation for the understanding shown, and action taken by you and Secretary Muskie regarding Indo-U.S. cooperation in the nuclear field. The statement welcomed the Senate's decision and expressed hope that this decision will contribute positively to the continued cooperation between India and the United States." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 31, 9/28/80–10/3/80)

**202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 2, 1980

1. *Tarapur*. I told Indian Foreign Minister Rao today that our great efforts to win approval of the Tarapur shipments were a reflection of our determination to have strong positive relations with India.<sup>2</sup> Rao conveyed Mrs. Gandhi's appreciation. Mrs. Gandhi had also asked him to stress that she thought it very important that the US and India continue to adhere to the 1963 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and that it remain in force until the stated period has ended.<sup>3</sup>

I explained to Rao the arrangements we have worked out, in assurances to the Senate, to provide the first shipment immediately and the second shipment when it is needed. Rao said that the second shipment is needed now. He said that because of past delays in shipments, Tarapur has been operating at less than full capacity. I told Rao that I would convey his and Mrs. Gandhi's position to you. In the meantime, I have asked for a determination as to when the second shipment is really needed. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 10/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 267207 to New Delhi, October 6, summarized Muskie's October 2 discussion with Rao in New York regarding the shipments of nuclear fuel to Tarapur. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2052)

<sup>3</sup> In his October 2 discussion with Muskie, Rao also stated that "India had received reliable reports that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb. Somewhat fuzzily, he drew a connection between this and the need to maintain Indo-U.S. nuclear relations. He reiterated that the Prime Minister urged that everything be done to save the Indo-U.S. agreement." See footnote 2 above.

**203. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable<sup>1</sup>***[cable number not declassified]*

Washington, October 9, 1980

## COUNTRY

India

## SUBJECT

Indian Intentions Regarding the Second Shipment of Enriched Uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and Regarding Reprocessing of Tarapur Spent Fuel *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

## SOURCE

*[1 line not declassified]*

1. Officials in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) are pleased that the meeting between the Indian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State was friendly and warm.<sup>2</sup> Indian officials are especially pleased that the Secretary stated he would tell the U.S. President of Indian desires that the entire amount of enriched uranium for the Tarapur atomic power station be shipped as soon as possible rather than one shipment in 1980 and the second in 1981. Before the meeting, Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao received word from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he should play the subject of the second shipment in low key for the time being. She does not think that right before the U.S. elections is the right time to push the matter of the second shipment. Also New Delhi believes it necessary to look at the matter of the second shipment in the larger perspective of overall Indo-U.S. relations. However, the Government of India (GOI) does intend to press vigorously for the second shipment after the U.S. elections.

2. *[(less than 1 line not declassified): See (less than 1 line not declassified)]* that the GOI may start reprocessing spent fuel from the Tarapur reactors. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Indian Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) sometime between 11–24 September 1980 approved the plan to begin reprocessing Tarapur spent fuel in approximately two months. The CCPA decision was made before Indian officials went to Vienna to talk with officials in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the GOI realizes the embarrassment potential for the U.S. administration in this matter is very high because of the administration's efforts to obtain Senate

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 10/80. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*.

<sup>2</sup> For Muskie's report of the meeting, see Document 202.

approval for the shipments of enriched uranium. Further, the GOI expects that the U.S. will refuse to allow the second shipment if spent fuel reprocessing precedes it.)

3. ([less than 1 line not declassified]: The faction within the GOI advocating a hard line in nuclear matters is headed by Homi Sethna, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and his adviser M.A. Vellodi. It was Vellodi who prepared the briefing papers on nuclear affairs for Foreign Minister Rao's meeting with the Secretary of State.)

4. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [2 lines not declassified].

6. Washington Dissem:

to State exclusive for the Director, INR.

to DOE exclusive for the Senior Intelligence Officer.

to ACDA exclusive for the Chief of the Intelligence Staff.

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#### **204. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 10, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*India May Reprocess:* An intelligence report indicates that India plans to begin reprocessing Tarapur fuel in the near future.<sup>2</sup> State has checked with our mission at the IAEA and discovered that the agency has completed negotiation of a "facility attachment" for the reprocessing plant at Tarapur, and was on the verge of notifying the Indian government that it had entered into force. A facility attachment is the detailed agreement specifying how safeguards will be applied. IAEA has agreed to hold up the letter momentarily, but Ambassador Kirk thinks it unlikely we can turn it off. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 31, 10/10/80-10/14/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter wrote "Zbig, C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 203.

The Indians can use this as a legal basis for proceeding to reprocess with or without U.S. consent. The 1963 agreement provides that they can only reprocess U.S. fuel after a joint determination “that safeguards can effectively be applied.” They will argue that the IAEA has so found, and that U.S. refusal to make the determination is arbitrary and beyond the intent of the 1963 agreement.<sup>3</sup> (S)

The immediate problem is to avoid a leak of the Indian intent to reprocess until after November 4. We probably can’t hold the IAEA letter that long, and if it became known that we tried, the political cost would be heavy. State will try to get Gonsalves to do nothing until he arrives here on October 27. We will have to lean very hard on the Indians to avoid a disaster before the election. (S)

However, even if we can hold off that long, it looks like we will be forced to choose between acquiescing or seeing them go ahead over our objections. We *have* to object. Even if we do, the Indians are probably determined to punish us for our efforts on Tarapur fuel.<sup>4</sup> (S)

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<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this and the previous paragraph, Carter wrote: “See me when I return Fri.” On Friday, October 10, Carter returned from Florida and met with Brzezinski at 4:10 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

<sup>4</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this and the previous paragraph, Carter wrote: “It may be better to publicize the info.”

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## 205. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 27, 1980, 2:35–3:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Indo-US Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Thomas P. Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council

Eric Gonsalves, Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs  
K.R. Narayanan, Indian Ambassador to the United States

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 7–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.

*Dr. Brzezinski* welcomed Mr. Gonsalves and pointed out that a number of the issues which they had discussed during Gonsalves' last visit to Washington<sup>2</sup> were still very much on the agenda. (S)

*Gonsalves* said that was indeed the case but it was that sort of thing that provided continuing employment for people in foreign policy. He then went on to convey a personal message from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the President, expressing great appreciation for the efforts that the President had made in bringing the Tarapur matter to a successful conclusion. Gonsalves noted that the issue was not fully settled but that the Government of India greatly appreciated the commitment to the bilateral relationship which the President's effort represented. (S)

*Gonsalves* then recapitulated several themes that had come up in his morning discussion at the State Department.<sup>3</sup> He noted first of all that it was evident that there are a number of misconceptions in the United States about Indian policy. This underlined the need to step up communication between the two governments and he is glad that Ambassador Narayanan has now arrived so that this can be done more effectively. Gonsalves believes that the Indian position is often misunderstood in the United States and no attempt is made to find out accurately what the Indian position is. It is automatically assumed that India's view is against that of the United States. On the other hand, he admitted, the Indians are sometimes inclined to take simplistic views of the problems that the United States faces, as in the security area. He said that a second point that had become clear this morning was that, as *Dr. Brzezinski* had suggested in general terms earlier in the year, the sense of crisis in international affairs had moved from Europe towards Asia. It is now focussed on the Indian Ocean littoral where India has the misfortune to be located. Gonsalves said that India had not yet filled out its conceptual framework, but is attempting to gain an overview of the whole region. It sees this region as a much more fragile area than Europe and hopes to reactivate the role of the non-aligned movement to help structure peace and order in the region. India's objective is to keep the great powers out of the Indian Ocean. The American presence is overwhelmingly powerful and the societies of the region are very fragile. This could lead to a crumbling of order in the area. He admitted that the non-aligned movement is in a very inchoate state now and somewhat obese with its bloated membership. India is not sure how it can be activated to provide a more stable and effective approach to the problem but is going to try and do this at the non-aligned conference which will begin in New Delhi in January. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 172.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 206 and 207.

*Dr. Brzezinski* welcomed Gonsalves' ideas and said they seemed to be a better way of stating some of the thoughts that he had recently given in a speech. (He gave a copy of the speech to Gonsalves and said he would appreciate any comments on it.)<sup>4</sup> He pointed out that we are now engaged in the third phase of post-war history. The first phase had involved deterrence in Europe, the second is the safeguarding of the Far East and normalization with China, and the third would be the most difficult one, the preservation of stability in the Persian Gulf region. He agreed that the Persian Gulf region is quite different and that the United States, in dealing with it, must adopt a different approach that would be compatible with the post-Colonial experience. (S)

He also agreed that the United States and India must have serious consultative discussions such as the last talk that he and Gonsalves had had earlier in the year. He pointed out forcefully however that the United States Government did not make a practice of publicly criticizing Indian policies and expressed his regrets at the recent statement by Prime Minister Gandhi that the United States was still "tilting" against India.<sup>5</sup> (S)

*Gonsalves* said that that was not really what Mrs. Gandhi had meant—that she was simply referring to statements that have been made by American writers. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* replied somewhat ironically that he was glad that there are no public polemics than between the United States and India. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that there is one problem that definitely needs elucidation. The Indians should understand that we are not seeking to bring the cold war to the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, however, we do have a vital interest in not allowing the Soviets to affect the flow of oil out of the region. Until about two years ago, *Brzezinski* said, the Persian Gulf was fairly well isolated from the Soviet threat by a buffer, comprising the States of the northern tier. India was also an important factor for stability. Now, however, Iran has an uncertain future and Afghanistan is objectively an effective wedge into that tier. It does not matter what the Soviets' subjective reasons were for going into Afghanistan; objectively they now have such a position.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> As reported in telegram 22001 from New Delhi, October 21, Gandhi made the following statement at an October 21 press conference: "We have tried for friendship with America very consistently all along and that is still our role, because we think that regardless of a country's system or what they want to do there, we should be friends, especially with such an important nation as the United States. Unfortunately, it is their administration which we learn according to their writers who are always having a tilt against us." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800502–1139)

Even if Brezhnev's motives in Afghanistan are of the purest, we cannot be sure how a future Soviet Government might use that position. Now, the Iran/Iraq war threatens to become a war of attrition, providing an opening for foreign involvement.<sup>6</sup> In that conflict we seek first to prevent its spread (and we have made significant contributions to that end already), second to reinforce the position of the moderate Arab states, and third, despite the hostage situation, to protect the integrity of Iran. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* went on to say that the restoration of Afghanistan to a non-aligned status is in the interest of the states of the region. This will be possible, however, only if the Soviets perceive the price that they have to pay—both inside Afghanistan and on the international scene—as higher than the costs of withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States accepts the reality of the Soviet political preponderance in Afghanistan. We insist however that this must exist in the context of a neutral Afghan government that is acceptable to the people. The Babrak regime however is not acceptable and everyone knows that it could not stay in power for a day without the presence of 100,000 Soviet troops. We think that there should be transitional arrangements possible to permit the Soviets to withdraw while still leaving in place a government that would not be slaughtered on the spot. (S)

The United States, *Brzezinski* said, has a different perspective from India's. The Indians are making it easy for the Soviets to remain in Afghanistan. India has a special role and a special authority. It is not easy to understand how India is able to compromise its moral qualities in the position that it's taking in Afghanistan. India is helping to perpetuate the farce that the Babrak Karmal Government is an acceptable regime in Afghanistan. (S)

*Gonsalves* replied that that is not the Indian position. The Indians are at least as interested in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan as is the United States. The Government of India has made this point both in Moscow and to the Afghans. However it has to take reality into account. There is no visible alternative to Babrak Karmal at this time. The opposition forces are in complete disarray. India and the United States agree on the package required to get the Soviets out and the Indians have stated their position forcefully to the Soviets. But the Soviets are not willing to withdraw without guarantees against continued external interference, and nobody has been able to identify an alternative leadership. (S)

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<sup>6</sup> The Iran-Iraq war began on September 22 when Iraq invaded Iran, and ended in a stalemate in August 1988.



*Gonsalves* agreed that there should be a broad based government in Kabul. India had tried to get the Soviets to agree to withdraw in the context of guarantees from Iran and Pakistan not to interfere. The Pakistanis, however, have been reluctant to talk with the Afghan Government on this subject because of, allegedly, the position of the Islamic Conference. India had hoped to find common ground between the position of the Islamic Conference and the Afghan proposals of May 14,<sup>7</sup> and it is still trying to do so. It is hard to see where to go from here but the matter will be taken up with Brezhnev when he visits India in December. *Gonsalves* reemphasized that India is not seeking to make the Soviet position easier. (S)

*Brzezinski* responded that that is not the impression that we get—the Indians seem to be equating incommensurate things in criticizing both the US and Soviet positions with regard to Afghanistan. (S)

*Gonsalves* again said that the United States misapprehends the Indian position which has been set forth in the recent statement of the Indian Foreign Minister.<sup>8</sup> (*Gonsalves* said he would see that *Brzezinski* got a copy of that statement.) Reflecting a comment he had made earlier in the morning, he said that India was taking the low road to getting the Soviets out while the United States was taking the high road. (S)

*Brzezinski* responded that that was certainly understandable and we do not expect India to echo our position. India does however have important moral suasion to bring to bear. (S)

*Gonsalves* observed that the great problem was the need to find a face-saving way out for the Soviets. (S)

*Brzezinski* agreed that a formula has to be found but that formula must include a government. The Soviets insist on that being Babrak Karmal, but that simply will not work. It is of course true that the Afghan resistance is disorganized. *Brzezinski* wondered if there would be a possibility of Pakistan organizing a single Afghan resistance group. (S)

*Gonsalves* responded that the Pakistanis would not be able to do that. (S)

*Brzezinski* asked whether the Indians had perceived any flexibility in the Soviet position. (S)

*Gonsalves* replied that they have not seen much. India has repeatedly told them that there has to be a political solution and that the military option will not work. He said that India did not have the

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 452. On May 14, the Afghan Government released a statement proposing a regional political solution to the crisis in Afghanistan. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 270.

<sup>8</sup> Not further identified.

power to push the Soviets too hard. It is necessary to convince the Soviets that it is not in their interest for them to remain in Afghanistan. For instance, India has pointed out to the Soviets that their actions in Afghanistan are simply drawing the United States more and more into South Asia. (S)

*Brzezinski* agreed that that was exactly right and that the United States does not want to see a collapse of US-Soviet relations. Following the election we will move forward on SALT and hope gradually to see a return to a more reciprocal and restrained form of detente. In the earlier years detente had been defined so vaguely that it was bound to end up in confrontation. Perhaps the outcome of the present situation could lead to an improvement. Sometimes a lovers' quarrel is a useful way of clarifying emotion. (S)

*Brzezinski* reiterated that the United States does not want to humiliate the Soviet Union and put them through another Vietnam. That would take too long, it probably would not be successful, and the price would not be worth it. We want a genuine compromise—withdrawal with some transitional arrangements to avoid bloodshed when the Soviet troops are taken out, and a more palatable government in Afghanistan. India could play a very useful role in that process. *Brzezinski* considered, for instance, the possibility of having non-aligned troops in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping force. This could include Algerians, Syrians, Indonesians and Indians if they want to be part of it. Perhaps some 50,000 troops could be put in to maintain some order. (*Gonsalves* interjected that 50,000 troops could not do anything more than hold a few cities; if they ventured into the countryside they, too, would be shot.) (S)

*Brzezinski* said that something along this line was needed to avoid the cul-de-sac of a continually interacting confrontation which, among other things, would make it hard for us to ratify SALT. (S)

*Gonsalves* thought that getting SALT back on the tracks would help make the Soviets more flexible. (S)

*Brzezinski* said he thought that was also the case and the United States will take the lead in moving towards improved relations with the Soviet Union. We will be doing this in good faith and they should reciprocate. *Brzezinski* hoped that the Indians would tell this to Brezhnev when he came to New Delhi in December. (*Gonsalves* said that they would do so.) *Brzezinski* went on to say that we can compete with the Soviets in an arms race although it would not be good for either of us. In the last analysis, however, we would win the competition because we have a stronger and more creative society while the Soviet Union has many internal weaknesses despite its outward appearance of strength. (S)

*Gonsalves* observed that an intensified competition with the Soviets would also not be in India's interest. (S)

*Brzezinski* said that we have to return to the earlier status. It is important to settle the Afghan problem because of the impact it has on US public opinion and also because of the impact it has on a critical region of the world. He went on to say that the United States has no interest in forming military pacts or establishing a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean region. We have something much more flexible and indirect in mind. A solution to the Afghan problem will make it easier for the United States not to get too deeply involved. The buffer which isolated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf would be restored and remove a great deal of the pressure. (S)

*Gonsalves* observed that American fears seem somewhat unfounded to the Indians. The movement in Iran is a genuine political revolution which the Soviets cannot dominate. (S)

*Brzezinski* said that that was true as long as Iran did not become polarized; *Gonsalves* responded that that is not likely to happen in the immediate future (one or two years) and thus the important buffer is still intact. (S)

*Gonsalves* concluded by saying that India is seeking a universalized detente in the arc of the Indian Ocean—a situation which would allow the regional states to work out their own differences. This is the thought that they are developing and hope to be able to put forward at the non-aligned meeting in January.

Thereupon the meeting closed.

## 206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 1, 1980, 0907Z

291464. Subject: Indo-US Bilateral Talks in Washington. Ref: New Delhi 20426<sup>2</sup> (Notal).

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. Introduction and summary: The annual bilateral talks held in Washington October 27–29, provided a valuable and timely opportunity for us to conduct a candid exchange with the Indians about our positions on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues. The Indian side was led by Secretary Eric Gonsalves, second-ranking career official in the Ministry of External Affairs. Gonsalves met briefly with the Secretary and had longer talks with the Deputy Secretary (who hosted lunch) and Dr. Brzezinski.<sup>3</sup> Under Secretary Newsom led the discussions. Although little new ground was broken in the presentation of positions, the talks were effective in bringing home to the Indians our strong sense of disappointment with their reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the influence that this disappointment has had on our view of the broader Indo-US relationship. They arrived in Washington with a more upbeat assessment of Indo-US ties than we had. The candid dialogue we had with them served to reduce this asymmetry and to encourage a sounder understanding of our differing policies and perceptions, and the elements on which they are based.

3. The Indians dealt with the nuclear supply relationship, our most important bilateral issue, in a restrained, low-key manner. They did not push strongly for immediate shipment of the second Tarapur fuel

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800522–0076. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Bangkok, Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kuala Lumpur, London, Madras, Moscow, Singapore, Tokyo, and CINCPAC. Drafted by Walter Manger (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S–O and by Schaffer, Coon, and Deitz; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 20426 from New Delhi, September 27, reported: “DOD Under Secretary Komer had a cordial and free-swinging discussion on September 26 with MEA Secretary Gonsalves which elicited a remarkable candid statement of Indian strategic thinking. Under Secretary Komer outlined for the Indians the rationale behind the US policy of deterrence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, emphasizing the new departures in this policy. Gonsalves argued that cooperation among the regional powers was more conducive to stability than the efforts of a superpower. Under Secretary Komer stressed the linkage between oil and security, both to the West and to the littoral states. Gonsalves pushed the IOZP concept. He said India tended to see US actions as more threatening than Soviet actions, because of the impact of US relations with China and Pakistan. The meeting ended with a discussion of the overall balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800465–1095)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 205.

export authorized by the President (septel).<sup>4</sup> On regional security issues, Gonsalves hewed to familiar GOI positions almost identical to those he adopted with DOD Under Secretary Komer in New Delhi in September (reftel). The Indians reiterated their familiar position on Afghanistan and again pushed the Babrak proposal for a dialogue between the DRA and Iran and Pakistan. They expressed apprehension at our increased security presence in the Indian Ocean and sought our participation in the Colombo conference next year on the IOZP proposal.<sup>5</sup> Other issues reviewed included the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East peace process, Indo-Pak and U.S.-Pak relations, the Soviet Union, relations with China, Kampuchea, and North/South issues. The latter three subjects, which involved separate sessions with EA and Under Secretary Cooper, are being reported separately. End introduction and summary.

4. Afghanistan: The Indians stuck to their familiar position on Afghanistan but, as in the past, failed to produce any specific ideas for resolving the problem. Gonsalves reiterated the GOI's strong desire for a Soviet withdrawal, noting that Soviet troops were much closer to India's borders than to the U.S.' and that this was a matter of concern to New Delhi. However, he [garble] his remarks with the proviso that the Soviet presence cannot be isolated from the realities of the situation. Any resolution must take into account Soviet security concerns. Gonsalves believed that the Soviets are committed to an eventual withdrawal but only after they are certain that a friendly regime can survive in Kabul without their direct military support. Public pressure will not encourage a withdrawal. The Indians disclaimed having any special influence in Moscow and allowed that the Soviets were disappointed with the GOI's position.

5. Gonsalves reiterated India's preference for a political solution to the Afghan problem and its opposition to the Soviet effort to achieve a military solution. He found merit in the Babrak regime's May 14 proposal for a dialogue between the DRA and Iran and Pakistan and expressed disappointment that this idea had foundered for what he described as semantic rather than real differences. We reviewed with the Indians the possibilities of a broad-based government in Kabul

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 207.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 4863 from USUN, November 5, which reported on the progress toward UNGA adoption of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolution, summarized the proceedings of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at Colombo: "On Oct. 30, at its final meeting in 1980, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean unanimously approved an IOZP resolution which will be forwarded to the UNGA First Committee for adoption. Resolution accords with basic US and Western objectives. Ad Hoc Committee will meet next in February 1981." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800535-0893)

acceptable to both Moscow and the Afghan people. For the Indians, however, the bottom line was that there is presently no viable alternative to Babrak. Gonsalves speculated that once Afghanistan's neighbors give pledges of non-interference through the dialogue approach there could be some form of self-determination leading to a phased Soviet withdrawal. He did not pursue this line in detail. We expressed our disappointment with India's stance which tended to legitimize the Babrak regime and reviewed what we saw as the key elements in any resolution. Recognizing these divergences, the two sides agreed to remain in touch on this issue.

6. Southwest Asian security and Indian Ocean: We explained in detail the basis for our enhanced security presence in the region; the Indians predictably expressed their apprehensions. Gonsalves said that many Indian Ocean littoral states have fragile regimes which prefer to seek support from the great powers rather than address their own internal problems. This tendency introduced super power rivalries into what had been purely local conflicts and destabilized the region. Citing India's own experience, he said a better approach would be for the regional states to cooperate among themselves to seek to resolve local disputes without great power involvement. Gonsalves speculated that perhaps the Non-Aligned Movement could play a key role in this approach, provided that the NAM returned to its original principles. India is developing its thoughts along this line and he thought that some progress could be made at the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi early next year. At the same time, he added, the super powers should sit down to resolve their differences and seek to return to their earlier code of conduct which provided for mutual restraint in regional disputes. (Gonsalves' reference to a role for nonaligned regional countries in the Indian Ocean was very fuzzy, but it may foreshadow an Indian effort to counter big power presence in the Indian Ocean by promoting some regional consensus. This clearly bears watching. FonMin Rao also touched on this theme in his UNGA speech.)

7. Gonsalves took issue with our contention that our increased security presence was meant to counter-balance an existing Soviet presence. India viewed our naval presence as "lop-sided" compared to that of the Soviets. He said that Diego Garcia will be a full-fledged military base, rather than merely a communications/support facility. Gonsalves said that India was aware of Soviet activities in certain littoral states, but observed that there is a growing feeling among the Indian public that the U.S. presence is [garble] "somewhat menacing". We responded that India must recognize the depth of U.S. public concern over Soviet intentions toward a region in which we had vital interests.

8. Referring to GOI support for the IOZP proposal, Gonsalves argued for U.S. and Soviet participation in the Colombo conference

next year on the Indian Ocean, saying that the super powers had been taking actions in the region without consulting littoral states. We explained how difficult it would be to gain public support for our participation, since the conference would likely focus on U.S. naval forces and ignore Soviet land troops in littoral states.

9. Iran-Iraq war: We reviewed our efforts to end the war and our contingency planning to keep open the Straits of Hormuz. Gonsalves explained the dilemma facing the GOI arising from India's good relations with both belligerents and characterized India's role as "non-participatory". He mentioned that India still faces a difficult oil supply situation due to cut-off from Iran and Iraq.

10. Middle East: Assistant Secretary Saunders reviewed the state of the Camp David peace process and observed that any forward motion on the Palestine problem would help ease our relations with the Gulf states. The Indians expressed hope for success but shared Arab skepticism that Israeli intransigence would block any real progress.

11. Indo-Pakistan relations: Characterizing India's relations with its neighbors as satisfactory, Gonsalves said that the GOI remains committed to further normalization with Pakistan at a modest pace, largely because the Pakistanis themselves are reluctant to move too far too fast. A complicating factor is Pakistan's habit of seizing issues sensitive to India (specifically India's communal problems) for propaganda purposes. We [garble—expressed] our support for Indo-Pak normalization and reviewed our relations with Islamabad. The U.S. would consider military sales to Pakistan within certain limitations consistent with our concern for Pakistan's security following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While acknowledging Pakistan's legitimate security concerns, Gonsalves said that India still has "some degree of unhappiness" about Pakistani military purchases. (See septel on nuclear relations for exchange on the Pak nuclear issue.)

12. Soviet affairs: We explained to the Indians our assessment of recent developments within the Soviet leadership and prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. We predicted a tense and strained relationship with Moscow over the next year or two unless the Soviets show some sign of flexibility on Afghanistan. The Indians maintained that Soviet leaders see the U.S. and China as attempting to "encircle" the USSR. On Southwest Asia, Gonsalves said that Soviet actions in Afghanistan were taken to secure the USSR's southern borders and that any great power would take similar action if faced with chaotic conditions in a bordering state. He agreed with our assessment that the Soviets had misread the situation and underestimated the difficulties they would encounter after the invasion. Gonsalves doubted that the Soviets would intervene in Iran over the next few years because the revolutionary situation there would offer no opening for Soviet meddling. Asked



about Soviet policy toward Pakistan, Gonsalves thought the Soviets did not want to threaten Pakistan's security, but might be tempted to destabilize the GOP if Islamabad continues to orchestrate an Islamic front against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Indians had warned the Pakistanis not to create a situation they could not handle.

13. Minimize considered.

**Muskie**

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## **207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 3, 1980, 2223Z

293936. USIAEA, Colombo for Schaffer. Subject: US-Indian Bilateral Talks: Tarapur.

1. (Secret entire text).

2. Summary: The Deputy Secretary raised Tarapur briefly in his session with Gonsalves;<sup>2</sup> urging the Indians not to press for the second shipment. In a follow-on session devoted solely to nuclear matters, the two sides exchanged views on the second shipment, future US supply of fuel for Tarapur, the continuation of US-Indian nuclear cooperation, and the question of a joint determination to permit reprocessing of US-origin spent fuel. Gonsalves made clear he did not have a brief from his government on any of these issues, but flagged potential problem areas. The problem of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, about which the Indians were quite pessimistic, was also discussed. End summary.

3. The Deputy Secretary emphasized the political efforts by the administration to get Tarapur through the Congress. It had been a tight squeak and the letter to Senator Church was politically necessary.<sup>3</sup> There were no new conditions affecting India, although the second shipment will not be sent until needed. Mr. Christopher urged that we let the dust settle and hoped the Indians would not press now for the second shipment since this would have an unnecessarily adverse effect

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870108-0301. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad, Vienna, Bombay, Colombo, and the White House. Drafted by John Salmon (OES/NET/NEP); cleared in S/S and by Nosenzo, Van Doren, Deitz, and Coon; approved by Pickering.

<sup>2</sup> For the rest of Christopher's discussions with Gonsalves, see Document 206.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 197.



on the situation. We should turn the issue over to the experts to discuss the question of when the second shipment is needed. Gonsalves agreed to discuss the matter with Assistant Secretary Pickering.

4. A follow-on session devoted to nuclear issues was held October 28. Participants were Assistant Secretaries Saunders and Pickering, ACDA Assistant Director Van Doren, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Coon and Nosenzo, NEA/INS Director Schaffer and OES/NEP Deputy Director Salmon. The Indians were represented by Secretary (East) Gonsalves, Additional Secretary Hiremuth, Director Mukherjee, DCM Haksar, and EmbOff Cowsik.

5. Assistant Secretary Pickering said that the administration's recent intensive, politically sensitive, effort to secure congressional approval of the two fuel shipments for Tarapur demonstrated the US desire to preserve our nuclear relationship—a desire echoed by Prime Minister Gandhi in her letter to the President.<sup>4</sup> However, the timing of the second shipment had to be governed by the letter from the Secretary to Senator Church.

6. Secretary Gonsalves replied that India and the US both had free presses and Parliaments which complicated the handling of issues such as this. India could not accept an indefinite delay in the second shipment. It was already overdue under a schedule the US itself had proposed and legally such delays could constitute US default of the agreement. India regarded the assurances provided to the Senate as a domestic US matter and as such would try to avoid commenting on them. The immediate problem for the GOI was developing an approach for dealing with the Tarapur issue before the Indian Parliament which would reconvene November 17. While there are obvious difficulties, Indian authorities would try to develop language which would avoid inflaming the situation and would accommodate the basic requirements of both sides. Their initial approach would probably say no more than that consultations with the US were underway, that they hoped for early release of the second shipment, and early, favorable action on the new application.

7. More generally, Gonsalves opined that the nuclear relationship was a continuing cause of irritation between the US and India. Although he had no mandate to discuss such a proposition, might it not be better in the long run to set our nuclear relationship aside?

8. Pickering said that in the view of the US the delay of the second shipment did not raise any questions of legal default. The schedule to which Gonsalves had referred was now outdated. However, the arrangement for the second shipment continued to proceed on the

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 187.

basis of the basic premise of that schedule, namely that the Hyderabad fuel fabrication facility should be kept in operation on a reasonable, uninterrupted basis. Unless India created a new situation by exploding a nuclear device, the second shipment would be treated on this basis. No new conditions were being imposed on India.

9. On the general point, Pickering said that the US had just been through a searing experience over Tarapur and abandonment of our nuclear relationship would be very difficult to accept at this time. In the longer term, perhaps such a concept would have to be discussed. However, termination should not be done hastily. If India was determined to initiate discussions on the termination of our relationship, the US, of course, could not refuse but nonetheless greatly preferred not dealing with this so soon after the Tarapur decision. Pickering made clear that the ball on this issue is in the Indian court and Gonsalves agreed.

10. Gonsalves said that the US was limiting India to a one year supply of fresh fuel while other nations, such as the FRG and Japan, had sufficient fresh fuel for seven or eight years in stock. As to future fuel supplies for Tarapur, the Muskie-Church exchange of letters implied that India must accept full-scope safeguards (FSS).

11. Pickering replied that the paragraph Gonsalves was referring to in the Secretary's letter had been carefully drafted to reflect US law on this matter.<sup>5</sup> Thus, it did not foreclose the possibility of a Presidential waiver as was provided under the law. In any event, leaving aside the obvious political problems of a waiver, the shipment under the next license would not be needed for at least a year.

12. Gonsalves reiterated for the record that India could not accept FSS. With respect to handling the exchange of letters, the potential problem lay with the possible reaction of the Indian Parliament. It was not clear how long the GOI could hold to their initial line in the face of heated parliamentary debate. He would review the situation on his return to New Delhi and talk with our Embassy about their line as they develop it.

13. Turning to the Indian aide memoire of last April,<sup>6</sup> Pickering noted that it raised two issues—fuel supplies for Tarapur and a joint determination on reprocessing US-origin spent fuel. The US had

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<sup>5</sup> Apparent reference to the following paragraph in Muskie's September 10 letter to Church (see footnote 3, Document 197): "I agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for the treatment of future export license applications. The full-scope safeguards export licensing criterion as set forth in Section 128 A (1) of the Atomic Energy Act will apply to any future license applications for the export of nuclear fuel to Tarapur."

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 8, Document 180.

responded orally in the past and now was prepared to respond in writing on both points now that the fuel supply situation had been clarified.

14. Reprocessing raised a timing problem for India, Gonsalves stated, since storage capacity for spent fuel would be exhausted at some point.

15. Pickering replied that reprocessing raises not only a variety of technical issues but also policy issues for the US. The US does not reprocess spent power reactor fuel in this country and is unlikely to change its policy of discouraging other nations from doing so. Moreover, reprocessing raises significant safeguards questions. Therefore, the US view on the joint determination was unlikely to change from the negative view which President Carter had previously conveyed to Prime Minister Desai.

16. Although not wishing to address the issue in depth and feeling that technical discussion would be premature and likely to create strains, Gonsalves said that India could not accept an indefinite delay in reprocessing. The US was bound to render a decision by the agreement. Speaking personally, he wondered if perhaps India should present the US with a *fait accompli* on reprocessing.

17. Such a step would be very badly received in the US Pickering stated. Our bilateral nuclear relationship would be ended in an acrimonious fashion. While one could only speculate about the fate of additional fuel licenses for India, it was important not to move precipitously now but rather to permit time for full consultations. Early Indian action such as this would simply place enormous strains on the rest of our relationship. As to the joint determination, the US legal position was that both sides were required to act affirmatively on it before reprocessing was permissible. Prime Minister Desai had publicly stated the same view.

18. Gonsalves said that the Indian legal position was the opposite of that of the US.

19. Both sides had raised important issues which the US would be happy to discuss further if India so desired. However, Pickering continued, it was important to avoid peremptory actions.

20. Gonsalves expressed understanding for US problems but said that India has political difficulties of its own. During the recent congressional debate, the GOI had sought to avoid exacerbating US political problems. Pickering said the US appreciated this restraint.

21. In reply to Pickering's expression of appreciation for Indian restraint in foregoing further tests and work on a weapons program, Gonsalves said that some of the allegations about India which had surfaced in the recent debate over fuel for Tarapur were unfortunate.

India has undertaken a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons despite the Chinese and Pakistani situations. India hoped to maintain this commitment but was troubled by the lack of appreciation for it in the US Congress and press.

22. Pickering said that the 1974 Indian explosion was the source of many of the problems which had arisen in the recent US debate. While it would have been very helpful if we could have asserted that the GOI had foresworn any further nuclear explosions, we could only say that we have no evidence that a further explosion was contemplated.

23. Turning to the problem of Pakistan's nuclear explosive aspirations, Pickering said that the US had made a serious effort to halt the flow of supplies to this program. However, despite our efforts, we still could not be sure that the Pakistani effort will be stopped. We estimate that a Pakistani explosion is at least two years away and probably somewhat longer. The US has pressed Pakistan to foreswear the development of nuclear explosives, thus far unsuccessfully although they have denied that they intend to develop nuclear weapons. Would a joint Indo-Pakistani no-nuclear weapons pledge be a useful device?

24. Gonsalves said that Indian discussions with Pakistan on the nuclear issue had been inconclusive. India's view was that this was a strongly held Pakistani objective and that Pakistan was unlikely to be turned from it. Indian estimates of Pakistan's capabilities were similar to our own—they should be able to begin production of material for weapons early next year, both through enrichment and reprocessing. India had increasing evidence that the Pakistanis had diverted material from KANUPP for their reprocessing program and also had conclusive evidence that the Pakistani program predated India's 1974 explosion. Gonsalves spoke of a fanatical Pakistan commitment to acquire a nuclear explosives capability which was being cynically abetted by members of the London Suppliers Group (LSG). Indian complaints to various LSG members brought only dispiriting replies and India saw no prospect of halting Pakistan's efforts.

25. While the US saw no reason for much optimism, Pickering indicated, the US had applied great pressure on other suppliers and had made some progress. Our efforts had not been universally well received as other suppliers sometimes claimed that we were attempting to interfere in routine commercial activities. Nonetheless, the US would persevere. US law would require serious steps if Pakistan, or indeed any other non-nuclear state, was responsible for a nuclear explosion. The law gives us no choice in these matters.

26. In response to a query from Pickering, Gonsalves offered to provide evidence that the Pakistani program predated 1974. Pickering said that Pakistan's serious effort to acquire nuclear explosives raised

grave issues not only for the sub-continent but also elsewhere. In this vein, the US appreciated India's restraint with respect to nuclear exports to sensitive countries.

27. While India is committed to equality in nuclear exports, Gonsalves acknowledged that India recognized that there were problem areas which required the exercise of discretion.

28. When queried about Indian evidence for the charge that the Pakistanis were diverting material from KANUPP, Gonsalves pointed to the difficulties in agreeing on an IAEA safeguards inspection at KANUPP and Pakistan's recently completed indigenous fuel fabrication facility which could produce fuel for KANUPP as causes for concern. He did not claim, however, to possess any solid evidence of diversion. Pickering indicated that the US, too, was concerned about diversion from KANUPP and noted that the IAEA was conducting an inspection.

29. Comment: The Indians' most immediate requirement is to develop the approach to be followed in the upcoming parliamentary debate on this issue. The Embassy should stay in contact with Indian authorities on this matter in an effort to assure that the GOI's approach does not create political difficulties for us. End comment.

**Muskie**

## 208. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 5, 1980, 0613Z

25393. Subj: Poland: Ambassador's Call on GOI Foreign Minister.  
Ref: State 320349.<sup>2</sup>

1. I met with the FM this morning for half an hour and put before him in my own words the instructions contained in reftel. At the close of the meeting I also left with him the non-paper containing reftel's talking points.

2. Narasimha Rao's response was very low-keyed. He took note of the concern of my government on the Polish situation, as he had also, he said, that of several other countries. He expected that the GOI would be conveying its perceptions on this problem area, and would seek full discussions, during the Brezhnev visit. He hoped that the situation in Poland would not be allowed to escalate but would instead be resolved in a manner satisfactory to all concerned.

3. The low-key and rather formal nature of Narasimha Rao's response was to be expected. It is in key both with his temperament and the fact that Mrs. Gandhi is the one who will call the shot on a matter of this importance and sensitivity. I shall try to make the same pitch to her Tuesday<sup>3</sup> afternoon during my farewell call, but it may not prove the occasion for a very good hearing.

Goheen

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800579-0766. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow and Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 320349 to New Delhi, December 3, instructed Goheen to meet with "Rao urgently to express US concern over possible Soviet military intervention in Poland." Goheen was directed to impress upon Rao that India, as a member of the NAM and a friend of the Soviet Union, "has a key role to play in restraining potential Soviet adventurism in Poland." The telegram directed Goheen to use the following talking points: the Poles should be left free from outside intervention; there would be a strongly adverse international reaction to Soviet intervention in Poland; and Brezhnev's upcoming visit would be an opportunity to deliver this message." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800577-0967)

<sup>3</sup> December 9. See Document 209.

## 209. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, December 9, 1980, 1156Z

25695. Subj: Ambassador's Farewell Call on PM. Ref: State 322465.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C–Entire text)

2. I regret that I was unable to turn my farewell call on Mrs. Gandhi into other than a ceremonial 15 minutes. She was gracious in manner, but not at all disposed to discuss issues, and at the end of a quarter hour it was made clear that my allotted time had been consumed. (As usual the outer office of her Parliament House suite was teeming with people waiting to see her both when I arrived and when I left.)

3. For my remarks, I followed the approach outlined in reftel, but ran out of time before getting to the regional<sup>3</sup> at the bequest of the Polish Prime Minister. This appears to have been the extent of the discussion of Poland in Brezhnev's and Mrs. Gandhi's first meeting.

4. I took the opportunity of the call to present to her personally Senator Percy's letter which had arrived by cable this morning.<sup>4</sup> I had hoped she might read it and that that might provide the basis for further discussion. Unfortunately that was not in her scenario, but the Percy letter seems to me to make the necessary points about Poland, Afghanistan and India's role better than I could and with much more authority. I am confident it will get her close attention.

**Goheen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–0833. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow and Islamabad.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 322465 to New Delhi, December 5, suggested that in his meeting with Gandhi, Goheen should emphasize the importance of Indo-U.S. relations, allay Gandhi's suspicions about U.S. policies and motives, and reiterate the talking points that were prepared for Goheen's December 5 meeting with Rao (see footnote 2, Document 208). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800582–0474)

<sup>3</sup> Omission in the original. According to telegram 327480 to multiple posts, December 11, which was a repeat of telegram 25695 from New Delhi, the missing text is: "security issues. She was very uncommunicative about her talks with Brezhnev yesterday. Under questioning, she said she had raised with him reports that the USSR had been marshalling forces on Poland's border. Brezhnev, she said, replied that reports were not correct; maneuvers there had been planned, but now were postponed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800589–0685)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 324878 to New Delhi, December 8, transmitted Percy's undated message to Gandhi, in which he discussed his recent high-level talks in Moscow. Percy urged Gandhi: "It would strengthen the hands of all of us who are friends of India, and I do believe it would bring to you the respect and gratitude of the entire free world if you would, while pursuing bilateral interests which are to the advantage of India and consistent with your friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, take a very strong position with President Brezhnev on Poland and Afghanistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800585–0739)

**210. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Additional Information Items

*Indian Handling of the Brezhnev Visit:* Indian Foreign Secretary Sathe [less than 1 line not declassified] that he thought Brezhnev's visit to India would be viewed as a turning point in New Delhi's relations with Moscow because it represented the first time India publicly displayed its disenchantment with Soviet actions in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> According to Sathe, India has taken this stance for three reasons:

—Gandhi believes world opinion, particularly in Asia, expects India to stand up to the Soviet Union and insist on a serious commitment for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

—Up to this point, India's position as a leading nonaligned country has been eroded by its compliance with Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

—India wants to repair its relations with ASEAN which were damaged by New Delhi's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in July 1980. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 33, 12/9/80–12/12/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 25696 from New Delhi, December 9, reported on Brezhnev's visit to India December 8–11. According to the report, the visit was marked by demonstrations and hostility from the Indian press, which was a "striking departure from the usually uncritical press coverage of high level Soviet visits." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–0902) Telegram 25697 from New Delhi, December 9, noted Reddy's criticism of Soviet foreign policy in his December 8 banquet speech, quoting his statement to Brezhnev: "We in India remain opposed to any form of intervention, covert or overt, by outside forces in the internal affairs of the region." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800586–0891)



**211. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Gloomy Assessment of India:* One of the State Department's most seasoned observers of India returned from a visit there with a discouraging interpretation of the political situation and prospective future developments.<sup>2</sup> According to his report, India appears to be drifting without any sense of direction, unable so far to come to grips with its serious economic, social, and political problems. The prospect seems to be for continuing drift, punctuated by sudden and not carefully conceived measures to deal with increasingly difficult problems. Mrs. Gandhi may turn to more authoritarian measures, with questionable effect. The erosion of the bureaucracy, the police, the political parties, and parliament, strengthens the conclusion that continuing non-performance is likely. There is no likely threat to Mrs. Gandhi's authority over the next 2–3 years, but it is a sign of the political disarray that nobody has any idea who would succeed her if she died suddenly. (C)

In light of this situation, the U.S. must be prepared to deal with further manifestations of Mrs. Gandhi's long-held suspicions of our policies and motives. Trouble at home may prompt an even tougher line towards the neighbors, especially Pakistan. There could be sudden fits and starts, and efforts to demonstrate purposeful activity, but in the main we should not expect genuine new departures in Indian foreign policy. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 33, 12/13/80–12/17/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Schaffer, who visited India for 10 days in mid-November. Thornton sent Schaffer's report to Brzezinski under a December 12 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 92, India: 7–12/80)

## 212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 19, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

4. *Meeting with Indian Ambassador Narayanan:* My meeting with the new Indian Ambassador Friday<sup>2</sup> focussed primarily on Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi.<sup>3</sup> The Ambassador said that Brezhnev had offered no fresh insights on Afghanistan, merely reiterating the long-standing Soviet position. He said the Indians had spoken strongly to the Soviets, and called my attention to Mrs. Gandhi's statement in Parliament drawing a distinction between the Indian and Soviet positions.<sup>4</sup> I expressed our concern that the Soviets have not moved beyond the proposal made by the Babrak Karmal regime in May.

The Ambassador said that Poland had not come up in any significant way in the discussions with Brezhnev. I reviewed the outcome of the NATO deliberations, and made a particular point of telling him that the Polish issue seemed to have stiffened NATO resolve on Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup>

India is preparing to host the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting in February, where criticism of our naval buildup in the Indian Ocean is likely to be a focus for unfriendly attention. I thought it important to express our disappointment over the one-sided treatment the Indians gave to Indian Ocean issues in statements made during the Brezhnev visit. They frequently single out Diego Garcia for criticism, but ignore Soviet facilities and large Soviet land and air forces nearby. The Ambassador didn't comment. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 12/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Ed, C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> December 19.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 210.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 26101 from New Delhi, December 15, transmitted the text of Gandhi's December 15 speech to both houses of the Indian Parliament, where she reported on the Indo-Soviet bilateral discussions. To the Soviet officials, Gandhi said, "we made our perceptions clear and conveyed our serious concern. We expressed our opposition to all forms of outside interference in the internal affairs of other countries whether through the introduction of regular troops or through infiltration and our view that all such interference should stop in order to make possible a political solution." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800596-0325)

<sup>5</sup> Documentation on the NATO deliberations on Poland is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

**213. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 19, 1980, 5:10–5:25 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Indo-US Relations; Afghanistan (U)

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Thomas P. Thornton, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

K.R. Narayanan, Ambassador of India  
S. Haksar, Minister, Embassy of India

*Dr. Brzezinski* opened the meeting with the hope that Indo-American relations would continue to improve. He pointed out that the Carter Administration has done all that it could to move these relations in the right direction. In this, the personal correspondence between President Carter and the two Indian Prime Ministers was a major factor. The President found this correspondence extremely important to him; he was very much impressed and influenced by what was contained in these very *personal* exchanges. (C)

*Brzezinski* pointed out that the United States has been attempting recently to improve its strategic position. Unfortunately, we face the traditional dilemma that physical power is still an extremely important determinant of global affairs. Despite this situation, however, we have sought to respect the new central reality in the world. That is, the Eurocentric age has come to an end; the countries of the Third World are now in the majority, and there is a new distribution of economic and political power throughout the world. Relations between India and the United States are particularly crucial in this context, since India is a leader, indeed, even *the* leader of the Third World. We sincerely hope that we have made significant progress in our relations with India. (C)

We are convinced that we must keep the East-West confrontation out of the Third World. For instance, our response to Cuban and Soviet activities in Ethiopia and Afghanistan is not an attempt on our part to export East-West tensions into the Third World, rather, to prevent their spread. We and India share an interest in this. The prospects for world peace will be poisoned if East-West conflicts are exported to the Third World. (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 60, Chron: 12/20–23/80. Confidential. Drafted on December 22. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

We have no interest in establishing a position in Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the presence of American ships in the Indian Ocean, which are trampling on nobody, can by no means be equated to the presence of Soviet tanks and helicopters in Afghanistan which are killing Afghans. We would, indeed, be happy to diminish our presence in the Indian Ocean region if the Soviets leave Afghanistan and if our access to Persian Gulf oil is assured. Obviously, however, we cannot accept the idea of being co-guarantors with the Soviet Union of this access. They are the ones who would be most likely to cut it off. In this regard, we are very impressed by what President Reddy said recently.<sup>2</sup> We hope that India will use its moral and political influence to get the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. As I said before, we are not seeking a special position in Afghanistan, and we recognize that the Soviets do have a special concern there. (C)

I would also hope that India will do what it can to prevent a Soviet invasion of Poland. This would be the end of detente and would have world-wide repercussions. There would probably be a world-wide boycott, which we would help organize, by trade unions directed against Soviet goods. Perhaps it might even lead to "U.S.-Chinese military relations." We will not exploit the Polish situation for our advantage, but we also will not be passive. (C)

*Ambassador Narayanan* replied that Prime Minister Gandhi had appreciated the personal exchange of correspondence with President Carter, and she had mentioned to him specifically when he made his call on her how pleased she had been with this. (C)

*Ambassador Narayanan* said that India is very aware that the United States has done much to improve Indo-US relations in the last four years, although obviously there are some points of difference. We recognize this period as one of very significant forward movement. (C)

We also appreciate your view that East-West conflicts should not intrude into the Third World. This is indeed part of India's rationale of non-alignment—that the Third World should not become involved in the Cold War. This is important to India for two reasons. First, in terms of simple self-interest, India does not want this to happen since it wants to concentrate on its own development. Second, a confrontation between the two superpowers has become too direct and unavoidable. Thus, the existence of a non-aligned group makes a contribution to world peace. We believe that world peace ultimately depends on the reaching of a *modus vivendi* between the U.S. and the USSR. Neither of these two superpowers can put the other down. It is for this reason

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Reddy's comments in his December 8 speech; see footnote 2, Document 210.

that we relate nonalignment to peaceful coexistence and are pleased that you agree that the Third World must remain free from Cold War conflicts. (C)

India recognizes Soviet action in Afghanistan as a major historical event. Indeed, India is more directly threatened perhaps than any other country. We know very well that in the past invasions have come into India through Afghanistan. We do not know, however, how to deal with this problem. (C)

Up until the Mughal period the military threat to the sub-continent was from the North through Afghanistan. After that, it came from the sea as the Portuguese, Dutch, British and others conquered India from that direction. This is the latest memory that we have—these attacks from the sea. In addition, there was also a brief threat from China in 1962, and of course we have had three wars from Pakistan. (C)

Therefore, our assessment of the threat involves all four of these problems. That is the reason why we are so keen on creating a zone of peace on the Indian Ocean. These two hundred years of colonial history are deep in the Indian mind. (C)

We know conceptually that there is a threat from Central Asia. But the present generation of Indians has never experienced this threat. The Soviet action in Afghanistan has summoned this memory from the depths of history, and we are beginning to take it into account. (C)

At the very beginning we tried to talk to Pakistan in this context. The quarrel between India and Pakistan has never been in our interest, and is even less so in the post-Afghan period. We have tried to bury the hatchet with them and form a basis of cooperation, in terms of Indo-Pakistani policy, not military cooperation or anti-Soviet cooperation. We have, of course, no interest in being anti-Soviet. (C)

*Dr. Brzezinski* concluded the meeting by saying that more discussions of this type are needed. We do not have these kinds of discussions often enough with other governments—not just India. Usually we talk only when we have something specific to negotiate. There is a great need to share our perspectives and concerns with each other. It was good of you to make time for me so that we could have this talk, even though it was only brief. (C)

Thereupon the meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.

The Indian side had pictures taken at the beginning of the meeting.

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**214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 15, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]

6. *US-India Nuclear Issues*: On January 14 the Indian Embassy gave us an aide-memoire on the nuclear cooperation issues between our two countries.<sup>2</sup> The Indian Government's communication brings to a head both the issue of future US supply to the Tarapur reactors and the issue of Indian reprocessing of US-origin Tarapur spent fuel. First, it states that if we are not in a position to provide Tarapur fuel until 1993 as called for by the 1963 nuclear cooperation agreement, and if no positive assurances are received from us by the end of February, India "would be constrained to make alternative arrangements for the efficient and continuous operation of the Tarapur" plants. Second, the aide-memoire states that in accordance with India's arrangements with the IAEA for safeguarding the reprocessing plant at Tarapur, India has decided to "shortly commence the reprocessing" of the Tarapur spent fuel. The aide-memoire takes the position that US agreement to a joint determination under the 1963 agreement is not needed since the safeguards provisions were transferred to the IAEA. The Indians have offered an opportunity to confirm, "anytime before the end of February," that safeguards will be effectively applied. We have said we hope there will be some flexibility in the time frame. We are now reviewing the options for responding. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 1/81. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

# Nepal

## 215. Letter From King Birendra of Nepal to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, February 7, 1977

Your Excellency,

Here in Nepal, we have been following with great interest your success in the Presidential elections and your recent inauguration.

I believe that this interest reflects the close bonds of friendship between our two peoples and I am confident that relations between Nepal and the United States of America will be further strengthened and will encompass other areas of mutual interest during Your Excellency's Presidential tenure.

I wish to take this opportunity to write to you frankly some of my country's problems and share with you my thoughts on how best we feel the United States can extend cooperation. Nepal is a small country situated between two of the world's most highly populated countries. Our endeavour has been, and will always continue to be, to have relations of peace, friendship and cooperation with all countries of the world, but particularly with our two main neighbours, India and China. Our geographical location is in an area which has been the scene of armed conflict on several occasions in the last thirty years. Nepal has not been involved in any of these hostilities, and we would like this state of affairs to be perpetuated. It is in this context that I have proposed that Nepal be declared a Zone of Peace.<sup>2</sup> Any right-thinking person realises that the energies and resources of a small, underdeveloped country like ours has to be channeled fully to the task of raising the living standard of our people. Acceptance of Nepal as a Zone of Peace, with reciprocal obligations on the part of other countries not to engage in hostile activity against Nepal and on the part of Nepal not to allow

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770071-0401. No classification marking. Borg forwarded the letter to Brzezinski, as well as a draft reply from Carter to King Birenda, under a March 11 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In his March 11 memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 1 above), Borg explained that the "purpose of the Zone of Peace proposal is to secure a pledge from India of non-interference in Nepal's internal affairs, a key preoccupation for a country which is not just land-locked, but India-locked. However, India, which considers Nepal to lie within its strategic sphere, has reacted coolly to the proposal. Other countries, including the United States, have refrained from taking a position. The Ford Administration told the Nepalese privately that the U.S. would not comment until Nepal had worked out a specific understanding with its neighbors. We believe that this remains the best stance. U.S. endorsement of the Zone of Peace proposal at this stage would be viewed by India as gratuitous involvement in a bilateral matter of considerable importance to Delhi."

its soil to be used for hostile activity against other countries, would make it possible to devote ourselves fully to the task of economic development and would in its own way contribute to peace in the region and peace in the world. American understanding and support of Nepal as a Zone of Peace would be deeply appreciated by the people of Nepal.

I might mention here that, responding to the Nepalese people's deeply-cherished desire for peace, of the governments in this region, my government alone has signed and ratified the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Your Excellency's initiatives to stop the spread of nuclear arms and the possible means of their manufacture will meet the full support of the Nepalese people, located, as our country is between two of the world's six countries possessing nuclear technology.

Nepal's problems as a landlocked country are, I believe, well appreciated by the American Government and people.

Your Excellency may not find it so easy with all your onerous duties to visit other countries in the early period of your Administration. May I, however, extend on behalf of the Government and people of Nepal an invitation for you and Mrs. Carter to visit Nepal at any time convenient to you. We have the highest respects for the ideals which the American people uphold and you can rest assured a warm welcome awaits you, however your visit may be organised, officially or unofficially.

Please convey warm good wishes from my wife and myself to Mrs. Carter.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

**Birendra R.**



**216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 30, 1977, 0256Z

70323. Subject: Letter From the President to the King of Nepal.

1. Following is text of letter from President Carter to King Birendra, replying to King's letter of February 7,<sup>2</sup> which was delivered through Royal Nepalese Embassy. Signed original being pouched.<sup>3</sup> Embassy should deliver soonest.

2. Quote: Your Majesty:

(A) Thank you for your letter of February 7 with its warm greetings and gracious reference to the close bonds of friendship between our two peoples.

(B) I appreciate the candor with which you have described Nepal's situation and your hopes for ensuring your country's peaceful development. Let me assure you that I intend to continue the U.S. policy of support for the independence and territorial integrity of Nepal and to maintain U.S. assistance programs designed to support the economic development of Nepal.

(C) Thank you also for explaining your proposal to declare Nepal a zone of peace. The objective of keeping Nepal free from involvement in foreign conflicts is certainly consonant with our policy towards Nepal and with our overall policy towards South Asia as a whole, which looks to peaceful settlement of disputes and concentration on the economic betterment of the peoples of the area. At the same time, however, American policy looks to the countries of the region to promote stability in South Asia without outside interference. Thus I do not believe it would be advisable for the United States to take a position on your proposal until specific understandings have been worked out with neighboring countries.

(D) I fully share your hope that the friendly relations between Nepal and the United Nations [*States*] will be further strengthened in the coming years. I am confident that they will be. Our common hopes for world peace and our common determination to address major global issues such as nuclear proliferation and the problems of development provide a firm basis on which we can work together for the good of all mankind.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770110–0315. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S; approved by Dubs.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 215.

<sup>3</sup> No copy of the signed original was found.

(E) It was most kind of you to invite Mrs. Carter and me to visit your beautiful country. We have heard much about Nepal, and I hope we will have occasion to accept your gracious hospitality at some point in the future.

(F) I hope you will convey greetings and best wishes from Mrs. Carter and myself to Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya.

(G) Sincerely, Jimmy Carter End quote.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram, which quoted Birendra's February 7 letter to Carter.]

Vance

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## 217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 9, 1977, 0007Z

132964. Subject: Opium—Nepal. Ref: (A) Kathmandu 2219;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 122979.<sup>3</sup>

1. On June 8, Deputy Assistant Secretary Dubs called in Ambassador Khatri to deliver demarche on opium as contemplated reftels. Khatri commented that he knew there was a marihuana problem in Nepal and that poppies can grow there, but this is first he has heard of commercial production of opium. He asked where exactly the poppies were sighted and was told in the far western hills.

2. Following are talking points used with Ambassador Khatri, and given to him in blind courtesy copy: Quote:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205-0378. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to New Delhi and the Mission in Geneva. Drafted by David R. Telleen (NEA/INS); cleared in S/NM; approved by Dubs.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2219 from Kathmandu, June 1, the Embassy agreed with the Department's proposal for parallel démarches in Washington and Kathmandu regarding suggestions that the Nepalese Government might be considering legal opium production, as proposed in telegram 122979 to Kathmandu. See footnote 3 below. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770194-1036)

<sup>3</sup> Dated May 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770191-0406)

—We have begun to receive for the first time firm reports<sup>4</sup> that opium poppies are being cultivated in western Nepal, and would appreciate an indication from the Government of Nepal whether this is so, and whether there are plans to move against this illegal production under the new Narcotics Control Act.

—The United States strongly believes that the proper approach to opium is to discourage the spread of poppy cultivation, and we hope the Government of Nepal will take all possible measures to that end.

—In light of our long-standing concern with controlling the narcotics traffic, the emergence of Nepal as a source of illicit opium would raise a serious problem in our otherwise smooth bilateral relations.

—In this context, we are also greatly concerned about indications that the Government of Nepal may be considering some form of legalized production of opium. We believe this would be a serious mistake, for several reasons:

A) The world market for legal opium is approaching a situation of over-supply, and current international efforts are directed toward controlling this over-supply rather than adding new production;

B) Article 24 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, prohibits signatories from importing opium from states not permitted to export under its provisions. Exporting states are those which, during the ten years immediately prior to 1 January 1961 exported opium, or those states receiving special permission from the International Narcotics Control Board to export no more than 5 tons per year, after having proven adequate control mechanisms exist;

C) We do not believe leak-proof legal production of opium could be set up in Nepal, and therefore would view any encouragement of legal production as inevitably resulting in increased illicit production for international traffic.

—In view of attitudes towards narcotics in the U.S., if Nepal came to be perceived as indifferent to the international effort to control opium production, U.S. aid to Nepal would be called into question, in Congress and elsewhere.

—President Carter is very concerned over the international narcotics control problem and this matter ranks as a priority issue in U.S. foreign relations. Unquote.

3. In addition, Dubs emphasized the domestic problems that narcotics traffic and traffickers can cause for source countries if allowed to become entrenched.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

4. Charge should follow up with same points to Prime Minister Giri,<sup>5</sup> as suggested ref A.

Vance

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2374 from Kathmandu, June 13, reported that Eaves called on Giri in order to raise the matter of opium production. According to Eaves: "Giri said he did not know much about these matters but said that Government of Nepal had been giving some consideration to 'buying up' opium for export. He added that Nepal had received inquiries from 'two or three countries' expressing interest in purchasing opium. Both Prime Minister and Foreign Ministry officer who was also present were unfamiliar with Single Convention, and appeared surprised at limitations it imposed, and wondered aloud why approaches to Nepal for export of opium had been made in view of such limitations. Neither was aware also of Dubs approach to Khatri." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770209-1082)

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## 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, August 5, 1977, 0550Z

3278. Subj: Call on Prime Minister: Economic Aid, Narcotics, and Human Rights.

1. Accompanied by DCM Eaves, I made my initial call on Prime Minister Giri August 3. Foreign Office note taker also present.

2. After expressing my pleasure at the continuing excellent state of Nepali-U.S. relations, which Prime Minister shared, I told the Prime Minister that, without getting into detailed discussion during what was courtesy call, I thought it would be useful to alert him to three areas of activity, development assistance, human rights and narcotics, to which U.S. administration was giving high priority and which, to one degree or another, might have bearing on our bilateral relationship.

3. First of these subject had been mentioned in my remarks at the presentation of credentials,<sup>2</sup> i.e., the administration's strong interest in increasing economic assistance to the least developed countries, such as Nepal. This, I noted looked like good news for Nepal, assuming of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770281-0021. Confidential. Sent for information to New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Heck presented his credentials on July 29.

course, congressional support for the President's initiatives in this area, and we looked forward to contributing in greater measure to helping meet Nepal's development needs on the basis of the development policies and priorities which Nepal sets for itself.

4. Second area of priority in our foreign policy was international narcotics control, and a third was promotion of human rights, and both of these were closely related to the policy of increased economic assistance, as reflected, for example, in congressional legislation on aid and human rights passed last week.<sup>3</sup> (USIS Kathmandu has issued text of Wireless File item on congressional action as press release<sup>4</sup> and I left copy with Giri drawing his attention to congressional language on human rights.) I told the Prime Minister that it was therefore possible we would need to have discussions on these subjects from time to time in the future in order that we understand each other's position fully and fairly. In that connection, I noted that DCM Eaves (then Charge) had a short time ago discussed with the Prime Minister certain developments with regard to narcotics in Nepal that were causing some concern in Washington (Kathmandu 2374),<sup>5</sup> and that our concern over these developments had also been communicated to Ambassador Khatri by the State Department.<sup>6</sup> I told the Prime Minister I would be interested in any further comments the GON might have on these matters.

5. The Prime Minister replied that he appreciated my remarks and looked forward to candid discussions of such matters whenever it seemed desirable. He said his door would always be open for such discussions. He welcomed the prospect of increased economic assistance from the U.S. and also our recognition of Nepal's interest in developing "in the Nepalese way". With regard to narcotics, the Prime Minister said he saw no serious problem. However, as the government began to implement its narcotics legislation, it was getting complaints from people who had traditionally used wild-growing cannabis for a variety of economic purposes and they were asking for either exemption from the legislation or for assistance in crop substitution. The government has not yet decided its course on this matter. With regard to the possible cultivation of opium on a controlled basis, the government has been giving some consideration to this, in response to shows of interest by "two or three governments" in purchasing opium from Nepal, but no decision has been reached. I said we have had some experience on such matters as crop substitution or other economic

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L. 95–88), enacted on August 3.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 217.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 217.

measures to help farmers and we were ready to discuss this with GON at any time. On the question of opium production, this was a very serious matter and I hoped we would have opportunity to present our views fully if GON decided to consider such a step. Giri said GON would certainly keep in touch with us.

6. On human rights, the Prime Minister said he hoped there would be no problem but he could foresee some possible differences of opinion. Nepal was committed to a partyless system of government, but had a Panchayat system which allowed for popular participation in a way which the GON considered suitable to Nepalese conditions. If the non-existence of political parties were considered by others to be inconsistent with human rights, then there could be a difference of opinion. Similarly, he could foresee a possible difference of opinion on so-called "political prisoners". GON had no objection to political activity by persons who accepted Panchayat system and sought to work within its framework. However, Nepal had under detention some people who had committed criminal acts in connection with their political activities aimed at changing the present system of government. This was treason. Comment: This is same view Shah takes against political activists in Iran. End comment. Nepal, he said, would of course adhere to the system it believed best suited to its own conditions and needs, "U.S. aid or no". However, he believed it would be useful to have candid discussions of any problems which might arise in this area and he hoped that any differences of opinion could be resolved through such discussions. He again reiterated his availability for talks at any time.

7. I thanked the Prime Minister for his candor and said I welcomed his receptivity to further discussions on these subjects should the need arise. The Prime Minister was friendly and attentive during my remarks and forthcoming in his responses, and I believe this was a useful beginning in preparing the way for further discussions on narcotics and human rights.

Heck

**219. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kathmandu, September 3, 1977, 0520Z

3788. New Delhi for Embassy and DEA. Subj: Audience With King Birendra—Narcotics. Ref: Kathmandu 3642.<sup>2</sup>

1. During my call on King August 19, I reviewed with him various aspects of our bilateral relations against the background of several of the President's priority concerns, including developmental assistance, human rights<sup>3</sup> and narcotics. This message deals with our discussion on narcotics question.

2. I recalled that subject of narcotics was one which had been under discussion with HMG for some time. As cannabis grew wild in Nepal and its cultivation was difficult to control we were naturally concerned over its leakage into international market. We had accordingly welcomed GON initiative last year to adopt legislation establishing controls and penalties and we had expressed hope that adequate enforcement machinery would follow.

3. King interjected to say that this was his objective also. However, it was his impression that so far, adoption of this legislation had unfortunately contributed more to an increase in corruption among officials than to controlling narcotics traffic. Much more would have to be done in the way of developing better trained officials and raising the general standard of administration before this law could be effectively enforced and this would take time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320–0988. Confidential. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3642 from Kathmandu, August 26, reported Heck and Birendra's general discussion of U.S.-Nepalese relations during their August 19 meeting. Both agreed that relations were good and that no serious issues loomed. Heck told Birendra: "Our objectives in Nepal were clear-cut and totally above board. We had no political, military or strategic ambitions in Nepal and we were here basically to give concrete meaning to our recognition of Nepal as sovereign and independent state and to help country develop and improve lot of its people." Heck also addressed the Carter administration's interest in increasing developmental aid to Nepal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770309–0415)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 3789 from Kathmandu, September 3, reported Heck and Birendra's discussion of human rights during their August 19 meeting. Heck explained that he "had not yet had opportunity to study the situation in Nepal carefully but it seemed to me that according to US criteria and concepts violations of human rights might be occurring in Nepal." Heck said that he "thought it best to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than making a public issue and risk a confrontation from which it would be difficult to extricate ourselves." Birendra expressed agreement with this course of action "and without committing himself one way or other on question whether there was human rights issue in Nepal he said this was a topic we could revert to in future discussions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770319–1153)

4. I went on to say that while we had expressed our concern about illicit trafficking in hashish as a matter of principle, this problem as far as I knew did not impinge directly on US interests because very little of this narcotic reached the US from Nepal as far as the Embassy was aware. However, there was a far more serious problem possibly looming ahead because we had received reports earlier this year of poppy cultivation in western Nepal together with other reports that the GON was considering going into opium production, ostensibly to meet legitimate medical needs and for export. This subject had come up in my initial call on the Prime Minister who acknowledged that “one or two countries” had expressed interest in purchasing opium from Nepal and had confirmed that the GON was considering the matter (Kathmandu 3278).<sup>4</sup> The King nodded and said this was case, mentioning that the Soviet Union was one of the countries to which Prime Minister had referred.

5. I reminded King that we had recently made a demarche both in Washington and here expressing our concern over these developments and drawing on State 132964,<sup>5</sup> I repeated the points in this message which the then-Charge had expressed to the Prime Minister (Kathmandu 2374).<sup>6</sup> I added that Nepal was blessed by not having an opium and heroin problem and that if the King were concerned about corruption, the introduction of poppies and opium into Nepal could have far more serious effects, threatening to corrupt the youth of the country to say nothing of the temptations this would offer all levels of government. I concluded by reminding the King of the President’s concern about the international narcotics control problem. While I did not want to use a phrase which sounded threatening, especially in our first meeting, in all candor I had to tell him that if the GON decided to go down this road this could have a very serious effect on our bilateral relations.

6. The King took this in stride remarking that he really hadn’t focused on the difference between hash and opium and the dangers inherent in the cultivation of poppies. He said he would look into the matter further. The discussion turned to other subjects after I said I would send him some literature on opium cultivation.

7. Comment: The feedback we are getting from the palace is that the palace guard and the royal family accepted with good grace the various points I raised with King including the human rights question but were annoyed at the thrust of my remarks on the narcotics issue.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 218.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 217.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 217.



This comes close to home, since in this business the palace is said to be considering how to react to my presentation. We may be in for some unpleasant business and some deflation in the general euphoria that currently prevails over the excellent state of our bilateral relations.

Heck

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**220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1978, 0107Z

25964. Subject: Letter to the King of Nepal from President Carter. Please deliver following message. Original being pouched.<sup>2</sup>

Begin quote:

Your Majesty:

I regret that I did not have sufficient time during my recent trip to visit other countries in South Asia.<sup>3</sup> However, I am well aware of Your Majesty's hopes for regional peace, and I can assure you that I had them in mind during my discussions in New Delhi. My visit, on which Ambassador Heck has briefed you, was intended not only as an indication of the importance which the United States attaches to good relations with India, but also as a reaffirmation of our interest in the whole area.

In visiting one country in South Asia, I have been struck by the efforts of all of the countries in the area to solve problems peacefully, increase stability in the region, and promote development. I have noted Nepal's continuing efforts to improve its relations with its neighbors and appreciate the contribution Your Majesty's government is making to regional peace and stability.

I believe that one of the most promising steps toward regional cooperation is the attention countries are giving to mobilizing water resources. I was particularly interested in the initiatives you proposed on this subject in your inaugural address at the Colombo Plan Consulta-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047–0236. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Percival; cleared in S/S–S and by Dubs and Thornton; approved by Lande.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of the original was found.

<sup>3</sup> Carter visited India January 1–3. See Documents 90–92.

tive Committee, especially your pledge to participate in joint ventures which would emphasize, as you stated, independence through interdependence. As you know, both Prime Minister Callaghan and I restated this theme during our visits.<sup>4</sup>

My administration is committed to provide development assistance, especially to the most needy countries such as Nepal, and I look forward to continuing and expanding our collaboration through AID and the Peace Corps.

The United States is concerned about strengthening international efforts to control narcotics. We have welcomed your assurances that Nepal will take effective action against the production of and illicit trafficking in all narcotic substances. I especially welcome the assurance that Nepal will not produce opium.<sup>5</sup>

As Ambassador Heck told you in his recent audience,<sup>6</sup> a number of Americans have expressed concern to me over the condition of Mr. B.P. Koirala.<sup>7</sup> Your decision to release Mr. Koirala for medical attention in the United States last summer was certainly an act of great humanity. I understand that the American doctor who was present at that operation believes that Mr. Koirala should receive further tests within the next few months, though I am sure that Mr. Koirala will continue to receive excellent medical attention from his Nepalese physicians. I have no intention of interfering in the political or legal processes of your country, and I appreciate the courtesy with which you discussed this matter with Ambassador Heck. I mention the matter of Mr. Koirala once again in the spirit of avoiding any possible complication in our

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<sup>4</sup> The Colombo Plan Consultative Committee met in Kathmandu November 29–December 9. Delegations from 23 Colombo Plan member nations, including the United States, attended. Telegram 5344 from Kathmandu, December 7, reported the King's December 5 speech to the opening of the Ministerial session, during which he proposed regional cooperation in the development of water resources. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770454–1379) For more information on regional efforts to mobilize water resources, see Documents 1, 3, and footnote 9, Document 14.

<sup>5</sup> During a September 20, 1977, meeting with Heck, Prime Minister Bista declared that Nepal would not produce opium, saying that it was "out of the question." (Telegram 4100 from Kathmandu, September 21, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770343–0034)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 169 from Kathmandu, January 10, reported Heck's January 5 discussion with Birendra. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780016–0256)

<sup>7</sup> In connection with Carter's letter to Birendra, Tarnoff informed Brzezinski in a January 12 memorandum: "The only sensitive point in the letter is the reference to B.P. Koirala. The Government of Nepal resents foreign, particularly Indian, support for B.P. Koirala, Nepal's former Prime Minister and primary opposition figure. J.P. Naryan, the Indian political and moral leader, has asked the President to intervene to secure the release from prison of Koirala, who faces criminal charges in Nepal. Koirala, despite a recent operation in New York, may require further medical attention." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780037–0272)

good relations, and in consideration of the compassion and statesmanship that you have shown in the past.<sup>8</sup>

I want to reiterate my assurances of the continuing commitment of the United States to world peace and cooperation and our continuing interest in strengthening friendship between the peoples of our two countries. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End quote.

Vance

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<sup>8</sup> On February 22, Bista informed Heck that “in response to President’s recent friendly letter,” the “King had decided quote to consider matter sympathetically on humanitarian grounds unquote. In response to my request for clarification of what this meant exactly, Prime Minister said that Koirala would be released ‘very soon’ and would be free to leave country for further medical treatment.” (Telegram 926 from Kathmandu, February 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780079–0948) Telegram 943 from Kathmandu, February 23, reported that Koirala was released from detention on February 23. According to the Embassy: “Koirala told our source he had been released on ‘some kind of parole’, terms of which will presumably be clearer after his appearance before special tribunal later this morning.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780083–0422)

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## 221. Letter From King Birendra of Nepal to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, April 20, 1978

Your Excellency,

I have received your letter of the 30th of January 1978 rendering your advice to me in the spirit of mutual goodwill and friendship for which I would like to thank you.<sup>2</sup>

The Nepalese people share with you and the people of the United States the great ideals of freedom and human dignity. We also share your belief in the Rule of Law which can be guaranteed only when there exists an independent judiciary. I hope Your Excellency is aware that the Constitution of Nepal guarantees not only fundamental rights, but also requires that no discrimination be made between one man and another before law and none can be punished without trial before

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780079–1172. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 220.

courts of law. All this has been done in the belief that an individual must find justice before courts of law and enjoy his freedom as an individual. Although I have heard of some cases of offence against the State in my country, it is only appropriate that I should not interfere into the cases *sub judice*. Any person convicted by the last court of appeal even enjoys the privilege of sending an appeal for clemency.

For some weeks past I was on a regional tour of my country. The more I travel, the more the people I meet and talk to, the more I feel convinced that the demands of the vast majority of our people are for basic economic development. Only some weeks ago, I was travelling through those areas where people have specially been hit hard by the prohibition on the traditional cultivation of narcotic plants. It is not fair that hundreds of thousands of people should suffer by a stroke of a decision where their livelihood has been affected most deeply. I wonder if it was really what we wanted. This is where I believe our obligation comes in strongly.

Excellency, as a friend of the American people and as a Nepali who enjoyed the privilege of spending a year at Harvard, I wish you to be assured that the partyless Panchayat democratic system, which we profess, is developing in accordance with the wishes of the Nepalese people. An attempt to subvert it from outside will lead, I am sure, toward instability. As I believe in the ideals of democracy so I believe that the need for an all-round economic development requires serious attention. But neither economic development nor democracy will have any meaningful impact on our people unless they get a fair share in the distribution of the fruits of development. These are the subjects where my thoughts are being directed. I am happy to note that Your Excellency is giving sincere thoughts on offering assistance to Nepal and I much appreciate your offer to help us develop our water resources.

Excellency, I wish you to be assured that I have championed the cause of Nepalese democratic policy to flourish in Nepal. Also, as I have been seriously concerned about the need for economic development in Nepal, I have been pleading to friends across the world to accept Nepal as a Zone of Peace.<sup>3</sup> As I write in all frankness, I also wish to mention categorically that the people of Nepal shall never accept imposition from any one from outside. Proud of their heritage of independence, they guard their freedom and dignity, equity and the Rule of Law, the absence of which can only lead to a rule of force, violence and terrorism. In the name of a new order and change, people have been saddened in the past to witness freedom being replaced by despot-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 215.

ism, and democracy having been trampled upon by dictatorship of one kind or another in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. This is where I believe our maturity and sober understanding are called for. As one who has stood for individual rights and freedom, it was natural that my government and people missed Your Excellency during your tour of Asia. May I once again invite Your Excellency and Madame Carter to pay a friendly visit to Nepal at a date convenient to you.

Your country's Ambassador, Mr. Douglas Heck, has no doubt communicated to you the essence of much of what I have written. My government appreciates his contribution to Nepal-United States friendship and we wish him well in this endeavour.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

**Birendra R.**

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## **222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 12, 1978, 2352Z

176191. Subject: Letter to the King of Nepal from President Carter.

1. Please deliver following message. Original being pouched.<sup>2</sup> Begin quote: Your Majesty: I appreciate your cordial and candid letter about our shared goals and principles.<sup>3</sup> Your government has tempered the law with compassion in a way that sets an example for all of us. As I mentioned in my last letter, we have no intention of interfering in the judicial processes of your country.<sup>4</sup> The Government of the United States fully respects each nation's right to guarantee fundamental rights and govern itself in accordance with its own traditions.

We hope that all countries of South Asia will continue to search for peace and stability. The area has, in the past few years, seen a perceptible reduction of tensions as nations have addressed controversial issues in a cooperative manner. Some countries of the region,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780286–0497. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Percival; cleared by Miklos and Thornton; approved by Lande.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of the original was found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 221.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 220.

however, have now expressed concern about the recent events in Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> I, too, am concerned about the trend of events and about Soviet intentions, with their possible effects on the stability of South Asia. We believe that the wisest course is to try to maintain links with the new Afghan regime; we have, therefore, indicated our willingness to work with the new government in support of Afghanistan's independence. At the same time, we have stressed our support for regional stability and for the peaceful settlement of problems among neighboring countries. We will continue to watch the situation closely, and I will ask Ambassador Heck to keep you informed of our view of the situation. I would be grateful for any advice that you might care to offer.

Your government has made a significant contribution to regional cooperation, peace, and stability. The United States continues to be interested in your proposal for regional development of the waters of the eastern part of the sub-continent.<sup>6</sup> I also welcome your decision to examine the potential for developing the Karnali River basin. We are prepared, if requested, to join with other nations to cooperate with Nepal and India on the studies required for this project.

My country remains committed to meeting the concerns you mentioned in your letter, namely, that the people of a nation receive a fair share of the fruits of development. Development should have a direct impact on the lives of the rural poor; this is the purpose of the Peace Corps and increasingly, of A.I.D. Our joint projects to limit the degradation of the environment and improve the lives of the people of the Rapati zone are one step in this direction. Moreover, the rural development programs on which we are cooperating should help offset the loss of income that some small farmers have felt since the enactment of Nepal's beneficial narcotics legislation.

Thank you very much for your kind invitation to visit your country. Although that may not be possible in the near future, I hope that we may have an opportunity to meet each other at a mutually convenient time and place. In the meantime, Ambassador Heck is keeping me informed of your views. I deeply appreciate hearing from you directly. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

**Christopher**

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the April military coup in Afghanistan. See Document 276.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 220.

## 223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nepal<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 26, 1979, 2310Z

21949. Subject: B.P. Koirala's Meeting With Department Officials. Ref: A) Kathmandu 6539 (78),<sup>2</sup> (B) State 147350 (78).<sup>3</sup>

1. B.P. Koirala met with working-level officers from NEA/INS and HA (Grahame, Maxim,<sup>4</sup> Percival) afternoon of January 25. Nepalese Embassy had been informed of decision to receive Koirala. Nepalese EmbOff telephoned Desk Officer to convey Ambassador Khatri's "strongest displeasure."

2. Though some in the Nepali Congress Party would disagree, Koirala believes that the King would prefer to liberalize the political system and recognizes that the monarchy and the NCP have "mutual interests" in reaching an understanding. The King, however, might not prevail against the entrenched conservatives in his family, the government, and particularly the army. Though he suggested that the King would probably temporize, Koirala said he does not know how the King will respond to B.P.'s proposals for a gradual program of a) amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, b) greater freedom of expression, and c) elections on national, partyless basis to the National Assembly which would then decide if ban on political parties should continue.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790040–0845. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi. Drafted by Percival; cleared in HA; approved by Jay Grahame (NEA/INS).

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 6539 from Kathmandu, December 14, 1978, reported on a recent meeting between Koirala and Birendra. According to the Embassy: "B.P.'s proposals to the King, characterized by both moderation and precision, consisted of three time-separated phases: (a) amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles and the return of confiscated property; (b) greater freedom of expression, including the press, circulation of written views (e.g. pamphlets), and the right of assembly; and (c) elections on a national, partyless basis to the National Assembly which would then decide if the ban on political parties should be lifted. The King understood B.P.'s points but did not respond either during the meeting or since." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780527–1136)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 147350 to Kathmandu, June 9, 1978, reported Koirala's June 8 meeting with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Assistant Secretary Derian, and working level officers from HA and NEA/INS, during which Koirala argued that Nepalese "monarchy and democracy are compatible," as well as shared his belief that the King of Nepal "is inclined to liberalize the Nepalese political system, but is shackled by 'vested interests' in the palace." After discussing his own legal situation, which remained unclear, Koirala maintained that "the U.S. was the 'most influential' country in Nepal. While disavowing any concern for his person, he pleaded for U.S. intervention with the King to support the 'democratic forces' in Nepal." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780242–0445)

<sup>4</sup> Robert M. Maxim (HA).

3. The GON was portrayed as a weak and fragile government, crippled by the increasingly sharp conflict between progressives and reactionaries. Koirala argued that the government's inept handling of the opposition forces and the Carpetgate scandal proved this point.<sup>5</sup> Koirala suggested that the U.S. continue its quiet diplomacy, but intervene forcefully with the King to strengthen his hand against the conservatives in the palace and the army.

4. Memcon will follow by next pouch.<sup>6</sup>

Vance

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 6342 from Kathmandu, December 5, 1978, described the ongoing criminal investigation, which some in Nepal dubbed "Carpetgate," of the alleged "misuse of export/foreign exchange system" that implicated upper and mid-level government officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511-0989)

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

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## 224. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, April 23, 1979, 0602Z

2336. Subject: Meeting with B.P. Koirala.

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Shortly after B.P. Koirala's return from his last visit to the US, I suggested that we get together. He readily agreed and spent about one and one-half hours with me at the residence last week. This message reports the highlights of discussion with this former Prime Minister and leading political dissident in Nepal. It is covered more fully in memcon being pouched to NEA/INS.<sup>2</sup>

3. First part of meeting focused on human rights. I explained to B.P. Embassy's policy on this matter involving mix of public and private diplomacy. B.P. strongly agreed with this approach, saying it would be counter-productive for USG to get in a public debate with GON on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790186-0636. Confidential. Sent for information to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



human rights. This would not help the cause and would only strengthen hands of hard-liners in the palace. In this connection B.P. mentioned that he was unimpressed with current approach to human rights by Amnesty International which went around “counting people in jails.” He was in greater sympathy with broader-base definition used by US involving personal freedoms, economic rights and political and civil freedoms.

4. B.P. continued to be baffled by recent executions and could offer no satisfactory explanation for their timing or abrupt way in which they had been handled, unless this was a decision taken by hardliners to embarrass the King.<sup>3</sup> He shrugged off recent order restricting his movements to Kathmandu Valley as shortsighted and unimportant and further proof that hardliners currently had upper hand.

5. In his last meeting with King before going to US, there were at least two sharp exchanges.<sup>4</sup> First came about when B.P. told King that present system of government supporting monarchy was not adequate and monarchy was doomed unless King remembered that the people of Nepal were his ultimate source of power. Second exchange took place when King made point that one of problems of having political parties in Nepal was that they received foreign financing and this threatened security of country. B.P. retorted that there was strength in numbers and political parties were less vulnerable to outside influences than individuals. He added he could name dozens of senior officials in government and in palace who were in the pay of foreign powers. King reddened and changed subject.

6. As for his future plans, B.P. is still waiting to talk to the King and has not given up hope of bringing King around to broadening and liberalizing political base for the country. Meanwhile, he is maintaining a low profile and seems content to wait things out in hopes of hearing from King.

7. In this connection B.P. said that he was opposed to current student agitation which has led to closing of the university.<sup>5</sup> He told

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1296 from Kathmandu, March 7, reported on the events surrounding the execution of two of Koirala's supporters: “Even those of our contacts who ordinarily give unquestioning support to the government are unhappy and worried over these events. They regard the timing of the executions as at best a disastrous blunder or misguided attempt to split the Congress Party; at worst, a sinister inside plot to discredit the King.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790104–0858)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 223.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 2392 from Kathmandu, April 24, the Embassy reported: “The government efforts to quash the student strike by a combination of a cooling-off period, arrests and an offer to discuss at least some issues has failed. Although campuses reopened April 22 most students did not return, and there was a major police-student clash on April 23 which resulted in serious injuries and quite probably several deaths. This in turn led to multiple arrests and the reclosing of the university campuses in the Kathmandu Valley, this time ‘indefinitely.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790187–1060)

student leaders not to undertake this agitation but they went ahead anyway. He did not think that confrontation policy of students was helpful in dialogue that was necessary with GON. Comment: Other Nepali Congress leaders have confirmed that they are trying to get student leaders to cool situation but they are having trouble controlling the students.

8. We agreed to meet again in the near future.

Heck

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## 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, May 24, 1979, 0535Z

3098. Subject: Panchayat System or No?—Issue To Go to the People. Ref: Kathmandu 3090.<sup>2</sup>

1. (U) In the wake of last night's disturbances in Kathmandu, these in turn following on serious troubles over the past week in the Terai, Radio Nepal announced on the 6:45 a.m. news morning of May 24 that the palace has ordered that an election commission be formed within one week to present the following choice to the people of Nepal in a referendum, on the basis of universal adult franchise via secret ballot:

(1) Retain the present Panchayat system with suitable reforms; or

(2) Set up a multi-party system of government. The palace announcement defended the Panchayat system as having been designed to accommodate all the people under a democratic system that reflected the wishes of the people, provided a suitable umbrella for development, and protected Nepal's territorial integrity; but it went on to say that "in view of the present situation", in order explicitly to understand the type of system desired by the people, the above questions would be offered. (Exact text of royal proclamation follows).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790235-0662. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Beijing, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3090 from Kathmandu, May 23, the Embassy informed the Department that the police response to a student protest led to a major outbreak of violence in the center of Kathmandu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790234-0755)

2. (U) The King said that, since setting up the referendum would take some time, the present government would continue in office for the present.

3. (C) Clearly there are questions still to be answered. What role will the Back to the Village National Campaign and the existing [garble] structure take in the election process? Will campaigning in favor of one choice or the other be permitted? Will freedom of assembly to discuss issues be allowed? These are important issues [garble—presumably] to be clarified by the election commission, but nevertheless it appears that the palace has truly bitten the bullet and acknowledged that uncompromising defense of the Panchayat system is no longer tenable.<sup>3</sup>

**Boehm**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3137 from Kathmandu, May 25, the Embassy reported: "In the second major announcement in two days, morning radio broadcasts and press May 25 carry a notice from the palace reporting the resignation of Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista. The release goes on to state that the present Council of Ministers will remain in office until the King can obtain a recommendation on a successor to Bista from the forthcoming session of the Rastriya Panchayat, the National Assembly. The release also states that the King is summoning the Rastriya Panchayat two weeks earlier than originally planned—i.e., May 30. Bista is the King's man and, while he may have doubts about recent policy decisions, we do not believe that he would be leaving if the King desired otherwise. In short, this is a palace decision intended to help defuse the current unrest." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790237–0929) Nepal's national referendum took place on May 2, 1980; see Documents 227 and 228.

**226. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State (Schaffer) to Members of the Nepal Interagency Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 14, 1979

SUBJECT

November 28 Nepal IG: Record of Discussions

At the invitation of Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Saunders, the above addressees sent representatives to a November 28 Interagency Group Meeting on our policy toward Nepal. Deputy Assistant Secretary Jane Coon chaired the meeting, substituting for Assistant Secretary Saunders; a list of other participants in the meeting is attached (Attachment A).<sup>2</sup>

The principal recommendation which emerged from the meeting was that U.S. assistance to Nepal should be increased for FY-81 as a reflection of our desire to demonstrate support for the fragile but more democratic government that may emerge from the present referendum process. The meeting also endorsed other recommendations made in the attached discussion paper (Attachment B).<sup>3</sup>

*Discussion*

Mrs. Coon described the situation in Nepal as it bears upon our interests in the region. We have few direct interests in Nepal, and our presence and influence there are appropriately modest. However, developments in Afghanistan show how the political problems of seemingly small and quiet border states can suddenly impact on regional stability in ways which do affect important U.S. interests.

The referendum process presently under way in Nepal aims at bringing about more popular participation in political institutions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 95, Nepal: 9/77-12/80. Secret. Sent to McGiffert, [name not declassified] (CIA), Bowdler, Thornton, Lieutenant General Lawson (JCS), Derian, Bartholomew, Falco, Curren, Sullivan, Bergsten (Treasury), Sanders (OMB), Kreisberg, Holbrooke, Celeste (Peace Corps), and Saunders. Drafted by Donald Paarlberg (NEA/INS); cleared in draft in NEA/RA, ICA, INR, Peace Corps, CIA, HA/NEA, PM/ISP, OJCS/J-5, OASD/ISA/NESA, AID/ASIA/PNS, OMB, and INM, and by Coon; approved by Schaffer.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached

<sup>4</sup> See Document 225.

Success in this attempt would contribute to regional stability with minimal cost to us.

Failure, however, would threaten the institution of the Monarchy which remains Nepal's only cohesive force and could lead to widespread disorder. We could see far more active Sino/Soviet competition in backing various left-wing political factions, each seeking to prevent the other from dominating Nepal's weakened government. If the situation unraveled further, the Indians would certainly be tempted to intervene in order to counter the perceived Chinese threat. Chinese counteraction to Indian military intervention is unpredictable, but the U.S. might well be faced with awkward choices. Indian intervention in Nepal would also contribute to further regional instability as other neighbors of India felt threatened by the prospect of Indian "hegemony" on the subcontinent.

Ambassador Heck elaborated on the importance to us of continued orderly political development in Nepal. In addition to the regional concerns described by Mrs. Coon, he noted Nepal's constructive role in non-aligned fora and its UNIFIL contribution in Lebanon. Nepal is also a critical actor in any international effort to develop the potential of the subcontinent's eastern rivers.

The Ambassador described the referendum process and the elements which will affect the outcome. Disorder in many parts of Nepal has recently increased as extreme rightist and leftist factions attempt to undermine the referendum and prevent administration of a fair and orderly vote. So far, the Government has been equal to such challenges and remains committed to the referendum, although there are important elements, even in the Palace, which are opposed. The success of the referendum process probably depends upon the ability of the King and the most prominent political leader, B. P. Koirala, to prevail against extremist pressures and come to some sort of working relationship.

We retain significant influence in Nepal due to Nepal's perception that we are without ulterior motives and genuinely interested in the country's continued viability and development. We can use this influence quietly to encourage successful completion of the political process beginning with the referendum and followed by constitutional changes and subsequent elections. If this process does succeed we should demonstrate our support of the government which will emerge. The discussion paper recommends a course of action which would implement this strategy at extremely modest cost.

The IG then considered the "courses of action" described in the discussion paper, and participants made the following observations:

*A. Until the Completion of the Referendum.*

1. *Public Statements.* Mr. Thornton recommended public statements at this time of our support for the referendum process. Ambassador

Heck said that we are already making appropriate statements in response to questions in Kathmandu.

2. *Privately Counsel Major Leaders.* Mrs. Coon observed that Ambassador Heck's personal relationships with both the King and B. P. Koirala uniquely qualify him to execute this role.

3. *Food Assistance.* Ambassador Heck, Mr. George<sup>5</sup> and Mr Paarlberg reviewed steps we have taken to implement our recent decision to provide emergency food assistance to Nepal.

4. *Foreign Interference.* Mr. Schaffer commented that, following the Indian elections,<sup>6</sup> we will be better able to gauge our ability to discourage foreign interference.

*B. If the Referendum Succeeds.*

1. *State Visit to United States by the King; Visit to Washington by the Prime Minister.* Mr. Thornton said that "a visit" involving a one-hour official call on the President might be feasible during 1981, as opposed to a "state visit" per the discussion paper. Mr. Thornton also suggested that we attempt to include such an official call in the rubric of a larger visit to the United States—e.g., perhaps to receive an honorary degree, etc. Mrs. Coon said that the Department of State would attempt to arrange similar appropriate treatment for the Prime Minister. Mrs. Coon also endorsed the recommendation that senior USG officials be encouraged to visit Nepal if the referendum succeeds.

2. *AID, IMET, ICA.* Mrs. Coon commented that all of these budgetary recommendations are extremely modest in proportion to their positive impact on the situation.

a. *AID.* Mr. George said that it may be possible to increase the FY-81 budget to \$20.5 million. This proposal is presently pending before OMB.

b. *IMET.* Mrs. Coon observed that world-wide impact of the IMET program in proportion to its dollar cost is generally very favorable; and the impact is comparatively greater in smaller countries such as Nepal. Ambassador Heck described the structure of Nepal's small army, pointing out its important contribution to UNIFIL, and also the fact that the King's two closest aides are recent IMET graduates. Mr. Edgar<sup>7</sup> and Lt. Col. Sexton<sup>8</sup> pointed out that we favor a viable IMET program in Nepal but our declining budget makes it difficult to increase the program at this time. Mr. Thornton stated that an increase would

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<sup>5</sup> Bryant George (AID/ASIA/PNS).

<sup>6</sup> See Document 165.

<sup>7</sup> James S. V. Edgar (PM/ISP).

<sup>8</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Sexton (JCS/J-5).

be possible if the Department of State gave the Nepal program a higher priority.

c. *ICA*. Ms. Robins-Mowry said that although financial resources for Nepal's IV program remain unclear, she is optimistic that with fallout from other countries' programs it may be possible to increase the number of IV grants. She suggested that Embassy Kathmandu recommend more IV grantees and look into increased use of partial grants.

*C. If the Referendum Fails.*

1. *Dissociation*. Mr. George agreed with Ambassador Heck's observation that AID's budgetary process will probably prevent decrease in AID levels in the event the referendum fails. Mr. Thornton pointed out that even so, we can demonstrate our disappointment by signing implementing agreements at a slower rate.

2. *Diplomatic Representations*. Mr. Schaffer reiterated that our ability to act on this alternative will depend upon our relationship with India and other circumstances at the time.

3. *Continued Modest Presence*. Mr. Gall pointed out that the Peace Corps would probably want to stay in Nepal regardless of political developments, and would decrease its presence only if law and order deteriorated.

*Conclusion*. There was a general consensus supporting the proposed courses of action. Mr. DuSault (OMB) noted the tight budgeting situation in FY-81 and was not sure that OMB could support AID's \$20.5 million "proposed" figure. Moreover it is possible that Congress will cut the AID budget. If so, then the question of implementing this course of action would probably depend upon readiness within AID to reprogram money for Nepal programs.

## 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Kathmandu, April 29, 1980, 1100Z

2528. Subject: Nepal's National Referendum: Issues.

1. (Confidential-Entire text)

2. Begin summary: Apart from the referendum question itself, Nepal's forthcoming national referendum contains a number of underlying issues. In essence, the Panchayat side has identified itself with nationalism and stability, while the multiparty side has put itself forward as the champion of democracy. This telegram analyzes these two positions. End summary.

3. After a year of preparation and campaigning, Nepal will hold its national referendum on May 2. Technically, the sole issue being put to the voters is simple: Should Nepal adopt a "multiparty system" or continue with a modified version of the partyless Panchayat system that has been in place for the last two decades.

4. The apparent simplicity of the referendum issue is, however, deceptive. The term "multiparty system" has not been defined, although its major proponents have made it clear that they regard it as meaning a Western-style parliamentary system. Likewise, there has been no official announcement of the specific reforms implied by the term, "modified Panchayat system". It is generally thought, however, that such a system would be based on direct election of a Parliament through universal adult franchise, with a Prime Minister to be chosen by the Parliament and a Cabinet responsible to the Parliament.

5. If these widely-held assumptions are correct, then the sole difference between the two referendum options would be the existence or non-existence of legal political parties. This, however, is not the popular conception of the meaning of the referendum. To many people, it is seen simply as a vote for or against the 20-year record of the Panchayat system; to others, it is the King and the Panchayat system versus B.P. Koirala (leader of the Nepal Congress Party and the Prime Minister of Nepal's only previous popularly chosen government).

6. In the course of the campaign, advocates of both sides have taken full account of these popular understandings of the meaning of the referendum in their campaigns, and have introduced a range of issues that go far beyond the mere choice of political structure. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800215-0956. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, and New Delhi.



results of the referendum will be taken as indicating popular attitudes on these issues.

7. Issues raised by the Panchayat side. The Panchas have based their campaign essentially on nationalism, stability and royalism. They have argued that in a country as historically and ethnically diverse as Nepal, a system of parties implies communalism and disunity and invites foreign interference. They label various parties (not completely inaccurately) as being agents of one foreign power or another, and warn that in the event of the introduction of a party system, Nepal could become a battleground over which the rivalry of these foreign powers would be fought out. They assert that the Panchayat system is uniquely suited to the traditions and problems of Nepal, and that only this system can assure the essential leadership role of the King. They argue that the instability that would be characteristic of a party system would distract energy from economic development and would jeopardize equal enjoyment of civil rights. They characterize themselves as the system of law and order, the guarantor of Nepalese values, culture and tradition. They attempt to demonstrate that during its 20 years in office, the Panchayat system has, in fact, moved Nepal decisively forward on the path of economic development.

8. Multiparty issues. The multiparty side in the referendum consists of groups ("banned parties") somewhat more diverse in philosophy than the Panchayat side. It has not waged a unified campaign, and there have thus been differences in multiparty emphasis on various issues depending on who is doing the talking. Certain common threads, however, run through most multiparty statements. These tend to center about the alleged failures and sins of the Panchayat system. The Panchayat system is charged with corruption, repression of civil liberties, enrichment of the few while the great mass of the poor have become even more impoverished, failure to introduce democracy, destruction of the economy, and during the campaign itself, misuse of public funds to advance its cause in the referendum. It is argued that a partyless system is essentially incapable of functioning democratically, and thus cannot enlist the popular participation necessary to unleash the country's energies for development. The multiparty side has tended to ignore foreign policy issues, although it has made ritual obeisance to non-alignment. It has defended itself against charges of vulnerability to foreign influence by contending that a democratically enhanced national consciousness would be the best guarantor of Nepalese sovereignty and independence.

9. What it boils down to is that the Panchas have rested their case on stability and an appeal to nationalism, while the multiparty has stressed democracy and social justice. The outcome of the referendum,

if it is reasonably and fairly conducted, will thus provide an indication of the extent to which Nepal has emerged from its feudal past.

Heck

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**228. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Nepal.]

4. *Nepal*. In a recent national referendum on fundamental changes in the political system, Nepalese voters narrowly supported (by 55%) the conservative option, largely preserving the authority of the monarchy. The outcome will probably slow, but not stop, the process of political liberalization initiated by the King last year following serious student rioting. The key question is whether the opposition political leaders and their student supporters will accept the results.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 5/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Warren, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

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**229. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Kathmandu, December 31, 1980, 0425Z

7734. Subject: Ambassador's View of Nepal at Year End.

1. (C-Entire text)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810001-0382. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Beijing, Colombo, Dacca, New Delhi, and Calcutta.

2. U.S. national interest in Nepal is almost non-existent. We have no significant trade, no defense interest and our political interest is limited to our objectives of regional stability towards which stability in Nepal and Indo-Nepalese cooperation is conducive. My analysis of Nepali political and economic development is set in that context.

3. The monarchy is for now the key to Nepal's unity. The government is the only significant national institution but is neither strong nor effective. Hinduism has no institutionalized church or organization. Former political party organizations are not dynamic, have not been tested in parliamentary elections for 20 years and were not as politically potent (either in organization or leadership) as many expected in the recent referendum campaign. The Panchas are not now unified but probably have the best potential for national organization. At this time it is nevertheless still potential although it is assumed, as during the referendum that government machinery will be mobilized on its behalf. The judiciary is weak. The press is at best docile. In this situation the King dominates the scene politically.

4. Prior to the referendum relatively small scale student-led disturbances shook the structure, illustrating the fragility of the government and its vulnerability to small urban-based insurgents. That vulnerability remains. The King easily preempted the prior difficulties by the referendum announcement which absorbed political energies for the next year. After the Panchayat victory the multiparty elements have been in disarray and the Panchas split. The constitutional reform process has shown again how dependent all politicians are on the King, and that he intends to continue to manipulate the actors.

5. Nevertheless the reforms offer genuine possibility of participation for all political groups and cannot reasonably be refused. The alternative for the Congress group is confrontation which probably would be partially successful since Congress has strength concentrated in urban and Terai areas, and because the Communists with complementarily based support would join in. However, presumably the government has learned some lessons from its mishandling of the pre-referendum demonstrations, and my judgment is that the popularity, particularly of Congress, is at a low ebb. Consequently, I expect the government would weather the storm of multiparty confrontation. From the point of view of USG interest in stability and economic development, confrontation would be unfortunate. Consequently, I have emphasized the apparent reasonableness of the reforms and have [garble] encouraged wide participation.

6. The Communists also have something to gain by participation since they too risk isolation from the political process under a confrontation strategy and are widely thought not to be particularly popular now. Moscow and Peking have officially supported the King, although

there is some evidence and much talk that the Soviets are bent on destabilizing Nepal. Neither has any apparent reason at this time to send their parties into the streets. I must, however, confess that my instincts tell me that the Communists are stronger now, and certainly potentially stronger, than most local observers give them credit for. This may reflect in part an assumption that they will prove, as they have elsewhere, to be better organized than, for example, the democratically-oriented Congress group. They most certainly will be better financed. And, most important, they will be seen as the most radical alternative to a system and a government which, in the longer run, will fail to deliver to the people.

7. I, however, would not expect this to materialize this year. For the time being, the weakness and disarray of Congress and Communist groups will help the King string along potential opposition forces. The Panchas are not united either, but I expect will muster more discipline and thus fare better in the elections. I do expect a continuing series of low level disturbances less than mass riots and demonstrations a la Tehran or even India, and less than full-scale insurrection in the Terai—in this year. At the same time one must realize that even low level demonstrations can get out of hand, the student groups are probably not very effectively controlled by their masters (particularly if they smelled blood), and the government is not very competent or strong. An anarchic situation could develop, but [garble] not rate the chances very high.

8. Instead I expect the elections to be held and most opposition groups to participate. The contests will probably be among personalities for the most part (indeed, one of the most striking features which I have found in the Nepali political scene is the lack of coherent ideology or program among the Congress leaders, a factor which contributes to their weakness). As I said before I didn't expect it to be a smooth process but unless the government proves grossly inept, it should be able to contain student unrest and political demonstrations. And I believe the palace will continue to dominate politics, through jobs and other favors, drawing on its constitutional powers and traditional authority.

9. Over the longer term one cannot be as optimistic about either the stability of the government or the future of the monarchy. These will depend on the ability of government to deliver services and economic development, the economic situation generally and the ability of the King to maintain popularity in the face of palace association with governmental decisions (which will increase as communications and political awareness among the population improve) and an aloof style of governance. I wouldn't rate the probability high on any of these counts, but this is all long-term speculation that isn't particularly useful or even relevant for current policy formulation.

**Trimble**

# Pakistan

## 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, January 14, 1977, 0800Z

480. Subj: Bhutto in Power: A Fifth Anniversary Assessment.

1. The following is a summary of Embassy Airgram A-09.<sup>2</sup>

2. "Bhutto's fifth anniversary in power, played down in Pakistan, offers an opportunity to examine some major themes of these years. The most significant of them have been the PM's own mastery of the Pak political scene and the transformation of the country's institutions which has accompanied it and helped make it possible.

3. Bhutto's power is remarkable, and he is able to exert decisive influence over aspects and levels of Pak life which in other times remained at most indirectly affected by the man on top. His pervasive involvement reflects his intensely personal approach to government and politics. In the course of his five years of increasingly unquestioned power there has evolved a quasi-imperial Bhutto caught up in what some identify as a cult of personality. His style has doubtless disillusioned some of his earlier followers. Any assessment of a leader's popular standing in a country like Pakistan is difficult: Ours would be that Bhutto is less popular now than when he first came into office, and that this decline has generally been more pronounced in the cities than in the countryside.

4. At this time, the PM faces no significant challenge from any source either to his authority or the manner in which he exercises it. He is more politically astute than his rivals. The fact that there has been no one in their ranks able to project himself as a plausible national alternative to Bhutto has also been an important advantage for the PM.

5. Like other politicians, Bhutto uses carrots and sticks to hold power; the increased involvement of the GOP in different aspects of life have made more of these available. More far-reaching and novel have been Bhutto's efforts to transform Pakistan's institutions in ways which enhance his political power. Much of what Bhutto has tried to accomplish in remodeling these institutions has been consistent with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770014-0761. Confidential. Sent for information to Dacca, Kabul, New Delhi, and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> Airgram A-09 from Islamabad, January 13, provided an in-depth examination of Bhutto's political power. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770010-0303)

his vision of a more socially and economically just Pakistan. The power of possible competitors in the civil service, the religious leadership, and other elites have been curtailed by these reforms.

6. For all his personal flamboyance and the far-reaching changes he is effecting in Pak life, Bhutto is a cautious politician. He has a good sense of timing and sound political judgment. His foreign policy role has significantly added to the sense of indispensability which has been one of his trump cards. He has created new institutions and new elites, but they serve to bolster the PM's power and none has been allowed to become a rival to him. Yet while Bhutto has changed Pakistan's institution in ways which reduce the power of potential rivals, the structure he has built is itself a fragile one which could ultimately prove a source of weakness.

7. The Bhutto system is so very dependent on the PM's powerful figure at the center, and so reflects his personal style, that it is unlikely to survive his departure from the political scene in its present form. The changes he has effected—particularly the politicization and “awami-ization” (popularization) of important segments of Pakistan life—have fundamentally transformed the political equation of the country. What follows him is likely to be different, but it will be profoundly affected by what he has accomplished.”

**Byroade**

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**231. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 14, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My predecessor has brought me fully up to date on our past consultations regarding non-proliferation issues, in the context of the close and friendly bilateral relationship our two Governments have enjoyed over several decades. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm my interest in continuing this relationship which has been of benefit to both countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770030-2355. Confidential. Drafted on February 3 by Lande and Jan Kalicki in S/P; approved by Atherton. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the letter, an unknown hand wrote: “Orig given to Pak. Amb. by Mr Christopher Feb 14.”

As you know, President Carter is deeply concerned about the implications of sensitive technology transfers, including reprocessing, for the non-proliferation objectives which are of fundamental importance on a worldwide basis. At the same time, we recognize the importance of the legitimate needs of others being fulfilled as they forego capabilities for which we can see no valid basis.

It is in this general context that I would like to suggest that we resume confidential discussions of alternatives to your Government's reprocessing plans. In light of your upcoming elections,<sup>2</sup> I propose we consider opening consultations in mid- or late March unless you believe it would be useful to open these earlier. Pending these talks, I would hope that your Government would take no further steps to carry out the reprocessing project. For our part, we will do all we can to avoid making this a public issue between our two countries.

I hope that you share my feeling about the importance of resolving this issue to the satisfaction of both countries. I look forward to receiving your ideas as to the next steps in this dialogue.

Sincerely,

**Cyrus Vance**

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 227 from Islamabad, January 8, the Embassy reported that during a January 8 address to the Pakistan National Assembly, Bhutto announced that general elections for the National Assembly would be held on March 7 and elections for provincial assemblies on March 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770008–0153)

## 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, February 17, 1977, 1144Z

1734. For the Secretary from Byroade. Subject: Pakistan Nuclear Issues.

1. I was delighted to receive the text of your letter to Bhutto contained in State 033636.<sup>2</sup> It was timely and should serve as an effective transition vehicle for you to start to deal with this delicate and important matter in the future.

2. I have delayed giving you a rundown on the Pakistani end of this problem, despite its importance, in view of your own heavy transition load and also my hope that any further attempt to handle this matter here in Pakistan could wait until after Bhutto's election process is over. Your letter clearly recognizes this need for delay, and I am sure that this is wise. What follows in summary form is my view of the highlights as seen from Pakistan as to just how we got where we are on this problem. It also offers some thoughts for the future. It will not, I suspect, strictly duplicate the transition papers you must have received on this problem. To that extent I hope it will be helpful in rounding out the picture.

### I. The Background

3. I do not know just what decisions Bhutto made after India exploded its nuclear device in 1974. I suspect, however, that he did just what any of us might have done had he been the political leader of Pakistan, i.e., call in his experts and ask them to set in motion steps that would allow him the eventual option to duplicate the Indian achievement. Such an approach would not mean that at that time he necessarily made the decision either to actually explode a nuclear device or follow through with an attempt to make nuclear weapons, as these decisions would not have to be made for some years. At that time rather he was keeping his nuclear option open.

4. There is no evidence to indicate, and indeed some to the contrary, that Bhutto considered as he moved forward that he was risking a major and serious confrontation with the United States. Kissinger had talked to him briefly about nuclear matters during his visit to the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2522. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 33636 to Islamabad, February 15, transmitted Vance's February 14 letter to Bhutto. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2520, N770001-0538) See Document 231.



in early 1975<sup>3</sup> but it's instructive to recall that as late as February 1976, when the two met briefly in New York, it was Bhutto himself who brought up the matter not Kissinger.<sup>4</sup> Bhutto had of course watched carefully our reaction to the Indian blast. We had not only not done anything (I am not implying that there was much we could do) but we had not even taken a public position except in reply to questions. The Kissinger visit to New Delhi a few months later,<sup>5</sup> when he acknowledged India's predominant position in the subcontinent, almost certainly confirmed Bhutto's impression that the U.S. not only had no problem with India's nuclear capability, but also possibly had come to have greater respect for India as a result of it.

5. In any event, the Pakistanis continued their lengthy negotiations with the French for the acquisition of the reprocessing plant. When these were completed in March 1976 the facility was publicly billed by the GOP as a key element in its effort to develop its nuclear energy program, and this has been the Pak public stance ever since. There is no doubt, however, that Bhutto—aware, as he told me, of the importance of the need to restore public confidence in the wake of the Indian explosion—had got out the word that the purchase from the French was connected much more with national security and national prestige than with energy generation. It was accepted as such in Pakistan and, as Bhutto had correctly foreseen, proved a popular move.

6. We knew here in the Embassy only vaguely that these long-drawn out negotiations were going on between the Paks and the French. I now know as a result of my latest consultations that Washington had more specific information than we here due to USG participation in the London Suppliers Group efforts to draw up guidelines. As I understand it now, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as to the details of the safeguards that would be used in the Pakistani case. The truth seems to be that our own position was becoming progressively more hard (and I think rightly so) on this question while the Pak/French negotiations were in process, and this to the point of having us say when the

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 189.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 49421 to Rabat, March 1, 1976, reported on Kissinger's February 26, 1976, meeting with Bhutto in New York. Near the end of the conversation, which centered on the subject of détente, "Bhutto suggested that an embryonic nuclear capability could lead India to agree to a nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean, a concept New Delhi now opposes. The Secretary repeated U.S. concern over national reprocessing capabilities and pointed to a regional multinational plant as an alternative but Bhutto provided no evidence at all that Pakistan would consider foregoing the national option." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840095–1651)

<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 180.

agreement was signed that the safeguards we ourselves have been associated with could not guarantee misuse of the facility.

7. During this period we here could sense a rapidly growing congressional, and public, concern about nuclear proliferation which eventually was expressed in the Symington Amendment.<sup>6</sup> Feeling this coming, but without instructions, I nevertheless often talked informally to Bhutto on this subject, giving him my increasingly strong personal conviction that he was headed for real trouble on this issue, while pressing him to continue to think of alternatives to the route he was following. Although these informal conversations, along with Pak awareness of our (successful) efforts to turn off the Korean-French deal and of our equivocal position in the IAEA vote on the Pak-French safeguards, made it clear to Bhutto that we would not be happy with the reprocessing deal, he had no reason to expect as sharp a U.S. reaction as he got in a March 19, 1976 letter from President Ford in which the President took exception to the proposed agreement.<sup>7</sup> His distress with it was compounded by its arriving nearly coincidentally with the signing of the agreement with the French.<sup>8</sup> He complained to me, wondering why we could not have gotten in touch with him more quickly on such an important matter and his embarrassment over the position he was then in as regards the timing of the letter. I think this point was well taken, for we were at that time imposing new and tougher standards retroactively, and taking a more clear cut stand with the Paks than we had while their negotiations were proceeding.

8. After Bhutto's March 30 reply to Ford<sup>9</sup> there was no further communication between our two sides on the issue until Kissinger's visit to Lahore in August,<sup>10</sup> except for my own frequent but uninstructed assertions to him that this was a problem that would not go away and for which alternatives had to be found. The visit undoubtedly served to impress upon Bhutto more forcefully the gravity of the issue he faced. This positive accomplishment was however offset by the fact that it generated extensive worldwide press comment which undoubtedly increased the political hazards, both here and in France, as it raised the question publicly as to whether France or Pakistan would bow to U.S. pressure. This publicity also for the first time clearly linked

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 6.

<sup>7</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 225.

<sup>8</sup> The French agreed in late 1975 to design a nuclear reprocessing plant. The French delivered the plans to Pakistan on March 18, 1976.

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

<sup>10</sup> Kissinger visited Lahore August 8–9, 1976.

the reprocessing and the A-7<sup>11</sup> issues which was indeed unfortunate even though it of course was a fact in the sense that we could not possibly move ahead with the A-7's until the reprocessing issue had been satisfactorily resolved. The passage of the Symington Amendment in late June of course made the problem that much more difficult.

9. Soon after Kissinger's departure, Bhutto made a completely new proposal to me obviously based upon his intense concern over the linkage of the A-7 and reprocessing issues, and his further reflection of the difficulties he was headed into with us in the nuclear field. He said we had to find some way to delink the aircraft and nuclear issues, stressing that he just could not afford politically to be charged with giving away the elements of Pakistan's long term security for a few airplanes which would in a relatively short period of time wear out or become obsolete. He said if the two issues could be delinked, he would be prepared to make a formal side agreement, directly with us, adding almost any conceivable additional safeguard that we could think of to make certain that the plant was never misused. What he was saying in effect was that he could live with a "white elephant" (my words) but could not live with the political liability of "cancellation" of the French contract.

10. Our distaste for this proposal, for reasons which I better understand in view of my recent consultations was such that it was never given serious consideration. I fear that that same distaste may have served to obscure what I think was its real importance. Bhutto was surprised at the rigidity of the safeguards imposed by the French, and I believe he thinks the plant is pretty well bound up even now as regards its misuse. It would just never occur to him (nor indeed did it to me until I came to Washington and got educated) that the United States was not clever enough to find and apply additional safeguards which would be fool proof. My own conclusion, based on this and other factors, is that by offering to completely tie up the reprocessing plant, Bhutto in his own mind was telling us that he would give up his nuclear option in order to avoid extreme confrontation with the United States.

11. When I returned here from the States just before Christmas I had in hand excellent guidance to continue my talks with Bhutto. As I reported, my own conclusion from these talks was that Bhutto was

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<sup>11</sup> In February 1975, the United States lifted its 10-year-long arms embargo against Pakistan. (Bernard Gwertzman, "India Assails U.S. on Its Decision to Lift Pakistan Arms Embargo," *New York Times*, February 25, 1975, p. 3). The Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs proposed purchasing U.S.-built A-7 fighter aircraft during a September 30, 1975, meeting with Kissinger. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 210.

ready to slide out of his nuclear arrangements providing we are prepared to assist him in making it as quiet and painless as possible under the circumstances and that we wait until after his election.

12. Yet I must add a word of caution about this judgment of mine. The Bhutto I have been dealing with up to now has had good reason to be extremely confident of his own political position. He has felt that he has done a good job in his first term and that he would be returned, particularly with his own Herculean electoral efforts, with a convincing mandate. He knows that whenever he gives on the nuclear issue it will hurt him domestically as he will be accused, no matter how he does it, of bowing to American pressure on this matter of extreme importance. This charge has particular force in Pakistan because of recollections here of earlier instances when the U.S. persuaded the Paks to take unpalatable decisions (e.g. in 1962); then in their view welched on implied commitments. I believe that Bhutto had in fact already made the decision that he could live with this setback after his next mandate. We are now faced, however, with the surprise that the opposition has been able to band together more effectively than anyone, including Bhutto, thought possible. While we still think he will win, we are no longer certain his mandate will be anything like a landslide. Bhutto, being the type of subcontinental politician that instinctively considers a 90 percent mandate to be about right, may come through the elections being far more cautious about taking political risks, and this of course could greatly increase our difficulty on this end.

## II. Where Do We Go From Here

13. Tactics will be important as you start to grapple with this problem. Your letter to Bhutto seems to give full recognition of the desirability to proceed as quietly as possible and with a minimum of publicity at least in its initial stages. This would seem to indicate that the future talks could best be initiated through normal diplomatic channels.

14. We seem to be in a position where an indefinite postponement or cancellation of the deal would involve either the French or the Pakistanis backing down on this issue—or that they do so jointly. We here see great merits in the latter as probably the easiest for both the French and Pakistanis, and one that would tend to preserve our position as much as possible by leaving us out of any publicized decision. This recommendation is of course based upon incomplete information as I do not know how events since January 20, and particularly the Vice President's talks in Paris,<sup>12</sup> may have changed the situation.

15. In your letter to Bhutto, you spoke of our recognition of the importance of the legitimate needs of others being fulfilled as they

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<sup>12</sup> Vice President Mondale visited Paris January 28–29.

forego capabilities for which we can see no valid basis. In responding to the carefully-conceived ambiguity of this phrase, Bhutto will be thinking in terms of possible U.S. package involving conventional weapons, including the A-7, assistance in the energy field, and stepped up economic aid. A comment may be in order about the proposed “package”, as it occurs to me that some may be under the wrong impression on this score.

16. I do not believe that Bhutto has in mind any package from us that would be announced simultaneously with a solution to the nuclear problem. His serious objection to linking the A-7 and reprocessing issues are an indication of that fact. If delinkage is to occur, I suppose from Bhutto’s point of view it would be ideal for our package to be announced first, but think he would accept the fact that we could not agree with this. I think that for planning purposes we could therefore assume that we would only have to agree privately in our confidential nuclear discussions about the steps we would be prepared to take afterwards, to be implemented and announced on a piecemeal basis. Publicly, when Bhutto announces he is at least indefinitely delaying the plant, he should be able to announce that alternative energy arrangements are being made. This would be the only public linkage, and even here any role of ours should it be announced at all would be as supportive of French assistance in this area.

17. The A-7 deal is the most controversial element in the package, and I am sure it will be a difficult one for you. I recognize that the administration is more concerned with the implications of arms sales than its predecessor, and I’m aware that there could be a charge by the uninformed of nuclear “blackmail.” This allegation ignores the chronology of the A-7/reprocessing plant connection and the fact that the linkage between the two issues was made not by the Paks but by us. The question of a new generation aircraft for Pakistan, their greatest military need, came to us long before the nuclear issue became a problem. It would have been the first item on Pakistan’s shopping list after the embargo was lifted in early 1975 except that President Ford cautioned Bhutto during his State visit at the time (1975) that our supply program could not start out with this item.<sup>13</sup> If they waited until mid-1976 to formally ask us to sell the aircraft, it was certainly not because they saw an opening provided by our non-proliferation effort, but rather because they believed that over time our military supply policy had evolved to the point where such a request had become acceptable.

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<sup>13</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 188.

18. The Pak case for this type aircraft is militarily legitimate and can indeed stand close scrutiny. You should also know that since late 1975 the Paks have been under the impression that their request for the A-7 would in fact be approved, and that the only question remaining was one of timing. (A brief eyes only letter from me to you follows.)<sup>14</sup> Even if the reprocessing deal can be forestalled without the A-7 as a key element in a U.S. package designed to head it off, it seems to me, in view of all the history of this case, that we can hardly be the instrument that forces Pakistan out of its nuclear option and then refuse to help them on conventional defense requirements as long as they remain modest and well below anything that would upset India's dominant military position in the subcontinent.

19. I would hope that we would in addition to moving ahead with tangible, material elements in a proposed package, also be prepared to consider more sympathetically than we have in the past Pakistan's efforts to win support for broader international assurances against what to the GOP is the very real challenge of a nuclear India. I have in mind particularly Pakistan's moves at the UN to work out guarantees for the security of non-nuclear states and to have South Asia declared a nuclear weapons free zone.<sup>15</sup> These efforts it seems to me are a further reflection of the type of legitimate needs Pakistan may feel it should have as it foregoes its nuclear option. We have not been forthcoming on GOP efforts on this score in the past, and I would urge that we seek to look at them more sympathetically in the context of your letter.

20. I continue to believe that we will get through this one, and that in one manner or another the reprocessing plant will not proceed. If this proves to be wrong we would be in the most serious kind of dilemma. The most extreme possibility would include failure on the diplomatic front, with Pakistan getting its reprocessing plant and our bilateral relations wrecked with the triggering of the Symington Amendment, and all in all, probably a significant realignment of Pakistan's foreign policy. I hope that the background and thoughts I've outlined above can in some small measure be helpful in heading off such a disastrous outcome.

**Byroade**

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<sup>14</sup> Not found.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 4, Document 82.

**233. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #2

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Proliferation—France and Pakistan.* Bilateral talks were held with the French on Friday and Saturday of last week.<sup>2</sup> They were extremely reluctant to discuss the Pakistani issue in any of the formal sessions. For political reasons, they are deeply afraid that the US might even *hint* publicly that they are considering any abrogation of their contract. They continue to make clear, however, that if we can get any movement out of the Pakistanis, they will welcome it. One major problem is that they have already exported nearly 80% of the blueprints. State is beginning to explore ways to approach the Pakistanis after their elections which will be held on March 10.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 8–12/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 42053 to Paris, February 25, the Embassy reported that as a result of U.S.-French talks on nuclear non-proliferation policy, held in Washington February 19–20, the French promised to “defer sensitive transfer now pending to Pakistan for at least three more weeks to give us time to persuade GOP to accept joint agreement on indefinite deferral.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2027, N770001–0657)

## 234. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, February 28, 1977, 1120Z

2028. For the Secretary from Byroade. Subject: Nuclear Reprocessing. Ref: Islamabad 1734.<sup>2</sup>

1. Our regular Embassy reporting is portraying the fact that Bhutto and his PPP party appear to be faltering to the extent that the election outcome here, with a week still to go, is increasingly in doubt. This message is to highlight that fact for your personal attention and make further comment as to how this situation may affect our nuclear problem with Pakistan.

2. In paragraph 12 of my round-up message referenced above, I referred to the fact that the Bhutto I have been dealing with up to now has been confident of his own political position, but that he could come out of this election with a mandate sufficiently reduced as to cause increased caution on his part in any quick and public solution to our nuclear dilemma. This is to state that the situation looks worse as of today. It is now fairly obvious that if Bhutto manages to stay in power it will be with only a slight majority. We must in fact begin to face up to the fact that he might lose out as Prime Minister.

3. If he wins by a slight majority we could predictably go into a period of ineffectual government with the primary emphasis being on political infighting to increase by the trade-off process Bhutto's parliamentary majority. If the opposition should win, chaos in government would probably be even more apparent as there is little cohesion among the opposition and they are literally without plans for picking up the actual reins of power or sound substantive programs for running the country.

4. Of particular concern in this context is the very last paragraph of State 042053<sup>3</sup> which indicates that the French have agreed to hold up sensitive transfers for at least three more weeks, which would seem to expire about one week after the national election here on March 7. Whether there can be an effective government in power here that could act this quickly is increasingly more in doubt. It would seem timely therefore to begin thinking now about the possibility of asking the French to give us more time. There may be a chance, of course, that

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2477, N770001-0707. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 232.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 233.



commercial prudence itself would cause the French to want to delay in any event if a radical change should occur here which would cast prior commitments in doubt.

5. On a more general subject, violence here is increasing, and we cannot predict at this point how serious this could become in the week ahead. We are reporting this separately.<sup>4</sup>

**Byroade**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2041 from Islamabad, February 28, the Embassy reported: "Law and order situation in Pakistan has taken turn for the worse during last four days. During past week-end, a number of deaths occurred during altercations involving police, PPP and PNA workers. New wave of violence began February 25, in Hyderabad, Sind, when police, according to official handout, 'engaged in a gun fight with persons illegally carrying arms'. GOP claims three killed with numerous persons injured." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068–0930)

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### **235. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 3, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was deeply pleased by your New Year's greeting, and by your kind wishes for my Presidency.<sup>2</sup> I also welcome your sharing your thoughts with me, both about Pakistan and its relations with the United States, and about other matters important to both our countries.

Your perspective on the course of relations between our two countries was of great interest to me. The friendship between Pakistan and the United States has been deep and enduring. As I said often before I took office, I will work to strengthen our relations with nations which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 11/76–5/77. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner of the letter, an unknown hand wrote: "Handed to Amb Yaqub Khan 4:10 pm 3/4 by David Aaron."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 32769 to Islamabad, February 13, transmitted the text of Bhutto's congratulatory message to Carter after his inauguration as President of the United States. In the message, Bhutto expressed his hope for a continuation of close U.S.-Pakistani relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0597)

have traditionally been our friends and allies. Whatever difficulties and misunderstandings there may have been in the past, I want to work directly with you to strengthen the close ties between the United States and Pakistan.

The United States has a deep interest in the future of South Asia. We hope that each nation there can live in peace with its neighbors, secure in its own integrity, and able to provide for the well-being of its people. I share the admiration of the American people for what Pakistan, under your leadership, has achieved in recent years, both in seeking improved relations with your neighbors in South Asia, and in providing new hope in the lives of your people. We also share your concern that no power should obtain a position of dominance in the region.

I would welcome hearing from you further about the security problems of Pakistan, and about your own efforts to improve relations with other South Asian countries. Your perspective will be invaluable as we decide on our own course of action.

There is one subject on which I would like to have a continuing confidential dialogue with you in order to take advantage of your extensive personal experience: that is the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

I feel strongly that the United States and China have important parallel concerns; our common interest in the security of Pakistan is an important example. I also believe that there is an increasing agenda of global problems of interdependence that can only be solved with the active cooperation of the People's Republic.

I have already had a positive meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen.<sup>3</sup> I stressed my Administration's commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué,<sup>4</sup> and my desire to normalize relations with Peking. I believe we can complete the process of normalization in a way that will enable both countries to remain true to their national principles.

I would welcome your own assessment of developments in China, and recommendations of the best way for the United States to proceed. I will treat these in strict confidence.

I am also deeply concerned to develop a more viable basis for relations with the Soviet Union. In future SALT talks, we will make a number of new proposals. We will also seek meaningful reductions of

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<sup>3</sup> On February 8, Carter met with Huang Chen, the Chief of the People's Republic of China's Liaison Office in the United States. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIII, China, Document 5.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 11, Document 90.

the levels of nuclear arms, in order to bring the arms race to a halt and demonstrate our commitment to non-nuclear states to reduce the importance of these weapons in international relations. We will also try to make progress with the Russians in other areas of arms control.

At the same time, I have already made it clear to the Soviet leaders the importance we attach to basic human rights; not just in the Soviet Union, but also in other nations, beginning with the United States.

I am also personally concerned about the possible spread of nuclear weapons. This question clearly affects Pakistan. In creating a strategy for non-proliferation—in close cooperation with other nations—I want to have Pakistan's interests clearly in mind, and would welcome hearing from you on this subject.

My Administration is committed to promoting peace. It is equally committed to reaching out to nations in the developing world, particularly those facing the more critical needs in seeking to make possible new lives for their people. We will work closely with both industrialized and developing nations—including Pakistan—so that all will be able to play a full part in the global economy, and to gather increasing benefits from it. My Administration will place first priority in its efforts to assist developing countries on the needs of those nations and peoples most seriously affected by economic problems, including the precipitous rise in the price of energy.

I am looking forward to the next ministerial meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. At that time, the United States will want to be responsive to developing country needs, and will negotiate seriously on problems of debt and commodity earnings. At the same time, we have critical concerns about the world supply and price of energy, on which we need the cooperation of both oil-producing and other developing countries. Your thoughts on these issues will be of help to me.

I believe that at heart, the basic task facing our two countries, together, is about people—about our shared desire to enable each individual, each family, to develop to the full range of human possibility. I know that both our nations are committed to making real that age-old dream of mankind.

I look forward to hearing from you again.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

## 236. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 10, 1977, 1225Z

2341. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Pakistan Politics.

Summary: The fundamental political fact of Pakistani life in the wake of the election is that PM Bhutto retains his dominant position.<sup>2</sup> Although the campaign evidenced deep-seated and widespread dissatisfaction with the Bhutto government and the PPP, and disclosed more clearly than before the erosion of the PM's own personal popularity, the election outcome demonstrated that by whatever means Bhutto was able to turn back the challenge of an unexpectedly united opposition and maintain his supremacy. Within the PPP itself, his partymen are if possible even more dependent on him for their political standing than they were before the election.

The PNA's decision not to contest the provincial elections or take the 37–38 seats it won in the National Assembly will mark the end of Pakistan's fragile multiparty legislative system, assuming all MNAs-elect accept the Alliance directive. Pakistan party politics will consist entirely of extra-legislative agitation. The form that this will take is still to be charted by the opposition. Arguments over whether the conduct of the polling justified the decision, and whether it was tactically sound, are likely to continue. Our own tentative conclusion is that substantial tampering probably did take place on March 7, and that while it did not determine the ultimate outcome of the election, which we believe the PPP would have won anyway, it did influence the margin of the Bhutto victory. The verdict of the Pak public [garble—is not] yet [garble—in but] we suspect that most Paks are likely to draw some conclusion. Whatever tactics the opposition now adopts in carrying out its new agitational approach, and however widely held the view that it was cheated on March 7, we have little doubt that the government will be able to contain its challenge in the near term. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Byroade**

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770082–1099. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Dacca, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Karachi, Lahore, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2300 from Islamabad, March 9, the Embassy reported that in Pakistan's March 7 general election, the "latest unofficial returns indicate that with 196 of 200 seats declared, PPP has won 154, PNA 33, and QML one." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770080–1308)

### 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 14, 1977, 1130Z

2438. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Post-Election Maneuvering—Bhutto Takes the Initiative. Ref: Islamabad 2395.<sup>2</sup>

Summary: Bhutto is faced with growing popular perception he engaged in massive tampering to ensure March 7 election victory. We continue to receive reports supporting this view. In attempt to counter the contention his mandate is seriously flawed, the PM has embarked on offensive highlighted by address to nation March 12. In conciliatory speech he implicitly held out hope of holding provincial assembly elections again and, through appeals to Election Commission, allowing the PNA to increase its representation in the National Assembly. He has also sent letter to PNA leader Mufti Mahmud offering “unconditional” talks.

The PNA has called for anti-government processions, centered in five major cities. The opposition leadership claims they will be small, completely non-violent and restrained. Most observers believe the PNA will turn down the PM’s offer to hold talks and will continue with their cautious and deliberate strategy of testing the waters and determining the extent of popular dissatisfaction with Bhutto. End summary.

1. The Prime Minister is faced with a growing popular perception that the government engaged in massive tampering to ensure a sweeping PPP victory in March 7 National Assembly elections. ConGens Lahore and Karachi report increasing evidence that the GOP used various tactics to ensure an overwhelming PPP victory, especially in the Punjab. We continue to receive reports from numerous sources of ballot box stuffing, misreporting of tallies and voter intimidation in many districts. ConGen Lahore reports that even some PPP officials have expressed distaste with the election outcome [garble] rigging that occurred. Lahore adds that for some observers the question is no longer

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086–1245. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and Tehran. Sent for information to CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2395 from Islamabad, March 12, the Embassy reported: “At Lahore press conference midday March 12, PNA leadership reportedly announced decision to begin demonstrations throughout Pakistan beginning Monday, March 14. Demonstrations would continue until PNA demands are met, or until Alliance decides to call them off. PNA demands announced at press conference are (1) resignation of PM Bhutto, (2) appointment of new Election Commission, (3) establishment by Pakistan President of interim government in consultation with PNA, (4) holding of fresh elections by interim government with participation of army.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086–0106)

who really won the election but rather how to react to the heavy-handed manipulation by the ruling party. A senior civil servant has told us he and his colleagues have seen considerable proof of massive rigging and are now concerned about possible government actions against those civil servants who did not actively support the PPP effort.

2. In obvious attempt to counter the increasingly held view that his new mandate is seriously flawed, the PM made a nation-wide television and radio address evening March 12. In a generally conciliatory, mild, controlled and politically astute speech, the PM noted he was always ready for a dialogue with the opposition. He went on to say that except for National Assembly elections, which were a settled matter, he was ready to discuss "other things" and find remedies. Speech contained usual warning that opposition should not engage in violence since "if you want to use force and unconstitutional means, it would be a wrong political decision," and would be crushed by the government. After recounting in detail examples of his allegiance to democracy as shown in his long political career, the PM suggested that election malpractices would be remedied through the normal constitutional process and through appeals to the Election Commission. During weekend press conference, the chief Election Commissioner, in conciliatory gesture, noted he had suggested to PM—who seemed receptive to proposal—that Election Commission be allowed to review election cases awhile the National Assembly is in session. Normally, any proceeding involving a National Assembly member would have to be postponed until Assembly is adjourned.

3. PM continued his offensive with March 13 letter to Mufti Mahmud which offered "unconditional" talks with opposition. He said he would like to have an "open and sincere" dialogue with the opposition and that he is willing to discuss "any grievances that they may have." Government at same time exhibited iron fist in velvet glove by having several hundred lower level PNA workers picked up and detained throughout the country. We believe they will be held for several days both to disrupt PNA plans and to give a warning to PNA workers.

4. Popular consensus is that Bhutto has implicitly, both in speech and letter to Mufti, made two specific offers to PNA. If they are willing to talk directly with him, he would be willing to call for new provincial assembly elections, and would also be willing to allow more PNA members to sit in the National Assembly. First conclusion is based on PM's offer to discuss any issues, except for results of National Assembly elections, and his pointed omission of provincial assembly elections while repeatedly noting that the NA polls could not be held again. Second conclusion is based on PM's suggestion that PNA appeal to Election Commission—"for as many as thirty, forty seats"—and EC will decide if their appeals have standing.

5. We believe the initial public reaction to Bhutto's speech and letter is generally positive. The PM has projected image of a man of reason willing to discuss all issues with his opponents. The two leading vernacular papers—*Nawa-i-waqt* which was sympathetic to the opposition during the campaign and *Jang* which covered the campaign objectively and in detail—have editorially encouraged the PNA to accept the PM's offer to hold discussions.

6. The PNA has begun to respond to the Prime Minister's offensive. The opposition, in a meeting this past weekend in Lahore, issued four demands noted in reftel. The PNA is being very cautious, however, and has not called for a mass movement to overthrow the government. According to *Nawa-i-waqt*, the PNA is centering its process on activities in only five cities, Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Asghar Khan has called on his followers to "exercise restraint" and has told the press that "we are not courting arrest. We are exercising our rights in a spirit devoid of violence." The opposition has also repeatedly decided it will limit the numbers of people in its processions; Asghar Khan publicly contended only himself and five other PNA leaders will be in the Lahore procession and added the PNA will attempt to avoid having others participate. Karachi procession leader NDP chief Sherbaz Mazari has indicated, however, the march in Karachi would be much larger. The PNA will begin the marches after afternoon prayers on the 14th. Both Mufti Mahmud and Begum Wali Khan have asked for equal time on radio and television to respond to the Prime Minister's speech. Pakistan press, including government controlled papers, continue to give surprisingly complete and accurate coverage to opposition statements and activities and have not yet returned to pre-campaign practice of nearly total blackout of opposition news.

7. Most observers believe the PNA will turn down the PM's offer to hold talks. Asghar Khan has said that the opposition is not interested in getting four or five more NA seats or forming a provincial ministry—it has taken an irrevocable stand. The opposition feels it has been badly burned when it had discussions with Bhutto in the past and was either out-manuevered by the wily Prime Minister or Bhutto reneged on his promises to them. The Prime Minister is once again, however, showing his political acumen and through his speech and letter has, for the moment, put the opposition on the defensive. The PNA has chosen a cautious, deliberate strategy as a way of testing the waters, gauging the extent of dissatisfaction with the PM, and determining the degree to which the public is willing to participate. Building on its ability to disrupt Karachi, and dissatisfaction and unrest in the frontier (we continue to hear reports of law and order difficulties in certain areas of the frontier province) the PNA probably hopes to start with small

violations of Section 144<sup>3</sup> and eventually build—if enough public support is garnered—to massive public anti-government demonstrations. This strategy will not lead to Bhutto's downfall in the next several days; several weeks must pass before a final judgment on its efficacy can be made. If the Prime Minister is able to weather the next few months, however, and his political abilities to do so should not be underestimated, his position for the mid-term seems fairly secure.

**Byroade**

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<sup>3</sup> Section 144 of Pakistan's Code of Criminal Procedure banned the gathering of four or more people for rallies or protests.

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**238. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 23, 1977, 0821Z

2786. Ref: Nuclear Issues. Ref: Islamabad 2682.<sup>2</sup>

1. Since reporting my talk on March 18 with Prime Minister Bhutto (reftel), developments here lead me to believe that the opportunities for meaningful dialogue with Bhutto have all but vanished in the near term. I report this with the greatest reluctance as I had, up to now, retained the strong personal hope that I could see this issue on its way to solution prior to my departure from the post.<sup>3</sup> Also, after further

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770099-0298. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2682 from Islamabad, March 19, the Embassy reported on Byroade's March 18 discussion with Bhutto, which Byroade labeled as "interesting for its impressionistic, but substantively inconclusive." The discussion dealt with Bhutto's increasingly difficult domestic position following the recent general election and the issue of Pakistan's plans to develop nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities with technical help from France. Regarding the former issue, Byroade commented that he was "inclined to believe that Bhutto did in fact instruct his underlings to assure his victory, but was indeed angered by the distorted result their zeal produced." The latter issue focused on whether the pending shipment of nuclear reprocessing equipment and technology from France could be delayed in order to permit U.S.-Pakistani discussions on safeguards. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770094-0852)

<sup>3</sup> During their March 18 discussion, Byroade informed Bhutto that he would leave post on April 13. See footnote 2 above.



reflecting on my talk with Bhutto, I now believe he was conveying to me a position considerably harder than he had taken when we suspended our dialogue last January.<sup>4</sup>

2. The day following my discussion with Bhutto, Karachi erupted in a degree of violence that has required the army to restore order and the imposition of a stringent curfew to prevent further violence. The opposition's demonstrated ability to close down Pakistan's largest city and only port presents Bhutto with domestic problems of the greatest magnitude. His response has been to release leaders of the opposition arrested only days before and to renew his offer of dialogue. The opposition, however, viewing this as a sign of weakness on the PM's part, has so far rejected Bhutto's offer and the confrontation continues with the possibilities for ugly consequences increasing daily.

3. Although I recognized that the context of our talks was certainly altered by the growing domestic crisis, I nevertheless went ahead with my plans to review the nuclear issue with Aziz Ahmed whom I met on March 21. He had already reviewed the notes of my talk with Bhutto. It was apparent that he fully understood my points on the difficulties associated with impending transfers of reprocessing equipment or technology. However he argued forcefully that in the GOP's view it could not suspend these shipments pending resumption of our dialogue because to do so would imply that Pakistan had abandoned its determination to go ahead with the reprocessing plant, and knowledge that it had done so would inevitably become public. Aziz Ahmed repeated Bhutto's arguments for a delay in further consideration of this problem until a new government is formed, and an orderly Cabinet level review of Elan's position can be undertaken. I read Bhutto's and Aziz Ahmed's views on this point to mean that the GOP cannot consider taking any steps on the reprocessing issue while the opposition here is mounting a sustained effort to topple Bhutto from power.

4. Agha Shahi remains out of town but may return in a few days. If so, I will go over the ground again with him, but do not anticipate that his position would be any different from Bhutto's or Aziz Ahmed's.

5. After reflecting further on my March 18 talk with Bhutto, I think I can conclude that his position on the issue has hardened. As Bhutto sees the problem, there are three possible negotiating phases involving varying outcomes: (1) Pakistan goes ahead with the reprocessing plant stringently safeguarded as agreed with the French and the IAEA; (2) Pakistan negotiates with the USG additional safeguards and condi-

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 226 from Islamabad, January 8, summarized Byroade's "broad and general" discussion with Bhutto about the nuclear reprocessing issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2462)

tions that would assure us there can be no diversion of plutonium for an explosives program; and (3) Pakistan and the USG negotiate an agreement under which Pakistan foregoes the reprocessing plant and the US agrees to assist Pakistan with some of its security, energy and economic requirements. In January, in the waning days of the last administration, I believed that Bhutto had advanced to a willingness to consider the third phase and that was where we would resume discussions after his election. It is now apparent to me that Bhutto intends to start *de novo* with an effort to convince the new administration that the agreement with the French already provides sufficient safeguards to meet the President's non-proliferation goals, or, failing in that, to persuade us to negotiate additional bilateral safeguards that satisfy these goals. Only in a third phase, and most reluctantly, would Bhutto begin discussions on a concept that involved giving up the reprocessing plant. In this context, Bhutto's apparent determination not to delay equipment and technology can be seen as part of his effort to keep the dialogue from moving to phase three, before he has had an opportunity to present his case in phases one and two, or at least until he is out of the woods in his current internal scene. The dilemma we and he face, however, is that by the time we reach the third phase—if we do—deliveries may have gone ahead to the point where either implementation of the Symington Amendment (or an explanation of why it is not being implemented) becomes unavoidable.

6. With the situation as I have described it above, I do not believe that I can usefully go back to Bhutto at this time. We all know that there is a point beyond which it can become counter-productive to press on external matters with a government in deep internal trouble. In my opinion we have now reached this point. If the Department believes it feasible, it may be desirable to approach the French once again arguing for further delay in transfers, (even after contracts are signed if that is possible) on the grounds that we are not able to engage the government here meaningfully until the present crisis is resolved and a secure government is formed. Our most optimistic estimate for this, if it is to happen under Bhutto's leadership, is mid-April.

**Byroade**

**239. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 25, 1977, 1205Z

2868. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Bhutto Clamps Down.

1. Bhutto has decided to crack down on opposition following PNA's latest rejection of his offer of a dialogue. Most major PNA leaders have been arrested, and orders have been given in all four provinces to shoot looters and rioters on sight.

2. Latest steps are direct result of PNA decision to reject Bhutto's dialogue offer. In late afternoon press conference March 24, PNA Secretary General Ghafoor Ahmed released copy of reply to PM from Mufti Mahmud. In letter, PNA states that if its demands for the PM's resignation, formation of a new Election Commission, and holding of fresh National Assembly elections are met, only then would the PNA meet with Bhutto. The purpose of such a meeting would be only to discuss modalities of implementing PNA's demands, not to negotiate.

3. PM, in face of opposition intransigence, decided to put the lid on the PNA and take firm steps to bring PNA sponsored anti-government activities to an end. He consequently called meeting in Pindi of all four Chief Ministers and instructed them to tighten up the security situation in their provinces. Each Chief Minister released press statement early March 25 stating that orders have been given to "shoot on sight anyone committing violence, arson, looting, damaging private or public property, or attempting to disturb the means of communications." Sind Chief Minister's statement also noted that in addition to police and FSF, the army has orders to carry out his directions. This is first public order by government official to army to enforce security situation even to extent of shooting rioters.

4. In further step to muzzle opposition, the following PNA leaders were arrested during early hours of March 25: Mufti Mahmud, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, Sherbaz Mazari, Shah Ahmad Noorani, Malik Qasim (Muslim League leader) and Mohammed Tufail (Jamat-i-Islami leader). Begum Wali Khan is reportedly under house arrest. ConGen Lahore also reports that the President of Lahore High Court Bar Association has been picked up and that crackdown extends beyond active political party leaders to include other prominent Lahoris who have supported the opposition.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770102–1266. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, and New Delhi. Sent for information to CINCPAC.

5. Demonstrations and processions continued throughout country yesterday. Late Thursday afternoon in Lahore a procession was broken up when police used lathi charges and tear gas on a crowd of two to three hundred. ConGen Lahore also reports that an apparently spontaneous PNA march went through the residential area of Gulberg at 2000 hours last night—the first time any processions were taken out in the more prosperous residential areas of the city. Members of the Lahore High Court Bar Association had protest march on the mall at noon today with about 100 lawyers, under heavy police surveillance, carrying pro-opposition banners.

6. Three PNA processions are scheduled for Pindi today, and Begum Wali Khan and Begum Asghar Khan had been scheduled to lead women's procession in Peshawar. The National Assembly is still scheduled to convene tomorrow morning, March 26. Most NA members are already in Islamabad, arriving early to avoid any PNA attempts to disrupt national transportation networks on the 26th.

7. Bhutto's response to the PNA's refusal to talk ends for the moment any hope of a negotiated solution to the present impasse. Most observers did not expect the PNA to agree to talk with the PM, since the opposition believes it has him on the defensive and also probably fears his ability to divide the opposition if it did sit down with him. Our assessment is that the lines have now been firmly drawn with the opposition committed to the PM's political demise and Bhutto as ardently dedicated to the retention of power. Most people believe the confrontation will not be resolved around the conference table or through negotiations, but rather the outcome will be finally determined by result of the continuing struggle in the streets for popular support.

**Byroade**

**240. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1977

## SUBJECT

Reprocessing Negotiations with Pakistan: A Negotiating Strategy

Last week, Prime Minister Bhutto told Ambassador Byroade that he was prepared to enter into negotiations with us to achieve a quick resolution of the nuclear reprocessing issue.<sup>2</sup> Up to then, Bhutto had delayed opening talks—primarily, we judge, because of preoccupation with his domestic problems.

In now wanting to move quickly on resolving this problem, Bhutto may be influenced by recent developments in India and Pakistan, believing that these developments presage a warming of U.S.-Indian relations and a less sympathetic U.S. attitude toward Pakistan. He has probably also been impressed with your determination with respect to nuclear proliferation issues.

In this situation, Bhutto's overriding consideration remains his determination to stay in power. In the final analysis, his decision on how to deal with us on the nuclear reprocessing question will be determined by his judgment of the effect it will have on his domestic political position. He has capitalized on the reprocessing agreement with France to strengthen his position domestically. For him to back down on this, without being able to demonstrate that he has received significant benefits for Pakistan, would provide additional ammunition to his domestic opposition.

We believe we should respond to Bhutto's willingness to negotiate as speedily as possible. While Bhutto's domestic position appears uncertain, he has just been reelected Prime Minister, and we have no alternative to dealing with him if we are to move quickly to resolve this problem. We will, of course, watch the Pakistani domestic situation carefully as discussions unfold.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 17, WC—Official Chrons—Jan/Dec 1977. Secret. The date is handwritten.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2831 from Islamabad, March 24, Byroade reported Bhutto's March 24 offer to begin discussions on nuclear issues. According to Byroade, Bhutto said he "intended to call me earlier today but he was in bed with a very high temperature he thought from food poisoning from partridges kept too long after our last Larkana shoot. Bhutto said, if Washington was agreeable, he was prepared to enter into talks here with me as soon as I was ready and he was out of bed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2473, N770002-0165)

We have urged the French to cancel or indefinitely postpone the sale. They have been helpful by delaying shipments of sensitive technology and agreeing to accept Pakistan's cancellation if it were to take place as well as to forego any future sales of reprocessing plants.<sup>3</sup> However, internal political pressures today are such that the French Government cannot itself cancel the sale and it faces difficulties in further delay in deliveries unless the Pakistanis acquiesce.

We believe that we have a good chance of persuading Bhutto to forego his nuclear purchase if we can offer him trade-offs which he can present domestically as responsive to Pakistan's legitimate military, economic and energy needs. Our approach has been to seek to develop a package which could stand on its own feet in the face of Congressional and public scrutiny, i.e., arms sales which would not start an arms race in South Asia or cause us major difficulties with India and an economic package which is sensible in development terms. While we are likely to encounter some criticism for having "bought off" Pakistan, I think we would be on good grounds to defend our position. Given the high priority we attach to non-proliferation, we should be prepared to accept this risk.<sup>4</sup>

The Package we propose to offer to Bhutto would be made up of items listed below.

*Arms.* We would offer cash sales of aircraft concentrating on F-5Es but also including A-4s if necessary.<sup>5</sup> Pakistan's air force consists primarily of vintage F-86s and Chinese MIG 19s—there is a genuine need for modernization. We would also offer to continue cash sales of less controversial equipment, which we could have sold under existing guidelines: air defense radar systems, general utility helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, self-propelled howitzers, communications equipment, two surplus destroyers and helicopters mounted with TOW anti-tank missiles. In our judgment, and that of ACDA and Defense, such an offer can be justified on its merits and would not be destabilizing in South Asia. Before the elections, Indian officials privately told us that they have no problems with the sale of the non-aircraft items and they would probably not object loudly to F-5Es.<sup>6</sup>

We recognize that Bhutto may not be satisfied with this offer and he may insist on at least some A-7s and possibly FMS credits, both of which were offered by Kissinger last August. We will try to convince

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 233.

<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "A-5's only."

<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined "A-4s" and wrote "no" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 62.

him that our offer meets his needs but, if he is insistent on other terms, we will come back to you with his requests and our recommendations.<sup>7</sup>

*Economic and Energy Items.* Kissinger offered and Bhutto has expressed interest in “generous” economic assistance. Pakistan will receive about \$76 million in aid this year and AID has proposed \$98 million for FY 78 under the regular development program. We would like to consider an addition \$100–125 million economic assistance package to be extended over two to three fiscal years. AID has pointed out that there are serious Congressional problems with using economic development funds for a political purpose of this kind, and we would only go forward with this element after further review with AID and consultation with the Congress.<sup>8</sup>

We would add as generous Title I PL 480 assistance as we can offer and perhaps some sort of agreement on U.S. holdings of Pakistani rupees, if Congressional leaders concur. On the energy side, we would make the same offers we have made to Brazil—assured fuel supply for Pakistan’s nuclear reactors, participation in an international fuel cycle evaluation program, and technical assistance in the non-nuclear energy field.<sup>9</sup> We would reiterate Kissinger’s offer to seek to facilitate financing of a French nuclear reactor and possibly a low enriched fuel fabricating plant in lieu of the reprocessing facility.<sup>10</sup>

*Congress.* Before talking to the Pakistanis we believe we should consult informally on all aspects of our position with key Congressional leaders.

*India.* A key element in our thinking is our desire to avoid antagonizing the new Indian Government.<sup>11</sup> India is the preeminent power in South Asia and it would be pointless to go back to the policies of the 1950s which the Indians perceived as an attempt to build up Pakistan as a rival to India. We would consult at an appropriate stage with the Indians and believe that, while they will complain, they will accept the approach outlined to you as not threatening their desire toward regional stability.

*Recommendation:*

Cy Vance and I would appreciate your approval of the above approach. We are under considerable time pressure due to our desire

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<sup>7</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “no.”

<sup>8</sup> In the right-hand margin next to the two preceding sentences, Carter wrote: “I don’t favor this.”

<sup>9</sup> In the right-hand margin, Carter highlighted this sentence and wrote: “ok.”

<sup>10</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “Why finance a French purchase?”

<sup>11</sup> See Document 64.

to avoid being faced with a *fait accompli* in Brazil and/or Pakistan. If you concur in it, we will keep you informed on our consultations with Congress and the course of the negotiations with Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Carter did not check either the Approve or the Disapprove option, but wrote in the right-hand margin next to the options: "See all notes, J."

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#### 241. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 9, 1977

##### SUBJECT

Pakistan: Reprocessing and Arms Sales Negotiations

The attached memorandum (Tab A) sets forth State's strategy for responding to Bhutto's request for quick discussions on the nuclear reprocessing issue. Since the memo was drafted, the French have told us that, unless the Pakistanis request otherwise, France will send the last (and critical) technical drawings of the reprocessing facility to Pakistan *by April 15*. An early objective of talks with Bhutto would be to slip this basically artificial deadline.

State's package of incentives goes back to a Kissinger promise of a wide variety of items if Pakistan gave up reprocessing. From your point of view, the key issues within the package are these:

*Military assistance.* The basic military package suggested by State (page 3) is highlighted by 100 F-5s, with perhaps an admixture of A-4s. All agencies believe this package will be tolerable in terms of regional political impact and congressional reaction, and it is extremely important for Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Its dimensions are such, however, that it will put heavy strain on your arms sales restraint policy, raising annual sales from the current \$150 million to about \$250 million. There is universal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1-12/77. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, go over entire pkg of memos with Cy, J." Aaron initialed for Brzezinski. An unknown hand wrote next to Aaron's initials: "ZB concurrence."

<sup>2</sup> In the right-hand margin next to the two preceding sentences, Carter wrote: "Bribery may be a mistake."



opposition to the sale of A-7 aircraft which are of greatest interest to Bhutto and were reportedly promised by Kissinger. Defense recognizes a legitimate Pakistani need for 60 A-7s and believes that we will have to put them in the package ultimately. These aircraft would, however, severely damage our relations with India, meet firm congressional opposition, and reverse your decision to shut down A-7 production.

*Economic assistance.* AID opposes providing assistance as a political payoff and OMB feels even more strongly that it would create an undesirable precedent, highlighted by the need for a supplemental budget request.<sup>3</sup>

*FMS Credits.* All military sales to Pakistan are for cash. FMS terms for this incentives package would be very attractive to Bhutto and, OMB points out, would have advantages for the U.S. when compared to economic assistance. State firmly opposes FMS because of its high political symbolism here and in South Asia, and soundings in Congress have been uniformly negative. We and OMB, however, would not exclude an offer to explore FMS financing for this one transaction as an ultimate fallback or as a trade-off for some other highly costly or politically difficult element of the package.

*Are the political and economic costs of this package worth paying?*<sup>4</sup> Your arms sales policy, our South Asian policy, and our relationship to the new Indian Government will be jeopardized; and we will have set a tempting precedent for other potential proliferators. You may want to consider the possibility of simply telling Bhutto that his reprocessing plant will cost him the totality of his relationship with us. Given his weak domestic political situation, he might well throw in his hand. As tempting as this approach is, we cannot recommend it to you with confidence since its failure would almost certainly result in a strident Pakistani nuclear policy and a severe blow to non-proliferation. It is, however, a close call.

The approach set forth in State's memorandum is, however, too restrained. We recommend Ambassador Byroade be instructed to conduct a very tough negotiation, emphasizing your concerns, moving to incentives only after he is convinced that Bhutto will not fold, and offering incentives gradually, rather than as one package. The sequence of offers would, illustratively, be (1) energy assistance and ground and naval equipment; (2) F-5/A-4 aircraft; and (3) economic assistance. FMS credits would be a fallback; A-7s would be excluded; we should simply face Bhutto down on this.

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<sup>3</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "I agree."

<sup>4</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this question, Carter wrote: "no."

## RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the State Department's request subject to modifications set forth above.<sup>5</sup>

## Tab A

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1977

## SUBJECT

Negotiations with Pakistan on the Nuclear Issue: Congressional Reactions

We have been consulting informally with key members of the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee on our negotiating problem with Pakistan and the possible elements of a package proposal designed to persuade Pakistan to forego its nuclear option. During these consultations we have emphasized that there has been no Administration decision on the nature of a package but that we wanted to obtain Congressional reactions *before* we made a final decision and began negotiations.

The Congressional reaction to this form of consultations has been enthusiastic. Both Chairman Zablocki and Senator Humphrey went out of their ways to express appreciation for being consulted before final decisions were made. There was unanimous agreement that it was highly desirable to prevent Pakistan from obtaining a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and that we should be prepared to offer Bhutto a package of trade-offs designed to enable him to take on the political costs he would incur in cancelling or indefinitely postponing this project.

A number of Congressmen and Senators expressed concern about the arms supply aspects of such a negotiation. These members want to be assured that items included in the military package will not destabilize the military status quo on the subcontinent and will not foreclose opportunities for improving the U.S.-Indian relationship.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In the margin below this sentence, Carter wrote: "I hate to pay for French avarice—J."

<sup>6</sup> Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Cy—I'm not inclined to bribe him. My inclination would be to go no further than A-5's—if he cancels the reprocessing plant—J."

<sup>7</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "I agree."

Specifically, members recommended against offering the A-7 and FMS credits to Pakistan. Chairman Zablocki of the HIRC stated that we should offer “no more modern equipment than the F-5,” (although he later conceded that the A-4 would not be objectionable in small quantities) and that we “should not agree to FMS credits.” Senator Humphrey stated, “I want to go on record as strongly opposing the A-7. It has offensive capabilities which would be destabilizing on the subcontinent.”

We indicated that, because of discussions held between Bhutto and the previous Administration, Pakistan may insist on A-7s and FMS credits.<sup>8</sup> The members seemed to understand the difficulty this problem poses, but warned that selling a package to Congress which includes these two components will be exceedingly difficult. We stated that we would consult further before making any offer of these items.

Members expressed concern that an FMS credit relationship with Pakistan would constitute a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Lee Hamilton expressed concern that such a change might signal that “we have yet to understand that India is the most important country on the subcontinent.” Senator Humphrey, while stating that he is sympathetic to Pakistan’s legitimate military needs, warned that the extension of FMS credits would represent “a fundamental change of policy,” and advised, “I would feel out the Indians on all these matters.”

There was general agreement that other items in our proposed package are not unreasonable and would face no strong Congressional objections. Some concern was expressed about the A-4, but the members seemed to accept the fact that the A-4 would not be perceived by the Indians to be as threatening as the A-7. It is clear that the recent Indian election has markedly transformed Congressional attitudes toward that country.

With some qualifications, the members support the concept of an economic aid package, although they pointed out that enactment of any foreign aid legislation is difficult. Senator Humphrey stated that the SFRC “is much more sympathetic to economic needs (than to military).” Congressman William Broomfield said that “those affected by the President’s decision on water projects will be looking very hard at foreign aid.” Congressman Bingham, who is strongly in favor of the course we propose, told his colleagues that we will have to pay a high price but that “stopping the reprocessing facility will be well worth the price we have to pay.” Senator Humphrey concluded the meeting by stating

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<sup>8</sup> Carter underlined the words “may insist” and wrote in the right-hand margin next to the sentence: “Why do they have a right to insist?”

that further consultations would be welcomed; the views he and other Senators had expressed represented their “druthers.”

To sum up, we believe that these consultations have produced a better understanding of the difficult trade-offs we face in developing military and economic packages adequate to convince the Government of Pakistan to cancel its contract with France. Within the limits described above, these members are prepared to support a negotiating package aimed at stopping the delivery of the reprocessing facility. All members with whom we consulted appreciate the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation and seem willing to pay a reasonable price to prevent this transaction.

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#### 242. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, April 13, 1977, 0630Z

3564. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Allegations Persist of US Support for Pak Opposition.

1. Five weeks after the Pakistan general elections, reports persist here and elsewhere in country that USG is financially backing and otherwise supporting opposition Pakistan National Alliance. These reports, which include such wild stories as one we just heard today alleging that Ambassador Byroade was being expelled by the GOP for his role in bankrolling the PNA, are circulated almost entirely by word of mouth. We have seen only a handful of press items making the charge either directly or indirectly. Despite the absence of these allegations in print, it seems likely that large numbers of politically-aware Pakistanis are familiar with them, and that many either accept them at face value or are not easily prepared to dismiss them as the nonsense they are.

2. The circulation of such rumors, and the acceptance they seem to have won, comes as no surprise. The phenomenon is hardly a new one here. Pakistanis tend naturally to view politics in conspiratorial terms, and the notion of sinister foreign intervention in Pakistan domestic affairs has been trotted out repeatedly in the past. As we have mentioned before, the apparent ability of the PNA to garner more

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770128-0687. Confidential. Sent for information to Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and CINCPAC.

campaign funds than its own slender resources seemingly made possible added to the natural suspicion that a foreign hand was involved. The widely-held and long-standing belief that Air Marshal Asghar Khan was somehow “close” to the US, the allegation that the US would naturally prefer a “conservative” PNA regime to the “progressive” and activist Bhutto government, and the supposition that the USG would see in the downfall of Bhutto an opportunity to halt the Pak-French reprocessing deal appear to have helped bolster the idea of US involvement. The delay—as it seemed to many Pakistanis—in President Carter’s sending a congratulatory message to Bhutto until the PM was actually sworn in for a second term also contributed to the impression here that the US was siding with the opposition.<sup>2</sup> (The fact that other major powers also waited and did not congratulate Bhutto immediately after the March 7 PPP election victory was overlooked, and much was made of the contrast between our silence immediately after the Pak election and our enthusiastic public reaction to the Indian results a few weeks later.)<sup>3</sup>

4. The hand of the Pakistan Government in all of this is difficult to determine. We have already reported (in Islamabad 2888) H.K. Burki’s provocative March 26 Pakistan Times article, which could only have been printed with GOP approval.<sup>4</sup> In his inauguration speech a couple

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2396 from Islamabad, March 13, the Embassy recommended postponing a congratulatory message to Bhutto until he was sworn in as Prime Minister because “a message sent now could be seen as reflecting our considered judgment on the disputed honesty of the election. With the opposition charging that there was massive manipulation at the polls, especially in the Punjab, and this view evidently gaining increasing popular credence, the receipt and publication of a congratulatory message now could be potentially embarrassing to the USG and involve us—through our placing our informal imprimatur on the results—in an unnecessarily exposed position both here and in the US.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086–0644) Telegram 70596 to Islamabad, March 30, transmitted Carter’s brief message of congratulations to Bhutto on his assumption of office. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770109–0751)

<sup>3</sup> Less than a week after the Indian election was complete, the *New York Times* reported that the Carter administration, “emphasizing human rights in its foreign dealings, called the Janata Party’s victory a ‘noteworthy’ example of democracy.” (“The Millions Judge: India Clearly Prefers Its Democracy,” *New York Times*, March 27, 1977, p. 147) According to the *Washington Post*, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted on March 30 to repeal an “anti-India measure adopted by Congress in reaction to that nation’s May, 1974, nuclear explosion.” The measure required U.S. representatives to the World Bank to vote against low-interest loans to India. (Don Oberdorfer, “Senate Unit Votes Repeal Of Anti-India Measure,” *Washington Post*, March 31, 1977, p. 24)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 2888 from Islamabad, March 26, the Embassy reported on an article in the *Pakistani Times* (described as a newspaper that “carries only government approved news”) in which the “most disturbing line, from our viewpoint, is comment, while speaking of the opposition, that ‘judging by the level of organization, size of the agitation and the inexhaustible funds, it seems that the imperialist powers that were behind the Indonesian operation (we assume a reference to Sukarno’s overthrow) are backing this bloody adventure in Pakistan.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770104–0550)

of days later, Bhutto ostensibly exonerated the USG, and other powers, of charges of financing the opposition. But the way the PM discussed the issue led many to conclude that what he actually meant to convey was that the US had been involved. The PM's remark that "if we get half of the 25 crores of rupees"—\$25 million, the amount the PM says the opposition boasted of receiving abroad for the elections—"we will be prepared to discuss even human rights" is still cited as evidence for this conclusion. (The Embassy does not share it.) More recently, ConGen Karachi reported<sup>5</sup> that Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed addressed armed forces officers there and told them that there is proof that the US provided 280 million rupees to the PNA. The well-informed Reuters correspondent here tells us that Aziz Ahmed made a similar allegation to an officers' gathering in Multan.

5. We have not discussed this issue with GOP officials and see little purpose in doing so.<sup>6</sup> There is no evidence that the allegations have led to any significant change in public attitudes toward the US or that they have created an atmosphere in which American lives or property are endangered.

**Byroade**

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<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 3866 from Islamabad, April 19, reported that at an April 18 dinner given by Bhutto for Byroade to mark the occasion of the latter's departure from post, Bhutto "dismissed his note taker and asked if he could talk to me as a personal friend and not as the American Ambassador." Bhutto then confronted Byroade on the subject. After some discussion, "Bhutto made clear that he trusted me personally without question but he still was concerned about remarks and activities of some of my people that I might not know about and the local effect this was having. I told him I did not run that kind of an outfit. Every man under my command knew of my strict personal instructions that they stay completely out of internal politics. My reputation for firing people on the spot was well known in the service and I did not think there was any in my command that would go against me. [1 line not declassified]" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770135-1065)

**243. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 20, 1977, 1253Z

3935. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Positions Harden as the Country Unravels.

Summary: The confrontation between Bhutto and the opposition sharpens against a backdrop of increasing violence and destruction of property in Pakistan. The PM will attempt to hold on to power as long as possible and has now armed and sent his supporters into the streets to confront Pakistan National Alliance followers. Bhutto continues to hold out an olive branch to the opposition but with negligible chances of acceptance. We believe the opposition, in face of Bhutto's obduracy, will follow two courses—increase level of violence and paralyze the nation by disrupting essential public services. The PNA has placed central emphasis on removal of PM from office. Mufti Mahmud has now refined opposition demands to include President's rule pending new elections. Situation on the ground continues to unravel. Students are more active, although labor has still not assumed major role in the movement nation-wide. Students are calling for hartals to disrupt transportation, PIA workers have gone on strike thereby grounding most PIA domestic and international flights. The Army still holds the key and we believe its position is unchanged—it does not want to be drawn into the conflict and wants a constitutional solution. We do not believe it will move until it sees all other options have disappeared. These other options still include President's rule or the removal of the PM from power by the PPP parliamentary group. Likelihood of latter is quite small, and former improbable, if not imposed by Army, unless Bhutto agrees to go peacefully. If Army faced with stark choice of taking over or witnessing a complete breakdown of law and order and disruption of essential services, they would reluctantly choose the former. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Byroade**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770249–0650, D770137–0354. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.

## 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 26, 1977, 2348Z

94109. London for the attention of Joseph S. Nye. Subject: Pakistan Political Situation.

1. Summary: Ambassador Yaqub Khan called on Under Secretary Habib on April 25 for a broad ranging review of Pakistan's political situation. Habib expressed the hope that a dialogue with the opposition would take place but stressed that the U.S. would not involve itself in domestic Pakistani decision making. End summary.

2. Yaqub Khan noted that the Army had been brought in "to aid civil power" in a number of cities. Such action was "distasteful" for both the Army and civil authorities and would hopefully be temporary. He stressed the GOP's desire for a dialogue with the opposition "on any terms the opposition suggests." One such possibility would be new provincial elections under military or judicial supervision to be followed by new national elections if the opposition attains a majority in the provincial elections. So far the opposition had been unwilling to enter into any form of dialogue but had merely sought Bhutto's ouster. Leading opposition figures currently under detention had now been assembled near Islamabad with the hope that talks could be initiated.

3. Yaqub Khan stated that there was a "body of opinion" in Pakistan that a foreign power, often identified as the United States, was supporting the opposition, financially or otherwise. This subject had already been discussed with Ambassador Byroade by the Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> The USG decision to suspend shipments of tear gas<sup>3</sup> had been used as an example of the U.S. taking sides even though he personally was sure that this was not the case.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770145-1053. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Kabul, London, New Delhi, Tehran, and Paris. Drafted by Lande; cleared by Dubs and in S/S; approved by Habib.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> On April 27, the Department instructed the Embassy in Pakistan to tell Pakistani officials, if asked, "that it has long been U.S. Government policy not repeat not to ship riot control equipment, small arms and munitions, and anti-personnel weapons to security forces in circumstances such as prevail now in Pakistan." The Department also reported that it did in fact clear the munitions control license for the tear gas on March 6, but "subsequent developments involving mass civil disturbances weighed heavily in our taking the decision to suspend the license." (Telegram 94452 to Islamabad, April 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770146-0109)



4. Habib noted that Ambassador Byroade in his meeting with Bhutto had already replied to the charge of U.S. support for the opposition and the Prime Minister seemed to accept this denial. He had thought that the Ambassador's comments had already put this matter to rest. However, he wanted Yaqub Khan—and the Prime Minister—to know that U.S.G. has been extremely careful to avoid even the appearance of involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs, both during the recent elections and during the recent disturbances. Yaqub Khan said he was pleased to receive these reassurances.

5. Habib noted that the tear gas export suspension was based on precedent, that we had taken similar action in other cases of civil disturbances.

6. Habib noted that it was not in USG's interest to have upheavals in Pakistan. We hoped that a domestic dialogue would take place, but we would not become involved in Pakistan's decision making process and will not "second guess" Pakistan. We are saddened by the sight of a friendly country tearing itself apart and can only hope that the Pakistani people would resolve the problem. The USG wished to maintain its close relationship with the GOP.

7. Action requested: In view of the apparent GOP concern about the USG attitude towards Pakistan's current problems, you should seek an opportunity to convey our position at the highest appropriate level.

Vance

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**245. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Bhutto's Comments to the Military

[3 lines not declassified] the government-controlled press has surfaced reports of US aid for the opposition and government officials are making the same allegations to some diplomats.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/77. Confidential. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

You asked, in response to this item, whether we should officially deny these reports. For your information, yesterday our Charge called on Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi to make a demarche on the increasing frequency of anti-American statements. The Charge emphasized our hope that anti-US slogans would not become part of the Pak political scene since we do not want to see our bilateral relations suffer. The Foreign Minister replied that he wanted to make it clear that the anti-American slogans are not countenanced by anyone in authority including the Prime Minister. The Foreign Minister added that the GOP desires friendly relations with the US and if we have any differences, we can discuss them privately and amicably.<sup>2</sup>

Embassy Islamabad doubts that the demarche will completely stop anti-American allegations, but feels that it may persuade the Government of the need for caution and inhibit escalation.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4197 from Islamabad, April 27, the Embassy reported on Constable's demarche to Shahi. Shahi told Constable: "the government has been receiving reports for over one and one-half months of foreign money bank-rolling the PNA and the GOP has purposely not raised this with US." Shahi added that "he had been asked by journalists if there was any truth to claims of 'superpower' support for the PNA. Agha Shahi said he answered the journalists that he would not express any comment. The Charge noted that such a reply must have left the journalists in doubt as to whether or not the GOP believed the charges. Agha Shahi quickly responded that the government has no evidence either way and in any case could not clear the name of one super-power without raising questions about others. He said it is not the proper time to give official views on this matter, but the GOP has not made any allegations and the MFA has not received any instructions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770146-1346)

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#### 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1977, 2212Z

96447. For delivery to Charge at opening of business. Subject: Message for the Prime Minister.

1. You should deliver the following letter from the Secretary to the Prime Minister:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770149-0230. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Lande; cleared by Atherton and Habib and in S/S; approved by Vance.

Quote: Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have very carefully reviewed Ambassador Byroade's report on his last meeting with you,<sup>2</sup> and was disturbed to learn that in a speech to Parliament on April 28 you severely criticized the United States and accused us of gross interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs.<sup>3</sup>

I would like to underscore that Ambassador Byroade spoke accurately and authoritatively in rejecting allegations of U.S. support for your political opponents. The United States Government is not engaged in any form of interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs and has no intention of becoming so involved. We have given no assistance, financial or otherwise, to any political organizations or individuals in Pakistan.

Despite occasional differences on specific points, we have continued to work with your government on a broad range of issues. I am sure that you are aware, for example, that economic assistance has continued and that military equipment sales and shipments have never been interrupted. We would like to continue the close and cooperative relationship with Pakistan.

We are always prepared to discuss any concerns you may have quietly and dispassionately. Considering the long history of close and amicable relations between our two countries I suggest that we seek ways to avoid public charges which can only damage our relations.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely, Cyrus Vance.

End quote.

Vance

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> In an April 28 memorandum, Vance informed Carter that "Bhutto told the National Assembly April 28 that Pakistan was being 'flooded' with dollars from the U.S. for his opponents. He identified the U.S. only as the 'superpower' earlier involved in Viet-Nam. Bhutto alleged there was 'an international conspiracy against Islamic Pakistan'. He charged that two American diplomats, in a telephone conversation after the March 7 elections, said 'the party is over. He has to go.' This afternoon, Under Secretary Habib called the Pakistani Ambassador to reject these charges as false and tendentious. Also, we have issued a strong public denial. I have sent a message to Bhutto making clear that his charges are groundless and urging that any differences between us be aired in private." In the left-hand margin next to the preceding three sentences, Carter initialed: "C." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 4/77)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 4387 from Islamabad, April 30, transmitted reports received from foreign journalists that Bhutto was "driving around Pindi, stopping at street corners and addressing crowds. As part of speech, he is waving a piece of paper and saying it is a letter from Secretary Vance. We do not yet have definitive report of what he is specifically saying." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770152–0459) According to telegram 99755 to Islamabad, May 3, Vance's April 28 letter to Bhutto was publicly released during a May 3 Department of State press briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770154–1305)

**247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan**

Washington, April 30, 1977, 1435Z

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979. Secret; Niact Immediate. Roger Channel 1 page not declassified.]

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**248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1977, 0018Z

100260. CINCPAC for POLAD—Please pass to Ambassador Byroade. Subject: Prime Minister's Letter to the Secretary.

The following letter from Prime Minister Bhutto to the Secretary was delivered to the Department on May 3:

Quote: Dear Mr. Secretary: I thank you for your letter of April 29.<sup>2</sup>

I have always attached the utmost importance to the Pakistan-United States relationship. It has benefited both countries. I have publicly expressed my faith in this relationship on many occasions and during the past five years my government has steadily striven to strengthen it further.

However, we have been disturbed in the recent past by the role of the United States, with its adverse impact on Pakistan's stability, its likely repercussions on the security of this region, already under mounting Soviet pressure, and on our bilateral relationship. My regret is the greater because much of what has happened was entirely avoidable. We were frankly shocked when, as Pakistan's election campaign got under way and during its aftermath, disturbing evidence began to accumulate of American involvement on the side of the opposition which had launched a violent campaign designed to subvert the constitution and undermine the stability of Pakistan. It was for that reason that I broached this subject with Ambassador Byroade on not less than

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770155–0820. Secret; Niact Immediate. Also sent to CINCPAC. Drafted and approved by Lande.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 246.

three occasions. I mentioned to him concrete instances of United States role in this context. Ambassador Byroade's explanations did nothing to reassure us.

Eventually, matters came to such a pass that I was left with no choice but to take my people into confidence in the course of my recent speech in Parliament.

I welcome your suggestion that we discuss our concerns privately. I would be very happy to receive you in Pakistan for this purpose at your earliest convenience.

In the meantime, I would do whatever is possible to restrain public reaction against foreign intervention in Pakistan's domestic affairs. However, you will appreciate that the momentum that this reaction has gathered cannot be abruptly and immediately arrested.

I sincerely hope that the kind of discussions you propose would lead to a restoration of mutual confidence and understanding and a renewal of our common awareness of the abiding value of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Sincerely, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

End quote

We would appreciate your comments on this letter in general, and particularly on the reference to the "three occasions." We are only aware of the discussion at the farewell dinner.<sup>3</sup>

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> In response to the inquiry, the Embassy reported in telegram 4530 from Islamabad, May 4: "Aside from discussion at farewell dinner, only other occasion we can identify was in course of Bhutto-Byroade March 18 conversation on internal political situation which accompanied Ambassador's demarche on nuclear matters. This conversation is recorded in Islamabad 2682 [see footnote 2, Document 238] and related to Bhutto's obvious concern in the delay of a Presidential congratulatory message." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2517, N770003–0179)

**249. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 13, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistan.* Bhutto announced yesterday that the opposition had “slammed the door” on the possibility of a negotiated settlement, presumably including new elections. He simultaneously announced that he would hold a national referendum at an unspecified date to determine whether he should remain in office. He rejected new elections as too disturbing for Pakistan and offering “foreign powers” an opportunity to intervene. The referendum proposal is unlikely to change the basic political situation, but it may buy Bhutto more time in the face of an incipient revival of agitation and increased military disenchantment.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 5/77. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

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**250. Message From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, May 31, 1977, 0909Z

Subject: Evening Report for the President.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

6. I met today with Pakistani Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed, for almost an hour and a half. He clearly had a precise brief from Prime Minister Bhutto and spent the first 45 minutes of our meeting reviewing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 5/77. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The message was transmitted via the White House Situation Room in message WH70336 to Carter at his vacation residence on St. Simons Island, Georgia. Vance was in Paris May 28–June 2 in order to attend the CIEC Ministerial conference. Carter initialed in the right-hand margin of the message. The message was repeated to the Department of State as telegram Secto 5020 from Paris, May 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2172, N770003–0596)

the course of U.S.-Pakistani relations over the past 25 years.<sup>2</sup> The thrust of his presentation was that Pakistan had made many sacrifices over the years to support American interests and that it had been frequently let down by the U.S. He cited in particular our failure to support Pakistan more strongly in the 1966 and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars and our ten-[omission in the original] discriminatory against Pakistan since India had ready access to Soviet arms. He reviewed the evolution of Pakistan's arrangements with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant, pointing out (with some justification) that the U.S. had waited until 1976 (3 years after the project was started) to make its opposition to the reprocessing project known to the Pakistanis. Finally, Aziz Ahmed repeated the charge that Pakistan has extensive evidence of massive U.S. support for the opposition parties in the recent elections—evidence which he said he had with him if we wanted it. I did not ask for the material he said he had.

7. Aziz Ahmed said that U.S.-Pakistani relations are at a crossroads and can go either in the direction of confrontation or of restoring mutual confidence between us. If the choice is confrontation, he foreshadowed a Pakistani withdrawal from the Central Treaty Organization, a turning to the Soviet option, and a continuation of Bhutto's anti-American campaign. Having said all that, Aziz Ahmed emphasized that Pakistan would prefer to treat what has happened as a closed chapter and approach the future of our relationship in a constructive spirit. He, at the same time, clearly implied that our future position on Pakistan's reprocessing project, and Bhutto's evaluation of this meeting, would be key factors in determining which way our relations went.

8. Having heard Aziz Ahmed out, I decided this was not the occasion for a confrontational response. So far as charges of U.S. interference in Pakistani internal affairs are concerned, I made clear there was no basis for such charges and suggested that whatever evidence the Pakistanis had might be the result of a disinformation campaign against us. Beyond that, I emphasized how highly we have valued our relations with Pakistan, our respect for Prime Minister Bhutto in the past, and our desire to follow the path of restoring mutual confidence in our relations. With respect to the reprocessing project, I outlined our own decisions to forego reprocessing and look for less dangerous alternatives. I stressed our hope that others would do the same, while acknowledging that in the end every country must make its own sovereign

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<sup>2</sup> According to the memorandum of conversation, Atheron, Ambassador-designate Hummel, and Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter also attended the meeting, as did Haider and Dhleri representing Pakistan. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1977)

decision in such matters. Aziz Ahmed did not raise either arms supply questions or economic assistance, and I decided to leave these matters for later exchanges between us.

9. In summary, I made clear that our preferences were to pursue cooperative relations if Pakistan will do the same, but left unanswered the question of what the content of those relations will be and did not hold out any promise that we can fulfill Pakistan's objectives in the nuclear reprocessing and arms supply fields. Having signaled our desire to forget the recent past and restore our relations on a basis of mutual respect, I believe we must now wait a bit to see whether Bhutto reciprocates before undertaking more concrete discussions of the issues which still have to be resolved in our relationship.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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## **251. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, June 11, 1977, 1233Z

6036. USIAEA. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Reprocessing Issue and the U.S.: Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed Address the National Assembly.

Summary: Addressing the National Assembly on June 10, Prime Minister Bhutto declared that Pakistan will never cancel or postpone its nuclear reprocessing agreement with France. He stated that Pakistan wished to improve its relations with the U.S. and at the same time he criticized America for threatening Pakistan if it went ahead with the purchase, and reiterated his claim of U.S. interference. Asghar Khan was indirectly rapped for being an imperial "stooge". Emphasizing that the reprocessing plant would only be used for peaceful purposes, Bhutto argued that its acquisition by Pakistan would not contribute to nuclear proliferation. In spite of past differences, he said he did not want to damage Pakistan's relations with the U.S. and praised the Secretary for looking to the future in his recent talk with Aziz Ahmed. The Foreign Minister, in a speech immediately preceding Bhutto's disclosed details about the "massive" U.S. pressure put on Pakistan to give up the reprocessing deal. He selectively quoted and misquoted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770209-0469. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Tehran, Vienna, and CINCPAC.



confidential exchanges with former Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Byroade to bolster his argument. Ahmed said that Pakistan needed the reprocessing plant to ensure that it would have adequate supplies of nuclear fuel, which it could not rely on obtaining from international sources. He recalled his meeting with Secretary Vance in Paris during which it was agreed that both countries would put the past behind them and approach their relations in a positive and constructive manner.<sup>2</sup> End summary.

1. Stating formally that his government would never cancel or postpone acquisition of the French nuclear reprocessing plant, Prime Minister Bhutto declared in the National Assembly on June 10 that Pakistan was prepared to open a new chapter of good relations with the US. At the same time he was critical of the United States for being unreasonable and punitive in its approach to the reprocessing issue. In a one and a half hour rambling and disjointed speech on an adjournment motion regarding American pressure on Pakistan to cancel its nuclear agreement with France, Bhutto warned that Pakistan would not tolerate any further U.S. discrimination. If it continued, his government would be forced to reconsider its policy on CENTO. He recalled that this was not the PPP stand, but rather that of the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) which pledged, if elected, to withdraw from CENTO. If the PNA were serious about its pledge, he said, they should publicly call for withdrawal from CENTO and make it a national issue. They should then “leave it up to me.”

2. Referring to the tremendous pressure the US has brought to bear against Pakistan on the reprocessing deal, Bhutto declared that postponement was out of the question. This would merely be a euphemism for calling off the deal, he emphasized, and warned the people to be on guard against any government which tried to hoodwink them by declaring that the deal was intact, but had to be put off for some time.

3. Bhutto told the National Assembly that if any person thought he could rule the country by becoming a stooge (of a foreign power), he is doomed. Indirectly referring to Asghar Khan’s recent statement praising President Carter’s position on human rights,<sup>3</sup> Bhutto said only a stooge could praise such a policy after what Pakistan has gone through. He added that he had the utmost respect for the President, but that he could not praise him under the circumstances. He recalled that he had told Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed to have “quiet and private” talks with Secretary Vance in Paris to close the ugly chapter

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 250.

<sup>3</sup> Asghar Khan praised the administration’s human rights policy in a June 7 press conference in Rawalpindi. (Telegram 5910 from the Islamabad, June 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–0189)

relating to US interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs. He said Pakistan would not act "emotionally and temperamentally" in the situation, but noted that the US cancelled the A-7 aircraft deal soon after the Paris talks were concluded.<sup>4</sup>

4. Bhutto then went into a long rehash of the reprocessing deal and Pakistan's peaceful nuclear ambitions. He claimed that he did not see any conflict between Pakistan's decision to acquire a reprocessing plant and its desire to preserve cordial relations with the US. If the US were to conclude otherwise, the dynamics of politics would take over. The Prime Minister pointed out that Pakistan's decision to acquire the reprocessing plant was not proliferation in any sense of the term because it was for non-military purposes. As far as Pakistan is concerned, he added, formal agreement has been reached with France to acquire the reprocessing plant. France, in turn, has ruled out the supply of similar plants to any country other than Pakistan. Similarly the Prime Minister noted, West Germany has stated that it would not sell any more reprocessing plants after fulfilling its agreement with Brazil. We are not, therefore, contributing to proliferation, he declared. The Canadian DCM, who heard the speech at the National Assembly, later told us Bhutto had said that there are now six nuclear powers. Since France and West Germany have indicated they will not sell any more reprocessing plants after the Pakistani and Brazilian deals go through, there can at most only be eight nuclear powers. Therefore, there should not be cause for concern. (Newspaper coverage of the PM's speech did not include this statement.)

5. In any event, the PM emphasized, the problem of proliferation could not be solved by discrimination, rather the answer had to be a moral and political one. The real problem, he noted, lay in the destruction of all nuclear weapons. If the nuclear powers declared that they would destroy their atomic arsenals, he said, then Pakistan, as a gesture of goodwill, would cancel or postpone the acquisition of the reprocessing plant from France.

6. Referring to his April 28 speech in the National Assembly when he accused the U.S. of massive interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs,<sup>5</sup> Bhutto said he deliberately chose not to go into details about foreign intervention. Pakistan, he noted, did not want to pursue a

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<sup>4</sup> On June 3, the *New York Times* reported that the Carter administration had decided to withhold the sale of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan. (Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Withholds Sale of Jets to Pakistan," *New York Times*, June 3, 1977, p. 18) In a meeting with Habib on June 8, Yaqub Khan protested that the press stories had been a "source of embarrassment, disappointment and some dismay to the GOP." (Telegram 132972 to Islamabad, June 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205-0240)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 246.

course that would undermine its beneficial association with the U.S. He declared that it was an act of statesmanship on the part of Secretary Vance at the Paris talks that he did not want to go into the past, but instead chose to discuss the future. Bhutto observed that Aziz Ahmed had brought with him to the meeting a fifty page file detailing specific instances of American intervention in Pakistan's [garble]. By now, he added, it may have acquired ten more pages. However, the Secretary fortunately opted for a visionary course choosing to ignore past differences.

7. Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed, who spoke in a quiet and dispassionate manner for about forty minutes before Bhutto, said he would disclose the details of the "massive" U.S. pressure being brought to bear on Pakistan to abandon the reprocessing deal with France. The Foreign Minister then proceeded to outline the history of our discussions with the GOP on this matter, selectively quoting from private discussions and confidential diplomatic exchanges we have had with the GOP. Through a process of distorting what was said in these exchanges and omitting various items, he painted a picture of a Pakistan wounded by a capricious and willful great power. He declared Pakistan would not submit to the US. Reading carefully from a text, he said pressure had been brought to bear on France as well as Pakistan and paid compliments to the French for "having formally rejected this pressure."

8. He then recited the history of Pakistan's negotiations with France, noting that the reprocessing deal was finalized in January, 1976, and until then no objections were raised by the US. The Minister stated that it was August, 1976, when Secretary Kissinger raised the matter with the PM in Lahore and asked him to give up the plant. Kissinger, he asserted, threatened to cut off military supplies and economic aid to Pakistan if it was not abandoned. After that, the Foreign Minister said, there was a rapid escalation of US threats against Pakistan.

9. In September of last year, he noted, Secretary Kissinger warned the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington that the Democratic Party would want to make "a horrible example" of Pakistan if it won the Presidential election. The Secretary noted that Pakistan must weigh the consequences of acquiring the reprocessing plant, which was likely to lead it into trouble.<sup>6</sup> In a later meeting he had with Kissinger in October, Ahmed said the Secretary told him that the American Congress would put "punitive" measures in the non-proliferation bill (sic),

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<sup>6</sup> Possibly a reference to Acting Secretary Robinson's meeting with Yaqub Khan on September 7, 1976, during which they discussed the reprocessing plant. Telegram 222478 to Islamabad, September 8, 1976, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084-0512)

remarking that it was a pity that the first country to be affected would be Pakistan. When Aziz Ahmed objected that it would be unfair for such legislation to have retroactive effect when the US had not previously objected to the reprocessing deal, Kissinger replied that these facts would not be taken into consideration by Congress which is looking for some country to push around and waiting for a crusade.<sup>7</sup>

10. The Foreign Minister went on to quote selectively and in a distorted manner subsequent statements made privately by Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Byroade which he characterized as further warnings to Pakistan about the reprocessing plant. He said the U.S. adopted a threatening attitude on the issue because it feared the plutonium produced by the plant would be used to make atomic bombs. Pakistan, he emphasized, has given repeated assurances that it only wants the plant for peaceful purposes and has already accepted “onerous” safeguards.

11. The Foreign Minister noted that the U.S. had offered to supply nuclear fuel, but said that similar guarantees had proven unreliable in the past. In this connection, he said that before the 1965 war with India, the American President had “semi-officially” informed Pakistan that if it were attacked by India, America would come to Pakistan’s aid. After the war began, and the GOP asked for help, it was told, according to Aziz, to go to the UN. A related example, he said, was Canada’s recent repudiation of its agreement with Pakistan to supply fuel for the KANUPP power reactor in Karachi. That was [garble], he maintained, Pakistan wished to acquire the reprocessing plant to ensure that its future nuclear fuel requirements will be met. Double standards, he said, were being applied on this question, especially where India was involved.

12. The Foreign Minister concluded by recalling his recent meeting with the Secretary in Paris during which it was agreed that whatever had happened in the past should now be treated as closed chapter and both countries instead should approach the question of US/Pakistan relations in a positive and constructive manner.

13. Comment—The Prime Minister had obviously decided that he and the Foreign Minister would take two different approaches to the reprocessing question in the Assembly. Bhutto took the road of the world statesman and Pakistani patriot. Although criticizing the US for its unfair tactics and demands on the reprocessing issue, he did reiterate several times his desire for good relations with the US, his respect for

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram Secto 30002 from USUN, October 19, 1976, reported on this October 6 meeting between Kissinger and Aziz Ahmed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840109–2670, N760007–0706)

President Carter, and the need to put the past behind us and open a new chapter in US/Pak relations. These protestations of good intentions were in sharp contrast to the repetition of the charge of US interference in Pakistan—in the context of criticizing Asghar Khan and Bhutto's reference to the "fifty pages of proof"—claims the US had threatened Pakistan if he went ahead with the plant, and veiled hints Pakistan may withdraw from CENTO.

14. Aziz Ahmed played the role of the disinterested observer unemotionally reading the compendium of facts proving massive American pressure on Pakistan to give up the plant. Most disquieting was the practice—recently followed by Bhutto in Rawalpindi in late April when he read to a crowd from the Secretary's letter to him<sup>8</sup>—of quoting publicly from records of private discussions and confidential diplomatic exchanges between our two governments. The fact the Foreign Minister did this in a distorted manner and was carefully selective to prove American malafides, is further evidence of the caution with which we must approach discussions with the GOP and the extent to which the government is ready to willfully misrepresent bilateral issues if it believes it will gain some domestic political advantage.

**Constable**

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<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4, Document 246.

**252. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1977

SUBJECT

*Pakistan's Purchase of a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant: The Symington Amendment and Consultations with Congress*

ISSUE FOR DECISION

There have been recent press reports on the transfer of reprocessing technology to Pakistan. The fact of these transfers is not new—indeed most of them probably took place in early 1976—but the current press attention may spark press and Congressional inquiries as to why we have not applied the Symington Amendment which would require the termination of all economic assistance to Pakistan. We think it would be useful to take the initiative to consult informally this week with key members of Congress and their staffers to describe where we are on this matter and our reasons for not applying the Symington Amendment at this time.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

A recent article in a U.S. trade publication, *Nucleonics Week*,<sup>2</sup> quotes the President of the French firm St. Gobain (prime contractor for the reprocessing plant) to the effect that St. Gobain has delivered about 95 percent of the reprocessing plant plans, covering all basic features including the fuel element chopping machine. The statement was made that the Pakistanis are now in a position to go ahead with construction of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant whether or not further transfers of technology or equipment actually take place. On June 18, the *Washington Post* also carried a report of technology transfers which have taken place and the presence of French nuclear consultants in Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Congressman Bingham has already asked Joe Nye about these stories

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 8, WC—Official Chrons—Jan/Dec 1977. Confidential. Sent through Habib. Drafted on June 22 by Lande; cleared in draft in PM/NPO, L/PM, and AID and by Coon; cleared in EUR/RPE and by Nye. Christopher sent the memorandum back to Atherton under a June 25 covering note in which he wrote: "Roy—Per our discussion, Warren." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Simon Winchester, "Nuclear Plant Seen as Issue In Pakistan Vote," *Washington Post*, June 18, 1977, p. A12.

and we expect further queries on the status of negotiations with the French and/or Pakistanis and why we have not yet applied the Symington Amendment.

The Symington Amendment requires us to terminate economic and military assistance if Pakistan receives reprocessing equipment, material or technology.<sup>4</sup> However, the Office of the Legal Advisor believes that an immediate termination is not required so long as we are negotiating in good faith with the Pakistanis and/or French to prevent the delivery or construction of the plant and we have a reasonable chance to achieve this objective.

Our information on the extent of transfers of technology is not complete. We have no basis to challenge St. Gobain's statement that the basic blueprints have been transferred. We doubt, however, that these drawings, in themselves, would permit the Pakistanis to construct a plant without further French assistance. Our view is reinforced by the fact that Pakistan has unsuccessfully sought reprocessing assistance elsewhere. Up to now, the French have been cooperative in delaying shipments of sensitive equipment, particularly of the most vital element in the plant, the chopping machine.

We have asked the French to cancel or indefinitely defer the contract and this remains our best hope for resolving the problem, but the chances of the French accepting our position in isolation from other nuclear questions of interest to France are slight in view of the political implications in France of this question. We are currently considering entering into a broad negotiation on nuclear policy with France and a separate decision memorandum posing various options for these negotiations will be sent to you shortly. One of the options will be to seek French agreement to cancel the Pakistanis' contract as one *quid pro quo* for concessions which the French seek from us. Obviously, invocation of the Symington Amendment, especially at this point in U.S.-Pakistan relations, would be highly damaging.

Ideally we would prefer to await the outcome of these negotiations before we consult with key Congressional figures. However, our initiative in approaching Congress at this point would demonstrate our continued desire to achieve the objectives of the Symington Amendment. If these consultations go well it could reduce the likelihood of Congressional pressure to cut off aid to Pakistan, thus precipitating a new crisis in our bilateral relations.

What we have in mind is a general approach to key staffers and members of Congress reviewing the actual state of transfers of technology, pointing out that the French have been cooperative up to now

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 6. Christopher underlined "technology."

and that we intend to pursue the issue with the French. Our position would be that application of the Symington Amendment would further damage our relations with Pakistan and could greatly reduce our chances of obtaining French cooperation.

Therefore, our continuation of assistance while we continue our efforts to prevent Pakistan from acquiring a reprocessing capability is consistent<sup>5</sup> with the legislative intent of the Symington Amendment. We would promise to continue to keep the Congress informed.

#### *THE OPTIONS*

We have the choice of waiting to see whether we receive further questions from Congress or moving first in an attempt to establish our *bona fides* and reduce the impact of potentially hostile questions.

##### *Recommendations:*

That you authorize us to consult with key Congressional figures immediately.

ALTERNATIVELY, that we take no initiative with the Congress but take the stance outlined above if questions are raised.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Christopher underlined "is consistent" and in the left-hand margin next to it wrote: "Is it really? Can we make a persuasive case that the Amendment is not yet applicable—or are we just asking for (a) forbearance or (b) *trouble*?"

<sup>6</sup> Christopher did not check either the Approve or the Disapprove option under either recommendation.



**253. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 5, 1977

## SUBJECT

Information Items

*Pakistani Military Takeover:* The Pakistani military seized power last night, after apparently concluding that there was no hope of a negotiated settlement to the four-month-old political crisis. Prime Minister Bhutto and the most important opposition leaders have been placed in "temporary protective custody," and army commander General Zia-ul-Haq reportedly is heading the military government. Zia along with chiefs of the navy and air force have formed a Council of Government with the status of martial law administrators. President Chaudhry remains in office and the constitution has been suspended, but not abrogated. Embassy Islamabad has been assured that the measures are purely internal steps taken to save the country from disorder and will not affect its foreign policy. One Pakistani official informed the embassy that elections are still planned for October 6 and the leaders now in custody will be released to run their election campaigns.<sup>2</sup> The embassy reports that the situation throughout the country appears normal.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily Report File, Box 2, 5/21/77–5/31/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6830 from Islamabad, July 5, the Embassy reported that a Pakistani Foreign Ministry official privately told Constable the information regarding the elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Foreign Policy File, D770237–0875, D770246–0043)

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**254. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 5, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

5. *Pakistan*. The military coup yesterday in Pakistan came after talks on holding new elections had again broken down and new clashes between armed, opposing political groups were reported. The military, assisted by the judiciary, provides an interim administration acceptable to all political parties and capable of carrying out a new national election. The cities are quiet; communications and transportation are functioning normally; no Americans or other foreigners have reportedly been affected. Saudi Arabia and Iran reacted privately with mild relief to the military takeover.<sup>2</sup>

Our goals in Pakistan are first, while not commenting publicly on the coup, to encourage the military authorities to honor their pledge to hold free elections and, second, to continue to try to move the Pakistanis and the French toward cancellation or deferral of the nuclear reprocessing plant despite the military takeover.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 7/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Too bad about our old friend Bhutto!"

**255. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 6, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

4. *New Military Regime in Pakistan*: Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan called on me July 6 on instructions to say that the military regime had only reluctantly intervened and fully intended to restore the democratic process in Pakistan. He said that only when the political dialogue inside Pakistan had broken down and a civil war threatened the Army felt it had to intervene. While it is General Zia's intention to hold elections in October, it might not be possible. With Bhutto out of office the opposition bloc may disintegrate and the political parties may have to ask Zia to postpone the elections for a month or two.

The Ambassador said he expected that our bilateral relations with the new regime would improve. He expressed appreciation for US "forbearance" over the past few months and stated that he thought this policy would be shown to have been extremely wise. I noted that we have taken the public line that developments in Pakistan were internal matters on which we would not comment. I also stressed that we do want our bilateral relationship restored.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State): 7/77. Secret. Carter wrote: "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Let's be friendly to new regime—but expect early elections."

## 256. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, July 10, 1977, 1013Z

7017. Subject: Reprocessing: Meeting With Zia.

1. In candid, frank 35 minute conversation July 9 with General Zia, I presented the case for postponement or cancellation of reprocessing contract with France per State 158583<sup>2</sup> and Islamabad 6942.<sup>3</sup> I stressed the immediacy of the reprocessing question and our interest in finding satisfactory answers, in the context of possible application of the Symington Amendment. In response, Zia made it clear that his was an interim government, temporarily holding power with the sole objective of organizing free elections and transferring authority to a popular government. In this context, the martial law government was not prepared to undertake major policy decisions. Zia said that he was very familiar with the reprocessing issue and that the Military Council had the question under intensive review. Zia stated that he would report our conversation to the Council, and that he could not speak further to the issue at this time, except to note his Martial Law Administration had committed itself, publicly and privately, to carry out all treaties, commitments and agreements undertaken by previous regimes.

2. At Zia's request, MFA Secretary General Agha Shahi then intervened with a reiteration of standard GOP positions on reprocessing. Shahi summarized his points with three observations: (a) Pakistan's professed intention to use the reprocessing only for peaceful energy purposes was assured by the safeguards agreed to and by Pakistan's

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770245-0423. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 158583 to Islamabad, July 8, the Department concurred with the Embassy's July 7 request in telegram 6942 from Islamabad (see footnote 3 below) to approach Zia-ul-Haq in order to discuss bilateral relations in general and the reprocessing issue specifically. The Department informed the Embassy that there was "reliable information that the new government has approached the French requesting that the transfer of nuclear reprocessing equipment and technology be completed in the near future. It is important, since Zia may not be aware of the consequences of proceeding with the reprocessing deal, that you inform Zia that we will have to face the issue of the Symington Amendment in connection with prospective aid agreements coming up for approval within the next few weeks, if nuclear transfers continue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770242-0388)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 6942 from Islamabad, July 7, the Embassy suggested approaching Zia-ul-Haq with a message that urged the indefinite postponement or cancellation of the purchase of nuclear reprocessing technology from France, and make known that "unless this issue is satisfactorily resolved, we will be faced with a legislatively mandated cut-off of aid to Pakistan and a consequent downward spiral in our relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241-0130)

inability to withstand the external pressures and costs that would follow any diversion of plutonium for explosive purposes; (b) the US position against Pakistan's reprocessing facility (especially the Symington Amendment) was fundamentally discriminatory, in that no penalties have been applied to reprocessing facilities in India, South Africa and Israel; and (c) the US had failed to come to grips with the security requirements of countries like Pakistan which were faced with potential nuclear threats from hostile neighbors.

3. Comment: Throughout, Zia was friendly and reiterated his strong desire for close relations with the U.S. However, it was clear that he was not at that moment prepared to engage in any substantive discussion on changes in Pakistan's reprocessing policy. I am confident he fully grasped the significance of what I told him about the consequences of the imposition of the Symington Amendment should technology or equipment transfers continue. I am not however so confident that Zia is prepared to intervene decisively to change the course of the French-Pakistani accord in any way that would subject his interim government to criticism that he was tampering with an important political and security decision reached by his predecessor. I believe we have very few allies on the reprocessing issue in Pakistan, with the concerned career government officials firmly committed to purchase of the plant and the military hesitant to change a fundamentally important political decision during its temporary tenure. Unfortunately, in his waning days, Bhutto as part of his anti-American campaign had defined any postponement of the reprocessing contract as tantamount to cancellation, and it is in this context that Zia and his Military Council must weigh the request the United States has placed before them.

4. Assuming, as I think we must for planning purposes, that Zia subsequently will inform me no delay can be envisaged on Pakistan's part in implementation of the contract, we must begin to plan carefully how the US should proceed. We will convey some thoughts for this contingency in a separate message.

**Hummel**

## 257. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, July 12, 1977, 1111Z

7134. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Why the Army Moved—A Retrospective. Ref: Islamabad 6969.<sup>2</sup>

1. One of the most intriguing questions regarding the imposition of martial law on July 5 is why the military chose to act when it did. Negotiations between the PPP and the PNA had not formally broken off and there still seemed to be some possibility of a compromise agreement. Both sides had been making threatening statements, but violence was limited. During the previous weeks of political agitation, the military had clung to its constitutional role and refused to act against the government despite considerable pressure from both the middle ranks and some segments of the public. What happened during the period when talks were being held between the PPP and PNA that led the Army to change its mind?

2. The most important reason for the Army's action appears to be General Zia's belief that the two sides would not be able to reach agreement. He emphasized this in his conversation with the Embassy Office of Defense Representative officer on July 5 (reftel), noting that the two sides distrusted each other completely. He cited PPP rioting in Lahore over the July second weekend as the proximate cause for the take-over, but these were relatively minor incidents. What he must have feared was the outbreak of violence on a large scale if the talks broke down. The PPP had been arming its supporters and Bhutto's political advisor Mustafa Khar had warned that the PPP would strike back if the opposition confronted it in the streets. We have been told that Khar had convinced Bhutto the PPP should "take the offensive" in Punjab. PNA hardliners had responded to Khar's challenge with tough talk, and appeared equally determined to fight it out. The Army undoubtedly saw this as an ominous harbinger of things to come.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770248-0795. Confidential. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6969 from Islamabad, July 7, the Embassy discussed Zia's consolidation of power: "In a brief conversation at a social function on July 6 with Embassy Office of Defense Representative officer, Zia said the decision to assume control was made after the Army had to act in Lahore to stop political rioting during the past weekend. He emphasized that the Army did not wish to govern, which is why it held off for three months to allow time for a political solution." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241-0468)

3. Zia probably believed that the election campaign would be violent even if an agreement was reached. Rather than wait until a deterioration in the security situation necessitated military intervention, he evidently decided to make a preemptive move to save the nation from further turmoil and pave the way for free and fair elections. This gave him the advantage of surprise and enabled him to arrest key leaders of the opposition and government while they were conveniently located in Islamabad. As a side benefit, the Army's image was refurbished: It had been damaged earlier when partial martial law to support Bhutto was imposed on Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi. The public generally greeted the take-over with relief, an indication that they regarded it as both timely and welcome, a plus for the military.

4. Both Zia and sources close to Bhutto have said to us that the PM had been told the Army would not support him again in the streets and that if an impasse in the talks developed, the military would take over. Bhutto had no hint, however, the Army would move early on July fifth, and seemed to believe that he could stay in power as long as he kept the talks going. Zia has told foreign diplomats that the military had contingency plans for a take-over, and all the service chiefs had agreed one of the plans could be implemented whenever Zia thought it necessary. The Army Chief has said that he alone made the decision to move on July 5, certain that he would have the support of the other chiefs and his corps commanders.

5. Bhutto did not want to hold elections and hoped to split the opposition by dragging out the negotiations. This, and his concern that the Army believe there was not a negotiating deadlock, may explain the last minute press conference he called about two hours before he was arrested in which he emphasized that the talks were still open and further meetings would take place. When the take-over first occurred, it was thought by some to be another Bhutto trick, but this notion was quickly dispelled once it was learned that he and his party were really out of power.

6. It is more difficult to assess the position of the PNA and what they may have known of the Army's intentions. Some observers believe the PNA, or at least certain hardliners like Asghar Khan, were out to sabotage any agreement with Bhutto. Others speculate that Asghar had been tipped by friends in the military that the take-over was in preparation and that he imposed further negotiating demands to trigger it off. We do know that the immediate cause of the last negotiating impasse was an additional ten demands—including reportedly the release of Wali Khan—that the PNA made to Bhutto after both negotiating teams had agreed on an accord text. A likely possibility is that the PNA, gifted once again with a blind sense of impending events, made what with hindsight seems to have been the right decision without really knowing it.

7. Zia has said that the most important thing for the Army to do is to hand power back to civilian control as soon as possible. The goodwill that the take-over has engendered for the Army will quickly dissipate if political leaders remain overly long in "protective custody" and elections are delayed. Despite the risks involved in allowing the political process to function again, the Army must remember that the movement which toppled Bhutto could turn against it with equal fury if the Army is not prepared to relinquish power.

Hummel

## 258. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 3, 1977, 1133Z

8981. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With General Zia. Ref: Islamabad 8980<sup>2</sup> (Notal).

1. General Zia, Chief Martial Law Administrator, called me in at 3:00 p.m. local September third. He said he wanted to inform me and the USG that former Prime Minister Bhutto was arrested last night in Karachi. The arrest was carried out by the police, not the military, at the instance of the Lahore High Court that has before it a case of murder in which five other persons have been arrested and Mr. Bhutto appears to be a key figure.

2. General Zia said that the interests of "the state" were involved, but "we preferred to let the private case take its course in the courts". He said he personally did not expect much reaction in the country although Bhutto's party might have some reaction. He said there seemed to be no legal barrier to Bhutto's contesting the election from jail; murder is a non-bailable charge and while the Supreme Court in

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323-1086. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to New Delhi, Kabul, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Tehran, Jidda, Paris, and Peking.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8980 from Islamabad, September 3, the Embassy reported: "Radio Pakistan announced on its 1:00 p.m. news broadcast that former Prime Minister Bhutto was arrested early morning September third in Karachi. Reportedly, Bhutto was picked up on a murder charge being heard before the Lahore High Court. The case involves the shooting death of the father of former National Assembly member and former Bhutto supporter Ahmed Raza Qasuri." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320-0164)



theory could intervene, he did not think they were likely to. Zia gave it as his impression that in any case a large segment of Bhutto's PPP party would contest the elections, and that the other party, the PNA, would remain united, so that effective elections could be held and a reasonably stable government formed.

3. Zia said he had wanted to inform me despite the fact that the arrest of Bhutto is an internal matter because he felt the USG could be interested in the situation and its background. I expressed appreciation that he had informed me of this significant domestic development that was of interest.

4. We assume Ambassadors from other countries important to Pakistan are also being briefed.

Hummel

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**259. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Pakistan—Aid and Proliferation

State and AID are about to sign some \$45 million worth of loans and grants to Pakistan. They are for reasonable, people-oriented projects (\$25 million for fertilizer, \$8 million for rural roads, \$7 million for primary education are the main components). Under terms of the Glenn amendment<sup>2</sup> this is all legal as long as the Pakistanis have received no prohibited nuclear technology since August 4. (They probably haven't; confirmation of this fact is being sought in Paris.)<sup>3</sup> State has informed Glenn, who seems relaxed, and they would preface the signings with a stern lecture to the Pakistanis that this did not indicate any softening in our determination to prevent them from getting a reprocessing plant.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 1977. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 6.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 207904 to Paris, August 31, requested the information. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071-1751)

Hummel, in Islamabad, is of course all in favor of the idea, and failure to sign will be taken poorly by Pakistanis of all stripes.

Looked at from another way, however, what we are doing is exploiting something very near a loophole in our legislation. The government receiving this money has been notably unforthcoming in meeting our non-proliferation concerns. We will sign off a large amount of money with every expectation that the Pakistanis will in short order import some piece of equipment that will trigger Glenn Amendment sanctions. The money will continue to flow, however, since the sanctions apply to commitments, not expenditures. (I wonder if Glenn will stand by his relaxed attitude then!) The press will (with some little justification) claim that the Administration has pulled a fast one, and no matter how stern Hummel's lecture to Zia, I doubt that Zia will be all that impressed.

This makes me frankly uneasy. I have no desire to punish the Pakistanis at this time, least of all in ways that will hurt some pretty poor people. Yet, going ahead as planned seems to offer a tempting target to critics of our proliferation policy and may even decrease our chances of getting the Pakistanis into line.

There should be some way of protecting our flanks on this one—perhaps by holding back on some of the projects, postponing action until there is an elected government in Pakistan, or some mixture of these. I don't think that State has thought this through, and unless you have already discussed this matter with Vance, I believe that you should throw some sand in the machinery. The attached memo<sup>4</sup> seeks to do this.

Tuchman concurs.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you sign the attached memo to Secretary Vance.

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

## 260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 10, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

5. *Franco-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation*: The French have told Ambassador Hartman that DeGuiringaud conveyed to Pakistani Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi on September 7<sup>2</sup> the proposal previously outlined to us on restructuring the French reprocessing plant so it could not produce pure plutonium.<sup>3</sup> Agha Shahi noted the danger of the reprocessing plant becoming an election issue if Bhutto in particular should sense any change in the current status of the project. He would, however, be willing to recommend to General Zia further discussions with the French after the Pakistani elections if, in the meantime, (1) both sides reaffirmed publicly that the present agreement will be carried out; (2) some equipment could be approved by the French for shipment; (3) the US remains opposed to the deal.<sup>4</sup> The French agreed to delay discussions on the restructured plant until after elections, but told Agha Shahi there was no possibility of early transfer of the key equipment,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter wrote: "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 26348 from Paris, September 10, the Embassy reported that the French briefed Hartman on September 9 regarding de Guiringaud's discussion with Shahi about the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing deal. During the conversation, Shahi purportedly "felt it was most necessary that both sides publicly declare that the agreement will be carried out as originally contemplated and that this public posture be maintained at least until the election." According to the report, de Guiringaud indicated that France "would look into the matter to see if a few non-sensitive contracts could be released without jeopardizing the French position on the issue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0254).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 22983 from Paris, August 8, Hartman reported on the August 8 discussion during which de Guiringaud informed him of the French proposal to modify the plans for the reprocessing plant so that it would only create reactor fuel that could not be—without significant effort—repurposed into weapons grade plutonium. According to Hartman: "Irrespective of how the Pakistanis might really feel about that—and whatever the internal pressures might be from the military or other elements of the power structure in Pakistan—the Pakistanis would have to limit their outward protest: otherwise they would be, in effect, admitting to the world that they want the reprocessing plant in order to obtain plutonium." The revised reprocessing plant would cost, according to de Guiringaud, an additional \$10–12 million, which the French expected the United States to help cover. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0297) For the full text of the telegram, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 350.

<sup>4</sup> According to the French, Shahi insisted to de Guiringaud that "the United States must not appear to publicly alter its posture vis-a-vis Pakistan directly or indirectly since this would look as though secret deal had been made." (Telegram 26348 from Paris, September 10; see footnote 2 above)

a chopping machine. They asked our Ambassador about the effect of transfers of other “non-sensitive” equipment on application of the Glenn Amendment.<sup>5</sup>

On Thursday,<sup>6</sup> Joe Nye discussed with Glenn the application of his amendment to Pakistan. Glenn confirmed that so long as no French equipment for the reprocessing plant had been shipped after August 4, the effective date of his amendment, he had no objections to our signing new AID agreements with Pakistan. We have asked the French for assurances that this is the case.

While we understand the Pakistanis’ need for a public “the deal is still on” stance during the election campaign, we would be legally required to apply the Glenn Amendment whenever any future transfers of machinery or equipment take place.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “What is election date?”

<sup>6</sup> September 8.

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## 261. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1977

### PARTICIPANTS

US  
The Secretary  
Under Secretary Philip Habib  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Assistant Secretary George S. Vest  
James F. Dobbins, EUR/WE  
(Notetaker)

FRANCE  
Louis de Guiringaud, Foreign  
Minister  
Francois de Laboulaye, Political  
Director

### *Pakistan and Non-Proliferation*

De Guiringaud related that, in a meeting on September 8 with Pakistani Foreign Minister Aga Shahi,<sup>2</sup> he had told Aga Shahi that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, [untitled folder]. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dobbins; cleared by Vest; approved in S/S. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.

<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 26348 from Paris, September 10, de Guiringaud’s meeting with Shahi took place on September 7. See footnote 2, Document 260.

France had a contract to furnish Pakistan with a plant which was capable of reprocessing used nuclear fuel in a manner that would enable it to be used again to fuel reactors. He had then proposed to have plans for this plant restructured, along the lines de Guiringaud had earlier discussed with Ambassador Hartman.<sup>3</sup> De Guiringaud told Aga Shahi that the French government would, in due course, open conversations with Pakistan to rewrite certain parts of the agreement.

Aga Shahi had been very surprised, de Guiringaud said. De Guiringaud had been forced to endure an hour-long series of complaints about discrimination against Pakistan, vis-a-vis India, in the nuclear field. Aga Shahi had talked about the Canadian and US assistance to India in the nuclear field, including assistance on breeder technology. He claimed that India had been able to become a nuclear power as a result of such assistance. He had insisted that Pakistan must receive treatment comparable to that given India. Something must be done for Pakistan or assistance to India must be cut back.

De Guiringaud said that he had, as a result of this conversation, initiated a study of France's nuclear relationship with India. The Secretary said that he would have a paper prepared for de Guiringaud outlining the current state of the US nuclear relationship with India. He said that the United States had agreed to provide a certain amount of fuel for the Tarapur reactor. The United States had also talked to India about the need to accept full-scope safeguards. The Indians had agreed to consider this seriously. Habib added that there had been some general discussion on this issue with Desai who had indicated that the Indians would not conduct further nuclear tests. The Secretary said that Desai personally had been clear on this, and that he rejected testing. De Guiringaud noted, however, that not all of Desai's subordinates were in agreement with his position, nor was Desai necessarily capable of controlling these people.

De Guiringaud said that Aga Shahi had asked, during the period before the Pakistani elections, that the French government not do anything to give the impression that the contract was not going forward without change. De Guiringaud had agreed to this request. He agreed that if it became known that pressure was being applied on Pakistan this would become an election issue which Bhutto might well make use of. (De Guiringaud also said that Aga Shahi had conveyed a clear impression that he felt that some of the charges against Bhutto, including one of murder, were not without substance.)

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 260.

De Guiringaud asked that the contents of this conversation with Aga Shahi be kept absolutely confidential. The Secretary promised to do so.

De Guiringaud recalled that Ambassador Hartman had asked whether there had been any transfers from France of equipment for the Pakistani reprocessing plant after August 4.<sup>4</sup> He said that the French government had last authorized transfers of such equipment on July 16. Such authorizations were valid for six months, and there was no way of determining within that period when items authorized were shipped.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 259.

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## 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 18, 1977, 1225Z

9348. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Bhutto Arrested by Martial Law Authorities. Ref: Islamabad 9303.<sup>2</sup>

1. The growing confrontation between the Martial Law Administration and former Prime Minister Bhutto took a decisive turn with Bhutto's arrest and General Zia's announcement Bhutto would be tried in a martial law court. It had become increasingly evident in the past week that the MLA was fearful of a pro-Bhutto political upsurge and was determined in one way or another to assure that Bhutto never resumes public office in Pakistan.

2. In his announcement on September 17, Zia said that Bhutto will be tried by a military court and a judgment will be reached before the October 18 election date. Zia said that when he assumed power he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770339-0357. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 9303 from Islamabad, September 15, reported the establishment of a special court in Pakistan, the purpose of which was to try any offense punishable under the 1973 High Treason Act. The telegram also transmitted remarks made by Zia during an interview with an Urdu language newspaper, in which Zia purportedly characterized Bhutto's government as "a Gestapo-style police state." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770334-1105)

pledged he would be fair and impartial. However, the “free press and independent judiciary” had unearthed “serious irregularities” proving the misdeeds of the Bhutto government. Zia contended that the inquiries have shown that during the past five and a half years, “all civil institutions were systematically destroyed,” public funds were used for “personal luxury,” “primitive, inhuman and barbaric methods were employed to crush all dissident elements,” the March elections were “massively rigged,” and the PPP stayed in power without “moral or legal cover.”

3. After reciting the extensive charge sheet, Zia added that Bhutto had said he wanted a fair trial before polls and Zia had decided to oblige him. Consequently, he will be tried before a military court with a verdict before elections. Zia closed by repeating he will not interfere in the civil court cases against Bhutto, that he maintains his neutrality toward all political parties, and that elections will be held October 18.

4. Among the more prominent of Bhutto’s colleagues arrested are PPP Secretary General Bhulam Husain, party Vice President and most prominent leftist Sheikh Rashid, Hafeez Pirzada, former Frontier Chief Ministers Nasrullah Khattak and Jadoon, Baluchistan PPP leader Raisani, and Sind leader Mumtaz Bhutto. All were arrested under a martial law regulation authorizing the detention of anyone acting contrary to the security, public safety or interest of Pakistan. Although there were demonstrations against the arrests in Bhutto’s hometown of Larkana, the country remains generally quiet on the eve of full-scale campaigning.

5. Those arrested are either prominent Bhutto sycophants with no political base or the more leftist of the PPP leadership. The only exceptions are Mumtaz Bhutto, the PM’s cousin, and Jadoon from NWFP. Notable for their absence from the list are Kauser Niazi and other leading members from the conservative faction of the party.

6. Zia obviously hopes the PPP will still contest, but that it will be a PPP emasculated by a martial law conviction of Bhutto and in the hands of more conservative elements of the party. Zia may assume that without Bhutto on the hustings, the party cannot carry the Punjab, and a more conservative PPP would be an acceptable opposition in the new National Assembly.

7. There is little doubt about the outcome of the military trial. First, we think there is probably adequate evidence to demonstrate illegal activity by Bhutto and his colleagues. Second, Zia has already branded Bhutto publicly as guilty of heinous crimes; we do not think a jury of subordinate military officers will disagree. Although no formal charges have yet been filed, we assume they will be closely defined and directed at, for example, misuse of funds and criminal abuses of power rather than broad-brush charges of general treasonous activities. The more

general charges may be raised separately before the special court (reftel) announced earlier to hear treason charges.

8. Zia's answer to the Bhutto political conundrum reflects the General's personality—blunt, direct, quick and lacking in subtlety. However, as a political solution, Bhutto's arrest by the MLA and a military trial have some drawbacks. Bhutto's removal from the political scene by the arm of martial law may leave a long-term legacy of martyrdom and challenges to the legitimacy of any government elected in a process that eliminated Bhutto by questionable means. Another risk remains: That the PPP will continue to be a vehicle for "Bhuttoism" in Pakistan, perhaps under the leadership of Begum Bhutto, and present the MLA with the ultimate challenge by winning the October elections with its martyred leader in jail. Equally improbable scenarios have come to pass in Pakistani politics.

**Hummel**

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**263. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, September 27, 1977, 1219Z

9689. Subject: General Zia's Concern Over Omission of Pakistan From President's Itinerary.<sup>2</sup>

1. Shahnawaz, Acting Head of MFA in the absence of Agha Shahi, told me last night that he had planned to call me in to make some critical observations about President Carter visiting India but not Pakistan. However when Shahnawaz mentioned this intention to Gen. Zia, the latter asked that I come to see him instead. Accordingly I went to see Gen. Zia this afternoon.

2. Shahnawaz had given rather sharp reaction stressing that the people of Pakistan would not understand, because it was well known that in the past US Presidents (we know of no instance of this except

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770351-0816. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Tehran and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Carter was scheduled to travel to five countries, including India and Iran, November 22–December 3. In early November, the trip was postponed. (Charles Mohr, "Carter Postpones Foreign Tour to Deal With Energy Legislation," *New York Times*, November 5, 1977, p. 1) See also Document 86.



President Johnson's airport stop in '66) and other dignitaries had often visited Pakistan, but not India. Also Pakistan was an ally (through CENTO) and India was not, and there would be considerable concern about the long-range intentions of the US Government in the subcontinent.

3. Gen. Zia was somewhat milder but nevertheless pointed in his formulation when I saw him today. He urged that the President also visit Pakistan. Noting that he had seen a useful report from Ambassador Yaqub which explained the reasons for the President's itinerary, General Zia said that Pakistanis believe they are being ignored when they see a schedule that calls for a stop in Iran and three days in India. Zia said Pakistan is "proud of its past association" with the US and would greatly appreciate it if the President's schedule would permit him to come. Zia also said that he hoped a civilian government would be in office by the time of President's trip and that he wanted to extend the invitation on behalf of his successors.

4. In response, I noted my regret that the President's schedule would not permit a visit to Pakistan during the November trip, but emphasized that the visit to India in no way indicated any diminution of US interest in Pakistan.

5. Two hours later, Gen. Zia sent Agha Hilali, (now retired but previously long-time diplomat, Ambassador to Washington and also Agha Shahi's brother) to see me. Hilali and Zia wanted advice whether a special envoy such as himself should be sent to Washington to explain the importance of a visit to Pakistan, however brief. Their intention was to underline that this matter has real and long-range implications for Pakistan's attitudes toward the US. I advised Hilali that no special envoy should go to Washington, pointing out that *de facto* FonMin is in New York, and could make telephone representation to Atherton or the Secretary in Washington if so instructed. I also noted Shahi is scheduled to see the Secretary later.

6. Comment: There is no doubt that the omission of Pakistan from the President's itinerary is keenly felt here. The President's itinerary is already the subject of internal political controversy, with PPP spokesmen claiming the US would not have dared treat Pakistan so shabbily were Bhutto still in power. Zia finds himself in an awkward position during an extremely sensitive time. He has clearly and publicly cast himself in the position of desiring close ties with the US but in the public eye here is seen as rebuffed by the US. At the moment there may be nothing that can be done about the President's schedule. However, if an elected government does assume office here prior to the President's

trip, it would be advisable to reconsider the possibility of adjusting the President's schedule to permit a brief stopover in Pakistan.

7. Other points of interest in meeting with Zia will be sent septel.<sup>3</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 9690 from Islamabad, September 27, Hummel reported that during their September 27 meeting Zia informed him of the existence of evidence that the Soviet Union was interfering in Pakistani internal affairs. Zia also told Hummel that Bhutto's trial needed to be completed before elections could take place, and that he hoped that the trial would be held by October 18. Hummel commented that Zia "left me in some doubt that the case against Bhutto, particularly the martial law case, could be completed before that date." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770351-0832)

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## **264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1977, 0150Z

232989. Exdis, for the Ambassador. Subject: Deferral of New Development Assistance. Refs: (A) Islamabad 7017;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 7274;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 9527.<sup>4</sup>

1. We have reluctantly concluded that under present circumstances we must defer signing new development assistance agreements with Pakistan until we have an opportunity to review the situation with a post-election government. This does not mean that the Glenn Amendment has come into effect since we are not aware of any transfers

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770353-0359. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Coon; cleared in OES, AID, S/S-O, and by Farley, Nye, and Oplinger; approved by Dubs.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 256.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 7274 from Islamabad, July 17, reported the MLA's formal response to Hummel's July 9 démarche (see Document 256), which indicated that, due to its temporary nature, the military government was not in a position to make any decision on the nuclear reprocessing issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770254-0602)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 9527 from Islamabad, September 22, reported the MFA's September 21 inquiry about the status of a fertilizer loan and whether other "unsigned AID funds will be lost at the end of this fiscal year." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770346-0350)

of reprocessing equipment since August 4, the effective date of the amendment.<sup>5</sup> However, the public reaffirmation in Paris that the reprocessing deal will go forward<sup>6</sup> places us in a untenable position on new agreements now with the Congress and the public. If, shortly after we were to sign off on nearly 45 million dollars worth of pending loans plus additional grants, further transfers were to take place, not only would Glenn immediately come into effect but the adverse congressional reaction could extend to other areas with more severe consequence for bilateral relations.

2. In view of this decision, AID has taken action to authorize pending loans, which means that funds will be available in FY 78, when and if we are able to sign new agreements after elections. Grant money cannot be carried over, but we would consider reprogramming projects in the next fiscal year. AID will provide specific details in a separate message.

3. The question which now arises is how we manage the issue of an AID deferral over the next few weeks until we can have substantive discussions with a Pakistani Government. In this regard, we must rely heavily on your judgment since you are closer to the scene, although, as you are aware, we may need to deal with the question in upcoming talks with Pakistanis here and in New York. In this regard, we would like to lay out some of the considerations as seen from here.

4. It would obviously be desirable to avoid to the extent possible a public debate, particularly during the election campaign, which could foreclose the possibility of a constructive dialogue with a post-election government. At the same time, the GOP should be aware of the seriousness of our concern over the reprocessing issue and that, while we hope to move ahead with aid agreements after elections, any transfers of reprocessing equipment in the meantime would preclude this possibility by bringing the Glenn Amendment into effect.

5. We have been struck by the fact that in recent weeks Pakistani officials both here and in Islamabad have been remarkably reticent about asking questions on pending AID agreements. We conclude that there may be some disposition at the senior levels of the GOP, who are familiar with the current status of aid, not to ask the question since they would prefer not to receive a formal answer. We wonder if the

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 6.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 260. On September 8, the French Government gave a "seemingly irrevocable pledge to proceed with the controversial sale of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant to Pakistan, a move many countries fear might enable that poor, populous and politically unstable nation to acquire atomic weapons." After his meeting with Shahi, de Giringaud reportedly said, "I have confirmed to Mr. Shahi that this contract will be honored by France." (Paul Lewis, "Pakistan Atom Deal Affirmed by France," *New York Times*, September 9, 1977, p. 45)

present *de facto* deferral, left unstated and unacknowledged, as difficult as this may be to live with, might not be preferable from both our points of views as a means of keeping the issue out of the election campaign. In other words, there may be some merit in continuing our present stance unless directly queried at a high level.

6. On the other hand, we noted (reftel C) that an MFA official on September 21 inquired about the fertilizer loan. The subject of pending aid agreements may also come up during call by Finance Secretary Kazi on Governor Gilligan September 30 or at the Agha Shahi bilateral with the Secretary on October 7. Moreover, we suppose that there may be practical considerations in Islamabad which militate in favor of clarifying the situation with the GOP. Nevertheless, we see real dangers in having our decision on deferral become an election issue.

7. On balance we see some advantage in leaving our position unstated, but we believe you are in the best position to make this judgment and, if you determine otherwise, to decide on the timing and the level of an approach to the GOP. If you believe that an approach is desirable, the following points should be drawn upon. We will await word from you before including these same points on a contingency basis in the briefing materials for Governor Gilligan and the Secretary for use if the question of pending aid agreements is raised by the Pakistanis.

—It is our most earnest desire to continue and to strengthen the cooperative relations which have existed between our two countries for so many years. One of the pillars of this relationship has been our ability to discuss mutual problems frankly and openly.

—As the Government of Pakistan is aware, President Carter attaches the highest importance to the goal of limiting the spread of nuclear explosive capability. The Congress shares his concern and in August passed legislation, known as the Glenn Amendment, which supersedes the Symington Amendment. The Glenn Amendment provides similar sanctions against the provision of US development and security assistance to countries which receive from abroad reprocessing equipment, technology or materials after the date of enactment, which was August 4.

—We understand the position of General Zia that his is an interim regime which must leave policy decisions on the reprocessing issue to an elected government. We also appreciated the willingness of the Pakistanis to discuss the question with Dr. Nye in late July<sup>7</sup> and we look forward to pursuing these discussions with a post-election government.

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 7765 from Islamabad, July 31, transmitted the proceedings of Nye's July 30 meeting with MFA officials in Islamabad. As to the results of the meeting, Hummel reported: "Although we did not achieve breakthrough on reprocessing issue—and did not think we would—meeting was held in open atmosphere, and it is evident both sides want to find a way out of the reprocessing quandary." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274-0450)

—In the meantime, however, we feel constrained to defer decisions on pending aid agreements until such discussions can take place. We believe that this is consistent with General Zia’s understandable desire to leave such policy decisions to a new government. In view of the election schedule, it is our hope that the deferral of aid will not need to be prolonged more than a few weeks.

—Our current deferral of aid does not mean the Glenn Amendment has come into effect and we hope that it will be possible to move ahead after talks with a new government. Of course, in the meantime, the GOP should be aware that if there are transfers of any equipment subsequent to August 4, signing new agreements would not be possible since the Glenn Amendment would automatically apply.

—We would like to assure the GOP that the pending aid loans for FY 77 have been authorized and thus the funds would carry over into our new fiscal year. Although grants cannot be carried over, we would consider reprogramming them next year. PL 480 would not be affected by the Glenn Amendment and we are hopeful about early action on some pending requests.

—We are sure that the martial law regime shares our desire to maintain cordial relations and our hope that nothing will transpire which would foreclose the possibility of continuing our dialogue with a successor government.

8. We are sending contingency press guidance by septe<sup>8</sup> and would appreciate your comments.<sup>9</sup>

Vance

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<sup>8</sup> Telegram 232987 to Islamabad, September 28, offered contingency press guidance on the deferral of development assistance for Pakistan. The points emphasized that aid had not been cut off and that the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was not in effect. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770353–0353)

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 9733 from Islamabad, September 28, the Embassy concurred with the conclusion that the Pakistani Government was “reluctant to press” the issue of loans, adding that Zia was “aware that funds for loans, which cannot be signed in this fiscal year, are being held over until next fiscal year.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770353–0053)

## 265. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 7, 1977, 2329Z

Secto 10065. For S/S-S. Subject: Secretary's Conversation With Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 7.

1. Summary: Agha Shahi stressed Pakistan's concerns about the President's visit to India without a stopover in Pakistan. The visit, coupled with recent US statements on Indian preeminence in the sub-continent, could lead Delhi to conclude that the US/Pakistan connection had been weakened. Given Pakistan's military vulnerability, he felt it important that the GOI understand that the US/Pakistan link remains strong. He reported that Pakistan had proposed a joint declaration by South Asian nations that they would not develop or use nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis also asked us to reconsider our position on a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone (SANFZ).<sup>2</sup> The Secretary strongly reaffirmed our belief in sovereign equality of nations and the importance we attach to our relations with Pakistan. He also reviewed the status of the negotiations on SALT and the Middle East. He undertook to reexamine our position on SANFZ. End summary.

2. The Secretary met with Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in New York on October 7. Shahi was accompanied by Pakistan Ambassador to the UN Iqbal Akhund, Ambassador Yaqub Khan and Mr. Naik from the Foreign Ministry. Under Secretary Habib, Assistant Secretary Atherton and Country Director Jane Coon were also present.

3. Agha Shahi conveyed to the Secretary greetings from General Zia and said the General looked forward to a visit by the Secretary whenever he was traveling to the sub-continent or at any other convenient time. The Secretary expressed appreciation, but regretted he would be unable to stop off during his forthcoming trip with the President.

4. In response to a question, the Secretary said that we had made progress on SALT and narrowed differences with the Soviets on some major issues. In his judgment these issues would be resolved although he was not sure how soon. He was firmly of the opinion that we would reach an agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770367-0494. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to the Department of State, Colombo, Dacca, Kathmandu, and New Delhi. Vance was in New York to attend the 32nd United Nations General Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 82.

5. On the Middle East, the Secretary said we have been making some progress, slow progress, but we believe all parties want to enter into serious negotiations and go to Geneva. They are willing to find ways around the obstacles rather than magnify them. However, he does not minimize the problems which we will be confronting. Agha Shahi wished us every success and expressed gratification on the progress made.

6. Agha Shahi referred to the luncheon hosted by President Carter on October 5 for Asian Chiefs of State and Heads of UN delegations.<sup>3</sup> He said he had reported to General Zia the President's personal greetings and his remarks that General Zia was doing a fine job in the face of great difficulties. According to Shahi, when he said he was sorry that Pakistan would not have the pleasure of welcoming the President, the President responded that he could come back.

7. Shahi went on to say that he was sure that Ambassador Hummel had reported General Zia's invitation to the President to stop over in Islamabad and the concerns of the people of Pakistan that this would be the first time an American President had visited India without stopping in Pakistan. He cited the long alliance relationship and underscored Pakistan's concerns with both substance and the appearance of the visit, seeing it as heralding a new chapter in US foreign policy. The visit, coupled with recent US statements including that of our Ambassador in Delhi, are causing great anxiety.<sup>4</sup> He also mentioned the exchange of letters between President Carter and Prime Minister Desai leading up to the visit,<sup>5</sup> noting that Pakistan will have no way of knowing what transpires and therefore no way of correcting any slanted picture given by the Indian Prime Minister. Shahi felt it important that India not draw the wrong conclusions for the Presidential visit, namely that the US/Pakistan connection has been weakened. For 30 years the US has been Pakistan's primary connection, with China the second important connection in more recent years. He noted Pakistan's military vulnerability given the preoccupation of the armed forces with

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<sup>3</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter hosted a working lunch with Asian Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegations to the UN from 1:12 to 2:18 p.m. on October 5 at USUN. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

<sup>4</sup> From a September 26 interview with Goheen, the *New York Times* reported: "For one thing, he said, the United States has now acknowledged that 'India is clear and away the pre-eminent nation on the subcontinent,' and has stopped trying to treat Pakistan as India's equal, which 'was a terrific cause of friction between India and ourselves. Whether you look at it in geographical terms, in military terms or in economic terms, India and Pakistan really aren't competitors anymore, so that the game we played for many years of trying to balance one off against the other, greatly influenced by concern about Russia—that's a dead game.'" ("Goheen Sees U.S. Ties With India Improving," *New York Times*, September 27, 1977, p. 13)

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 80 and 84.



internal matters and their inability to rebuild adequately after our arms embargo. Indian policy toward Pakistan is now correct, but it is important that the GOI understand that the US/Pakistan tie remains strong. He also indicated anxiety over Soviet policies, noting that they seemed to be intervening internally in support of the PPP.

8. The Secretary referred to Agha Shahi's comments about remarks by US officials where the word preeminence was used with respect to India. He wished to make it very clear that we believe in the sovereign equality of all nations. He felt, as does the President, that nations large and small can take leadership roles. There was no intention to single out India as a leader vis-a-vis Pakistan. We want no one to draw the conclusion that we do not regard a strong and vital relationship with Pakistan as important to us. We will make it clear to India that our relations with Pakistan are in no way weakened. Pakistan has our support and good will and we attach great importance to the relationship. The Secretary added that he wished there was some way to add another stop in the President's itinerary, but this was not possible given the time constraints. We will do everything possible to see that the omission is not interpreted as downgrading our relations with Pakistan. Agha Shahi said he was grateful for the Secretary's comments and would report them to General Zia.

9. Shahi went on the express concern about Indian nuclear capability given its independent fuel cycle. Pakistan has been convinced that India is going for a weapons option. Shahi said the GOP has proposed that the countries of South said [*Asia*] make a joint declaration that they would neither develop nor use nuclear weapons. There had been no positive response from the Gandhi government, but yesterday he raised the matter with Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee who assured him that Desai had strong moral convictions on this issue. Vajpayee undertook to raise the subject with the Prime Minister. (Naik later told us that Pakistan had approached other South Asian nations with the proposal including Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka—the latter before the change of government. He made a clear distinction between this proposal and both the SANFZ resolution and the suggested “no-war” pact.<sup>6</sup>) Ambassador Akhund raised the question of

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 3453 from Islamabad, April 9, the Embassy informed the Department: “In case anyone has been holding his breath, we must report that PM Bhutto has rejected Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's recent renewal of India's long-standing offer of a no-war pact. Speaking to newsmen at Lahore airport April 8, Bhutto stated that without the settlement of the Kashmir issue or the provision for a self-executing or mandatory machinery, a no-war pact would mean acceptance of the status-quo. As Bhutto noted, this position is a reiteration of a line the Paks have consistently taken toward the no-war pact offer.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770124-0676)



the US attitude toward the South Asia Nuclear Free Zone (SANFZ) and saw some inconsistencies in the US stance on non-proliferation and its position that the parties concerned should consult with each other. He asked that we reconsider our position since by supporting SANFZ we could thereby signal to the GOI our seriousness of purpose on non-proliferation.

10. The Secretary said that nuclear matters had been an area of difference with India; that we have been discussing them and would be discussing them during the visit. On SANFZ, the Secretary said he would look into the matter personally.

11. Shahi welcomed the President's speech in the UNGA, noting particularly the section on arms sales.<sup>7</sup> He hoped we would take into account indigenous production capabilities so that our policy does not leave some countries virtually defenseless. He thought we should give equal weight in our decisions to the extent to which some countries are accumulating arms. He referred to our decision on the A-7's,<sup>8</sup> noting that 100 A-7's would scarcely give Pakistan the capability to conquer India. In any event, he hoped we would continue to act on pending Pakistan requests for arms. The Secretary said he understood there had been no interruption and the processing of requests was proceeding normally. Ambassador Yaqub Khan confirmed that this was substantially correct.

12. The Secretary thanked Shahi for the congratulatory letters on the Panama Canal Treaty,<sup>9</sup> and also spoke highly of Ambassador Akhund's leadership of the Group of 77. The Secretary said he had a great personal interest in the North/South dialogue and he would be picking up discussions soon with Jamaica. An important UNCTAD meeting is

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<sup>7</sup> In his October 4 address to the 32nd United Nations General Assembly, Carter said: "For our part, the United States has now begun to reduce its arms exports. Our aim is to reduce both the quantity and the deadliness of the weapons that we sell. We have already taken the first few steps, but we cannot go very far alone. Nations whose neighbors are purchasing large quantities of arms feel constrained to do the same. Supplier nations who practice restraint in arms sales sometimes find that they simply lose valuable commercial markets to other suppliers." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, p. 1719) The full text of Carter's address is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 56.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4, Document 251.

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

coming up and we must continue to devote a great deal of attention to this.<sup>10</sup>

Vance

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<sup>10</sup> Telegram Secto 10063 from USUN, October 7, reported that at the end of their October 7 meeting, Shahi asked to speak to Vance alone, with only Yaqub Kahn present. Shahi raised with Vance the nuclear reprocessing issue, noting that it had "become such a political issue in Pakistan that the interim government cannot change the Pakistani position." Shahi said Pakistan was prepared "to do anything to show that it had no nuclear weapons intentions." However, when Vance "asked if this meant that Pakistan was prepared to accept full scope safeguards," Shahi did not answer and shifted the conversation to Indian nuclear policy. Later, when Vance asked about Pakistani-French relations, Shahi replied that "the French were delaying implementation of the reprocessing agreement, claiming that they have certain administrative problems. In any case, he said, they are not shipping anything to Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072-1992, N770006-0296)

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## 266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 9, 1977, 2116Z

243490. Cherokee for Ambs Hartman and Hummel only. Subject: Pakistani Reprocessing: Meeting Between Secretary and de Guiringaud.

1. De Guiringaud, accompanied by de Laboulaye, called on Secretary in New York to report on his latest meeting with Agha Shahi on Pakistan reprocessing plant. De Guiringaud recalled that when he had seen Agha Shahi in Paris September 8,<sup>2</sup> he had proposed modifying the blueprint to change the proposed plant from a reprocessing to a co-processing plant, the final phase of which would produce reactor fuel but no weapons grade plutonium. At that time Agha Shahi had no satisfactory answer to the question of what Pakistan would do with plutonium produced by the reprocessing plant. He had simply reiterated that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons intentions and would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0684, N770006-0337. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad. Drafted by Atherton; cleared in S/S-O; approved by Atherton. On October 10, this telegram was repeated to the White House. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 261.

accept any additional safeguards, had made much of the argument of discrimination between Pakistan and India, had thrown in arguments about South Africa, Brazil and Japan, and had stressed that Pakistan was the only state in the region resisting the Soviets. Agha Shahi had promised, however, to report the French proposal to his government for study and to provide a reply to the French in New York.

2. De Guiringaud said he had now had a meeting in New York with Agha Shahi (accompanied by the Pakistani Perm Rep plus two others). Agha Shahi had reported that the Pakistani interim military government had decided that the French proposal was not repeat not acceptable. While reiterating Pakistan's peaceful intentions, he said Pakistan had contracted for a certain type of plant and was not prepared to change it. This time, de Guiringaud continued, Agha Shahi had an answer to the question of what it would do with the plutonium. He said it was needed for use in reactors Pakistan was building or planning to build. According to Agha Shahi, Pakistan had ordered a 600 megawatt light-water reactor, had a 180 megawatt reactor under construction and planned to order another one.

3. De Guiringaud told the Secretary this answer was not repeat not satisfactory. The reprocessing plant would produce 100 kilograms of plutonium per year. Pakistan would need six 600 megawatt reactors to use the reprocessing plant to full capacity. Furthermore, his experts had told him that the use of pure plutonium in such reactors has never been tried and is still in the developmental stage. It was therefore clear that the proposed reprocessing plant had no economic purpose.

4. De Guiringaud said it had been foolish to sign the agreement with Pakistan but this had taken place at a time when no one was focusing on the proliferation problem. He said that he and President Giscard want to get out of this contract; the question was how. When the French had said publicly they would keep their commitment to Pakistan, they had meant their commitment to build "a" plant.

5. De Guiringaud said France was not prepared to transfer any equipment for the reprocessing plant until Pakistan had signed other contracts with France (he mentioned an auto plant and aircraft specifically). Even then, he said, France would not permit the transfer of anything which was not available on the open market (e.g., pumps). No sensitive equipment would be transferred.

6. De Guiringaud said that the next play was now up to the United States. The military regime in Pakistan would face difficulty in a few weeks. France, he said, had no confidence in General Zia. In this connection, he recounted a conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Khalatbary, who had expressed great concern about possible Indian and Soviet moves leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The Secretary said he had found both the Indian and the Afghan Foreign Ministers

very concerned about Pakistan, fearing that things were heading for a mess but no one saw any way to turn things around.

7. De Laboulaye commented that since Pakistan needed help for its army, the U.S. had a means of influencing Pakistan. The Secretary noted that we have been continuing our military supply to Pakistan and have a substantial economic assistance program. We do have leverage, he said, and will have to take a hard look at how we deal with this problem.

8. De Guiringaud concluded by saying that France would make no moves without getting in touch with the U.S. He strongly requested that this conversation be most closely held. The Secretary assured him that it would be.

Christopher

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**267. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 12, 1977

SUBJECT

Information Items

*Pakistani Diplomatic Drive on Reprocessing Plant:* Pakistan is engaged in a diplomatic drive to protect its agreement with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Islamabad is also trying to reduce the likelihood that the upcoming International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) meeting will be used as a vehicle to threaten the agreement.<sup>2</sup>

In recent discussions with officials of several countries and international organizations, the Pakistanis have been pointing out the "unwis-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily Report File, Box 4, 10/1/77–10/15/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.

<sup>2</sup> At the initiative of the United States, an international organizing conference, held in Washington October 19–21, 1977, established the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The organization sought to promote the use of peaceful nuclear energy while combating nuclear proliferation. The INFCE provided technical analysis to member governments, the results of which took the form of policy suggestions regarding peaceful cooperation on nuclear energy production and related safeguards and controls. Various working groups and steering committees met from 1977 until 1980. (R. Skjöldebrand, "The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation—INFCE," *IAEA Bulletin*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1980, pp. 30–33)

dom” of the U.S. putting more pressure on Islamabad. They have been stressing the idea that the issue has become one of national sovereignty and honor, making it impossible for any Pakistani government or leader to give up the plant or acquiesce in non-implementation of the agreement with France.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] Pakistan’s UN delegate told Secretary General Waldheim [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for example, that, if the U.S. continued to apply pressure, relations with the U.S. would be wrecked, with adverse consequences for the stability of South Asia.

—Pakistan has also asserted that the safeguards imposed by France make it impossible for Pakistan to achieve a military nuclear capability, and that, in any case, it would be inconceivable for Pakistan to “defy the whole world” by using plutonium for military purposes.

—Pakistan has also been attempting to enlist the support of other countries in convincing France to stand by the reprocessing plant agreement. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Paks have asked Saudi Prince Faysal to use his influence to impress upon France the need to honor its commitment to Pakistan so that France’s agreements with other countries will not come into question.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

## 268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 26, 1977, 0135Z

255592. Cherokee, for the Ambassador. Subject: Reprocessing Plant and the Question of Aid. Ref: Islamabad 10226.<sup>2</sup>

1. We have carefully considered your recommendation that we resume aid to Pakistan. We agree that to the best of our knowledge, there has been no violation of the Glenn Amendment, and that there are persuasive economic and political reasons for resumption.

2. As you pointed out, prior consultation with key congressional leaders would be essential. Unfortunately, we see no way to avoid risking a leak which would embarrass the French, by suggesting that they were not fulfilling their commitment.

3. Moreover, the administration is extremely anxious to have the non-proliferation policy bill<sup>3</sup> passed during this session of Congress but the situation on the Hill is fragile. Consultations leading to resumption of aid to Pakistan, in face of the publicly stated intentions of both the French and Pakistanis to move ahead on the reprocessing contract, could be used to delay passage of this legislation which is critical to our non-proliferation efforts worldwide.

4. We, therefore, have concluded that we should continue our aid deferral for the time being, but we will review the situation again in two to three weeks.

5. Nevertheless, we agree you should approach Zia, particularly to disabuse him of any misunderstanding about the Glenn Amendment and to reaffirm our continuing desire for close relations and that resolution of the reprocessing issue would facilitate our ability to be helpful. You should draw on the following points:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2300. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Paris. Drafted by Coon; cleared in S/AS and S/S-O, and by Sullivan, Nye, Oplinger, Dobbins, Nosenzo, and Atherton; approved by Vance. On October 26, this telegram was repeated to the White House. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 10226 from Islamabad, October 14, the Embassy reported that since the French supply of nuclear reprocessing equipment to Pakistan was stopped—thus fulfilling U.S. objectives—and the Glenn Amendment, “as far as we know,” was not violated, continuing “the current suspension of new economic assistance places us in a punitive posture, when that is no longer appropriate, and adds unnecessarily to the strong negative currents that are plaguing US-Pak relations at this time.” Thus, the Embassy recommended, aid to Pakistan should resume. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2288, N770006-0430)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which Carter transmitted to Congress on April 27. He signed the bill on March 10, 1978. See Document 6.

—Affirm our desire for close relations with Pakistan and our support for its national sovereignty and peaceful development.

—Suggest our awareness of their security concerns, and indicate interest in the proposal for a South Asian joint declaration on nuclear weapons mentioned by Agha Shahi to the Secretary.

—Restate unequivocally our concern about the reprocessing plant in the context of the danger of nuclear competition in the subcontinent which would not contribute to the security of any of the parties.

—Explain the Glenn Amendment and its implications for both development assistance and the military training program (IMET).

—(If asked about the status of aid) note that we are continuing to review the situation, but that we face a difficult problem given Pakistan's stated intention of proceeding with the reprocessing contract. We note, however, Agha Shahi's remark to the Secretary that no equipment is currently being shipped.<sup>4</sup> We would hope the Pakistanis could refrain from pressing for transfer of equipment since any transfers after August 4 automatically bring the Glenn Amendment into effect. (If Zia asks for details, you may inform him that 44 million dollars worth of loans have been authorized; the grant aid can be reprogrammed.)

6. FYI. You should not suggest that the GOP undertake further discussions with the French on modification of the reprocessing plant contract. The Pakistani rejection of the French proposal is a potentially positive outcome from our point of view since it clearly signals their desire for plutonium and therefore could lead France to cancel the project. We have grave doubts that co-processing could meet our non-proliferation concerns and strongly prefer that Pakistan obtain no reprocessing technology or equipment from abroad.

7. FYI. Ambassador Yaqub Khan has requested an appointment with Governor Gilligan to discuss aid. We propose to suggest to Yaqub Khan that he meet instead toward the end of this week with Assistant Secretary Atherton and AID Assistant Administrator Sullivan. Atherton and Sullivan will draw on the above talking points in their discussion here.

Vance

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 10, Document 265.

## 269. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, November 1, 1977, 0733Z

10778. Subject: Reprocessing; Comments on Ambassador's Conversation With General Zia, October 29. Ref: Islamabad 10710.<sup>2</sup>

1. As promised reftel, the following observations are offered on my conversation with Gen. Zia on reprocessing.

(a) If we or Washington had any lingering hopes that we could persuade Martial Law Administration to back off reprocessing issue, the hard line taken by Zia and his most senior civilian advisers should end them. I think there are two reasons for Zia's inflexibility. The first is the internal political difficulty of changing past policies. But secondly, Gen. Zia and his advisers share the nearly unanimous opinion here that reprocessing offers the prospect of a fundamental gain in Pakistan's search for security vis-a-vis India. This has become an accepted article of faith which will not be shaken by logical arguments to the contrary.

(b) We will not move the GOP on the reprocessing issue either by pressure or inducement, and if we are to succeed in obtaining cancellation of the contract, it will have to be through the French. I believe that a future civilian government here will prove as intractable as the present one.

(c) In dealing with the French, I hope we can continue to hammer home our conviction that Pakistan's purpose in acquiring reprocessing is to obtain a nuclear explosive capability. Public statements by political leaders and newspaper editorials often address the reprocessing plant in terms of Pakistan's security requirements. We will continue to keep the Dept. posted on these statements for whatever use can be made of them.

(d) Cancellation by the French will be a sharp blow to Pakistan's self-esteem and to its sense of security. While there will be resentment against the French, the U.S. will be the principal object of widespread popular wrath and official dismay. We believe it is preferable to go through this difficult period while the Martial Law Administration is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 10710 from Islamabad, October 30, transmitted the details of Hummel's October 29 meeting with Zia, Agha Shahi, and an MFA official referred to as "SecGen in Chief Bhulam Ishaq Khan." Hummel reported that although he carried out instructions from the Department of State to discuss the nuclear fuel reprocessing issue (see Document 268), he "could not shake Pak determination to proceed with reprocessing contract." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2295)



in power, rather than experiencing it with a new elected government a year hence. A new government with no responsibility for the reprocessing issue would start off with a cleaner slate in its dealings with the US and we would have fresh opportunities to rebuild our relationship. I hope this timing aspect can be borne in mind in urging the French towards settlement of this problem.

2. In our next approach to the French, I think it would be useful to brief the GOF on my conversation with Zia, emphasizing our conclusions that the GOP is unlikely to cooperate voluntarily in terminating the reprocessing contract and that the GOI purpose, shared by Zia, continues to be development of a nuclear explosives option.

3. Recommend this be repeated to Paris.

Hummel

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**270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 26, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. *Pakistan*. It is becoming clear to Pakistan that it will not receive from the French the necessary transfers to complete its reprocessing plant. The French have indicated privately that they will not transfer to Pakistan technology that will produce weapons usable material, and instead will offer to study development of a more proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In a November 12 memorandum, Vance informed Carter that "although the public position of their government remains unchanged, reports from our Embassies in Paris and Islamabad make it increasingly evident that France will not proceed with transfers for the Pakistani reprocessing plant. Furthermore, in private conversations with Gerry Smith and Joe Nye this week, Andre Giraud, head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, confirmed that France will not transfer to Pakistan technology that will produce weapons usable material. France will only offer to study with Pakistan the development of a safeguardable reprocessing technology." (Ibid.) In a meeting with Carter on January 5, 1978, Giscard "said that he would not authorize the shipment of sensitive material to Pakistan but that this matter presented great difficulties for him internally. The Pakistanis are pressing for deliveries under the contract and he wished to avoid any explanation of this problem at the present time." See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 361.

The Zia Government does not appear to desire a confrontation with us over the reprocessing plant and seems inclined to minimize the political impact and publicity of the French decision. Acting Foreign Minister Agha Shahi admitted in a press backgrounder in Karachi recently that the reprocessing deal is not going well. He also told the press that there is no evidence to support former Prime Minister Bhutto's claim of US interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.

We are exploring various approaches, including aid decisions and assistance in meeting Pakistan's energy needs, that might be viewed by Pakistanis as positive US steps to infuse our relations with a new, more cooperative tone.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "ok."

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## 271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 2, 1978, 0251Z

29943. Exdis for Ambassador. Subject: General Zia's Letter to President Carter.

1. On January 31 Pak Embassy delivered following letter for President Carter from General Zia:

Quote:

Dear Mr. President, Ambassador Hummel has conveyed the message you were good enough to send to me while overflying Pakistan on the conclusion of your visit to India.<sup>2</sup> I thank you for it and for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780053-0938. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Berry; cleared by Thornton and Dubs and in S/S-O; approved by Mulligan.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 13060 to Islamabad, January 3, transmitted Carter's brief message to Zia: "As I depart South Asia, I want to extend to you and the citizens of Pakistan my warmest greetings. The people of Pakistan and the United States have a history of long, close and mutually beneficial relations. That tie is strengthened by our shared belief that for the sovereign equality, security and integrity of every nation is essential for world peace and stability. Support for the territorial integrity, development and independence of Pakistan remains an enduring principle of American foreign policy." Carter also expressed admiration for Pakistani efforts to normalize South Asian relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780005-0254) Carter visited India January 1-3; see Documents 90-92.

your kind words about my country's role in the international field and specially in regard to the normalization of relations among the states of South Asia.

We are disappointed that you could not come to Pakistan during your recent tour of seven countries.<sup>3</sup> I venture to hope that before long there would be an opportunity for you to visit Pakistan. I assure you of a warm and enthusiastic reception.

We welcome the reaffirmation of American support for the territorial integrity, development and independence of Pakistan and the assurance of abiding U.S. friendship for Pakistan which reflect the true spirit of the mutuality of interests and the close and enduring ties that link our two countries. Your declaration that the sovereign equality, security and integrity of every nation is essential for world peace and stability will be widely acclaimed both for its substance and timeliness. It will help promote a correct perception of U.S. policies in South Asia.

Mr. President, we appreciate and admire your profound regard for human rights and democratic values. This is a concern we share with you in a very real way. I am making strenuous efforts for an early restoration of our democratic institutions. Continued moral support of friends such as the United States will help us in achieving this goal speedily.

With my warm personal regards and assurances of highest esteem and consideration. General (M. Zia-ul-Haq) Unquote.

2. We are considering appropriate reply.<sup>4</sup>

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> From December 29, 1977, through January 6, 1978, Carter visited Poland, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Belgium.

<sup>4</sup> In a February 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff argued in favor of sending a response from Carter to Zia's letter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence With Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78–7/79) In a February 8 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton noted that the opposition to sending a response at the working level in the Department of State had initially been overcome at a higher level, but Hummel had subsequently recommended against sending a response from Carter. Although he still thought a response could be useful, Thornton declined to oppose and agreed that "we should do nothing at this time that might even remotely run the risk of upsetting the French in their maneuvers to disengage from the reprocessing plant." Aaron approved Thornton's recommendation that he advise the Department of State that a reply would not be necessary. (Ibid.) The text of Hummel's recommendation was repeated in telegram 32955 to Paris and the White House, February 8. (Ibid.)

## 272. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 19, 1978, 0913Z

2704. Subject: Bhutto Death Sentence. Ref: (A) Islamabad 2692;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 60396.<sup>3</sup>

1. I today conveyed to Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz message to Gen Zia authorized by Dept concerning death sentence for Bhutto, reading the following text at dictation speed:

Quote Pakistan's judicial procedures are of course the responsibility of the GOP, and I have no desire to intervene in such internal affairs. However I and my government have legitimate interest in any factors that affect US/GOP relations. Therefore I am in my proper sphere of activity when I speak for my government and say that the execution of Mr. Bhutto would be very badly received in the U.S. and would be a matter of serious concern to the USG. I hope you will keep this reaction in mind, as well as the probable adverse reactions of other countries, as you consider the desirability of executive clemency, if the Supreme Court upholds the death penalty. Unquote.

2. Shahnawaz said he would immediately convey it to Gen. Zia. Shahnawaz refrained from comment except to point out that judicial procedures including appeal to Supreme Court were beyond power of executive branch to influence. I replied that text of demarche indicated clear understanding of this point, referring as it did to executive clemency.

3. My staff and I are getting questions from friendly Ambassadors asking what USG intends to do. I have told only British Charge in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780121-0949. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2692 from Islamabad, March 18, the Embassy reported that Bhutto, who was convicted of murder on March 18 and sentenced to death, had 5 days to file an appeal of his sentence. The Embassy suggested that the United States should publicly announce that it had made a *démarche* to the Pakistani Government after it had done so. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780120-1030) Telegram 2081 from Islamabad, March 1, transmitted the text of the proposed *démarche*. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-1790) Under a March 3 covering memorandum, Thornton sent the Embassy's proposed *démarche* to Brzezinski and wrote that it was a "good idea." Brzezinski indicated his agreement by writing "ok" on the memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 99, Evening Reports: 6-7/78)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 60396 to Islamabad, March 9, the Department concurred with the Embassy's proposed text of a *démarche* that Hummel would make to the Government of Pakistan if Bhutto were sentenced to death. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176-1377)

strict confidence, and do not intend to tell anyone else unless Dept so authorizes me or makes public acknowledgement of demarche as recommended in reftel (A). Several Ambassadors hope their governments will weigh in on side of clemency. West European group discussed the matter at a meeting today, with most Ambs deciding to recommend private, unpublicized demarches to GOP. PRC Amb told me last night he thought death penalty is not appropriate, but that imprisonment would be; he did not say whether PRC will convey that thought to GOP. Demarches having greatest effective weight would be those of Saudis and Iranians, if they decide to do so.

4. Department repeat as desired.

Hummel

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**273. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 21, 1978, 0520Z

2812. Subject: Review of Reprocessing Issue.

1. GOP budget and AID programming cycles will require us to make hard decisions on FY 78 aid program by early May. With completion of French elections,<sup>2</sup> I hope Dept will undertake new talks with French aimed at cancellation of Pakistan nuclear reprocessing plant contract. If that maximum goal remains elusive, I would hope that we could persuade the GOF: (a) to continue its moratorium on transfer of reprocessing equipment or technology<sup>3</sup> and (b) to agree that the US should now undertake consultations with the Congress leading to a resumption of aid lending to Pakistan. Our commitments to GOF, about avoiding actions and statements, presumably terminate with passage of elections, and while we will want to stay in step with GOF where possible, we have our own interests in Pakistan.

2. In urging (b) above on the GOF, we should argue that we are now nearing the point where we will lose the entire FY 78 program of aid (some \$52 millions) for Pakistan if we do not move ahead;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780130–0977, D780124–0599. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> The French elections took place on March 12 and March 18.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 270.

without movement now we will find it extremely difficult to maintain our AID mission here in a state of readiness. Further delay would also make it virtually impossible to make rational preparations for an eventual FY 79 program. All this would have important adverse effects on US/GOP relations, including our ability to support nonproliferation goals.

3. In presenting our position to the French we can point out that in our congressional consultations we will say only what is already on the public record, i.e., that to the best of our knowledge there has been no violation of the Glenn Amendment since its passage, that the French Government has proposed to the GOP changes in the reprocessing contract, and that no further shipments under the contract are contemplated while the GOF and GOP continue their discussions. We would also, of course, explain to congressional leaders that no solution has been achieved on the reprocessing issue, but as long as we know of no imminent violation of the Glenn Amendment, we believe it inappropriate to hold back aid funds.

4. AIDAC septel<sup>4</sup> will outline specifics of timing constraints on program decisions and other personnel and program issues affected by continued freeze on assistance programs.

**Hummel**

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

**274. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 23, 1978, 9:35–10:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

DR. BRZEZINSKI

TOM THORNTON (Note Taker)

AGHA SHAHI—de facto Foreign Minister of Pakistan

AMBASSADOR YAQUB KHAN

MINISTER HAYAT MEHDI

SUBJECT

Call By Agha Shahi

Agha Shahi opened with compliments to the United States on the Middle East policy—for taking Israel head on despite domestic problems. He said everyone was impressed by this but he was becoming despondent because of lack of results.

Brzezinski said one should not be despondent since we are aiming for an overall achievement not simply piecemeal steps. This meant that there would not be short term results. The step-by-step process under Kissinger had been appropriate for its time although perhaps some additional movement after 1973 would have been possible. Brzezinski had in fact just left a meeting between the President and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at which the President said frankly there is now a basic disagreement between the United States and Israel. One of the Senators there, a super supporter of Israel, had told the President he thought we were on the verge of something major. Remember that President Carter likes to tackle big problems head on like Panama and the Arab-Israeli issue. The whole world stands to gain from the settlement.

Shahi then moved to his main topic of concern; matters relating to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Pakistan is deeply concerned over India's capability and has repeatedly raised the question of getting better guarantees from the nuclear weapons states. The question of positive guarantees is very difficult, including under Article 51,<sup>2</sup> and Security Council statements are not binding. Pakistan is looking for a way to strengthen these and find means that would prevent

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 4/77–12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Brzezinski, Aaron, Huntington, Matthews, and Armacost. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

<sup>2</sup> Article 51 of the United Nations Charter safeguards a state's right of individual or collective self-defense in the event of armed aggression.

nuclear weapons states from threatening non-nuclear weapons states. It recognizes that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is able to accept a simple formulation because of the situation in Western Europe. Pakistan therefore developed a formula year before last that nuclear weapons states would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states not allied with super powers. It welcomed our abstention on this. Shahi pointed out that we should realize the alternative formula favored by the non-aligned (nuclear weapons states should not threaten non-nuclear weapons states that do not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory) would get overwhelming support in the UN. Therefore we should favor the Pakistani formulation. Pakistan believes that our formula should now be pursued at the SSOD.

Brzezinski asked how this would affect a North Korean attack on South Korea.

Shahi was obviously not prepared to answer and said the formulation might have to be altered to take this kind of circumstance into consideration. He offered to discuss this with us bilaterally. At Brzezinski's request he then restated the formulation as follows:

Nuclear weapons states undertake not to threaten the use of or to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states who are not parties to a security arrangement of a nuclear weapons state.

Brzezinski pointed out that the DPRK is actually covered by a Soviet Treaty.

Shahi reiterated Pakistan's serious concern in the matter and pointed out it would be the first meaningful step taken in the UN in 30 years in this area.

Brzezinski said that last year at the UN the President had undertaken not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons unless we were first attacked.<sup>3</sup> He said that the Pakistani formula sounds ingenuous and we will want to explore it further and very seriously.

Shahi then moved to the question of the nuclear weapons free zone, pointing out that India opposes this but did abstain last year while the US and UK voted in favor.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan does not however expect to succeed in this area. It had proposed to India as a first step that all South Asian countries should commit themselves multilaterally not

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<sup>3</sup> In his October 4, 1977, address to the 32nd United Nations General Assembly, Carter pledged: "In order to reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weaponry, I hereby solemnly declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear weapons except in self-defense; that is in circumstances of an actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our territories, or Armed Forces, or such an attack on our allies." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, p. 1722*)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 4.



to acquire nuclear weapons. Even though India had said as much unilaterally it refused to do this. Shahi was deeply concerned about India's un-safeguarded nuclear facilities and estimated that India has some 12 to 36 nuclear weapons. Therefore they are very interested in the formula they will propose at the SSOD. Brzezinski again undertook to explore it and said it sounded promising.

Shahi turned to a third point; Pakistan's concern at the tilting balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Pakistan feels defenseless and is under great Soviet pressure, for instance, not to reinvigorate CENTO. India is virtually a super power and is now going to acquire deep penetration strike aircraft.<sup>5</sup>

Brzezinski pointed out that India, not without encouragement, has marginally moderated its relations with the Soviets. We understand Pakistan's deep concern but believe that the situation is now better balanced with a more non-aligned India, a stronger Iran, and, potentially, development towards a stronger internal situation in Pakistan. We will of course help matters along from the outside as best we can. Ours is however a world of regional powers and it's diversity and nationalism that keeps the Soviets in check. Military strength is of course also important.

Shahi contested Brzezinski's view that there has been a shift in India but at that point the meeting broke up because Brzezinski had to go to the President.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnotes 8 and 9, Document 96.

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## 275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 24, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. *Agha Shahi's Call on me*—Pakistan's defacto Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, in a call yesterday, asked for U.S. support in the Special

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 3/78. Secret. Carter wrote: "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum.

Session on Disarmament for a Pakistani proposal on security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states.<sup>2</sup> Essentially, he proposes that nuclear weapons states undertake not to threaten to use, or use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who are not parties to a security arrangement of a nuclear weapons state. Shahi believes that Peking will support the Pakistani resolution, France is favorably inclined, and the USSR is "not opposed". I said we would give the Pakistani formulation most serious consideration but pointed out that Korea presents a problem.

Shahi noted the improvement in relations with both Afghanistan and India. In the case of Afghanistan, however, he fears that the USSR may use its influence to prevent a final resolution of the outstanding border problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan. With India, there is a point beyond which Pakistan cannot go without greater Indian flexibility on Kashmir.

Shahi, noting Pakistan's military weakness, asked us to consider aircraft sales, specifically the F5-E's. He noted that Indian acquisition of the Jaguar or other Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft, would exacerbate the situation and upset the military balance on the subcontinent, thus rendering invalid our reason for turning down the A-7 request last spring.

We expressed our strong concern over the nuclear reprocessing plant and the effect on our relations should the Glenn Amendment be triggered. Both Jerry Smith and Joe Nye tried out various compromise formulations which would involve the deferral of work on the reprocessing plant while studies were made in the context of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation.<sup>3</sup> Shahi was completely inflexible on deferral asserting that it would be politically impossible. He said that Pakistan would be prepared to have "triple safeguards" and even accept French inspectors in addition to IAEA safeguards. Pakistan was also willing to explore co-management with Iran although the Shah seemed reticent. We pointed out that the application of the Glenn Amendment would inevitably affect other aspects of our relations, possibly including Congressional approval of arms sales.

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<sup>2</sup> A more extensive report of Vance's meeting with Shahi is in telegram 76866 to Islamabad, March 24. Also attending the meeting were Yaqub Khan, Mehdi, Gerard Smith, Nye, Dubs, and Coon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780131-0116)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 267.

**276. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 28, 1978, 0700Z

4199. Subject: Military Coup in Afghanistan. Ref: (A) Kabul 3351;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 108149.<sup>3</sup>

1. For first twelve hours after initial Flash message from Kabul yesterday about the coup, I and EmbOffs kept FonSec Shahnawaz (and through him, General Zia) quite fully informed of contents of Kabul reporting tels. GOP is grateful and has asked us to continue to furnish any info that we get.

2. I am now starting to taper off our contributions to GOP, partly because GOP apparently now has its own sources, including what Iranians are furnishing as well as Kabul Radio reports, and partly to avoid stimulating GOP into any over-reaction. We have therefore withheld from GOP Kabul's well-founded speculation (Kabul 3247 para 5)<sup>4</sup> that control of Kabul is not same as control of countryside and that guerrilla action could continue for some time. We will continue to give GOP factual information as we get it, if we think it would contribute materially to their knowledge of situation, but we are omitting most appraisals and speculations. We will also try to find out what GOP thinks.

3. As scenario unfolds, we should jointly consider when and how to urge restraint on Pakistan and (presumably) Iran. Pakistan has broad spectrum of capabilities for meddling across Afghan border, beginning with oral encouragement of Pathans and other tribes to assist their cousins across border, through active supply of weapons, and on up into direct military support of anti-coup elements. Key to GOP choices will be attitude and actions of Shah; USG exhortations of GOP will have little force if not echoed by Iranians. I would expect Paks to be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–1177. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Kabul, New Delhi, and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to telegram 3251 from Kabul, April 28, which reported the proclamation broadcast on Radio Afghanistan that day abolishing the Afghan constitution and announcing control of the military by the Revolutionary Council. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–1089)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 108149 to Tehran and Islamabad, April 27, the Department instructed that the Embassies "at their discretion may share available information with host governments at highest appropriate level and obtain their assessment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0175)

<sup>4</sup> Paragraph 5 of telegram 3247 from Kabul, April 28, emphasized the point that control of Kabul did not equate to control of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0626)

cautious, knowing dangers of combined Afghan/Sov counter-reaction, but advice from the Shah counselling moderation would not be amiss, if the Shah is willing to give it.

Hummel

## 277. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, April 30, 1978, 0745Z

4220. Subject: Gov Rockefeller's Talks With Gen. Zia.

1. Former Vice President Rockefeller told me his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan<sup>2</sup> was undertaken at instigation of Shah of Iran, who had urged this gesture of U.S. support to both countries. Shah had reiterated his oft-stated belief that govts in both countries were dangerously fragile and that USG was doing too little to shore them up. Pak Amb in Washington promptly picked up a cue from Rockefeller and invited his party as guests of Gen. Zia.<sup>3</sup>

2. I had chance to sit in on about one-third of Zia's meetings with the Gov, but Gov had chance to give me highlights of Zia's statements.<sup>4</sup>

3. Zia's motive was to convey sense of problems Pakistan faces, and to elicit sympathy and support of USG. He spent much time in criticism of Bhutto who had primary responsibility for present economic ills and for much of political problems in Pakistan. His crippling and harassment of private sector, particularly industries, had caused disastrous uncertainties that slowed investments and renovations of

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185-0152. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to New Delhi and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 75091 to multiple posts, March 23, the Department informed posts of Rockefeller's itinerary, which included stops in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Iran. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780128-1001) According to telegram 2476 from Kabul, April 3, Rockefeller was scheduled to meet Afghan President Mohammed Daoud Khan on April 29, a day after the coup in Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780143-0370) In telegram 7071 from New Delhi, May 4, the Embassy reported that Rockefeller also met with Desai on May 4 in New Delhi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780191-0043)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 2367 from Islamabad, March 8, indicated that Hummel learned of Rockefeller's visit through Yaqub Khan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780105-1078)

<sup>4</sup> Rockefeller's visit to Pakistan was scheduled for "about April 24-26." (Ibid.)

aging plants. Then nationalizations and forced employment of Bhutto's party supporters as supernumeraries further damaged efficiency, particularly in export-oriented textile industry.

4. Zia said he had "proof" that Bhutto had gone through Libyans to Sovs with offer of close cooperation last June, and Zia asserted this was one of reasons he had moved to take over govt July 5. (Comment: As I told Rockefeller, we know Bhutto had received offers of Soviet cooperation directly from Sov Amb here, but we doubt (a) that Bhutto was seriously considering a Soviet option or (b) that this was proximate cause of Zia's coup. End comment)

5. Zia said he thought elections would be held next April. On Bhutto trial, he said that whatever Supreme Court decided about Bhutto's appeal, there would be some internal disturbances after that decision (Comment: Decision could be in July) but any troubles would be contained and would be over in a month. Zia thus left ambiguous his intentions concerning executive clemency.

6. Gov Rockefeller emphasized genuine and longstanding American friendship and desire to be helpful to Pakistan, and U.S. desire for stability and development in the area.

7. Zia touched on nuclear reprocessing plant only lightly, complaining that GOP had offered to renounce the plant if USG could achieve dismantling of Indian reprocessing plant and Indian adherence to full-scope safeguards. Zia said that he had not had an answer to this proposal. (Comment: I was not present during that exchange, so had no chance to comment to Gen Zia. I told Gov Rockefeller that GOP had made some noises about accepting full-scope safeguards if Indians did, but had not offered to renounce reprocessing plant; we had explained to GOP, and the situation in India had shown, that full-scope safeguards in India (if achieved at all) would be result of lengthy process of dialog with India.)

8. As Department and others already know, Gov's party got as far as Peshawar but after coup in Kabul cancelled plans to drive there. Zia strongly and personally urged Gov to return through Islamabad on his way to India, and they had one-hour talk which I attended during refuelling stop. Zia's purpose was to express concern at events in Kabul, and he asserted that USG had not done all it should to give assistance, both economic and in military training, to Daoud government.

9. Comment: Zia projected his usual image of sincerity and simplicity. He obviously enjoyed the opportunity to speak his mind to an influential and sympathetic American.

Hummel

## 278. Editorial Note

On May 1, 1978, Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel reported that, due to the events in Kabul, the Government of Pakistan was "intensely worried" not only about the general insecurity caused by a pro-Soviet Afghan regime, but also about the possibility of instability in Pashtunistan and Soviet efforts to secure a port on the Indian Ocean. While acknowledging that there was little the United States could do, and seeking to avoid unrealistic expectations, Hummel recommended that President Jimmy Carter send a letter to Pakistani Chief Marital Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq in order to reassure the Pakistanis of the United States' "continuing interest in and dedication to the stability and well-being of South Asia, and the central role Pakistan plays in that area." (Telegram 4264 from Islamabad, May 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185-0567) The day before, on April 30, as reported in telegram 3372 from Kabul, April 30, Radio Afghanistan announced that Nur Mohammed Taraki, leader of the pro-Soviet Communist Khalq Party, was named President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185-0099) Telegram 3372 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 10.

In a May 1 memorandum, National Security Council Staff member Thomas Thornton brought Hummel's request for a Presidential letter to the attention of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski. Thornton argued against sending a Presidential letter (a draft of which was provided by the Embassy), stating: "I thought the letter vacuous and see no reason to elevate the matter to the level of personal correspondence. Since, however, Hummel wants an excuse to go in and hold Zia's hand, I told State to do talking points for a personal oral message that Hummel can deliver to Zia in the President's name." Brzezinski approved Thornton's recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1-12/78)

In telegram 112361 to Islamabad, May 3, the Department communicated the decision not to send a Presidential letter because it "might enhance Pakistan's concerns, as well as raise unrealistic expectations." However, the Department—forwarding the personal oral message cleared by Brzezinski—authorized Hummel "to inform General Zia that the President has asked you to personally convey his interest in the possible implications of developments in Kabul and that he would welcome General Zia's personal assessment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188-0749)

Before learning of the decision not to send a Presidential letter, Hummel informed the Department of State of Pakistani de facto Foreign

Minister Agha Shahi's "strong bid for a face-to-face meeting" between Carter and Zia. According to Hummel, Shahi argued: "The 'historic events' which have taken place in Afghanistan now make it 'imperative' for there to be renewed consideration of the possibility of a meeting between General Zia and the President." Hummel commented: "A very significant event to the future of this region has occurred in Kabul, and I believe it gives a new importance to our careful handling of the Paks during the next few months. I would remind the Department, for instance, that refusal in 1965 of a previous President of the United States to meet the urgent desire for a meeting by a former military ruler of Pakistan was a contributing element in the subsequent deterioration of regional relations in South Asia." (Telegram 4351 from Islamabad, May 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0740) Citing Carter's busy schedule, the Department of State denied the requested meeting, adding: "Apart from scheduling problems, we believe such a high level meeting might raise unrealistic expectations with respect to possible US support, particularly in light of the impasse on the reprocessing issue." (Telegram 117630 to Islamabad, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196–0666)

**279. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Information Items

*Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Letter to You from General Zia:*<sup>2</sup> Pakistani head of state General Zia Ul-Haq has written you expressing deep concern about the turn of events in Afghanistan and appreciation for the exchange of views he already has had through Ambassador Hummel. He states the "advent of the leftist regime in Kabul is an event of historic proportions" and describes the flavor and rhetoric of the new regime as conforming to the classic communist line. He sees it as another success for the Soviets in their grand design to extend control to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

According to the letter, the nature of the response to the new situation is still being discussed with Pakistan's friends and allies, but he notes that, unless timely action is taken to block the Soviet "avalanche", the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula may be lost to the West. Zia's foreign affairs adviser is currently in Tehran discussing strategy. Zia warns the situation for the Iranians could be as serious as it is for the Pakistanis.

In conclusion, Zia hopes that a fuller, personal exchange of views with you on the seriousness of the situation can be arranged at a convenient time.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily Report File, Box 6, 5/11/78-5/19/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> In his May 9 letter to Carter, Zia warned of the danger that the events in Afghanistan posed. He noted: "the Afghan barrier has been breached and our country lies directly in the path of the flood which rolled out of Czarist Russia in the last century and is now flowing in full force towards the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf." Zia estimated the ascent to power of new regime in Afghanistan as "an event of historic proportions. The change is of a fundamental nature which will have a profound impact on the balance of power in our region and beyond. Its consequences for Pakistan are incalculable." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Huq, 2/78-7/79) The letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 16.



## 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Iran and France<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 15, 1978, 1957Z

123149. For Ambassadors Sullivan and Hartman. Subject: Pakistan Reprocessing Plant. Refs: (A) Tehran 4355;<sup>2</sup> (B) Tehran 4016;<sup>3</sup> (C) Tehran 4356;<sup>4</sup> (D) Tehran 4521.<sup>5</sup>

1. For Tehran—The French MFA is preparing an options paper for Giscard on the reprocessing plant sale to Pakistan. We understand that one option—the only one consistent with our non-proliferation policy—is cancellation of the contract. We obviously want to see the French choose that route, and are looking at ways we can encourage them to do so.

2. We believe that now is a propitious time to seek greater Iranian involvement in the reprocessing plant sale. Your frank comment to Khalatbary on this issue, reported reftel C, hit right on the mark. We

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780205–0919. Secret; Exdis; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad. Drafted by Raphael; cleared by Coon, Greene, Dobbins, Nosenzo, Nye, Oplinger, and in S/S–O and S/AS; cleared and approved by Lande.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4355 from Tehran, May 8, Sullivan reported the Shah's opposition to Pakistan's plans to build a nuclear reprocessing plant. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780197–0333)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4016 from Tehran, April 27, Sullivan argued that the Shah should be included in efforts to persuade Pakistan against continuing its efforts at acquiring nuclear reprocessing technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780182–0334)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 4356 from Tehran, May 8, the Embassy reported Khalatbary's request for a statement containing the "U.S. view of situation resulting from events in Afghanistan," an estimate of Soviet intentions in the region, feasible responses to "prevent further Soviet exploitation of situation," and "what actions U.S. would be prepared to support, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan." Responding to Khalatbary's inquiry regarding assistance to Pakistan, Sullivan "pointed out again that we could do nothing, either in the military or economic fields, if the Pakistanis insist upon acquiring their reprocessing plant. I suggested Iran make this point clearly and bluntly to their Pakistani friends." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194–1064)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 4521 from Tehran, May 11, the Embassy reported Sullivan's discussion with Khalatbary regarding the Communist takeover in Kabul and its possible threat to the CENTO region. Khalatbary raised concerns about Afghan intentions in Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, noting U.S. reluctance to offer aid to Pakistan until the nuclear reprocessing issue was resolved. Sullivan learned that Khalatbary raised the nuclear reprocessing issue with the Shah, who discussed the problem on several occasions with Agha Shahi during his May 7–10 visit to Tehran. Later, "at airport upon his departure, Agha Shahi asked Khalatbary to propose to Shah that reprocessing issue might be neutralized if Iran would join with Pakistan in the enterprise and could act as guarantor that plant would not be used for weapons purposes. Khalatbary had relayed this to Shah, who told him to tell Agha Shahi that Iran wouldn't touch the plant with a ten-foot pole." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200–0389)

find the Shah's negative comment on the plant reftel D especially encouraging. We have also noted your assessment that the Shah would like to play a role in our attempts to have Pakistan forego reprocessing. Although the Shah's views may not be a major consideration in the way Giscard chooses to go on reprocessing, an expression to Paris of Iran's concerns and its willingness to help find an acceptable solution, might help tip the balance toward cancellation of the contract. We want to avoid, however, any appearance that we are encouraging the Shah to pressure the French, and would prefer that any approach to GOF be positive in tone and content. We should not reveal privileged conversations between US and the French including the fact that study on the subject is being now prepared for President Giscard.

3. You should consequently seek an appointment at an appropriately high level and make the following points on the reprocessing plant:

—We share the Shah's deep concern that Pakistani insistence on the reprocessing plant is ill-advised and contains the seeds for further instability in the region.

—Following the recent events in Afghanistan, we face a different and disturbing situation in the area, one in which Pakistan's security and well-being take on even greater importance.

—If the GOP persists in its attempts to obtain a reprocessing capability, it will have a continuing direct and negative impact on our ability to help meet Pakistan's needs.

—A key to the resolution of this issue is France, which now must determine how to proceed in this matter.

—We want the Shah to know that we are actively considering what positive inducements we and others could offer to Pakistan after it agrees to renounce the reprocessing option. If the Shah is willing to undertake a candid exchange with Paris on the reprocessing issue, we hope he would be able to express Iranian willingness to work closely with us and Paris to find a way which is in our mutual interests out of the reprocessing dilemma.

—We believe it would be very useful if the Shah would express his concerns, and his willingness to work with the US and France on the reprocessing issue, to President Giscard in the near future. We think it is in our mutual interest if Paris is fully aware of Iranian views in this matter.

4. If the Shah asks what steps we plan to take to encourage cancellation, you can note that we are engaged in continuing talks with the French on this issue. We have expressed our views forcefully to Pakistan. We will continue to consult closely with the Shah to have the benefit of his views. (FYI. We are actively working on a proposed

package which could include economic, political and military sales components. End FYI.)

5. For Paris—We want to avoid any feeling in Paris that we are orchestrating a campaign to bring pressure on France. You may, if you believe it desirable, inform Soutou or Jacomet that we hope to involve the Iranians in supporting our mutual goal of finding an alternative to the reprocessing plant, perhaps in terms of support for the package we would offer Pakistan after it gives up the plant. We have initiated discussions with Iran to that end. We will keep GOF fully apprised of the course of our talks in Tehran.

Vance

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**281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 29, 1978, 2026Z

136041. Paris for Dr. Nye. Subject: Secretary's Conversation With Agha Shahi, May 25.

Summary: In bilateral discussions with the Secretary on May 25, Pakistan's defacto Foreign Minister Agha Shahi painted a grim picture of the Soviet/Afghan threat to Pakistan. He said pressure is building in Pakistan for accommodation with the Soviet Union and withdrawal from CENTO. The Shah is also perturbed and is urging cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India. Pakistan remains deeply suspicious of quote Indian designs unquote and feels it now stands alone. Pakistan needs a security guarantee as well as military and economic assistance. The Secretary said Shahi had raised very serious issues and they should get together again, perhaps on June 2 after the Secretary had a chance to consult with the President and others. End summary.

1. The Secretary met with Pakistan Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi in New York on May 25.<sup>2</sup> Shahi was accompanied by Pakistan's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–0373. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Paris. Sent for information to Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Ankara, Moscow, London, Jidda, and USUN. Drafted by Coon; cleared in S; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> Vance was in New York May 23–25 in order to attend the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

UN Perm Rep Akhund, Ambassador Yaqub-Khan, Additional Foreign Secretary Niaz Niak and Minister-Counselor Hayat Mehdi. Also present were Counselor Matthew Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Saunders, and Ambassador Leonard. PAB Country Director Jane Coon was notetaker.

2. Shahi opened the discussion by noting that there had been an exchange of views in Islamabad with the U.S. Embassy but he was disquieted because our perceptions varied so much.<sup>3</sup> Pakistan believes there has been a profound qualitative change in the regional situation; the USSR is on Pakistan's borders. Pakistan is following a correct policy toward the new regime in Kabul but that government has served notice of its intentions with respect to the Baluch and Pathan problems. In this connection, Shahi cited the Afghan Foreign Minister's statement in Havana calling for settlement of these problems in light of their quote historic antecedents unquote.<sup>4</sup> The new regime says it is non-aligned and it may choose to consolidate its position first, but then it will begin subversion against Pakistan.

3. Pakistan has taken a quote independent attitude unquote toward the Soviets, e.g., the refusal of the overflight permission for Soviet planes to Ethiopia. Now Pakistan faces the external danger of having the Soviets use the Afghan regime as a tool against Pakistan. In addition, there is also the internal danger from leftist elements in Pakistan who may try to follow the Afghan example. He claimed Pakistan already had information on subversion by Afghan/KGB agents in Iran and it may reach as far as Saudi Arabia. If Pakistan's intelligents [*intelligence?*] see the USSR as the stronger power in the region he fears for the future of Pakistan.

4. Agha Shahi referred to his May 7–10 visit to Iran.<sup>5</sup> The Shah, he said, is perturbed and wants to initiate closer cooperation among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India. Agha Shahi, however, has great

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4727 from Islamabad, May 12, Hummel reported that after briefing Shahi that day regarding the official U.S. reaction to the Communist takeover in Kabul, "Shahi took sharp issue with our assessment on grounds that it was only tactical and failed to mention US policy response to a new challenge posed to Pakistan and CENTO." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780204-0665) The assessment that Hummel provided to Shahi was transmitted in telegram 118510 to Ankara, May 9, which contained talking points for an oral briefing of the CENTO Council of Deputies. According to the telegram, the United States believed "it is too early definitively to assess the degree to which the regime will come under Soviet influence as opposed to the degree to which it may wish or be able to maintain a genuine nationalist and independent posture." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780197-0152)

<sup>4</sup> The text of Afghan Foreign Minister Hafizullah's speech at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Havana was transmitted in telegram 4225 from Kabul, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File. D780218-0877)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 280.

reservations about the Iranian tendency to go over Pakistan's head to India and equal difficulty in accepting the US and Iranian perception that we can loosen Indian ties to the USSR. Indeed, the Delhi-Moscow-Kabul axis has revived. Pakistan, according to Shahi, is a front line state and needs help. But as far as the Paks can understand, the Shah is not prepared to give aid. The Saudis have promised but are slow.

5. In this situation, Pakistan stands alone. It may have to make some gesture to the Soviets such as quitting CENTO. If the people perceive that Soviets can act adventurously and get away with it, then there will be increasing pressure for Pakistan to follow an quote appeasement policy unquote. However, Pakistan has not yet taken this decision.

6. The Secretary, referring to Shahi's remarks on Pakistan's standing alone, asked what kind of assistance it needed and from whom. Shahi cited the 1959 bilateral agreement with the U.S.<sup>6</sup> and asserted that the Soviets were threatening Pakistan by proxy as they did in 1971. Pakistan thinks there should be a security guarantee. If the Soviets have an alliance with India, the only remedy lies in quote another super power supporting its friends and allies unquote. When CENTO was created, America had the will to act, but today this is questionable. He noted that Pakistan was not getting military or economic aid and claimed that all countries with sole exception of the U.S. were willing to reschedule Pakistan's debt (sic).<sup>7</sup> He reverted to the Indian threat and said if the Shah wants to take the leadership, he should enlist Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries but Pakistani public opinion will not allow any approach to India.

7. Finally Agha Shahi remarked that the Pakistanis had heard that Daoud had wanted to come to the U.S. and that we had turned him down. Quote Some people unquote thought this was a clear signal that

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<sup>6</sup> The bilateral Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan was signed on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact (the predecessor of CENTO). The United States pledged its commitment to the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan" and to taking "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." (10 UST 317) For the texts of the Department of State statement announcing signature of agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and the agreement with Turkey, which is identical to that with Pakistan, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 23, 1959, pp. 416–418.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 135204 to Islamabad, May 26, the Department informed the Embassy that during the World Bank's June 1–2 Consortium meeting, Pakistan's request for multilateral debt relief would be addressed. However, the United States would not participate in any rescheduling arranged at the meeting. A draft statement (included in the telegram) by the U.S. delegation at the meeting cited the absence of an acute debt crisis in Pakistan, "and that in all likelihood it will be able to continue financing necessary imports and meet its debt service obligations in the year ahead." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223–0823)

Daoud was expendable and that the U.S. was no longer willing to support Afghanistan as a buffer state. He noted that this was speculation but quote it makes a difference in popular opinion unquote.

8. The Secretary responded that Shahi had raised a number of serious issues. He would like to consult with the President and his colleagues because Shahi is entitled to a clear answer.<sup>8</sup> We will be back in touch and perhaps meet again on June 2 to carry on the discussions.<sup>9</sup>

Vance

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<sup>8</sup> In a May 25 memorandum, Christopher informed Carter of Vance's meeting with Shahi and noted: "Our ability to support Pakistan is constrained by its intention to acquire nuclear weapons. We need to persuade the French to cancel the reprocessing plant contract (Giscard plans to raise the subject with you on Friday). If that can be accomplished, we are considering a package of inducements which might be offered to Pakistan to dissuade it from constructing a plant on its own." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 5/78) Christopher was referring to Carter's working dinner with Giscard scheduled for Friday, May 26. See Document 282.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 285.

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## 282. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Paris, May 30, 1978, 1120Z

17008. Subj: Pakistan Reprocessing Issue. Ref: State 135953.<sup>2</sup>

1. Summary: On May 29 Joseph Nye and EmbOff met with Andre Jacomet, Quai nuclear non-proliferation adviser, to review GOF current views on the reprocessing plant contract. Nye covered substance of reftel. Jacomet described a much more encouraging situation within

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0965. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 135953 to Paris, May 27, the Department authorized the Embassy to discuss the Pakistani reprocessing issue with French officials and suggested the following points be made: preventing Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons was now more critical because of the Communist takeover in Kabul; a possible U.S. aid package was an inducement for Pakistan against "going it alone on reprocessing;" and Iran had a role to play in both dissuading Pakistan from seeking nuclear capability and financing part of the aid package. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780224-1257)

the GOF: Co-processing had been dropped; most officials in GOF were pushing for a decision to go ahead or to cancel; Giscard would decide by June 6 (possibly the 15th); if the decision is to cancel, the GOF would welcome appropriate coordination with the USG on economic and military assistance programs for Pakistan. End summary.

2. The reported highlights of the Carter-Giscard meeting of May 26 relating to Pakistan were mentioned:<sup>3</sup> Giscard had flatly said that he would not contribute to proliferation in Pakistan and he also said that the US and France should work together to help save face for Pakistan; and President Carter had mentioned USG limitations due to the Glenn Amendment. Jacomet said he had hoped more time would have been available for discussion between the two Presidents to permit some balanced actions on Pakistan and China—cancellation of Pakistan and approval of the reactor sale to the PRC.

3. Jacomet then summarized the current GOF position on the subject. The CEA had dropped the coprocessing proposal as it was too expensive to develop and not worth much applied to the Pakistan situation. Involved French industry officials were pressing for a decision—go or stop. Others in the GOF were joining the cry to make a decision, some urging to go ahead and others pressing cancellation. Jacomet said Giscard would make a decision soon. (Jacomet made some comment about June 6 and then said something had been slipped back to June 15. We assume he was referring to Giscard's decision date on this subject.) If the decision was to cancel, then the GOF and the USG would need to consult on coordination of economic and military assistance programs for Pakistan.

4. Nye reviewed in detail the points covered in reftel. Jacomet indicated that the GOF shared the US view that the Afghan situation was a significant new element and made an early decision (particularly if to cancel) more necessary. He noted that export opportunities for France would be important in coping with internal GOF opposition to cancellation of the project. In addition, while the GOF/USG coordination of assistance programs was necessary to deal with Pakistan, the view to internal France must be that it was a GOF decision to cancel (if such is decided) and not a result of USG pressure. Jacomet had specific interest in USG views on how the coordination would be developed including the role of other countries, such as Iran. Nye emphasized that we would follow the French lead, but the GOF should keep in mind that at some point some members of Congress would

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<sup>3</sup> From 5:55 to 9:01 p.m. on May 26, Carter met with Giscard and hosted a working dinner at the White House in his honor. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting was found. A memorandum from Aaron to Carter in preparation for the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

need to be informed to some degree. Jacomet took particular note of our view that Iran would play a useful role. Nye corrected Jacomet on the aspect of military aircraft noting that we were considering F5E, not F15 or A7 aircraft.

5. At the conclusion of the subject, Jacomet appeared enthusiastic about the future of the matter. He seemed to indicate that he believed Giscard would decide to cancel and that the coordinated assistance could be sufficient to cause further work on the reprocessing plant by Pakistan to be dropped or at least delayed indefinitely. Jacomet promised to keep in close touch with the Embassy and to consult immediately when Giscard makes his decision.

6. Comment: Jacomet certainly provided a much more encouraging situation from the point of view of US interests. However, please note that Giscard has yet to make his decision. We hope that Washington will press ahead with its decisions on the assistance package (based on an assumed decision by Giscard to cancel the project) and that views from AmEmbassies Islamabad and Tehran will be available to permit our full and well considered advice to the GOF soon after a Giscard decision to cancel the plant.

7. Department please pass to Tehran and Islamabad.<sup>4</sup>

**Hartman**

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<sup>4</sup> This telegram was repeated to Tehran and Islamabad as telegram 136074, May 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-1225)



**283. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1978

## SUBJECT

NEA/CIA/INR Meeting of May 31, 1978

## PARTICIPANTS

NEA—Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretaries  
William Crawford and Nicholas Veliotis; CIA—[2 names not declassified]  
(COS, Islamabad); INR—Bob Melone

*Pakistan:* Noting that he had had a blast from Agha Shahi, including a threat that Pakistan would have to adopt a policy of appeasement,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Saunders solicited [less than 1 line not declassified] views on Pakistan's fragility and the likely effects of such things as the nuclear reprocessing dispute and the Afghan coup on the country. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Paks tend to panic. Ambassador Hummel and he had tried to reassure them, promising that the U.S. would watch the Afghan situation closely and keep them fully informed. [less than 1 line not declassified] felt there was no reason for us to become excited and suggested that it might even be wise to call Agha Shahi's bluff.

[less than 1 line not declassified] remarked that the region chronically chooses the worst case hypothesis. On occasion, the worst comes true, at least as locally perceived. The Paks are now saying that after 20 years of U.S. reassurances that India did not intend to dismember the country, it did, the Paks totally disregarding our caveat that this would not happen unless Pakistan handed it to the Indians on a silver platter. [less than 1 line not declassified] prepared to believe that the Soviets knew about the Afghan coup beforehand, but not that they engineered it. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Shah hadn't helped with his statements that the U.S. was simply sitting back watching.

Replying to Saunders' question about the degree of fragmentation, [less than 1 line not declassified] that Pakistan is fairly cohesive. [less than 1 line not declassified] only a very determined Soviet effort could split the country. [less than 1 line not declassified] doubted that the Soviets would make any such effort. Rather, they would try to woo the Pakistanis, but might threaten troubles in Baluchistan. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Soviets will try to woo the Paks in order to break

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000012, Box 6, NEA/CIA/INR Weekly meetings 1978–1980. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Shahi's May 25 meeting with Vance, which Saunders attended. See Document 281.

their Chinese connection. The Soviets also might try to revive their Asian collective security pact idea. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Chinese are concerned that we are not giving the Paks the reassurances they need. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Paks and the Shah may be considering whether the Soviets have determined that the U.S. won't fight in view of our inaction in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

Saunders wondered whether the Afghan events had made the Pakistani military more or less united. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* that they were more united in face of the perceived threat, although the military is not too happy with Zia. Replying to Mr. Veliotis' question, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* not think that the Iranians could be very helpful since the Paks do not trust them. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* that the Paks are aware of Iran's financial support of Bhutto. He felt that the problem on the internal scene was that nobody thinks Zia is doing a good job. Disaffection started with the lawyers in Lahore, spread to civil servants, and now the generals are wondering. Reagan said that if Zia goes, he likely will be replaced by another general whose foreign policies would not differ significantly from his. Generals Chisti and Iqbal were mentioned as possible successors.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

**Harry R. Melone<sup>3</sup>**  
INR/DDC

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<sup>3</sup> Melone initialed the memorandum over his typed signature.

**284. National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

NIE 32–78

Washington, June 6, 1978

**Pakistan—The Costs of Political Instability**

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

**PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS**

It has been almost a year since General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq established the Martial Law Administration in Pakistan, but the country remains in a period of political uncertainty. This uncertainty could lead to serious instability in the coming months as Zia is obliged to reach decisions on the fate of imprisoned former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and on the establishment of a projected joint military and civilian government. Whatever actions Zia takes on these problems, he almost certainly will face continued political unrest, further erosion of popular support for his own regime, and gradually increasing discontent within the military.

These pressures may lead to further changes in Pakistan's government and to additional damage to the country's already enfeebled political institutions, but are not likely in the near term to result in the imposition of a radically different social or political order. We believe that basically conservative military or military-controlled government is likely to persist in Pakistan over the next two or three years, even if Zia is replaced by other senior Army officers or if civilian politicians are brought into the government. It is much less likely that an effective, all-civilian government will be established, or that radical military or civilian leaders will seize power and install an extreme nationalist or leftist regime.

Pakistan is an overwhelmingly Muslim state, but deep regional, cultural, and ethnic rivalries have strained the country's political system since independence. Regionally based political groups in recent years have sought provincial autonomy rather than secession, but these strains persist, and may in fact intensify following the assumption of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/78. Secret; Noform; Nocontract According to the title page (not printed), the CIA, the NSA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Defense, as well as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence issued the estimate with the concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Carter initialed the title page. Turner gave the NIE to Carter at a June 27 meeting; see Document 289.

power in 1978 by what the Pakistanis consider to be a Communist-controlled government in Afghanistan. It is not yet clear what policy the new Afghan Government will follow concerning its conservative neighbors, but Afghanistan in the past has often given support to separatist political groups in Pakistan's border provinces.

Continuing political uncertainty has joined with Pakistan's enduring resource and population problems to militate against any significant early improvements in the country's economy, which had deteriorated over the past several years as a result of adverse international economic developments, domestic political instability, and Bhutto's economic policies. The military government has not taken aggressive action to deal with the country's economic problems, but has exhibited interest in promoting agricultural productivity, private investment, and measures to improve the balance-of-payments position. The future economic well-being of Pakistan, which has considerable long-term economic potential, will depend heavily on such exogenous factors as good weather, worker remittances, and foreign assistance, as well as on more effective economic management and political leadership and stability.

The immediate challenge facing the current government is to restore economic growth and preserve public order without reverting to more repressive measures that would threaten such social justice and human rights as do exist in Pakistan. There is no doubt that General Zia wishes to right the economy, just as there was no question initially that he planned to hold fair elections, or that he still hopes to install a more representative government. There is growing doubt, however, that he will succeed.

Unlike several earlier periods of political instability in Pakistan's 30-year history, the current uncertainty has not been caused by, nor is it likely to precipitate, a concomitant crisis in foreign relations and external security. Pakistan's relations with its powerful neighbors, India and Iran, are now relatively good, and are likely to remain so for the next two to three years. Relations with Afghanistan, which in the recent past have been unusually warm, now are likely to return to their normal pattern of deep mutual distrust. Pakistan's relations with the USSR—generally cool but stable—are likely to experience new strains as a result of increased Soviet assistance to, and presence in, Afghanistan. This expanded Soviet activity in the area may lead to further strengthening of the already close relations between Pakistan and China.

Although Pakistani leaders are aware of the country's long-term regional insecurity and need for continued external support, Pakistan's relations with the United States will be subjected to strains in the next few years. Differences will continue concerning Pakistan's nuclear program, narcotics control efforts, human rights record, and need for foreign financial and arms aid. In the near term, the issue of Pakistan's

acquiring a nuclear reprocessing capability will continue to dominate all others in the bilateral relationship. This issue affects US global nonproliferation aims, and may limit or end our ability to support Pakistan's economic development and security requirements. The United States has no critical political, economic, or military interests at stake in Pakistan at this time, but developments there do impact directly on wider US interests in the region and worldwide.

The ambitious nuclear program that Pakistan now is pursuing is intended to expand the country's electric power output, but also, we believe, to provide the capability to develop a nuclear explosive device. Pakistan has a reasonable chance of acquiring a reprocessing capability—its foremost priority in nuclear matters—by the early 1980s, [2 lines not declassified] Pakistan probably will be capable of assembling a nuclear device in the early 1980s, although its decision on whether to do this, as well as whether to proceed toward a nuclear weapons program, will be determined largely by political and military considerations.

Pakistan's conventional military capabilities, like its nuclear capabilities and potential, remain inferior to those of India. This imbalance in capabilities will grow, as Pakistan in the next few years will be unable to manufacture or purchase advanced arms—especially aircraft, mechanized equipment, and air defense weapons—on the same scale as India. Although the Pakistanis over the long term may pursue a nuclear weapons capability as a means of partially redressing this imbalance, Pakistan will not have a credible nuclear weapons option until at least the mid-1980s.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]

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**285. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, June 7, 1978, 0920Z

5573. For Asst Secy Saunders from Hummel. Subject: Growing Need for Early French Notification to Pakistan on Reprocessing Plant.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1771. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

1. We are much concerned here about evidence we are now seeing: (a) that Pak reaction to Agha Shahi's two talks with Secy Vance<sup>2</sup> is generally negative and discouraged; (b) that plans are well along for Ghulam Ishaq (SecGen in chief and most senior civil servant) to visit Moscow for discussions of increased Pak-Soviet cooperation; and (c) that Agha Shahi will probably follow on with another visit at the invitation of Gromyko.

2. I draw the tentative conclusion that the GOP is seriously planning a warming-up of Pak-USSR relations as a means of postponing, countering, or diminishing the Afghan pressures that they expect. We have said before, and still believe, that any such warmth will be limited by the attitudes of Pakistan's close friends the PRC, Iran, and the Saudis, as well as by deeply-held suspicions of Sovs among most Pakistanis (septel).<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it would be unfortunate if the Paks begin these moves as a result of wrong assumptions about future US support and cooperation, and take some steps that might further inhibit our ability to be helpful.

3. I would hope that this vexing situation could quickly be exposed to the French, therefore, as a means of speeding up their notification to the Paks of the cancellation of the reprocessing contract, thus freeing us to offer the Paks the kind of US assistance that might change their minds about approaching the Soviets.<sup>4</sup> Although I can't pretend to any insights into the French scene, I wonder if the French bureaucracy might be tempted to try negotiating with us specific assurances of cooperation in Pakistan before they notify the Pakistanis, thus delaying

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<sup>2</sup> For Vance's May 25 meeting with Shahi, see Document 281. Telegram 141229 to Islamabad, June 3, reported that at a June 2 meeting, Vance informed Shahi that Newsom planned to visit Islamabad in July. According to Vance, the purpose of the visit was to see what the United States could do in the region in response to events in Afghanistan. Vance also addressed the nuclear issue and informed Shahi that there would be benefits in the form of military and non-military aid if Pakistan stopped its efforts to acquire nuclear reprocessing technology. Shahi responded that he would consult with his government. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 3, Iran, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, July 1978)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5631 from Islamabad, June 8, the Embassy offered an analysis of possible Pakistani policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union. The Embassy reported that Pakistani moves to court the Soviet Union "may now be seen by some Pakistanis as their most effective lever in extracting greater support from the West; by others it is seen as their only real defense against the use of Soviet power and the activities of Soviet surrogates; and by still others is seen to be useful for both purposes." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780247-0070)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 146509 to Islamabad, June 9, Saunders responded to Hummel's report: "I completely agree that the sooner the Paks are informed of the French decision the less chance there is of substantial damage to US/Pak relations. We are giving urgent consideration to this question and will keep you fully informed as we move ahead." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-2162)

the exposure to the Paks of the full range of Pak options in the new, post-reprocessing era.<sup>5</sup>

Hummel

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<sup>5</sup> In a June 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, the Global Issues division of the National Security Council Staff reported: "In a truly breathtaking display ofchutzpah the French have come back to us with a statement that they will finally cancel the Pakistani reprocessing plant if we will provide \$250 million in credit for the Paks to buy French Mirages. Besides being totally unacceptable, this would be illegal. My view is that they *probably* will stick with the decision to cancel and are just trying to see what they can hook us for." In the right-hand margin next to the mention of the French statement, Brzezinski drew a diagonal line, beside which he wrote "no." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 4–6/78)

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**286. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 9, 1978

Dear General Zia:

Your letter of May 9 was very helpful in sharpening my understanding of Pakistan's position in South Asia.<sup>2</sup> I have also profited from the valuable insights that Ambassador Hummel has gained from his talks with you, and that Secretary Vance has added from his meeting with Mr. Agha Shahi.<sup>3</sup>

Both you and I view events in Afghanistan with a similar concern for the effect that they may have on the region's security. I share your concern with the political antecedents of the new Afghan leaders, and am equally disturbed by their past statements concerning the Durand

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78–7/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 279.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 281 and footnote 2, Document 285.

line.<sup>4</sup> We agree fully that Soviet domination of Afghanistan would be a development of great seriousness for South Asia and the entire free world. Those of us who share this view must cooperate closely over the coming weeks and months.

We are under no illusions about the difficulties that may arise. We must be careful to avoid actions which could seemingly provide justification for those who seek to worsen the situation and limit the government's chances of maintaining independence. When faced by changes that may indeed be of a historic scope, it is important that we all act with forethought and determination.

The new Afghan government has declared its intention to remain non-aligned. Your decision to maintain contact in order to test its willingness to continue constructive foreign policies is a wise one. I, too, intend to pursue this course as a first step, and hope we can work together in trying to hold the Kabul leadership to its promise. Given these similarities in our approach, I will value continued close contact so that we can most carefully assess what the next steps should be.

There are a number of other matters on which I feel we can both profit from a further exchange of views. I know that you too have been troubled by issues which have arisen between our two countries. Secretary Vance has explained to Mr. Agha Shahi the real legal and political hurdles placed in our way by Pakistan's plans to acquire a reprocessing plant. While recognizing these difficulties, I urge that we both keep clear in our minds the long-range interests and concerns which underlie our relationship.

For my part, I share the conviction both of my predecessors and yours that our relationship is important to each of our nations. With this lasting perspective in mind, we will be better able to solve the immediate problems that stand between us, and build upon the fundamental consensus that binds us. I am determined to do everything within my power to continue developing our historic relationship of cooperation and friendship.

I believe, as you do, that a personal meeting would be helpful. It would be especially fruitful after we assess the exchange of ideas between Secretary Vance and Mr. Agha Shahi, and after we have some

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<sup>4</sup> According to telegram 4630 from Islamabad, May 10: "Paragraph 8 of the ruling Khalq Party's manifesto issued in October 1977, specifically mentions the Durand Line, the recognized international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a 'colonial imposition' and pledges support to the so-called 'national movement of the people of Pakhtoonistan' in our territory. In his very first press conference on May 6, 1978, the new Afghan President raised the matter of the Durand Line saying, of course, that he wanted a peaceful settlement of this border issue with Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780197-1239)



clearer knowledge of the attitude of the new government in Afghanistan.

In the meantime, I suggest that we keep in touch through Ambassador Hummel and, as needed, through direct correspondence. Once again, I thank you for sharing your thoughts with me; I hope you will continue to do so on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1978, 1719Z

155119. For the Ambassador from Assistant Secretary Saunders. Subject: Meeting With Pakistan Ambassador Yaqub Khan.

1. At the conclusion of the meeting June 16 with Yaqub Khan (reported septel),<sup>2</sup> the Ambassador asked for five minutes alone with Assistant Secretary Saunders.

2. Yaqub Khan said he wished to convey his personal view that U.S./Pakistan relations were currently at the lowest ebb in recent years. He wanted us to know that when this view is expressed by officials in Islamabad, it is not a question of tactics, but is genuinely felt. Saunders commented that it was his strong impression, while reimmersing himself in subcontinental affairs after several years away from the subject, that the nuclear issue dominated the relationship. If this issue were behind us, relations across the board could revert to a more satisfactory state, although not to the extremely close ties of the early 1960's. Yaqub Khan generally acknowledged this to be the case, and felt we had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0052. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Coon; cleared in S/S; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 155072 to Kabul, June 19, reported on Saunders's meeting with Yaqub Khan, at which Saunders described his talk with the Afghan Foreign Minister in New York. Saunders explained that the purpose of the meeting was to demonstrate to the new Afghan leaders that the United States was prepared to have relations with them. The telegram also noted: "Yaqub-Khan said that since the coup the Afghans have been talking out of both sides of their mouth. In private they say one thing but their public pronouncements are redolent of the past painful relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255–0275)

arrived at a satisfactory plateau about 3 years ago, to which it would be desirable to return.

3. The Ambassador warned that there was considerable resentment growing up among the top circles in Islamabad about our "continuing campaign" on behalf of Bhutto. The matter is before the courts, the regime has meticulously adhered to correct judicial procedures, and outside comment is perceived as unwarranted interference. Saunders pointed out that our official overtures had not been addressed to the judicial process, but only sought to highlight the effect on world opinion if the former Prime Minister were executed.<sup>3</sup> We, of course, had no control over expressions of concern by the U.S. press, private citizens and members of the legislative branch.

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 272.

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**288. Report Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center,  
Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

RP INBR 78-013

Washington, June 21, 1978

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

[Omitted here are the title page, the table of contents, and the first two sections of the report.]

*PAKISTAN: An Uninspiring Approach to Narcotics Control*

Pakistani officials appear to have little interest in narcotics control. Addiction is not considered a significant domestic problem and Pakistan is not believed to have any obligation to use its limited resources, or deprive farmers of income in order to help solve the richer industrialized nations' addiction problems. There have been notable exceptions, however, as in the case of the recent successful raid on a morphine/

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Records of Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues, Subject Files, Box 41, Narcotics, Intelligence and Policy, 6/15/78-9/5/78 [CF. O/A 157]. Secret; Noform; Nocontract.

heroin conversion laboratory earlier this month, after much prompting from US representatives in Islamabad.<sup>2</sup>

The overall impetus for narcotics control comes from abroad. The Pakistanis need economic, diplomatic, and military support from Western nations—especially the US—and recognize that their narcotics policies are an important factor both in bilateral relations with individual Western nations and in Pakistan's image in the West. Narcotics control is, however, only one of many issues in Pakistan's foreign relations, and Islamabad's willingness to pursue narcotics control policies is influenced by the willingness of other countries to support Pakistan on other issues. Declining support from the US and disagreements on problems such as Pakistan's nuclear plans, however, have not been the major factor in Pakistani reluctance to pursue narcotics control vigorously. Far more important has been the internal situation.

The poppy-growing areas of Pakistan—the North-West Frontier Province and the adjoining Federally Administered Tribal Areas—are of secondary political and economic importance to any Pakistani government. The government—whether civilian or military—depends on support in the Punjab, and to a lesser extent the Sind, and little if any opium is produced in either province.

Nevertheless, the government in Islamabad has no desire to add to its difficulties by creating unnecessary problems in the historically troublesome NWFP.

[Omitted here is a map of the opium growing region of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.]

Moreover, Islamabad's concern with secessionist tendencies in the province and a belief that Afghanistan and the USSR would exploit any dissidence in an effort to break up Pakistan give additional weight to arguments against policies on narcotics, or any other issue, likely to antagonize the people on the Frontier. Officials at the provincial and local levels, who must carry out anti-narcotics programs, are much less likely to be concerned with the foreign policy benefits of narcotics control, and give much higher priority to maintaining peace.

The part of Pakistan in which opium is produced is generally divided into three areas:

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5761 from Islamabad, June 13, the Embassy reported on the June 13 raid by Pakistani forces on a morphine/heroin conversion laboratory in the village of Gandaf. The DEA officer stationed in Pakistan supplied the information and logistics for the raid. The Embassy commented: "It is apparent that the efforts of Ambassador Hummel and the Mission have finally paid off. The Ambassador's constant pressuring of the CMLA staff into taking positive action against morphine/heroin conversion laboratories ultimately committed the GOP into a positive enforcement effort in the NWFP. We hope that this new impetus on their part will continue in future similar operations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246-0898)

—The tribal areas, some under federal administration, others under provincial control. The authority of Islamabad and Peshawar, the provincial capital, is very limited in this area. The enforcement of unpopular laws can require a military expedition, and tribal rebellions—although generally minor—are frequent.

—The “merged” areas, former princely states merged into the NWFP. Provincial and federal control is considerably greater in this part of the province, but still limited in many places.<sup>3</sup>

—The “settled” areas—those parts of the NWFP which have long been under central government control.

This division of the poppy-growing area, however, gives only a general picture of the degree of government authority. In some parts of the settled areas, for example, official authority is probably as weak as any place in the tribal areas. Moreover, law enforcement is complicated, even in places where the government is in full control, by the possibility of a reaction in a part of the province where central authority is weak. (CONFIDENTIAL)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>3</sup> The unofficial “tribal areas” correspond closely to the official “Federally Administered Tribal Areas”; the “merged areas” to the official “Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.” [Footnote is in the original.]

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## 289. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Conversation of 27 June 1978<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

6. Pakistan: Delivered the NIE.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 23, Folder 442: Memo of Conversation with the Pres. White House. Secret. Prepared by Turner on June 28.

<sup>2</sup> On June 27, Carter met with Turner from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. in the Oval Office. Brzezinski and Jordan were also present. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> NIE 32-78; see Document 284.

a. The question was asked whether Zia has any control or substantial influence over the Supreme Court. I told him I thought not, but wasn't able to answer that concretely. I did say that Zia had the authority to commute the sentence even if the court affirmed the original decision. I'd like to have both of these points checked.

b. There was skepticism when I mentioned that the French were thinking of announcing the termination of the reprocessing plant procurement in mid-July.

c. The point on the position of the civilian leaders in not wanting to join the government that was going to have to take the rap on Bhutto got across easily.

d. The point on the economy, particularly the gas reserves and the overseas remittances, seemed to be new points.<sup>4</sup>

e. When I mentioned the possibility that Pakistan would depart CENTO, the question was raised was that important to us. Brzezinski responded that it was from a psychological point of view; I affirmed it. In effect, Pakistan had almost not been participating in CENTO for the last couple of years—they were there only in a very titular manner.

f. There was particular appreciation expressed for this item. It apparently filled a need.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

**Stansfield Turner<sup>5</sup>**  
*Director*

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<sup>4</sup> According to the body of NIE 32–78: “Domestic economic conditions in Pakistan are currently stable, and concern over the balance-of-payments problem has eased as a result of sharply increased remittances from Pakistanis working overseas.” According to the estimate, remittances rose from \$150 million in 1974 to an estimated \$1.1 billion in 1978. The NIE also cited abundant natural gas reserves as cause for possible economic improvement. The reserves were a potential source for both domestic energy consumption and for export. The NIE continued: “In the absence of firm policy direction from the political leadership, however, no great progress can be expected in exploiting these potentials.”

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand signed on Turner's behalf.

## 290. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, July 2, 1978, 1002Z

6400. Subject: Reprocessing, the Shah's Role, and the Newsom Visit.  
Ref: A. Islamabad 6399;<sup>2</sup> B. Islamabad 6335;<sup>3</sup> C. State 167550.<sup>4</sup>

1. We have attempted, briefly, to sort out for benefit of Under Secretary Newsom our impression of the mood he will face when he sets down here in Pakistan on the 14th (ref A). An important factor in this is Iranian-Pak tension.

2. We have also made a strong point of importance we attach to the Shah's role in the delicate scenario for the Jacomet and Newsom visits during the next two weeks. (ref B).

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103-2284. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6399 from Islamabad, July 3, the Embassy assessed the current attitude of Pakistani officials regarding U.S. policy concerns and strained Pakistani-Iranian relations. The Embassy warned: "Gen. Zia and other high GOP officials have told several diplomats here that the GOP is 'convinced' that the USG has decided 'to scrap' Pakistan in favor of India and Iran does not intend to react in any meaningful way to the GOP's need for support against [garble] Afghan designs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780273-1270)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 6335 from Islamabad, July 1, the Embassy responded to an inquiry from NEA in telegram 167501 to Islamabad, July 1, as to how the Embassy predicted the Pakistani Government would react if Jacomet informed the Pakistanis of the French decision to cancel the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing deal, and whether the Pakistanis would immediately go public and denounce the French decision in order to avert a possible leak to the PPP. The Embassy speculated that the Pakistani reaction depended on how categorically the French cancelled the reprocessing deal, and whether the Pakistanis perceived even a slight chance of future cooperation in building a reprocessing plant. According to the Embassy, if the Pakistanis saw no potential for future help from France, they would most likely go public immediately. The Embassy added: "It is also important that the Shah play his hand at this time, i.e. approve Iranian guarantee for the \$300 million in commercial loans and pony up a sizeable sum for military equipment purchases. It would be preferable for the Shah to convey his good news after the French inform the GOP and before Newsom arrives here." (Telegram 6335 from Islamabad, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103-2277. Telegram 167501 to Islamabad, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-2669)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 167550 to Paris, July 1, the Department expressed concern "that an overlap between Jacomet and Newsom in Islamabad could publicly symbolize to the Pakistanis what they already view as unwelcome collaboration between the French and Americans contrary to Pakistan's security interests." The Department noted that French coordination with Iran would be helpful in moderating Pakistan's reaction to the French cancellation, but "the Shah is deeply concerned about how the Zia regime will handle the fate of Bhutto, and the possible consequences for Pak internal security if Bhutto is executed. Accordingly, he has taken a reserved position on the flow of Iranian aid until that issue is satisfactorily resolved." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-2672)

3. It is with these points in mind that we were struck with the Department's apparent assumption that the Shah won't play unless and until the Bhutto drama is played out to his satisfaction (ref C). We find this especially disturbing in view of the long history of lectures we have received from the Shah about not paying enough attention to this area, etc. and the close cooperative role we have developed with him (and the French) on the non-proliferation question. Getting past the nuclear reprocessing issue is essential to our being able to provide the help he and we agree Pakistan needs. But our role is not enough; our package may not, by itself, carry the day. We need his contribution too.

4. It seems to me that we should not blandly allow him to sit this out, at this stage, without challenge and that this should be an important part of the Newsom message in Tehran.

5. Department please repeat to Tehran and Paris.

Hummel

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**291. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

F-5Es for Pakistan

Pakistan has a strong interest in updating its aging fighter aircraft fleet, and we believe the question of an F-5E purchase may be raised by the Pakistanis during David Newsom's July 14–17 visit.<sup>2</sup> Our policy continues to dictate that we will not, even if asked again by Pakistan, sell the A-7.

Our military analysts agree that Pakistan's Air Force, compared with India's, is outdated and ineffective. A persuasive military case can be made for Pakistan's need for a modern, lightweight interceptor for legitimate air defense needs. They have formerly told us they would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan I. Secret. Printed from a copy that Vance did not initial. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page reads: "As given to A.H. [Arthur Hummel], 7/6/78."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 293.

want approximately 110 F-5Es at a cost of about \$700–800 million for aircraft only. We assume financing would come from wealthy OPEC friends.

There are a number of advantages to an F-5E sale. It would be a major sign of our interest in regional security in the wake of events in Afghanistan and Yemen. It would have the active and full support of Iran and Saudi Arabia and would help meet the concerns of those governments about our response to direct or indirect pressure on our friends from the USSR. There is a recognized military justification, and it would foster a sense of security among Pakistan's leadership.

Furthermore, while the Pakistanis have never made an explicit linkage, they have said that if we want cooperation from developing countries on nuclear nonproliferation, we should be prepared to help them meet their legitimate defense needs through responsible sales of conventional military equipment. Finally, the purchase would not pose a threat to Indian military superiority and would not introduce a higher level of arms sophistication in the area. (India already has the MIG-21, a comparable aircraft.)

There are drawbacks to a sale, however. Our South Asian arms supply policy states we will not be a major supplier,<sup>3</sup> and you told Desai our sales posture would be limited. Depending on the number of aircraft involved, a sale to Pakistan of F-5Es could make us a major supplier. It would also put additional pressure on our arms sales ceiling. In addition, the Indians may be concerned that the sale would signal a renewed "special relationship" with Pakistan. Finally, if the human rights record of the Pakistani Government does not improve or worsens, such a sale could be cited as inconsistent with our human rights policy.

David Newsom would not raise the F-5E issue in Islamabad and would respond only if the Pakistanis actively pursued the issue. We believe that if we respond positively to the Pakistanis, we should only agree in principle, with certain caveats. Newsom would say that our agreement would extend to no more than 40 aircraft, and he would not commit the U.S. to provide financing. He would also say that any sale would require Congressional approval. If the reprocessing issue is not resolved by the time of his visit, he would also note any sale would be contingent on Pakistan's foregoing reprocessing.

In addition, Newsom would say that our agreement in principle would apply to F-5Es or "equivalent aircraft." Mentioning "equivalent aircraft" would indicate that we would not oppose further French sales to Pakistan of Mirage aircraft which are rough equivalents of the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 5.



F–5E. (You may recall that we previously told the French that we would not attempt to undercut their sale of Mirage aircraft to Pakistan but that if the Pakistanis asked us about F–5Es, we would respond on the merits.)

*Recommendation*

That you approve David Newsom’s responding, if asked by the Pakistanis, that, without making any commitment concerning the financing, we agree in principle to Pakistani acquisition of not more than 40 F–5Es or equivalent aircraft. He would not discuss the specifics of a sale, would note the need for Congressional approval, and, if reprocessing has not been resolved, would say that our approval would be contingent on Pakistan’s foregoing reprocessing.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but in a July 10 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance of Carter’s approval (see Document 292) and added that Carter directed that financing for the aircraft “should be cash.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan I)

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**292. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 7, 1978

SUBJECT

F–5 Es for Pakistan

The attached memo from Cy (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> seeks your approval for one element of the package that David Newsom will be carrying to Pakistan—sale of F–5 Es. The rest of the package is reinstitution of a modest aid and PL 480 relationship, (probably less than Pakistan would have gotten had the reprocessing issue not cut off our aid) and some military equipment including four old destroyers, a destroyer tender, some howitzers and perhaps a small HAWK system. The F–5 Es are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/78. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 291.

the only significant element in the whole package and even they are of much less interest to Pakistan than would be A-7s. None of this can move, of course, until the reprocessing issue is settled to our satisfaction.

Cy's memo sets forth the pros and cons and the recommendation is modest enough. In fact, I would recommend that Newsom not be restricted to the 40-50 figure. That has not really been staffed out and would be an unnecessary affront to the Pakistanis, who are probably expecting something much more impressive to assuage their fears of Afghanistan and make up for time lost during the reprocessing imbroglio.

Attached at Tab B<sup>3</sup> for your information is the statement of our South Asian arms supply policy developed under the previous administration and reaffirmed last year by you.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you approve Cy's recommendation, but remove any reference to specific numbers. Cy's memo has been cleared with DoD.

Approve

Retain 40-50 limitation<sup>4</sup>

No F-5 Es at all

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<sup>3</sup> Not attached. Presumably a reference to PD/NSC-13. See footnote 2, Document 5.

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked this option and initialed in the right-hand margin next to it.

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## 293. Editorial Note

During his visit to Islamabad July 15-16, 1978, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom had a number of discussions with Pakistani officials. On July 15, Newsom met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sardar Shahnawaz at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss regional issues. Citing the situation in Afghanistan, Shahnawaz described Pakistan as "both threatened and friendless." Shahnawaz also warned Newsom that Pakistan "sees recent events as unprecedented and fulfillment of 'ancient Russian dream' of driving toward Indian Ocean. GOP sees developments in Horn, Southern Yemen, and Afghanistan as part of same Soviet plan." Newsom said that he had recommended that the United States should be "'cautiously positive'

toward Afghanistan until (and unless) they prove themselves to be other than genuinely non-aligned. He said Afghans are still feeling their way, regime is not solidly in place, and they are moving slowly—whether of their own or Soviet volition.” (Telegram 6914 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0992) Newsom visited Kabul July 13–14 and met with President Taraki and Foreign Minister Amin. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 26.

On the morning of July 16, Newsom met with Ghulam Ishaq, Pakistani Minister of Finance, Planning, and Coordination, and the “senior-most” Minister in Pakistani Chief Marital Law Administrator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s Cabinet. Ishaq and Newsom discussed the reprocessing issue. Newsom described U.S. flexibility on this issue as “virtually non-existent.” When asked to explain the purpose and the economics of the reprocessing plant, Ishaq asserted that the plant was tied to Pakistan’s energy needs and he “denied flatly any purpose other than peaceful uses.” Ishaq reminded Newsom that Pakistan had offered “to put the reprocessing plant under whatever safeguards anyone wants in order to prevent a surreptitious diversion of plutonium.” Following a brief discussion regarding the Glenn Amendment and U.S. aid to Pakistan, Ishaq contended that “present US policies do not appear to be conducive to maintaining Pakistan as an independent entity. Speaking personally, he said it seems to him that ‘Pakistan no longer finds a place in the book of US priorities.’” (Telegram 6904 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0865)

On July 16, Newsom also met with Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, who “in a more than usually feisty mood, repeated familiar litany of lack of US support for Pakistan. He noted that in face of new realities, internationally and in the region, only option that now seems open to Pakistan is to withdraw from CENTO,” the Central Treaty Organization. Newsom countered that the United States could help Pakistan after the reprocessing issue was resolved. Shahi “responded brusquely that it is politically impossible to give up reprocessing plant. He implied that even if GOP did do so, the items we could offer, including the F–5E, would be insufficient and not help Pakistan build a modern defensive structure.” (Telegram 6931 from Islamabad, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292–0958)

Later on July 16, Newsom and Zia held the first of two meetings. Zia argued that the U.S. position regarding the planned Pakistani reprocessing plant was clearly discriminatory. After Zia expressed doubts about the value of CENTO, Newsom replied that Pakistan might make “overtures to the Soviets as one means of relieving expected pressures. We are certain that in current situation Pakistan would not wish to give

Soviets impression their tactics are successfully turning other countries from the West. A withdrawal from CENTO under these circumstances could give this impression. The central question is how the USG and GOP can restore our previous close relations to our mutual benefit. We know our non-proliferation policies cause problems for the GOP but we are firmly committed to this policy world-wide. In view of immediate defense priorities we suggest the GOP might consider suspension of work on the reprocessing plant or its ultimate cancellation." Zia then returned to discussing CENTO before he closed the conversation. (Telegram 6874 from Islamabad, July 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780292-0207)

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#### 294. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, July 17, 1978, 0700Z

6910. From Under Secretary Newsom. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom Final Meeting With Gen. Zia.

1. Summary. In my 75-minute final session with him on July 16,<sup>2</sup> Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul-Haq insisted on inability of any Government of Pakistan to agree to stop reprocessing project, explained again GOP conclusions that even if they did, they would not get sufficient economic and military support for their needs, described some aspects of their proposed feelers to Soviets, and assured us that he would not cause detriment to USG position with respect to Soviets. End summary.

2. I began final session with Gen. Zia (Amb. Hummel, Agha Shahi, Shahnawaz present) with brief summary of my conversations with other GOP officials during the day (septels)<sup>3</sup> and expressing appreciation for full and frank discussions.

3. Zia reiterated inability of any government in Pakistan to cancel the reprocessing plant. Bhutto had blown the issue out of all proportion, and now the people are convinced not only that the plant is a symbol

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103-2305, P850103-2299. Secret; Priority; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Tehran, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Paris, London, Moscow, and Jidda.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of Newsom and Zia's first session, see Document 293.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 293.

of independence from foreign pressures but also confuse it with the ability to generate electric power. Zia had consulted political leaders, and they all agreed that it was impossible even to postpone the plant. Public opinion would be outraged, and there is no way to explain why a project considered essential and prestigious has been traded for some military hardware.

4. I asked if explanations that new power generation plants would be built would clear up the confusion and ease public concern. Zia said the issue had become too acute to be explained that way. He said he knows that Shah intends to have seven power plants without any reprocessing, but even that fact would not convince the public that Pakistan does not need one. The Shah had put considerable pressure on the GOP to cancel, but King Khalid had not made any conditions concerning the plant.

5. Zia said that while he “bore no grudge” against the USG, and had appreciated the sincerity and openness with which I and others had discussed US policies, he had to say he thought it morally wrong and unfair for the USG to make its support conditional on cancelling reprocessing. Pakistan faces a clear and new threat and hopes for US support but instead has been given an unacceptable ultimatum. Anyway, it seems that even in the best of circumstances, the combined efforts of USG, PRC (which had given considerable military help), Iran and others, would not produce the large amounts of military aid that Pakistan would need to handle its own security. Basically what is needed is firm USG support with unmistakable guarantees of territorial integrity that would be credible as deterrent against Afghan encroachments. There is no use in relying on Iran; for one thing Iran’s army is new, unbloodied in any way, and the Shah’s attitude does not give confidence. Pakistan is basically Western-oriented, but it has concluded it cannot rely on the West and must seek other means of bolstering security.

6. I asked what he would consider his priority needs, if the reprocessing problem were solved. He said he has no exaggerated ideas such as 500 tanks. His first priority would be warships, then aircraft for the obsolete air force (stipulating he needed no long-range strike aircraft), and then equipment for ground forces (in which field he also hoped to develop indigenous production capabilities for self-reliance). I said the USG could earmark three ships if the major problem disappeared. I asked if he would wish to have F–5s, but he said he would rather have Mirage-Fives. (Comment: This is contrary to what we understand to be Pak Air Force view.) He said he has [garble] of acquiring sufficient arms from traditional friends, had concluded that USG lacks the will to counter the Soviets, and so would have to explore other policies.

7. I asked if he thought some combination of support from Iran, and the Saudis, which we could try to stimulate might meet the immedi-

ate needs. He said he would be willing to have Saudi help but he would not wish to receive assistance "through Iran". However, if there was good understanding that there would be no Pak obligation to Iran, perhaps arrangements could be made. His preference, however, would be for direct aid from the US.

8. I asked what price he expected the Soviets to exact in return for a changed attitude toward Pakistan. He said he does not know, but initially the Soviets would ask, as they had before, for Pak withdrawal from CENTO. He said wryly that if the price of Sov support is entanglement as a near-satellite, then it would be better for Pakistan to continue to "argue with the USG". Pakistan understands the Sovs very well—and the dangers of getting involved—but everything had changed with the Afghan coup.

9. At any rate, Zia assured me, there would be no precipitate action. On CENTO Pakistan would move deliberately. He said forcefully that he would undertake no step that would be detrimental to the US position with the Soviets. I expressed appreciation.

10. I pointed out, as I had before, that many people would fail to see the logic of appeasing the Sovs, who are the cause of the trouble. This is hardly the time to be causing the dissolution of CENTO.

11. I suggested again that the reprocessing plant might be put off as a problem for a later elected government to decide on, but Zia said that even Bhutto, as powerful and dictatorial as he was, did not have the power to turn back the public opinion he had stimulated on this issue. In fact, Bhutto had decided on a full-fledged turn to Soviet support, as Zia discovered to his disgust after reading secret files. Bhutto had gone to Qaddafi of Libya, who in turn had approached Brezhnev, who promised substantial military and economic aid. Zia had questioned Qaddafi, asking what price the Soviets had demanded, but Qaddafi would not say. Bhutto's plan was interrupted by Zia's takeover July 5, 1977. At any rate, Zia said he has no intention of entering the close embrace of the Soviets, he has agreement from Pak political leaders, however, to explore alternatives to present policies.

12. I tried to sum up. We all understood that we were not engaged in a bargaining session—of exchanging quids pro quo. What I had said about CENTO and the effect of a Pak withdrawal was not a demand. I could not hold out any hope that US policies on reprocessing would change, but as I understood it, Pakistan felt the following needs, some of which the USG might be willing to consider if there is no reprocessing:

(A) Recognition of its frontiers as inviolable and a pledge of support if the frontier was violated. (I said I had it pointed out to me that it had been soft [*some?*] time since the USG had reaffirmed its recognition of the Durand Line); (b) US participation in strengthening Pakistan's defense capabilities with modern equipment for naval, air, and ground

forces—in which, because USG is no longer in the grant military aid business, we could supply some credits but mostly had to do cash sales); (c) USG encouragement of Saudi and Iranian willingness to help pay the bills; and (d) a substantial and meaningful level of economic assistance.

13. Zia agreed this was a good summary, thanked me for giving the opportunity for frank and useful discussions, and reiterated his desire to retain good relations with the US despite the differences that separate our policies.

Hummel

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**295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 27, 1978, 2359Z

190561. Subject: Pakistan Reprocessing.

1. Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan in luncheon meeting with Under Secretary Newsom July 26 showed full awareness of current status of French-Pakistani exchanges on nuclear reprocessing.<sup>2</sup> He made clear his understanding that Pakistan has not yet fully decided how to react other than by sending letter to President Giscard.

2. In course of conversation he said that one aspect which disturbed GOP was suggestion that U.S. would, in addition to fact of cancellation, want Pakistan to state in writing that it would not undertake reprocess-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2047. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Paris. Sent for information to the White House. Drafted by Newsom; cleared in S/S–O and by Miklos; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6960 from Islamabad, July 18, the Embassy reported on Jacomet's July 18 meeting with Pakistani nuclear officials in order to deliver the message that the French Government had decided not to build the planned reprocessing plant. After Jacomet's meeting, Hummel sought assurances from Zia, through Shah Nawaz, that "there should be no hasty public statements, no public statement about going it alone, and our hopes for a private assurance Pakistan will not go it alone, in which case USG could begin process necessary to resume assistance." The Embassy continued: "Pak initial reaction was somewhat bitter, accusatory and argumentative, but they made no threats of going it alone, and even hinted at separation of reprocessing issue from French commercial and military sales." (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 3, Iran, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, July 1978)

ing in the future. He said this would appear to be quote rubbing Pakistan's nose in the dirt. Unquote. He asked, in the event that final French decision is not to proceed with the reprocessing plant, whether this fact alone would be sufficient to satisfy the U.S.

3. Under Secretary Newsom expressed surprise at this, stating that all that the U.S. required was to be informed that the French project was cancelled. He conjectured that he may have left this impression because in his proposals before the Pakistani discussions with Jacomet, he had suggested a formula involving a public announcement of suspension and private assurances that there would be no further reprocessing. There had been no suggestion that such assurances would be required if the French project was cancelled. Ambassador Yaqub-Khan said he would clarify this with his government.

4. The Ambassador also mentioned the Pakistani feeling that the French had made their decision under American pressure and with American collusion. Under Secretary Newsom said that he was aware of this Pakistani feeling but assured the Ambassador that the decision had been one made by France entirely on its own. The U.S. had informed France of its concern over the reprocessing plant but the decision was that of France. Newsom added that he honestly had not known exactly what message Jacomet would deliver to the Government of Pakistan before his own visit to Islamabad.

5. As you have pointed out to Shahnawaz (Islamabad 6960)<sup>3</sup> we would welcome private assurances by Paks that they do not intend to build their own plant. However, we do not intend at this point to lay this down as a condition. If the question arises, possibly as a result of Yaqub-Khan's report on his luncheon meeting with Newsom, you may clarify this point.

6. FYI: At PRC meeting 27 July Newsom made point that, after consulting with Congress, we should renew our economic and military cooperation with Pakistan, explicitly noting that its continuation is based on our clear assumption the GOP will not develop a reprocessing capability. We would not expect to receive GOP confirmation of this but we would have to be clear that our assistance would terminate if it became clear such a reprocessing capability was being constructed. End FYI.

**Christopher**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2 above.



**296. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistan.* David Newsom told Clem Zablocki and John Glenn that the French are currently discussing possible withdrawal from the Pakistan reprocessing project and said we might be coming to them within a few weeks to consult on resumed aid. Both Zablocki and Glenn said that many in Congress remain suspicious of Pakistan's nuclear intentions. They said that, even if the French withdraw, Congress will probably seek public assurances from the Pakistanis that they will not proceed on any other basis with reprocessing.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 8/78. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 7591 from Islamabad, August 5, reported that during a meeting with Hummel, Shahi "stated flatly and repeatedly that no Govt of Pakistan could give even a private assurance not to engage in reprocessing and still survive in face of public opinion. He characterized USG request for private assurance as impinging on sovereignty of Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2242)

## 297. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, August 15, 1978, 1027Z

7947. Subject: Reprocessing: Newsom Discussion With Agha Shahi.  
Ref: State 205550.<sup>2</sup>

1. We have following comments on Agha Shahi's conversation with Under Secretary Newsom, August 11 (reftel):

—As previous Embassy reporting has indicated, no Govt of Pakistan can make public assurances it has renounced reprocessing.<sup>3</sup> We had once thought it might be possible, albeit very difficult, for GOP to give us private assurances but events of past ten days make that option extremely unlikely.

—Publicity generated here by Reuters story on suspension of new aid commitments<sup>4</sup> has forced all political leaders to go on record uncompromisingly in favor of reprocessing plant and in opposition to U.S. pressure on this issue. No govt official or political leader associated with the govt would now dare run risk of offering private assurances which might subsequently be made public.

—As economy continues to falter and Gen. Zia fails to generate any widespread support for his military regime, it is inconceivable that he or his associates will contemplate public or private assurances. Zia's efforts to generate new support by formation of a civilian cabinet have yet to yield any appreciable results and are unlikely to do so in foreseeable future.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103-2255. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 205550 to Islamabad, August 14, the Department reported on Newsom and Shahi's August 11 discussion in New York about the reprocessing issue and how to resume U.S. aid to Pakistan. Shahi asserted: "It would be politically fatal to the government to provide public or private assurances regarding future plans on reprocessing." With this in mind, Shahi then inquired into what programs might be affected if Congress took a negative view on the restoration of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Newsom replied that development assistance, military sales or credit, as well as debt rescheduling could be endangered, but P.L. 480 and aid already in the pipeline would not be affected. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2279)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 296.

<sup>4</sup> Not found. In telegram 198367 to Islamabad, August 5, the Department explained: "On August 2 Under Secretary Newsom backgrounded Reuters correspondent in general terms on trip to area. Subsequently, Reuters pieced together situation on status of aid to Pakistan and put out story (sent to you USINFO) which contains no new elements, but we agree that the timing is unfortunate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321-1218)

—As Zia faces his greatest challenge in weeks ahead, e.g., his decision on the fate of Bhutto, he cannot be expected to weaken his internal position further by giving any hint that he is less dedicated to reprocessing than his arch rival Bhutto.

—In these circumstances the most we can hope for are public statements that leave options open (i.e., are not rpt not categorical that reprocessing plant will be completed). Such statements will at least leave option open to us of persuading GOP that benefits of rejuvenated relationship with U.S. outweigh advantages of positive steps toward proliferation.

—Shahi was quite right in noting that whatever our political contacts may say privately about foolishness of GOP reprocessing caper (and a few have acknowledged it as a mistake) none can be counted to say anything publicly that would question importance of reprocessing facility for Pakistan.

—We recognize difficulties flagged by Zablocki and Glenn in persuading Congress that renewal of assistance is valid in the absence of assurances from Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> Major point which we believe should be made is that in absence of viable relationship with us, GOP will almost certainly try to pursue a nuclear option. However, if we renew economic assistance and expand our relationship in meaningful ways (e.g., more military sales), we at least stand a chance of convincing GOP that a non-nuclear future is in its own best interest. And we of course retain option of again curtailing assistance if we are convinced subsequently that GOP is nevertheless moving toward proliferation.

**Hummel**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 296. In telegram 204785 to Islamabad, August 12, the Department summarized Newsom's August 11 discussion with Zablocki and Glenn regarding the Pakistani reprocessing issue and the resumption of U.S. aid. In the meeting, Zablocki and Glenn "stressed that many in Congress remain deeply suspicious of Pakistan's nuclear intentions and that, even if the French withdraw, Congress will probably wish public assurances from the Pakistanis that they will not proceed on any other basis with reprocessing." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 8/12–31/78)

**298. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, August 22, 1978, 1143Z

8222. Subj: PRC Denies Intention To Supply Reprocessing Plant.

1. There have been recurrent reports in Islamabad, including vernacular press mentions, that if the French do not deliver on their reprocessing plant contract the PRC will supply Pakistan with a plant. This story first surfaced in the Indian press, and East European diplomats here are promoting it.

2. The PRC Amb Aug 22 categorically assured Amb Hummel that there is no substance whatever to the rumor. The PRC Amb asserted that the PRC would not have any intention to supply such a plant to Pakistan and in any event lacks the capability, having no reprocessing plant of that sort itself.<sup>2</sup> He said further that there had been no discussion of the possibility of PRC supply, and no Pak request for the PRC to supply one.

**Hummel**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780344-0117. Confidential. Sent for information to New Delhi, Paris, Beijing, and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 216584 to Islamabad, August 25, the Department acknowledged receipt of Hummel's report of his meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan and noted: "PRC assurances that Chinese have no intention of aiding Pakistanis in reprocessing seem credible since it would not seem to serve PRC interests to undercut US and French nuclear policy at this time. As a technical matter, however, Department notes that Chinese presumably could provide Pakistan with a reprocessing facility suitable for extraction of plutonium from the spent fuel of the Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) particularly if the fuel were suitably modified. Such a facility could be less sophisticated and versatile than the proposed French plant and thus easier to construct." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2407)

**299. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 23, 1978

## SUBJECT

Pakistan Reprocessing

## PARTICIPANTS

Congressman Clement Zablocki, Chairman, House International Relations  
Committee

David D. Newsom, P

Under Secretary Newsom telephoned Chairman Zablocki to advise him of the press conference which had been given by General Zia al-Huq, Pakistan's Chief Martial Law Administrator.<sup>2</sup> In this conference he had announced that the French had pulled back from the nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> He had done so, however, in a way which appeared to leave the door open for satisfactory relations with the French as well as a resumption of normal relations with the U.S.

Chairman Zablocki expressed appreciation for being informed and noted that the resumption of American aid to Pakistan "should be no problem" if they are clearly not proceeding with reprocessing.

The Under Secretary told Chairman Zablocki that we would be proceeding with formal consultations with Congress on resumption of aid to Pakistan once we had a clear idea of both French and Pakistani intentions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan. Unclassified. Drafted by Newsom. Copies were sent to Bennet, Nye, and Coon.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 8318 from Islamabad, August 24, transmitted a portion of Zia's comments at his August 23 press conference, which was held following the swearing-in of his new civilian Cabinet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780346–0880) In telegram 8328 from Islamabad, August 24, the Embassy reported that Zia, "in an essentially one man show despite the presence of President Chaudhry and his new Cabinet fellows, announced the formation of a civilian government August 23. The appointment of the 24 member Cabinet, which contains 21 full Ministers and 3 Ministers of State, is the culmination of the Martial Law Administration's lengthy and often frustrating search for a broader political base." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780347–1017)

<sup>3</sup> On August 20, the French Ambassador to Pakistan shared with Hummel portions of Giscard's letter to Zia confirming the abandonment of French participation in the building of a reprocessing plant in Pakistan. The French Ambassador termed the letter "the most extraordinarily obscure diplomatic communications he has ever encountered." (Telegram 8167 from Islamabad, August 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2258)

### 300. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, August 24, 1978, 0650Z

8289. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Pakistani Views of Afghanistan Developments and Pak/US Relations. Ref: (A) Islamabad 7941;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 7508;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 7688;<sup>4</sup> (D) Islamabad 7726;<sup>5</sup> (E) Islamabad 8095.<sup>6</sup>

1. Summary: Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz—in a lengthy discussion with Ambassador Dubs and me—provided us with some revealing

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780346-0493. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7941 from Islamabad, August 15, Hummel reported that he told Zia about an official statement by the U.S. Government which reaffirmed the Durand Line to be the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hummel also reported that on the following day he gave Shahnawaz a non-paper that cited a statement in a SEATO communiqué reaffirming the Durand Line as the boundary. Hummel noted that "Shahnawaz was puzzled about citation of SEATO rpt SEATO communiqué pointing out that SEATO is defunct." Hummel emphasized that the content of the statement "was the important point." Hummel explained to the Department that "I used occasion to extend to Shahnawaz an invitation to a small dinner I am giving for Amb Dubs on Aug. 21. He accepted and indicated it would be a good occasion for more in-depth discussions of Pak/Afghan situation. He also felt MinState Agha Shahi (who returns tonight from Rome) might want to attend this dinner to participate in talks with Amb Dubs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780333-1145)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7508 from Islamabad, August 2, Hummel reported his August 2 meeting with Shahnawaz, during which he shared the substance of Dubs's discussion with Afghanistan's Foreign Minister. Dubs reported that the Afghans were anxious to reestablish a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan. Shahnawaz "stated that GOP/DRA relations being conducted on two levels—on rhetorical level frictions emphasized but in private Afghans appear anxious for reestablishment of some sort of meaningful dialogue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780317-0423)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 7688 from Islamabad, August 7, the Embassy reported on an Associated Press story about an Afghan Air Force MiG-17 that flew to Pakistan on August 7 and landed. The Embassy added that it "has no further information on possible defection." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322-0771)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 7726 from Islamabad, August 8, the Embassy relayed Shahnawaz's explanation to Hummel regarding the Afghan Air Force MiG-17 that landed in Pakistan on August 7 (see footnote 4 above). Shahnawaz maintained that the pilot had simply strayed off course and run low on fuel. Shahnawaz "stated flatly that pilot was not a defector and acknowledged that defection would have caused serious problems in Pak-Afghan relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780323-1136)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 8095 from Islamabad, August 18, Hummel reported that, according to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Afghanistan, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Mahmoud Baryalai, "stated flatly and unmistakably that Pakistan's dismemberment is inevitable. He predicted that agreement would be reached with India and possibly Iran by which Afghans would get all areas west of Indus River as their rightful due, India would absorb most of the rest, and the Shah would probably be satisfied if he got Karachi." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780339-0426)

views of the Pakistani attitude vis-a-vis the new Afghan regime. Shahnawaz sees the possibility of resurrecting a meaningful dialog between Kabul and Islamabad within the next few months and says the GOP is committed to test Kabul's willingness. The FonSec considers US/Pakistani relations as a vital factor in any reestablishment of a *modus vivendi* with the Afghans as well as an important ingredient in regional stability. He seems optimistic that the reprocessing issue will soon be settled definitively thus making possible more real and visible US support for Pakistan. End summary.

2. I hosted a small dinner for Amb. Dubs August 21 attended by FonSec Shahnawaz, MFA Director General for Afghanistan Amir Usman, DCM and Acting Pol Couns. Shahnawaz had told me earlier he would welcome small affair limited to Pak and US participants to pursue meaningful discussions with Ambassador Dubs (ref A).

3. Shahnawaz and Usman showed an admirable depth of knowledge and sensitive understanding of the new Afghan regime and characterized relative power of various ministers and factions in manner very similar to our own perceptions.

—Shahnawaz said FonMin Amin is the “real power” in the DRA regime and Taraki is the senior “father figure,” (the latter being Dubs’ term fully agreed to by Shahnawaz).

—He said the Parchamist faction “exile” was by no means pervasive and that the Soviets permitted Taraki to purge certain elements as a domestic political necessity. The Soviets, however, maintain close relations with the Parchamists (both purged and in Afghanistan), probably regarding them as an alternative regime—almost a government in exile—for use if and when Taraki’s government should stumble.

4. Pak/Afghan relations. Shahnawaz reiterated his earlier remarks to me (ref B) about Afghan foreign policy being “two faced” with a critical quarrelsomeness in their public stance but a much more amenable attitude in private. He said the Pak Minister of Commerce visit to Kabul is now firming up and will take place either in the third week of September or in early October.

—If the Afghans want to talk about political matters Shahnawaz may accompany and the meetings would then provide an opportunity to test possibility of resuming dialogue on Durand Line interrupted by overthrow of Daoud.

—Shahnawaz believed that DRA would quickly come to appreciate (as had Daoud) security advantages for Afghanistan of a settlement with Pakistan, and would want to enter into serious negotiations. He expressed some doubt whether Soviets would permit DRA to reach an overall settlement with Pakistan unless it were achieved under Soviet auspices.

—Shahnawaz strongly reiterated his previous assurances to me that the GOP is doing all it can to discourage any trouble-making along Pak/Afghan frontier. He also indicated this assurance has been repeated to DRA. He noted that there are refugees coming into Pakistan who have to be accommodated here. He emphasized, however, that they are firmly instructed that no anti-DRA activity will be tolerated from Pak soil.

—The handling of the MiG-17 which strayed into Pakistan recently (ref C and D) was, according to Shahnawaz, a good signal to the DRA of Pakistan's intentions regarding Afghanistan and that the DRA expressed sincere appreciation for all the GOP had done in effecting the smooth return of the aircraft and pilot. He mentioned, incidentally, that although the GOP invited the DRA Ambassador in Islamabad to sit in on the debriefing of the wayward pilot, Kabul did not permit him to participate.

—On the subject of the DRA's representative here, I mentioned to Shahnawaz the knowledge in the diplomatic community of the intemperate remarks made to Italian Ambassador by DRA Ambassador Baryalai (ref E). Shahnawaz remarked that Baryalai was showing the effect of his Moscow indoctrination. The FonSec appeared to place no undue significance on the matter.

5. Pak/US relations. Shahnawaz lamented the general state of Pak/US relations. He said US support for Pakistan is the key to regional stability and—more specifically—to effecting a *modus vivendi* with the DRA. The overt lack of traditional US support, he continued, makes the GOP foreign policy considerably more difficult. I responded that a satisfactory resolution of the reprocessing issue is a necessary first step to a resumption of a more normal relationship.

—Shahnawaz illustrated the unsatisfactory state of US/Pak relations by citing the discussion I had with him concerning the US position on the Durand Line (ref A), complaining mildly that this was the only result of the serious discussion between CMLA Zia and Under Secretary Newsom.<sup>7</sup> He also expressed Zia's unhappiness with our position—not for its content but for its central reference to the 1956 communique of the defunct SEATO.<sup>8</sup> Shahnawaz said he hoped we

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 294.

<sup>8</sup> The relevant portion of the SEATO Council communiqué of March 8, 1956, reads: "Insofar as these (Soviet) statements referred to 'Pakhtoonistan', the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan." (Quoted in telegram 203315 to Islamabad, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328-1136)



could somehow publicly state our support for the Durand Line without the unwelcome historical reference.

Hummel

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**301. Telegram 219397 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan**

Washington, August 29, 1978, 2003Z

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979. Secret; Immediate; Nofoin; Roger Channel. 1 page not declassified.]

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**302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1978, 0011Z

222185. For Ambassador Hummel from Saunders. Subject: Meeting With Ambassador Yaqub Khan.

1. At his invitation, I had lunch with Yaqub Khan Tuesday.<sup>2</sup> He has on previous occasions invited me for a general discussion either before or after his consultations in Islamabad. This time, however, I found him during a good part of our conversation somewhat rambling in his presentation and not at all his usual smooth and coherent self. His Minister, Hayat Mehdi, was with him.

2. The beginning of our conversation was devoted to a long review of his effort before and during his recent consultation to establish precisely our position on Pakistani assurances on the nuclear issue. He recounted how it had seemed initially to his government that we were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–1796. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Tehran. Sent for information to the White House. Drafted by Saunders; cleared in S/S and by Newsom; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> August 29.

seeking assurances from Pakistan that went beyond what the law requires. He said that after two conversations with Dave Newsom<sup>3</sup> he had concluded that the U.S. position is as follows: The U.S. seeks from Pakistan no assurances beyond the fact that the French reprocessing deal is off. If, however, a Pakistani pronouncement of its peaceful intentions in the nuclear field could be made, this could be a helpful complement to our efforts to win support in Congress for a normalization of our relationship. Yaqub concluded this portion of his narrative by indicating that this is the way he had described the U.S. position during his stay in Islamabad, which had coincided with that of his colleague from Paris.

3. After stating his assumption that our next step would be to consult with the Congress on resuming normal aid relationships with Pakistan, he began to think out loud on the points that he himself would make in his contacts with key Members of the Congress. They included the following: The present U.S. legislation could have the effect of driving nations underground in the nuclear field rather than precluding nuclear development. Pakistan would consider the U.S. response now a test of whether the U.S. can be counted on to support Pakistan during this difficult period in South Asia. Yaqub then spun out the analogy of someone going through a divorce who tested the faithless partner in all kinds of ways so that, when the separation was completed, he could feel relief that all avenues had been tried and the partner had demonstrated beyond doubt that the relationship could not work. He added that if the U.S. resumed a normal relationship it would give us more leverage if Pakistan were found later going the nuclear route. It was during this part of the discussion that he seemed nervous and least articulate.

4. I asked what impression he would intend to leave with the Members of Congress regarding Pakistan's future intentions in the nuclear field. He indicated that he would try to leave the impression that Pakistan foreswears the route of developing nuclear weapons, even though as a matter of principle there are some explicit commitments it cannot make. Conversely, he recalled that Pakistan is prepared to accept full-scope safeguards the moment India does. Mehdi added at that point that Pakistan knew it could not win an arms race, whether conventional or nuclear, with India and therefore had relied on diplomacy for its protection, such as proposing nuclear free zones.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Newsom's July 26 meeting with Yaqub Khan (see Document 295) and their August 1 conversation. According to telegram 194167 to Islamabad, August 1, in the August 1 conversation, Newsom assured Yaqub Khan that the United States did not require written assurances that Pakistan would not develop reprocessing technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2121)

5. Asking that his confidence be fully protected, Yaqub then said there was one other point he would like to make to Members of Congress but would refrain from making. This point reflected his deep concern with what he described as the revolutionary course of events now turned loose in Iran. In the end, his point was that, even though Pakistan might be “running on only two cylinders and might be facing disintegration itself, the time might come when Pakistan is the only area of stability in the region.” He went on at some length about the seriousness of developments in Iran, and it was only when we reached this part of the conversation that his normal coherence and articulateness returned. He recalled from his own Pakistani military experience the change that had taken place within the Pakistani Army when Army leaders realized that Ayub Khan had lost popular support and had no other source of support but the military. He suggested that this same kind of development could come about in Iran before long. He speculated that the current course of events would end with the Shah stepping aside in favor of some sort of regency until his son can come to power.

6. I cannot fully account for Yaqub’s unaccustomed nervousness and rambling during the entire part of our conversation when we were talking about the Pakistani nuclear problem. He did indeed ramble. The entire hour and a half was spent with him talking with almost no more than an occasional comment or question from me. My colleagues here have speculated that he sounded almost like a man who wanted to build the case that Pakistan had indeed been forced underground in its nuclear developments so that, when the facts came to light later, if there were such facts, he would not be guilty of having deceived us and would be in a position to say that he had indeed warned us that our actions were driving Pakistan down precisely the route we wanted it to avoid.

7. I do not want to make too much of this meeting because anyone is entitled to a bad day now and then. I report it to you only in case it jibes with observations you may have made during your meetings with Yaqub in Islamabad.

Vance

### 303. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 5, 1978, 0657Z

8683. Subject: Ambassador's Talk With Gen Zia. Ref: State 222911 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. I saw Gen Zia for 25 minutes August [September] 4 at my request. FonSec Shah Nawaz and MFA notetaker also present. I had passed word that I had been asked to have consultations in State Dept and I would be pleased to call on Gen Zia if he wished to see me before my departure.

2. Zia said that U.S. President "should be happy" about status of French reprocessing plant. Giscard's letter was "nice" and talked about continued cooperation in training in nuclear field and in power generation, but was not satisfactory.<sup>3</sup> Zia said he was continuing discussions with France, having "gone back to Giscard" in another letter to tell Giscard that if it is Giscard's intention to cancel the contract he should say so publicly. Apparently, Zia said, American pressure had paid off. He said that it was absolutely impossible for any Pak Government to agree to any cancellation or change in the contract, and added that this of course is a matter between the French and Pak Govts.

3. I referred to Under Secy Newsom's remarks that we understand the difficulties of the GOP's position and had no desire to make additional problems; I referred briefly to congressional attitude as explained by Newsom to Agha Shahi August 11.<sup>4</sup> I was pleased that USG comments on the reprocessing plant had been minimal. Shah Nawaz agreed that text of Department spokesman's remarks August 24 which we had given him was very unrestrained [*restrained?*].<sup>5</sup> Neither of us mentioned resumption of aid.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103-2265. Secret; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Paris, Tehran, and Kabul.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 222911 to Islamabad, September 1, the Department instructed Hummel "to return to Washington for consultations," adding that it was important not to indicate to Pakistani officials that the purpose of the trip was to consult with Congress or that it was "any kind of a signal that we will be resuming our aid and military sales programs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 299.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 297.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 215950 to multiple posts, August 24, the Department transmitted excerpts of the August 24 press briefing. At the briefing, Kenneth Brown, the Department's spokesman, was asked about the level of U.S. involvement in the cancellation of the Franco-Pakistani plan to build a reprocessing plant. Brown acknowledged past discussions with both governments on the subject, but admitted no knowledge of the specifics of the conversations between Pakistan and France. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780347-0598)

4. Zia said he wanted me to tell Newsom that Zia had held to his words about not leaving CENTO quickly or in any manner that damaged USG interests, and Zia asked what about Newsom's words concerning a statement about the Pak-Afghan border. I reminded him that we had delivered a statement to MFA, reaffirming the USG view that the Durand Line is the international border, which the GOP was free to refer to.<sup>6</sup> Zia stipulated that he was not making any request, but wanted to point out that the U.S. statement was awkward because it was based on a "defunct SEATO" context, and the GOP would far prefer a public statement by the USG. He said that although U.S.-Pak relations are now "at the lowest ebb" it is not good that they should be seen publicly as being at the lowest ebb. Zia and Shahnawaz said it is now more important than ever to have international support, because of what they termed the highly aggressive and ominous statements from Kabul on August 31 on the occasion of "Pushtoonistan day". The statements specifically repudiated the Durand Line and claimed all territory west of the Indus. I said I would discuss the matter in Washington.

5. Turning to CENTO, Zia said he doubted that the organization could ever play a really useful role, that as far back as the 1970 election campaign all Pak political parties had pledged to leave CENTO, and it seemed to have "no value, only penalties". When Zia asked what USG intends to do to strengthen CENTO, I said I had no specific instructions but I knew that Washington is considering various possibilities for strengthening the alliance.

6. I said I would stay one day in Tehran Sept 9 on my way to Washington, and Zia said he would also be in Tehran on a visit the same day.

Comment: Zia was uncharacteristically sarcastic in the substance of some of his remarks, while maintaining the normally calm and courteous manner he has always shown me. Small-talk was relaxed and very friendly. He did not say so directly, but it was clear he knows the reprocessing plant is cancelled. My instructions in reftel not to discuss possible resumption of aid or any consultations I might have with Congress caused me to let Zia carry the conversational ball and I refrained from probing.

**Hummel**

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 300.

### 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 15, 1978, 0856Z

8939. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Zia's Ascension to the Presidency. Ref: (A) Islamabad 8911 (Notal)<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 7509<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad A-84.<sup>4</sup>

1. Summary: Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Zia ul-Haq's decision to assume the presidency on September 16 appears to be a decision thrust upon him by the absence of any other acceptable alternative solution to the President's apparent determination to step down (ref A). It will have important ramifications for Pakistan politics and possibly, for Zia's own future. The negative impact of the General's ascension to the presidency—fear that he is moving Ayub Khan-like, a sentiment already being expressed—will be determined, however, in large measure, by the way in which President Zia ul-Haq plays the all-important issue of national elections. End summary.

2. CMLA General Zia's decision to accept President Chaudhry's resignation and take over the presidency (now scheduled for 1700 September 16) comes as a minor surprise. There has been speculation for some months that President Chaudhry, whose term officially expired August 14, 1978, would resign and rumored candidates for his replacement were numerous (ref B). Chaudhry is old (74), reported often to be in poor health, tired of the office, and with no taste for the decision on Bhutto's fate which might in time be taken in his name. That Zia has

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780375-1091. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8911 from Islamabad, September 14, the Embassy reported: "Radio Pakistan announced early evening 14 September that President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry will step down from office at midday on Saturday 16 September. He will be succeeded as President by Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who will be sworn into office by the Chief Justice. Announcement also indicated Gen. Zia will retain all of his present responsibilities as he assumes the presidency, meaning that he will continue as Head of Government/Chief Martial Law (de facto Prime Minister), as Chief of Army Staff, and as Foreign Minister, inter alia." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780374-0171)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7509 from Islamabad, August 2, the Embassy speculated on the future of Chaudhry's presidency, the term for which was set to expire on August 14, amid rumors that Chaudhry had submitted his resignation repeatedly. The Embassy also noted: "Renewed speculation on Chaudhry's future has been sparked by an August 1 statement by A.K. Brohi, Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, that the constitution would 'probably be amended by the authority of martial law to appoint a new President.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780318-0301)

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

finally decided to take the largely ceremonial office himself probably reflects the CMLA's judgement that he had no real alternative.

3. Once Zia accepted the fact that Chaudhry would not remain, some of the following arguments may have led him to grasp the presidential mantle:

A. Dearth of serious contenders:

—Zia's rumored first choice to replace Chaudhry, Law Minister A. K. Brohi, had been indiscreet about the issue (ref B), and Brohi's recent remarks about Pakistan's important Christian community, which caused a great stir, had already forced Zia to punish Brohi with the loss of the religious affairs portfolio in the new Cabinet. The other rumored candidate, Pakistan Muslim League President Pir of Pagaro, never was a serious contender. The Chief Justice was also a possibility but his appointment would have upset the ongoing Bhutto appeal before the Supreme Court.

—Zia probably felt that even if no civilians were acceptable, he could not appoint another military man. Besides running the risk of creating an alternative power center—a pitfall Zia has quite successfully avoided up until now—Zia would lay himself open to charges that the military has no intention of ever relinquishing power.

B. National goals and Zia's program:

—Zia may believe that he can use the presidency as a legitimating force with which to build national unity, and to help him pursue the other goals, such as Islamicization, that he desires for Pakistan.

4. The General's ascension to the presidency, however, will cause him political problems.

A. Legitimacy:

—His takeover will further weaken the "legitimacy" of the government (refair), as all of those in high office (save the Chief Justice) occupy them extra-constitutionally. Initial negative reactions to Zia's announcement have focussed on this issue. Yahya Bakhtiar, former PM Bhutto's lawyer, has said that Zia's decision "proves that the constitution is in abeyance."

B. The Bhutto problem:

—Zia will lose the last fig-leaf in the upcoming decision on Bhutto's fate. If the Supreme Court upholds Bhutto's conviction and death sentence, Zia will be faced squarely with the ultimate life and death decision in his own name, as his new office is the point of last appeal.

C. Credibility:

—By taking the presidency for himself, Zia may further aggravate opposition to him in the Army. DAO reports (septel)<sup>5</sup> that several

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<sup>5</sup> Not found.

senior officers have already expressed their disappointment with the General's decision. While we doubt Zia's move into the presidency will spark Army coup plotting, the Army's self-conception as the nation's temporary arbiter will be further shaken, and there will be comparisons made to Ayub Khan's reign.

—Zia will have a much tougher time now convincing the people that his administration remains a temporary regime, intent on cleaning up the Bhutto mess and then turning the nation back to the people's elected representatives. His move will be interpreted by many as the latest in a long series of actions he has taken toward making permanent his role at the top. Since his "temporariness" has, in fact, been a continuing source of strength—by denying the opposition politicians an issue on which they all could rally—his credibility on this score is important to his future. Opposition parties and politicians, already using the more liberalized political atmosphere to step up their demands for elections, will have now a new issue on which to assail the General and his regime. He may even have difficulties with those politicians who are already in his government.

—In foreign affairs, we doubt these factors will prove a problem; Zia has been dealt with as the man in power by all outsiders since he ousted former Prime Minister Bhutto in July 1977; the additional trappings of office will make no change. We would not be at all surprised if he discussed his plans on this matter privately with the Shah during his visit last weekend.

5. Most important, however, is how the new President plays his oft-repeated commitment to elections. Neither he nor his government has issued any statement other than the brief announcement of September 14th (ref A) to clarify their intentions or the background to the decision. Until now, it had appeared to most observers that the General was moving more and more directly toward a commitment to hold elections in 1979, with October as the likely time. He will need to reassert this commitment forcefully and promptly if he is not to face a radically changed political situation as he gazes down from the presidency.

**Constable**



**305. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1978

*Pakistan.* We have completed Congressional consultations on resumption of economic aid and arms sales to Pakistan now that the French reprocessing deal is off. We told the Members that the proliferation problem with Pakistan has not been completely resolved but that we believe a restoration of normal relations would best serve both our non-proliferation objectives and our interest in regional stability.<sup>2</sup> There were no objections to resumption of economic aid. Although some concern was expressed about arms sales, we found a general willingness not to oppose them.

Recent intelligence suggests that Pakistan is exploring other means of completing the reprocessing plant or otherwise acquiring a nuclear option.<sup>3</sup> However, the French cancellation will prevent any rapid progress by Pakistan towards this objective and gives us time to work at deterring the Pakistanis from acquiring a nuclear option. We will carefully monitor Pakistan's activities and are working with other suppliers to inhibit the acquisition of sensitive equipment or materials. Should Pakistan develop an indigenous nuclear explosive capacity, or acquire reprocessing or enrichment equipment or technology from some other country,<sup>4</sup> we would have to review immediately our overall relationship.<sup>5</sup>

When Cy met with Pakistani Minister of State Agha Shahi yesterday,<sup>6</sup> we made clear our continuing concern over Pakistani nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 10/78. Secret. Carter wrote "Warren, J" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 235372 to Vienna, September 15, transmitted the talking points that Newsom, Nye, and Hummel planned to use in order to argue for the resumption of aid and arms sales to Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2175, N780007–0554)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 306.

<sup>4</sup> Giscard's staff informed Embassy officials that they had information that Pakistan had initiated inquiries in Rome, Tokyo, and Madrid for help with completing the reprocessing plant. (Telegram 31540 from Paris, September 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2235)

<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Hold firm on this."

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 252370 to multiple posts, October 4, the Department reported on Vance's October 2 meeting in New York with Shahi in more detail. Vance "informed Agha Shahi that we were prepared to resume our aid programs, including 37 million dollars of FY-77 aid which could be released immediately. We had completed the consultations with Members of Congress and had their concurrence to proceed with our normal programs." Concerning military sales, Vance informed Shahi that "we are also prepared to consider military sales but would need to wait until January before submitting notification on specific items to Congress." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780406–0359)

intentions and reminded him of U.S. legislation and Administration policy on non-proliferation. Agha Shahi asked for a clarification of our policy with respect to A-7 sales in light of India's intention to buy 200 deep penetration strike aircraft.<sup>7</sup> Cy replied he had told the Indian Foreign Minister that we saw no reason for the Indian purchase and warned that it could create a new spiral of arms acquisitions in the region. Cy agreed that if the Indians go forward, we would have to review our policy. Agha Shahi was informed that we would have no objection to a sale of F-5Es, subject to Congressional review.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 141.

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### 306. Article in the *National Intelligence Daily*<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 4, 1978

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] apparently is still trying to develop a nuclear explosive capability [9 lines not declassified; *portion markings not declassified*]

The Pakistanis established a group of scientists [*1 line not declassified*] shortly after the Indians tested their nuclear device in 1974. The group apparently completed the theoretical phase of its studies in mid-1976 [5 lines not declassified]. The group's current work appears to be a continuation of its earlier studies.

[2 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] probably would not be able to develop even a prototype uranium enrichment capability in less than five years. [4 lines not declassified]

The Pakistanis probably have limited uranium ore reserves, but they should have no difficulty obtaining enough ore for a few nuclear explosives.

The Pakistanis may also attempt to finish work on a reprocessing plant [3 lines not declassified]. The Pakistanis may hope to obtain weap-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 79T00748A: National Intell Daily Publication (1977-1978), Box 4, Folder 2: National Intelligence Daily. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

ons-grade plutonium from this plant by the early 1980s. It is very unlikely that they could complete it to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* but they may be able to contract a facility that meets lower technical, environment, and safety standards.

*[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]*

*[less than 1 line not declassified]* will not in the foreseeable future be able to obtain spent fuel that is not under safeguards. Its safeguard agreements with Canada, the US, and the International Atomic Energy Agency are complicated, however, and it is unclear how *[less than 1 line not declassified]* interprets its obligations with regard to reprocessing and peaceful nuclear explosives *[2 lines not declassified; portion markings not declassified]*.

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### 307. Letter From Pakistani President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1978

Dear Mr President,

I thank you for sharing your thoughts with me both before and after the Camp David meetings through your messages of August 15<sup>2</sup> and September 18.<sup>3</sup> It is my sincere hope that your personal commitment and the dedicated efforts of your Administration to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, will bear fruit.

We have read with deep interest the documents which were signed at the conclusion of the Camp David meetings. My Government has issued a public statement expressing its admiration for your determined

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780178–1557. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 205979 to Islamabad, August 16, transmitted the text of Carter's letter to Zia, which discussed the upcoming meeting with Begin and Sadat at the Camp David summit. The Embassy was informed that a signed original letter to Zia would not be sent. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332–1179)

<sup>3</sup> A message from Carter to Zia dated September 18 on the subject of the Camp David meetings was not found. Telegram 236001 to Islamabad, September 17, transmitted Carter's congratulatory message to Zia on his assumption of the office of President. The message ended: "We wish you every success in your plans for a restoration of representative government in the months ahead." The message was sent along with the instruction to the Embassy that "if you believe there will be congratulatory messages from other countries (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, France, or the UK) you may at your discretion deliver following message from President Carter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780378–0891)

efforts towards securing peace in the Middle East and the process jointly initiated by you and President Sadat to achieve this objective.

Pakistan is linked with the Middle East and the Arab world in immutable ties of history, culture and religion. Our people are, therefore, deeply committed to the cause of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In our estimation, if the process of peace is to gather momentum, the initiative already taken by you would have to be pursued further to settle more fundamental issues which affect the entire Middle East region. No settlement of the Middle East conflict will be permanent or acceptable to the Arab and the Muslim world which fails to secure the national rights of the Palestinian people or does not ensure Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including the Holy City of Jerusalem, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

It is our earnest hope that under your leadership the United States will continue to exercise its positive influence on the peace making process. The restoration of peace and stability in the area through your efforts will indeed be a great act of statesmanship and will undoubtedly bring its own reward to the United States.

I will also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you our concern at the latest development in our region of which you would be aware. India's decision to introduce an entirely new offensive weapon in South Asia by the acquisition of the Anglo-French Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike aircraft,<sup>4</sup> will cause grave apprehension to the neighbouring countries. It is most regrettable that in total disregard of your Government's sincere advice, India should have decided to augment its strike capability, at a time when there was no need or justification whatsoever for doing so. According to India's own analysts these highly sophisticated strike aircraft can be effectively used only within the South Asian region.

In these circumstances, I would sincerely request you to consider bolstering Pakistan's defence capability vis-a-vis the mounting threat to its security from several directions. I have already written to you in detail about our assessment of the developments in Afghanistan<sup>5</sup> which the most recent events fully substantiate. While I am sparing no effort to promote peace and stability in our region by improving our relations with Afghanistan and India on the basis of mutual trust and confidence, I cannot overlook the fact that these two immediate neighbours of ours are bound in close treaty relationship with the Soviet Union which is relentlessly pursuing its own historic ambitions in and beyond our

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 141.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 279.

region. It is our earnest hope that U.S. preoccupations with the SALT and Camp David Agreements will not make it oblivious of the need to ensure responsible Soviet behaviour in the South Asian Region.

The developments which are currently taking place in our region, are of the deepest import and will have wide repercussions. I have, therefore, asked Mr. Agha Shahi, my Adviser on Foreign Affairs to seek an audience with you in order to acquaint you in detail with our observations and assessments. I am hopeful that you will have the time to receive him.

With profound regards,

Yours sincerely,<sup>6</sup>

**M. Zia-ul-Haq**  
*General*

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<sup>6</sup> The two closing paragraphs are handwritten.

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### **308. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, October 23, 1978, 1315Z

34818. Subject: Pakistan Ambassador to France Hardlines on Reprocessing Plant.

1. Pakistani Ambassador Iqbal Ahmed Akhund (please protect source) told me the other day that Pakistan has every intention of finishing the reprocessing plant on its own. He said it would take longer than if France helped, but the GOP was determined to go ahead. He asserted that Pakistani completion of the plant was not contrary to US law (i.e. that the Glenn Amendment applies only to transfers of equipment, materials, or technology between countries). He continued

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780434–0619. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Islamabad, New Delhi, Tehran, and Kabul. In an October 23 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton reported the information contained in the telegram. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 100, Evening Reports: 8–10/78)

that the US was mesmerized by the non-proliferation issue and was not taking a balanced view of things. He virtually admitted the purpose of the plant was military—to give the Pakistani people, Indians, and others a perception of a Pakistani military capability. But he also vigorously justified the program on other grounds and insisted Pakistan understands non-proliferation. In the Pakistani view, he said, the Indian and Afghan situations mandated the need for a nuclear weapons capability. This did not mean that Pakistan would explode a device; it meant simply that Pakistan should have the capability to do so.

2. In response to all this, I argued that the best way to assure Pakistan's security was to make sure it had friends. I said that for Pakistan to go ahead with the plant would make it extremely difficult for the US to maintain the kind of bilateral relationship that the Paks would want for their own security. I repeated what we have told them in Washington, New York, and Islamabad about not taking the letter of the Glenn Amendment as an assurance that aid could continue if Pakistan completed the plant.

**Hartman**

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**309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 31, 1978, 0357Z

276668. Exdis; for Ambassador. Subject: Contingency Message From President Carter to President Zia About Bhutto.

1. Following is a contingency message for use in the event that the execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto appears imminent. There will be no signed original.

2. You may use this message at your discretion but if at all possible you should re-check with the Department and the NSC before delivery.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78-7/79. Confidential; Exdis. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: "Ambassador Hummel delivered this message on Feb 6, 1979." Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. According to the Department of State copy, the telegram was drafted by Hornblow; cleared by Thornton and in S/S-O; approved by Lande. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780448-0268)

3. Please notify us immediately if the message is delivered.<sup>2</sup>

4. Begin text:

Dear President Zia:

In the spirit of friendship and frankness which has traditionally characterized relations between our two countries, I write to you concerning the death sentence against former Prime Minister Bhutto, which the Supreme Court of Pakistan has now upheld.

The Supreme Court has a well-deserved reputation for independence, and we have been impressed by the deliberate and careful way in which it has heard the case. Now that the judicial process is completed, however, I feel it is no longer out of place to urge you to show clemency which we learn from the mercy and compassion of the Almighty.

I urge this as one who values the relationship between our countries and respects your own strength and courage as a national leader. This matter is clearly a domestic concern of your government, but I feel obliged as a friend to say that a decision by you to spare Mr. Bhutto's life would be seen in the United States as an act of clemency, courage and statesmanship, consistent with the humane values our religions teach us. It would be welcomed and applauded by Pakistan's many friends in the United States and around the world.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

End text.

**Vance**

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1492 from Islamabad, February 6, 1979, Hummel reported that "immediately upon learning that the Pakistani Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal on the Bhutto case," he sought an appointment with Zia in order to deliver Carter's appeal for clemency. Because Shahnawaz could not assure Hummel that a meeting with Zia was possible, Hummel gave the message to Shahnawaz, who "said he would see that Pres Zia received it immediately." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790056–0569)

### 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 1, 1978, 2321Z

278243. Subject: Pakistani Reprocessing Plant. Ref: (A) Paris 31540;<sup>2</sup> (B) Paris 31663;<sup>3</sup> (C) New Delhi 15633;<sup>4</sup> (D) London 16951;<sup>5</sup> (E) Vienna 8200.<sup>6</sup>

1. Reports that the Paks are moving ahead to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities, including reprocessing and enrichment capability, and that work on high explosives continues, is raising serious concern here regarding Pakistan as a major proliferation risk. The USG intends to bring our concern to the attention of governments of potential supplier countries, including Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK on the basis of the following talking points and non-paper.

2. We would like to brief the French first on our plans to approach other capitals in order to bring the GOF up to date on our latest intelligence. We hope this continuation of our dialogue with the French on the Pakistan problem will also encourage reciprocal sharing of information.

3. Embassy Paris is requested at the earliest opportunity to approach appropriate French officials (e.g., Jacomet) and review the intelligence information at para 5 and present the talking points and text of non-paper in paras 6 and 7. Please report any French reactions and comments soonest, but do not suggest that we are clearing this proposed approach with them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-2294. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Islamabad. Drafted by Coon; cleared in OES/NET, P, S/AS, S/S-O, and EUR/RPE, and by Humphries, Van Doren, Coon, and Gallucci; approved by Nye.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 305.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 31663 from Paris, September 25, relayed information that "Paks have decided to approach Belgian, Italian, and Japanese firms in an attempt to buy covertly necessary materials and equipment to complete the plant." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780393-0468)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 15633 from New Delhi, October 10, the Embassy discussed Indian press reports about British investigations into an alleged Pakistani purchase from a British firm of electrical equipment that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780414-0610)

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 8200 from Vienna, September 13, the Embassy reported on Smith's September 11 meeting in Paris with Jacomet. [*text not declassified*] (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156-2451, N780007-0523)



4. In introducing this subject, you may say that the U.S. has, from its own sources, received information [2 *lines not declassified*] add that the USG has decided at least initially to share some of our information with key potential supplier countries and alert them to our concerns regarding Pak intentions as the UK has recently done regarding Pak gas centrifuge activity. We express the hope that particular attention be paid to Pak efforts to acquire materials and equipment to complete a reprocessing plant. Stress that we are drawing on U.S. or public information only, [5 *lines not declassified*]

5. As background information for the GOF, Embassy should relay the following noting that this intelligence is for the GOF and is not being fully shared with other capitals receiving our proposed non-paper.

A. In August 1977 a Departmental officer briefed Quai officials on information about the work of four subdivisions within the “technical development division” of the PAEC. The activities were: Implosion hydrodynamics; neutronics probably including initiators for nuclear explosives; high explosive testing; metallurgy including packaging of high explosives. [5 *lines not declassified*]

B. In addition to that activity recent intelligence indicates that at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Technology (PINSTECH) a “hot laboratory” is under construction which includes a laboratory scale reprocessing operation.

C. In addition, recent news indicates that the GOP is pursuing the development of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. A large order of inverters is being sought from a UK firm. This topic recently was covered in Indian and British press reports (refuels C & D). The British have taken steps to prevent the proposed export of the inverters, and to alert other potential suppliers to these activities. (see septel)

Please stress for the French that this information is highly sensitive and closely held with the USG; we ask similar protection within the GOF. [2 *lines not declassified*]

6. Our anticipated approach to other governments comprises the following talking points and text of a non-paper at para 7. Begin talking points:

—I have been asked to raise with you a matter of deep concern at the highest levels of the USG. You are aware that for the past two years or more we and others have been troubled by Pakistan’s efforts to acquire a nuclear reprocessing facility which we believe could be an important step in the development of nuclear explosive capability.

—In addition we are increasingly concerned about the geopolitical situation in South Asia, as a result of the Afghan revolution and growing instability in Iran. We believe it is critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation objectives to inhibit Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive capability.

—There are news reports that former Prime Minister Bhutto recently claimed that before he was deposed, Pakistan was on the verge of “full nuclear capability”. He pointed out in this context that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with Islamic states. We do not necessarily accept Mr. Bhutto’s claims of imminent success in this field, but we do find this statement of intentions to be disquieting.

—We are under no illusion that Pakistan’s motivations or intentions have changed with respect to development of the nuclear explosive option. We believe that Pakistan is exploring the feasibility of completing construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant as a national project. To do so, Pakistan may attempt to obtain technical expertise, materials, and equipment from individuals and firms in various foreign countries, including yours.

—Also the United Kingdom has recently advised that it has firm information that the Paks are pursuing the development of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. The U.K. has stopped export of inverters for such use and has asked other potential suppliers to be in a position to take similar action.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—Acquisition of a nuclear fuel reprocessing or enrichment capability would, and we believe is intended to, complement these activities. If Pakistan were to succeed in its efforts, we believe a particularly dangerous risk of nuclear proliferation would arise in Pakistan, with profound implications for the Middle East as well as the subcontinent. It is for this reason that my government has asked that your government be made aware of this information on a highly confidential basis. We are in close touch with other concerned governments on this matter: Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K. End of talking points.

7. Begin non-paper: The USG has reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to complete the Chasma reprocessing plant—and perhaps build an additional facility at PINSTECH that may be capable of reprocessing—neither of which would necessarily be subject to international safeguards. If completed, either of these reprocessing facilities might produce sufficient plutonium annually for several nuclear explosive devices. We believe Pakistan is seeking materials, equipment, and technical assistance for these facilities from European countries and Japan. The Pakistanis may try to establish contact with relevant firms perhaps resorting to the use of indirect representatives and “dummy” purchasing agents to circumvent potential government controls.

The U.S. believes that your government should be in possession of these facts in order that it may exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities which would

permit them to develop nuclear explosive capability. In addition, the US would appreciate receiving any additional information on this matter which may come to the attention of your government. The U.S., for its part, intends to permit no exports of materials, equipment, or technology from the U.S. which might contribute to completion of sensitive nuclear facilities in Pakistan. End text of non-paper.

8. Please report GOF reactions ASAP. We would be interested as well in any indications as to whether the French intend to raise this matter with other governments, although we do not propose pressing them to do so.<sup>7</sup>

9. For Islamabad: The information in para 3 above is in line with your suggestion contained para 2 and 3 of Islamabad 9753.<sup>8</sup>

10. For London: Advise Moberly that we are proceeding with above approach of talking points and non-papers to capitals of countries listed and note that we are passing US-origin information in para 3 above to Jacomet. Please confirm that UK has no objection to fifth talking point in para six above taking into particular account fact that we will be approaching two capitals, Madrid and Brussels, which were not recipients of British note.<sup>9</sup>

Vance

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 36143 from Paris, November 2, the Embassy reported that Jacomet planned to call in the Italian and Spanish Ambassadors in the near future to express concerns about supplying Pakistan with sensitive equipment that could be used to make nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1897)

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 9753 from Islamabad, October 8, Hummel suggested that the Embassy in Paris be informed of intelligence relating to Pakistani plans to build nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2268)

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 18055 from London, November 2, transmitted minor British alterations to the talking point. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2181)

### 311. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 3, 1978, 0152Z

279885. Subject: Message From President Carter to President Zia.

You may deliver the following message from President Carter to President Zia.

Begin text. Thank you for your October 8 letter about the Camp David meeting, and your encouragement for our efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> I especially appreciated your government's public statement of support for those efforts.

The Egyptian-Israel negotiations now in progress must, as I said in my statement of October 12 opening these talks,<sup>3</sup> be the basis for, and the first step toward, the larger goal of a comprehensive and lasting settlement between Israel and her neighbors. We will continue to do everything that we can to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

With regard to South Asia, we have consistently opposed India's acquisition of deep penetration-strike aircraft, as you pointed out in your letter. We have told the Government of India that we regret its decision to purchase Jaguar aircraft and were disturbed by their public linking of this purchase to the possible sale of F5's to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, I still hope that this purchase will not interfere with the rapprochement between your two countries. I believe that India sees its own best interests served by an independent and united Pakistan, and I hope that India and Pakistan can develop a relationship of mutual trust which permits both countries to devote their resources to more productive purposes.

I do, of course, understand your concerns about Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. I assure you that we are not complacent about developments in the area. We recognize the sovereign equality of countries in the region and our support for the integrity of Pakistan is unwavering. Our major goal in the area is to help our friends safeguard their integrity and independence, free from domination by any outside power.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780453-0568. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Kabul and New Delhi. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S-O and by Wisner; approved by Miklos.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 307.

<sup>3</sup> See *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1757-1760.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 141.

Under Secretary of State Benson is visiting Pakistan to discuss military and scientific matters with officials of your government, and I hope that they will share their concerns with her candidly.<sup>5</sup>

I regret that because of my heavy schedule, it was not possible for me to see Agha Shahi, your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, while he was in the United States.<sup>6</sup>

Thank you once again for sharing your views with me; I value these contacts very much. End text.

Vance

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<sup>5</sup> Benson met with Zia on November 4 and Shahi on November 6. See Documents 312 and 313.

<sup>6</sup> Shahi met with Vance on October 2 in New York. See footnote 6, Document 305.

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### **312. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, November 6, 1978, 0655Z

10882. PACOM and EUCOM for POLADs. Subject: Meeting Between President Zia ul-Haq and Under Sec Benson.

1. Under Secretary Benson, accompanied by Ambassador Hummel and Les Brown, met for over an hour with President Zia evening of 4 November. Meeting was followed by a small dinner. Present at pre-dinner session was Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, MGen. Arif (Chief of Staff to President) and MFA notetaker Touqir; Arif and Shahnawaz were joined on Pak side by Defense Secretary Jilant and Atomic Energy Chief Munir Khan for dinner.

2. Benson opened discussion by drawing on points contained in scope paper,<sup>2</sup> as amended by State 280774,<sup>3</sup> emphasizing that the pur-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780457–0503. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Kabul, Karachi, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 280774 to Islamabad, November 4, the Department informed Benson and Hummel that authorization to offer Pakistan TOW-mounted helicopters or additional F5–Es beyond the 40 already approved (see Document 292) had not yet been obtained. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0219)

pose of her mission was to obtain Pakistani views on security problems in the region and to open a frank dialogue on military supply matters. Benson reviewed items we are prepared to lay before Congress in January and informed Paks of our negative decision on F-16's and F-18's in the present circumstances. (The question of A-7's did not arise, although it did loom up on following day in session with Defense Secretary Jilani (septel).<sup>4</sup>

3. President Zia's response was somewhat rambling and unfocused. His major theme was the apparent inability of the U.S. to face its responsibilities to the free world, and particularly to the small countries within it, and Pakistan's inability to find out exactly how it stood in its relationship with the U.S. He rhetorically asked whether Pakistan could expect a warm handshake or a cold touch. He expressed great concern about events in Iran, and he pointed out that Pakistan should become more important to U.S. interests if the Iranian Government suffers sharp change or becomes weak. He and Shahnawaz outlined in familiar terms Pakistan's perceptions of future threats to regional stability that they predicted would come in due course from Afghanistan and might also come from India.

4. Among the more interesting specific points made by Zia were the following:

A. Economic development is more important than military strength for Pakistan and Pakistan is interested in acquiring indigenous defense production capabilities as well as military end items. (This subject arose again the following morning with Defense Secretary Jilani but the only production request made by Jilani was for fuses for 106 mm recoilless rifle ammunition; see septel.)

B. The Chinese had provided "billions, not millions, of dollars" of military equipment following 1966 but "haven't asked for a penny in repayment." By contrast, Zia noted that in the thirty months since his deputy went to the U.S. in 1975, not very much had been received by Pakistan. He remarked that he finds it difficult to explain this to his troops. Amb Hummel interjected at this point that the General should tell his troops that the United States had provided TOWs, AIM-9 missiles, two destroyers, and a number of other things.

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 10928 from Islamabad, November 7, the Embassy reported on Benson's November 5 meeting with Jilani. After laying out what types of military hardware the United States was and was not prepared to sell to Pakistan (Benson specifically indicated that the United States was "not prepared to make available" F-16s, F-18s, and A-7s), the discussion centered on the F5-E, which the Pakistani officials regarded as inadequate in light of India's recent purchase of British Jaguar aircraft. The Pakistanis agreed to create a list of U.S. military equipment that they desired and that complied with U.S. arms sales policy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780459-0098)

C. The Army, according to Zia, is more important than the Air Force in terms of Pakistan's defenses, and therefore primary emphasis should be given to ground force equipment.

D. In the context of discussing the limitations of CENTO, Zia stated that Pakistan could not align itself with the Soviets since picking up the Soviet option would "foreclose" all other Pak options. Zia reiterated his previous assurances that the GOP would do nothing quickly in regard to CENTO and, in any event, would do nothing to damage U.S. interests.

E. He stressed, as did others, that Pakistan has no desire to seek parity with Indian power, but only wants to maintain a credible deterrent against Indian or Afghan/Soviet military action.

5. Shahnawaz had little to say in the course of discussion but tended to echo the President's theme about the uncertainty of the U.S. Pakistani relationship, in the light of regional uncertainties.

6. In response to Benson's remarks about U.S. interest in human rights and in narcotics control, Zia expressed his comprehension of strong U.S. views. He said his govt is thoroughly mindful of the rights of its citizens and is taking only minimal steps to curtail free debate and action, consistent with the maintenance of public order. He cited his observation of a village called Gupis in the far northern Gilgit area, where many of the inhabitants are opium addicts, and expressed his determination to curtail production and trafficking. He said he had personally refused a recent request by some of the villagers in the NWFP for permission to plant opium.

7. Comment: Zia had obviously been forewarned of negative decision on aircraft more advanced than F-5E's, and chose to discuss broader issues rather than specific items of military hardware. He was cordial and attentive, but seemed somewhat tired (it was the eve of his departure for a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca at the invitation of Saudi Prince Fahd.)

**Hummel**

### 313. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, November 7, 1978, 0815Z

10929. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Under Secretary Benson's Meeting With Agha Shahi. Ref: (A) Islamabad 10882;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 10928.<sup>3</sup>

1. Summary: At President Zia's direction, Agha Shahi met with Under Secretary Benson November 6 (he returned a day early from Paris for the meeting) to continue discussions previously held between Benson and President, and with Defense Secretary General Jilani. Shahi gave impressive, if one-sided, review of US-Pak relations, Pakistan's security concerns and desire for greater US military assistance, and GOP views on possible restructuring of regional security arrangements including CENTO. New element in Shahi's presentation, absent from earlier discussions with Zia and Jilani, was Shahi's assertion that Pakistan has "rightful expectation" of "free" military assistance under terms of 1959 bilateral agreement whose continued validity US has reaffirmed. Under Secretary reiterated US support for Pakistan, explained US position on arms sales (including decision not to sell aircraft more advanced than F-5E and non-availability of grant MAP) and expressed willingness to consider proposals for strengthening CENTO or other regional security arrangements. End summary.

2. GOP view of US-Pak relations—Shahi gave lucid but one-sided review of US-Pak relations since early 60s with heavy emphasis on devastating effects for Pak security of virtual ten year embargo on provision of major military equipment. Shahi noted prolonged period of perplexity on part of GOP as to US intentions toward Pakistan and continued uncertainty. Referring to his March 1978 meeting with National Security Adviser Brzezinski,<sup>4</sup> Shahi claimed US was placing all its security eggs for this region in Iranian and Indian baskets. GOP had thus concluded US was no longer interested in Pakistan and was prepared to see it "fend for itself". Under prodding from Amb Hummel, Shahi acknowledged that Under Secretary Newsom's visit,<sup>5</sup> his October

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780459-0621. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Ankara, Kabul, London, Karachi, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 312.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 312.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 274.

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 293 and 294.



18 speech on the region<sup>6</sup> and Mrs. Benson's visit were all concrete manifestations of US interest and indicated a positive trend in US policy.

3. Shahi said it is up to US to define US-Pak relations and that Pakistan will have to adjust to US definition, and then see what else it can do to fill security needs not met in context of relations with US. Shahi said that Pakistan was greatly disquieted by developments in Africa, Red Sea area, and more immediately in Afghanistan and Iran. GOP was pleased to see US also disturbed by these developments, but felt that US concern had not yet led to commensurate support for Pakistan. US policy of sole reliance on Iran and India for area security was not viable because (a) Iran is in period of what may be prolonged instability and (b) India will never move to check Soviet expansion in area. In these circumstances Pakistan must have military assistance from US. With our explicit reaffirmation of validity of '59 bilateral agreement,<sup>7</sup> which Pakistan believes embodies "rightful expectation" of "free" military assistance from US, he hoped for more forthcoming US posture. Shahi noted congressional problems, said GOP understands them, but urged that administration agree in principle to meet Pak security needs and then work on strategy to achieve congressional support. Shahi noted GOP disappointment over negative US position on aircraft and tanks for Pakistan, and said Pakistan particularly wants US equipment because of relatively low cost for end-items and maintenance, which he contrasted with very high cost French equipment.

4. In response Under Secretary reiterated continuing US support for Pakistan's independence and security, as most recently expressed in November 3 letter to President Zia<sup>8</sup> and noted that her purpose in visiting Pakistan was to help establish new and realistic relationship between our governments. She noted she had discussed previous day with Defense Secretary list of military items which could be sold to

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<sup>6</sup> Newsom gave a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on October 18. Newsom outlined the following six policy objectives vis-à-vis the South Asia region: "to encourage and strengthen independent nations, free from domination by outside powers; to assist, through investment, trade and, where appropriate, aid in the economic and social development of these nations; to encourage regional cooperation in overcoming common economic and security problems and in resolving disputes and conflicts among the states of the region; to respond appropriately to the defense needs of these nations; to insure that the development of peaceful nuclear technology is consistent with nonproliferation; and to encourage the observance of human rights, in all aspects—political, social, and economic." (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1978, pp. 52–55)

<sup>7</sup> In a November 3 meeting with Yaqub Khan, Saunders again affirmed that "the 1959 agreement remains in effect." (Telegram 280861 to Islamabad, November 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0311)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 311.

Pakistan, including our F-5E offer which remains open. In spite of our inability to meet requests for more advanced aircraft such as F-16, Benson noted we would have no objection if Pakistan looked elsewhere and indicated our willingness to try to help Pakistan find financial backing for military purchase from mutual friends such as Saudis. On tanks, Under Secretary noted that US had none to spare from current inventories, and that lead times [garble] very long from production line. In response to query about possible third country transfer of M-48 tanks, Benson noted this hypothetical issue had not been addressed but said USG would be willing to consider specific request if GOP found some available (FRG is apparently potential source for Pakistan, according to Shahi). Responding to Shahi's points about congressional difficulties on arms sales, Under Secretary emphasized that these are very real at present, particularly with regard to grant and credit assistance, but that President was committed to maintain relations with allies and was prepared to do battle with Congress when required, as was demonstrated with lifting of Turkish arms embargo.

5. CENTO and regional security—Under Secretary urged GOP to look very carefully at CENTO before taking any decisions. She argued that it would be a serious mistake for any of members to weaken it at this time and would give the wrong signal to the Soviets. Benson explained that US is prepared to consider proposals to strengthen CENTO and is willing to cooperate in devising new means to serve purposes members agree they may want. Alternatively, we would be prepared to collaborate on working out regional arrangements acceptable to all.

6. Shahi welcomed indications that US is prepared to consider proposals for strengthening CENTO and said GOP will give intensive thought to this possibility and to evolution of possible substitute for CENTO. GOP will consult with others in area on these points. Following long discussion on attitudes in area towards alliances and pacts (mostly negative in his view), Shahi clearly spelled out fundamental GOP view on CENTO: as long as CENTO fails to deal with contingencies such as arose in the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan by India, backed by Soviet Union, CENTO can give Pakistan no security. Shahi also spoke about appeal of Non-Aligned Movement for Pakistan in security terms, asserting that NAM solidarity might provide more meaningful political support for Pakistan against Soviet threat than CENTO can. Shahi concluded by noting that "security is our touchstone" in assessing all its relationships with rest of the world.

7. Subsequently at Amb's dinner for Benson, Agha Shahi made particular point of telling Benson of GOP's appreciation for US offers responsive, at least in part, to Pak military and security requirements, as well as for Washington efforts to re-examine situation in area, and for Benson's visit to Pakistan.

**Hummel**

### 314. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, November 14, 1978, 1105Z

11120. Paris for OECD. Subject: How Can We Break the Debt Rescheduling Impasse? Ref: (A) State 237737;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 10061.<sup>3</sup>

1. We are under a drumfire of inquiry by GOP officials about when we are going to reschedule debt. We have told them in every way we know that they want debt rescheduling as a form of aid and that the U.S. does not extend its aid through debt rescheduling. It is a dialogue of the deaf. They are convinced of the justice of their case and view us as unreasonably and rigidly negative, especially since just about every other creditor country already is easing its terms on debt (UK, Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands) or has privately indicated it would reschedule if only the U.S. would (Germany, France, Italy). The Germans are actively lobbying for a generalized rescheduling. The only instructions we have are quite stiff (in effect, State 237737 advised the Pakistanis to “bite the bullet” and do it now since the longer they wait the stiffer the price they will have to pay) and quite stale (State 237737 was sent September 19). This leaves us in an uncomfortably negative and rigid posture, one from which it is impossible to be constructive.

2. As we have said before, we think the U.S. should be trying to negotiate needed reform so that resource transfers more effectively accomplish development. Just as you can’t beat something with nothing, neither can you negotiate effectively by saying “no”, even if you say it nicely. We understand the U.S. opposition to debt rescheduling

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780469–0121. Confidential. Sent for information to Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, Paris, and Tehran.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 237737 to Islamabad, September 19, transmitted the Department’s negative response to Pakistan’s August 16 note verbale, which requested U.S. support for Pakistan’s effort to reschedule its foreign debt. The Department stated: “It is our judgment that Pakistan’s balance of payments outlook is more optimistic than previously forecast by Pakistan and the World Bank, and that Pakistan’s situation should permit full servicing of debt in the year ahead.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780383–0210)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 10061 from Islamabad, October 16, the Embassy reported an October 15 discussion between U.S. officials and Pakistani Finance Secretary Aftab Ahmed Khan during which Khan was warned of U.S. concerns about recent Pakistani threats to default on its foreign debt in order to qualify for immediate debt rescheduling. Khan gave assurances that Pakistan would not unilaterally default. He added that in lieu of debt rescheduling, Pakistan “would welcome equivalent fast disbursing aid.” The Embassy recommended: “In the light of this, and if Aftab’s budget and money numbers are acceptable to the IMF, we think the U.S. should not stand in the way of a meeting to discuss Pakistan’s debt and economic situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427–0228)

under Pakistani circumstances and point out the reasons for it to the Pakistanis at every opportunity. We look for direct resource transfer instead in exchange for performance and this is the negotiation we and other creditors (including the IMF) should be engaged in. Even those who are most willing to reschedule or otherwise increase resource flow (including the Germans) agree this should be linked to reform.

3. We suggested a possible way out along these lines in our Islamabad 10061. Since the message has gone unanswered, we don't know if this approach or some evolution of it holds any promise. If it doesn't, we should like for someone else to suggest an approach that might get us out of our present impasse. (We assume all will agree this is desirable). With Pakistan's own political situation precarious, with one of its neighbors close to revolution and with another harboring dubious intentions after its own revolution, this is not the time to be negative and uncompromising. We will pay a price for such a posture in many ways for a long time to come. It is the time to try to give Pakistan the cushion of external resources it sincerely feels it needs in return for (and as lever for) the sort of policy reform that will see that these external resources are well used.<sup>4</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 292333 to Islamabad, November 17, the Department maintained the position that Pakistan's balance of payments was manageable and did not require debt relief, adding: "We welcome Embassy's effort to encourage GOP to resume discussions with the IMF. However, we do not wish to play the role of broker for either side or to pressure the IMF to accede to the GOP demands." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780475-0398)

### 315. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 30, 1978, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

PRC on Pakistan—Summary of Conclusions

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *State*

David Newsom, Under Secretary for  
Political Affairs

Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for  
Security Assistance, Science and  
Technology

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary  
for Near Eastern and South  
Asian Affairs

##### *Defense*

Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary  
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for Near Eastern,  
African, and South Asian Affairs

##### *Office of Management and Budget*

Randy Jayne, Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs

Ed Sanders, Associate Director for  
International Affairs

##### *Agency for International Development*

John Gilligan, Administrator, Agency  
for International Development  
Malcolm Butler, Deputy Assistant  
for Intragovernmental Affairs

##### *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*

Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director  
Thomas Hirschfeld, Deputy Assistant  
Director

##### *Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Lt. General William Smith

##### *Central Intelligence Agency*

Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director,  
National Foreign Assessment  
Center

Robert Ames, Acting NIO for Near  
Eastern and South Asian Affairs

##### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

##### *National Security Council*

Thomas Thornton  
Gary Sick

#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The PRC met to discuss specific issues relating to Pakistan and the broader regional context of which Pakistan is a critical part.

*Regional Context:* There was general agreement that we need to look beyond Pakistan. What we are primarily concerned about is the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 74, Policy Review Committee: 11/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 71, PRC 079, 11/30/78, Pakistan.

impact that problems in Pakistan (and Iran and Afghanistan) are likely to have on the West Asian and Persian Gulf region (the Subcontinent to the Red Sea). We should approach our policy choices in Pakistan within this broader context.

At this point we lack such a broad framework, both geographically (in that we have not dealt with the Subcontinent-through-Red Sea region as a whole) and conceptually (in that we have not examined a range of alternatives that goes beyond near-term restraints posed by resource shortages and by current public and Congressional attitudes).

The PRC agreed to set up an Interagency Working Group on an urgent basis to look at the region in broad geographic and conceptual terms. The group will consist of DOD, JCS, NSC, and State as chairman. AID, ACDA, Treasury and others will be called on to assist as appropriate. It will draw up a plan for further study and action and present it to the PRC for approval before the end of December.

CIA will provide appropriate estimative intelligence inputs.

The PRC addressed some *specific Pakistani issues* that can be dealt with even before the formulation of a broader framework:

*Political:* It was agreed to keep open the question of inviting President Zia to visit the United States; a decision on this cannot be made until the outcome of the Bhutto case is clear.<sup>2</sup> In addition, we will concentrate on more substantive exchanges with the Pakistanis at all levels to show attentiveness, and seek to encourage Western European and Japanese support for maintaining Pakistan's western orientation.

*Nuclear Issues:* It is clear that the Pakistanis continue to look for ways to develop a nuclear explosive capability and that their activities, if unchecked, will ultimately force us to cut off our economic assistance and military sales. A Pakistani explosive capability seems about five years away, and there are some steps that they may take before then that would force a cutoff. Meanwhile our current strategy should not be confrontational. We will continue to monitor the situation closely, continue to impress on the Pakistanis the effect that their nuclear program can have on our relationship, and seek to gain influence by building up other areas of our relationship. We are not at the moment

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<sup>2</sup> In a November 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton argued against inviting Zia to Washington. Pointing to Bhutto's possible execution as grounds to postpone a visit, Thornton argued: "This is especially advisable since we would then be able to better assess the internal situation in Pakistan. If Zia gets in bad trouble we probably would be well-advised to keep away from him; if he weathers the storm well, then we should have a better perspective on where Pakistan is heading and what we can do about it. I also do not want to have Zia here until we know what we want to say to him and I don't think we know at this point." In a handwritten note in the left-hand margin of the memorandum, Brzezinski indicated his agreement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1-12/78)

at a critical juncture; thus we should move ahead with certain positive steps (see below) and then resume the nuclear dialog forcefully and make clear what specific kinds of Pakistani behavior are unacceptable, so that they will not be surprised if we are forced to cut off aid because they have passed certain milestones on the road to a nuclear capability.

*Military Sales:* During Lucy Benson's visit the Pakistanis agreed to prepare a want list of material that is uniquely of US origin and fits within our arms sales policy.<sup>3</sup> We expect the list to be forthcoming.

In the meantime, however, the Pakistanis have specifically asked us about the availability of aircraft and helicopter-borne TOWs. *We will need Presidential approval for both of these.*

—While we have turned them down on A-7s and told them we would react receptively to requests for the F-16 or F-18, the PRC proposes to increase to 76 the number of F-5Es that we are willing to sell Pakistan from the 40 approved earlier by the President.<sup>4</sup> (The Pakistanis had suggested 100.) These additional aircraft would be provided as one-for-one replacements of obsolete F-86s.

—The Pakistanis have legitimate concerns about Indian and Afghan tank forces and the PRC recommends making available a helicopter TOW system. The PRC, except for ACDA, agreed that this sale would *not* require the President to make an exception to PD-13.<sup>5</sup>

The PRC further agreed that: FMS financing is not available although we may have to reconsider later; we would consider approval of third-country transfer of US-origin equipment to Pakistan (specifically tanks); and if the Pakistanis request, we will recommend to the Saudis and UAE that they pay the bills.

The PRC also agreed, at DOD request, that a clarification is needed in existing Presidential guidance on arms sales policy to South Asia as regards equality of treatment for India and Pakistan. NSC undertook to provide clarification.

*Economic Assistance:* The Pakistanis believe that we are committed to restore earlier aid levels (\$60 million and more annually) now that they have been denied the French reprocessing plant. At current FY 80 budget levels it will be very hard to eke out more funds for Pakistan than the \$40 million now provided for. State believes that at a minimum the level should be \$50 million. AID, OMB and Henry Owen expressed strong reservations in view of Pakistan's poor economic performance.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 312.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 292.

<sup>5</sup> PD/NSC-13, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," May 13, 1977, aimed to restrain the transfer of conventional weapons. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.



The PRC did recognize the need for modest additional resources and it was agreed to look into the possibility of making Pakistan eligible for Security Supporting Assistance in FY 80 if funds could be found. In any event, this should be looked at in connection with FY 81. State noted that \$10 million might be taken from both the Egyptian and Israeli SSA allocations in FY 80.

There was general consensus that debt relief at this time is not appropriate for Pakistan but the question will be kept under review with Treasury.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Under a December 4 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski forwarded the Summary of Conclusions and recommended: "That you approve the Summary of Conclusions, specifically including the improved offer on F-5s and the helicopter TOWs. This recommendation is supported by all PRC participants." Carter checked the Approve option and initialed Brzezinski's memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 71, PRC 079, 11/30/78, Pakistan)

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### 316. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 5, 1978

Monthly Warning Report:  
Nuclear Proliferation [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

2. *Pakistani Uranium Enrichment Technology Acquisition*. Pakistan's efforts to acquire foreign equipment for a uranium enrichment plant now under construction have been more extensive and sophisticated than previously indicated. Despite the best efforts of nuclear supplier states to thwart these activities, Pakistan may succeed in acquiring the main missing components for a strategically significant gas centrifuge enrichment capability. To the extent Indians learn about or suspect Pakistani progress toward a nuclear weapons capability, and there are signs of heightened concern, their aversion to intrusive safeguards on nuclear facilities and their interest in more nuclear weapons-oriented activities may be strengthened substantially. [*portion marking not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 83B01027R: Policy Files, Box 3, Folder 13: Monthly NIO Warning Memos. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by Despres, who sent the report to Turner under a December 5 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)



### 317. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 19, 1978, 5–5:20 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan of Pakistan

Hayat Mehdi, Minister, Pakistan Embassy

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Thomas P. Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

#### SUBJECT

U.S.-Pakistan Relations; Southwest Asian Security (U)

Dr. Brzezinski had asked Ambassador Yaqub-Khan to pay a call before going to his new post in Moscow. The discussion opened with comments on Brezhnev's health (both sides agreeing that he probably had good and bad days) and the prospects for change in the Soviet leadership. Brzezinski suggested that there is a 12–13 year generation gap in the Soviet Union, and that we are going to be seeing a transitional leadership situation for some time to come. (C)

In response to a question, Yaqub-Khan noted that his assignment to Moscow was the opposite of the usual progression (Moscow-Washington) for Asian ambassadors, and that it probably did reflect a Pakistani desire to reach a better accommodation with the Soviets. Pakistan would not be jumping into the Soviet camp nor harming its ties with the U.S., but the Soviet presence in South Asia is a reality that is making itself felt and Pakistan would be unwise to offer provocations.<sup>2</sup> (C)

Brzezinski said that this was a very sensible approach. He stressed our continuing interest in the independence of the countries of the region, including Pakistan. We are also concerned with the stability and independence of Iran. Our improved relations with India are helpful to all parties including Pakistan. We are gratified also by the recent turn in Sino-U.S. relations and expect these to develop further. We see in this pattern of relationships the makings of long-run regional stability. These countries must think in regional terms for their security. We

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

<sup>2</sup> According to a November 13 Memorandum for the Record by Turner, Vance told Turner: "The Paks recently transferred Ambassador Khan from Washington to the Soviet Union. He is a first-class Ambassador and was giving the impression that his transfer was because they thought they ought to explore whether they should have better relations with the Soviets." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 22, Folder 10: Memo of Conversation w/Sec of State)

know, of course, of Pakistan's problems with India but there is a larger historical convergence of interest in independence and stability. Changes in any of the four countries involved would increase the vulnerability of the other three—albeit least so in the case of China. India, Iran and Pakistan all have problems; great political and social stress inevitably has a foreign affairs impact. We want to assist in promoting stability and regional independence. Our arms offers were a token of this—but the critical issue is how Pakistan handles your domestic problems. (C)

Yaqub replied that the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations was warmly received in Pakistan and, responding to Brzezinski's observation, said that Pakistan indeed took special pride of having played an important role at the beginning of the process. Turning to relations with India, Yaqub said that there was less tension in the relationship than for many years past. Pakistan was doing its best to move towards normalization. Kashmir remained a problem, however, that had been aggravated by Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee's recent statements.<sup>3</sup> The Pakistanis have sought to minimize the impact of that and there have been good exchanges of sports teams, etc. Pakistan is also seeking to maintain normal relations with Afghanistan as evidenced by the recent visit of the Pakistani Commerce Minister. Responding to a question by Brzezinski, Yaqub said the Kabul regime was not stable. There had already been a coup in the army; there were widespread resentments against the regime; and it could not deliver the short-term economic benefits needed to retain popular support. The Soviets are propping Taraki up—through treaties and physical presence. The regime can be kept in power, however, only by force majeure (i.e. Soviet.) (C)

Brzezinski told Yaqub that the U.S. would continue to seek to dissuade Pakistan—and India—from going nuclear. We recognize that there are differences of opinion, but feel that we must pursue our long-term non-proliferation concerns for the greater security of all. Pakistani nuclear explosive development would greatly complicate our bilateral relations. (Yaqub did not respond.) Otherwise, Brzezinski said, we have no clouds on our bilateral horizon. (C)

Yaqub noted the unstable situation in Iran where the signs and portents are unfavorable. Pakistan had been glad to see George Ball play a role. (C)

Brzezinski reiterated our support for the Shah. We are trying to help set a framework for dealing with the immediate problem and to

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<sup>3</sup> According to telegram 18920 from New Delhi, December 8, which reported his December 6 comments in the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee "warned Pakistan that it would be playing with fire if it talked of self-determination in Kashmir." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780510-1041)

set things in motion for dealing with deeper problems over time. We think we are doing well in the former. Turning to U.S.-Soviet relations, Brzezinski said he looked for improvement. We have created a framework that excludes mindless confrontation on the one hand, and global condominium on the other. (C)

Yaqub noted misgivings on the Soviet side about the opening to China; despite what they say, they are very sensitive about the potentialities. (C)

Brzezinski closed the meeting by saying that we have sought to reassure Moscow on this point; we do not intend to exploit Sino-Soviet differences. In our dealings with the Soviets we look for mutual restraint—e.g., by the Soviets in Africa. (C)

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### **318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 16, 1979, 1411Z

11800. Subject: Statement on Pakistan Nuclear Developments. Ref: 78 Islamabad 10202,<sup>2</sup> 11830,<sup>3</sup> 12681.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1481. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Coon and Fuller; cleared in S/AS, PM/NPP, and S/S–O, and by Benson, Guhin, Van Doren, Gallucci, and Saunders; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 10202 from Islamabad, October 19, 1978, Hummel explained his plan to let the Pakistanis know that the United States was in possession of information regarding Pakistan's covert nuclear program and suggested the wording that he would use, subject to Departmental approval. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 11830 from Islamabad, December 1, 1978, Hummel reported his November 30 conversation with Yaqub Khan, during which he said that the United States "and some other countries also, are perturbed over private reports we have received that GOP is actively engaged in research and development of atomic weapons. I said that I hoped GOP would realize that consequences for Pakistan could be severe, in terms of very adverse reactions by a number of countries, if such a course is pursued." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2272)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 12681 from Islamabad, December 24, 1978, Hummel suggested how best to approach the Pakistanis about U.S. intelligence regarding the covert Pakistani nuclear program. Hummel argued against a *démarche*, favoring "a gradual process of introducing appropriate Pak officials to the realities and consequences of outside knowledge of what they're up to. We don't want any abrupt confrontation, at least at this stage, and we don't want to hear a lot of defensive untruths." Hummel also suggested that simultaneous approaches to Pakistan by other countries would be helpful. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2274)

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following careful consideration of proposed language on Pak nuclear programs, you are authorized to initiate the process of making the GOP aware of our knowledge of their efforts and the potential consequences if they persist in their course.

3. We recommend you start with Zia and later let others know. At an early opportunity, please seek an appointment with President and as appropriate, draw on the following: Quote: You should know that my government and also other governments are concerned about Pakistan's intentions with respect to developing nuclear weapons capability. You are aware of our views on reprocessing. You should know that we are equally concerned about continuing reports which come to us of Pakistan's efforts in the field of uranium enrichment which we believe are designed to provide fissile material for nuclear explosive devices. Such reports and other information regarding research into nuclear explosives naturally give us concern.

There is no question that the continuance of these activities will have serious consequences for the stability of the region and will impact adversely on our bilateral relations including affecting our ability to continue our economic and other support for Pakistan. We wish to bring this to your personal attention since we believe the continuing instability in the area underscores the fact that it is in our mutual interest to maintain and strengthen our relations. End quote.

Vance

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### 319. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 18, 1979

#### Monthly Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. *Pakistani Gas Centrifuge Development and Foreign Supply Acquisition Efforts*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 83B01027R: Policy Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Monthly NIO Warning Memos. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Despres sent the report under a January 18 covering memorandum to the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation. (Ibid.)

The Community continues to be concerned that Pakistan, if it has not already done so, may soon acquire all the essential components for a plant that could ultimately produce the fissile material for several nuclear weapons a year. Indeed, Pakistan may already have succeeded in acquiring the main missing components for a gas centrifuge plant and ancillary facilities that are probably being built to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons, perhaps even by 1982. Still, foreign suppliers, by limiting Pakistan's access to specially suited materials and equipment, could at least marginally complicate Pakistani efforts to complete the plant and to make it fully and efficiently operational. However, Pakistan has probably already acquired all the technology—designs, plans, and technical expertise—that is critical for the eventual operation of this plant. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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**320. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 18, 1979

SUBJECT

Trip Report: Pakistan (U)

I shall make the first of my report memos on Pakistan<sup>2</sup> since what I have to say bears very directly on the PRC meeting that will be held on Monday.<sup>3</sup> (C)

My conversations were pretty desultory with Pakistani officials. They included the number three men in the Foreign and Finance ministries (more senior officials were away) and some Defense ministry

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner, Brzezinski wrote: "V[ery] interesting + depressing. ZB. Any action items? ZB."

<sup>2</sup> Thornton visited Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan January 1–14, with a stopover in London on January 15 before returning to the United States a day later. For Thornton's report on his visit to India, see Document 121.

<sup>3</sup> January 22. See Document 321.

types who were uninteresting.<sup>4</sup> In addition, I had good conversations in the Embassy and with several foreign diplomats in Islamabad. (C)

The reason that the conversations were desultory is simple: nobody in Pakistan has anything to say except the old, outworn litanies. The country is in a state of suspended animation awaiting the Bhutto outcome and movement toward a government that can make some decisions. Elections are supposed to take place this fall, but many doubt that they will and even if they do, there is no probability that they will produce a government that can tackle the foreign and domestic problems of Pakistan, either in the political or domestic spheres. Aside from Bhutto there is no leadership in sight; Zia is clearly in over his head. There was not a positive note to be heard anywhere—also not at the Chiefs of Mission conference.<sup>5</sup> This is not to say that Pakistan does not have considerable potential; rather, that the conditions are not ripe for realizing that potential. (S)

An immediate issue relates to debt relief. Treasury resists debt relief on general principle; the Pakistanis claim that their situation is desperate. One telling point is that their repayments to us will soon exceed our aid to them. I have asked Guy Erb to look into this. In talking to the Pakistanis, however, I pushed hard for them to take the domestic steps that will get their house back in order. (Probably they will not be able to.) (C)

On the foreign front the Pakistanis are very worried about Afghanistan; somewhat less so about Iran but the chaos there certainly adds to their despair. But above all, they are obsessed with India. As long as this is the case, there is no way that they can participate effectively in a regional security system of any kind. This is why we have to keep pressure on them (seconded by China) to convince them that we will not provide them with an alternative to finding an accommodation with India. (S)

There are some things to be done with India in terms of making them more accommodating to the Pakistanis. (They have been doing pretty well but more is needed.) Some possibilities are: Acceptance of Pakistan's ideas for a nuclear free zone or other nuclear reassurances; less provocative Indian troop dispositions; letting the Pakistanis engage in a little rhetoric on Kashmir without jumping on them; downplaying reaction to Pakistani arms purchases. In London I suggested that the

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 156 from Islamabad, January 4, the Embassy reported on Thornton's January 2 meetings with Pakistani officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005-0428)

<sup>5</sup> Thornton attended the Chiefs of Mission meeting, which took place in Colombo on January 8. See Document 9.

British might explore some of these with the Indians—they may be listened to more readily than we would be. (S)

There was virtually unanimous agreement that we should not get involved in explicit or implicit commitments to Pakistan. Even in our traditionally client-oriented embassy all sentiment was for a hard line towards Pakistan, ameliorated by economic assistance. (Much bitterness over the small FY 80 aid allocation to Pakistan compared to India and Bangladesh.) (C)

The only exception was a harangue I got from the Chinese Ambassador. In his analysis of the situation the Eastern and Western fronts were being held firmly against the Soviets; only the South was soft. He may be right; his prescription however was faulty—strengthening of CENTO. The President must take this up with Deng. (S)

A final note: one senior politician took me aside and complained about the activities of the Cubans in the world. He went on to say that we needed to have our own Cubans—and offered Pakistan in that role. That is just about where Pakistani thinking is at. (C)

### 321. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1979, 4:15–6 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: Mini-PRC on Pakistani Nuclear Matters

#### PARTICIPANTS

*State*  
David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

Thomas Pickering, Assistant  
Secretary for Middle East  
Affairs

Jane Coon, Director, Office of  
Pakistan/Afghanistan/  
Bangladesh Affairs

*Defense*  
Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for Near Eastern,  
African, & South Asian Affairs  
Cdr. Ronald Zwart (DOD/ISA)

*Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*  
Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director  
Barry M. Blechman, Assistant  
Director, Weapons  
Evaluation & Control Bureau

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*  
Lt. Gen. William Smith  
Lt. Col. Sheldon H. Cooper

*Central Intelligence Agency*  
Dr. Robert Bowie, Deputy  
Director for National  
Foreign Assessment  
John Despres, Nat'l.  
Intelligence Officer for  
Nuclear Proliferation

*White House*  
David Aaron

*National Security Council*  
Thomas Thornton  
Jessica Mathews

#### *Intelligence Background*

It is increasingly clear that Pakistan is proceeding along a course that will enable it to achieve a nuclear explosive capability, possibly sometime between 1981 and 1984. Certain critical components in their efforts have very probably been imported since August 1977, the effective date of the Symington Amendment and this raises serious questions about its application. (S)

#### *Congressional/Legal Aspects*

The PRC considered the possibility of asking for changes in the Symington Amendment to bring it into line with the Glenn Amendment so that the President would have a broader waiver capability to permit continued cooperation with Pakistan while seeking to dissuade them

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 82, MPRC 004, 1/22/79, Pakistan. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed at the upper right-hand corner of the summary.



from the nuclear option. It was decided, however, that we would, initially at least, approach key members of Congress (especially Senator Glenn and Congressman Zablocki) with a full explanation of the problem and our diplomatic strategy to cope with it. We would agree to keep them informed and to report back prior to the consideration of the foreign aid bill. In the interim we would not invoke the Symington Amendment on the grounds of our diplomatic efforts and the critical importance of Pakistan in the current circumstances of the area. (S)

State was also tasked to determine what agreements are up for signing in the next several months with Pakistan. (S)

*Diplomatic Strategy*

Ambassador Hummel has already been instructed to approach President Zia in general terms about the Pakistani nuclear program and to point out to him the implications for US-Pakistani relations. (The Congressional consultations will not take place until after Hummel reports on his meeting.)<sup>2</sup> (S)

The PRC agreed that we should raise the issue with Deng Xiaoping. State Department will contact the Saudis and selected Europeans to enlist their support in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear course. No special approach will be made to the Soviets although we will routinely mention Pakistan to them when we discuss general proliferation concerns. We will sound out Ambassadors Goheen and Hummel on the utility of having Goheen talk privately with Indian Prime Minister Desai about the possibility of a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement not to develop or use nuclear weapons. (This, if successful, could eliminate most of the motivation for the Pakistani program.) (S)

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<sup>2</sup> Hummel met with Zia on January 24. See Document 322.

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**322. Memorandum Prepared in the White House Situation Room<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

8. *Zia Comments on Pakistan Nuclear Program:* Ambassador Hummel took advantage of a meeting with Zia yesterday to privately raise the subject of Pakistani enrichment and nuclear explosives research. Zia reacted sharply, emotionally, and asked Hummel to report that he “not only contradicted the allegations, but said they are outright lies.” Hummel asked if there might be nuclear activities of which Zia was unaware. Zia replied that this would be impossible and requested specifics that he could check on to disprove the allegations. Hummel reports that he could detect no false note in Zia’s denials and recommends that we make absolutely sure of our assessments and consider the merits of having U.S. nuclear experts, with Zia’s approval, have a look at suspected sites. At a minimum, we could underline the seriousness of our concern. Hummel concludes that we should refrain from talking to other Pakistani officials until we decide whether such a quiet, unpublicized visit is the appropriate next step. (Islamabad 935 NODIS,<sup>2</sup> PSN 38196) (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 16, 1/16/79–1/2/1979. Secret. Carter wrote “Zbig, C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 935 from Islamabad, January 24, Hummel reported on his meeting with Zia. Regarding Zia’s behavior during the meeting, he commented: “I could detect no false note in his denials, but he could of course be a better actor than I have given him credit for. In any case, Dept should make absolutely sure of validity of our assessments, which I understand come [*less than 1 line not declassified*] from data on purchases of equipment, which could have multiple purposes.” Zia offered to allow Hummel to inspect any site where suspected enrichment and nuclear explosives research were taking place. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1475)

**323. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State and the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, February 27, 1979, 1055Z

2413. New Delhi for Deputy Secretary Christopher. Subject: (S) Pakistan Nuclear Program: Technical Team Visit. Ref: (A) Islamabad 0935;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 1622.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz called me in February 27 to convey GOP decision not to permit U.S. team to inspect Pak nuclear facilities. DCM and MFA notetaker sat in. Rationale for refusal carefully constructed on basis of Indian refusal to accept similar inspections, and included offer to permit bilateral reciprocal Indo-Pak inspection, with or without U.S. participation. I expressed deep regret that GOP was now reversing offer twice affirmed by Pres. Zia (Jan 24 and Feb 9); noted that serious discrepancies remained between our information about Pak nuclear programs and GOP assurances thereon, which could have serious impact on our relations if unresolved; and said I would report and seek instructions from Washington.

3. Shahnawaz opened conversation with reference to “curious” Feb 8 letter from Desai to Zia in which former noted reports of Pak activity in sophisticated nuclear technology and in effect urged Pakistan not to undertake anything which could upset balance for peace in area.<sup>4</sup> According to Shahnawaz, who read selected phrases from letter, Desai asserted Indian nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes and that GOI remained firmly against weapons proliferation. Shahnawaz said reply had been drafted but not yet sent. He said letter was puzzling in view of India’s nuclear explosion, existence of three unsafeguarded facilities in India, its rejection of South Asia nuclear free zone, and its failure to sign NPT.

4. Shahnawaz then pulled out Vajpayee Feb 3 “Blitz” interview<sup>5</sup> and quoted FM’s remarks to effect that India will resume nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780469–0121. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 322.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1622 from Islamabad, February 9, Hummel reported on his February 9 meeting with Zia regarding inspection of Pakistan’s nuclear program, during which Zia “accepted technical team visit, but asked for postponement for couple of weeks due to internal problems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2668, N790002–0015)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 143.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 125.

explosions when it is persuaded these are necessary for research on peaceful uses and his reminder to interviewer that he is from party which had favored development of nuclear weapons.

5. Shahnawaz concluded that in view of Pakistan's historical stance of past 15 years against discrimination in nuclear matters and against unilateral submission to inspection, Pakistan could not accept U.S. inspection team unless it also applies to India. He argued that any appearance Pakistan was permitting outside inspection while India refuses would be unacceptable to public opinion in Pakistan. Shahnawaz added that GOP was prepared to agree to reciprocal Indo-Pak inspection bilaterally or in collaboration with India.

6. In response, I noted that GOP appeared to be repudiating clear, unequivocal, and repeated offer by Pres. Zia, to which Shahnawaz replied that Zia's offer had been conditional on full consideration of full implications of unilateral inspection. He added that there had been no communication from Desai at that point, and that sudden Indian interest in Pak nuclear programs is disturbing in view of history of GOI rejection of Pak proposals for nuclear free zone and reciprocal inspection, and of GOP's offer to sign NPT same day India signs it.

7. I then expressed my deep regret at this decision and said I saw no connection between Desai letter and inspection which Zia had twice affirmed his willingness to accept. Noting that purpose of proposed inspection was to clear up discrepancies between our information and GOP assurances about its nuclear programs, I said that continuance of these discrepancies will have effect on U.S. attitudes toward Pakistan and that applicable U.S. law might have to be implemented. Finally, I said I would report conversation and seek instructions.

8. For New Delhi, Deputy Secretary: We are sending by septel our thoughts on how you should deal with nuclear issue in view of this development during your visit.<sup>6</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 2411 from Islamabad, February 27, the Embassy suggested that during his upcoming meeting with Zia, Christopher should urge Zia to reconsider his refusal to allow U.S. nuclear inspection teams to visit Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027-2663) For an account of Christopher's March 1 meeting with Zia, see Document 325.

**324. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1979

1. *Pakistan Nuclear Intentions*: We face, in Pakistan, a potentially serious conflict between our objective of non-proliferation and that of strengthening Pakistan in the current West Asian context.

General Zia has backed off from his agreement to allow a US team to inspect Pakistan's nuclear installations, contending that India has not had to submit to such inspections.<sup>2</sup> Warren, who will be in Pakistan tomorrow, will take a very firm line with Zia, noting we have information that Pakistan is developing a nuclear explosives capability and, if it continues, we will have no choice but to cut off assistance under the Symington/Glenn amendments. If Zia still refuses to allow the team visit, Warren will propose a visit from Tom Pickering to discuss the nuclear issue and to encourage the GOP to reconsider its decision on the team.<sup>3</sup>

While keeping the pressure on Pakistan, we will also informally explore, with John Glenn, the possibility of modifying the Glenn/Symington amendments to give the Administration greater flexibility in dealing with this problem. We have kept John, who has been understanding, generally briefed on the issue, and Dave Newsom will give him an update, and raise the modification possibility, in the next several days.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 2/79. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 323.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of Christopher's March 1 meeting with Zia, see Document 325.

### 325. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 2, 1979, 0400Z

2553. For Secretary From Ambassador Hummel. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: (S) Pak Nuclear Activities—DepSec Conversation With President Zia.

1. Secret entire text.

2. DepSec Christopher had one and half hour discussion with Pres. Zia before Zia's dinner evening of Mar 1. General and some bilateral topics will be reported septel.<sup>2</sup> This message deals with half-hour talk on nuclear issues. Restricted group included: Pres. Zia, FinMin Ghulam Ishaq, Fon Adviser Agha Shahi on Pak side, and DepSec, Amb Hummel, Miklos and Thornton.

3. DepSec said he was sure Zia knew of USG disappointment that GOP had deferred the visit of the US nuclear team, and he hoped Zia would reconsider. However DepSec said he had a deeper message because USG has information that GOP is moving toward a nuclear weapon through enrichment activities. He said that if the enrichment activities continue, they will trigger US laws that must cut off aid programs DepSec had discussed earlier. The reasons for the cutoff would become known and, as they do, they would likely affect attitudes of other countries. There would also be an obvious effect on the Pak nuclear weapons free zone proposal.

4. DepSec said he hoped GOP would draw back from nuclear weapons program, and convince the USG it had drawn back. If it is not possible to allow a U.S. inspection team, then we hope GOP would receive a visit by Asst. Sec. Pickering for further discussions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2569 from Islamabad, March 2, the Embassy reported the portions of Christopher's conversation with Zia that did not relate directly to nuclear non-proliferation issues. During this part of the meeting, Christopher "assured Zia of USG desire to strengthen U.S.-Pak ties, said U.S. was considering additional economic assistance for Pakistan, and indicated willingness to sell limited military equipment subject to U.S. military supply policy constraints. Zia emphasized disappointment over U.S. support in recent years. He said Pakistan is anxious to remain in free world, but is now faced with difficult problems that could move it out of CENTO and into NAM. He implied that Pakistan may also have to seek accommodation with Soviet Union, which is now 'at our border,' if greater Western support is not forthcoming. Zia made no specific requests." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790095-0655) Christopher also visited New Delhi. See Documents 129-131.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 57015 to Islamabad, March 8, instructed Hummel not to raise a possible Pickering visit unless otherwise authorized. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027-2680)

5. Zia responded that he had given this subject much thought. He realized that the USG had ways to get information by discreet means but USG information “is not wholly correct” concerning uranium enrichment facilities. However, Zia made no real attempt to deny intention to develop nuclear weapons or to distance himself from the effort.

6. Zia asked for comments from Finance Min Ghulam Ishaq. He thought U.S. laws applied *ex post facto* to the French reprocessing contract were unfair and contrary to normal international practice. He said it would be a sad day if USG cut off aid, but US aid is already at a low point, where US inputs would total \$120 million and Pak repayments on prior loans to USG would total \$100 million, giving net increment of only \$20 [garble—million] He said no country would sacrifice its future for that amount of aid, and no free country should be forced by an aid cut off to give up its sovereign rights.

7. DepSec said he appreciated hearing GOP views. He said USG purpose was to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons, and the consequences of developing a nuclear weapons capability extended beyond any US aid cutoff. He closed by hoping that the GOP would keep matters under review, would continue discussions with Ambassador Hummel, and would receive Pickering for technical discussions. The talks adjourned to join a larger group at the dining table.

8. Comment: The Paks left little to ambiguity or nuance, and obviously we have a lot to think about. The Pak side made no real attempt to deny the validity of our information. There was an attempt to suggest a tradeoff of enrichment activity for USG agreement on a safeguarded French reprocessing plant, but we doubt this is serious from the Pak side, much less acceptable to US. Ishaq’s complaints that US aid magnitude is insufficient inducement for abandoning nuclear program does not seem to be an opening because Ishaq has been a strong proponent of Pak nuclear ambitions from the beginning. Follow-on discussions by DepSec on morning of March 2 will be reported shortly.<sup>4</sup> DepSec has reviewed and edited this message.<sup>5</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 326.

<sup>5</sup> In a March 2 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized Christopher’s March 1 discussions with Zia. Carter initialed Vance’s memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 3/79)

### 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 2, 1979, 1140Z

2568. Department repeat as desired. Subject: (U) Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi on CENTO.

1. (Secret) Entire text: Protect FGI.

2. During course of two-hour discussion with Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi morning 2 March, Deputy Secretary asked what is current Pakistani attitude toward CENTO.<sup>2</sup> Shahi replied by noting that key in Pakistan's eyes is Iran, with which Pakistan desires to establish close contact. As a result of the fast moving situation there, GOP had held up its own statement on CENTO. However, "the question is settled." Khomeini and Bazargan will move Iran toward the Non-Aligned Movement, and Pakistan will "want to keep in step with Iran," lest the field there be left open to others, like Arafat and Qaddafi. Pakistan, moreover, must not appear to be an instrument of US power; "what is past is past," he said. In making public announcement, Pakistan will not oppose US interests and will consult, he said, but it cannot act in concert with the US or with any one outside the region in any joint announcement.

3. Asked if Pakistan is thinking of some other form of association for the region, Shahi replied, Pakistan is thinking about other possibilities in light of what has happened in Iran, perhaps something like ASEAN—a notion DepSec said US would endorse. Shahi said we will "need to proceed extremely warily," however. He indicated he plans to visit Iran shortly and will urge that Iran take no precipitous action.

**Hummel**

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790095-0222. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, London, New Delhi, CINCPAC, Jidda, and CINCEUR.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2575 from Islamabad, March 2, the Embassy reported that, besides CENTO, Christopher and Shahi discussed Indo-Pakistani relations, which Shahi characterized as almost "tension free" before he listed the ways in which Pakistan is comparatively weak. Christopher and Shahi then discussed the Pakistani nuclear program issue without coming to any resolution of the impasse. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036-2157, P850027-2666)



**327. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 9, 1979, 2–3:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Minutes: PRC Meeting on Pakistan

**PARTICIPANTS***State*Warren Christopher, Deputy  
SecretaryDavid Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political AffairsLucy Benson, Under Secretary for  
Security Assistance, Science &  
TechnologyThomas Pickering, Ass't. Secretary  
of State, Bureau of Oceans &  
Internat. Environmental and  
Scientific AffairsGeorge Rathjens, Deputy to  
Ambassador Smith*Defense*Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary  
David McGiffert, Assistant  
Secretary for Developing  
Nations*Energy*John Deutsch, Acting Ass't.  
Secretary for Energy/  
Technology*Office of Management and Budget*  
Randy Jayne, Assoc. Director for  
Security and Internat. Affairs*Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency*  
Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director*Joint Chiefs of Staff*  
Lt. General William Smith*Director of Central Intelligence*  
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director  
John Despres  
[name not declassified]*White House*  
David Aaron*National Security Council*  
Thomas Thornton  
Henry Owen  
Reg Bartholomew  
Jessica Mathews  
Rutherford Poats

*Christopher:* I would like to have this meeting address four questions. First, steps that we should take to achieve compliance with the Symington Amendment. Second, means of preventing Pakistan from securing materials for its nuclear program. Third, how we can persuade the Pakistanis from pursuing their nuclear option. And four, how we can maintain the best possible relationships with Pakistan. Moving to the first item, we are now at the point where the Symington Amendment has been triggered and we must take the reach of that law into

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 102, Pakistan 3/9/79: 3/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 73, PRC 096, 3/9/79, Pakistan.

account. The issue is not reprocessing so much as it is enrichment and the material that they have gotten for their enrichment program. This is all well documented. The CIA agrees?

*Turner:* We agree absolutely. The Pakistanis are determined to have at least a nuclear option. They have a program underway, including a small scale plant that they will test this month and a large scale plant that they will perhaps have in operation by next year.

*Aaron:* We have consulted with Congress on this and I don't think that automatic implementation necessarily flows at this point. The law is specific but we should seek to keep maximum flexibility. How, for instance, is Congress going to press us on this? Senator Glenn has been briefed. We should wait until we hear back from Congress before we take any automatic action.

*Christopher:* The law requires that we supply no development assistance or military equipment on concessional terms, nor IMET.

*Benson:* We are not allowed to undertake any new obligations. We are going to have to work out what this means in terms of IMET since each of the services has different obligating procedures etc.

*Smith:* What is the trigger that sets off the Symington Amendment?

*Christopher:* The receipt of enrichment technology after August of 1977.

*Smith:* Then what really has happened since the last time we met; how are things different so that we have to trigger the amendment? At that time we just said that it was imminent.<sup>2</sup>

*Christopher:* We now have evidence of the transfer of critical equipment.

*Aaron:* What evidence do we have that this is for nuclear weapons purposes?

*Turner:* Our evidence is strictly by deduction, arising from the fact that they do not have a nuclear power program that would require enriched uranium of this type.

*Christopher:* The purpose is not set forth in the statute.

*Mathews:* The purpose is to avoid the transfer of sensitive equipment.

*Christopher:* In effect the escape clause in the legislation defines the purpose—it provides for a waiver if we have reliable assurances that there is no nuclear weapons program.

*Aaron:* As a matter of fact then the equipment has arrived and is being installed?

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 321.

*Christopher:* Yes, the buildings are there and we have photographs.

*Owen:* I have to leave at this point, but I want to make the point that we cannot enter into any new development assistance obligations. PL-480 is not covered by the law, but we will have to consult Congress about further sales. We are going to need consultations on the Hill and must tell the Pakistanis that ultimately PL-480 will also be affected.

*Newsom:* It is hard to argue that the statute has not been triggered. It is not just a question of the intelligence that we have, but also the equivocation of the Pakistanis in discussing the matter with us.

We seem to be excluding the option of consulting with Congress and laying out to them the implications of an abrupt triggering of the Symington amendment. We could explain to them that we are hoping to gain time. There are three aid items that we have to think about immediately. One of these has been signed by the Pakistanis and has come back to us for cover signature; the other two are ready for signing. The Pakistanis expect us to sign them. Thus, we cannot simply let things drift, the Pakistanis will know that we are implementing the amendment.

*Christopher:* We cannot, however, sign agreements at this point without putting the person who signs them in some jeopardy under the law.

*Thornton:* The issue is not whether the Pakistanis know that we are implementing the amendment, rather whether it becomes public knowledge here.

*Christopher:* The Pakistanis would not want to make it public. They asked us to proceed as quietly as possible in doing what we have to do. We can let these agreements slip for a while. The legal adviser cannot authorize the signing of them in contravention of the law, and consultation with Congress does not solve this legal problem.

*Aaron:* What is actually a commitment or an obligation? We make a commitment, they sign it, and we should counter-sign it. I assume that in that case we are already obligated. Could we not consult with Congress and then go forward with these commitments?

*Newsom:* Perhaps this would be a subterfuge, but couldn't we generate a piece of paper that would specify a trigger date so that whatever was signed prior to that date would be legal? Could we, for instance, put into such a paper everything that we know and then have the Secretary of State conclude that, say, March 15th would be the triggering date?

*Christopher:* The legal interpretation is that we cannot enter into any new obligations. I am willing to stretch this as much as possible.

*Smith:* How does the trigger mechanism actually work?

*Pickering:* There is no specific form. The test is the shipment of equipment and that has happened. We know this based on intelligence.

*McGiffert:* We can ask for a formal opinion, or for a decision by the Secretary of State.

*Christopher:* We can't delay very much. On the basis of the evidence we should have taken this step long ago. We can follow a deliberate process, but at the same time we cannot ignore reality.

*McGiffert:* The process could extend beyond the scheduled signing of these three agreements couldn't it?

*Smith:* I have no piece of paper in front of me that tells me we have crossed a specific line that would require triggering.

*Christopher:* The intelligence is overwhelming that that line has been crossed.

*Turner:* Actually, we have had almost all of this intelligence since last August. There is really nothing new. We just didn't ask the question in these terms before.

*Aaron:* Yes, there is one new piece of intelligence. Zia did not deny their enrichment program when he talked to Deputy Secretary Christopher.<sup>3</sup> That is the most important piece of overt intelligence that we have received and that is the real trigger.

*Benson:* The situation is still harder with IMET because we don't know when the remaining money is actually obligated.

*Christopher:* We will go forward deliberately and have a legal finding at an early date. We will carry out the law but not with an exaggerated effect.

We will look into the situation of the matters that are now on the table. Where we have already made an oral commitment, perhaps that will justify signing.

*Keeny:* I thought that at the last meeting we had decided to put off all things that might require signing.

*Aaron:* Does this apply to all U.S. grants?

*Benson:* It includes map, IMET, SSA, Development Assistance, and FMS Credits.

*Mathews:* What signal will we be sending to the Pakistanis if we seek a legal expedient to be as helpful as we can in signing these agreements?

*Christopher:* We may have to advise them that on a certain date we will not be able to sign any further agreements. Turning to the second item, steps that we can take with the allies to foreclose shipment of materials to Pakistan, shouldn't we be doing more?

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 325.

*Pickering*: We have stayed in touch with our allies all along and have now agreed with the Commerce Department on a list of exports to be prohibited from the United States.<sup>4</sup> We are sending this to our allies and will be adding to it over time. We are now doing all that we can.

*Aaron*: Does anybody really think we are going to stop the Pakistanis through this?

*Benson*: No.

*Christopher*: We certainly won't be able to stop their desire. Perhaps, however, we can slow it down or impair it.

*Pickering*: Our actions can slow it down but nobody is going to say that we will be able to stop them. We estimate now they may be 3–5 years away from an explosive capability; perhaps we could double these figures.

*Deutsch*: We do not think that you have 3–5 years to work with.

*Pickering*: Yours is the only Agency that doubts that estimate.

*Benson*: This method itself is not going to work, but there are other things that we can do alongside it that will help slow them down.

*Christopher*: We probably cannot stop them from completing the 70 centrifuge installation, but perhaps we could keep them from completing the 1,000 centrifuge installation, and that would make a difference.

*Turner*: [2 lines not declassified]

*DesPres*: [5 lines not declassified]

*Deutsch*: When will the 1,000 machine array become operational?

*DesPres*: About December 1980, and they should have enough material for a weapon by the first quarter of 1982.

*Deutsch*: We also have to bear in mind that if they are able to get any slightly enriched uranium at all this would greatly accelerate their timetable.

*Turner*: We also have to take into account that the Indians are extremely concerned and might take action against the Pakistani facilities.

*Newsom*: We should ask ourselves how important Pakistan is to us. It is a critical area, a weak but populous country, it is near the Soviet border. The effect of Iran has been great in Pakistan. We cannot ignore their nuclear programs, but if they are determined and if our allies are not as committed to non-proliferation as we will we not

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 58001 to London, March 9, transmitted a draft list of items to be prohibited. The items relate to centrifuge equipment and components. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0956)

further alienate the Pakistanis in addition to the actions taken under the Symington amendment by prodding our allies to take restrictive moves against Pakistan?

*Benson:* I agree but we should broaden the consideration. There are other options. We need to fit these kinds of decisions into broader scenarios. I, for my part, think that Pakistan is important.

*Keeny:* Do we also not think that our non-proliferation objectives, and our relations with India are important? These should also affect our judgments.

*Benson:* I am concerned with preventing an Indo-Pakistani nuclear race.

*Aaron:* When we cut off new commitments it will become known that Pakistan is on the way to a nuclear capability. This will tend to undercut INFCE. We will have the first case of a public Nth country since India.

*Keeny:* No, South Africa has also come along since then. When does the triggering action become public? What if we were to sign these few things pending and then perhaps delay everything else to gain time?

*Christopher:* We are not going to announce that Pakistan is building a bomb, we will just refer to their enrichment capability. The position of the President as regards nuclear technology is well enough known that this would be credible. Even with the maximum discretion, however, we have only a month or so. We can define very carefully what triggering involves.

*Newsom:* And we must tell the Congress.

*Christopher:* Turning to the third item, ways to dissuade the Pakistanis, perhaps there are some Indo-Pakistani bilateral arrangements possible, for instance, declarations against weapons or explosive capabilities. This would necessarily bring the United States, Soviet Union, and China into the picture. All of these are long-shots.

*Newsom:* Perhaps the only real avenue open to us is the diplomatic exploration of the Pakistani offer of a no-weapons formula and Desai's opposition to weapons. These might offer an approach to the problem. I suggest that we set up a mechanism to prepare diplomatic scenarios on approaching India and Pakistan, and enlisting third countries' support.

*Smith:* I would support that. I am troubled because the Pakistanis are involved in what they are doing because of India. We cannot deal with the Pakistan problem in isolation.

*Newsom:* There is an additional possibility. Could we gain time either through getting greater understanding in Congress or a change in the Symington amendment language? We need to have maximum leverage in this matter. If we start by cutting Pakistan off, it will lessen our chances of influencing them. Could we perhaps get a one-year moratorium on implementing the Symington amendment?

*Aaron:* We would need to have some encouragement from the Pakistanis to build on.

*Christopher:* We would need “reliable assurances” that they are not building a nuclear weapon.

*Aaron:* If they, for instance, say they are prepared to work with India, and that they are not building anything now, we would be able to confirm that through intelligence. If, on top of that, they are willing to negotiate, then that might be an adequate basis for the President to invoke the waiver.

*Christopher:* The Pakistanis might be interested in something along that line, which would be like the South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, but that would raise problems for us with regard to transit, etc.

*Aaron:* The problem is that India now has a nuclear device. It is hard to see how Pakistan could be involved, in light of that, in what we could consider a good faith negotiation.

*Keeny:* It would depend on the wording that was chosen. One could talk about deployment or testing, or perhaps involve a grandfather clause.

*McGiffert:* Could not the Pakistanis say that they haven’t made a decision to build a weapon? The language of the waiver has to do with producing a military capability, not simply keeping options open.

*Aaron:* You would have to have some kind of ongoing negotiations.

*Benson:* And also you would have to persuade the Indians to talk to the Pakistanis. This would be a further underpinning of the scenario.

*Christopher:* Let’s have several scenarios worked up.

*Aaron:* Let the record show that I never said I thought they might agree to this! (laughs)

*Keeny:* Turning to the State paper, you may not need all of the assurances that are suggested in that.<sup>5</sup> An agreement between India and Pakistan might make safeguards unnecessary. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have good intelligence on the Pakistani program.

*Christopher:* Let’s pursue the scenarios. The whole trend in India and Pakistan is going the other way. Desai is under great domestic

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<sup>5</sup> An undated discussion paper, entitled “US Policy Toward Pakistan’s Nuclear Programs,” which was prepared in the Department of State for the March 9 meeting, reviewed the history and current intelligence on Pakistan’s suspected nuclear weapons project. The paper also outlined suggested courses of actions regarding the Symington Amendment and Pakistan’s nuclear program. Concluding with the issue of assurances in the event that Pakistan declared its intention to stop the transfer of nuclear technology, the paper argued that reliance on verbal assurances and intelligence alone would be insufficient. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan III)

pressure. We should not be too euphoric. Furthermore, we should consider whether we can provide carrots to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear option. I am afraid, though, that these would be expensive and hard to relate to the Symington amendment.

*McGiffert:* Wouldn't it be worth a very high price to us?

*Bartholomew:* If you do that, though, you are opening yourself to blackmail from other possible nuclear powers.

*Newsom:* Is there any chance that other suppliers and Pakistani creditors could make a total debt rescheduling dependent on Pakistan's abandoning its nuclear program?

*Pickering:* Perhaps. The supplier countries are interested in the commercial angle, but if the Pakistani debt situation falls apart, then there will be no commercial sales. These countries also have their domestic anti-nuclear lobbies. The problem we would confront is that we might isolate Pakistan completely from the West.

*Newsom:* Aside from the non-proliferation aspect, the diversion of resources to the nuclear program is a bad thing for Pakistan itself.

*Christopher:* What is the cost of the program?

*DesPres:* Perhaps \$20–\$30 million a year; the cost of the whole large facility is from \$100–\$150 million.

*Christopher:* Are funds coming from the outside?

*DesPres:* [1 line not declassified]

*Christopher:* Concerning the fourth agenda item, how to maintain good relations with Pakistan, we should presumably not cut back on PL-480 and keep our diplomatic channels open. How hard should we push other countries? Are there legal obligations to do so?

*Pickering:* We have policy obligations to do so in the suppliers group, and there is an implied legal obligation in the Symington amendment. We also have to be careful of our own suppliers.

*Aaron:* Are these items not on a control list?

*Pickering:* We are going to put out a list next week.

*Aaron:* My judgment is this: We should go ahead with the loans that are ready to be signed, and tell the Pakistanis that there will be nothing more under present circumstances. We should then try to create a change in the circumstances and make a major effort on the supply front.

*Keeny:* Why is it taking us so long to get our own house in order?

*Newsom:* The Commerce Department has been reluctant.

*Mathews:* That's not really the problem. The issue is that it is hard to set up a list that is sufficiently specific, but at the same time does not tell you how to make an enrichment facility.



*Pickering*: We have things in order now. We are showing the list to the other suppliers and have been in touch with them all along on specific cases.

*Christopher*: Should we set this working group up on an inter-agency basis?

*Aaron*: Yes.

*Christopher*: We will get representation from each of you. We will try to make a finding in a way that leaves open the possibility of change.

*Aaron*: We will need a tight deadline.

*Newsom*: What will be the form of the finding—the minutes of a meeting such as this?

*Christopher*: It should probably be a finding by the Secretary of State.

*Newsom*: What shall we do with regard to Congress? We have talked to Glenn. Should we move on quickly to Zablocki and perhaps the Leadership? We should tell them that evidence is building up; the Pakistanis have refused to accept our inspection. We should tell Congress that we have not made any final determination, but that we are continuing to explore further options.

*Deutsch*: Bear in mind that when the Secretary of State makes this finding, you will have to take into account the responsibility of the Secretary of Energy for making findings on enrichment matters.

*Christopher*: If Congress asks for an intelligence briefing, and we say that we are still studying the matter, we are going to look very bad once they know how far things have gone.

*DesPres*: That depends on how it is done. We would simply brief on the facts, not on any finding.

*Aaron*: It is similar to the verification issue where CIA briefs only on the facts, but leaves determinations to others.

*Keeny*: We should finish this study in a few days or a week.

*Christopher*: We could brief the Congress and tell them that we had arranged to suspend all programs while we explore other options.

*Newsom*: Is it agreed that we will authorize the two pending obligations?

*Christopher*: The legal adviser will have to check that out.

*Duncan*: If it is legal, then we will proceed.

*Benson*: There is still the IMET question.

*McGiffert*: There must be enough flexibility there to do something.

*Aaron*: Let us just make sure that the lawyers make it easy for us to do what we want to do, not the other way around.

*Christopher*: I will get the committee underway and we will set tight deadlines.

Thereupon the meeting ended.

**328. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Hummel)  
to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
(Newsom)**

Washington, March 13, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000015, Box 6, Pakistan 1973–1980. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified.]

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**329. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1979

1. *Pakistan*—Chris met with the Pakistan Ambassador this afternoon and recapitulated his discussions in Islamabad with President Zia and others.<sup>2</sup>

Chris made clear that Zia had not denied Pakistan's nuclear intentions and sensitive programs and that we consider this a virtual acknowledgement of such activities. Chris reaffirmed our desire for a closer and more supportive relationship with Pakistan, but noted that we must comply with the law (Symington Amendment). A cut-off of aid would inevitably become public, whether we wish it or not, and would have severe repercussions on our overall relationship.<sup>3</sup>

The Pakistan Ambassador indicated he hoped that any damage to our relationship could be limited. He affirmed that Pakistan's with-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 3/79. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 65294 to Islamabad, March 16, relayed a full account of Christopher's meeting with Pakistan's Ambassador, Sultan Mohammad Khan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2685)

<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to the this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Cy—I would hate to lose Pakistan or India. I'll help as needed."

drawal from CENTO in no way detracts from the importance Pakistan attaches to its US ties, including the 1959 bilateral agreement.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 3021 from Islamabad, March 13, the Embassy reported Shahnawaz's announcement that Pakistan—per formal procedures—intended to submit its withdrawal notification from CENTO on August 22 and formally sever its links with the organization in February 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790116–1167) For the Embassy's analysis of Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO, see Document 330.

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### **330. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 22, 1979, 0915Z

3415. Military addressees for POLADs. Subject: (C) CENTO: Implications of Dissolution. Refs: (A) Islamabad 2980;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 2971;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 3021;<sup>4</sup> (D) Islamabad 3099;<sup>5</sup> (E) Tehran 3115.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0748. Confidential. Sent for information to Bonn, Rome, Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, Peshawar (pouch), Lahore (pouch), CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2980 from Islamabad, March 12, the Embassy reported to the Department that Shahnawaz informed the Chargé that Pakistan had decided to withdraw from CENTO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0848)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2971 from Islamabad, March 12, the Embassy reported the March 11 return to Islamabad of a Pakistani delegation to Iran headed by Shahi. Speaking to reporters, Shahi “described his meetings with Ayatollah Khomeini and Foreign Minister Sanjabi as ‘further strengthening the already excellent’ relations between Pakistan and Iran. Shahi said that Islam represents the ‘new element’ in Pak-Iranian relations and quoted Sanjabi as saying it will further strengthen the fraternal ties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0459)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 329.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 3099 from Islamabad, March 14, the Embassy reported an account by a Pakistani official of Agha Shahi's March 9–12 visit to Iran. According to the report, the trip was a “get-acquainted session aimed at establishing initial contact with new Iranian leadership at high level, exchanging views on bilateral and regional matters, and setting the stage for a close bilateral relationship in the future. Pakistan's decision to quit CENTO, made before the visit, had been held in abeyance until it was possible to discuss the question with the new Iranian leadership, and it was natural that the two nations would have discussed this step in their very first high-level contact.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790117–0910)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 3115 from Tehran, March 20, the Embassy reported a discussion between the Embassy and a Pakistani Embassy official in Tehran regarding “Shahi visit to Iran last week, Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO, and Pakistan's position on continuation and possible expansion of the RCD.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790131–0251)

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: Pakistan's March 12 announcement of its withdrawal from the CENTO Alliance (and the parallel Iranian and Turkish decision) effectively dissolves the 20-year old "garment of patches" and leaves Pakistan with only the 1959 bilateral agreement with the US as its remaining defense agreement with its former patron.<sup>7</sup>

—The GOP decision had been taken effectively long ago; CENTO has proved virtually useless in Pakistan's confrontations with India (and more recently in assuaging Pakistan's anxieties regarding Afghanistan). It stood, moreover, as a continuing obstacle to Pakistan's affiliation with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The occasion for implementing the decision, however, was the appearance in Tehran of a government also willing now to shed its CENTO past. Many of the benefits of the alliance, especially in terms of regional cooperation, are still of value to the GOP, however, and we fully expect Pakistan to pursue, on a selective basis, the perpetuation of certain programs under bilateral or other (e.g. RCD) auspices.

—From the US point of view there also are aspects of the alliance worth salvaging, if the proper vehicle can be found. The dissolution of this alliance rids us of an irritant in US-Pak relations and may provide an opportunity for evolving a new approach to the region.

—Psychologically, the end of the CENTO—even with continuing Chinese support and a mutually-reaffirmed 1959 bilateral with the US<sup>8</sup>—will usher in a new era in Pakistan's foreign affairs. Greater consideration of the views of the non-aligned and—as seems likely—of the views of the new leadership of Iran will increasingly come to dominate Pakistan thinking. In time, we would expect Pakistan to feel nonetheless more alone than heretofore, as the inadequacy of the NAM in security terms manifests itself. While many in Pakistan will argue that the new circumstance will impose on Pakistan a greater requirement for independence and self-confidence as a nation, the real pressures on Pakistan—from the massive Indian presence on one border, from a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on another, and from the Soviet Union (refs)—may, in time, loom larger and more threatening without CENTO. End summary.

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<sup>7</sup> The text of the Pakistani statement announcing Pakistani withdrawal from CENTO, given to Constable by Shah Nawaz on March 12 (see footnote 4, Document 329), is in telegram 62521 to Valleta, March 14, which quoted telegram 2982 from Islamabad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790118-0145)

<sup>8</sup> In his March 2 meeting with Zia, reported in telegram 2569 from Islamabad, March 3 (see footnote 2, Document 325), Christopher again "reaffirmed 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan and added that U.S. will also look for tangible ways to help that will maintain and earn Pakistan's friendship."

3. The Pakistani withdrawal from CENTO, announced March 12, came as a real surprise to few. It can, in simplest terms, be seen as a move by the GOP to shed an attachment no longer useful. Pakistan's attachment to its CENTO tie had long since eroded, mainly the result of the alliance's inability to assist Pakistan in coping with India, Pakistan's major perceived threat, and in more recent times, as a result of the alliance's impotence with regard to other regional developments, such as the Communist takeover in Afghanistan. Beyond that, Pakistan paid a cost for its membership in terms of its consequent exclusion from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The revolution in Iran, and the coming to power there of a non-aligned, Islamic Republic provided the catalyst for action, overcoming the last consideration of such positive aspects of the alliance as contact with Western and regional military services, joint military exercises, and a broad range of non-military activities.

4. In this message, we try to describe generally what the CENTO programs were, how they benefitted the GOP, and what their loss will mean to Pakistan and to the Western members of the now-moribund alliance. We will also comment on our initial views of how US-Pakistani bilateral relations may move to fill at least part of the vacuum created by CENTO's demise.

5. CENTO activities in which Pakistan participated in the past few years were both military and non-military. In the former group, the most visible and energetic activities were military exercises. Less visible were programs under which CENTO members shared some intelligence and staged various conferences and visitations. In the non-military area Pakistan participated in numerous conclaves organized under the CENTO auspices (or that of its associated framework—RCD) which addressed civilian subjects from "land use" to "advanced technology." These conferences and seminars brought into the CENTO–RCD milieu hundreds of private and public sector Pakistanis. A final category of CENTO activities—straddling the two outlined above—was the periodic political consultations held by the regional and non-regional members.

6. Military activities: In the past few years, much of Pakistan's involvement in CENTO matters was broadly in the military area.

A. Military exercises—The most ambitious of these joint undertakings—and to the Pakistanis the most valuable—have been the military exercises included in CENTO's annual calendar. Taking place primarily at sea or in the air, and hence of greatest value to Pakistan's Navy and Air Force, these have included: Midlink (naval exercise); Nejat (search and rescue), Doost (military communications); Shabaz (air defense) and Nishan (small arms competition). In addition, the GOP has participated in annual Permanent Military Deputy Group (PMDG) meetings, visitations, and seminar programs.

—Major defects in the exercise programs have been their artificiality, the elementary level of the activity, the lack of challenge therefore to the Western participants, and the near total absence from the cycle of active participation by the Pakistan Army. This last has been a major limitation from the Pakistan side. Pakistan is a land-warfare oriented nation, and its army is its senior-most and most important service, but the army's lack of involvement gave it never more than a lukewarm attachment to the alliance as a whole. For Pakistan, moreover, a land threat has always meant a threat from India, and for a variety of political reasons, the alliance could never plan around or—in 1965 and 1971—be responsive to that threat.

—Combined exercises have given the US (and the UK) an occasion to plan operations in the region; but just as our participation in the alliance was half-hearted, so was the priority we accorded, in our military and strategic thinking to the South Asian area. The main—albeit limited—advantage the exercises provided to the Western members was the occasion they presented for the deployment, support, and operation of armed forces for brief periods in this part of the world, remote from their normal operating areas. For Pakistan, the main value has been the shared operating experience and the exposure to “state of the art” procedures and equipment.

B. Joint planning—Some joint planning has been undertaken in connection with the preparation of exercise scenarios; it has been limited in nature, however, and has foundered on the CENTO alliance's inability over the years to provide the type of political guidance—agreed to by all members—against which military planning can proceed. Part of this has been the result of the ambiguity of the threat perceptions of the members (beyond agreement on the threat from the USSR, that is); and part of this has been the lack of sense of unity of region.

C. Intelligence sharing—There has been some sharing of intelligence between US forces and the GOP but the flow is small and in one direction.

D. Military communications: During military exercises, the US and UK made available to the Pakistan military services communications equipment which has—at least in the context of the exercise—proven valuable to the GOP. In addition, the US has supplied some cryptographic equipment which allowed the GOP to maintain an “on line” capacity with other regional alliance members. This ad hoc arrangement was to be supplemented by the establishment of an extensive and expensive communications network, stillborn at the planning stage.

7. Non-military activities: A growing proportion of GOP time and money allocated to CENTO-related activities was expended in the non-military sector. These activities took various forms, including seminars

and conferences under the general auspices of CENTO or within the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) framework. Conclaves with CENTO and RCD sponsorship have addressed subjects ranging from agricultural technology to socio-economic planning and have brought a wide range of Pakistanis from the public and private sectors into the CENTO/RCD cooperative milieu. Enthusiasm for these non-military activities has been generally high and in the first few days following the GOP withdrawal announcement we have been advised by various GOP officials and others of their hope that this type of activity will continue under some sponsorship other than CENTO. Pakistanis (and Iranians) at least, seem agreed that the RCD framework is at this point the most likely vehicle for a perpetuation of this highly-valued aspect of regional cooperation.

8. Periodic consultations, at the ministerial and lesser levels, represented a conduit for the exchange of political views and perceptions of the agreed threat from the north during the early days of the alliance. But almost from the departure of the Iraqis in 1958, this aspect of alliance membership waned. Meetings were held, but the content declined in real importance. From Pakistan's view, the organization lost political value in direct proportion to its inability to satisfy Pakistan's concern about the threat from India. The wars in South Asia in 1965 and 1971—whatever the causes and outcome—demonstrated to Pakistan's leaders the utter futility of expecting CENTO to offer real security for Pakistan. Pakistani contribution to consultations in most recent years has consisted mainly of harping on the organization's shortcomings, and under Bhutto, Pakistan's flirtation with alternative international groupings, like the Non-Aligned Movement, began in earnest. And here, CENTO membership was an impediment to Pakistan's acceptability.

—Thus we doubt that Pakistan will very much miss the consultative process of the erstwhile alliance system; they will, of course, continue to consult bilaterally with us on a variety of matters important to their security. For us, the demise of CENTO denies us a multilateral role in the area. It also clears away what might be properly called the CENTO irritant in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan.

9. Next steps: In our dealing with a Pakistan which has declared its affinity for the NAM and forsaken its multilateral security ties, we can—in some ways—begin with a slate wiped clean of all save our 1959 bilateral agreement. Many of the functions or irritants of the CENTO period will die a natural death and need no efforts at resuscitation. New patterns of bilateral cooperation, consistent with our interests and with Pakistan's, realistically appraised, should now be anticipated.

10. All of this presumes that in taking its CENTO decision, Pakistan has not taken a step which will take it completely out of the US orbit,



i.e. that the 1959 bilateral—repeatedly reaffirmed in the last year—will still be operative, will still provide even a non-aligned Pakistan some additional security consideration from Washington, and that the GOP will want that to continue. If the CENTO decision is the first step toward a more radical non-aligned status by Islamabad—a conclusion we are not prepared to reach at this point—then, of course, all efforts at bilateralization—even the 1959 bilateral itself—will pass into insignificance.

11. But we will be dealing with a Pakistan more assertive of its independence than heretofore, more jealous of its putative non-aligned credentials and of its G-77 interests than in earlier years. There will post severe limits on the kinds of bilateral cooperation which will survive, especially in the military/security area, however empty Pakistan's new orientations may eventually prove in security terms.

#### 12. Military activities:

—The continuation of certain aspects of joint military activities, such as exercises, may be seen—in time—by Pakistan's leaders to be advantageous; we have no doubt that the Pakistan military especially the leadership of the air force and navy, will remain favorably disposed to future cooperation. The political leadership of the nation, and we must include within that President Zia ul-Haq as well as any likely elected successor, will be very slow to take advantage of any opportunities afforded in this area. Small-scale exercises, before or after US ship visits to Karachi, may be possible in the short term, as a way of keeping some military cooperation alive. And it is also possible that the GOP will, in time, express its interest in expanding its bilateral military exercise activities to include such non-CENTO-era partners as Saudi Arabia and France, as well as the UK (from CENTO and other days).

—We must avoid too hasty an initiative in this delicate area, because any increase in U.S./Pak bilateral military activities may be perceived as a reward to the Pakistanis for withdrawing from CENTO. Nevertheless, we should not be too hasty in cutting back our current levels of bilateral military activities outside the CENTO forum. In line with this, perhaps our best course will be to continue regular US Navy ship visits to Karachi, combined with the offer of occasional [garble]. Apart from resupply activity by MAC aircraft, we doubt that there will be an early opportunity to contemplate combined activities by US Air Force units with the Pakistan Air Force. To keep alive our contacts and ties with the Pakistan Air Force, as with the Army, we will have to look to our present forms of contact, through arms sales and advice, IMET, visits, etc. (such as those of MGens Thompson and Wolfe), to keep our lines open.

13. Non-military—As we see it from Islamabad, it is the non-military area which offers the most hope for post-CENTO collaboration,



but even here the US role is likely to be minimal. In the first place, our overall bilateral relationship with Pakistan covers many areas of mutual cooperation and activities; they remain unaffected by the CENTO dissolution. More important, however, is likelihood that as Pakistan and its regional partners convert CENTO/RCD to a new organization, there will be little role for us to play in it.

14. True, our expertise in many areas will be missed, especially by Pakistan collaborators in various CENTO–RCD technical or scientific endeavors. But if we read the regional tea leaves correctly, the new RCD will be an organization—at the start at least—which has little place for a US hand or role. We should be prepared to be supportive when asked, just as we have been in the case of ASEAN. But a US role which is too direct or too assertive would, we believe, be the kiss of death to even this minimal form of CENTO/RCD follow-on. We should quietly encourage Pakistan to play a leading role in this activity, but we should also accept with grace the death of CENTO, the end of an era, and our consequent exclusion from regional affairs in Southwest Asia as an inevitable consequence of the broader changes now underway. And in this, we need to look to the preservation of both our global and our regional interests through hard-working bilateral diplomacy.

**Constable**

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**331. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 24, 1979, 0700Z

3464. Kathmandu for Hagerty. Subject: Supreme Court Dismisses Bhutto Review Petition. Ref: Islamabad 3448.<sup>2</sup>

1. (U) The Pakistan Supreme Court has rejected former Prime Minister Bhutto's final attempt to overturn the conviction and death sentence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–1062. Secret; Niact Immediate; Noform. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, New Delhi, Paris, CINCPAC, Tehran, Lahore, and Peshwar (pouch).

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3448 from Islamabad, March 22, transmitted a March 22 Radio Pakistan news bulletin that announced that the Supreme Court of Pakistan would convene the morning of March 24 in order to deliver its decision on whether to accept Bhutto's appeal to review his conviction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790132–0712)

passed by the Lahore High Court. The court dismissed Bhutto's review petition on March 24, thus exhausting Bhutto's alternatives for judicial relief from the conviction.

2. (U) In delivering the court's decision, Justice Akram said merely: "We all agree that the petition be dismissed." Yahya Bakhtiar, Bhutto's chief defense attorney asked permission to see his client and the court referred him to the government for such permission. The court then rose after spending less than five minutes on this dismissal.

3. (U) This action seems definitively to end the judicial consideration of Bhutto's fate. The only additional appeal is to the President for mercy. We understand such a mercy petition must be submitted within seven days after the condemned man has been advised of the dismissal of his appeal. However, Zia has repeatedly referred in the past to appeals already before him, and he could simply say that these have been considered and rejected.

4. (S) Based on developments of the past week, including President Zia ul-Haq's announcement on March 23 of a firm election date (septel),<sup>3</sup> high level military personnel changes and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Zia has made up his mind,<sup>4</sup> it appears unlikely that clemency will be granted. Rather, all indicators are that Zia will carry out the sentence—perhaps within the next few days.<sup>5</sup>

## Constable

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3465 from Islamabad, March 24, the Embassy reported Zia's announcement during a March 23 speech at the annual military parade that national and provincial elections would be held on November 17. The telegram also noted: "Zia also reportedly said that changes will be made in the 1973 constitution to achieve 'balance' between the roles of the President and the Prime Minister." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135-1073)

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> In response to the news that Bhutto's appeal for review was denied, the Department instructed the Embassy in telegram 73715 to Islamabad, March 24, to "seize on any appropriate opportunity to reiterate our hope that clemency will be granted Bhutto on humanitarian grounds." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790136-0859)

**332. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, March 28, 1979, 1200Z

3713. Subject: Soviet Demarche on Alleged GOP Assistance to Afghan Dissidents: GOP Requests US Clarification of 1959 Bilateral.

1. (S) Entire text. FGI throughout.

2. Summary: On March 28 GOP Advisor on Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi passed to me substance of a strongly worded Soviet demarche which was made by the Soviet Ambassador to President Zia ul-Haq March 26. In the demarche, the Soviets accuse the GOP of “connivance” in the activities of the Afghan dissidents against the Kabul regime, and say that they “cannot remain indifferent” to armed attacks on a country with which they are allied by treaty.

3. Shahi also read me Zia’s reply, in which the President strongly denied the Soviet accusation, and challenged Moscow to make the Kabul government show more restraint so that the refugees—who were fleeing “repression”—would no longer be a problem. Zia also told the Soviet Ambassador that Afghan hostility toward Pakistan would not be tolerated, and that the next DRA plane to violate Pak airspace “would be shot down.”

4. Shahi said that the GOP takes the Soviet demarche “very seriously” and asked that we “clarify fully” the USG position on our 1959 bilateral agreement. End summary.

5. Agha Shahi called me to the MFA mid-day March 28 to “inform” the USG about a Soviet demarche delivered by Soviet Ambassador Azimov to President Zia on March 26. Shahi read carefully from the demarche, which began by referring to the Soviet role in “trying to promote the normalization of Pak-Afghan relations,” and to President Zia’s recent statements that the GOP wants neighborly relations with all states.

6. The Soviet note then went on to say that “groups hostile to the Democratic Government of Afghanistan (DRA) had settled in Pakistan,” and that “armed gangs of saboteurs and terrorists were penetrating into Afghanistan.” The Soviet note described these groups as “counter-revolutionaries,” who “freely roamed up and down the Pak-Afghan border,” and were on the attack because of their opposition to “the reforms” now being carried out in Afghanistan by the DRA. The note

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2662. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

accuses the GOP of "connivance" in this anti-DRA activity, and says such action could lead to "severe aggravation in Pak-Afghan relations."

7. The note goes on to say that the "Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to such developments," especially when "aimed at a country with which the Soviet Union has a treaty of friendship which it values." Moscow "will not allow" Afghanistan to "become the object of attack no matter what the source."

8. The Soviet note concludes by saying that the USSR is delivering this message "in a frank and friendly manner," and that Moscow would "not like to believe that the use of Pakistani territory" for dissident activity "goes on with your knowledge." The note says that the GOP should consider the demarche with "all seriousness which this question deserves."

9. Shahi then read from what I presume is a written summary of President Zia's reply to Ambassador Azimov. According to Shahi, Zia told the Soviet Ambassador that:

—He "strongly rejected" the Soviet accusation about the GOP's alleged connivance with anti-DRA dissidents; and that,

—The GOP has "scrupulously remained tied" to its policy of "non-intervention," and has "done everything possible to keep the refugees from engaging in anti-DRA activities."

10. Zia told Azimov that to try to keep the Afghan refugees under control, the GOP has established two refugee camps, one at Warsak and the other at Tarbela, and that Azimov could visit either of them at any time to satisfy himself that no guerrilla training or other military activity is taking place. Zia said that there are now 35,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that they are arriving at the rate of 5,000 per month. The GOP, according to Zia, has been doing the best it can to keep the groups under control, and has warned Pakistani politicians not to make statements that will incite refugee activity, or be construed as anti-Afghan. Zia said that the GOP has ordered the refugee groups to cease holding press conferences, and that the GOP has provided "no arms, no training, and no financial support, other than humanitarian aid" to the refugees.

11. The President told the Soviet Ambassador that the real root of the refugee problem is in the "repression carried out against the Afghan population by the DRA". Zia told Azimov that Moscow should "impress upon Kabul" the need to avoid creating "the conditions that cause the exodus." According to Zia, Islamabad would be willing to cooperate with Kabul in preventing the entry of refugees. (When I queried Shahi about this later, he said that Zia meant that, if the Afghans close their border, the Paks would cooperate. Shahi did not think this a "very realistic proposition" because the border is so porous.)

12. On a government-to-government level, Zia said, he would continue to take “all the steps within his power” to see that “no hostile acts against the DRA originated in Pakistan.” He said, however, that the Taraki government in Kabul is becoming increasingly aggressive, and cited as examples the recent shelling of two villages in Pakistan, and the “three dozen” violations of Pakistani airspace by DRA planes. One violation occurred less than six weeks ago, when a DRA plane penetrated “thirty miles” into Pakistan. Zia said that he had “so far” ordered his forces not to shoot, and that he has contented himself with protests to Kabul, but he said that the next DRA aircraft to violate Pak airspace “would be shot down.”

13. Zia concluded by noting that he was affronted to be accused of complicity in the “half-hearted attempts by the Afghan dissidents” to overthrow the Kabul regime, and that, if the “GOP was really hostile to the DRA” it could make “life difficult” for the Taraki government. Zia decried the “substantial campaign of false allegations against the GOP” carried on by the Soviet media. The Soviet demarche, Zia said, “is stronger and more explicit” than anything the GOP has heard from the DRA, and that Moscow’s invocation of the USSR–DRA treaty will “only encourage Afghanistan to persist in its hostile attitude” toward Pakistan.

14. Shahi said that the GOP believes this demarche came from the “highest levels in Moscow” and that it “perhaps” reflects Soviet Premier Kosygin’s personal views. Shahi said that the GOP sees Kosygin’s hand behind the recent *Pravda* and *Izvestia* articles,<sup>2</sup> and that the GOP has a report that Kosygin told Indian FonMin Vajpayee in Delhi that Pakistan is behind all of the dissident activity in Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup>

15. Shahi told me that the GOP is taking the Soviet demarche “very seriously” and is not treating it as an “empty threat or bluff.” Shahi reasons that Moscow is “nursing its anger” over the GOP’s decision to ban Soviet overflights to Vietnam, and Pakistan’s subsequent refusal to succumb to Soviet pressure at the risk of harming its relations with China. Shahi noted that Moscow has suffered a “setback” in the Sino-

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6717 from Moscow, March 19, the Embassy reported that the March 19 edition of *Pravda* “carries authoritative article on foreign—particularly Pakistani—support for various sorts of subversive activities directed against Afghan Government. Egypt, China, Iran, and ‘some’ Western countries are also criticized in this regard.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790127–0582) According to telegram 3313 from Islamabad, March 20, a “BBC Moscow reporter recapped an *Izvestia* article which repeated *Pravda*’s earlier criticism of the Government of Pakistan for its support of Afghan exile activities, repeated also the allegation of Chinese assistance in this effort and added an explicit criticism of the US and the UK for their support of these activities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790128–1086)

<sup>3</sup> Kosygin visited New Delhi March 13–15.

Vietnam conflict and “could be expected” to seek an opportunity to “reestablish its credibility as a superpower.”

16. The Advisor said that the GOP labors with a set of contradictions in the matter. The “brutal oppression” of Afghans has caused “real unhappiness” in Pakistan and elsewhere. In fact, Shahi said, when he was in Tehran the Ayatollah Khomeini “asked me to convey a message to the DRA” about its repression of “religious people.” Shahi said that he told Khomeini that such a message might “drive the DRA to even more repression,” but the GOP delivered Khomeini’s message to the Afghan Ambassador in Islamabad anyway. Shahi said he also made a direct appeal to Afghan FonMin Amin to stop oppressing Muslims. Shahi said that, as expected, the appeals have “incensed the Afghans,” who are having a hard time maintaining control over the country, and now—with both Iran and Pakistan having risked Soviet wrath—Moscow has stepped into the breach.

17. Shahi said that it is in this context that the GOP “seeks a clarification” of USG policy in relation to the 1959 bilateral. Shahi said that both DepSec Christopher and Assistant Secretary Saunders have told the Paks that the bilateral remains in force,<sup>4</sup> although Shahi said that the DepSec had said that the treaty is “twenty years old and needs a new scope of definition.”<sup>5</sup> I told Shahi that the bilateral indeed remains in force, and that any “new definitions” mentioned by the DepSec were in the nature of expanding economic assistance to Pakistan (not covered in the bilateral), as a reflection of our desire to be more help to the GOP. I also reminded Shahi of my call on FonSec Shahnawaz, in which I presented the Department Spokesman’s comments that we would regard external involvement in Afghanistan’s internal problems as a serious matter with the potential of heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region.<sup>6</sup>

18. Shahi said that a clarification was very important to the GOP at this time because “if we have to deal with this threat alone we will take one policy”, but “if we feel the U.S. is behind us we can be courteous but firm” in a response to pressure from Moscow and the DRA. Shahi said the military situation is “not academic” because Saudi Arabia has asked Pakistan for military manpower, and, while the GOP

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<sup>4</sup> Christopher addressed the issue in his March 2 discussion with Zia. See footnote 8, Document 330. In a November 3, 1978, discussion with Yaqub Khan, Saunders confirmed the agreement remained in force. See footnote 7, Document 313.

<sup>5</sup> No record of Christopher’s specific comment was found.

<sup>6</sup> Constable met with Shahnawaz on March 25. (Telegram 3508 from Islamabad, March 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790138–0455) Telegram 72878 to multiple posts, March 23, transmitted Department Spokesman Hodding Carter’s March 23 statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0457)

can provide training and maintenance personnel now, “if they want more to counter Soviet moves in the Yemen”, then the GOP will have to gauge carefully its own military situation.

19. When I asked Shahi what concrete Soviet action the GOP fears, he said that there is a real concern that “KGB agents” will begin to work in Baluchistan, and this, combined with the “incitement of ethnics” already happening in Iran under Soviet tutelage, could make Pakistan a “target of opportunity for the Soviets”. Baluchistan is an even more likely target, Shahi maintained, because Baluch leaders—“such as Bizenjo”—are already “pro-Soviet.”

20. Shahi agreed that one reason for the Soviet demarche may be that things are getting out of hand in Afghanistan, and he suggested that Moscow may be preparing Communist and other international opinion for an intervention along the lines of “Hungary or Czechoslovakia.”

21. I told Shahi that I understood the GOP’s concerns and appreciated the seriousness of their request for clarification. I said that I would report our conversation fully to Washington.

22. The Advisor said that he would see the Chinese Ambassador evening of March 28 to deliver the same message and that Pak Ambassadors in Beijing, Washington, and Moscow have already cabled full reports. Amb Yaqub has been instructed to reiterate Zia’s response to Kosygin, whom Yaqub had already asked to see.

23. I am sending recommendations on an appropriate response to GOP by septel.<sup>7</sup>

24. Recommend Dept repeat this message to Am Embassies Beijing, Jidda, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi and Tehran.

**Constable**

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 3714 from Islamabad, March 28, the Embassy recommended that the United States should “inform GOP that we see 1959 bilateral as precisely intended to provide for Pakistan’s security against aggression by a Communist or Communist-dominated power—a definition which includes both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.” The Embassy argued that a linkage between the 1959 agreement and the nuclear issue should be avoided. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2669) In telegram 77843 to Islamabad, March 29, the Department directed the Embassy to inform Shahi that “we consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be in force, and in this context, we will want to continue to consult closely on the Afghan situation and Soviet activities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2697)

### 333. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 28, 1979, 2:45–5:30 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

PRC on Pakistan: Minutes (C)

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *State*

Warren Christopher, Deputy  
Secretary  
Amb. Gerard Smith, Special  
Representative of the  
President for Non-  
Proliferation Matters  
Amb. Arthur Hummel,  
Ambassador to Pakistan  
David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

##### *Defense*

David McGiffert, Assistant  
Secretary for Internat. Security  
Affairs  
Cdr. Ronald P. Zwart

##### *Energy*

Holsey Handyside, Deputy  
Assistant Secretary for  
Internat. Programs

##### *OMB*

Randy Jayne, Associate  
Director for Security &  
Internat. Affairs

##### *ACDA*

Spurgeon Keeny, Acting  
Director  
Charles Van Doren,  
Assistant Director for  
Non-Proliferation

##### *JCS*

Lt. Gen. William Smith

##### *CIA*

Frank Carlucci, Deputy  
Director  
John Despres

##### *White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Henry Owen

##### *NSC*

Thomas Thornton  
Jessica Mathews

The meeting was preceded by a fifteen-minute session attended only by the principals of the agencies.<sup>2</sup>

*Christopher:* All of us are aware of the Pakistani enrichment program. It has already gotten some attention in the press in India and in the UK. We have undertaken a sequenced program of compliance with the Symington Amendment; we have undertaken selective consultations with Congress; and have briefed Secretary General Eklund of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 099, 3/28/79, Pakistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, Box 100, NSC Meetings: Summaries of Conclusions, 3/1978–6/1979. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No record was found of this meeting.



the IAEA.<sup>3</sup> We have several letters ready for the President's signature, awaiting the outcome of this meeting.

We will follow today an agenda along these lines: 1. Cutoff of supplies to Pakistan; 2. a positive program of inducements if that is felt desirable; 3. a survey of possible effective sanctions; 4. an approach involving India and Pakistan in a regional agreement; and 5. the question of exposing the program to public view. I do not mean to de-emphasize our requirements in the nuclear area at the expense of our security interests. These will come up in the course of discussion. The telegrams that we have received from Islamabad this morning (concerning Soviet demarche to Pakistan on alleged Pakistani support of Afghan insurgency and the Pakistani request for clarification of our obligations under the 1959 agreement) add both to the complexity of the problem and perhaps offer an opportunity.<sup>4</sup> The Pakistanis responded firmly but do want clarification from us. Let us turn first to the question of cut-off of supplies to the Pakistani nuclear program.

*Gerard Smith:* We have sent word out to all known sources of equipment for the Pakistani enrichment program and they are cooperating with us.<sup>5</sup> It is difficult however to control dual-purpose items short of a complete embargo. We can slow up the Pakistani program but we cannot abort it.

*Despres:* We have examined all the possibilities for impeding the Pakistani program and acted upon those that seem to have promise. Further efforts are likely to have only marginal impact. At most we can perhaps aggravate the Pakistanis' technical difficulties.

*Christopher:* Do we need anything more to ensure full compliance, such as an inter-agency group?

*Gerard Smith:* I have talked with Pickering and he thinks things are well in train.

*Christopher:* We all agree that this is an extremely important effort and we should redouble those efforts if it will serve any purpose. How have our allies reacted?

*Gerard Smith:* They are doing the best they can. The Swiss seem to be having some problems but the French, British and Germans are going all out and the Swedes are helping also.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2940 from Vienna, March 27, the Embassy transmitted a summary of the meeting with Eklund to brief him on U.S. concern over the Pakistani program. The Embassy reported that Eklund "felt implications of Pak activities are very serious—even more for NPT regime than for peaceful uses of nuclear Power." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0152)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 332 and footnote 6 thereto.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 327.

*Mathews:* The main problem seems to be with governments trying to control the activities of foreign-owned subsidiaries.

*Gerard Smith:* The effect of getting this program into the public view will probably help. I am surprised that this has not happened to a greater extent.

*Christopher:* Let us turn to positive inducements to Pakistan to suspend their nuclear program. There seem to be many variables but also many problems, for instance the effect on India and the precedent for blackmail that this would set. Also the Paks may be so determined that anything we do might not help. When I was in Islamabad I told them that the 1959 treaty was in force.<sup>6</sup> Now they are back again questioning us about it. We should work up a very careful message to them to confirm that we still support the treaty.

*Newsom:* To clarify a bit, the 1959 treaty is legally based on the Middle East Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Might the Soviet demarche provide an opportunity for us to review the security situation with the Pakistanis and point out to them the futility of a nuclear capability vis-a-vis the Soviets?

*Aaron:* This is extremely important. Would it be helpful for the carrier that is now off Socotra to make a port call at Karachi? Would that be reassuring to the Pakistanis?

*Christopher:* How does the group relate this question of the treaty to the nuclear option? The way Dave Newsom did? (No response.)

*Newsom:* The next step is to lay out before us the extensive military requirements in connection with reassuring the Pakistanis. If we start down this road and discourage them from a nuclear option it will mean requests from them for military equipment which will cause problems with the Indians and here domestically.

*William Smith:* They will still want to have a nuclear capability for dealing with India. Nonetheless I think this is worth trying.

*Keeny:* But if they go ahead with their nuclear program that will preclude assistance from us.

*Aaron:* At least it offers us an opportunity to approach the question from a different angle. We mustn't detract from our commitment to them.

*Christopher:* There seems to be a new mood in Pakistan from the time I was there, at least as far as I can see from these new telegrams. They played down the importance of US aid to me.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 8, Document 330.

*Hummel:* The mood is probably different but there are the same issues in their minds and the same requests will surface: Bilateral agreement, perhaps a friendship treaty and new US commitment.

*Gerard Smith:* Congress will no doubt be intrigued with the idea of implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1979!

*Aaron:* It is important how we make the connection between reassurance and the nuclear question. We should tell them clearly that the commitment stands but what we can do for them in specific terms is another matter that depends on the outcome of the nuclear matter.

*Gerard Smith:* Will our commitment to them persist?

*Aaron:* That decision has not been made.

*William Smith:* That is to some extent a question of timing. Now the commitment does exist. We will have to see if it changes in the light of events later.

*Newsom:* I did not mean we should draw back, but set the discussion of it aside. We should start with an intelligence and security briefing and lead from that into a discussion of the realities of their situation. We cannot fully respond to them until the nuclear situation is straightened out.

*Aaron:* We have interests in Pakistan over and above non-proliferation in the region, as important as that may be. We should be very straight-forward in reassuring them. If they want to have a follow-up meeting with us on more detailed matters then we can use that opportunity to show them the problems inherent in their nuclear program.

*Thornton:* What they are asking though is not a reaffirmation of the treaty but an expansion of it.

*William Smith:* Let's not quibble with them now when they need help and let us not exert too much linkage at this point.

*Hummel:* Reaffirming the 1959 treaty as such will simply get derivative restatement from them of the need to expand it. They will ask us what we intend to do.

*Christopher:* We can use the conversation as an opportunity to get back into a dialogue with them and reopen the discussion which is now stalled.

*Hummel:* I agree that we should not expect too much.

*Christopher:* How fast should we reply to them?

*Newsom:* We should send an affirmative holding response and then prepare a message of instruction for Hummel in more detail. We should do this within a week.

*Christopher:* We will send some immediate message but not at this time for the President because of the Bhutto problem. We will work on the message for Hummel to carry back with him.

*Keeny:* But the Pakistanis will want more than mere reaffirmation.

*McGiffert:* The Pakistanis are looking to see how real our commitment is and simple reaffirmation of the agreement will not help.

*Newsom:* Constable recommends that we tell them that we see the Soviet and Afghan threats as relevant in terms of the treaty—i.e. a threat from a Communist-dominated country. We would however need some Congressional consultation for that.

*Christopher:* Do we want to say at this point that Afghanistan is a Communist power? We will have to study that issue closely. (Referring to Section 620(f) of the FAA.)<sup>7</sup>

*McGiffert:* Couldn't we expand the agreement for instance to include nuclear aggression from non-Communist states? Some think piece on this subject might be useful.

*Christopher:* We might need to set up a working group on this Pakistani question.

*William Smith:* Expanding the terms of the 1959 commitment is a dubious undertaking as is the naming of specific countries.

*Newsom:* I was involved in the drawing up of the 1959 security agreements and we went to great pains to avoid naming specific countries.

*Christopher:* I would want to give a lot of thought to the question of including Afghanistan.

*Aaron:* We should address this policy question ourselves of how far we intend to support them in helping the Afghan insurgency, and not pass it off to a working group.

*Newsom:* We have not supported the Afghan insurgency and apparently the Pakistanis have not either.

*Gerard Smith:* We have to be clear that we are not giving them a green light to support the Afghan insurgency.

*Newsom:* Would it be useful to remind the Soviets of our 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan? (No answer.)

*Aaron:* The Pakistanis certainly have not kept the Afghan guerrillas from operating across the border. They will want to know whether we support that level of their involvement, and we should give them an answer. Will we help them if they get into trouble? Are we indifferent to what happens? Should they seal the Afghan border? Would the 1959 agreement apply then?

*Keeny:* Do you want to go on record in writing about all of that? The Soviets may just be building a paper trail to justify their own

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<sup>7</sup> Section 620 (f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibited giving assistance to Communist countries. (P.L. 87-195)

intervention in Afghanistan as a response to foreign attacks on Afghanistan.

*William Smith:* The Soviets probably have a legitimate complaint. Should we put ourselves in the position of offering to defend Pakistan against that? Can the Pakistanis close the border anyway?

*Carlucci:* No, they could not close the border but they are certainly not impeding the activities of the Afghan insurgents.

*Hummel:* All of this discussion refers to the short-term period. In the longer run, if Taraki is destabilized Soviet troops might enter into Afghanistan up to the border of Pakistan. What would we do then?

*McGiffert:* When Harold Brown was in the Middle East, we told them that we saw the US role as protecting them against the Soviets, rather than against regional threats.<sup>8</sup> The Pakistanis certainly can handle the Afghans; we should make the same point to them.

*Christopher:* Let us not try to formulate an answer here. We will draft a telegram of response and clear it around.

*Aaron:* Hummel should have instructions on our attitude towards the insurgency.

*Christopher:* Let us now turn to the question of sanctions and pressures. We have sent over draft letters to the European leaders and these should go forward for the President's signature. I do not think anything else is appropriate here; we have already invoked the Symington Amendment.

*Owen:* Do these letters tell the Europeans what we are doing about aid?

*Christopher:* I do not believe they do. (Copies of the letters were produced and shown to have a passing reference to this.)

*Owen:* We should set this forth to them both in the spirit of candor and to enlist their assistance.<sup>9</sup>

*Christopher:* I agree. Are there any other ideas? What about approaching the Saudis, if money is coming to the Pakistanis from them to support their nuclear plant?

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<sup>8</sup> Brown visited the Middle East in early February. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 19 and 20.

<sup>9</sup> On April 8, identical letters from Carter were sent to Schmidt, Giscard, Callaghan, Trudeau, and Ohira, informing them of the U.S. cutoff of aid to Pakistan because of concern over its nuclear program. (Telegram 87132 to Bonn, April 7; telegram 87133 to Paris, April 8; telegram 87134 to London, April 8; telegram 87135 to Ottawa, April 8; and telegram 87136, to Tokyo, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2188, P850011–0426, P840125–1930, P840142–2672, P850050–1856, respectively)

*Despres:* The Saudis are supporting it only indirectly in that they provide money generally to the Pakistanis and it is of course fungible.

*Christopher:* The Saudis showed no interest in pursuing this subject when I talked to them in Riyadh.<sup>10</sup>

*Aaron:* We have a lot on our plate with the Saudis, let's not overload it.

*Hummel:* I don't think it's a good idea to ask other countries to cut off aid, at least at this point.

*Owen:* The Germans would be quite sensitive to our point of view, more so than would be the French.

*Christopher:* The best thing is to tell the allies what we are doing and then let them draw their own conclusions about what they should do.

*Owen:* Let's consult with the Germans on this at the next opportunity.

*Christopher:* We do not want to get into the position of organizing an international conspiracy of nations to harass the Pakistanis.

*Owen:* No, I just mean to talk the problem over with them.

*Aaron:* In talking to them we should spell out our full range of concerns, not just the issue of proliferation. We should also talk about security and stability in the area.

*Christopher:* Turning to the next item, do we think that an Indo-Pakistani agreement is possible?

*Newsom:* We have examined this in some detail and have some ideas to build on. Zia has offered mutual safeguards and inspections and Desai sometime ago made his non-nuclear pledge. We should start our consultations with the Pakistanis and see what Zia is willing to do. Then we could go to the Indians. There are however several problems: 1. The situation in India has changed quite a bit since Desai made this statement and he is now under much greater pressure. 2. Our own nuclear problems with India have grown as a result of the Tarapur problem. 3. The Indians are concerned about the Chinese nuclear program and this makes it difficult for them to come to a bilateral agreement with the Pakistanis. The chances of success are pretty small but they are worth exploring.

*Gerard Smith:* As an interim step why don't we try to do something about ensuring continued supply for Tarapur, for instance by putting the Indians in the EURATOM category and continue to supply them as long as they are negotiating the safeguards question in good faith;

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<sup>10</sup> Christopher and Brzezinski visited Riyadh March 17–18. (Telegram 2323 from Jidda, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790132–0002) No record was found of their discussion with Saudi officials regarding Pakistan.

we could share our national means of verification to make it easier for them to accept the idea of joint inspection; we could encourage the Pakistanis to slow down the tempo of construction of their reprocessing and enrichment facilities to correspond to economic requirements. This could string these out for fifteen years or longer; we could help the Pakistanis on the construction of nuclear power stations. We should try first to get a non-use declaration, move them to IAEA inspections and then with luck to adherence to the NPT.

*Newsom:* There is also the question of the South Asia nuclear weapons free zone that will come up. This could make difficulties for us in terms of transit of our ships through the area.

*William Smith:* That will be a problem but we should be able to handle it.

*Christopher:* We also want to be careful not to jar our relations with India.

*Newsom:* Should the British or perhaps some prominent international individual take the lead in suggesting these things rather than have us do it with all of the problems that that entails?

*Gerard Smith:* We also should relate this to the question of security assurances.

*Aaron:* Much of the things that you suggest depend not just on India and Pakistan but also our ability to be more flexible on non-proliferation issues.

*Keeny:* Why are we concerned about involving India; should we not approach Desai early on in this matter?

*Christopher:* Desai is under very great pressure at home on the nuclear issue.<sup>11</sup> Toleration of a Pakistani nuclear program could be devastating for him politically.

*Keeny:* I think we have to move in parallel with Desai. Are we not talking about something that would delay an approach to the Indians for a matter of months?

*Newsom:* One thing we have to get across to the Indians is our estimate of how far away the Pakistanis are from a nuclear explosive capability.

*Hummel:* The chances of getting all of this to work are very poor. What Pakistan really wants is to have equal treatment with India. That would mean freezing the Indian program also.

*McGiffert:* We probably all agree that this approach will fail but want to go ahead with it anyway. We should ask ourselves whether it perhaps will be harmful to our larger interests. I do not think it will.

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<sup>11</sup> See Documents 130 and 131.

*Christopher:* Let me summarize: First we will tell the Pakistanis to slow down their program to correspond to economic needs; second we will seek to get a non-use/non-production pledge from both India and Pakistan; and third we will seek to get other regional states to sign on to the agreement.

*Gerard Smith:* All of this needs to be worked out in very great detail.

*Keeny:* Our approach to Desai in a letter should be on the high ground, stressing his responsibility and opportunity as an international statesman. He is the key to our success as regards India.

*Christopher:* We have a letter to Desai; you will need to redraft it.

*Newsom:* Before we write to Desai we have to know what we are going to do about Pakistan.

*Thornton:* We cannot wait too long; Desai gets nervous when he does not get a quick reply to his letters.

*Newsom:* I agree. The letter that we send however should not be very specific.<sup>12</sup>

*Christopher:* The next item is the question of exposing the Pakistani program to public view.

This was effective in the case of South Africa but Pakistan is not an international pariah as South Africa is. The publicity is going to come by itself without us doing anything. There is not much more that we can or should do.

*Newsom:* We have to consider how the non-aligned nations will react if we reveal the Pakistani activities. This might be quite counter-productive if it looks like we are pressuring the Pakistanis.

*Carlucci:* I agree. It might be seen as pressuring the Pakistanis unduly and backfire on us.

*Owen:* [2 lines not declassified]

*Hummel:* No, the Pakistanis see their problem as being with India.

*Newsom:* This might however have considerable impact on the Saudis, who could then put pressure on the Pakistanis.

*Owen:* We have talked a lot about this today but we have barely scratched the surface of this critical issue. Should we not set up a small group of people, chosen for their expertise, not because of their Agency affiliation, to look for some far out alternatives, [less than 1 line not declassified] and report back to us?

*Christopher:* The idea has merit. Are there any objections? (No objections were raised.)

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<sup>12</sup> Carter wrote to Desai on April 5. See Document 133.



*Aaron:* But isn't this just what the State Department has done in the paper that we have in front of us?<sup>13</sup> It is time that we ourselves address these difficult questions.

*Owen:* Certainly, we shouldn't hold up any decisions that we have taken here today. But it would also be useful to have a group examine some more adventurous possibilities. I am not offering a rationale for delay.

*Newsom:* Maybe it would be a good idea to get a group together somewhere outside the normal places of meeting where we would be undisturbed, for an all day meeting.

*Christopher:* Let's consider this further. We can have a small group set up to report back to us on what can be done to keep Pakistan from achieving a nuclear capability. Let me now summarize what I think we have come up with: 1. We will continue and intensify our efforts to work with the suppliers. 2. We shall send an intermediate response to the Pakistani question about the 1959 agreement. 3. We will develop more detailed instructions for Hummel to take back.<sup>14</sup> 4. We shall send letters for the President to sign to the European leaders and also an improved letter to Desai. We will also have conversations on this with the Germans at the next opportunity. 5. We will develop a fuller approach on the question of a possible Indo-Pakistani agreement and coordinate this with the UK. 6. It is not a productive idea to publicize the Pakistani program at this time. The working group will continue to focus on ways to keep Pakistan from a nuclear explosive capability and report back to us. It will consider some far out options and relate these to broader security concerns.

*Gerard Smith:* What about approaching the Soviets? I think we should.

*Hummel:* I do not think we should at this juncture in our relations with the Soviets and their relations with the Pakistanis. I would not put it past them to go immediately to the Pakistanis and tell them of the approach.

*Mathews:* We need a rapid response in preparing this report on ways to frustrate the Pakistani nuclear capability.

*Keeny:* We will also have to bring the Indians into the picture.

*Christopher:* I agree with Hummel about the Soviets; we should not approach them at this time.

Thereupon the meeting ended.

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<sup>13</sup> Not found.

<sup>14</sup> See Document 336.

### 334. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 4, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistan in the Aftermath of Bhutto's Execution:* In the wake of the government's official announcement this morning of Bhutto's execution, the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area remains generally calm.<sup>2</sup> Increased security precautions have been implemented without unnecessary visibility. Karachi and Peshawar are also quiet with groups of residents gathered around literate individuals reading aloud from newspaper reports of the execution. A small group throwing stones at passing cars in Lahore was quickly dispersed and the city is quiet. (C)

The government's announcement did not mention the fate of the four others condemned with Bhutto, but our consulate in Lahore reports they were not executed pending final consideration of their mercy petitions.<sup>3</sup> (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 3/26/79–3/31/1979. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed at the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> On March 29, Carter made a final appeal to Zia to spare Bhutto's life. (Message WH90848 from the White House to Islamabad and the Department of State, March 29; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78–7/79) After confirming delivery of the text of Carter's letter to Zia's office, Constable commented: "While I recognize that USG will, if asked, want to acknowledge that President has made further appeal, I hope we can avoid volunteering this information at this time. GOP, Bhutto's supporters and general public are well aware of U.S. opposition to execution of Bhutto. GOP will resent this reiteration of our appeal in view of previous statements of our position, and this resentment will be unnecessarily aggravated if we now publicize it." (Telegram 3742 from Islamabad, March 29; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> No report from Lahore was found.

**335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1979, 2248Z

87127. Subject: Pakistan Nuclear Program and Application of the Symington Amendment.

1. Summary. The Pakistan Ambassador called on Under Secretary Newsom April 6 to express regret over the manner and timing of the news concerning application of the Symington Amendment to Pakistan. Mr. Newsom pointed out that evidence available to us on Pakistan's nuclear enrichment activities gave us no choice but to apply the law. Public disclosure at the noon press briefing was not in the form of any announcement, but came out in response to queries from the press.<sup>2</sup> We hope to continue to have close relations with Pakistan and Ambassador Hummel on his return to Islamabad will be exploring the full range of our relations with President Zia. End summary.

2. Pakistan Ambassador Sultan Mohammad Khan called at his request on Under Secretary Newsom April 6. He was accompanied by Minister Hayat Mehdi. Ambassador Hummel and NEA/PAB Director Coon were also present.

3. Ambassador Khan said he wished to inquire about the content and timing of our announcement regarding the application of the Symington Amendment. The issue had been discussed by Mr. Christopher in Islamabad<sup>3</sup> and more recently in the Ambassador's call on the Deputy Secretary<sup>4</sup> and he had hoped that there would have been a normal process of consultation before making such an announcement. Moreover, he had understood that the USG would not seek publicity on the issue but he felt the announcement had been made in a way to attract publicity. He noted that Hayat Mehdi had been called into the Department this morning and told that there were press inquiries on this subject and had been shown prepared Q's and A's which only indicated

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790160–0372. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Tehran. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi, London, Paris, Jidda, Beijing, and Moscow. Drafted by Coon; cleared in S/S–O and by Miklos and Nosenzo; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In response to a reporter's question about Pakistan's nuclear program during the April 6 Department of State press briefing, Department Spokesman Hodding Carter acknowledged that the United States Government had concluded that Pakistani Government "activities" had triggered the Symington Amendment, and that U.S. aid was being discontinued. (Telegram 86090 to multiple posts, April 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790158–1089)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 325.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 329.

that we would be “winding down” our programs.<sup>5</sup> The Ambassador felt constrained to express his surprise, disappointment and regret.

4. Mr. Newsom said that he shared these feelings. The circumstances surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear activities have presented us with complex and difficult questions. Pakistan is a country with which we have had and want to continue to have the closest relations. It is still our hope that we can find areas in our relations where we can cooperate. Mr. Newsom pointed out, however, that as the Pakistan Government well knows from many conversations, including Mr. Christopher’s in Islamabad, we have increasing evidence of construction of enrichment facilities which cannot be explained in terms of Pakistan nuclear power program. Faced with this evidence we had hoped we could persuade Pakistan to review its policy so that we could continue to cooperate to our benefit. After Christopher’s visit, we determined within the administration that we had no choice but to apply Symington.<sup>6</sup> It had been our hope that we could move quietly and in an orderly manner to apply the law in a way which would minimize the negative effects of this action in our overall relations. However, publicity outran our hopes. Articles in the Indian press and Manchester Guardian and a German TV program apparently led to questions here yesterday which we had to answer in the press briefing. We had called in Mr. Medhi to inform him of the impending publicity and the fact the Symington was in effect. Mr. Newsom clarified a misunderstanding by the Ambassador, pointing out that we had not made a formal announcement at the press briefing but only responded to questions.

5. The Ambassador responded that his government had been placed in a difficult position and it would now have to make clear its views on the question. He said it would be difficult to avoid the impression that our action is discriminatory, noting that India has three (sic) reprocessing plants which is far in excess of its need for power production. He also noted that Pakistan had made constructive suggestions in nuclear matters—to India and others—including the proposal for a South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ).

6. Mr. Newsom said he understood Pakistan’s point of view and commented that in another year we will be unable to deliver nuclear fuel to India if there is not agreement on full-scope safeguards. He

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 85666 to Islamabad, April 6, the Embassy reported Miklos’s April 6 meeting with Mehdi, during which Miklos informed Mehdi of that day’s Department press briefing and warned him that the story about the U.S. response to Pakistan’s nuclear program could break very soon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790158–0189)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 333.

noted that the Symington Amendment is not intended to discriminate against Pakistan, but the law only applied after a certain date and is not retroactive. Referring to Pakistan's constructive suggestions such as SANWFZ, Mr. Newsom indicated we hoped that these would be further explored.

7. Mr. Newsom also described the orderly manner in which we hoped to phase out the aid program. The Symington Amendment does not affect aid in the pipeline and we can make limited new obligations in order to complete projects which are well underway. Under the IMET program, students already selected for courses will be able to proceed as planned. He also cited that provision in the Amendment that permits a Presidential waiver if it is in US national interest and if we receive reliable assurances that a country will not produce nuclear weapons.

8. The Ambassador commented that such assurances had been given at the highest level on many occasions; the other condition of course is up to the US. Mr. Newsom recalled that during Mr. Christopher's conversation in Islamabad the question of Pakistan's intentions arose and the President did not seem to feel that he was in a position to give such assurances. Indeed we had received a contrary impression. He said that if the Pakistan Government could provide such assurances, supported by a suitable formula for verification, we would be happy to reverse the process.

9. In conclusion, Mr. Newsom asked the Ambassador to convey to his government that we have taken this action out of necessity and with great reluctance. We hope still to develop a pattern of cooperation with Pakistan, and also to continue a dialogue on this particular question to see if there might be a solution. He noted that Ambassador Hummel was leaving tonight for Islamabad and we hope he may see President Zia at an early date to explore the full range of our relations of which this is but one facet.

**Vance**

**336. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Raphel) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Pakistan

During a meeting with Ambassador Hummel on April 5, the Secretary outlined the following priorities in our policy toward Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

—Our policy is not driven by intelligence concerns. Pakistan could have intelligence value, but there are other, and potentially more valuable, verification possibilities.

—Although we have expressed our regret over the Bhutto execution,<sup>3</sup> we will not let it be a long-term irritant in our relationship with Islamabad.

—We should not let actions we take with Pakistan cause excessive hazards to our relationship with India.

We, consequently, have two major foreign policy priorities with Pakistan—our security relationship and the nuclear non-proliferation issue. Our difficulties in implementing our policy toward Pakistan over the weeks and months ahead reflect the fact that the means of attaining our objectives on these two issues often conflict. The instructions for Ambassador Hummel's meeting with General Zia are based on the considerations noted above and reflect the facts that:

—There are real legal and political constraints on what we can do for and with Pakistan if they continue to develop a nuclear weapons potential;

—We recognize the validity of the 1959 Bilateral, the potential threat posed to Pakistan from events in Afghanistan and the consequent instability it could cause in South Asia. We consequently have a real and immediate interest in cooperating with Pakistan to oppose that threat;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January–July 1979. Secret. Also sent to Saunders, Kreisberg, Pickering, Smith, Gelb, and Hummel. A stamped notation in the lower right-hand corner of the first page reads: "Mr. Newsom Has Seen," Apr 21 1979."

<sup>2</sup> No other record of the meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 334.

—We also realize that we may well be unable to dissuade Pakistan from proceeding down the nuclear road and may well be faced, within the next two to five years, with a nuclear Pakistan;

—Over the short term, we should attempt to maximize our chances to be successful in both the nuclear and security areas, even though we realize inherent conflicts exist.

The Secretary said that we should proceed expeditiously with the planned PL 480 Title III program in Pakistan. He asked Mr. Newsom to pursue this issue with Henry Owen.

We should be alert to possible changes in the leadership of Pakistan, and closely watch the political trends within the country.

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### **337. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 10, 1979, 1140Z

4206. Subject: Discussion With President Zia. Ref: State 85585.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text; protect FGI.

2. Summary: In hour-long meeting April 9 with President Zia, I presented USG views and proposals as stated in reftel. Zia found comments relating to security questions “positive” and “reassuring” and said he would react more fully in a few days following consultation with his Cabinet. He reacted with vehemence to U.S. announcement of aid cut-off, and denied Pakistan had nuclear program directed toward weapons;<sup>3</sup> he accused U.S. of engineering international campaign

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan IV. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Oxman wrote: “WC, SO.”

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, provided Hummel with instructions for his meeting with Zia, which included an offer to make a *démarche* to the Soviet Union, as well as to send U.S. warships to the Indian Ocean. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January–July 1979) The instructions reflected the points developed in the April 5 meeting in Washington (see Document 336). See also footnote 5 below, and footnote 3, Document 339.

<sup>3</sup> Oxman underlined the words “denied Pakistan had nuclear program directed toward weapons.”

against Pakistan and timing it to take advantage of Pakistan's internal problems. Zia asserted that any change in Pak nuclear activities would have to await installation of civilian government after November elections, but then agreed that there could be room for further discussions on basis of "new ideas" adumbrated in para 10 reftel.<sup>4</sup>

3. Zia was clearly angry and hurt by abruptness of USG announcement on assistance cut-off. Exchanges were heated at some points, but overall Zia appeared to be reassured by evidence that U.S. seeks to separate in so far as feasible nuclear issue from efforts to provide other support to meet threat from Afghan situation. End summary.

4. I met with President Zia on afternoon of April 9 for hour-long session. Constable accompanied me; Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz and MFA notetaker participated.

5. I led off presentation with rather full explanation of how Department press briefing on Pak nuclear program and assistance cut-off had come about,<sup>5</sup> emphasizing the necessity of responding to press queries which were building up following press stories in India, Manchester Guardian, and German TV program. Expressing regret that timing had worked out as it had, I concluded saying: "Now that both sides have spoken for the public record, we hope we can minimize further public controversy and carry out our discussion in private."

6. I then proceeded slowly, carefully and verbatim through points in paras 1 to 13 in reftel. Only point I added was in para 2a, dealing with need for internal cohesion and stability in Pakistan, saying we noted with satisfaction Zia's announcement of elections for national and provincial assemblies on November 17. Zia jotted down salient points as I read from my instructions.

7. Zia's response began with statement that it was reassuring that not everything in our relationship is linked to our differences on nuclear issues. He then launched into lengthy and emotional criticism of U.S. attitudes on Pak nuclear program. Zia first said our intelligence was

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<sup>4</sup> Oxman drew a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Paragraph 10 of telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, reads: "Finally, we would be willing to work with you and other countries, both within and without the region, to seek to ensure that you will not be threatened by the development of nuclear weapons by others in your region. In this connection we welcome your thoughts as to the kind of arrangements Pakistan would feel meet its security concerns in this respect." See footnote 2 above.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 335.



faulty, based on unreliable source<sup>6</sup> (septel).<sup>7</sup> He said U.S. has assumed Pakistan is making a bomb and our journalists have dubbed it a “Muslim” bomb. “I assure you once again,” he said, “all this is totally wrong. Pakistan is carrying out a research program dedicated to peaceful purposes.” He then reviewed the GOP efforts since 60s to limit nuclear proliferation, citing South Asia Nuclear Free Zone proposals, suggestion for nuclear-free zone in Indian Ocean, proposals for reciprocal inspection with India. He lamented at length discrimination against Pakistan as compared to U.S. treatment of India, Israel, South Africa, and Brazil.

8. At this point Zia became somewhat agitated and accused U.S. of initiating and orchestrating world-wide campaign against Pakistan. He asserted that it was no coincidence that Desai letter arrived shortly before DepSec Christopher’s visit.<sup>8</sup> “What U.S. journalists have been told is totally wrong, and an attempt to fabricate that is not worthy of a great country like the U.S. The present debate is unfortunate and uncalled for.”<sup>9</sup>

9. Zia then said that the Martial Law Administration (MLA) can do some difficult things but it “cannot compromise Pakistan.” MLA cannot accept unilateral inspection; “I can give personal guarantee of our peaceful intentions,<sup>10</sup> but I cannot turn my back on programs previous government has undertaken in this field. . . . Let the U.S. wait six months until an elected government comes into power. Maybe a political government can take a different stand.”

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<sup>6</sup> Oxman underlined the words “our intelligence was faulty based on unreliable source.”

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 4207 from Islamabad, April 10, the Embassy reported the portions of Hummel and Zia’s meeting that dealt with intelligence matters. Regarding the source of U.S. information on Pakistan’s nuclear program: “Zia said we were basing our information on a poor source if we believed what we were told by our man in Karachi whom the GOP had arrested.” Hummel responded that information on Pakistan’s nuclear activities came from many sources, and noted that “a principal source of intelligence was from procurement activities of the GOP in several Western European countries—activities which were known to us and to several other governments.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 325. Regarding Desai’s letter, see footnote 4, Document 143.

<sup>9</sup> Oxman drew a bracket in the margin to the right of this paragraph.

<sup>10</sup> Oxman underlined the words “personal guarantee,” next to which in the right-hand margin he drew a question mark. In an April 11 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski reported Hummel’s discussion with Zia. In the left-hand margin of the memorandum, next to a sentence that reads: “He gave his ‘personal guarantees’ of ‘peaceful intentions,’ but said he cannot accept unilateral inspection,” Carter drew an arrow from the word “but,” underneath which he wrote: “We want *international* inspection, not *unilateral*.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 4/7/1979–4/12/1979)

10. Zia concluded this portion by noting that he had sought to accommodate U.S. views by leaving CENTO in a dignified way that would not harm U.S. interests. "I could have been flamboyant about it," in the style of others (i.e. Bhutto); but now U.S. cuts off aid in the most dramatic manner against "little" Pakistan which is some degree dependent on U.S. assistance, thereby "taking advantage of our internal situation."

11. Having got this off his chest, Zia then turned to substance of my remarks, noting GOP appreciation for 24-hour response to Pakistan's request for clarification of validity of '59 bilateral in view of Soviet demarche.<sup>11</sup> He said he would call urgent Cabinet meeting to discuss substance of USG proposals, including visit of high-level mission, ship visits, and possible U.S. demarche to Soviets. On last point, Zia said he was pleased that Pakistan still has some friend that could deliver such a demarche, and that it would be reassuring if it were undertaken.<sup>12</sup> On the possibility of additional economic assistance, Zia noted that it was badly needed and would be very helpful in dealing with massive development requirements in Baluchistan. However, if such assistance is to be linked to nuclear question, then U.S. should wait six months for elected government before making its proposals.<sup>13</sup>

12. Zia said he would welcome discussions with high-level mission, subject to his consultations with Cabinet.

13. Zia then talked briefly about Pak policy on Afghan refugees, reaffirming GOP decision to provide only humanitarian assistance and nothing more. "Without a strong hand on my back (read U.S. support), I can't take extravagant actions on my own." He noted, however, that some organizations in Pakistan, such as Jamaat-i-Islami, had connections with refugee groups. Zia said these organizations and some foreign countries were supplying large sums of money to refugee groups and had, in the process, driven up ammunition prices for obsolete 303 Enfield rifles from 1 rupee per round to 200 rupees. Zia also said that there had been three instances in which GOP had had to stop pilfering of Pak Army ammunition for sale to refugee groups.

14. Zia then recounted Soviet protest and Pak response (Islamabad 3713)<sup>14</sup> adding that Ambassador Yaqub had also responded in recent meeting with Kosygin.<sup>15</sup> Zia asserted that Pakistan would deal harshly

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<sup>11</sup> See Document 332.

<sup>12</sup> Oxman underlined the words "would be reassuring if it were undertaken."

<sup>13</sup> Oxman drew a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>14</sup> See Document 332.

<sup>15</sup> Oxman underlined the words "Ambassador Yaqub" and drew a line from the word "Kosygin" to the bottom of the page and wrote: "Yes, we know."

with any Afghan incursions into Pak tribal territory, but GOP could not handle any large-scale Soviet-backed attacks. Zia then lamented the legacy of the Chinese attack on Vietnam, saying that while the Chinese may have taught the Vietnamese a lesson, the Soviets may now respond by “teaching Pakistan a lesson.”<sup>16</sup>

15. Zia concluded this portion by expressing his “deep gratitude”<sup>17</sup> to President Carter for assurances on 1959 bilateral and said he looked forward to useful discussions, irrespective of nuclear question.<sup>18</sup>

16. Shahnawaz then intervened to say that segregation of nuclear and security problems was a “very positive point”<sup>19</sup> and showed that door is not “totally closed.” He continued with complaint that Hayat Mehdi had not been given notice of aid cut-off and that timing of announcement was seen as sign of displeasure over Bhutto execution. I corrected the record at this point, pointing out that Mehdi had been given our press guidance which announced winding down of aid.<sup>20</sup> I strongly denied that USG had generated publicity, or that USG had orchestrated anti-Pak campaign. I assured him that USG did not stimulate Desai letter or publicity in Indian or European press. I noted that other governments have their own sources of information about Pak nuclear activities and their own concerns about these.

17. I then referred back to some of Zia’s earlier remarks. I took sharp issue with charge of discriminatory treatment of Pakistan and rehearsed again for Zia the valid reasons for differences in our approach to nuclear activities of India and Pakistan. I concluded by reiterating what Under Secretary Newsom had told Amb. Sultan Khan (State 87127)<sup>21</sup> that under terms of Nuclear Export Control Act we would ultimately be prohibited from exports of enriched uranium to India if latter did not accept adequate safeguards on all its facilities.

18. I then said I was personally disappointed, and knew my government would also be, to learn that Zia was apparently ruling out further nuclear discussions during his tenure.<sup>22</sup> We had hoped to explore ways that Pakistan’s concerns over nuclear danger might be met, and to consider whether some freeze<sup>23</sup> on existing Pak activity might be

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<sup>16</sup> Oxman underlined the words “teaching Pakistan a lesson.”

<sup>17</sup> Oxman underlined the words “deep gratitude.”

<sup>18</sup> Oxman underlined the words “irrespective of nuclear question.”

<sup>19</sup> Oxman underlined the words “very positive point.”

<sup>20</sup> See footnote 5, Document 335.

<sup>21</sup> See Document 335.

<sup>22</sup> Oxman underlined the words “that Zia was apparently ruling out further nuclear discussions during his tenure.”

<sup>23</sup> Oxman underlined the word “freeze.”

arranged while further discussions take place. I re-read to Zia para 10 of my instructions (on working with other countries to reduce nuclear threat) and noted we were not seeking categorical answers at this stage but some flexibility on part of GOP so that we could seek to put a cap on regional activities that would lead to proliferation.<sup>24</sup>

19. This portion was interrupted at several points by somewhat acrimonious exchanges with Zia and Shahnawaz, with both vigorously protesting that Pakistan did not have the capability to produce enriched uranium. Zia at one point asked, "Who is enriching uranium?"<sup>25</sup> to which I replied: "You are, Mr. President, and you have no peaceful use for enriched uranium". Zia then responded, "You say we are; we say we're not."<sup>26</sup> He said Pakistan is carrying out a research program like "any other country," but "I can assure you Pakistan is not in a position to enrich uranium".<sup>27</sup> Shahnawaz added that U.S. with its intelligence resources must know that Pakistan cannot produce a weapon, and that Pakistan does not have enough electric power resources to enrich uranium. He said that while no GOP spokesman can publicly say what Pakistan does or does not have, it should nevertheless be apparent that Pakistan cannot achieve a nuclear option.

20. Zia concluded on more conciliatory note by saying that my remarks on possible discussion of regional proliferation problems was "a very positive step" and that Pakistan would be prepared for further discussions along these lines.<sup>28</sup>

21. Finally, I advised Zia that we were still looking forward to negotiating a \$40 million Title III P.L. 480 agreement with Pakistan which would have favorable developmental aspects from the use of the proceeds and would also provide a basis for multi-year concessional sales of wheat and vegoil.

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<sup>24</sup> Oxman drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>25</sup> Oxman underlined the question "Who is enriching uranium?" and drew a bracket in the right-hand margin.

<sup>26</sup> Oxman drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to the two preceding sentences. He also underlined the words "You say we are; we say we're not" and drew a line from this phrase to the bottom of the page and wrote: "Surely we should be able to put an end to this puerile shadow-boxing."

<sup>27</sup> Oxman underlined the words "is not in a position to enrich uranium."

<sup>28</sup> Oxman underlined the words "would be prepared for further discussions along these lines."

22. I will send comments on conversation and recommendations by septel.<sup>29</sup>

Hummel

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<sup>29</sup> Telegram 4215 from Islamabad, April 10, transmitted Hummel's comments on his April 9 meeting with Zia. Hummel concluded: "Zia was genuinely taken aback by vigor of U.S. response to Pakistan's enrichment program and is concerned about a weakening of his own position domestically. The coincidence of internal tensions over Bhutto execution, the threat from Sovs/Afghans, and the now-widespread publicity of U.S. aid cut-off all put unusual pressures on Zia and his government. At the same time, many Pakistanis, unaware of the details of secret Pak enrichment activity or its purpose, can be expected to be very resentful of 'U.S. pressures' at a time when Pakistan needs international support." Hummel recommended further high-level talks. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January–July 1979)

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### **338. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 12, 1979, 1255Z

4344. Subject: Discussions With President Zia. Ref: (A) Islamabad 4215;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 4206.<sup>3</sup>

1. (S) Entire text: Protect FGI.

2. Summary: President Zia called me to his home April 12 to respond to proposals I had placed before him on April 9. Zia appreciated USG's "positive, cooperative and substantial" proposals. He asked for a rain check on demarche to the Soviets; preferred to postpone question of additional ship visits;<sup>4</sup> welcomed further intelligence exchanges;<sup>5</sup> agreed (but without enthusiasm) to further discussions on nuclear problems, and asked that Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P-14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan IV. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Oxman wrote: "WC, SAO—any reply?"

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 29, Document 337.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 337.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 337.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 339.

and a small politico-military team consult in Washington April 24–27 under '59 bilateral in lieu of U.S. official mission here. Zia also spoke of immediate concern over possible Afghan raid against refugee camps and said in this even Pakistan would retaliate.

3. Zia's response reflects (a) satisfaction over apparent U.S. support; (b) desire to explore further the practical dimension of that support; (c) his hope to evade further confrontation over the nuclear issue; and (d) concern that certain steps, such as demarche and ship visits, if taken prior to further exploration of our support, would aggravate the Soviets and complicate Pakistan's entry into the NAM to be decided in early June. In short, Zia wants to maintain maximum flexibility until he learns how far we are really prepared to go.

4. I recommend that we accept Shahi and a team in Washington April 24–27, or propose a later date if April dates are not convenient.<sup>6</sup> End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Hummel**

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<sup>6</sup> At the end of telegram, Hummel commented: "It is evident that Paks are no longer as agitated about the Afghan/Sov threat as they were previously, although they expect some further troubles with both. It is also clear that Paks intend to explore how far they can stretch our security assurances (and arms sales) without giving way on their nuclear programs. Whether further consultations are held in Pakistan or in Washington, we will want to continue exploration of ways to deflect, freeze, or terminate the enrichment programs; it is likely that the Paks will remain adamant in refusing to accept the validity of our information on enrichment and will keep up probing pressure on the subject of US security support."

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### **339. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 12, 1979, 1307Z

4345. Subject: Discussion With President Zia on Intelligence Matters. Ref: Islamabad 4344.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979. Secret; Roger Channel.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 338.

1. (S) Entire text: Protect FGI.

2. This should be read in conjunction with septel reporting on my talk with President Zia April 12.

3. President Zia referred to points I had made April 9 on instructions in paras 12 and 13 of State 85585.<sup>3</sup> Zia said that GOP wants to continue intelligence cooperation, and would welcome even higher level of dialogue, perhaps at the Ambassadorial level. He said carefully that it would not, however, be possible to have special USG equipment on Pak territory.<sup>4</sup> I said I would so report, and pointed out that my intell officer was waiting for an appointment with Gen. Riaz Khan of ISID to discuss internal Afghan insurgency situation and I believed that discussion should take place before we move to any addition to the existing liaison relationship. Zia agreed and said that as soon as Gen. Riaz returns to Islamabad, he would receive my officer. In response to Shahi comment I agreed that Embassy would continue periodic briefings of MFA on Afghan situation.

4. [8 lines not declassified]

**Hummel**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 337. Paragraph 12 of telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, reads: "(If raised by Zia) We appreciate the significance of current developments in Afghanistan including the actions of the Afghan insurgents, directed as they are against a Soviet-maintained regime. The questions that you have raised on this question in other channels are being studied, and we will react through the same channels. We believe that the repercussions of the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the Soviet involvement there could most usefully be discussed by the team that we propose to send to Islamabad." Paragraph 13 of telegram 85585, reads: "We hope to be able to continue and strengthen our cooperation in the intelligence area. We will be in touch with you separately on those matters. We would try to keep this issue, as well as our support for you against the Soviet threat, as separate as possible from the legally binding consequences on us of our differences over nuclear matters."

<sup>4</sup> [text not declassified]

**340. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, April 18, 1979, 1103Z

4544. Subject: (C) Gearing-Class Destroyers for Pakistan: Decision Awaited.

1. (C)–Entire text. This is an action message.

2. I am concerned that as we deal with the ramifications of our imposition of the Symington Amendment because of our concerns about the directions of Pakistan's nuclear policies, we may lose sight of or postpone too long an urgent and necessary decision we have before us on the sale of four additional Gearing-class destroyers to Pakistan.

3. As Department will recall, original Pak request for Gearings was for six, two of which have already been overhauled, sailed the Pacific, and joined the Pakistan Navy. GOP has been officially informed that the four others would be available in time, two perhaps as early as 1980, and the Pakistan Navy has reaffirmed its interest in them. We know that all four are now projected to be available for transfer to the Pakistan Navy on 1 October 1979, if the Congress approves and the GOP agrees it can accept that many at one time. We understand the Pakistan Embassy has been so informed in Washington, and the CNO Admiral Hayward's recent letter to the new Pakistan CNO restates this point.<sup>2</sup> While we have not formally addressed the question in recent weeks with GOP officials, the impression we have from Pakistan Navy (PN) contacts is that the Paks would be prepared to receive all four this fall and to man two of them for immediate transit across the Atlantic (or Pacific) upon completion of a 2 to 4 week USN tender period for essential voyage repairs to ensure a safe ocean transit. The other two would be manned with skeleton crews to deal with upkeep and to wait the transit of the first two and return of additional crew members for [garble] second group transit. We understand the PN would take ships as is, where is, and would undertake major overhauls/refitting in the PN's Karachi shipyard.

4. Finally, we understand that there are other potential claimants for these ships, that once the current batch is disposed of to other potential claimants there may not be any additional Gearings available for some time (or at all), and that if we do not make up our minds on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178–0573. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to New Delhi and CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



notifying the Paks of their availability, verifying their willingness to take all four, and moving ahead with necessary congressional consultations, we may lose one or more of four ships now identified for the PN to other claimants.

5. I can understand a certain reluctance to put notice of our intent to sell these ships to Pakistan to the Congress so soon after the Bhutto execution and our unrelated aid cutoff. However, since Symington Amendment does not apply to such sales, since ship transfers are part of an on-going program, and since time is a-wasting in terms of availability, I strongly and urgently recommend that we take the decision to carry out the sale and begin the necessary consultations with the Congress at the earliest possible opportunity. Ideally, we should be in position to notify the GOP by no later than 10 May when Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi will be in the United States.<sup>3</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 199305 to Islamabad, August 1, the Department informed the Embassy: "The question of additional destroyers for Pakistan is still under review. No decision has been made. You should be aware, however, that the matter is now further complicated by the uncertain availability of destroyers for foreign sale." After outlining the Navy's ship decommission schedule, the Department noted: "The foregoing planning has recently come into question as a result of congressional interest in naval reserve force destroyer programming. Essentially, the House Appropriations Committee believes that some of the ships should be retained in active service to support US Naval Reserve programs." The Department explained that the issue "may have to wait for passage of the FY 1980 Appropriations Act. This probably will not occur before late September. The net effect of this on Pakistan is that the destroyers identified for possible transfer to Pakistan and other countries are not now available and are unlikely to be available before calendar year 80." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–1188)

### 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, April 30, 1979, 1025Z

5035. Subject: (S) Pakistan, the US, and the Bomb.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: The GOP has rejected our proposals to freeze Pakistan's nuclear enrichment activities at a nominal research stage, and our concurrent offer to conduct consultations under our 1959 bilateral agreement.<sup>2</sup> The negative response ends whatever hopes we may have had of bilaterally negotiating an end to President Zia ul-Haq's pursuit of a nuclear weapons option. Zia, whose nuclear policy enjoys wide public support, believes that he has no need to negotiate with us a solution which meets his concerns about Pakistan security and ours about nuclear proliferation.

3. Our effort should now become more multilateral. We recommend enlisting the support of the IAEA, the nuclear suppliers, and other concerned nations, including the Soviet Union, China and India. We also recommend a careful airing of our nuclear concerns at the June IBRD Consortium meeting, but recommend against launching a no-aid-to-Pakistan campaign among other donors at this time. We should also consider how we can best position ourselves to deal with the nuclear problem with the elected government which will replace President Zia's this fall if elections are held as scheduled, how we can halt further public antagonism—that will be fostered by electioneering—in the US-Pakistan relationship, and how we can discourage Pakistan from pursuing an increasingly reckless foreign policy in its search for security. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Hummel**

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059-1720. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to London, New Delhi, Paris, and Beijing.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3856 from Islamabad, April 25, Hummel reported that during an April 25 meeting, Shahnawaz rejected the U.S. proposals that Pakistan freeze its nuclear program, which Hummel had presented to Zia on April 9 (see Document 337), but "rehearsed Pakistan's willingness to accept safeguards on non-discriminatory basis. He lamented apparent linkage between nuclear issues and security talks under '59 bilateral and said unless U.S. can provide assurance that Washington talks with Shahi would relate only to security issues, GOP sees no point in holding them." Shahnawaz gave Hummel a copy of his presentation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150-0759)

**342. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1979

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Agha Shahi, Pakistani Adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Gerard Smith, S/AS

After the “security” discussion<sup>2</sup> the Secretary asked Agha Shahi to join him in his office. Smith was present. The Secretary said that the U.S. was deeply concerned over the Pak nuclear program but wanted to be of help if possible. We made a proposal that the Paks limit it to R&D in the enrichment field. He stressed that we made no demands. We wanted to work with the Pakistanis. We were quite serious about trying to put a South Asian weapons free zone into effect. We discussed this with the Indians and thought we detected some flexibility. The Pakistanis will be kept informed. He asked if the Pakistanis had any thoughts as to a possible compromise. Agha Shahi had none.

Smith stressed the importance of sticking to the facts in any public discussion. He said that the two sides seemed to be taking a different view of the facts.

Agha Shahi said the Pakistanis did not want controversy with the United States. They had had to say something publicly after the stories started to leak. They do not want to go for nuclear weapons. In fact they cannot. They do not have the technology. The Indians, on the other hand, can develop nuclear weapons in six months. It is true that the Paks are doing some work on enrichment but they have in mind going to light water power reactors.

The Pakistan program that we had referred to is a “bargaining chip.” They have real concern for world opinion. They know what the impact of their going for a nuclear weapon program would be. There

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5–12/79. Secret. Drafted on May 7 by Smith. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.

<sup>2</sup> In a May 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized his meeting with Shahi. Regarding the discussion on security, Vance noted that Shahi “spent considerable time highlighting the Soviet threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s perception of its own precarious geopolitical situation. I reiterated our support for Pakistan’s security and stability, and our willingness to have expert-level discussions on our 1959 defense cooperation agreement. Shahi said he appreciated the offers, but the timing was not right; he tentatively suggested discussions on the 1959 agreement in early fall. I took Shahi on about his perception of our unwillingness to come to the aid of our friends, and he backed down.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 5/79)

is no imminent danger of that, but the morale of their people would collapse if they stopped their present program. He discounted the notion of an Islamic bomb, saying that they would not transfer technology to another country. They were a responsible nation. They had received no foreign aid for their nuclear program. They had had discussions with Libya about a submarine and a factory (not in the military field). The Saudis had offered to assist them in building the reprocessing plant but they turned that offer down. They had shown their good faith by proposing to France that the plutonium from the reprocessing plant be put into an international plutonium storage regime.

Smith pointed out the weakness of the "bargaining chip." If necessary, the Indians could outbuild the Pakistanis ten to one in nuclear weapons and he also suggested some possibility that the Indians or the Soviets might be inclined to preemptively take care of Pakistani weapons plants.

Agha Shahi said in the light of the excellence of the U.S. intelligence we should tell the Pakistanis if they were about to explode a nuclear weapon, implying that that was not a near-term possibility.

The Secretary denied the claim that Agha Shahi made that the U.S. policy was tilting towards India. He said the law had compelled the aid cutoff. He again asked if a regional solution was not possible. Agha Shahi said they would be open to any kind of regional solution—even a multilateral declaration but India had said no to that. Pakistan then tried "confidence building" measures without success.<sup>3</sup>

Smith wondered if the alleged "bargaining chip" was anywhere near as valuable to Pakistan as its whole relationship with the United States.

The Secretary closed the meeting saying he hoped the discussion could be continued at a later date.

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<sup>3</sup> In his May 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance remarked: "In response to my question as to how far Pakistan is prepared to go on a regional or Pak-Indian basis, he said Pakistan would agree to any regional ban on the development of nuclear weapons and was also prepared to enter into a similar agreement with India alone. We will pursue this opening." See footnote 3 above.

**343. Memorandum Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

5. *Meeting with President Zia*: President Zia again stressed to Ambassador Hummel yesterday Pakistan's peaceful nuclear intentions and asked him to emphasize to Washington Pakistani willingness to accept any safeguards system that was applicable equally to India. Regarding security matters, he indicated he would be submitting a "modest" list of military requirements in a couple of weeks. He appreciates our offers in the area of security, but prefers to wait until Pakistan fully establishes itself in the nonaligned movement this summer before initiating security talks or invoking U.S. support vis-a-vis the Soviets. Hummel comments that Zia apparently at this time is interested in keeping the door open to the U.S. to see if we will relieve the pressure on the nuclear issue by working on the Indians for a regional solution and to see if there will be some security value to further dialogue. (Islamabad 5472,<sup>2</sup> PSN 4391) (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 19, 5/9/79–5/15/1979. Secret. Carter wrote "Zbig, C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5472 from Islamabad, May 11, Hummel reported his May 10 meeting with Zia. He commented: "Tone of the meeting was cordial and relaxed throughout, in contrast to some of our more tense recent sessions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790213–0925)

**344. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Additional Information Items

*Shahi Comments on Washington Visit and Pakistan's Nuclear Program:* Pakistani Foreign Affairs advisor Aga Shahi recently briefed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on his meetings in Washington.<sup>2</sup> [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Shahi:

—denigrated the U.S. as a “second-rate superpower” which is being used “by Zionist elements to further the hegemonistic policy”;

—claimed the Soviet Union was clearly the dominant power on the world's seas and would soon overtake the U.S. in the nuclear weapons field;

—asserted that Moscow had proven itself to be loyal to their friends, regardless of whether their friends were right or wrong, while Washington had demonstrated that it could not be trusted. (S)

Shahi [*less than 1 line not declassified*] dismissed the U.S. statement that under the 1959 bilateral agreement it would assist Pakistan if Islamabad were attacked by a Communist nation as only a ploy. In the foreign affairs advisor's reasoning, the U.S. was attempting to undermine Pakistan's efforts to gain entry into the nonalign movement by creating the impression that Islamabad was still aligned to the U.S. under the 1959 agreement. (S)

Shahi added that it was impossible to acquiesce to a U.S. request that Pakistan freeze its nuclear program at the present levels because it would be too expensive and difficult to resume in the future. He also inferred that Pakistan may explode a nuclear device in three months. Other Pakistani officials have recently mentioned the “within three months” time frame for a possible nuclear explosion.<sup>3</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 19, 5/23/79–5/29/1979. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> See Document 342.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 345.

**345. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 1, 1979

1. *Pakistan*: While purportedly defending the peaceful purposes of Pakistan's nuclear program, Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi has implied to our Charge that the program's goal is a nuclear explosion.<sup>2</sup> Shahi said that, even if Pakistan set off a peaceful explosion in the next few months, it should not be cause for concern. He asserted that talk of an Islamic bomb is nonsense and said Pakistan had rejected a request by Qaddafi for Libyan participation in the Pakistani reprocessing plant. Although we have no confirmation of reports that Pakistan might test a nuclear device within the next few months, we are advising our allies that our earlier estimate of a three to five year period before Pakistan could explode a device may be questionable.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 6/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this conversation with Constable was found. CIA Intelligence Information Cable [*cable number not declassified*], May 22, reported a Pakistani official's assertion that "Pakistan had succeeded in assembling what he described as a small, crude nuclear device, but that President-General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq would probably delay testing of the device until late September or early October 1979." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 20, Folder 2: Tab E DCI Book–PRC Meeting, Pakistan and India (Nuclear Matters) 5/23/79 PRC)

### 346. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 7, 1979, 2216Z

146736. USIAEA. Subject: Pakistan's Nuclear Program.

1. (S) Entire text.

Please pass the following to appropriate host government officials:

2. We cannot now rule out the possibility that Pakistan might be in a position to detonate a nuclear explosive device within year. The most direct indication came when GOP Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi implied to the US Charge in Islamabad on May 30 that Pakistan program was directed in part toward development of a nuclear explosive.<sup>2</sup> Shahi went so far as to say that even if Pakistan were to set off a peaceful nuclear explosive in a few months, this should be no cause for concern because any such development would be in the context of defensive measures against Indian nuclear capability. He also stated that any talk of an Islamic bomb would be "nonsense". This is the farthest that Shahi has gone in admitting to us that GOP goal is a nuclear explosion. Although he did not make it explicit that Pakistan either could or would set off a nuclear device in the near future, he did not avoid such an implication.

3. We do not believe that above constitutes firm indication that Pakistan will explode a nuclear device within a few months. We have no evidence that it will have sufficient fissile material from its enrichment program for an explosive device in this time frame. There are other hypothetical scenarios for acquiring sufficient nuclear material, including clandestine reprocessing of the KANUPP fuel and/or research reactor fuel or acquisition of fissionable material from an overseas source. Again we have no evidence that this has occurred. While we do not believe that this information rules out our previous estimates that it would take the Paks three to five years to set off an explosion, it makes us less confident about this assessment. We will be seeking additional information and urge host governments to look for and share with us indications of this kind.

4. For London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, Tokyo, Rome and The Hague. Please convey following to appropriate Foreign Ministry official in host

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-2171. Secret; Nodis. Sent Priority to Bonn and to Tokyo, Paris, London, Ottawa, The Hague, Rome, and Canberra. Sent for information Priority to Vienna. Sent for information to Islamabad, New Delhi, and the White House. Drafted by Rust Deming (OES/NET/NEP); cleared in S/AS, PM/NPP, L/N, INR, and S/S-O, and by Newsom, Gallucci, Miklos, Pickering, and Van Doren; approved by Vance.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 345.



capital: The U.S. would like to take advantage of Ambassador Gerard Smith's presence in Vienna on June 27, in connection with IAEA Board of Governors meeting to meet with appropriate representatives from other nations to have informal consultations on the Pakistan nuclear issue. We envisage this as an opportunity for informal discussions among several key states of a serious non-proliferation problem which might suggest new approaches worthy of further consideration. The discussions would supplement the bilateral contacts which have taken place over the past several months and which we expect to continue. Ambassador Smith would be prepared to provide an update of the U.S. assessment of the Pakistan nuclear issue and to review our recent discussions with the Pakistanis. We would hope to meet on the edges of the Board of Governors' meeting with appropriate officials from your country and four or five other states on June 27 at the residence of the Permanent U.S. Representative to the IAEA (Ambassador Kirk) for this discussion. We believe it is premature at this time to organize a formal group to meet on a regular basis or to have a formal meeting but, we anticipate that the kind of informal discussion we are proposing would be useful. Because of the fact that regular representatives to the IAEA Board meeting may not be the individuals whom governments would designate for such consultations, we are extending this invitation well in advance to provide governments flexibility in their selection of an individual. We hope that any such meeting could be held without attracting attention and urge addressees to hold our proposal closely.<sup>3</sup>

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> On June 25, Smith informed IAEA Director General Eklund about "the seriousness with which the United States viewed" the "evidence" that Pakistan "was pursuing a nuclear explosive program, mentioning activity in reprocessing, gas centrifuge enrichment and nuclear explosive design." (Telegram 178818 to Vienna, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840167–2015)

**347. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Bowdler) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 8, 1979

*A Nuclear Pakistan in 1979*

On the basis of our analysis of the available evidence, we [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have concluded separately that the Pakistanis will not be able indigenously to produce enough fissile material to construct and test a nuclear explosive device before the end of 1982. [*2 lines not declassified*]

On the other hand, [*2 lines not declassified*] have led us to examine two other propositions: (1) the Pakistanis are moving ahead more quickly than we have thought; (2) they are purposely trying to mislead us into thinking that they have a nuclear capability.

On the first of these propositions, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Pakistanis have stolen or purchased enough fissile material to make an explosive device, [*1 line not declassified*]. There is also a long-shot chance that the Pakistanis have enough material on hand to construct a device, but the procedure is technically difficult and politically risky, involving diversion of safeguarded fuel, and we doubt that they would choose to follow it.

On the second proposition, from our vantage point, there seem to be many disadvantages for the Pakistanis in trying to convince others that their nuclear program is more advanced than it is. The perception that Pakistan is going nuclear could arouse further international concern and opprobrium, prompt India to retaliate or to build nuclear weapons, end any possibility of further supplies for their nuclear power program, and severely damage their relations with the US.

From the Pakistani point of view, however, there are several reasons why they may want to appear to have a nuclear capability:

—Such a claim could enhance Zia's political position, since the nuclear explosives program is highly popular in Pakistan as a means of countering India's military superiority and matching its 1974 nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P87000-0565. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon; Nodis. Drafted by Karen Longetieg (INR/RNA/SOA); cleared in INR/STA. Telegram 147619 to Islamabad, June 8, transmitted the text of Bowdler's memorandum to the Embassy with the following explanation: "We submitted the following memorandum to the Secretary on June 8. Ambassador Hummel and NEA/PAB who reviewed it, asked that it be repeated to you for any comments you may have." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040-2003)

test. In addition, for a variety of reasons, Zia is likely to cancel the elections scheduled for November, even though this move could threaten his tenure. An announcement that Pakistani scientists had developed a nuclear weapons capability could help Zia through this crisis.

—The Pakistanis may be gambling that a known nuclear capability will persuade the US and other Western suppliers to end punitive pressures on Pakistan in support of non-proliferation. They may even calculate that we would gradually restore aid programs and improve bilateral relations.

—Pakistani leaders may believe that convincing India they have a bomb will deter an Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. ([1 line not declassified] some Indian leaders are considering that option.)

—The Pakistanis may also think that if they can sufficiently alarm the Indians, New Delhi might agree to some form of mutual nuclear restraint—the South Asia nuclear weapons free zone, a non-first-use agreement, or mutual or international inspection of facilities. (Desai has already labeled US pressure on Pakistan a “back-door method” to get India to agree to inspections.)<sup>2</sup>

—The Pakistanis probably believe that only a nuclear weapons capability can restore Pakistan's international prestige. They seem convinced that even the perception of this capability would virtually guarantee a much-needed influx of economic and financial assistance from wealthy Arab countries.

If the Pakistanis have chosen this bluff as policy but are unable to carry out a test, we would expect them to continue to drop hints throughout the summer, and then let it be known in the fall that they have constructed a device but “choose not to test it.” They could then publicize their posture of self-restraint while again proposing nuclear negotiations with the Indians.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 9582 from New Delhi, June 2, the Embassy reported Desai's June 1 press briefing, during which the Prime Minister was asked about a reported U.S. proposal to create a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Desai responded that “such a proposal was a ‘backdoor method’ to induce India to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790252–0954) The *New York Times* reported on May 27 that the Carter administration had proposed a nuclear-free zone in South Asia backed by security guarantees from the United States, Soviet Union, and China. (“Curb on Atom Arms in South Asia Urged,” *New York Times*, May 27, 1979, p. 8)

### 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, July 2, 1979, 1135Z

7485. Subject: (C) Implications of Recent Incidents Involving Alleged Nuclear Sites in Pakistan. Ref: (A) Islamabad 7335;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 7395;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 7483.<sup>4</sup>

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Recent incidents in which French Ambassador Islamabad beaten near alleged nuclear site (ref A) and BBC correspondent beaten following his aggressive pursuit of nuclear story (ref B) have obvious disturbing implications. In addition tone of Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi's press conference on nuclear issue (ref C)—at which BBC correspondent asked provocative questions shortly before he was attacked—can only heighten local tension over nuclear issue and foreign interest in it.

3. When these incidents are put in context of recent charges by Foreign Secretary here (Islamabad 6953)<sup>5</sup> and Pakistani Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790300-0181. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Paris, and Peshawar (pouch).

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7335 from Islamabad, June 28, the Embassy reported: "French Ambassador to Islamabad Le Gourrierc and his First Secretary (Political) Jean Forlot were attacked by thugs as they drove near village of Kahuta on the evening of June 26. Forlot, who was knocked unconscious in the fray, attributes the attack to a GOP attempt to discourage foreigners visiting the area around the alleged nuclear enrichment site at Kahuta." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790294-0180)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7395 from Islamabad, July 1, the Embassy reported the abduction and beating of BBC correspondent Chris Sherwell by six assailants on the night of June 28. The Embassy described Sherwell's efforts to investigate Pakistan's nuclear program and his direct questions about the program to Shahi at a June 30 press conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790298-0247)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 7483 from Islamabad, July 2, the Embassy relayed a July 1 *Pakistan Times* article that refuted Pakistan's putative program to develop a nuclear weapon. The article was based on the June 30 press briefing when Sherwell confronted Shahi (see footnote 3 above). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790300-0929)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 6953 from Islamabad, June 19, the Embassy reported Shahnawaz's protest over a June 11 and 12 CBS Evening News story entitled "The Islamic Bomb." Shahnawaz complained that Pakistan "was particularly concerned since presentation was made by Walter Cronkite, a figure of world-wide prestige. Fact that American officials appear on program and other unnamed officials were quoted could only be taken as official US sanction for public airing of Pakistan's alleged nuclear intentions, which taking place despite every assurance to the contrary." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

in Washington (State 168104)<sup>6</sup> that USG in some way bears responsibility for recent spate of stories on Pakistan developing nuclear weapons capability, there emerges possibility of some further incident here—either by chance or by contrivance—involving American. Consequently, I have convened meeting of Security Watch Committee to review what we know about situation and to consider our posture. There was consensus at meeting that—on fairly safe assumption that both incidents involving French Ambassador and BBC correspondent were ordered by some level of GOP—we should exercise particular caution in coming weeks so that no official American or visitor with official or journalistic connections wanders into situation that could lead to incident. It was also agreed that nuclear sites in Pakistan have been sufficiently mentioned in local press that their whereabouts are general knowledge. Most of these sites are in areas of no touristic or professional interest for official Americans. We are quietly passing the word that for the time being it would be well for official Americans to avoid these areas.

4. I have also asked concerned agencies to avoid any routine intelligence gathering activities that could be basis for incident (such as recent request by DAO for clearance to take aerial photographs).

**King**

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram 168104 to Islamabad, June 29, the Embassy reported Newsom's June 28 meeting with Sultan Khan, during which Cronkite's reference to an "Islamic Bomb" (see footnote 5 above) was discussed. Khan conveyed the "concerns of his government regarding references to 'official sources' in the CBS program." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790295–0906)

349. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistan Nuclear Developments:* [1 line not declassified] Foreign Affairs Advisor Shahi indicated [1 line not declassified] that:

—He had been misinformed by the project's director in early 1978 that enough enriched uranium would be available for a nuclear test device by mid-1979.

—He understood the difficulties in obtaining project equipment from abroad and the setbacks which this must have caused.

—Pakistan's nuclear program was coming under great international pressure, and he was unsure how much longer it could be resisted.

—Considerable urgency was attached to the rapid acquisition of enough enriched uranium to test a nuclear device. (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] the enrichment project was not far enough along to provide enough fissionable material to conduct a test within the next six months. [less than 1 line not declassified] areas where [less than 1 line not declassified] test preparations were underway shows no clear evidence of such preparations. The State Department continues to believe that Pakistan is at least two or three years away from being able to assemble a nuclear test device from indigenously produced material. (TSC)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 20, 7/1/79–7/6/1979. Top Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

**350. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. *Pakistan*—While our relations with Pakistan are severely strained over the nuclear issue, we are continuing to work with it on some subjects of mutual interest in order to sustain our bilateral ties.

Pakistan/US civil air negotiations were held in Washington last week in a fairly cordial atmosphere. The Pakistanis proposed a route to San Francisco via China and Japan. We have countered with a Seoul-Seattle routing which they have agreed to consider.

Today we approved a \$35 million CCC credit to Pakistan for the purchase of vegetable oil, for a total of \$130 million in CCC credits this year.

A Pakistan delegation is in Washington for consultations under our textile agreement. The discussions are cordial, and it appears the Pakistanis will leave tomorrow with modest but useful adjustments favorable to the GOP.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 7/79. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The bilateral cotton textile agreement between the United States and Pakistan of January 4 and 9, 1978 (TIAS 9050), was amended by an exchange of notes on July 27 and 30. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, p. 67)

**351. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 25, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Pakistani Bomb:* Framatome's Director for Commercial and International Affairs, Yves Girard, made the following points to an Embassy Paris officer during a briefing on his recent visit to Pakistan:<sup>2</sup>

—Pakistani AEC Chairman Munir Khan clearly admitted Islamabad's intention to develop a nuclear bomb. He said it was a decision made earlier by Bhutto, and is convinced the effort will succeed.

—Despite the cutoff of French reprocessing assistance, Pakistan can complete its planned reprocessing plant on its own, even if it is not as efficient.

—The bomb will be based on heavy enriched uranium produced in Pakistan's centrifuge plant, employing technology acquired from Urenco.

—Pakistan will be able to produce weapons-grade uranium, and construct a nuclear weapon. Even if unable to come up with a militarily effective delivery system, Pakistan will be satisfied to have one nuclear explosion.

—The single motivating reason is fear of India. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 21, 7/24/79–7/31/1979. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Code-word. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 22907 from Paris, July 18, the Embassy reported the July 11 briefing given by Yves Girard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840130–1730)



**352. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale**

Memo No. 631–79

Washington, July 26, 1979

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Policy Breakfast, Box 2, Talking Points for Foreign Policy Breakfast, [7/79–12/79]. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified.]

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**353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in  
Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1979, 1558Z

196363. Subject: Comments by the Pakistan Ambassador on the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Islamabad.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. Pakistan Ambassador Sultan Khan, at lunch with Assistant Secretary Saunders and Deputies Constable and Coon, on July 27, provided a readout on the Chiefs of Mission conference in Islamabad. Khan reported that 32 Pakistan Ambassadors had participated. President Zia himself was present during most of the four days of talks. The major focus was on Pakistan's relations with the U.S., India, USSR and Afghanistan.

3. The US and the nuclear problem: There was a consensus that relations with the US were important to Pakistan, and that the nuclear issue should not get in the way of our overall relations. He noted that Agha Shahi would probably take up our offer of bilateral talks, perhaps in September in an effort to keep communications open. Khan affirmed that the 32 Ambassadors had been assured that Pakistan did not intend to test a nuclear device. Choosing his words very carefully, Khan implied that Pakistan wanted the capability, i.e., sufficient enriched uranium, to exercise a nuclear option but would stop short of doing so. He advanced the theory that Pakistan had nothing to gain by testing a device since this would only provoke Indian weaponization and that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2017. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to New Delhi. Drafted by Coon; approved by Constable.

Pakistan could not hope to keep up with India. He also alluded to the substantial costs in Pak relations with the West of a nuclear explosion. This view, he said, was held by many of his colleagues and was not contradicted by the GOP policy makers present. Khan noted that most Pakistanis believe that a nuclear weapons program is underway and heartily approve. Indeed, the villagers in the vicinity of Kahuta refer to the plant as the "atom bomb factory." According to Khan, President Zia will shortly be making a nation-wide television speech stressing the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear program and trying to dampen down public expectations. Khan agreed that we should continue our dialogue and hoped that inflexible positions would not get in the way. Khan also inquired about President Zia's talk with Constable in June<sup>2</sup> and whether we would be responding. Constable described Zia's oral assurance to him concerning Pakistan's commitment not to test a device and said Ambassador Hummel will be pursuing this with Zia in Islamabad.

4. Indo-Pakistan relations: In response to a question, Khan affirmed that Indo-Pakistan relations were quite good. The Shahnawaz visit to Delhi had broken new ground in that the Foreign Secretaries for the first time had gone beyond the discussion of bilateral relations to more wide-ranging discussion including such things as their relations with China, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> He noted with appreciation the stand Desai had taken in Moscow on Pak-Afghan problems.<sup>4</sup> As to the future, while Desai is viewed as the architect of India's good neighbor policy, Sultan felt that in a subsequent government the MEA bureaucracy would have an important role and that bureaucrats like Jaghat Mehta were strong supporters of that policy.

Vance

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6585 from Islamabad, June 11, Constable reported his June 9 conversation with Zia on the occasion of Constable's reassignment from Chargé d'Affaires to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. During the conversation, Zia "stated that Pakistan does not have capability for 'peaceful nuclear explosion;' that Pakistan's definition of peaceful purposes excludes PNE; and that he is willing to put this in writing." (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January-July 1979)

<sup>3</sup> Shahnawaz visited New Delhi May 28-June 1. Telegram 9756 from New Delhi, June 5, reported on his talks with the Indian officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790257-0715)

<sup>4</sup> Desai visited Moscow June 10-14. According to an Indian diplomat: "During discussion of Afghanistan, Desai stressed Indian opposition to any type of outside interference, while Brezhnev hit hard at Pakistani interference." (Telegram 15928 from Moscow, June 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790326-0213)

**354. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1979

## SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Zia's Written Assurance Offer:* In a reluctant and somewhat equivocal manner, President Zia agreed to provide a written assurance conveying the peaceful purposes of Pakistan's nuclear program and its intention not to conduct a nuclear explosion.<sup>2</sup> After emphasizing that Pakistan's nuclear program had always been "100 percent peaceful" and that he had repeatedly assured the U.S. of this fact, Zia noted his offer to provide written assurances was a "common Urdu phrase meant to be illustrative." Zia noted he had not stated that Pakistan's definition of peaceful purposes excludes a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion. Turning to what form the assurance should take, Zia suggested a letter from himself to you, concluding that the assurance would represent a commitment "for the foreseeable future and particularly during my Presidency."

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 21, 7/24/79–7/31/1979. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Zia made the offer to Constable on June 9. See footnote 2, Document 353. In telegram 185580 to Islamabad, July 18, the Department instructed Hummel to raise with Zia his offer to Constable to give written assurances that Pakistan did not intend to conduct a nuclear explosion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2008) In telegram 8500 from Islamabad, July 30, Hummel reported his July 29 discussion with Zia, who "somewhat reluctantly and somewhat equivocally agreed to give written assurance emphasizing peaceful purposes of nuclear program and saying Paks do not intend to conduct a nuclear explosion. It remains to be seen whether and how he implements the commitment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

**355. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, August 2, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000012, Box 6, NEA/CIA/INR Weekly meetings 1978–1980. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified.]

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**356. Memorandum From Gerald Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 7, 1979

## SUBJECT

Pakistan Test Sites [*less than 1 line not declassified*][*1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified*]

[*1 line not declassified*]*—*I think we have to take this seriously enough to do some fast contingency planning. I asked Bob Kelly, Smith's assistant, to try to set up a meeting<sup>2</sup> of a few people this afternoon to put together a quick paper recommending actions we should take if (a) more information convinces us a test is imminent, or (b) a test takes place. I'm inclined to think that a Presidential statement should be considered for (a), and is indispensable for (b).<sup>3</sup>(S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5–12/79. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski underlined the words "set up a meeting."

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the preceding two sentences and wrote: "OK, Keep me informed, ZB."

**357. Letter From Pakistani President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, August 9, 1979

Dear Mr President,

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States of America has been nurtured over a long period. There has hardly been greater need for its preservation and reinforcement than at present. The destabilisation of one country after another in our neighbourhood has served the Soviet Union's purposes and underlined the fact that Pakistan, a traditional friend of the United States, with which it continues to be allied under the 1959 Bilateral Agreement, stands isolated. Following the Marxist coup in Afghanistan in April last year, the Soviet threat to Pakistan and the oil bearing region of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula has moved down south from the Oxus to the Khyber Pass. Iran, the erstwhile regional influential which was expected to have bolstered Pakistan's security as well has, itself, been destabilised and is in the throes of a revolution the consequences of which are incalculable. Our other neighbour India is also facing political turmoil and prospects of prolonged political instability which cannot but cause us concern.

You would understand, Mr. President, our deep disappointment that in such a situation which, in our estimation, should also be a matter of profound concern to the United States, our lines of communication stand disrupted for reasons beyond our control. Our modest nuclear research programme which is geared entirely to peaceful purposes, has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by your Administration as well as by the Congress and the U.S. media, as a sinister attempt to manufacture a nuclear weapon, which, to aggravate our problem further, has been described as a "Muslim Atom Bomb". I am referring to the CBS broadcast by Mr. Walter Cronkite on June 11 and 12, which presented a highly distorted and tendentious picture of our activities in the nuclear field, giving an unmistakable impression that the Western countries and the United States were conducting an orchestrated campaign to misrepresent the intent and purpose of our peaceful nuclear programme.<sup>2</sup> The suggestion in the CBS broadcast that India or Israel or perhaps even the Soviet Union might be tempted to destroy Pakistan's nuclear facilities amounted to an incitement to these coun-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870006–1306. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten. Sent under an August 15 covering memorandum from Sultan Khan to Vance, for delivery to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870006–1305)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 348.

tries to commit aggression against Pakistan. A U.S. official was quoted by the *Hindustan Times*, published in New Delhi, as saying, "If you can take out East Pakistan in fourteen days, there is no reason why you cannot take out the nuclear plant in fourteen minutes."

On several occasions in the recent past, I have had occasion to convey to visiting U.S. dignitaries as well as to your Ambassador our concern at the manner in which the United States has reacted to our peaceful nuclear programme and the serious consequences it could have not only for Pakistan's security but also for the future of the relationship between our two countries.

During my most recent exchange of views with Ambassador Hummel on this subject on July 29,<sup>3</sup> he brought a message suggesting that your Government would welcome a written assurance regarding our commitment to a nuclear programme entirely devoted to peaceful purposes. I have no hesitation whatsoever, Mr. President, in conveying to you my firm assurance that Pakistan's nuclear programme is entirely peaceful in nature and that Pakistan has no intention of acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

Such an assurance is fully in accord with Pakistan's unremitting efforts in the United Nations and other international forums for nuclear guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states and for the establishment of a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Let me further assure you of Pakistan's readiness at all times to continue to cooperate with the United States in the United Nations as well as bilaterally, in exploring how best we might make this region safe from the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, may I say that the signing of the Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on limiting strategic weapons is an achievement of historic proportions.<sup>5</sup> We see in this development a reflection of our own deep yearnings for the deliverance of mankind from the catastrophe of nuclear war and the establishment of a world order based on general disarmament, peace and justice. The conclusion

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 354.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 9252 from Islamabad, August 14, Hummel commented on Zia's letter to Carter, noting: "This language is, of course, far short of the assurances Zia had told Constable he would be willing to sign, and far short of the language that I had carefully dictated to Zia and his notetaker when I requested such a letter on July 29." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Presidential Correspondence: 1-12/79)

<sup>5</sup> Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna on June 18.

of the Agreement would not have been possible without your patient and dedicated pursuit of this noble objective.

With profound regards.

Yours sincerely,<sup>6</sup>

**M. Zia-ul-Haq**  
*General*

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<sup>6</sup> The two closing paragraphs are handwritten.

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**358. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, August 27, 1979, 1100Z

9734. For UnderSecy Newsom and NEA Constable from Hummel.  
Subject: (S) GOP Pres. Zia's Stopover in New York: Discussions With U.S. Officials. Ref: State 221085<sup>2</sup> (Notal).

1. (S—Entire text)

2. I am pleased to hear that you intend to see Pres. Zia in NY Sept 1.

3. I think you will find Zia in a rather glum and not particularly outgoing mood, in contrast to his usual friendly and courteous manner. I believe he is genuinely worried about what kinds of harsh and punitive actions the USG is planning in order to have our way with the Pak nuclear program.

4. As we have reported, even before the Burt article in the Times,<sup>3</sup> we had been hearing of Pakistani worries that the USG might be planning drastic steps. SecDef Brown's statements about a 110,000 man

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2092. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to New Delhi

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 221085 to Islamabad, August 23, the Department notified the Embassy that Newsom and Constable planned to meet with Zia during his stopover in New York en route to the September summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2035)

<sup>3</sup> See Richard Burt, "U.S. Aides Say Pakistan Is Reported to Be Building an A-Bomb Site," *New York Times*, August 17, 1979, p. A6.

task force for possible use in the Middle East<sup>4</sup> triggered some highly imaginative Pak speculations. These included concerns that the USG might stimulate the Israelis to do an Entebbe-type raid on Pak nuclear facilities and/or that the USG was trying to stimulate the Indians to destroy the facilities. Ludicrous as that may sound to us, we have to remember that Gerry Smith, on May 4th had given what Paks considered to be an official U.S. warning or threat of military attack on the installations.<sup>5</sup>

5. In this already existing atmosphere, the Burt article in the Times was accepted as gospel; media and GOP homed in on prospect of unilateral U.S. military action and related this to SecDef's ME task force remarks. In addition, the GOP had "evidence" that some unnamed USG official had allegedly encouraged the Indians to attack, and also the alleged statements by Sen. Percy<sup>6</sup> that were read in similar vein.

6. Now the tough USG attitude on debt rescheduling<sup>7</sup> (including a new Burt article)<sup>8</sup> will also cause the Paks to speculate that USG is acting out the earlier "Burt option" of economic strangulation and that the USG may try to stimulate other donors to withhold aid.

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<sup>4</sup> The statement was made by the Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers. Telegram 160530 to multiple posts, June 22, reported that Rogers, at a press conference on June 21, "made a statement to the effect that the USG is working to come up with a 'unilateral corps' quick reaction force of 110,000 men which could be sent to the Persian Gulf or other critical spots." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790282-0098)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 9257 from Islamabad, August 14, the Embassy reported an August 14 meeting between Hummel and Shahnawaz, during which Shahnawaz argued that during the May 4 meeting between Vance and Shahi, "Smith pointed out to Shahi that the Soviets seriously planned a preemptive strike against PRC nuclear facilities at the time the Chinese developed a weapons program. This, Shahnawaz said, was the first official hint that such a strike could be planned against Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790007-0026) Smith's comment does not appear in the U.S. record of the meeting; see Document 342.

<sup>6</sup> During their August 14 meeting (see footnote 5 above), Shahnawaz discussed with Hummel comments that an Indian newspaper attributed to Senator Percy on August 11 in New Delhi. According to the article, Percy "said in Delhi that the nuclear weapons development process in Pakistan has started and that 'it is horrible to think of the close range of Indian cities to Pakistan's potential for destruction.' At the same time, there was surprise expressed by Percy at the apparent disregard within the GOI for the potential for disaster represented in Pakistan's nuclear program." In telegram 1542 from Calcutta, August 17, the Consulate claimed that the report in the Indian press of Percy's comments was inaccurate: "Strictly speaking, in a rambling and impromptu interview at the Calcutta airport, Senator Percy made no comments on Pakistan's nuclear intentions or capabilities." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790373-1126)

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 208884 to Islamabad, August 10, the Department directed the Embassy to inform the Pakistani Government that the United States would not support debt rescheduling without an IMF stabilization program, thus leaving the question up to the IMF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790364-0273)

<sup>8</sup> Reference is presumably to Richard Burt, "Fears Rising in Washington That an India-Pakistan Nuclear Race Is Inevitable," *New York Times*, August 24, 1979, p. A4.



7. I think Zia and others actually believe that USG is engaging in calculated leaks to the media in “campaign of international vilification.” Given likelihood of continued US press coverage and speculation about Pak nuclear problem, I cannot think of much that can be said to convince Paks otherwise, beyond reiterating our denial and our desire to keep as good relations with Paks as possible.

8. In this atmosphere, and given present state of paralysis (or perhaps I should say re-examination) of U.S. policies toward Pakistan, you will be better able than I to formulate what can be said to Zia about U.S. policy and attitudes. I hope you will be able to get guidance from Secy Vance and that you can cite him as authority for your statements to Zia.

9. From where I sit, however, several things are clear at this point. We are not, by our variety of actions, deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with their nuclear enrichment program and the related efforts in the field of weapons research. We are, however, eroding badly our relationship with a nearly broke, badly shaken, and potentially very unstable “former ally”—to the detriment of our broader interests in Pakistan, in South Asia, and in this region as a whole. We must find a way soon to address these broader politico-military/strategic interests in this part of the world in addition to (or at least parallel to) our search for ways of heading off proliferation of nuclear weapons. If not, we run the risk of so badly stressing our bilateral relationship with Pakistan as to reduce our ability to carry on in pursuit of our regional and bilateral goals after the nuclear issue is behind us—when this could be an even more difficult and unstable region than it is now.

Hummel

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### 359. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 30, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000015, Box 6, Pakistan 1973–1980. Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages not declassified.]

### 360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 4, 1979, 1524Z

231631. Subject: Newsom Meeting With Pakistani President Zia; Nuclear Issue and US-Pak Consultations.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Newsom-Zia meeting September 1 touched on the nuclear issue, US-Pak consultations, Afghanistan and the NAM conference. This cable reports the exchange on the nuclear issue; other subjects covered septels.<sup>2</sup> Newsom noted that Zia's letter to President Carter omitted assurances on nuclear testing or non-transfer of technology or material to others.<sup>3</sup> Zia acknowledged the point, and said that a nuclear explosion had never been in his mind. He did not offer, however, to enlarge on his assurances. Zia said Pakistan stood by the safeguards agreement with France on the reprocessing facility. He also discussed his correspondence with Desai on the nuclear question.<sup>4</sup> On the upcoming US-Pak consultations, Zia said he hoped for a free and frank exchange, and emphasized the need for a continued dialogue on the nuclear question. End summary.

3. Under Secretary Newsom called on Zia at his Waldorf Towers suite September 1, for a 45-minute meeting during Zia's layover on his way to Havana. Newsom delivered a message from President Carter (septel).<sup>5</sup> He was joined by Deputy Assistant Secretary Constable and NEA/PAB Director Peck. Sitting in on the Pak side were Ambassador

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040-2039. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S-O and D, and by Constable; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 232868 to Islamabad, September 5, reported Zia and Newsom's September 1 discussions regarding the NAM summit in Havana. Newsom noted the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba. Zia said "he was proceeding from the basic premise that the NAM should display by its actions and words that it was truly non-aligned" and shared his intention not to let Castro "take us for a ride." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790405-0803) For Zia's and Newsom's discussion of Afghanistan and assistance to insurgents, see Document 361.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 357.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 143.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 233118 to Islamabad, September 5, transmitted the text of Carter's message to Zia. Carter welcomed Zia to New York and suggested: "We should acknowledge our differences but, in doing so, give new impetus to the search for a mutually acceptable resolution of those differences." On a personal note, Carter added: "Rosalynn has told me of her meeting with Begum Zia and the medical evaluation received by your daughter here in Washington. Rosalynn joins me in wishing Zain good health and all success in any further therapy she may undergo." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

Sultan Khan, Consul General Khurshid Hyder, Presidential Chief of Staff MGen. Arif, and Toquir Hussain.

4. Zia opened the meeting with a reference to his recent letter to President Carter in which he had explained the “spirit and scope” of Pakistan’s “peaceful nuclear program,” which he suggested was essential for Pakistan. Newsom noted his letter was being studied and that we would be working on a reply.

5. Continuing on this line, Newsom noted that Zia and Constable, in their last meeting in Islamabad,<sup>6</sup> had talked about the kind of assurances the GOP might give. Zia’s subsequent letter to Carter had provided one significant assurance, namely that Pakistan would not develop or manufacture nuclear weapons. Newsom said there were two other elements of the problem. We hoped Zia would give further consideration to assurances that Pakistan would not test a nuclear device and that it did not intend to transfer nuclear technology or material to others. Newsom said that, if Zia could add to what he had already said and refer to these other elements, we would have the basis for a constructive dialogue on where we could go from here. The USG was not unsympathetic to the desire of any country to develop peaceful nuclear capacity. The issue as we saw it was how a peaceful nuclear program could be constructed in Pakistan to provide the kind of safeguards and assurances to enable us to set this issue aside.

6. In reply Zia alluded to a “misunderstanding” as to the kind of assurances he had originally offered to put in writing, but did not directly dispute Constable’s recollection of the conversation. He “distinctly remembered” discussing Pakistani capabilities. He said he could assure us Pakistan’s program was for peaceful purposes and that Pakistan was not interested in any nuclear device. Since a nuclear explosion had never been in his mind, he had not focussed on this point.

7. Newsom said the problem had been created in part by others who had exploded a device and called it peaceful. We believed that there was no distinction possible. Because of this, we believe that the question of a test or explosion becomes a critical element in non-proliferation policy.

8. Zia shifted the subject to reprocessing. He said Pakistan stood by the guarantees provided France on use of the reprocessing facility and he hoped the USG would not put pressure on France. Pakistan was prepared for any kind of safeguards on this facility, even to the extent of posting French or other experts at the plant. Pakistan was only interested in energy, since by 1982 Pakistan’s energy needs would have reached a critical stage.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 353.

9. Newsom said that the US stood ready, if our differences could be satisfactorily resolved, to assist Pakistan either bilaterally or multilaterally to develop nuclear power. We were as eager as Pakistan to find a way out of this problem, and we wanted to maintain our dialogue. He noted that what India does would have a bearing on the situation, and asked for Zia's assessment of the prospects for reaching some sort of understanding with India.

10. Zia said he had taken the initiative in corresponding with PriMin Desai on this matter. He had explained Pakistan's interest in non-proliferation, and said that his government was willing to do anything India might propose. He had told Desai Pakistan was prepared to discuss putting safeguards on any nuclear facility. He had also drawn Desai's attention to Pakistan's proposals in the UN context, and suggested that the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone should be pursued vigorously.

11. Zia said Desai had replied that India could not consider a joint effort "at this stage." He had countered with the suggestion that India make a statement that there would be no nuclear explosion and that Pakistan follow with its own statement. This would then be the equivalent of a joint statement. Desai had been categorical in saying India was not interested in nuclear weapons, but unfortunately Desai was now gone. The new PriMin's statements<sup>7</sup> had justified Pakistan's doubts over the value of personal assurances.

12. Newsom said we welcomed the Pak suggestion for security discussions.<sup>8</sup> Zia noted he had discussed dates with Ambassador Hummel and that the October dates looked good (week of Oct. 8 or 15). Newsom asked if Zia could elaborate on what he wanted to see on the table or what results he hoped for. Zia said he wanted a free and frank exchange of views. Referring back to the nuclear question, he added that "the more we talk, the better for both of us."

**Vance**

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5, Document 153.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 9796 from Islamabad, August 28, reported Shahnawaz's August 28 request to schedule high-level security talks between the United States and Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040-2095)

**361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1979, 1712Z

232800. For Ambassador or Charge only. Subject: Newsom-Zia Meeting: Afghanistan. Ref: Islamabad 9986.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Question of Afghanistan and outside assistance to insurgents was discussed briefly by Under Secretary Newsom and President Zia during broader meeting September 1, in New York. Other subjects septels.<sup>3</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary Constable and NEA/PAB Director Peck sat in. Attending on the Pak side were Ambassador Sultan Khan, Consul General Khurshid Hyder, Presidential Chief of Staff MGen Arif, and Toquir Hussain.

3. Newsom noted he was aware of subjects raised during Zia's August 31 meeting with Ambassador Hummel. Regarding Afghanistan, we are cooperating with Pakistanis and will continue to do so. The particular dimension Zia mentioned to Hummel is difficult for us, but we may provide medical kits and other medical equipment. We welcome Pakistan's interest.

4. Zia replied that recent events had proved that there is tremendous scope for encouraging the insurgency to continue, though whether the rebels would be able to overthrow the regime was debatable. Whatever measures "one can take" to revitalize the insurgency or to support it would be worthwhile and in the interests of the free world. He stressed the need for all elements among the rebels to unite. There was no cohesive leadership. He thought that by giving assistance—of whatever sort, including medical or humanitarian—it would keep alive hope among the rebels.

Vance

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel. Sent for information Priority to Kabul. Drafted by Peck, cleared by Constable and McAfee; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 9986 from Islamabad, August 31, the Embassy reported Hummel's August 31 meeting with Zia. The two discussed a number of issues, including the 170,000 Afghan refugees inside Pakistani territory. Zia also requested that the United States support the Afghan dissidents inside Afghanistan who were fighting Taraki's government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2099)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 360 and footnote 2 thereto.

**362. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State  
(Christopher) to Thomas Thornton of the National Security  
Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1979

SUBJECT

Pakistan Nuclear Issue

We have three diplomatic initiatives under way with respect to Pakistan. The results of these initiatives may provide some light on this almost intractable problem. They are:

(1) Secretary Vance will take up the Pakistan nuclear issue in his meetings with the Quadripartite foreign ministers in New York<sup>2</sup> and with the other Summit foreign ministers.<sup>3</sup>

(2) Secretary Vance will meet with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi October 16–17.

(3) Our technical team will discuss details of Pakistan's nuclear efforts with our closest allies the week of September 24.

Our dilemma is well known—how do we balance our global non-proliferation interests in relation to Pakistani activities, and our regional and bilateral security interests? Within that constraint, my tentative hypotheses are as follows:

(1) We have an important security relationship with Pakistan, both in terms of our general interest in regional stability and several specific intelligence concerns. We should try to conduct ourselves so as not to impair or destroy that relationship.

(2) We cannot abandon our global non-proliferation policy and should continue to look for ways to enhance it. We have done a number of things, more than any other country, to try to prevent the Pakistanis from going nuclear, including application of the Symington/Glenn amendments. Any “give” in our non-proliferation concerns, in response to our interest in a cooperative security relationship with Pakistan, must be balanced against the cost to our global non-proliferation goals. In non-proliferation terms, Pakistan is not a discrete problem but only part of a global mosaic.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Nuclear: 6/77–12/80. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> The Quadripartite Foreign Ministers were the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. No record of the meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

(3) No set of incentives or disincentives (certainly nothing that it would be feasible for us to undertake) would be likely to cause Pakistan to dismantle, cut back or freeze construction of its sensitive facilities or to make a no-test pledge. Given the domestic Pakistan situation, I doubt if we could presently obtain the assurances we seek, and if we did get assurances, I doubt that they would be kept. All the intelligence I have seen tends to reinforce this gloomy view, and regrettably none of it contradicts it.

(4) We should closely watch the elections in both Pakistan and India for possible openings to the resolution of the nuclear problems as well as others, but we should not count on any decisive results in the very near term.

(5) Our best chance now probably lies in trying to intercept and freeze the Pakistani nuclear development at a stage where it would be more nearly equivalent with India—the driving force in Pak policy.

As we look ahead over the next several months, we plan to take the following steps:

1. We are drafting a response to Zia's letter which contained inadequate assurances.<sup>4</sup> To be most effective, it should be sent soon so the GOP has adequate time to consider it before Agha Shahi meets the Secretary.

2. If the consultations at UNGA indicate that we may be able to undertake useful multilateral initiatives to hinder the development of Pakistan's nuclear explosive potential, we will consider asking Gerry Smith to go to selected capitals for follow-on talks.

3. We should look at the range of possible strategies either if Pakistan tests or if a test appears imminent. I have instructed that such a paper be drafted in the Department.

4. Concerning India, a paper is being drafted in the Department looking at broad strategy options for our nuclear relationship with India in the context of the Tarapur question. The Pakistani and Indian problems cannot be treated in isolation, and as we look ahead we have to keep in mind that actions taken by each party affect the other.

After the UNGA consultations, I plan to get together with several people to discuss our strategy for the Agha Shahi meetings. Once they take place, and depending upon their outcome, we will then take a more comprehensive look at where we are heading in the South Asian nuclear context. My own view is that the question of whether and when to hold a PRC on this problem, and other tactical questions, should await that review.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 357.

Throughout this process, we would expect the NSC to participate fully in our planning. I would appreciate any thoughts you may have on this issue.

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**363. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, September 27, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000012, Box 6, NEA/CIA/INR Weekly meetings 1978–1980. Secret; Sensitive. 3 pages not declassified.]

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**364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1979, 1905Z

255653. Subject: Secretary's Bilateral With Pakistani Foreign Advisor Shahi.

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary. Secretary Vance and Agha Shahi agreed to announce following their meeting that US-Pak bilateral talks would be held October 16–17 in Washington (State 247873).<sup>2</sup> The Secretary noted that the recent assurances provided by President Zia covered nuclear weapons development, and hoped these would be extended to include no-test and non-transfer assurances. Shahi said this could be discussed at next month's talks; he added that Pakistan did not presently have the capability to test and that this would be a question for future government to decide. The Secretary categorically denied we were linking

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2166. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to New Delhi. Drafted by Peck, cleared in S/S and by Saunders and Newsom; approved by Vance.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 247873 to Islamabad, September 21, the Department directed the Embassy to propose to the Pakistanis the dates of October 16 and 17 for bilateral discussions, as well as a general outline of topics to be discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2046)



debt rescheduling with the nuclear issue. Shahi was pessimistic about the significance of the recent Afghan leadership change<sup>3</sup> and unsure of Soviet intentions. Shahi said the number of Afghan refugees could grow to 500,000, and the Secretary said the US was prepared to help. Discussion of narcotics covered septel.<sup>4</sup> End summary.

3. Secretary Vance held a cordial 40 minute meeting with Pakistani Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi in New York September 25. Shahi was accompanied by Ambassador Sultan Khan, Pakistani Perm Rep Niaz Naik and Head of Chancery Shamshad Ahmad. Sitting in on the US side were Under Secretary Newsom, Asst. Secretary Saunders, and NEA/PAB Director Peck.

4. Bilateral talks: The Secretary said he was looking forward to next month's bilateral talks. He and Shahi agreed that they would make a short public announcement following the meeting to the effect that the talks would be part of the continuing dialogue between the two countries on matters of bilateral interest. Shahi asked that there be no reference to the 1959 US-Pak bilateral agreement or to "differences" between the two sides. Shahi also noted that he was waiting for a formal invitation to visit Afghanistan in the near future, and therefore suggested that the announcement not refer to a discussion of regional issues.

5. The Secretary expressed the hope that during the talks we would reach an understanding on Pakistan's security needs and on US security concerns. He wanted these issues to be "thrashed out" in a thorough way. Shahi agreed, and added his appreciation for the Secretary's understanding during their last meeting in May<sup>5</sup> in not pressing for convening these bilateral talks before the Non-Aligned Summit.

6. Nuclear issue: The Secretary noted we had received President Zia's letter to President Carter,<sup>6</sup> were studying it and would be replying in the near future. Shahi said Zia had sent a similar letter to Indian PriMin Charan Singh. At Havana Zia had told Indian FonMin Mishra that, if India was concerned about reports that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, Pakistan was ready to enter into talks on mutual

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<sup>3</sup> On September 14, Afghan President Nur Mohammad Taraki was ousted as President of Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin assumed the Presidency that same day. Documentation is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 255601 to Islamabad, September 28, the Department reported Vance and Shahi's discussion regarding the prevention of narcotics trafficking. After Vance expressed the hope that the United States and Pakistan could work together to eradicate the problem, Shahi said that "the GOP had no reservations at all on this issue. He noted the poppy growing districts were in tribal areas which complicated efforts to control the problem." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790444–0943)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 342.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 357.

reassurance. Zia complained to Mishra that despite Pakistani denials these reports continued to be spread. (Shahi commented that it would be a tragedy if, on the basis of baseless reports, India would conduct further nuclear tests and go on to develop nuclear weapons.) Mishra had reportedly replied to Zia that Charan Singh's Red Fort statement<sup>7</sup> had been "hypothetical." Since Pakistan was not engaged in a weapons program, this would "fall by the wayside," and there would be no change in Indian nuclear policy.

7. Returning to the Zia-Carter letter, the Secretary noted it had contained assurances on nuclear weapons development; he hoped these would be extended to include assurances that there would be no nuclear test at all and that there would be no transfer of material or technology to others. Shahi replied that the question of transfer of technology could be discussed in next month's bilateral talks. As for the question of a nuclear explosion, Pakistan did not have this capability at this stage. This would be a question for a future government to decide. Of course, that government would have to take into account the climate of public opinion at that time. Shahi concluded that we could also discuss this question at the bilateral talks. The Secretary agreed, noting that he wanted to assure that it was on the agenda. The Secretary added that we were sympathetic to Pakistan's needs for nuclear power and understood the problems Pakistan faced in this area.

8. Afghanistan: Asked for his assessment of the Afghan situation, Shahi suggested that the recent leadership change was "not for the better". Amin was more dogmatic than Taraki and has the reputation of being much tougher and more ruthless. He expected internal repression would be stepped up. The rebellion was continuing, but the intensity might be abated somewhat when winter weather set in. The rebels were determined to continue the struggle, but were not in a position to bring down Amin because of the overwhelming firepower put at the disposal of the regime by the Soviet Union. Shahi predicted that the internal struggle within the Khalq Party would continue. The real question was to what extent the Soviets would become involved and whether they would intervene massively if the regime was in danger of being toppled. Shahi was not sure how the Soviets might react. The Soviet stake in Iran was very great and a massive military move in Afghanistan would unite all elements in Iran against them. The Soviets also had to consider the reaction in the Moslem world in general, as well as the need to stay on good terms with "certain countries".

9. Regarding Pakistani policy, Shahi said Pakistan had been approached by various Afghan elements, but rejected these overtures.

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5, Document 153.

Pakistan did not want to be in a position of long-term hostility with the Soviet Union, especially with the Soviets now “just across the border”. Pakistan did not know what the situation in the region would be like in the future. With instability in Iran, Yemen and other places, Pakistan was in a very uncomfortable situation. Asked if there was any move toward coalescence among the various rebel groups, Shahi said that the tribal groups were very “hard-headed”. Even though they felt they were in a position to overthrow the regime, they wanted to know what the GOP would do before committing themselves. Shahi described a recent visit to him of a large delegation of tribal leaders from both sides of the border. The delegation argued that the GOP should either go all out to topple the Khalqi regime (by providing arms to the rebels) or, if it felt it could not do this or was intimidated by the USSR, the GOP should come to some agreement with the USSR. Shahi concluded vaguely that this was “not our policy”.

10. Debt rescheduling: The Secretary raised the issue of debt rescheduling, noting that there were public claims that the US was impeding Pakistan’s request for rescheduling and was organizing the donors against Pakistan. He categorically denied that we were doing anything of the sort. Obviously Pakistan would have to work something out with the IMF. We would then be prepared to do what we could to help. Our approach, however, was not linked in any way to political questions or the nuclear issue. Shahi replied that his government would be very pleased to hear this reassurance. He argued, however, that the IMF wanted Pakistan to adopt extremely tough measures of a political nature, including devaluation. Pakistan had imposed heavy taxes, but was not at this time in a position to comply with further IMF demands. Shahi said Pakistan would like some indication to others that the US was not linking the debt question to the nuclear issue. The Secretary said Pakistan could say the US had given this assurance, and offered to so inform other Foreign Ministers with whom he would be meeting, mentioning specifically the West German and Japanese. Shahi asked if he would include the Canadian, and the Secretary agreed. Shahi thanked the Secretary. He said this would be very helpful and that he was sure President Zia would be grateful.

11. Afghan refugees: The Secretary expressed understanding of Pakistan’s growing problem with Afghan refugees and said the US was prepared to help. Shahi noted Pakistan had asked for international assistance. The burden was quite heavy. The number could grow to half a million refugees. Pakistan was concerned their presence could generate internal tensions. They had to be fed, housed and their flocks given grazing space; they could become a permanent liability. Taraki and Zia had disagreed on the subject at Havana, with Taraki insisting they were criminals and should be returned to Afghanistan. Zia coun-

tered that Afghanistan could not accommodate so many criminals in its jails, so that Pakistan had little choice but to provide them refuge. Taraki had not really made a big issue of the refugees and had admitted that perhaps only the “ring-leaders” were criminals. Taraki had given the impression that Afghanistan didn’t mind what Pakistan was doing, but Shahi added that Amin might take a tougher line. Saunders noted that the issue would be getting some publicity in the US in the next few days because of the Wolff Subcommittee hearings September 26 on Afghanistan and the refugee situation. We would indicate our willingness to contribute to the UNHCR, but the High Commissioner had not yet stated the exact amount of money required. The USG wanted to keep the High Commissioner “out front” on this issue.

12. Report of discussion on narcotics follows septel.

Vance

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### 365. Letter From Pakistani President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 29, 1979

Dear Mr President,

It was a great pleasure for me, during my stop over in New York, to receive your very kind message of welcome and personal greetings through Under Secretary of State Newsom.<sup>2</sup> I was gratified to learn that my letter of August 9<sup>3</sup> is receiving your close attention and to be assured of your personal commitment to the restoration of our traditionally close ties of friendship and mutual cooperation.

We sincerely feel that there are no real differences between us on matters of substance but only a series of unfortunate misunderstandings resulting from lack of proper communication. I had a useful talk with Mr. Newsom and earnestly hope that the misunderstandings will be cleared in the course of our dialogue which will continue through the discussions due to be held between Secretary Vance and my Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Agha Shahi.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870006-2536. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 360 and footnote 5 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 357.

I assure you once again that we have no intention whatsoever of pursuing any programme which may be geared to the production of nuclear weapons. Our modest nuclear programme, which is entirely for peaceful purposes, has been misrepresented to such an extent as to divert attention from the critical developments in our region which threaten not only the security of Pakistan but of the entire region. We, on our part, will do whatever lies in our power to restore mutual trust and confidence so that the contradictions in our current appreciation of and approach to our security problems and those of the region are removed enabling the United States Government to establish an order of priorities which would more accurately correspond to the situation on the ground.

May I conclude by saying how deeply touched I was by your concern for my daughter's health and specially by Mrs. Carter's kindness and help to my wife who joins me in conveying to you and Mrs. Carter and the entire family our warm regards and sincere good wishes.

With profound regards,

Yours sincerely,<sup>4</sup>

**M. Zia-ul-Haq**  
*General*

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<sup>4</sup> The two closing paragraphs are handwritten.

**366. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1979

1. *Meeting With Shahi:* Following the larger bilateral meetings,<sup>2</sup> I met alone today with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shahi, who gave the most explicit exposition we have yet heard on Pakistani nuclear intentions. Shahi, noting that he was speaking in great confidence, said that Pakistan will reiterate its assurance that it does not plan to develop nuclear weapons. He will also recommend to President Zia that Pakistan give us assurances it will not transfer sensitive nuclear technology. On the question of assurances on explosions, Shahi was not forthcoming. He said that he believes the present government would not explode a device within the next 6–12 months. He could not say what the policy of a new government would be, however, or what the Zia Government would do after 12 months, if it is still in office.

Based on the discussions over the last two days, we have no doubt that the Paks are seeking to develop nuclear explosives. They made no effort to deny it, but Shahi did indicate that they have not finally decided to push the program to completion. I noted that any Pakistani explosion would have a devastating effect on our bilateral relationship, and Shahi responded that Pakistan realized this.

I would like to discuss with you at breakfast Friday<sup>3</sup> where we go from here on this issue.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 10/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 368 and footnote 4 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> October 19. Carter met with Vance and other senior foreign policy advisers from 7:30 to 8:46 a.m. in the White House Cabinet Room. No record of the discussion was found.

**367. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, October 17, 1979, 0942Z

11814. Dept also for NEA Ambassador Hummel. Subject: Charge's Meeting With President Zia. Refs: (A) Islamabad 11788;<sup>2</sup> (B) State 270293;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 11813.<sup>4</sup>

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Flash precedence being used to assure distribution prior to commencement of final day of US/Pakistani bilateral talks.

3. President Zia opened meeting by saying that he wanted US Government to have his personal explanation of why he had felt it necessary to postpone elections and ban political activity. He had been completely sincere in setting November 17 date for elections many months ago. He had wished to allow orderly evolution of electoral process, whereas practice in Pakistan had usually been to call elections on shortest possible notice. Despite this he had not been able to achieve satisfactory conditions for holding elections. Country's largest party, Bhutto's PPP, had disqualified itself by refusing to comply with constitutionally based order requiring submission of financial statement. It had seemed that Pakistan National Alliance would contest election, but after a great deal of vacillation its leadership had finally left itself in a position where it had not met legal requirements. Consequently, the only parties which in the end were qualified to contest election were so insignificant that there was no possibility of setting up a representative and effective government based on elections held at this time.

4. Zia said that he had forwarned Ambassador Hummel recently that things were not progressing well and that he was doubtful that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790475–0674. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 11788 from Islamabad, October 16, the Embassy notified the Department that on October 16, one hour after he cancelled the elections scheduled for November 17, Zia requested a meeting with King on October 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0431)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 270293 to Islamabad, October 16, the Department directed King to inform Zia during their October 17 meeting that "the reaction in the US to a postponement of Pakistani elections would be sharply adverse." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0528)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 11813 from Islamabad, October 17, provided a summary of Zia's October 16 speech, which announced the indefinite postponement of elections scheduled for November 17, the banning of all political activity, and the closing of selected newspapers and periodicals and the imposition of media censorship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790475–0871)

elections could be held as scheduled.<sup>5</sup> This had turned out to be the case, and he had decided that under the circumstances the best course was to take firm and decisive action. He had decided on a period of severe martial law to bring the situation under control. The first order of business would be the urgent human needs of the mass of the population, to provide them with basic necessities and protect them against the effects of inflation and corruption. The common man did not care “two hoots” whether Zia or anyone else was running the country as long as his basic needs were met, and this was Pakistan’s first priority. At the same time, a political solution would be sought, and he had hopes that the local bodies election which had already taken place would produce new leadership from the grassroots. While martial law would be severely applied for the time being, he recognized that after a few months martial law begins to lose its effectiveness. Zia added that there had been no violent reaction to his speech—Mission observations confirm this—only a flood of congratulations. He did not anticipate violence, “although, of course, one can never be completely sure.”

5. I said that he would certainly recall that Ambassador Hummel had anticipated that any such action as he had taken last night would lead to an adverse reaction in the U.S. administration, Congress, and among the American people. Zia added “and the press”. Now that the step had been taken, I had been instructed to say that the U.S. Government regrets his decision. It is our belief that it is important for Pakistan to develop its political institutions through free elections. We hope that the postponement of the November 17 elections will be for as brief a period of time as possible.

6. In reply, Zia said that he appreciated the U.S. point of view and that he shared our belief in elections as the proper way to build political institutions. However, now that he had been forced into the decision he had taken, it was quite possible that it would be necessary to devise some new system under which elections should be held. In any case, he would certainly hold elections just as soon as he felt it was possible.

7. Comment: Zia’s remark on political institutions confirms [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Pak Times editorial that Zia and his colleagues now see future elections in the context of some as yet unidentified new political system in Pakistan.

**King**

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<sup>5</sup> In an October 7 discussion with Hummel, Zia expressed doubts that elections could be held. (Telegram 11417 from Islamabad, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2132)



**368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 20, 1979, 1713Z

274950. Subject: US-Pak Discussions, October 16–17: Overview and Nuclear Issue. Ref: State 270484.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: There was no breakthrough on the nuclear issue during two days of discussions in Washington with a Pakistani delegation headed by Agha Shahi, but both sides agreed to continue the dialogue. Shahi said his government had not yet made a decision on the goal of its nuclear program, but was at pains to indicate that a test was not imminent. He probed unsuccessfully for flexibility in U.S. willingness to resume economic assistance and military sales in the absence of progress on the nuclear issue. Discussion of the relevance of the 1959 bilateral agreement in the present situation covered septel.<sup>3</sup> The first day of talks was largely devoted to discussion of regional issues and Pakistani security concerns. These issues are also reported separately.<sup>4</sup> End summary.

3. The US and Pakistani delegations spent over seven hours in formal discussions at the State Department October 16 and 17. The Pakistani delegation included Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2050, N790008–0225. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Beijing, Bonn, London, Moscow, New Delhi, and Paris. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S and by Constable, Gerard Smith, and Coon; approved by Newsom.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 270484 to Islamabad, October 16, transmitted the text of Vance's opening statement made on October 16 at the U.S.-Pakistani talks in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0771)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 277952 to Islamabad, October 25, the Department reported the discussion of the 1959 bilateral agreement: "In reply to a direct question from Shahi the Secretary stated forcefully that the agreement was not linked to any other issue and that it stands on its own. The Secretary stressed that in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan the United States would consider the agreement to be relevant and that we would be prepared to consult immediately with Pakistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0815)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 277901 to Islamabad, October 24, the Embassy reported on the October 16 U.S.-Pakistani bilateral discussions on regional issues. Both sides agreed on the danger posed by the situation in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis "were fairly relaxed about the state of the current relations with India, but still consider India to be Pakistan's principal long-range security threat. On Iran, Shahi emphasized the importance of establishing a personal equation with Khomeini and indicated that Pakistan was trying to save the RCD in the face of Iranian opposition. The US strongly reaffirmed its support for Pakistani security, but we indicated that our ability to express this support in practical terms would remain constrained as long as our differences over the nuclear issue were unresolved." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790488–1023)

Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Lt. General Ghulam Jilani Khan, Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. Munir Khan, UN PermRep Niaz Naik, and others. Secretary Vance attended all the sessions (with some interruptions); he also hosted a luncheon the first day and held a private bilateral meeting with Agha Shahi at the conclusion of the talks.<sup>5</sup> The US delegation included Deputy Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary Newsom, Under Secretary Benson, Ambassador Hummel, Ambassador Gerard Smith, Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretaries Saunders and Pickering, and others.

4. The Secretary opened the talks with a welcoming statement (reftel) and Agha Shahi gave a less formal reply. The remainder of the first day was devoted largely to a discussion of the geopolitical situation in the region and Pakistani security concerns (septel).<sup>6</sup> The second day Deputy Secretary Christopher led a discussion of the nuclear question.

5. Setting the stage: The principal themes developed by the US side were set out in the Secretary's opening statement and Under Secretary Newsom's initial presentation on the US strategic overview. These were:

(1) The US has important interests in the area, including countering Soviet expansionism, and is determined to defend those interests;

(2) The US values its ties with Pakistan, is concerned about growing threats to Pakistani security, and wishes to find a way to restore full cooperation;

(3) The spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states affects vital US interests;

(4) Pakistan's nuclear programs are a threat to regional stability and Pakistan's own security; the two issues of Pakistani security and its nuclear activities cannot be separated.

The US strategy was to demonstrate that Pakistani security required a mix of measures including economic and political strength at home, an adequate military defense and a diplomatic posture to minimize threats from abroad and maximize support for Pakistan from outside the region. We argued that Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear weapons option ran counter to such a balanced approach, particularly since it limited the degree to which the US and other friends could assist Pakistan.

6. The Pakistanis developed the following basic themes:

<sup>5</sup> See Document 366.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4 above.

(1) The Soviet Union was aggressively expanding its influence throughout Asia and Africa, and public opinion in the region increasingly perceived the Soviet Union as able and willing to support effectively leftist movements and friendly regimes, while the US was perceived as disinterested and ineffective.

(2) The Soviet Union was consolidating its hold on Afghanistan; a reorganized and reequipped Afghan Army would face the insurgents in the spring; assuming the present Marxist regime consolidated its position in two or three years it would be ready to turn its attention to Pakistan; measures had to be taken now to strengthen Pakistan's ability to meet this inevitable threat.

(3) Pakistan had not yet decided whether to pursue present nuclear programs to the point of development of a nuclear device, and therefore there was no real urgency to the problem; strong Pakistani public opinion had to be taken into account, and the present military government was particularly vulnerable to the charge that it might sell out to the Americans on the nuclear question.

7. Christopher presentation: Leading off the second day's discussion on the nuclear issue, the Deputy Secretary reiterated that the nuclear problem could not be separated from other aspects of our overall relationship. He said our interest in this issue reflected a very deep and fundamental concern in our body politic. He cited the President's personal commitment to nonproliferation and congressional legislation in this regard. Recalling past US-Pak discussions regarding our objections to the scale and nature of Pakistani programs, Christopher concluded that these programs will result in a substantial increase in the threat to Pakistan and our own interests in the area. He discussed potential Indian and Soviet reactions, noting that Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear explosive capability would tend to engage basic Soviet interests in a manner the Soviets would probably attempt to exploit to their own advantage. At the same time the ability of the US and others to counter Soviet influence would be constrained. He said we also were concerned that these activities raised a serious risk of conflict with India.

If Pakistan achieved an explosive capability or exploded a device, India would almost certainly resume its nuclear explosives program and pressures would develop within India to take even more forceful actions against Pakistan. Christopher stressed that the US would not condone any such action.

8. Christopher concluded that we believed Pakistan's best interests would be served by following a course which would not even suggest it was pursuing a nuclear explosive capability. This would mean that nuclear programs should be consistent with real nuclear energy needs, which today they are not. As a first step he suggested a declaration that Pakistan would not develop or explode any nuclear explosive

device nor engage in any transfers to other countries of weapons-usable material or sensitive equipment or technology, such as that connected with enrichment or reprocessing. Such a first step, he continued, would provide a framework for US and other friends of Pakistan to meet Pakistan's security needs in parallel with changes in its current nuclear program. It would also provide a framework for wider cooperation in peaceful nuclear development. He warned, however, that if Pakistan explodes a device the basic relationship between us would suffer a drastic change. He indicated our understanding of Pakistan's political problems and offered to try to find ways to help Pakistan deal with them.

9. Shahi's response: In reply, Agha Shahi cast Pakistan as the aggrieved party whose credibility had unfairly been called into question. He described at some length the safeguards Pakistan had agreed to for the reprocessing plant to be supplied by France. These "iron-clad" safeguards were unprecedented and Pakistan had even been prepared to place its plutonium in an international plutonium reserve. The US, he complained, had applied the provisions of the Glenn Amendment retroactively. Pakistan would understand a US policy of limiting the transfer of sensitive technology to other countries, but we had gone beyond this to oppose even indigenous acquisition (an apparent reference to the enrichment facility). Pakistan's enrichment capability, he said, is being developed on the basis of self-reliance, "apart from some parts or equipment". Shahi said Pakistan wanted to exploit its own uranium reserves, and he didn't understand what we meant in our references to a "relatively large" enrichment program. Pakistan had planned for light water reactors, but construction of these had been postponed because of resource constraints.

10. Former Prime Minister Bhutto had made himself a symbol as the defender of Pakistan's vital interests on the nuclear issue and many believed he came to grief only because of his refusal to give in to the US. Thus the nuclear issue had become a central political issue in Pakistan and political leaders were united in a policy of resisting outside pressure. The military government which overthrew Bhutto was in a particularly difficult position. It had on a number of occasions considered US requests regarding nuclear policy, but had hoped the issue could be handed over to an elected government. Now elections had again been postponed,<sup>7</sup> and the government was "squarely faced with this challenge".

11. Shahi pointed to various Pakistani initiatives over the years which demonstrated Pakistan's commitment to nonproliferation. He

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 367.

said Pakistan was convinced India was manufacturing nuclear weapons—indeed already had some on the shelf—and was only waiting for a pretext such as a Pakistani explosion to go public. China was also convinced of this. Pakistan did not wish to say this publicly since it would only cause bilateral problems. Pakistanis were not “madmen”, and recognized that, if there were a nuclear arms race, there would be no possibility of Pakistan catching up with India.

12. Assurances: Shahi then turned to what he called the US’s “three demands”: no weapons, no transfer, and no explosion. Pakistan had already met the first demand in undertaking, in letters to President Carter and Prime Minister Desai and Charan Singh, not to manufacture or develop nuclear weapons. Regarding the issue of no-transfer, Shahi quoted from Pakistan’s April 24, 1978 aide memoire provided to Ambassador Hummel.<sup>8</sup> In the third paragraph of this document Pakistan said it would “neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons, nor assist other nations in doing so”. He concluded that Pakistan therefore had met two of our three “demands”.

13. On the question of a no-test assurance, Shahi said the Pakistan Government had given great thought to this matter. There had been “wild speculation” that President Zia would explode a device this fall to permit him to postpone elections. There would be no such explosion since Pakistan was not near the stage where it could conduct one. Pakistan had listened to the arguments against such an explosion, but this decision would be one for the government at the time when Pakistan was nearer the capability. That government would have to take into account its relations with the US, international opinion, and the possible reaction of India. This government had not taken the decision to conduct an explosion. It was an academic question. At this point Shahi said he did not have the authority to give this assurance (no-test), but it could be discussed when the time was appropriate. Pakistan had respect for our nonproliferation concerns and the policies of President Carter. The GOP intended to act as a responsible government and was doing its best to reassure India and to avoid the dire consequences the US feared. Thus, he concluded US concerns were unwarranted.

14. The Secretary commented that Shahi had seemed to be saying that Pakistan would continue to develop the capability to conduct an explosion but would not make the decision until it was nearer this goal. Shahi replied that no decision had been taken to develop this capability. The goal of Pakistan’s nuclear program remains to be determined. It should not be assumed, he said, that Pakistan would develop

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the aide-mémoire of April 24, 1979, which Shahnawaz gave to Hummel in their April 25 meeting. See footnote 2, Document 341.

this capability. This is an "open question". In a digression, Shahi described Pakistani efforts to make some bilateral arrangements with India. He concluded that the effort to "bring India into line" was Pakistan's "principal preoccupation".

15. Christopher asked if the previous day's announcement regarding postponement of elections would affect the Pakistani position that this was not a decision to be taken by the present military government. Shahi replied that he personally did not believe that the question of an explosion would arise for a decision "during the tenure of this present government".

16. No-transfer: Christopher asked for a clarification of the no-transfer assurance contained in the April aide memoire. He pointed out that the kind of statement which would be most reassuring to the world would be one to the effect that Pakistan would not transfer to others sensitive technology or equipment which could provide the capability for development of nuclear weapons. Shahi replied that he thought Pakistan's previous assurance covered our concerns but, if we wanted it to be spelled out, they would certainly examine the question.

17. Ambiguity in Pak intentions: Christopher asked what purpose was served by Pakistan's maintaining the ambiguity with respect to its intentions. Among the disadvantages, he added, was the fact that it would not be feasible for us or others to cooperate with Pakistan in the area of nuclear power generation as long as the ambiguity remained. In reply Shahi commented at length on the alleged discriminatory features of US policy, both as regards our reaction to the Indian explosion and to our alleged indifference to the research and development programs of many other countries in the enrichment and reprocessing fields. Shahi argued that the ambiguity in Pakistan's program is inherent in the technology of enrichment, since the technology could be used for various purposes. Christopher replied that the ambiguity was not inherent in a program of the size and shape of that which Pakistan was pursuing.

18. Amb. Smith introduced the argument that Pakistan's timing in constructing sensitive facilities before even placing an order for a light water reactor was "very curious"—even preposterous. Shahi countered that the elements of the Pakistani program had been synchronized in the planning stage, but because of lack of resources Pakistan had been unable to acquire a reactor and its program had become "incoherent and disjointed". Smith also argued that, should Pakistan explode a device, there would be a great tendency for international commerce in the nuclear field to dry up, which would be contrary to what both Pakistan and the US wanted in regard to nuclear commerce.

19. Discrimination: In reply to Shahi's repeated charge of discrimination, Christopher recounted the growth of concern about prolifera-

tion in this country and development of nonproliferation policy following the Indian explosion in 1974. He said we had not singled out Pakistan, but the facts had singled out Pakistan. We were prepared to work with Pakistan to help it meet legitimate energy needs if the ambiguities regarding Pakistan's program could be removed. He added that if Pakistan's enrichment program really were designed to meet these needs, we were willing to work with Pakistan to develop the necessary safeguards and limitations.

20. Shahi's final pitch was that he hoped that the nuclear issue would not be the sole determinant of US policy toward Pakistan. As a result of these discussions, he hoped there would be some change of attitude and a relaxation of our policies toward Pakistan, particularly because of the geopolitical situation in the region. This situation, he added, had far greater significance than Pakistan's peaceful research and development program. Christopher replied that a meeting of this length always resulted in some reappraisal, but he would be misleading the Pakistan delegation if he indicated anything other than the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program would continue to stand as a very tall impediment to our doing the things for Pakistan we would otherwise want to do.

21. In summing up at the concluding session, Newsom stressed our appreciation for the candor of our exchanges and our hope to continue the dialogue. We were very sympathetic to Pakistan's energy needs, and understood the problem of Pakistani public opinion. While noting our position on premature reprocessing and enrichment, Newsom said we would be willing to talk further, possibly at the expert level, in the context of assisting Pakistan in developing a power reactor program. It would have to be clear, however, that an explosion of a nuclear device was ruled out and the problem of Pakistan's development of sensitive facilities would have to be resolved. For his part, Shahi said he would be returning home somewhat disappointed. He said he had nothing hopeful to report regarding our bilateral relations and the US approach to assistance. Nonetheless, he echoed our satisfaction that the discussions had been unusually frank and that we had gained a better appreciation of each other's positions. He also said we should continue the dialogue begun with these talks, with particular reference to the 1959 agreement (see septel).

22. This is a summary report for the information of the addressee posts only. Addressee posts should not repeat not utilize this report in conversations with host governments. We are briefing appropriate Embassies in Washington and will inform you when these briefings have taken place.

**Christopher**



### 369. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 23, 1979, 1717Z

4544. Dept pass the Secretary Immediate. Subj: Transmission of Letter From Pakistan Adviser for Foreign Affairs.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Following is text of letter received this afternoon (10/22/79) from Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Adviser for Foreign Affairs. He had hoped to see you personally or to speak to you, but I told him that you were away from Washington and that classified telephone transmission was difficult, if not impossible.

3. Text follows, quote:

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Before returning to Pakistan today, I would like to say how greatly we valued your participation and unflagging interest in the two days of intensive discussions between our two delegations in Washington last week.<sup>2</sup> It is gratifying that in regard to the nuclear issue which became the prime topic of the talks, you expressed to me in our private session<sup>3</sup> your readiness to explore how our dialogue on this issue may continue.

I venture to hope that my assurances to you on the non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and non-transfer of sophisticated nuclear technology, have allayed the non-proliferation concerns of your government. In regard to the explosion of a nuclear device, I stated during our discussions that Pakistan was nowhere near the attainment of explosion capability and that the present Government of Pakistan would not test a nuclear device. I also said that a decision in this regard would have to be taken by a future government which, in doing so, will no doubt take into account all the relevant circumstances, including the international political climate, regional repercussions and other factors.

I would like to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that President Zia-ul-Haq is fully in accord with President Carter's non-proliferation concerns and attaches the greatest importance to the maintenance and further strengthening of US-Pakistan relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-2326, N790008-0279. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 368.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 366.



It is our profound hope that the continuation of the dialogue between our two sides would, in the months ahead, lead us towards a solution which would set your apprehensions at rest and at the same time would be acceptable to Pakistani political and public opinion. We were gratified that in his summing up statement, Mr. Newsom appreciated this difficulty which the Government of Pakistan faces.

In our private talks, you were kind enough to ask me how I thought we might fruitfully explore a solution of the divisive issue which confronts us. Let me assure you that we will address ourselves most earnestly to this formidable challenge.

We would be in the best position to continue our efforts in this direction if the talks between our two sides on this highly sensitive issue remain confidential until a solution is found. Revelations such as Don Oberdorfer's unfortunate remarks in the *Washington Post* of October 20, suggesting that an atomic test by Pakistan was likely within a period of six months to a year, which I take this opportunity to categorically contradict, can cause avoidable complications.<sup>4</sup> I have thought it necessary to issue a reply in the hope of removing any misapprehensions that may have been aroused. What I said in our private discussion about the relevance of the postponement of elections in Pakistan and the consequent prolongation of life of the present government, to the question of explosion, in no way implied that it might be carried out between six months to a year.

In conclusion I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the convergence of views and shared concern over the threat from Afghanistan and at your assurance that the United States is ready to hold consultations under the agreement of 1959 in regard to the specific nature of the support that the US would extend to Pakistan in the contingencies that may arise.

It is very reassuring for me to know that you found our talks most useful and that you have agreed to remain in close touch with us in regard to our security concerns in the immediate future and for the long term.

With highest regards, sincerely, signed Agha Shahi, Adviser for Foreign Affairs. End quote.

McHenry

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<sup>4</sup> See Don Oberdorfer, "Effort to Block Pakistan From A-Bomb Faltering," *Washington Post*, October 20, 1979, p. A3.

370. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Raphel) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 24, 1979

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

1. [8 lines not declassified]

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] assessment was also misleading in two important ways:

—He contends that real progress in our relationship depends upon Pakistani acceptance of full-scope safeguards. This is not true, and [less than 1 line not declassified] seems either to be intentionally misreporting to Zia, or has misread our position;

—[less than 1 line not declassified] believes that even if the nuclear issue were behind us, our economic aid to Pakistan would not increase beyond 40–45 million a year, and our military sales would not go beyond what Lucy<sup>2</sup> offered last year (in other words, we would not sell F–16s, or any other advanced or major sophisticated weaponry).<sup>3</sup>

We should look for ways to ensure that the Pakistanis understand clearly;

a. that we are not asking for acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite in order to resume a normal relationship, and

b. that the advantages to be gained by such normalization probably go beyond \$40 million in aid a year and F–5 sales.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 3, Chron 1979. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Christopher. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> Lucy Benson.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 312.

**371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1979, 0143Z

285130. Subject: Demarche to Soviets on Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
Ref: State 277901.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S—Entire text)

2. During discussions with the Pakistani delegation October 16–17 (reftel), the U.S. side strongly reaffirmed its support for Pakistani security. The Secretary specifically stated that in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan the United States would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant.<sup>3</sup> Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi asked that we assert to the Soviet Union our interest in Pakistan's security and our concern that the USSR not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. Shahi suggested that such a reaffirmation might usefully contain a reference to the 1959 agreement.

3. In response to Shahi's request, either Secretary Vance or Under Secretary Newsom will call in Ambassador Dobrynin at an early date to discuss Afghanistan and Pakistan. During your meeting with Gromyko or, alternatively, Korniyenko, you should make a similar demarche using the following talking points:

—During two days of intensive talks October 16–17 in Washington with a high level Pakistani [garble—delegation] led by Agha Shahi, we had an opportunity for a thorough discussion of the regional situation and our bilateral relations, including the nuclear issue.

—On the nuclear issue we had a full and candid exchange. We made clear our continuing deep concern about the direction of Pakistan's nuclear program. While there was no breakthrough on this issue, both sides have a clearer understanding of the other's perspective. We agreed to continue our dialogue over the coming weeks and months.

—During an exchange on the situation in the region, concern was expressed about the implications of developments in Afghanistan for regional stability.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503–0073, D790500–0228. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad. Sent for information to Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, London, Bonn, and Paris. Drafted by Peck; cleared in EUR, S/MS, L/PM, S/AS, PM, and S/S–O, and by Newsom, Coon, Leslie Brown, and Thornton; approved by Vance.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 368.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 368.

—The Pakistani delegation indicated Pakistan's desire to continue a diplomatic dialogue with Afghanistan in an effort to find ways to reduce tensions and resolve outstanding problems. The United States is following a similar policy.

—We hope that the Soviet Union shares our desire to encourage better and more stable relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this regard we believe it important that the Soviet Union avoid exacerbating relations between the two countries by false and contentious official and semi-official statements alleging Pakistani interference in Afghan internal affairs.

—The United States reaffirmed its support for Pakistan's security and stated that in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan we would consult with Pakistan in accordance with our 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan.

—We would also like to reaffirm the view which we have made clear to the Soviet Government previously. We believe that in the interest of regional stability Afghanistan should be left to resolve its internal problems without outside interference. In this connection we cannot but note the increasing involvement of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>

Vance

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 25153 from Moscow, November 2, the Embassy reported the November 2 delivery of the *démarche* to Korniyenko, who, in response, "did not directly address the question of charges of Pakistani interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, but spoke instead of the use of Pakistani territory for hostile actions against Afghanistan." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790505-1230) Telegram 25153 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 79.

**372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 17, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

3. *Pakistan*: During a recent trip to Western Europe, Gerry Smith asked senior officials in the UK, France, FRG and the Netherlands to consider telling Pakistan, as we have, that a nuclear test by Pakistan would foreshadow major changes in bilateral relations. Gerry did not find support for this approach, and his interlocutors were also pessimistic that any combination of available incentives or disincentives would influence Pakistan's nuclear course. His visit to Western Europe immediately followed that of Hua Guofeng, who had emphasized the need to bolster Pakistan against Soviet activities in the area.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 11/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

### 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Consulates in Karachi and Lahore<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, November 19, 1979, 1142Z

13079. Subject: (C) Unrest Among Iranian Students May Be Directed at US Installations. Ref: (A) Karachi 6489;<sup>2</sup> (B) Islamabad 12993;<sup>3</sup> (C) Islamabad 12983.<sup>4</sup>

1. (C) Entire text

2. Embassy FSN Political Advisor who visited campus of Quaid-i-Azam University November 19, on unrelated mission was warned by Professor [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that small number Iranian students on campus becoming outspokenly anti-American [*less than 1 line not declassified*] handed Advisor broadside published by Iranian students organization giving GOP de facto ultimatum to release their colleagues who were arrested for demonstrating at ConGen Karachi November 16 (reftel A). If no release effected by November 20, flyer says, students "shall not be responsible for any other reactions shown elsewhere."

3. The students' appeal to the GOP is based on Muslim Brotherhood of two countries and on shrill cries against "American imperialism".

4. While [*less than 1 line not declassified*] did not want to overstate the unrest among the Iranian students (and although demand is addressed mainly to GOP), he did want to warn American diplomats in Pakistan that anger is building and could result in some manifestations on or after November 20 if GOP does not release students arrested November 16.

**Hummel**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532-0780. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Kabul, London, New Delhi, and CINCPAC. Sent for information Priority to the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 6489 from Karachi, November 16, the Consulate reported: "Approximately 40 Iranian students who intended demonstrate in front of ConGen Karachi November 16 stopped by police two blocks away from ConGen and taken into detention." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790527-0714, D790544-0726)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 12993 from Islamabad, November 17, the Embassy described anti-American protests and violence in Karachi. A Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs official informed an Embassy official on November 17 of an incident that began when Iranian protesters, prevented from reaching the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, attempted to carry out demonstrations outside the Consul General's residence. Police in Karachi intervened and violence ensued. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790529-0238)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 12983 from Islamabad, November 16, the Embassy reported rumors and stories of impending demonstrations outside the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790527-0664)

**374. Telegram From the Consulate in Lahore to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Lahore, November 20, 1979, 0335Z

1467. Subj: Anti-US Demonstration Dispersed. Ref: (A) Islamabad 12993;<sup>2</sup> (B) Lahore 1456<sup>3</sup> (Notal).

Summary: Demonstration vs. US—prefigured by massive strengthening police protection at USG facilities—turned out to be more Arab than Iranian. Marchers successfully contained by police and were dispersed before reaching goal of American Center. No violence reported.

1. In defiance of martial law restriction on political activity of any sort, procession of 150–200 students, the vast majority Arabs, formed on downtown old campus of Punjab University this morning (November 19) and proceeded along mall. Goal reportedly was USICA's American Center, on Queen's Road. Police, which had strengthened guard significantly around Center and at ConGen and residence in Gulberg since last Thursday (November 15)—Ref. B—brought in further reinforcements and produced a massive show of strength of over 100 police each at Center and ConGen and 40 at residence. Procession was also well attended by police, with police Jeep out front, lines of constables flanking the sides, and further police in back. Procession may have wanted to turn off mall down Queen's Road to Center but at Charing Cross, was deterred from doing so and ultimately dispersed. We have received no reports of attempted violence by the students or application of counter force by police.

2. Situation now quiet. Police guard in process of being reduced to more normal levels at Center, ConGen and residence.

3. Comment: Martial law authorities appear to have been well prepared to contain this demonstration. Police protection of U.S. establishments, including American school, was provided at their initiative and was extensive. Though processions of any sort are prohibited under martial law, police, under direction of Sub-Martial Law Administrator, DIG and DC, decided not to break up procession immediately but to let it wind its way along carefully prescribed channel until it spent itself.

4. Police had led us to believe that demonstration would be largely by Iranian students here—of whom there are an estimated 100,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790533–0913. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information to Karachi and the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 373.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

described as “radical”—and that themes would relate U.S. opposition to Iranian revolution, hostages in Tehran, and extradition of Shah.<sup>4</sup> However, though one Iranian flag and a few Iranian students were seen, most of marchers were Palestinian and other Arabs, many in khefiyahs; the banners and placards were on Palestinian issues; and a large portrait of Arafat was held aloft but reportedly none of Khomeini.

Fuller

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<sup>4</sup> Civil unrest began in Iran in October 1977 and culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty when the Shah fled the country in January 1979. While the new Iranian Government sought his extradition, the Shah was admitted into the United States in October. On November 4, irregular Iranian students seized the Embassy in Tehran and took 52 U.S. diplomats and citizens hostage.

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### 375. Editorial Note

On November 20, 1979, an armed group took control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, withstanding a Saudi military counter-attack. A November 21 article in the *New York Times* reported that the perpetrators were “fundamentalist Moslems believed to be from Iran.” The article cited a United Press International article that reported the Saudi Defense Ministry “blamed the attack on ‘a group of renegades to the Islamic religion’ who had presented one of their number as ‘the promised Messiah.’” (Philip Taubman, “Mecca Mosque Seized by Gunmen Believed to Be Militants From Iran,” *New York Times*, November 21, 1979, p. A1) In telegram 8041 from Jidda, November 21, the Embassy in Saudi Arabia reported: “The Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized by a Saudi religious fanatic, Muhammad Abdallah, 26 years old, a member of the Utayba tribe. He has approx 300 well-armed persons with him, 13 of which have been captured by Saudi authorities. The captured group included at least one Pakistani. There is no rpt no direct relationship with Iran and Muhammad and his followers deny any Khomeini influence in their actions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790536-0257)

In telegram 302084 to Jidda, November 21, the Department of State relayed the following Foreign Broadcast Information Service report of a statement by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that was broadcast by radio in Tehran at 10:30 GMT, November 21: “In the name of God, the



merciful, the compassionate. According to reports received, a group of armed people have attacked the blessed mosque in Mecca and the Imam of the Mosque has been shot. This act is contrary to Islamic principles and, in addition to the fact that the blessed mosque is a Muslim sanctuary, the great Mecca itself is likewise a sanctuary. It is clear that certain criminal hands are trying to split the Muslims and make Islamic revolutions look ugly. It is not farfetched to assume that this act has been perpetrated by the criminal American imperialism so that it can infiltrate the solid ranks of Muslims by such intrigues. Muslims should not cease their alertness; they should expect such foul acts by American imperialism and international Zionism. It would not be farfetched to assume that, as it has often indicated, Zionism intends to make the house of God (Mecca-FBIS) vulnerable and create riots.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790536–0118)

For telegram 8041 from Jidda and additional documentation on the seizure of the Grand Mosque, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 201–203.

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**376. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State and the Consulate in Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, November 21, 1979, 0830Z

13177. 1. At approximately 1245 local time about 330 students, Pakistani and Iranian, from Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, began a demonstration in front of the Embassy. They left briefly, but then, joined by four more busloads, returned. The compound is fairly well protected; students have breached the grounds. Local police are, however, firing shots into the air and tear gas is being used. We have asked for more police.

2. The protesters are shouting slogans against Carter and an alleged American takeover of the Qabba in Mecca.<sup>2</sup> They have burned an Embassy vehicle. More reports later.

**Hummel**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790535–0826. Unclassified; Flash.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 375.

**377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979, 0904Z

302207. Subject: Relay of Message From SY Officer Islamabad to Karachi.

NCOIC provides following: Information concerning death of MSG Steven J. Crowley.

When demonstrations first started NCOIC sounded recall approx 1230 AM. Crowley and other MSGs responded. MSGs assumed regular defensive posts. Crowley and one other MSG was assigned to the north position on the Chancery roof.

2. During this period [demonstrators?] were throwing rocks at Chancery and there was some small arms fire. Approx 1300 hours NCOIC checked all MSG posts. He observed Crowley lying at his post on the roof. Further observation revealed that Crowley had been shot through the head. He was given immediate first aid but died several hours later.

3. Please pass this information to RMO Ronald in Karachi. End text.

**Vance**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790536-0550. Unclassified; Niact Immediate. Drafted and approved in S/S-O.

**378. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Attack on U.S. Embassy Islamabad

U.S. embassy Islamabad reported at 0330 EST that it was under attack by "a mob of unknown persons."<sup>2</sup> One marine was killed.<sup>3</sup> Cars were burned and fires started in the embassy. The extent of damage is unknown. Embassy personnel were evacuated to the secure third floor post command center, however, Ambassador Hummel remains in the residence and in telephone communications with State. Hummel asked for Pak police support and the British subsequently have reported that the Pak army and police are now clearing the compound. According to Hummel they are having little success against the mob. There reportedly was little time for complete destruction of classified material.

Meanwhile, a crowd of 600–800 reportedly is heading toward our consulate in Karachi and there is a radio report that the American Center in Rawalpindi is burning.

These actions reportedly are directly related to the Mecca incident.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5–12/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> No record of the report found; see, however, Document 376.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 377.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 375.

**379. Telegram From the Consulate in Karachi to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Karachi, November 21, 1979, 1130Z

6611. Subject: Anti-US Demonstrations in Pakistan—2.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Our contact in Islamabad reports that observers in American school not far from Embassy compound report fire coming from ground floor motor pool area. Pakistani troops are in area but have apparently not moved against mob. American school observers report, however, some rifle fire.

3. Our contact reports that helicopter (presumably Pak Army) has now landed on roof of Embassy apparently attempting to clear demonstrators from roof.

4. While Ambassador's whereabouts not certain, he is on radio and while apparently not in Chancery may be in his residence. He has gotten through to British Ambassador a request that the latter contact President Zia with request that Embassy compound be cleared to enable staff to resume normal operations.

**Post**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790535-1002. Confidential; Flash.

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**380. Telegram From the Consulate in Karachi to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Karachi, November 21, 1979, 1145Z

6612. Subject: Anti-US Demonstrations in Pakistan—3.

1. Our contact in Islamabad reports that group in Embassy vault area are becoming concerned about supply of oxygen in vault. Contact

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537-0262. Confidential; Flash.

reports British Ambassador has been in touch with President Zia and reports no rpt no concrete result.<sup>2</sup>

2. If Department could establish contact with Zia either directly or indirectly through Embassy Washington, that might help to spur on what appears to our observers in Islamabad to be sluggish GOP response to Embassy take-over by mob. We are trying our best through our contacts but so far aside from report of helicopter on roof our efforts have not been crowned with success.

**Post**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 383.

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**381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Banisadr)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979, 1209Z

302083. To U.S. Charge Bruce Laingen from Iran Working Group.<sup>2</sup> Subject:

1. This is message number 9. Please confirm receipt.

2. Our Embassy in Islamabad has been taken over by a mob which may have been sparked by false repeat false reports of U.S. involvement in an incident yesterday in Mecca. In that incident a group of Muslims took over the Grand Mosque and barricaded themselves inside. It is absolutely essential that Iranian authorities permit no repeat no further such false reports to be broadcast or published in Iran. The U.S. had no repeat no involvement in that incident in any way and any report to the contrary could dangerously inflame already difficult situation in Tehran. Please bring this to attention of your contacts immediately.

3. For your information, Tehran Radio quotes statement issued by Imam Khomeini's office in Qom today which includes following sentence: "It is not farfetched to assume that this act has been perpe-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790535–1044. Unclassified. Drafted by Saunders; cleared in S/S–O; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> Laingen was being held at the Foreign Ministry where he was when students occupied the Embassy in Tehran on November 4.

trated by the criminal American imperialism. So that it can infiltrate the solid ranks of Muslims by such intrigues.”<sup>3</sup>

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 375.

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**382. Message From the White House Situation Room to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979, 1258Z

WH92180. Subject: Anti-US Demonstrations in Pakistan.

Demonstrators are firing through air conditioning duct. Second and third floors of Embassy as well as motor pool are now afire. Helicopter which went to clear roof forced to retire and is now hovering along with another helicopter. Troops are at Embassy but have made no move to intervene apparently having not rpt not been given command to move in. Ambassador has been attempting to persuade authorities in person one General Aktar to intervene, but apparently without success.

2. Islamabad also has had contact with American Center in Rawalpindi, confirms that Center on fire, and reports that they have just lost radio contact with Center. Post

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5-12/79. Confidential. Sent to Wise for delivery to Carter, who was at Camp David. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the message. The message repeats telegram 6613 from Karachi, November 21, except the first sentence, which reads: “Islamabad reports that demonstrators are now beating on door of vault.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790546-0401, D790535-1045)

**383. Telegram From the British Embassy in Washington to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979 1412Z

Please pass following to Iran Task Force, Operations Centre, State Dept. Following received from British Embassy Islamabad.

Begins.

1. I<sup>2</sup> spoke to President Zia at 1710 hours local time. I spoke in strongest terms about British Council destruction in Rawalpindi, lack of extra police at this Embassy, and about the US Embassy, stressing 60 lives at risk in strong room and immediate action required. Army had taken 4 hours to do anything. He needed a battalion on the spot at once.

2. President was full of apologies and assurances that I and my staff would be fully protected. A battalion was being sent at once to clear the area. He blamed the BBC for tendentious report this morning about Shia/Sunni troubles in Mecca.<sup>3</sup> I said that I did not see what relevance that had to attack on US Embassy. He said it had inflamed passions but he agreed that whole episode was disgraceful and he would broadcast to nation tonight saying so. Meanwhile he would do everything possible to bring situation under control as quickly as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790170–1519. Unclassified.

<sup>2</sup> British Ambassador to Pakistan Sir Oliver Forster.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 385.

### 384. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Camp David, November 21, 1979, 10:35 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Call to President Zia

President Carter thanked Zia for effective action Pakistan had taken in saving American lives. President Zia said that he was only doing his duty; as he had told Secretary Vance and Ambassador Hummel,<sup>2</sup> he was aware that relief had been slow in coming but his main objective had been avoidance of bloodshed.

President Carter asked if it was safe in the streets and for Americans in their homes. President Zia responded that everything was "nice and fine." He could guarantee all Americans were safe including one missing family who were probably in hiding.

President Carter said he hoped that Zia would make clear to the people of Pakistan that the U.S. had had no hand in the events in Mecca. Zia replied that he had just made this point in his radio-TV address to the nation. Zia went on to say that BBC<sup>3</sup> and Indian Radio<sup>4</sup> had created the conditions for this trouble through their malicious reporting.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10-12/79. Unclassified. Carter spoke to Zia by telephone from 10:39 to 10:44 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> No other record of these communications was found.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 23186 from London, November 21, transmitted the text of the BBC's November 21 broadcast that announced the attack on the Grand Mosque. The BBC's announcement, according to the telegram, reads: "Communications between Saudi Arabia and the outside world have been cut amid reports of a disturbance in the holy city of Mecca. The reports of the incidents have so far all come from Washington. A State Department spokesman said that a mosque in Mecca had apparently been taken over by a group of people, but their identity was not certain. One report said that armed men were holding hostages in the mosque. The State Department also confirmed reports from Bahrain that communications with Saudi Arabia had been cut for some hours. Muslims throughout the world have been celebrating the first day of the fifteenth century of the Islamic calendar." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537-0704)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 21360 from New Delhi, November 22, the Embassy reported its investigation of the allegation that a remark made by an All India Radio commentator during a November 21 cricket match in Bangalore contributed to the attack on the Embassy in Islamabad. In response to an Embassy inquiry, the All India Radio manager stated: "No remarks or comments of any kind were made during cricket match broadcast which could conceivably have had this effect." Moreover, "In response to ICA query, AIR executives state AIR never carried allegations that Mecca mosque was seized by Americans or other non-Muslims." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537-0704)



President Carter said we will contact India about this directly. He reiterated his own appreciation and that of the American people and said that he looked forward to our continued close relationship.

Zia concluded by saying that Pakistanis are not fanatics despite their closeness to Islam and it is the government's duty to protect foreign embassies especially those of good friends such as the United States. He expressed his great sorrow and that of the Pakistani people over the loss of the life of our marine guard.

President Carter assured Zia that his expression of sympathy would be made known to the American people.

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**385. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1979

SUBJECT

Evening Report (U)

*Pakistan.* The situation is now calm. Some at State are speculating that Zia may have gotten such a black eye from this incident that his military colleagues will use it as an excuse to remove him. I wouldn't go that far yet; it could all blow over. Hummel successfully (and correctly) resisted Vance's efforts to have all Americans evacuated. Dependents and non-essential personnel will, however, be evacuated on Friday. We should keep in mind that the Pak performance in this was far from stellar. Although there is a major military base within 10–15 miles, it took them 4–5 hours to get adequate force on the scene and the rescue was in the nick of time. (100–150 people crowded into a small vault; rioters firing through ventilators in the roof and pounding on the door, and the carpet on the floor beginning to singe from the heat of the burning building.) Our Consul General in Lahore reports that it seemed that the security forces there were under orders to give way rather than risk a confrontation with the mob. (C)

*Radios.* As far as we can tell, the Indians did not broadcast anything inflammatory. BBC juxtaposed two news items (Mecca, U.S. reinforce-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 100, Evening Reports: 9–12/79. Confidential.

ment in Indian Ocean) that could have led fevered minds to the wrong conclusion. VOA carried an item blaming the Mecca incident on Shias; this was badly received among, at least, the Shias in Pakistan. This may have been what Zia was referring to as “malicious attempts to split Islamic sects” during his talk with the President, although he mentioned only BBC and All-India Radio. (C)

*Bangladesh.* Ambassador Schneider is concerned about the situation there, where mob action could break out with little warning. The Government would do all that it could—but that isn’t very much. (C)

*Press Contacts.* DiCola of NBC, at David’s<sup>2</sup> request, for details on the death of the Marine Guard.<sup>3</sup> (U)

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<sup>2</sup> David Aaron.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 377.

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### 386. Situation Report Prepared by the Pakistan Working Group<sup>1</sup>

No. 3

Washington, November 22, 1979

Situation in Pakistan as of 0400 EST, November 22, 1979

At mid-day, Islamabad was reported calm and adequate security protection appeared to be in place. Martial law authorities had reportedly denied a student request for permission to hold a procession in protest for the deaths of demonstrators at the Embassy. The Embassy had, however, received unconfirmed reports that crowds were gathering again in Lahore and that some American residences might be under attack. The Ambassador has contacted martial law authorities and the MFA and received assurances of adequate protection. At last report the MFA had told the Embassy that all Americans were safe.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 23, 11/29/79–12/4/1979. Confidential. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the report. The report was repeated in telegram 302839 to all diplomatic and consular posts, November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790538–0002) The Pakistan Working Group was established in the State Department Operations Center on November 21 under the direction of Saunders. (Telegram 302263 to all Near Eastern, South Asian, and European posts, November 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790536–0647)

During a search of the compound, a badly charred body was found in the apartment of Warrant Officer Brian Ellis, who had earlier been identified as the only remaining missing Amcit. Positive identification may be impossible in the absence of dental records which we have not yet located. The strong presumption is that the body is that of Ellis, and a wire service is carrying the story of his death.

The bodies of two Pakistani employees were found in the basement of the Chancery. Funeral services will be held later in the day.

After a thorough check, the Embassy has determined that there was no compromise of classified material. All safes remain locked. The compound remains under Pakistan Army guard, and the Officer-in-Charge denied access to a Soviet Embassy vehicle earlier in the day. The RSO has requested TDY assistance to support his efforts to secure and dispose of classified material. The Consulate in Lahore was not entered by the mob and as of COB November 21 the building remained secure.

The Secretary has ordered an evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel. A Pan Am commercial charter 747 is scheduled to arrive in Islamabad Friday morning local time to pick up those departing. Evacuees from Lahore will arrive in Islamabad on a chartered Fokker aircraft Thursday evening. Evacuees from Peshawar plan to drive down in the early morning hours Friday. The Pan Am charter will refuel in Karachi and pick up additional Americans. It is scheduled to arrive at Dulles at 10:00 p.m. Friday, November 23. Some private Amcits have requested space and may be accommodated at the Ambassador's discretion. Some personnel from Karachi will be departing by commercial aircraft.

Ambassador Hummel has drawn up a list of non-essential personnel and will be transmitting it through British Embassy channels. At this point, we do not know the numbers.

The remains of Sgt. Crowley may be transported on the charter aircraft to Frankfurt where embalming and mandatory formalities will require a minimum delay of 48 hours. The remains will be flown to the U.S. no earlier than Monday on a military aircraft. The family has not yet decided on the place of burial. We are in touch with the White House on ceremonial arrangements.

The Ambassador has set up temporary office quarters in the A.I.D. building. Present plans are to relocate the Embassy in these quarters, which housed the Embassy before the new Chancery was constructed. An emergency communications package which had been pre-placed in Athens for use in Tehran will be flown in for installation in these temporary quarters.

The Ambassador has briefed the eight or ten American correspondents in Islamabad. He limited his comments to a factual discussion of

events and avoided speculation on GOP motivations or of the adequacy and speed of the government's response. He warns, however, that these correspondents will be filing articles very critical of the GOP's performance. The *Time/Washington Star* correspondent, Marsha Gauger, was in the vault during the siege and heard the repeated radio calls for reinforcements. The Embassy has prepared a full report on this aspect of the events and will forward it by immediate cable along with a summary of the Ambassador's comments to the press.<sup>2</sup>

The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps (the FRG Ambassador) plans to convene a meeting of his colleagues today or tomorrow to consider a joint demarche. The expectation is that the Diplomatic Corps will register a strong protest over the lack of protection of American facilities.<sup>3</sup>

**Robert Peck**

*Pakistan Working Group*

**George Becker**

*Senior Watch Officer*

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<sup>2</sup> Not found. According to telegram 13238 from Islamabad, November 29, the report with Hummel's comments to the press was entitled "Islamabad No. 8" and dated November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790549-0467)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 389.

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### **387. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1979

1. *Pakistan*: The evacuation is proceeding smoothly with the Pan Am charter, which will be met by Dave Newsom, scheduled to arrive at Dulles at 8:45 tonight. We are establishing a processing center at State tomorrow morning to assist with funds, travel arrangements, and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 11/79. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum.

administrative and personnel problems. The remains of Marine Sgt. Crowley and Warrant Officer Ellis are scheduled to be brought back on a special military transport early next week.<sup>2</sup>

There were no further significant demonstrations in Pakistan today, although some groups were threatening marches to protest the student deaths at the Embassy. Demonstrations at our Embassy in Dacca and Consulate General in Calcutta were contained by police. Ambassadors Goheen and Schneider closed our Embassies and Consulates in India and Bangladesh today as a precautionary measure.

Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi has told Ambassador Hummel that an investigatory commission will be established to look into the GOP's handling of the attack on American facilities. He asked, and Hummel agreed, that we cooperate in the investigation. He also offered full compensation for the damage to the Embassy.<sup>3</sup>

Pakistan's Ambassador to the US Sultan Muhammad Khan was called in to State by Deputy Assistant Secretary Constable. Constable reiterated your and my appreciation for the assistance provided by the Pakistan Government. At the same time he noted the importance we attach to the Commission's inquiry into the response to our requests for help in rescuing our personnel trapped in the Embassy.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "We must work out for each nation a plan to defend diplomatic. We should prepare thru St, DoD, NSC a specific proposal for every country."

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 303414 to all diplomatic and consular posts, November 23, the Department reported Hummel's November 22 discussion with Shahi. During the meeting, Shahi "categorically denied that any Pakistan radio had ever broadcast hints that the US or Israel had been responsible for the Mecca attack." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790539–0091)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 305314 to the British Embassy in Washington, November 24, the Department reported Constable and Sultan Khan's November 23 meeting. During the discussion: "Stressing the need for quick reaction forces, Constable noted that had help arrived early when the demonstrators were still outside the Embassy, the ensuing tragedy might have been averted. Constable also expressed concern over the absolutely untrue statement in the quasi-official 'Pakistan Times' that Marines had fired on the crowd and thereby provoked the rioters. He stated categorically that no American weapons were fired during the entire episode." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790542–0693)

### 388. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, November 26, 1979, 1010Z

13188. Subject: Update on 22 Nov. Report.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Following updates long telegram summarizing 21 Nov. developments and is based on info not available at that time.

(A) Arrival GOP forces: German Amb<sup>3</sup> visited compound at 1500 and 1700 on 21st in capacity Dean of Corps. He tried to enter building to speak with those inside but could not enter doors because of fire. Building surrounded by student age demonstrators everywhere, some with guns and with little indication much organization. Police outnumbered on both occasions and army nowhere in sight. (Separate MFA source reports fire brigade did not get to building until at 1800 because of fear of violence, that truckloads of demonstrators were spewing onto compound, most from Pindi, at 1500–1600 period, and that army numbers were not sufficient to enter compound until after 1700. Source also says some demonstrators were still in building as roof evacuation began.)

(B) Non-Pakistani involvement: Persian-speaking Emb officers manning inside of roof hatch believe language being used by determined band on outside was Arabic, in addition to Urdu; no Persian spoken. Army sources say interrogation of 6 demonstrators suggests Pak students involved covered Pak political spectrum but real hardcore activists were mainly Iranians and Palestinians.

(C) Third floor: Contrary to earlier report, evidence now suggests demonstrators at one time controlled whole building with exception of vault area.

(D) FSN deaths: Two FSN bodies were found on ground floor at opposite end of building from third (top) floor vault in which remaining FSN's and US staff, plus Time correspondent sheltered on 21st. They were part of group of 4 FSN's plus Vallejo (FBO officer) who were trapped in GSO spaces by swiftness of developments. Others involved there escaped with injuries (one broken leg); the phone operator and telex operator, both males, stayed at their stations in offices on same floor until around 1530 before they too made good their escape.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790544–1006. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Karachi.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Ulrich Scheske.

(E) All India Radio (AIR): Ref. to AIR interruption of cricket broadcast with Khomeini remarks 21 Nov. reported in long summary sent 22 Nov, remains subject of controversy and denials; it should be regarded with suspicion, although Paks still refer to it as fact.<sup>4</sup>

3. Request this update and basic 22 Nov report be summarized to posts in neighboring countries.

4. Dept. should be aware also that Time correspondent here has been told two full pages of this week's edition will be given over to her minute-by-minute account from inside the vault.<sup>5</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 384.

<sup>5</sup> See "Flames Engulf the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan" and "'You Could Die Here,'" *Time*, December 3, 1979, pp. 26–27.

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### **389. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, November 28, 1979, 1102Z

13220. Subject: (C) Diplomatic Corps Protest and Demarche to GOP.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. Dean of Dip Corps Islamabad (FRG Amb Scheske) called meeting of Corps Nov 24 to get concurrence in demarche to GOP protesting inadequate security in Islamabad area and also slow GOP response to events at AmEmbassy Nov 21. Amb Hummel did not stimulate this action and did not see draft until few minutes before meeting. Amb did give oral briefing to meeting of Corps at their request.

3. As authorized by Dip Corps, FRG Amb made oral demarche to FonSec Shahnawaz Nov 25, left aide memoire, and asked for meeting with Pres. Zia, which has yet to take place. Shahnawaz was quote defensive and not forthcoming about GOP security shortcomings. FRG Amb is not rpt not distributing to Corps text of aide memoire because to do so would cause leak of its sharp language to press that would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790547–0952. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

detract from prospect for constructive GOP response. FRG has given Embassy one copy. Please hold closely in Washington.

4. Begin text: "As Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Islamabad I have been asked by the Corps to make the strongest protest at the events of 21st November when the American Embassy and residential compound, as well as the British Council Library, the American Cultural Centre and other American buildings in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and elsewhere in the country were burnt down.

"The savage attack on the US Embassy building and the killing of four members of the Embassy staff are ample evidence that adequate protection was not provided by the competent authorities. Conspicuous was the lack of any warning by the authorities about the preparation of the attack, the obvious weakness and helplessness of the police forces deployed around the Embassy buildings, the absence of any timely efforts by the fire brigade to extinguish the fire and the belated appearance of military forces on the scene. No provision was made to cordon off the roads leading to the US Embassy in order to stop further demonstrators arriving from Rawalpindi. All the actions that were eventually taken came too late to prevent total destruction of the Embassy and loss of life.

"Some events are still shrouded in mystery and need clarification:

—Why was it not possible to give some warning of the likelihood of an attack?

—Why did the Army operation to clear the premises of the US Embassy only start so long after the attack?

—Why have no arrests been announced so far in connection with the events? It cannot be difficult for the Martial Law authorities to identify those responsible.

"The events of 21st November which were witnessed by several diplomats, have grave implications for the whole Diplomatic Corps in Islamabad and must give rise to concern over their future safety.

"I do not need to draw your attention to the fact that in international law the host government bears the full responsibility for the security of the Diplomatic Corps. In this connection, the Diplomatic Corps has noted with satisfaction the concern expressed and the assurances given by His Excellency the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

"The Diplomatic Corps recalls the suggestions made earlier by the Dean to improve the security of the Corps and is of the opinion that full and adequate protection should be given to the life and property of the Diplomatic Corps as well as to foreign institutions in Pakistan.

"The Diplomatic Corps requests that these measures should be implemented immediately and I would like your confirmation that this has been done. Islamabad 24th November 1979".

**Hummel**



**390. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, November 30, 1979, 0900Z

13255. Subject: (C) Political Implications of Mob Attack on US Embassy.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: Ripples of 21 Nov mob madness at USEmb Islamabad are spreading widely. Various inquiries are underway in GOP, heads will roll in Army and police, and fair number of student demonstrators already 'helping police with their enquiries.' We attempt in this report to make preliminary assessment of implications of events of 21st on political standing of Zia regime. End summary.

3. Mob destruction of USEmb compound in Islamabad on 21 Nov with neither warning nor conspicuous GOP quelling success, has important political implications for Martial Law Administration (MLA) of Pres./Gen/Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Zia ul-Haq. While there have been disturbances at times during nearly 30 months of Zia govt., at no time since July 1977—even during final days of Bhutto saga—have martial law proscriptions against demonstrations so thoroughly broken down. This has to be ominous for any regime which rests on martial law, all more so when it is obvious that effectiveness at the center, i.e. in Rawalpindi/Islamabad area, was noticeably less than at province level where attempts to attack Consulates were firmly blunted. Reluctance of regime to fire on student demonstrators at USEmb—however understandable in terms of disparity in numbers, etc.—adds to picture of MLA which in this instance demonstrated [garble] and inefficiency and which has left some doubt about its willingness to face down students if necessary.

4. Difficulty for Zia in coming to grips with implications of 21 Nov. events is that two of his most important constituencies—the Army and the "Islamics"—are involved.

5. Neither the Army nor the police had a plan for dealing with an unprecedented mob scene like the 21st in Pakistan's normally bucolic capital city. College students here number in hundreds, not thousands, bazaars are not mass dwelling and working areas they are in other South Asian cities, and Rawalpindi, a typical Punjabi cantonment town of more than one-half million, is insulated from capital by several miles of open country. Although highest levels of govt. and military were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0783, D790550–1133. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

repeatedly made aware throughout afternoon of dimensions of mob action and precise danger facing trapped Americans in Chancery and in compound, both police and Army were too little and too late, behind the power curve all day long.

6. We now know that responsibility for capital area was with Punjab, not federal, govt. We understand that will change—a sub-MLA for Islamabad has been named—but efficiency of Army remains suspect. This brings home suggestion from some that not only has Martial Law period sapped Army's energies in terms of traditional Army role but—combined with serious equipment shortages—it has badly affected Army's ability to do anything very well. As Army Chief, Zia must deal directly with this by demonstrating efficiency and retaining Army support (it cannot be made scapegoat) while nonetheless punishing those found wanting; and he must do this with due regard for views of his senior colleagues, some of whom reportedly lay lack of reaction to 21 Nov events at his door.

7. With 'Islamics' Zia task is equally tricky. Conservative Islamic organizations, like the highly disciplined Jamaat-i-Islami and its military student wing, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, provided the shock troops which eventually brought Bhutto's government to its knees in spring of 1977. They endorsed military takeover in July 1977 and have been in the vanguard of public support for MLA since then, including even willingness to serve as Ministers in Zia government. 'Islamics' support Zia's dedication to process of Islamization of Pakistani society and legal system, and they were not unhappy with Zia's decision, in mid-October 1979, to postpone elections and toughen up martial law.<sup>2</sup>

8. Although strongly Sunni in their approach, home-grown 'Islamics' are alive to the pan-Islamic currents sweeping out from Iran, among other places, and are determined to keep Pakistan apace with trends. Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba took a prominent, even leading role—with Iranian and Palestinian students and other not-so-academic organizations—in whipping up student fervor on morning of 21st. Jamaat-i-Islami leadership will be very sensitive to actions Zia might take to punish those whose guilt and complicity are proved. They have potential for organizing public backlash against Zia regime itself.

9. Attention will no doubt focus on prospects for renewed demonstrations in next few weeks. Iran-US confrontation will keep sensitivities aroused at least through end of Muharram in mid-December, if Tehran hostages are not released by then. Regime's ability to keep order may well be tested anew, and disorder could focus more directly

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 367.

on MLA, especially if police and Army are forced to kill some demonstrators or security forces are again found wanting.

10. In the longer run, attention appears to focus, for Zia, on period beginning March 1980, when the long-awaited, big decisions on governance, MLA re-organization, and the [garble] are promised. Zia himself will be tested in the coming months, and come March—if not before—it could well be his own future as CMLA and head of state which will be up for decision.

11. Department pls repeat to New Delhi, Karachi, and other possible addressees.

Hummel

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**391. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, December 2, 1979, 1315Z

13275. Subj: (S) Contacts With Paks—GOP Attitudes. Ref: Islamabad 13255.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text. Protect FGI.

2. We are seeing evidence of genuine Pak fears for future, domestically within Pakistan and in the region. Strangely and disappointingly, I have not been offered substantive contacts with high MFA officials for a week, except for numerous contacts by phone and meetings relating to security of Americans. However, these and other contacts clearly indicate great uncertainty on Pak side.

(A) Paks are worried that despite U.S. protestation of desire to continue full relations, in fact Americans are steadily pulling out and reducing both presence and programs. When further reductions take place, as I shall suggest to Dept tomorrow, this fear will be strengthened and will add to Pak concerns in next para.

(B) As Agha Shahi clearly foreshadowed to me (reftel)<sup>3</sup> Paks are preeminently concerned that US military action against Iran, or even

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790571–0297, D790555–0738. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 390.

<sup>3</sup> The reference telegram (see footnote 2 above) does not indicate any communication between Hummel and Shahi.

imminent threat of same, will place GOP in position of being forced to line up with Islamic world against USG. What we hear of internal debates at highest levels of GOP highlight urgent need to solve Tehran hostage problem so Paks are not forced in Islamic direction this leadership does not want. Following quote contains near-verbatim text of appeal from ISID (Milintell) Chief LGen. Akhtar, through Chief of Station, to me and to USG. It is not clear to what extent Akhtar speaks for others; he did not say he spoke for President Zia, and my surmise is that he represents other high-ranking generals without direct order from Zia. Begin quote—Lt. General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, Director of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and a close confidant of President Zia ul-Haq, made the following comments to a senior American Embassy officer on 2 December, just after returning from a meeting with President Zia and his senior advisors.

—The Government of Pakistan (GOP) is deeply concerned at the present crisis between Iran and the U.S. over the hostage situation. Recent U.S. moves such as bringing a third aircraft carrier into the area and the U.S. threat to use force are contributing to increased tension. Pakistan is deeply concerned because the use of force will have a disastrous effect on GOP efforts to maintain internal stability and control divisive elements in Pakistan. Also, because the use of force will cause an irrevocable break between Iran and the U.S., destabilize the whole area and create opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the area—all of which are contrary to Pakistan's security and national interest.

—The GOP is fully committed to protect U.S. diplomats in Pakistan and is determined to do all possible to maintain a U.S. presence. The use of force by the U.S. against Iran will cause reactions in Pakistan which will be difficult to control.

—Pakistan is willing to do anything to defuse the present tense situation. President Zia is prepared to take any action which will assist the U.S., including a visit to Iran to talk to Khomeini to seek some face saving situation for both sides. Zia realizes Khomeini may not accept him but Zia's senior advisors believe something must be done and are willing to consider any move which will assist. End quote.

(C) Almost equally strong is GOP's feeling that further disorders, if they come, will in fact be attacks on Zia's govt as much as on foreign targets. Failures of security Nov 21 and to some extent since have shaken GOP's confidence that it can survive widespread disorders, whether triggered by external events or by domestic unrest.

3. This complex of worries is causing considerable paralysis within GOP. Zia has so far not responded to urgent request of Dean of Diplomatic Corps a week ago for meeting to discuss past GOP failures Nov.

21 and future security measures.<sup>4</sup> I have waited in vain for any Cabinet-level officer to come to view the destruction of Chancery compound. This morning, I gave direct suggestion that in Paks' own interests a very high level visitor, perhaps Pres. Zia himself, should make such a visit (unpublicized if they wish) so as to avoid inevitable future criticism of Pak Govt inattention (start of cleanup of compound begins tomorrow or Tuesday).<sup>5</sup> Result is that Minister of Interior Haroon, a holdover from early cabinets [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will visit, which is hardly satisfactory. As Chief of Protocol observed to me when I suggested Zia visit, Zia did visit burnt-out Catholic convent school in Rawalpindi, and he should also visit U.S. Embassy.

4. I have very little to say to Zia at this point and would like guidance about requesting appointment with him. I doubt that there is anything useful I can say about possible U.S. military actions west of Pakistan but perhaps Dept can formulate something. I do not know either whether we want to see if Zia is willing, as Lt. Gen. Akhtar claims he is, to go to see Khomeini to urge release of hostages and rational discussion of US-Iranian differences. I could of course probe Zia about domestic tensions he is worried about, but that should not be sole purpose of such a meeting. Phil Habib should be prepared to say what can be said about all these subjects, but I want to try for earlier meeting than Dec 9, when Phil arrives,<sup>6</sup> or later, providing there is enough substance for my discussion.

5. If we have anything to say to Zia and the Pak Govt on these related issues, now may well be the right time to do so.

6. FYI. I still need accurate, legal language from Dept. to use with GOP, representing USG understanding of Zia's offer of "full compensation" for damage.

**Hummel**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 389.

<sup>5</sup> December 4.

<sup>6</sup> Habib's proposed trip was postponed.

392. Memorandum Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 6, 1979

1. *Zia Speaks on Iran and U.S.*: During conversations yesterday with Ambassador Hummel and his senior aides, President Zia voiced his support of the U.S. in its current difficulties with Iran and again expressed his sorrow about the embassy burning. On the Iranian situation, Zia stated that the President should show "his teeth," i.e., a bit of power, and that "not every Tom, Dick and Harry could be allowed to mock the U.S. as Qadhafi had done with his behavior over the attack on the American embassy in Tripoli."<sup>2</sup> However, the U.S. should not use military force now against the Iranians. Later it might be entirely justified, and Zia might then privately approve the use of force. While emphasizing that Pakistan's geographic proximity to Iran necessitated certain accommodations, Pakistan would endeavor to reestablish its lines of communications with the Iranian foreign ministry and assist us in diplomatic channels. Zia advised us that we should put more pressure on the USSR to make more forthright statements in support of respect for international law. Hummel observes that while Zia did not seem eager to take a personal initiative with the Iranian authorities as some of his advisers had hinted privately, this initiative may yet bear fruit after other Pakistani officials consider it. As for our bilateral relations and the effect of the embassy attack on them, Zia made it clear that Pakistan assumed full responsibility not only for all damages to all our facilities but for restoration of them to their original shape and form.<sup>3</sup> (Islamabad 13371 NODIS,<sup>4</sup> PSN 37210) (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 23, 12/5/79–12/9/1979. Secret. Carter wrote "Zbig, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 310572 to all NEA posts, December 2, the Department reported: "1030 local time December 2, demonstrators broke into Embassy at Tripoli, Libya. Chancery on fire. All Americans got out safely. Most classified documents, material destroyed. All posts should take full precautions immediately. With Shah's departure from New York for San Antonio, this could be very difficult period." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790555–0275)

<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "Let them do so".

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 13371 from Islamabad, December 5, Hummel reported his December 5 meeting with Zia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2142, P850040–2147, N790009–0648)

**393. Record of a Meeting of an Interagency Working Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 7, 1979

A PRC Working Group (NSC, State, CIA, DOD/ISA, JCS) met at the White House on December 7, to consider the non-nuclear aspects of U.S.-Pakistani relations. (S)

*Political*

The meeting opened with a discussion of where Pakistan is headed. It was generally agreed that the U.S. has, at most, minor influence on the course of events in Pakistan and that course, in the longer term, is threatening. Our policy operates within two constraints: for the short-term, at least, we need to maintain a significant, if reduced, involvement with Pakistan in order to further our various interests there. We do not want to look as if we are abandoning Pakistan. In the longer-term, however, we expect Zia to fall and do not want to go down with him as we did in Iran with the Shah. (It was pointed out, however, that the Iranian model may not be relevant. The opposition in Pakistan is criticizing us for doing too little for their country, rather than too much for Zia.) It was generally agreed that there is very little pro-American sentiment left in Pakistan, especially among younger people. (S)

State will prepare a study along these lines that can serve as background for the next PRC on Pakistan. (C)

*Security*

State proposed that there be no more *ship visits* to Karachi until at least the end of the Iranian problem. DOD has no requirements for the next month or two, barring unforeseen emergencies. The matter will be reviewed again early in 1980. (S)

The sale of *Gearing destroyers* is probably moot. Congress has reportedly decided that these ships should be kept in the Naval Reserve. In any event, there was not much enthusiasm for the sale at this time. (C)

There was general support for a State proposal to permit the sale of equipment required for the last stages of the Pakistani *tank rehabilitation*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 1/80. Secret. The record was sent to Brzezinski under a December 10 covering memorandum from Thornton, who noted that he had chaired the meeting and suggested that Brzezinski "might want to read the first two sections." Thornton continued: "Generally, the outcome is that we put things on hold until we have a better fix on just what the Paks did and did not do on November 21. We should have that in a week or so and there is nothing that urgently needs doing before then." "ZB Has Seen" is stamped in the upper right-hand corner of Thornton's memorandum. (Ibid.)

program (about \$400,000). There has been no stop in the *military sales pipeline*, but State is informally holding all *new requests for sales* until we have a clearer idea of just what happened at (and the Pak role in) the Embassy burning. This will take two weeks at most. If State wants to continue the hold beyond that time, we will consider the matter further. State and DOD will look into the status of possible Pakistani requirements for *riot control equipment* (e.g. tear gas). While this could be useful for protection of embassies, there are serious dangers that it would be used in domestic political strife. NSC asked that there be no such sales without further consultation. The question of the sale of a *destroyer tender* was left unsettled. Unless DOD poses an objection, this sale will also be held up pending the outcome of the review of the Embassy burning. (S)

We will hold off on *security consultations under the 1959 agreement* until the Iranian situation is more stable. (S)

#### *Economic*

PL-480 negotiating instructions should be readied by early January. At NSC request, a hold has been put on discussing them with the Pakistanis. NSC will look into this further. (S)

It was agreed that the *human rights* problems that we have been having with Pakistani loans from the IFIs are not affected by the burning of the Embassy and all agencies will support a positive vote on the two agreements coming up in January. (S)

The *AID pipeline* of some \$64 million continues to flow and will do so at least until 1982. It was questioned, however, whether a staff of over 28 people in Islamabad is not excessive for this. (See below.) (S)

State finds that the recent Pak arrangement with the IMF does not meet the criteria that would warrant a *debt rescheduling* exercise.<sup>2</sup> NSC asked if State could consult a bit with Treasury and others to see if we couldn't use this partial step as an opening for some preemptive discussions between the Pakistanis and their creditors. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 13117 from Islamabad, November 20, the Embassy reported the details of the deal made between Pakistan and the IMF, in which Pakistan agreed to a program of fiscal restraint and no devaluation of its currency in exchange for IMF financial assistance. The Embassy commented: "The deal with the Fund will probably permit Pakistan to get through the year narrowly without defaulting, selling gold or other drastic steps." Noting, however, that the deal was "only a first tranche arrangement on soft terms in which the Fund acquiesced when the GOP balked at a stabilization program," the Embassy reported the doubt of a member of the IMF negotiating team that Pakistan "would in fact live up to its budgetary commitments and said the Fund would have to depend on the donors to maintain pressure." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534-0462)



*Staffing*

In addition to reservations about the size of the AID mission, it was suggested that the DAO/ODRP offices, already scheduled to be merged, might be reduced in size from the present combined level of about 15 persons. It was generally agreed that the present reduced staffing pattern would provide useful background against which to judge permanent staffing needs. State also said that it proposes to move most of the regional offices out of Karachi. Although many of these moves have been triggered by the events of November 21, most agreed that staff reductions in Embassy Islamabad and Karachi seemed to make good management sense. Both institutions seem to reflect an earlier period of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Nobody saw this, however, as a punitive exercise against the Pakistanis. (S)

*PRC*

There was considerable doubt about the wisdom of holding a PRC as early as mid-December on the Pakistani nuclear question. The matter will be reviewed.<sup>3</sup> (NSC action.) (S)

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<sup>3</sup> In his December 10 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton noted: "The group was skeptical about holding a PRC on Pakistani nuclear matters following Gerry Smith's return. There don't seem to be many decisions to make in that area, and there is nothing of PRC quality in the attached paper. I suggest that we hold off until we have the outcome of the study of the Embassy fire. There will probably be some significant issues arising from that; together with the nuclear items, they might make an adequate menu for the PRC." (See footnote 1 above) The PRC met on December 27; see Document 397.

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#### **394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan and Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 26, 1979, 2314Z

331577. Subject: Soviet Move Into Afghanistan.

1. (Secret–Entire text)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to all NATO capitals, Kuwait, New Delhi, Dacca, Beijing, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in EUR, S/MS, IO, and S/S and by Saunders; approved by Newsom.

2. We have reports of a large scale Soviet airlift into Kabul on December 25–26 suggesting that the Soviets have begun to move additional combat units with field equipment, e.g., field kitchens, ambulances, etc., into Afghanistan. The airlift, possibly involving several hundred aircraft to Kabul and elsewhere, is apparently continuing. Continued mobilization of Soviet forces north of the Afghan border suggests that this airlift may be a precursor to the movement of even larger units across the border. The buildup of ground forces and the massing of airborne units in areas adjacent to Afghanistan probably amounts to at least five divisions and there are indications of further mobilization beyond this level.<sup>2</sup>

3. For Islamabad: Ambassador should inform the GOP at highest available level of the information in para 2 and seek any confirmation it may have. We note from press that Agha Shahi has left for Tehran. Request that GOP urgently pass information to Shahi and ask him to raise issue with Ghotbzadeh and others with whom he has contact. If GOP concurs in our view that these developments are a threat to Iran or the region, it may wish to have Shahi convey this thought to Khomeini on GOP behalf along following lines:

The substantial increase in Soviet troops in Afghanistan could pose a threat to Iran and to Iran's revolution. Khomeini should now consider seriously whether the prolongation of his confrontation with the United States is in the interest of Iran or his revolution. The United States, before the seizure of the hostages, was prepared to seek satisfactory relations with the Revolutionary Government. It is now in the wider interests of Iran and of Islam for the Revolutionary Government to reconsider its position on the hostages in the face of new and potentially threatening Soviet moves.<sup>3</sup>

4. For Belgrade: Please share info para. 2 with GOY at an appropriately high level and request any confirmation from their sources. You should also suggest that GOY consider instructing its representative in Tehran to discuss this information with key Iranian contacts, suggesting

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<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the December 26–27 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and U.S. actions in the immediate aftermath, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 93–117.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 15280 from Islamabad, December 27, Hummel described Shahnawaz's reaction after Hummel carried out his instructions from Washington. According to Hummel, Shahnawaz was "instantly receptive to idea of passing on to Shahi such information" about the situation in Afghanistan. However, Hummel noted: "As for specifically using information on Soviet actions to persuade Iranian Government to reconsider its position on hostages, he said this will be very tricky. He agreed to convey U.S. request urgently to Shahi but emphasized that using info about Soviet actions to assist on hostage issue will require most 'delicate' handling lest Iranians 'smell' U.S. hand causing effort to turn counter-productive." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2161, N790010–0455)

that a release of the hostages at this time would help Iran and the world concentrate on the larger threat to regional security and principles of non-alignment posed by this naked show of Soviet force in Afghanistan. FYI: We will be making a similar approach to Yugoslav Ambassador here. End FYI.

Vance

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### 395. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Pakistani President Zia<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 28, 1979, 1:42–1:50 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Carter  
President Zia of Pakistan

The President opened the call with an exchange of holiday greetings.

*President Carter* expressed concern about the latest development in Afghanistan and stressed the importance of strengthening U.S.-Pakistani relations. We should consult at various levels and the U.S. should expedite delivery of the military equipment that Pakistan has ordered. We should put aside differences that have caused concern in the past and move expeditiously to strengthen our mutual resolve against further Soviet intrusions into Southern Asia.

*President Carter* reported that European leaders had said this is one of the most serious Soviet actions since the take-over of Czechoslovakia. He solicited President Zia's reaction and asked what the U.S. could do to help Pakistan.

*President Zia* expressed his gratitude for U.S. concern for Pakistan which is now about to face the Soviet onslaught. He confirmed President Carter's assessment of the situation. President Zia had recently completed a detailed discussion of the situation which concluded that,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10–12/79. Confidential. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter spoke to Zia from the second floor residence at the White House from 1:35 to 1:43 p.m.; the Daily Diary also indicates that the conversation took place on a conference line and that Thornton was a party to the call. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

beyond the intrusion of Soviet troops, the overthrow of the Amin regime is a direct involvement of the Soviet Union in a country bordering Pakistan.

*President Carter* reassured Zia that he has a friend here and we are eager to help in any way possible.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. wants to continue detente and progress on SALT. But we cannot afford to stand mute and let the Soviets take this very serious action with impunity and without political consequences. We will take our case concerning the hostages in Iran to the UNSC tomorrow. Other countries—Pakistan or others—should raise this issue of Soviet intrusion publicly or even, later on, in the UN. We will probably meet this weekend with our NATO allies to discuss the Afghan situation.

*President Zia* said it is right to think on those lines. Pakistan considers itself an ally and a great friend of the United States. Our past association contains many instances of mutual respect and assistance according to our capabilities. It is encouraging that the U.S. is still the torchbearer of the free world. We consider ourselves members of the free world and look to the U.S. as a beacon. What has happened in Afghanistan is delicate, tragic and most significant in this part of the world. Tomorrow it could be Pakistan.

*President Carter* suggested that Warren Christopher could come to Pakistan in the next few days to talk with Zia, if that were desirable.

*President Zia* recalled the pleasure of meeting Christopher,<sup>3</sup> an old friend, and promised to give his reaction to the idea tomorrow through Ambassador Hummel.

*President Carter* invited President Zia to come to visit to discuss matters of mutual concern. When Zia decides that would be advantageous our foreign ministers could work out arrangements.

*President Zia* expressed his appreciation and said it would be a great honor to meet the President of the U.S. He promised to arrange mutually convenient dates.

*President Carter* said he would have Secretary Vance tell Hummel to expect an answer on the Christopher trip.

The conversation concluded with best wishes on both sides.

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<sup>2</sup> In an undated memorandum to Brzezinski regarding the 1959 U.S.-Pakistani bilateral agreement, Thornton noted that Carter "implicitly affirmed" the agreement during his telephone conversation with Zia. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 57, NSC-026, 01/02/80, Afghanistan Invasion, Christopher Brown, Pakistan/Afghanistan/China)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 325.

**396. Memorandum Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 28, 1979

1. *Reassuring Pakistan*: In response to Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz' very pessimistic interpretation of events in Afghanistan, Ambassador Hummel recommends that Washington consider sending a quick message to the Paks to reassure them of U.S. concern and determination to prevent further Soviet expansion in this, or other, regions. Hummel urges that he be authorized to reaffirm to the highest levels of the GOP our continuing commitment to Pakistan's integrity and sovereignty, and possibly also formally request a consultation as envisaged under the 1959 bilateral. Hummel notes that such a demarche would have even greater impact if part of what he was instructed to say were cast in the form of a letter from the President to President Zia, expressing concern about the December 25–28 events in Kabul and soliciting Pakistan's views about the meaning of these developments.<sup>2</sup> Hummel believes we have exhausted the efficacy of oral diplomatic assurances, and that Pakistani paranoia and anxiety will rise in the absence of tangible follow-up actions which demonstrate that our interest in the security of the region is matched by a capability to respond to new threats. The ambassador also thinks that our failure to use Pakistan as one vehicle in our response to the Soviet actions in Kabul will produce a new set of pressures in Pakistan and the whole region for a further dilution to ties with a seemingly helpless U.S., and for a further accommodation with Soviet power. (Islamabad 15303 NODIS, PSN 9875)<sup>3</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 10–12/79. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: "Called Zia—offered to send Warren. Pledged our support. J." See Document 395.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 15303 from Islamabad, December 28, Hummel reported his December 28 meeting with Shahnawaz. After describing Shahnawaz's alarm at events in Afghanistan, Hummel made a plea and offered a draft text for a Presidential letter that would reassure Pakistan of U.S. support. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2162, N800001–0001) Telegram 15303 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 104.

**397. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*NSC Activities*

*SCC on Pakistan, India and Developments in Afghanistan*

The PRC met last evening to discuss our relations with Pakistan and India, and the implications of recent events in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> The recommendations of the meeting will have significant impact on our arms sales and non-proliferation policies. With regard to *Pakistan*, we agreed to substantially liberalize our arms supply policy, provide more refugee assistance through the UN, press forward with a PL 480 agreement, and dispatch a high-level mission to Pakistan to reduce Pakistan's sense of isolation and strengthen our relationship. The mission would also discuss expansion of covert cooperation in Afghanistan—a matter that will be discussed at an SCC today.<sup>3</sup> We agreed that something should be done to remove the nuclear impediment in our relationship—including perhaps changes in existing legislation. We agreed with regard to *India* to liberalize our military sales policy, send a high-level mission following their elections and (pending ACDA concurrence) recommend that you authorize the first pending shipment for Tarapur and send the second to the NRC. (S)

State will act on your instruction to get other countries to weigh in with the Soviets on Afghanistan. We will not raise the matter in the UN, however, lest it distract attention from the hostage issue. We did not come to any other conclusions on dealing with the Soviets on Afghanistan; those questions will be pursued further at today's NSC.<sup>4</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily [*less than 1 line not declassified*] File, Box 24, 12/26/79–12/31/1979. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 161.

<sup>3</sup> The minutes of the December 28 SCC meeting were not found.

<sup>4</sup> The minutes of the NSC meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 107. The decision to send Christopher to Pakistan was affirmed.

**398. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, December 30, 1979, 0000Z

15326. For the Secretary. Subject: (S) Afghanistan Situation: Agha Shahi on US-Pak Consultations. Refs: A. State 33890;<sup>2</sup> B. Islamabad 15309;<sup>3</sup> C. Islamabad 15303.<sup>4</sup>

1. (S) Entire text; protect FGI. This is an action message.

2. I had 90 minute discussion with Fon Adviser Agha Shahi morning 29 Dec, mostly on detail exposition of his discussions with Iranian officials, including Khomeini, and with SecGen Waldheim, which will be reported septel.<sup>5</sup> This telegram concentrates on elements of discussion relating to U.S.-Pak consultations and in particular to proposed visit to Pakistan by DepSec Christopher.

3. I gave Shahi substance of instructions in ref A. Shahi said he had been author of Shahnawaz' rather negative comments to me yesterday (para 4 ref B) about Christopher visit at this time. Matter had been discussed with Pres. Zia ("and his senior advisers"). Visit would normally be welcome, Shahi said, but not right now. Shahi believed it was his representations in Iran, chiefly to FonMin Gotbzadeh and Ayatollah Behesti, that had caused Iranians to make "thundering" statement condemning Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Now Paks want to wait "a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2170, N800001–0154. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 333890 to Islamabad, December 29, the Department directed Hummel to inform Shahi that the United States shared an interest with Pakistan in the security of South Asia and to discuss with him the possibility of meeting Christopher. The Department also asked to be informed of Shahi's thoughts on the situation in Iran and readouts on his recent meeting with Khomeini and Iranian officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001–0122)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 15309 from Islamabad, December 29, Hummel reported his December 29 meeting with Shahnawaz, during which he informed Hummel that Pakistan was considering engaging Islamic countries to address the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Shahnawaz, noting that Pakistan did not have a "clear idea" of what support Christopher would offer, also speculated that even "much larger scale military assistance" from the United States "would 'perhaps not be enough' to defend Pakistan" from a potential combined threat from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and India. Shahnawaz expressed doubt as to what Christopher had to offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2166, N800001–0042)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 396 and footnote 3 thereto.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 15329 from Islamabad, December 30, Hummel reported his December 30 discussion with Shahi about his December 26 and 28 meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh and Ayatollah Behesti in Tehran, and his December 27 meeting with Khomeini in Qom. Shahi also described his telephone conversation with Waldheim about a draft Security Council resolution. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2010, N800001–0158)

few days" to see whether Islamic world will rise to occasion following Iranian and Pak lead. A visit by Christopher would undermine prospects for Islamic condemnation of Soviets and would provide ammunition to Soviets and pro-Soviet Muslim countries to accuse Pakistan and others of acting at behest of USG and in collusion with NATO powers.

4. Shahi said his govt would consider possibility of consulting with USG officials "later on," in Europe or Washington or elsewhere, but clearly did not make any commitment.

5. Meanwhile, Shahi said, GOP "needs indication" of what kind and magnitude of assistance—"political, economic, military"—USG might be prepared to extend, in light of new Soviet incursions into the region. Shahi referred to existing constraints on USG including the Symington Amendment arms transfer policy, U.S. aims in India, etc, and also to report he has had about "some stoppage" of U.S. military assistance that is now being lifted. I countered with VOA report this morning saying that USG is planning to expedite delivery of previously ordered equipment. I said I would see what Washington could say at this early stage about contemplated USG support.

6. As will be seen from septel reporting the whole talk,<sup>6</sup> Shahi is very anxious that USG not rpt not give publicity to any moves that seem parallel to, or as instigation of, Pak responses to Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He cited his dismay that Pres. Carter phone call to Pres. Zia<sup>7</sup> (along with NATO countries) had been publicized, and he said that Pak ability to bring Iranian Govt along to more active condemnation of Sovs, and of course also Pak ability to play [garble—helpful?] role in hostage situation, would inevitably be damaged by such publicity. He strongly requested that US-Pak exchanges on Iran or Afghanistan should be held very closely in Wash DC and not publicized at all. I said I would do what I could.

7. Comment: Import of Shahi request for indication of magnitude and kind of proposed USG support is obvious, and is same request we have often heard before; ref (C) also refers. I think that unless USG chooses very high cost and high risk option, which I do not expect or advocate, Shahi and others will consider USG responses to be inadequate to warrant running what Paks consider to be their own high risks of damaging their solidarity with Iran and other friendly Islamic (and NAM) nations. Nevertheless, I hope we can have Wash. decisions that put us in position of offering substantial assistance so that we are seen to have offered support rather than ignored Pak needs. This could

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 395.



be important later on in inevitable recriminations about USG inactivity that we will continue to hear from Zia govt and any likely successor.

8. Shahi sensitivity re appearance of US-Pak collusion should not be interpreted as countering my recommendations in ref (C) for USG offer of practical steps in support of Paks; offer of Christopher visit—if we can keep it quiet—has had salutary effect in focusing on our willingness to consult; consultations I have been instructed to carry out have also been useful and should continue. A confidential letter to Zia, as proposed ref (C), would also be helpful.

9. Paks clearly think ball is now in USG court to give indications requested, and I would not take literally the “few days” that Shahi says GOP needs to assess Islamic reactions. When and if Washington has worked out indications of support and other messages to give to Paks, I would want to deliver them to Pres. Zia rather than Agha Shahi; Zia would be more receptive than Shahi to idea of meeting, particularly if we can reiterate at that time invitation for Zia to visit Washington.<sup>8</sup>

**Hummel**

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<sup>8</sup> Thornton attached this telegram to a December 31 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, commenting: “Whether we like it or not, the Paks do not see the situation as we do.” (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79)) Thornton’s memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 122.

**399. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 31, 1979

SUBJECT

Military Sales Pipeline for Pakistan (C)

State called to give me a rundown on the military sales pipeline to Pakistan and the status of pending requests. This, in effect, is what the President has been talking about when he talks of expediting, etc.<sup>2</sup> It is not very impressive.<sup>3</sup> (C)

*The pipeline* is fairly big in dollar terms—about \$900 million—but the items are not very exciting. About \$35 million is various kinds of ammunition and about \$16 million communications equipment. There are still 74 APCs to be delivered (from an original order of 230) and 227 (of 1,000) light trucks. Also 15 tank recovery vehicles and torpedoes and ASROCs for the two *Gearings* that the Paks already have. A number of the items are due for imminent delivery in any event; perhaps it would be possible to speed up the APCs and howitzers which may otherwise not get to Pakistan until August. Nothing is scheduled for later than August. (C)

*Pending requests* are even more modest. There are the other two *Gearings* (which have now been approved), \$5 million worth of TOWs, some jeeps, 20 howitzers and a destroyer tender. We should have no trouble approving any of these except possibly the tender which will require special legislation. (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 5-12/79. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Schecter. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "We need a complete package of *what is needed*. ZB."

<sup>2</sup> In his December 28 telephone call to Zia, for example, Carter expressed the need to expedite delivery of military equipment that Pakistan had ordered. See Document 395. In addition, the *Washington Post* reported on December 31 that Carter, in a December 29 luncheon "made known to reporters" that he was resolved to speed up the delivery of military supplies to Pakistan. (Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Affirms Commitment to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, December 31, 1979, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> Brzezinski underlined this sentence.

**400. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 2, 1980

## SUBJECT

Presidential Decisions on Pakistan, Afghanistan and India (S)

The following decisions were made by the President as a result of the PRC Meeting of December 27<sup>2</sup> and the NSC Meeting of December 28<sup>3</sup> and should be implemented:

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistan*

1. We are prepared to send a high-level mission to Pakistan, headed by Deputy Secretary Christopher, to consult on the new situation in the region.

2. Military sales will be resumed and facilitated.

3. We shall ask the Saudis to assist on financing military purchases by Pakistan.

4. Two GEARING-class destroyers will be provided to Pakistan expeditiously.

5. We shall move promptly in providing \$40 million in PL-480 assistance.

6. Additional assistance will be provided to help Pakistan deal with the Afghan refugee problem.

7. We will reaffirm our nuclear policy towards Pakistan and make clear the legislative restrictions. We will, however, urge the Pakistanis to put the problem aside for solution later while we deal with the Soviet-Afghan problem. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 92, India: 6/79–6/80. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Brown and Turner. The full text of the memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 128.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 161.

<sup>3</sup> The minutes of the meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 107.

**401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 3, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

6. *Consultations on Pakistan*—As you know, we have discussed options for moving ahead with an assistance program for Pakistan with Frank Church and Clem Zablocki today. Clem and Jack Bingham, the authors of the Non-Proliferation Act, announced today that they will sponsor legislation to assist Pakistan immediately upon Congress' return. They also expressed the view that assisting a friendly nation to withstand a conventional military threat would, in the long run, work in the interest of our non-proliferation policy. Frank Church also issued a statement from Idaho favoring the removal of statutory barriers to assistance to Pakistan.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy, J" at the top of the memorandum. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1979. Below the date, an unknown hand wrote: "(1980)."

## 402. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 4, 1980, 9:25–10:25 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Pakistan—Funding Issues

### PARTICIPANTS

*State*  
Warren Christopher\*  
David Newsom\*  
Harold Saunders

*Defense*  
W. Graham Claytor

*JCS*  
Admiral Thomas Hayward  
General John Pustay

*CIA*  
Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Frank Carlucci

*White House*  
David Aaron  
Henry Owen\*\*

*Vice President's Office*  
Denis Clift\*\*

*NSC*  
Colonel William Odom\*\*  
Thomas Thornton\*\*  
Gary Sick

*OMB*  
John White

\*Departed at 10:00 a.m.

\*\*Not present for final item

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The SCC reviewed a series of papers on proposals for increasing economic and military assistance to Pakistan,<sup>2</sup> development of an emergency fund to cover unanticipated expenses related to the Southwest Asia crisis, and the possibility of seeking legislative relief from certain restrictions on Presidential action.<sup>3</sup> It was decided to proceed as follows:

1. *Symington Amendment*. All agreed that our first priority must be to lift the legislative restrictions which currently prevent U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The NSC staff will work with State in refining the draft bill which State had prepared for the meeting. (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Daily Diary, Box 10, 7/17–30/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote "Zbig, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

<sup>2</sup> A January 3 memorandum from Saunders to Newsom, entitled "SCC Meeting January 4: Economic Assistance for Pakistan," recommended giving Pakistan \$100 million in ESF for FY 1980 and \$100 million in FY 1981. For both years, the suggested programming of the funds was \$60 million for fertilizer imports, \$25 million for rural electrification, and \$15 million for rural roads. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800028–0122) No paper on military assistance was found, but see footnote 13, Document 405.

<sup>3</sup> Neither of these papers was found.

2. *Supplemental Funding for Pakistan.* OMB will work with State on a recommended funding level for a supplemental. This subject will be reviewed at the meeting on Monday.<sup>4</sup> The SCC noted the discussion at the President's Foreign Policy Breakfast earlier in the morning where a funding level of \$100 million in FMS credits and \$100 million in ESF was considered.<sup>5</sup> It was agreed that we should inform both Pakistan and India in advance of any decisions. (S)

3. *Increasing the Discretionary Authority of the President.* The SCC agreed that we should use this opportunity to seek relief from certain legislative restrictions beyond the Symington Amendment as feasible. The test would be feasibility. We want to avoid a Legislative-Executive battle over prerogatives which could distract from or derail the Pakistan effort. State and the NSC will work together to identify restrictions which are troublesome and which might feasibly be waived in the context of the crisis. (S)

4. *Pakistan Debt Relief.* Henry Owen noted that debt relief might be an even more effective means of assisting Pakistan than FMS/ESF. He will work with Treasury and State to develop a paper on this option for consideration next Monday. (C)

5. *Security Consortium.* All agreed that it might be useful to develop a consortium of nations to assist Pakistani security. A consortium already exists on the economic side. However, it would be desirable for another nation—perhaps Pakistan itself—to take the lead in forming such a group, and we would wish to insure that it did not slow down our ability to act quickly. State will prepare a paper on a strategy of how we could best pursue the consortium option. (C)

6. *Arms for Pakistan.* A Defense paper was reviewed, which provided a series of options on the type of military equipment (and costs) which we might be willing to provide. The key question will be whether or not we are willing to provide advanced aircraft, including the possibility of the FX, which has now been approved for development. An alternative approach would be to focus on defensive equipment which Pakistan could use for self-defense in the event the conflict in Afghanistan spills across the border. The latter would include anti-tank weapons, howitzers, and tanks. Defense noted that many of the items—including M48 tanks—would have to be drawn from current inventories and would have a significant impact on U.S. force readiness. The SCC agreed that the possible packages needed to be better defined in terms of alternatives. State and Defense will prepare a paper defining

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<sup>4</sup> January 7.

<sup>5</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, from 7:30 to 9:15 a.m., January 4, Carter met with Vance, Brown, Donovan, Jordan, Cutler, and Brzezinski in the Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No record of the meeting was found.

the options and examining the guidance which we could provide to a military survey team, assuming Pakistan accepts our offer. (S)

*Intelligence Issues*

[3 paragraphs (18 lines) not declassified]<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Carter checked the Approve option, below which he initialed "J." To the right of the options, Carter wrote: "Give me a breakdown, J.".

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#### 403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 11, 1980, 0743Z

7608. Following Repeat State 07608 Action Dacca 11 Jan 80. Qte Secret State 007608. Subject: Zbigniew Brzezinski's Meeting With Ambassador Sultan Khan on January 4.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. Text of MemCon follows:<sup>2</sup>

Ambassador Sultan Khan called on Dr. Brzezinski on January 4th, 1980. Shaikh and Thornton sat in. Sultan opened with an expression of gratitude for Brzezinski's public reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement. Brzezinski noted that this had been done at the instruction of the President.<sup>3</sup> Sultan went on to stress Pakistan's sense of isolation and the questions that Pakistan had about whether the level of interest now visible in Washington will be durable.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 3, Islamabad 1980–1983. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Drafted by John J. Kelly (INR/WO); approved by Benedict.

<sup>2</sup> The January 4 memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 144.

<sup>3</sup> According to Don Oberdorfer of the *Washington Post*, on December 30, 1979, Brzezinski, "speaking on 'Issues and Answers' (ABC, WJLA), read portions of the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan agreement, as a public message to Pakistan and the world that 'it is an important commitment and the United States will stand by it.' Brzezinski said he had been specifically authorized to reaffirm the U.S. commitment, presumably by President Carter." (Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Affirms Commitment to Pakistan, New Soviet Moves Into Neighboring Afghanistan Noted," *Washington Post*, December 31, 1979, p. A1) No official record of Carter's instructions to Brzezinski was found.

Brzezinski confirmed our view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan as one of major and lasting importance, carrying with it a threat to Iran and Pakistan. He emphasized that the Soviet action should not be cost-free and that the Afghan resistance should get widespread support. He reassured Sultan that he will act, preferably in concert with other countries, to meet Pakistan's security needs and we will consult with Congress to reduce impediments to security assistance. Secretary Brown will be discussing the situation fully in Beijing.<sup>4</sup>

Brzezinski stressed that continuation of Pakistan "ambiguity" about its nuclear intentions poses a difficult problem. While we are not making any specific linkage at this point, the Pakistanis must understand that cooperation, especially for the long haul, once the drama of the moment subsides, will be much easier if the "ambiguity" is resolved. The situation has changed in South Asia, and Pakistan should rethink its position just as we have rethought ours. Sultan reiterated Pak positions and said that Pakistan could not abandon its nuclear efforts. Brzezinski responded that we are not asking abandonment, but a greater Pakistani realization that we must minimize all problems between us.

On the problem of assistance to the Afghan insurgents, which Brzezinski again emphasized, Sultan said that Pakistani actions would depend on their perceptions of US assistance and reliability. Brzezinski said that we are considering what we can do in military and economic terms, in addition to public statements. He said that the President would be stating our initial action soon.

Sultan recalled that the Pakistanis had asked Ambassador Hummel whether the US was prepared to talk in specifics, and what the extent and nature of US aid would be.<sup>5</sup> Pakistan needs an answer. Brzezinski

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<sup>4</sup> The portions of the memoranda of conversation of Brown's meetings in Beijing that deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 149 and 150.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1 from Islamabad, January 1, Hummel informed the Department: "I expect to be called in to MFA tomorrow Jan. 2, if indeed I am not summoned during today's holiday, and questioned about recent substantive policy decision by USG. So far, I lack any official information on which to base reply." Hummel added: "To put it politely as possible, how about remedying this strange deficiency?" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0758, D800005-0126) When Shahnawaz sought information during his January 2 meeting with Hummel about possible U.S. aid to Pakistan, Hummel explained that he "expected instructions shortly." (Telegram 54 from Islamabad, January 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007-0838) On January 5, after summarizing a meeting he had with Zia that day, Hummel again urged that he be given instructions on what aid the United States would offer Pakistan. He concluded: "There should be no doubt in Washington that in order to remain credible with the Pakistanis and to overcome their resistance to too close a reidentification with us, what we will propose will have to be substantial in volume and composition." (Telegram 79 from Islamabad, January 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 1/1/80-1/6/80) Telegram 79 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 145.



agreed that the US and Pakistan should discuss this as well as the multilateral support that could be generated, and what could jointly be done for the Afghan rebels. The USG would also continue to consult with other governments and with Congress, and would fashion a tangible response to Pakistan's needs.

Both sides noted that each seemed to be waiting for the other to take the next step. Thornton stressed that in order to make a realistic presentation, we need a better general idea of what Pakistan thinks it needs, even if Pakistan is not ready to make specific requests. Sultan agreed that a US response that fell far short of Pakistani hopes would be counterproductive. Brzezinski pointed out that we cannot generate a massive package instantly, and we will need to talk to others. Sultan hoped that this process would not take months. End text. Vance

Unqte

Vance

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**404. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*Pakistani Expectations of U.S. Aid: [2 lines not declassified]*

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 1/7/80–1/10/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

#### 405. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Assistance for Pakistan (U)

This package contains items for your decision on what we can convey to the Pakistanis about our intention to provide them economic and military assistance. We have delayed our discussions with the Pakistanis so that we might be as concrete and forthcoming as possible. Now that Agha Shahi is coming to discuss these issues,<sup>2</sup> we need your guidance on a range of issues so we speak with one voice.

1. *Legislation to Lift the Symington Amendment.* This would be aimed at exempting Pakistan from the Symington Amendment and facilitating supplemental authorization and appropriation of FMS and ESF assistance for Pakistan which is now prohibited by law. A draft text is attached at Tab A.<sup>3</sup> It is still being polished with OMB, so you need not approve the text, but I do need your approval to inform the Paks that we will take this legislative step.<sup>4</sup>

2. *A Package of Military and Economic Assistance.* A memorandum prepared by OMB and Henry Owen is attached at Tab B with a memorandum from Cy appended to it.<sup>5</sup> They include the following items for your decision.

—\$100 million FMS Credit. All agencies agree that this is required.<sup>6</sup>

—\$100 million ESF. All agencies agree on the sum; \$100 million ESF is necessary to release Pak budget resources to take advantage of our \$100 million FMS credit. The only issue is whether to make the ESF aid conditional. The State Department agrees with OMB and Henry Owen that we should continue to participate in the Pakistan aid consor-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, (Meetings—SCC 293: 3/25/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote "Zbig, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 159 from Islamabad, January 8, Hummel reported that, having told Shahi that decisions on assistance to Pakistan would soon be made in Washington, Shahi planned to visit after his stop at the UN in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800014-0103)

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked the Approve option, to the right of which he wrote: "I would still prefer some mention of non-prolif assurances—not exceeding those we have already gotten."

<sup>5</sup> Tab B is printed below.

<sup>6</sup> Carter checked the Approve option.

tium and support its efforts at reform. However, State feels the impact of the aid will be vitiated if we hold up commitments or disbursements pending further Pakistan financial reforms. I agree with State and, if you approve, we will ensure that the directive to the Agencies makes clear that while we will rejoin the consortium and support it, we will not attach additional strings to this supplemental \$100 million for ESF for Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

—FY 81. State is prepared to let OMB and Congressional Liaison work out the modalities of the FY 81 ESF/FMS package for Pakistan but argues strongly that we should be prepared now to commit to a two-year program of \$100 million ESF/\$100 million FMS for each year, thus enabling us to present it to the Paks as a \$400 million package. OMB would have us be somewhat more vague on FY 81 levels, both for reasons of impact and to concretely demonstrate the enduring nature of our commitment. I support State's \$400 million two-year package approach.<sup>8</sup>

—PL 480. Both State and OMB recommend a \$10–20 million increase in PL 480 with the precise amount determined by Pak absorptive capacity and our budget limits. I agree.<sup>9</sup>

—IMET. State and OMB both endorse \$600,000 for military training. I concur.<sup>10</sup>

—*Refugees*. State recommends a \$6 million increase in refugee aid with a possibility of \$25 million if the number of refugees doubles. OMB believes this can be met through reprogramming.<sup>11</sup>

A separate issue for the future is whether to continue to supply all the aid through the UNHCR or use other channels. The UNHCR will constrain the extent to which the refugees will provide a base for the insurgents in Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup>

3. *Military Items*. A key issue is what we should sell to the Pakistanis. An illustrative initial list is attached at Tab C along with possible items

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<sup>7</sup> At the end of this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "This is really important." Carter did not check either the Approve or Disapprove option. In the right-hand margin, he wrote: "\$100 mil ok. I prefer auth to waive reform requirement if necessary—Paks must be under constraint to behave economically."

<sup>8</sup> At the end of this sentence, Brzezinski changed the last period of the paragraph to a comma, after which he wrote: "because it indicates a longer-term political commitment." Carter checked the option "Approve OMB approach," to the right of which he wrote: "I may change—Let me see what Agha Shahi says".

<sup>9</sup> Carter checked the Approve option.

<sup>10</sup> Carter checked the Approve option.

<sup>11</sup> Carter checked the Approve option.

<sup>12</sup> At the end of this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "It should be bilateral with Pakistan." Below this, Carter wrote: "Bilateral, at least as option."

for future sale.<sup>13</sup> We envision a technical-level discussion with the Paks on just what they would want within the \$100 million, and what their other priority items are for funding by themselves or third parties. As you can see, \$100 million will not go far. The critical question, however, is not so much money as it is equipment—especially whether we are prepared to sell Pakistan advanced aircraft such as the F-16. If we are not going to provide such aircraft out of concern for India's reaction, we should let the Paks know soon so that India does not mount a campaign against it and Pakistan does not make it a litmus test of our relationship. Accordingly, I would appreciate your guidance. If you are not prepared to sell advanced fighter aircraft to Pakistan, it would be helpful to know it. Otherwise, I will have State and Defense prepare an analysis and recommendation.

Will not sell advanced aircraft<sup>14</sup>

Prepare analysis and options

A number of other items are covered in the State and OMB/Henry Owen memoranda, such as debt rescheduling, on which you need not act now.

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<sup>13</sup> Attached but not printed at Tab C is an undated covering memorandum entitled "DOD Memorandum, Arms for Pakistan," attached to which is a list entitled "Pakistan (Illustrative Sales)" which is broken into two sections: "List I: FMS Funding" and "List II: Funding from Non-US Sources." In the covering memorandum, on which Carter wrote "Zbig, C" in the upper right-hand corner, the Department of Defense argued: "We need to keep India in mind as we make military supply decisions for Pakistan. India will be concerned in principle about the resumption of a U.S.-Pakistan supply relationship, and in this sense whatever we supply will be troublesome for India; none of the items proposed for FMS funding, however, would in themselves pose a significant threat to India. The Part II items would be more difficult for India to accept, and the F-16 aircraft, M48A5 tanks, and TOW-mounted helicopters, would be the most contentious." Carter wrote: "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. Below this paragraph, which concluded the memorandum, Carter wrote: "We should approve quickly: Weapons which can be used to defend both Afghan & Pakis as soon as possible. In general, however, not to attack India. J."

<sup>14</sup> Carter checked this option.

**Tab B****Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter<sup>15</sup>**

Washington, undated

## SUBJECT

Additional Aid to Pakistan (U)

This memorandum summarizes current U.S. aid to Pakistan and presents possible options for increasing assistance. Cy Vance's memorandum is attached.<sup>16</sup> We agree on the basic recommendations. (U)

*Background*

In assessing possible options, we must be explicit about the nature of the problem we are trying to solve and the effectiveness of various initiatives in solving them. We see several possible objectives for U.S. assistance. (S)

*Possible Objectives*

1. *Signal overall support to Pakistan.* Offering substantial aid to Pakistan will send this signal. (S)

2. *Solve Pakistan's security problems.* Military equipment would help in countering security threats to Pakistan, although Cy Vance notes in his memorandum that "Pakistan is unlikely to welcome any dramatic gestures of military support, at least while the Iranian hostage situation remains unsolved." (S)

3. *Solve Pakistan's economic problems.* U.S. aid can contribute to Pakistan's economic progress if it is extended in the context of the existing aid consortium and thus encourages continuing Pakistani self-help measures. (S)

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<sup>15</sup> Secret. Sent for action. A stamped date reads: "Jan 8 1980." In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, J."

<sup>16</sup> Attached but not printed. In his January 8 memorandum to Carter, Vance argued: "I firmly believe that failure to provide significant quantities of economic and military assistance over a two year period will bring into question the seriousness of our commitment to Pakistan."

*Current Aid Levels*

	(\$ in millions)		
	<u>1979 Actual</u>	<u>1980 Estimate</u>	<u>1981 Estimate</u>
AID	2.9	—	—
PL-480 (Title I)	40.0	40.0	42.5
IMET	.5	—	—
(Training)			(S)

Under the Symington amendment, no bilateral U.S. assistance (except PL-480) can be provided to Pakistan. Steps are now being taken to remove this impediment. There are no other prohibitions on aid to Pakistan. (S)

*Possible Assistance Initiatives*

1. *Economic Assistance.* The AID mission was closed in March because of the Symington amendment. As a result, we do not have the people in place to implement quickly traditional AID projects. Two large projects for rural electrification and rural roads, which meet basic human needs criteria, were in the advanced design stage when the AID program was terminated last March and might be reactivated. These funds would, however, be spent slowly over a number of years. From Pakistan's point of view, more useful aid would be balance of payments support (perhaps tied to U.S. phosphate fertilizer imports), which would also help Pakistan offset its excessive budget deficit. Given the political/security rationale for the aid, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) would be the most appropriate source. (S)

If Pakistan is to be helped by the aid, it is important to avoid undercutting the efforts of the World Bank and other donors in the Pakistan aid consortium to encourage much needed economic reforms. Improved Pakistani policies will do more than enlarged aid to help Pakistan economically; conversely, aid that discouraged reforms would leave Pakistan worse off economically than if there had been no aid.<sup>17</sup> (S)

Pakistan is now beginning to move in the right directions, according to the World Bank. This may lead the Bank both to double its present annual lending (\$125 million) and to urge other donors to increase their present \$800 million in annual aid to \$1.2 billion. The United States should rejoin the consortium, from which it dropped out when U.S. aid to Pakistan ceased. In providing the new aid, the United States should join the other members of the consortium in encouraging further progress by Pakistan in the two areas which the consortium has emphasized—placing increased emphasis on agriculture and reducing the

<sup>17</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "I agree."

overall budget deficit. Like other consortium members, the United States would reserve the right to make up its own mind as to whether these or other policies were the right ones to urge on Pakistan, in light of changing conditions. (S)

The message that the Pakistanis would get is that U.S. aid is being resumed on the same basis that it was provided before it was cut off. This would avoid undermining other aid donors' efforts to reform Pakistan's economic policies but would not require us to attach onerous policy conditions to our aid, and would permit immediate resumption of our aid.<sup>18</sup> (S)

Recognizing the basic political motivation for the aid and its open-ended balance of payments rationale, there is little basis for setting a specific amount. Pakistan's balance of payments projection for 1980 is not in severe deficit, but the recent oil price increases and insecurity could upset present estimates. A program for FY 1980 in the range of \$100 million would convey a message of serious U.S. support and would be defensible in view of the uncertainties as to Pakistan's balance of payments. (S)

We considered asking Congress for authority to transfer some of the funds requested for Pakistan to other countries most affected by the crisis in the region in support of measures to deter Soviet aggression—a sort of contingency reserve. On closer consideration we concluded that no needy country in the region is likely to seek such support in FY 1980 except possibly in connection with U.S. military base facility negotiations, for which we are not yet able to estimate the scale or reality of contingent requirements. We recommend that the question of whether or not action is needed to meet this possible requirement should be considered separately when the facts are available. (S)

2. *PL-480 Food Aid*. In April, the U.S. broke off discussions on a \$40 million increment of PL-480 Title-III (grant aid) because of inadequate Pakistani economic policy reforms and its nuclear activities. We would argue against resumption of discussion of a Title-III agreement. (Any Title-III agreement would be in addition to the existing \$40 million Title-I agreement which we are trying to accelerate.) Cy Vance believes the possibility of a Title-III agreement should be left open, but does not propose immediate discussions with Pakistan. (S)

On the other hand, 1980 and 1981 Title-I PL-480 (concessional loans) could be increased from the presently projected \$40 million. The amount of any increase would be limited, however, by U.S. budget availabilities in 1980 (unless we can get early congressional approval of the pending supplemental) and by Pakistan's lack of need for wheat

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<sup>18</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "I agree."

this year because of good harvests. The most likely increment would be some \$10–20 million in vegetable oil in 1980 and 1981, unless more wheat is needed in 1981 because of poor harvests. (C)

3. *Debt Relief*. The U.S. and other creditors have consistently taken the position that no debt relief should be provided unless a country is in a situation of “imminent default” and unless it is prepared to undertake needed reforms (usually a full-fledged and politically difficult IMF stabilization agreement). The Congress has insisted on these conditions, so that debt relief does not become a way around the appropriation process. (S)

If Pakistan meets the criteria for debt relief, the creditors (mainly the U.S., Germany, Japan, Canada, and France) could reschedule up to about \$200 million in 1980 with the U.S. share being up to \$90 million. This would provide quick cash relief. (S)

State now will consult with other creditors, to see under what conditions they might agree to debt relief. We will have to be prepared to move quickly toward a multilateral negotiation with Pakistan, if the need arises. If a change in our traditional debt rescheduling policy is indicated, as Cy Vance suggests may be the case, we will prepare a decision memorandum for you. (S)

4. *Refugee Aid*. Refugee relief requirements are still tentative because most of the Afghan refugees to date have received local support from related groups in Pakistan. The United States will be stepping up aid to these refugees as rapidly as required by increased flows. Because of the slowdown in Vietnamese refugee flows, we anticipate that these new requirements can be met by reprogramming existing funds. State is preparing a memorandum on the question of bilateral and multilateral means of aiding refugees. (S)

5. *Military Assistance*. The level and form of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan should be sufficient to:

- demonstrate U.S. political support;
- meet Pakistan’s urgent security requirements, and
- act as a catalyst for a multilateral security effort, in which other interested countries (India, China, and other Moslem nations, as well as our Western allies) would join to provide military aid to Pakistan. (S)

The \$100 million level discussed by the SCC would be a first step in meeting these requirements. It is not excessive, and would cover only a part of Pakistan’s security needs. Other countries, taken together, would have to supply a larger amount. State is discussing multilateral and bilateral approaches to this problem with other potential donors. (S)

This issue, however, is less one of the level of aid than of the types of equipment we are ready to sell. Ambassador Goheen indicates that if the equipment is largely defensive, it should not unduly alarm India,



whose cooperation with Pakistan (which he believes is more feasible in the present situation) would do much to enhance Pakistan's security, and whose increased hostility could prejudice that security. The Pakistanis, however, want precisely the types of advanced weapons that worry the Indians most, and they will be disappointed if they don't get them. State and DOD are currently reviewing this problem. (S)

6. *International Military Education and Training (IMET)*. Cy Vance recommends \$600,000 for IMET. We agree that a training program would be desirable, assuming Pakistani interest, and will meet that need within the current budget request. (S)

7. *Drawdown Authority*. Under current law, the President has available \$10 million in so-called "drawdown" authority (Section 506, Foreign Assistance Act) to order defense articles and services for delivery to a foreign government provided that he determines that "an unforeseen emergency exists which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international organization; and that the emergency requirement cannot be met under authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other law except this section." If it appears that we will face serious delays because of congressional budget procedures, we may want to initiate a small program under this authority. (S)

8. *Accelerated Deliveries*. The Defense Department is currently reviewing the availability for early delivery of equipment to be included in the proposed military aid package for Pakistan. (S)

9. *FY 1981 Assistance*. If Pakistan decides to mount a determined effort to shore up its resistance to Soviet-sponsored threats to the subcontinent, it will expect U.S. support beyond FY 1980. Indeed, Zia's decision on Pakistan's course might turn partly on whether we and other supporting nations are committed to the long haul. A two-year package of U.S. aid involving \$100 million ESF and \$100 million FMS for FY 1981 would have a larger impact on his thinking than a package for only FY 1980. (S)

On the other hand, we have no basis now for determining the appropriate amount of U.S. military or economic aid in FY 1981. An arbitrary extension of the FY 1980 amounts for another year might prove inadequate for political or substantive reasons, or we might wish to reduce FY 1981 aid below these levels if the situation changes. These considerations argue for withholding specific commitments as to FY 1981 for some weeks or months until Pakistan's needs become clearer. (S)

On balance, we believe that the following approach would meet both our diplomatic and budget requirements. We would transmit 1980 supplementals for \$100 million in ESF and \$100 million in FMS credits. For FY 1981 assistance, we would indicate to Zia our intent to provide further assistance of the same magnitude in our next fiscal year as

Pakistan's needs become clearer. The budget message would indicate that a budget amendment would be transmitted at an appropriate time. (S)

*Recommendations*<sup>19</sup>

1. *ESF*. \$100 million to be provided to Pakistan immediately, probably for U.S. fertilizer imports; this aid to be provided through the existing economic aid consortium and in support of continued Pakistani progress toward self-help. (S)

2. *FMS*. \$100 million, as described above and elaborated in separate memorandum. (S)

3. *FY 1981 Aid Commitment and Budget Request*. Defer the FY 1981 request to Congress and the specific commitment to Pakistan until Pakistan's requirements and policies are clearer; while advising Zia now that you are planning to request similar magnitudes of aid for 1981 depending on Pakistan's requirements.

Based on your decisions, we will forward the implementing legislation to you for immediate transmittal to Congress.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> There is no indication of Carter's approval or disapproval of the three recommendations.

<sup>20</sup> Below this sentence, Carter wrote: "Answers given on Zbig's cover memo. I want to help Pak, but preserve the Consortium approach & maintain econ reform pressures. J."

**406. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 11, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

The overthrow of the Afghan Government and occupation of that country by Soviet military forces represents a profoundly disturbing threat to the stability of the region and, most directly, to the security of Pakistan.

In these circumstances, it is essential that there be no misunderstanding as to the commitment of the United States to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. The 1959 Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan represents a firm commitment between our two governments which remains fully valid. Its provisions are directly relevant to a Soviet threat via Afghanistan. I want you to know that the United States intends to stand by its commitments under this Agreement.

I am particularly concerned with the crescendo of charges and threats emanating from certain quarters regarding the presence in your country of hundreds of thousands of unfortunate refugees fleeing oppression and violence in Afghanistan. In these circumstances, the United States reiterates that it considers the Durand Line to be the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that our actions under the 1959 Agreement will reflect that fact.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800018–0826. No classification marking. According to telegram 9607 to Islamabad, January 12, Vance told Shahi that he would give him a letter on January 12, shortly before Shahi met with Carter later that day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–1122)

**407. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3–3:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting Between Dr. Brzezinski and Agha Shahi

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Agha Shahi, Pakistani Adviser

*Dr. Brzezinski* opened the meeting by recalling the previous time he had met with Shahi and there had been substantial areas of both agreement and disagreement.<sup>2</sup> The current meeting, however, is taking place in a different context.

*Shahi* responded that it was important now to have agreement on fundamentals. Pakistan is facing a grave situation and Shahi was glad to be able to come here to exchange views.

*Brzezinski* described the Afghan events as a regional problem with wide strategic significance. We do not know what the Soviet motives were in their move but the consequences are far-reaching, to the extent that the motives are irrelevant. There is a real possibility now of sustained pressure on both Pakistan and Iran; both military and political intimidation were possible though the latter is more likely. Therefore American interests are engaged. The ramifications of such pressure could not be confined to the region. The 1959 Agreement and other assurances are clear; aggression against Pakistan would engage the United States. We fought side by side with you in Korea and know the calibre of your people. We know that you will not be intimidated.

You do however need political and psychological support. If there is an incursion from Afghanistan resulting in a skirmish, Pakistan must be in a position to rebuff such an incursion. You have to be in a position to force the invaders either to withdraw or else to escalate to clear cut aggression in which case you would not be alone. Indeed, if the Soviets know that you are determined you are in a much better position to rebuff any skirmishing along the line.

The military package which we have offered is both a token of our support and a substantial help.<sup>3</sup> We consider it to be the point of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 274.

<sup>3</sup> The details of the offer were discussed earlier that day. See Document 409.

departure for a more sustained relationship, including help provided by other countries.

The United States recognizes that Pakistan does not want an excessive embrace nor do you want to be seen as responding too clearly to our overtures. You must however not be ambiguous in the position you take towards the Soviet Union. If you should make an alternate decision, not to stand up to the Soviets, that is certainly your sovereign right. If you do make a positive decision, however, you should know that you do not stand alone.

*Agha Shahi* reaffirmed that the Pakistanis certainly wanted to take a stand on independence and would not submit to Soviet intimidation. It was clear that this decision had already been made because of Pakistan's efforts among the LDCs in the UN General Assembly and in the Islamic Conference. At the same time, however, it is necessary to understand the gravity of the threat. Pakistan has noted the 1959 Agreement and the subsequent statements made about it; it would however like to have a clear-cut assurance that, as time goes on—perhaps as the situation on the ground eases—your interest diminishes, there is perhaps a revival of detente—what would the impact of all of this be on American resolve?

Pakistan has chosen a non-aligned course but sees this as compatible with opposition to the Soviet Union. The modulation of American support, however, is a real problem. America's commitment would have to endure despite changes both internal and external to Pakistan.

*Brzezinski* pointed out to Shahi that US Soviet arms control negotiations will probably resume. We see these in our interest and are seeking to compartmentalize them as much as possible from the general downturn in our relationship. Our decision to postpone consideration of SALT is not a punitive action against the Soviets but simple realism.<sup>4</sup> There is no relationship whatsoever between our ties to Pakistan and SALT. Our concern about Pakistan is not derived or dependent upon a change in US-Soviet atmospherics. The situation in Southwest Asia is an abiding reality. We have a vital interest in the region and the Soviets are actively threatening that interest. This means we need to have good and secure relations with Pakistan and if possible with Iran (and anything you can do to help us there would be gratefully received). If Pakistan were to disintegrate American vital interests would be affected. This simple reality is much more important in judging our commitment than is any amount of rhetoric.

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<sup>4</sup> Postponement of congressional consideration of SALT was discussed at the January 2 NSC meeting, along with other U.S. actions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the minutes of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 135.

The internal policies of Pakistan are indeed germane to our commitment but they are certainly not overriding. Both countries share an interest in a strong Pakistani policy. Indeed the greatest threat to Pakistan is probably from subversion rather than direct attack, and vulnerability to subversion is a factor of domestic politics to a certain extent. Brzezinski reassured Shahi that the United States is not offering any prescription as to what Pakistan should do.

He also hoped that the nuclear impediment to a close continuing relationship could be removed. This was previously the central issue in our relationship with Pakistan; it is no longer. It must be realized, however, that when the immediate atmospherics of the current situation change, non-proliferation will return as an important political reality. The United States does not object to Pakistan having a nuclear program; it is specifics of that program that we object to.

*Agha Shahi* acknowledged that the United States had nuclear concerns but pointed out that Pakistan has told the United States the truth in this regard; it has received no outside financing; it is not engaged in a weapons program; and it would not transfer sensitive nuclear technology to other countries. It will review the nuclear explosives question, but this is an extremely sensitive issue for Pakistan domestically (Brzezinski noted that it was equally so for the United States). Shahi continued by observing that the concerns frequently expressed in the press were gross exaggerations.

Returning to the Soviet threat, *Shahi* pointed out that Pakistan has stated in the earlier meetings its requirements for the Western front; it would not be possible to shift troops there from the East. Pakistan has to expect to confront some ten Soviet divisions there.

Pakistan appreciates the offer that the United States has made, but the members of the team that has come to Washington feel that this offer is not commensurate with the gravity and the size of the threat. These matters, however, will be discussed later.

Shahi recalled that in the past Pakistan had had some success in normalizing its relationship with India. There was now concern, however, because of the return of Mrs. Gandhi and the incredible speech that the Indian representative made on Afghanistan in the General Assembly.<sup>5</sup> Pakistan is concerned that a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi access [*axis*] will be established. Karmal has had long and close ties with Indira Gandhi and Pakistan fears a concerted pressure, at sometime in the future, from Afghanistan and India, sponsored by the Soviet Union.

*Brzezinski* inquired whether the refugee camps along the Frontier are adequately protected with anti-aircraft weapons, for example, since

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

it was quite possible that the Soviet/Afghan forces might make reprisal raids against them.

*Agha Shahi* said they certainly were not and that the troops in the West are all under strength.

*Brzezinski* pressed, asking whether the camps are not likely to be attacked either from the air or, less likely, on the ground. Would it not be a good idea to protect these camps?

*Shahi* agreed and noted that if there were an attack against the camps, the Pakistanis would have to retaliate against the Soviet/Afghan forces inside Afghanistan, if domestic morale were to be maintained. But, he wondered, in 3 to 6 months from now how would the United States react to a possible concerted pressure from Afghanistan and India? We have been told before that the 1959 Agreement is not applicable against India. We need to have the defensive capability against India.

*Brzezinski* countered that it was important to think strategically about this question. Pakistan is receiving advanced aircraft from the French and the United States has demonstrated its willingness to help with supply of other weapons and resources. In the future perhaps we will be able to improve our relations with Iran. Pakistan and Iran are already able to work together and the United States and China are strengthening their ties. This fabric, in its totality, would provide a neutralizing effect to any concerted pressure of the kind that *Shahi* suggests. He cautioned *Shahi* that the United States will not enter into an alliance against India. We suspect, incidentally, that the Indian military also does not want to succumb to Soviet domination. The statement that was made in the United Nations yesterday is perhaps not the last word on the subject.

*Brzezinski* reiterated three points:

1. We must be sure that our bilateral relations are strong;
2. Pakistan must make unambiguously clear that if attacked it will fight. The Soviets always try to intimidate countries and usually, if they encounter resistance, withdraw. It is important that Pakistan react very strongly in skirmishing along the border;
3. We will attempt to create a wider framework with others. We have increased our Naval strength in the Indian Ocean and our presence there will grow. The Saudis and the Europeans will cooperate with us and this would offset a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi access [*axis*]. That kind of an alignment of course is not in our interests. New Delhi should have an option to get out from under Soviet control. Finally, he observed, the Soviets should not find the digestion of Afghanistan too easy.

*Agha Shahi* noted that if Pakistan helped the refugees, the Soviets will react. Would the United States then stand full square with Pakistan?

*Brzezinski* replied that if there is Soviet aggression we will be engaged. If there is a skirmish, Pakistan should be able to resist to the point of aggression. Recapitulating, *Brzezinski* said that if the Soviets commit aggression they will engage the United States. Pakistan should be able to fight skirmishes and not be intimidated. Pakistan should also make very clear its will to fight. *Brzezinski* in this context recalled the situation of Yugoslavia in 1949. Tito had no security guarantees at that time but because of his demonstrated willingness to fight, the Soviets did not commit aggression against them. Soviet planners may know that they can take Afghanistan in 4 weeks or take Czechoslovakia in 4 days. If they cannot they would be extremely cautious in planning any moves against Pakistan.

*Agha Shahi* indicated that he understood these points but questioned the magnitude of the assistance that the United States was offering.

*Brzezinski* told him to consider the fact that we, in just two weeks, have made a very impressive beginning and a long step over the situation that attained the last time the two men spoke.

Thereupon the party left to join the President.

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#### 408. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

Meeting with Agha Shahi

##### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Arthur W. Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan  
Thomas P. Thornton, National Security Council

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.



Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Pakistan  
Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pakistan Ambassador  
General Ghulam Jilani, Pakistan  
General Khalid Mahmoud Aref, Pakistan

*The President* met on Saturday, January 12, with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, following meetings that Shahi had had with Dr. Brzezinski<sup>2</sup> and Secretary Vance.<sup>3</sup> Various advisers were present on each side. (S)

*The President* opened by welcoming Shahi and noting that he had had a good series of communications with President Zia. President Carter noted that the Soviet invasion is a major adverse development, an ominous change in Soviet practice. He was pleased at the support that he had received from the American people for his responses, and from nations all around the world. The President recalled that we had again reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 agreement, and our recognition of the Durand line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> He pointed out that we had put together with great care a strong military and economic aid package, and that some of our top officials will be going to Europe in the next week to discuss sharing of the economic and military burden. He said that he believed the European leaders were already positively inclined and he would appreciate Agha Shahi's guidance on the degree to which our efforts in all of these regards should be made public. He noted, of course, that the dimensions of our aid program will have to become public as soon as we present it to Congress. (S)

*The President* reviewed various measures that we have taken to increase our strength on a permanent basis, including the revitalization of NATO, the establishment of important relations with China, and measured development of Diego Garcia, where the British are now more willing to be forthcoming on expansion. He noted, however, that our relations with India have become difficult following the elections.<sup>5</sup> He told Mr. Shahi that he had had a nonsubstantive telephone conversation with Mrs. Gandhi and that he was disconcerted, although not especially surprised by the speech which the Indian Permanent Representative had made on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly.<sup>6</sup> The speech sounded as if it had come from East Germany, Czechoslovakia,

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 407.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 410.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 406.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 165.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166. Carter and Gandhi spoke on the telephone from 10:42 to 10:46 a.m. on January 9. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

or North Vietnam. He told Shahi that we plan to send an emissary to India to attempt to convince Mrs. Gandhi of our attitude towards her country, and to point out that we will be making commitments to Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> (S)

*The President* said we trust that Pakistan is determined to defend its territory. We will report back on matters of concern to you after we have talked to India and our European allies. The Chinese Foreign Minister will soon be visiting Pakistan and I hope you will share with us, to the proper extent, the results of that visit. (S)

We are talking not about a transient commitment. We value our relations and are aware of our interest in Southwest Asia. Our position on nuclear explosives is clear and I hope you will relay our concern to President Zia. Movement on this is not a prerequisite for cooperation, but our long-term relations will be substantially affected by the question of nuclear explosives. We hope that you could promise not to test during the administration of President Zia. Such a pledge could be kept confidential; we would share it only with a few Congressmen. It could, however, be a prerequisite to the granting of aid. A future explosion by Pakistan would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. The nuclear question, then, is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but it remains important. (S)

*Agha Shahi* thanked the President for taking time to see him, and for reaffirming the American commitment under the 1959 Agreement. Mr. Shahi said that no matter how difficult the situation might be, it was always a pleasure to deal with Secretary Vance. (S)

*Mr. Shahi* agreed that there was a need to continue the discussion between the two sides. He referred to an Army-Air Force-Navy team which would meet with American counterparts to review the threat to Pakistan and discuss its requirements.<sup>8</sup> He pointed out that the Pakistani requirements were large because their Western Frontier is nearly undefended. All the troops are in the East because Indian forces are massed along that border. (S)

*Mr. Shahi* said he had received fairly explicit and satisfactory reassurances about our security guarantee. He noted that in the past there had been some question of the applicability of these guarantees, and wondered if an executive agreement would be as effective as a treaty. He said that Secretary Vance had given him the benefit of his views and that he was glad to hear from the President that the American commitment to the region is permanent. He stressed that if Pakistan

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<sup>7</sup> See Documents 169 and 170.

<sup>8</sup> Defense and military officers from Pakistan and the United States met earlier in the day. The group decided to hold future meetings. See Document 409.

does face up to the Soviet threat, and once again is left high and dry by the United States, this would pose a great danger to the very existence of Pakistan. Pakistan is now a front-line state; its concerns are legitimate and its demands are not exaggerated. He hoped for some possible strengthening of the 1959 Agreement, particularly one that would be binding on future administrations. (S)

President Carter replied that both he and Dr. Brzezinski had publicly broadcast this commitment to the American people.<sup>9</sup> In addition, it will be possible to send a message to Congress to this effect.<sup>10</sup> (S)

*Secretary Vance* pointed out that such a reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement would be included in the language of the assistance package. (S)

*President Carter* said that the material included in the legislation would be the same as in the letter that he had written to President Zia.<sup>11</sup> He said it would be impossible to put any treaty to the Senate before the SALT II Agreement was considered, and that was, of course, now deferred. (S)

*Agha Shahi*, turning to India, said that Pakistan had sought to normalize relations and had had considerable success with the previous administration. Indira Gandhi is now in office, however, and she is unpredictable. In the past she has adhered to her father's vision of India's greatness and even its hegemony in the region. While Pakistan would not argue with India's legitimate aspirations, it could not accept the concept of regional hegemony. Mr. Shahi said Pakistan hoped to resume soon its dialogue with India; the Indian Foreign Secretary would be coming to Islamabad and he hoped to go to Delhi to have talks with his Indian counterpart, especially concerning the nuclear issue and what guarantees each side might be able to provide the other. Pakistan would like to receive assurances from India. It would not

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<sup>9</sup> In a January 4 televised address, Carter promised: "Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north." See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 24. For Brzezinski's public comments, see footnote 3, Document 403.

<sup>10</sup> In his January 21 State of the Union message to Congress, Carter argued that the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan "has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States. It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia and specifically Pakistan is threatened. Therefore, I am asking Congress, as the first order of business, to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan defend itself." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 165)

<sup>11</sup> See Document 406.

promote a quarrel with India, but if Mrs. Gandhi were to develop a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis and engage in diplomatic pressures, Pakistan hopes that U.S. support would not be ended. (S)

*President Carter* observed that a newsman told him this morning that India had invited Pakistan to deploy its troops away from the eastern border, and to the West and that India would guarantee Pakistani security in the East. (S)

*Agha Shahi* said that he had not heard of this, having been away for awhile. In the past, at the official level, the Indians had reassured him that they would not create problems. (S)

*President Carter* asked if the Pakistanis would accept such an assurance and *Agha Shahi* replied that while they would welcome it, they would still want to be on their guard. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked whether the Indian military shared Indira Gandhi's indifference to the strategic realities of Afghanistan. (S)

*Mr. Shahi* thought they probably did not, but pointed out that the Indian military had always been subordinated to civilian control and were unable to assert themselves or their views. The Pakistanis believe that Indian and Pakistani interests converge. It is possible, however, that Mrs. Gandhi might see some shortsighted advantage in an alliance with the Soviet Union, designed to dismember Pakistan and allow the Soviets to take over the oil fields. He recalled that in 1971 the Indians had promised not to cause problems in East Bengal, only later on to invade it and separate it from the rest of Pakistan. The situation that Pakistan now faces is one virtually of life and death. Once Pakistan makes a choice it will have no freedom of maneuver, and will have to place itself and its trust in the honor and good faith of the United States. (S)

*President Carter* observed that a move of Pakistani forces to the West would be a sign of Pakistani resolve. He said that the United States will be helpful in getting support for Pakistan from other countries and asked that *Agha Shahi* give Zia exactly the same message that had been given to him. We will stand with Pakistan. Pakistan is vital to United States' security, and the 1959 Agreement is permanent. It is a pleasure to have Pakistan as a friend. We both now have an opportunity to repair the doubtful relations of the past. Please take to heart the American people's concern about the spread of nuclear weapons; this concern is not directed particularly at Pakistan, but also a series of other countries who are at the nuclear threshold. (S)

Thereupon the meeting ended. (U)

**409. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 12, 1980, 2232Z

9606. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Military Sub-Group.

1. S–Entire text.

2. Summary: After plenary meeting (described septel)<sup>2</sup> military group met for an hour and a half. Session was chaired by Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor who expressed US desire to move quickly in providing assistance to Pakistan. General Aref described in some detail Pakistan's current defense posture and its priority needs. Pakistan agreed to follow up with specific lists to be provided by their Embassy in Washington. Pakistan tentatively agreed to receive a US defense team for further detailed talks and indicated that they would get back to us on timing. End summary.

3. Secretary Claytor opened meeting by noting that US was prepared to accelerate delivery of equipment already in pipeline and wished to discuss with GOP what additional equipment was required. Claytor also indicated US was prepared to help Pakistan in strengthening its defense production capabilities. In response both General Aref and General Jilani indicated Pakistan was interested in strengthening its defense production capabilities in certain critical areas.

4. General Aref then provided a lengthy exposition on Pakistan's strategic and defense position. He noted that bulk of Pakistan's forces were on eastern front facing India and that forces on western side were meager and ill equipped. This was because main threat had always been from India not Afghanistan and Afghanistan had never stabbed Pakistan in back during its three wars with India. Essential point was that Pakistani force deployments in east were essentially self sufficient with a good logistical infrastructure. This was not at all true in west, where the infrastructure was virtually non existent.

5. Aref emphasized that as a result of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan now faces a different strategic situation. On the east they are facing an India which has some 30 divisions 13 of which were directly oriented against Pakistan. On the west there are now 5 Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–1114. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to New Delhi, Beijing, London, Moscow, Jidda, and Paris. Drafted by Hornblow; cleared in PM and DOD/ISA; approved by Coon.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 410.

divisions in Afghanistan and about five more stationed north of the Oxus River. In a month the GOP estimates there will be ten Soviet divisions in Afghanistan. In addition the Afghans themselves have had 13 divisions. These divisions admittedly now are being purged but with Soviet training and Soviet hardware will be rebuilt and then Pakistan will be faced with a combined Soviet/Afghan threat.

6. Aref noted that Soviet troops have fanned out to border towns on Pak frontier and there have been some air border violations since December 27. Pakistan believes but has no firm proof that aircraft were being flown by Soviet pilots because of the pattern of their maneuvers. The possibility of future Soviet incursions into Pakistan cannot be ruled out perhaps starting out as hot pursuit.

7. Aref said that Pakistan thus was in an eyeball to eyeball position with the Soviet Union. It is a frontline state. Aref outlined certain defense considerations facing Pakistan.

A. At present Pakistan cannot shift troops from the eastern front to the west. Pakistan won't reinforce its troops in the east but won't take any out. The east and west are separate theaters.

B. Pakistan is faced with a considerable shortage of military hardware. Much of Pakistan's equipment is old and needs modernizing.

C. In terms of its western borders Pakistan may have to raise new formations. He stressed that at the present time Pakistan had no radar on its western borders and no integrated air defense system in those areas. Thus Pakistan's first priorities were radar and air defense.

8. In sum Aref said Pakistan is faced with a permanent threat from the west and needed to take a long term view. For the long haul it needed to know how durable defense guarantees and defense assistance from such friends as the US would be. By itself Pakistan could not take on the USSR and needed to have a deterrent force.

9. Secretary Claytor said the US completely agreed with Pakistan's analysis. Our objective was to deter any Soviet move into Pakistan.

10. General Aref then provided general information on Pakistan's defense priorities service by service, stating that details would be worked out in later discussions:

- Army
- Anti aircraft guns
- Short-range air defense missiles (Roland/RBS-70)
- Long range artillery (self-propelled and towed)
- APCs
- Tanks (M48s or M60s)
- Armored vehicle launched bridges
- Engineer vehicles
- Anti-tank missiles (TOW, possibly Dragon)

- Air force
- Aircraft to match MiG–23, 25, 27s
- Anti-tank, gunship helicopters
- C–130s
- Sparrow air to air missiles
- Maverick air to ground missiles
- Laser guided bombs
- Ammunition
- Airborne warning radar (E–2C)
- I-Hawk SAMs
- Navy
- 2 submarines
- Missile boats with harpoon
- Naval helicopters (Sea King)
- 2 destroyers or frigates

11. In commenting on Pakistan's aircraft requirements Aref reviewed the past history of our differing views of Pakistan's needs and noted that Pakistan was now faced with a new situation. Many of its planes are obsolete and the Soviets had their most advanced planes in Afghanistan. Pakistan thus must face the gamut of the Soviet arsenal; MiG–23s, MiG–25s and MiG–27s. Aref intimated that the US was in the best position to tell Pakistan what kind of planes were needed to meet this threat.

12. At end of meeting Secretary Claytor asked if Pakistan would like to receive a team from the three services for further talks. General Aref said such a visit would be welcome and they would get back to us shortly about the timing of a visit. General Aref specifically asked that such a team include a specialist in defense production.

**Vance**

#### 410. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 13, 1980, 0131Z

9863. Tokyo pass Secretary Brown and AsstSec Holbrooke. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Political Discussions. Ref: (A) Islamabad 219;<sup>2</sup> (B) London 482.<sup>3</sup>

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi held wide-ranging talks January 12 with a US team headed by Secretary Vance. Shahi also called on Dr. Brzezinski<sup>4</sup> and on President Carter.<sup>5</sup> The principal focus of the talks was on the nature of the US security commitment to Pakistan in light of the much increased threat from Soviet-supported Afghanistan. The US side reaffirmed the relevance of our 1959 bilateral agreement to the current situation. We said we were proposing to the Congress a substantial economic assistance package and were willing to resume major military sales. As expected, the Pakistani team outlined the threat they faced in stark terms, noting the threat from both the west and east (India). The Pakistanis were asked for assurances on their nuclear intentions which we could use with the Congress in connection with the authorizing legislation. They will get back to us. We believe that the talks went well and laid the basis for a more cooperative US-Pak relationship. The GOP team seemed pleased with the seriousness of the US concern and the magnitude of assistance offered. The following account is a brief summary of the talks, for your background and, for London, Beijing and Jidda, to brief host governments. Embassy Islamabad should pass this information to Lord Carrington (ref A). End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsum Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 16, Pakistan, February–October 1980. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Islamabad, Beijing, London, Moscow, Jidda, New Delhi, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and Tokyo. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in S/S–O and by Peck, Coon, and Raphael; approved by Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 219 from Islamabad, January 10, the Embassy reported British Prime Minister Carrington's planned arrival in Islamabad on the evening of January 14. The purpose of the visit was to meet with Shahi and Zia, after which Carrington planned on visiting areas affected by the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. The Embassy requested that details of U.S. aid to Pakistan be forwarded to Islamabad in case such information proved useful to Carrington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800017–0517)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 482 from London, January 8, the Embassy reported Carrington's itinerary for his South Asia trip beginning on January 9. The Embassy noted Carrington's plans to offer U.K. humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800014–0764)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 407.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 408.



3. Pakistan Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi visited Washington January 12 for an all-day series of meetings. He was accompanied by Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Secretary General of Defense General Jilani, and General Aref, Military Chief of Staff to President Zia. FYI: Ambassador to Moscow Yaqub Khan, also participated, but the Pakistanis do not wish this to be made public. End FYI. The US team was headed by Secretary Vance and included Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor, Deputy Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary Newsom, Under Secretary Nimetz, and other officials from State, Defense, and NSC. Shahi also called on Dr. Brzezinski and on the President. Ambassador Hummel was present.

4. Secretary Vance, in welcoming Shahi, emphasized the gravity of the threat Pakistan faced as a result of developments in Afghanistan and the importance the USG attached to supporting Pakistan at this time.<sup>6</sup> Shahi's initial statement reiterated Pakistan's acute sense of insecurity and the need for a concrete indication of US intentions.

5. The principal themes which emerged during the discussions were:

A. Nature of US commitment: Shahi made a very strong plea that our 1959 agreement of cooperation be turned into a treaty. He argued that this would reassure the Pakistani public and be a more binding commitment in unforeseeable future circumstances. Yaqub Khan noted considerable public cynicism about the 1959 agreement, citing our restrictive interpretation of it during Pakistan's past conflicts with India. The Secretary reaffirmed the validity of the agreement; noted that its legal force was the same as a treaty in US law; specified that the threat Pakistan now faced was the type of situation envisaged in the agreement; and argued that no useful purpose would be served in trying to turn it into a treaty. He told Shahi that we intend to use language presenting the legislation which would create a record reaffirming the agreement. He also gave Shahi a letter from President Carter to Zia strongly reaffirming this commitment in the context of the threat from Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup> He offered to make the letter public if Pakistan wished, in order to provide a warning to the USSR. The Secretary agreed on a need for further discussions on threat scenarios and how we might be prepared to meet them.

B. Economic assistance: Secretary Vance told Shahi that we were requesting authority to provide a total of \$400 million in fiscal years 80 and 81, equally divided between Economic Support Funds

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<sup>6</sup> The text of Vance's opening statement was transmitted in telegram 9607 to Islamabad, January 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File D800021–1122)

<sup>7</sup> See Document 406.

and FMS credits. The US side said it was re-examining the debt relief problem. Shahi emphasized that Pakistan's principal economic concern was with its balance of payments, and stressed the importance of debt relief. Both sides agreed that further economic discussions would be held, and that the Pakistan Finance Minister should probably visit Washington within the next two weeks.

C. Soviet intentions: Shahi argued that the Pakistanis believed that, regardless of whether the Soviets had a grand design, the situation in South Asia would present them with a temptation for a forward thrust. Yaqub Khan advanced the strategic view that the Soviet salient between Iran and Pakistan could permit envelopment of the Arabian Peninsula and even East Africa. Yaqub also noted the imminent threat of "hot pursuit" incursions across the Durand Line. Such intimidation of Pakistan would fit with what he perceived to be the current Soviet mood. Secretary Vance said that we agreed the potential for such developments was there.

D. Military supply: Shahi made it clear that military supply was critical to enabling Pakistan to defend its border. The Secretary said our approach was to concentrate in the first instance on equipment relevant to the threat from Afghanistan and which could be quickly supplied. In separate military talks the Pakistanis described their urgent equipment needs and substantial agreement was reached on general priorities. A US defense team will visit Pakistan in the very near future for more detailed discussions. Septel on military sub-group discussions follows.<sup>8</sup>

E. India: Shahi said Pakistan still regards India as a major threat and he alluded to the Indian UNGA statement, as confirmation of Pak fears of a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis.<sup>9</sup> He pointedly asked what would we do if the Indians, in concert with Afghanistan, brought pressure against Pakistan. Both sides agreed that everything possible should be done to encourage a stable Indo-Pak relationship.

F. Iran: Shahi said that he thought the gravity of the situation and the awkwardness of the continuing US-Iran confrontation was "gradually beginning to dawn on them". He described at length his discussions with Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh and Ayatollah Beheshti, both of whom seemed interested in resolving the situation, but went on to state that the decision was in the hands of Khomeini. He said he urged release of the hostages to Khomeini, who reportedly remained silent.

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 409.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

G. Refugees: Shahi said that Pakistan was budgeting dols 50 to 60 million from its own resources for refugee relief, and both sides agreed on the urgency of more UNHCR resources. Secretary Vance said that we would expect to meet 1/3 of the UNHCR total.

H. Nuclear problem: Secretary Vance outlined the intense and continuing interest of the Congress and the US executive in nuclear nonproliferation. He said that we would need to be able to provide to the Congress assurances regarding Pakistan's nuclear intentions when we present the authorizing legislation for aid to Pakistan. The legislation would permit aid notwithstanding the Symington Amendment. In the ensuing discussion, Shahi said that the GOP would not object to our restating publicly that Pakistan would not manufacture nuclear weapons nor transfer sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, or technology to other countries. Regarding a test, Shahi said that further clarification which we could use with Congress, would require a decision by President Zia and his advisors. He emphasized that the question of publicly foreclosing a nuclear explosion was very sensitive in Pakistan. The Secretary in his opening statement said we believe any Pakistan nuclear test under present circumstances would have deeply destabilizing consequences to the region.

I. Coordination with other countries: The Secretary said we had had preliminary discussions with our major allies and other friends of Pakistan about Pakistan's needs. We hoped that our assistance would encourage others to be generous in helping to meet these needs. He said we would continue these efforts if Shahi wished us to do so. Shahi agreed, emphasizing the importance of the Saudi response.

6. European posts should not rpt not brief host governments at this time so as not to preempt Christopher's briefings.<sup>10</sup> For Beijing: septel un-related subject<sup>11</sup> should be put together with this report and shared with MFA in advance of Huang Hua departure for Pakistan. Islamabad should find way to have Carrington briefed. Jidda will receive subsequent instructions for talk with Saudis.

Vance

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<sup>10</sup> Christopher visited Brussels, Bonn, Paris, London, and Rome January 14–16 to discuss with the European allies the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

<sup>11</sup> Not further identified.

#### 411. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 15, 1980, 2157Z

11930. USNATO for Coon with Christopher party. Subject: US-Pakistan Talks: Economic Assistance and Debt. Ref: State 9863.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-Entire text).

2. The following is an expanded description of those portions of the discussions held by Pakistan Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi in Washington January 12 that dealt with economic assistance and debt.

3. The Secretary, in his opening statement, described the 400 million dollar package for which we were seeking congressional authorization to provide to Pakistan in fiscal years 80 and 81. The package includes 100 million dollars each in Economic Support Funds and FMS credits in each of these two fiscal years.

4. Shahi's presentation on the economic side was very brief, and stressed Pakistan's impending balance of payments crisis, the adverse impact of the increasing price of oil, and the importance in this connection of the debt issue. He argued that Pakistan's European creditors were looking sympathetically at a possible rescheduling, but were waiting for the US to move. He hoped we could give a positive response.

5. Ambassador Henry Owen then described the US approach to Pakistan's economic problems in somewhat greater detail. He started from the premise that the US was concerned about Pakistan's balance of payments problems and wanted to be supportive. He said that the World Bank was encouraged by recent trends in Pakistan's economic policies, in particular the increased emphasis on agriculture, growing realism of agricultural prices, and the reduction in the budget deficit.

6. Ambassador Owen said that we wanted to be helpful in a number of ways. First of all, in programming our Economic Support Funds, we wanted to make sure that a "good part" of this went for quick disbursing activities, such as financing fertilizer imports. In this connection, it might be possible to include in the loan agreement some understanding on fertilizer prices. Second, in resuming economic assistance, we would become fully active members of the Consortium once again. In this connection, if the World Bank felt that Pakistan's economic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026-0917. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Islamabad, New Delhi, Jidda, Beijing, London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, USNATO, and Tokyo. Drafted by Schaffer; cleared in AID, EB/IFD/OMA, and S/S-O, and by Owen; approved by Peck.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 410.

policies justified proposing an increase in the overall level of Consortium aid to Pakistan, we would be prepared to support it.

7. The third area which we had to consider, Owen continued, was debt relief. The normal Paris Club rule, he said required two pre-conditions. First, they required “imminent default.” Our aid would probably reduce the likelihood of imminent default as usually defined by the Paris Club, i.e. a situation in which arrearages had already begun. Owen said we would consult with other countries about this connection.

8. The second pre-requisite was a stabilization agreement with the IMF. This was essential. Owen advanced the “personal” view that it might be possible for Pakistan to work out a plan under which economic reforms were phased in and the percentage of debt the creditor country rescheduled could be adjusted in parallel with these economic reforms. In response to Shahi’s contention that the IMF mission last November had made a “favorable recommendation”, Owen pointed out that this was in the context of a first tranche drawing which is often largely unconditional.<sup>3</sup> Stabilization should be considered in the context of a longer term agreement. The IMF, he said, had to be part of a rescheduling.

9. In winding up the economic discussion, both sides agreed that it would be advisable for senior economic officials of the US and Pakistan to get together and discuss these problems. Shahi suggested that the Pakistan Finance Minister visit Washington for this purpose, and we agreed that such a visit should take place in about two weeks.

**Vance**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 393.

## 412. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 17, 1980, 9–10:45 a.m.

### SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Ambassador Robert Komer

#### *JCS*

Chairman General David Jones  
Lt. General John Pustay

#### *CIA*

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci  
Robert Ames  
Charles Cogan

#### *OMB*

Deputy Director John White

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Hamilton Jordan  
Jody Powell  
Hedley Donovan  
David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Colonel William E. Odom  
Captain Gary Sick  
Thomas Thornton  
Fritz Ermarth

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski explained that the purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC,<sup>2</sup> the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.

Dr. Brzezinski also added that the Soviet publication "New Times" has issued a call for all Communist states and parties to seize new revolutionary opportunities created by the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of present Soviet policy directions.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book [I]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right-hand corner of the Summary, Carter wrote: "Zbig—These are very serious matters. The discussions are necessary but any proposal for contentious action must be submitted to me first. J."

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the January 16 SCC meeting on Iran and the Soviet Union is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President's Daily Diary, Box 10, 7/31/78–8/13/78.

*Military Assistance to Pakistan*

Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance commented that the President's meeting with Agha Shahi<sup>3</sup> went as well as could be expected. Secretary Brown asked how we will deal with the situation if the Pakistanis insist they want \$1 billion in aid while we only offered \$400 million. Secretary Vance predicted that they will take our \$400 million and complain, not reject our aid.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the French willingness to sell the Mirage aircraft to Pakistan. Secretary Vance reported that the French will probably supply the Mirage. As a next step, it will be discussed at the Political Directors Meeting in London on January 24th. State will push France to make a decision by then.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of American A-7 aircraft for Pakistan. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis did not ask for them. Rather they asked that they be supplied with aircraft sufficient to protect themselves against the Soviet air threat, implying, of course, for the need for the US F-16 or the Mirage. The A-7, as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, would be very useful in a ground support role along the Western frontier. Furthermore, because the U.S. has a large number, nearly 700, it can undoubtedly spare 30 or 40. Secretary Brown agreed the Pakistanis might be willing to buy some A-7s.

*Military Consortium*

Dr. Brzezinski asked for Defense's proposal for a division of labor among the members of the military consortium. Secretary Brown submitted a paper showing which countries can produce what categories of military equipment.<sup>4</sup> The issue of who pays remains to be solved, he added. Secretary Vance noted that according to Agha Shahi, the Saudis promised Pakistan \$800 million for military purchases over a year ago but have not yet delivered. We should press the Saudis to make the promise good.

Concerning Japan, Vance has instructed Phil Habib to ask the Japanese for \$400 million for the consortium. They may give less, but Vance feels we should ask for that much. We will get little from Britain and France, he continued, but the French should be willing to sell them aircraft and the British will certainly be willing to sell tanks and tank guns. Secretary Brown added that the U.S., France, and Germany can provide anti-tank weapons, much needed for insurgency and defense. It was also pointed out that the Pakistanis want foreign assistance for building a communications infrastructure on their western front.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 408.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we need a big consortium figure for public and political effect such as \$1 billion. Secretary Brown observed that one to one and a half billion dollars for equipment spread over three years could be absorbed effectively by the Pakistanis; therefore, Dr. Brzezinski's figure is about right. Dr. Brzezinski added that we must avoid a figure which is so high that we are open to criticism that we are "saturating" Pakistan with arms the same way we did Iran.

Dr. Brzezinski added that we need a military equipment package and a concept for a division of labor which we can propose to the allies. Secretary Vance suggested that this be done at the upcoming Political Directors Meeting on January 24. Dr. Brzezinski agreed; we must supplement our delegation with technical teams sufficiently competent to make concrete decisions on both funds and equipment.

*Agreed action:*

—State will press France on the Mirage aircraft.

—The Political Directors Meeting will be reinforced with sufficient staff to discuss military assistance and funding.

—The U.S. will give an exemplary package to the Political Directors as a proposal for a division of labor.

—To fund the consortium, we will press the Japanese for \$400 million and the Saudis for \$800 million which, combined with our \$400 million, should be above \$1 billion.

—Britain and France will be encouraged to supply specific military equipment.

*U.S. Assurances to Pakistan*

Secretary Vance reported that we are still working out contingency scenarios to define circumstances under which we would come to Pakistan's military assistance against foreign attack. Secretary Vance promised to have a paper by Friday or Saturday<sup>5</sup> which spells these out in considerable detail for the President.

*It was agreed*, at Secretary Vance's suggestion, that this is the next big decision issue which should be discussed with the President.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>5</sup> January 18 and 19.



**413. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, January 17, 1980, 1415Z

438. Also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: Agha Shahi Gives Preliminary Views of Pakistan Government on Aid Package.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. I was called in this evening (Jan 17) by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi to receive what he described as preliminary reaction of Pakistan Government to U.S. aid offer. Agha Shahi prefaced remarks by saying U.S. should understand that GOP appreciates firm stand by President Carter over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his offer to come to Pakistan's assistance. However, he would like Washington to have his "informal and preliminary" assessment of initial GOP reaction to aid package. Fuller and more formal GOP reaction would be forthcoming.

3. Agha Shahi said that initial reaction of government leaders was one of disappointment. Considering the immensity of the threat, U.S. offer of \$400 million viewed as inadequate to meet the situation in terms of the kinds of military equipment that Pakistan required, \$200 million would not go very far, particularly if one took into account requirements such as high performance aircraft. He had also discussed offer of \$200 million in economic assistance with Economics Minister Ghulam Ishaq, who felt that this amount would not go very far in meeting Pakistan's needs, particularly with questions of debt rescheduling still hanging over their heads. However, Agha Shahi added, aid package more inadequate in regard to military needs.<sup>2</sup>

4. GOP also concerned about degree of American resolve, since already the "liberal" press in U.S. is attacking provision of assistance to "undemocratic" government in Pakistan. Certainly Pakistan did not enjoy an ideally democratic government and martial law prevailed,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0698, N800002–0047. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> A January 16 intelligence memorandum prepared for the Secretary of Defense reported one Pakistani reaction to the U.S. aid offer. The memorandum included comments by Pakistani Air Chief Marshal Shamim, a "Zia protégé and supporter," who "welcomed the prospect of US military aid for Pakistan, but cautioned that such assistance would be perceived by the population as a show of support for Zia and the Martial Law Administration (MLA). Since Pakistanis, including the all-powerful army officer corps are 'fed up' with the MLA, Shamim acknowledged that US aid could have a negative impact and would inhibit the emergence of a democratic political system in Pakistan for another 5 to 10 years by bolstering Zia's position." (Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files, Accession No. 330–82–03217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan–16 Apr 1980)

but such a reaction was disappointing in view of the critical threat posed by Soviet aggression.

5. A further concern, said Agha Shahi, is fear of Indo-Soviet alliance against Pakistan. He had learned on good authority that visit to Moscow by Indian defense team (sent by caretaker government) had resulted in firm Soviet offer of \$2 billion in arms.<sup>3</sup> Pakistan wanted to reach an understanding with Indira Gandhi on response to Soviet expansion, and GOP had authorized Lord Carrington to convey this view to Indian Government. He felt Soviet military aid offer could go a long way to explain pro-Soviet statement made prior to UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan<sup>4</sup> which should have dictated a negative Indian vote on resolution. Indian Government now backing down somewhat only because of massive UN vote against Soviets.<sup>5</sup> In any case, overtures to India had been made. Ambassador Bajpai had brought message from Indira Gandhi accepting President Zia's congratulations on her election and proposing visit to Islamabad by Indian Foreign Secretary early in February. Proposal had been accepted.

6. In response, I said that "preliminary reaction" would be immediately transmitted to Washington. In regard to doubts that Foreign Advisor expressed there would be ample opportunity to discuss matters further. Ambassador Hummel would be returning to Islamabad around Jan 21 and as he was aware, Deputy Secretary Christopher would be paying a visit in very near future.<sup>6</sup> There should be no doubt at all regarding American resolve in face of Soviet aggression. Pakistan should not expect unanimity of views in American press on situation. There would, of course, be comments critical of Pakistan Government among reports of huge number of journalists already assembled in Islamabad. More could be expected out of Tehran and we had just had report foreign journalists in Kabul being expelled and many of those would no doubt come here. In long run however, Pakistan should expect to benefit from world attention being focussed on Soviet aggression, and I thought it would be particularly beneficial to have plight of Afghan refugees given full publicity. In any case, there should be no confusion over what free press may or may not say and U.S. Govern-

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 186.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

<sup>5</sup> On January 14, an emergency special session of the UNGA adopted Resolution ES-6/2 by a vote of 104 to 18, with 18 abstentions. The resolution, introduced by Pakistan on behalf of 24 sponsors, "strongly deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan, which was inconsistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State, and appealed to all States to respect that principle and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 300-302, 307-308)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 423.

ment position. I had provided Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz with full texts of Hodding Carter's press briefings, which I thought spoke for themselves.<sup>7</sup>

7. Comment: Agha Shahi's expression of disappointment over aid package came as no surprise. In backgrounder yesterday to several American journalists, he was even more critical of U.S. \$400 million aid package (Islamabad 437).<sup>8</sup> From our contacts we believe there is a continuing debate on this question within the GOP. While Agha Shahi and others may be taking negative view, which we must remember may be largely for bargaining purposes, there seems to be much more positive attitude on part of Pakistani military. We will have better idea of whether President Zia will now modify his original positive public reaction to aid offer after press briefing he quite willingly gave to several American journalists, which will take place this evening.

8. Department may wish pass this message to New Delhi and Moscow.

King

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 12097 to multiple posts, January 15, the Department reported one such press briefing. At one point in the January 15 briefing, a reporter asked: "Hodding, Pakistan is yet another military dictatorship, also an Islamic country in which just a few short weeks ago the U.S. Embassy was sacked and burned apparently beyond the control of the government, the military government. Is there any concern in the Carter administration about handing over arms to possibly restive people who might in some way use these arms, or be ungrateful in receipt of these arms and use them in some anti-American way?" Hodding Carter replied: "I think that Pakistan fully understands where the threat to its security lies. I think that it fully knows and has indicated publicly in statements by President Zia and others what its requirements are to meet that threat." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800026–1055)

<sup>8</sup> In telegram 437 from Islamabad, January 17, the Embassy reported comments several U.S. journalists in Pakistan attributed to Shahi. According to the telegram, "Freely using \$400 million figure for U.S. assistance in talking to the reporters, Agha Shahi said (and the quotes are from the reporters' notes): it is 'not meaningful at all.' 'The U.S. suffers from Hamlet-like indecision every time the subject of assistance to Pakistan comes up.' 'The offer was received with profound disappointment.' 'Some Cabinet Ministers had glowered' when the terms were revealed to them. He referred to relations between the U.S. and Pakistan as 'ambiguous, uncertain' and troubled by 'a sense of impermanence.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0032) See also Document 414.

#### 414. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, January 18, 1980, 1055Z

449. Department also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: (C) Zia's Remarks to US Newsmen on US Aid Offer, Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue. Ref: Islamabad 0443.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C) Entire text.

2. The following are excerpts of the statements President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq made to US reporters Jan. 17 (reftel). We transcribed the material from the tape recording made by William Borders of the New York Times (please protect).

3. US aid offer:

—Q. You said that without Pakistan the US has no direct influence in this arc from Turkey to Vietnam. Would Pakistani security be strengthened if there was an American military base of some sort in Pakistan and would you welcome it?

—A. No. Because bases of countries particularly of the rival powers in another country are always a source of trouble for those who have those bases inside that country and for those against whom those bases are utilized. We still haven't forgotten the lesson we learned of the U-2 bases when Khrushchev drew his dagger and said "this is Pakistan and I'm going to sort them out" or words to that effect. So it will not be possible for Pakistan to increase, to earn the animosity of the Soviet Union at the cost of earning bases, because then we are in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. But it is the influence in the area you do not gain by acquiring bases only, you acquire by having friends in the region.

—Q. Could you be specific about exactly what it is you want?

—A. Pakistan does not want any weapons which could create a scare in our neighbors, particularly India, that Pakistan is arming itself for aggressive designs against any one of her neighbors, no. All we want is a good defensive capability . . . we should have modern airplanes, ground-to-air missiles, . . . anti-tank weapons, . . . better communications facilities. In the worst [*west*] we are devoid of total infrastruc-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800030-0861. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow and New Dehli.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 443 from Islamabad, January 18, the Embassy warned of impending press reports of Zia's critical remarks regarding the U.S. assistance offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800030-0405)

ture. There are no good roads, no communications, no wireless coverage, no radar coverage. We are blind on our west, totally.

—Q. How much money would all of this cost?

—A. Oh, it's a matter of calculation . . . it's difficult to say.

—Q. The US is talking of a \$400 million program over two years of civilian and military . . .

—A. If that is true, that is peanuts. (Laughs.) And that is terrible, if this is true, as I said, I've not learned it officially, if this is true what has been coming out in certain quarters in the press then I say that it is terribly disappointing. And Pakistan will not buy its security with \$400 million. It will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much more influential in this region than the US.

—Q. Is there enough aid that would buy Pakistan's security while not incensing the Soviet Union?

—A. It is not only the equipment, . . . the money that will buy Pakistan's security. It is the plane of morality and the plane of world conscience to which I am appealing.

4. Bilateral agreement:

—Q. You mean a moral commitment? . . . What form would it take?

—A. We have a 1959 agreement with the US. We would like to turn it into a treaty, where the US has a commitment, and then whether you have or not . . . President Carter, I'm glad to say, has come out in the last two days or so very openly that the expansionism or expansionist designs would be thwarted, if possible, by the Soviet Union, and Pakistan's integrity or any other country's freedom is guaranteed.<sup>3</sup> But we are living in the twentieth century and 1980. People want more fundamental sureties rather than words alone.

—Q. What kind of treaty are you referring to?

—A. We have a bilateral agreement, the clauses of which are subject to interpretation. One, it is an agreement, it is not a treaty. It's an agreement which is liable to be accepted or rejected by the executive alone. The Congress or the Senate has no say bearing into this. In 1971 it was put to test and if you have read . . . memoirs, it very clearly spells out as to what are the difficulties and what were the interpretations to that agreement. We want to remove those anomalies.

—Q. Are you talking about a mutual defense treaty?

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<sup>3</sup> In a January 15 interview with news editors and directors, Carter spoke of the need to bolster Pakistan's defensive capability and to stop further Soviet expansion. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 102–109.

—A. No. It can be . . . what's wrong with a defense treaty? A friendship treaty, yes . . . we are looking for a bilateral treaty in which the integrity and the freedom of Pakistan is guaranteed.

—Q. Would the Soviet-Indian model be acceptable?<sup>4</sup>

—A. Yes, sir. Not only acceptable, but . . . there are many models today which can be examined and the Soviet-Indian model, the Afghanistan-Soviet model, [garble—or any?] other model you can think of.

—Q. Could you spell out what kind of a defense treaty you have in mind? You want a treaty under which the US would what?

—A. I do not expect that the US would send its troops to Pakistan or, it would be foolish on my part to expect that the American or Chinese will come and fight for the freedom of Pakistan. Pakistan will have to fight for its own freedom . . . but human beings as we are, we want occasionally a hand on our back, and it is that hand that I am looking for, because we are in confrontation with a super power. We can't by ourselves or even with the assistance, we cannot and we should not challenge a super power. So . . . if you can think that there is a case, there are instances, and whether it's US or its allies or joined together with the Western countries, think that Pakistan's integrity or security can be guaranteed by certain measures, by bilateral treaty, by a defense pact, then Pakistan will certainly welcome it.

—Q. But the CENTO model is obviously not . . . ?

—A. We are now and for the next, quite some time, we are a Non-Aligned Movement [member] and we do not want to get involved in multinational agreements, treaties or pacts.

—Q. What kind of commitment are you looking for from the US? In real terms, what would you like to see on paper?

—A. A good treaty of friendship, in conjunction with others, economic and military assistance, in that order of priority.

5. Nuclear issue:

—Q. Would you consider allowing some sort of American inspection of the nuclear program to satisfy itself as to Pakistan's intentions as to nuclear weapons?

—A. No, not on a unilateral basis. But we have offered inspection of non-discriminatory nature. But if other countries can be treated like this and I won't go further, I will say just take next-door India. If the US can get an agreement of inspection of nuclear facilities of India I would go out of my way not only to have those nuclear facilities inspected by the US or by an international agency, but before anybody else . . . the US and myself we are in an argument on technical grounds

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

because the US Government is following a policy of non-proliferation of weapons to which we fully, wholeheartedly support. But the US is not providing us any facilities.

—Q. But the whole situation has changed in the last few weeks . . .

—A. The point is, first of all, is Pakistan making a bomb. And I tell you now with all the emphasis at my command that Pakistan is not making a bomb. Where lies the question of the nuclear facility, yes we are enriching uranium. I've said so at top of my voice. But it is a very humble, modest experiment . . . and for the . . . last three weeks, this question has not appeared in our talks and our considerations and I hope that with the situation that we are faced today we can keep this problem aside for the time being until we have resolved greater issues. And then you can come across on the nuclear issue.

King

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#### **415. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 19, 1980, 0041Z

14110. Subject: Pakistani Criticism of US Assistance Package. Ref: 80 Islamabad 448 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Deputy Secretary Christopher called in Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan January 18 to discuss recent disparaging comments to the press by President Zia and Agha Shahi regarding the size of the US

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0690, N800002–0112. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi, Beijing, and Jidda. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, Tokyo, and the White House. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S–O and by Constable; approved by Christopher.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 448 from Islamabad, January 18, the Embassy reported a Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs request to delay the submission of the proposed aid package for Pakistan to Congress pending Shahi's consultation with Zia on the issue over the next day or two. The Embassy noted: "There is, no doubt, a certain amount of bargaining in GOP position, as well as real divisions within government. In addition Pakistanis may be maneuvering in relation to upcoming Islamic Conference here, with thought of showing their independence from alliances as well as demonstrating that American aid must be supplemented by rich Muslim states. Finally, on basis of tape of Zia's meeting with US newsmen, there is a certain amount of confusion on Pak side." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0694)

assistance package for Pakistan. Khan was accompanied by DCM Naj-muddin Shaikh, while Ambassador Hummel, DAS Constable and PAB Director Peck sat in on US side.

3. The Deputy Secretary made the following points:

—Secretary Vance has decided to go ahead with his scheduled appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21 in support of our legislative package to Pakistan. The legislation will concurrently be formally submitted to the Congress.

—We have taken note of the criticism by President Zia and Agha Shahi of the amount of our assistance. Public ridicule of our efforts will not be helpful and does not serve Pakistan's interests or ours.

—This criticism tends to undermine the support we need in Congress. It also complicates our efforts with our allies, and may send the wrong signal to the Soviets. Our allies are prepared to be helpful, but they look to us to take the first step.

—The amount of our assistance was decided by the President and his top advisers after very careful consideration. It represents in our judgment a substantial contribution to Pakistan's needs. In addition, we are providing PL-480 assistance, aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and will be reviewing Pakistan's debt situation.

—As we made clear in our discussions on January 12,<sup>3</sup> our assistance will be part of a larger multinational effort. The US should not be the sole supplier of Pakistan's needs. We felt that by taking the lead we could stimulate others to provide substantial help to Pakistan.

—We are anxious to develop closer relations with Pakistan in this difficult period. It is not helpful for our efforts to be denigrated publicly in colorful and colloquial terms.

—Pakistan's needs and the importance of increased assistance is well understood. We expect that the Secretary's testimony before the SFRC will find a good deal of resonance and support.

—Nonetheless, no one should underestimate the difficulties before this legislation. Its sweeping provisions will be questioned by those in the Congress who have an interest in nonproliferation and human rights. We need Pakistan's cooperation in avoiding statements which could be picked up by opponents of the legislation.

4. In reply, Sultan Khan said that Pakistan deeply appreciates the concern shown at the highest levels of the USG and the efforts in Pakistan's behalf demonstrated at the January 12 discussions. Khan noted that we had reached full agreement at that time on the magnitude of the threat facing Pakistan, and indicated that the response to this

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 410.



threat represented by the US assistance package was not commensurate. Pakistan had respected the secrecy of the figures discussed at that meeting, but had to consider the impact on Pakistani public opinion when these figures leaked out. The US assistance would irritate the USSR and India without having an appropriate compensating effect in helping Pakistan. He stressed that there was no intention to ridicule, since that would be inconsistent with the confidence on both sides which characterized the Washington talks.

5. Khan pressed for specific figures as to what the allies might provide Pakistan. Christopher said he had not gotten into precise figures during his recent European consultations since he had also been heavily engaged with Iran and Soviet-related matters. We were now prepared to begin precise consultations, and our intention was to start with a narrow group, then to broaden it. We were prepared to go beyond NATO and, without creating any tight-knit group, to increase the size of the assistance as much as possible. With assistance coming from many different sources, the sums could add up to a very considerable amount. In closing, Christopher urged that we work quietly and effectively together to move down the path agreed upon during the Washington talks.<sup>4</sup>

6. For Islamabad: In lieu of State 13950,<sup>5</sup> you should draw on above points in informing MFA that we have decided to move forward with our legislation despite Pakistani criticism.

**Vance**

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<sup>4</sup> In a January 19 memorandum, Vance informed Carter of Christopher's meeting with Sultan Khan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 1/80)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 13950 to Islamabad, January 18, the Department informed the Embassy that Carter had decided to submit the legislative package for Pakistan to Congress on January 18 "despite the public criticism of our program from President Zia and Agha Shahi." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800031–0321)

#### 416. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, January 20, 1980, 0710Z

454. Subject: GOP Position on U.S. Assistance to Pakistan: Secretary's Testimony Before SFRC.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. This is an action message. This message should be available to Department principals by opening of business Monday, January 21.

3. I was called late last night by Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, who had obviously just returned from meeting with President Zia. He expressed deep concern over any unilateral U.S. announcement of aid package to Pakistan. I asked for appointment with Foreign Secretary first thing this morning (Jan 20) to get full and more precise statement of GOP position, which I have now done.

4. Gist of GOP concern as expressed by Shahnawaz is that U.S. decision to proceed with legislation in Congress on \$400 million aid package is, as we have already been informed (Islamabad 453),<sup>2</sup> considered by GOP as a unilateral act. If consultations with Congress or legislative action leads to public record showing that U.S. has requested or been granted by Congress \$400 million aid package, GOP will be obliged to make public statement that it is not associated with this decision. Pakistan is prepared to challenge the Soviet Union once it is determined that sufficient resources are available to do so; but this is a decision which must be made by Pakistan. GOP considers that question of assistance is still under negotiation. It would be particularly unfortunate if we found ourselves taking public positions on U.S. assistance on eve of Islamic Conference.<sup>3</sup> Results of conference could even be damaged by perception that Pakistan's call for Islamic meeting is linked to U.S. aid package.

5. I told Shahnawaz I wanted to review once again in precise detail the reasons for our decision to proceed quickly with Congress, and I went over points made by Deputy Secretary to Pakistani Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0686, N800002-0143. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 453 from Islamabad, January 19, the Embassy reported that Shahi's initial response to the U.S. intention to proceed with the submission to Congress of the assistance package for Pakistan was that if the package were submitted, Pakistan's concurrence should not be assumed. Shahi also expressed doubt that aid from other countries would be forthcoming. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800032-0457)

<sup>3</sup> The Islamic Conference met January 26-29 in Islamabad. See footnote 3, Document 422.

(State 14110).<sup>4</sup> (Shahnawaz expressed some annoyance that conversation has not yet been reported by Sultan Khan.) I laid particular emphasis on the importance of putting \$400 million package in context of larger assistance from variety of sources and importance of U.S. taking the lead to accomplish this end. Shahnawaz said that while there might be persuasive reasons for taking the action we have at the Washington end, consideration must also be given to negative results that could ensue on this end. He repeated that before calling down the wrath of the Soviet Union on its head, Pakistan had to make its own judgement of its capabilities. GOP considered that visit by U.S. military team was part of process of determining Pakistani requirements. We had spoken of “ridicule” of U.S. offer but point is that if \$400 million aid offer becomes a formal part of the public record, it is others who will ridicule it. He would be interested in knowing how soon Congress will act and how much of our testimony before Congress will be on the public record.

6. At an appropriate point in the conversation I emphasized the multilateral and continuing nature of our effort by advising Shahnawaz that GOP should immediately request increased assistance from Japan as follow-up to Ambassador Habib’s discussions in Tokyo (State 15264).<sup>5</sup> This was a concrete example of efforts we were making. I also took occasion to inform Shahnawaz that we would be seeking GOP agreement to use U.S.-owned rupees for local costs of refugee relief and to maximize U.S. food and dollar imports (State 15189).<sup>6</sup>

7. Finally, I said that GOP concerns would, naturally, be transmitted immediately to Washington, I believed GOP had a complete and precise picture of U.S. position. Important next step would be an early meeting between President Zia and Ambassador Hummel. I said that I could reconfirm that Ambassador would be arriving tomorrow, Jan 21. Shahnawaz said he would do his best to arrange meeting with President that afternoon and he thought that it could be done.

8. Comment: It would be useful to have Department’s best estimate of timing of legislative action on aid request. GOP obviously hopes

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 415.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 15264 to Islamabad, January 20, transmitted the results of Habib’s discussions with the Japanese Government regarding assistance to Pakistan. After Habib suggested Japan should contribute \$335 million for 1980, the Japanese expressed willingness to consider larger contributions if done through a consortium and urged that the Consortium meeting, planned for May, should be held sooner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800033–0451)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 15189 to Islamabad, January 19, the Department reported the results of a series of discussions between UNHCR and officials from the Department of State and AID. In addition to other aid, U.S. officials offered to use at least 5 million of U.S.-owned rupees to aid the estimated 500,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800033–0297)

that portions of our testimony before Congress dealing with exact amount of aid package can be kept off public record, at least for the time being, and particularly until after Islamic Conference in Islamabad which begins on Jan 26.

9. Department may wish to pass this message to other interested posts.

**King**

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**417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 20, 1980, 2308Z

16431. For Ambassador Hummel. Subject: Your Meeting With President Zia. Ref: Islamabad 00454.<sup>2</sup>

1. (Secret-Entire text).

2. Given the GOP's views as conveyed by Shahnawaz, we have decided to delay presentation of the legislation on assistance to Pakistan until after the Islamic Conference. Secretary Vance will meet with SFRC in closed session as scheduled on January 21 to brief committee on situation in Afghanistan and South West Asia and on our approach to assistance for Pakistan, but without reference to specific legislation. In reaching this decision, we found particularly persuasive Shahnawaz's point that the results of the conference could be damaged by perception that Pakistan's call for Islamic meeting is linked to U.S. aid package.

3. Following is proposed text of statement Senator Church will make on January 21 in announcing postponement of submission of legislation:

Quote Secretary Vance will meet with the SFRC in closed session at 3:00 pm today to discuss the situation in Southwest Asia, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the threat posed to Pakistan and other independent nations in the region by the Soviet action, and the US hostages held by Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0683, N800002-0164. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Constable; cleared in S/S-O and by Saunders; approved by Christopher.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 416.

The Secretary and I have agreed that formal submission of legislation relating to assistance to Pakistan will be deferred for a short period of time to permit further consultation with Pakistan and with other nations which have also been examining the possibility of aid to Pakistan. Unquote.

4. In informing President Zia of foregoing, you should make it clear that we do not view delay as a period for reconsideration of levels we are preparing for Pakistan over next eighteen months. We will use time provided to undertake urgent consultations with variety of other potential donors to Pakistan to develop broad multilateral package of economic and security assistance for Pakistan.

5. You should also inform President Zia that we would like to send the military team which was discussed with Shahi to Pakistan as soon as possible. The discussion with Shahi on January 12 indicated we would send a team within 10 days.<sup>3</sup> We are prepared to move ahead with this as soon as Pakistan desires. We understand that this may not be possible this week because of Pakistan's preoccupation with the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister and the upcoming Islamic Conference. If the GOP prefers, the team can join the delegation headed by Deputy Secretary Christopher, or could follow his visit if GOP prefers. (FYI: DepSec would be prepared to come as early as Jan. 30 or 31, but you should let GOP suggest dates it prefers. End FYI)

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 410.

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**418. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, January 22, 1980, 1540Z

564. Subject: Meeting With President Zia.

1. (S) Entire text.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0680, N800002–0232. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2. President Zia was unable to receive me Jan 21, the day of my return to Islamabad, and consequently, we passed message to Zia that day through Shahnawaz so that he would be aware that we were delaying congressional presentation of assistance legislation temporarily and that Secretary's meeting with SFRC would be in closed session.<sup>2</sup> Shahnawaz had expressed appreciation for this move.

3. I met with President Zia this evening, January 22, for more than an hour, and this message summarizes points that will be of immediate interest to Washington. A fuller account of conversation will follow.<sup>3</sup>

4. I opened the meeting by stressing directly to Zia the importance of not denigrating US assistance. The President quickly replied "I had to do that once or twice, but I won't be doing it again." Later in conversation, Zia explained that when \$400 million figure leaked in Washington, there had been a flood of telegrams and letters from Pakistanis criticizing amount and urging government not to accept. Only strenuous use of press censorship had prevented this from becoming major issue here.

5. President Zia would be pleased to receive Deputy Secretary Christopher any time from February 1 on. Islamic Conference ends January 28 and Australian Foreign Minister Peacock visiting Pakistan January 29–31. Military team could accompany Christopher if we wished, but Zia thought it would make more sense to have team come immediately after Christopher visit.

6. Government of Pakistan has no present intention of releasing text of President Carter's letter to Zia on Jan. 11<sup>4</sup> unless we do so. In future GOP would release letter only after consulting us.

7. Zia again raised question of possibility of our considering formal treaty in place of 1959 agreement. I will cover this subject more fully in a separate message. Suffice it to say here, that I reviewed the reasons why we thought this would not be the best course, including problem of our disagreement over Pakistan's nuclear program. I also reminded Zia that we would need, even in reaffirming 1959 agreement, some nuclear assurances from Pakistan, as discussed with Agha Shahi in Washington.

8. *[5 lines not declassified]*

9. On question of military and economic assistance from other countries, Zia expressed strong desire for estimate of total inputs so that Pakistan could make a better judgment of whether it was going

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<sup>2</sup> In his February 5 statement before the Committee, Vance again postponed the aid request for Pakistan. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, pp. 40–43)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 419.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 406.

to be able to secure the resources to meet the Soviet challenge. I explained that he should press ahead with the Japanese, West Germans and Saudis on the basis of the spade work we had already done, to ascertain their plans.

10. Other subjects discussed will be covered in separate messages tomorrow in addition to elaboration of some of topics summarized above.

Hummel

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#### **419. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, January 23, 1980, 1025Z

596. Subject: Zia's Interest in Defense Treaty With United States. Ref: Islamabad 564.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. During my conversation with President Zia Jan 22 (reftel) he raised subject of 1959 agreement several times. Zia has not given up on idea that a formal treaty with U.S. would be a greater guarantee of Pakistan's security than 1959 agreement. Zia said that while he accepts our assurances that 1959 agreement equally binding, there are no grey areas. He said Dr. Kissinger, in his recently published book (as was pointed out by Paks during Wash talks with Shahi), raises some questions about 1959 agreement,<sup>3</sup> and many Pakistanis question U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0677, N800002–0249. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 418.

<sup>3</sup> In *White House Years*, Kissinger wrote: "On December 2 [1971] Pakistani Abassador Raza delivered a letter from Yahya Khan to President Nixon invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan as the basis for US aid to Pakistan. The American obligation to Pakistan was thus formally raised. The State Department was eloquent in arguing that no binding obligation existed; it regularly put out its view at public briefings. It pointed out that Article I spoke only of 'appropriate action' subject to our constitutional processes; it did not specify what action should be taken." Kissinger also noted: "State simply ignored all other communications between our government and Pakistan. The image of a great nation conducting itself like a shyster looking for legalistic loopholes was not likely to inspire other allies who had signed treaties with us or relied on our expressions in the belief that the words meant approximately what they said." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 894–895) For Yahya Khan's letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 219. For Nixon and Kissinger's decision to send U.S. military aid to Pakistan via Iran, see *ibid.*, Documents 222 and 265.

response in 1965 and 1971 when there were hostilities with India. This is relevant, said Zia, since we are now in situation, given Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971, where there needs to be clearer understanding of what U.S. will do in three contingencies: Soviet attack on Pakistan; Soviet-Indian collusion in attack; and situation in which Soviets encourage Indian attack. Under present circumstances, Pakistan unable to denude its Indian border forces to bolster defense of border with Afghanistan.

3. Zia went on to say that we all agree that situation has drastically changed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs the kind of guarantees that will assure that it can hold out for some time against Soviet aggression. British have recognized the qualitative difference in situation. Although UK has never had mutual security agreement with Pakistan, Lord Carrington told Zia that there now is a clear cut case where West would have to come to Pakistan's defense. Zia asked that DepSec Christopher be prepared to discuss three contingencies above.

4. I once again reviewed for President Zia the reasons why we did not favor seeking a treaty, including immediacy of problem and possible difficulties with Congress, particularly as a result of our differences over nuclear program. In our judgement 1959 agreement does everything for Pakistan that a treaty would do. Zia asked why could we not continue under 1959 agreement while administration sought ratification of a treaty in the Senate, even if this should take a long time. I emphasized to President Zia that I did not think that we were likely to find this as an attractive alternative to already satisfactory arrangement. However, DepSec Christopher would, of course, be willing to discuss this and any other ideas President Zia had for mutual security guarantees.

5. Comment: Zia has obviously been advised to try to extend U.S. commitments to Pakistan to include various forms of conflict with India. I assume Christopher will be prepared to respond that 1959 agreement does not cover that contingency, being focussed on Communist aggression. Paks will respond that they want to pose contingency (which Zia described as admittedly remote) that Indians will assist a Communist aggression, or act as Soviet surrogate. Paks tried to make this argument to us in 1971 war with India, and it would be useful for Dept to research USG responses at that time. As we will be pointing out in other messages, Zia needs to be able to assure the armed forces as well as the public of the adequacy of the U.S. offer and the degree of our commitment, against widespread doubts about both.

**Hummel**



**420. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Evening Notes

*Zia's Talking Points for Your Upcoming Meeting:*<sup>2</sup> President Zia, in the face of the Soviet threat, recently instructed Pakistani [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to prepare a study of Pakistan's defense needs aimed at Islamabad's monetary and material needs from the U.S.<sup>3</sup> [*3 lines not declassified*] has concluded that Pakistan faces a serious situation because:

- the U.S. is far away and has only one airborne division;
- the Soviets can quickly attack from Quetta or Peshawar and have 11 airborne divisions;
- Islamabad could not defend the key installations from Soviet air attacks;
- Pakistan needs \$5 billion and 5 years to bring the current military formations to full strength; and
- Moscow cannot be trusted and alliance with the Soviets would anger China, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia; so, Pakistan must move closer to the U.S. (S)

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] concludes that in the upcoming discussions Islamabad must:

- obtain immediate “cast-iron” U.S. guarantees and support with no strings attached;
- point out the U.S. attempt to form a united front within Western Europe to assist Pakistan will probably not succeed;
- ask Washington to obtain assurances that India will not attack Pakistan over issuance of U.S. aid; and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book [I]. Top Secret; Sensitive; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski and Christopher met with Zia on February 2 and 3. See Document 423.

<sup>3</sup> A CIA Intelligence Information Cable, January 29, reported information [*text and 1 line not declassified*] regarding a special report on Pakistan's defense needs, prepared for Zia by the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, Yaqub Khan. The cable concluded that Pakistan would be unable to “meet a sustained military attack from the Soviets in the present state of readiness.” This shortcoming, according to the cable, could only be reversed by U.S. aid, and the “best possible” way to assure U.S. commitment to Pakistani security would be the establishment of U.S. military bases in Pakistan. (Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files, Accession No. 330–84–0056, Box 7, Pakistan)

—have the U.S. establish bases in Pakistan or Oman. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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**421. Memorandum From President Carter to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Your Visit to Pakistan (U)

The following will be your objectives in your discussions with President Zia and senior Pakistani officials.<sup>2</sup>

—Lay a solid basis for a further mutual understanding of the issues we face as regards Soviet behavior and intentions, global and regional responses, and our bilateral trust and cooperation. An important part of this exchange will be listening to Zia's views.

—To convey to Zia a sense of the breadth and firmness of the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. You should draw on my State of the Union message.<sup>3</sup>

—To impress upon Zia that our support for Pakistan's independence and security is enduring, based on our vital interests, and backed up not only by U.S. resources, but by a determined U.S. effort to mobilize broad international support.

—To reaffirm the present level of our proposed bilateral assistance through FY 81 and to convince Zia that it would be unwise, and detract from our central effort, to voice public disappointment with our assistance or to criticize U.S. unwillingness to negotiate a treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2/1–5/80: Cables and Memos. Secret; Sensitive. A covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, attached to another copy of Carter's memorandum, noted that Vance had already cleared the instructions and recommended that Carter approve them as well. Carter approved and initialed "J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X:11/80)

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski and Christopher met with Zia on February 2 and 3. See Document 423.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 10, Document 408.

—To begin to define with Zia and his advisers the nature of U.S. responses in various contingencies arising from a Soviet-Afghan threat to Pakistan's security.

—To present our firm view that it is essential to Pakistan's security that Pakistan and India continue and expand their efforts toward normalization of their relations.

—To seek assurances that the Zia government will not test a nuclear device and to impress upon Zia how dangerous a test would be to Pakistan's security and to the new Western relationship we are seeking to develop. And to point out that a satisfactory long-term relationship requires a settlement of the nuclear problem.

—To convey to Zia U.S. interest in a resolution of Pakistan's internal political and economic problems so that Pakistan can address its security problems from a united base.

—To inform Zia of our intention to proceed with: submission of the Pakistan legislation on February 4; military supply talks in Islamabad following your meetings; discussions of the programming of our proposed AID funds; and continuing *mutual* efforts to muster broad support for Pakistan.

You should describe to President Zia why it is not feasible to convert the 1959 Bilateral Agreement into a treaty. You should impress upon Zia the relevance of the 1959 Agreement for the contingencies of a Soviet or Soviet-directed attack on Pakistan. You should also note my letter to President Zia and point out that we are asking the Congress to affirm the 1959 bilateral. You can assure him that in the event of an attack threatening the independence of Pakistan, we would consider our vital interests to be engaged and we would consult urgently with both the Government of Pakistan and the Congress on steps to be taken, including the use of force. (S)

In discussing contingencies with Pakistan, you should raise (but not press at this time) the possibility of additional U.S. access to facilities or bases on Pakistani soil. However, in addressing possible large-scale Soviet incursions or assaults on Pakistan, you should note that it is in our mutual interest to begin discussions of ways in which U.S. forces, particularly naval and tacaair, could be deployed in and near Pakistan in certain situations. You should also indicate that we would be prepared now to make an exercise visit of U.S. tactical aircraft and/or engage in joint air or naval exercises if Pakistan would find that a useful demonstration of U.S. resolve. (S)

In responding to President Zia's questions on contingencies involving an Indian attack on Pakistan, you should point out that Pakistan's best security against a two-front war or an Indian attack lies in the normalization process with India, and the strength of its broad-range

relationships with China, the United States, the Moslem world and the Non-Aligned. You should make clear that the interests of Pakistan, the U.S. and the West would be injured by closer Indian relations with the Soviets and we should all work to avoid such a course on India's part. (S)

In your discussions of military assistance for Pakistan, you should emphasize that we are prepared to move quickly in providing equipment that can be made readily available and will immediately improve the situation along the Afghan border, strengthening the ground and air defense capability. While we will be willing to assist the Pakistanis in seeking financing from others for high-performance aircraft, these financing requirements should be considered in the context of overall defense needs and the priority for the immediate strengthening of defense on the border. (S)

You should inform President Zia that the amounts of our military and economic support assistance for FY 1980 and 81 are firm. You may also say that in considering our levels for FY 1982 and beyond, we will carefully assess Pakistan's ongoing requirements. President Zia should also be apprised that we are making strong efforts, in support of their own activities, to enhance support for Pakistan from other Western and Islamic donors. On debt rescheduling, you can inform Zia that we are prepared to consider this question in concert with other creditors in conjunction with an upper tranche IMF stabilization program, if an emerging default situation seems likely. (S)

In addressing the nuclear question, you should seek assurances (in addition to the assurances on non-development of weapons and transfer of sensitive technology) that President Zia will not test a nuclear device while he is in office. You should stress that we will continue our dialogue with Pakistan looking forward to an understanding on the scope and purpose of Pakistan's nuclear program. (S)

If you are asked about our objectives in Afghanistan and our view of the insurgents, you should say that our maximum goal is a neutral Afghanistan, free of Soviet forces, and our minimum goal is a protracted resistance that increases the costs to the Soviets and galvanizes world opinion against their aggression. (S)

You should note to President Zia our continuing interest in Pakistan's political development, greater political unity and attention to the needs of minority groups such as the Baluchis. (S)

In your approach to the Pakistanis, you should keep in mind that, despite their assertions to the contrary, Pakistan deeply needs our support both in bilateral assistance and in mobilizing diplomatic and other resources. You should, therefore, be firm in presenting our actions and program of assistance in a positive light and avoid any sense of defensiveness about our participation in Pakistan's security. (S)

**Jimmy Carter**

**422. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

I have asked two of my close advisers, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Warren Christopher, to go to Pakistan to meet with you and your senior officials. I am glad you can find time to see them, for I know how exceptionally heavy your schedule has been in the past weeks.

In my State of the Union message to Congress last week, I focused almost entirely on Southwest Asia.<sup>2</sup> I did this because of the immense importance that I attach to our relations with that area. It is, as I said then, truly of vital national interest to the United States.

I hope that you will share your views on the current situation with Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher so that they can report them back to me.

I have instructed them to be completely frank in their talks with you. It is of the greatest importance that the United States and Pakistan share a common appreciation of the situation and build a basis of trust for dealing with each other. In that context, specific issues, as important as they may be, can be addressed in a way that strengthens rather than weakens, the overall relationship.

In closing, let me congratulate you on the very successful Islamic Conference which Pakistan hosted and led.<sup>3</sup> This is yet another evidence of the important role that Pakistan has to play in Southwest Asia and beyond.

Sincerely,<sup>4</sup>**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800029–0925. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> For the foreign policy section of Carter's January 21 message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 162–180.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 801 from Islamabad, January 29, transmitted a summary of the plenary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held in Islamabad January 26–29. The plenary session “passed a resolution Jan 29 that strongly ‘condemns the Soviet military aggression against the Afghani people.’ So far as we are aware, this constitutes the first open condemnation mentioning the Soviets by name on the part of nations with overlapping membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. We believe it represents a major defeat for the Soviets.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800050–1060)

<sup>4</sup> Below his signature, Carter wrote: “Best wishes—J.”

## 423. Summary Record of Talks<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, February 2–3, 1980

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Pakistan*

President Zia  
 Ghulam Ishaq, Finance Minister  
 Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser  
 Shahnawaz, Foreign Secretary  
 General Jilani  
 General Arif  
 Ambassador Sultan Khan  
 Ambassador Yaqub Khan

#### *United States*

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
 David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
 Arthur Hummel, American Ambassador to Pakistan  
 Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff Member  
 Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
 General Graves, Department of Defense  
 Arnold Raphel, Department of State

The meetings began on the morning of February 2, with a briefing of the military situation by the Pakistanis. It followed the customary lines and concentrated heavily on both the Afghan/Soviet and the Indian threats. The main contingencies which the Pakistanis envisioned on their Western border are the following:

(1) Hot pursuit by Soviet or Afghan units pursuing Afghan rebels. The Pakistani objective would be to punish the intruding troops.<sup>2</sup>

(2) A Soviet/Afghan attempt to occupy and hold salients within Pakistan. The Pakistanis would seek to dislodge these salients.

(3) An attack by India as a Soviet proxy. The Pakistanis say they need additional equipment and a stronger commitment from the United States to deal with this.

(4) An attack from east and west with the objective of dismantling Pakistan. Pakistan would require additional equipment to strengthen

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0420. Secret; Sensitive. Dodson sent the summary record to Tarnoff under an October 28 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0419)

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Pakistani concerns about “hot pursuit,” see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 182.

itself so that it could deter or delay such an attack until the U.S. could come to its assistance. (S)

In the course of this military briefing, Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it would be helpful to the Pakistanis if the Chinese were to increase their forces along the Indian border, thereby forcing the Indians to pull troops away from the Pakistan border. The Pakistani briefer replied that this would probably not be very useful since the seasons for military operations on one border are quite different from those on the other. (S)

After the military briefing, the two sides gathered in a smaller group for discussions led on the Pakistani side by President Zia, and on the American side by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. Dr. Brzezinski opened by putting out that he had learned much from the briefing and emphasizing the historical significance of the current meetings for U.S. and Pakistan relations. He read Presidential instructions reiterating American support for Pakistani independence and security<sup>3</sup> and said that the U.S. has made an important choice in this regard. He outlined our attempt over thirty years to build security and stability in Western Europe and the Far East. We have vital interests there which are inseparable from our own security and our actions have demonstrated our seriousness there. We have made clear the threat of nuclear war in Europe and showed ourselves ready to shed blood in the Far East. The President has, in addition now, indicated that American vital interests are engaged in Southwest Asia. (S)

In defending these vital interests we have a choice between a purely maritime strategy on the one hand, and on the other an involvement on the mainland. We have chosen not to adopt a purely maritime strategy because we have faith in Pakistan and in the future of the relationship. We are just at the beginning of a new stage with the relationship, not one that is going back to the 1950's, but one in which we will stand by you since we believe you are prepared to stand up on your own. (S)

After some discussion of the global threat and Soviet moves in Afghanistan, Dr. Brzezinski returned to the points made in the briefing concerning the threats to Pakistan. He said there are four areas of response to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan (leaving aside for the time being bilateral U.S.-Pakistani issues):

(1) The first is a broad, strong and continuing international response.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 421.

(2) It is important to keep the Soviets occupied within Afghanistan so as to raise the cost to them and prevent a quick consolidation of an operating base.

(3) There is a need for a multilateral effort with United States participation to strengthen Pakistani capability to withstand especially the lower levels of Soviet aggression. Dr. Brzezinski added that Iran must be included in this at some time and wondered whether Pakistan could help. He noted that the American people were deeply resentful about Iran but were also mature enough to put this matter behind them once the issue is resolved. (S)

(4) We must convince the Soviets of an American response if they impose a challenge beyond Pakistan's capabilities. (S)

These four considerations in turn define minimum and maximum objectives for Afghanistan itself. The maximum objective would be the establishment of a neutral Afghan government without any Soviet presence. The minimum objective is protracted Soviet involvement in the suppression of the Afghan people. The former of these is harder to obtain; thus it should be made politically and militarily costly for the Soviets to continue on with their actions. On the political front you and other Muslim nations might propose a neutralization by an international Muslim force. This would put the Soviets on the defensive and belie the idea of U.S.-Pakistani collusion. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* went on to discuss the progress which we had made in the four objectives he had mentioned above. He noticed that the Islamabad conference had been remarkably successful in bringing international pressure to bear on the Soviets as had the vote in the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> He praised Pakistan for its role in both of these. It is important to insure that there is a more intense and more sustained response in this case than there was at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The United States leadership is determined to make this stick. (S)

On the second point we need to consult more closely. This is a delicate matter that needs to be handled with determination. We have also discussed it with other governments. (S)

On the third issue it is important to strengthen Pakistan's ability to respond to political intimidation or subversion as well as limited military operations (e.g., the first two threats mentioned in the morning briefing). The Soviets must be forced either to withdraw or to escalate the conflict which would precipitate a U.S. engagement under the 1959 agreement. It is necessary to examine concrete ways for strengthening north-west frontier. Turning to other concerned regional nations, Dr. Brzezinski recounted briefly some of the results of the Brown visit to

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 422.



China.<sup>5</sup> With regard to India he cautioned the Pakistanis not to prejudice that country in a way that would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We, too, were disturbed by the Indian statement in the UN General Assembly,<sup>6</sup> but we do not see India as a partner in the Soviet global design. Perhaps we and our allies can encourage them to realize that the strengthening of Pakistan's security will help them too. We have to be sensitive to India about their concerns in the view of their own role. We do not dispute the dilemma that Pakistan faces, but the United States and Pakistan should not become anti-Indian. With regard to Iran, he reiterated our willingness to re-establish relations and look for a new relationship. (S)

Pakistan and the United States, he went on, are at the beginning of a new relationship which must be based on realistic harmony. It was impossible to satisfy Pakistan's immediate expectations, but this must be seen as a long-term relationship. Pakistani independence is important to the United States, and we know that you will fight even if you are not supported by outside forces. We think of you as Poles rather than Czechs. (S)

A year ago, what we are proposing to do with Pakistan would have been inconceivable. (S)

If the result of our meeting is that our effort is seen as inadequate, this will impact adversely on our historic relationship. (S)

It is hard to mobilize others, but by all means do not characterize what we are doing as inadequate. We have to convince Congress five years after the Vietnam war to become reengaged. The threat is one of great magnitude and we do not want to have to fall back to a maritime strategy. We cannot expect 100% agreement with you, but we should not leave the impression of a dispute. (S)

*President Zia* responded by mentioning three additional points: This is the first time that the Soviet Union has expanded into Asia; a buffer state has disappeared from the maps; and Peter the Great's will is being carried out. (Dr. Brzezinski intervened at this point to say that the so-called will of Peter the Great is a forgery.) *Zia* continued that the world community's conscience had been aroused in a way that had not been the case previously. A Russian expansionist movement has engulfed Afghanistan and is threatening Pakistani security and U.S. vital interests. There is a qualitative geopolitical change in Southern Asia. (S)

Pakistan, *Zia* continued, has a superpower on its western borders and an unfriendly, if not hostile India on the East. Pakistan is looking

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 403.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 1, Document 166.

for durable and permanent guarantees for its security; thus, they are seeking clarification (assumedly of the U.S. commitment). The Soviets resent the activities of which Pakistan is a focal point. The Indian Foreign Minister demanded a regional discussion of the problem, but Zia responded to him that the problem is global. The Islamic Conference was indeed a victory for the United States and Pakistan, but it leads to further Soviet hostility. Thus we need another superpower as an antidote to the hostility of that superpower. The 1959 agreement must be reconfirmed, especially in light of our experiences in 1965 and 1971. (Zia at this point went into a fairly lengthy discussion of assurances from Ambassador Oehlert,<sup>7</sup> George Ball,<sup>8</sup> and the quotes in the Kissinger autobiography about 1971.<sup>9</sup>) In order to remove these lacunae, Pakistan proposes that the 1959 agreement be turned into a treaty, or else give it a Congressional cover, approval or reaffirmation. To write a new treaty is, of course, lengthy and difficult. (S)

How does the U.S. see implementation of the 1959 agreement now? In case of aggression from the West, will it stand committed to Pakistani security? If the threat is agreed on, military assistance should be commensurate with the appreciation of that threat. We have to assure our own security and half-way measures will not be adequate. Certain items will be needed urgently for dealing with hot pursuit, and these will also help to boost army morale. We have to start development activity in the West, and that means economic assistance. How are we going to be able to overcome our problem in the East? Can the Indian threat be neutralized? Can the U.S. approach China to give guarantees to Pakistan? What if the USSR and India attack jointly? We are seeking to improve our relations with India, but what if we fail? If there is collusion and an attack from both sides will you stand by our side? (S)

Henry Kissinger, in the January 21st *Wall Street Journal* interview said it is unlikely that the Soviets would attack Pakistan over an Indian objection.<sup>10</sup> The danger for us is being dismembered by India. We are trying hard in our relations with India. But don't forget that during the 1970 visit (to Washington) Mrs. Gandhi talked about the congenial

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<sup>7</sup> Not further identified. Benjamin Oehlert was Ambassador to Pakistan from August 1967 to June 1969.

<sup>8</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, South Asia, Document 328.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 3, Document 419.

<sup>10</sup> In the interview, Kissinger said: "It is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would attack Pakistan over the opposition of India. The real threat will therefore develop if the Soviet Union and India cooperate. We must of course do our best to prevent this from occurring. But the greatest danger is that India may seek with Soviet cooperation to dismember its neighbor by splitting off Baluchistan and the Northwest Province and occupying Kashmir. Both India and the Soviet Union would then be surrounded by weak client states." ("An Interview With Henry Kissinger," *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 1980, p. 18)

defects of Pakistan, its regional weaknesses, etc. This is all in the Kissinger book.<sup>11</sup> (S)

Therefore, a reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement should address first, proxy aggression from India, second, subversion, and third, it should be free from references to all older documents such as the Eisenhower doctrine, since this poses problems with Pakistan's non-alignment. It should become a purely bilateral agreement against the threat from the West as well as the East. (S)

Our position is similar to that of Poland in 1939, when the Germans and Russians wanted territory and the UK had no power to uphold the guarantees it had given. Agreements and treaties are valid only as long as they can be implemented. (S)

President Carter has said that the United States wants to give Pakistan the ability to repel and deter invasion. Our commitments are permanent, not transitory. We conclude that the United States is serious and will provide the necessary support. If so, you need not be reminded that limitation to any particular armament is not practical. We must assess the needs and find ways to meet them. Dr. Brzezinski has said the U.S. would "become engaged" in case of a hot pursuit. What does that mean in light of the 1959 agreement? Our experiences are bitter. In 1970 and 1971, refugees went to India from East Pakistan and the Soviets accused us of mismanagement. In 1979, the Soviet Ambassador claims that Pakistan is interfering in Afghanistan by accepting refugees. Also in 1970–71, we told Indira Gandhi that if she supports the insurgents it would cause similar problems for India. She agreed, but then did exactly the opposite. The Soviets have a tremendous reinforcement capability. If they can move 50,000 troops into Afghanistan in four weeks, we can imagine what greater things they could do. (S)

Turning to the scope of the Afghan insurgency, when in April 1978, following the coup, we consulted China, we were told that we would get our fingers burned if we became involved. We felt that the United States was not interested in the situation. Even with our meager resources we have alone been helping the freedom fighters. In November 1979, we told Prince Fahd that the Muslims could regain their position if they had help. He, however, said no. But we have been helpful (and with U.S. aid in the last few months). Now the Chinese

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<sup>11</sup> Gandhi met with Nixon on November 4 and 5, 1971. According to Kissinger's account, Gandhi told Nixon that "Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred for India, which was being stoked by each new generation of Pakistani leaders. Conditions in East Pakistan reflected tendencies applicable to *all* of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan; they too wanted and deserved greater autonomy; they should never have been part of the original settlement." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 881) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 150 and 151.

and Saudis have also agreed in principle. Throughout centuries, the Afghans have never been subjugated. The insurgency will continue, but whether at a high or low level depends on the level of Soviet operations. The Soviets are ruthless. (S)

Since December 27th, up until January 20th, 22,000 refugees have fled to Pakistan, showing Soviet ruthlessness. Therefore, the insurgency has prospects but the freedom fighters need outside support. They will need outside bases, and that means Pakistan and to some extent Iran, and these bases must be secure. An insecure Pakistan would jeopardize the future of the freedom fighters and the situation in Iran is still less favorable. (S)

What is the likely timeframe for the Soviet push further southward? We cannot fix that. It depends on the deterrents at the international level—the United Nations, the Islamic Conference, U.S. resolve and support—and also the strength of Pakistan itself. (S)

U.S. and Pakistan each have interests to watch over. President Carter has talked about vital interests in the Persian Gulf. That is a strong commitment. Is Pakistan included? I gather from Dr. Brzezinski that we are. (S)

There was then some discussion on the exact wording of the President's State of the Union message, and what the Pakistanis perceived as a difference in strength of commitment between the longer and shorter versions.<sup>12</sup> (S)

This new undertaking has a dynamic which we appreciate. Not only the quick U.S. response including steps already taken, but international efforts as well which we appreciate highly. (S)

We had serious differences over a few months ago, and I was deeply ashamed about these. (President Zia was referring here to the burning of the American Embassy.) We have never been ungrateful, we have tried to stand by our friends. We are facing serious decisions and are at a crossroads. No country ever closes its options, and frankly this is the best time for U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. You will find a neglected ally and you will build a dam against the Soviets. Our national interests coincide. We deeply appreciate your visit and hope we will be able to find appropriate answers to all these questions. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* then spoke concerning the American security commitment to Pakistan. He noted that the President has recently reaffirmed this commitment publicly, and in a letter to President Zia.<sup>13</sup> We are ready to do more. We are ready to make this letter

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<sup>12</sup> Reference is to the President's lengthy January 21 message to Congress and his January 23 State of the Union address.

<sup>13</sup> See Document 406.

public, and to ask Congress to reaffirm the 1959 agreement. Asking Congress to do this is highly significant. It would define the Soviet threat (at this point Secretary Christopher quoted a sentence beginning “these extraordinary.”<sup>14</sup> Such a reaffirmation would be enacted in both Houses and thus be more binding than an Executive agreement. Secretary Vance and I have discussed this with Congress and they are prepared to move ahead. The contemporary vitality of this agreement will reassure you and educate our people. This is an unprecedented way for us to go about making such a commitment. (S)

It is also unprecedented that the legislation will provide for assistance “notwithstanding any other provision of law”, thus setting aside the Glenn and Symington amendments and any other obstructions. (S)

We need to see this as a beginning of a process. We have to get it enacted. Congress is chary of such things, but at this time is willing to do it. Proceeding this way is much quicker, cleaner and more decisive than a treaty. You recognize the delay that would be involved in a treaty, and an in-treaty would likely incur debate over various conditions such as non-proliferation. (S)

Addressing the contingencies you raised, a Soviet or Soviet/Afghan attack that threatened your independence or integrity would fall under the terms of the 1959 agreement. The President would immediately consult with you under Article I of the agreement, and also consult with Congress. Our response could involve the use of armed force. (S)

In case of a concerted Indian-Soviet attack, the first article of the 1959 agreement would also come into play. (S)

If the Soviets have India attack as a proxy—we see this most unlikely. India is even less willing to do this after the invasion of Afghanistan. The key, though, would be whether the attack was Communist controlled and/or inspired. More important, though, is that the United States and India have good relations. We are pleased that you are consulting with the Indians. To sum up, though, if India attacked as an agent of the Soviet Union, Article I would indeed come into effect. (S)

Concerning assistance: this is not a single shot effort but the beginning of a long-term effort. We have to get our own legislative system started up. (S)

On the economic side our contribution would be part of a consortium. Others, such as the FRG and Japan will also increase their aid and we will press them on this. Our first step will be \$200 million in

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<sup>14</sup> Not further identified.

ESF over the next 18 months. This is very difficult for us politically since it means reopening the FY 80 budget and amending the FY 81 budget. We have to begin on this immediately and present the legislation next Monday.<sup>15</sup> Otherwise there will be no money in FY 1980. (S)

We will also increase our PL-480 to \$60 million and perhaps more in FY 80 and FY 81. (S)

We will fund up to one-third of the effort on refugees. (S)

We are prepared to look at your debt structure together with other creditors and reschedule in connection with an IMF upper tranche agreement if default is imminent. We cannot, however, use rescheduling as a substitute for aid. (S)

Thus, the total economic aid we have in mind is almost \$300 million. But this aid should not be measured in monetary terms; it has a value beyond the dollars involved. Therefore, let's agree to get this legislation going next week. (S)

On the military side, our offer of an FMS program is a reversal of a 15-year policy against military sales credits. The \$200 million is also just one step, and part of a combined effort. We want to hear about your efforts in getting money from others. The President has also authorized special FMS terms for Pakistan involving no-principle payments for ten years, and a 20-year repayment period thereafter.<sup>16</sup> If we do not move promptly on this, we could lose nearly a year. (S)

On the nature of military supply, we want to agree on a priority package to be delivered quickly. As regards the wording of the 1959 agreement (not commitment) the President views the agreement as a solid base for cooperation. He intentionally left the definition of the Persian Gulf region vague, but there is a specific U.S.-Pakistani agreement. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* added that President Carter has said the threat to Pakistan is a threat to the Persian Gulf region. This provides a wider context to the 1959 agreement. As we think of security, we should consider how our actions contribute to deterrents. For instance, shouldn't our forces in the Indian Ocean be deployed near Pakistan? Should we have joint exercises? We are not proposing these things, but would be prepared to respond if you wish. (S)

We are beginning a difficult process and we must start off on the right foot for a long-haul relationship. (S)

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<sup>15</sup> February 11.

<sup>16</sup> In a February 1 memorandum, Aaron informed Vance: "The President approved your recommendation to seek ten/twenty year extended repayment terms for Pakistan FMS financing loans in both FY 80 and FY 81." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2-3/80)

*Ghulam Ishaq* then set forth Pakistani views on the economic matters. He noted that the U.S. has been the largest donor over the years, but that all aid except for PL-480 has recently been stopped. As late as 1974–75, U.S. aid was more than \$200 million. (S)

The current Pakistani government inherited an economy in shambles, but has done quite well in improving it. (Ghulam Ishaq gave considerable statistic detail which is not recounted here. He did particularly note that aid flows have dropped considerably, and that in some cases there is a reverse flow.) He went on to point out that defense must now have still a greater priority, and this comes at a time when there is a greatly increased energy impact. He also pointed out that he would have to find counterpart rupees because of increased U.S. assistance as well as building up a new infrastructure in certain parts of the country. (S)

He said that \$200 million is not even a beginning for a meaningful program. He projected resource gaps for 1981, 1982 and 1983 of \$988, \$1,496, and \$1,812 million respectively. (S)

He specifically recommended debt relief. If the ODA maturities were to be written off this would yield \$232, \$215, and \$213 million in the respective years. He suggested food aid for those years in the sum of \$150, \$100, and \$100 million, as well as \$400 million non-food aid. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* pointed out that if we pass our legislation it will open up the possibility of development assistance aid in addition to the ESF and PL-480 we are offering. The Pakistanis should note that ESF is fast disbursing. (S)

We are not making any non-proliferation conditions to our proceeding with these undertakings. We have adjusted our policy. You should recognize, however, that we will be questioned closely and we will want to underscore our continuing concern in these regards. (S)

A nuclear explosion would greatly increase the danger to Pakistan. Other countries have also raised this problem with me and there would be a strong impact on Congressional and public opinion. (S)

We need to count on you to act responsibly. In recent discussions Agha Shahi gave us two guarantees. We also need an assurance that you will not explode a nuclear device "in the course of your administration. (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* responded that Pakistan needs flexible aid to help sustain its defense effort. Debt rescheduling will be best, in the amount of \$200 million. There should be no conditions attached to fertilizer aid. The Soviets will be trying hard to make an impression in Afghanistan, therefore we must do more for the northwest frontier and for Baluchistan. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* responded that we are prepared to be more flexible on debt and talk about emerging default rather than



imminent default. We are also asking other countries to use grants and other real aid instead of debt rescheduling. We support your concerns about Baluchistan, and we are often asked about the minorities in Pakistan. We will be greatly helped if we can hear from you what the plans are for your minorities. (S)

At this point the morning session ended. In the afternoon of February 2nd the discussions resumed. *Dr. Brzezinski* began with some discussions of handling the press, with which President Zia agreed. (S)

*Zia* began his presentation by saying that he is an optimist. He had lived through hard times and risen from modest circumstances. He saw Pakistan come into being. Like you, *Dr. Brzezinski*, I had to leave my home. My mother had to walk 80 miles in 1947 to reach the safety of Pakistan at the time of the massacre. I remained behind with the Indian army longer than anyone else and brought the very last stores, etc., with me to Pakistan in December 1947. Therefore, I will be forthright and frank. (S)

We are looking for three things in order of priority. One, security guarantees; two, economic capabilities; and three, military capabilities. (S)

An antidote of the superpower is another superpower. The USSR is too much for us with or without Indian support. We could not cope with that attack, even if we had a massive military program of the kind you have provided to Egypt. Such a close "love-lock" may be impossible right now after the past differences we have had. In Islam, marriage contracts contain various stipulations, even including the amount of alimony to be paid in case of divorce. There is much talk of temporary marriage these days. The U.S. and Pakistani relationship, however, is not such a temporary marriage, but an Islamic marriage. (S)

(At this point, President Zia left for evening prayers; the discussions resumed when he returned.) *President Zia* asked about implications in all three of the areas he discussed, since there are gray areas involved. (S)

We recognize there are difficulties with your legislation, and thus we have decided to split the issues. The most important is the security guarantee. We are at a crossroads now; should we foreclose our options? (S)

We consider that the 1959 agreement is against a Communist threat. You should perhaps replace the word "Communist" with some other word which would restrict it to Soviet or Soviet-aided enemies. (S)

Then we need some guarantees against India. After the meeting that we will be having with the Indians, and then with the Chinese, we will see what more we need. We will ask the Chinese for moral support. (S)



We look forward to the practical implementation of this agreement, even including the U.S. use of troops. (S)

Then we have to see about the infrastructure. Detailed planning must continue. The U.S. military team now in Pakistan will be looking into this and at the end of that we can talk about military needs. (S)

On the economic side, it is not a question of a token grant. We do not want to embarrass you. Therefore, don't undertake such an exercise because of nuclear opinion here. I can give you certain understandings later, after the military program is in place, but not now. Therefore, let us leave aside the economic and military matters and focus on security guarantees. (S)

*Ambassador Yaqub Khan* was then asked to speak. He said that the program proposed by the United States offers a provocation to both the USSR and India. It is not even in the interests of the United States to engage its prestige in something that does not do more than provide a token. This would simply become another case of the U.S. ally coming out second best, and this would damage U.S. prestige. (S)

(*Deputy Secretary Christopher* interrupted to ask whether the Pakistani side was clear that our proposal does not require nuclear assurances to Congress. President Zia said no, that he understood this but the American government would be asked by Congress.) (S)

*Yaqub* went on to say that the government of Pakistan is also very sensitive to public opinion, more so than in many countries that claim to have democratic governments. It would be impossible to explain the U.S. legislative proposals to the Pakistani public. I have pointed out to President Zia that between the sincere will of President Carter and its implementation, there are many Congressional obstacles. I do not mean this as a criticism, but we have to take reality into account. (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* made two more points: the first regarded the type of security guarantees, and the second the need to strengthen defense and economic capabilities. (S)

He said that public opinion is very important. The guarantees must be permanent and all-embracing. There must be no equivocation and they must come automatically into play under agreed circumstances. There must be a guarantee to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. (S)

The 1959 agreement, reaffirmed by Congress, would be adequate if its weaknesses are removed, such as the reference to "Communist" aggression. This was conceived on the basis of another historical setting and it will have to be amended. The economic and military factors can be de-linked. (S)

Defense aid can be assured only after the military team has made its survey. Only experts can determine what is needed immediately

and what in the long run. On the basis of that, a price tag can be developed. (S)

On the economic side, I gave you the figures this morning. We need 1 to 1.5 billion dollars annually for five years. This does not take defense needs into account. If aid can be revived on the basis described, we can proceed. (S)

If you prefer, you can provide extensive aid under PL-480, including edible oil and wheat. This would not require a change in your law. (S)

When we do resume aid, the type most needed will be flexible aid—commodity program lending and debt rescheduling. (S)

You have talked about “keeping the insurgency alive” in Afghanistan. The issue is one of motivation. To accept an injection of arms to the refugees would be dangerous for us unless we are able to defend against the first two strategic contingencies we discussed earlier. (S)

*Agha Shahi*, at this point, suggested some amendments to the 1959 agreement which he described as “merely updating.” In fact, the proposed changes deleted all elements of the agreements linking the U.S. commitment to “Communist-inspired” aggression. The result would have been to expand the scope of the agreement to include aggression from India. (S)

With regard to Article I, *Agha Shahi* hoped that Congressional support would mean that Congress will readily concur in actions the President may propose. He suggested reducing the scope of uncertainty by consulting in advance on contingencies in the actions that would be appropriate in response to those contingencies. (S)

With regard to India, President Zia has said that we are seeking good relations. This will depend on India and Mrs. Gandhi. If we are to help the insurgents with arms, however, the Indians may intervene. He then quoted from an interview which Mrs. Gandhi had given to the French magazine *Paris Match*. (S)

Please explore with the Chinese what guarantees you might jointly give in case of an attack. (S)

It would be very difficult to prove Indo-Soviet collusion in an attack. Therefore there should be no reference to that sort of thing. (S)

*President Zia* took up the discussion and said that they were not putting any price tag on the relationship when Ghulam Ishaq cited figures. He is an economic expert and sets things forth in those terms. (S)

He noted that very few countries do not attach strings to their aid. China is an exception and it would be good if the U.S. kept this in mind. Third, once a country is under obligation, the relationship must be equal. There must be no demands in the internal situation. The policies you followed towards the Shah in Iran, for instance, turned

out to be unproductive. Let us leave the whole question of military and economic assistance. If favors can be granted as Ghulam Ishaq says, we would accept this. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski*, at this point, asked for an adjournment so that the American side could discuss the situation. (U)

Upon his return, *Dr. Brzezinski* said that the U.S. side understands that the points you have made are based on serious concern for the structure of U.S.-Pakistani relations. We share that point of departure. (C)

We agree on some things:

—Consultations about contingencies, although we must recognize that no formalistic conclusions can be made.

—As our relations unfold, there will be consultations with others, such as China. (Secretary Brown has done some of this already.) China might help defeat a Soviet-Indian alignment, but if we are not careful Chinese involvement could precipitate just such an alignment.

—We agree that relations must be equal. Only a self-reliant country is a good ally. (S)

Turning to some basic points:

—In your discussion of the changes you want in the 1959 agreement, you asked for full-scale, comprehensive guarantees in all directions. This is not consistent with some of the points that we have made, namely that the agreement is directed against the threat from the north. If that threat is not joined with others, then we have no problem. But we are not ready to make this agreement applicable against other regional powers.

—We have no problem with making this agreement more up to date. But if it is intended to transform its essence, that would result in problems for us.

—We are prepared to stand with you against the strategic threat from the Soviet Union. We assume that you would not want to transform the agreement, given what you said this morning.

—You suggest first that the defense team is to stay behind to determine what is needed; second, that your economic needs are very considerable; and third, that we initiate no steps in the Congress.

—You are saying that you do not want to undertake a long process, but want an instant, pre-arranged marriage. If we do not submit legislation, we will lose momentum. I have had conversations with Senator Glenn and think that his problems can be taken care of if we move rapidly. If we do not undertake this legislative effort, then our international efforts will collapse. (S)

Thus, what we propose is more effective and practical:

—First, reaffirm our commitment through legislation—a unique historic commitment.

—Second, provide in the legislation for an initial input to your economic and military well-being. This expresses our engagement in

Pakistan and you should appreciate its symbolic significance. What you propose means a complete dissipation of what we are trying to do.

—Three, propose military cooperation to demonstrate to the Soviets that we are engaged.

—Four, we are prepared to mount efforts for military and economic consortiums. (S)

In brief, we are proposing a sustained American engagement with Pakistan as our partner. I understand that you are rejecting this. This will have strategic results. We must be clear. We came here to engage with you in a program that would generate political support. (S)

*President Zia* replied that this was not a rejection. He pointed out that he has political difficulties just as the American government does. He said he saw this as a beginning that would generate support internationally, but stressed that he has to also be able to sell this arrangement to his people. (S)

He noted that \$200 million would only buy, for instance, 12 Mirages. The United States seems to want to have Pakistan stand up with crutches. Zia wants it to stand on its own strength. (S)

Let us then, he said, proceed by steps. Give us a security guarantee against the Soviet threat—we can review the amendments that we have proposed. The aid you proposed is just not commensurate with what I see. You are looking at things on a material plain, [*plane*] we are looking at them more on a moral plain [*plane*]. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said this was true, but that we also have to show the Soviets that we are engaged. Congressional involvement will become part of the U.S. commitment. We are filling in a gap in our commitments. We also want to give you what you need to stand on your own. If we do not start, then we will not even be able to develop the security guarantee. You want a comprehensive guarantee, including India, but still do not want to take steps to implement this guarantee. We are attempting to start a process; you needn't say that what we have offered is enough. Just simply say to your people it is the first step on a long road, which will also include sacrifices and challenges. (S)

*President Zia* asked what if India were left out. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* went on to say that we want to start a process of help so that Pakistan can rebuff the Soviets. A guarantee is only a hollow promise without that kind of back-up, and we would lose an excellent opportunity in the United States. (S)

*Zia* responded that we should then work out a total amount. (U)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said we can do both. The military team is not here to discover the obvious fact that \$100 million a year is not enough for Pakistani requirements. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* recommended that the two sides consider matters further overnight and meet tomorrow. (U)

*Ghulam Ishaq* pointed out that the problem arises in de-linking the military and economic aspects from questions relating to the 1959 agreement. He asked whether it is necessary to specify amounts. Could this not be left to the consortium? (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that momentum would be lost. (U)

*Ghulam Ishaq* reiterated that the only question arises if we have to quantify the amount. (U)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* responded that we cannot go to the consortium without legislation. (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* suggested that the U.S. could make an announcement subject to legislative action. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that the Pakistanis are underestimating the time question. All that they have to do is act in ways that would not embarrass the United States. They do not have to accept the amounts that we propose. We can find ways of dealing with that. (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* said that there would be a terribly adverse reaction in Pakistan and with its neighbors. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that Congress would not lift the legislative restrictions without a sum of money being specified. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* added that we will be losing a great opportunity and in particular we will lose bipartisan momentum in Washington by summer. (S)

*President Zia* suggested that we must first of all be clear as to the commitment. Money is not the issue; let's first get an idea of the amounts of money that are possible. Carrington offered nothing more than tea and sympathy. Giscard and the Germans won't help much, and the Saudis have no ideas. The security guarantee is most important. (S)

*Zia* stated that India would not have to be included in the treaty to meet the Pakistani requirements. (S)

Then we could go ahead and see what we can develop in the area of economic assistance. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* reiterated that we cannot move on the question of a security guarantee without the legislative process. We can legislate in a way that would permit us to again become active in the Consortium. (unclear). (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* referred to the arms embargo of 1971–1975. When it was lifted no figures were specified in the action. Why can it not be done again this way. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* noted a fundamental paradox. It is hard to envision a guarantee for a weak country that will not accept help. (S)

*President Zia* said that there are two problems between the U.S. and Pakistan. Some form of a guarantee would give us a boost. Pakistan

also asks how this would be supported. \$400 million will be seen as a detraction from Pakistani security. I cannot just simply talk to people about the future. Also, we always run into the problem of Pakistan and India, but we will not insist this time. (S)

What am I supposed to tell the officers of my army? That I am getting 12 Mirages? (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that President Zia should consider this as the beginning of a process by which the United States becomes engaged in Pakistani security. Otherwise, Pakistan will be getting nothing. If Pakistan rebuffs us, we will then have to protect our own security as best we can. If our legislative process creates problems for Pakistan, then let us figure out some formula whereby we can proceed while each side states its own view. We are unable to renew the 1959 agreement in the abstract. People will wonder why we are not specifying some particular amount. (S)

The United States can, on the one hand, develop a strategy together with Pakistan, and ultimately Iran, and seek to neutralize India. Or, on the other hand, it can move to an air and naval strategy and not become involved in the Asian heartland. (S)

*Ambassador Hummel* added that all U.S. security agreements require the other country to take steps to strengthen itself to postpone the level at which the United States would have to become engaged with military force. It seemed to him, therefore, impossible to seek a commitment without Pakistan accepting aid to strengthen itself. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* added further that President Carter has made a major public commitment. It has become widely known what we will be asking the Congress for, and if we go back with a lesser package, people will see this as a political rebuff to President Carter. We absolutely must find a solution. If not, our strategies are based on the wrong assumptions. (S)

*President Zia* said he agreed with that. And he had told the United States not to go public with the \$400 million figure. Pakistan now finds itself faced with a *fait accompli*. (S)

At this point the meeting adjourned for the day. The following morning and afternoon were taken up with travel to a refugee camp and the Khyber Pass. The sessions resumed in the evening of February 3rd. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* opened the session by pointing out that the problem was how to state the U.S.-Pakistani relationship accurately, and with political sensitivity, pointing out what can be done now, and that more is needed for the future. He tabled a proposed draft communique

which he said seeks to take these characteristics into account.<sup>17</sup> There are eight specific ways, in this document, the American side seeks to meet your concerns. It contains an explicit affirmation of the 1959 agreement by Congress; the focus is on Soviet-directed aggression; it removes the obstacles of the Glenn and Symington amendments; it is a beginning of a process (and you can see from Sadat's experience where this sort of thing can lead); there is a military team here; and there is no limit on what they are to look into; we will try to get others to help shoulder the burden which, without legislation, we would be unable to do, it stresses the magnitude of needs, and it is labeled as "initial steps" which should help President Zia with his political problem. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that he and the Deputy Secretary had been in touch with the President who wants to move on this matter.<sup>18</sup> Anything short of the package that the United States is offering would be a major rebuff to us and we would draw the appropriate conclusions. (S)

*President Zia* responded that it is not a question of money. We want to stress our needs and see best how to implement a program that will meet them. We are grateful for the American concern; we appreciate the consultations that have been held both here and in Washington. We have watched Afghanistan closely. On May 9, 1978, President Zia said he had written to President Carter on the problems posed by the Soviet role in Afghanistan,<sup>19</sup> and was now glad to see that the United States agrees with him. Pakistan does not have military strength, and has opted for a military and diplomatic response in combination. It has

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<sup>17</sup> Message WH80172 from Brzezinski's aircraft to the Department of State, February 4, relayed the text of the draft joint communiqué. The following text in the draft did not appear in the final version of the joint communiqué: "The United States in accordance with its Constitution will take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon in order to assist Pakistan. The proposed legislation will remove all current barriers to economic and military aid to Pakistan, with the result that the initially requested economic and military aid will approximate one-half billion dollars during the next 18 months." (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, February–October 1980) For the final version of the joint statement, see footnote 22 below.

<sup>18</sup> No record of any direct communication with Carter by Christopher or Brzezinski was found. In a February 2 memorandum, Vance informed Carter: "We have just received a cable from Chris and Zbig indicating that Zia told them this morning that the Pakistanis do not wish us to go forward with legislation containing economic and military assistance in the amounts which we have offered. Zia has also expressed concern about continuing assistance to any insurgents on the basis that this might draw fire on the Pakistanis. It is not clear whether this is still a bargaining position, but it has a ring of seriousness to it. We will know more by tomorrow morning." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80) Message WH80154 from the White House to Camp David, February 2, reported on the February 2 afternoon session. See footnote 3, Document 424.

<sup>19</sup> See Document 279.



opposed the invasion and called for a withdrawal. It has condemned the Soviet action. It has mobilized Third World support. It has hosted the Islamic Conference. It has taken up diplomatic contacts with India to alert them to the threat and reassure India on Pakistan's desire for normalization while allaying their concern over American arms supply to Pakistan. It has remained close to China, but this is a limited relationship. (S)

The United States is the only answer to the Soviet threat. This is why we want to update the 1959 agreement. Our exchange of views shows agreement and common interests and concerns. Under these circumstances, your offer of Congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement is acceptable, even though it falls short of what Pakistan would like. We also understand that you will try to get the Chinese to help Pakistan. (S)

Pakistan is working to improve its relationships with India. The dimension of the threat in the West is great, and therefore we feel that Congressional affirmation of the agreement could provide a deterrent. (S)

We deeply appreciate the total offer that you have made, but we must note the risks involved in our accepting it. President Carter's statements have created great expectations, and the figure of \$400 million will disappoint the Pakistani public. We must also reckon with an adverse reaction from the Islamic states. India will raise an alarm and seek more weapons from the Soviet Union. We also note that the United States has offered to supply weapons to India.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, we ask you again, do not specify any amount. Please remove the Symington amendment and then we can discuss the dimensions of our need. (S)

We appreciate your approval of what we have done with regard to Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> We are ready for a long-term relationship, and we appreciate the more flexible aid position you are taking. (S)

Referring to the paper he had tabled, specifically page 2, *Dr. Brzezinski* proposed one further change following the phrase "during 18 months." He would at that point add "in the meantime, both sides will consult on the long-term needs of Pakistan." (S)

At this point the meeting broke temporarily so that the two sides could consult among themselves. (U)

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<sup>20</sup> When Clark Clifford met with Gandhi on January 31, he told her that the United States "was prepared" to sell arms to India (see Document 169) but no record of a U.S. offer of military aid to India was found.

<sup>21</sup> Regarding Pakistani assistance in the delivery of arms to Afghan insurgent groups, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 176.



When he returned, *President Zia* said that the draft statement was well-worded, and that the only change is from \$400 to \$500 million. Pakistan, however, does not want a price tag. Please only refer to the 1959 agreement and put no emphasis on the price or aid. The rest of the agreement is fine. (At this point he read his revisions.) (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that we seem to be moving in the right direction, and each side recognized the other's problems. The United States has to go ahead with legislation, including aid programs. (At this point he read from his revision of the document.) We will, however, have to introduce legislation. (S)

*President Zia*: "No." (U)

*Dr. Brzezinski* insisted that if we are going to go ahead we will have to introduce the figures. You could express appreciation, but you could also note that you are disappointed that the figure was so small. (S)

*President Zia* said he could say that now. (U)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that it would depend on how it was said. (U)

*President Zia* said, however, that it would be better if *Dr. Brzezinski* simply reported the facts back to the President and called this whole thing a fact-finding mission. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* asked when then could we produce the legislation? (S)

*President Zia* replied, "After the needs have been assessed and the overall kitty had been put together." (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* reiterated that we cannot ask for affirmation of the agreement without showing how we intend to back it up. Congress would reject this and ask whether the problem is urgent or not. (S)

*President Zia* said the Americans should tell Congress that Pakistan considers the word of the United States more important than any money. (S)

*Ambassador Yaqub* said that both sides evidently agree in substance. We agree on the 1959 agreement, the need to cooperate, the fact of sizeable economic and military requirements, there is not a quarrel over any specific amount, and the breakdown is on a secondary essentially non-substantial issue. (Yaqub said this with considerable emotion.) (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* responded that there are two substantial elements. The first is that the people and Congress back up any commitment that is made, and secondly, we want to organize an effective consortium. (By implication, neither of these would be possible if no sum were specified in the request to Congress.) (S)

*President Zia* remarked that the United States is always too little and too late in what it does. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* asked what if we came to the conclusion later that \$400 million was not enough? (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* said that Pakistan had not yet studied the dimensions of the military requirement. Similarly, Pakistan is, at this point, going through a new assessment of its economic requirements by the IBRD. Why not do the military aspect in the same way. Without that kind of a survey your monetary figure is less convincing. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* reiterated that the time is pressing. It will be harder to get funds later. Indeed, there is a very small window of about a week or so in which we can get Congressional action. (S)

*Ghulam Ishaq* asked what that said about the reliability of the American commitment. (C)

At this point, once again the two sides took a break for consultation. (S)

When the meeting resumed, *Dr. Brzezinski* said that there were two choices. The first was to issue a revised communique (which he then read), after which the United States would submit legislation. This would be seen as first-step seed money. The sum would not be mentioned in the communique, but it would have to be specified in the legislation. The Pakistanis could then: welcome Congressional endorsement of the 1959 agreement, welcome the newly restored friendship between the United States and Pakistan, register their disappointment with the amount involved, and point out that they expect to receive more through multilateral efforts. (S)

The other possibility would be to issue an abbreviated communique involving only pages 1 and 3. There would be no reassurances or removal of the restraints on aid. There would subsequently have to be further consultations. (S)

The American side, *Dr. Brzezinski* said, had come to Pakistan to work out an understanding. But it has to mobilize domestic support now for this major strategic commitment. (S)

*President Zia* pointed out that each side has a public opinion problem and said it would be best to call the visit a fact-finding mission. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* stated his belief that the proposed statement is the best that the American side can do. We are in danger of losing historic opportunity. We have stretched our position as far as we can and it would be a shame to lose this opportunity. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* agreed that this was the case and each side would have to draw its own conclusions. (U)

*President Zia* complained that the meeting had bogged down in modalities. The offer of \$400 million is a disgrace for the United States. (S)

*President Zia* again said that the United States should have consulted first with Pakistan before publicizing the figure. The Pakistanis had, in Washington, specifically asked the United States not to let the \$400 million figure become public. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that we would be able to consider alternatives in the future; check out other possibilities with other countries. (S)

*President Zia* said that he thought the dialogue should be continued. (U)

*Dr. Brzezinski* pointed out that the press will ask what all of this means. We will say that the legislation has been deferred and is under study pending further consultation. When asked why, we will say that further study is needed and we have left a military team behind. (S)

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that we would have to say that we were not able to reach an agreement on the terms. (S)

Responding to *Dr. Brzezinski*, *President Zia* said that additional consultations could also be mentioned, as appropriate. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that when asked when an agreement will be submitted, we would respond that it is being held for further discussion. *Dr. Brzezinski* asked in passing, what would happen if the United States submitted the agreement unilaterally. (S)

*President Zia* responded that the Pakistanis would issue a sharply critical statement, and wondered what is behind the great hurry of the United States in this matter. (S)

(*Dr. Brzezinski* explained once again the need for speed.) (U)

*Ghulam Ishaq* asked how the United States could unilaterally initiate legislation at the same time promising to consult further. Were the Pakistanis to accept the \$400 million figure, they would have exposed themselves to a great danger. (S)

*President Zia* said in conclusion that the two sides understand each other. We agree but we fall out over modalities. (S)

*Dr. Brzezinski* concluded by saying that the United States wants to make its commitment to Pakistan tangible. (C)

The two sides agreed that the shortened form of the communique should be issued<sup>22</sup> and that *Dr. Brzezinski* and *Agha Shahi* should

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<sup>22</sup> The substantive portion of the final version of the February 3 joint communiqué reads: "The two nations agreed that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the aggression against the Muslim people of that country is a flagrant violation of international covenants and norms and a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world. The United States reiterated that its commitment to Pakistan's independence and security pursuant to 1959 agreement is firm and enduring. The Government of Pakistan reiterated its resolve, as stated in the 1959 agreement, that it is determined to resist aggression. President Zia-ul-Haq expressed appreciation for the visit of *Dr. Brzezinski* and *Mr. Christopher*. The American side expressed warm appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to it by the Government of Pakistan. Appropriate consultations between the two governments will continue." (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 65)

hold a joint press conference, which they subsequently did.<sup>23</sup> (President Zia held his own press conference later in the evening.) (S)

Thereupon, this session concluded. This marked the end of this series of U.S.-Pakistani talks. (U)

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<sup>23</sup> In telegram 954 from Islamabad, February 4, the Embassy reported Brzezinski's February 4 press conference at the Islamabad airport. In response to a question on the U.S. response if Pakistan's security were threatened, Brzezinski stated: "President Carter asked Deputy Secretary Christopher and myself to come here to reaffirm the agreement of 1959. We have done so. He has asked us to come here to lay the foundations for an invigorated friendship between our two countries. We have done so. He has asked us to come here to consult with President Zia, Minister Shahi and others on the nature of the strategic dilemma that we and you confront. We have done so." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800061-0291)

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#### 424. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 4, 1980, 2:30-2:36 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan

*The President* said hello Mr. President, this is Jimmy Carter.

*President Zia* asked if he were speaking with President Carter. Good evening sir.

*The President* asked if he were speaking with President Zia.

*President Zia* said this is Zia speaking.

*The President* said it was a pleasure to talk with him. How did the visit of Dr. Brzezinski go?<sup>2</sup>

*President Zia* said excellent; this is why he is calling the President. He is sure that Dr. Brzezinski will inform him (the President) of their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80. Secret. Carter spoke to Zia by telephone from the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 423.

discussions.<sup>3</sup> They had frank, useful, and educational exchanges of views. President Zia had explained Pakistan's threat perception. He was encouraged to see that the Brzezinski team agreed totally.

*The President* said that this was good news.

*President Zia* said that Dr. Brzezinski is a very intelligent, capable, and sincere personality. He (President Zia) was highly impressed.

*The President* said he was pleased and not surprised.

*President Zia* said he was grateful for this high powered team.

*The President* said good.

*President Zia* said there were some differences in assessment, but this was only a cursory perception. Perhaps their only real difference was that the Brzezinski team had a lack of flexibility (laughs). He (President Zia) could see that they could not deviate from their instruction.

*The President* said that he would get their report here. They are in Saudi Arabia, now, and will be here in a day and a half.<sup>4</sup>

*President Zia* said that they had told him this. He tried to put across the needs of Pakistan's security, and the infringement of its freedom. They agreed. The overall reaction in Pakistan to the visit has been satisfactory. This is visible in press reporting today in Pakistan. On the U.S. papers, he doesn't know.

*The President* said that reports here are good. He also had seen a summary of the Islamabad papers.

*President Zia* said he hopes they can continue the policy of detailed consultations. He looks forward to the next visit of a Brzezinski-type team. Carrying these on would be useful.

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<sup>3</sup> Message WH80154 from the White House to Camp David, February 2, transmitted "a hurried report on a rough and rainy afternoon" of Brzezinski and Christopher's February 2 meeting with Zia. The message noted, among other things: "The Paks do not wish to have us present the request for economic or military assistance at the indicated levels. The initially stated reason was that questions might be raised about the Pak nuclear program and they did not wish to quote embarrass us close quote. Subsequent conversation indicated however that the principal obstacle is the 'token' size of the proposed economic and military elements." The message is stamped "1980 Feb 2 1957, David" and Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the first page. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2/1–5/80: Cables and Memos) The message repeated telegram 899 from Islamabad, February 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0638, N800002–0615)

<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski and Christopher traveled to Riyadh on February 4 and met with Saudi Prince Saud. For their discussion of the U.S. aid offer to Pakistan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 194. Brzezinski reported to Carter on the talks in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, including recommendations for further steps, in a February 6 memorandum, and Christopher and Brzezinski summarized their trip at a February SCC meeting; see *ibid.*, Documents 197 and 198.

*The President* asked what success President Zia has had with other nations, in terms of securing economic and military aid.

*President Zia* said that unfortunately, not much. Unless there is a leader—the USA—moving, then others will not (laughs). He has had no success so far.

*The President* said that he saw.

*President Zia* said that when the President gets the report of the Brzezinski team, he will understand.

*The President* said he looks forward to it. He thanked President Zia for receiving the team, and that the discussions were frank.

*President Zia* said that it was his pleasure. He hopes to see a U.S. team again. It was educational.

*The President* said they should keep in close contact.

*President Zia* asked how he was otherwise.

*The President* said fine. He is faced with a multiplicity of issues. But having friends like President Zia makes it easier.

*President Zia* wished the President success in his next primary. He will pray for the President.

*The President* said he hoped that it would come true.

*President Zia* thanked the President, and extended his regards to Mrs. Carter.

*The President* concluded by extending his greetings.

#### 425. Memorandum Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 6, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

2. *Iranian Pressures on Pakistan*: Ambassador Hummel expresses concern about increasing indications of considerable pressures on Pakistan from Iran, urging the Paks not to engage themselves in any new relationship with the U.S. He specifically cites a CIA field report from an excellent source that the messages are coming through various channels, all with the same kind of warning. The ambassador sees this as being obviously the work of Soviet-sponsored elements in Iran seeking to play on already-present Pak skittishness about the U.S. relationship. As for countering these efforts, Hummel suggests that we continue our follow-on dialogue with Islamabad both there and here urging their continued resistance to the pressure. (Islamabad 1041 NODIS, PSN 8585)<sup>2</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily [less than 1 line not declassified] File, Box 25, 2/5/80–2/8/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1041 from Islamabad, February 6, Hummel concerns about Iranian pressure on Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0580, N800003–0024) He cited a report which stated: "Reports are being received by the Government of Pakistan (GOP) that Iran is opposed to Pak acceptance of U.S. aid. There is a very strong anti-Pakistan leftist lobby in Iran which is undoubtedly influenced by the Soviets. This information was being used by some GOP officials as an argument against accepting U.S. aid. There are indications of some secret Soviet/Iranian ties and agreement which worries the GOP." (Intelligence Report, undated; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Afghanistan, Box 6, 2/4–6/80)

**426. Letter From Pakistani President Zia to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, February 7, 1980

Dear Mr President,

I was happy to receive through Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski your kind letter of January 30, 1980,<sup>2</sup> and I thank you also for your earlier letter<sup>3</sup> sent through Mr Agha Shahi, my Adviser on Foreign Affairs.

The visit of Dr Brzezinski and Mr Warren Christopher has provided us with a valuable opportunity to discuss the regional strategic situation and has enabled our respective positions to be clarified. Your advisers were completely frank in their talks with me as I was with them. Indeed it is very necessary at this time that we should share with each other our perceptions of the situation and our views on dealing with it so that we can build up an edifice of mutual cooperation which will endure in the days to come.

In your State of the Union message, Mr President, you had indicated that you planned to propose to Congress a military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> Dr Brzezinski and Mr Christopher will convey to you our considered views on this subject. It is our feeling that a premature focus on the quantum of such assistance before a full examination has been conducted of the nature of our requirements for a credible defensive capability would be counter-productive, particularly in the light of the report that the United States has offered to sell to India sophisticated electronic and navigational aids to enhance the offensive capability of the 200 Jaguar aircraft under procurement.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, Mr Gromyko's forthcoming visit to India is expected to be climaxed by the announcement of a 2.6 billion dollar arms sales package to India.<sup>6</sup>

The team of experts which had stayed behind after the departure of your advisers has held detailed discussions with our officials, in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, February–October 1980. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten

<sup>2</sup> See Document 422.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 406.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 10, Document 408.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 141.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 171.



light of which you may wish to review the quantum of aid you deem appropriate, keeping in mind the gravity of threat posed to Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

Dr Brzezinski's public reiteration that the US commitment for Pakistan's independence and security pursuant to the 1959 Bilateral Agreement is firm and enduring<sup>8</sup> is welcome and we look forward to its reaffirmation by Congress. We would however, still prefer to substitute the Agreement by a Treaty which would serve a notice to the Soviet Union that the United States stands resolutely and fully committed to assist Pakistan if it is subjected to aggression. At the same time, I cannot conceal our apprehension over the distinction that may be drawn between the nature and extent of the US commitments to the security of the Persian Gulf as compared to Pakistan's security under the 1959 Agreement. Dr Brzezinski assured me that the latter is specific to Pakistan and that the Carter doctrine<sup>9</sup> is a "reinforcement" and "premium" to Pakistan. This would be so if we are assured that Pakistan is considered to fall within the geographical area of the Persian Gulf, even though countries have not been named.

The visit of Dr Brzezinski and Mr Warren Christopher has served to re-invigorate the friendship between our two countries and the joint statement issued at the end of our talks has been well received.<sup>10</sup> Dr Brzezinski's brilliant handling of the discussions on so many diverse and complicated issues and the very great understanding which he displayed throughout our talks have created a deep impression on us.

I thank you, Mr President, for your kind words on the success of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference to which Pakistan had the honour and privilege of playing host.<sup>11</sup> The Conference is a high water mark in the consolidation of the unity of the Muslim world and reflects its growing strength and vitality.

Mr President, we deeply appreciate the personal interest which you have manifested in the security and stability of Pakistan. I wish to assure you that it will be our constant endeavour to explore with

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<sup>7</sup> In a February 9 memorandum to Secretary Brown, McGiffert reported the results of the U.S. military team's February 2–7 visit to Pakistan. Among other exchanges, the Pakistani military officials gave the U.S. team a list of immediate needs. According to McGiffert: "This list prices out at about \$3.5 billion; of this \$800 million is for the Navy for items not related to the western front, \$1.5 billion is for 66 F-16s and \$400 million for I-HAWK. If we can come up with a more modest air defense program (see below) we should be able to construct a meaningful package in the range of \$1.5–\$2 billion." The proposal for a more modest air defense system was presented later in the report. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, February–October 1980)

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 23, Document 423.

<sup>9</sup> See Document 16.

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 22, Document 423.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 3, Document 422.

your Government all possible ways of attaining our common objective of regional peace, stability and prosperity. I have no doubt that in the years ahead our multi-faceted relationship forged over three decades of cooperation will be further strengthened so that it becomes a permanent and dependable instrument for the peace, stability and security of this region.

With profound regards and very good wishes,  
Yours sincerely,<sup>12</sup>

**M. Zia-ul-Haq**  
*General*

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<sup>12</sup> Zia handwrote: "With profound regards and very good wishes, Yours sincerely."

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#### **427. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 19, 1980

1. *Pakistan.* The Pakistanis are firmly opposed to a congressional suggestion that the House Appropriations Committee proceed immediately with funding \$200 million for Pakistan in FY-1980, in advance of an Administration request for an authorization.<sup>2</sup> The Paks want to assess their efforts to obtain additional multilateral and bilateral financial support in the Gulf and in Western Europe before supporting any US proposal. In particular, they seem to be waiting further word from the Saudis.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. Carter wrote "Warren, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In a February 7 memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, Turner reported Lieutenant General Akhtar's statement that the \$200 million offer was "completely unacceptable and personally demeaning" to Zia. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Feb 1-29) The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 200.

We have had several recent indications that the Pakistanis are ambivalent about accepting military aid from the US, at the proposed levels. Agha Shahi told Ambassador Hummel yesterday<sup>3</sup> that Pakistan might want the US to focus only on economic assistance while it looks for military financing elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 1470 from Islamabad, February 19, Hummel reported his February 18 meeting with Shahi, during which Shahi explained that “it might be better to have US focus only on economic assistance to Pakistan, while Pakistan looks elsewhere for the funding it requires for satisfaction of its urgent military needs, e.g. high performance aircraft, border roads, airfields, tanks, APCs, etc. If the Arabs—he specifically mentioned Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, in that order—provide the money, Pakistan would, of course, be interested in substantial cash purchases of arms from the U.S., but not as tied to ‘aid from the U.S.’ ‘If Arab money is not there,’ he added, ‘then Pakistan’s defense will rest solely on its diplomacy’—a hint again of the possible need to seek accommodation with a regionally paramount USSR.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0542, P870097–0551, N800003–0643)

<sup>4</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “If Paks prefer this, it’s ok with me” and drew an arrow pointing to the phrase “looks for military financing elsewhere” in the last sentence of the paragraph.

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**428. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Afghanistan

We understand the SCC on Wednesday will be discussing the question of increased support for the Afghan insurgents.<sup>2</sup> We also

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000013, Box 4, SCC Reports 1979–1980, SCC Meeting Book 24, Feb. 27 1980. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Coon. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Saunders’s behalf.

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, held on Wednesday, February 27, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, vol. XII, 1977–1980, Afghanistan, Document 220. The Afghanistan covert action program included a July 3, 1979, Presidential Finding authorizing aid to the insurgents; a November 7, 1979, Presidential Finding enabling the supply of non-military supplies, procurement advice, and communications equipment; and a December 28, 1979, Presidential Finding providing for lethal military aid. Documentation on the covert program and the Pakistani role is *ibid.*

understand that a decision in principle has been made to provide additional arms. The proposed level of US funding would be \$15 million for CY 80 [1 line not declassified].

You are fully aware of the pros and cons previously adduced with respect to this covert program. However, I think the program should be looked at in the context of our overall relations with Pakistan at this time.

Since the Brzezinski/Christopher mission<sup>3</sup> it has become increasingly clear that the Pakistanis are reluctant to enter into a high profile relationship with us. They have asked us not to go ahead at this time with our legislative proposal including reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement, FMS and economic aid, although they will probably accept US assistance as part of a multilateral package.<sup>4</sup> The Pakistanis still doubt our constancy in the long haul. Moreover, they probably see a conspicuous bilateral relationship with us as running against the domestic political grain and as detrimental to the maintenance of other important ties, particularly to the Islamic and non-aligned world.

In contrast to their reluctance to enter into a high profile public relationship, the Pakistanis are apparently receptive to continued covert cooperation in support of the insurgents. (The Pakistanis, however, have been very upset by the Washington leaks on the program<sup>5</sup> and may have second thoughts if there should be any further publicity.) We understand that about \$7 million worth of weapons has been delivered since December. This has been distributed through the Pakistanis [less than 1 line not declassified]. Some is going into the [less than 1 line not declassified] in central Afghanistan and some to the eastern provinces [less than 1 line not declassified] have most of their connections. The

<sup>3</sup> See Document 423.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 427.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, William Beecher, "What he Didn't Say," *Boston Globe*, January 5, 1980, p. 1; Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1980, p. A1; David Binder, "U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms in a Covert Operation," *New York Times*, February 16, 1980, p. A1; Craig R. Whitney, "Soviet Press Plays Up U.S. Reports on Help For the Afghan Rebels," *New York Times*, February 17, 1980, p. A10. In telegram 1487 from Islamabad, February 19, Hummel summarized a conversation with Shahi, during which Shahi conveyed Zia's "very deep concern about these evident leaks," which raised his concern about whether Pakistan "can confide in U.S. officials and leaders and take their word in return for face value." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2-3/80) In a February 27 memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, Turner reported similar comments made by Lieutenant General Akhtar, who was instructed by Zia to convey the following regarding the Afghan covert action program: "President Zia and I are greatly incensed at leaks by U.S. officials about support to Afghan tribesmen. Our future cooperation will be jeopardized if there are similar leaks in the future." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, February 1-29)

Agency believes the equipment is indeed moving into Afghanistan and, at a minimum, is providing psychological support for the insurgency. A small number of SA-7's are included.

[5 lines not declassified] However, we doubt that a program of these dimensions, particularly including anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, will go unnoticed by the Russians. More visible introduction of weapons from Pakistan may well tempt the Soviets to take punitive action against Pakistan in the form of a cross-border strike or raids on refugee concentrations. The Pakistan Government is already evincing growing concern over this possibility.

It would seem appropriate to consider what situations we might face if the Soviets decide on punitive action and where this might leave us in terms of our relations with Pakistan and others who are involved with us. Pakistani leaders have said that they prefer to have Pakistani armed forces take care of cross-border incursions if they can obtain sufficient outside equipment and financial aid. However, the political and psychological impact in the near term of a deliberate punitive raid by the Soviets is difficult to gauge. The GOP could choose to use the occasion to demand greatly enhanced US military and economic assistance. Failure to meet these demands would undercut US credibility as a reliable partner not only in Pakistan but elsewhere in Southwest Asia. Alternatively, given their reluctance to enter into a high profile relationship, the Pakistanis might conceivably cave to Soviet pressure and this could also leave us out on a limb with our colleagues in this endeavor. In either case we risk being seen as a "paper tiger".

Since the State Department may have to testify before Congressional intelligence committees on the policy context of the covert program, I believe it would be useful to raise these issues at the SCC and get some sense of how we propose to handle questions directed at these contingencies.

In presenting this to the SCC, you might wish to raise a number of questions.

—Will the input of \$30 million worth of weapons into Afghanistan move this program to a new level of visibility? Does it increase the chances of Soviet reaction?

—Do the Pakistanis have the capability now to respond to a punitive cross-border raid by the Soviets/Afghans? If the Pakistanis are unable to respond effectively, what is the likely political impact on the Pakistan Government?

—If the Pak response were to turn to us for a massive increase in military and economic assistance, what would be our reaction? Failure to meet their demands could undercut our reliability with the Paks and our other partners.

—It is also conceivable that the political climate following a raid might lead the Pakistanis to seek accommodation with the Soviets and refuse further covert cooperation. This could lead to recrimination if the Paks sought to shift the blame to us and/or leave us looking helpless in countering Soviet action.

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**429. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 10, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

2. *Pakistan Aid*: During the past week, Foreign Affairs Advisor Shahi (before a Pakistani audience)<sup>2</sup> and President Zia (with an American journalist)<sup>3</sup> have indicated that Pakistan is interested in a U.S. assistance package which does not have an FMS component. The newspaper stories indicating a complete Pakistani rejection were overdrawn. Both Shahi and Zia talked in terms of economic aid, debt rescheduling, cash purchase of U.S. military equipment and a Congressional affirmation of the 1959 Agreement, not linked to the aid package. Although this offers us the basis for further discussions with the Pakistanis—and they may, on their own, reopen the dialogue—we plan to hold off initiating discussions until we see whether, as a result of the budget review, we will have funds available for Pakistan.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 3/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2110 from Islamabad, March 6, the Embassy summarized a *Pakistani Times* article that reported a March 5 speech made by Shahi to the first All Pakistan Local Bodies Convention. According to the article, Shahi rejected the U.S. "aid package as proposed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800115-0739)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2181 from Islamabad, March 9, the Embassy reported Selig Harrison's March 8 interviews with Zia and Shahi. Harrison, characterized by the Embassy as an "American scholar" who interviewed the two separately, informed the Embassy that Zia and Shahi would still accept economic assistance if it were independent of military aid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800121-0902)

**430. Memorandum Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1980

1. *Status of U.S.-Pak Relations:* Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz told Ambassador Hummel yesterday that Pakistan continues to want a congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral agreement and maintains its desire for economic assistance in the form of debt rescheduling, commodity aid and project aid. The foreign secretary stressed that Islamabad rejects only the \$400 million package “as presented” and linked as it was with the reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement. He emphasized that a reading of recent pronouncements as signifying the end of the Pak/U.S. security relationship would be in error. Hummel notes that this apparently is the authoritative Pakistani position and the assurance that we have “returned to square one,” as represented by the status of U.S./Pak relations prior to the \$400 million package offer, promises a valuable benchmark. (Islamabad 2290, PSN 56791)<sup>2</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 3/7/80–3/12/80. Secret. Carter wrote: “Zbig, C” in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2290 from Islamabad, March 12, Hummel reported his March 11 discussion with Shahnawaz regarding Pakistan's position on the U.S. assistance offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800126–0754).

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**431. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, March 17, 1980

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, Folder 32: Pakistan Feb–May 1980. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

## 432. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 25, 1980, 9–10:10 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Iran and Afghanistan

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Harold Saunders

#### *OSD*

Secretary Harold Brown  
W. Graham Claytor\*

#### *JCS*

Lt. Gen. John Pustay\*

#### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner\*

#### *Justice*

Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti\*

#### *Treasury*

Robert Carswell\*

#### *White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Lloyd Cutler\*

Ray Jenkins\*

Henry Owen\*

#### *Office of the Vice President*

Denis Clift\*

#### *NSC*

Gary Sick

Alfred Friendly\*

\*Present only for discussion of item 1

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

4. *Pakistan*. Secretary Vance had some reservations about the sequence of events in our next steps for Pakistan. He was concerned that we not force the pace of events faster than the Pakistanis can accept and thereby risk another embarrassment. He was concerned that we do not have the necessary money on the economic side, and there is no agreed position within the U.S. Government on debt rescheduling. Secretary Brown noted that all we had agreed on was debt rescheduling, and that will take a long time so we have time to work out the budgetary aspects. It will not involve the current budget. Dr. Brzezinski noted that we are in a position of being damned if we do and damned if we don't. The two elements which need to be explored are debt rescheduling and reaffirmation of the security commitment.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, (Meetings—SCC 293: 3/25/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote "Zbig, J" in the upper right-hand corner of the Summary of Conclusions.



Is it possible to get the reaffirmation without tying it to a specific piece of Pakistan-related legislation? All agreed that we first need to be clear in our own minds exactly what we can do, which includes consultations with key members of Congress, and then quietly approach the Pakistanis. The SCC agreed on the following sequence of steps:

(1) Henry Owen will convene a working group to develop an agreed U.S. Government position on debt rescheduling.

(2) Then informal and quiet consultations will be undertaken with key members of Congress concerning debt rescheduling and a possible formula for reaffirming the security commitment to Pakistan.

(3) After those steps have been completed, we will talk to the Pakistanis. The SCC discussed various channels of communication which could be used, and concluded that it would be best to work through Ambassador Hummel, with a carefully prepared set of talking points which relate our efforts to those of the allies and others. Dr. Brzezinski thought the Pakistanis still did not understand the role we had played and were playing in encouraging others to support Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> (S)

Approve the sequence above.<sup>3</sup>

Other.

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<sup>2</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Do this w/out any press."

<sup>3</sup> Carter checked this option. Beneath the options, he wrote: "A Senate resolution may be possible. J."

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### 433. Article in the *National Intelligence Daily*<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 26, 1980

#### USSR-PAKISTAN: Soviet Pressure Decreases

*Soviet pressure on Pakistan has eased following Islamabad's rejection of the US aid offer, and Moscow has even suggested that it would be more forthcoming with its own assistance. [portion marking not declassified]*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 8, Folder 36: Afghan Crisis—NIDs—03/01/1980—03-31-1980. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

Soviet leaders generally have avoided criticizing Pakistan in recent speeches on Afghanistan, and Soviet Ambassador Azimov held out the hope of increased economic aid when he met with President Zia earlier this month. [1 line not declassified] Azimov said that Moscow had no plans for any incursions into Pakistan from Afghanistan and would overlook past Pakistani support for the insurgents if no additional assistance is provided. [portion marking not declassified]

Azimov also informed Zia, however, that Moscow had detailed information on the extent of Pakistan's support for the insurgents; he asked for assurances that no US bases or troops would be permitted in Pakistan. [portion marking not declassified]

Zia reportedly welcomed the Soviets' offer, but reiterated his demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, denied that Pakistan was aiding the insurgents, and refused to provide the assurances regarding the US that Azimov sought. Nonetheless, the President subsequently told a meeting of senior Pakistani military officers that Islamabad had to do some "fence mending" with the USSR and should cut back its aid to the Afghan insurgents. In a press conference on Monday,<sup>2</sup> he publicly indicated that "all doors" for a dialogue with Moscow "must remain open." [portion marking not declassified]

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<sup>2</sup> March 24.

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#### 434. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, March 30, 1980, 1101Z

2934. Subject: (S) GOP Clarifies Position on U.S. Assistance and Security Relationship. Ref: Islamabad 2290.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text-FGI.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 3/27/80-3/31/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram. An unknown hand underlined the telegram number and the subject line. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 430.

2. MFA Additional Secretary Riaz Piracha called me in March 30; I was accompanied by PolOff Sherman and Piracha by USA Director Farouk Rana as notetakers.

3. Piracha prefaced his remarks by saying GOP wishes to avoid misunderstandings alleged to have surrounded Agha Shahi's address early in March in which he rejected aid package<sup>3</sup> and the subsequent press reports that move caught U.S. by surprise. He also sharply criticized impression that "the Government of India seems to have been privy to substance of our previous confidential conversations on aid package." He expanded on this saying that about time of Eric Gonsalves' visit to U.S. it became clear that the "GOI was aware of almost everything USG and GOP had discussed, thus GOP made no public reaction on military/security relationship".<sup>4</sup>

4. Proceeding to substance, Piracha made three points:

—The GOP considers the US/Pak security relationship to have "reverted" to its status preceding the Brzezinski-Christopher visit. The apparently "insurmountables obstacles to conversion of the 1959 agreement into a treaty with Senate ratification had been made clear to GOP. Piracha explained that GOP fully aware that congressional consideration even of reaffirmation of '59 agreement would likely open Pandora's box of "extraneous" issues (nuclear, internal political situation, human rights, Indian considerations, etc), and his government has no desire to see this happen now. Therefore, GOP accepts executive agreement as it is, and President Carter's public statements of continuing U.S. adherence to that agreement, as basis of present security relationship.

—Concerning U.S. economic aid, Piracha said, "We are ready to accept it, of course, without any strings." GOP priorities are: (a) debt rescheduling; (b) commodity assistance; (c) program assistance and; (d) project aid—in that order, he said. Piracha said these priorities follow those catalogued to me by FonSec Shahnawaz earlier (ref A) but with addition of program assistance in third place.

—Third point Piracha made echoed his preface in that he expects this exchange to remain privileged. He mentioned Amb. Goheen's March 18 Rotary speech in Calcutta<sup>5</sup> in which allegedly skewed version of US-Pak bilateral negotiations was presented along with statement that the U.S. has turned down a new GOP arms request because it would have "shifted power balance in region." Piracha described present state of bilateral US-Pakistan discussions as "very delicate."

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 429.

<sup>4</sup> Gonsalves visited Washington February 26. See Documents 172 and 173.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

5. I thanked Piracha for presentation but declined to make any comments at this time. Because he had not mentioned the subject, I asked whether GOP considers cash sales military supply program still in effect and desirable. He responded that the program—since it precedes Brzezinski-Christopher visit—remains an ongoing interest.

6. Comment: Piracha said he used as briefing paper for our meeting a cable MFA sent to Ambassador Sultan in Washington on March 24. If not already done, I expect Dept will soon hear the same message directly from Sultan. Piracha's remarks on GOP dissatisfaction with perceived lack of confidentiality on our previous exchanges were polite but sharp. End comment.

Hummel

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**435. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Stemming the Deterioration in U.S.-Pak Relations:* Ambassador Hummel believes we should begin consideration of the best ways of limiting the long-term effects of the seemingly inevitable deterioration in our relations with Pakistan while working toward achievable goals.<sup>2</sup> He adds that our objective should be to stem the downward slide at a point where relations can bottom-out and hopefully later turn upward.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 4/1/80–4/4/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3062 from Islamabad, April 2, transmitted Hummel's analysis and recommendations for handling U.S.-Pakistani relations. Hummel based his view that bilateral relations would continue to worsen on four assumptions: "A. It is now problematical whether the Congress will agree to lay aside the Symington Amendment ban which is a prerequisite to appropriating even \$100 million in economic aid in '81; B. We will not be seeking congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 executive agreement; C. There is no economic assistance money available from the '80 budget, and at most \$100 million in economic aid in '81; D. The Paks will continue to reject FMS credits and a closer military relationship with the U.S." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0476)

Specifically, Hummel recommends we refrain for the time being from further full-scale consultations with the Pakistanis about our plans and intentions; proceed with a debt rescheduling regime in a context of multilateral support and structural reform; and press ahead with military-to-military discussions of the results of the U.S. military team visit.<sup>3</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 426.

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**436. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia  
(Ames) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

NFAC 2800–80

Washington, April 15, 1980

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting of 14 April 1980—"Security Framework"

1. *Action Requested*: None; the following is for your information. [portion marking not declassified]

2. *Background*: This was the eighth in a series of SCC meetings on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Brzezinski announced at the outset that the meeting would last until 1130, vice 1200, that the Defense paper on basing would not be discussed (it was not ready) and that base access in Somalia and Pakistan would be the items covered. He also noted that the last fifteen minutes would be devoted to a rump session on intelligence items. [portion marking not declassified]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 13, Folder 11: SCC Meeting ME Security. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 112, SCC 302, 4/14/80, Security Framework. An extract is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 73.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

4. *Pakistan*: Dr. Brzezinski opened this segment by stating that he believed that Pakistan was important to our strategic needs in the area. Egypt and Saudia want us to support Pakistan. Pakistan is important vis-a-vis the Afghan insurgency. A stable Pakistan is healthy for the region. Henry Owen then outlined the Pak's key concern—debt rescheduling—per his paper.<sup>3</sup> He said this question boiled down to two issues: could we waive the “imminent default” clause and where would the money come from. We will have a better indication of the latter when the FY81 budget goes forward in three weeks, but it will be difficult to come up with something positive for the Pakistanis right now. It was mentioned that the Pakistanis are currently reviewing their policy options and it would be a good time to come up with something that might cause them to turn our way. Perhaps we can say the following—we will be prepared to discuss with you an effort to undertake debt rescheduling in early May, before the Pak Debt Consortium convenes in June. In this kind of statement we make no promises, but three weeks (the budget will have gone forward) and the Paks could well be in imminent default. This option will be reviewed for the PRC on Pakistan. On arms, we will not give the Paks a list of recommendations, but rather a list of items we are prepared to sell. This will assume the Paks can come up with their own financing. The list will show our assessment of the levels of immediacy of types of weapons required to defend the northwest. *[portion marking not declassified]*

5. Other Pakistani items, including a response to Zia's letter to the President,<sup>4</sup> will be discussed at the PRC meeting on Pakistan to be held on 21 April, vice 18 April as originally scheduled. *[portion marking not declassified]*

6. *NIO/NESA Comments*: In spite of Dr. Brzezinski's comments on the importance of Pakistan to our policy in the region, I did not get the impression that anyone was prepared to take strong positions to ensure that Pakistan does not seek an accommodation with the Soviets. The 200 million dollars required to sustain debt rescheduling will either have to be found in the budget or Congress must be presented with the vital nature of the problem and grant an increase. We are pussy-footing around the Pak issue while other friends in the region, who are also debating the extent of US resolve, are waiting to see how we handle Pakistan. Can we really be giving billions to Israel, while potentially losing South Asia for want of 200 million? It seems we not only have some priorities wrong, but are subsidizing regional

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 426.

instability. I realize that a “good” budget and an election year go hand in hand, but we cannot survive as a nation in this rapidly changing world if every four years we forget about long term policy for a year. Pakistan is a very important case in point. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Robert C. Ames

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**437. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia  
(Ames) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

NFAC 2881–80

Washington, April 18, 1980

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting of 21 April 1980—Pakistan

1. *Action Requested*: None; the following is for your background in preparing for PRC meeting on Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. *Background*: It is our impression that there are differences between the NSC and State (and within State) over how to handle the Pakistanis. Part of the problem is that there are no good options at this point: the Zia government is alienated as a result of the last aid offer go-around; there is a perception that Congress will not go along with the level of aid offers that would entice the Paks; and there is no consensus on prioritizing our interests in the Pakistan problem as they relate to proliferation, India, China, the Arab States, etc. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. Within the State Department, those who favor trying to strengthen our ties with India as a counter to Soviet moves in Afghanistan are making life difficult for those advocating more forceful initiatives toward Pakistan. The mood in the NSC seems to have swung full circle from extreme annoyance with the Pak rejection of our first aid offer, to consideration of an Indian option, then back to how can we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 18, Folder 16: PRC Meetings—Pakistan. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 438.

re-embrace Pakistan. It is our impression that Brzezinski would now like to use a “successful” initiative with Pakistan to demonstrate US resolve. Even those in State favoring a resumption of a Pak-US dialogue want the effort to be cautious and low profile. *[portion marking not declassified]*

4. We suspect that you have been asked to open the meeting with an unusually broad intelligence assessment because the Agency has not been pulled into the “to-ing and fro-ing.” State probably believes that the facts will highlight Pakistan’s instability and thus the dangers of over-dramatizing our efforts. Indeed, the facts do seem to suggest that “splashy” achievements in strengthening bilateral ties are probably impossible. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Robert C. Ames<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *[name not declassified]* signed for Ames.

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#### 438. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 21, 1980, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Minutes—PRC Meeting on Pakistan (C)

##### PARTICIPANTS

*State*  
 Warren Christopher, Dep. Sec.  
 Harold Saunders, Ass’t. Sec.,  
     Near Eastern & South Asian  
     Affairs  
 Matthew Nimetz, Under Sec. for  
     Security Assistance, Science &  
     Technology  
 Arthur Hummel, Ambassador to  
     Pakistan

*ACDA*  
 Spurgeon Keeny, Dep.  
     Director  
 Dr. Robert Roch, Dep.  
     Ass’t. Dir. for Non-  
     Proliferation  
  
*JCS*  
 Lt. Gen. John Pustay

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 138: 4/21/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.



*Treasury*

Fred Bergsten, Ass't. Secr.  
Donald Templeman, Director,  
Office for Developing Nations  
and Finance

*Defense*

Ambassador Robert Komer, Under  
Secr. for Policy  
David McGiffert, Ass't. Secr.,  
Internat. Security Affairs

*OMB*

Dr. John White, Dep. Director  
Randy Jayne, Assoc. Dir. for Nat'l.  
Sec. & Internat. Affairs

*DCI*

Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director  
Robert Ames, NIO for Near  
East and South Asia

*IDCA*

Guy Erb, Deputy Director

*White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Ambassador Henry Owen

*NSC*

Thomas P. Thornton

The meeting opened with a briefing by Admiral Turner on the situation in Pakistan. He noted a substantial change in mood in the country—an abatement of fear of Soviet attack in the short-run and a growing desire to cooperate with India. He noted however that the Pakistanis feel isolated from their traditional friends because of the inadequate aid they have received. On balance they have time to weigh their options.

*Admiral Turner* continued on domestic matters, noting that President Zia looks to be in office for the foreseeable future but that he faces difficult problems in the long-term on both the political and economic fronts.

Overall the sense in Pakistan is one of political apathy and a sufficient fear of the outside threat that there is a reluctance to change leadership. Also there is no real competitor in sight.

*Admiral Turner* noted a new reality in Pakistani foreign politics—an unwillingness to antagonize either India or the Soviet Union, a desire to improve relations with India, and a seeking for support wherever available, especially among the non-aligned. Most Pakistanis oppose a rapprochement with the Soviets but the outcome of that debate is still undecided. It is difficult for the Pakistanis to meet the various demands that the Soviets are likely to put on them. Pakistan will, however, seek to improve relations with the Soviets.

With regard to the insurgents, *Admiral Turner* said the critical question would be the extent of Soviet success in the coming months in sealing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the Soviets are successful in doing this, then further Pakistani support to the insurgents would be seen as a direct affront to the Soviets and be extremely dangerous.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For a Special Analysis prepared in the CIA, April 22, entitled "Pakistan: The Afghanistan Debate," see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 256.

*Ambassador Hummel* expanded on this analysis by noting that some elements, already in sight, could change it. First, the Pakistanis are still unaware that we are not going to have any resources available for them until Fiscal Year 82. This will lead to a serious deterioration in our bilateral relations. They are also deeply concerned about the lack of Saudi and other Arab response.

If there is little assistance forthcoming to Pakistan, this will have negative implications for Zia's domestic position and also enhance the prospects of Soviet action against an apparently unsupported Pakistan. Also, of course, the Saudi and Chinese perceptions of US reliability will alter. *Ambassador Hummel* closed his remarks by flagging the importance of debt rescheduling to the Pakistanis.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* pointed out that Pakistan is important to the United States because of the support that it provides to the Afghan insurgents, its opposition to Soviet policies in Afghanistan, the desirability of access to Pakistani ports, and some nuclear hopes that we still have with regard to Pakistan. He added that an abandonment of relations with Pakistan would harm the United States. Therefore we should avoid an all-or-nothing approach and see how much of the relationship we can retain. He also noted that debt relief is their key concern and this should be our first matter of discussion.

With regard to debt relief, he said it is his personal opinion that the Executive Branch should concert with the Congress and only then approach the Pakistanis with the possibility that we may be able to do something. First we have to get the issues sorted out among ourselves.

*John White* asked whether debt relief or ESF would be better.

*Ambassador Hummel* said the Pakistani priorities were first, debt relief, second ESF, and third other foreign bilateral aid. The possibility of \$100 million for Fiscal Year 1981 is only marginally useful in our relations with them.

*Dr. Brzezinski* pointed out that he wanted to make some general comments since he had to leave the meeting early. He agreed that we should retain what leverage we can over Pakistan. We should move as best we can on the economic side. His mind is open as to whether we should consult Congress first or later; a delay of two weeks or so shouldn't make too much importance. He also thought we should proceed with the arms sales list which had, after all, been agreed upon at the previous SCC.<sup>3</sup>

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that Pakistan must realize that we have not cut off our relationship in the security area. Thus he would be opposed

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<sup>3</sup> The list was not found. See Document 436.

to creating any difficulty about selling M–60 tanks to Pakistan. The list which DOD has prepared shows what we are willing to do.

Turning to the draft letter to General Zia,<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski suggested it be changed along the following lines. First, it should be frank, not the formal kind of communication in the current draft. It should specifically raise the problem of public polemics (for instance Zia's comments about US assistance to the Afghans which he made in Salisbury).<sup>5</sup> We should not enclose a litany but a brief paragraph pointing out the problems this sort of rhetoric causes us with Congress and public opinion. Secondly, we should take credit for the fact that we have been helpful in getting other countries to assist Pakistan economically. Third, the letter should include a statement that we attach great importance to what happens to the Afghan resistance and note that the resistance forces require sustenance.

He then raised the possibility of Thornton and Peter Constable going to Pakistan to continue talks at a substantive but not high level. He said that this should be left to the decision of the PRC.

Overall he emphasized that we should show the Pakistanis that we are serious.

*Ambassador Hummel* pointed out that he had had no input to the list of military equipment that had been prepared, that he believed there should be more than a simple list. We should talk about the kinds of units and organization that the Pakistanis need for defense of the Northwest border; the paper that we give them should be much broader than a simple list. They expect help from us in their planning effort and the Defense Department should be able to construct a response at the military-to-military level.

*Under Secretary Komer* said that this would simply be an invitation for the Pakistanis to ask more than we can provide.

*Ambassador Hummel* replied that was of course the case but we had crossed that bridge some time ago when we agreed to send a military mission.

*Dr. Brzezinski* said we should transmit the list now and send the President's letter. We should also offer planning advice and assistance on how the Pakistanis could best organize themselves.

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<sup>4</sup> The draft letter was not found. For the final version, see Document 440.

<sup>5</sup> According to the *New York Times*, on April 17, Zia, while in Salisbury celebrating the establishment of Zimbabwe, said that the United States "should have played a much more significant role over the Soviet intervention, which I'm sorry to say it did not," and concluded: "On such occasions, practical steps are more significant than mere statements." ("Zia Assails U.S. on Afghan Stance," *New York Times*, April 18, 1980, p. A6)

*Ambassador Hummel* said we should first ask the Pakistanis when and how they want to continue the military dialogue. They will probably want to wait until after the Islamic Conference in Islamabad in May.

*Dr. Brzezinski* agreed that this sounded sensible but we should have the list ready if they want it right away.

*Assistant Secretary McGiffert* replied that we have already asked the Pakistanis about further consultations and they said no. We did not, however, get into the question of a list with them. There is no need for us to create a large appetite in Pakistan; what we offer can be related to a relatively limited threat. It can be done quickly and the list itself implies our view of their organizational requirement.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that we should go to the Pakistanis and offer the list to them at any time and also be prepared to go beyond and analyze their organizational requirements.

*Under Secretary Komer* said just simply send the list; it carries its own organizational implication.

*General Pustay* noted that there is a great lack of infrastructure in Pakistan and if we suggest further military consultations this will imply that we are ready to provide assistance in developing the infrastructure.

*Ambassador Hummel* noted that the Pakistanis already have a considerable appetite but they have no illusions about what they are going to be able to get from us in the way of assistance. He reiterated the need for an established military-to-military relationship that could survive political vicissitudes.

*Under Secretary Komer* said he thought that the Pakistanis still do have other illusions. The list is impressive and as far as organization for defense of the Northwest goes, the Pakistanis probably know more about that than we do.

*Ambassador Hummel* countered by noting that their planning is rudimentary and asked whether Komer suggested that we do nothing.

*McGiffert* said we could use the offer of a sales list to create an opportunity for further military-to-military contacts.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* summed up by saying we should agree to send a list on the Pakistani timetable and then ask if they want further analysis. But we have already done enough to discourage them.

*Dr. Brzezinski* said we had excessively discouraged them.

*Under Secretary Komer* said looking at the history of the relationship that the Pakistanis are always raising new expectations. Let's leave the initiative with them.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said we could make our approach in a low key and that would probably reduce the danger.

*Henry Owen* briefed the meeting on the status of the debt relief question, suggesting that we should defer any action until we have the first budget resolution in hand. We should not go to the President now.

*Guy Erb* pointed out that debt relief means an immediate outlay of dollars and that this is much more difficult than other forms of aid.

*John White* said that the situation in Congress is extremely confused and dangerous now and said that a decision on the first budget resolution was certainly more than a week away—perhaps as much as one or even two months. Even after the first budget resolution we might not know much more than we do now.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* asked whether we should just restrict ourselves to thinking about FY 1982.

*Henry Owen* said it would be cleaner to do so since getting anything for Fiscal 81 would be unlikely.

*John White* added that what he can see of 1982 will not be much better.

*Ambassador Hummel* said that 1982 assistance offers create a tactical problem. Zia will see this as an indication that we are committed to his overthrow and want to wait to deal with a successor government which might be more cooperative on nuclear matters.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* asked whether any money would be needed before 1982 for debt relief.

*Henry Owen* said that probably there would be no need for actual outlay of funds in FY 1981.

*Assistant Secretary Bergsten* said that he could see no need now for debt relief and could certainly not tell what the situation might be by Fiscal Year 1982. This would just look like a way of getting around restrictions on foreign aid. It would be impossible to reach an agreement on debt relief and then implement it some time after. The usual practice is to provide debt relief immediately once a settlement has been negotiated.

*Guy Erb* asked if there was a possibility of ESF in 1982.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* pointed out that the Pakistanis are less interested in ESF and in any event this would raise problems of getting around the Symington Amendment.

*John White* asked whether the Symington Amendment was also not a defacto barrier to rescheduling. (The question was not answered.)

*Randy Jayne* said he was afraid that if we went to Congress and talked about rescheduling in 1981 Congress would make its own judgment and allot the money to Pakistan leaving it up to us to find out how to find the money. We then might not be able to come to an agreement in that year and would then lose the money. This would be the worst of all possible worlds and there is no way of avoiding this danger through informal consultations.

*Under Secretary Nimetz* asked when the Pakistan Consortium would meet.

*Henry Owen* replied that the date was June 13. He summed up the discussion by pointing out that OMB, Treasury and others believe that debt relief in FY 1981 is not feasible and that we are not in a position to discuss the possibility for FY 1982.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said it was not clear that debt relief was unfeasible in 1981. We should not act now but we also should not raise the issue with the President until the budget situation is clarified.

*Guy Erb* asked Ambassador Hummel whether it was correct, as Hummel had said earlier, that the Pakistanis did not realize that there would be no funds available in FY 1981. (That question was not answered; later in a private conversation Hummel said that indeed the Pakistanis were not clear about this since their Embassy had not informed them adequately.)

*Under Secretary Nimetz* expressed his concern that what we were doing would look bad not just with the Pakistanis but also with the Saudis and others.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher*, turning to the question of a letter to Zia, said that the redraft should take Brzezinski's comments into account and asked whether there were other items that should be added.

*Spurgeon Keeny* asked whether we should not add something on the nuclear issue, especially as regards the possibility of transfer of technology to countries such as Libya.

*Assistant Secretary Saunders* said that our position had been made perfectly clear to the Pakistanis on this and we did not need to refer to it further.

*Assistant Secretary McGiffert* suggested we should say something to the Pakistanis about our concern at their rapprochement with the Soviets.

*Under Secretary Nimetz* said that the point that Brzezinski had made about support to the Afghans covered this matter adequately in a positive manner.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* said that a redraft could be circulated so that it can go to the President before the end of the week.

*Under Secretary Nimetz*, discussing IMET, said there was no possibility of finding funds in Fiscal 1980 or 1981. If we raise this hypothetical question with the Congress this would risk a confrontation which would be harmful for Pakistan. In any event the amount involved was very small.

*Assistant Secretary McGiffert* doubted that Congress was concerned so much about FMS credits as it is about IMET.

*Under Secretary Nimetz* said that was true but there was always the danger that somebody on one of the committees might make it a major issue.

*Ambassador Hummel* said that a modest IMET program is simply not worth the danger of a serious confrontation with Congress. The Pakistanis even now are buying whatever IMET they need.

*Assistant Secretary McGiffert* said that if that was the case he would yield to Ambassador Hummel's judgment.

*Ambassador Hummel* spoke in favor of selling M-60 tanks to the Pakistanis despite the problems this would cause with India.

*Under Secretary Komer* agreed with him and thought it wouldn't be too hard on the Indians. We could get the tanks to the Pakistanis in 1982 and perhaps earlier.

*Deputy Secretary Christopher* asked whether we should seek FY 1982 funds (ESF?) but added that it was probably premature to do so now.

*Assistant Secretary Saunders* suggested that we plug this into preliminary planning for FY 1982; there is no need to make a decision now.

*Under Secretary Nimetz* asked whether it would be advantageous to tell the Pakistanis of our plans.

*Ambassador Hummel* said that we should probably do so rather than appear to be giving a totally negative response on assistance to the Pakistanis. (S)

Thereupon the meeting closed at 11:30 a.m.

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#### 439. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, April 26, 1980, 0528Z

3912. Subject: (U) Tehran Rescue Mission—GOP Reaction.

1. (U) Official GOP reaction to abortive rescue attempt of hostages in Tehran<sup>2</sup> one of "shock and dismay". GOP spokesman called US action "adventurous" and "flagrant violation of international norms and law . . . which ended in disaster". Spokesman "deplored act which constituted serious violation of Iran's sovereignty."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800206-0349. Confidential; Niac Immediate. Sent for information to Karachi, Lahore, Moscow, Cairo, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> The failed attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Tehran, known as Operation Eagle Claw, was launched on April 24.



2. (U) The official reaction also contained the statement that abortive attempt could have “far reaching consequences for the peace and security of the region”. MFA spokesman praised the “responsible and statesmanlike reaction of the Iranian Foreign Minister who has counselled restraint and and moderation in the face of this grave provocation”.

3. (U) The spokesman reiterated Pakistan’s consistent policy of opposition to the use of force and intimidation in resolving the problem of the hostages. He said Pakistan “would stand by Iran in its struggle to defend its sovereignty and national honor.” The official statement closed by ridiculing “the false and mischievous speculations in certain foreign media that US aircraft had been launched from Pakistan. Any attempt to implicate Pakistan in any way whatsoever in the U.S. adventure should be treated with the contempt it deserves.”

4. (C) Comment: The strong GOP condemnation of the US “adventure” and its unequivocal rejection of any sympathy for, or involvement in, the operation underlines both the GOP’s continuing policy of avoiding antagonizing of Iran and also its unwillingness to articulate a balanced view of the hostage situation. The international “piracy” and violation of America’s rights and sovereignty—not to mention bases of accepted diplomatic practice—continue to be ignored in Pakistani official pronouncements on this issue.

**King**

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#### **440. Letter From President Carter to Pakistani President Zia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter following the visit of Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher.<sup>2</sup> I welcome the personal attention you have given US-Pakistan relations, and I hope that strengthened cooperation between our two nations will help to show the Soviet Union how seriously we view their ruthless and unprovoked aggression in Afghanistan.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Trips File, Box 151, [Vice President’s Trip To Yugoslavia for Tito’s Funeral, 5/6–8/1980]: Briefing Book on Bilateral Issues. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 426.



I was deeply impressed by the reports of my emissaries of your country's determination to counter the Soviet challenge. Your leadership at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in January was vital in putting the Islamic World on record condemning the Soviet seizure of a neighboring Muslim country.<sup>3</sup> I hope that Pakistan will exercise equally firm leadership at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in May to demonstrate that the Islamic world remains united in its condemnation of Soviet actions.

One particularly effective way to demonstrate opposition to the Soviet invasion is to boycott the Olympics, and I was pleased to learn privately of your Government's decision not to go to Moscow.<sup>4</sup> Making your position public before the beginning of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference would increase the likelihood that the moral weight of the Conference will remain behind the boycott.

The struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet occupation forces is one of the most stirring events of our time. I attach the greatest importance to this struggle and know that you share my admiration for the Mujahidin. Not only does their bravery deserve recognition, their ability to continue their resistance brings home the cost of aggression to the Soviets every day. Such resistance, therefore, is in the interest both of the Islamic world and of the democratic western countries.

The United States places a particular value on close consultations between our two Governments in these critical times. We are always ready to work with you to find mutually acceptable and effective means of dealing with the problems and concerns that we share. We would be glad to hold any further consultations that you think advisable and will also continue to discuss with our allies those matters which are of interest to you. As you know, those discussions have already helped to mobilize some assistance.

I had hoped that this letter could include word of a successful rescue of the hostages in Tehran.<sup>5</sup> Our attempt was a limited military action for that purpose, not an attack on Iran. Its failure has redoubled our determination to see the hostages freed. I hope you will continue to use your influence with the Iranian officials to promote a prompt resolution of this issue through peaceful and diplomatic means. This is not only a matter of humanity and justice, it is necessary for solving a problem that is dangerously distracting attention from the real issues confronting Southwest Asia.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 422.

<sup>4</sup> Pakistan did not attend the 1980 Summer Olympics.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 439.

In closing, Mr. President, let me thank you again for sharing your thoughts with me. It is important to share common plans and to air our differences in private correspondence or through diplomatic channels. Public criticism cannot promote our common objectives and will only make it more difficult to generate broad support for our mutual interests. I look forward to continuing our dialogue in the coming weeks and months.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**441. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Debt Rescheduling for Pakistan

Our response to Pakistan's long-standing request for external debt rescheduling has emerged as the critical short-term element in our continuing effort to build a cooperative relationship with Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> I believe that the time has come for us to make an exception to our normal debt rescheduling policy, permitting us to join in a multilateral rescheduling of Pakistan's debt contingent only on satisfactory economic reforms (and not on "imminent" or "emerging" default.)

This issue will be discussed at the meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium June 12. This memorandum sets forth our reasoning on this issue and presents options for dealing with its budgetary implications.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 85, Sensitive XX: 6/1-24/80. Secret. Sent to the President under cover of a June 6 memorandum from McIntyre and Owen; see Document 444.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4900 from Islamabad, May 21, Hummel appealed directly to Muskie to "suggest that we need to have a whole new look at our policies and actions in Pakistan, especially as they relate to the Afghan situation." Hummel stressed the importance of debt rescheduling, P.L. 480 assistance, and grants for the relief of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0461) Telegram 4900 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 274.

*US-Pakistan Relations:*

Our efforts to strengthen our relations with Pakistan got off to a shaky start when Pakistan turned down our initial offer of military and economic assistance. Since then, however, Pakistan has made clear that it does want our economic help, with debt rescheduling as its top priority. For our part, we have continued to enunciate a policy of seeking to strengthen the states in South and Southwest Asia in order to deter future Soviet adventurism.

Because of our budgetary austerity, you ruled out any additional FY 81 economic aid funds for Pakistan some months ago.<sup>3</sup> However, given our earlier offer and our continued emphasis on the importance of the regional countries, Pakistan clearly expects us to come up with some form of economic support, and others—Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia—will see our actions toward Pakistan as indicative of our seriousness about the area. Without either aid or debt rescheduling, the US will be a net recipient of funds from Pakistan in FY 81 (our \$40 million in PL 480 and estimated \$40 million in disbursements from old aid projects will be more than offset by the \$120 million Pakistan owes us). If we fail to provide any resources before FY 82, it would confirm Pakistan's disposition to doubt our commitment to their security. As a result, we could see a reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy, including a move toward some form of accommodation with the Afghan regime.

With aid ruled out, the only possibility we have for responding to Pakistan's economic needs before FY 82 is to make a limited exception to our debt rescheduling policy. We traditionally treat debt rescheduling as a measure designed solely to ensure repayment of international obligations. Our latest formulation of debt policy applicable to Pakistan stipulates that we would participate in a multilateral rescheduling in conjunction with an upper tranche IMF agreement if an "emerging default situation seems likely."

We cannot now predict that Pakistan faces default in the coming year. The Saudis and other Persian Gulf countries are likely to provide as much as \$1 billion in aid, but clearly expect that much of this will be offset by military purchases and in any event disbursements may be stretched out.

An exception to our normal debt relief policy under which we would agree to reschedule in conjunction with an IMF upper tranche agreement, without insisting on imminent default, would permit us to give some substance to our stated goal of providing support for Paki-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 432.

stan. Though it is unlikely to bring about a dramatic improvement, it could help slow the deterioration in US-Pakistan relations.

The other members of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium are willing to reschedule on the basis of an IMF upper tranche agreement. We are the only donor who remains firm on the default criterion. Pakistan knows that we are the lone hold-out, and an exception to our normal policy would bring our view into line with our allies'. We understand that the Germans may be considering rescheduling their debt bilaterally, even without USG agreement, so a change in US policy would avert an embarrassing break in Allied solidarity.

This exception to our policy would consequently be a significant demonstration to our allies and Japan, who have expressed their concern about debt relief for Pakistan, that we are prepared to back up in a concrete way the leadership we asserted earlier in responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, we would show the Saudis that we are willing to make extraordinary efforts to complement their stated intent to organize contributions to Pakistan from themselves and the Gulf states totalling perhaps \$1 billion.

It is possible that Pakistan would not meet our requirement for economic reforms, in which case there would be no rescheduling. If the GOP did work out an upper tranche IMF agreement, however, this would involve badly needed economic reforms. Without these, Pakistan and ultimately its creditors could be facing serious and even unmanageable deterioration in Pakistan's financial position in the next few years.

I recognize that there are real costs inherent in deviating from our standard debt rescheduling policy. The principal ones, as we see it, are that the use of debt relief to assist Pakistan will provoke Congressional efforts to limit further the ability of the Executive Branch to reschedule without appropriations, possible accusations from the Hill that we are trying to circumvent the Symington Amendment's aid ban, and the pressure we will face to provide similar treatment for other countries. I have examined these objections carefully and believe they are outweighed by overriding political considerations. The first two I believe can be contained by careful Congressional consultation, and the third by making it clear that our reasons for this unusual action toward Pakistan stem from unique political circumstances.

Our preliminary soundings on the Hill suggest that support for assistance to Pakistan remains strong. There is a reluctance to reschedule debt, but no actual opposition to this as a unique case. There is no enthusiasm, but general agreement that this is a sensible approach to maintaining an important relationship with Pakistan.

Debt rescheduling would involve postponing about \$70-110 million in budgetary receipts of which just under half consists of principle

repayments which would normally be credited to the international affairs function of the budget. In the past we have not made special provision in the budget for rescheduling. In this case, however, our determination to balance the budget, and the fact that Pakistan is not in a default situation make it necessary to deal with the budgetary effect.

We have considered and ruled out the option of looking for an offsetting cut in net outlays in the international affairs function. The budget for this function has been seriously cut by the Budget Committees, and the foreign policy costs of any further cuts would be higher than the costs of doing nothing for Pakistan.

I consequently recommend that we treat the loss of receipts due to rescheduling as a claim on the Reserve for Contingencies of the General Budget. The reserve now stands at \$500 million. This would be somewhat unusual, given the presumption in normal budget procedures that net outlays will be offset from within the same function of the budget. However, this is how we expect to handle our FY 81 rescheduling for Turkey (approximately \$250 million). This would permit us to provide some economic support promptly, reaping the maximum benefits of the policy exception we are recommending.

Some would agree to a policy change now but suggest that we work out some formula with Pakistan and the other creditors whereby most or all of the US participation would take place in FY 82 or thereafter. This would considerably reduce the benefits we would hope to gain from a change in policy. The Pakistanis and the other creditors would be annoyed that we would not be willing to participate in rescheduling for another 16 months. Moreover, it would not relieve Pakistan's FY 81 financial problems. It would also present technical difficulties with the other creditors, and would only postpone, but not ameliorate, any difficulties we may face on the Hill.

*Recommendation:*

That we make an exception for Pakistan to our debt rescheduling policy, and state our willingness to participate in a multilateral rescheduling in conjunction with an upper tranche IMF agreement. If you approve, we would treat the loss of receipts from a Pakistan rescheduling as a claim on the reserve for contingencies of the general budget.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Carter checked the Approve option, below which he initialed "J."

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**442. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

*Assistance to Pakistan:* Ambassador Hummel makes a "last-ditch appeal" to avoid the predictable damage to our interests if we fail to give the Paks the economic support they have requested and that we have urged others to give.<sup>2</sup> He notes that our plans for economic aid to Pakistan will be discussed publicly for the first time at an aid consortium meeting in Paris on June 12. Unless there are changes in our present position it will become known that Washington plans no economic assistance to Pakistan during the current fiscal year and none at all in FY 1981. In addition, there will be no perceptible movement on rescheduling Pak debts because of our hardline position on the subject. The damage of all of this, in Hummel's view, includes: giving the Soviets the wrong signal; dismay among our friends, including the Saudis; and sharp deterioration in U.S.-Pak bilateral relations.<sup>3</sup> (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 28, 6/1/80-6/8/80. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, J."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4961 from Islamabad, May 22, transmitted Hummel's appeal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097-0459) See also footnote 2, Document 441.

<sup>3</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Check with Ed & Jim—Advise what we can do, J." In a June 3 memorandum to Muskie and McIntyre, Brzezinski wrote: "the President wishes, on an urgent basis, a recommendation on our plans for economic assistance to Pakistan in the current fiscal year and beyond." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800089-2098) An unknown hand wrote "O.B.E." at the top of Brzezinski's memorandum and referred to Muskie's June 2 memorandum to Carter; see Document 441.

**443. White House Situation Room Checklist<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 3, 1980

1. *Congressman Wolff's Meeting with President Zia*: In a meeting with Congressman Wolff's delegation, President Zia gave his assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan and urged a "policy of patience" for the U.S. in dealing with Iran's holding of our hostages. Responding to Wolff's question, Zia indicated that a "major positive change" in the Afghan situation was the active role Iran was now playing, particularly at the recent Islamic conference.<sup>2</sup> Zia expressed regret of his inability to "convince the U.S. that Afghanistan should be the top priority", even while our hostages continue to be held. While recognizing the limited success of the Olympic boycott and trade restrictions in response to the Soviet invasion, Zia stressed the need for the Afghan "freedom fighters" to have access to modern weapons. Without such weapons the rebel resistance will collapse in 4 to 5 months as the U.S. is perceived as incapable of action due to the hostage situation and our upcoming elections. Zia indicated to the delegation that "he broke with Dr. Brzezinski" over the issue of arming and supporting the Afghan rebels.<sup>3</sup> Though willing to provide a conduit for military aid to the Afghan resistance, Pakistan required in return a U.S. security guarantee, a commitment the \$200 million military assistance offer clearly did not fulfill. Zia continued that if U.S. aid levels matched that of the Soviet assistance supplied to Afghanistan, Pakistan would provide the necessary support to the Afghan resistance and be willing to risk a Soviet attack for their efforts. Zia advised that while the U.S. and Pakistan "have our differences," he desired improved relations and was gratified to see the U.S. increase its defense spending and reassert itself in the world. On the hostages in Iran, Zia advised that the U.S. should let the issue subside from public view since the new assembly may provide a mechanism to resolve the crisis and any threat

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 28, 6/1/80–6/8/80. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right-hand corner of the page, Carter wrote: "Zbig, C."

<sup>2</sup> The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad May 17–22.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 5311 from Islamabad, June 2, the Embassy reported Congressmen Wolff and Nolan's June 1 meeting with Zia: "When Cong. Nolan noted that the rebels ('freedom fighters,' Zia admonished) we met today wanted arms not tents and blankets, Zia replied that this was the issue over which 'we broke with Dr. Brzezinski' when he advocated arming the Afghans. Zia, invoking the Viet Nam analogy, said that Pakistan was willing to be the Hanoi for the freedom fighters, i.e., source of support and refuge. The Chinese told him they quietly supplied more than \$20 billion to North Viet Nam during the war; the Soviets did much more.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800270–0012)

or use of force would be counterproductive. (Islamabad 5311, PSN 56785, 56791)<sup>4</sup> (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3 above.

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**444. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs (Owen) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

Debt Rescheduling for Pakistan (U)

Secretary Muskie seeks your approval of a US offer, in concert with other western creditors, to reschedule \$70–\$100 million of Pakistan's debts to US Government agencies that will fall due in FY 1981, subject to Pakistan's agreement with the IMF on a stabilization program. His memorandum (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> asks you to agree to waive, on political and security grounds, our usual requirement that rescheduling be granted only as necessary to avert imminent default. (S)

Secretary Miller states that he will support the proposed exception to our debt rescheduling policy "provided that we obtain express Congressional concurrence for this approach and that we hold firm on the need for a meaningful IMF program." (Tab B)<sup>3</sup> (S)

Your decisions are needed to guide the US representative at the annual meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium on June 12. (U)

*Background*

The agencies concerned have been reviewing these issues since last winter. They deferred making recommendations to you until the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 85, Sensitive XX: 6/1–24/80. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 441.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached.



Congress clarified how your latitude to grant debt relief would be affected by the first budget resolution for FY 1981. (S)

State argues that unique political and budgetary factors require the United States to make an exception in this case to one of its two basic conditions for debt relief, i.e., that rescheduling is necessary to avert imminent default. State contends that the United States, having taken the lead internationally in promoting increased aid to Pakistan in response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and having subsequently been unable to provide increased US aid, cannot continue to be the lone holdout against debt relief among the major creditors without confirming Pakistani inferences of US political duplicity. Pakistan believes US resistance to rescheduling is blocking over \$200 million in debt relief by the western “club” of creditors. Zbig supports State’s position in this respect.<sup>4</sup> (S)

While noting State’s case that US participation in debt relief for Pakistan “could help slow the deterioration in US-Pakistan relations,” other agencies have raised these issues:

1. Inasmuch as many developing nations can contend that they face serious balance of payments problems next year, will the waiver of the “imminent default” test for Pakistan expose the United States to wholesale demands for debt relief with long-term budgetary consequences? (S)

Congressional advocates of this test will require assurances that a dangerous precedent is not being set. State and NSC staff believe that a precedent can be avoided on the basis of Pakistan’s unusual circumstances; OMB and Treasury are skeptical. OMB and Treasury believe that State’s case for an exception is, in fact, a better argument for politically determined new aid to Pakistan, via reprogramming of ESF money or a supplemental request, than it is for debt relief. IDCA thinks that if an exception must be made for political security reasons, it should be limited clearly to an FY 1981 international response to a security emergency. (S)

2. Will the Congress retaliate by cutting foreign aid, or by tightening restrictions on the President’s latitude to accord debt relief, or by making debt relief subject to restrictive provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act? (S)

Secretary Muskie believes that these concerns can be mitigated by careful Congressional consultation. State has consulted a dozen members of Congress, mostly Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee members, and reports that all favored the proposed debt rescheduling. More extensive consultation with Banking and Appropri-

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 445.

ations Committee members is required. In addition, any draft agreement must be submitted to four committees of Congress at least 30 days before it is to take effect. (S)

3. Where will the money come from? (U)

A rescheduling will increase net budget outlays by reducing scheduled receipts. Secretary Muskie is concerned that Congress might not provide the increase in budget ceilings necessary to accommodate the rescheduling, thereby forcing reductions in other programs, most likely in International Affairs. We would try to minimize this danger but cannot wholly preclude it. No agency advocates a supplemental request for additional ESF funds in view of the negligible probability of obtaining budget ceiling relief and additional appropriations. (S)

The US budgetary impact and timing of a Pakistan debt rescheduling are highly uncertain. All agencies agree, as do the other major creditor governments, that debt rescheduling must be conditioned on the debtor government's executing an economic stabilization agreement with the IMF which makes it eligible for upper tranche IMF drawings. The Government of Pakistan has shown no appetite for the economic reforms that would be IMF conditions for such an agreement. Therefore, a multilateral rescheduling agreement is not foreseen in the near future and may never be consummated. (S)

4. Can our political objective and budgetary constraints be reconciled by deferring the application of US debt relief to FY 1982? (U)

This would require negotiating special treatment for the United States in the multilateral debt rescheduling group. State dismisses this option as "annoying" to both the Pakistanis and our allies. It also would weaken the justification of a policy exception for Pakistan based on an immediate security crisis. (S)

*Options:*

I. (Policy)

A. Waive the "imminent default" condition, subject to satisfactory Congressional consultations. (State, Brzezinski, and Owen)<sup>5</sup>

B. *Alternatively*, waive the "imminent default" condition, subject to express concurrence by the Congress. (Treasury favors; others oppose.)

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<sup>5</sup> Carter checked the Approve option under Option A. At the bottom of the last page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "a) This is very important. b) Congress has slashed foreign aid. This will substitute for some of it. c) Ed & Bill must do extensive consultation—without delay. J." In a June 9 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Muskie, Miller, and McIntyre of Carter's decision. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 85, Sensitive XX: 6/1-24/80)

C. *Alternatively*, reaffirm existing US policy, conditioning debt rescheduling on imminent default. Your adoption of this option would in present circumstances mean rejection of debt relief for Pakistan. (OMB)

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**445. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Pakistan Debt Relief (U)

Despite the very difficult points raised in the McIntyre/Owen memo,<sup>2</sup> I strongly concur in Secretary Muskie's recommendation for debt relief to Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> His argumentation is compelling from the foreign policy and security points of view. Quite simply, there is nothing else left for Pakistan in our bag, until 1982 at the earliest. We have dunned the Saudis, Europeans and Japanese and it would be incredible for us to do nothing for the next sixteen months. (C)

The Muskie memo is realistic in saying that this action will not buy us much with Pakistan. Doing this minimum is, however, essential if we are going to at least stem the downward trend in our relationship. In addition, it is increasingly clear that we cannot expect continued Pakistani cooperation on issues of importance to us, especially clandestine support for the Afghan freedom fighters, unless there is a tangible sign of our support for Pakistani concerns. In effect, unless we are prepared to do at least this much, we can write off any effort to bog the Soviets down in Afghanistan. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 85, Sensitive XX: 6/1–24/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, J."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 444.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 441.

#### 446. Editorial Note

On June 11, 1980, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner discussed with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski a Pakistani request for SA-7s and RPG-7s. Turner informed Brzezinski that, as soon as details were addressed with the Department of Defense, "the DDCI would come to him with a memo proposing an SCC meeting to get a policy ruling on whether we wanted to support the Paks in one way or another. To get that ruling we would have to indicate the legal and other difficulties in going either the SA-7/RPG route or the Redeye/Dragon route. The former could be done on a clandestine basis; the latter would be done on an FMS basis and would have to be overt." (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 43: DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron meetings January–December 1980) Pakistan's initial request for arms was not found, but Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel discussed it in a June 30 message; see Document 447.

Later on June 11, after meeting with Brzezinski, Turner reported to President Jimmy Carter the Pakistani request for "some weapons for their own use in the border area" near Afghanistan. Turner continued: "A comment was made that they had probably been siphoning off all along. I said that was certainly possible, but the fact that they had come and asked us for some now would indicate they were being reasonably aboveboard." Turner offered his opinion that Pakistan's request was "perhaps an attempt to determine how serious we were about supporting them after all the confusion over the \$400 million of aid; they were now trying to see through the clandestine side whether they could tell whether we were serious or not." (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 49: DCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Presidential Briefings January–December 1980)

During a June 17 conversation, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci informed Brzezinski: "I could see only two ways of resolving the question of SA-7's for Pakistan: FMS or a CA finding. We both agreed that a Finding was probably the best route, but he said it could not be signed until the President returned. I did get his concurrence to go ahead with a SCC(I) meeting under Aaron's chairmanship to thrash out the policy issue and get SCC approval." (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 43:

DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron meetings January–December 1980) Regarding Carlucci's reference to President Carter's absence from the White House, Carter left for Camp David at 2:02 p.m. on June 14, departed Camp David the same day for Spruce Creek, Pennsylvania, returned to Camp David on June 15, and returned to the White House at 2:36 p.m. on June 16. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

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**447. Message From the Embassy in Pakistan to the National Security Council and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, June 30, 1980, 1400Z

For: Brzezinski and UnderSecy of State Newsom.

From: Amb Hummel.

1. Summary: This message is designed (a) to stimulate longer-range thinking about a contingency I think likely—that the Sovs will later this summer begin armed attacks into Pakistan; (b) to solicit USG instructions to me on the subject of preparing Pakistan to repel such attacks and (c) to lead to a dialogue with Pres Zia on this subject. End summary.

2. I assign a somewhat higher probability than do others to the likelihood of Soviet attacks across the border into Pakistan, after the Olympics are over.<sup>2</sup> I see the Soviets as being completely incapable as of now of making any progress toward their goals in Afghanistan, and because they will not give up in defeat, they are very likely to escalate their pressures.

3. For me, the basic Soviet goal is not so much propping up Babrak, or dampening the insurgency, but is far more basic and ambitious—the remaking, over a number of years, of all the institutions in Afghanistan so that Afghanistan is more than just a Finland but rather is indistinguishable from other SSR's. I think they came in December thinking they could provide basic security so that the party, the Afghan army, the civil service, the economy, and the religious infrastructure

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Privacy Channels In/Out, Box 128, 5–6/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent via Privacy Channels.

<sup>2</sup> The closing ceremony of the 1980 Summer Olympics, held in Moscow, was on August 3.

could over time all be re-built in a socialist mode. They assumed difficulties but nothing of the present magnitude of internal resistance and external pressures.

4. Thus the Sovs must be deeply discouraged, because they must realize that it is now impossible to achieve even minimal progress toward rebuilding a new and viable Afghan polity, given the hatreds and tensions endemic in that society, added to which is the new anti-Soviet fervor displayed in cities and countryside alike. I do not believe any Soviet planner can realistically see any way to begin reviving the Khalq-Parcham Party, the army, or any other Afghan institution.

5. Therefore, I rate as fairly high the possibility that the Sovs will seek to break this downward trend by lashing out at visible sources of external support—i.e., Iran, or more likely Pakistan. Soviet motives will likely be a combination of (a) desire to curtail the insurgents' cross-border activities; (b) an expectation of destabilizing Pakistan, perhaps to the point where the Pakistan Peoples Party (the President of which has already announced [her] desire to accommodate to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan) can succeed a Zia government that has demonstrated its inability to defend the country; and/or (c) Soviet hopes for the additional bonus of presenting the USG with a very serious dilemma—whether to offer to deploy US forces to Pakistan with the attendant risk of direct US-Soviet combat, or to be seen by our allies as being unable to give meaningful substance to our assurances that we will resist the Sovs and defend countries that come under attack by them.

6. But the exact degree of probability of this scenario is not my central point. Even if higher-level USG estimates should differ from mine, all should agree there is a measurable possibility, that is far from zero, that we may see Soviet intrusions into Pakistan, and we should be making plans for that contingency, even if some may think it less than likely.

7. Pres Zia has passed word [*less than 1 line not declassified*]<sup>3</sup> that he needs some immediate help for his own forces because of his concerns which seem similar to mine, about a more aggressive Soviet posture later this year. He has pointed out that time may be short, if as we fear the Sovs begin to move in August after the Olympics are over. He has asked specifically for SA-7's and RPG-7's for his own army to upgrade his ability to defend against, and to repel, "hot pursuit" raids, or perhaps temporary lodgment of Sov forces in some border areas of Pakistan.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

8. It is not going to be useful to engage at this juncture in piecemeal or incremental decision-making. No “one-time exception” to our present policies of arming Afghan rebels only (and not GOP forces) is going to serve. We should look at longer-term needs and act accordingly. For one thing, there is no inherent need to confine ourselves to Soviet-origin equipment if Pak forces are to be the recipient. And SA-7’s seem extremely difficult (and perhaps impossible) to acquire in the numbers that would be needed for a meaningful upgrading of the GOP’s defense forces on the border. Logically, US or European origin weapons would be even better, as Zia has said, and preferably in magnitudes that will produce a meaningful, and not just a cosmetic, upgrading of GOP capabilities. Any Pak Govt, Zia’s or a successor’s, would be severely undermined by a demonstration that it cannot take strong and effective action against such Soviet aggression; likewise, Pakistan and Saudi, and PRC, and NATO, and Thai confidence in the USG would plummet if our responses to this danger are seen as feeble, or late. A modest number of SA-7’s, RPG’s and other new weapons for the Pak Army, even if we could find them, will not materially affect Pakistan’s abilities to defend itself at this low end of the escalatory spectrum. We should think in broader, more realistic terms if we want insurance against an unstable situation that the Soviets would take further advantage of.

9. Ideally, we should wait until the Saudis, Kuwaitis, etc, produce funds with which the Paks could purchase US weapons, and then we would make cash sales with the usual congressional consultations. It does not appear that we have the time for this. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* fund the weapons on a grant basis would, I presume, not violate the Symington Amendment’s prohibition against using Foreign Assistance Act funds in Pakistan, but I have no way of knowing whether *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the necessary congressional consultations prior to their use would present an obstacle in terms of the spirit of Symington. In any event, there is a strong case for moving as quickly as we can, by whatever means are necessary.

10. Whatever we furnish to the GOP would, I believe, be used prudently on the Afghan [garble—borders?]; there is no streak of adventurism in the Pak military that might trigger an unnecessary conflict with the USSR. However, I doubt that we could obtain cast-iron assurances from the Paks that under no circumstances would our weapons ever appear on the Indian front; we could perhaps get agreement that they would be used for defense against India only in the event of a coordinated Indian-Soviet attack from both fronts (the Paks think this likely but we do not) but defining that contingency would likely leave loopholes.

11. As can be seen, this message is designed to open a discussion with Washington decision-makers—a discussion that should not be

too lengthy in view of the short time for action. I would hope that a further step in the not distant future would be for me to get instructions with which I could start a direct dialogue with Pres Zia on these matters. Dept will know that I have made sure, directly with Zia as well as indirectly [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Zia knows that I am fully informed of all aspects [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with the GOP. Zia has let me know that he does not want me to discuss these matters with any MFA officials, nor do I want to. If I get appropriate Wash instructions, I could arrange a special meeting with Zia, without MFA presence, for discussion of his latest request for SA-7's and RPG's as well as broader discussions of the parameters of possible USG inputs, and whatever stipulations we would have to make about use and deployment of the weapons.

Hummel

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**448. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Afghan Covert Action Program

I would like to report to the SCC on my recent discussions on the Afghan covert action program with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Saudi Arabia.<sup>2</sup> [*less than 1 line not declassified*] gave an unequivocal endorsement to continued Saudi participation in this program, including any expansion of it that appeared feasible. He clearly is anxious to provide everything that we possibly can to the cause of the Afghan insurgents. There are three aspects of the program which require SCC attention:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000013, Box 4, SCC Reports 1979–1980, SCC Meeting Book 27, July 7, 1980. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Turner visited Jidda on June 22. He reported on his trip to Saudi Arabia, among other countries, in a July 7 memorandum to Carter. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, 80 Saudi Arabia) For the portion of the memorandum on his talks in Saudi Arabia, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 297.



a. The Pakistanis have indicated to us a capability and willingness to increase the flow of arms to the Afghan insurgents. I propose that we plan on a total program of \$50 million rather than \$30 million as has previously been planned. This amount would be divided equally [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Funds for our portion would be made available from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] but this may require another 1981 supplemental [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

b. The Pakistanis have approached us to provide a limited number of SA-7s and RPG-7s for their own defensive use in the border areas. This is a reasonable and logical item of support for our program to the Afghan insurgents [*3 lines not declassified*]. This program could cost up to \$6 million over some period of time. Availability of the SA-7s is such, however, that it will take some time to provide that much support. I propose asking the Saudis to fund this program jointly. (Attached is a formal SCC proposal for this aspect of the program.)

c. The Pakistanis have approached the Saudis to provide \$2 million to support the families of Mujaheddin now resident in Pakistan. The point here is that some of the fighters cannot go off to Afghanistan because they must work to support their families. The Saudis feel very strongly that this portion of the program is at least as important as the provision of the arms themselves. They propose to fund it separately. I recommend we offer to fund it jointly and merge it with the other two programs above. This would help to continue the fine team effort we have had with the Saudis thus far. It would also ensure against the Pakistanis in any way playing one of us and one of our programs against the other. (S)

Stansfield Turner<sup>3</sup>

## Attachment

### Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Members of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

#### SUBJECT

Covert Action Options for Pakistan

1. *INITIATIVE*: The initiative for this proposal originates within CIA in response to a Pakistani request. It arises from Pakistani concern about future Soviet incursions into Pakistan in retaliation for Pakistani support to the Afghan insurgents.

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<sup>3</sup> Turner signed "Stan Turner" above this typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A stamped date reads: "30 Jun 1980."

2. *ISSUE FOR DECISION*: The issue for decision is whether CIA should supply Pakistan with weapons to counter possible [*less than 1 line not declassified*] incursions into Pakistan. Since the Presidential Finding of 28 December 1979,<sup>5</sup> [*1 line not declassified*] approximately \$10 million worth of weapons and materiel to the Afghan insurgents. An additional \$20 million worth of equipment will have been distributed by September 1980. There is good evidence that this materiel is being effectively used by the insurgents.

The Pakistanis are concerned about [*less than 1 line not declassified*] incursions into Pakistan in retaliation for this aid program. [*4 lines not declassified*] The Pakistanis are not intimidated by the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] threat but wish to be prepared to meet it. To this end they have asked for assistance in acquiring for their own purposes some of the types of anti-armor and anti-air weaponry which have been passed to the Afghan insurgents. The Pakistanis intend to place these weapons along the Afghanistan border at spots most vulnerable [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

3. *ACTION OPTIONS*: Our first preference is to supply the Pakistanis with Soviet-made weapons. If these are not available from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the world arms market, we would then supply them with weapons of some other country. Lastly, we would provide U.S. weapons if necessary. We are requesting authority to acquire and deliver the weapons, either unilaterally, or through other countries, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and to offer procurement advice if the Pakistanis wish to act on their own or through other countries. This is in order to retain as much flexibility as possible in terms of channels, funding, and advice in supplying the weapons. These weapons would be deployed in Pakistan for defensive purposes only.

We are making one proposal containing three aspects:

A. Provide Pakistan with about 100 Soviet SA-7 Missiles and 20 Launchers and 100 Soviet RPG-7 Anti-armor launchers and appropriate ammunition.

B. To the extent that Soviet weapons are not available, provide Pakistan with foreign manufactured weapons of similar capability.

C. To the extent that neither Soviet nor equivalent foreign weapons are obtainable, provide Pakistan with U.S.-manufactured weapons with similar capabilities to the SA-7 and RPG-7, such as Redeye missiles and Dragon Anti-armor weapons.

RISK: Moderate

COST: \$6 million

4. *COMMENTS*: The Pakistanis believe that the target of Soviet incursions would be Afghan refugee camps, Pakistani frontier forces

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 428.

outposts and Pakistan SIGINT installations. This is where they would deploy these weapons for defensive purposes.

Consideration has been given to supplying Pakistan through the Defense Department's Foreign Military Sales Program, but the Pakistanis do not want to overtly purchase this material because of [1 line not declassified] and probable adverse domestic Pakistan reaction. (This paper does not consider possible overt options which would in any event be complicated by the Symington Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act.) Having turned down a \$400 million U.S. offer for the putative reason that it was inadequate in the face of the Soviet threat, President Zia will find it difficult or impossible to publicly justify a small purchase which could generate the same threat. Zia is aware of and endorses this request with the understanding that the matter be handled via intelligence channels as part of the Afghan support program and not as open U.S. aid which would be publicly announced. Ambassador Hummel supports this proposal as a one-time effort to assist the Pakistanis in defending the border. He also noted the importance of keeping the matter secret.

5. *FINDING*: The option outlined above requires a Presidential Finding, and will require reporting to Congressional Oversight Committees—in accordance with Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. A draft Presidential Finding is attached. Also attached is a Scope Paper to indicate what CIA will do if the activity is approved.<sup>6</sup>

6. *SOURCE OF FUNDS*: Saudi Arabia will contribute half the cost of these weapons (\$3 million) as part of their matching funds program for Afghan support. No money is in the Agency budget for this purpose. If this program is approved [1 line not declassified].

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<sup>6</sup> Both are attached but not printed.

#### 449. Minutes of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 7, 1980, 10–10:30 a.m.

##### SUBJECT

Minutes: SCC Meeting on Pakistan

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### STATE

David Newsom, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of  
Intelligence and Research

Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for Near Eastern-  
South Asian Affairs

###### DEFENSE

Robert W. Komer, Under  
Secretary for Policy Affairs

Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under  
Secretary for Policy Matters

###### JUSTICE

Judge Charles Renfrew, Deputy  
Attorney General

###### JCS

Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass't. to the  
Chairman

###### DCI

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director  
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director  
Charles Cogan, Chief, Near  
Eastern Division

###### OMB

John White, Deputy Director

###### WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

###### NSC

Thomas Thornton

*Brzezinski:* Pointed out that there were three items on the agenda. The first is an increase from \$30 million to \$50 million in support for the Afghan insurgents. The second is a Finding to permit covert supply of military equipment to Pakistan. The third is a request for \$2 million for refugee support. He asked Adm. Turner to introduce the first item.

*Turner:* Up until now the opportunities of sending materials to the Afghan insurgents has been limited by pipeline restrictions in Pakistan. Now, however, the Pakistanis say that these restrictions are overcome and they want to increase the flow. The Saudis also want to maximize our efforts. I am concerned that the Soviets may be building up for a major offensive following the Olympics and the insurgents will need an increase in support in late August and early September. Therefore we should act now.

*Newsom:* State Department agrees.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 103, SCC: (I) Pakistan 7/7/80: 7/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the Summary of Conclusions of this meeting, identified as a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 298.

*Brzezinski:* Is there no objection (there was none). Therefore we shall recommend unanimously to the President that we favor this first item. Will you please now go on to the second?

*Turner:* This represents an approach by General Akhtar, but he assures me that Zia is definitely behind it. The idea is to strengthen the Pakistani sense of assurance and to ensure that they continue the kinds of programs we have just been discussing. We and the Pakistanis have reached agreement on the numbers involved.

The Pakistanis do not want this openly; they prefer on a covert basis. I cannot guarantee that they will not be coming back to us for more. Our lawyers believe that it is legal for us to do this.

*Komer:* Are the SA-7s available?

*Turner:* No, [less than 1 line not declassified].

*Brzezinski:* Why can they simply not buy them? They are getting money from the Saudis.

*Turner:* It is very hard to find SA-7s.

*Carlucci:* The Pakistanis see this as an integral part of our cooperative program with them in supporting the insurgency.

*Brzezinski:* I find that we are crossing a very dubious boundary line here on the political side. Not much money is involved. They have turned down our military aid; are they trying by this means to accomplish something that is substantively significant? Are they perhaps seeking an increase in our political commitment? I have recommended to State that we have a PRC on Pakistan in light of the cable from Ambassador Hummel.<sup>2</sup> Could we not defer this question until then? (Not, of course, the covert aspect which has to be handled in an SCC, but the issue of the overall military relationship.) This is after all a qualitatively different type of political decision that we would be making.

*Komer:* This all will not help the Pakistanis very much militarily. In addition their troops are not used to this kind of equipment. If we go ahead for this, does it not give them a signal for further expansion?

*Brzezinski:* It certainly gives them some kind of a signal. We should weigh the political component very carefully. Therefore I am very uneasy about this. The Pakistanis have the money to buy this equipment and if necessary we could help them locate it.

*Turner:* This is part of the decision we made to help the Afghan insurgents. This will keep the Pakistanis on board; it is what they say they need.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 447.

*Brzezinski:* But we can sell equipment to them or help them find it. This operation would in all likelihood leak and could prejudice their program. I would emphasize that this is a political decision.

*Aaron:* What is the difference between supplying this covertly and openly? Why do they want it covertly?

*Newsom:* We have no objection to sending in Soviet equipment but we do not believe there is a fine line between what is used in the camps and by the insurgents in Afghanistan. We would have no way of knowing what crossed the frontier. Therefore we do not want to provide US equipment in a covert operation.

*Carlucci:* The Pakistanis see this as one overall operation and are skimming some off of the top. We are proposing, in effect, a two-to-one ratio.

*Turner:* Should we say in the Finding<sup>3</sup> that we will provide Soviet or other equipment?

*Newsom:* The State Department position is that there should be no weapons involved that are of US-origin.

*Turner:* Then we can delete the "or US" in the Finding.

*Komer:* Where are the SA-7s? [4 lines not declassified]

*Brzezinski:* Let's get a proposal on the table.

*Aaron:* How about having the Chinese do it? They need SA-7s themselves and do not make them.

*Brzezinski:* Let's look into that also.

*Turner:* [2 paragraphs (5 lines) not declassified]

*Murphy:* [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

*Aaron:* Before we leave this issue are we all comfortable on the legal side?

*Turner:* Our lawyers have looked into it and said it is legal.

*Newsom:* We agree, and our Congressional liaison people say that it would also be feasible.

*Turner:* Taking up the third item, help for the refugee families, we recognize that this is peanuts but the Saudis are very anxious that we follow this. They see Muslims being killed in Afghanistan and feel that we should be doing more about it. By cooperating in this program we can keep our actions synchronized with the Saudis.

*Brzezinski:* This is certainly a minimal thing, apparently a form of Baksheesh. Let's go ahead and do it.

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<sup>3</sup> A draft of the Finding was attached to the undated memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for members of the Special Coordination Committee; see the attachment to Document 448. For the final text, see Document 450.

*Newsom:* I am concerned that this is introducing a new dimension into the relationship. What will the long term total be?

*Carlucci:* I don't see that this is really much different from regular refugee relief.

*Newsom:* We think that the \$1 million figure for this is simply unrealistic.

*Brzezinski:* Let us register then that this is only a one-time operation and is meant as a goodwill gesture. It should not be the opening of a new program.

*Spiers:* Once you start a program like this, it is hard to stop.

*Aaron:* I think it would be easier to stop it right now before it starts.

*Brzezinski:* Well then, let's turn this request down.

*Cogan:* This is really a matter of principle for the Saudis and we should go ahead.

*Carlucci:* The Saudis feel that we just are not paying attention to the Muslims.

*Constable:* We are putting some \$50 million into refugee relief.

*Turner:* But this would be tailored specifically to help the fighters. I have no doubt that it will grow; we will just have to keep it in bounds.

*Carlucci:* [1 line not declassified]

*Turner:* (After some general discussion showing unease.) Let me simply withdraw this item. I will use my own good judgment in how I expend some funds that are already authorized.

*Renfrew:* As I look at the Finding, must we use the word "lethal" twice in it?

*Brzezinski:* Why don't we just drop the word "lethal" in its second usage?

*White:* No. It is necessary for it conveys a very special meaning.

*Brzezinski:* Very well then. Let us close. We will expect the proposal with regard to the SA-7s in one week.

Thereupon the meeting closed at 10:25 a.m.

**450. Presidential Finding<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 8, 1980

*Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection*

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

SCOPE  
Pakistan

DESCRIPTION  
Provide directly to the Government of Pakistan, or via third countries, lethal military equipment of Soviet or other foreign manufacture for defensive purposes along the Afghan border. As necessary, provide cash, procurement advice and weapons training. Encourage other countries to discreetly supply funds or lethal military equipment directly to Pakistan.

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 103, SCC: (I) Pakistan 7/7/80: 7/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Attached as Tab A to the Summary of Conclusions of the July 7 SCC (I) meeting, during which the proposed covert action was "unanimously supported, albeit with qualifications." See footnote 1, Document 449.



**451. Report Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1980

*Evening Reading Item*

The PRC met today to discuss the policy implications of a possible increase in Soviet pressure on Pakistan, including a direct attack.<sup>2</sup> The CIA estimates that while a direct Soviet attack cannot be excluded as a possibility, it is unlikely, given Soviet concerns with detente, Muslim attitudes and the danger of provoking closer US involvement with Pakistan. The Soviets will, however, put increasing pressure on Pakistan. (S)

Rather than move directly to specific issues for decision, Ed Muskie used this session for a broad exploration of the implications of the problem, leaving the specifics for a second meeting next week. A number of extremely interesting issues were developed, notably:

—What steps can we take that will both signal our concern to the Soviets and encourage the Pakistanis to continue their support of the insurgents?

—The possible need to respond to a Soviet thrust against Pakistan; is the US willing and able to respond militarily?

—To what extent does our aid to the Afghan insurgents contribute to an escalation of Soviet pressure on Pakistan which, in turn, could draw us in?

—Should we begin to approach Congress now to educate them on the possible choices before us? How should we proceed on the Symington Amendment? (S)

Defense will be preparing some specific arms packages that we might need to supply to Pakistan in an emergency; we will discuss that and other issues when the PRC reconvenes early next week. (S)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/16/80–7/22/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the report. Thornton sent the report to Brzezinski under a July 17 covering memorandum, in which he reported that "there would be no Summary of Conclusions at this point." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 103, PRC: Pakistan 7/17/80: 7/80)

<sup>2</sup> For the minutes of the meeting and Thornton's July 21 memorandum on the proceedings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 303 and 304.

## 452. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 22, 1980, 10:30 a.m.–noon

### SUBJECT

Minutes—PRC Meeting on Pakistan

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Edmund Muskie  
Warren Christopher, Deputy  
Secretary

Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary  
for Near Eastern & South  
Asian Affairs

#### *Defense*

Ambassador Robert Komer, Under  
Secretary for Policy  
Ambassador Robert Pelletreau,  
Deputy Ass't. Secretary for  
Near Eastern, African, &  
South Asian Affairs

#### *Office of Management and Budget*

John White, Assistant Director  
Ed Sanders, Associate Director for  
International Affairs

#### *United Nations*

Ambassador William  
Vandenheuevel, Deputy U.S.  
Representative to the U.N.

#### *Arms Control and Disarmament*

Ralph Earle, Director  
Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

#### *Joint Chiefs of Staff*

General Lew Allen, Acting  
Chairman-Chief of Staff for  
Air Force  
Vice Adm. Thor Hanson, Director,  
Joint Staff

#### *Central Intelligence Agency*

Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director  
Robert Ames, NIO for Near East  
and South Asia

#### *International Development Cooperation Agency*

Guy Erb, Deputy Director  
Frederick Schieck, Deputy Ass't.  
Adm. for AID-Bureau of Asia

#### *White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Henry Owen

#### *National Security Council*

William Odom  
Thomas Thornton

*Muskie:* I would like to state several assumptions that I am making:

1. We have no immediate plans to increase our military assistance to Pakistan. We are restricted by the Symington Amendment, the Pakistanis do not have money available to buy equipment, and they are not interested in an FMS program of the size that we offered.
2. Pakistan needs economic assistance. We have agreed to move ahead on debt rescheduling and they have said that they want economic aid.
3. Defense and State should do more work on contingency planning and the possibility of sending military supplies on short notice.
4. Our

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 81, PRC 145, 7/22/80, Pakistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

response should be in terms of items that do not require Congressional consultation and also those that do. Based on these assumptions I would make several recommendations:

1—State and DOD refine the paper on intermediate level contingencies and diplomatic/military responses.<sup>2</sup>

2—DOD refine its planning on equipment availability and review its arrangements—with the goal of faster reaction time—for a short notice military supply operation.

3—The Secretary of State reaffirm to Shahi, during his visit to Washington next week, our willingness to discuss intermediate level contingencies whenever they wish to do so.

4—Ambassador West be instructed to ask the Saudis the status of the Saudi/Gulf states assistance package for Pakistan.

These proposals are not related to the ultimate horror story; they reflect a conservative estimate of what may happen in the post-Olympic period.

*Brzezinski:* The third point that you make is the most important one. Please enlarge on it.

*Muskie:* If Agha Shahi says yes we would come back here to review on the basis of that what they want. We assume that they do not want to pursue a military dialog. What I am trying to do is to put the ball in their court.

*Brzezinski:* I agree with both your analysis of the situation and the tactics you propose. The Pakistanis prefer to have the Islamic nations up front. But since this is the key to strengthen their confidence in us, how would we respond if Shahi agrees?

*Muskie:* If he responds in a significant way we (the PRC) would review the problems involved.

*Brzezinski:* Would we offer a team from State and Defense to meet covertly with the Pakistanis, or would we have an open dialogue?

*Muskie:* I just intend to show a willingness to listen without encouraging them. If Shahi is positive I would only say that we would review the issue.

*Brzezinski:* But what do we envision ourselves?

*Muskie:* I would state my third point as finding out if the Pakistanis are really thinking of a military relationship, and if so when, and what level.

*Komer:* But if Shahi is specific in what he wants, what do we think ourselves? Where does the road lead?

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

*Brzezinski:* When Warren Christopher and I were in Pakistan we were asked about how we would respond to various levels of contingencies. We said that in case of a massive attack the 1959 Agreement would come into effect. In the case of more limited attacks the Pakistanis would handle it themselves but we could supply military equipment. We were generally quite vague.<sup>3</sup> Your third point is extremely important. It gives Pakistan the feeling that they can talk to us. But we should decide soon how we would structure ourselves for such a discussion. Should Saunders and McGiffert go to Pakistan? What kind of a response do we have in mind?

*Muskie:* The more we discuss my third point the less enthusiastic I become about it. Shahi is coming here to talk about the Islamic Conference,<sup>4</sup> not Afghanistan. I see this as an incidental question to be raised to get a view of their position, but not to encourage them.

*Christopher:* Based on my past experience I would say that if they do pick up our offer we should do it in the most inconspicuous way possible and reduce any expectations. If the Secretary of State were to go to Pakistan to talk to Zia you could risk a confrontation. We should handle this at a lower level to see if their request would be realistic.

*Muskie:* Will they respond to this?

*Brzezinski:* Probably not initially, but perhaps if the situation heated up.

*Muskie:* Well that possibility exists anyway. It would be interesting to get their estimate of danger of Soviet pressure and their judgment whether they can contain it.

*Komer:* Zia and the Pakistani military are the key actors in this. They are more interested in this sort of planning than is Shahi.

*Saunders:* Last week we raised the possibility of Hummel talking to Zia while Shahi is here in the United States.

*Muskie:* I do not intend to raise the matter unless Shahi does.

*Komer:* I agreed with you (Muskie) until you explained what you have in mind. I agree that this is a time-buying exercise. We are talking

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 423.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to a reported statement by Shahi that the Islamic Conference Standing Committee on the Afghan crisis planned to call an international conference on the crisis, potentially to include the United States, among other countries. In telegram 188526 to Islamabad, July 17, the Department requested more information on Shahi's statements. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344-0713) The Committee was established by a resolution adopted at the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Islamabad May 17-22. The resolution also condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Marvine Howe, "Islamic Conference Ends; Afghanistan Talks Proposed," *New York Times*, May 23, 1980, p. A10)

today about the same issue we discussed at our last meeting.<sup>5</sup> We are embarking on a risky road and the odds would be against us militarily if we confronted the Pakistanis in this part of the world. If so, do we not want to take steps to prevent escalation as was discussed last time? I question your first three or four assumptions, especially since they are based on the idea that the Pakistanis know what they are doing. I don't think they do. The Pakistanis are not completely without money. They would like to buy military equipment from us and will probably get Saudi money to do so.

The Pakistani military is more nervous about the Soviets than is Agha Shahi. The Pakistanis are in over their heads and they are inching our way. We have gotten conflicting signals since January but these have become increasingly positive, especially in the intelligence channels. I don't think we can make a firm decision now on how far we would go in the way that Brzezinski's logic takes us. As I said last time I would like to see us work the Indian side of the street. Nine of the fourteen Pakistani divisions are facing India. The Pakistanis want to equip the other five and when they do so this will make problems for India. It would make a lot of difference if they could divert some of their divisions on the Indian front to the Afghan front. We could talk with Indira Gandhi and should. We cannot ignore India as we try to deal with South Asia. This is something that I learned in the Johnson Administration. The Indians do not want to see the Soviets in the subcontinent and they do not want to confront the Soviets over a divided Pakistan. If India were to pull back its forces the Pakistanis might shift some of theirs away from India and move them to the Western front. This is of course easy to articulate but very hard to put into effect.

*Saunders:* This is a good objective over time but is not likely to be achieved in the next month or so. Agha Shahi did discuss this with Indira Gandhi.<sup>6</sup>

*Brzezinski:* I agree that it is desirable but the payoff will not come quickly. It will not solve our short-term problem which involves a possible Soviet effort in Afghanistan which falls short because of Afghan resistance and then spills over into Pakistan. If the Soviets were to attack Pakistan we will have to do a lot more than we are ready to and want to do now. Think, if we had met in mid-December we would not have come up with one-third of the list of things that we finally did after the Soviets attacked. The most important thing to do is to

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 451.

<sup>6</sup> Shahi met with Gandhi on July 15. (Telegram 14997 from New Delhi, July 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800341–0818) He also met with Foreign Minister Rao. See footnote 3, Document 191.

deter Soviet action. We will save trouble later by doing this now. We want to give the Pakistanis confidence that we are there, and in some subtle fashion, we want to convey to the Soviets that we would not be indifferent to pressure on Pakistan. We just would give some indicators.

If the Pakistanis decide they want to talk to us about security cooperation the Soviets will come to know it.

*Komer:* That also argues for Zbig's point. Harold Brown does not want to send ground forces into Pakistan; therefore he wants to minimize the likelihood of Soviet attack.

*Muskie:* We should do the minimum that we can without blowing things up. What I have suggested is modest.

*Brzezinski:* I would add to your list that you or the President should talk to Senator Byrd and ask him to give some thought to this Pakistan question.

*Muskie:* The President talked to Byrd about the rescue mission the day before it happened but without letting him know that it was underway.<sup>7</sup> Byrd was burned badly on that. He will not hold this sort of thing close; he will suggest that we talk to Stennis and Church. Some of the people he will talk to could get very uptight. Byrd will also think that, in light of his Iran experience, more is going on than he is being told about. I am trying to put us in a position to anticipate the more conservative CIA estimate of the danger and come to know what the Pakistanis and the Saudis may intend. We can position ourselves by doing these four things. This obviates the need of going to Congress at this point.

*Vandenheuvel:* Komer's suggestion is worth further consideration and it wouldn't cost us anything. Could the initiative to the Indians come from another source?

*Muskie:* The Indians may not be too receptive at this point in view of the Tarapur situation.<sup>8</sup> Anyway, if the Indians understand the realities of the situation they may well do it on their own.

*Komer:* You cannot assume that.

*Muskie:* Let us wait until after the Tarapur issue is over.

*Vandenheuvel:* Perhaps somebody else could take the initiative.

*Komer:* The British?

*Saunders:* We will have to think about who could best do it.

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<sup>7</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Byrd at 7:49 p.m. on April 23 in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

<sup>8</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 196.

*Komer:* I have a very personal interest in this since I hope to go to Delhi and would like to be the bearer of the news to Mrs. Gandhi.<sup>9</sup> Returning to the fourth point of Secretary Muskie's, we have prepared a paper with three illustrative, quite modest packages.<sup>10</sup> They add up to \$52, \$111, and \$226 million respectively. This would not be a major financial problem and the equipment could be moved rapidly. It is all old equipment except for perhaps some C-130s. We should tell the Saudis that we have this ready for quick sale. We will be happy to sell it to the Pakistanis and they should tell the Pakistanis that.

*Brzezinski:* Are you going to tell the Pakistanis the price on the F-15?

*Komer:* No, let them get that from McDonald-Douglas. We could sell them for instance 1,000 TOWs. We could encourage Pakistan to accept these as a positive gesture. We could dribble this out slowly over time so that we don't even have to approach Congress for the sales. We can also accelerate the TOWs and add some launchers and perhaps some LAWs. This would enable us to make some positive gestures in the military cash sales area and these would be big enough to register in both Moscow and Delhi.

*Christopher:* You had best be careful in how you approach the idea to the Saudis. They know in any event that we are ready to continue our cash sales policy.

*Komer:* I find that you have to tell the Saudis everything at least 7 times.

In any case the acceleration of deliveries is a separate issue from the approach to the Saudis.

*Brzezinski:* In effect then you are adding to the fourth point that we are willing to accelerate sales and you're adding a new fifth point to tell Pakistan that it would be in their interest to buy certain types of weapons.

*Turner:* That relates to the question of deterrence.

Most of what we do won't have a deterrent impact.

*Muskie:* It is implicit in point number four that we are willing to sell to Pakistan. We will tell them that the arms are available. Your fifth point assumes an answer to number three. Should we not get that answer first?

*Komer:* No, these should be treated as entirely separate. The contingency discussion in your third point is separate from the question of arms sales.

*Muskie:* What is the nature of Pakistan's sensitivity?

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 206.

<sup>10</sup> Not found

*Aaron:* They want to stick with the Islamic relationship.

*Komer:* That was the rationalization after the event last January.<sup>11</sup> Zia was simply mad at the size of the package we offered.

*Saunders:* A big US assistance package is different from cash sales.

*Turner:* They simply saw the risks as outweighing the benefits in accepting our offer.

*Komer:* They overplayed their hand. I wanted to separate the aid relationship from the discussion in the third point.

*Muskie:* I'm interested to see if they are ready for an open arms relationship. Have we changed their minds since last January? Also, remember that the Pakistanis were rude to Congress—as Congress sees it. We don't want to tell Congress that we went and solicited them; we want to be able to tell Congress that the Pakistanis have changed since January.

*Komer:* I assumed in your list that "limited contingencies," meant action on the ground.

*Christopher:* Let us strike those words and substitute, "their interest in a possible arms relationship."

*Muskie:* Instead of an Indian initiative as number five, I suggest that the Minutes of this meeting show that the matter has been raised and we discussed both the need for greater Indian concern and the possibility of raising the troop withdrawal issue<sup>12</sup> with them. We will explore but we do not have any specific ideas at this point. Is there any further discussion?

*Turner:* Have we addressed the fundamental issue? Is this a policy which will buttress the Pakistanis to encourage the insurgency? We could do more now with the Congressional involvement. The Pakistanis are telling us that food is becoming a major problem for the insurgents; we could supply that either overtly or covertly. We could also undertake either a covert or overt propaganda campaign to publicize the Soviet incursions that have taken place this far as a form of deterrence. There are also other covert possibilities that I would prefer to discuss privately.

*Saunders:* The Pakistanis have preferred to keep the incursions quiet.

*Aaron:* I don't want to see the idea of contingency planning dropped. Could we develop a joint assessment with the Pakistanis of the existing risk? We could do this through the intelligence channels.

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the Pakistani rejection of the U.S. aid offer. See Documents 407 and 408.

<sup>12</sup> Not further identified.



This might tell us how they view the incursions and whether they would want to go ahead with contingency planning.

*Turner:* Yes, we can do that.

*Aaron:* This would show them that we care and that we are thinking ahead.

*Muskie:* Would that not raise the same kind of problems we've been discussing?

*Turner:* We can do it and indeed have been discussing it with them. But we can make it more formal by sending me out or Carlucci.

*Muskie:* That sounds like a sensible idea.

*Saunders:* We could add that to the first of Secretary Muskie's four points.

*Komer:* Yes, add "and request formal joint assessment of the threat from Pakistan."

*Turner:* We will tell them that we are concerned about the post-Olympic situation.

*Aaron:* This would lead directly from their request for military equipment which they made through other channels.

*Muskie:* Have they made such a request already? (Secretary was informed of the proceedings of a previous meeting.)<sup>13</sup>

*Allen:* Militarily, the longer the Soviets are embroiled with the Afghan rebels the more time we will have to get things done. We should do all we can to increase the insurgents capabilities.

*Komer:* Should we not decide to accelerate the military sales pipeline and plan for that—for instance the TOWs that they have already bought and paid for and are scheduled for delivery in 1982 could be moved up for delivery in the third or fourth quarter of this year. This would however mean diverting from other customers such as Korea and Israel or from US active duty inventories. Would you want to do that? It will cause a lot of trouble with my clients but we would not need to notify Congress.

*Muskie:* Let us wait until we have finished the exercise that I have suggested. I am meeting with Shahi tomorrow. State and DOD should have their papers written before the end of the week.

*White:* Before you talk to anybody make sure that we are indeed able to accelerate deliveries and will not run into insuperable difficulties within our government. You should not be in a position to offer something that you cannot do.

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<sup>13</sup> Reference is to the July 7 SCC(I) meeting. See Document 449.

*Muskie:* Let's look at everything that we are in a position to do. The problem is the other customers. What about food? Can we get food to Afghanistan?

*Turner:* We have to get it to the refugee camps. (A confused discussion of PL-480 ensued.)

*Muskie:* Let us look into the food question. We would have to handle a large food program either through reprogramming or by going to Congress for additional resources.

*Aaron:* Also, we need to know where the shortages are appearing geographically. If they are spread throughout the country, perhaps other countries could help by sending food through Iran.

*Turner:* We will look into that.

*Muskie:* Let us have all of that ready for a meeting late next week.

#### 453. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 23, 1980

1. *Meeting with Shahi:* I met with Pakistan Foreign Minister Shahi this afternoon and reaffirmed that we were committed to following our policy on Afghanistan. I stated our admiration for the Islamic Conference efforts on Afghanistan and reiterated our support for Pakistan's efforts to safeguard its independence and territorial integrity.

Shahi reported that during his talks in Europe he was pleased with the common perception of events in the region but found the European leaders reluctant to act in accordance with their assessment of the strategic implications. Shahi added that if the Islamic Commission initiative<sup>2</sup> comes to a halt, the three-man committee will meet with the other Islamic Foreign Ministers in New York, just before the General Assembly session, to consider the possibility of a UN sponsored conference to find a solution to the crisis.

Shahi said that the Soviets have not shown any flexibility on the Afghanistan issue and seem determined to continue to support Babrak.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 7/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 452.

On the insurgents, Shahi reported that their morale was good, although they need anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons and additional food. He added that there may be need for increased contributions over the longer-term for support of the nearly one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He also said that he saw no immediate threat of a full-scale Soviet invasion of Pakistan in the near future, although it remained a longer-term concern.

On Pakistan's relationship with the US, Shahi reiterated Pakistan's concerns about the perception of a close military relationship and repeated his government's interest in economic assistance.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to U.S.-Pakistani relations.]

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#### **454. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 7, 1980

##### **SUBJECT**

Daily Report

##### *Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*U.S.-Pakistan Politico-Military Dialogue:* According to Ambassador Hummel, we are at a critical point in our effort to maintain a politico-military dialogue with the Pakistanis,<sup>2</sup> with attention currently focusing on U.S. decisions regarding the sale/provision of high performance aircraft as a gauge of our determination to be forthcoming and of our seriousness of purpose in helping nations defend themselves from an aggressive Soviet Union. The dilemma at present is that Pakistan does not want the F-5E, the type of aircraft we have offered, cannot wait for its follow-on—the F(X), and cannot afford the aircraft their air force believes it wants. Hummel proposes a “package approach” to this problem, one which introduces the idea of another

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 30, 8/7/80–8/10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig, C.”

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7761 from Islamabad, August 5, Hummel reported his analyses and recommendations, which he explained were based on the views of “senior civilian and military officers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800374–0530)

aircraft into the mix, and one which has none of the painful association of those already mentioned regularly and prominently in our dialogue. Specifically, he recommends that we think in terms of a package aircraft deal, tied in the long-run to the sale of the F(X), whatever that turns out to be. Such a deal would involve sufficient numbers to meet Pakistani needs, probably three squadrons, and would be preceded by the sale or lease to the Pakistani air force of 2–3 squadrons of used F–4E aircraft which would be returned, re-sold, or used as the downpayment on the latter sale. Hummel urges that Washington resolve to make this package offer at the highest level, with full recognition of its political importance. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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**455. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 8, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Presidential Meetings With Foreign Leaders During the UNGA

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan:* President Zia has indicated through intermediaries that he would like to meet with the President while he is in the U.S. during the first week in October.

Since Zia will be addressing the UNGA in his capacity as spokesman for the Islamic Conference, a meeting with the President would symbolize our sensitivity to Islamic views and interests. Given Pakistan's active diplomatic role on Afghanistan and vulnerability to Soviet pressure, a meeting with Zia would demonstrate our support for Pakistan and our resolve to keep the pressure on for a Soviet withdrawal. Substantively, the President could further our dialogue on broadened security cooperation directly with Zia, unconstrained by the extreme nervousness felt in the Foreign Ministry on this subject. The Saudis and the Chinese would not understand our failure to seize this opportunity to demonstrate our solidarity with Pakistan and the Islamic world.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Zia Visit: 7–9/80. Confidential.

On the other hand, a meeting with Zia would closely follow his UNGA address in which he undoubtedly will be highly critical of our Middle East policies. Zia would also probably use a meeting to argue for greatly increased U.S. economic assistance. Finally Zia is not a popular leader, and his reception by you would raise human rights concerns, even though his military rule has been relatively benign. A businesslike office call, however, without the trappings of a state visit would be consistent with our explanations to opposition groups in Pakistan that our support for Pakistan, particularly at this time of crisis, is not linked to a particular regime.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

**Peter Tarnoff<sup>3</sup>**  
*Executive Secretary*

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 231137 to Islamabad, August 30, the Department directed the Embassy to inform the Pakistani Government that Carter had agreed to meet with Zia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800414–0745)

<sup>3</sup> Seitz signed for Tarnoff.

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#### 456. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 28, 1980

SUBJECT

Conversation of 28 August 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan]

3. I then went on to discussion of the Somalia situation and finally my concern that between that and Pakistan, where I pointed out that the Soviets had warned Zia about being a conduit for weapons to the Afghans and threatened punishment, and with Khomeini that there

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 49: DCI Memrecs/Memos, agendas of Pres Brief, Jan–Dec 1980. Top Secret. Drafted by Turner on August 29. According to the President's Daily Diary, Turner gave the briefing, which ran from 11:39 a.m. to 12:12 p.m., to Carter in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

might be some move against us between now and the elections. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Later in the meeting, this subject came up again. [2 lines not declassified] I said that Zia had pointed out that the Soviets had come to him with details of what aircraft and what dates there had been shipments of arms through Pakistan to the Afghans, but that Zia was holding firm. Zia had said he didn't understand why the Soviets hadn't made a retaliatory move. He thought that they would either send armor or air across and make a strike and then return to Afghanistan. Still, he intended to hold firm. The biggest thing bothering him was the leaks. He didn't want it made so blatant that he was helping the Afghans. He wanted to know if the reports of Soviet helicopters being shot down by SA-7s were true. I said we had those reports but we could not verify that they were really true at this point. We knew the Soviets were losing helicopters. [3 lines not declassified]<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan]

**Stansfield Turner**

*Director*

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<sup>2</sup> For two CIA reports on the increased Soviet pressures on Pakistan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 312 and 313.

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#### 457. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, September 19, 1980, 0622Z

9533. Subject: Visit of President Zia-ul-Haq to US: What's On His Mind?

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: On his upcoming visit to the U.S. to meet with President Carter, President Zia-ul-Haq will be testing the depth of the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446–1081. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to New Delhi, Jidda, Beijing, Moscow, London, Paris, USUN, Karachi, Peshawar (pouch), and Lahore (pouch).

understanding of Pakistan's concerns and the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's security. Afghanistan is likely to be at the top of his agenda, but arriving in Washington just after representing the Islamic world at the UNGA, he is also likely to rehearse Pak and Islamic Conference concerns about the Middle East, especially as they affect the ability of the U.S. to defend Western interests in the region. Bilaterally, Zia will be interested in learning what the U.S. can do to assist Pakistan economically and possibly also what the prospects might be regarding the purchase of a major weapons system like a high performance fighter. End summary.

3. Pakistan's security in South and Southwest Asia: In the context of what may be a developing siege mentality in Pakistan, President Zia-ul-Haq is likely to have security concerns uppermost in his mind during his Washington visit. It will be important to permit him to convey his personal assessment of the threat to Pakistan and the region, particularly the relative weight which he attaches to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the problems of worsening relationships with both Iran and India. Pakistan feels very much alone at the moment and seeks reassurance—not only because it believes the West has let it down but also because its Islamic friends have not come through with much support. American determination to resist Soviet expansionism, and to help others to do so, should be explained to Zia at some length.

4. The Department should keep in mind that Zia's views on these issues do not necessarily coincide with those of FonMin Agha Shahi, who, though he retains an essentially free hand in foreign affairs, is less favorably disposed toward the US than Zia is. Zia's visit—he will undoubtedly be accompanied by Shahi—should provide an opportunity to determine nuances that exist in their respective views and preferred policies.

5. I believe that Zia personally is still tempted by the idea of a formal security relationship with the U.S. which—if it were substantial enough—could offset Afghan and Indian agreements with USSR. The kind of binding agreement—with built-in automaticity—he occasionally suggests is clearly not in the cards. Our problem will be to convince him of the credibility of our commitment to Pakistan's continued independence and territorial integrity while pointing out that a new agreement on paper would potentially create more controversy and difficulties than it would enhance Pakistan's security.

6. Zia is also likely to exhibit a new concern about developments in Iran and Iranian intentions toward Pakistan. Pak-Iranian relations have deteriorated; they have become a domestic issue in both countries, with suspicion growing in Pakistan of Iranian exploitation of Shia-Sunni issues here. Just as we hope for better relations with Iran, good

Pak-Iranian relations are in the U.S. interest, and Zia should be assured that we take no satisfaction out of the recent deterioration in their bilateral ties.

7. At the same time, we share Zia's interest in close cooperation with Islamic moderates like Saudi Arabia, and we should use this opportunity to encourage continued Pak-Saudi-Kuwait cooperation. The Pakistanis face a delicate balancing act in dealing with the Iranians and the Saudis; we should be supportive and sympathetic.

8. All this said, it is clear that the Indian bogey still looms very large in Pakistani eyes. Zia must take that fact into account in all his security calculations. Pak-Indian relations have suffered a setback as a result of recriminations over communal violence in India. I believe that Zia sees the need to continue efforts at improving relations with India, however, and we should quietly encourage him in this regard, understanding that the road to cooperation is filled with potholes and diversions created by decades of distrust, hostility and mutual suspicion. We should be aware that Pakistanis, from Zia on down believe that we care more for India than we do Pakistan and that this consideration permits Indian considerations to limit what we do for Pakistan.

9. As for China, Zia would appreciate hearing the President's views on our evolving relationship with Beijing. Pakistan still perceives China as its staunchest ally and vividly recalls its own pivotal role in facilitating normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. Nonetheless, China cannot meet Pakistan's needs for modern and more sophisticated military equipment. We should seek Zia's views on the role China can play in enhancing security in South and Southwest Asia.

10. It is possible that Zia may raise Pakistan's urgent need for high-performance aircraft. We have offered to sell F-5Es; Pakistan would prefer a more capable, later-generation aircraft, which we have declined to supply, although we have held the door open for the F-X. My views on the importance of our being more forthcoming on this issue have been transmitted before,<sup>2</sup> and if Washington is unable to come up with any new options, I hope that at least careful thought will be given to a thorough and convincing justification as to why we are unable to meet GOP needs in this area. It will not be easy to convince Zia that this is not the product of US concern for Indian relations.

11. Afghanistan: Zia's meeting with the President provides us with an opportunity to sound Zia out on his medium and long-term analysis of the Afghanistan situation. We will want to get his views in particular on: (1) Soviet intentions within Afghanistan; (2) the ability of the Afghan resistance groups to continue fighting as well as possibilities for

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 447 and 454.



improved cooperation among them; and (3) the longer term political, social and economic implications of the million-plus Afghan refugees (with more coming) in Pakistan. We should also express interest in Pakistan's view of the diplomatic situation with regard to Afghanistan including efforts by the Islamic Conference and further steps which could be taken in multilateral forums to continue pressures on the Soviet Union to withdraw and to keep the conflict alive as an issue of international concern. We should underline our desire to consult and cooperate closely with Pakistan on policy towards Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion.

12. Middle East: Since the main purpose of Zia's trip to the U.S. is to address the UNGA as spokesman for the Islamic Conference, we should anticipate that he will want to discuss Islamic concerns about U.S. policy towards the Middle East, particularly Jerusalem and Palestinian issues and is likely to argue that the US relationship with Israel will continue to be an irritant in US-Islamic ties and will become an increasingly important impediment to Islamic cooperation with us in playing a stabilizing role in the region. I believe Zia's discussions of this subject will be moderate; in my talks with him he has accepted (but not agreed with) US policies toward Israel. I am confident he will not take a confrontational posture in his meeting with President Carter, whatever he may feel he must say on the floor of the UNGA.

13. Economic aid: Bilaterally, we would expect Zia to focus on possibilities for renewed economic assistance to Pakistan. I would hope we could give him a rather definite indication of the magnitude of our proposed commodity and other assistance for the next two fiscal years. He will probably express appreciation for U.S. willingness to consider debt rescheduling but may argue for a longer-term (3–4 years) commitment.

14. Nuclear issue: Discussion of resumed assistance will of course open the subject of Pakistan's nuclear program. While Zia may not raise the topic himself, we assume we will want to make known our continuing concerns. While making clear the seriousness with which we regard Pakistan's attempt to develop a nuclear capability, we should reaffirm our commitment to Pakistan's security and try to reassure Zia that we are neither opposed to development of nuclear power for peaceful uses nor discriminatory against Pakistan in our non-proliferation policy.

15. Human rights: I would hope we can use the opportunity of the President's meeting with Zia to explain candidly our basic human rights policy and our view that the stability of Pakistan—and its continued existence as an independent nation—can best be served by early restoration of representative institutions. This can be done by expressing an understanding for the problems Zia faces, an appreciation of the

important and constructive role Pakistan is playing, and a reaffirmation that we stand committed to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. We would be remiss were we to avoid the issue and its importance for Pakistan's future. We have reported on Zia's new negotiations with political leaders, aimed at forming a civilian government before he departs for the U.S.<sup>3</sup> It may be that Zia will be in a position to explain what he has accomplished in moving toward a civilian government and perhaps toward general elections.

16. Narcotics: There is an area in which we can and should compliment Zia—narcotics. The ban on opium cultivation in the Frontier and the subsequent precipitous decline in production deserves an acknowledgement from the highest levels of the USG. We can also point out that this is an area in which we are cooperating and can continue working together in spite of whatever other difficulties we have had.

17. Hostages: Zia's concern re hostages in Tehran parallels ours, and he has voiced these concerns on a number of occasions with Iranian authorities. His ability to be helpful is very limited, but the President should acknowledge our appreciation for what he has done, which includes an early Zia-Khomeini letter and a demarche through FonMin Agha Shahi to Khomeini.

18. Zia has waited over three years for this chance to meet President Carter face-to-face. Following our inability to come to terms earlier this year, we should seek to use this meeting as a means of determining the parameters within which our relationship with Pakistan can be conducted. Without seeking to be dramatic, I believe it could be a watershed event in our relationship, taking place as it does against a background of Pakistani disillusionment and even bitterness with past U.S. support. To the extent we are able to convince Zia of the steadfastness of our resolve in defending our interests (and those of Pakistan) in this area of the world, we will open up possibilities for cooperation. To the extent that we fail to do so, we will encourage those tendencies within Pakistan who believe their country is at sea and can only survive—if at all—through acceptance of a Soviet fait accompli in Afghanistan and accommodation to Soviet pressures.

**Hummel**

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 9279 from Islamabad, September 15, the Embassy reported on meetings that Zia had with various Pakistani political leaders and speculated on the make-up of Zia's future Cabinet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800439-0658)

**458. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Islamabad, September 21, 1980, 0642Z

9565. Subject: Operation Sandeman. Ref: State 248368.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S) Entire text.

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] managed to acquire the names of the individuals involved on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and on the morning of Sept 20 I phoned Gen Arif (Pres Zia's top staff officer) explaining I had to have a private appointment with Zia before my departure.

3. I met Zia at 8:00 pm on Sept 20 (only he and I were present) and delivered the demarche as instructed in reftel with two changes: (A) because of new information developed by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I made the first para read quote we have reliable reports that a member of your party, Capt Qamar, has made specific plans to smuggle about ten kg. of heroin into the U.S. in your personal aircraft during your upcoming visit to the United States. The heroin may be secreted inside several marble or onyx lamps, or may be in his personal kit. We believe he has been promised 300,000 rupees for arranging this smuggling, and the organizers, with whom Capt Qamar has been meeting, are Pakistani suppliers and smugglers named [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of Kharian village [*less than 1 line not declassified*] unquote, and (B) I added that we are holding the matter very closely both here and in Washington.

4. Zia reacted positively and strongly, saying he would immediately institute an investigation. He then said that perhaps in any case it would be a good idea for him to ask U.S. officials to search the aircraft on arrival in New York so as to be completely sure no narcotics were aboard. I repeated the point in my instructions that it would be highly advisable to apprehend the individuals without alerting them prematurely so as to bring them to justice through criminal prosecution, and thus settle the matter here in Pakistan. Zia repeated that if the USG still has any suspicions at the time the plane arrives, he would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0324. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 248368 to Islamabad, September 18, the Department instructed Humel to inform Zia before his departure for the United States that a "member of your party, whose identity is not known to us, plans to smuggle ten kilograms of heroin into the U.S. in your personal plane during your upcoming visit to New York. The heroin is allegedly to be secreted inside several marble or onyx lamps which will be taken with you as gifts." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0327)

immediately authorize a search. He said that while he realized that a search might lead to publicity that it would be better to avoid, he wanted it to be clear that he had made the offer.

5. He repeated that he would put investigators on the case immediately. When he mentioned the Pak Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) in passing I told him that PNCB so far as we knew had no knowledge of the case, and that he should decide how best to handle the investigation so as to assure that the culprits are punished. He wrote down the names of the persons involved and asked why, if the sellers are known traffickers, they had not been prosecuted.

6. Zia closed the 15-min conversation by thanking me for bringing the information to him and assuring me he would act effectively on it, and would keep DCM King informed.

7. Comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] here have been effective and cooperative. The language in para 3-B was developed with their assistance and concurrence. We will transmit further [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on this case through this channel.

8. FYI It would be noted that contrary to early info the lamps were not intended as official gifts but were to be on the plane ostensibly as a private set of gifts from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to friends in the U.S. However, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is now having second thoughts about taking so many lamps and is considering putting some, or most, of the heroin in his personal baggage.

9. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will be in Washington on evening of Sept 24 and will be handcarrying copy of this message and full report on this case.

10. Please convey to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] my appreciation (and presumably that of the Dept) for the professionalism and cooperativeness of my [*less than 1 line not declassified*] here, who uncovered the situation in the first place, handled it discreetly, and developed further essential information that could be passed to the GOP.

Hummel

**459. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Military Sales to Pakistan

As your meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq approaches, I believe it very important to our strategy interest in SW Asia that we keep open the door for renewal of close security ties with Pakistan. My concern is heightened by the Iraq/Iran conflict and the threats to stability which it poses.<sup>2</sup>

We can and have indicated a willingness to sell to Pakistan certain military equipment for cash including M60 tanks. We have transferred two old destroyers, and have pursued the defense industrial cooperation program initiated last February.<sup>3</sup> However, we cannot give them the security guarantees they desire and it is probably infeasible at this time to persuade Congress to remove the legislative barriers to grant aid and FMS credits, even if we renewed our earlier decision to turn a blind eye to their nuclear weapons program. In the absence of sales, we have had practically no strategic or military-to-military dialogue with them.

There is, nevertheless, one move we could make which would be taken by Pakistan as very positive evidence of our continued concern for Pak security and would thereby reinforce other cooperative programs. That move would be to agree to their long standing request that we sell advanced aircraft and, specifically, to offer to sell the F-16 for delivery in 1984 or 1985. Pakistan has also shown an interest in F-15.

In light of the threat to Pakistan, posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan, a good case can be made for Pakistan's acquisition of either the F-15 or F-16. Pakistan's air defense problem has been accentuated by the arrival of high performance Soviet Air Force aircraft in Afghanistan, as well as continued modernization of India's Air Force through recent receipt of Jaguars and reported plans to acquire the MIG-23 and MIG-25. With its strength comprised of obsolescent Chinese built F-6 (MIG-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330-82-0263, ASD/ISA #4 Policy Files. Secret. A copy was sent to Muskie.

<sup>2</sup> The Iran-Iraq war began on September 22 when Iraq invaded Iran, and ended in a stalemate in August 1988.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 426.

19) and a modest number of Mirage III and V aircraft, and with very limited surface-to-air missile capability, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is no match for its neighbors, and is practically unable to maintain sovereignty over its own air space.

Almost two years ago, we advised Pakistan that we were prepared to sell F-5E aircraft on a one-for-one basis to replace the PAF's Korean War-vintage F-86s. Subsequently, Pakistan has been cleared to receive presentations on the F-X but they have expressed no interest. Surplus F-4Es are unavailable and would be unsuitable against the threat. The F-16, which you considered but deferred last January,<sup>4</sup> may be a practical option. Though the F-15 might be even more appropriate for the defense task Pakistan faces, it costs far more than the Arabs seem willing to furnish; I do not recommend it.

Expression of our willingness to sell advanced aircraft would have great symbolic value. It would help to dispel the Pakistani impression that we accord them second class status. Pakistan would still be required to come up with the cash for the transaction and the cost involved—over \$1 billion for 40 F-16s. Normal production leadtime would preclude delivery of the F-16 or F-15 until mid-1984.

I recognize that India would react negatively to US agreement to sell Pakistan the F-16. However, we have also resumed selling arms to India and could demonstrate our South Asian evenhandedness by offering to release the F-16 to New Delhi as well, even though it is unlikely the Indians would be interested.

I urge you to consider offering to sell the F-16 to Pakistan.

**Harold Brown**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 405.

**460. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1980, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

*State*

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher (Chairman)

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Ambassador Arthur Hummel—Pakistan

Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor

Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

*JCS*

Lt. General John Pustay

*DCI*

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Mr. Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

*Treasury*

Deputy Secretary Robert Carswell

Mr. Harvey Shapiro, Deputy Director, East-West Economic Policy

*Agriculture*

Secretary Bob Bergland

Mr. Thomas Hughes, Administrator, Foreign Agriculture Service

*OMB*

Dr. John White

Mr. Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

*ACDA*

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director

Mr. Charles Van Doren, Director, Bureau of Non-Proliferation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 152: 9/29/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page, Carter wrote: “Zbig, See note, J.” In the upper right-hand corner of the second page, after the list of the meeting’s participants and before the beginning of the summary, Carter wrote: “Let me be the one to *open* the discussion with the Paks. I’ll get together with you all beforehand—J.” The minutes of the meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 6–12/80.

*IDCA*

Mr. Guy Erb, Deputy

Mr. Fred Schieck, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Asia—AID

*White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. David Aaron

Ambassador Henry Owen

*NSC*

Mr. Thomas Thornton

General William Odom

Ms. Hazel Denton

*SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS*

The PRC met to discuss the forthcoming visit of Pakistani President Zia and reviewed the talking points that will be offered to the President.<sup>2</sup> A number of textual changes were adopted and will be included in the revised talking points to be submitted by the State Department. (S)

On specific substantive points the PRC agreed:

—The President should offer to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan if we can avoid a situation in which Zia would turn down the offer and publicize the fact. To that end, Ambassador Hummel would sound out Zia's reaction before the two presidents meet.<sup>3</sup> The PRC carefully weighed the reaction in India and recognized the importance of maintaining the best possible relationship with India, but it concluded that India is unlikely to join in a strategy of resistance to Soviet aggression. On balance, the PRC felt that our Southwest Asia strategy would be incomplete without an active U.S. involvement in providing Pakistan with the means to defend itself. (Given India's acquisition of the Jaguar and the prospect of a MIG-23 and MIG-25 purchase, a modest number

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<sup>2</sup> Tarnoff sent the draft talking points to be considered at the meeting to Brzezinski under a September 28 memorandum. An undated note attached to the talking points reads in part: "Points for discussion and decision by the PRC have been set off in brackets." These points were: the U.S. response if Soviet forces invaded Pakistan; various joint U.S.-Pakistani actions that would "demonstrate to the Soviets that we are cooperating closely together," as well as discussion of sales of U.S. equipment to improve Pakistani air defense; the possible sale of F-16s to Pakistan; and the fact that more economic aid would be complicated by budgetary problems and the nuclear issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800169-0175)

<sup>3</sup> In a September 30 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Muskie and Brown: "The President read a brief summary of yesterday's PRC meeting on Pakistan which noted agreement to offer F-16's to Pakistan and that State would attempt to sound Zia out on this issue before his meeting with the President. In response, the President noted, 'Do not sound him out on this. I do not approve. Defensive air and ground to deal with Afghan-Soviet threat—not to threaten India. Let me have minutes before any action.'" (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 10, Unlabeled Misc)



of F-16's in Pakistani hands would not upset the military balance.) An offer to sell the F-16 would probably have more impact with Zia than anything else we can do. (S)

—The question of economic assistance for FY-82 should not be discussed in detail with President Zia until we can reassess our position on revision or waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments. The President could tell Zia that we are serious about our desire to be helpful, as part of a broad international effort, in increasing support to Pakistan, and we will look at the situation again after our election. (S)

—The President should be cautious in discussing anything more than a one-year debt rescheduling exercise for Pakistan. (S)

—The President should be given talking points that will convey to Zia the full range of actions we are taking in support of the Southwest Asian security framework. (S)

—Other countries should be urged to do more to meet the food needs of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. (There is likely to be an unmet gap of at least \$27 million next year.) (S)

—Material should also be included on Pakistan's assistance on the narcotics front. (S)

—The possibility of a Title III, PL-480 program in the amount of \$30 million will be examined further. (S)

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#### **461. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1980

##### **SUBJECT**

Relations with Pakistan: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

We have an unusual two-tiered relationship with Pakistan—overt *[less than 1 line not declassified]*. On the overt level, we have a number of differences and Pakistan seeks to keep some distance between us in order to sustain its non-aligned and Islamic credentials. As you know, however, we cooperate closely in *[less than 1 line not declassified]* covert activities, including *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the program to assist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Top Secret; Sensitive.

the Afghan insurgents. Pakistan is absolutely key to our ability to keep pressure on the Soviets through the insurgents since it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to channel arms and supplies through any other route. Without Pakistan's support, the insurgents probably could not continue for long.

President Zia has been very supportive and personally keeps a close eye on the covert programs through direct supervision of the responsible agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). He has also carefully kept the covert program quite separate from most other aspects of our relations, never linking [*less than 1 line not declassified*] cooperation to military sales, economic aid, etc. However, some months ago he did choose to use the ISID chief as a channel to express his uncertainty about the nature of the American security commitment to Pakistan.

In discussions in late August with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Ambassador Hummel, Zia reaffirmed his intention to continue cooperation in assisting the insurgents, despite fairly heavy Soviet pressures.<sup>2</sup> He indicated that he thought the current level of support to the insurgents was about right, implying that substantial increases could provoke serious Soviet reaction.

Zia has rigorously limited knowledge in his own government of our covert programs. He has made clear, for example, that the subject should not be raised with Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. Zia is extremely sensitive to leaks in Washington and has threatened to cease cooperation if these recur.<sup>3</sup> In public comment, the Pakistan Government officially denies that it is arming or assisting insurgents in Afghanistan, although it acknowledges that it cannot effectively control movement across the border by Afghan tribals.

Zia has asked our Station Chief in Islamabad to inform Washington that he does not intend to raise "sensitive intelligence cooperation projects" during his visit. We suggest that during your *private* meeting with Zia, you simply indicate your admiration for his willingness to support the Afghan insurgents and our intention to continue cooperation in ways and at a level agreeable to him and that you not go into details. Stan Turner's people will be standing by in the event that any detailed discussions are necessary.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 456.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 428.

**462. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Daily Report

*Information*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*NSC Activities*

*Visit of Pakistani President*

The PRC met yesterday afternoon to discuss the talking points that will be submitted for use in your meeting with Pakistani President Zia, taking into account your desire to make a “preemptive offer.”<sup>2</sup> The principal outcome was agreement to recommend that you offer to sell about 40 F-16s to Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Several of us were concerned that Zia might add this to the already long list of U.S. offers he has rejected. State will attempt to sound him out before the meeting,<sup>4</sup> and we will prepare language for you to use that does not put you too far out front. The need to turn to F-16s resulted from the absence of anything useful that we can say on the economic front. FY 82 assistance will depend on our addressing Symington next year, we are not ready to do anything more with regard to PL-480, and refugee needs are still not clear. (S)

There was considerable discussion of the exact wording that you might want to use in discussing security assurances as well as various other topics that may arise. You will be getting the talking points well before the visit; I will highlight any particular issues that you need focus on in them. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 31, 9/28/80–10/3/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Carter wrote: “Zbig, C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 460.

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined: “principal outcome was agreement to recommend that you offer to sell about 40 F-16s to Pakistan.”

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined: “State will attempt to sound him out before the meeting.” In the left-hand margin next to this phrase, Carter wrote: “Do not sound him out on this. I do not approve. Defensive air and ground to deal with Afghanistan-Soviet threat—not to threaten India. Let me have minutes before *any* action.” Brzezinski informed Muskies and Brown of Carter's instructions in a September 30 memorandum. See footnote 3, Document 460.

**463. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1980

SUBJECT

F16s for Pakistan

I urge you to reconsider your decision not to offer to sell F16s to Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> My reasons are contained in my memorandum to you of September 29 (attached).<sup>3</sup> I want to reemphasize that—

—Pakistan has a well justified military case: all its neighbors have advanced aircraft, including most prominently the Soviets in Afghanistan.

—We are, quite properly, unwilling to broaden our security commitment or seek FMS credits at this time. This leaves agreement to sell advanced aircraft as the only politically significant step we can take on the security side of our relationship. It would be an important step: we need to encourage the Paks to resist increasing Soviet pressure for accommodation; we need to encourage regional states to believe in our commitment to oppose Soviet expansion.

—Our hopes that reluctance to sell Pakistan advanced weapons would help in bringing India to resist Soviet aggression more robustly have proved idle. In my judgment, continued reluctance won't stiffen the Indians and a sale of F16s (which we can also offer to India) won't push them into Soviet arms.

**Harold Brown**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig—put in briefing book, J."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 462.

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached but printed as Document 459.

**464. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1980

SUBJECT

Your Decision on F-16's for Pakistan

Attached is a memorandum from Harold Brown urging you to reconsider your decision not to sell F-16's to Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> (S)

Warren Christopher has seen the memo and supports it. It corresponds, of course, to the unanimous recommendation of the PRC.<sup>3</sup> (C)

I support Harold on this on the grounds that the F-16 is all that we have to put in the pot with Zia. (C)

Since there is a real risk of refusal, however, I think that you should not make your final decision until you see how the drift of your conversation with Zia is going. (S)

If you want, we could still activate Ambassador Hummel to take some preliminary soundings with Zia before the meeting. (C)

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you favorably consider the sale of F-16's to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> (S)

If you do so decide, should Hummel take soundings?<sup>5</sup> (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 11, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 10/3/80: Briefing Book. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Brown's memorandum is printed as Document 463. On Carter's decision not to sell F-16s to Pakistan, see footnote 4, Document 462.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 460.

<sup>4</sup> Carter checked neither the Yes nor the No option. In the right-hand margin next to these choices, Carter wrote: "I will decide."

<sup>5</sup> Carter checked the No option, below which he initialed "J."

## 465. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 3, 1980, 11:10–11:50 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan

General K.M. Afir (Notetaker)

*President Carter:* There are a few items that I wish to discuss with you privately. I want you to know how much we admire your courage and our nation is also full of admiration for your humanitarian acceptance of so many refugees. Our nation is one of refugees and we thus deeply feel about this. I am also grateful to you for your role as the Islamic Conference spokesman.<sup>2</sup> I would like to know the results of your recent intervention. Did you get a positive response?

(Some exchange of pleasantries, including birthday greetings for President Carter, etc.)

*President Zia:* I was encouraged by the response in Teheran.<sup>3</sup> I was the first head of state in Teheran since the revolution and I was very warmly received. Bani-Sadr was at the airport. He is a straightforward and flexible man, with a very philosophical mind. He is very well read. During his conversations with me, Bani-Sadr was receiving reports from his Air Force commander. He cited them to me as indicating the difficulty he would have in accepting a cease-fire. His Air Force is being successful, more so than his Army, and Bani-Sadr would have difficulty in imposing a cease-fire. I asked him to consider it in the longer run and he said he would. Our estimates are that the Iranians

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "ok, J."

<sup>2</sup> Zia addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in the morning of October 1. In telegram 3939 from USUN, October 2, the Mission reported that Zia "emphasized his role as spokesman for the entire world Moslem community. Zia expressed the 'anguish' of the Islamic world over the conflict between Iraq and Iran, and reported on his mission of goodwill to the residents of the two countries." After criticizing the United States for its policies in the Middle East and North Africa, Zia "deplored the 'tragedy of military intervention on a massive scale' in Afghanistan, without directly referring to the Soviet invasion. He praised Afghan resistance as a 'sacrosanct struggle,' and denied Pakistani involvement in the resistance movement." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800475–0472)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 9964 from Islamabad, September 28, the Embassy reported on Zia's September 28 visits to Tehran and Baghdad in order to "ascertain the views of both Iran and Iraq on the conflict the two countries are currently waging." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800463–0040)

are flying about<sup>4</sup> 150 flights a day and that they have 650 pilots available. The Iranian military is very proud and confident of itself. As a result, the Iranians are now inflexible. Bani-Sadr said he would be helpless if he tried to declare a cease-fire because the military would object and the leaders do not have the institutions to impose their will. They see themselves as spokesmen for the people. The leadership is very divided but united in its determination to fight Iraq. They see themselves as the aggrieved party and they will fight to the last. They are also desperate. They feel isolated in the Islamic world. (They may be getting some aid from outside and President Zia described here the appearance of an Iranian Air Force 747 in Islamabad carrying sensitive equipment from North Korea.)

In Baghdad, I found the Iraqis equally confident though keen for a cease-fire, even on a unilateral basis. I told them that some withdrawal may be necessary for a cease-fire. The Iraqis said no. They disclaim any territorial ambitions, only the territory that should have been theirs back in 1975, Shatt al Arab and the three islands which should revert to UAE.

*President Carter:* This looks like a stalemate to me. The Iraqis are poised to take Dezful and thus to exclude Khuzistan. A stalemate is the most likely outcome and that would be a crippling blow to Teheran.

We share a common concern over the Soviets in Afghanistan. And it is important for the UN to maintain its condemnation. The foregoing, together with the fall of the Shah, has caused us to increase our presence in the region. We now have two carriers in the area. We have prepositioned military cargo. We are developing the Rapid Deployment Force. We are conducting exercises with some of the countries in the region. We have acquired facilities in Oman and Kenya, and we are determined to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Moreover, we have recently deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia. We want to contain the conflict, and we have discouraged the Saudis and Omanis from becoming involved.

In my State of the Union message, I stated the region was vital to our national security and that we would act to protect that security.<sup>5</sup> I wanted Brezhnev to know we would feel our vital interests are engaged if there was a Soviet intrusion. They might have moved into Poland if not for the world reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan. I see no possibility of business as usual while the Soviets are in Afghani-

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<sup>4</sup> Carter crossed out the words “are flying about” and drew a line from the phrase to the bottom of the page where he wrote: “have had as many as.”

<sup>5</sup> See Document 16.

stan. Again, let me say how much we admire your courage as well as your support for the refugees.

I am disappointed and regretful that we did not have an adequate communication in the past on an economic/military package. The public/press exchanges were mutually embarrassing. I understand that you do not want military assistance, but we will continue to be helpful in modest ways with regard to the refugees. We also understand your aversion to U.S. military aid, which in any case is forbidden by Congress, but we are willing to discuss purchases, if you want, of military equipment. If you need the assurance from us that you could purchase F-16s, we would be forthcoming. I know you have access to French planes, but we are willing to sell if you so desire it. If you want it, let's work it out between us directly.

We are deeply committed to the security of your country. We will be forthcoming if you want to purchase military equipment. We both have military backgrounds, so we can deal, if you want, directly.

*President Zia:* We admire you personally and we are grateful. We are a developing country and our dream is to have what is best for our military. We have only China, France, or the USA from whom to get aircraft; and only China or the USA for our tanks. We understand your sensitivity about India and we also understand that the U.S. must have an interest in Pakistan before it does anything for us. We do not ask you to sever your relations with India, but we are sensitive about any India veto over your relations with us. (Clifford apparently told Mrs. Gandhi that the Brzezinski visit was only an eyewash.)<sup>6</sup> We should get your aid on our own merits, not because of an Indian veto or wishes.

We do not have any money for purchases. We will not get it from Saudi Arabia unless the Saudis feel a genuine interest in Pakistan. Our problem is that the Soviet Union is now our neighbor. I have told the Soviets that we will resist to the end and in the meantime, with your help, we will continue fighting the battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan.

*President Carter:* It is our fight too.

*President Zia:* I am 100 percent certain the Afghanistans will not surrender. The Soviets will feel the pinch.

*President Carter:* What is your assessment of the effectiveness of resistance?

*President Zia:* Excellent. And they could do more.

*President Carter:* Do you think more is needed?

*President Zia:* Yes. Not enough has been given so far. I feel that Pakistan should continue to fight in Afghanistan, but Pakistan must

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<sup>6</sup> For the Embassy's report on Clifford's meeting with Gandhi, see Document 169.



be safe. It is in the interest of both Pakistan and the U.S. to support the freedom fighters. But Pakistan will be punished by the Soviet Union, and we are prepared for that. If they escalate, and they will do so in the next few months in order to humiliate us, we will stand up and we will need your assistance.

I could greatly improve the spirit of my Air Force if I had six more planes, but if I am able to feed more effectively 650,000 people, I can tell the military the country is getting stronger. I do not need direct military assistance. Our real need is in debt rescheduling. That would be the greatest favor to us.

*President Carter:* The three year part is the most difficult.

*President Zia:* One year to start and then the others will follow.

*President Carter:* We will do the one year and the food supply will be sustained by us. And if you want to buy military equipment, including F-16s, we will be forthcoming.<sup>7</sup>

*President Zia:* I need your support with the Europeans. They are too scared.

*President Carter:* Giscard and Thatcher said we should do more to help the freedom fighters. What should I tell them?

*President Zia:* Tell them to contact me. The freedom fighters need more anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons (discussion of some defective SAM-7s). France has good weapons and the Europeans should be more helpful.

On another issue, I just want to say that Mrs. Gandhi is no friend of Pakistan or the U.S.

*President Carter:* Do not hesitate to approach me directly. You can also use a personal emissary to keep in touch with me.

There was an exchange of pleasantries and then the meeting concluded.

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 297580 to Islamabad, November 8, notified Hummel that General Akhtar would be asked to inform Zia that the United States was “prepared to make available from U.S. Army stocks 200 Redeye missiles for purchase through foreign military sales channels” because of “ever increasing Soviet pressure on Pakistan.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000018, Box 3, Islamabad 80–81) Telegram 297580 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 333.

## 466. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 3, 1980, 11:53 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

### SUBJECT

President Carter's Meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S. Side*

President Jimmy Carter  
 Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie  
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Henry Owen  
 Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders  
 Arthur W. Hummel, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan  
 Thomas P. Thornton, Notetaker

#### *Pakistan Side*

Zia ul-Haq, President of Pakistan  
 Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi  
 Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan  
 Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, Governor of Baluchistan  
 Lt. Gen. Mujibur Rahman Khan, Secretary of Information  
 Sultan Mohammad Khan, Pakistan Ambassador  
 Najimuddin Shaikh, Notetaker—Pakistan Embassy

The two presidents went directly to the Oval Office where pictures were taken. They then remained there with Dr. Brzezinski until 11:53 a.m.<sup>2</sup> at which time they came into the Cabinet Room.

*President Carter* said how deeply honored he was to receive the visit of President Zia and that the two had a very fruitful conversation together. President Carter said that he had expressed to President Zia the deep admiration that Americans have for the people and leaders of Pakistan for the way that they face pressure, but also for the humanity that they have shown to the many refugees that have come to Pakistan from Afghanistan.

The United States, he continued, is grateful for the good relations between our two countries. He noted that he and President Zia had been able to discuss some of the issues of mutual interest to the two countries, and President Zia had reported to him on his efforts in the Iran-Iraq crisis.

*President Carter* observed that Pakistan is located in a very troubled region that affects both Pakistani and American security. President

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 465.

Carter said that he had outlined the growing US military presence in Southwest Asia to President Zia. He concluded by saying that he is honored by President Zia's visit and deeply grateful for Pakistan's contribution to regional security and peace, which affect both countries directly.

*President Zia* responded that he was grateful for the invitation to the United States, which Pakistan considers an ally and a friend. President Zia said that the Pakistani people admire President Carter as a sincere person, a man of God and of the Book, and hold him in high esteem.

President Zia hoped that his briefing on the Iran-Iraq situation had been helpful. He feels that if the two countries are left to themselves, there is likely to be a stalemate and that may be the best outcome.

President Zia also expressed thanks for American help with the Afghan refugees and added that more assistance would be welcome.

*President Carter* said that the United States would do what it can and would help to get others, such as Japan and Canada, to assume a more fair share of the burden.

*President Zia* noted that there are from thirty to thirty-five thousand additional refugees each month; by years end, the total refugee count will be 1.3 or 1.4 million.

*President Carter* asked how the Pakistani people feel about the refugee flow.

*President Zia* replied that they were being very supportive. Also, the refugees were showing very correct qualities and that was widely appreciated. There were of course occasional problems over such things as grazing rights. In response to a question from President Carter, Zia said that while some 50,000 refugees had moved deeper into Pakistan, the great bulk of them remained within ten or fifteen miles of the border.

*Secretary Muskie* said that in the past ten days he has had a series of good discussions with his European counterparts. He found that the Iran-Iraq conflict had refocused their attention on the region—not just the Gulf, but also Afghanistan and Pakistan. He believes that this would be a good time to approach the Europeans on refugee assistance and other problems. Secretary Muskie said that he had already told this to Agha Shahi who had seemed skeptical, but the opportunity was in any event worth pursuing.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram Secto 8041 from USUN, September 30, Muskie reported his September 29 meeting with Shahi in New York. The discussion focused on the Iran-Iraq conflict and Pakistani-Soviet relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800466–0445) After the meeting, they discussed the question of European assistance to the Afghan rebels. For an account of the discussion, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 321.

*Foreign Minister Agha Shahi* replied that he has passed this on to President Zia who would soon be meeting with Thatcher and Schmidt. He suggested to President Zia that Zia might ask them to demonstrate their interest in the region in a concrete way.

*President Zia* observed that if they didn't come to this conclusion by themselves, circumstances would force them.

*Secretary Muskie* agreed that as long as the US and Pakistan carried the burden, others would be content to let them do so.

*President Carter* asked what had been the outcome of Pakistan's discussions with the International Monetary Fund on the debt relief question.

*Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq* said that agreement had been reached on all issues except import liberalization; Pakistan needed some flexibility on that score. The IMF had suggested a stabilization program and all components of a stabilization program are in place. He described the gratifying pace of Pakistani growth. He did not want Pakistan to follow a three-year IMF program and then afterwards be left just where it is today (presumably with regard to its balance of payments position). Action must be taken on the supply as well as the demand side. If anybody could tell him how to manage the demand side more effectively than is being done now, he would be glad to hear it.

The IMF, Ghulam Ishaq said, was demanding complete liberalization of Pakistani imports. Pakistan is willing to import everything that is needed for its economic development but cannot liberalize consumer goods imports. The developed countries are becoming increasingly protectionist (e.g. shoes and textiles) but the IMF is demanding that Pakistan simply open up its market.

*President Carter* said he found that illogical.

*Henry Owen* told the President that he had talked to Ghulam Ishaq before the meeting but said that if the United States were to intervene with IMF Director LaRosiere, it would be counter productive.

*President Carter* emphasized that we are anxious to cooperate on debt relief.

*Ghulam Ishaq* reminded the President that there is now a negative resource flow from Pakistan back to the United States. Debt repayments are running at about \$134 million. The facility being arranged with the Fund is for three years but the American commitment is only for one. This makes it very hard for the Pakistanis to plan.

*President Carter* said that it was difficult for us to make a three-year commitment but he would look into it.

*Ghulam Ishaq* said that he was less interested in getting a legal commitment out of the United States than an understanding.

*President Carter* instructed Henry Owen to give him a memo on the subject.

Henry Owen said that he would examine the situation as soon as the IMF agreement had been finalized.

President Carter reiterated that we want to be helpful. He noted that it was time to go out to meet the press. He expressed pleasure with the meeting and said that he and President Zia had agreed to stay in communication. The US and Pakistan, he said, have so many things in common—their goals, friends, adversaries, commitments to human considerations, and security interests. The cooperation between the two countries is not a one-way street; it is mutually advantageous.

President Carter observed that in the past the two countries have not communicated well enough. He said that he now understands Pakistani sensibilities better; his comprehension of this had been inadequate before. President Carter also observed that our budgetary processes, with their long lead-time, made for misunderstandings.

President Zia said that he was very grateful for the meeting. The Pakistani side is going away with the idea that President Carter wants to see US-Pakistani relations develop on their own merits.

President Carter agreed that this is crucial.

President Zia said that US-Pakistani friendship had been confirmed; Pakistan hopes for more economic assistance from the US. He wished President Carter success in the election and said that he hoped to be dealing with “President” Carter in the coming years.

President Carter concluded the meeting with an expression of personal best wishes for Begum Zia and Zian. He said he would pray for Zian’s health. He presented President Zia with copies of *Why Not the Best*<sup>4</sup> and a book of satellite photographs. He noted that this kind of use of space was beneficial for development and that LANDSAT coverage is available to other countries. He also thanked Zia for the roses that had been sent for his birthday.

President Zia said he was a great collector of books and expressed his appreciation.

Thereupon at 12:05 the meeting ended and the two presidents went to meet with the press.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1975, 1977).

<sup>5</sup> For Carter and Zia’s remarks to the press, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book III, pp. 2055–2057.

**467. Letter From the President's Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters (Smith) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 9, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

According to a newspaper report quoting Zia,<sup>2</sup> the subject of Pakistan's nuclear explosives program did not arise in your recent talk.<sup>3</sup> Since the Pakistan program is the clearest present threat of proliferation, I hope that we will not give up trying to abort it.

We spend so much of our energies working over our Allies in the non-proliferation field to get them "to clean up their act"! I trust we don't lose sight of the main threats.

I would urge you in all appropriate conversations with heads of government to stress your deep concern about the Pakistani drive for a nuclear explosive capability.

Respectfully,

**Gerard Smith<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters (S/AS), Entry UD-07, Lot 81D155, Box 16, Pakistan, (May-Dec 1980). Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is possibly to a *Washington Post* article that reported: "According to Zia, the subject of his country's nuclear efforts was never raised in the White House meeting. This suggested a dramatic downgrading of the nonproliferation issue in Carter's concerns and interests about Pakistan." (Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Urged to Keep Out of Iran-Iraq War," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1980, p. A15)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 465 and 466.

<sup>4</sup> Smith signed "Gerry Smith" above his typed signature.

**468. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 10, 1980

SUBJECT

Weekly Report #157

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

*U.S.-Pakistani Relations after the Zia Visit*

In reviewing your meeting with President Zia,<sup>2</sup> several things stand out:

—A cordial personal relationship was established. This was the main object of the visit.

—The Pakistanis went away believing that the Indians no longer have a veto over the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. (We would argue that they never did, but Zia clearly thinks that we have turned a significant corner and that you confirmed this to him.)

—On covert support of the Afghan nationalists, Zia is as cooperative as he thinks he can be on a bilateral basis; the Pakistanis do not, however, want us to get involved in organizing *other countries' support* of the insurgents<sup>3</sup> (hence Zia's instruction that the *Europeans should approach him directly*).<sup>4</sup>

—The Pakistanis want and probably expect large-scale economic assistance. They put this in terms of debt relief. I have little doubt, however, that they are expecting something pretty significant for FY-82 bilateral assistance to be unveiled after our elections. They did not ask for anything but they made their expectations known.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 42, Weekly Reports (to the President), 151–161, (8/80–12/80). Top Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig, C."

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 465 and 466.

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined "other countries' support" and in the margin above these words wrote: "Have we followed up on this?" followed by an arrow pointing to the word "insurgents."

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined the words "Europeans should approach him directly." In an October 9 memorandum to Brzezinski assessing U.S.-Pakistani relations following the Zia visit, Thornton asserted that Zia's request that Carter instruct European leaders to contact him directly was a sign that Pakistan wanted to keep an "arms-length relationship" with the United States in the covert program to provide arms to the Afghan rebels. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 10/9–31/80)

The net result of all of this would seem to be a relationship in which Pakistan receives no military aid from us; makes routine military purchases, but not of the kind that would heavily affect our Indian concerns; expects substantial economic assistance; pursues its nuclear projects; leaves us to figure out how to deal with the Symington question; pursues its all-azimuths foreign policy, in which we play a significant but not dominant role; within that context continues to support the Afghan resistance; and works on a relationship with us that may win some support against India.

Since the appearance of the Pakistani policy design suits our purposes adequately, we might as well follow it and thereby try to reinforce it. In this context, we should:

—Maintain the moderate level of rhetoric that we have been following and hope that the Paks do the same. (Zia's statements to the press and subsequent "inspired" Pak press commentary are well within the acceptable range.)

—Make an effort for something substantial (i.e. much more than the planned \$100 million) in the FY 82 assistance budget for Pakistan. If we do not act soon, this situation will be completely out of hand and we will be talking about FY 83. This means that we are going to have to make the decision to go for a repeal or waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments. We will, of course, wait until after our elections but must start to lay our plans soon.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan]

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<sup>5</sup> In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "Keep expectations low."



**469. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Dampening Pakistani Expectations (C)

The President's cryptic comment on keeping Pak expectations down for FY 82 assistance<sup>2</sup> means real trouble. It is being interpreted in State as a definitive removal of Pakistan from the FY 82 aid lists.<sup>3</sup> Whether or not this is what the President intended, that is just what is going to happen if his injunction stands for even several weeks. If the President's concern is to keep the matter on ice until after the elections (because of nuclear sensitivities) we could in theory still affect the process during November. But that is very short time. Bureaucratically, the President has put things in reverse gear. It will be very hard to reverse the momentum even if we want to. Letting the "moratorium" drag on into December will make it virtually impossible to get a substantial package in FY 82 for Pakistan short of a supplemental appropriation. (S)

If the President is not going to loosen up after the elections, then I need to know that now so that I can get my hands on the money tentatively earmarked for Pakistan and put it to good use.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

That you check with the President (if necessary) to see how he intends to proceed and let Henry Owen and me know so that we can do an optimum job of managing the situation in accordance with the President's actual desires.<sup>4</sup> (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 58, Chron: 10/10–19/80. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Owen, who did not initial the memorandum. The memorandum was marked "Outside the System," but an unknown hand crossed out the marking and wrote: "reg.#" beneath it.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 468.

<sup>3</sup> In an October 14 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Muskie of Carter's comment to "Keep expectations low" regarding possible economic assistance to Pakistan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 8/80–1/81)

<sup>4</sup> At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: "Zbig—This is silly—no 'moratorium' exists. 1982 budget for *all* purposes will be tight. We'll set worldwide priorities & I'll decide what to include. J."

**470. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs (Owen) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Pakistan Debt Rescheduling (U)

When President Zia was here and asked you for a three-year debt rescheduling you asked Owen for a memo on this issue.<sup>2</sup> The Finance Minister of Pakistan informed us October 9 that a three-year IMF agreement had been reached, and formally requested a three-year rescheduling.<sup>3</sup> This memorandum seeks your decision, for the guidance of US officials in the negotiations which are scheduled for the week of December 15.<sup>4</sup> (C)

Zia requested rescheduling over a three-year period, and your advisers have given this proposal serious consideration and decided not to recommend it to you. State and Treasury are concerned that our position on debt rescheduling not be eroded. They fear that this would occur if we promised relief to Pakistan for more than 18 months. They are concerned that in this event other countries now in difficulty would seek to obtain the same treatment, especially since their economic difficulties are more severe than those of Pakistan. They are also concerned about Congressional reaction to any debt relief for more than 18 months. You are, therefore, now being presented with two options:

1. Stick to the one-year rescheduling which you have already approved. This would provide about \$75 million in relief, and it would increase budget outlays by a like amount. (OMB recommends.) (C)

2. Extend the rescheduling to 18 months, providing about \$109 million; include in the record of the meeting, if necessary to conclude the negotiations satisfactorily, a statement by the Chairman that creditor

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 60, Chron: 12/7-9/80. Confidential. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski initialed "ZB" and Carter initialed "C." A typed note at the top of the page reads: "Latest action date: Friday, December 12."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 466.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 10490 from Islamabad, October 8, the Embassy reported that Pakistani Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq and IMF Director de Larosière had agreed on an IMF assistance package. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800481-0027)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 335572 to Islamabad, December 20, the Department indicated that the negotiations were rescheduled for January 13-14, 1981. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800605-0570)

countries would carefully consider any request for further debt relief (or equivalent measures) in light of circumstances at the time of the request; and similarly we could indicate privately to the GOP that we would recommend to the incoming Administration that it seriously consider a one-year extension, after the initial 18 months, if the GOP is then in compliance with its IMF agreement. (State, Treasury, NSC Staff, and Owen recommend.) (C)

OMB believes that no commitment on debt rescheduling beyond 1981 should be made now. In the OMB view, any aid beyond the one-year debt rescheduling that you have already approved should be provided through the appropriations process. Whether this “front door” approach is feasible depends upon the attitude of the new Congress toward modification of the Glenn/Symington amendment (which currently prevents us from providing aid to Pakistan). OMB points out that Pakistan does not face imminent default, and that any extension beyond one-year rescheduling could cause a backlash from Congress against back-door financing, in addition to setting a bad precedent for other countries. (C)

*State and Treasury* share some of these concerns but feel that a package that does not go beyond eighteen months and about \$100 million in total cost would not set a bad precedent for other countries and would not require additional Congressional consultation. They agree that a statement by the Chairman could be included in the record of the meeting—that creditor countries would carefully consider requests for further debt relief. State and Treasury further believe that if such a statement is made, a private US indication to the Government of Pakistan that we will recommend to the succeeding Administration that it seriously consider a one-year extension, if Pakistan seeks such an extension and is in compliance with its IMF agreement, would be consistent with that statement. *Owen* favors this option, and believes, as does State, that anything less would be seen by the GOP as unresponsive to its concerns. (C)

YOUR DECISION:

*Alternative #1*

Stick to a one-year rescheduling. (OMB recommends.) (U)

*Alternative #2*

Extend the rescheduling to cover an eighteen-month period; include in the record of the meeting, if necessary to conclude the negotiations satisfactorily, a statement by the Chairman that creditor countries would carefully consider any request for further debt relief (or equivalent measures) in light of circumstances at the time of the request; and if such a statement is made by the Chairman we would

indicate privately to the GOP that we would recommend to the incoming Administration that it seriously<sup>5</sup> consider a one-year extension, after the initial eighteen months, if the GOP is then in compliance with its IMF agreement. (State, Treasury, NSC Staff, and Owen recommend.)<sup>6</sup> (C)

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<sup>5</sup> Carter crossed out the words: "recommend to the incoming Administration that it seriously."

<sup>6</sup> Carter checked the Approve option, to the right of which he initialed "J." In telegram 1284 from Paris, January 15, 1981, the Embassy reported that a "two-day special Pakistan Consortium meeting on debt ended January 14 with an agreement by the Consortium countries to reschedule 90 percent of ODA principle and interest—falling due between January 15, 1981 and July 14, 1982. These debt service payments will be rescheduled, refinanced or offset by other equivalent measures at terms providing at least 55 percent grant element. Total amount rescheduled is estimated by World Bank at \$233 million with the US share \$116.7 million." The Embassy also reported that Pakistani representatives expressed "deep dissatisfaction" that a greater amount was not rescheduled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810021–1167)

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#### 471. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Islamabad, January 6, 1981, 1117Z

160. Subject: (S) U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. This message attempts to summarize where we stand in our relations with Pakistan at the beginning of the new administration and makes recommendations on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. The underlying assumption of this message is that Pakistan is a country of critical importance in an area of the world vital to U.S. interests; that the question is not whether we should strengthen Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet expansion in the region but how best to do so. In the interest of brevity it is also assumed that the reader is conversant with the history of U.S. involvement in the subcontinent over the last three decades.

3. What do we want from Pakistan? Our objectives in Pakistan must of course support our objectives in the region as a whole, which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810006–1195. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

are to counter Soviet expansionism, promote long term stability and protect U.S. and Western access to the region's resources, particularly oil. Within this context it is in our interest to see a Pakistan strong enough to present a serious obstacle to Soviet expansion in the region of the Gulf and Southwest Asia. It is important that an improvement in Pakistan's defense capability take place rapidly enough to forestall a Soviet move motivated by some unforeseen opportunity or frustration with the course of the war in Afghanistan. In the entire region the Pakistani Armed Forces represent one of the few indigenous impediments to Soviet expansion. This is truer than even a year ago, with Soviet-Indian friendship just having been reaffirmed at the highest level,<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan under Soviet occupation, and conditions in Iran, chaotic as they already are, deteriorating. Economic stability in Pakistan is essential to a strong defense posture, and it follows that the strengthening of Pakistan's military capability must go hand in hand with appropriate support for economic development. Finally we will want to see Pakistan maintain and strengthen its ties with other regional states opposed to Soviet expansion, primarily China and Saudi Arabia, to a lesser degree Turkey and, at least potentially, Egypt. It is also to our advantage to see Pakistan continue to play a leading role in Islamic councils.

4. What does Pakistan want from us? What Pakistan wants from us can be stated simply: Credible security assurances, which at a minimum will guarantee Pakistan's national survival and territorial integrity. Whatever form such assurances should take they would naturally be expected to include direct access to U.S. military equipment. In conjunction with U.S. security assurances, Pakistan would expect the U.S. to contribute to its economic development and use its influence to persuade its allies, the oil-rich Gulf states and the IMF/IBRD to do likewise.

5. Impediments to achieving our goals: Fundamentally what we want and what the Pakistanis want are by no means irreconcilable, but there exist impediments to close cooperation. These are of two kinds: those that are based on misconceptions or long-cherished illusions and those that are quite real and based on practical considerations.

—A. In the first category is a long-standing Pakistani hope that somehow U.S. security assurances against Soviet aggression can be expanded to include a guarantee that the U.S. will protect Pakistan from India. A second and related Pak idea is that the U.S. is intrinsically an unreliable ally given to sudden and erratic policy shifts and with—

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to Gromyko's visit to India in February. See Document 171.

when the chips are down—a bias in favor of India. In this regard it should be noted that it is widely believed in Pakistan (with some justification) that Republican administrations are more sympathetic to Pakistan relative to India than are Democratic administrations. While in one sense this belief will be useful to policy makers in the new administration it must be seen as well as an expression of the Pakistani view that we are a fickle friend. Our view of our relations with Pakistan has also not been free of illusions. We act sometimes as if we believe we can deal with Pakistan in a vacuum. We need go back no further than a year ago for the latest example of the U.S. announcing policy decisions regarding Pakistan without adequate prior consultations with the country that would bear the consequences of these decisions. We also have in the past often acted as though our old relationship with Pakistan could be resumed at any time we were prepared to resume our role as an aid donor. Presumably we have now been disabused of this idea.

—B. There are other and more serious impediments of an immediate nature. On the Pakistani side, our support for Israel is seen as a very serious impediment to close relations with the U.S., if Pakistan is to retain its Islamic and non-aligned credentials (which were obtained in the first place precisely because the U.S. was seen as not being an effective guarantor of Pakistan's survival). To a lesser degree the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations inhibits Pakistan from drawing close to the U.S., as the Pakistanis attempt to maintain good relations (rather unsuccessfully) with at least one immediate neighbor. On our side, we have been inhibited in achieving a closer relationship with Pakistan by public and congressional attitudes both toward the continuation of non-representative government and martial law in Pakistan and the continuation of a nuclear development program which could in the not too distant future (perhaps as little as 2–3 years) result in Pakistan setting off a nuclear explosion.

6. Positive elements. Although there are impediments to closer U.S.-Pakistani cooperation there are also a number of positive elements, some of them stimulated by the very threat we seek to counter. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has generally drawn the Islamic world together in opposition to Soviet expansionism and, specifically, has made the Gulf states willing to provide some economic support to Pakistan to help meet this threat. The same is true of Pak-China relations. A second positive element is that since the Soviet invasion and the initial rejection of the U.S. aid offer there has been a growing realism in U.S.-Pakistani views of the other's needs and interests, as evidenced recently by the Zia-Carter meeting, our decision to reschedule Pakistan's debt,<sup>3</sup> and increased Pakistani interest in acquiring new

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 465, 466, and 470.

types of U.S. military equipment. Finally the new U.S. administration has not only the clean slate of any new government but is seen by the Pakistanis as determined to take a strong stand against Soviet expansionism and particularly in this area of the world.

7. What do we need to do? Although our interests in Pakistan and what we see as our most important objectives have been presented in stark outline, we believe that based on the facts presented here certain policy conclusions are fairly clear. If we are to effectively and expeditiously improve Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet aggression in the region the following steps need to be taken:

—A. We need first of all to go considerably further in reestablishing our credibility. This means defining our policy objectives here and stating them clearly to Pakistan and its neighbors. If we are to strengthen Pakistan against the Soviets we will have to face up to Indian opposition to any strengthening of Pakistani military capability. Given Mrs. Gandhi's policy of friendship toward the Soviet Union and almost paranoid mistrust of the U.S., it seems that the best we can hope for is minimum good relations with India, and we should accept that limitation. While the Indians should understand that we will not allow their objections to prevent our strengthening Pakistan, the Pakistanis must also understand that we can offer no absolute guarantees against India. We also need to make it clear to the Pakistanis, their neighbors, our allies, and U.S. public and congressional opinion that the situation that we face in Southwest Asia and the Gulf is of sufficient gravity (1) to override our concern with the lack of representative government in the country and (2) to require us to seek the removal of the legislative prohibition on aid resulting from Pakistan's nuclear [omission in the original] government is in control [omission in the original] to resist Soviet aggression.

—B. Once congressional restrictions on aid are removed and our policy clarified, we will have a better chance of influencing a Pakistani decision to develop nuclear weapons (which also has its origins in Pakistani fears that the U.S. is not a reliable protector). Our non-proliferation policies have remained static in recent years, despite conspicuous changes in the international environment. The USG must, and presumably will, reexamine and revise those policies, which have unfortunately failed to achieve our non-proliferation objectives—in Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, perhaps Iraq, and elsewhere. We need to keep working toward our objectives, but not with methods that have demonstrably failed, and not at the expense of other objectives such as enhancing the security of the region and stemming Soviet expansionism.

—C. After these steps have been taken we should reach an understanding with the Pakistanis on the terms of U.S. security assurances

and then on the levels of U.S. military and economic support. Both the assurances and the material support must be sufficient to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that any attempt to dominate the region by either overrunning or intimidating Pakistan will meet with a level of resistance that would make such a move extremely costly. We should also remember that economic disorders precipitated the downfall of Bhutto and Ayub Khan governments and that any significant shortage of basic food commodities or run down of monetary reserves which threatened the GOP's ability to meet its financial commitment could put the Zia government to the test. U.S. willingness to take the lead in providing PL-480 commodities and BOP assistance will be viewed as a crucial indicator of our commitment to Pakistan.

—D. Once we have made our position clear and shown our willingness to provide U.S. resources to strengthen Pakistan, we should both encourage our allies to increase their aid and encourage Pakistan to pursue the building up of a network of relationships in the region with like-minded states. These would include first of all China and Saudi Arabia, but also the other Islamic states opposed to Soviet expansionism. How such a network of relationships would fit into U.S. defense arrangements for the Middle East and the Gulf is beyond the scope of this message.

**Hummel**



# Sri Lanka

## 472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sri Lanka<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 30, 1977, 2140Z

70468. Subject: Sri Lanka Ambassador's Call on the Acting Secretary.

Sri Lanka Ambassador Kanakaratne made a brief courtesy call on the Acting Secretary March 29. The Ambassador noted that there were no significant bilateral problems and the conversation therefore was broad-gauged, touching upon a number of areas of general concern to both countries. The Acting Secretary identified some of these as including Indian Ocean policy, Sri Lanka's democratic institutions, and its key role in multilateral fora. The U.S., he noted, would be watching with expectation the forthcoming New Delhi Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference.<sup>2</sup> The discussion also covered Sri Lanka's social achievements, which the Ambassador stressed as a long-standing GSL priority along with the preservation of a democratic institutional framework and human rights. Kanakaratne also conveyed GSL appreciation for U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka, both bilateral and multilateral. The Acting Secretary expressed special interest in Sri Lanka's family planning achievements and stated our satisfaction with the constructive use to which U.S. aid has been put.

Christopher

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770110-0613. Confidential. Drafted by Thibault; cleared in S/S and D; approved by Dubs.

<sup>2</sup> Sri Lanka held the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement from August 1976 until September 1979. The New Delhi Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference took place April 6-11.

#### 473. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Colombo, July 22, 1977, 1053Z

2539. Subj: New Sri Lanka Prime Minister.

1. Sri Lanka's new Prime Minister,<sup>2</sup> 70-year old Junius Richard Jayewardene, is a man whose total career has been devoted to politics. After thirty-seven years in the electoral arena J.R. has finally earned supreme power. That it was earned, there can be no doubt. His reputation for thorough organization, hard work, and political astuteness is more than borne out by the smooth and effective operation of the campaign which brought the overwhelming election victory of the UNP. His followers, to whom he is "the leader", shower him with praise for his personal discipline, keen sense of morality, and toughness (or what his opponents call ruthlessness). No one has ever suggested, however, that he is endowed with great personal charm or warmth. His image is of an aloof, unsmiling authority figure. He is certainly not of the "press the flesh" style of politician. His followers prefer instead to keep him on a pedestal and at a respected distance. His austere costume of "national dress" (white shirt and sarong) invites comparison with Morarji Desai of India, and, indeed, he has benefitted from a similar image. (He does not smoke or drink, although he apparently has no special dietary habits.)

2. His political philosophy is difficult to pin down. He is criticized by opponents as pro-Western (whence his nickname "Yankee Dickie") but his might be more a function of his distrust toward Communism (one factor, perhaps, in his campaign attack on the Soviet Embassy) than any uncritical admiration of the U.S. economic system. He has for some time advocated a form of democratic socialism. Aided by the pressure both of events and of the youth in the UNP he has brought much of the party hierarchy around to the more statist economic viewpoint that is today the sine qua non of Sri Lanka politics. He has made it clear that he accepts the social and economic reforms, including land reform, of the previous government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770262-0236. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2528 from Colombo, July 22, the Embassy reported: "The United National Party (UNP) scored an unprecedented landslide over Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SRFP) in general elections July 21. The UNP now has a clear majority in the new 166 member assembly." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770260-0904)

3. Particularly in the early years of independent Ceylon, J.R. worked periodically on foreign affairs. He is proud of his co-authorship of the Colombo Plan and was a Governor of the World Bank and IMF in the early 1950's. He represented Ceylon at the Algeria UNCTAD Conference in 1967 and travelled extensively on government missions.

4. Although he has had party critics, the prominent ones have been forced out of the UNP; disloyalty to J.R. by Rukman Senanayake, ex-Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake's nephew and political heir was punished by expulsion from the party. J.R. has been particularly quick to stamp out any cliques threatening his leadership.

5. Personal data: Born September 17, 1906, J.R. is of the Goyigama caste, and thus of acceptably high birth to become Prime Minister. Although baptized as an Anglican, he later became Buddhist. His education was at Royal College and the Ceylon Law College, both in Colombo. Unlike others of his generation from wealthy backgrounds, he and others in his family did not attend university in England, a fact in which they take quiet pride.

6. In the 1930's he married Elina Rupasinghe, reportedly a rather quiet woman. They had only one child, Ravi, who after marriage and three children, fast living, divorce, and careers as a businessman, pilot and captain in the Ceylon army volunteers, entered the Buddhist monkhood in Thailand. Earlier this year he left the monastery and married a burgher (Anglo-Ceylonese) former air hostess Penny White; they now live in Australia.

7. Among J.R.'s seven brothers and sisters, mostly professional people, are Harry W. Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka's bar association, R.P. Jayewardene, a member of the American College of Cardiologists, and Ione, wife of the late N.W. Authukorale, former Counselor in the Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington. Although a talented and fairly large family, it does not appear likely to be employed as prominently in government jobs as was the extended Ratwatte clan of his predecessor Sirimavo Bandaranaike (nee Ratwatte).

8. The Jayewardene family is wealthy, and has business interests in textiles (Asian cotton mills) and journalism (shares in now government-controlled Lake House, founded by J.R.'s maternal grandfather).

9. Political career: 1940—elected to Colombo Municipal Council; 1943—elected to State Council; 1947—elected to Parliament; 1947–53—Minister of Finance; 1953–56—Minister of Agriculture and Food; 1956—defeated in Bandaranaike landslide; 1960—elected to Parliament; 1960–65—Deputy Leader of the Opposition; 1965–70—Minister of State, Deputy Minister of Defence and External Affairs; 1970–77, Leader of the Opposition.

**Perkins**

**474. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Colombo, August 22, 1977, 0546Z

3050. Subj: Meeting With Prime Minister J.R. Jayewardene.

1. In first interview with new PM Jayewardene, I offered to arrange briefing on naval activity of Soviet and American navies. He showed no interest, saying he was adequately informed for his purposes. The important thing from his point of view was that the external fleets not disappear since that would "leave us at the mercy of the Indians, who have the only regional navy of consequence." He said he had discussed this with Mrs. Bandaranaike already and she agreed.

2. I indicated the seriousness with which the U.S. and the Soviets were trying to reach mutually agreed limitation, but there was no evidence either were ready to abandon the Indian Ocean to the other or to Ceylon's larger neighbors. His forthrightness is far more characteristic of the present PM than his predecessor, but his frankness must be protected.

**Wriggins**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770302-0297. Secret; Exdis.

**475. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sri Lanka<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1978, 0204Z

89598. Subject: Jayewardene Letter to the President.

Sri Lanka Embassy delivered on April 6 following letter from President Jayewardene to President Carter. Your comments would be appreciated by April 10 for inclusion in draft reply to Jayewardene. (Letter dated March 29, 1978).

Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group scheduled to be held in May this year.

The government of the United National Party which was voted to office in July 1977 with an overwhelming and unprecedented majority inherited a rundown economy. This was the cumulative result of adverse terms of trade over the past several years, unfavorable weather conditions affecting the production of rice and tea in particular, coupled with the ill-considered economic policies of the previous administration. It is widely recognized that this country has, over the years, succeeded in containing population growth, ensuring a more equitable distribution of income, and maintaining a quality of life not matched by many other countries with far larger per capita incomes. It is nevertheless also true that in more recent years the country's social achievements, and its capacity to meet the basic needs of its people built up over a period of three decades, has been eroded by a conspicuous lack of resources to maintain them. This has been caused by a failure to realize the full growth potential of the economy which averaged under 3 percent in the last 7 years, resulting from, among others, a diminution in the rate of savings, both public and private, a lack of well conceived and viable projects and a general misallocation of resources. The emasculation of the private sector and the uncertainties caused by an excessively dirigiste economy, characterized by a proliferation both of quantitative controls and relative price distortions have also contributed to this state of affairs. Successive administrations have shirked the tough decisions required and have responded with populist palliatives to overcome current difficulties in a manner which has only served to compound our unemployment problem.

We look upon the mandate given to our party by the people as a clear endorsement of the policies of the United National Party, more

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149–1020. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John R. Malott (NEA/INS); approved by Lande.

particularly its economic policies and by implication a rejection of the policies pursued by the previous administration. It is, therefore, a mandate not to shirk the tough economic decisions so obviously required at a very early stage in my administration so that these may bear fruit within the constitutional lifetime of my government which is committed to the preservation of democratic processes. It is however also to be expected that the institution of an executive presidency<sup>2</sup> together with the contemplated adoption of proportional representation will be conducive to that degree of political stability required for development within a democratic system.

My government has in other words established the framework both of popular and institutional support required to carry through economic reforms aimed at promoting economic growth and at fostering a climate suitable for investment both in the public and private sectors, while conserving those social values that have in the past resulted in a unique quality of life and regard for basic needs. The policy of the United National Party is, in brief, to create and maintain a just society within the framework of a liberal economy.

Deriving from these considerations, several measures have been taken in the budget proposals announced in November last year in an attempt to correct the deficiencies of the past and to set a more rational course for economic development. The unification and the floating of the rate of exchange for the Sri Lanka rupee at a realistic level, the increase of the guaranteed price to producers of rice, and the removal to a large extent of import and exchange controls, were all measures aimed at correcting the more obvious price distortions in the economy. Action has also been initiated to increase productivity and improve efficiency of management particularly in the public sector enterprises. In particular public sector enterprises management has been transferred to private hands while retaining the principle of public ownership. The food subsidy which our people have been accustomed to enjoy over the past 30 years or more has been removed from one half of the population, with incomes of over rs. 300 per month per family unit. This attempt to shift resources from consumption to development has thus taken into account the necessity to protect the nutritional needs of, in particular, the bottom 50 percent of income earners. Several other

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 963 from Colombo, March 1, the Embassy summarized recent constitutional changes in the Sri Lanka Government. The Embassy reported: "Sri Lanka's constitution is still being evolved. A second amendment to the constitution was passed in October 1977 changing the presidency from a figure head, ceremonial position to a strong executive similar to the French model. On February 4, 1978, J.R. Jayewardene, until then Prime Minister, automatically became President. The second amendment gives him strong executive powers, but the mechanism he will use for implementing those powers is unclear." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780094-1168)

measures will nevertheless be required on a phased basis to reallocate resources in this manner, as the economy responds to the new measures and employment increases. Our being a parliamentary democracy, there are obvious constraints affecting the pace of change but not their direction. The fact that these decisions were taken at the very commencement of my administration is the surest guarantee of visible results within the next several years.

The International Monetary Fund has endorsed the economic policy of my government by extending essentially bridging balance of payments support to sustain the economy in this transitional period of structural change. This support is necessarily of a short-term duration, even taking into account the resources we expect to obtain on completion of the formal negotiations under the Extended Fund Facility and the Supplementary Credit Facility. It will not be expected to sustain a long-term development programme entailing considerable outlays upon initial rehabilitation of run down sectors and defined areas of economically feasible productive investment. For this, we have necessarily to turn to bilateral assistance and to international institutions such as the World Bank.

The twin problems the government has inherited are, in summary, unemployment and a stagnant economy. About 25 percent of the work-force of the country are unemployed, the vast majority of whom are in the age group of 14 to 30 years, with a secondary school education. While we realize that these problems could not be resolved immediately, and that more durable solutions take time to evolve, I cannot emphasize too strongly the imperative need to make a quick impact on employment creation in order to meet the expectations of our people, to prevent social discontent, and to maintain the momentum of the adjustment process upon which we have launched without which the required domestic savings for an acceptable medium term investment programme cannot in political terms be generated.

It is largely for this reasons that my government has given priority to the acceleration of the Mahaweli Ganga development scheme, a large multipurpose irrigation cum power project over the next 5 years. The priority areas that have been identified for commencement involve an expenditure during this period of around rs. 11,000 million in current terms. Magnitudes of this order appear to be sensible in macro economic terms in the sense of leaving room for other needed productive investment during this period and permitting their immediate commencement. Among these areas is the need to rehabilitate the agricultural sector, more particularly the tree crop sector which is our principal source of foreign exchange earnings, the rehabilitation of our transport (road and rail) and health infra-structures, the development of industry, fisheries, housing and minor irrigation. But I cannot emphasize too

strongly that unless a commencement is made on Mahaweli construction with the Victoria multipurpose complex being initiated in March 1979 and parallel employment activity being launched on irrigation channel construction in anticipation of the dam being built, the political will to move away from subsidies towards development cannot be sustained in a democracy such as ours.

The Mahaweli programme is expected in the next 5 years to bring under irrigated cultivation about 300,000 acres of new land in the Mahaweli Basin, besides generating 250 megawatts of additional electric power, apart from the consideration that its early commencement is an essential prerequisite for a more rapid adjustment process. It will also give employment to 400,000 persons during the construction and development phase of land for farm families besides several agro-based industries and ancillary services. The government is aware of the need to plan the execution of the project and consider carefully its technical feasibility and economic viability in the usual micro economic sense. Nevertheless we cannot afford the luxury of leisurely progress on a project that has already captured the imagination of the people and has become an essential element of nation building. It is our intention, therefore, to undertake as a matter of urgent priority, the execution of a substantial portion of the project that has been determined as a basis for technical and economic evaluation and being capable of completion in 5 to 6 years. In this effort we need the understanding and support of the donor governments and institutions.

Two other major activities which my government shall undertake shortly are the establishment of an export processing zone and the Greater Colombo urban housing development project, involving the resettling and rehousing of urban slum dwellers.

Legislation has already been enacted for the establishment of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission with autonomy in making quick decisions on important aspects. An area of 200 square miles between the airport and harbour in Colombo has been identified for the establishment of an industrial investment zone where tax concessions and inducements generally not less favorable than those accorded to industries set up in free trade zones in other countries would be allowed. We look upon the establishment of this zone as yet another area which would provide employment to our youth and at the same time promote increased economic activity, though we recognize that this benefit will accrue both to the extent that my government inspires international confidence and the determined at the pace at which international economic recovery continues to take place. We need both financial support from donor governments for building the infra-structure of the zone and would also welcome any encouragement friendly countries can give to would be entrepreneurs to invest in our industrial investment zone.



The other major area of emphasis of government policy—the Greater Colombo urban housing development project—is basically designed to help the urban poor presently occupying slums to move into housing units with basic facilities and to generate employment in construction activity. This entails the reclamation of land around Colombo and the construction of housing units. Donor support in a particularly imaginative venture such as this bearing in mind that Sri Lanka is committed to maintaining the traditional over-whelmingly rural balance of its population would be welcome. Rural housing will also be undertaken both by the state and on an aided self-help basis.

Institutional arrangements have been made for identifying and developing viable projects suitable for foreign financing and a committee of development secretaries under the chairmanship of the Secretary to the Cabinet and serviced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning meets weekly to review these and other policy issues. While several projects have been identified, it is expected that the development of detailed project proposals will take a little more time. The portfolio of projects is expected to be ready by September this year and it is our expectation that an annex outlining proposals, with suggestions for feasibility study, will be made available to donor governments as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the country needs considerable foreign assistance to sustain its liberalized import policy, to strengthen the infrastructure and to maintain and increase production in the agricultural and industrial sectors. While project aid remains a medium-term objective, our present and immediate need is for a quickly disbursable programme of commodity assistance.

I shall appreciate it greatly if you would, in the light of the reasons stated above, direct the officials of your government to explore and consider favorably the prospects for making a substantially increased pledge of assistance at the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka aid group.

I wish to thank you, the Government of the people of the United States of America for the generous assistance extended to Sri Lanka in the past.

Yours sincerely,

(J.R. Jayewardene) End text.

Vance

**476. Letter From President Carter to Sri Lankan President Jayewardene<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March 29 concerning the forthcoming meeting of the Sri Lanka Aid Group.<sup>2</sup> I recognize the special importance to you of this meeting, the first since your Government came to power and instituted major economic reforms.

Since 1975, the United States has increased its development assistance to Sri Lanka. Indeed, from 1976 through 1979 we will provide more assistance to Sri Lanka than we did during the previous quarter century.

Our foreign assistance policies toward Sri Lanka and other nations direct our support primarily toward agricultural and rural development and the improvement of health and social infrastructure. Ambassador Wriggins will be pleased to provide you with more detailed information on how our policies relate to your development goals.

We continue to be interested in assisting the important Mahaweli Ganga irrigation project. The United States funded the original study of this project in 1961, and we are now providing assistance for part of its construction. We have had numerous discussions with your Government, the World Bank, and the other donor nations on the Mahaweli Ganga project and seek specific activities that would be consistent with our policies. We are ready to collaborate with your Government on an environmental impact study of the project and would like to be as forthcoming as possible in providing additional assistance. We await your Government's plans and the results of the World Bank study on the proposed acceleration of this project.

The United States seeks a mutually beneficial relationship with Sri Lanka that will enjoy the widest possible support from your people. I believe that we are making progress together and look forward to continued cooperation with you.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780088-1654. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 475. The Sri Lanka Aid Group meeting took place in May in Paris. Telegram 2637 from Colombo, June 7, reported De Mel's June 6 public report of the Paris meeting to Parliament. De Mel stated: "donor countries and institutions had expressed full support for the 'sound economic and financial policies of the J.R. Jayewardene government,'" and had pledged around \$385 million for development projects other than the Mahaweli project. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780240-0550)

**477. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Colombo, May 16, 1978, 1130Z

2292. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With President J.R. Jayewardene.

1. Summary. Ambassador had requested appointment with President prior to 20 May departure for consultation in Washington. President responded with invitation to lunch on May 15 in two hour relaxed luncheon with President and Mrs. Jayewardene, Ambassador and Mrs. Wriggins had an easy discussion on many subjects. This cable summarizes discussion on Tamil-Sinhalese problems, Colombo Plan and food aid, and internal politics. End summary.

2. Tamil-Sinhalese problems.

Over past several weeks, militant group of young Tamil separatists (Liberation Tigers) are alleged to have assassinated five police officers. President has ordered all-out effort by police and military to track them down. His most intense worry is his fear that should the Tamil Tigers kill only one Sinhalese, the country could erupt in a communal explosion, as angry Sinhalese would take revenge. That is why the army is on special alert (this will be covered in septel),<sup>2</sup> why special effort is being applied to pursuing Tamil extremists, and why police are being given special authority to pick up suspects.

3. The communal situation is so incendiary that he is seeking special powers to ensure that the press does not publicize any incidents where a Sinhalese is killed, though he will avoid anything that smacks of "emergency powers."

4. Although Mrs. Bandaranaike believes the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Tamil Tigers work closely together, President believes they are not connected. I speculated on the virtues and liabilities of a search-and-destroy policy that policy and military have been instructed to carry out, pointing out that it could backfire. He argued government had this well under control.

5. He hopes that the establishment of district Ministers and the consequent decentralization of administration with local MP's having more responsibility for development will ease Tamil anxieties. For many years the Tamil Federal Party agitated for regional autonomy and the district Ministry reform will inconspicuously bring that about.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780217–0830. Secret. Sent for information to Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, and New Delhi.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

(Comment: While in our view this reform is likely to satisfy the bulk of the Tamil community, it will not be sufficient to pull the teeth of the Tamil Tigers.)

#### 6. Possible foreign power interest in north?

President raised with me the question of whether a major foreign power could be behind the Tamil extremists. I said I did not know; the Libyans occasionally dabbled in such situations. He dismissed this with the observation, "I am not afraid of money or training from them." He thinks Tamil extremists do find sanctuary in south India which is annoying but not really worrisome. He wonders whether Soviet Union does not have sufficient interest in gaining a strategic position in northern Ceylon, including Trincomalee, to tempt them to fish in these troubled waters. I did not contradict this view although I said we had no evidence to confirm it. He acknowledged he had no evidence either although "Soviet personnel have been active with many visits to the north" and are being watched.

7. He asked whether I thought there were any states nowadays that sought to extend their territories like the old imperialists. I replied that probably not—the risks were too great. There were other ways of consolidating influence such as supporting a coup group or providing military assistance to a so-called "liberation movement." We saw numerous examples in Africa right now. He replied, yes, the Cubans are really mercenaries of the Russians.

#### 8. Cabinet changes.

I reported to him the widespread feeling outside the government that things had been going too slowly during the past three months and many people thought Cabinet changes were overdue. He said he expected to make some substantial changes within the next month as soon as legislation for district Ministers was accepted by the Assembly. It is clear from his comments that he is so concerned about the communal issue and the strong anti-Tamil sentiments among some members of his Cabinet that he is not now ready to run the risk of losing political support by unceremoniously dropping Ministers who are his political supporters. He is aware that people feel he is being too kind to some of his colleagues but this is not the time to generate political antagonisms. If he found irrefutable evidence that they were corrupt, he would not hesitate to dismiss them, and the establishment of district Ministers may provide within the month a face saver for those eased out.

#### 9. Prime Minister and foreign affairs.

A number of diplomats have been puzzled as to whether to discuss international affairs with Prime Minister Premadasa, who is very busy in developing Colombo and has shown little interest in foreign policy

problems (though he was impressed with President Carter whom he met on his trip before last year's American election). The President urged me to keep in touch with the Prime Minister and to share with him our views on international affairs.

10. Cuba.

Mentioning Moscow as Cuba's paymaster and Cubans as mercenaries in Africa, President said Cuba as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement could cause problems, but the Yugoslavs and others are again active and should be helpful. The NAM is clearly not one of President's priority concerns. He stressed again his determination to be non-aligned though clearly "very friendly to the United States and Great Britain."

11. Non-Proliferation Treaty.

When he raised the issue of "total" disarmament as a worthy principle, I mentioned the difficulties of moving from here to there. He stressed the importance of stating high principles while I urged the necessity of moving toward them in some concrete way. I urged that one way of moving in direction of disarmament would be if Sri Lanka would ratify the NPT which it signed in 1968. Whether the message got through, I'm not sure.

12. Colombo Plan.

On the Colombo Plan I indicated we were pleased to be hosts for the next meeting,<sup>3</sup> that the Colombo Plan had had its utilities and wondered if he had any thoughts on how it could be more useful in the future. He had obviously not thought about it in some time but said he would put some thought to it. He has no plans to travel "until my job is done here."

13. Food and PL 480.

On food self-sufficiency and the price of flour, I pointed out the possible difficulties to us for future PL 480 allocations if it became a general practice for Sri Lanka to sell rice on the international market. This year's crop has been so bountiful and their earlier purchases of rice in Pakistan as insurance had been such that they now have a clear surplus which they expect to sell for foreign exchange earnings. I

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 153372 to multiple posts, June 16, announced: "The United States Government will host the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia in Washington at both the ministerial and officials level. The officials meeting of the committee will be held from November 28 to December 1, 1978 and the ministerial meeting from December 4 to 6, 1978. The Colombo Plan was established in 1950 in Colombo, Sri Lanka to provide a forum for focusing attention on the role of economic assistance in helping to raise living standards in the Asian countries. The United States has been a full member since 1951." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780253-0757)

reminded him of the agreement to make a study of the disincentive effects of PL 480 and he agreed to raise the question with the central bank.

14. Other problems.

In recent surprise personal visits to the port and airport, he has been horrified at the lack of discipline and the way equipment has been allowed to run down. He has appointed General Attygalle, retired Commander and Chief of the Army, as his special administrator for both and hopes that things can be put right within the next six months.

15. While clearly under the burden of numerous problems, President seems serene but by no means smug. He indicated Lee Kwan Yew sought advice on meditation and how to face difficulties with calm. In return, he wished he could turn the place over to Lee Kuan Yew for six months.

16. He gave me a copy of a book about himself to present to President Carter,<sup>4</sup> to whom he wished me to convey his respects and best wishes. I expressed appreciation for the book and also for his government's decision to adhere to the three anti-hijacking conventions, which help demonstrate how little international support hijackers are now receiving.

Wriggins

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to J.R. Jayewardene of *Sri Lanka: The Inside Story of how the Prime Minister led the UNP to Victory in 1977*, by T.D.S.A. Dissanayaka (Colombo: Swastika Press, 1977).

**478. Message From President Carter to Sri Lankan President Jayewardene<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to extend my personal welcome to you as you touch upon American soil. I hope that your brief visit in California will be a relaxing interlude between your labors at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Havana and your official visit to Japan.<sup>2</sup>

The United States believes that the Non-Aligned Movement can play a creative role in international affairs—if the Movement is not diverted from the path of genuine non-alignment. As your country has long been a spokesman of true non-alignment, I am glad that you decided personally to attend the recently concluded Summit in your role as outgoing Chairman, and as representative of your country.

Our countries share a common hope for a peaceful and orderly world. I know you are aware of the time and effort I and my government spent negotiating the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union. I deeply believe that the limitations and reductions provided by the SALT II Treaty are of genuinely historic significance, and I am confident that this treaty will win the support of the United States Senate, as it has won the support of governments throughout the world.

I would like to compliment you on the innovations in economic and development policy undertaken in your two years as leader of Sri Lanka. Because your country is one of the few multi-party democracies in Asia, it is particularly gratifying to witness the substantial economic progress that has taken place in those years. I know that this progress

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 19, Near Eastern and South Asia (Except Pakistan), 1978–1979. No classification marking. The message was sent to Jayewardene under a September 6 covering letter from Newsom. (Ibid.) Jayewardene visited Los Angeles September 7–9.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 4526 from Colombo, August 30, the Embassy recommended sending Jayewardene a message from Carter: “It would be well received by him and I think beneficial for us. We have a number of indications that Jayewardene plans to play a more substantive role on behalf of the moderates at Havana than we had thought before. The degree of success he achieves notwithstanding, exposure to the realities and ramifications internationally of NAM deliberations may prompt President Jayewardene to take a greater interest in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy formulation in the post-Havana period. If this should turn out to be the case, we may find Sri Lanka more responsive to our positions on a number of important issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790395–0770) The Havana Non-Aligned Movement Summit took place September 3–9.

has resulted in an improving investment climate, which, I hope, will mean closer economic relations between our countries.

Finally, let me express my satisfaction with the excellent state of bilateral relations between our countries. On the basis of our mutual commitment to democratic institutions and the search for world peace, I am sure that our countries will continue to work together, bilaterally and internationally, in pursuit of these goals.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**479. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 12, 1979

SUBJECT

Proposed VOA Expansion in Sri Lanka: History and Current Status

In his message to Congress of March 22, 1977 the President mentioned the need to locate four additional VOA transmitters in the Far East.<sup>2</sup> The President did not specify countries: VOA considered as possible locations the Philippines (further expansion), Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Sri Lanka where small VOA transmitters had been constructed in the early 1950's. In December 1977 VOA Deputy Director Hans Tuch travelled to Colombo to discuss the possibilities with Ambassador Howard Wriggins.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800005-0443. Confidential. Drafted by Lee O. Coldren (NEA/INS). An unknown hand initialed the memorandum for Saunders.

<sup>2</sup> On March 22, 1977, Carter sent a message, along with a report, to Congress on U.S. international broadcasting. For the text of the message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 478.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 4913 from Colombo, December 14, 1977, reported on Tuch's visit to Colombo. During the visit, the Embassy informed him that "the political situation in Sri Lanka was insufficiently stable to justify the investment of some \$15 million in four VOA transmitters, which would probably not be ready for business for 5-6 years." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465-0209)



Ambassador Wriggins at that time opposed approaching the newly installed United National Party administration of J.R. Jayewardene. He believed—and the Department concurred—that the volatile nature of the Sri Lankan politics could result in the loss of any substantial long term VOA investment in Sri Lanka, even if in the short term the Jayewardene Government should welcome such construction. A large VOA installation in Sri Lanka would be an unavoidable target for the left in the next election in Sri Lanka. The present government probably would be accused of compromising Sri Lanka's non-alignment. The visibility of a VOA relay station, both in its construction and when finished, could also be a tempting target for peaceful demonstrations or even terrorist action.

In addition to these considerations there are some specific obstacles in reaching a new agreement. The current VOA agreement states that the Government of Sri Lanka has the right to veto both the content and languages of VOA broadcasts. This is contrary to VOA's current charter and would have to be dropped, presenting a target for opposition assertions that J.R. Jayewardene (who in the past earned the epithet "Yankee Dick") had sold out to the Americans. It is worth noting that the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which forms the core of the left in Sri Lanka, is not a fringe opposition, but has alternated in power with the UNP for decades. After the SLFP's last electoral victory in 1970 the Peace Corps and the Asia Foundation were expelled and AID programs curtailed.

Convinced that Sri Lanka did not offer a good prospect for VOA expansion and untroubled operation for the 15 year period needed to justify the investment, VOA looked elsewhere in 1978. Unable to find alternative sites, VOA once again turned to Sri Lanka.

As there appeared to be no other options available to VOA and the UNP government was more firmly established, Ambassador Wriggins reversed his position during consultations in the Department in May 1979.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly he informally approached President Jayewardene with the general VOA proposal on June 20. Jayewardene was mildly encouraging and suggested that the subject be discussed after the Havana Non-Aligned Summit. In reporting that meeting (Colombo

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<sup>4</sup> During a meeting with VOA, ICA, and Department of State officials on May 24, Wriggins agreed that the Sri Lankan Government should be approached with the proposed VOA expansion, but he warned: "If something happens to President J.R. Jayewardene, there could be trouble for VOA. J.R. would see the foreign exchange, technology transfer, and so on, advantages. Alternate successors may not be so sophisticated. I expect the Foreign Ministry would be opposed—they cherish non-aligned equal distant from all major powers. Broadcasting in Russian & Chinese therefore, could pose problems for them." (Memorandum of conversation, May 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 73, Sri Lanka: 1/77-1/80)

3234, attached)<sup>5</sup> Wriggins stated his assumption that VOA would staff out the design and a statement of policy concerning the proposed facilities for Embassy review prior to preliminary formal discussions in October.

VOA did not do so. After we called this to their attention in November, however, VOA Acting Director Tuch asked Wriggins to approach the GSL with a proposal based on past discussions between VOA, State, and the Ambassador (cable attached).<sup>6</sup> In a phone conversation with the INS Country Director on December 12, Wriggins reported that the VOA engineer resident in Colombo is hesitant to approach the GSL without a more formal proposal. Nonetheless, Wriggins plans to discuss the general prospects for VOA expansion at a farewell meeting with President Jayewardene today<sup>7</sup> and seek a reaffirmation of his supportive position.

We are sending a memorandum to VOA informing them of this conversation and urging that they promptly staff out a clear-cut proposal if Jayewardene provides an affirmative response.<sup>8</sup>

During Don Toussaint's consultations,<sup>9</sup> the current state of play as described above was discussed with ICA Director Reinhardt, and in two meetings held with VOA Acting Director Tuch and staff.

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached. Telegram 3234 from Colombo, June 21, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790327-0158.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is telegram 28203 from USICA to Colombo, November 14, which conveyed the ICA's request to Wriggins.

<sup>7</sup> No record of the meeting was found.

<sup>8</sup> No memorandum was found.

<sup>9</sup> On November 27, Toussaint was appointed Ambassador to Sri Lanka and Maldives.

**480. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State and the International Communication Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Colombo, January 25, 1980, 1130Z

400. Subj: VOA Expansion: Meeting With Jayewardene. Ref: Colombo 292.<sup>2</sup>

1. C—Entire text.

2. In January 25 meeting with President Jayewardene, Ambassador took up expansion of VOA installation, explaining we wish to secure GSL agreement in principle to proposed expansion and, assuming Jayewardene so agreed, plan to discuss matter with Minister of State De Alwis<sup>3</sup> in greater detail.

3. After noting present arrangements are due to expire in 1981 and have never been source of friction between U.S. and GSL, Ambassador gave in summary form outline of our thinking re expanded installation. He noted differences new arrangements would make in number and size of transmitters, buildings, number of American staff, geographical coverage (“VOA would have capability for broadcasts to Soviet Central Asia and western China, as well as northern India”), and operational management and control.

4. Jayewardene said he could see no objection in principle to what we have in mind and encouraged Ambassador to take matter up with De Alwis in order to get agreement in principle. (Ambassador has requested early meeting with De Alwis.)<sup>4</sup>

5. Jayewardene raised no questions re languages of broadcasts, duration of agreement or control of program contents. Immediately after Ambassador noted need for VOA managerial and operational control of expanded installation, however, Jayewardene commented he would ask De Alwis to bring before Cabinet or directly to President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800043–0355. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 292 from Colombo, January 21, requested from the Department information on the scope of future VOA transmission from Sri Lanka and the type of transmitters VOA would use. The requested information was to be used in preparing for discussion with Jayewardene. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D80035–1293)

<sup>3</sup> Dustan De Alwis, Sri Lankan Minister of State and Presidential Counsel.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 509 from Colombo, February 1, reported Toussaint’s meeting with De Alwis. The Embassy commented: “Although reaction was basically positive, De Alwis and top aide were clearly troubled by VOA need for managerial/operational control. De Alwis will discuss proposed expansion with Jayewardene, who will decide whether Sri Lankan agreement in principle requires Cabinet discussion; if so, and De Alwis considers this likely, it will be about one month before agreement in principle can be given.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800056–0659)

himself any questions needing attention before GSL agreement in principle is given.

6. Comments: While timing of latter remark may have been purely coincidental, it could well be indication we are in for some trouble on point of U.S. managerial and operation control over expanded installation.<sup>5</sup>

**Toussaint**

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<sup>5</sup> The Sri Lankan Ministry of State informed the United States that it would seek Cabinet approval of the revision to the VOA agreement on December 8. (Telegram 6104 from Colombo, December 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800597-0978) On January 22, 1981, the *Ceylon Daily News* reported that the Sri Lankan Government had approved the revision of the VOA agreement. (Telegram 336 from Colombo, January 22, 1981; National Archives, RG 59, D810032-1042)

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#### **481. Report Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 20, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Sri Lanka.]

2. *Sri Lankan Initiative*: President Jayewardene expressed some doubts to Ambassador Toussaint on Sunday<sup>2</sup> about the wisdom of his own idea of calling an international meeting to consider a collective appeal for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Jayewardene provided very little further information on his plan, and then only when asked, and he seemed to be thinking more about whether to proceed than how to proceed. Toussaint comments that the lessening of Jayewardene's earlier determination to organize international pressure against the Soviet invasion<sup>3</sup> could be the result of soundings he has made with other countries he had in mind for the collective appeal; or it could also result from doubts raised by his foreign minister. The ambassador also notes that while Jayewardene has still not dropped

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 25, 2/15/80-2/20/80. Secret. Carter initialed "C" in the upper right-hand corner of the report.

<sup>2</sup> February 17.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 394.

the idea of a De Mel meeting with the President, he did not press the point, and Toussaint suspects his interest in such a meeting will depend on his decision about the Sri Lankan initiative. (Colombo 790,<sup>4</sup> NODIS, PSN 27418) (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Sri Lanka.]

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 790 from Colombo, February 19, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0257, N800003–0530.

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#### 482. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

##### SUBJECT

Sri Lankan Finance Minister's Call on the Secretary

Sri Lankan Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel met with the Secretary February 29 as special envoy of President Jayewardene. Meeting lasted 30 minutes. De Mel was unaccompanied. Howard Schaffer, NEA/INS Director, was notetaker.

De Mel recalled that Jayewardene's government had adopted a pragmatic and practical policy in many areas, including the economy, which had successfully grown as a result. The time had now come for it to be more practical and pragmatic in its foreign policy. It had studied with great care President Carter's State of the Union message, particularly the reference to the US' desire to cooperate with the states of the South Asian region.<sup>2</sup> The GSL had decided to respond positively to the President's invitation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 97, Sri Lanka: Presidential Correspondence: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In his January 21 State of the Union message to Congress, Carter proposed that the United States help South Asian countries "develop a capability to withstand Soviet pressures in a strengthened framework for cooperation in the region. We want to cooperate with all the states of the region in this regard—with India and Pakistan, with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal." Carter noted: "We are also pursuing the possibility of gaining access to military facilities in the region in time of trouble. We are prepared to work closely with our friends in the region, on a cooperative basis, to do whatever is required to ensure that aggressors would bear heavy costs so that further aggression is deterred." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 171–172) See also Document 16.

While Sri Lanka would remain in the non-aligned movement and “basically non-aligned”, it now wished to play a different role in the area. As a small country equally friendly with all regional states, it could play a useful role in working out some form of consultative process among them in the face of Soviet aggression. This would include efforts to improve relations between the South Asian countries, especially between India and Pakistan. President Jayewardene was prepared to take the initiative, de Mel said. The Secretary said he was pleased that Sri Lanka was prepared to play such a catalytic role at this time, and noted that it was particularly well qualified to do so.

De Mel said there was a second, more difficult aspect to the GSL’s new approach. The GSL had made a decision to work in closer association with the US than it had in the past. While the form that the implementation of this decision would take had still to be evolved, he could say that Sri Lanka was prepared to be responsive to the President’s State of the Union message statement (which he quoted) regarding the US “pursuing the possibility of gaining access to military facilities in the region in time of trouble.” He could tell the Secretary in confidence that in the event of open confrontation Sri Lanka would have “only one friend, the United States.” It was prepared to give the US access to naval and other facilities in such an event. (de Mel did not specifically mention US-Soviet open confrontation but from the context of his discussion it is clear that that is what he meant. He later told Schaffer that the Sri Lankan offer specifically included use of the port of Trincomalee.)

De Mel said that it was very important that the offer be kept secret. (Comment: He is dead right. A leak could be very damaging to the Jayewardene government. End Comment.)

The Secretary stated that the Sri Lankan decision was a very important one. He said the President—to whom he would relay it at once—would appreciate it and find it of great significance.

De Mel said that in coming to its decision to change its foreign policy approach the GSL had taken many aspects into consideration. He sought to link the move to take a more active role in the area with the decision to become more closely associated with the US. By seeking to bring about better understanding among the regional countries and encouraging “common thinking”, Sri Lanka could make them more understanding of its policy of closer friendship with the US.

De Mel touched on the Sri Lankan approach to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Noting that Sri Lanka is chairman of the UN *ad hoc* committee, he said the GSL would have to continue to make noises

there.<sup>3</sup> He noted that Jayewardene does not believe that the IOZP concept is a feasible proposition. There must be a balance of power in the Indian Ocean area, and this balance must include the land forces stationed in the region. In this connection, he said that the only way that the Soviet drive toward warm water ports could be dealt with was through counter-balancing naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

The Secretary said that we had hoped three years ago to be able to limit naval forces in the area. It is now necessary for us to maintain an over-the-horizon naval force to balance the Soviets. We had told the Soviets that there was no longer a basis for continued discussion of the reduction of naval forces in the Indian Ocean until circumstances change in that part of the world.<sup>4</sup>

De Mel said that Jayewardene also wished to convey to the President and the Secretary his favorable reaction to the President's State of the Union message statement about the importance of steady growth of US economic assistance to the South Asian countries. He spoke of the difficulties world-wide inflation has caused for Sri Lanka's development plans. Citing Sri Lanka's democratic traditions, human rights record, pragmatic economic programs and stability, he urged that the US do what it can in providing increased assistance to help Sri Lanka meet inflation-induced shortfalls. De Mel gave the Secretary a copy of a letter he had brought from Jayewardene to the President which focused on this.<sup>5</sup> He also urged greater US private investment in Sri Lanka.

De Mel made no specific mention of Jayewardene's plan to call a meeting of regional countries to appeal for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup> He told Schaffer afterwards that if the President

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<sup>3</sup> Sri Lanka chaired the UN Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) Ad Hoc Committee, which promoted demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Also on the committee were representatives from Mozambique, Madagascar, and Indonesia. Telegram 142646 to USUN, May 31, transmitted an interagency-approved scope paper that provided background on the IOZP: "The proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace originated in a 1971 UN resolution sponsored by Sri Lanka. In 1972, an ad hoc committee was set up to prepare the way for implementation of an IOZP, and work has proceeded slowly toward that goal ever since. Until recently, we refused to join the committee because substantively we opposed the concept itself and tactically we saw little danger of the committee's work producing tangible results. Last year, however, this picture changed. The committee finally set a date for an IOZP conference (1981), and its membership was substantially widened to include the Soviet Union and several major maritime users—including many of our NATO allies." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800266–0477)

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on U.S. efforts to promote arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula. U.S.-Soviet discussions on the issue were suspended in February 1978.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 483.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 481.

responded favorably to the message he had passed to the Secretary, the GSL would be prepared to send emissaries to other South Asian states. He did not say what their specific mission would be.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In a March 1 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized his meeting with De Mel and noted: "The decisions taken by Sri Lanka are a major change of position on their part." Carter initialed Vance's memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State): 3/80)

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#### **483. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sri Lanka<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 3, 1980, 1948Z

57199. New Delhi for Ambassador Toussaint. Subject: Jayewardene Letter to President Carter.

Following is text of letter from Sri Lankan President Jayewardene to President Carter. Letter, dated February 22, was hand-carried to Washington by Finance Minister De Mel.<sup>2</sup>

Begin text

Excellency,

It gives me great pleasure to send the Hon'ble Ronnie De Mel, my Minister of Finance and Planning, as my special envoy to you.

Our two countries have a long record of friendship and cooperation based on a shared attachment to democratic ideals and human rights. As you are aware, Sri Lanka is one of the few developing countries which has demonstrated her deep commitment to these ideals. I am sure you also appreciate how difficult it is for a country like Sri Lanka to sustain and nourish these ideals without rapid economic growth and increased prosperity for its people.

It is in this context that my government has embarked on an accelerated programme of economic development within the framework of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800110-0930. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to New Delhi. Drafted by Lee O. Coldren (NEA/INS); cleared in NSC and S/S; approved by Schaffer.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 482.



a liberalised economy. The success of this programme is not only of vital importance to the people of Sri Lanka but is also a test of the applicability and viability of this type of democratic and economic system in a developing country. I therefore look forward to my Minister having an opportunity to explain to you the scope and priorities of our programme of development. I am confident that we will have your understanding and cooperation to find a solution to some of the problems that face Sri Lanka in the implementing of this programme.

May I also take this opportunity to convey to you my sincere appreciation of the assistance the United States has given in the past and gives now to Sri Lanka to maintain and to continue its programmes of development.

Yours sincerely,  
(J.R. Jayewardene)  
End text.

**Christopher**

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**484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sri Lanka<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 3, 1980, 1942Z

88473. Subject: Message to President Jayewardene From President Carter.

1. (C–Entire text)
2. Please pass the following message from President Carter to President Jayewardene. There will be no signed original.
3. When Ambassador Toussaint delivers the message, he should use the occasion to bring to Jayewardene’s attention the material on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0261, D800190–0376, D800168–0654. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in NEA, S/S, and S/S–O; approved by Schaffer.

the Non-Aligned Movement that has been sent out in three recent messages: State 075059,<sup>2</sup> 075464,<sup>3</sup> and 076639.<sup>4</sup>

4. Begin text

His Excellency

Junius Richard Jayewardene

President of the Democratic Socialist

Republic of Sri Lanka

Colombo

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciated your warm letter of February 22,<sup>5</sup> and the message which Finance Minister De Mel conveyed to me through Secretary Vance.<sup>6</sup>

As you stated so eloquently, our two countries have long shared a deep attachment to democracy and the realization of human rights. In fact, the friendship we enjoy has roots that go back many decades. The world would be better able to rise to the growing challenges it confronts if the commitment to democracy and human rights that Sri Lanka has made were more universal and your willingness to embark on pragmatic economic programs more widespread. Sri Lanka's fine record in these areas have a real effect on the level of economic assistance provided by the United States, and we will continue to support your nation's development. I am pleased to tell you that the increase

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 75059 to all diplomatic posts, March 21, the Department provided background information for discussions with host countries' governments regarding comparisons between Communist and Western aid to LDCs: "In 1976-1978, total Communist country economic aid to LDCs accounted for less than four percent of worldwide net aid disbursements. US assistance alone was almost six times larger than all Communist country aid." The Department continued: "Western bilateral aid is offered on far more concessional terms than that given by USSR." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800144-0524)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 75464 to all diplomatic posts, March 21, provided background information on recent U.S. defense policy, including the defense budget, the MX missile, and the deployment of long-range nuclear forces in Europe. In the telegram, the Department noted: "The Soviets (and Cubans) are seeking to portray these decisions as contributing to the growth of international tension and as diverting sizeable sums from economic development. In fact, these decisions were taken against the background of the relentless growth of Moscow's expenditures for military systems across the board." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800145-0435)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 76639 to multiple posts, March 22, the Department discussed the U.S. approach to the NAM, in light of its lack of forceful opposition to the Soviet intervention to Afghanistan: the "Department view that best course for US and allies during Cuban NAM chairmanship is to deal with particular non-aligned countries on specific issues better than with NAM per se." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800147-0330) Cuba chaired the NAM from 1979 to 1983.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 483.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 482.

in our planned development assistance to Sri Lanka in the next fiscal year is the largest percentage increase for any Asian nation. As you will understand, however, the United States is also facing unprecedented inflation, and I have had to ask my countrymen to make real sacrifices. Thus there is not much prospect for any additional increase in planned foreign assistance levels. Ambassador Toussaint will be discussing this subject with your government. I hope that the United States investment mission sent to Sri Lanka under the auspices of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will benefit both our countries and contribute to the success of the liberalized economic policies you have instituted.<sup>7</sup>

Secretary Vance has already told Minister De Mel how much we appreciate the forthright foreign policy position your government intends to take as a result of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

In that connection, I would also like you to know how concerned I am about the direction of the Non-Aligned Movement. It is discouraging that the Cuban chairmanship had made it so difficult for the NAM to express the outrage most of its members feel about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I am particularly troubled by the prospect of the loss of President Tito, who has played such a major role in keeping the movement truly non-aligned. I know how much you contributed to this effort in Havana;<sup>8</sup> it is critical that leaders such as yourself persist. Perhaps you could also bring your personal influence to bear on Mrs. Gandhi and encourage her to keep India's voice one of true non-alignment. Let me also say how very pleased I was by your positive response to my State of the Union message. The new approaches you propose to adopt are significant developments in the effort to maintain and enhance regional security. They reflect your longstanding dedication to world peace and freedom and your commitment to the stability and independence of South Asia. All who share this commitment—and I count myself among them—must be grateful to you.

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram 2521 from Colombo, May 28, the Embassy reported: "Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) investment mission to Sri Lanka May 12–16 was both a success and a disappointment. On the positive side, it demonstrated U.S. interest and support for Sri Lanka's effort to achieve economic development through foreign private direct investment. A joint investment agreement of \$5 million in a ceramics plant (\$4 million from the U.S. divided about equally between equity and loans and \$1 million local capital also equally divided) was concluded, and several other investment actions are under discussion. On the negative side, the mission could have benefitted from stronger membership. GSL attached special importance to mission knowing the size, wealth, advanced technology and central role played by private sector in the highly developed American economy. Mission was one of a series of similar foreign investment missions to come to Sri Lanka over the past 15 months with encouragement and support of Sri Lanka Government and private sector." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800266–0542)

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 2, Document 478.

Sincerely,  
Jimmy Carter  
End text.

Vance

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**485. Telegram From the Embassy in Sri Lanka to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Colombo, April 4, 1980, 1235Z

1637. Subj: GSL Attitudes Toward US Policy and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Ref: State 088475.<sup>2</sup>

1. S-Entire text.

2. Summary: In January, the GSL strongly opposed Soviet invasion and called for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. That policy has not changed but is coupled with careful guarding of non-aligned reputation. GSL's attitude toward U.S. policies has been one of understanding and general agreement but no public support. GSL is unlikely to take initiative but probably prepared encourage and join with other efforts, particularly by any non-aligned states. End summary.

3. In January 3 statement, GSL strongly opposed interference by the Soviet Union or any other country in the internal affairs of non-aligned Afghanistan; supported the sovereign right of Afghans to determine their own destiny; said "outside interference or aggression cannot be condoned under any circumstances;" and called upon the "Soviet Union to withdraw its military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan immediately."<sup>3</sup>

4. This remains GSL policy. The GSL reiterated it in the UNGA debate<sup>4</sup> and took the Indians to task privately for being out of step with other regional and non-aligned countries and for not spearheading effort toward Soviet withdrawal. In February, President Jayewardene,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800169-0829. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 58 from Colombo, January 4, reported Sri Lanka's January 3 statement on the Afghan crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800009-0352)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to the debate during the Sixth Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which took place January 10-14. See footnote 5, Document 413.

disturbed by invasion and frustrated by Indian attitudes, actively considered calling a conference of South and Southeast Asian states to foster a concerted appeal for Soviet withdrawal.<sup>5</sup> He later backed off this idea, probably because soundings made him doubt successful outcome.

5. While understanding of U.S. reaction to Soviet invasion, GSL has not always been supportive, and has carefully guarded non-aligned reputation:

—They agree that pressure is needed but hesitate to join in Olympic boycott without widespread company.

—While greatly interested in the State of the Union offer of cooperation with South Asian states,<sup>6</sup> GSL was quick to state publicly U.S. had not offered security cooperation and that Sri Lankan actions would be in keeping with non-alignment and the concept of Indian Ocean zone of peace.

—GSL is not bothered by increased U.S. military presence in Indian Ocean,<sup>7</sup> President Jayewardene privately welcomes ship visits as reminder of U.S. power to Soviets and India, and GSL is sympathetic to view that IOZP conference<sup>8</sup> must consider land power in Indian Ocean; at same time, concern re non-aligned reputation led Foreign Minister to insist publicly that a) there no change in IOZP policies of GSL and b) first U.S. ship visit after Afghan invasion was strictly routine.

6. We expect no change in GSL policy to Afghanistan and believe Sri Lanka would like to help get Soviets out and mitigate other regional tensions which flow from invasion. However, given (a) Jayewardene focus on economic development; (b) Sri Lankan reluctance to differ sharply with India; (c) resignation to Soviet presence in Afghan among Foreign Ministry professionals and hesitant Foreign Minister, we do not foresee Sri Lankan initiatives. Do believe, however, Sri Lanka prepared encourage and probably join in efforts by other, more venturesome NAM states.

7. The GSL is unlikely to publicly support our policies. Possible initiatives or agreement with our policies always broached in confidence. This pattern is unlikely to change unless there is a more direct threat to Sri Lanka or an imminent, wider conflict.

**Toussaint**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 481.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 482.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 16.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 3, Document 482.